HomeReportsInvestment Climate Statements...Custom Report - 03a881cd4f hide Investment Climate Statements Custom Report Excerpts: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia +167 more Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Sort by Country Sort by Section In this section / Albania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Algeria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Andorra Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Angola Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Argentina Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Armenia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Australia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Austria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Azerbaijan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Bahrain Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Bangladesh Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Barbados Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Belarus 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption Belgium Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Belize Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Benin Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Bolivia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Botswana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Brazil Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices Brunei Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Bulgaria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Burkina Faso Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Burma Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Burundi Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Cabo Verde Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Cambodia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Cameroon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Canada Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Chad Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Chile Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information China Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Colombia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Costa Rica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Croatia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Cyprus Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Czechia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Denmark Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Djibouti Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Dominica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Dominica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Dominican Republic Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Ecuador Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Egypt Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics El Salvador Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Eritrea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Estonia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices Eswatini Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime Ethiopia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Fiji Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Finland Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information France and Monaco Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Gabon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Georgia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Germany Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Ghana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct Greece Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Grenada Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Guatemala Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Guinea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Guyana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Haiti Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Honduras Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Hong Kong Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Hungary Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Iceland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information India Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Indonesia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Iraq Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Ireland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Israel Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Italy Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Jamaica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Japan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Jordan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Kazakhstan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Kenya Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Kosovo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Kuwait Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Kyrgyz Republic Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Laos Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Latvia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Lebanon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices Lesotho Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Liberia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Libya Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Lithuania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for more Information Luxembourg Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Macau Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information: Malawi Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Maldives Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Mali Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices Malta Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Mauritania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights Mauritius Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Mexico Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Micronesia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Moldova Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Mongolia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Montenegro Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for more information Morocco Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Mozambique Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Namibia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Nepal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information New Zealand Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Nicaragua Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Niger Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Nigeria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information North Macedonia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Norway Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Oman Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Pakistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Palau Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Panama Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Papua New Guinea Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Paraguay Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Peru Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Poland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Portugal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Qatar Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Romania Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Rwanda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Saint Kitts and Nevis Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Saint Lucia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Samoa Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Sao Tome and Principe Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Saudi Arabia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Senegal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Serbia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Seychelles Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Sierra Leone Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Singapore Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Slovakia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Slovenia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Somalia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information South Africa Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information South Korea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information South Sudan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Spain Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Sri Lanka Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Sudan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Suriname Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Sweden Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Switzerland and Liechtenstein Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Taiwan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Tajikistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Tanzania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Thailand Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information The Bahamas Executive Summary Title 1. Openness to and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information The Gambia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information The Netherlands Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information The Philippines Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Timor-Leste Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Togo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Trinidad and Tobago Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Tunisia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Turkey Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information: Turkmenistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Uganda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information United Arab Emirates Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information United Kingdom Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies Uruguay Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Uzbekistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Vietnam Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information West Bank and Gaza Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Zambia Executive Summary 1. Openness To and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics 14. Contact for More Information Zimbabwe Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 4. Industrial Policies 5. Protection of Property Rights 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 8. Responsible Business Conduct 9. Corruption 10. Political and Security Environment 11. Labor Policies and Practices 14. Contact for More Information Albania Executive Summary Albania is an upper middle-income country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 16.77 billion (2021 IMF estimate) and a population of approximately 2.9 million people. In 2020, the economy contracted by 4 percent in the height of COVID-19 and in 2021 re-bounded with a growth rate of 8.7 percent. The increase was fueled by construction, easing of pandemic related restrictions, recovery of tourism sector, increase in the real estate sector, record domestic electricity production, and continued budgetary, monetary, and fiscal policy support, including IMF and EU pandemic and earthquake related support. The initial growth projection for 2022 was 4.1 percent, despite uncertainties related to the pandemic, elevated fiscal deficits and public debt, and external and internal inflationary pressures. However, uncertainties due to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, surging energy prices, and inflationary pressures, coupled with limited room for fiscal maneuvering due to high public debt that exceeded 80 percent at the end of 2021, present challenges to the Albanian economy. Albania joined NATO in 2009 and has been a member of WTO since 2000. The country signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 2006, received the status of the EU candidate country in 2014, and began accession negotiations with the EU in July 2022. Albania’s legal framework is in line with international standards in protecting and encouraging foreign investments and does not discriminate against foreign investors. The Law on Foreign Investments of 1993 outlines specific protections for foreign investors and allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in all but a few sectors. The U.S.-Albanian Bilateral Investment Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, ensures that U.S. investors receive national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. Albania and the United States signed a Memorandum of Economic Cooperation in October 2020 with an aim of increasing trade and investment between the two countries. Since the signing multiple U.S. companies have signed agreements for major projects in the country. As a developing country, Albania offers large untapped potential for foreign investments across many sectors including energy, tourism, healthcare, agriculture, oil and mining, and information and communications technology (ICT). In the last decade, Albania has been able to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the UNCTAD data, during 2010-2020, the flow of FDI has averaged USD 1.1 billion and stock FDI at the end of 2020 reached USD 10 billion or triple the amount of 2010. According to preliminary data of the Bank of Albania the FDI flow in 2021 is expected to reach USD 1 billion. Investments are concentrated in extractive industries and processing, real estate, the energy sector, banking and insurance, and information and communication technology. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, and France are the largest sources of FDI. The stock FDI from United States accounts for a small, but rapidly growing share. At the end of Q3 2021, the United States stock FDI in Albania reached USD168 million, up from USD 99 million at the end of 2020, nearly a 70 percent increase. Despite a sound legal framework, foreign investors perceive Albania as a difficult place to do business. They cite endemic corruption, including in the judiciary and public procurements, unfair competition, informal economy, frequent changes of the fiscal legislation, and poor enforcement of contracts as continuing challenges for investment and business in Albania. Reports of corruption in government procurement are commonplace. The continued use of public private partnership (PPP) contracts has reduced opportunities for competition, including by foreign investors, in infrastructure and other sectors. Poor cost-benefit analyses and a lack of technical expertise in drafting and monitoring PPP contracts are ongoing concerns. U.S. investors are challenged by corruption and the perpetuation of informal business practices. Several U.S. investors have faced contentious commercial disputes with both public and private entities, including some that went to international arbitration. In 2019 and 2020, a U.S. company’s attempted investment was allegedly thwarted by several judicial decisions and questionable actions of stakeholders involved in a dispute over the investment. The case is now in international arbitration. Property rights continue to be a challenge in Albania because clear title is difficult to obtain. There have been instances of individuals allegedly manipulating the court system to obtain illegal land titles. Overlapping property titles is a serious and common issue. The compensation process for land confiscated by the former communist regime continues to be cumbersome, inefficient, and inadequate. Nevertheless, parliament passed a law on registering property claims on April 16, 2020, which will provide some relief for title holders. In an attempt to limit opportunities for corruption, the GoA embarked on a comprehensive reform to digitalize all public services. As of March 2021, 1,200 services or 95 percent of all public services to citizens and businesses were available online through the E-Albania Portal . However, Albania continues to score poorly on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2021, Albania declined to 110th out of 180 countries, a fall of six places from 2020. Albania continues to rank low in the Global Innovation Index, ranking 84 out of 132 countries. To address endemic corruption, the GOA passed sweeping constitutional amendments to reform the country’s judicial system and improve the rule of law in 2016. The implementation of judicial reform is underway, heavily supported by the United States and the EU, including the vetting of judges and prosecutors for unexplained wealth. More than half the judges and prosecutors who have undergone vetting have been dismissed for unexplained wealth or ties to organized crime. The EU expects Albania to show progress on prosecuting judges and prosecutors whose vetting revealed possible criminal conduct. The implementation of judicial reform is ongoing, and its completion is expected to improve the investment climate in the country. The Albanian parliament voted overwhelmingly and unopposed to extend this vetting mandate in February 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 84 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2018 $35 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 5,210 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Albanian government leaders have acknowledged that private sector development and increased levels of foreign investment are critical to supporting sustainable economic development. Albania maintains a liberal foreign investment regime designed to attract FDI. The Law on Foreign Investment outlines specific protections for foreign investors and allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies, except in the areas of domestic and international air passenger transport and television broadcasting. Albanian legislation does not distinguish between domestic and foreign investments. The Law on Strategic Investments approved in 2015 offers incentives and fast-track administrative procedures, depending on the size of the investment and number of jobs created, to both foreign and domestic investors who apply before December 31, 2023. The Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA) is the entity responsible for promoting foreign investments in Albania. Potential U.S. investors in Albania should contact AIDA to learn more about services AIDA offers to foreign investors ( http://aida.gov.al/ ). The Law on Strategic Investments stipulates that AIDA, as the Secretariat of the Strategic Investment Council, serves as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, from filing the application form to granting the status of strategic investment/investor. Despite supporting legislation, very few foreign investors have benefited from the “Strategic Investor” status, and almost all projects have been granted to domestic companies operating in the tourism sector. Foreign and domestic investors have equal rights of ownership of local companies, based on the principle of “national treatment.” There are only a few exemptions regarding ownership restrictions: Domestic and international air passenger transport: foreign interest in airline companies is limited to 49 percent ownership by investors outside the Common European Aviation Zone, for both domestic and international air transportation. Audio and audio-visual broadcasting: An entity, foreign or domestic, that has a national audio or audio-visual broadcasting license cannot hold more than 20 percent of shares in another audio or audio-visual broadcasting company. Additional restrictions apply to the regional or local audio and audio-visual licenses. Agriculture: No foreign individual or foreign incorporated company may purchase agricultural land, though land may be leased for up to 99 years. However, if the company registers in Albania, this limitation on agricultural land does not apply. Albania currently lacks an investment-review mechanism for inbound FDI. However, in 2017, the government introduced a new provision in the Petroleum Law, which allows the government to reject a petroleum-sharing agreement or the sale of shares in a petroleum-sharing agreement to any prospective investor due to national security concerns. Albanian law permits private ownership and establishment of enterprises and property. To operate in certain sectors, licenses are required but foreign investors do not require additional permission or authorization beyond that required of domestic investors. Commercial property may be purchased, but only if the proposed investment is worth three times the price of the land. There are no restrictions on the purchase of private residential property. Foreigners can acquire concession rights on natural resources and resources of the common interest, as defined by the Law on Concessions and Public Private Partnerships. Foreign and domestic investors have numerous options available for organizing business operations in Albania. The 2008 Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies and Law Establishing the National Business Center (NBC) allow for the following legal types of business entities to be established through the NBC: sole proprietorship; unlimited partnership; limited partnership; limited liability company; joint stock company; branches and representative offices; and joint ventures. The World Trade Organization (WTO) completed a Trade Policy Review of Albania in May 2016 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp437_e.htm ). In November 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) completed the first Investment Policy Review of South-East European (SEE) countries, including Albania ( http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1884 ). The National Business Center (NBC) serves as a one-stop shop for business registration. All required procedures and documents are published online http://www.qkb.gov.al/information-on-procedure/business-registration/ . Registration may be done in person or online via the e-Albania portal. Many companies choose to complete the registration process in person, as the online portal requires an authentication process and electronic signature and is only available in the Albanian language. When a business registers in the NBC it is also automatically registered with the Tax Office, Labor Inspectorate, Customs, and the respective municipality. According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report, it takes 4.5 days and five procedures to register a business in Albania. Albania neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Albania’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems have improved in recent years, but there are still many serious challenges. Endemic corruption, uneven enforcement of legislation, cumbersome bureaucracy, distortion of competition, and a lack of transparency all hinder the business community. Albanian legislation includes rules on disclosure requirements, formation, maintenance, and alteration of firms’ capitalization structures, mergers and divisions, takeover bids, shareholders’ rights, and corporate governance principles. The Competition Authority ( http://caa.gov.al ) is an independent agency tasked with ensuring fair and efficient competition in the market. However, business groups have raised concerns about unfair competition and monopolies, rating the issue as one of the most concerning items damaging the business climate. The Law on Accounting and Financial Statements includes reporting provisions related to international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for large companies, and national financial reporting standards for small and medium enterprises. Albania meets minimum standards on fiscal transparency, and debt obligations are published by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Albania’s budgets are publicly available, substantially complete, and reliable. In August 2020, Albania approved the law for the establishment of the register of the Ultimate Beneficiary Owners. The law aims to ensure transparency on the ultimate beneficiary owners, who directly and indirectly own more than 25 percent of shares, voting rights, or ownership interests in all entities registered to do business in Albania, and was adopted following the recommendations of MONEYVAL. The rulemaking process in Albania meets the minimum requirements of transparency. Ministries and regulatory agencies develop forward regulatory plans that include changes or proposals intended to be adopted within a set timeframe. The law on notification and public consultation requires the GoA to publish draft laws and regulations for public consultation or notification and sets clear timeframes for these processes. Such draft laws and regulations are published at the following page: http://www.konsultimipublik.gov.al/ . The business community frequently complains that final versions of laws and regulations fail to address their comments and concerns and that comment periods are frequently not respected. The Albania Assembly ( www.parlament.al ) publishes a list of both proposed and adopted legislation. All laws, by-laws, regulations, decisions by the Council of Ministers (the government), decrees, and any other regulatory acts are published at the National Publication Center at the following site: https://qbz.gov.al/ Independent agencies and bodies, including but not limited to, the Energy Regulatory Entity (ERE), Agency for Electronic and Postal Communication (AKEP), Financial Supervising Authority (FSA), Bank of Albania, Competition Authority (CA), National Agency of Natural Resources (NARN), and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), oversee transparency and competition in specific sectors. Albania acceded to the WTO in 2000 and the country notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2006. The EU agreed to open accession talks on March 25, 2020, and the country is awaiting to hold the first Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), which would mark the official opening of accession talks. Albania has long been involved in the gradual process of legislation approximation with the EU acquis. This process is expected to accelerate with the opening of accession negotiations. The Albanian legal system is a civil law system. The Albanian constitution provides for the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, thereby supporting the independence of the judiciary. The Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 1996, governs civil procedures in Albania. The civil court system consists of district courts, appellate courts, and the High Court (the supreme court). The district courts are organized in specialized sections according to the subject of the claim, including civil, family, and commercial disputes. The administrative courts of first instance, the Administrative Court of Appeal, and the Administrative College of the High Court adjudicate administrative disputes. The Constitutional Court, reviews cases related to the constitutionality of legislation and, in limited instances, protects and enforces the constitutional rights of citizens and legal entities. Parties may appeal the judgment of the first-instance courts within 15 days of a decision, while appellate court judgments must be appealed to the High Court within 30 days. A lawsuit against an administrative action is submitted to the administrative court within 45 days from notification and the law stipulates short procedural timeframes, enabling faster adjudication of administrative disputes. Investors in Albania are entitled to judicial protection of legal rights related to their investments. Foreign investors have the right to submit disputes to an Albanian court. In addition, parties to a dispute may agree to arbitration. Many foreign investors complain that endemic judicial corruption and inefficient court procedures undermine judicial protection in Albania and seek international arbitration to resolve disputes. It is beneficial to U.S. investors to include binding international arbitration clauses in any agreements with Albanian counterparts. Albania is a signatory to the New York Arbitration Convention and foreign arbitration awards are typically recognized by Albania. However, the government initially refused to recognize an injunction from a foreign arbitration court in one high-profile case in 2016. The Albanian Civil Procedure Code outlines provisions regarding domestic and international commercial arbitration. Albania does not have a specific commercial code but has a series of relevant commercial laws, including the Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies Law, Bankruptcy Law, Public Private Partnership and Concession Law, Competition Law, Foreign Investment Law, Environmental Law, Law on Corporate and Municipal Bonds, Transport Law, Maritime Code, Secured Transactions Law, Employment Law, Taxation Procedures Law, Banking Law, Insurance and Reinsurance Law, Concessions Law, Mining Law, Energy Law, Water Resources Law, Waste Management Law, Excise Law, Oil and Gas Law, Gambling Law, Telecommunications Law, and Value-Added Law. There is no one-stop-shop that lists all legislation, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. However, foreign investors should visit the Albania Investment Development Agency webpage ( www.aida.gov.al ), which offers broad information for foreign investors. Major laws pertaining to foreign investments include: Law on Foreign Investments Law on Strategic Investments: Defines procedures and rules to be observed by government authorities when reviewing, approving, and supporting strategic domestic and foreign investments in Albania Law on Foreigners Law on Concessions and Public Private Partnerships: Establishes the framework for promoting and facilitating the implementation of privately financed concessionary projects Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies: Outlines general guidelines on the activities of companies and the legal structure under which they may operate Law on Cross-Border Mergers: Determines rules on mergers when one of the companies involved in the process is a foreign company Law on Protection of Competition: Stipulates provisions for the protection of competition, and the concentration of commercial companies; and Law on Collective Investment Undertakings: Regulates conditions and criteria for the establishment, constitution, and operation of collective investment undertakings and of management companies. The Law on Foreign Investments seeks to create a hospitable legal climate for foreign investors and stipulates the following: No prior government authorization is needed for an initial investment. Foreign investments may not be expropriated or nationalized directly or indirectly, except for designated special cases, in the interest of public use and as defined by law. Foreign investors enjoy the right to expatriate all funds and contributions in kind from their investments. Foreign investors receive most favored nation treatment according to international agreements and Albanian law. There are limited exceptions to this liberal investment regime, most of which apply to the purchase of real estate. Agricultural land cannot be purchased by foreigners and foreign entities but may be leased for up to 99 years. Investors can buy agricultural land if registered as a commercial entity in Albania. Commercial property may be purchased, but only if the proposed investment is worth three times the price of the land. There are no restrictions on the purchase of private residential property. To boost investments in strategic sectors, the government approved a new law on strategic investments in May 2015. Under the new law, a “strategic investment” may benefit from either “assisted procedure” or “special procedure” assistance from the government to help navigate the permitting and regulatory process. Despite supporting legislation, very few foreign investors have benefited from the “Strategic Investor” status, and almost all projects have been granted to domestic companies operating in the tourism sector. Authorities responsible for mergers, change of control, and transfer of shares include the Albanian Competition Authority ACA: http://www.caa.gov.al/laws/list/category/1/page/1 , which monitors the implementation of the competition law and approves mergers and acquisitions when required by the law; and the Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority FSA: http://www.amf.gov.al/ligje.asp , which regulates and supervises the securities market and approves the transfer of shares and change of control of companies operating in this sector. Albania’s tax system does not distinguish between foreign and domestic investors. Informality in the economy, which may be as large as 40 percent of the total economy, presents challenges for tax administration. Visa requirements to obtain residence or work permits are straightforward and do not pose an undue burden on potential investors. Generally, U.S. passport holders are entitled to a one year stay in Albania without a residence permit, a special provision the GoA reaffirmed in March 2022. The government approved a new Law on Foreigners in July 2021, which partially aligns the domestic legislation, including that on migration, with the EU Directives. The new law introduces a single application procedure for permits in general. For investors there is a special permit called “Unique Investor Permit.” Foreign investors are issued a 2-year unique investor permit if they invest in Albania and meet certain criteria, including a quota ratio of one to five, of foreign and Albanian workers. In addition, same ratio should be preserved in the Board of Directors and other leading and supervisory structures of the company. Salaries of the Albanian workers should match the average of last year for equivalent positions. The permit can be renewed for an additional three years and after that the investor is eligible to receive a permanent permit provided that they fulfil the criteria outlined above and prove that the company is properly registers, has paid taxes and is not incurring losses. The Council of Ministers approves the annual quota of foreign workers following a needs assessment by sector and profession. However, work permits for staff that occupy key positions, among other categories, can be issued outside the annual quota. Foreign investors can obtain the single permit by the immigration authorities following the initial approval for employment from the National Agency for Employment and Skills https://www.akpa.gov.al/ . U.S. citizens along with EU, Western Balkans, and Schengen-country citizens are exempt from this requirement. In addition, U.S., EU, and Kosovo citizens when applying for residency permit for the first time, have a term of 5 years. The new law also introduced the National Electronic Register for Foreigners (NERF), which is a state database on foreigners, who enter or intend to enter Albania, with purpose of staying, transiting, working, or studying in Albania. NERF will register data on foreign nationals, who have an entry visa, stay, or transit in the Republic of Albania, have a temporary or permanent residence permit, and have a have a unique permit (residence and employment) in Albania. The Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies sets guidelines on the activities of companies and the legal structure under which they may operate. The government adopted the law in 2008 to conform Albanian legislation to the EU’s Acquis Communitaire. The most common type of organization for foreign investors is a limited liability company. The Law on Public Private Partnerships and Concessions establishes the framework for promoting and facilitating the implementation of privately financed concessionary projects. According to the law, concession projects may be identified by central or local governments or through third party unsolicited proposals. To limit opportunities for corruption, the 2019 amendments prohibited unsolicited bids, beginning in July 2019, on all sectors except for works or services in ports, airports, generation and distribution of electricity, energy for heating, and production and distribution of natural gas. In addition, the 2019 amendments removed the zero to 10 percent bonus points for unsolicited proposals, which gave companies submitting unsolicited bids a competitive advantage over other contenders. Instead, if the party submitting the unsolicited proposal does not win the bid, it will be compensated by the winning company for the cost of the feasibility study, which in no case shall exceed 1 percent of the total cost of the project. The Albanian Competition Authority http://www.caa.gov.al/?lng=en is the agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. The Law on Protection of Competition governs incoming foreign investment whether through mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, or green-field investments, irrespective of industry or sector. In the case of share transfers in insurance, banking and non-banking financial industries, the Financial Supervisory Authority ( http://amf.gov.al/ ) and the Bank of Albania https://www.bankofalbania.org/ may require additional regulatory approvals. Transactions between parties outside Albania, including foreign-to-foreign transactions, are covered by the competition law, which states that its provisions apply to all activities, domestic or foreign, that directly or indirectly affect the Albanian market. Parties can appeal the decision of the CA to the Tirana First Instance Court within 30 days of receiving the notification. The appeal does not suspend the enforcement of the decision that authorize concentrations and the temporary measures. The Albanian constitution guarantees the right of private property. According to Article 41, expropriation or limitation on the exercise of a property right can occur only if it serves the public interest and with fair compensation. During the post-communist period, expropriation has been limited to land for public interest, mainly infrastructure projects such as roads, energy infrastructure, water works, airports, and other facilities. Compensation has generally been reported as being below market value and owners have complained that the compensation process is slow, and unfair. Civil courts are responsible for resolving such complaints. Changes in government can also affect foreign investments. Following the 2013 elections and peaceful transition of power, the new government revoked, or renegotiated numerous concession agreements, licenses, and contracts signed by the previous government with both domestic and international investors. This practice has occurred in other years as well. There are many ongoing disputes regarding property confiscated during the communist regime. Identifying ownership is a longstanding problem in Albania that makes restitution for expropriated properties difficult. The restitution and compensation process started in 1993 but has been slow and marred by corruption. Many U.S. citizens of Albanian origin have been in engaged in long-running restitution disputes. Court cases go on for years without a final decision, causing many to refer their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, France. A significant number of applications are pending for consideration before the ECHR. Even after settlement in Strasbourg, enforcement remains slow. To address the situation, the GOA approved new property compensation legislation in 2018 that aims to resolve pending claims for restitution and compensation. The 2018 law reduces the burden on the state budget by changing the cash compensation formula. The legislation presents three methods of compensation for confiscation claims: restitution; compensation of property with similarly valued land in a different location; or financial compensation. It also set a ten-year timeframe for completion of the process. In February 2020, the Albanian parliament approved a law “On the Finalization of the Transitory Process of Property Deeds in the Republic of Albania,” which aims to finalize land allocation and privatization processes contained in 14 various laws issued between 1991 and 2018. The GOA has generally not engaged in expropriation actions against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. There have been limited cases in which the government has revoked licenses, specifically in the mining and energy sectors, based on contract violation claims. The Law on Strategic Investments, approved in 2015, empowers the government to expropriate private property for the development of private projects deemed special strategic projects. Despite the provision that the government would act when parties fail to reach an agreement, the clause is a source of controversy because it entitles the government to expropriate private property in the interest of another private party. The expropriation procedures are consistent with the law on the expropriation, and the cost for expropriation would be incurred by the strategic investor. The provision has yet to be exercised. Albania maintains adequate bankruptcy legislation, though corrupt and inefficient bankruptcy court proceedings make it difficult for companies to reorganize or discharge debts through bankruptcy. A 2016 law on bankruptcy aimed to close loopholes in the insolvency regime, decrease unnecessary market exit procedures, reduce fraud, and ease collateral recovery procedures. The Bankruptcy Law governs the reorganization or liquidation of insolvent businesses. It sets out non-discriminatory and mandatory rules for the repayment of the obligations by a debtor in a bankruptcy procedure. The law establishes statutory time limits for insolvency procedures, professional qualifications for insolvency administrators, and an Agency of Insolvency Supervision to regulate the profession of insolvency administrators. Debtors and creditors can initiate a bankruptcy procedure and can file for either liquidation or reorganization. Bankruptcy proceedings may be invoked when the debtor is unable to pay the obligations at the maturity date or the value of its liabilities exceeds the value of the assets. According to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings suspends the enforcement of claims by all creditors against the debtor subject to bankruptcy. Creditors of all categories must submit their claims to the bankruptcy administrator. The Bankruptcy Law provides specific treatment for different categories, including secured creditors, preferred creditors, unsecured creditors, and final creditors whose claims would be paid after all other creditors were satisfied. The claims of the secured creditors are to be satisfied by the assets of the debtor, which secure such claims under security agreements. The claims of the unsecured creditors are to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, excluding the assets used for payment of the secured creditors, following the priority ranking as outlined in the Albanian Civil Code. Pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, creditors have the right to establish a creditors committee. The creditors committee is appointed by the Commercial Section Courts before the first meeting of the creditor assembly. The creditors committee represents the secured creditors, preferred creditors, and the unsecured creditors. The committee has the right (a) to support and supervise the activities of the insolvency administrator; (b) to request and receive information about the insolvency proceedings; (c) to inspect the books and records; and (d) to order an examination of the revenues and cash balances. If the creditors and administrator agree that reorganization is the company’s best option, the bankruptcy administrator prepares a reorganization plan and submits it to the court for authorizing implementation. According to the insolvency procedures, only creditors whose rights are affected by the proposed reorganization plan enjoy the right to vote, and the dissenting creditors in reorganization receive at least as much as what they would have obtained in a liquidation. Creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the reorganization plan and each class votes separately. Creditors of the same class are treated equally. The insolvency framework allows for the continuation of contracts supplying essential goods and services to the debtor, the rejection by the debtor of overly burdensome contracts, the avoidance of preferential or undervalued transactions, and the possibility of the debtor obtaining credit after commencement of insolvency proceedings. No priority is assigned to post-commencement over secured creditors. Post-commencement credit is assigned over ordinary unsecured creditors. The creditor has the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims and to request information from the insolvency representative. The selection and appointment of insolvency representative does not require the approval of the creditor. In addition, the sale of substantial assets of the debtor does not require the approval of the creditor. According to the law on bankruptcy, foreign creditors have the same rights as domestic creditors with respect to the commencement of, and participation in, a bankruptcy proceeding. The claim is valued as of the date the insolvency proceeding is opened. Claims expressed in foreign currency are converted into Albanian currency according to the official exchange rate applicable to the place of payment at the time of the opening of the proceeding. The Albanian Criminal Code contains several criminal offenses in bankruptcy, including (i) whether the bankruptcy was provoked intentionally; (ii) concealment of bankruptcy status; (iii) concealment of assets after bankruptcy; and (iv) failure to comply with the obligations arising under bankruptcy proceeding. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Albania ranked 39th out of 190 countries in the insolvency index. A referenced analysis of resolving insolvency can be found at the following link: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/255991574747242507/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Albania 4. Industrial Policies The Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA; www.aida.gov.al) is the best source to find incentives offered across a variety of sectors. Aside from the incentives listed below, individual parties may negotiate additional incentives directly with AIDA, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, or other ministries, depending on the sector. To boost investments in strategic sectors, the GoA approved a Law on Strategic Investments in May 2015 that outlines the criteria, rules, and procedures that state authorities employ when approving a strategic investment. The GoA has extended the deadline to apply to qualify as a strategic investment to December 2023. A strategic investment is defined as an investment of public interest based on several criteria, including the size of the investment, implementation time, productivity and value added, creation of jobs, sectoral economic priorities, and regional and local economic development. The law does not discriminate between foreign and domestic investors. The following sectors are defined as strategic sectors: mining and energy, transport, electronic communication infrastructure, urban waste industry, tourism, agriculture (large farms) and fishing, economic zones, and development priority areas. Investments in strategic sectors may obtain assisted procedure and special procedure, based on the level of investment, which varies from EUR one million to EUR 100 million, depending on the sector and other criteria stipulated in the law. In the assisted procedure, public administration agencies coordinate, assist, and supervise the entire administrative process for investment approval and makes state-owned property needed for the investment available to the investor. Under the special procedure, the investor also enjoys state support for the expropriation of private property and the ratification of the contract by parliament. The law and bylaws that entered into force on January 1, 2016, established the Strategic Investments Committee (SIC), a commission in charge of approving strategic investments. The Committee is headed by the prime minister and members include ministers covering the respective strategic sectors, the state advocate, and relevant ministers whose portfolios are affected by the strategic investment. AIDA serves as the Secretariat of SIC and oversees providing administrative support to investors. The SIC grants the status of assisted procedure and special procedure for strategic investments and investors based on the size of investments and other criteria defined in the law. Major Incentives Albania Offers: Energy and Mining, Transport, Electronic Communication Infrastructure, and Urban Waste Industry: Investments greater than EUR 30 million enjoy the status of assisted procedure, while investments of EUR 50 million or more enjoy special procedure status. The government offers power purchasing agreements (PPA) for 15 years for electricity produced from hydroelectric plants with an installed capacity of less than 15 megawatts. The government also offers feed-in-premium tariff for solar installations with installed capacity of less than two megawatts and for wind installation of less than three megawatts. Exemption from custom duties and VAT is available for the manufacturing or the mounting of solar panel systems for hot water production. Certain machinery and equipment imported for the construction of hydropower plants are VAT exempt. The government supports the construction of small wind and photovoltaic parks with an installed capacity of less than three megawatts and two megawatts, respectively, by offering feed-in-premium tariffs for 15 years. The Energy Regulatory Authority (ERE; http://www.ere.gov.al/ ) conducts an annual review of the feed-in-premium tariffs for wind and photovoltaic parks. The ERE also conducts an annual review of the feed-in-tariffs for small hydroelectric plants with an installed capacity of less than 15 megawatts. Imports of machinery and equipment for investments of greater than EUR 400,000 for small wind and solar parks with an installed capacity of less than three megawatts and two megawatts, respectively, enjoy a VAT exemption. Imports of hot water solar panels for household and industrial use are also VAT exempt. Tourism and Agritourism: Investments of five million euro or more enjoy the status of assisted procedure, while investments greater than EUR 50 million enjoy the status of special procedure. In 2018, the GoA introduced new incentives to promote the tourism sector. International hotel brands that invest at least USD 8 million for a four-star hotel and USD 15 million for a five-star hotel are exempt from property taxes for 10 years, pay no profit taxes, and pay a VAT of 6 percent for any service on their hotels or resorts. For all other hotels and resorts, the GoA reduced the VAT on accommodation from 20 percent to 6 percent. Profit taxes for agritourism ventures were reduced to 5 percent from 15 percent previously, while VAT for accommodation is now 6 percent, down from 20 percent. Five star hotels and agritourism facilities are exempt from the tax on impact on infrastructure while both four and five start hotels are exempt from tax on buildings. Agriculture (Large Agricultural Farms) and Fishing: Investments greater than EUR three million that create at least 50 new jobs enjoy the status of assisted procedure, while investments greater than EUR 50 million enjoy the status of special procedure. In addition, the GoA offers a wide range of incentives and subsidies for investments in the agriculture sector. The funds are a direct contribution from the state budget and the EU Instrument of Pre-Accession for Rural Development Fund (IPARD.) IPARD funds allocated for the period 2018-2020 totaled EUR 71 million. The program is managed by the Agricultural and Rural Development Agency ( http://azhbr.gov.al/ ). Agricultural inputs, agricultural machinery, and veterinary services are exempt from VAT. The government offers other subsidies to agricultural farms and wholesale trade companies that export agricultural products. Some incentives offered in the agriculture sector include: Zero VAT for agricultural machineries and for 27 fishing industry items including ships, nets, electronic equipment, refrigerators, ship engines, etc. Zero tariff for the registration and compulsory vaccination of livestock. Zero tax for the purchase of diesel from fishing vessels (0 excise, 0 fuel tax, 0 carbon tax.) A reduction of profit tax up to 5 percent for Agricultural Cooperative Societies and 10 percent VAT for supply of agricultural inputs including chemical fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and seedlings. In addition, those investing in agriculture sector can rent agriculture land from 10 to 99 years. Development Priority Areas: Investments greater than EUR one million that create at least 150 new jobs enjoy the status of assisted procedure. Investments greater than EUR 10 million that create at least 600 new jobs enjoy the status of special procedure. Foreign Tax Credit: Albania applies foreign tax credit rights even in cases where no double taxation treaty exists with the country in which the tax is paid. If a double taxation treaty is in force, double taxation is avoided either through an exemption or by granting tax credits up to the amount of the applicable Albanian corporate income tax rate (currently 15 percent). In 2019, the GoA reduced the dividend tax from 15 percent to 8 percent. Corporate Income Tax Exemption: Film studios and cinematographic productions, licensed and funded by the National Cinematographic Center, are exempt from corporate income tax. Loss Carry Forward for Corporate Income Tax Purposes: Fiscal losses can be carried forward for three consecutive years (the first losses are used first). However, the losses may not be carried forward if more than 50 percent of direct or indirect ownership of the share capital or voting rights of the taxpayer is transferred (changed) during the tax year. Lease of Public Property: The GoA can lease public property of more than 500 square meters or grant a concession for the symbolic price of one euro if the properties will be used for manufacturing activities with an investment exceeding EUR 10 million, or for inward processing activities. The GoA can also lease public property or grant a concession for the symbolic price of one euro for investments of more than EUR two million for activities that address certain social and economic issues, as well as activities related to sports, culture, tourism, and cultural heritage. Criteria and terms are decided on an individual basis by the Council of Ministers. Incentives for the Manufacturing Sector and ICT: The GoA reduced the profit tax from 15 percent to 5 percent for software development companies and the automotive industry. Manufacturing activities are exempt from 20 percent VAT on imports of machinery and equipment. The government offers a one-euro symbolic rent for government-owned property (land and buildings) for investments exceeding USD 2.7 million that create a minimum of 50 jobs. No VAT is charged for products processed for re-exports. Employers are exempt from paying social security tax for one year for all new employees. The GoA pays the first four months of salaries for new employees and offers various financing incentives for job training. The manufacturing sector obtains VAT refunds immediately in the case of zero risk exporters, within 30 days if the taxpayer is an exporter, and within 60 days in the case of other taxpayers. Apparel and footwear producers are exempt from 20 percent VAT on raw materials if the finished product is exported. In 2011, the GoA also removed customs tariffs for imported apparel and raw materials in the textile and shoe industries (e.g., leather used for clothes, cotton, viscose, velvet, sewing accessories, and similar items). Technological and Development Areas (TEDA): The Law on Economic Development Areas provides fiscal and administrative incentives for companies that invest in this sector and for firms that establish a presence in these areas. Major incentives include: Developers and users benefit from a 50 percent deduction of profit tax for five years, exemption from the infrastructure impact tax, and exemption from real estate tax for five years. A full list of incentives can be found at: TEDA (aida.gov.al) Albania has no functional duty-free import zones or free trade zones, although legislation exists for their creation. The May 2015 amendments to the Law on the Establishment and Operation of Technological and Development Areas (TEDAs) created the legal framework to establish TEDAs, defining the incentives for developers investing in the development of these zones and companies operating within the zones. The Albanian government has granted the status of the Technological and Development Areas to TEDA Spitalle (49.1 ha), Koplik (61 ha) and Kashar (35 ha) (Tirana) but none has been developed to date. There are no performance requirements for foreign investors or minimum requirements for domestic content in goods or technology. Investment incentives are equally available to foreign and domestic investors. Investments in certain sectors require a license or authorization and procedures are similar for foreign and domestic investors. Visa, residence, and work permit requirements are straightforward and generally do not pose an undue burden on potential investors. The government approved a new Law on Foreigners in June 2021, which partially aligns the domestic legislation, including that on migration, with the EU Directives. The new law introduces a single application procedure for permits. For investors there is a special permit called “Unique Investor Permit.” Foreign investors are issued a 2-year unique investor permit if they invest in Albania and meet certain criteria, including a quota ratio of one to five of foreign and Albanian workers. In addition, same ratio should be preserved in the Board of Directors and other leading and supervisory structures of the company. Salaries of the Albanian workers should match the average of last year for equivalent positions. The permit can be renewed for an additional three years and after that the investor is eligible to receive a permanent permit provided that they fulfil the criteria outlined above and prove that the company is properly registered, has paid taxes and is not incurring losses. The U.S. citizens when applying for the first time receives a five-year permit. Foreign investors can obtain the single permit by the immigration authorities following the initial approval for employment from the National Agency for Employment and Skills ( https://www.akpa.gov.al/https://www.akpa.gov.al/ .) U.S. citizens along with EU, Western Balkans, and Schengen-country citizens are exempt from this requirement. In addition, U.S., EU, and Kosovo citizens when applying for residency permit for the first time, have a term of 5 years. The new law also introduced the National Electronic Register for Foreigners (NERF), which is a state database on foreigners, who enter or intend to enter Albania, with purpose of staying, transiting, working, or studying in Albania. NERF will register data on foreign nationals, who have an entry visa, stay, or transit in the Republic of Albania, have a temporary or permanent residence permit, and have a have a unique permit (residence and employment) in Albania. The Council of Ministers approved an annual quota of foreign workers following a needs assessment by sector and profession. However, work permits for staff that occupy key positions, among other categories, can be issued outside the annual quota. Albanian legislation regulating the functioning of the National Agency of Information (AKSHI) requires that every company contracted by the government to develop a computer system provide the source code and all related technical documents of the system. In addition, every government system and its data must be hosted at the government datacenter maintained by AKSHI. There are no legal restrictions to transferring business-related data abroad, except for a few cases that need prior consent. There are more stringent requirements for personal data. Albania has comprehensive legislation for the protection of personal data: the Law on the Protection of Personal Data, including by-laws, as well as the 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and the Additional Protocol to the Convention regarding Supervisory Authorities and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data, ratified by Albania in 2004. The authority in charge of the protection of personal data is the Information and Data Protection Commissioner https://www.idp.al/?lang=en . Based on Albanian legislation, international transfers of personal data in countries deemed to have an adequate level of protection are not restricted. However, companies must notify the Commissioner in advance of any processing of personal data and any intention to transfer data to third countries. This applies to companies in foreign jurisdictions that operate in Albania using any means located within the country. To transfer data to third countries that do not have an adequate protection level, companies need prior authorization from the Commissioner. There are exemptions to this policy for certain data categories defined by the Commissioner as well as when certain conditions are met. Countries with an adequate protection level include EU member states, European Economic Area countries, members of the 1981 Convention and related protocol, and all countries approved by the European Commission. Many foreign companies operating in Albania that process sensitive data opt to keep their data in Albania. 5. Protection of Property Rights Individuals and investors face significant challenges with protection and enforcement of property rights. Despite some improvements, procedures remain cumbersome, and registrants have complained of corruption during the process. Over the last three decades, the GoA has drafted and passed much, though not all, of its property legislation in a piecemeal and uncoordinated way. However, the GoA is working to complete the process for registration and compensation of properties, and the law on the finalization of transitional ownership processes adopted in March 2020, specifically aims to consolidate property rights by finalizing land allocation and privatization processes contained in 14 various laws issued between 1991 and 2018. According to the European Commission Report 2021 on Albania, progress on property rights should be made on further first registration of properties and transitional ownership processes, in a transparent and inclusive manner. The GoA aims to fully digitize property documents within 2023, however, the poor state of the data is a risk for title security and a constraint to investment. To streamline the property management process, the GoA established in April 2019 the State Cadaster Agency (ASHK), which merged different agencies responsible for property registration, compensation, and legalization, including the Immovable Property Registration Office (IPRO), the Agency of Inventory and Transfer of Public Properties (AITPP), and the Agency for the Legalization and Urbanization of Informal Areas (ALUIZNI). The property registration system has improved thanks to international donor assistance, but the process has moved forward very slowly as Albania has yet to complete the initial registration of property titles in the country. In total, about 3.54 million properties were registered as part of the initial registration process. In December 2021, GoA launched a two-year project which aims to complete the digitization of the about 2.3 million remaining properties however plot records for many of these properties are still only in paper form and often in poor and outdated condition. Approximately half a million properties have still not been registered for the first time, which includes the southern coastal area. In 2020, the State Cadaster Agency initiated the process of first registration for eight zones in the Himara municipality area that holds significant potential for the tourism industry. The Agency for the Treatment of Property (ATP) continued assessing requests and distributing funds for compensation of properties. In 2021, it distributed around USD 9.5 million from the financial fund and an area of around 100 hectares from the land fund. Albania has registered an estimated 440,000 illegal structures, built without permits, and illicit construction continues to be a major impediment to securing property titles. A process that aims to legalize or eliminate such structures started in 2006 but is not complete. Around 200,000 legalization permits were issued through the end of 2020. The fluid situation has led to clashes between squatters, owners of allegedly illegal buildings, and the Albanian State Police including during the demolition of these structures to make way for public infrastructure projects. According to the 2020 World Bank’s “Doing Business Report,” Albania performed poorly in the property registration category, ranking 98th out of 190 countries. It took an average of 19 days and five procedures to register property, and the associated costs could reach 8.9 percent of the total property value. The civil court system manages property rights disputes, but verdicts can take years, authorities often fail to enforce court decisions, and corruption concerns persist within the judiciary. Albania is not included on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. That said, intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement and theft are common due to weak legal structures and poor enforcement. Counterfeit goods are present in some local markets and shopping malls, including software, garments, machines, and cigarettes. Albanian law protects copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical indications, but enforcement of these laws remains weak. Regulators are ineffective at collecting fines and prosecutors rarely press charges for IPR theft. U.S. companies should consult an experienced IPR attorney and avoid potential risks by establishing solid commercial relationships and drafting strong contracts. According to the 2021 International Property Right Index published by Property Right Alliance, Albania ranks 98th out of 129 countries evaluated, registering an improvement compared to the previous year when ranked 112th. It ranked 79th in the subcategory of copyright protection and 23rd in trademark protection. Amendments to the Albanian Industrial Property Law, introducing new provisions regarding trade secrets and trademarks entered into force in August 2021. The most significant change is the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. Trade secrets were previously regulated by the Law on Entrepreneurs and Companies, and Labor Code, and their subject matter was defined in broader terms. Now, under the amended IP law, a trade secret is defined as undisclosed expert knowledge, experience or business information that is not generally known or easily accessible, that has a certain market value, and for which sufficient measures have been taken to keep it a secret. In 2019, the Criminal Code was amended to include harsher punishments of up to three years in prison for IPR infringement. In the areas of copyright, patent, and trademarks, the two main bodies responsible are the Copyright Directorate at the Ministry of Culture and the General Directorate of Industrial Property (GDIP), which is in charge of registering, administering, and promoting IPR. Other institutions responsible for IPR enforcement include the Copyright Division of the State Inspectorate for Market Surveillance (SIMS), the Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA), the General Directorate for Customs, the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor’s Office, the State Police, and the courts. In 2018, the National Council of Copyrights was established as a specialized body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the law and certifying the methodology for establishing the tariffs. Two other important bodies in the protection and administration of IPR are the agencies for the Collective Administration (AAK) and the Copyrights Department within the Ministry of Culture. Four different AAKs have merged in 2017 to provide service into a sole window for the administration of IPR. The 2021 amendments to the IP law also define the role and duties of the State Inspectorate for Market Surveillance (SIMS), the main responsibility of which is to ensure the safety of non-food consumer products by instigating internal market inspections. The SIMS, established in 2016, is responsible for inspecting, controlling, and enforcing copyright and other related rights. Despite some improvements, actual law enforcement on copyrights continues to be problematic and copyright violations are persistent. The number of copyright violation cases brought to court remains low. While official figures are not available this year, Customs does usually report the quantity of counterfeit goods destroyed annually. In cases of seizures, the rights holder has the burden of proof and so must first inspect the goods to determine if they are infringing. The rights holder is also responsible for the storage and destruction of the counterfeit goods. Cigarettes are traditionally the most common counterfeited product seized by Customs. According to the EU 2021 report on Albania, the high number of counterfeit products in the country remains a cause for concern. Last year the customs administration suspended the release of more than 23,000 products suspected of infringing IPR. The GDIP is responsible for registering and administering patents, commercial trademarks and service marks, industrial designs, and geographical indications. In 2020, the number of applications for registration of trademarks continued to rise, amounting to 1,164 national applications and 2,936 international applications. As for patents, 897 patent applications were filed at the GDIP in 2020, of which 12 were national patent applications with Albanian national applicants, and 885 patent applications were patents issued by the European Patent Office seeking protection in Albania. Albania is party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Law Treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and is a member of the European Patent Organization. The government became party to the London Agreement on the Implementation of Article 65 of the European Convention for Patents in 2013. In 2018, Parliament approved the Law 34/2018 on Albania’s adherence to the Vienna Agreement for the International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks as well as the agreements of Lisbon and Locarno on international classification and protection of industrial designs. In June 2019, Albania joined the Geneva Act of WIPO’s Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Resources for Rights Holders Contact at Embassy Tirana on IPR issues: E-mail: USALBusiness@state.gov Country resources: American Chamber of Commerce Address: Rr. Deshmoret e shkurtit, Sky Tower, kati 11 Ap 3 Tirana, Albania Email: info@amcham.com.al Phone: +355 (0) 4225 9779 Fax: +355 (0) 4223 5350 (amcham.com.al) List of local lawyers: tirana.usembassy.gov 6. Financial Sector The government has adopted policies to promote the free flow of financial resources and foreign investment in Albania. The Law on “Strategic Investments” is based on the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and protection of foreign investments. Foreign investors have the right to expatriate all funds and contributions of their investment. In accordance with IMF Article VIII, the government and Central Bank do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Despite Albania’s shallow foreign exchange market, banks enjoy enough liquidity to support sizeable positions. Portfolio investments continue to be a challenge because they remain limited mostly to company shares, government bonds, and real estate as the Tirana stock market remains non-operational In recent years, the constant reduction of non-performing loans has allowed commercial banks to loosen lending standards and increase overall lending especially as the economy has recovering from the severe COVID-19 economic disruption in 2020. Non-performing loans (NPL) at the end of 2021 dropped to 5.65 percent compared to 8.1 percent one year ago. Overall lending has steadily increased since 2019 and at the end of 2021 reached about USD 6 billion marking a 10 percent increase compared to 2020. The credit market is competitive, but interest rates in domestic currency can be high. Most mortgage and commercial loans are denominated in euros because rate differentials between local and foreign currency average 1.5 percent. Commercial banks operating in Albania have improved the quality and quantity of services they provide, including a large variety of credit instruments, traditional lines of credit, and bank drafts, etc. In the absence of an effective stock market, the country’s banking sector is the main channel for business financing. The sector is sound, profitable, and well capitalized. The Bank of Albania, the country’s Central Bank, is responsible for the licensing and supervision of the banking sector in Albania. The banking sector is 100 percent privately owned and its total assets have steadily increased over the years reaching USD 17 billion at the end of 2021 mostly based on customers deposits. The banking sector has continued the consolidation process as the number of banks decreased from 16 in 2018 to 11 at the end of 2021 when the Greek Alpha Bank was purchased by OTP Bank. As of December 2021, the Turkish National Commercial Bank (BKT) was the largest bank in the market with 26 percent market share, followed by Albanian Credins Bank with 15.8 percent, and Austrian Raiffeisen Bank third with 15.3 percent. The American Investment Bank is the only bank with U.S. shareholders and ranks sixth with 5.5 percent percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The number of bank outlets has also decreased over the recent years also due to the consolidation. In December 2021, Albania had 417 bank outlets, down from 446 from 2019 and the peak of 552 in 2016. Capital adequacy, at 18 percent in December 2021, remains above Basel requirements and indicates sufficient assets. At the end of 2021, the return on assets increased to 1.42 percent compared to 1.2 percent one year ago. As part of its strategy to stimulate business activity, the Bank of Albania has adopted a plan to ease monetary policy by continuing to persistently keep low interest rates. However, due to the recent inflationary pressure in March 2021, Bank of Albania increased the base interest rate to 1 percent, up from a historical low rate of 0.5 percent which was in place since June 2018. Many of the banks operating in Albania are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Only three banks have an ownership structure whose majority shareholders are Albanian. However, the share of total assets of the banks with majority Albanian shareholders has increased because of the sector’s ongoing consolidation. There are no restrictions for foreigners who wish to establish a bank account. They are not required to prove residency status. However, U.S. citizens must complete a form allowing for the disclosure of their banking data to the IRS as required under the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. Parliament approved a law in October 2019 to establish the Albanian Investment Corporation (AIC). The law entered in force in January 2020. The AIC would develop, manage, and administer state-owned property and assets, invest across all sectors by mobilizing state owned and private domestic and foreign capital, and promote economic and social development by investing in line with government-approved development policies. The GoA plans to transfer state-owned assets, including state-owned land, to the AIC and provide initial capital to launch the corporation. In December 2021, the GoA transferred to the AIC close to USD 20 million. There is no publicly available information about the activities of the AIC for 2020 or 2021. The IMF https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/26/mcs11262019-albania-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2019-article-iv-mission Staff Concluding Statement of November 26, 2019, warned that the law would allow the government to direct individual investment decisions, which could make the AIC an off-budget spending tool that risks eroding fiscal discipline and circumventing public investment management processes. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as legal entities that are entirely state-owned or state-controlled and operate as commercial companies in compliance with the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies. SOEs operate mostly in the generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity, oil and gas, railways, postal services, ports, and water supply. There is no published list of SOEs. The law does not discriminate between public and private companies operating in the same sector. The government requires SOEs to submit annual reports and undergo independent audits. SOEs are subject to the same tax levels and procedures and the same domestic accounting and international financial reporting standards as other commercial companies. The High State Audit audits SOE activities. SOEs are also subject to public procurement law. Albania is yet to become party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO but has obtained observer status and is negotiating full accession (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm ). Private companies can compete openly and under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. SOE operation in Albania is regulated by the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies, the Law on State Owned Enterprises, and the Law on the Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises into Commercial Companies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and other relevant ministries, depending on the sector, represent the state as the owner of the SOEs. SOEs are not obligated by law to adhere to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines explicitly. However, basic principles of corporate governance are stipulated in the relevant laws and generally accord with OECD guidelines. The corporate governance structure of SOEs includes the supervisory board and the general director (administrator) in the case of joint stock companies. The supervisory board comprises three to nine members, who are not employed by the SOE. Two-thirds of board members are appointed by the representative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and one-third by the line ministry, local government unit, or institution to which the company reports. The Supervisory Board is the highest decision-making authority and appoints and dismisses the administrator of the SOE through a two-thirds vote. The privatization process in Albania is nearing conclusion, with just a few major privatizations remaining. Entities to be privatized include OSHEE, the state-run electricity distributor; 16 percent of ALBtelecom, the fixed-line telephone and mobile company; and state-owned oil company Albpetrol. Other sectors might provide opportunities for privatization in the future. The bidding process for privatizations is public, and relevant information is published by the Public Procurement Agency at www.app.gov.al . Foreign investors may participate in the privatization program. The Agency has not published timelines for future privatizations. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Public awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) in Albania is low, and CSR and RBC remains new concepts for much of the business community. The small level of CSR and RBC engagement in Albania comes primarily from international corporations operating in the energy, telecommunications, heavy industry, and banking sectors, and tends to focus on philanthropy and environmental issues. International organizations have recently improved efforts to promote CSR. Thanks to efforts by the international community and large international companies, the first Albanian CSR network was founded in March 2013 as a business-led, non-profit organization. The American Chamber of Commerce in Albania also formed a subcommittee in 2015 to promote CSR among its members. Legislation governing CSR, labor, and employment rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection is robust, but enforcement and implementation are inconsistent. The Law on Commercial Companies and Entrepreneurs outlines generic corporate governance and accounting standards. According to that law and the Law on the National Business Registration Center, companies must disclose publicly when they change administrators and shareholders and to disclose financial statements. The Corporate Governance Code for unlisted joint stock companies incorporates the OECD definitions and principles on corporate governance but is not legally binding. The code provides guidance for Albanian companies and aims to provide best-practices while assisting Albanian companies to develop a governance framework. Albania has been a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2013. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Albania signed and ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016 and the Solidarity and Just Transition, Silesia Declaration in 2018. The country has committed to an effective transition to low GHG emissions. In 2019, Albania became member to the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) Partnership, showing its commitment to ambitious implementation of its NDC under the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. In July 2020, Albania submitted its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) for the period 2021-2030 to the Energy Secretariat for formal recommendations. In December 2020, the country approved the law on Climate Change and is the process of approving its bylaws defining the mechanism for monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions. The government has drafted the National Plan for Energy and Climate 2021-2030, which outlines plans of the government to reduce GHG emissions. Albania has one of the lowest emissions per capita in Europe in part due hydropower dominating electricity generation and in part due to limited levels of industrial manufacturing. 9. Corruption Endemic corruption continues to undermine the rule of law and jeopardize economic development. Foreign investors cite corruption including in the judiciary, a lack of transparency in public procurement, lack of transparency and competition, informal economy, and poor enforcement of contracts as some of the biggest problems in Albania. Despite some improvement in Albania’s score from 2013 to 2016, progress in tackling corruption has been slow and unsteady. In 2021, Albania’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score was 35 and its ranking fell by six slots from 104 to 110, a significant decline from the 2016 score and rank of respectively 39 and 83. Albania is still one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, according to the CPI and other observers. The country has a sound legal framework to prevent conflict of interest and to fight corruption of public officials and politicians, including their family members. However, law enforcement is jeopardized by a heavily corrupt judicial system. The passage of constitutional amendments in July 2016 to reform the judicial system was a major step forward, and reform, once fully implemented, is expected to position the country as a more attractive destination for international investors. Judicial reform has been described as the most significant development in Albania since the end of communism, and nearly one-third of the constitution was rewritten as part of the effort. The reform also entails the passage of laws to ensure implementation of the constitutional amendments. Judicial reform’s vetting process will ensure that prosecutors and judges with unexplained wealth or insufficient training, or those who have issued questionable verdicts, are removed from the system. As of publication, more than half of the judges and prosecutors who have faced vetting have either failed or resigned. The establishment of the Special Prosecution Office Against Corruption (SPAK) and Organized Crime and of the National Investigation Bureau, two new judicial bodies, will step up the fight against corruption and organized crime. Once fully implemented, judicial reform will discourage corruption, promote foreign and domestic investment, and allow Albania to compete more successfully in the global economy. The government has ratified several corruption-related international treaties and conventions and is a member of major international organizations and programs dealing with corruption and organized crime. Albania has ratified the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe), the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe), the Additional Protocol to Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe), and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Albania has also ratified several key conventions in the broader field of economic crime, including the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (2001) and the Convention on Cybercrime (2002). Albania has been a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) since the ratification of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2001 and is a member of the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI). Albania is not a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Albania has adopted legislation for the protection of whistleblowers. To curb corruption, the government announced a new online platform in 2017, “ Shqiperia qe Duam ” (“The Albania We Want”), which invites citizens to submit complaints and allegations of corruption and misuse of office by government officials. The platform has a dedicated link for businesses. The Integrated Services Delivery Agency (ADISA), a government entity, provides a second online portal to report corruption. Effectiveness of the portal is minimal. In February 2020, GoA approved the establishment of the Special Anticorruption and Anti-Evasion Unit which operates under the Council of Ministers. The mission of the unit is the coordination between the main public institutions, agencies, and state-owned companies in order to discover, investigate and punish corruption and abusive practices. During 2021, the National Network of Anti-Corruption Coordinators, a structure that is under the Minister of Justice, who also serves as the National Coordinator against corruption, became functional. The coordinators are placed in seventeen institutions that have the highest public perception of corruption. The coordinators collect, process, and analyze complaints filed by the citizens and businesses and report to the law enforcement authorities if necessary. Despite progress, corruption remains pervasive. Albania has yet to build a solid track record of investigations, prosecution, conviction, and confiscation of criminal assets resulting from corruption-related offences. Interested parties can file a complaint related to corruption directly to the coordinators embedded in the various institutions or by writing directly to them in the following e-mail, koordinatori.ak@drejtesia.gov.al They can also use the anti-corruption platform by filing a complaint at shqiperiaqeduam.al 10. Political and Security Environment Political violence is rare, the more recent instances being an attempt led by a former Albanian leader designated by the USG for corruption to breach a party headquarters in January 2022 that required police intervention and political protests in 2019 that included instances of civil disobedience, low-level violence and damage to property, and the use of tear gas by police. Albania’s April 2021 elections and transition to a new government were peaceful, as were its June 2019 local elections. On January 21, 2011, security forces shot and killed four protesters during a violent political demonstration. In its external relations, Albania has usually encouraged stability in the region and maintains generally friendly relations with neighboring countries. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Albania’s labor force numbers around 1.2 million people, according to official data. After peaking at 18.2 percent in the first quarter of 2014, the official estimated unemployment rate has significantly decreased in recent years. In December 2021, unemployment reached 11.4 percent compared to 11.8 percent at the end of 2020 marking an improvement following the economic disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment among people aged 15-29 remains high, at 20.6 percent. Around 40 percent of the population is self-employed in the agriculture sector. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), share of informal employment in the employed population was almost 57 percent in 2019, the highest in the region. The institutions that oversee the labor market include the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Labor, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, the National Employment Service, the State Labor Inspectorate, and private entities such as employment agencies and vocational training centers. Albania has adopted a wide variety of regulations to monitor labor abuses, but enforcement is weak. Outward labor migration remains an ongoing problem affecting the Albanian labor market especially in the IT and health sector. There is a growing concern about labor shortage for both skilled and unskilled workforces. In recent years, media outlets have reported that a significant number of doctors and nurses have emigrated to the European Union, especially Germany. According to the World Bank, Albania has the lowest number of doctors per capita in the region with just 1.647 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants in 2019. In December 2021, the average public administration salary was approximately 70,531 lek (approximately USD 650) per month. The GoA has announced it will increase the minimum wage by 6.5 percent to 32,000 lek per month (approximately USD 300) in April 2022, which remains the lowest in the region. In March 2019, parliament approved a new law on employment promotion, which defined public policies on employment and support programs. Albania has a tradition of a strong secondary educational system, while vocational schools are viewed as less prestigious and attract fewer students. However, the government has more recently focused attention on vocational education. In the 2020-2021 academic year, about 19,000, or 18.5 percent, of high school pupils were enrolled in vocational schools. The Law on Foreigners 79/2021 that was approved in July 2021 and various decisions of the Council of Ministers regulate the employment regime in Albania. Employment can also be regulated through special laws in the case of specific projects, or to attract foreign investment. The Law on TEDA’s provides financial and tax incentives for investments in the zone. Law on Foreigners extends the same employment and self-employment rights of Albanian citizens to citizens of the five Western Balkan countries and provides the same benefits that the original law provided to the citizens of EU and Schengen countries. The Labor Code includes rules regarding contract termination procedures that distinguish layoffs from terminations. Employment contracts can be limited or unlimited in duration, but typically cover an unlimited period if not specified in the contract. Employees can collect up to 12 months of salary in the event of an unexpected interruption of the contract. Unemployment compensation is approximately 50 percent of the minimum wage. Pursuant to the Labor Code and the recently amended “Law on the Status of the Civil Employee,” both individual and collective employment contracts regulate labor relations between employees and management. While there are no official data recording the number of collective bargaining agreements used throughout the economy, they are widely used in the public sector, including by SOEs. Albania has a labor dispute resolution mechanism as specified in the Labor Code, article 170, but the mechanism is considered inefficient. Strikes are rare in Albania, mostly due to the limited power of the trade unions and they have not posed a significant risk to investments. Albania has been a member of the International Labor Organization since 1991 and has ratified 54 out of 189 ILO conventions, including the eight Fundamental Conventions, the four Governance Conventions, and 42 Technical Conventions. The implementation of labor relations and standards continues to be a challenge, according to the ILO. See the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report: https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/; and the U.S. Department of Labor Child Labor Report: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor . 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Tirana, Albania Rruga Stavro Vinjau, Nr. 14 Tirana, Albania +355 4 224 7285 USALBusiness@state.gov Algeria Executive Summary Algeria’s state enterprise-dominated economy is challenging for U.S. businesses, but multiple sectors offer opportunities for long-term growth. The government is prioritizing investment in agriculture, information and communications technology, mining, hydrocarbons (both upstream and downstream), renewable energy, and healthcare. Following his December 2019 election, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune launched a series of political reforms, which led to the adoption of a new constitution in December 2020 and the election of a new parliament in June 2021. Tebboune has declared his intention to focus on economic issues in 2022 and beyond. In 2020, the government eliminated the so-called “51/49” restriction that required majority Algerian ownership of all new businesses, though it retained the requirement for “strategic sectors,” identified as energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals manufacturing (with the exception of innovative products). In the 2021 Finance Law, the government reinstated the 51/49 ownership requirement for any company importing items into Algeria with an intent to resell. The government passed a new hydrocarbons law in 2019, improving fiscal terms and contract flexibility in order to attract new international investors. The new law encourages major international oil companies to sign memorandums of understanding with the national hydrocarbons company, Sonatrach. Though the 43 regulatory texts enacting the legislation have not been formally finalized, the government is using the new law as the basis for negotiating new contracts with international oil companies. In recent years, the Algerian government took several steps, including establishing a standalone ministry dedicated to the pharmaceutical industry and issuing regulations to resolve several long-standing issues, to improve market access for U.S. pharmaceutical companies. The government is in the process of drafting and finalizing a new investment law. Algeria has established ambitious renewable energy adoption targets to reduce carbon emissions and reduce domestic consumption of natural gas. Algeria’s economy is driven by hydrocarbons production, which historically accounts for 95 percent of export revenues and approximately 40 percent of government income. Following the significant drop in oil prices at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the government cut budgeted expenditures by 50 percent and significantly reduced investment in the energy sector. The implementation of broad-based import reductions coupled with a recovery in hydrocarbon prices in 2021 led to Algeria’s first trade surplus since 2014. Though successive government budgets have boosted state spending, Algeria continues to run a persistent budget deficit, which is projected to reach 20 percent of GDP in 2022. Despite a significant reduction in revenues, the historically debt-averse government continues to resist seeking foreign financing, preferring to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost employment and replace imports with local production. Traditionally, Algeria has pursued protectionist policies to encourage the development of local industries. The import substitution policies it employs tend to generate regulatory uncertainty, supply shortages, increased prices, and a limited selection for consumer goods. The government depreciated the Algerian dinar approximately 5% in 2021 after a 10% depreciation in 2020 to conserve its foreign exchange reserves, contributing to significant food inflation. The government has taken measures to minimize the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including delaying tax payments for small businesses, extending credit and restructuring loan payments, and decreasing banks’ reserve requirements. Though the government has lifted domestic COVID_19 related confinement measures, continued restrictions on international flight volumes complicate travel to Algeria for international investors. Economic operators deal with a range of challenges, including complicated customs procedures, cumbersome bureaucracy, difficulties in monetary transfers, and price competition from international rivals particularly the People’s Republic of China, France, and Turkey. International firms operating in Algeria complain that laws and regulations are constantly shifting and applied unevenly, raising commercial risk for foreign investors. An ongoing anti-corruption campaign has increased weariness regarding large-scale investment projects and put a chill on bureaucratic decision making. Business contracts are subject to changing interpretation and revision of regulations, which has proved challenging to U.S. and international firms. Other drawbacks include limited regional integration, which hampers opportunities to rely on international supply chains. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 120 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 20xx USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,570 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Algerian economy is challenging yet potentially highly rewarding. While the Algerian government publicly welcomes FDI, a difficult business climate, an inconsistent regulatory environment, and sometimes contradictory government policies complicate foreign investment. There are business opportunities in nearly every sector, including agribusiness, consumer goods, conventional and renewable energy, healthcare, mining, pharmaceuticals, power, recycling, telecommunications, and transportation. The urgency for Algeria to diversify its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbons has increased amid low and fluctuating oil prices since mid-2014, a youth population bulge, and increased domestic consumption of energy resources. The government reiterated its intention to diversify in its August 2020 plan to recover from the COVID-19 crisis. The government has sought to reduce the country’s persistent trade deficit through import substitution policies, currency depreciation, and import tariffs as it attempts to preserve rapidly diminishing foreign exchange reserves. On January 29, 2019, the government implemented tariffs, known as DAPs, between 30-200 percent on over 1,000 goods it assessed were destined for direct sale to consumers. In January 2022, the Ministry of Commerce said it would expand the number of items subject to DAPs to 2,600; it has yet to publish the new list of affected goods. Companies that set up local manufacturing operations can receive permission to import materials the government would not otherwise approve for import if the importer can show materials will be used in local production. Certain regulations explicitly favor local firms at the expense of foreign competitors, and frequent, unpredictable changes to business regulations have added to the uncertainty in the market. There are two main agencies responsible for attracting foreign investment, the National Agency of Investment Development (ANDI) and the National Agency for the Valorization of Hydrocarbons (ALNAFT). ANDI is the primary Algerian government agency tasked with recruiting and retaining foreign investment. ANDI runs branches in Algeria’s 58 states (wilayas) which are tasked with facilitating business registration, tax payments, and other administrative procedures for both domestic and foreign investors. U.S. companies report that the agency is understaffed and ineffective. Its “one-stop shops” only operate out of physical offices and do not maintain dialogue with investors after they have initiated an investment. The agency’s effectiveness is undercut by its lack of decision-making authority, particularly for industrial projects, which is exercised by the Ministry of Industry in general, the Minister of Industry specifically, and in many cases the Prime Minister. While the government operates an ombudsman’s office (Mediateur de la Republique), the office’s activities are not explicitly targeted toward investment retention. ALNAFT is charged with attracting foreign investment to Algeria’s upstream oil and gas sector. In addition to organizing events marketing upstream opportunities to potential investors, the agency maintains a paid-access digital database with extensive technical information about Algeria’s hydrocarbons resources. Establishing a presence in Algeria can take any of four basic forms: 1) a liaison office with no local partner requirement and no authority to perform commercial operations, 2) a branch office to execute a specific contract, with no obligation to have a local partner, allowing the parent company to conduct commercial activity (considered a resident Algerian entity without full legal authority), 3) a local company with 51 percent of capital held by a local company or shareholders, or 4) a foreign investor with up to 100% ownership in non-strategic sectors. A business can be incorporated as a joint stock company (JSC), a limited liability company (LLC), a limited partnership (LP), a limited partnership with shares (LPS), or an undeclared partnership. Groups and consortia are also used by foreign companies when partnering with other foreign companies or with local firms. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. However, the 51/49 rule requires majority Algerian ownership in all projects involving foreign investments in the “strategic sectors” of energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals (with the exception of innovative products), as well as for importers of goods for resale in Algeria. The 51/49 investment rule poses challenges for investors. For example, the requirement hampers market access for foreign small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they often do not have the human resources or financial capital to navigate complex legal and regulatory requirements. Large companies can find creative ways to work within the law, sometimes with the cooperation of local authorities who are more flexible with large investments that promise significant job creation and technology and equipment transfers. SMEs usually do not receive this same consideration. There are also allegations that Algerian partners sometimes refuse to invest the required funds in the company’s business, require non-contract funds to win contracts, and send unqualified workers to job sites. Manufacturers are also concerned about intellectual property rights (IPR), as foreign companies do not want to surrender control of their designs and patents. Several U.S. companies have reported they have policies that preclude them from investing overseas without maintaining a majority share, out of concerns for both IPR and financial control of the local venture, which thus prevent them from establishing businesses in Algeria. Algerian government officials defended the 51/49 requirement as necessary to prevent capital flight, protect Algerian businesses, and provide foreign businesses with local expertise. For sectors where the requirement remains, officials contend a range of tailored measures can mitigate the effect of the 51/49 rule and allow the minority foreign shareholder to exercise other means of control. Some foreign investors use multiple local partners in the same venture, effectively reducing ownership of each individual local partner to enable the foreign partner to own the largest share. The Algerian government does not officially screen FDI, though Algerian state enterprises have a “right of first refusal” on transfers of foreign holdings to foreign shareholders in identified strategic industries. Companies must notify the Council for State Participation (CPE) of these transfers. In addition, initial foreign investments remain subject to approvals from a host of ministries that cover the proposed project, most often the Ministries of Commerce, Health, Pharmaceutical Industry, Energy and Mines, Telecommunications and Post, and Industry. U.S. companies have reported that certain high-profile industrial proposals, such as for automotive assembly, are subject to informal approval by the Prime Minister. In 2017, the government instituted an Investments Review Council chaired by the Prime Minister for the purpose of “following up” on investments; in practice, the establishment of the council means FDI proposals are subject to additional government scrutiny. According to the 2016 Investment Law, projects registered through the ANDI deemed to have special interest for the national economy or high employment generating potential may be eligible for extensive investment advantages. For any project over 5 billion dinars (approximately USD 35 million) to benefit from these advantages, it must be approved by the Prime Minister-chaired National Investments Council (CNI). The CNI previously met regularly, though it is not clear how the agenda of projects considered at each meeting is determined. Critics allege the CNI is a non-transparent mechanism which could be subject to capture by vested interests. In 2020 the operations of the CNI and the CPE were temporarily suspended pending review by the former Ministry of Industry, and in November 2021 the Prime Minister reported that almost 2,500 projects are awaiting approval from the council once it resumes activities. Algeria has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). The last investment policy review by a third party was conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2003 and published in 2004. Civil society organizations have not provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Algeria offers an online information portal dedicated to business creation, www.jecreemonentreprise.dz, though the business registration website www.cnrc.org.dz is under maintenance and has been for more than two years. The Ministry of Commerce is currently developing a new electronic portal at https://cnrcinfo.cnrc.dz/qui-somme-nous/ . The websites provide information about several business registration steps applicable for registering certain kinds of businesses. Entrepreneurs report that additional information about requirements or regulation updates for business registration are available only in person at the various offices involved in the creation and registration process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also recently established an Information Bureau for the Promotion of Investments and Exports (BIPIE) to support Algerian diplomats working on economic issues abroad, as well as provide local points of contact for Algerian companies operating overseas. Algeria does not restrict domestic investors from investing overseas, though the process for accessing foreign currency for such investments is heavily regulated. The exchange of Algerian dinars outside of Algerian territory is illegal, as is the carrying abroad of more than 10,000 dinars in cash at a time (approximately USD 72; see section 7 for more details on currency exchange restrictions). Algeria’s National Agency to Promote External Trade (ALGEX), housed in the Ministry of Commerce, is the agency responsible for supporting Algerian businesses outside the hydrocarbons sector that want to export abroad. ALGEX controls a special promotion fund to promote exports, but the funds can only be accessed for limited purposes. For example, funds might be provided to pay for construction of a booth at a trade fair, but travel costs associated with getting to the fair – which can be expensive for overseas shows – would not be covered. The Algerian Company of Insurance and Guarantees to Exporters (CAGEX), also housed under the Ministry of Commerce, provides insurance to exporters. In 2003, Algeria established a National Consultative Council for Promotion of Exports (CCNCPE) that is supposed to meet annually. Algerian exporters claim difficulties working with ALGEX including long delays in obtaining support funds, and the lack of ALGEX offices overseas despite a 2003 law for their creation. The Bank of Algeria’s 2002 Money and Credit law allows Algerians to request the conversion of dinars to foreign currency in order to finance their export activities, but exporters must repatriate an equivalent amount to any funds spent abroad, for example money spent on marketing or other business costs incurred. 3. Legal Regime The national government manages all regulatory processes. Legal and regulatory procedures, as written, are considered consistent with international norms, although the decision-making process is at times opaque. Algeria implemented the Financial Accounting System (FAS) in 2010. Though legislation does not make explicit references, FAS appears to be based on International Accounting Standards Board and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Operators generally find accounting standards follow international norms, though they note that some particularly complex processes in IFRS have detailed explanations and instructions but are explained relatively briefly in FAS. There is no mechanism for public comment on draft laws, regulations, or regulatory procedures. Copies of draft laws are generally not made publicly accessible before enactment, although the Ministry of Finance published drafts of the 2021 and 2022 Finance Laws in advance of consideration by Parliament. Government officials often give testimony to Parliament on draft legislation, and that testimony typically receives press coverage. Occasionally, copies of bills are leaked to the media. All laws and some regulations are published in the Official Gazette (www.joradp.dz ) in Arabic and French, but the database has only limited online search features and no summaries are published. Secondary legislation and/or administrative acts (known as “circulaires” or “directives”) often provide important details on how to implement laws and procedures. Administrative acts are generally written at the ministry level and not made public, though may be available if requested in person at a particular agency or ministry. Public tenders are often accompanied by a book of specifications only provided upon payment. The government does not specifically promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. In some cases, authority over a matter may rest among multiple ministries, which may impose additional bureaucratic steps and the likelihood of either inaction or the issuance of conflicting regulations. The development of regulations occurs largely away from public view; internal discussions at or between ministries are not usually made public. In some instances, the only public interaction on regulations development is a press release from the official state press service at the conclusion of the process; in other cases, a press release is issued earlier. Regulatory enforcement mechanisms and agencies exist at some ministries, but they are usually understaffed, and enforcement remains weak. The National Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CNESE) studies the effects of Algerian government policies and regulations in economic, social, and environmental spheres. CNESE provides feedback on proposed legislation, but neither the feedback nor legislation are necessarily made public. Information on external debt obligations up to fiscal year 2019 is publicly available online via the Central Bank’s quarterly statistical bulletin. The statistical bulletin describes external debt and not public debt, but the Ministry of Finance’s budget execution summaries reflect amalgamated debt totals. The Ministry of Finance is planning to create an electronic, consolidated database of internal and external debt information, and in 2019 published additional public debt information on its website. A 2017 amendment to the 2003 law on currency and credit covering non-conventional financing authorizes the Central Bank to purchase bonds directly from the Treasury for a period of up to five years. The Ministry of Finance indicated this would include purchasing debt from state enterprises, allowing the Central Bank to transfer money to the treasury, which would then provide the cash to, for example, state owned enterprises in exchange for their debt. In September 2019, the Prime Minister announced Algeria would no longer use non-conventional financing, although the Ministry of Finance stressed the program remains available until 2022. In 2021, the non-profit Cercle d’Action et de Réflexion pour l’Entreprise (CARE) launched an online dashboard compiling key economic figures published by various ministries within the Algerian government. Algeria is not a member of any regional economic bloc or of the WTO. The structure of Algerian regulations largely follows European – specifically French – standards. Algeria’s legal system is based on the French civil law tradition. The commercial law was established in 1975 and most recently updated in 2007 ( www.joradp.dz/TRV/FCom.pdf). The judiciary is nominally independent from the executive branch, but U.S. companies have reported allegations of political pressure exerted on the courts by the executive. Organizations representing lawyers and judges have protested during the past year against alleged executive branch interference in judicial independence. Regulation enforcement actions are adjudicated in the national courts system and are appealable. Algeria has a system of administrative tribunals for adjudicating disputes with the government, distinct from the courts that handle civil disputes and criminal cases. Decisions made under treaties or conventions to which Algeria is a signatory are binding and enforceable under Algerian law. The 51/49 investment rule requires a majority Algerian ownership in “strategic sectors” as prescribed in the 2020 Complementary Finance Law (see section 2), as well as for importers of goods available for resale domestically as prescribed in the 2021 Finance Law. There are few other laws restricting foreign investment. In practice, the many regulatory and bureaucratic requirements for business operations provide officials avenues to informally advance political or protectionist policies. The investment law enacted in 2016 charged ANDI with creating four new branches to assist with business establishment and the management of investment incentives. ANDI’s website (www.andi.dz/index.php/en/investir-en-algerie ) lists the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Much of the information lacks detail – particularly for the new incentives elaborated in the 2016 investments law – and refers prospective investors to ANDI’s physical “one-stop shops” located throughout the country. There is an ongoing effort by the customs service, under the Ministry of Finance, to establish a new digital platform featuring one-stop shops for importers and exporters to streamline bureaucratic processes. The Ministry announced the service would begin in 2021, but the Ministry of Industry clarified in February 2022 that the one-stop shop would be set up with the approval of the new investment law. The National Competition Council (www.conseil-concurrence.dz/) is responsible for reviewing both domestic and foreign competition-related concerns. Established in late 2013, it is housed under the Ministry of Commerce. Once the economic concentration of an enterprise exceeds 40 percent of a market’s sales or purchases, the Competition Council is authorized to investigate, though a 2008 directive from the Ministry of Commerce exempted economic operators working for “national economic progress” from this review. The Algerian state can expropriate property under limited circumstances, with the state required to pay “just and equitable” compensation to the property owners. Expropriation of property is extremely rare, with no reported cases within the last 10 years. In late 2018, however, a government measure required farmers to comply with a new regulation altering the concession contracts of their land in a way that would cede more control to the government. Those who refused to switch contract type by December 31, 2018, lost the right to their land. Algeria’s bankruptcy system is underdeveloped. While bankruptcy per se is not criminalized, management decisions (such as company spending, investment decisions, and even procedural mistakes) can be subject to criminal penalties including fines and incarceration, so decisions that lead to bankruptcy could be punishable under Algerian criminal law. However, bankruptcy cases rarely proceed to a full dissolution of assets. The Algerian government generally props up public companies on the verge of bankruptcy via cash infusions from the public banking system. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, debtors and creditors may file for both liquidation and reorganization. Since the resignation of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in early 2019, the courts have given the government authority to put several companies in receivership and have appointed temporary heads to direct them following the arrests of their CEOs as part of a broad anti-corruption drive. The government has since nationalized some of the companies following the conviction of the owners. 4. Industrial Policies While the government previously required 51 percent Algerian ownership of all investments, the 2020 budget law restricted this requirement to the energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals manufacturing sectors, and the 2021 budget law extended the requirement to importers of goods for resale in Algeria. Any incentive offered by the Algerian government is generally available to any company, though there are multiple tiers of “common, additional, and exceptional” incentives under the 2016 investments law (www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/2016/F2016046.pdf). “Common” incentives available to all investors include exemption from customs duties for all imported production inputs, exemption from value-added tax (VAT) for all imported goods and services that enter directly into the implementation of the investment project, a 90 percent reduction of tenancy fees during construction, and a 10-year exemption on real estate taxes. Investors also benefit from a three-year exemption on corporate and professional activity taxes and a 50 percent reduction for three years on tenancy fees after construction is completed. Additional incentives are available for investments made outside of Algeria’s coastal regions, to include the reduction of tenancy fees to a symbolic one dinar (USD .01) per square meter of land for 10 years in the High Plateau region and 15 years in the south of Algeria, plus a 50 percent reduction thereafter. The law also charges the state to cover, in part or in full, the necessary infrastructure works for the realization of the investment. “Exceptional” incentives apply for investments “of special interest to the national economy,” including the extension of the common tax incentives to 10 years. The sectors of “special interest” have not yet been publicly specified. An investment must receive the approval of the National Investments Council in order to qualify for the exceptional incentives. There are no specific investment incentives for investors from underrepresented groups. Regulations passed in a March 2017 executive decree exclude approximately 150 economic activities from eligibility for the incentives (www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/2017/F2017016.pdf). The list of excluded investments is concentrated on the services sector but also includes manufacturing for some products. All investments in sales, whether retail or wholesale, and imports business are ineligible. The 2016 investments law also provided state guarantees for the transfer of incoming investment capital and outgoing profits. Pre-existing incentives established by other laws and regulations also include favorable loan rates well below inflation from public banks for qualified investments. The government does not issue guarantees for private investments, or jointly financed foreign direct investment projects. In practice, however, the government is disinclined to allow companies that employ significant numbers of Algerians – whether private or public – to fail and may take on fiscal responsibilities to ensure continued employment for workers. President Tebboune’s administration also indicated more flexibility in considering alternative financing methods for future projects, which might include joint financing. The government does not offer specific incentives for clean energy investments, although the government announced in February 2022 that companies bidding on solar energy tenders would not be subject to the 51/49 investment rule. Algeria does not have any foreign trade zones or free ports. The Algerian government does not officially mandate local employment, but companies usually must provide extensive justification to various levels of the government as to why an expatriate worker is needed. Any person or legal entity employing a foreign citizen is required to notify the Ministry of Labor. Some businesses have reported instances of the government pressuring foreign companies operating in Algeria, particularly in the hydrocarbons sector, to limit the number of expatriate middle and senior managers so that Algerians can be hired for these positions. Contacts at multinational companies have alleged this pressure is applied via visa applications for expatriate workers, or via specific restrictions applicable to expatriate employees that are not applicable to Algerian employees. U.S. companies in the hydrocarbons industry have reported that, when granted, expatriate work permits are usually valid for no longer than six months and are delivered up to three months late, requiring firms to apply perpetually for renewals. Government-imposed restrictions on routine international travel since March 2020 in response to COVID-19 initially caused difficulties for foreign companies attempting to rotate their expatriate staff into and out of Algeria, though the situation has improved since June 2021. In 2017, the Algerian government began instituting forced localization in the auto sector. New regulations governing the sector issued in September 2020 would require companies producing or assembling cars in the country to achieve a local integration rate of at least 30 percent within the first year of operation, rising to 50 percent by the company’s fifth year of operation, however, the regulations remain under government review and have not gone into effect. Since 2014, the government has required car dealers to invest in industrial or “semi-industrial” activities as a condition for doing business in Algeria. Dealers seeking to import new vehicles must obtain an import license from the Ministry of Commerce. Since January 2017, the Ministry has not issued any licenses, and the process of assigning new import quotas to qualified importers under the new 2020 specifications are on hold pending review by the government. As the Algerian government further restricts imports, localization requirements are expected to broaden to other manufacturing industries over the next several years. For example, specifications released in 2020 governing consumer appliance manufacturing mandate local content thresholds, and a tender launched in December 2021 for 1000MWs of solar projects mandated local content thresholds. Information technology providers are not required to turn over source codes or encryption keys, but all hardware and software imported to Algeria must be approved by the Agency for Regulation of Post and Electronic Communications (ARPCE), under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. In practice, the Algerian government requires public sector entities to store data on servers within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property are generally recognized and enforceable, but court proceedings can be lengthy and results unpredictable. All property not clearly titled to private owners remains under government ownership. As a result, the government controls most real property in Algeria, and instances of unclear titling have resulted in conflicting claims of ownership, which has made purchasing and financing real estate difficult. Several business contacts have reported significant difficulty in obtaining land from the government to develop new industrial activities; the state prefers to lease land for 33-year terms, renewable twice, rather than sell outright. The procedures and criteria for awarding land contracts are opaque. Property sales are subject to registration at the tax inspection and publication office at the Mortgage Register Center and are part of the public record of that agency. All property contracts must go through a notary. Patent and trademark protection in Algeria remains covered by a series of ordinances dating from 2003 and 2005, and representatives of U.S. companies operating in Algeria reported that these laws were satisfactory in terms of both the scope of what they cover and the penalties they mandate for violations. A 2015 government decree increased coordination between the National Office of Copyrights and Related Rights (ONDA), the National Institute for Industrial Property (INAPI), and law enforcement to pursue patent and trademark infringements. An Algerian court ruled in favor of a U.S. pharmaceutical company in late 2020 in the first case of alleged patent infringement by a local producer pursued in the courts by a U.S. company. ONDA, under the Ministry of Culture, and INAPI, under the Ministry of Industry, are the two entities within the Algerian government that protect IPR. ONDA covers literary and artistic copyrights as well as digital software rights, while INAPI oversees the registration and protection of industrial trademarks and patents. Despite strengthened efforts at ONDA, INAPI, and the General Directorate for Customs (under the Ministry of Finance), which have seen local production of pirated or counterfeit goods nearly disappear since 2011, imported counterfeit goods are prevalent and easily obtained. Algerian law enforcement agencies annually confiscate hundreds of thousands of counterfeit items, including clothing, cosmetics, sports items, foodstuffs, automotive spare parts, and home appliances. The government is currently drafting new legislation on counterfeiting and intellectual property to improve enforcement and interagency coordination. Algeria is listed on the Watch List of USTR’s 2022 Special 301 Report (https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301)for, among other reason, ineffective enforcement efforts against trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Algiers Stock Exchange has five stocks listed – each at no more than 35 percent equity. There is a small and medium enterprise exchange with one listed company. The exchange has a total market capitalization representing less than 0.1 percent of Algeria’s GDP. Daily trading volume on the exchange averages around USD 2,000. Despite the lack of tangible activity, the market is regulated by an independent oversight commission that enforces compliance requirements on listed companies and traders. Government officials have previously expressed their desire to reach a capitalization of USD 7.8 billion and enlist up to 50 new companies. Attempts to list additional companies have been stymied by a lack both of public awareness and appetite for portfolio investment, as well as by private and public companies’ unpreparedness to satisfy due diligence requirements that would attract investors. Proposed privatizations of state-owned companies have also been opposed by the public. Algerian society generally prefers material investment vehicles for savings, namely cash. Public banks, which dominate the banking sector (see below), are required to purchase government securities when offered, meaning they have little leftover liquidity to make other investments. Foreign portfolio investment is prohibited – the purchase of any investment product in Algeria, whether a government or corporate bond or equity stock, is limited to Algerian residents only. The banking sector is roughly 85 percent public and 15 percent private as measured by value of assets held and is regulated by an independent central bank. Publicly available data from private institutions and U.S. Federal Reserve Economic Data show estimated total assets in the commercial banking sector in 2017 were roughly 13.9 trillion dinars (USD 116.7 billion) against 9.2 trillion dinars (USD 77.2 billion) in liabilities. In response to liquidity concerns caused by the oil price decline and COVID-19 crisis, the bank progressively decreased the reserve requirement from 12 percent to 3 percent between March and September 2020. The IMF and Bank of Algeria have noted moderate growth in non-performing assets since 2015, currently estimated between 12 and 13 percent of total assets. The quality of service in public banks is generally considered low as generations of public banking executives and workers trained to operate in a statist economy lack familiarity with modern banking practices. Most transactions are materialized (non-electronic). Many areas of the country suffer from a dearth of branches, leaving large amounts of the population without access to banking services. ATMs are not widespread, especially outside the major cities, and few accept foreign bankcards. Outside of major hotels with international clientele, hardly any retail establishments accept credit cards. Algerian banks do issue debit cards, but the system is distinct from any international payment system. The Minister of Commerce has announced multiple plans to require businesses to use electronic payments for all commercial and service transactions, though the most recent government deadline for all stores to deploy electronic payment terminals by the end of 2021 was indefinitely delayed. In addition, analysts estimate that between one-third and one-half of the money supply circulates in the informal economy. Foreigners can open foreign currency accounts without restriction, but proof of a work permit or residency is required to open an account in Algerian dinars. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in the country, but they must be legally distinct entities from their overseas home offices. In 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Algeria from its Public Statement, and in 2016 it removed Algeria from the “gray list.” The FATF recognized Algeria’s significant progress and the improvement in its anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF also indicated Algeria has substantially addressed its action plan since strategic deficiencies were identified in 2011. Algeria’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is the “Fonds de Regulation des Recettes (FRR).” The Finance Ministry’s website shows the fund decreased from 4408.2 billion dinars (USD 37.36 billion) in 2014 to 784.5 billion dinars (USD 6.65 billion) in 2016. The data has not been updated since 2016. Algerian media reported the FRR was spent down to zero as of February 2017. Algeria is not known to have participated in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state. Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks, and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land. SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms. The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament. The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued. There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Multinational, and particularly U.S. firms operating in Algeria, are spreading the concept of responsible business conduct (RBC), which has traditionally been less common among domestic firms. Companies such as Occidental, Cisco, Microsoft, Boeing, Dow, Halliburton, Pfizer, and Berlitz have supported programs aimed at youth employment, education, and entrepreneurship. RBC activities are gaining acceptance as a way for companies to contribute to local communities while often addressing business needs, such as a better-educated workforce. The national oil and gas company, Sonatrach, funds some social services for its employees and supports desert communities near production sites. Still, many Algerian companies view social programs as the government’s responsibility. While state entities welcome foreign companies’ RBC activities, the government does not factor them into procurement decisions, nor does it require companies to disclose their RBC activities. Algerian laws for consumer and environmental protections exist but are weakly enforced. Algeria does not adhere to the OECD or UN Guiding Principles and does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Algeria ranks 73 out of 89 countries for resource governance and does not comply with rules set for disclosing environmental impact assessments and mitigation management plans, according to the most recent report by National Resource Governance Index published in 2017. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption The current anti-corruption law dates to 2006. In 2013, the Algerian government created the Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC) to investigate and prosecute any form of bribery in Algeria. The number of cases currently being investigated by the OCRC is not available. In 2010, the government created the National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC) as stipulated in the 2006 anti-corruption law. The Chairman and members of this commission are appointed by a presidential decree. The commission studies financial holdings of public officials, though not their relatives, and carries out studies. Since 2013, the Financial Intelligence Unit has been strengthened by new regulations that have given the unit more authority to address illegal monetary transactions and terrorism funding. In 2016, the government updated its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance legislation to bolster the authority of the financial intelligence unit to monitor suspicious financial transactions and refer violations of the law to prosecutorial magistrates. Algeria signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003. The new Algerian constitution, which the President approved in December 2020, includes provisions that strengthen the role and capacity of anti-corruption bodies, particularly through the creation of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention, and Fight against Corruption. This body is tasked with developing and enabling the implementation of a national strategy for transparency and preventing and combatting corruption. The Algerian government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. The use of internal controls against bribery of government officials varies by company, with some upholding those standards and others rumored to offer bribes. Algeria is not a participant in regional or international anti-corruption initiatives. Algeria does not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. While whistleblower protections for Algerian citizens who report corruption exist, members of Algeria’s anti-corruption bodies believe they need to be strengthened to be effective. International and Algerian economic operators have identified corruption as a challenge for FDI. They indicate that foreign companies with strict compliance standards cannot effectively compete against companies which can offer special incentives to those making decisions about contract awards. Economic operators have also indicated that complex bureaucratic procedures are sometimes manipulated by political actors to ensure economic benefits accrue to favored individuals in a non-transparent way. Anti-corruption efforts have so far focused more on prosecuting previous acts of corruption rather than on institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption. In October 2019, the government adopted legislation which allowed police to launch anti-corruption investigations without first receiving a formal complaint against the entity in question. Proponents argued the measure is necessary given Algeria’s weak whistle blower protections. Currently the government is working with international partners to update legal mechanisms to deal with corruption issues. The government also created a new institution to target and deter the practice of overbilling on invoices, which has been used to unlawfully transfer foreign currency out of the country. The government imprisoned numerous prominent economic and political figures in 2019 and 2020 as part of an anti-corruption campaign. Some operators report that fear of being accused of corruption has made some officials less willing to make decisions, delaying some investment approvals. Corruption cases that have reached trial deal largely with state investment in the automotive, telecommunications, public works, and hydrocarbons sectors, though other cases are reportedly under investigation. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC) Mokhtar Lakhdari, General Director Placette el Qods, Hydra, Algiers +213 21 68 63 12 +213 21 68 63 12 www.facebook.com/263685900503591/ www.facebook.com/263685900503591/ no email address publicly available no email address publicly available National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC) Tarek Kour, President 14 Rue Souidani Boudjemaa, El Mouradia, Algiers +213 21 23 94 76 +213 21 23 94 76 www.onplc.org.dz/index.php/ www.onplc.org.dz/index.php/ contact@onplc.org.dz contact@onplc.org.dz Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Djilali Hadjadj President Algerian Association Against Corruption (AACC) www.facebook.com/215181501888412/ www.facebook.com/215181501888412/ +213 07 71 43 97 08 +213 07 71 43 97 08 aaccalgerie@yahoo.fr 10. Political and Security Environment Following nearly two months of massive protests, known as the hirak, former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned on April 2, 2019, after 20 years in power. His resignation launched an eight-month transition, resulting in the election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as president in December 2019. Voter turnout was approximately 40 percent and the new administration continues to focus on restoring government authority and legitimacy. Following historically low turnout of 24 percent in the November 2020 constitutional referendum and President Tebboune’s lengthy medical absences in late 2020 and early 2021, hirak protests resumed in February 2021 before government security services brought them to a halt in May 2021. Demonstrations have taken place in Algeria’s major wilayas (states) and have focused largely on political reform, as protestors continue to call for an overhaul of the Algerian government. President Tebboune dissolved parliament in February 2021 and Algeria held parliamentary elections in June 2021 and local elections in November 2021. Prior to the hirak, which began in 2019, demonstrations in Algeria tended to concern housing and other social programs and were generally smaller than a few hundred participants. While most protests were peaceful, there were occasional outbreaks of violence that resulted in injuries, sometimes resulting from efforts of security forces to disperse the protests. Hirak protests were relatively peaceful, though security forces occasionally use heavy-handed tactics to suppress protesters. In 2021, the government adopted laws that give authorities more leeway to arrest political opponents. In 2013, a terrorist group now known as al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. More than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including 3 U.S. citizens, and resulting in damage to the facilities. Seven other U.S. citizens escaped. Since the attack, the Algerian government has increased security personnel and preventative security procedures in Algeria’s oil and gas producing regions. Government reactions to public unrest typically include tighter security control on movement between and within cities to prevent further clashes, significant security presence in anticipated protest zones, temporary detention of protestors, and promises of either greater public expenditures on local infrastructure or increased local hiring for state-owned companies. During the first few months of 2015, there were a series of protests in several cities in southern Algeria against the government’s program to drill test wells for shale gas. These protests were largely peaceful but sometimes resulted in clashes, injury, and rarely, property damage. Government pronouncements in 2017 that shale gas exploration would recommence did not generate protests. On April 27, 2020, an Algerian court sentenced an expatriate manager and an Algerian employee of a large hotel to six months in prison on charges of “undermining the integrity of the national territory” for allegedly sharing publicly available security information with corporate headquarters outside of Algeria. The Algerian government requires all foreign employees of foreign companies or organizations based in Algeria to contact the Foreigners Office of the Ministry of the Interior before traveling in the country’s interior so that the government can evaluate security conditions. The Algerian government also requires U.S. Embassy employees to coordinate travel with the government on any trip outside of the Algiers wilaya (state). The Algerian government continues to limit the weekly number of authorized international flights in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and they remain at less than 40 percent of pre-COVID levels two years after the onset of the pandemic. In February 2020, ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bomber who attacked a military barrack in southern Algeria, killing a soldier. This was met with a swift response by Algerian security services against the militants responsible for the attacks, and the Algerian army continues to carry out counterterrorism operations throughout the country. According to official Defense Ministry announcements, Algerian security forces “neutralized” 37 terrorists (21 killed, 9 arrested, and 7 surrendered) and arrested an additional 108 “supporters” of terrorism in 2020. Army detachments also destroyed 251 terrorist hideouts and seized a large quantity of ammunition and explosives during the year. In 2021, the government broadened the definition of terrorism to include any act – peaceful or otherwise – that undermines Algeria’s national unity, prompting a slew of terrorism arrests for acts not necessarily in line with the internationally recognized definition of terrorism. U.S. citizens living or traveling in Algeria are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) via the State Department’s travel registration website, https://step.state.gov/step, to receive security messages and make it easier to be located in an emergency. 11. Labor Policies and Practices There is a shortage of skilled labor in Algeria in all sectors. Business contacts report difficulty in finding sufficiently skilled plumbers, electricians, carpenters, and other construction/vocational related areas. Oil companies report they have difficultly retaining trained Algerian engineers and field workers because these workers often leave Algeria for higher wages in the Gulf. Some white-collar employers also report a lack of skilled project managers, supply chain engineers, and sufficient numbers of office workers with requisite computer and soft skills. Official unemployment figures are measured by the number of persons seeking work through the National Employment Agency (ANEM). According to the most recent official figures in 2019, Algeria had an unemployment rate of 11.4%. Following the pandemic, the real unemployment rate is likely much higher with some sources estimating it to be above 30 percent in the youth population. In January 2021, Minister of Employment, Labor, and Social Security El Hachemi Djaaboub said that new job offers in 2020 fell by 30% compared to 2019 (from 437,000 to 306,000). Djaaboub also said recently that the closure of auto assembly and household appliance plants as a result of the halt in imports for the necessary assembly kits (semi-knock-down kits, or SKDs) since 2019 has resulted in the loss of 51,000 jobs. The 2022 Finance Law included a provision to establish an unemployment allowance, which applies to first-time job seekers between 19 and 40 years of age, paid monthly for six months, renewable only once, with baseline benefit levels of 13,000 dinars (USD 92) adjustable for geographical location. Approximately 300,000 Algerians qualified for the initial benefit, slated to go into effect on March 28. Additionally, the subsidy allotted to finance vocational integration (le dispositif d’insertion professionnelle) decreased from 135 billion dinars in 2013 to 32 billion in 2021. The government has undertaken efforts to protect formal sector employment throughout the COVID-19 crisis, focusing particularly on unemployment benefits, as well as increasing relative wages by 14 to 16 percent in the 2022 Finance Law by reducing income taxes. In general, finding a job is regulated by the government and is bureaucratically complex. Prospective employees must register with the labor office, submit paper resumes door to door, attend career fairs, and comb online job offerings. According to the Office of National Statistics, 81 percent of university graduates say that they favor “family relationships” or “the family network” as the best way to look for a job. The private sector accounts for 62.2 percent of total employment with 7.014 million people, with 37.8 percent in the public sector, employing 4.267 million people. Additionally, the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that more than one-third of all employment in Algeria takes place in the informal economy. The informal sector is estimated to comprise up to 50 percent of Algeria’s non-hydrocarbon economy. The Ministry of Vocational Training sponsors programs that offer training to at least 300,000 Algerians annually, including those who did not complete high school, in various professional programs. Companies must submit extensive justification to hire foreign employees, and report pressure to hire more locals (even if jobs could be replaced through mechanization) under the implied risk that the government will not approve visas for expatriate staff. There are no special economic zones or foreign trade zones in Algeria. The constitution provides workers with the right to join and form unions of their choice provided they are Algerian citizens. The country has ratified the ILO’s conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining but failed to enact legislation needed to implement these principles fully. The General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) is the largest union in Algeria and represents a broad spectrum of employees in the public sectors. The UGTA, an affiliate of the International Trade Union Conference, is an official member of the Algerian “tripartite,” a council of labor, government, and business officials that meets annually to collaborate on economic and labor policy. The Algerian government liaises almost exclusively with the UGTA, however, unions in the education, health, and administration sectors do meet and negotiate with government counterparts, especially when there is a possibility of a strike. Collective bargaining is legally permitted but not mandatory. Algerian law provides mechanisms for monitoring labor abuses and health and safety standards, and international labor rights are recognized under domestic law, but are only effectively regulated in the formal economy. Typical labor inspections were greatly reduced in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions, but largely resumed in 2021 at normal rates. The government has shown an increasing interest in understanding and monitoring the informal economy, evidenced by its 2018 partnerships with the ILO and current cooperation with the World Bank on several projects aimed at better quantifying the informal sector. Sector-specific strikes occur often in Algeria, though general strikes are less common. The law provides for the right to strike, and workers exercise this right, subject to conditions. Striking requires a secret ballot of the whole workforce, and the decision to strike must be approved by a majority vote of the workers at a general meeting. The government may restrict strikes on several grounds, including economic crisis, obstruction of public services, or the possibility of subversive actions. Furthermore, all public demonstrations, including protests and strikes, must receive prior government authorization. By law, workers may strike only after 14 days of mandatory conciliation or mediation. The government occasionally offers to mediate disputes. The law states that decisions agreed to in mediation are binding on both parties. If mediation does not lead to an accord, workers may strike legally after they vote by secret ballot. The law requires that a minimum level of essential public services must be maintained, and the government has broad legal authority to requisition public employees. The list of essential services includes banking, radio, and television. Penalties for unlawful work stoppages range from eight days to two months imprisonment. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, there have been periodic strikes affecting companies in various sectors as a result of the economic recession caused by the pandemic. Several strikes were initiated by workers in the northern regions, particularly in the industrial zones of Tizi-Ouzou, Béjaïa, and Bordj Bou Arreridj. In January 2021, employees of the electronics and household appliance group Condor demanded the firing of the director of the company appointed by the courts and back payment for salaries from December 2020. Stringent labor-market regulations likely inhibit an increase in full-time, open-ended work. Regulations do not allow for flexibility in hiring and firing in times of economic downturn. For example, employers are generally required to pay severance when laying off or firing workers. Unemployment insurance eligibility requirements may discourage job seekers from collecting benefits due to them, and the level of support claimants receive is minimal. Employers must have contributed up to 80 percent of the final year salary into the unemployment insurance scheme in order for the employees to qualify for unemployment benefits. The law contains occupational health and safety standards, but enforcement of these standards is uneven. There were no known reports of workers dismissed for removing themselves from hazardous working conditions. If workers face hazardous conditions, they may file a complaint with the Ministry of Labor, which is required to send out labor inspectors to investigate the claim. Nevertheless, the high demand for unemployment in Algeria gives an advantage to employers seeking to exploit employees. Because Algerian law does not provide for temporary legal status for migrants, labor standards do not protect economic migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere working in the country without legal immigration status. However, migrant children are protected by law from working. The Ministry of Labor enforces labor standards, including compliance with the minimum wage regulation and safety standards. Companies that employ migrant workers or violate child labor laws are subject to fines and potentially prosecution. The law prohibits participation by minors in dangerous, unhealthy, or harmful work or in work considered inappropriate because of social and religious considerations. The minimum legal age for employment is 16, but younger children may work as apprentices with permission from their parents or legal guardian. The law prohibits workers under age 19 from working at night. While there is currently no list of hazardous occupations prohibited to minors, the government reports it is drafting a list which will be issued by presidential decree. Although specific data was unavailable, children reportedly worked mostly in the informal sector, largely in sales, often in family businesses. They are also involved in begging and agricultural work. There were isolated reports that children were subjected to commercial sexual exploitation. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor laws. There is no single office charged with this task, but all labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing laws regarding child labor. In 2018, the Ministry of Labor focused one month specifically on investigating child labor violations, and in some cases prosecuted individuals for employing minors or breaking other child-related labor laws. While the government claims to monitor both the formal and informal sectors, contacts note that their efforts largely focus on the formal economy. The National Authority of the Protection and Promotion of Children (ONPPE) is an inter-agency organization, created in 2016, which coordinates the protection and promotion of children’s rights. As a part of its efforts, ONPPE continues to hold educational sessions for officials from relevant ministries, civil society organizations, and journalists on issues related to children, including child labor and human trafficking. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Algiers Political and Economic Section 5 Chemin Cheikh Bachir El-Ibrahimi, El Biar Algiers, Algeria (+213) 0770 082 153 (+213) 0770 082 153 Algiers_polecon@state.gov Andorra Executive Summary Andorra is an independent principality with a population of about 79,000 and area of 181 square miles situated between France and Spain in the Pyrenees mountains. It uses the euro as its national currency. Andorra is a popular tourist destination visited by over 8 million people each year (pre-pandemic) who are drawn by outdoor activities like hiking and cycling in the summer and skiing and snowshoeing in the winter, as well as by its duty-free shopping of luxury products. Andorra’s economy is based on an interdependent network of trade, commerce, and tourism, which represent nearly 60% of the economy, followed by the financial sector. Andorra has also become a wealthy international commercial center because of its integrated banking sector and low taxes. As part of its effort to modernize its economy, Andorra has opened to foreign investment and engaged in other reforms, including advancing tax initiatives. Andorra is actively seeking to attract foreign investment and to become a center for entrepreneurs, talent, innovation, and knowledge. The Andorran economy is undergoing a process of digitalization and diversification that accelerated due to the impact pandemic-related border closures had on its dominant tourist sector. In 2006, the Government began sweeping economic reforms. The Parliament approved three main regulations to complement the first phase of economic openness: the law of Companies (October 2007), the Law of Business Accounting (December 2007), and the Law of Foreign Investment (April 2008 and June 2012). From 2011 to 2017, the Parliament approved direct taxes in the form of a corporate tax, tax on economic activities, tax on income of non-residents, tax on capital gains, and personal income tax. Andorra joined the IMF in October 2020, providing it access to additional resources for managing its economy. Also, as part of the post-pandemic economic recovery plan, Andorra passed Horizon 23, a comprehensive roadmap backed by 80 million euros of public funds to accelerate economic diversification into sectors like fintech, sports tech, esports, and biotech. These regulations aim to establish a transparent, modern, and internationally comparable regulatory framework. These reforms aim to attract investment and businesses that have the potential to boost Andorra’s economic development and diversification. Prior to 2008, Andorra limited foreign investment, worried that large foreign firms would have an oversized impact on its small economy. For example, previous regulations allowed non-citizens with less than 20 years residence in Andorra to own no more than 33 percent of a company. While foreigners may now own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. The approval can take up to one month, which can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. Andorra is a microstate that accounts for .001 percent of global emissions and has demonstrated its ambition to the fight against climate change by establishing a national strategy that commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by a minimum of 37 percent by 2030 and pursuing carbon neutrality by 2050. In addition to implementing an energy transition law, Andorra approved the Green Fund and a hydrocarbon tax to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Andorra’s per capita income is above the European average and above the level of its neighbors. The country has developed a sophisticated infrastructure including a one-of-a-kind micro-fiber-optic network for the entire country that provides universal access for all households and companies. Andorra’s retail tradition is well known around Europe, thanks to more than 1,400 shops, the quality of their products, and competitive prices. Products taken out of the Principality are tax-free up to certain limits; the purchaser must declare those that exceed the allowance. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Data not available 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Andorra has established an open framework for foreign investments, allowing non-residents to create companies in the country, open businesses, and invest in all kinds of assets. The Foreign Investment Law came into force in July 2012, completely opening the economy to foreign investors. Since then, foreigners, whether resident or not, may own up to 100 percent of any Andorra-based company. The law also liberalizes restrictions on foreign professionals seeking to work in Andorra. Previously, a foreigner could only begin to practice in Andorra after twenty years of residency. Under the current regulations, any Andorran legal resident from a country that has a reciprocal standard can work in Andorra, although special working permits are required for specific professions. The government of Andorra created Andorra Business ( https://www.andorrabusiness.com ), Andorra’s economic development and promotion office, to provide counseling services to both Andorran companies looking to grow and foreign investors wanting to start new businesses in Andorra. Andorra Business’ mission is to increase competitiveness, innovation, and the sustainability of the economy. Andorra Business’ five key objectives are: Promoting key sectors for the diversification of the economy. Being a motor in the improvement of the public sector and microeconomic environment. Attracting and supporting both foreign and local investment in key sectors. Providing support to Andorran businesses to be more competitive on a National and International scale. Creating favorable conditions for innovation and entrepreneurship, in both the public and private sectors, to create an environment for testing new innovations at the country level. The Andorran Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Services of Andorra ( https://www.ccis.ad/ ) aims to promote and strengthen Andorra’s financial and business activity as well as provide services to foreign companies. The Chamber’s activities include organizing a census of commercial, industrial, and service activities; the protection of the general interests of commerce, industry, and services; promoting fair competition; and issuing certificates of origin and other commercial documents. The Andorran Business Confederation (CEA) provides support to national companies to navigate within Andorra’s new legal, labor, and fiscal framework and facilitates companies’ international expansion projects. CEA also works to foster international investment into the country through its Iwand project , which provides information about Andorra’s economic and fiscal environment ( www.cea.ad ). The Andorran legal framework has also adapted to international standards. The most relevant laws passed by Parliament to accompany the economic openness include the law of Companies (October 2007), the Law of Business Accounting (December 2007), and the Law of Foreign Investment (April 2008 and June 2012). The OECD removed Andorra from its “tax haven list” in 2009 after the country signed the Paris Declaration, formally committing to sharing fiscal information outlined by the agreement. With the approval of the Law 19/2016, of November the 30th, on automatic exchange of information on tax matters, Andorra will exchange financial information with signatories of the “Common Reporting Standard” (CRS), developed by the G20 and approved by the OECD Council in July 2014. From 2011 to 2019, the Parliament approved direct corporate, non-resident, capital gains, and personal income taxes. At 10 percent, well below the European average, Andorra’s corporate tax is more competitive than rates in neighboring Spain or France. While foreigners may own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. The approval can take up to one month and can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. On June 2021, the IMF released a report detailing Andorra’s macro-economic trends and investment climate. In the past five years the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have not conducted an investment policy review. The government of Andorra, in responding to the economic downturn of COVID, released Horizon 23, an economic recovery roadmap to increase investment competitiveness In the past five years, civil society organizations have not provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Andorra established Andorra Business, a public/private agency, made up of several ministries, government agencies, associations, and organizations from the private sector. It aims to increase competitiveness, innovation, and sustainability. It provides counseling services to Andorran companies and potential foreign investors to facilitate investment and economic diversification. Andorran regulations allow for two types of commercial companies: Limited Liability Company (Societat de Responsabilitat Limitada – SL), which has a minimum capital requirement of 3,000 euros; and Joint Stock Company (Societat Anonima – SA) which is normally required for multiple shareholders and has a minimum capital requirement of 60,000 euros. The business establishment procedures and for share acquisitions or transfers are quite similar to those of other countries, requiring the filling of a simple application form, with the additional unique condition of the presentation of any prior investment authorization received in the country. This same procedure is applicable for incorporation, establishment, extension, branching, or other form of business expansion. Once the company is registered, the foreign investment is established, and the investor is required to deposit the share capital with an Andorran banking entity and proceed to public deed of incorporation before a notary. The Government’s Andorra Business programs provide grants, counseling, and online resourced to small and medium size companies to foster competitiveness and facilitate internationalization. The Andorran Chamber of Commerce ( www.ccis.ad ) helps companies search for business opportunities abroad and organizes, with the government, trade missions to explore international business exchanges. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Andorra has bilateral agreements with France (2003), Spain (2003), and Portugal (2007). No bilateral investment treaty exists between Andorra and the United States. Andorra has signed Tax Information Exchange agreements for the exchange of fiscal information with 24 countries. All those agreements have been ratified and are in force. In 2014, Andorra became the 48th signatory to the OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, which commits countries to end bank secrecy for tax evasion purposes. Andorra is a member of the OECD’s Inclusive Framework base erosion profit shifting (BEPS). Additionally, Andorra ratified the Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which came into effect January 1, 2022. Andorra signed a Non-Double Taxation agreement with France, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, San Marino, and Hungary and is currently negotiating other such agreements. 3. Legal Regime Andorra set out transparent policies and laws, which have significantly liberalized all economic sectors in Andorra. New foreign-owned businesses must be approved by the government and the process can take up to a month. Andorra is committed to a transparent process. Andorra has begun to relax labor and immigration standards; previously, foreign professionals had to establish 20 years of residency before being eligible to own 100 percent of their business in Andorra. This restriction has been lifted for nationals coming from countries that have reciprocal standards for Andorran citizens. Following approval of the new Accounting Law in 2007, individuals carrying out business or professional activities, trading companies, and legal persons or entities with a profit purpose must file financial statements with the administration. Although not a member of the European Union (EU), Andorra is a member of the European Customs Union and is subject to all EU free trade regulations and arrangements regarding industrial products. Concerning agriculture, the EU allows duty free importation of products originating in Andorra. Andorra is negotiating a new association agreement with the European Union alongside Monaco and San Marino that will allow Andorrans to establish themselves in Europe and Andorran companies will be able to trade in the EU market. Andorra holds observer status at the WTO, although it took steps in the past for full membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Andorra became the 190th member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October 2020. Andorra has a mixed legal system of civil and customary law with the influence of canon law. The judiciary is independent from the executive branch. The Supreme Court consists of a court president and eight judges, organized into civil, criminal, and administrative chambers. Four magistrates make up the Constitutional Court. The Tribunal of Judges and the Tribunal of the Courts are lower courts. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed in the national court system. The Law on Foreign Investment (10/2012) entered into force in 2012, opening the country’s economy by removing the sectorial restrictions stipulated in the prior legislation. In this way, Andorra has positioned itself on equal terms with neighboring economies, enabling it to become more competitive for new sectors and enterprises. On March 2022, Andorra approved a sanctions package in line with EU sanctions against designated Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities. Andorra Business is responsible for economic promotion and provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures to set up a business in Andorra, as well as reporting requirements to investors. The organization also provides other services to facilitate foreign and local investments in strategic sectors. The Law on Effective Competence and Consumer Protection (13/2013) protects investors against unfair practices. The Ministry of Economy is responsible for administering anti-trust laws and reviews transactions for both domestic and international competition-related concerns. The Law of Expropriation (1993) allows the Government to expropriate private property for public purposes in accordance with international norms, including appropriate compensation. We know of no incidents of expropriation involving the U.S. entities in Andorra. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Andorra became a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in September 2015, requiring Andorran courts to enforce financial awards. Andorra is not a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Investor-State Dispute Settlement Andorran legislation establishes mechanisms to resolve disputes if they arise and its judicial system is transparent. The constitution guarantees an independent judiciary branch, overseen by a High Council of Justice. The prosecution system allows for successive appeals to higher courts. The European Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter of unsettled appeals. Contractual disputes between U.S. individuals or companies and Andorran entities are rare, but when they arise are handled appropriately. There have been no reported cases of U.S. investment disputes. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Parties to a dispute can also resolve disputes contractually through arbitration. The Arbitration Court of the Principality of Andorra (TAPA) was established in July 2020 by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services and the Andorran Bar Association in accordance with Law 16/2018. The main goal of this institution is to mediate both national and international business disputes to reach a fair settlement for both parties without having to go to court. Andorra’s bankruptcy decree dates to 1969. Other laws from 2008 and 2014 complement the initial text and further protect workers’ rights to fair salaries and sets up mechanisms to monitor the implementation of judicial resolutions. Additionally, Law 8/2015 outlines urgent measures allowing Government intervention of the banking sector in a crisis. 4. Industrial Policies Andorra has been known for its favorable tax regime, which investors have used to promote products such as tobacco, alcohol, jewelry, cosmetics, and dairy. In recent years, Andorra has reached agreements with neighboring countries to limit and regulate duty-free sales with a view towards promoting economic integration, though smuggling continues to be an issue. Andorra is a member of the European Customs Union and therefore has no tariffs on EU-manufactured goods. Andorra is actively seeking to attract foreign investment and to become a center for entrepreneurs, talent, innovation, and knowledge. For example, Grifols, a large Spanish pharmaceutical multinational, announced that they will establish a new immunology research hub in Andorra. Andorra Business provides grants for small and medium-sized companies to foster competitiveness and facilitate their internationalization. The ActuaTech Foundation was created in 2015, in collaboration with the Media Lab of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), with the aim of employing Andorra’s unique economy as a “living lab” to promote innovation at the country level. Andorra, thanks to its size, recent liberalizing legislation, relative affluence, and its eight million visitors per year, offers ideal conditions to test this technology (https://ari.ad/en). The United States Embassy and Consulate in Spain launched the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE) in April 2022 aimed at fostering women entrepreneurship in Andorra ( https://www.andorrabusiness.com/programa-awe/). In May 2021, three of the country´s research and innovation entities merged to become a single public body: Andorra Research + Innovation, integrated by the Andorran Studies Institute, Andorra´s Sustainability Observatory, and Actua Innovation. This public entity seeks to generate knowledge, provide solutions for sustainable development, and contribute to the diversification of the Andorran economy. Although not a full member of the European Union (EU), Andorra, as a member of the European Customs Union, is subject to all EU free trade regulations and arrangements regarding industrial products. Moreover, the EU allows duty free importations of products acquired by visitors in Andorra in the framework of the franchises covered in the Customs Union Agreement (1990). Concerning agriculture, the EU allows duty free importation of products originating in Andorra. No free trade zones exist in the country. All employees wishing to work in Andorra must have work permits issued by annual quotas established by the Andorran government. Both domestic and foreign private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises. While foreigners may now own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. For a foreign resident, the process for obtaining permissions takes up to one month and is automatically approved if there are no objections. An application can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. As soon as the foreign investor receives authorization to invest in the country, national laws are applicable just like any other national investor. Andorra does not follow a “forced localization” policy. 5. Protection of Property Rights The constitution guarantees the right to private ownership for citizens and residents. Both domestic and foreign private entities now have the right to establish and own business enterprises. Andorran law protects property rights with enforcement carried out at the administrative and judicial levels. Foreign investments for the purchase of property are possible in Andorra, subject to prior authorization. There is a four percent asset-transfer tax. Secured property loans are available through the Andorran banking sector. The Andorran Financial Authority (AFA) oversees the banking sector, including mortgages ( https://www.afa.ad/en ). Andorra joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1994 and is party to the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, as well as the Rome Convention since 2004. Andorra is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but holds observer status. The country’s intellectual property rights (IPR) regime is not in compliance with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Protection of IPR in Andorra is weak. The legal framework includes the Trademarks Act of May 1, 1995, the Law 26/2014 on Patents of October 30 the Law on Authors’ and Neighboring Rights of June 1999, and Law 23/2011, of December 29, 2011, on the Creation of the Society of Collective Management of Copyright and Neighboring Rights. In 2012, the Society for the Administration of Authors’ Rights (SDADV) was created to manage the economic rights, neighboring rights, and the interests of copyright holders. Right holders can choose whether to participate in this voluntary collective arrangement though in some cases, the collective arrangement system is compulsory. Businesses seeking to register a trademark or patent should contact the Andorran Trademarks Office and Patents Office. Trademarks and Patents Office of the Principality of AndorraMinistry of EconomyEdifici Administratiu del Prat del RullCami de la Grau s/nAD 500 Andorra La VellaTel. (376) 875 600Email: ompa@govern.ad http://www.ompa.ad/ Andorra is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report nor included in the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Andorran financial sector is efficient and is one of the main pillars of the Andorran economy, representing 20 percent of the country’s GDP and over 5 percent of the workforce. Created in 1989, and redefined with more responsibilities in 2003, the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA; www.afa.ad ) is the supervisory and regulatory body of the Andorran financial system and the insurance sector. The AFA is a public entity with its own legal status, functionally independent from the Government. AFA has the power to carry out all necessary actions to ensure the correct development of its supervision and control functions, disciplinary and punitive powers, treasury and public debt management services, financial agency, international relations, advice, and studies. The Andorran Financial Intelligence Unit (UIFAND) was created in 2000 as an independent organ to deal with the tasks of promoting and coordinating measures to combat money laundering, terror financing, and the proliferation of weapons ( www.uifand.ad ). The State Agency for the Resolution of Banking Institutions (AREB) is a public-legal institution created by Law 8/2015 to take urgent measures to introduce mechanisms for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions ( www.areb.ad ). Andorra adopted the use of the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since July 1, 2013, Andorra has had the right to mint Euro coins. The Andorra banking system is sound and considered the most important part of the financial sector. It represents 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The Andorran banks offer a variety of services at market rates. The main lines of business in the banking sector are retail banking, private banking, and asset management and insurance. The country also has a sizeable and growing market for portfolio investments. The country does not have a central bank. The sector is regulated and supervised by the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA). The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has certified all the Andorran banks as qualified intermediaries. Founded in 1960, the Association of Andorran Banks (ABA; https://www.andorranba nking.ad/) represents Andorran banks. Among its tasks are representing and defending interests of its members, watching over the development and competitiveness of Andorran banking at national and international levels, improving sector technical standards, cooperation with public administrations, and promoting professional training, particularly dealing with money laundering prevention. At present, all five Andorran banking groups are ABA members, totaling an estimated 51.7 billion Euros in combined assets for 2021. Foreign Exchange Andorra adopted the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since 2013, Andorra has the authority to mint Euro coins. Remittance Policies There are no limits or restrictions on remittances provided that they correspond to a company’s official earning records. Andorra has no Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). 8. Responsible Business Conduct Andorra has taken steps to promote responsible business conduct, including Law 35/2008, which establishes a protocol for non-discrimination and equal opportunities for men and women and a gender-equality law approved in April 2022 that among other requirements sets a 60% ceiling for gender representation on governing boards. Over the years, the Andorran banking sector has been consolidating its voluntary responsible business conduct practices, mainly through their foundations. Rather than focus on a due diligence approach to lower risks, as promoted by international guidelines such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or UN Guidance on Business and Human Rights, the banking sector establishes private initiatives to promote responsible business conduct in a variety of areas like culture, sports, solidarity, education, and the environment. There are no reported cases of human or labor rights concerns related to responsible business conduct. The government of Andorra updated its National Energy Strategy Against Climate Change in February 2021. The national strategy commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by a minimum of 37 percent by 2030 and pursuing carbon neutrality by 2050. Andorra is responsible for an estimated 0.001 percent of global emissions, a figure that has continued to decrease since 2005. Since 2018, Andorra has implemented an energy transition law, approved the national strategic plan for the implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, approved the declaration of a state of climate and ecological emergency, established a National Commission for Energy and Climate Change, and updated the National Energy Strategy for the Fight Against Climate Change The government of Andorra approved the Green Fund, through Law 21/2018, to encourage plans and actions for the development of climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Earmarked green taxes, complementary budgetary allocations, donations and contributions received, and any other potential income sustains the fund ( https://www.govern.ad/taxaverda ). Andorra has created a price for carbon as an additional element of the general branch of the excise tax on hydrocarbons whose use generates or is likely to generate greenhouse gas emissions. 9. Corruption Andorra’s laws penalize corruption, money laundering, drug trafficking, hostage taking, sale of illegal arms, prostitution, terrorism, as well as the financing of terrorism. Additional amendments were added in 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2016 to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code that modify and introduce money laundering and terrorism financing provisions. In 1994, Andorra joined the Council of Europe, an institution that oversees the defense of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. That same year, the Justice Ministers of the Member States decided to fight corruption at the European level after considering that the phenomenon posed a serious threat to the stability of democratic institutions. In early 2005, Andorra joined the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in its fight against corruption. Andorra has gradually built its internal regulations and relevant legal instruments and has undertaken numerous initiatives to improve the State’s response to reprehensible acts and conduct committed internally and internationally. Andorra created the Unit for the Prevention and the Fight against Corruption (UPLC) in 2008 to centralize and coordinate actions that might concern local administrations, national bodies, and entities with an international scope. UPLC is responsible for implementing the recommendations made by GRECO. Andorra has not signed the UN Anticorruption Convention or the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. There are explicitly defined rules for the ethical behavior of all participating bodies within the Andorran financial system. The Andorran Financial Authority (AFA) has also established rules regarding ethical behavior in the financial system. The Andorran government modified and implemented new laws to comply with international corruption standards. The Andorran Financial Intelligence Unit (UIFAND), created in 2000 is an independent body charged with mitigating money laundering and terrorist funding ( www.uifand.ad ). Resources to Report Corruption: Unitat de Prevencio i Lluita contra la Corrupcio Ministeri de Justicia i Interior Govern d’Andorra Ctra.de l’Obac s/n AD700 Escaldes-Engordany Phone: +376 875 700 Email: uplc_govern@govern.ad 10. Political and Security Environment Andorra has not experienced any politically motivated damage to projects or installations, or destruction of private property. There are no nascent insurrections, belligerent neighbors, or other politically motivated activities. The likelihood of widespread civil disturbances is very low. Civil unrest is generally not a problem in Andorra. No anti-American sentiment is evident in the country. 11. Labor Policies and Practices All employees wishing to work in Andorra must have work permits, issued by annual quotas established by the government. The tourism sector is the largest labor sector. The Andorran constitution recognizes workers’ rights to form trade unions to defend their economic and social interests. Alternative dispute mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration do exist. Despite these rights, union membership is relatively low. Andorra is not a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO). There were a total of 42,931 employed workers in Andorra in December 2021. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate increased from 1.8 percent in 2019 to 3 percent in 2020 but improved to 2.2 percent as of the fourth quarter of 2021. The government of Andorra approved a 3.3 percent increase in the minimum wage that went into effect January 1, 2022, bringing it to 6.68 euros (roughly USD 7.40) per hour and 1,158 euros (roughly USD 1,283) per month. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Data unavailable. Data unavailable. 14. Contact for More Information ECON Officer, Omar Medina, medinao@state.gov POL/ECON Specialist, Eulalia d’Ortado; OrtadoE@state.gov United States Consulate General Barcelona tel. (34) 93 280 22 27 Angola Executive Summary The Angolan economy emerged from five straight years of recession with slight GDP growth of 0.7 percent in 2021, thanks primarily to growth in the non-oil sector. The government forecasts more substantial growth of 2.4 percent in 2022. The oil and gas sector remains the key source of government revenue despite declining oil production and the government should benefit from higher than budgeted oil prices in 2022. The growth in non-oil sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, transportation will be bolstered by increased demand from the lifting of COVID restrictions in late 2021 and early 2022. The Angolan government has maintained a reform agenda since the 2017 election of President Joao Lourenço. His administration has adopted measures to improve the business environment and make Angola more attractive for investment. Angola completed the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility in December 2021, demonstrating an ability to commit to and carry out difficult fiscal and macroeconomic reforms, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The government received three credit rating upgrades between September 2021 and early 2022. In addition to the Privatization Program (PROPRIV), revision of the Private Investment Law, and updated Public Procurement law, the government has taken steps to recover misappropriated state assets – the Attorney General’s Office claims just under $13 billion since 2018 – and to uproot corruption. Through the Private Investment and Export Promotion Agency (AIPEX), Angola seeks to connect foreign investors with opportunities across the private sector, with PROPRIV, and a wide range of available state-owned enterprises and other assets. The public procurement process has also become more transparent. Angola plans to present its candidacy to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2022 to increase transparency in the oil, gas, and mineral resource sectors. Despite the government’s efforts to address corruption, its prevalence remains a key issue of concern for investors. Angola’s infrastructure requires substantial improvement; which the government is seeking to address by attracting investment public-private partnerships to improve and manage of ports, railroads, and key energy infrastructure. The justice system and other administrative processes remains bureaucratic and time-consuming. Unemployment (32.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021) and inflation (which reached 27 percent in 2021) remain high. There is limited technical training, English-speaking skills are generally low. Skilled labor levels are also low, though the government has attempted to address the issue through training and apprenticeship programs. Overall FDI increased by $2.59 billion in 2020, the last full year of reporting, from 2019. The government has committed to reaching 70 percent installed renewable energy by 2025 and has recognized the risks of climate change for Angola. To reach its renewable energy goal, the government has signed deals with U.S. companies on the installation of solar and hydro capacity worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 132 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-578 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2140 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Angola is actively seeking FDI to diversify capital inflows, boost economic growth, and diversify the country’s economy. Angola has maintained its privatization program (PROPRIV), started in 2019, despite the difficulty attracting investment during the COVID-19 pandemic. PROPRIV offers investment opportunities for foreign investment in state-owned enterprises and other publicly owned assets as the government seeks to liquidate its stake in assets across sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, and banking. Angola has also modernized its tendering process to make it more transparent. Despite the increased openness and concerted effort to attract foreign investors, Angola passed local content regulations for the oil sector in October 2020 restricting the concept of “national company” to companies fully owned by Angolan citizens, as opposed to a companies with at least 51 percent ownership by Angolan entities. The regulation has three regimes determining the types of services that must be contracted with local entities and which can be contracted with foreign entities. The local content regulations apply to all companies providing goods and services to oil sector as well as oil companies. Angola’s trade and investment promotion agency AIPEX provides an online investment window platform for investors to register their investment proposals. AIPEX and the Institute of State Assets and Shares work together on roadshows to promote PROPRIV for foreign investors. AIPEX is also responsible for providing institutional support and monitoring investment project execution. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises with limitations on foreign entities holding the majority stake in companies in specific sectors. The 2018 Private Investment Law (PIL) establishes the general principles of private investment in Angola for domestic and foreign investors and applies to private investments of any value. Under the PIL, the acquisition of shares of an Angolan entity by a foreign investor is deemed to be a private investment operation. If the investor wishes to transfer funds abroad, the private investment project must be properly registered and executed, and appropriate taxes must be paid before transferring. Majority foreign shareholding restrictions persist in specific industries such as the oil and gas sector (49 percent cap) and the maritime sector, specifically for shipping, due to their significance in the Angolan economy. Mining rights are granted to private investors by the national diamond company ENDIAMA. The PIL lifted restrictions on having Angolan partners for several strategic sectors such as he telecommunications, hospitality and tourism, transportation and logistics, and information technology. At the government’s request, the last Investment Policy Review (IPR) of Angola’s business and economic environments was completed in 2019 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The full report and policy recommendations are accessible at UNCTAD TPR . The WTO’s last IPR was more than five years ago; OECD has never conducted an IPR of Angola. There are no recent policy recommendations by civil society organizations based on reviews of investment policy related concerns. Presidential Decree No 167/20, of June 15, 2020, created the “ Single Investment Window ” (Janela Única de Investimento, or JUI), which is aimed at simplifying the contact between the investor and all the public entities involved in the approval of foreign investment projects. To incorporate a company, investors must obtain a certificate of availability of the corporate name from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; deposit share capital and show proof of deposit to a notary; submit a draft incorporation deed, articles of association, and shareholder documents. The company must then register with the Commercial Registrar to register the company’s incorporation in the Angola’s Official Gazette (Diário da República). Despite efforts to reduce the bureaucracy related to incorporating a business, it still takes around 30 days to incorporate. The business then must register with Tax Authority , the National Institute for Statistics , and the National Institute for Social Security . The business can then initiate licensing procedures. Angola is also negotiating with the EU on a Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement , the EU’s first bilateral agreement on investment facilitation. The sides have had two rounds of negotiations in June and December 2021. The agreement intends to simplify procedures and encourage e-governance and public-private dialogue, while diversifying Angola’s economy and helping small and medium sized enterprises invest. Its goal is to support Angola’s ability to attract and retain investment by improving the investment climate for foreign and local investors. The Angolan government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict Angolans from investing abroad. Investors are free to invest in any foreign jurisdiction. Domestic investors often prefer to invest in Portuguese-speaking countries, with few investing in neighboring countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of investment is in real estate, fashion, fashion accessories, and domestic goods. Due to foreign exchange constraints, there has been very limited investment abroad by domestic investors. 3. Legal Regime Angola’s regulatory system is complex, vague, and inconsistently enforced. In many sectors, no effective regulatory system exists due to a lack of institutional and human capacity. The banking system is slowly beginning to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). SOEs are still far from practicing IFRS. The public does not participate in draft bills or regulations formulation, nor does a public online location exist where the public can access this information for comment or hold government representatives accountable for their actions. The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM) is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector and regulates prices for telecommunications services such as mobile telephone, internet, and TV services, particularly in sectors without much competition. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have permitted some purchase power agreements (PPA) participation. Overall, Angola’s regulatory system does not conform to other international regulatory systems. Angola became a member of the WTO in 1996. However, it is not party to the Plurilateral Agreements on Government Procurement, or the Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement and it has not yet notified the WTO of its state-trading enterprises under Article XVII of the GATT. A government procurement management framework introduced in late 2010 stipulates a preference for goods produced in Angola and/or services provided by Angolan or Angola-based suppliers. Technical Barriers to Trade regimes are not coordinated. Angola conducts distinct bilateral negotiations with seven of the nine full members of the Community of Portuguese Language countries (CPLP), Cuba, and Russia and extends trade preferences to China due to previously negotiated credit facilitation terms, while attempting to encourage and protect local content. Regulatory reviews are based on scientific, or data driven assessments or baseline surveys. Evaluations are based on data, but not made available for public comment. The state reserves the right to have the final say in all regulatory matters and relies on sectorial regulatory bodies for supervision of institutional regulatory matters concerning investment. The Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers oversees investment regulations that affect the country’s economy including the ministries in charge. Other major regulatory bodies responsible for getting deals through include: The National Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) is the government regulatory and oversight body responsible for regulating oil exploration and production activities. On February 6, 2019, the parastatal oil company Sonangol launched ANPG through Presidential decree 49/19. The ANPG is the national concessionaire of hydrocarbons in Angola, authorized to conduct, execute, and ensure oil, gas, and biofuel operations run smoothly, a role previously held by state owned Sonangol. The ANPG must also ensure adherence to international standards and establish relationships with other international agencies and sector relevant organizations. The Regulatory Institute of Electricity and Water Services (IRSEA) is the regulatory authority for renewable energies and enforcing powers of the electricity regulatory authority. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have improved legal protection for investors to attract more private investment in electrical infrastructure, such as dams and hydro distribution stations. The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM) is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector including for prices for telecommunications services. As of October 1, 2019, a 14 percent VAT regime came into force, replacing the existing 10 percent Consumption Tax. For The General Tax Administration (AGT) oversees tax operations and ensures taxpayer compliance. The new VAT tax regime aimed to boost domestic production and consumption and reduce the incidence of compound tax for businesses unable to recover the consumption tax. The government introduced a temporary reduction of the VAT in October 2021 for key items in the basic basket of goods to 7 percent. The temporary measure should run at least through 2022. Corporate taxpayers can be reimbursed for the VAT on the purchase of good and services, including imports. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, and the government does not allow the public to engage in the formulation of legislation or to comment on draft bills. Procurement laws and regulations are unclear, little publicized, and not consistently enforced. Oversight mechanisms are weak, and no audits are required or performed to ensure internal controls are in place or administrative procedures are followed. Inefficient bureaucracy and possible corruption frequently lead to payment delays for goods delivered, resulting in an increase in the price the government must pay. No regulatory reform enforcement mechanisms have been implemented since the last ICS report. The Diário da República (the Federal Register equivalent) publishes official regulatory action. The Ministry of Finance’s Debt Management Unit has a portal with quarterly public debt reports, debt strategy, annual debt plan, bond reports, and other publications in Portuguese and in English for the quarterly reports and the debt plan, though it does not have regular reporting on contingent liabilities. Regionally, Angola is a member of SADC and ECCAS, though it is not a member of SADC’s Free Trade Area or of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) the customs union associated with ECCAS. New regulations are generally developed in line with regulatory provisions set by AfCTA, SADC, and ECCAS. Standards for each organization can be found at their respective websites: AfCTA: https://au.int/en/cfta ; SADC: SADC Standards and Quality Infrastructure ; ECCAS: https://ceeac-eccas.org/en/#presentation Angola is a WTO member but does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regimes are not coordinated and often trade regulations are passed and implemented without the due oversight of the WTO. Angola’s legal system follows civil law tradition and is heavily influenced by Portuguese law, though customary law often prevailed in rural areas. Legislation is the primary source of law. Precedent is accepted but not binding as it is in common-law countries. The Angolan Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy of legislation and establishes the general principle of separation of powers between the judicial, executive, and legislative power. Primary judicial authority in Angola is vested in its courts, which have institutional weaknesses that include lack of independence from political influence in the decision-making process at times. The Angolan justice system is slow, arduous, and often partial. Legal fees are high, and most businesses avoid taking commercial disputes to court in the country. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 survey ranked Angola 186 out of 190 countries on contract enforcement, and estimated that commercial contract enforcement, measured by time elapsed between filing a complaint and receiving restitution, takes an average of 1,296 days, at an average cost of 44.4 percent of the claim. Angola has commercial legislation that governs all contracts and commercial activities but no specialized court. On August 5, 2020, the Economic Council of Ministers approved the opening of the Court for Litigation on Commercial, Intellectual, and Industrial Property Matters, at the Luanda First Instance Court. With the introduction of this commercial court, the GRA hopes the business environment and trust in public institutions will improve. Prior to this arrangement, trade disputes were resolved by judges in the Courts of Common Pleas. The commercial legislation provides that before going to court, investors can challenge the decision under the terms of the administrative procedural rules, either through a complaint (to the entity responsible for the decision) or through an appeal (to the next level above the entity responsible for the decision). In the new system, investors will be able, in general, to appeal to civil and administrative courts. Investors exercising their right to appeal, however, should expect decisions to take months, or even years, in the case of court decisions. Angola enacted a new Criminal Code and a new Criminal Procedure Code which entered into force on February 9, 2021, to better align the legal framework with internationally accepted principles and standards, with an emphasis on white-collar crimes and corruption. The legal reforms extend criminal liability for corruption offenses and other crimes to legal entities; provide for private sector corruption offenses to face similar fines and imprisonment to the punishments applicable to the public sector, and modernize and broaden the list of criminal offenses against the financial system. The legal system lacks resources and independence, limiting the effectiveness of the reforms. There is a general right of appeal to the Court of First Instance against decisions from the primary courts. To enforce judgments/orders, a party must commence executive proceedings with the civil court. The main methods of enforcing judgments are: Execution orders (to pay a sum of money by selling the debtor’s assets). Seizure of assets from the party and Provision of information on the whereabouts of assets. The Civil Procedure Code also provides for ordinary and extraordinary appeals. Ordinary appeals consist of first appeals, review appeals, interlocutory appeals, and full court appeals, while extraordinary appeals consist of further appeals and third-party interventions. Generally, an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decision of the lower court unless expressly provided for as much in the Civil Procedure Code. Angola’s legal system is becoming more favorable to FDI and has generally not allowed FDI in specific sectors such as military and security, activities of the Central Bank, and key infrastructure port and airport infrastructure. Under PROPRIV the government has encouraged FDI in ports and airports through management and operation tenders. Investment values exceeding $10 million require an investment contract that needs to be authorized by the Council of Ministers and signed by the President. AIPEX, Angola’s investment and export promotion agency, maintains the Janela Única do Investimento (Single Investment Window), which serves as Angola’s one-stop-shop for investment. Mergers and acquisitions, including those which take place through the sale of state-owned assets, are reviewed by the Institute of Asset Management and State Holdings (IGAPE) and competition related concerns receive oversight by the Competition Regulatory Authority (the “CRA”) which is also responsible for prosecuting offenses. Competition is also regulated by the Competition Act of 2018, which prohibits cartels and monopolistic behavior. A leniency regime was added in September 2020 to reduce fines for the first party to come forward under specific conditions. CRA decisions are subject to appeal, though Angola does not have special courts of jurisdiction to deal with competition matters. Angola’s Competition Act creates a formal merger control regime. Mergers are subject to prior notification to the CRA, and they must meet certain specified requirements. The thresholds requiring prior notification are the following: the creation, acquisition, or reinforcement of a market share which is equal to or higher than 50 percent in the domestic market or a substantial part of it; or the parties involved in the concentration exceeded a combined turnover in Angola of 3.5 billion Kwanzas in the preceding financial year; or the creation, acquisition, or reinforcement of a market share which is equal to or higher than 30 percent, but less than 50 percent in the relevant domestic market or a substantial part of it, if two or more of the undertakings achieved more than 450 million Kwanzas individual turnover in the preceding financial year. Mergers must not hamper competition and must be consistent with public interest considerations such as: a particular economic sector or region. the relevant employment levels. the ability of small or historically disadvantaged enterprises to become competitive; or the capability of the industry in Angola to compete internationally. Under the revised Law of Expropriations by Public Utility (LEUP), which came into force in October 2021, real property and any associated rights can be expropriated for specific public purposes listed in the LEUP in exchange for fair and prompt compensation to be calculated pursuant to the act. Only property strictly indispensable to achieve the relevant public purpose can be expropriated. The LEUP does not apply to compulsory eviction, nationalization, confiscation, easements, re-homing, civil requisition, expropriation for private purpose, temporary occupation of buildings, destruction for public purpose and revocation of concessions. Save for the urgent expropriation instances specifically set forth in the act, the LEUP enshrines the primacy of acquisition through private-law mechanisms, providing for a negotiation process between the expropriating entity – national or local government – and the relevant citizen or private-law entity. Despite the reforms, expropriation without compensation remains a common practice with idle or underdeveloped areas frequently reverting to the state with little or no compensation to the claimants who paid for the land, who in most cases allege unfair treatment and at times lack of due process. Angola’s Law on Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency went into force on May 10, 2021, representing the first amendment to bankruptcy legislation since 1961. The law regulates the legal regime of extrajudicial and judicial recovery of the assets of natural and legal persons in economic distress or imminent insolvency, provided recovery is viable and the legal regime of insolvency proceedings of natural and legal persons. The law permits the conservation of national and foreign investment since investors know they have a legal remedy that has as its purpose the preservation of the company. 4. Industrial Policies The Private Investment Law (PIL) of 2021 included amendments allowing for negotiation of tax incentives between state and potential investors. The PIL also eliminated the investment value and the value required to qualify for incentives in foreign and local investments, previously set at USD 1,000,000 and USD 500,000 respectively. It also eliminates the requirement for foreign investors to establish a partnership with an Angolan entity with at least a 35 percent stake in the capital structure of investments in the electricity and water, tourism, transport and logistics, construction, media, telecommunications, and IT sectors. Investors can determine their own capital structure in those sectors under the current law. Angola does not yet have a legislation which offers incentives to green investment. The PIL restructures the country into three economic development zones (zones A through C) determined by political and socio-economic factors, up from two as per the 2015 investment law. For Zone A, investors have a three-year moratorium on taxes reduced between 25- 50 percent of the tax levied on the distribution of profits and dividends. For Zone B, it is between three to six years with a 50 to 60 percent tax reduction, and for Zone C between six to eight years with a tax reduction between 60-70 percent of the tax levied on distribution of profits and dividends. The Free Trade Zones Law (FTZL) passed October 12, 2020. The FTZL establishes benefits to be offered to investors by the Angolan Government in exchange for meeting specific monetary, job creation, or other investment requirements on a per contract basis. Investors are granted use of the Free Zone for 25 years and can receive industrial tax and VAT benefits, customs rights, as well as land and capital benefits for investing in a Free Zone. Investments made in Free Zones must consider environmental protection interests. Investors are allowed to carry out industrial activities, agriculture, technology activities, as well as commercial and service activities. It is possible to carry out other activities which are not specified by the FTZL, provided that such activities target an international market and relevant authorities authorize the activities. Industrial activities should use Angolan raw materials and be focused on exports). The GRA follows “forced localization” in the oil and gas sector where foreign investors in the sector must use domestic goods and tertiary services as stipulated in decree 271/20 of October 20, 2020. The Local Content Law covers all companies providing goods and services to oil sector, as well as the oil companies themselves. Commercial relations for the oil and gas sector continue to be divided into an “Exclusivity Regime”, “Preference Regime”, and a “Competitive Regime. Under the Exclusivity Regime, oil and gas companies must contract wholly owned Angolan commercial companies. Under the Preference Regime, the contracted company must be incorporated in Angola, and under the Competitive Regime, there is contractual freedom in sourcing the company. The specific goods and services falling under the Exclusivity and Preference regimes must be listed by the National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) – the national concessionaire – annually. In addition, all companies operating in any segment of the petroleum-sector value chain are required to present an Annual Local Content Plan to the ANPG. Local content regulations offer guidelines that are only loosely enforced, and companies lack clarity on how to satisfy the Angolan government’s requirements. While the lack of enforcement may make it easier for foreign companies to comply with local content regulations, the lack of specificity challenges their business planning. For example, it is difficult for companies to compare their competitive position against each other when competing for lucrative concessions and licenses from the government, as local content is sometimes considered during competition for government tenders. Legal guidance to get the guarantees for investors under the PIL is strongly encouraged. Regulations around data storage, management, and encryption are still at nascent stages. The Institute for Communications of Angola (INACOM) oversees and regulates data in liaison with the Ministry of Telecommunications. The President of Angola passed Decree No. 214/16 on October 10, 2016, establishing the organizational framework of the data protection authority. The Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (‘MTTI’) announced, on October 9, 2019, that the National Database Protection Agency (APD) had become operational. The APD issued the first license to a private credit agency in February and collaborates with other governments and private sector entities to train Angolan public officials on data protection. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights enforcement remains difficult, given that the Land Law (Lei de Terras de Angola) has not been revised since its approval in December 2004 and two-thirds of Angolans are directly dependent on land property rights due to their work in agriculture. Normalization of land ownership in Angola persists with problems such as difficulties in completing land claims, land grabbing, lack of reliable government records, and unresolved status of traditional land tenure. Among other provisions, the Land Law includes a formal mechanism for transforming traditional land property rights into legal land property rights (clean titles), since a transparent system of land property rights enforcement did not exist before the civil war ended in 2002. Foreigners are permitted to hold land in Angola through acquisition or lease under the 2004 Land Law. The Land Law sets out requirements for all potential landholders to acquire land, with the main distinctions for foreign entities being the type of identification (passport) a foreign citizen must produce. Mortgages exist but can be difficult to obtain. According to the Land Law, the State may transfer or constitute, for the benefit of Angolan natural or legal persons, a multiplicity of land rights on land forming part of its private domain. Although, it is possible to transfer ownership over some categories of land, the transfer of State land almost never implies the transfer of its ownership, but only the formation of minor land rights with leasehold being the most common form. The recipient of private property rights from the State can only transfer those rights with the consent of the local authority and after a period of five years of effective use of the land. Weak land tenure legislation and lack of secure legal guarantees (clean titles) are the reasons given by most commercial banks for their greater than 80 percent refusal rate for loans since land is used as collateral. Foreign real-estate developers therefore seek out public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements with State actors who can provide protection against land disputes and financial risks involved in projects that require significant cash outlays to get started. Registering parcels of land over 10,000 hectares must be approved by the Council of Ministers. Registering property takes 190 days on average, ranking 167 out of 173 according to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 survey, with fees averaging three percent of property value. Owners must wait five years after purchasing before reselling land. There are no written regulations setting out guidelines defining different forms of land occupation, including commercial use, traditional communal use, leasing, and private use. Over the years, the government has given out large parcels of land to individuals to support the development of commercial agriculture. However, this process has largely proceeded in an unsystematic way and does not follow any formal rule change on land tenure by the State. Before obtaining proof of title nationwide, an Angolan citizen or an Angolan legal entity must also obtain the Real or Leasing Rights (“Usufruct”) of the Land from the Institute of Planning and Urban Management of Luanda (IPGUL), an often-time-consuming procedure that can take up to a year or more. However, if a company already owns the land, it must secure a land property title deed from the Real Estate Registry in Luanda. The local registry – if the property is not in the capital – then produces an updated property certificate (certidão predial) with the complete description of the property including owner(s) information and any charges, liens, and/or encumbrances pending on the property. The complex administration of property laws and regulations that govern land ownership and transfer of real property as well as its tedious registration process may reduce investor appetite for real estate investments in Angola. Dispatch no. 174/11 of March 11, 2011, mandates the total fees for the property certificate include stamp duty (calculated according to the Law on Stamp Duty); justice fees (calculated according to the Law on Justice Fees); fees to justice officers (according to the set contributions for the Justice budget); along with notary and other fees. The total fee is also dependent on the current value of the fiscal correction unit (UCF), set at 88 kwanzas. Domestic enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights can be difficult due to lack of resources and competing priorities, but the National Authority of Economic Inspection and Food Safety (ANIESA) was able to identify and break up a network of businesses selling counterfeit cosmetic products in early 2021. Authorities traced the source of the products to DRC, highlighting concerns about lack of border measures to intercept counterfeits. The Angolan Government signed an agreement with Portugal in October 2021 to jointly combat counterfeit medicines. In December 2021, ANIESA suspended the operations of three factories (located in Viana, Kikuxi, and Benfica) for producing counterfeit Havaianas-branded sandals. Trademark registration is mandatory to be granted rights over a mark. Angolan trademarks are valid for 10 years from the filing date and renewable for further periods of 10 years. The Instituto Angolano de Propriedade Intelectual (IAPI) is the governmental body within the Ministry of Industry & Commerce charged with implementing patent and trademark law. The Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Environment oversees copyright law. Regarding patents, additional fees are due for each claim after the 15th. Additionally, the request for the anticipation or postponement of the publication of a patent is now provided by the new applicable fees. Angola is not listed in United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 report nor the notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Foreign portfolio investment is still new in Angola, but the government is seeking to increase it. The National Bank of Angola (BNA) abolished the licensing previously required to import capital from foreign investors allocated to the private sector and export income associated with such investments. This measure compliments the need to improve the capture of FDI and portfolio investment and it is in line with the privatization program for public companies (PROPRIV) announced through Presidential Decree No. 250/19 of August 5, 2019, which encourages foreign companies to purchase state-owned assets the government is liquidating. BNA has also stopped requiring a license to export capital resulting from the sale of investments in securities traded on a regulated market and the sale of any investment, in which the buyer is also not – foreign exchange resident, pursuant to Notice No. 15/2019. The BNA is increasingly removing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Angola’s Debt and Securities Stock Exchange (BODIVA), planned to be privatized by 2022, trades an equivalent in local currency (kwanzas) of USD 2 billion a year. In view of policies adopted by the institution, BODIVA predicts an increase in the volume of trades. The stock exchange has 23 commercial banks and two brokerages as members, which operate mainly in government denominated Treasury Bonds. BODIVA allows the trading of different types of financial instruments through an electronic auction platform to investors with rules (self-regulation), systems (platforms), and procedures that assure market fairness and integrity to facilitate portfolio investment. The Capital Markets Commission, the regulator, is updating its own supervisory framework while looking to provide new services and attract more individual investors to the capital markets. Presently, only local commercial banks can list on the nascent stock exchange. According to the Capital Markets Commissioner, portfolio investment by individuals only represents 16 percent of BODIVA’s equity. Through the ongoing privatization program, the government announced in February its intent to sell 30 percent of the stocks it has invested in BODIVA by the end of 2022, with plans to sell the rest in phases in 2023 and 2024. Credit is partially allocated on market terms. Since the revision of the PIL in 2021, domestic credit is accessible to foreign investors and companies that are majority foreign held (this was previously only possible after implementation of the investment project). For Angolan investors, credit access remains limited. In 2020, however the BNA directed commercial banks to increase the minimum amount of subsidized credit that they must make available to borrowers 2 percent of their assets to 2.5 percent by the end of 2020 to accelerate the diversification of domestic production. The private sector has access to a variety of conventional credit instruments provided by commercial banks. Forty-seven percent of Angola’s income-earners utilize banking services, with 80 percent being from the urban areas. Angola is over-banked for the size of its economy. Although four banks have been closed since 2018, 26 banks still operate in Angola. The banking market remains marked by concentration and limited financial inclusion. The top six banks control nearly 80 percent of sector assets, loans and deposits, but the rest of the sector includes many banks with minimal scale and weak franchises. The total number of customers in the six largest banks is 9.9 million. Angola’s largest bank Banco Angolano de Investimentos has an asset value of approximately USD 5.5 billion. Angola has a central banking system. The banking sector largely depends on monetary policies established by Angola’s central bank, the National Bank of Angola (BNA). Thanks to the ongoing IMF economic and financial reform agenda, the BNA is adopting international best practices and slowly becoming more autonomous. On February 13, 2021, President Joao Lourenco issued a decree granting autonomy to the BNA in line with IMF recommendations. Since that time, the bank has made decision on monetary, financial, credit, and foreign exchange policies without political influence, while also maintaining its oversight, regulatory, and supervisory role of the institutions in the financial system. The reforms taken under the Lourenco administration have lessened the political influence over the BNA and allowed it to more freely adopt strategies to build resilience from external shocks on the economy. As Angola’s economy depends heavily on oil to fuel its economy, so does the banking sector. The BNA periodically monitors minimum capital requirements for all banks and orders the closure of non-compliant banks. Credit availability is limited and often supports government-supported programs. The GRA obliges banks to grant credit more liberally in the economy, notably by implementing a Credit Support Program (PAC). For instance, the BNA first issued a notice obliging Angolan commercial banks to grant credit to national production equivalent at a minimum to 2.5 percent of their net assets in 2020 and extended the notice through the end of 2022. Although the RECREDIT Agency purchased non-performing loans (NPLs) of the state’s parastatal BPC bank, NPLs remain high at 23 percent, a decrease of 9 percent since 2017. The country has not lost any additional correspondent banking relationships since 2015. At the time of issuing this report no correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group is evaluating Angola’s anti-money laundering regime. A positive result could lead private foreign banking institutions to reestablish correspondent banking relationships. Most transactions go via third party correspondent banking services in Portugal banks, a costly option for all commercial banks. Foreign banking institutions are allowed to operate in Angola and are subject to BNA oversight. The Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) was established in 2012 with $5 billion USD in support from the petroleum sector. The fund was established in accordance with international governance standards and best practices as outlined in the Santiago Principles. As of March 2021, the FSDEA reported $2.97 billion USD. Angola is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently 81 public enterprises listed on the State Institute of Asset and Shares Management website; 70 are wholly owned by the state, 8 with majority-ownership for the state and 3 with minority stakes for the government. A list of all of Angola’s SOEs can be found at the following link: https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sector-empresarial-publico/universo-do-sep . Based on the IMF definition of government owning at least 50 percent equity and revenue being greater than 1 percent of GDP, SONANGOL, the state oil company, and Sodiam, the state diamond company qualify as SOEs. There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government. Other public enterprises operate in the agribusiness, oil and gas, financial services, and construction sectors as well as others. The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. Angola began its privatization program (PROPRIV) in 2019, with an aim to privatize 195 assets by 2022. By January, the government had privatized 73 assets and raised $1.7 billion in revenue through the program despite COVID-19 pandemic-imposed hurdles. The program is supervised by State Institute of Asset and Shares Management (IGAPE) and will implemented through the Angolan Debt and Securities Exchange Market (BODIVA). The government plans to partially privatize the state-owned telecommunications company and the national oil company Sonangol, as well as the national airline TAAG, and companies in the extractives sector, health, manufacturing, and agriculture. The privatization process is open to interested foreign investors and the government has improved the transparency of the bidding process. The government has an “electronic auction” site where investors can submit their bids for the various tenders: https://leilaoigape.minfin.gov.ao/ . 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of expectations of or standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) or obligation to conduct due diligence to ensure no harm with regards to environment, social and governance issues. Projects that could have an impact on the environment are subject to an environmental impact assessment (EIA) depending on their nature, size or location, on a case-by-case basis. Presidential Decree No 117/20 of April 22, 2021 establishes the: Rules and procedures for EIAs for public and private projects. Environmental licensing procedure for activities that are likely to cause significant environmental and social impacts. Applicable fees. Fines for non-compliance. The government has few initiatives to promote responsible business conduct. In March 2019, the UNDP launched the National Network of Corporate Social Responsibility, “RARSE,” to create a platform to reconcile responsible business conduct with the needs of the population. The government, through the Ministry of Education, also held a campaign under the theme, “Countries that have a good education, that enforce laws, condemn corruption, privilege and practice citizenship, have as a consequence successful social and economic development” in 2020. The government has enacted laws to prevent labor by children under 14 and forced labor, although resource limitations hinder adequate enforcement. In June 2018, the government passed a National Action Plan for the Eradication of Child Labor (PANETI) (2018-2022) to eradicate the worst forms of child labor. This plan was updated on March 17, 2022 and is implemented by the Multisectoral Commission for the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor. The National Plan aims to eliminate child labor in Angola, by creating strategies, prevention policies, a favorable environment for the harmonious development of children, and creating institutional capacity to solve the problem of worst forms of child labor in the country. With limitations, the laws protect the rights to form unions, collectively bargain, and strike. Government interference in some strikes has been reported. The Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security has a hotline for workers who believe their rights have been infringed. Angola’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry established the Principles of Ethical Business in Angola. The GRA does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons but is made significant efforts to do so, especially considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. Those efforts led to Angola remain on Tier 2 in 2021. Some of the efforts taken by Angolan authorities include convicting multiple traffickers, including five complicit officials, and sentencing all to imprisonment; offering long-term protective services that incentivized victims to participate in trials against their traffickers; dedicating funds specifically for anti-trafficking efforts, including for implementation of the national action plan; and conducting public awareness campaigns against trafficking. In 2015, Angola organized an interagency technical working group to explore Angola’s possible membership in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Angola formally announced its intention to join the EITI in September 2020 and in November 2021 announced its intention to formally present its candidacy in March 2022. Angola has been a member of the Kimberley Process (KP) since 2003 and chaired the KP in 2015. Angola is not a party to the WTO’s GPA and does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate for SOEs. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . According to Article 5 of Decree No. 51/04 of July 23, 2004, every project (private or public) must present an Environmental Impact Study to the Ministry of Environment for their approval. Angola aims to address the impacts of climate change as stated in its National Development Plan . It includes the main goals and actions to tackle current and future impacts on important sectors for economic development and for environmental sustainability. In addition, the National Strategy for Climate Change (2018–2030) includes five pillars on mitigation, adaptation, capacity building, funding, and institutional coordination. In addition, the Government of Angola has ratified the UNFCCC and developed and submitted its National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs). Angola has not made firm commitments or introduced policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Angola prioritizes the implementation of adaptation measures in coastal zones, land use, forests, ecosystems and biodiversity, and water resources. On mitigation, Angola aims to reach 70 percent of installed renewable energy by 2025 and to sequester 5 million tons of CO2e per year through reforestation by 2030. Angola, like many African countries, needs access to abundant, always available, and cost-effective power to support economic growth. As part of a path towards sustainable transition, Angola needs to reduce emissions from its existing fossil fuel facilities. The Forest and Fauna law 06/17 of January 24, 2017, has significantly changed how natural forests are managed in the country, introducing the concept of forest concessions for the first time, allowing for a more rational use of forest resources. Recognizing the potential of the blue economy, the government has expanded the mandate of the Ministry of Fisheries to cover issues of the sea, launched a marine spatial plan to address conflicting uses of marine resources, and is planning to establish the first marine protected area in the country. In addition, the government has started the preparation of guidelines to regulate private concessions in protected areas, as an effort to attract private investments in nature-based tourism and has also established the Kavango Agency to ensure further multi-sectoral coordination in the management of the high-sensitive Kavango watershed. The Strategic Plan for the Protected Areas System of 2018 (PESAP 2018) is the most recent policy document for protected areas. The plan focuses on measures to allow fundraising, train staff, and strengthen institutions such as the National Institute for Biodiversity and Protected Areas. It also emphasizes the importance of maintaining the socioeconomic and financial sustainability of conservation areas. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a strong impediment to doing business in Angola and has had a corrosive impact on international market investment opportunities and on the broader business climate. The Lourenço administration has developed a comprehensive anti-corruption and anti-money laundering legal framework, but implementation remains a challenge. Angola has made several arrests of former officials and family members of the former president who were accused of embezzling state funds and has made a concerted effort to recover assets it accuses those individuals of stealing. Some of the recent anti-corruption legislation includes: The revised Criminal Law Code and Criminal Procedure Code, which both entered into force in February 2021: The updated laws include corporate criminal liability; harsh penalties for active and passive corruption by public officials, their family members, and political parties; criminalization of private sector corruption; and seizure of proceeds. The updated Public Procurement Law, which entered into force on December 23, 2020, emphasizes the management of potential conflicts of interest in awarding public contracts, including the requirement for foreign investors to have a local partner, which historically made procurement ripe for bribery and kickbacks. The Whistleblower Protection Law, which came into force on January 1, 2020, provides a protection system – including anonymity – for victims, witnesses, and the accused during judicial proceedings that involve corruption and/or money laundering allegations. The government does not require the private sector to establish internal codes of conduct and does not provide a mechanism for reporting irregularities related to public officials. U.S. firms in Angola are aware of cases of corruption in Angola despite efforts to combat the phenomenon and view it as a significant impediment to FDI. Corruption in Angola is pervasive in public institutions, government procurement customs and taxation. Foreign investors seeking to do business in Angola must remain mindful of the corruption risks and the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. FCPA. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Hélder Pitta Grós Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General of the Republic) Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General’s Office) Travessa Antonio Marques Monteiro 22, Maianga Telephone: 244-222333 172 Sebastiao Domingos Gunza Inspector General of State Administration Office of the Inspector General of State Administration Rua 17 de Setembro, Luanda, Angola +244 993 666 338 10. Political and Security Environment Angola maintains a stable political environment, though demonstrations and workers strikes occur with regularity, particularly in the last two years due to increased socio-economic difficulty. Politically motivated violence is not a high risk, and incidents are rare. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda—Military Position (FLEC MP) based in the northern province of Cabinda threatened Chinese workers in Cabinda in 2015 and claimed in 2016 that they would return to active armed struggle against the Angolan government forces. No attacks have since ensued and the FLEC has remained relatively inactive to date. Local elections were anticipated to take place in 2020 but have not yet occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of key legislation governing the elections. General elections are scheduled to occur in August 2022. Young people take to the streets occasionally to protest economic hardship and what they view as unrealized political pledges. Large pockets of the population live in poverty without adequate access to basic services. Crimes of opportunity such as muggings, robberies and car-jackings occur across the country. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In the fourth quarter of 2021, the unemployment rate for economically active Angolans 15 years and older – who represent half of Angola’s 33 million people – was 32.9 percent. The labor market in Angola is largely characterized by high unemployment and a high level of informality. There is also a deficit of skilled and well-trained labor, especially in the industrial sector due to the low level of vocational training. The foreign/migrant labor force bridges the gap in specialized labor. The Angolan labor force also has limited technical skills, English language capabilities, and management training. Companies in the construction and manufacturing sectors are significant sources of formal and informal mechanisms for workers to acquire skills and abilities particularly relevant to public and private construction works and manufacturing industry. In the fourth quarter of 2021, the economically active population in Angola age 15 years and older was estimated to be approximately 16.2 million people (48.3 percent male and 51.7 female). Over 80 percent of the employed population in Angola was estimated to work in the informal sector as of the fourth quarter of 2021, equal to around 8.8 million people out of the 10.9 million people 15 years of age and older and employed in the same period. Informal employment was highest among Angolans aged 15-24 years and 65 years or older – reaching over 90 percent. The unemployment rate for women was also 90 percent for women and 71.5 percent for men. There are gaps in compliance with international labor standards which may pose a reputational risk to investors. Children are sometimes employed in agriculture, construction, fishing, and coal industries. There have been reports of forced labor in agriculture, construction, artisanal diamond mining, and domestic work, each sometimes as a result of human trafficking. Additional information is available in the 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, (https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/angola/), 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/angola/), and 2020 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The General Labor Law 7 of September 15, 2015, governs all aspects of the employment relationship and provides guidelines on employment adjustments to respond to fluctuations in market or economic conditions. The law differentiates between layoffs and firing. However, there are unemployment insurance mechanisms in place or social safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. All forms of termination must rely on Social Security contributions along the years of employment in due course as the benefits are not readily available at termination but only when the beneficiaries reach retirement age or become physically impaired to maintain employment status. All employers and unions may enter into collective bargaining agreements under the Law on the Right to Collective Bargaining (20-A/92). Where there is no union representation, the employees may set up an ad hoc commission aimed at negotiating and concluding a collective bargaining agreement with the employer, subject to complex requirements. If more than one union represents an employer’s employees, the unions must set up a joint negotiation committee composed of representatives from each union in the same proportion as the employees are represented. The negotiation process for a collective bargaining agreement must be finalized within 90 days of the employer receiving the union/employees’ initial proposal. If this process is unsuccessful, the Law on the Right to Collective Bargaining provides for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve collective labor conflicts – notably conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Unions/employees may call a strike if the negotiations are deadlocked when the deadline for reaching an agreement passes. A collective bargaining agreement requires all the parties to maintain social peace while it is in force, rendering illegal any strike action or collective labor conflict during that period. Once the effective period has elapsed, the agreement shall continue to bind the parties until it is replaced by a new or amended collective bargaining agreement. Collective labor disputes are to be settled through compulsory arbitration by the Ministry of Labor, Public Administration and Social Security. The law does not prohibit employer retribution against strikers, but it does authorize the government to force workers back to work for “breaches of worker discipline” or participation in unauthorized strikes. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination and stipulates that worker complaints be adjudicated in the labor court. Under the law, employers are required to reinstate workers who have been dismissed for union activities. 14. Contact for More Information Dorcas Makaya Economic Specialist United States Embassy Luanda +244 222 641 000 MakayaDC@state.gov Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) statistics, Antigua and Barbuda’s 2021 estimated gross domestic product (GDP) was $1.47 billion (3.97 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars). This represents an approximate 5.3 percent growth from 2020. The ECCB forecasts 2022 growth at 4.7 percent. Unanticipated spending on pandemic response measures, coupled with sharp declines in government revenues, forced the government to increase borrowing in 2020. As of December 2021, Antigua and Barbuda reported total public sector debt of $1.3 billion representing 89 percent of GDP. Unlike other Eastern Caribbean (EC) countries, Antigua and Barbuda did not have the resources to significantly increase spending on social support payments to vulnerable populations. Following several years of operating losses, the government became the sole source of financing for regional airline Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) in mid-2020. Based in Antigua and Barbuda, LIAT was heavily overstaffed and therefore a major employer, but is now under the supervision of a bankruptcy trustee. Antigua and Barbuda ranks 113th out of 190 countries rated in the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report. The scores remain relatively unchanged from the 2019 report, though some improvements in the ease of starting a business were highlighted. Through the Antigua and Barbuda Investment Authority (ABIA), the government encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign exchange. The ABIA facilitates and supports foreign direct investment in the country and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. All potential investors are afforded the same level of business facilitation services. While the government welcomes all foreign direct investment, tourism and related services, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, information and communication technologies, business process outsourcing, financial services, health and wellness services, creative industries, education, yachting and marine services, real estate, and renewable energy have been identified by the government as priority investment areas. There are no limits on foreign control of investment and ownership in Antigua and Barbuda. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Antigua and Barbuda’s legal system is based on British common law. There is currently an unresolved dispute regarding the alleged expropriation of an American-owned property. For this reason, the U.S. government recommends continued caution when investing in real estate in Antigua and Barbuda. In 2017, the government signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Antigua and Barbuda to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 7.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 16,420 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Antigua and Barbuda encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, enhance economic activity, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Diversification of the economy remains a priority. Through the ABIA, the government facilitates and supports foreign direct investment in the country and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. All potential investors are afforded the same level of business facilitation services. ABIA offers complementary support services to investors exploring business opportunities, including facilitation of incentives and concessions, project monitoring, and general assistance. The government launched an additional website in early 2021 to serve as a “business hub for potential investors,” http://antiguabarbuda.com . While the government welcomes all foreign direct investment, it has identified tourism and related services, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, information and communication technologies, business process outsourcing, financial services, health and wellness services, creative industries, education, yachting and marine services, real estate, and renewable energy as priority investment areas. Uncertainty about the trajectory of economic recovery of the tourism, commercial aviation, and cruise industries impacts the potential for projects in those sectors. Local laws do not place any limits on foreign control of investment and ownership in Antigua and Barbuda. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Local and foreign entrepreneurs need approximately 40 days from start to finish to transfer the title on a piece of property. In 1995, the government established a permanent residency program to encourage high-net-worth individuals to establish residency in Antigua and Barbuda for up to three years. As residents, their income is free of local taxation. In 2020, the government established the Nomad Digital Residence Visa program in which eligible remote workers can apply for a two-year special resident authorization. Under this program, the visa holders are also exempt from paying local income taxes. These programs are separate from the Citizenship by Investment program. The ABIA evaluates all foreign direct investment proposals applying for government incentives and provides intelligence, business facilitation, and investment promotion to establish and expand profitable business enterprises. The ABIA also advises the government on issues that are important to the private sector and potential investors to increase the international competitiveness of the local economy. The government of Antigua and Barbuda treats foreign and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The OECS, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. Established in 2006, the ABIA facilitates foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. The ABIA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It also offers an online guide that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. The guide is available at https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/antiguabarbuda . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the ABIA to ensure the project is consistent with national interests and provides economic benefits to the country. To register a business. the general practice is to retain a local attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. A business must register with the Intellectual Property and Commercial Office, the Inland Revenue Department, the Medical Benefits Scheme, the Social Security Scheme, and the Board of Education. The Antigua and Barbuda Science Innovation Park (ABSIP) launched in 2019 to support and create business startup opportunities that will generate sustainable business enterprises. ABSIP provides business incubation and financing, access to business financing, branding, training, partnership establishment, and other services. ABSIP’s website is http://absip.gov.ag . The Prime Minister’s Entrepreneurial Development Programme (EDP) supports the creation of micro and small businesses with the intent of increasing the Antiguan and Barbudan ownership share of the country’s economy. Priority sectors in which EDP grants loans are agriculture and agro-processing, manufacturing, information technology, e-business, and tourism. Although the government of Antigua and Barbuda prioritizes investment return as a key component of its overall economic strategy, there are no formal mechanisms in place to achieve this. To sustain future economic growth, Antigua and Barbuda’s economy depends on significant foreign direct investment. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Antigua and Barbuda are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME). 3. Legal Regime The government of Antigua and Barbuda publishes laws, regulations, administrative practices, and procedures of general application and judicial decisions that affect or pertain to investments or investors in the country. Where the government establishes policies that affect or pertain to investments or investors that are not expressed in laws and regulation or by other means, the national government has committed to make them publicly available. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lie with the bicameral parliament of the government of Antigua and Barbuda. The House of Representatives has 19 members, 17 of whom are elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, one of whom is an ex-officio member, and one of whom is Speaker. The Senate has 17 appointed members. Respective line ministries develop relevant national laws and regulations, which are then drafted by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Laws relating to the ABIA and the Citizenship by Investment program are the main laws relevant to foreign direct investment. This website contains the full text of laws already in force, as well as those Parliament is currently considering. While some draft bills are not subject to public consideration, input from stakeholder groups may be considered. The government encourages stakeholder organizations to support and contribute to the legal development process by participating in technical committees and providing comments on drafts. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession. The constitution provides for the independent Office of the Ombudsman to guard against abuses of power by government officials. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints about acts or omissions by government officials that violate the rights of members of the public. The ABIA has primary responsibility for investment supervision, and the Ministry of Finance, Corporate Governance and Public-Private Partnerships monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. The ABIA can revoke an issued Investment Certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the Investment Authority Act and its regulations. Antigua and Barbuda’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to implement all appropriate measures to fulfill its various treaty obligations. The eight member states and territories of the ECCU tend to enact laws uniformly, though minor differences in implementation may exist. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties and other sanctions. The February 2022 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Antigua and Barbuda to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions in Antigua and Barbuda registered under the Banking Act of 2015. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda subscribes to principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Antigua and Barbuda is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under the authority of the OECS, unless it seeks specific concessions to do otherwise. As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade and is obligated to notify the Committee of any draft new and updated technical regulations. The Antigua and Barbuda Bureau of Standards is a statutory body that prepares and promulgates standards in relation to goods, services, processes, and practices. Antigua and Barbuda ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2017. The TFA is intended to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Antigua and Barbuda has implemented a number of TFA requirements, but it has also missed two implementation deadlines. Antigua and Barbuda bases its legal system on the British common law system. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and rules on constitutional law issues. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The final appellate authority is the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Antigua and Barbuda is only subject to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda is a party to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body which resolves disputes over WTO agreements. Courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Antigua and Barbuda brought a case before the WTO against the United States concerning the cross-border supply of online gambling and betting services. The WTO ruled in favor of Antigua and Barbuda, but agreement on settlement terms remains outstanding. The ABIA provides guidance on the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. These are available at http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/antiguabarbuda . The ABIA may grant concessions as specified in the Investment Authority Act Amended 2019. These concessions are listed on Antigua and Barbuda’s iGuide website. Investors must apply to ABIA to take advantage of these incentives. Under the Citizenship by Investment program, foreign individuals can obtain citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship by Investment Act of 2013, which grants citizenship (without voting rights) to qualified investors. Applicants are required to undergo a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. The minimum contribution for investors under the program is $100,000 (270,225 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the National Development Fund for a family of up to four people and $125,000 (337,818 Eastern Caribbean dollars) for a family of five, with additional contributions of $15,000 (40,538 Eastern Caribbean dollars) per person for up to four additional family members. Individual applicants can also qualify for the program by buying real estate valued at $400,000 (1,081,020 Eastern Caribbean dollars) or more or making a business investment of $1.5 million (4,053,825 Eastern Caribbean dollars). Alternatively, at least two applicants can propose to make a joint investment in an approved business with a total investment of at least $5 million (13.5 million Eastern Caribbean dollars). Each investor must contribute at least $400,000 (1,081,020 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the joint investment. Citizenship by investment investors must own real estate for a minimum of five years before selling it. A fourth option involves a contribution of $150,000 (405,383 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the University of the West Indies (UWI) Fund for a family of six people, which entitles one member of the family to a one-year tuition-only scholarship at UWI’s Five Islands campus. All applicants must also pay relevant government and due diligence fees, and provide a full medical certificate, police certificate, and evidence of the source of funds. Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission (CCC) to rule on complaints of anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as collusion between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Community, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within the Community. Antigua and Barbuda does not have any legislation regulating competition. The OECS agreed to establish a regional competition body to handle competition matters within its single market. The draft OECS bill has been submitted to the Ministry of Legal Affairs for review. According to the Investment Authority Act of 2006, investments in Antigua and Barbuda will not be nationalized, expropriated, or subject to indirect measures having an equivalent effect, except as necessary for the public good, in accordance with the due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis, and accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Compensation in such cases is the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation or the impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is earlier. Compensation includes interest from the date of dispossession of the expropriated property until the date of payment and is required to be paid without delay. There is an unresolved dispute regarding the 2007 expropriation of an American-owned property. Following the expropriation, the owners initiated legal action to enforce their rights under Antigua and Barbuda’s Land Acquisition Act. A 2014 Privy Council court decision ordered the Government of Antigua and Barbuda to pay the former property owners $39.8 million in compensation. The government has only paid approximately $20 million as of June 2021, and the property owners have continued to pursue multiple legal remedies to compel the government to pay the outstanding balance. Antigua and Barbuda appealed a 2018 court decision in favor of the claimants; legal proceedings are ongoing. The government has not made any additional payments to the claimants since 2015. The claimants continue to pursue recourse in other jurisdictions and in Antigua and Barbuda, with the latest legal filings in 2020. The outstanding debt is currently $19.1 million with daily accruing interest. Because of Antigua and Barbuda’s failure to fully compensate the owners as required by its own laws, the U.S. government recommends continued caution when investing in real estate or any other venture in Antigua and Barbuda. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1975), Antigua and Barbuda has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. The full text of the legislation can be found on the government’s website . 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Antigua and Barbuda granted certain concessions specified in the Investment Authority Act Amended 2019. These concessions provide exemption or reduction on various taxes and fees, including corporate income tax, withholding tax, stamp duty on land transfers, and import duties on vehicles and construction materials. The length and/or scale of concession is based on company and investment size. These incentives cover capital investment in agriculture, fisheries, agribusiness, business process outsourcing, energy, health and wellness, manufacturing, creative, financial services, information and communications technology, and tourism sectors. Investors must apply to the ABIA to take advantage of these incentives. Investments in healthcare, tourism, infrastructure development, renewable energy, education, and other projects considered important for economic development may receive incentives and/or concessions determined by the ABIA and Cabinet of Antigua and Barbuda if they are over $55.6 million (150.26 million Eastern Caribbean dollars) in size. The Government of Antigua and Barbuda has been proactively pursuing public-private partnerships through the National Asset Management Company (NAMCO). NAMCO is a wholly owned government entity that holds the government’s stake in joint ventures and manages the investment proceeds that accrue. The government established the Antigua and Barbuda Free Trade and Processing Zone (Free Zone) in 1994. A commission, acting as a private enterprise, administers the Free Zone. The Free Zone is part of a government initiative to diversify the economy. The commission is mandated to attract investment in priority areas. As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda is party to the Agreement to the Trade Related Investment Measures. While there are no formal performance requirements, the government encourages investments that will create jobs and increase exports and foreign exchange earnings. There are no requirements for participation either by nationals or by the government in foreign investment projects. There is no requirement that enterprises must purchase a fixed percentage of goods or technology from local sources, but the government encourages local sourcing. Foreign investors receive the same treatment as citizens. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (for example, backdoors into hardware and software or keys for encryption). 5. Protection of Property Rights The government owns 55 percent of Antigua’s land, and the remaining 45 percent is privately owned. The Lands Division in the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries and Barbuda Affairs is the custodian of Crown lands on behalf of the government. Historically, the residents of Barbuda owned all land on Barbuda communally, however the recent appropriation of land for new development projects has resulted in legal challenges to this system. In the aftermath of 2017’s Hurricane Irma, the government attempted to introduce a private property system by amending and repealing the Barbuda Land Act and replacing it with the Crown Land Regulation Act, which would allow private ownership of land in Barbuda by non-Barbudans. Barbudan representatives have filed a legal challenge to the constitutionality of this legislation in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. Therefore, the Crown Land Regulation Act has not yet taken effect. Citizens and non-citizens can lease or buy land on the island of Antigua from the government or the private sector. Land sold to non-citizens is subject to the Non-Citizen Land Holding Regulation Act, which requires buyers to obtain a license to purchase land. Buyers are advised to consult with a local attorney. All land titles and purchases must be registered at the Land Registry. The Town and Country Planning office of the Development Control Authority designates land use areas, including for commercial, agricultural, industrial, or tourism use. The government’s Free Trade and Processing Zone manages land and facilities which are geared towards attracting foreign direct investment in export sectors. Because Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the ECCU, lending institutions in Antigua and Barbuda generally follow the guidelines published by the ECCB. However, the lack of capital market depth in the sub-region makes the use of securitization difficult. Antigua and Barbuda has an extensive legislative framework supporting the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), however, enforcement efforts are inconsistent. Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works. Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME commits all 15 members to implement stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA contains the most detailed obligations regarding intellectual property in any trade agreement to which Antigua and Barbuda is a party. The EPA recognizes the protection and enforcement of IPR. Article 139 of the EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties, and of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).” As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda recognizes the WTO TRIPS Agreement. The Comptroller of Customs leads enforcement and prevention efforts against counterfeit goods, which include detention, seizure, and forfeiture. The Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda has extensive powers of search and seizure in the investigation of alleged infringements and has the power to confiscate suspected infringing copies. Antigua and Barbuda is not included in the United States Trade Representative 2022 Special 301 Report or the 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector As a member of the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda is also a member of the Eastern Caribbean Stock Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing securities market activities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Antigua and Barbuda is open to portfolio investment. Antigua and Barbuda accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. The government normally does not grant foreign tax credits except in cases where taxes are paid in a Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Antigua and Barbuda taxes, or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity services, and trade credits, as well as other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the 1983 agreement establishing the ECCB. The ECCB controls Antigua and Barbuda’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act (2015) is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Minsters of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Antigua and Barbuda. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assessments including effects of the pandemic are not yet available. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.07 billion (5.6 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019 and remained relatively consistent during the previous year. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was 6 percent of deposit liabilities. Antigua and Barbuda is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services offered. Some people still participate in informal community group lending, but the practice is declining. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue. Antigua and Barbuda’s Digital Assets Business Bill 2020 created a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital asset businesses, clients, and customers. The bill states that all digital asset businesses in the country must obtain a license for issuing, selling, or redeeming virtual coins, operating as a payment service or electronic exchange, providing custodial wallet services, among other activities. The government aspires to develop Antigua and Barbuda into a regional center for blockchain and cryptocurrency. At the end of 2020, over 40 major businesses accepted bitcoin cash. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Antigua and Barbuda in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. Neither the government of Antigua and Barbuda nor the ECCB, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Antigua and Barbuda are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they are not designed for competition. The government established many SOEs to create economic activity in areas where the private sector is perceived to have little interest. SOEs are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. In 2016, Parliament passed the Statutory Corporations (General Provisions) Act, which specifies ministerial responsibilities in the appointment and termination of board members, decisions of the board, and employment in these SOEs. To promote diversity and independence on SOE boards, professional associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society may nominate directors for boards. Antigua and Barbuda does not have a targeted privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible business conduct by producers and consumers is positively regarded in Antigua and Barbuda. The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including in support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. The NGO community, while comparatively small, is involved in fundraising and volunteerism in gender, health, environmental, and community projects. The government at times partners with NGOs in their activities and encourages philanthropy. Antigua and Barbuda is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Antigua and Barbuda remains susceptible to natural disasters and other effects due to climate change. Antigua and Barbuda has developed a multi-stakeholder policy on the environment that focuses on climate resilience and adaptation, disaster risk reduction, protection of biodiversity, effective natural resources and environmental management through the enforcement of policies, legislation and regulations. The Environment Protection and Management Act was amended in 2019 to create an updated institutional and administrative framework that codifies all decisions on environmental and climate-related issues. Antigua and Barbuda is party to the Paris Agreement. In 2021, the government updated its Nationally Determined Contribution to the United Nations to signal its commitment to becoming a low- emission resilient country. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implements these laws if corruption is proven. Allegations of corruption against government officials in Antigua and Barbuda are common. Both major political parties frequently accuse the other of corruption, but investigations yield few results. Antigua and Barbuda is party to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. The Integrity in Public Life Act requires all public officials to disclose all income, assets (including those of spouses and children), and personal gifts received while in public office. An integrity commission, established by the act and appointed by the Governor General, receives and investigates complaints regarding noncompliance with or violations of this law or of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As the only agency charged with combatting corruption, the commission was independent but understaffed and under-resourced. Critics stated the legislation was inadequately enforced and that the act should be strengthened. The Office of National Drug and Money Laundering Control Policy is the independent law enforcement agency with specific authority to investigate reports of suspicious activity concerning specified offenses and the proceeds of crime. The Freedom of Information Act granted citizens the statutory right to access official documents from public authorities and agencies and created a commissioner to oversee the process. In practice, citizens found it difficult to obtain documents, possibly due to government funding constraints rather than obstruction. The act created a special unit mandated to monitor and verify disclosures. By law, the disclosures are not public. There are criminal and administrative sanctions for noncompliance. 10. Political and Security Environment Antigua and Barbuda does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. Elections are peaceful and regarded as being free and fair. The next general elections are constitutionally due by May 2023. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Updated figures for the employed labor force for 2021 remain unavailable. According to available World Bank statistics, the adult literacy rate is 99 percent. The labor code dictates that the minimum working age is 16 years. People under 18 must have a medical clearance to work and may not work later than 10 p.m. The Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, and Labour conducts periodic workplace inspections to enforce this law. The labor commissioner’s office also has an inspectorate that investigates child labor allegations. The labor code dictates that workers have the right to associate freely and to form labor unions. Approximately 60 percent of formal sector workers belong to a union. Unions are free to conduct activities without government interference. Labor unions form an important part of the membership of both political parties. The law provides for the right of public and private sector workers to organize and bargain collectively without interference. The labor code provides for the right to bargain collectively and conduct legal strikes, though there are several restrictions on the right to strike. Essential workers must provide two weeks’ notice of intent to strike. Once the party to a dispute requests court mediation, strikes are prohibited under penalty of imprisonment. Because of the delays associated with this process, unions often resolve labor disputes before calling a strike. The Industrial Relations Court may issue an injunction against a legal strike when the national interest is threatened or affected. The law prohibits retaliation against strikers. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, but it does not specifically require reinstatement of workers illegally fired for union activity. The labor code provides that the Minister of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, and Labour may issue orders, which have the force of law, to establish a minimum wage. The minimum wage is $3.03 (8.18 Eastern Caribbean dollars) an hour for all categories of labor. In practice, the great majority of workers earn substantially more than minimum wage. The customary standard workweek is 40 hours in five days. The law provides that the employer may not require workers to work more than a 48-hour, six-day workweek, and provides for 12 paid annual holidays. The law requires that employees be paid one and a half times the employees’ basic wage per hour for overtime work in excess of the standard workweek. The Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, and Labour put few limitations on overtime, allowing it in temporary or occasional cases, but did not allow employers to make regular overtime compulsory. Investors in Antigua and Barbuda are required to maintain workers’ rights and safeguard the environment. While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the Labour Code provides general health and safety guidelines to labor inspectors. The Labour Commission settles disputes over labor abuses, health, and safety conditions. The law gives the ministry the authority to require special safety measures, not otherwise defined in the law, to be put in place for worker safety. Antigua and Barbuda is party to the International Labor Convention on Occupational Health and Safety No. 155 of 1981. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued employment. Inspectors then investigate such claims, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to their continued employment. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $1,668 2019 1,687.5 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 7 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 5 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 81.4 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank: https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/gdp-datas/comparative-report/1 Table 3 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Telephone Number: 246-227-4000 Email: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Argentina Executive Summary Argentina presents investment and trade opportunities, particularly in agriculture, energy, health, infrastructure, information technology, and mining. However, economic uncertainty, interventionist policies, high inflation, and persistent economic stagnation have prevented the country from maximizing its potential. The economy fell into recession in 2018, the same year then-President Mauricio Macri signed a three-year $57 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). President Alberto Fernandez and Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s (CFK) took office on December 10, 2019, and reversed fiscal austerity measures, suspended the IMF program, and declared public debt levels unsustainable. In September 2020, Argentina restructured $100 billion in foreign and locally issued sovereign debt owed to international and local private creditors. Together, these transactions provide short-term financial relief by clearing principal payments until 2024. Unable to access international capital markets, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit, further fueling inflation. Although Argentina’s economy rebounded 10.3 percent in 2021, offsetting a 10 percent decline in 2020, the economy remains below pre-recession levels. In 2021, the Argentine peso (official rate) depreciated 17 percent, inflation reached 50.9 percent, and the poverty rate reached 37.3 percent. Even as the pandemic receded and economic activity rebounded, the government cited increased poverty and high inflation as reasons to continue, and even expand, price controls, capital controls, and foreign trade controls. Agricultural and food exports such as beef, soy, and flour were frequent targets for government intervention. Beginning in May 2021, the government introduced bans and other limits on beef exports to address increasing domestic prices. However, the government also implemented incentives for exporters and investors in other industries. It eliminated export taxes for specific businesses and industries, including small and medium sized enterprises; auto and automotive parts exports over 2020 volumes; and information technology service exports from companies enrolled in the knowledge-based economy promotion regime. There were also investment promotion incentives in key export sectors such as agriculture, forestry, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, and mining. The high cost of capital affected the level of investments in developing renewable energy projects, despite the potential for both wind and solar power. In an effort to expand production of oil and natural gas, the current administration provides benefits to the fossil fuel industry that impact the cost-competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. The government has encouraged the use of biofuels and electric vehicles. A proposed Law for the Promotion of Sustainable Mobility includes incentives and 20-year timelines to promote the use of technologies with less environmental impact in transportation. After the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Argentina in March 2020, the country imposed a strict nationwide quarantine that became one of the longest in the world. Argentina reopened its borders to tourists and non-residents on November 21, 2021. Hotel and lodging, travel and tourism, and entertainment activities have reopened, although many businesses went bankrupt during the shutdown. Most of the pandemic-related economic relief measures were phased out during 2021. Both domestic and foreign companies frequently point to a high and unpredictable tax burden and rigid labor laws as obstacles to further investment in Argentina. In 2021, Argentina ranked 73 out of 132 countries evaluated in the Global Innovation Index, which is an indicator of a country’s ability to innovate, based on the premise that innovation is a driver of a nation’s economic growth and prosperity. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Argentina ranked 96 out of 180 countries in 2021, dropping 18 places compared to 2020. As a Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) member, Argentina signed a free trade and investment agreement with the European Union (EU) in June 2019. Argentina has not yet ratified the agreement. During 2021 there was little progress on trade negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, and Canada. Argentina ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on January 22, 2018. Argentina and the United States continue to expand bilateral commercial and economic cooperation to improve and facilitate public-private ties and communication on trade, investment, energy, and infrastructure issues, including market access and intellectual property rights. More than 265 U.S. companies operate in Argentina, and the United States continues to be the top investor in Argentina with more than USD $8.7 billion (stock) of foreign direct investment as of 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 73 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $8.7 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $9,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Argentina identified its top economic priorities for 2022 as reaching an agreement with the IMF to renegotiate the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement, controlling inflation, and continuing the post-pandemic economic recovery. When the Fernandez administration took office in late 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship became the lead governmental entity for investment promotion. The Fernandez administration does not have a formal business roundtable or other dialogue established with international investors, although it does engage frequently with domestic and international companies. Market regulations such as capital controls, trade restrictions, and price controls enhance economic distortion that hinders the investment climate in the country. Foreign and domestic investors generally compete under the same conditions in Argentina. However, foreign investment is restricted in specific sectors such as aviation and media. Foreign ownership of rural productive lands, bodies of water, and areas along borders is also restricted. Argentina has a National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency that provides information and consultation services to investors and traders on economic and financial conditions, investment opportunities, and Argentine laws and regulations. The agency also helps small and medium- sized companies (SMEs) export their products, provides matchmaking services, and organizes roadshows and trade delegations. Upon the change of administration, the government placed the Agency under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to improve coordination between the Agency and Argentina´s foreign policy. The Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion of the MFA works as a liaison between the Agency and provincial governments and regional organizations. The new administration also created the National Directorate for Investment Promotion under the Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion, making the Directorate responsible for promoting Argentina as an investment destination. The Directorate´s mission also includes determining priority sectors and projects and helping Argentine companies expand internationally and/or attract international investment. The agency’s web portal provides information on available services ( https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/ ). The 23 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires also have their own provincial investment and trade promotion offices. Foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law 19,550), the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, and rules issued by the regulatory agencies. Foreign private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in nearly all sectors. Full foreign equity ownership of Argentine businesses is not restricted, for the most part, with exceptions in the air transportation and media industries. The share of foreign capital in companies that provide commercial passenger transportation within the Argentine territory is limited to 49 percent per the Aeronautic Code Law 17,285. The company must be incorporated according to Argentine law and domiciled in Buenos Aires. In the media sector, Law 25,750 limits foreign ownership in television, radio, newspapers, journals, magazines, and publishing companies to 30 percent. Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes that a foreigner cannot own land that allows for the extension of existing bodies of water or that are located near a Border Security Zone. In February 2012, the government issued Decree 274/2012 further restricting foreign land ownership to a maximum of 30 percent of national land and 15 percent of productive land. Foreign individuals or foreign company ownership is limited to 1,000 hectares (2,470 acres) in the most productive farming areas. In June 2016, the Government of Argentina issued Decree 820 easing the requirements for foreign land ownership by changing the percentage that defines foreign ownership of a person or company, raising it from 25 percent to 51 percent of the social capital of a legal entity. Waivers are not available. Argentina does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not at a disadvantage to other foreign investors or singled out for discriminatory treatment. Argentina was last subject to an investment policy review by the OECD in 1997 and the fifth trade policy review by the WTO in September 2021 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp512_e.htm ). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has not done an investment policy review of Argentina. In 2019, automotive sector representatives, including the Association of Automobile Manufacturers (ADEFA, or Asociación de Fábricas de Automotores) and the Asociación of Auto Parts Manufacturers (AFAC, or Asociación de Fábricas Argentinas de Componentes), published Plan 2030, a strategic plan for investment and development in the automotive sector. (http://www.cafas.org.ar/assets/img/noticias/Plan2030.pdf ) In 2022, the Industrial Union of Argentina (UIA, or Unión Industrial Argentina) published a White Book of recommendations to promote development and increase productivity in Argentina. (https://www.uia.org.ar/general/3889/propuestas-para-un-desarrollo-productivo-federal-sustentable-e-inclusivo-libro-blanco/ ) The Rosario Board of Trade (BCR, or Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario) published regular reports and recommendations for agricultural trade and investment policies. ( https://www.bcr.com.ar/es ) In 2019, stemming from the country’s deteriorating financial and economic situation, the Argentine government re-imposed capital controls on businesses and consumers, limiting their access to foreign exchange. The government continued to update and increase both capital controls and taxes on imports and exports throughout 2021, generating continued uncertainty in the business climate. With the stated aim of keeping inflation under control and avoiding production shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government increased market interventions in 2020, creating further market distortions that may deter investment. During 2021, bans and other limits on beef exports were introduced to address rising domestic prices. Argentina currently has s a consumer goods price control program, “Precios Cuidados,” a voluntary program established in 2014.The Argentine Congress also passed the Shelves Law (No. 27,545), which regulates the supply, display, and distribution of products on supermarket shelves and virtual stores. Key articles of the Law are still pending implementing regulations. Private companies expressed concern over the final regulatory framework of the Law, which could affect their production, distribution, and marketing business models. In August 2020, the government issued an edict freezing prices for telecommunication services (mobile and land), cable and satellite TV, and internet services until December 2020, later extending the measure into 2021. Some telecommunication companies appealed through the courts and were granted protection from the edict. The health sector was also subject to limits on price increases. In February 2021, the Secretary of Trade took administrative action against major consumer firms and food producers for purportedly causing supermarket shortages by withholding production and limiting distribution. Companies are currently contesting this decision. In March 2021, the Secretary of Domestic Trade issued Resolution 237/2021 establishing a national registry to monitor the production levels, distribution, and sales of private companies. If companies fail to comply, they could be subject to fines or closure. Tighter import controls imposed by the Fernandez administration have affected the business plans of private companies that need imported inputs for production. The private sector noted increased discretion on the part of trade authorities responsible for both approving import licenses and obtaining access to the foreign exchange market to pay for imports. The Ministry of Production eased bureaucratic hurdles for foreign trade through the creation of a Single Window for Foreign Trade (“VUCE” for its Spanish acronym) in 2016. The VUCE centralizes the administration of all required paperwork for the import, export, and transit of goods (e.g., certificates, permits, licenses, and other authorizations and documents). The Argentine government has not fully implemented the VUCE for use across the country. Argentina subjects imports to automatic or non-automatic licenses that are managed through the Comprehensive Import Monitoring System (SIMI, or Sistema Integral de Monitoreo de Importaciones), established in December 2015 by the National Tax Agency (AFIP by its Spanish acronym) through Resolutions 5/2015 and 3823/2015. The SIMI system requires importers to submit detailed information electronically about goods to be imported into Argentina. Once the information is submitted, the relevant Argentine government agencies can review the application through the VUCE and make any observations or request additional information. The list of products subject to non-automatic licensing has been modified several times since the beginning of the SIMI system. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the government reclassified goods needed to combat the health emergency previously subject to non-automatic import licenses to automatic import licenses. During 2021, the number of non-automatic import licenses did not significantly change, although obtaining dollars from the Argentine Central Bank to pay for imports was often difficult for importers. Approximately 1,500 tariff lines are currently subject to non-automatic licenses. The Argentine Congress approved an Entrepreneurs’ Law in March 2017, which allows for the creation of a simplified joint-stock company (SAS, or Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada) online within 24 hours of registration. However, in March 2020, the Fernandez administration annulled the 24-hour registration system. Industry groups said this hindered the entrepreneurship ecosystem by revoking one of the pillars of the Entrepreneurs’ Law. In December 2020, the government issued the regulatory framework for the Knowledge Based-Economy Law, which was passed in October 2020. The Law establishes tax benefits for entrepreneurs until December 2029. The complete list of activities included in the tax benefit can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do;jsessionid=56625A2FC5152F34ECE583158D581896?id=346218 . Foreign investors seeking to set up business operations in Argentina follow the same procedures as domestic entities without prior approval and under the same conditions as local investors. To open a local branch of a foreign company in Argentina, the parent company must be legally registered in Argentina. Argentine law requires at least two equity holders, with the minority equity holder maintaining at least a five percent interest. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing itself in Argentina must legalize the parent company’s documents, register the incoming foreign capital with the Argentine Central Bank, and obtain a trading license. A company must register its name with the Office of Corporations (IGJ, or Inspección General de Justicia). The IGJ website describes the registration process, and some portions can be completed online (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/justicia/igj/guia-de-tramites ). Once the IGJ registers the company, the company must request that the College of Public Notaries submit the company’s accounting books to be certified with the IGJ. The company’s legal representative must obtain a tax identification number from AFIP, register for social security, and obtain blank receipts from another agency. Companies can register with AFIP online at www.afip.gob.ar or by submitting the sworn affidavit form No. 885 to AFIP. Details on how to register a company can be found at the Ministry of Productive Development’s website: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/crear-una-empresa . Instructions on how to obtain a tax identification code can be found at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/obtener-el-cuit-por-internet . The enterprise must also provide workers’ compensation insurance for its employees through the Workers’ Compensation Agency (ART, or Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo). The company must register and certify its accounting of wages and salaries with the Secretariat of Labor, within the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security. The Ministry of Productive Development offers attendance-based courses and online training for businesses. The training menu can be viewed at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/capacitacion . The National Directorate for Investment Promotion under the Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion at the MFA assists Argentine companies in expanding their business overseas, in coordination with the National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency. Argentina does not have any restrictions regarding domestic entities investing overseas, nor does it incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The Secretary of Strategic Affairs under the Cabinet is in charge of transparency policies and the digitalization of bureaucratic processes as of December 2019. Argentine government authorities and a number of quasi-independent regulatory entities can issue regulations and norms within their mandates. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rulemaking has traditionally been a top-down process in Argentina, unlike in the United States where industry organizations often lead in the development of standards and technical regulations. The Constitution establishes a procedure that allows for citizens to draft or propose legislation, which is subject to Congressional and Executive approval before being passed into law. Ministries, regulatory agencies, and Congress are not obligated to provide a list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals, share draft regulations with the public, or establish a timeline for public comment. They are also not required to conduct impact assessments of the proposed legislation and regulations. All final texts of laws, regulations, resolutions, dispositions, and administrative decisions must be published in the Official Gazette (https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar ), as well as in the newspapers and the websites of the Ministries and agencies. These texts can also be accessed through the official website Infoleg (http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/ ), overseen by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Interested stakeholders can pursue judicial review of regulatory decisions. In September 2016, Argentina enacted a Right to Access Public Information Law (27,275) that mandates all three governmental branches (legislative, judicial, and executive), political parties, universities, and unions that receive public funding are to provide non-classified information at the request of any citizen. The law also created the Agency for the Right to Access Public Information to oversee compliance. During 2017, the government introduced new procurement standards including electronic procurement, formalization of procedures for costing-out projects, and transparent processes to renegotiate debts to suppliers. The government also introduced OECD recommendations on corporate governance for state-owned enterprises to promote transparency and accountability during the procurement process. The regulation may be viewed at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=306769 . In April 2018, Argentina passed the Business Criminal Responsibility Law (27,041) through Decree 277. The decree establishes an Anti-Corruption Office in charge of outlining and monitoring the transparency policies with which companies must comply to be eligible for public procurement. The Argentine government has sought to increase public consultation in the rulemaking process; however, public consultation is non-binding and has been done in an ad-hoc fashion. In 2017, the Government of Argentina issued a series of legal instruments that seek to promote the use of tools to improve the quality of the regulatory framework. Amongst them, Decree 891/2017 for Good Practices in Simplification establishes a series of tools to improve the rulemaking process. The decree introduces tools on ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of regulation, stakeholder engagement, and administrative simplification, amongst others. Nevertheless, no formal oversight mechanism has been established to supervise the use of these tools across the line of ministries and government agencies, which make implementation difficult and severely limit the potential to adopt a whole-of-government approach to regulatory policy, according to a 2019 OECD publication on Regulatory Policy in Argentina. Some ministries and agencies developed their own processes for public consultation by publishing drafts on their websites, directly distributing the draft to interested stakeholders for feedback, or holding public hearings. In November 2017, the Government of Argentina launched a new website to communicate how the government spends public funds in a user-friendly format (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia/transparencia/presupuesto ). The Argentine government also made an effort to improve citizens’ understanding of the budget, through the citizen’s budget “Presupuesto Ciudadano” website: https://www.economia.gob.ar/onp/presupuesto_ciudadano/seccion6.php . The initiative aligns with the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and UN Resolution 67/218 on promoting transparency, participation, and accountability in fiscal policy. Argentina requires public companies to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Argentina is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The government of Argentina does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high and low-quality investments. Argentina is a founding member of MERCOSUR and has been a member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI for Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración) since 1980. Once any of the decision-making bodies within MERCOSUR agrees to apply a certain regulation, each of the member countries must incorporate it into its legislation according to its own legislative procedures. Once a regulation is incorporated in a MERCOSUR member’s legislation, the country must notify MERCOSUR headquarters. Argentina has been a member of the WTO since 1995, and it ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in January 2018. Argentina notifies technical regulations, but not proposed drafts, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Argentina submitted itself to an OECD regulatory policy review in March 2018, which was released in March 2019. The Fernandez administration has not actively pursued OECD accession. Argentina participates in all 23 OECD committees. Additionally, the Argentine Institute for Standards and Certifications (IRAM) is a member of international and regional standards bodies including the International Standardization Organization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Pan-American Commission on Technical Standards (COPAM), the MERCOSUR Association of Standardization (AMN), the International Certification Network (i-Qnet), the System of Conformity Assessment for Electrotechnical Equipment and Components (IECEE), and the Global Good Agricultural Practice network (GLOBALG.A.P.). Argentina follows a Civil Law system. In 2014, the Argentine government passed a new Civil and Commercial Code that has been in effect since August 2015. The Civil and Commercial Code provides regulations for civil and commercial liability, including ownership of real and intangible property claims. The current judicial process is lengthy and suffers from significant backlogs. In the Argentine legal system, appeals may be brought from many rulings of the lower courts, including evidentiary decisions, not just final orders, which significantly slows all aspects of the system. The Justice Ministry reported in December 2018 that the expanded use of oral processes had reduced the duration of 68 percent of all civil matters to less than two years. According to the Argentine constitution, the judiciary is a separate and equal branch of government. In practice, there are continuous instances of political interference in the judicial process. Companies have complained that courts lack transparency and reliability, and that the Argentine government has used the judicial system to pressure the private sector. Media revelations of judicial impropriety and corruption feed public perception and undermine confidence in the judiciary. Many foreign investors prefer to rely on private or international arbitration when those options are available. Claims regarding labor practices are processed through a labor court, regulated by Law 18,345 and its subsequent amendments, and implementing regulations by Decree 106/98. Contracts often include clauses designating specific judicial or arbitral recourse for dispute settlement. According to the Foreign Direct Investment Law 21,382 and Decree 1853/93, foreign investors may invest in Argentina without prior governmental approval, under the same conditions as investors domiciled within the country. Foreign investors are free to enter into mergers, acquisitions, greenfield investments, or joint ventures. Foreign firms may also participate in publicly financed research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Incoming foreign currency must be identified by the participating bank to the Central Bank of Argentina (www.bcra.gob.ar ). All foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law No. 19,550) and the rules issued by the commercial regulatory agencies. Decree 27/2018 amended Law 19,550 to eliminate regulatory barriers and reduce bureaucratic burdens, expedite and simplify processes in the public domain, and deploy existing technological tools to better focus on transparency. Full text of the decree can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/305000-309999/305736/norma.htm. All other laws and norms concerning commercial entities are established in the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, which can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/235000-239999/235975/norma.htm Further information about Argentina’s investment policies can be found at the following websites: Ministry of Productive Development (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion ) Ministry of Economy (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia ) The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (http://www.bcra.gob.ar/ ) The National Securities Exchange Commission (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/cnv ) The National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency (https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/ ) Investors can download Argentina’s investor guide through this link: https://www.investargentina.org.ar/ The National Commission for the Defense of Competition and the Secretariat of Domestic Trade, both within the Ministry of Productive Development, have enforcement authority of the Competition Law (Law 25,156). The law aims to promote a culture of competition in all sectors of the national economy. In May 2018, the Argentine Congress approved a new Defense of Competition Law (Law 27,442), which would have, among other things, established an independent competition agency and tribunal. The new law incorporates anti-competitive conduct regulations and a leniency program to facilitate cartel investigation. The full text of the law can be viewed at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=310241 . The Government of Argentina, however, has thus far not taken steps to establish the independent agency or tribunal. In February 2021, a bill introducing amendments to the Defense of Competition Law was passed by the Senate and is currently under study in the Lower House. The main changes are related to the removal of the “Clemency Program,” which encourages public reports of collusive and cartel activities, and the elimination of public hearings to appoint members of the Competition Office. The private sector has expressed concern over this bill, stating these changes are contrary to transparency standards embodied in the Law. In September 2014, Argentina amended the 1974 National Supply Law to expand the ability of the government to regulate private enterprises by setting minimum and maximum prices and profit margins for goods and services at any stage of economic activity. Private companies may be subject to fines and temporary closure if the government determines they are not complying with the law. Although the law is still in effect, the U.S. Government has not received any reports of it being applied since December 2015. However, the Fernandez administration has expressed its potential use when resisted compliance with price control programs, even if the program was supposed to be voluntary. In March 2020, the Government of Argentina enacted the Supermarket Shelves Law (Law 27,545) that states that any single manufacturer and its associated brands cannot occupy more than 30 percent of a retailer’s shelf space devoted to any one product category. The law’s proponents claim it will allow more space for domestic SME-produced products, encourage competition, and reduce shortages. U.S. companies have expressed concern over the pending regulations, seeking clarification about issues such as whether display space percentages would be considered per brand or per production company, as it could potentially affect a company’s production, distribution, and marketing business model. Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution affirms the right of private property and states that any expropriation must be authorized by law and compensation must be provided. The United States-Argentina BIT states that investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized except for public purposes upon prompt payment of the fair market value in compensation. Argentina has a history of expropriations under previous administrations. The most recent expropriation occurred in March 2015 when the Argentine Congress approved the nationalization of the train and railway system. A number of companies that were privatized during the 1990s under the Menem administration were renationalized under the Kirchner administrations. Additionally, in October 2008, Argentina nationalized its private pension funds, which amounted to approximately one-third of total GDP and transferred the funds to the government social security agency. In May 2012, the Fernandez de Kirchner administration nationalized oil and gas company Repsol-YPF. Most of the litigation between the Government of Argentina and Repsol was settled in 2016. An American hedge fund still holds a claim against YPF and is in litigation in U.S. courts. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Argentina is signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, which the country ratified in 1989. Argentina is also a party to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention since 1994. There is neither specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement under the 1958 New York Convention nor legislation for the enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention. Companies that seek recourse through Argentine courts may not simultaneously pursue recourse through international arbitration. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Argentine government officially accepts the principle of international arbitration. The United States-Argentina BIT includes a chapter on Investor-State Dispute Settlement for U.S. investors. In the past ten years, Argentina has been brought before the ICSID in 7 cases involving U.S. or other foreign investors. Argentina currently has seven pending arbitration cases, three of them filed against it by U.S. investors. For more information on the cases brought by U.S. claimants against Argentina, go to: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx #. Local courts cannot enforce arbitral awards issued against the government based on the public policy clause. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. Argentina is a member of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Argentina is also a party to several bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions for the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments, which provide requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Argentina, including: Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1898, ratified by Argentina by law No. 3,192. Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1939-1940, ratified by Dec. Ley 7771/56 (1956). Panama Convention of 1975, CIDIP I: Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 24,322 (1995). Montevideo Convention of 1979, CIDIP II: Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 22,921 (1983). International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms can be stipulated in contracts. Argentina also has ADR mechanisms available such as the Center for Mediation and Arbitrage (CEMARC) of the Argentine Chamber of Trade. More information can be found at: http://www.intracen.org. Argentina does not have a specific law governing arbitration, but it has adopted a mediation law (Law 24.573/1995), which makes mediation mandatory prior to litigation. Some arbitration provisions are scattered throughout the Civil Code, the National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, the Commercial Code, and three other laws. The following methods of concluding an arbitration agreement are non-binding under Argentine law: electronic communication, fax, oral agreement, and conduct on the part of one party. Generally, all commercial matters are subject to arbitration. There are no legal restrictions on the identity and professional qualifications of arbitrators. Parties must be represented in arbitration proceedings in Argentina by attorneys who are licensed to practice locally. The grounds for annulment of arbitration awards are limited to substantial procedural violations, an ultra petita award (award outside the scope of the arbitration agreement), an award rendered after the agreed-upon time limit, and a public order violation that is not yet settled by jurisprudence when related to the merits of the award. On average, it takes around 21 weeks to enforce an arbitration award rendered in Argentina, from filing an application to a writ of execution attaching assets (assuming there is no appeal). It takes roughly 18 weeks to enforce a foreign award. The requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments are set out in section 517 of the National Procedural Code. No information is available as to whether the domestic courts frequently rule in cases in favor of state-owned enterprises (SOE) when SOEs are party to a dispute. Argentina’s bankruptcy law was codified in 1995 in Law 24,522. The full text can be found at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25379/texact.htm . Under the law, debtors are generally able to begin insolvency proceedings when they are no longer able to pay their debts as they mature. Debtors may file for both liquidation and reorganization. Creditors may file for insolvency of the debtor for liquidation only. The insolvency framework does not require approval by the creditors for the selection or appointment of the insolvency representative or for the sale of substantial assets of the debtor. The insolvency framework does not provide rights to the creditor to request information from the insolvency representative, but the creditor has the right to object to decisions by the debtor to accept or reject creditors’ claims. Bankruptcy is not criminalized; however, convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy can carry two to six years of prison time. Financial institutions regulated by the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) publish monthly outstanding credit balances of their debtors; the BCRA National Center of Debtors (Central de Deudores) compiles and publishes this information. The database is available for use of financial institutions that comply with legal requirements concerning protection of personal data. The credit monitoring system only includes negative information, and the information remains on file through the person’s life. At least one local NGO that makes microcredit loans is working to make the payment history of these loans publicly accessible for the purpose of demonstrating credit history, including positive information, for those without access to bank accounts and who are outside of the Central Bank’s system. Equifax, which operates under the local name “Veraz” (or “truthfully”), also provides credit information to financial institutions and other clients, such as telecommunications service providers and other retailers that operate monthly billing or credit/layaway programs. 4. Industrial Policies Government incentives do not make any distinction between foreign and domestic investors. The Argentine government offers a number of investment promotion programs at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels to attract investment to specific economic sectors such as capital assets and infrastructure, innovation and technological development, and energy, with no discrimination between national or foreign-owned enterprises. Some of the investment promotion programs require investments within a specific region or locality, industry, or economic activity. Some programs offer refunds on Value-Added Tax (VAT) or other tax incentives for local production of capital goods. The Investment and International Trade Promotion Agency provides cost-free assessment and information to investors to facilitate operations in the country. Argentina’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/es/inversores , https://www.investargentina.org.ar/, and https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion . The National Fund for the Development of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises provides low- cost credit to small and medium-sized enterprises for investment projects, labor, capital, and energy efficiency improvement with no distinction between national or foreign-owned enterprises. More information can be found at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/financiamiento The Ministry of Productive Development supports employment training programs that are frequently free to the participants and do not differentiate based on nationality. Argentina has two types of tax-exempt trading areas: Free Trade Zones (FTZ), which are located throughout the country, and the more comprehensive Special Customs Area (SCA), which covers all of Tierra del Fuego Province and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2023. Argentine law defines a FTZ as a territory outside the “general customs area” (GCA, i.e., the rest of Argentina) where neither the inflows nor outflows of exported final merchandise are subject to tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or other taxes on goods. Goods produced within a FTZ generally cannot be shipped to the GCA unless they are capital goods not produced in the rest of the country. The labor, sanitary, ecological, safety, criminal, and financial regulations within FTZs are the same as those that prevail in the GCA. Foreign firms receive national treatment in FTZs. Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ may receive export incentive benefits, if applicable, only after the goods are exported from the FTZ to a third country destination. Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ and later exported to another country is not exempt from export taxes. Any value added in a FTZ or re-export from a FTZ is exempt from export taxes. For more information on FTZ in Argentina see: http://www.afip.gob.ar/zonasFrancas/ . Products manufactured in the SCA may enter the GCA free from taxes or tariffs. In addition, the government may enact special regulations that exempt products shipped through the SCA (but not manufactured therein) from all forms of taxation except excise taxes. The SCA program provides benefits for established companies that meet specific production and employment objectives. The Argentine national government does not have local employment mandates, nor does it apply such schemes to senior management or boards of directors. However, certain provincial governments do require employers to hire a certain percentage of their workforce from the provincial population. There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. Under Argentine law, conditions to invest are equal for national and foreign investors. As of March 2018, citizens of MERCOSUR countries can obtain legal residence within five months and at little cost, which grants permission to work. Argentina suspended its method for expediting this process in early 2018. Argentina has local content requirements for specific sectors. Requirements are applicable to domestic and foreign investors equally. Argentine law establishes a national preference for local industry for most government procurement if the domestic supplier’s tender is no more than five to seven percent higher than the foreign tender. The amount by which the domestic bid may exceed a foreign bid depends on the size of the domestic company making the bid. In May 2018, Argentina issued Law 27,437, giving additional priority to Argentine small and medium-sized enterprises and, separately, requiring that foreign companies that win a tender must subcontract domestic companies to cover 20 percent of the value of the work. The preference applies to procurement by all government agencies, public utilities, and concessionaires. There is similar legislation at the sub-national (provincial) level. In November 2016, the government passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law (27,328) that regulates public-private contracts. The law lowered regulatory barriers to foreign investment in public infrastructure projects with the aim of attracting more foreign direct investment. Several projects under the PPP initiative have been canceled or put on hold due to an ongoing investigation on corruption in public works projects during the last administration. The PPP law contains a “Buy Argentina” clause that mandates at least 33 percent local content for every public project. Argentina is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but it became an observer to the GPA in February 1997. In July 2016, the Ministry of Production and Labor and the Ministry of Energy and Mining issued Joint Resolutions 123 and 313, which allow companies to obtain tax benefits on purchases of solar or wind energy equipment for use in investment projects that incorporate at least 60 percent local content in their electromechanical installations. In cases where local supply is insufficient to reach the 60 percent threshold, the threshold can be reduced to 30 percent. The resolutions also provide tax exemptions for imports of capital and intermediate goods that are not locally produced for use in the investment projects. In 2016, Argentina passed law 27,263, implemented by Resolution 599-E/2016, which provides tax credits to automotive manufacturers for the purchase of locally produced automotive parts and accessories incorporated into specific types of vehicles. The tax credits range from 4 percent to 15 percent of the value of the purchased parts. The list of vehicle types included in the regime can be found here: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/260000-264999/263955/norma.htm . In 2018, Argentina issued Resolution 28/2018, simplifying the procedure for obtaining the tax credits. The resolution also establishes that if the national content drops below the minimum required by the resolution because of relative price changes due to exchange rate fluctuations, automotive manufacturers will not be considered non-compliant with the regime. However, the resolution sets forth that tax benefits will be suspended for the quarter when the drop was registered. The Media Law, enacted in 2009 and amended in 2015, requires companies to produce advertising and publicity materials locally or to include 60 percent local content. The Media Law also establishes a 70 percent local production content requirement for companies with radio licenses. Additionally, the Media Law requires that 50 percent of the news and 30 percent of the music that is broadcast on the radio be of Argentine origin. In the case of private television operators, at least 60 percent of broadcast content must be of Argentine origin. Of that 60 percent, 30 percent must be local news and 10 to 30 percent must be local independent content. Argentina establishes percentages of local content in the production process for manufacturers of mobile and cellular radio communication equipment operating in Tierra del Fuego province. Resolution 66/2018 maintains the local content requirement for products such as technical manuals, packaging, and labeling. The percentage of local content required ranges from 10 percent to 100 percent depending on the process or item. In cases where local supply is insufficient to meet local content requirements, companies may apply for an exemption that is subject to review every six months. A detailed description of local content percentage requirements can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do;jsessionid=0CA1B74C2D7EC353E66F1CC6CFD8B41D?id=255494 . There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, nor does the government prevent companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory. Argentina does not have forced localization of content in technology or requirements of data storage in country. There is no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors in investment incentives. There are no performance requirements. A complete guide of incentives for investors in Argentina can be found at: https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/es/inversores . 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property, including mortgages, are recognized in Argentina. Such interests can be easily and effectively registered. They also can be readily bought and sold. Argentina manages a national registry of real estate ownership (Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble) at http://www.dnrpi.jus.gov.ar/ . No data is available on the percent of all land that does not have clear title. There are no specific regulations regarding land lease and acquisition of residential and commercial real estate by foreign investors. Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes the restrictions of foreign ownership on rural and productive lands, including water bodies. Foreign ownership is also restricted on land located near borders. Legal claims may be brought to evict persons unlawfully occupying real property, even if the property is unoccupied by the lawful owner. However, these legal proceedings can be quite lengthy, and until the legal proceedings are complete, evicting squatters is problematic. The title and actual conditions of real property interests under consideration should be carefully reviewed before acquisition. Argentine Law 26.160 prevents the eviction and confiscation of land traditionally occupied by indigenous communities in Argentina or encumbered with an indigenous land claim. Indigenous land claims can be found in the land registry. Enforcement is carried out by the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs, under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The Government of Argentina adheres to some treaties and international agreements on intellectual property (IP) and belongs to the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization. The Argentine Congress ratified the Uruguay Round agreements, including the provisions on intellectual property, in Law 24425 in 1995. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)’s 2021 Special 301 Report listed Argentina on the Priority Watch List. Trading partners on the Priority Watch List present the most significant concerns regarding inadequate or ineffective IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limit market access for persons relying on IP protection. For a complete version of the 2021 Report, see: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf . Argentina continues to present long-standing and well-known challenges to intellectual property (IP)-intensive industries, including those from the United States. A key deficiency in the legal framework for patents is the unduly broad limitations on patent eligible subject matter. Pursuant to a highly problematic 2012 Joint Resolution establishing guidelines for the examination of patents, Argentina rejects patent applications for categories of pharmaceutical inventions that are eligible for patentability in other jurisdictions, including in the United States. Additionally, to be patentable, Argentina requires that processes for the manufacture of active compounds disclosed in a specification be reproducible and applicable on an industrial scale. Stakeholders assert that Resolution 283/2015, introduced in September 2015, also limits the ability to patent biotechnological innovations based on living matter and natural substances. These measures have interfered with the ability of companies investing in Argentina to protect their IP and may be inconsistent with international norms. Another ongoing challenge to the innovative agricultural chemical and pharmaceutical sectors is inadequate protection against the unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed test or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for products in those sectors. Argentina made progress on eliminating the patent application backlog, however, this did not include the backlog for pharmaceutical or biotechnology innovations. The number of patent examiners remains insufficient with retention and recruitment hampered by low public sector salaries. Argentina did not extend the Patent Prosecution Highway signed between the National Institute of Industrial Property’s (INPI) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which expired in March 2020. Enforcement of IP rights in Argentina continues to be a challenge, and stakeholders report widespread unfair competition from sellers of counterfeit and pirated goods and services. La Salada in Buenos Aires remains the largest counterfeit market in Latin America and is cited in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Piracy and Counterfeiting. Argentine police generally do not take ex officio actions, prosecutions can stall and languish in excessive formalities, and, when a criminal case does reach final judgment, criminal infringers rarely receive deterrent sentences. Hard goods counterfeiting and optical disc piracy are widespread, and online piracy continues to grow due to nearly nonexistent criminal enforcement against such piracy. As a result, IP enforcement online in Argentina consists mainly of right holders trying to convince Argentine internet service providers to agree to take down specific infringing works, as well as attempting to seek injunctions in civil cases, both of which can be time-consuming and ineffective. Rights holders also cite widespread use of unlicensed software by Argentine private enterprises and the government. Argentina made limited progress in IP protection and enforcement in a year marked by high inflation, sovereign debt negotiations with the IMF, and political conflicts within the ruling coalition. The pressing economic situation led to an increase of counterfeit products sales in informal markets once the confinement measures enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic were relaxed in the second semester of 2020. Online sales of counterfeit products, especially apparel and footwear spiked amidst the pandemic. The Argentine Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises noted an increase of national production of counterfeit sportswear, while sales of counterfeit luxury goods such as handbags decreased. Flight and border crossing restrictions applied during the COVID-19 health emergency prevented purchases of counterfeit products from China, Paraguay, and Bolivia, but were removed by November 2021. INPI began accepting electronic filing of patent, trademark, and industrial designs applications in 2018. During 2020, the agency successfully transitioned to an all-electronic filing system. Argentina continued to improve procedures for trademarks, with INPI reducing the time for a trademark opposition from an average of 3.5 years to one year. On trademarks, the law provides for a fast-track option that reduces the time to register a trademark to four months. Argentina formally created the Federal Committee to Fight Against Contraband, Falsification of Trademarks, and Designations, formalizing the work on trademark counterfeiting under the National Anti-Piracy Initiative launched in 2017. In November 2020, Argentina and the United States held a virtual bilateral meeting under the Innovation and Creativity Forum for Economic Development, part of the U.S.-Argentina Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, to continue discussions and collaboration on IP topics of mutual interest. The United States intends to monitor all the outstanding issues for progress and urges Argentina to continue its efforts to create a more attractive environment for investment and innovation. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The Argentine Constitution sets as a general principle that foreign investors have the same status and the same rights as local investors. Foreign investors have free access to domestic and international financing. After a three-year recession (2018-2020), the economy rebounded with 10.3 percent growth in 2021. However, the government did not ease the capital controls introduced in September 2019 to slow the outflow of dollars. Central Bank capital controls prohibiting transfers and payments are likely in conflict with IMF Article VIII. The government has maintained trade restrictions, price controls, distortive taxes, and high spending. Unable to access international capital markets (despite restructuring private debt in 2020) and with a shallow domestic market, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit. The excessive liquidity resulted in high inflation (50.9 percent in 2021) and deteriorating social conditions, with the poverty rate exceeding 40 percent. In August 2020, the government of Argentina formally notified the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its intent to renegotiate $45 billion due to the Fund from the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement. On March 3, 2022, IMF Staff and Argentine authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and financial policies required for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. In broad terms, the key objectives of the new EFF include a reduction in the fiscal deficit and monetary financing, tackling inflation, and the accumulation of foreign reserves. The IMF Executive Board approved the EFF on March 25, after the Argentine National Congress approved the measure. The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comisión Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 11 percent of GDP. Private sector credit gained some momentum in 2021, driven by the reopening of the economy after the pandemic and government support measures such as subsidized credit lines for businesses. Nevertheless, the stock of credit shrank in real terms as the nominal credit growth increased by 41 percent in 2021, below the inflation rate of 50.7 percent. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores). U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina. Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. Argentina’s banking sector has been resilient in the face of a multi-year economic recession (2018-2020). Limited financial intermediation combined with high inflation and interventionist interest rate regulations (mainly for small businesses) dented bank profitability in 2021. Banks compensated for this by controlling expenses and increasing digitalization of the sector. Non-performing private sector loans constitute 4.4 percent of banks’ portfolios. During 2021, financial entities maintained adequate solvency indicators. The banking sector is well positioned due to macro and micro-prudential policies introduced since 2002 that have helped to reduce asset-liability mismatches. The sector is highly liquid and its exposure to the public sector is modest, while its provisions for bad debts are adequate. Private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 8.4 trillion (USD $83.3 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 13.7 trillion (USD $135.7 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system. Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years. In November 2020, the Central Bank launched a new payment system, “Transfers 3.0,” seeking to reduce the use of cash. This system will boost digital payments and further financial inclusion in Argentina, expanding the reach of instant transfers to build an open and universal digital payment ecosystem. The government has expressed support for the process of digitization of payments to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and safeguard financial stability. The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Block chain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using block chain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally. Foreign Exchange Beginning in September 2019, the Argentine government and Central Bank issued a series of decrees and norms to extend or amend the government’s ability to regulate and restrict access to foreign exchange markets. As of October 2019, the Central Bank (Notice A6815) limits cash withdrawals made abroad with local debit cards to foreign currency bank accounts owned by the client in Argentina. Pursuant to Notice A6823, cash advances made abroad using local credit cards are limited to a maximum of USD $50 per transaction. As of September 2020, and pursuant to Notice A7106, Argentine individuals must limit purchases of foreign currency (or of goods and services denominated in foreign currency) to no more than USD $200 per month on a rolling monthly basis. Individuals must receive Central Bank approval to purchase foreign currency in excess of the $200 quota. Purchases of goods and services abroad with credit and debit cards issued by Argentine banks count against the USD $200 per month quota. Although no limit on credit or debit card purchases is imposed, if monthly expenditures surpass the USD $200 limit, the card owner will be prevented from purchasing foreign currency in Argentina for the number of months needed to cover the amount of excess spending. Also, the regulation prohibits individuals who receive government assistance and high-ranking federal government officials from purchasing foreign exchange. Pursuant to Public Emergency Law 27,541, issued December 23, 2019, all dollar purchases and individual expenses incurred abroad, in person or online, including international online purchases from Argentina, paid with credit or with debit cards will be subject to a 30 percent tax. Pursuant to AFIP Resolution 4815 a 35 percent withholding tax in advance of the payment of income and/or wealth tax is also applied. Non-Argentine residents are required to obtain prior Central Bank approval to purchase more than USD $100 per month, except for certain bilateral or international organizations, institutions and agencies, diplomatic representation, and foreign tribunals. Companies and individuals need to obtain prior clearance from the Central Bank before transferring funds abroad. In the case of individuals, if transfers are made from their own foreign currency accounts in Argentina to their own accounts abroad, they do not need to obtain Central Bank approval. Per Notice A6869 issued by the Central Bank in January 2020, companies will be able to repatriate dividends without Central Bank authorization equivalent to a maximum of 30 percent of new foreign direct investment made by the company in the country. To promote foreign direct investment the Central Bank announced in October 2020 (Notice A7123) that it will allow free access to the official foreign exchange market to repatriate investments as long as the capital contribution was transferred and sold in Argentine Pesos through the foreign exchange market as of October 2, 2020, and the repatriation takes place at least two years after the transfer and settlement of those funds. Exporters of goods are required to transfer the proceeds from exports to Argentina and settle in pesos in the foreign currency market. Exporters must settle according to the following terms: exporters with affiliates (irrespective of the type of good exported) and exporters of certain goods (including cereals, seeds, minerals, and precious metals, among others) must convert their foreign currency proceeds to pesos within 15 days (or 30 days for some products) after the issuance of the permit for shipment; other exporters have 180 days to settle in pesos. Despite these deadlines, exporters must transfer the funds to Argentina and settle in pesos within five business days from the actual collection of funds. Argentine residents are required to transfer to Argentina and settle in pesos the proceeds from services exports rendered to non-Argentine residents that are paid in foreign currency either in Argentina or abroad, within five business days from collection of funds. Payment of imports of goods and services from third parties and affiliates require Central Bank approval if the company needs to purchase foreign currency. Since May 2020, the Central Bank requires importers to submit an affidavit stating that the total amount of payments associated with the import of goods made during the year (including the payment that is being requested). The total amount of payments for importation of goods should also include the payments for amortizations of lines of credit and/or commercial guarantees. In September 2020, the Central Bank limited companies’ ability to purchase foreign currency to cancel any external financial debt (including other intercompany debt) and dollar denominated local securities offerings. Companies were granted access to foreign currency for up to 40 percent of the principal amount coming due from October 15, 2020, to December 31, 2020. For the remaining 60 percent of the debt, companies had to file a refinancing plan with the Central Bank. In February 2021, the Central Bank extended the regulation through 2021, and in March 2022 extended it again to include maturities through December 31, 2022. Indebtedness with international organizations or their associated agencies or guaranteed by them and indebtedness granted by official credit agencies or guaranteed by them are exempted from this restriction. The Central Bank (Notice A7001) prohibited access to the foreign exchange market to pay for external indebtedness, imports of goods and services, and saving purposes for individuals and companies that have made sales of securities with settlement in foreign currency or transfers of these to foreign depositary entities within the last 90 days. They also should not make any of these transactions for the following 90 days. Pre-cancellation of debt coming due abroad in more than three business days requires Central Bank approval to purchase dollars. Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The Central Bank limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 5 percent of their net worth. In December 2021, the Central Bank presented its monetary, financial, lending, and foreign exchange program. On monetary policy, the Central Bank committed to I) manage liquidity to prevent any imbalances that may directly or indirectly affect the disinflation process; II) set the path of the policy interest rate to obtain positive real returns on investments in domestic currency and preserve monetary and foreign exchange stability; and III) contribute to the development of the capital market and adjust minimum reserve requirements to strengthen the channel of monetary policy transmission. On foreign exchange, the Central Bank will maintain the gradual crawling peg of the exchange rate consistent with the pace of inflation. With the goal of strengthening international reserves, the Central Bank will manage capital control regulations to ensure monetary and foreign exchange stability. The credit policy objectives include encouraging financial intermediation and promoting the growth of the peso credit market to boost lending to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and to the sectors most affected by the pandemic. Remittance Policies In response to the economic crisis in Argentina, the government introduced capital controls in September 2019 and tightened them in 2020. Under these restrictions, companies in Argentina (including local affiliates of foreign parent companies) must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to access the foreign exchange market to purchase foreign currency and to transfer funds abroad for the payment of dividends and profits. In January 2020, the Central Bank amended the regime for the payment of dividends abroad to non-residents. The new regime allows companies to access the foreign exchange market to transfer profits and dividends abroad without prior authorization of the Central Bank, provided the following conditions are met: (1) Profits and dividends are to be declared in closed and audited financial statements. (2) The dividends in foreign currency should not exceed the dividends determined by the shareholders’ meeting in local currency. (3) The total amount of dividends to be transferred cannot exceed 30 percent of the amount of new capital contributions made by non-residents into local companies since January 2020. (4) The resident entity must be in compliance with filing the Central Bank Survey of External Assets and Liabilities. The Argentine government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is an increasing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers in Argentina. RBC and CSR practices are welcomed by beneficiary communities throughout Argentina. There are many institutes that promote RBC and CSR in Argentina, the most prominent being the Argentine Institute for Business Social Responsibility (http://www.iarse.org/ ), which has been working in the country for 20 years and includes among its members many of the most important companies in Argentina. Argentina is a member of the United Nation’s Global Compact. Established in April 2004, the Global Compact Network Argentina is a business-led network with a multi-stakeholder governing body elected for two-year terms by active participants. The network is supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Argentina in close collaboration with other UN Agencies. The Global Compact Network Argentina is the most important RBC/CSR initiative in the country with a presence in more than 20 provinces. More information on the initiative can be found at: http://pactoglobal.org.ar . Foreign and local enterprises tend to follow generally accepted CSR/RBC principles. Argentina subscribed to the Declaration on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in April 1997. Many provinces, such as Mendoza and Neuquén, have or are in the process of enacting a provincial CSR/RBC law. There have been many previously unsuccessful attempts to pass a CSR/RBC law. Distrust over the State’s role in private companies had been the main concern for legislators opposed to these bills. In February 2019, the Argentine government joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Argentina published its first report in 2020 (https://eiti.org/document/argentina-2018-eiti-report ). Argentina´s next Validation against the 2019 EITI Standard started January 1, 2022. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues The Government of Argentina created its national climate strategy, the National Plan for Adaptation and Mitigation (PANyMCC), to implement its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). This plan calls for developing a long-term strategy under the Paris Agreement as well as delineating the revision, improvement, and monitoring of the Sector Action Plans for the main emissions sectors. Multiple laws exist to control water and air pollution and to protect natural ecosystems. Despite the existing strategy and monitoring framework, stakeholders note limited transparency around both climate-related and energy sector planning and policymaking. Challenges in the business and investment climate impact the country’s attractiveness for developing renewable energy projects, despite the potential for both wind and solar power. The fossil fuel industry is strongly supported by the government through public subsidies, which impair the cost-competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy development is still a focus for the government. Law 27.191 set a goal that 20 percent of the energy matrix needed to come from renewable sources by 2025, this was later updated in the energy sector’s action plan under PANyMCC to 25 percent by 2030. The 2021 updated NDC submitted at COP26 set a goal of 30 percent by 2030. Several tax benefits exist to support renewable energy projects through Law 27.191. No new projects have been approved since the previous administration through the RenovAr program, which offered IFC funding and World Bank guarantees. The RenovAr program has faced multiple hurdles such as increased capital costs, currency volatility, and the impact of capital controls. Given the current state of energy transmission infrastructure in the country, smaller scale projects for on-site energy consumption are more likely to succeed. The Government of Argentina has historically focused on the transportation sector by encouraging the use of biofuels and electric vehicles. The country requires all gasoline to be a mixture between petroleum products and biofuels. In 2021, the Biofuels Regulatory Framework extended tax exemptions and benefits for biofuel producers but at the same time reduced the quantity of biofuels that are required to be used. The reduction in biofuel use is inconsistent with the climate change mitigation commitments Argentina has made. While still not approved, the draft Law for the Promotion of Sustainable Mobility includes incentives and objectives to promote the use of technologies with less environmental impact for mobility. The proposed scheme would be temporary but offers benefits over 20 years for the production and importation of electric vehicles and parts. There are regulatory requirements for labelling of products according to energy efficiency standards. Products including home construction supplies, vehicles, gas powered appliances, and domestic electronics are required to be labeled, some with minimum efficiency standards. Additionally, incandescent light bulbs are no longer permitted to be produced or imported into the country to encourage the use of more energy-efficient lighting sources. More information on labeling standards can be found here: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia/energia/eficiencia-energetica/etiquetado-en-eficiencia-energetica 9. Corruption Argentina’s legal system incorporates several measures to address public sector corruption. The foundational law is the 1999 Public Ethics Law (Law 25,188), the full text of which can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=60847 . A March 2019 report by the OECD’s Directorate for Public Governance underscored, however, that the law is heterogeneously implemented across branches of the government and that the legislative branch has not designated an application authority, approved an implementing regulation, or specified sanctions. It also noted that Argentina has a regulation on lobbying, but that it only applies to the executive branch, and only requires officials to disclose meetings with lobbyists. With regards to political parties, the report noted anonymous campaign donations are banned, but 90 percent of all donations in Argentina are made in cash, making it impossible to identify donors. Furthermore, the existing regulations have insufficient controls and sanctions, and leave gaps with provincial regulations that could be exploited. Within the executive branch, the government institutions tasked with combatting corruption include the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), the National Auditor General, and the General Comptroller’s Office. Public officials are subject to financial disclosure laws, and the Ministry of Justice’s ACO is responsible for analyzing and investigating federal executive branch officials based on their financial disclosure forms—which require the disclosure of assets directly owned by immediate family members. The ACO is also responsible for investigating corruption within the federal executive branch or in matters involving federal funds, except for funds transferred to the provinces. While the ACO does not have authority to independently prosecute cases, it can refer cases to other agencies or serve as the plaintiff and request that a judge initiate a case. Argentina enacted a new Corporate Criminal Liability Law in November 2017 following the advice of the OECD to comply with its Anti-Bribery Convention. The full text of Law 27,401 can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/295000-299999/296846/norma.htm . The new law entered into force in early 2018. It extends anti-bribery criminal sanctions to corporations, whereas previously they only applied to individuals; expands the definition of prohibited conduct, including illegal enrichment of public officials; and allows Argentina to hold Argentines responsible for foreign bribery. Sanctions include fines and blacklisting from public contracts. Argentina also enacted an express prohibition on the tax deductibility of bribes. Official corruption remains a serious challenge in Argentina. In its March 2017 report, the OECD expressed concern about Argentina’s enforcement of foreign bribery laws, inefficiencies in the judicial system, politicization, and perceived lack of independence at the Attorney General’s Office, and lack of training and awareness for judges and prosecutors. According to the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators, corruption remains an area of concern in Argentina. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Argentina ranked 96 out of 180 countries in 2020, dropping 12 places compared to 2019. Allegations of corruption in provincial as well as federal courts remained frequent. Few Argentine companies have implemented anti-foreign bribery measures beyond limited codes of ethics. In September 2016, Congress passed a law on public access to information. The law explicitly applies to all three branches of the federal government, the public justice offices, and entities such as businesses, political parties, universities, and trade associations that receive public funding. It requires these institutions to respond to citizen requests for public information within 15 days, with an additional 15-day extension available for “exceptional” circumstances. Sanctions apply for noncompliance. As mandated by the law, the executive branch created the Agency for Access to Public Information in 2017, an autonomous office that oversees access to information. In early 2016, the Argentine government reaffirmed its commitment to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), became a founding member of the Global Anti-Corruption Coalition, and reengaged the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Argentina is a party to the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption. It ratified in 2001 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention). Argentina also signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and participates in UNCAC’s Conference of State Parties. Argentina also participates in the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC). Since Argentina became a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, allegations of Argentine individuals or companies bribing foreign officials have surfaced. A March 2017 report by the OECD Working Group on Bribery indicated there were 13 known foreign bribery allegations involving Argentine companies and individuals as of that date. According to the report, Argentine authorities investigated and closed some of the allegations and declined to investigate others. The authorities determined some allegations did not involve foreign bribery but rather other offenses. Several such allegations remained under investigation. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Felix Pablo Crous Director Government of Argentina Anti-Corruption Office Oficina Anticorrupción, 25 de Mayo 544, C1002ABL, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. Phone: +54 11 5300 4100 Email: anticorrupcion@jus.gov.ar and http://denuncias.anticorrupcion.gob.ar/ Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Poder Ciudadano (Local Transparency International Affiliate) Piedras 547, C1070AAK, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires Phone: +54 11 4331 4925 ext. 225 Fax: +54 11 4331 4925 Email: comunicaciones@poderciudadano.org Website: http://www.poderciudadano.org 10. Political and Security Environment Demonstrations are common in metropolitan Buenos Aires and in other major cities and rural areas. Nevertheless, political violence is not widely considered a hindrance to the investment climate in Argentina. Protesters regularly block streets, highways, and major intersections, causing traffic jams and delaying travel. While demonstrations are usually non-violent, individuals sometimes seek confrontation with the police and vandalize private property. Groups occasionally protest in front of the U.S. Embassy or U.S.-affiliated businesses. In March 2022, thousands protested in front of Congress against a bill approving a new agreement with the IMF. In December 2017, while Congress had called an extraordinary session to address the retirement system reforms, several demonstrations against the bill turned violent, causing structural damage to public and private property, injuries to 162 people (including 88 policemen), and arrests of 60 people. The demonstrations ultimately dissipated, and the government passed the bill. Union disputes and politicized worker movements are common in CABA and the Provinces. In 2019 and early 2020, foreign-owned diamond mining companies in Neuquén were targeted by work stoppages and insider attacks in failed attempts to intimidate and force employers to increase salaries and benefits. These protesters were seemingly allowed to act without fear of response from local police forces, even after direct requests for assistance had been made. The companies believe the unions and protesters feel emboldened by the government’s stance towards Western companies and were forced to shut down operations for weeks in December 2019 and January 2020, in fear of the safety of their personnel at the local headquarters. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Argentine workers are among the most highly educated and skilled in Latin America. Foreign investors often cite Argentina’s skilled workforce as a key factor in their decision to invest in Argentina. Argentina has relatively high social security, health, and other labor taxes, however, high labor costs are among foreign investors’ most often cited operational challenges. The unemployment rate dropped to 8.6 percent at the end of 2021, according to official statistics. The government estimated unemployment for workers below 29 years old as more than double the national rate. Exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, analysts estimate informality that it stands between 20 to 40 percent. During 2020, the Argentine government implemented measures to alleviate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and employment. The government introduced measures to stimulate the economy and employment through public works and price limits; to protect workers in the workplace by promoting telework and offering leave for workers; and to support jobs and worker income by prohibiting employers from terminating employment. The government also facilitated social dialogue between the private sector and unions. The government has postponed implementation of Argentina’s ambitious Teleworking Contracts Regime, Law 27555, passed by Congress on July 30, 2020, and ratified by President Fernandez on August 14, 2020. The law entered into force on April 1, 2021. This law provides the legal framework for teleworking in employment settings that allow it. Labor laws are comparatively protective of workers in Argentina, and investors cite labor-related litigation as an important factor increasing labor costs in Argentina. For example, one of the first measures passed by President Fernandez after he took office was Decree 34/2019 which established that employees dismissed without cause have the right to double the legal severance payment, the measure was extended until December 31, 2021, through Decree 39/2021. There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in the Foreign Trade Zones. Organized labor plays an important role in labor-management relations and in Argentine politics. Under Argentine law, the Ministry of Labor recognizes one union per sector per geographic unit (e.g., nationwide, a single province, or a major city) with the right to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for that sector and geographic area. Roughly 40 percent of Argentina’s formal workforce is unionized. The Ministry of Labor ratifies collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining agreements cover workers in a given sector and geographic area whether they are union members or not, so roughly 70 percent of the workforce was covered by an agreement. While negotiations between unions and industry are generally independent, the Ministry of Labor often serves as a mediator. Argentine law also offers recourse to mediation and arbitration of labor disputes. During 2021, the Ministry of Labor registered 855 labor and collective bargaining agreements. These agreements covered approximately 5.4 million workers. Tensions between management and unions occur. Many managers of foreign companies say they have good relations with their unions. Others say the challenges posed by strong unions can hinder further investment by their international headquarters. Depending on how sectors are defined, some activities such as oil and gas production or aviation involve multiple unions, which can lead to inter-union power disputes that can impede the companies’ operations. The Fernandez government does not intend to pursue a broad labor reform bill, preferring instead to allow firms and workers to negotiate any adjustments to labor conditions through the collective bargaining process. The Ministry of Labor has indicated interest in proposing a “gig economy” bill (ley de plataformas) that would extend basic labor rights to, e.g., delivery workers coordinated through information technology applications. Labor-related demonstrations in Argentina occurred periodically in 2021. Reasons for strikes include job losses, high taxes, loss of purchasing power, and wage negotiations. Labor demonstrations may involve tens of thousands of protestors. Past demonstrations have essentially closed sections of a city for a few hours or impeded traffic. The Ministry of Labor has hotlines and an online website to report labor abuses, including child labor, forced labor, and labor trafficking. The Superintendent of Labor Risk (Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo) has oversight of health and safety standards. Unions also play a key role in monitoring labor conditions, reporting abuses and filing complaints with the authorities. Argentina has a Service of Mandatory Labor Conciliation (SECLO), which falls within the Ministry of Labor. Provincial governments and the city government of Buenos Aires are also responsible for labor law enforcement. The minimum age for employment is 16. Children between the ages of 16 and 18 may work in a limited number of job categories and for limited hours if they have completed compulsory schooling, which normally ends at age 18. The law requires employers to provide adequate care for workers’ children during work hours to discourage child labor. The Department of Labor’s 2020 Worst Form of Child Labor for Argentina can be accessed here: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/argentina The Department of State’s 2020 Human Rights Report for Argentina can be accessed here: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/argentina/ Argentine law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinion, union affiliation, or age. The law also prohibits employers, either during recruitment or time of employment, from asking about a worker’s political, religious, labor, and cultural views or sexual orientation. These national anti-discrimination laws also apply to labor relations and other social relations. Argentina has been a member of the International Labor Organization since 1919. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $389,064 2020 $383.10 www.worldbank.org/en/country www.indec.gob.ar Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $8.730 billion BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $627 million BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 1.0% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Not available Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 84,319 100% Total Outward 40,985 100% United States 20,015 23.74% Uruguay 19,715 48.10% Spain 4,013 13.58% United States 5,242 12.79% Netherlands 9,997 11.86% Paraguay 2,439 5.95% Brazil 4,614 5.47% Mexico 1,323 3.23% Chile 4,237 5.02% Brazil 649 1.58% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires Avenida Colombia 4300 (C1425GMN) Buenos Aires, Argentina +54-11-5777-474 ECONBA@state.gov Armenia Executive Summary Over the past several years, Armenia has received consistently respectable rankings in international indices that review country business environments and investment climates. Projects representing significant U.S. investment are present in Armenia, most notably ContourGlobal’s Vorotan Hydroelectric Cascade and Lydian’s efforts to develop a major gold mine. U.S. investors in the banking, energy, pharmaceutical, information technology, and mining sectors, among others, have entered or acquired assets in Armenia. Armenia presents a variety of opportunities for investors, and the country’s legal framework and government policy aim to attract investment, but the investment climate is not without challenges. Obstacles include Armenia’s small market size, relative geographic isolation due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, weaknesses in the rule of law and judiciary, and a legacy of corruption. Net foreign direct investment inflows are low. Armenia had commenced a robust recovery from a deep 2020 recession prior to the introduction of new sanctions against Russia. GDP growth reached five percent in 2021 and had been expected to continue to grow in 2022 by at least five percent. As a result of the war and sanctions imposed on Russia, Armenia’s 2022 GDP growth forecast is now just above one percent. In May 2015, Armenia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States. This agreement established a United States-Armenia Council on Trade and Investment to discuss bilateral trade and investment and related issues. Since 2015, Armenia has been a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union that brings Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia into a single integrated market. In November 2017, Armenia signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the European Union, which aimed in part to improve Armenia’s investment climate and business environment. Armenia imposes few restrictions on foreign control and rights to private ownership and establishment. There are no restrictions on the rights of foreign nationals to acquire, establish, or dispose of business interests in Armenia. Business registration procedures are generally straightforward. According to foreign companies, otherwise sound regulations, policies, and laws are sometimes undermined by problems such as the lack of independence, capacity, or professionalism in key institutions, most critically the judiciary. Armenia does not limit the conversion and transfer of money or the repatriation of capital and earnings. The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but investors note that the financial sector is not highly developed. The U.S.-Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty provides U.S. investors with a variety of protections. Although Armenian legislation offers protection for intellectual property rights, enforcement efforts and recourse through the courts are in need of improvement. Armenia experienced a dramatic change of government in 2018, when a democratically elected leader came to power on an anti-corruption platform after street protests toppled the old regime. Following the 2020 NK hostilities, in June 2021, the incumbent retained power in snap parliamentary election that met most international democracy standards. The government continues to push forth with economic and anti-corruption reforms that have improved the business climate. Overall, the competitive environment in Armenia is improving, but several businesses have reported that broader reforms across judicial, tax, customs, health, education, military, and law enforcement institutions will be necessary to shore up these gains. Despite improvements in some areas that raise Armenia’s attractiveness as an investment destination, investors claim that numerous issues remain and must be addressed to ensure a transparent, fair, and predictable business climate. A number of investors have raised concerns about the quality of dialogue between the private sector and government. Investors have also flagged issues regarding government officials’ ability to resolve problems they face in an expeditious manner. An investment dispute in the country’s mining sector has attracted significant international attention and remains outstanding after several years. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 69 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 6 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,220 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of Armenia officially welcomes foreign investment. The Ministry of Economy is the main government body responsible for the development of investment policy in Armenia. Armenia has achieved respectable rankings on some global indices measuring the country’s business climate. Armenia’s investment and trade policy is relatively open; foreign companies are entitled by law to the same treatment as Armenian companies. Armenia has strong human capital and a well-educated population, particularly in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields, leading to significant investment in the high-tech and information technology sectors. Many international companies have established branches or subsidiaries in Armenia to take advantage of the country’s pool of qualified specialists and position within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, many businesses have identified challenges with Armenia’s investment climate in terms of the country’s small market (with a population of less than three million), limited consumer buying power, relative geographic isolation due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and concerns related to weaknesses in the rule of law. Following a peaceful revolution in 2018 fueled in large measure by popular frustration with endemic corruption, Armenia’s government launched a high-profile anti-corruption campaign. The fight against corruption needs to be institutionalized in the long term, especially in critical areas such as the judiciary, tax and customs operations, and health, education, military, and law enforcement sectors. Foreign investors remain concerned about the rule of law, equal treatment, and ethical conduct by government officials. U.S companies have reported that the investment climate is tainted by a failure to enforce intellectual property rights. There have been concerns regarding the lack of an independent and strong judiciary, which undermines the government’s assurances of equal treatment and transparency and reduces access to effective recourse in instances of investment or commercial disputes. Representatives of U.S. entities have raised concerns about the quality of stakeholder consultation by the government with the private sector and government responsiveness in addressing concerns among the business community. Government officials have publicly responded to private sector concerns about perceptions of slow movement in the government bureaucracy as a function of needing to guard against corruption-related risks. The Armenian National Interests Fund and Investment Support Center (Enterprise Armenia) are responsible for attracting and facilitating foreign direct investment. There are generally very few restrictions on foreign ownership or control of commercial enterprises. There are some restrictions on foreign ownership within the media and commercial aviation sectors. Local incorporation is required to obtain a license for the provision of auditing services. The Armenian government does not maintain investment screening mechanisms in general, and for foreign direct investment, in particular. Government approval is required to take advantage of certain tax and customs privileges, and foreign investors are subject to the same requirements as domestic investors where regulatory approvals may be involved. An Armenian ecological NGO recently published an article claiming that many mines in Armenia do not have corporate social responsibility obligations, which are required by law. However, it was unclear from the article if the mines in question were still actively operating. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&language=en Link to Global Witness country-specific reports: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/all-countries-and-regions/ Link to conflicts listed on Environmental Justice Atlas, under “basic data,” select country: https://ejatlas.org/ In 2019, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its first investment policy review for Armenia. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review for Armenia in 2018. Companies can register electronically here. This single window service was launched in 2011 and allows individual entrepreneurs and companies to complete name reservation, business registration, and tax identification processes all at once. The application can be completed in one day. An electronic signature is needed in order to be able to register online. Foreign citizens can obtain an e-signature and more detailed information from the e-signature portal. In 2019, the government launched an e-regulations platform that provides a step-by-step guide for business and investment procedures. The platform is available at https://armenia.eregulations.org/ . According to the latest estimates, it takes four days to complete the company registration process in Armenia. The Armenian government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Armenian government increasingly makes efforts to uses transparent policies and laws to foster competition. Some contacts have reported that over the last few years the Armenian government has pursued a more consistent execution of these laws and policies in an effort to improve market competition and remove informal barriers to market entry, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises. Armenia’s legislation on the protection of competition has been improved with clarifications regarding key concepts. There have been some procedural improvements for delivering conclusions and notifications of potential anti-competitive behavior via electronic means. However, companies regard the efforts of the State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition (SCPEC) alone as insufficient to ensure a level playing field. They indicate that improvements in other state institutions and authorities that support competition, like the courts, tax and customs, public procurement, and law enforcement, are necessary. Numerous studies observe a continuing lack of contestability in local markets, many of which are dominated by a few incumbents. Banking supervision is relatively well developed and largely consistent with the Basel Core Principles. The Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) is the primary regulator of the financial sector and exercises oversight over banking, securities, insurance, and pensions. Armenia has adopted IFRS as the accounting standard for enterprises. Data on Armenia’s public finances and debt obligations are broadly transparent, and the Ministry of Finance publishes periodic reports that are available online. Safety and health requirements, many of them holdovers from the Soviet period, generally do not impede investment activities. Nevertheless, investors consider bureaucratic procedures to be sometimes burdensome, and discretionary decisions by individual officials may present opportunities for petty corruption. A unified online platform for publishing draft legislation was launched in March 2017. Proposed legislation is available for the public to view. Registered users can submit feedback and see a summary of comments on draft legislation. However, the time period devoted to public comments is often regarded as insufficient to solicit substantive feedback. The results of consultations have not been reported by the government in the past. The government maintains other portals, including http://www.e-gov.am and http://www.arlis.am, that make legislation and regulations available to the public. The governmental https://www.aipa.am/en/ portal is a comprehensive platform for a range of services including registering intellectual property, opening a company, or applying for a construction permit. It also provides links to key regulatory institutions and laws and regulations. The government does not require environmental and social disclosures to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Some regulations that affect Armenia are developed within the Eurasian Economic Commission, the executive body for the EAEU. Armenia is a member of the EAEU and adheres to relevant technical regulations. Armenia’s entry into CEPA will lead it to pursue harmonization efforts with the EU on a range of laws, regulations, and policies relevant to economic affairs. Armenia is also a member of the WTO, and the Armenian government notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Armenia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and has already sent category “A”, “B,” and “C” notifications to the WTO. Armenia has a hybrid legal system that includes elements of both civil and common law. Although Armenia is developing an international commercial code, the laws regarding commercial and contractual matters are currently set forth in the civil code. Thus, because Armenia lacks a commercial court, all disputes involving contracts, ownership of property, or other commercial matters are resolved by litigants in courts of general jurisdiction, which handle both civil and criminal cases. Judges that handle civil matters may be overwhelmed by the volume of cases before them and are frequently seen by the public as corrupt. Despite the ability of courts to use the precedential authority of the Court of Cassation and the European Court of Human Rights, many judges who specialize in civil cases do not do so, increasing the unpredictability of court decisions in the eyes of investors. Businesses tend to perceive that many Armenian courts suffer from low levels of efficiency, independence, and professionalism, which drives a need to strengthen the judiciary. Very often in proceedings when additional forensic expertise is requested, the court may suspend a case until the forensic opinion is received, a process that can take several months. Businesses have noted that many judges at courts of general jurisdiction may be reluctant to make decisions without getting advice from higher court judges. Thus, the public opinion is that decisions may be influenced by factors other than the law and merits of individual cases. In general, the government honors judgments from both arbitration proceedings and Armenian national courts. Due to the nature and complexity of commercial and contractual issues and the caseload of judges who specialize in civil cases, many matters involving investment or commercial disputes take months or years to work their way through the courts. In addition, businesses have complained of the inefficiencies and institutional corruption of the courts. Even though the Armenian constitution provides investors the tools to enforce awards and their property rights, investors claim that there is little predictability in what a court may do. Basic legal provisions covering foreign investment are specified in the 1994 Law on Foreign Investment. Foreign companies are entitled by law to the same treatment as Armenian companies. A Law on Public-Private Partnership (PPP), adopted in 2019, establishes a framework for the government to attract investment for projects focused on infrastructure. In 2021, the Law on PPP has been amended to introduce clear criteria for PPP project selection by the Government, as well as enabled investors to apply to the government with PPP project proposals. The Investment Support Center (Enterprise Armenia) is Armenia’s national authority for investment and export promotion. It provides information to foreign investors on Armenia’s business climate, investment opportunities, and legislation; supports investor visits; and serves as a liaison for government institutions. More information is available via the Investment Support Center’s website. SCPEC reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Relevant laws, regulations, commission decisions, and more information can be found on SCPEC’s website. Concentrations, including mergers, acquisitions of shares or assets, amalgamations, and incorporations, are subject to ex ante control by SCPEC in accordance with the law. Whenever a concentration gives rise to concerns about harm to competition, including the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, SCPEC can prohibit such a transaction or impose certain remedies. Armenia’s Law on Protection of Economic Competition has been amended several times in recent years to bring Armenia’s competition framework into alignment with EAEU and CEPA requirements. The law was changed in 2020 to improve SCPEC’s capabilities to investigate anti-competitive behavior, in collaboration with Armenia’s investigative bodies, whereas before SCPEC had to rely primarily on document studies and request information from other state bodies. Amendments to the competition law made in 2021 strengthened SCPEC’s preventive measures by allowing private sector representatives to obtain SCPEC’s advisory opinion on market concentration risks prior to a planned transaction or activity (formerly available only to state bodies). The most recent changes to competition law also defined the order to conduct sectoral market studies to identify potential competition violations and enlarged the scope of market transactions that can be assessed as market concentrations. Under Armenian law, foreign investment cannot be confiscated or expropriated except in extreme cases of natural or state emergency upon obtaining an order from a domestic court. According to the Armenian constitution, equivalent compensation is owed prior to expropriation. According to the Law on Bankruptcy adopted in 2006, creditors and equity and contract holders (including foreign entities) have the right to participate and defend their interests in bankruptcy cases. Armenia decided with the passage of a new Judicial Code in 2018 to adopt a new, specialized bankruptcy court, which began operations in 2019. Creditors have the right to access all materials relevant to cases, submit claims to court, participate in meetings of creditors, and nominate candidates to administer cases. Monetary judgments are usually made in local currency. The Armenian Criminal Code defines penalties for false and deliberate bankruptcy, concealment of property or other assets of the bankrupt party, or other illegal activities during the bankruptcy process. UNCTAD observes that Armenia’s framework for bankruptcy procedures needs improvement, adding that insolvency cases are expensive and almost always result in liquidation. Armenia amended its bankruptcy law in December 2019 to reduce the cost of bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, premiums have been set for bankruptcy managers for submitting financial recovery plans, as well as for the recovery of a bankrupt person, with the aim of raising rates of financial recovery. In 2020, the debt threshold to launch bankruptcy proceedings was raised to grant companies a greater ability to pay off debts rather than having their assets frozen. 4. Industrial Policies Armenia offers incentives for exporters (e.g., no export duty, VAT refund on goods and services exported) and foreign investors (e.g., income tax holidays, the ability to carry forward losses indefinitely, VAT deferral, and exemptions from customs duties for investment projects). Starting in 2018, the Armenian government began exempting imports of capital investment-related goods from VAT payments at the border. In 2015, the Armenian government began exempting from customs duties investment-related imports of equipment and raw materials from non-EAEU member countries. VAT and customs duties exemptions are implemented by government decisions made on a case-by-case basis. Also, in accordance with the Law on Foreign Investment, several ad hoc incentives may be negotiated on a case-by-case basis for investments that are targeted at certain sectors of the economy or are of strategic interest. As part of its response to COVID-19, the government launched several economic response and social support measures in 2020, some of them, including several support programs in the agriculture sector, are still active in 2022. In May 2022, the government had initiated changes in energy regulations to allow multiple usage points for solar panel installations. The Law on Licensing was amended in 2021 to simplify the licensing requirements for foreign companies to engage in 13 types of business activities in Armenia, including security/encashment and postal services, railroad and taxi services, urban development and engineering, and technical supervision of construction. In 2011, Armenia adopted a Law on Free Economic Zones (FEZ), amended in 2018, and developed several key regulations to attract foreign investments into FEZs: exemptions from VAT, profit tax, customs duties, and property tax. The Alliance FEZ was opened in 2013 to focus on high-tech industries, including information and communication technologies, electronics, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, architecture and engineering, industrial design, and alternative energy. In 2014, the government expanded operations in the Alliance FEZ to include industrial production. In 2015, the Meridian FEZ, focused on jewelry production, watchmaking, and diamond cutting, opened in Yerevan. The Meghri FEZ, located on Armenia’s border with Iran, opened in 2017. A new FEZ, located in Hrazdan, opened in late 2018 and is focused on the high-tech and information technology sectors. Armenia has signaled an interest in developing logistics hubs, including one in Gyumri, to facilitate goods trade. There are no performance requirements for investment in terms of mandating local employment. The processes for obtaining visas, residence, or work permits are straightforward. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest. Armenia does not follow any policy that would force foreign investors to use domestic content in goods and technology. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code or provide keys for encryption. There are no requirements to store data within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Armenian law protects secured interests in property, both personal and real. Armenian law provides a basic framework for secured lending, collateral, and pledges and provides a mechanism to support modern lending practices and title registration. According to Armenia’s constitution, foreign citizens are prohibited from owning land, though they may take out long-term leases. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. Armenia has a strong legislative and regulatory framework to protect intellectual property rights (IPR). Domestic legislation, including the 2006 Law on Copyright and Related Rights, provides for the protection of copyright with respect to literary, scientific, and artistic works (including computer programs and databases), patents and other rights of invention, industrial design, know-how, trade secrets, trademarks, and service marks. The Intellectual Property Agency (IPA) in the Ministry of Economy is responsible for granting patents and overseeing other IPR-related matters. The collective management organization ARMAUTHOR manages authors’ economic rights. Trademarks and patents require state registration by the IPA, but copyright does not. There is no special trade secret law in Armenia, but the protection of trade secrets is covered by Armenia’s Civil Code. Formal registration is straightforward, the database of registered IPR is public, and applications to register IPR are published online for two months for comment by third parties. Armenia’s legislation has been harmonized with the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In 2005, Armenia created an IPR Enforcement Unit in the Organized Crime Department of the Armenian Police, which acts only based on complaints from right holders and does not exercise ex-officio powers. Despite the existence of relevant legislation and executive government structures, the concept of IPR remains unrecognized by a large part of the local population. The onus for IPR complaints rests with the offended party. Law enforcement assert that the majority of cases are settled through out-of-court proceedings. While the Armenian government has made some progress on IPR issues, strengthening enforcement mechanisms remains necessary. UNCTAD reports that low awareness and poor monitoring of IPR violations harm the business climate. A new Law on Copyright has been drafted and submitted for government’s approval. It includes provisions from new international agreements (Marrakesh and Beijing Treaties). A new Law on Patents and Law on Industrial Design entered into force in July 2021. The new Law on Patents strengthens the requirement for substantive examination before rights registration and introduces the concept of a short-term patent. The new Law on Industrial Design includes some procedural changes, including publishing applications for industrial designs and objects during the state registration process. Armenia is not included in USTR’s Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but the financial sector is not highly developed, according to investors. Banking sector assets account for over 80 percent of total financial sector assets. Financial intermediation tends to be poor. Nearly all banks require collateral located in Armenia, and large collateral requirements often prevent potential borrowers from entering the market. U.S. businesses have noted that this creates a significant barrier for small- and medium-sized enterprises and start-up companies. The Armenian government welcomes foreign portfolio investment and there is a supporting system and legal framework in place. Armenia’s securities market is not well developed and has only minimal trading activity through the Armenia Securities Exchange, though efforts to grow capital markets are underway. Liquidity sufficient for the entry and exit of sizeable positions is often difficult to achieve due to the small size of the Armenian market. The Armenian government hopes that as a result of pension reforms in 2014, which brought two international asset managers to Armenia, capital markets will play a more prominent role in the country’s financial sector. Armenia adheres to its IMF Article VIII commitments by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to access credit locally. Since 2020, the banking sector has withstood the twin shocks created by COVID-19 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Indicators of financial soundness, including capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios, have remained broadly strong. The sector is well capitalized and liquid. Non-performing loans have ticked upward slightly from rates of around five percent of all loans. Dollarization, historically high for deposits and lending, has been falling in recent years. Seventeen commercial banks operate in Armenia. In 2021, all commercial banks in Armenia generated net profits and all had a positive return on average equity (the financial ratio that measures the performance of a bank based on its average shareholders’ equity outstanding). Total bank assets in Armenia at the end of 2021 were $14 billion; Armenia’s 2021 GDP was approximately $13.6 billion. As such, the ratio of banks’ total assets to GDP – approximately one-to-one – is average compared to peer countries. Concentration of banks’ assets is considered to be very low, with the three largest banks holding less than fifty percent of total banking sector assets. Market share of the largest five banks was 56 percent in 2021. Overall, Armenia’s banking sector is viewed by international financial institutions (IFIs) as relatively healthy. The minimum capital requirement for banks is 30 billion AMD (around $59 million). There are no restrictions on foreigners to open bank accounts. Residents and foreign nationals can hold foreign currency accounts and import, export, and exchange foreign currency relatively freely in accordance with the Law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control. Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary, branch, or representative office, and subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to provide the same types of services as domestically owned banks. The CBA is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The authority and responsibilities of the CBA are established under the Law on the Central Bank of Armenia. Numerous other articles of legislation and supporting regulations provide for financial sector oversight and supervision. Armenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Most of Armenia’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s, but SOEs are still active in a number of sectors. SOEs in Armenia operate as state-owned closed joint stock companies that are managed by the Department of State Property Management and state non-commercial organizations. There are no laws or rules that ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in any specific industry. Armenia is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and SOEs are covered under that agreement. SOEs in Armenia are subject to the same tax regime as their private competitors, and private enterprises in Armenia can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions. The Department of State Property Management maintains a public list of state-owned closed joint stock companies on its website. Most of Armenia’s SOEs were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the privatization processes for Armenia’s large assets were reported to be neither competitive nor transparent, and political considerations in some instances prevailed over fair tender processes. The most recent law on privatization, the fifth, is the Law on the 2017-2020 Program for State Property Privatization, which lists 48 entities for privatization. The Department of State Property Management oversees the management of the state’s shares in entities slated for privatization. Details of the privatization program are available on the Department of State Property Management website. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Comprehension of responsible business conduct (RBC) in Armenia is still developing, but several larger companies with foreign ownership or management have been operating under the concept in recent years. Initiatives, where they do exist, are primarily limited to corporate social responsibility efforts. However, RBC programs that do exist are viewed favorably. Some civil society groups and business associations are playing a more active role to promote RBC and develop awareness. Major pillars of corporate governance in Armenia include the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the Law on Banks and Banking Activity, the Law on Securities Market, and a Corporate Governance Code. International observers note inconsistencies in this legislation and generally rate corporate governance practices as weak to fair. Specific areas for potential improvement cited by the local business community include improving internal and external auditing for firms, enhancing the powers of independent directors on company boards, and boosting shareholders’ rights. Armenia has outlined commitments to corporate governance reforms, including with regard to mandatory audit, accounting, and financial reporting, within the context of an ongoing Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. Armenia joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in March 2017 as a candidate country. The first EITI national report for Armenia was published in January 2019. As part of its EITI membership aspirations, the government in March 2018 adopted a roadmap to disclose beneficial owners in the metal ore mining industry. Relevant implementing legislation, including for beneficial ownership disclosure, was adopted in 2019. Armenia is not a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and no Armenian party is a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association. Domestic laws and regulations related to labor, employment rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection are not always enforced effectively. These laws and regulations cannot be waived to attract foreign investment. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory. Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World; and Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Anti-Corruption Committee (ACC) 13A Vagharsh Vagharshyan Street Yerevan, Armenia +374 11 900 002 press@investigatory.am Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Sona Ayvazyan Executive Director Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center 12 Saryan Street Yerevan, Armenia +374 10 569 589 sona@transparency.am Following 2021 parliamentary elections that international monitors assessed as upholding fundamental rights and freedoms, the Armenian government’s commitment to eradicating corruption continues. Policy action and systemic change remain strong, and the government has pressed forward with legislative actions to establish investigative, prosecutorial and judicial anti-corruption institutions. The government’s anti-corruption agenda is outlined in a 2019–2022 strategy and action plan. These documents establish a new anti-corruption institutional framework with separate entities tasked with preventive, investigative, and prosecutorial functions as well as the Specialized Anti-Corruption Court. Established in 2019, the Corruption Prevention Commission (CPC) is the main entity responsible for preventing corruption and building integrity across government and society. CPC continued to make progress in the areas of asset declaration and integrity checks but has yet to fulfill its mandates for oversight of political party financing and prevention of conflicts of interest. The Anti-Corruption Committee, as an investigative body, was established in September 2021 to lead pre-trial criminal proceedings on alleged corruption crimes by carrying out both investigative and operative intelligence activities. The amendments to the Judicial Code on establishing the Specialized Anti-Corruption Court (SACC) were adopted on April 14, 2021, thus marking the completion of the creation of the government’s new institutional framework to fight corruption. The SACC is the first instance court, and the judges specialized in anti-corruption cases will sit at the Criminal Court of Appeals and the Anti-Corruption Chamber of the Cassation Court. As a follow-up to the passage of the Law “On Civil Forfeiture of Illegal Assets,” the department dealing with cases of civil forfeiture of illegal assets was established in September 2020 within the General Prosecutor’s Office. Civil society actors are divided in their opinions about the effectiveness of the government’s anti-corruption measures. Some assess the implementation of the anti-corruption program is on track, while others contend that the work of law enforcement and judiciary on corruption cases is not effective enough, citing already opened criminal cases on corruption and embezzlement that do not reach completion. Corruption remains an obstacle to U.S. investment in Armenia, particularly as it relates to critical areas such as the justice system and concerns related to the rule of law, enforcement of existing legislation and regulations, and equal treatment. Investors claim that the health, education, military, corrections, and law enforcement sectors lack transparency in procurement and have in the past used selective enforcement to elicit bribes. Judges who specialize in civil cases are still widely perceived by the public to be corrupt and under the influence of former authorities. The effectiveness and independence of newly formed anti-corruption institutions remains to be seen. Some individuals have voiced concerns around whether certain judicial representatives and law enforcement leaders have been selected objectively. The potential for politically motivated, outside influence on these anti-corruption institutions, as well as law enforcement bodies and prosecutorial services, also remains a concern. Transparency International released its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2021, ranking Armenia 58th among 180 countries. According to the report, Armenia’s CPI score in 2021 remained unchanged compared to 2020 (score of 49). Armenia’s rating is higher than the CPI global average of 43, indicating Armenia’s public sector was perceived by experts and businesspeople to be less corrupt than the global average. Among 19 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Armenia ranked the second highest. The report cited Armenia as among the countries which has registered significant progress in the last decade. (In his December 2021 Summit for Democracy speech, Prime Minister Pashinyan noted Armenia aims to rise from a score of 49 to 60 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index by 2026.) Various laws prohibit the participation of civil and municipal servants, as well as local government elected officials such as mayors and councilors, in commercial activities. However, powerful officials at the national, district, and local levels often acquire direct, partial, or indirect control over private firms. Such control is often exercised through a hidden partner or majority ownership of fully private parent companies. This involvement can occur through close relatives and friends. According to foreign investors, these practices reinforce protectionism, hinder competition, and undermine the image of the government as a facilitator of private sector growth. Because of the historically strong interconnectedness of the political and economic spheres, Armenia has often struggled to introduce legislation to encourage strict ethical codes of conduct and the prevention of bribery in business transactions. In 2016, Armenia adopted legislation on criminal penalties for illicit enrichment and noncompliance or fraud in filing declarations. Armenia is a member of the UN Convention against Corruption. While not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Armenia is a member of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and has signed the Istanbul Action Plan. Armenia is also a member of the global Open Government Partnership initiative. No specific law exists to protect NGOs dealing with anti-corruption investigations. 10. Political and Security Environment Armenia has a history of political demonstrations, most of which have remained peaceful. There have been some instances, however, of violent confrontations between police and protesters, or of attacks on government officials. The last major violent protest occurred in November 2020 following the release of a tripartite ceasefire statement by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, which brought an end to the fall 2020 intensive fighting in and around NK. Individuals and groups displeased with the announcement stormed government buildings and destroyed property. Protestors assaulted the speaker of parliament in the streets of Yerevan and broke into the prime minister’s residence. Since the release of the tripartite statement, groups opposed to the government have organized regular marches and rallies in Yerevan that have remained largely peaceful and caused minimal disruption to ordinary business. Pro-government groups have also organized peaceful rallies, although less frequently. Throughout Armenia, protestors use road blockades as a common tactic to register discontent, most often with the government over community-level issues. The disruption created by such road blockades is usually minimal. Protests have not resulted in any damage to projects of installations of international businesses. It is unlikely that civil disturbances, should they occur, would be directed against U.S. businesses or the U.S. community. During 44 days of intensive fighting from September 27 to November 10 in 2020 involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Armenia-supported separatists, significant casualties and atrocities were reported by all sides. After Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, reestablished control over four surrounding territories controlled by separatists since 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire arrangement announced by Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 9 resulted in the peaceful transfer of control over three additional territories to Azerbaijan, as well as the introduction of Russian peacekeepers to the region. The ceasefire has largely held, with frequent but localized violations. Tensions remain high, particularly along the international border, which has not been fully demarcated. Russian forces have played a role in controlling access along highways near the border and into the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government has suspended or threatened to suspend the operations of U.S. companies in Azerbaijan whose products or services are provided in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh currently under the administration of the Russian peacekeepers and has banned the entry into Azerbaijan of some persons who have visited NK. The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in and around NK as access is restricted. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Armenia’s human capital is one of its strongest resources. The labor force is generally well educated, particularly in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields. Nearly 100 percent of Armenia’s adult population is literate. According to official data, enrollment in secondary school is over 90 percent, and enrollment in senior school (essentially equivalent to American high school) is approximately 85 percent. Despite this, official statistics indicate a high rate of unemployment, at around 20 percent. Unemployment is particularly pronounced among women and youth, and significant underemployment is also a problem. Considerable foreign investment in Armenia has occurred in the high-tech sector. High-tech companies have established branches or subsidiaries in Armenia to take advantage of the country’s pool of qualified specialists in electrical and computer engineering, optical engineering, and software design. There is a shortage of workers with vocational training. About 20 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is employed in the informal economy, primarily in the services sector. Armenian law protects the rights of workers in the formal sector to form and to join independent unions, with exceptions for personnel of the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. The law also provides for the right to strike, with the same exceptions, and permits collective bargaining. The law stipulates that workers’ rights cannot be restricted because of membership in a union. It also differentiates between layoffs and firing with severance. According to some reports, labor organizations remain weak because of employer resistance, high unemployment, and unfavorable economic conditions; collective bargaining is not common in Armenia. Experts observe that the right to strike, although enshrined in the constitution, is difficult to realize due to mediation and voting requirements. Labor unions are generally inactive with the exception of those connected with the mining and chemical industries, and a few small grassroot movements to create unions in the fields of education and public health have sprung up over the last few years. Labor laws cannot be waived to retain or attract investment. The current Labor Code is considered to be largely consistent with international standards. The law sets a standard 40-hour workweek, with 20 days of mandatory annual paid leave. However, there are consistent reports that many private sector employees, particularly in the service sector, are unable to obtain paid leave and are required to work more than eight hours a day without additional compensation. The treatment of labor in FEZs is no different than elsewhere in the country. Employers are generally able to adjust employment in light of fluctuating market conditions. Severance in general does not exceed 60 working days. Benefits for workers laid off for economic reasons are mostly limited to receiving qualification trainings and job search assistance. Individual labor disputes can usually be resolved through courts; however, the courts are often overburdened, causing significant delays. Collective labor disputes should be resolved through collective bargaining. Since 2019, Armenia’s Health and Labor Inspection Body (HLIB) has gradually begun to exercise more robust enforcement of labor legislation and fulfill its oversight function. Its full mandate came into force in July 2021. Throughout 2021, the government continued to adopt inspection checklists and risk assessment methodologies in various sectors to enable HLIB to carry out inspections. HLIB also continued to add new inspectors throughout the year. Amendments to the Labor Code that entered into force in 2015 clarified the procedures for making changes in labor contracts and further specified the provisions required in labor contracts, notably those relating to probationary periods, vacation, and wage calculations. The current legal minimum wage is AMD 68,000 (approximately $135) per month. Most companies pay an unofficial extra-month bonus for the New Year’s holiday. Wages in the public sector are often significantly lower than those in the private sector. 14. Contact for More Information Economic & Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy Yerevan American Avenue 1 Yerevan, Armenia +374 10 494 200 YerevanBusiness@state.gov Australia Executive Summary Australia is generally welcoming to foreign investment, which is widely considered to be an essential contributor to Australia’s economic growth and productivity. The United States is by far the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for Australia. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the stock of U.S. FDI totaled USD 170 billion in January 2020. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2005, establishes higher thresholds for screening U.S. investment for most classes of direct investment. While welcoming toward FDI, Australia does apply a “national interest” test to qualifying investment through its Foreign Investment Review Board screening process. Various changes to Australia’s foreign investment rules, primarily aimed at strengthening national security, have been made in recent years. This continued in 2020 with the passage of the Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Act 2020, which broadens the classes of foreign investments that require screening, with a particular focus on defense and national security supply chains. All foreign investments in these industries now require screening, regardless of their value or national origin. The Foreign Investment Reform legislation commenced in January 2021. Despite the increased focus on foreign investment screening, the rejection rate for proposed investments has remained low and there have been no cases of investment from the United States having been rejected in recent years, although some U.S. companies have reported greater scrutiny of their investments in Australia. In response to a perceived lack of fairness, the Australian government has tightened anti-tax avoidance legislation targeting multi-national corporations with operations in multiple tax jurisdictions. While some laws have been complementary to international efforts to address tax avoidance schemes and the use of low-tax countries or tax havens, Australia has also gone further than the international community in some areas. Australia has increased funding for clean technology projects and both local and international companies can apply for grants to implement emission-saving equipment to their operations. Australia adopted a net-zero emissions target at the national level in November 2021 although made no change to its short-term goal of a 26-28 percent emission reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels. Australia’s eight states and territories have adopted both net-zero targets and a range of interim emission reduction targets set above the federal target. Various state incentive schemes may also be available to U.S. investors. The Australian government is strongly focused on economic recovery from the COVID-driven recession Australia experienced in 2020, the country’s first in three decades. In addition to direct stimulus and business investment incentives, it has announced investment attraction incentives across a range of priority industries, including food and beverage manufacturing, medical products, clean energy, defense, space, and critical minerals processing. U.S. involvement and investment in these fields is welcomed. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 179 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 25 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 170 billion https://www.bea.gov/data/ intl-trade-investment/direct-investment- country-and-industry World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 53,690 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Australia is generally welcoming to foreign direct investment (FDI), with foreign investment widely considered to be an essential contributor to Australia’s economic growth. Other than certain required review and approval procedures for designated types of foreign investment described below, there are no laws that discriminate against foreign investors. A number of investment promotion agencies operate in Australia. The Australian Trade Commission (often referred to as Austrade) is the Commonwealth Government’s national “gateway” agency to support investment into Australia. Austrade provides coordinated government assistance to promote, attract, and facilitate FDI, supports Australian companies to grow their business in international markets, and delivers advice to the Australian Government on its trade, tourism, international education and training, and investment policy agendas. Austrade operates through a number of international offices, with U.S. offices primarily focused on attracting foreign direct investment into Australia and promoting the Australian education sector in the United States. Austrade in the United States operates from offices in Boston, Chicago, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. In addition, state and territory investment promotion agencies also support international investment at the state level and in key sectors. Within Australia, foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises and may engage in all forms of remunerative activity in accordance with national legislative and regulatory practices. See Section 4: Legal Regime – Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment below for information on Australia’s investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Other than the screening process described in Section 4, there are few limits or restrictions on foreign investment in Australia. Foreign purchases of agricultural land greater than AUD 15 million (USD 11 million) are subject to screening. This threshold applies to the cumulative value of agricultural land owned by the foreign investor, including the proposed purchase. However, the agricultural land screening threshold does not affect investments made under the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). The current threshold is AUD 1.25 billion (USD 925 million) for U.S. non-government investors. Investments made by U.S. non-government investors are subject to inclusion on the foreign ownership register of agricultural land and to Australian Tax Office (ATO) information gathering activities on new foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which advises Australia’s Treasurer, may impose conditions when approving foreign investments. These conditions can be diverse and may include: retention of a minimum proportion of Australian directors; certain requirements on business activities, such as the requirement not to divest certain assets; and certain taxation requirements. Such conditions are in keeping with Australia’s policy of ensuring foreign investments are in the national interest. Australia has not conducted an investment policy review in the last three years through either the OECD or UNCTAD system. The WTO reviewed Australia’s trade policies and practices in 2019, and the final report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp496_e.htm . The Australian Trade Commission compiles an annual “Why Australia Benchmark Report” that presents comparative data on investing in Australia in the areas of Growth, Innovation, Talent, Location, and Business. The report also compares Australia’s investment credentials with other countries and provides a general snapshot on Australia’s investment climate. The 2021 Benchmark Report can be found at: http://www.austrade.gov.au/International/Invest/Resources/Benchmark-Report . Australia’s private sector frequently provides policy recommendations to the government, including as part of annual federal budget reviews and ad hoc policy reviews. In 2021 the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia published a report titled “The Opportunity is Now: Attracting U.S. Investors to Australia,” which provides a range of recommendations to government relating to Australia’s investment screening and general investment environment. The report is available via the following link: https://www.pwc.com.au/amcham-pwc-opportunity-is-now.html Business registration in Australia is relatively straightforward and is facilitated through a number of government websites. The government’s business.gov.au website provides an online resource and is intended as a “whole-of-government” service providing essential information on planning, starting, and growing a business. Foreign entities intending to conduct business in Australia as a foreign company must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). As Australia’s corporate, markets, and financial services regulator, ASIC’s website provides information and guides on starting and managing a business or company in the country. In registering a business, individuals and entities are required to register as a company with ASIC, which then gives the company an Australian Company Number, registers the company, and issues a Certificate of Registration. According to the World Bank “Starting a Business” indicator, registering a business in Australia takes two days, and Australia ranks 7th globally on this indicator. Australia generally looks positively towards outward investment as a way to grow its economy. There are no restrictions on investing abroad. Austrade, Export Finance Australia (EFA), and various other government agencies offer assistance to Australian businesses looking to invest abroad, and some sector-specific export and investment programs exist. The United States is the top destination, by far, for Australian investment overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Australian Government utilizes transparent policies and effective laws to foster national competition and is consultative in its policy making process. The government generally allows for public comment of draft legislation and publishes legislation once it enters into force. Details of the Australian government’s approach to regulation and regulatory impact analysis can be found on the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s website: https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation Regulations drafted by Australian Government agencies must be accompanied by a Regulation Impact Statement when submitted to the final decision maker (which may be the Cabinet, a Minister, or another decision maker appointed by legislation.) All Regulation Impact Statements must first be approved by the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) which sits within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, prior to being provided to the relevant decision maker. They are required to demonstrate the need for regulation, the alternative options available (including non-regulatory options), feedback from stakeholders, and a full cost-benefit analysis. Regulations are subsequently required to be reviewed periodically. All Regulation Impact Statements, second reading speeches, explanatory memoranda, and associated legislation are made publicly available on Government websites. Australia’s state and territory governments have similar processes when making new regulations. The Australian Government has tended to prefer self-regulatory options where industry can demonstrate that the size of the risks are manageable and that there are mechanisms for industry to agree on, and comply with, self-regulatory options that will resolve the identified problem. This manifests in various ways across industries, including voluntary codes of conduct and similar agreements between industry players. The Australian Government has recognized the impost of regulations and has undertaken a range of initiatives to reduce red tape. This has included specific red tape reduction targets for government agencies and various deregulatory groups within government agencies. In 2019, the Australian Government established a Deregulation Taskforce within its Treasury Department, stating its goal was to “drive improvements to the design, administration and effectiveness of the stock of government regulation to ensure it is fit for purpose.” The taskforce’s work is ongoing. Australian accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international standards. Accounting standards are formulated by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), an Australian Government agency under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. Under that Act, the statutory functions of the AASB are to develop a conceptual framework for the purpose of evaluating proposed standards; make accounting standards under section 334 of the Corporations Act 2001, and advance and promote the main objects of Part 12 of the ASIC Act, which include reducing the cost of capital, enabling Australian entities to compete effectively overseas and maintaining investor confidence in the Australian economy. The Australian Government conducts regular reviews of proposed measures and legislative changes and holds public hearings into such matters. Australian government financing arrangements are transparent and well governed. Legislation governing the type of financial arrangements the government and its agencies may enter into is publicly available and adhered to. Updates on the Government’s financial position are regularly posted on the Department of Finance and Treasury websites. Issuance of government debt is managed by the Australian Office of Financial Management, which holds regular tenders for the sale of government debt and the outcomes of these tenders are publicly available. The Australian Government also publishes and adheres to strict procurement guidelines. Australia formally joined the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement in 2019. Environmental Social Governance (ESG) reporting is not currently mandated for companies in Australia. However, companies are required to disclose any information that shareholders may deem relevant in assessing the performance of value of the company and this may include ESG components. Companies are also increasingly disclosing ESG aspects of their operations in response to shareholder demands and in order to secure an advantage over competitors. Further, financial services companies are required to disclose their exposure to climate risk as part of their standard risk disclosures (see further detail here: https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/corporate-governance-update-climate-change-risk-and-disclosure/ ) Australia is a member of the WTO, G20, OECD, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and became the first Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Dialogue Partner in 1974. While not a regional economic block, Australia’s free trade agreement with New Zealand provides for a high level of integration between the two economies with the ultimate goal of a single economic market. Details of Australia’s involvement in these international organizations can be found on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s website: https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/Pages/wto-g20-oecd-apec The Australian legal system is firmly grounded on the principles of equal treatment before the law, procedural fairness, judicial precedent, and the independence of the judiciary. Strong safeguards exist to ensure that people are not treated arbitrarily or unfairly by governments or officials. Property and contractual rights are enforced through the Australian court system, which is based on English Common Law. Australia’s judicial system is fully independent and separate from the executive branch of government. Information regarding investing in Australia can be found in Austrade’s “Guide to Investing” at http://www.austrade.gov.au/International/Invest/Investor-guide . The guide is designed to help international investors and businesses navigate investing and operating in Australia. Foreign investment in Australia is regulated by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) is a non-statutory body, comprising independent board members advised by a division within the Treasury Department, established to advise the Treasurer on Australia’s foreign investment policy and its administration. The FIRB screens potential foreign investments in Australia above threshold values, and based on advice from the FIRB the Treasurer may deny or place conditions on the approval of particular investments above that threshold on national interest grounds. In January 2021 new legislation, the Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Act 2020, took effect. This legislation tightened Australia’s investment screening rules by introducing the concept of a “national security business” and “national security land,” the acquisition of which trigger a FIRB review. Further details on national security considerations, including the definitions of national security businesses, are available on the FIRB website: https://firb.gov.au/guidance-resources/guidance-notes/gn8. The Australian Government applies a “national interest” consideration in reviewing foreign investment applications. “National interest” covers a broader set of considerations than national security alone and may include tax or competition implications of an investment. Further information on foreign investment screening, including screening thresholds for certain sectors and countries, can be found at FIRB’s website: https://firb.gov.au/ . Under the AUSFTA agreement, all U.S. greenfield investments are exempt from FIRB screening. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) enforces the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and a range of additional legislation, promotes competition, and fair trading, and regulates national infrastructure for the benefit of all Australians. The ACCC plays a key role in assessing mergers to determine whether they will lead to a substantial lessening of competition in any market. The ACCC also engages in consumer protection enforcement and has, in recent years, been given expanded responsibilities to monitor energy assets, the national gas market, and digital industries. Private property can be expropriated for public purposes in accordance with Australia’s constitution and established principles of international law. Property owners are entitled to compensation based on “just terms” for expropriated property. There is little history of expropriation in Australia. Bankruptcy is a legal status conferred under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and operates in all of Australia’s states and territories. Only individuals can be made bankrupt, not businesses or companies. Where there is a partnership or person trading under a business name, it is the individual or individuals who make up that firm that are made bankrupt. Companies cannot become bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act though similar provisions (called “administration and winding up”) exist under the Corporations Act 2001. Bankruptcy is not a criminal offense in Australia. Creditor rights are established under the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the Corporations Act 2001, and the more recent Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016. The latter legislation commenced in two tranches over 2017 and aims to increase the efficiency of insolvency administrations, improve communications between parties, increase the corporate regulator’s oversight of the insolvency market, and “improve overall consumer confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.” Under the combined legislation, creditors have the right to: request information during the administration process; give direction to a liquidator or trustee; appoint a liquidator to review the current appointee’s remuneration; and remove a liquidator and appoint a replacement. The Australian parliament passed the Corporations Amendment (Corporation Insolvency Reforms) Act 2020 in December 2020. The legislation is a response to the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and is designed to both assist viable businesses remain solvent and simplify the liquidation process for insolvent businesses. The new insolvency process under this legislation came into effect in January 2021. Australia ranks 20th globally on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report “resolving insolvency” measure. 4. Industrial Policies The Commonwealth Government and state and territory governments provide a range of measures to assist investors with setting up and running a business and undertaking investment. Types of assistance available vary by location, industry, and the nature of the business activity. Austrade provides coordinated government assistance to attracting FDI and is intended to serve as the national point-of-contact for investment inquiries. State and territory governments similarly offer a suite of financial and non-financial incentives. The Commonwealth Government also provides incentives for companies engaging in research and development (R&D) and delivers a tax offset for expenditure on eligible R&D activities undertaken during the year. R&D activities conducted overseas are also eligible under certain circumstances, and the program is jointly administered by government’s AusIndustry program and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The Australian Government typically does not offer guarantees on, or jointly finance projects with, foreign investors. The Australian government announced a new USD 1.1 billion Modern Manufacturing Strategy in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Strategy is primarily grants-based and provides funding to businesses to commercialize ideas and scale-up production in six target industries: resources technology and critical minerals processing; food and beverage; medical products; clean energy; defense; and space industry. Further details of the Strategy can be found on the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources’ website: https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/make-it-happen-the-australian-governments-modern-manufacturing-strategy/our-modern-manufacturing-strategy The Australian government provides a range of incentives for business investments in clean energy technologies, administered by the Clean Energy Regulator within the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources and funded through the Emission Reduction Fund. Details on the Fund and how to apply are available on the Department’s website via the following link: https://www.industry.gov.au/policies-and-initiatives/emissions-reduction-fund . The government also encourages voluntary investment in emission reduction, including through certifying carbon reductions resulting from business investments as part of the Climate Active initiative: https://www.industry.gov.au/regulations-and-standards/climate-active. Australia does not have any free trade zones or free ports. As a general rule, foreign firms establishing themselves in Australia are not subject to local employment or forced localization requirements, performance requirements and incentives, including to senior management and board of directors. Proprietary companies must have at least one director resident in Australia, while public companies are required to have a minimum of two resident directors. See Section 12 below for further information on rules pertaining to the hiring of foreign labor. Under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2015, telecommunications service providers are required to: retain and secure, for two years, telecommunications data (not including content); protect retained data through encryption; and prevent unauthorized interference and access. The Bill limits the range of agencies allowed to access telecommunications data and stored communications, and establishes a “journalist information warrants regime.” Australia’s Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act prohibits the transfer of health data out of Australia in some situations. Australia has a strong framework for the protection of intellectual property (IP), including software source code. Foreign providers are not required to provide source code to the government in exchange for operating in Australia. In February 2021, the Australian parliament passed the Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill 2021, which among other things requires designated digital platforms to notify media companies of significant changes to their algorithms with at least 14-days’ notice of such changes. However, technology companies are not required to provide source code for algorithms, or any other such IP, to the government for any purpose. Companies are generally not restricted in terms of how they store or transmit data within their operations. The exception to this is the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act (2012) which does require that certain personal health information is stored in Australia. The Privacy Act (1988) and associated legislation place restrictions on the communication of personal information between and within entities. The requirements placed on international companies, and the transmission of data outside of Australia, are not treated differently under this legislation. The Australian Attorney-General’s Department is the responsible agency for most legislation relating to data and storage requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Strong legal frameworks protect property rights in Australia and operate to police corruption. Mortgages are commercially available, and foreigners are allowed to buy real property subject to certain registration and approval requirements. Property lending may be securitized, and Australia has one of the most highly developed securitization sectors in the world. Beyond the private sector property market, securitization products are being developed to assist local and state government financing. Australia has no legislation specifically relating to securitization, although issuers are governed by a range of other financial sector legislation and disclosure requirements. Australia generally provides strong intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement through legislation that, among other things, criminalizes copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting. Australia is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report or on USTR’s Notorious Markets report. Enforcement of counterfeit goods is overseen by the Australian Department of Home Affairs through the Notice of Objection Scheme, which allows the Australian Border Force to seize goods suspected of being counterfeit. Penalties for sale or importation of counterfeit goods include fines and up to five years imprisonment. IP Australia is the responsible agency for administering Australia’s responsibilities and treaties under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Australia is a member of a range of international treaties developed through WIPO. Australia does not have specific legislation relating to trade secrets, however common law governs information protected through such means as confidentiality agreements or other means of illegally obtaining confidential or proprietary information. Australia was an active participant in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations and signed ACTA in October 2011. It has not yet ratified the agreement. ACTA would establish an international framework to assist Parties in their efforts to effectively combat the infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular the proliferation of counterfeiting and piracy. Under the AUSFTA, Australia must notify the holder of a pharmaceutical patent of a request for marketing approval by a third party for a product claimed by that patent. U.S. and Australian pharmaceutical companies have raised concerns that unnecessary delays in this notification process restrict their options for action against third parties that would infringe their patents if granted marketing approval by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA). In March 2020 the government recommended changes to the notification process whereby generic product owners must notify the patent holder of an intent to market a new product at the point they lodge an application for evaluation with the TGA. These changes have not been legislated at the time of writing. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Australian Government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment with no restrictions on inward flows of debt or equity. Indeed, access to foreign capital markets is crucial to the Australian economy given its relatively small domestic savings. Australian capital markets are generally efficient and able to provide financing options to businesses. While the Australian equity market is one of the largest and most liquid in the world, non-financial firms face a number of barriers in accessing the corporate bond market. Large firms are more likely to use public equity, and smaller firms are more likely to use retained earnings and debt from banks and intermediaries. Australia’s corporate bond market is relatively small, driving many Australian companies to issue debt instruments in the U.S. market. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit from domestic institutions on market terms. Australia’s stock market is the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Australia’s banking system is robust, highly evolved, and international in focus. Bank profitability is strong and has been supported by further improvements in asset performance. Total assets of Australian banks at the end of 2020 was USD4.2 trillion and the sector has delivered an annual average return on equity of around 10 percent (only falling to six percent in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, before rebounding to 11 percent in 2021). According to Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans was approximately one percent at the end of 2021, having remained at around that level for the last five years after falling from highs of nearly two percent following the Global Financial Crisis. The RBA is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the stability of the financial sector, while the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) monitors individual institutions. The RBA is also responsible for monitoring and regulating payments systems in Australia. Further details on the size and performance of Australia’s banking sector are available on the websites of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the RBA: https://www.apra.gov.au/statistics https://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/banking-indicators.html Foreign banks are allowed to operate as a branch or a subsidiary in Australia. Australia has generally taken an open approach to allowing foreign companies to operate in the financial sector, largely to ensure sufficient competition in an otherwise small domestic market. Australia’s main sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund, is a financial asset investment fund owned by the Australian Government. The Fund’s objective is to enhance the ability of future Australian Governments to discharge unfunded superannuation (pension) liabilities. As a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), the Future Fund’s structure, governance, and investment approach is in full alignment with the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (the “Santiago principles”). The Future Fund’s investment mandate is to achieve a long-term return of at least inflation plus 4-5 percent per annum. As of December 2021, the Fund’s portfolio consists of: 23 percent global equities, 8 percent Australian equities, 25 percent private equity (including 8 percent in infrastructure and 7 percent in property), and the remaining 37 percent in debt, cash, and alternative investments. In addition to the Future Fund, the Australian Government manages five other specific-purpose funds: the DisabilityCare Australia Fund; the Medical Research Future Fund; the Emergency Response Fund; the Future Drought Fund; and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund. In total, these five funds have assets of AUD 50 billion (USD 37 billion), while the main Future Fund has assets of AUD 204 billion (USD 150 billion) as of December 31, 2021. Further details of these funds are available at: https://www.futurefund.gov.au/ 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Australia, the term used for a Commonwealth Government State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is “government business enterprise” (GBE). According to the Department of Finance, there are nine GBEs: two corporate Commonwealth entities and seven Commonwealth companies. (See: https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/governance/gbe/ ) Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Public enterprises are not generally accorded material advantages in Australia. Remaining GBEs do not exercise power in a manner that discriminates against or unfairly burdens foreign investors or foreign-owned enterprises. Australia does not have a formal and explicit national privatization program. Individual state and territory governments may have their own privatization programs. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in any privatization programs subject to the rules and approvals governing foreign investment. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is general business awareness and promotion of responsible business conduct (RBC) in Australia. The Commonwealth Government states that companies operating in Australia and Australian companies operating overseas are expected to act in accordance with the principles set out in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to perform to the standards they suggest. In seeking to promote the OECD Guidelines, the Commonwealth Government maintains a National Contact Point (NCP), the current NCP being currently the General Manager of the Foreign Investment and Trade Policy Division at the Commonwealth Treasury, who is able to draw on expertise from other government agencies through an informal inter-governmental network. An NCP Web site links to the “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas” noting that the objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices. The Commonwealth Government’s export credit agency, EFA, also promotes the OECD Guidelines as the key set of recommendations on responsible business conduct addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries. Australian companies have very few instances of human rights or labor rights abuses and domestic law prohibits such actions. In 2018 the Australian parliament passed the Modern Slavery Act, new legislation requiring large companies to assess risks of modern slavery in their supply chains and take action to limit these risks. Australia began implementing the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2016. Australia has ratified the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and was a founding member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association. The Australian government announced a net-zero emissions target for 2050 in October 2021. Since 2015, the government has not revised its interim target of a 26-28 percent reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2030, which its own projections indicate Australia is likely to exceed. The opposition Labor Party has a 2030 target of a 43 percent reduction relative to 2005 levels. Australia’s climate policies are set out on a sector-by-sector basis and Australia does not have an economy-wide carbon tax or emissions trading scheme. Companies considered to be large emitters are subject to the Safeguard Mechanism, a regulatory requirement that places caps on the emissions intensity of a company’s output. Companies may face penalties for exceeding their regulated emissions intensity level. Further details of the Safeguard Mechanism, along with the government’s other emissions reductions policies, are available on the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources website at: https://www.industry.gov.au/policies-and-initiatives/australias-climate-change-strategies The Australian government has a strong emphasis on investing in clean energy technologies and has set out its technology priorities in its Technology Investment Roadmap. The Roadmap incentivizes research, investment and deployment of emissions reducing equipment through the Australian Renewable Energy Agency, which invests in new technologies in the early stage of development, and the Emissions Reduction Fund which provides funding to companies with eligible projects. Details on these programs are available through the link above. Australia has a strong focus on emission reduction through improved land use management and has supported initiatives aimed at better measuring soil carbon. The Department of Agriculture, Water, and the Environment has also implemented an Agriculture Biodiversity Stewardship Package. This program allows farmers to receive payments not only for carbon abatement, but also now for delivering improvements in biodiversity on-farm. The package also aims to create a trading platform to help farmers connect with buyers and kick-start private sector biodiversity markets. Although Australia has a range of policies to achieve its emission reduction targets, it typically ranks low on various measure of climate and environmental sustainability. The MIT Green Future Index ranks Australia 36th out of 76 countries and 49th on the carbon emissions sub-index. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Australia maintains a comprehensive system of laws and regulations designed to counter corruption. In addition, the government procurement system is generally transparent and well regulated. Corruption has not been a factor cited by U.S. businesses as a disincentive to investing in Australia, nor to exporting goods and services to Australia. Non-governmental organizations interested in monitoring the global development or anti-corruption measures, including Transparency International, operate freely in Australia, and Australia is perceived internationally as having low corruption levels. Australia is an active participant in international efforts to end the bribery of foreign officials. Legislation exists to give effect to the anti-bribery convention stemming from the OECD 1996 Ministerial Commitment to Criminalize Transnational Bribery. Legislation explicitly disallows tax deductions for bribes of foreign officials. At the Commonwealth level, enforcement of anti-corruption laws and regulations is the responsibility of the Attorney General’s Department. The Attorney-General’s Department plays an active role in combating corruption through developing domestic policy on anti-corruption and engagement in a range of international anti-corruption forums. These include the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Working Group, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption Working Groups. Australia is a member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery and a party to the key international conventions concerned with combating foreign bribery, including the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention). The legislation covering bribery of foreign officials is the Criminal Code Act 1995. Under Australian law, it is an offense to bribe a foreign public official, even if a bribe may be seen to be customary, necessary, or required. The maximum penalty for an individual is 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of AUD 2. million (approximately USD 1.6 million). For a corporate entity, the maximum penalty is the greatest of: 1) AUD 22.2 million (approximately USD 16.4 million); 2) three times the value of the benefits obtained; or 3) 10 percent of the previous 12-month turnover of the company concerned. A number of national and state-level agencies exist to combat corruption of public officials and ensure transparency and probity in government systems. The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) has the mandate to prevent, detect, and investigate serious and systemic corruption issues in the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, the CrimTrac Agency, and prescribed aspects of the Department of Agriculture. Various independent commissions exist at the state level to investigate instances of corruption. Details of these bodies are provided below. UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Australia has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption and is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Resources to Report Corruption Western Australia – Corruption and Crime Commission 86 St Georges Terrace Perth, Western Australia Tel. +61 8 9215 4888 https://www.ccc.wa.gov.au/ Queensland – Corruption and Crime Commission Level 2, North Tower Green Square 515 St Pauls Terrace Fortitude Valley, Queensland Tel. +61 7 3360 6060 https://www.ccc.qld.gov.au/ Victoria – Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Level 1, North Tower, 459 Collins Street Melbourne, Victoria Tel. +61 1300 735 135 https://ibac.vic.gov.au New South Wales – Independent Commission against Corruption Level 7, 255 Elizabeth Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel. +61 2 8281 5999 https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/ South Australia – Independent Commission against Corruption Level 1, 55 Currie Street Adelaide, South Australia Tel. +61 8 8463 5173 https://icac.sa.gov.au 10. Political and Security Environment Political protests (including rallies, demonstrations, marches, public conflicts between competing interests) form an integral, though generally minor, part of Australian cultural life. Such protests rarely degenerate into violence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Australia’s unemployment rate peaked at 7.5 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic but had fallen to 4 percent by early 2022. Average weekly earnings for full-time workers in Australia were AUD 1,748 (approximately USD 1,290) as of November 2021. The minimum wage is set annually and is significantly higher than that of the United States, currently sitting at AUD 2033 (USD 15.00). Overall wage growth has been low in recent years, growing at approximately the rate of inflation. The Australian Government and its state and territory counterparts are active in assessing and forecasting labor skills gaps across industries. Tertiary education is subsidized by both levels of governments, and these subsidies are based in part on an assessment of the skills needed by industry. These assessments also inform immigration policy through the various working visas and associated skilled occupation lists. Occupations on these lists are updated annually based on assessment of the skills most needed by industry. Immigration has always been an important source for skilled labor in Australia. The Department of Home Affairs publishes an annual list of occupations with skill shortages to be used by potential applicants seeking to work in Australia. The visas available to applicants, and length of stay allowed for, differ by occupation. The main working visa is the Temporary Skills Shortage visa (subclass 482). Applicants must have a nominated occupation when they apply which is applicable to their circumstances, and applications are subject to local labor market testing rules. These rules preference the hiring of Australian labor over foreign workers so long as local workers can be found to fill the advertised job. Most Australian workplaces are governed by a system created by the Fair Work Act 2009. Enterprise bargaining takes place through collective agreements made at an enterprise level covering terms and conditions of employment. Such agreements are widely used in Australia. A Fair Work Ombudsman assists employees, employers, contractors, and the community to understand and comply with the system. The Fair Work Act 2009 establishes a set of clear rules and obligations about how this process is to occur, including rules about bargaining, the content of enterprise agreements, and how an agreement is made and approved. Unfair dismissal laws also exist to protect workers who have been unfairly fired from a job. Australia is a founding member of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and has ratified 58 of the ILO’s conventions. Chapter 18 of the AUSFTA agreement deals with labor market issues. The chapter sets out the responsibilities of each party, including the commitment of each country to uphold its obligations as a member of the ILO and the associated ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998). 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $1.33 trillion 2020 $1.50 trillion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $170 billion 2019 $158 billion BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $98 billion 2019 $112 billion BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises -comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 59% 2019 53% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Australian Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 790,655 100% Total Outward 627,680 100% USA 151,171 19% USA 127,563 20% Japan 101,508 13% UK 103,597 17% UK 95,093 12% New Zealand 55,338 9% Netherlands 40,660 5% Canada 26,500 4% Canada 35,554 4% Singapore 13,934 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Counselor Doug Sonnek U.S. Embassy Canberra 21 Moonah Place, Yarralumla, ACT+61 2 6214 5759 SonnekDE@state.gov Austria Executive Summary Austria has a well-developed market economy that welcomes foreign direct investment, particularly in technology and R&D. The country benefits from a skilled labor force, and a high standard of living, with its capital, Vienna, consistently placing at the top of global quality-of-life rankings. With more than 50 percent of its GDP derived from exports, Austria’s economy is closely tied to other EU economies, especially that of Germany, its largest trading partner. The United States is one of Austria’s top two-way trading partners, ranking fifth in overall trade according to provisional data from 2021. The economy features a large service sector and an advanced industrial sector specialized in high-quality component parts, especially for vehicles. The agricultural sector is small but highly developed. The COVID-19 crisis deeply affected Austria’s economy, contributing to a GDP decrease of 6.7% in 2020 with the unemployment rate increasing to a peak of 5.4% at the end of 2020. Austria’s economy rebounded with 4.5% GDP growth in 2021 and unemployment lower than before the onset of the pandemic, but forecasters recently lowered expectations to 3.8% growth for 2022 due to instability stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Austria is experiencing a record number of vacancies, largely stemming from a shortage of skilled labor. The country’s location between Western European industrialized nations and growth markets in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) has led to a high degree of economic, social, and political integration with fellow European Union (EU) member states and the CESEE. Some 220 U.S. companies have investments in Austria, represented by around 300 subsidiaries, and many have expanded their original investment over time. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment into Austria totaled approximately EUR 11.6 billion (USD 13.7 billion) in 2020, according to the Austrian National Bank, and U.S. companies support over 16,500 jobs in Austria. Austria offers a stable and attractive climate for foreign investors. The most positive aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: Relatively high political stability; Harmonious labor-management relations and low incidence of labor unrest; Highly skilled workforce; High levels of productivity and international competitiveness; Excellent quality of life for employees and high-quality health, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. Negative aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: A high overall tax burden; A large public sector and a complex regulatory system with extensive bureaucracy; Low-to-moderate innovation dynamics; Low levels of digitalization; Low levels of private venture capital. Key sectors that have historically attracted significant investment in Austria: Automotive; Pharmaceuticals; ICT and Electronics; Financial. Key issues to watch: Due to a strong reliance on Russian natural gas and the third-highest banking exposure to Russia among EU Member States, Austria could be one of the hardest countries hit by sanctions against Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions are expected to cause a 0.4-0.5% decrease in Austria’s GDP. However, the impact is likely to be greater if natural gas supplies are disrupted. Austria relies on Russian imports for approximately 80% of its natural gas demand. At the same time, Austria’s export-oriented economy makes it particularly sensitive to events affecting trade, which could include potential setbacks in the pandemic, particularly during the winter months. The tourism sector, which, together with hotels and restaurants, accounts for 15 percent of the country’s GDP is still struggling, currently operating at two-thirds of its pre-crisis output levels. Many companies are also struggling to find skilled labor, which is hindering the economy from reaching its full output potential. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 18 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4.95 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 48,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Austrian government welcomes foreign direct investment, particularly when such investments have the potential to create new jobs, support advanced technology fields, promote capital-intensive industries, and enhance links to research and development. There are limited restrictions on foreign investment. American investors have not complained of discriminatory laws against foreign investors. Austria’s investment screening law, which requires government approval of transactions leading to 10 percent or more foreign ownership in sensitive sectors, has resulted in an increase in the number of investments screened, from less than three per year, to 50 completed screenings from July 2020 to July 2021, the first full year law has been in effect. The majority of these screenings (31 in total) were for U.S.-based investments. Please see the “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment” section below for further details on the law and its applications. The corporate tax rate, a 25 percent flat tax, is above the EU average. The government is planning to reduce it to 24 percent in 2023 and 23 percent in 2024. U.S. citizens and investors have occasionally reported that it is difficult to establish and maintain banking services since the U.S.-Austria Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Agreement went into force in 2014, as some Austrian banks have been reluctant to take on this reporting burden. Potential investors should also be aware of Austria’s lengthy environmental impact assessments in their investment decision-making. Some sectors also suffer from heavy regulation that may affect certain investments. For example, the requirement that over 50 percent of energy providers must be publicly owned places a potential cap on investments in the energy sector. Strict liability and co-existence regulations in the agriculture sector restrict research and virtually outlaw the cultivation, marketing, or distribution of biotechnology crops. The mining and transportation sectors are also heavily regulated. Austria’s national investment promotion organization, the Austrian Business Agency (ABA), is a useful first point of contact for foreign companies interested in establishing operations in Austria. It provides comprehensive information about Austria as a business location, identifies suitable sites for greenfield investments, and consults in setting up a company. ABA provides its services free of charge. The Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) and the American Chamber of Commerce in Austria (Amcham) are also good resources for foreign investors. Both conduct annual polls of their members to measure their satisfaction with the business climate, thus providing early warning to the government of problems identified by investors. There is no principal limitation on establishing and owning a business in Austria. A local managing director must be appointed to any newly established enterprise. For non-EU citizens to establish and own a business, the Austrian Foreigner’s Law mandates a residence permit that includes the right to run a business. Many Austrian trades are regulated, and the right to run a business in regulated trade sectors is only granted when certain preconditions are met, such as certificates of competence, and recognition of foreign education. There are limited restrictions on foreign ownership of private businesses. Austria’s investment screening law, requires an investment screening process to review potential foreign acquisitions of 25 percent or more of a company essential to the country’s infrastructure, lowering the threshold to 10 percent for sensitive sectors (see the “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment” section below for further details). In April 2019, the EU Regulation on establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union entered into force. It creates a cooperation mechanism through which EU countries and the European Commission will exchange information and raise concerns related to specific investments which could potentially threaten the security of EU countries. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) commented on Austria’s strengthened investment screening law following implementation in 2020, that the two-month screening process takes too long and places an undue administrative burden on companies. The AmCham advocated for expedited screenings for proposed investments with no clear threat to national security. Business interest groups, such as the Austrian Economic Chamber and the Federation of Austrian Industries also commented during the legislation’s draft and review process that the strengthened screening measures would impose an undue administrative burden on businesses, the definition of sectors requiring screening was too wide, and the updated legislation would reduce the attractiveness of Austria as an investment location. Austria generally ranked in the top 30 countries in the world in the past World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” reports, but starting a business takes time. The average time to set up a company is 21 days, while the average time in OECD high income countries is 9.2 days. To register a new company or open a subsidiary in Austria, a company must first be listed on the Austrian Companies Register at a local court. The next step is to seek confirmation of registration from the Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) establishing that the company is really a new business. The investor must then notarize the “declaration of establishment,” deposit a minimum capital requirement with an Austrian bank, register with the tax office, register with the district trade authority, register employees for social security, and register with the municipality where the business will be located. Finally, membership in the WKO is mandatory for all businesses in Austria. For sole proprietorships, it is possible under certain conditions to use an online registration process via government websites in German to either found or register a company: https://www.usp.gv.at/Portal.Node/usp/public/content/gruendung/egruendung/269403.html, or www.gisa.gv.at/online-gewerbeanmeldung. It is advisable to seek information from ABA or the WKO before applying to register a firm. The website of the ABA contains further details and contact information and is intended to serve as a first point of contact for foreign investors in Austria: https://investinaustria.at/en/starting-business/. The Austrian government encourages outward investment. Advantage Austria, the “Austrian Foreign Trade Service,” is a special section of the WKO that promotes Austrian exports and also supports Austrian companies establishing an overseas presence. Advantage Austria operates five offices in the United States (Washington D.C., New York, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and San Francisco). Overall, it has about 100 trade offices in 70 countries across the world, reflecting Austria’s strong export focus and the important role the WKO plays. (https://www.wko.at/service/aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftscenter.html#heading_aussenwirtschaftscenter) The Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs and the WKO run a joint program called “Go International,” providing services to Austrian companies that are considering investing for the first time in foreign countries. The program provides grants for market access costs and provides “soft subsidies,” such as counseling, legal advice, and marketing support. 3. Legal Regime Austria’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The government does not provide assistance in distinguishing between high- and low-quality investments, leaving this up to the market. Federal ministries generally publish draft laws and regulations, including investment laws, for public comment prior to their adoption by Austria’s cabinet and/or Parliament. Relevant stakeholders such as the “Social Partners” (Economic Chamber, Agricultural Chamber, Labor Chamber, and Trade Union Association), the Federation of Industries, and research institutions are invited to provide comments and suggestions on draft laws and regulations, directly online, which may be taken into account before adoption of laws. These comments are publicly available. Austria’s nine provinces can also adopt laws relevant to investments; their review processes are generally less extensive, but local laws are less important for investments than federal laws. The judicial system is independent from the executive branch, helping ensure the government follows administrative processes. The government is required to follow administrative processes and its compliance is monitored by the courts, primarily the Court of Auditors. Individuals can file proceedings against the government in Austria’s courts, if the government did not act in accordance with the law. Similarly, the public prosecution service can file cases against the government. Draft legislation by ministries (“Ministerialentwürfe”) and resulting government draft laws and parliamentary initiatives (“Regierungsvorlagen und Gesetzesinitiativen”) can be accessed through the website of the Austrian Parliament: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/ (all in German). The parliament also publishes a history of all law-making processes. All final Austrian laws can be accessed through a government database, partly in English: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/defaultEn.aspx. The effectiveness of regulations is not reviewed as a regular process, only on an as-needed basis. Austrian regulations governing accounting provide U.S. investors with internationally standardized financial information. In line with EU regulations, listed companies must prepare their consolidated financial statements according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) system. Public finances are transparent and easily accessible, through the Finance Ministry’s website, Austria’s Central Bank, and various economic research institutes. Overall, Austria has no legal restrictions, formally or informally, that discriminate against foreign investors. Austria is a member of the EU. As such, its laws must comply with EU legislation and the country is therefore subject to European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction. Austria is a member of the WTO and largely follows WTO requirements. Austria has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) but has not taken specific actions to implement it. The Austrian legal system is based on Roman law. The constitution establishes a hierarchy, according to which each legislative act (law, regulation, decision, and fines) must have its legal basis in a higher legislative instrument. The full text of each legislative act is available online for reference. All final Austrian laws can be accessed through a government database, partly in English: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/defaultEn.aspx. Commercial matters fall within the competence of ordinary regional courts except in Vienna, which has a specialized Commercial Court. The Commercial Court also has nationwide competence for trademark, design, model, and patent matters. There is no special treatment of foreign investors, and the executive branch does not interfere in judicial matters. The legal system provides an effective means for protecting property and contractual rights of nationals and foreigners. Sensitive cases must be reported to the Ministry of Justice, which can issue instructions for addressing them. Austria’s civil courts enforce property and contractual rights and do not discriminate against foreign investors. Austria allows for court decisions to be appealed, first to a Regional Court and in the last instance, to the Supreme Court. Austria has restrictions on investments in industries designated as critical infrastructure, technology, resources, and industries with access to sensitive information and involved in freedom and plurality of the media. The government must approve any foreign acquisition of a 25 percent or higher stake in any companies that generally fall within these areas. The threshold is 10 percent for sensitive sectors, defined as military goods and technology, operators of critical energy or digital infrastructure and water, system operators charged with guarding Austria’s data sovereignty and R&D in medicine and pharmaceutical products. Additional screenings are required when an investor in the above categories plans to increase the stake above the thresholds of 25 percent or 50 percent. The investment screening review period generally takes 2 months. The number of filed applications has increased significantly since the law was implemented, from three per year to 50 completed screenings in the first 12 months after the updated investment screening law went into effect (from July 2020 to July 2021). None of the completed screenings were rejected, and two were approved with amendments to safeguard domestic supply of the product/service in question. There is no discrimination against foreign investors, but businesses are required to follow numerous local regulations. Although there is no requirement for participation by Austrian citizens in ownership or management of a foreign firm, at least one manager must meet Austrian residency and other legal requirements. Expatriates may deduct certain expenses (costs associated with moving, maintaining a double residence, education of children) from Austrian-earned income. The “Law to Support Investments in Municipalities” (published in the Federal Law Gazette, 74/2017, available online in German only on the federal legal information system www.ris.bka.gv.at), allows federal funding of up to 25 percent of the total investment amount of a project to “modernize” a municipality. The Austrian Business Agency serves as a central contact point for companies looking to invest in Austria. It does not serve as a one-stop-shop but can help answer any questions potential investors may have (https://investinaustria.at/en/). Austria’s Antitrust Act (ATA) is in line with European Union antitrust regulations, which take precedence over national regulations in cases concerning Austria and other EU member states. The Austrian Antitrust Act prohibits cartels, anticompetitive practices, and the abuse of a dominant market position. The independent Federal Competition Authority (FCA) and the Federal Antitrust Prosecutor (FAP) are responsible for administering antitrust laws. The FCA can conduct investigations and request information from firms. The FAP is subject to instructions issued by the Justice Ministry and can bring actions before Austria’s Cartel Court. Additionally, the Commission on Competition may issue expert opinions on competition policy and give recommendations on notified mergers. The most recent amendment to the ATA was in 2017. This amendment facilitated enforcing private damage claims, strengthened merger control, and enabled appeals against verdicts from the Cartel Court. Companies must inform the FCA of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Special M&A regulations apply to media enterprises, such as a lower threshold above which the ATA applies, and the requirement that media diversity must be maintained. A cartel court is competent to rule on referrals from the FCA or the FCP. For violations of antitrust regulations, the cartel court can impose fines of up to the equivalent of 10 percent of a company’s annual worldwide sales. The independent energy regulator E-Control separately examines antitrust concerns in the energy sector but must also submit cases to the cartel court. Austria’s Takeover Law applies to friendly and hostile takeovers of corporations headquartered in Austria and listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. The law protects investors against unfair practices, since any shareholder obtaining a controlling stake in a corporation (30 percent or more in direct or indirect control of a company’s voting shares) must offer to buy out smaller shareholders at a defined fair market price. The law also includes provisions for shareholders who passively obtain a controlling stake in a company. The law prohibits defensive action to frustrate bids. The Shareholder Exclusion Act allows a primary shareholder with at least 90 percent of capital stock to force out minority shareholders. An independent takeover commission at the Vienna Stock Exchange oversees compliance with these laws. Austrian courts have also held that shareholders owe a duty of loyalty to each other and must consider the interests of fellow shareholders in good faith. According to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Austrian Civil Code, property ownership is guaranteed in Austria. Expropriation of private property in Austria is rare and may be undertaken by federal or provincial government authorities only based on special legal authorization “in the public interest” in such instances as land use planning, and infrastructure project preparations. The government can initiate such a procedure only in the absence of any other alternatives for satisfying the public interest; when the action is exclusively in the public interest; and when the owner receives just compensation. For example, in 2017-18, the government expropriated Hitler’s birth house in order to prevent it from becoming a place of pilgrimage for neo-Nazis, paying the former owner EUR 1.5 million (USD 1.8 million) in compensation. The expropriation process is non-discriminatory toward foreigners, including U.S. firms. There is no indication that further expropriations will take place in the foreseeable future. The Austrian Insolvency Act contains provisions for business reorganization and bankruptcy proceedings. Reorganization requires a restructuring plan and the debtor to be able to cover costs or advance some of the costs up to a maximum of EUR 4,000 (USD 4,720). The plan must offer creditors at least 20 percent of what is owed, payable within two years of the date the debtor’s obligation is determined. The plan must be approved by a majority of all creditors and a majority of creditors holding at least 50 percent of all claims. If the restructuring plan is not accepted, a bankruptcy proceeding is begun. Bankruptcy proceedings take place in court upon application of the debtor or a creditor; the court appoints a receiver for winding down the business and distributing proceeds to the creditors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, provided the affected person performed all his documentation and reporting obligations on time and in accordance with the law. Austria’s major commercial association for the protection of creditors in cases of bankruptcy is the “KSV 1870 Group”, www.ksv.at, which also carries out credit assessments of all companies located in Austria. Other European-wide credit bureaus, particularly “CRIF” and “Bisnode”, also monitor the Austrian market. 4. Industrial Policies Financial incentives and business subsidies provided by Austrian federal, state, and local governments to promote investments are equally available to domestic and foreign investors and include tax incentives, preferential loans, loan guarantees, and grants. Most incentives are targeted to investments that meet specified criteria, including job-creation and promotion of education, use of cutting-edge technology, improving regional infrastructure, strengthening SMEs, promoting research and development, supporting environmental protection, increasing renewable energy production, and promoting startups. Under these conditions, the EU ban on state aid would not apply. Austria’s Wirtschaftsservice (AWS) is the governmental institution that provides most federal government financial incentives for businesses. Information on targeted investment incentives is available at https://www.aws.at/en/. More detailed information on investment incentives and promotion in English language is also available on the ABA website (see chapter 1) at http://investinaustria.at/en/. The AWS also focuses on promoting investments, particularly for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), providing guarantees of up to EUR 25 million (USD 29.5 million) over 5 to 10 years for investments in Austria. Companies can also profit from growing their already existing investments, resulting in a 10 to 15 percent additional grant for this expansion. Various government agencies in Austria offer incentives for research and development (R&D) activities, including grants of up to 14 percent of investors’ total research expenditures. The incentives are also available for foreign-owned enterprises. The agencies providing incentives include: The Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) (https://www.ffg.at/en); the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), which is the country’s central body for the promotion of basic research (https://www.fwf.ac.at/en/); and AWS (above). Austria’s 2022 tax reform, as of January 2023, foresees a new 10-15 percent (eco-) investment tax allowance for purchasing new commodities or business assets that have a life span of at least four years and/or have an ecological impact on the business of the company (which the government will further define by ordinance before this aspect of the tax reform enters into force). In 2022, Austria plans to fund investments in the life sciences sector with up to EUR 29 million (USD 34 million), particularly for production of pharmaceuticals such as penicillin. A law to expand the production of renewable energy provides for investment subsidies and subsidies to sell renewable energy on the market for investors installing new wind, solar, biomass, and hydropower plants, which entered into force in February 2022. The subsidies are subject to installed capacities and environmental conditions. Not applicable If investors want to employ foreign workers from outside the EU in Austria, they need to apply for a work permit with the immigration authority in one of the Austrian provinces. The Austrian Labor Service (AMS) then certifies whether there is no comparable person in the pool of registered unemployed persons in Austria, which is a prerequisite for employing non-EU workers. This does not apply to senior management positions, researchers, highly qualified personnel, and a limited set of other categories. Austria offers several non-immigrant business visa classifications, including intra-company transfers/rotational workers, and employees on temporary duty. Recruitment of long-term, overseas specialists or those with managerial duties is governed by a points-based immigration scheme to attract skilled workers and specialists in individual sectors (points are available for qualification, education, age, and language skills). This Red-White-Red card (RWR) model allows firms to react flexibly to rising demand for talent in different occupations. It is available to highly qualified individuals, qualified specialists/craftsmen in certain understaffed professions (qualified labor and registered nurse jobs), and key personnel/professionals. Applicants must have an offer of employment to apply for the RWR. Highly qualified individuals holding U.S. citizenship may apply locally in Austria or opt to find a potential employer from abroad and have the company apply in Austria on their behalf. Austrian immigration law requires those applying for residency permits in some categories to take German language courses and exams. There is a specific visa category under the RWR model for independent key specialists and founders of start-up enterprises to support Austria’s push to expand its innovation economy. A less bureaucratic alternative is the EU Blue Card, which entitles applicants to a fixed-term residency of 24 months, and employment is tied to a specific employer. However, there is a threshold of a gross annual income of at least one and a half times the average gross annual income for full-time employees (in 2021: at least EUR 66,563 (USD 78,544); annual salary plus special payments). While there is no requirement for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, EU and Austrian data protection stipulations apply. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as adopted by Austria in 2018, places restrictions on companies’ ability to store and use customer data. It also requires specific user consent for companies to send out promotional materials (previously, implied consent was sufficient). Transmission of customer or business-related data is therefore subject to EU GDPR regulations. Austria’s Data Protection Authority is in charge of enforcing all GDPR-related matters, which include GDPR rules on data storage. In January 2022, the Austrian Data Protection Authority ruled that the website netdoktor.at violated EU GDPR rules for its use of Google Analytics. The Data Protection Authority found that using Google Analytics violated the GDPR in two key ways: 1) the transfer of personalized data to third countries that do not have stricter than or equal data protection rights as the EU is not allowed under the EU GDPR; and 2) users do not have the opportunity to willfully consent to the transfer. The data privacy organization noyb, which brought the case forward, filed over 100 similar cases across the EU. Similar rulings across EU countries are expected to follow over the course of the year. The Austrian government may impose performance requirements when foreign investors seek financial or other assistance from the government, although there are no performance requirements to apply for tax incentives. There is no requirement that Austrian nationals hold shares in foreign investments or for technology transfer, and no requirement for foreign investors to use domestic content in the production of goods or technology. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Austrian legal system protects secured interests in property. For any real estate agreement to be effective, owners must register with the land registry. Mortgages and liens must also be registered. As a rule, property for sale must be unencumbered. In case of rededication of land, approval of the land transfer commission or the office of the state governor is required. The land registry is a reliable system for recording interests in property, and access to the registry is public. Non-EU/EEA citizens need authorization from administrative authorities of the respective Austrian province to acquire land. Provincial regulations vary, but in general there must be a public (economic, social, cultural) interest for the acquisition to be authorized. Often, the applicant must guarantee that he does not want to build a vacation home on the land in order to receive the required authorization. Austria has a strong legal structure to protect intellectual property rights, including patent and trademark laws, a law protecting industrial designs and models, and a copyright law. Austria is a party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and several international property conventions. Austria also participates in the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) program with the USPTO (started in 2014), which allows filing of streamlined applications for inventions determined to be patentable in other participating countries. Austria’s Copyright Act conforms to EU directives on intellectual property rights. It grants authors exclusive rights to publish, distribute, copy, adapt, translate, and broadcast their work. The law also regulates copyrights of digital media (restrictions on private copies), works on the Internet, protection of computer programs, and related damage compensation. Infringement proceedings, however, can be time-consuming and costly. Austria implemented the EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (2019/790) by adopting an amendment to the Austrian Copyright Act in December 2021, with the Austrian music and film industry lauding it as “modern, balanced, and taking into account the interests of the related business sector.” Following a High Court decision from 2014, Austrian Internet providers must prevent access to illegal music and streaming platforms once they are made aware of a copyright violation. They must also block workaround websites from these platforms. In 2020 they registered 27,000 reports of illegal content. Austria also has a law against trade in counterfeit articles in place (amended 2020, streamlining the customs authorities in charge of tracking violations). In 2020 (latest available report), Austrian customs authorities confiscated pirated goods worth EUR 24 million (USD 28.3 million), which was a 50 percent increase from the previous year. Austria is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 or notorious markets reports, but its trade secrets regime has historically been a concern for some U.S. businesses. Austrian and U.S. companies have voiced specific concerns about both the scope of protection and the difficulty of adjudicating breaches. Following years of steady U.S. government advocacy, and because Austria was required to implement the 2016 EU Directive on Trade Secrets, the country improved its trade secrets regime in the Law Against Unfair Competition (entered into force in February 2019) to address these concerns. The most relevant change in the law is a requirement for safeguarding the confidentiality of trade secrets (and other business confidential information) in court procedures. The new law also defines injunctive relief and claims for damages in case of breach of trade secrets. The 2020 government program includes a plan to further toughen prosecution of violation of trade secrets that have an impact on Austria as a business location and to tackle industrial espionage, but no specific actions to implement the plan have been taken yet. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Austria has sophisticated financial markets that allow foreign investors access without restrictions. The government welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Austrian National Bank (OeNB) regulates portfolio investments effectively. Austria has a national stock exchange that currently includes 64 companies on its regulated market and several others on its multilateral trading facility (MTF). The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) is a price index consisting of the 20 largest stocks on the market and forms the most important index of Austria’s stock market. The size of the companies listed on the ATX is roughly equivalent to those listed on the MDAX in Germany. The market capitalization of Austrian listed companies is small compared to the country’s western European counterparts, accounting for 31 percent of Austria’s GDP, compared to 59 percent in Germany or 194 percent in the United States. Unlike the other market segments in the stock exchange, the Direct Market and Direct Market Plus segments, targeted at SMEs and young, developing companies, are subject only to the Vienna Stock Exchange’s general terms of business, not more stringent EU regulations. These segments have lower reporting requirements but also greater risk for investors, as prices are more likely to fluctuate, due to the respective companies’ low level of market capitalization and lower trading volumes. Austria has robust financing for product markets, but the free flow of resources into factor markets (capital, raw materials) could be improved. Overall, financing is primarily available through banks and government-sponsored funding organizations with very little private venture capital available. The Austrian government is aware of this issue but has taken few tangible steps to improve the availability of private venture capital. Austria is fully compliant with IMF Article VIII, all financial instruments are available, and there are no restrictions on payments. Credit is available to foreign investors at market-determined rates. Austria has one of the most fragmented banking networks in Europe with more than 3,800 branch offices registered in 2021. The banking system is highly developed, with worldwide correspondent banks and representative offices and branches in the United States and other major financial centers. Large Austrian banks also have extensive networks in Central and Southeast European (CESEE) countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Total assets of the banking sector amounted to EUR 1.0 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion) in 2020 (approximately 2.5 times the country’s GDP). Approximately EUR 460 billion (USD 543 billion) of banking sector assets are held by Austria’s two largest banks, Erste Group and Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI). The Austrian banking sector is considered one of the most stable in the world. Austria’s banking sector is managed and overseen by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) and the Financial Market Authority (FMA). Four Austrian banks with assets in excess of EUR 30 billion (USD 34 billion) are subject to the Eurozone’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as is Sberbank Europe AG, a Russian bank subsidiary headquartered in Austria (which was declared insolvent in March 2022, and its operations are now being wound down in a bankruptcy proceeding), and Addiko Bank AG due to their significant cross-border assets, as well as Volksbank Wien AG, due to its importance for the economy. All other Austrian banks continue to be subject to the country’s dual-oversight banking supervisory system with roles for the OeNB and the FMA, both of which are also responsible for policing irregularities on the stock exchange and for supervising insurance companies, securities markets, and pension funds. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country with no legal restrictions that place them at a disadvantage compared to local banks. Due to U.S. government financial reporting requirements, Austrian banks are very cautious in committing the time and expense required to accept U.S. clients and U.S. investors without established U.S. corporate headquarters. Austria has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Austria has two major wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs): The OeBB (Austrian Federal Railways) and Asfinag (highway financing, building, maintenance, and administration). Other government industry holding companies are bundled in the government holding company OeBAG (http://www.oebag.gv.at) The government has direct representation in the supervisory boards of its companies (commensurate with its ownership stake), and OeBAG has the authority to buy and sell company shares, as well as purchase minority stakes in strategically relevant companies. Such purchases are subject to approval from an audit committee consisting of government-nominated independent economic experts. OeBAG holds a 53 percent stake in the Post Office, 51 percent in energy company Verbund, 33 percent in the gambling group Casinos Austria, 31.5 percent in the energy company OMV, 28 percent in the Telekom Austria Group, as well as a handful of smaller ventures. Local governments own most utilities, the Vienna International Airport, and more than half of Austria’s 270 hospitals and clinics. Private enterprises in Austria can generally compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access, credit, and other such business operations as licenses and supplies. While most SOEs must finance themselves under terms similar to private enterprises, some large SOEs (such as OeBB) benefit from state-subsidized pension systems. As a member of the EU, Austria is also a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO, which indirectly also covers the SOEs (since they are entities monitored by the Austrian Court of Auditors). The five major OeBAG-controlled companies (Postal Service, Verbund AG, Casinos Austria, OMV, Telekom Austria), are listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Senior managers in these companies do not directly report to a minister, but to an oversight board. However, the government often appoints management and board members, who usually have strong political affiliations. The government has not privatized any public enterprises since 2007. Austrian public opinion is skeptical regarding further privatization, and there are no indications of any government privatizations on the horizon. In prior privatizations, foreign and domestic investors received equal treatment. Despite a historical government preference for maintaining blocking minority rights for domestic shareholders, foreign investors have successfully gained full control of enterprises in several strategic sectors of the Austrian economy, including in telecommunications, banking, steel, and infrastructure. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Austrian Responsible Business Conduct (RBC)/Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards are laid out in the Austrian Corporate Governance Codex, which is based on the EU Commission’s 2011 “Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility.” The Austrian Standards Institute’s ONR 192500 acts as the main guidance for CSR and is based on the EU Commission’s published Strategy, which is also compliant with UN guidelines. Major Austrian companies follow generally accepted CSR principles and publish a CSR chapter in their annual reports; many also provide information on their health, safety, security, and environmental activities. Austria adheres to the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Ministry for Labor, Social Affairs, Health, and Consumer Protection is represented in national and international CSR-relevant associations and supports CSR initiatives while working closely together with the Austrian Standards Institute. The Austrian export credit agency promotes information on CSR issues, principles and standards, including the OECD Guidelines, on its website. https://www.oekb.at/en/oekb-group/our-claim/corporate-governance.html Austria is a signatory to the Montreaux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, which it ratified in 2008. Austria has a National Climate and Energy Plan in place. It was last updated in 2019, and the government is currently preparing an update that it should have reported to the European Commission by end of 2020, according to the EU Climate and Energy Package, but it has not done so yet. The government, in its 2020 program, set the goal that Austria must be climate-neutral by 2040. According to the EU goals as outlined in the “Green Deal,” Austria is aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 48 percent by 2030. To implement the climate goals, Austria introduced a law to expand production and supply of renewable energies (photovoltaics, wind, hydropower, biomass) with annual subsidies of around USD 1 million until 2030. The government plans to invest EUR 17.5 billion (USD 20.7 billion) in the expansion of rail infrastructure and is subsidizing train tickets and the purchase of electric cars (around USD 5,900 per purchase). The Parliament, in 2021, adopted a “green tax reform,” introducing a new CO2 emissions pricing system as of July 2022, that phases in a fixed price, rising from EUR 30 (USD 34) per ton of CO2 in 2022 to EUR 55 (USD 62) in 2025. The tax reform will affect energy-intensive production of the private sector, but the government has not set specific emissions reduction goals for businesses. In April 2021, the government introduced a comprehensive “biodiversity monitoring” system to provide an overview over the number of (endangered) species and habitats in Austria. The Ministry for Climate, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology set up a EUR 50 million (USD 59 million) “Biodiversity Fund” to support the monitoring system to be implemented with input from universities and environmental NGOs. In 2021, the government adopted an “Action Plan Sustainable Procurement,” providing 16 binding ecological criteria for all public procurement beginning in 2022. It includes requiring emission-free cars for the government’s fleet, providing all public buildings with 100 percent electricity from renewable sources, and purchasing organic food for hospitals and school cafeterias. 9. Corruption Austria is a member of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and also ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. As part of the UNCAC ratification process, Austria has implemented a national anti-corruption strategy. Central elements of the strategy are promoting transparency in public sector decisions and raising awareness of corruption. Austria ranked 13th (out of 180 countries) in Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index. Despite this ranking, the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) February 2021 report criticized Austria for only fully implementing two of 19 recommendations since the last report was issued in 2017. The criticism largely focused on a lack of transparency on lobbying, receipt of donations, and the income of Members of Parliament. Bribery of public officials, their family members and political parties, is covered under the Austrian Criminal Code, and corruption does not significantly affect business in Austria. However, the public’s belief in the integrity of the political system was shaken by the 2019 Ibiza scandal, when a 2017 video surfaced in which Vice Chancellor and chair of the right populist Freedom Party (FPOe) Heinz Christian Strache and the FPOe floor leader in Parliament Johann Gudenus were filmed discussing providing government contracts in exchange for favors and political party donations with a woman posing as the niece of a Russian oligarch. This was compounded by further revelations in 2019 that the FPOe had allegedly promised gambling licenses to Casinos Austria in exchange for placing a party loyalist on the company’s executive board. Strache was convicted of corruption and bribery by the Vienna District Court in August 2021 following a separate health care fraud investigation. In October 2021, then-Chancellor Sebastian Kurz of the center-right People’s Party (OeVP) announced his resignation amid allegations that, while he was Foreign Minister in 2016, his inner circle paid newspapers to publish falsified opinion polls in his favor; that investigation by anti-corruption prosecutors is still ongoing. Finance Minister Bluemel (OeVP) also resigned, and prosecutors continue to investigate allegations that he may have facilitated political party donations by Casinos Austria subsidiary Novomatic, in exchange for government assistance with the company’s tax problems. Anti-corruption cases are often characterized by slow-moving investigations and trials that drag on for years. The trial of former Finance Minister Grasser, which started in 2017, concluded in late 2020, with Grasser receiving a sentence of eight years in prison from the trial court judge. The official verdict was published in January 2022, and Grasser is expected to appeal the sentence. Bribing members of Parliament is considered a criminal offense, and accepting a bribe is a punishable offense with the sentence varying depending on the amount of the bribe. The 2018 Austrian Federal Contracts Act implements EU guidelines prohibiting participating in public procurement contracts if there is a potential conflict of interest and requires measures to be put in place to detect and prevent such conflicts of interest. This required public authorities to set up compliance management systems or amend their existing structures accordingly. Virtually all Austrian companies have internal codes of conduct governing bribery and potential conflicts of interest. Corruption provisions in Austria’s Criminal Code cover managers of Austrian public enterprises, civil servants, and other officials (with functions in legislation, administration, or justice on behalf of Austria, in a foreign country, or an international organization), representatives of public companies, members of parliament, government members, and mayors. The term “corruption” includes the following in the Austrian interpretation: active and passive bribery; illicit intervention; and abuse of office. Corruption can sometimes include a private manager’s fraud, embezzlement, or breach of trust. Criminal penalties for corruption include imprisonment ranging from six months to ten years, depending on the severity of the offence. Jurisdiction for corruption investigations rests with the Austrian Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption and covers corruption taking place both within and outside the country. The Lobbying Act of 2013 introduced binding rules of conduct for lobbying. It requires domestic and foreign organizations to register with the Austrian Ministry of Justice. Financing of political parties requires disclosure of donations exceeding EUR 2,500 (USD 2,950). No donor is allowed to give more than EUR 7,500 (USD 8,850) and total donations to one political party may not exceed EUR 750,000 (USD 885,000) in a single year. Foreigners are prohibited from making donations to political parties. Private companies are subject to the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability, which makes companies liable for active and passive criminal offences. Penalties include fines up to EUR 1.8 million (USD 2.1 million). To date, U.S. companies have not reported any instances of corruption inhibiting FDI. Contacts at government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Wirtschafts- und Korruptionsstaatsanwaltschaft (Central Public Prosecution for Business Offenses and Corruption) Dampfschiffstraße 4 1030 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43-(0)1-52 1 52 0 E-Mail: wksta.leitung@justiz.gv.at BAK – Bundesamt zur Korruptionsprävention und Korruptionsbekämpfung (Federal Agency for Preventing and Fighting Corruption) Ministry of the Interior Herrengasse 7 1010 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43-(0)1-531 26 – 6800 E-Mail: BMI-III-BAK-SPOC@bak.gv.at Contact at “watchdog” organization: Transparency International – Austrian Chapter Gertrude-Fröhlich-Sandner-Straße 1 1100 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43-(0)1-960 760 10. Political and Security Environment Generally, civil disturbances are rare and the overall security environment in the country is considered to be safe. There have been no incidents of politically motivated damage to foreign businesses. Austria suffered a terrorist attack on November 2, 2020, when a gunman shot and killed four civilians and injured 23 in the center of Vienna. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Austria has a well-educated and productive labor force of 4.3 million, of whom 3.8 million are employees and 500,000 are self-employed or farmers. In line with EU regulations, the free movement of labor from all member states is allowed. The COVID-19 crisis has led to an increase in unemployment, which reached 5.4 percent in 2020, but has since returned to near-pre-crisis levels. As of February 2022, the unemployment rate was 4.9 percent, compared to 4.5 percent in 2019. At the same time, the number of people unemployed for longer than 12 months has increased by 23 percent since the start of the pandemic. The Labor Ministry is developing initiatives to reintegrate long-term unemployed in the job market and combat the current shortage of skilled labor. To combat the effects of lockdown-related business closures, the government implemented a subsidized reduced hours work program, enabling employers to reduce employees’ hours by up to 90 percent, with assistance to cover up to 80-90 percent of regular pay, which was in place until March 2022 and helped keep the unemployment rate under control. Foreigners account for almost one-quarter of Austria’s labor force; around 840,000 foreign workers are employed in Austria. Migrant workers come largely from the CEE region, but there are also many workers who arrived during the Syrian refugee crisis who have entered the labor market. Migrant workers often occupy lower-paying jobs and make up a large percentage of workers in the tourism and healthcare sectors. Youth unemployment is relatively low, compared to European reference countries. Austria’s successful dual-education apprenticeship system, combining on-the-job training with classroom instruction in vocational schools, has helped bring youth into the labor market. The program includes guaranteed placement by the Public Employment Service for those 15–24-year-olds who cannot find an apprenticeship. Austria and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to foster cooperation on apprenticeships and workforce development in April 2022. Austria has a well-balanced labor market but, like many of its neighbors, suffers from a shortage of skilled IT personnel, particularly in the banking and financial sector. Social insurance is compulsory in Austria and is comprised of health insurance, old-age pension insurance, unemployment insurance, and accident insurance. Employers and employees contribute a percentage of total monthly earnings to a compulsory social insurance fund. Austrian laws closely regulate terms of employment, including working hours, minimum vacation time, holidays, maternity leave, statutory separation notice, severance pay, dismissal, and an option for part-time work for parents with children under the age of seven. Problematic areas include increased deficits in the pension and health insurance systems, the shortage of healthcare personnel to care for the increasing number of elderly, and escalating costs for retirement and long-term care. Due to its generous social welfare system, Austria has a high rate of employer non-wage labor costs, amounting to approximately 30 percent of gross wages. Labor laws are commonly adhered to and strictly enforced. Labor-management relations are relatively harmonious in Austria, which traditionally enjoys a low incidence of industrial unrest. Strikes are uncommon with only two notable incidents over the past decades (2011, 2018). Additionally, all employees are automatically members of the Austrian Labor Chamber. Collective bargaining revolves mainly around wages and fringe benefits. Approximately 90 percent of the labor force works under a collective bargaining agreement. In 2017, Austria implemented a national minimum wage of EUR 1,500 (approx. USD 1,770) per month, with monthly wages paid 14 times per year. This equates to an hourly wage of EUR 10.09 (approx. USD 11.91), placing Austria in the upper tier among European countries with a minimum wage, ahead of France, Germany and the UK. Austrian law stipulates a 40-hour maximum workweek limit, but collective bargaining agreements also allow for a workweek of 38 or 38.5 hours per week. Firms may increase the maximum regular hours from 40 to 60 per week in special cases, with no more than 12 hours in a single day. Responsibility for agreements on flextime or reduced workweeks is at the company level. Overtime is paid at an additional 50 percent of the employee’s salary, and, in some cases, such as work on public holidays, 100 percent. Austrian employees are generally entitled to five weeks of paid vacation (and an additional week after 25 years in the workforce); the rate of absence due to illness/injury averages 13 workdays annually. 14. Contact for More Information Andreas Lerch Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Vienna, Vienna 1090, Boltzmanngasse 16 +43 1 31339-2387 lercha@state.gov Azerbaijan Executive Summary The overall investment climate in Azerbaijan continues to improve, although significant challenges remain. Azerbaijan’s government has sought to attract foreign investment, undertake reforms to diversify its economy, and stimulate private sector-led growth. The Azerbaijani economy, however, remains heavily dependent on oil and gas output, which account for roughly 88 percent of export revenue and over half of the state budget. The economy of Azerbaijan grew 5.6% year-on-year in 2021, compared to a 4.3% contraction in the previous year. Both oil and gas (1.7%) and the non-oil and gas (7.2%) sectors of the economy expanded as the economy continued to recover from the pandemic. While the oil and gas sector has historically attracted the largest share of foreign investment, the Azerbaijani government has targeted four non-oil sectors to diversify the economy: agriculture, tourism, information and communications technology (ICT), and transportation/logistics. Measures taken in recent years to improve the business climate and reform the overall economy include eliminating redundant business license categories, empowering the popular “Azerbaijan Service and Assessment Network (ASAN)” government service centers with licensing authority, simplifying customs procedures, suspending certain business inspections, and reforming the tax regime. Community spread of COVID-19 is occurring in Azerbaijan, and COVID-19 infections are present in all regions the country. The special quarantine regime was extended until May 1, 2022, according to a February 2022 decision by Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers. Masks are no longer required in outdoor spaces but remain obligatory indoors. In 2021, Azerbaijan allocated AZN 800.8 million (USD 471 million) from the state budget to support COVID-19 mitigation measures, including vaccine purchases, bonus payments to healthcare workers, and the operation of modular hospitals. Despite substantial efforts to open the business environment, progress remains slow on structural reforms required to create a diversified and competitive private sector, and corruption remains a major challenge for firms operating in Azerbaijan. A small group of government-connected holding companies dominates the economy, intellectual property rights enforcement is improving but remains insufficient, and judicial transparency is lacking. Under Azerbaijani law, foreign investments enjoy complete and unreserved legal protection and may not be nationalized or appropriated, except under specific circumstances. Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Foreign citizens, organizations, and enterprises may lease, but not own, land. Azerbaijan’s government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons or entities through illegal expropriation. The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Azerbaijan provides U.S. investors with recourse to settle investment disputes using the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The average time needed to resolve international business disputes through domestic courts or alternative dispute resolution varies widely. Following the release in November of a tripartite ceasefire declaration by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, which brought an end to the fall 2020 intensive fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani government is seeking new investments in the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that were previously under the control of Armenian-backed separatists. Azerbaijan’s 2022 budget includes an allocation of AZN 2.2 billion (USD 1.3 billion) for the restoration and reconstruction of these territories. These funds will be reportedly used to restore road infrastructure, electricity, gas, water, communications infrastructure, and the education and healthcare sectors, along with the restoration of cultural and historical monuments. The government is also pursuing green energy projects in this region. Reconstruction is expected to continue over the coming years, along with continued special budget allocations provided for rebuilding and resettling these territories. Demining these territories as part of reconstruction efforts remains a priority of the Azerbaijani government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 130 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 80 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A http://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $4,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Azerbaijani government actively seeks foreign direct investment. Flows of foreign direct investment to Azerbaijan have risen steadily in recent years, primarily in the energy sector. Foreign investment in the government’s priority sectors for economic diversification (agriculture, transportation, tourism, and ICT) has thus far been limited. Foreign investments enjoy complete and unreserved legal protection under the Law on the Protection of Foreign Investment, the Law on Investment Activity, and guarantees contained within international agreements and treaties. In accordance with these laws, Azerbaijan will treat foreign investors, including foreign partners in joint ventures, in a manner no less favorable than the treatment accorded to national investors. Azerbaijan’s Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments protects foreign investors against nationalization and requisition, except under specific circumstances. The Azerbaijani government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons or entities through illegal expropriation. Azerbaijan’s primary body responsible for investment promotion is the Azerbaijan Export and Investment Promotion Agency (AzPromo). AzPromo is a joint public-private initiative, established by the Ministry of Economy and Industry in 2003 to foster the country’s economic development and diversification by attracting foreign investment into the non-oil sector and stimulating non-oil exports. A January 2018 decree called for new legislation, which has not yet been introduced, to ensure Azerbaijan conforms to international standards to protect foreign investor rights. The Azerbaijani government meets regularly with the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) to solicit the input from the business community, particularly as part of AmCham’s biennial white paper process. In June 2021, AmCham Azerbaijan organized a press conference for publicly presenting subsequent publication of its White Paper on observations and recommendations for improving Azerbaijan’s business climate. The 2021 White Paper covered issues in several fields, including taxation, customs procedures, finance, and information and communications technology. Foreigners are allowed to register business entities by opening a fully owned subsidiary, acquiring shares of an existing company, or by creating a joint venture with a local partner. Foreign companies are also permitted to operate in Azerbaijan without creating a local legal entity by registering a representative or branch office with the tax authorities. Foreigners are not permitted to own land in Azerbaijan but are permitted to lease land and own real estate. Under Azerbaijani laws, the state must retain a controlling stake in companies operating in the mining, oil and gas, satellite communication, and military arms sectors, limiting foreign or domestic private ownership to a 49 percent share of companies in these industries. Foreign ownership in the media sector is also strictly limited. Furthermore, a special license to conduct business is required for foreign or domestic companies operating in telecommunications, sea and air transportation, insurance, and other regulated industries. Azerbaijan does not screen inbound foreign investment, and U.S. investors are not specifically disadvantaged by any existing control mechanisms. Azerbaijan has not conducted an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) investment policy review, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) investment policy review, or a WTO Trade Policy Review. Azerbaijani law requires all companies operating in the country to register with the tax authorities. Without formal registration, a company may not maintain a bank account or clear goods through customs. Registration takes approximately three days for commercial organizations. Companies may e-register at http://taxes.gov.az. Azerbaijan does not actively promote or incentivize outward investment, though Azerbaijani entities, particularly the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), have invested in various countries, including the United States. SOFAZ investment is typically limited to real estate, precious metals, and low-yield government securities. SOCAR has invested heavily in oil and gas infrastructure and petrochemicals processing in Turkey and Georgia, as well as gas pipeline networks in Greece, Albania, and Italy as part of the Southern Gas Corridor that transports Azerbaijani gas to European markets. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing overseas. 3. Legal Regime Azerbaijan’s central government is the primary source of regulations relevant to foreign businesses. Azerbaijan’s regulatory system has improved in recent years, although enforcement is inconsistent, and decision-making remains opaque. Private sector associations do not play a significant role in regulatory processes. The draft legislation process typically does not include public consultations and draft legislation text is rarely made available for public comment. The government has in some cases engaged business organizations, such as AmCham, and consulting firms on various draft laws. The website of Azerbaijan’s National Parliament, http://meclis.gov.az/ lists all the country’s laws, but only in the Azerbaijani language. Legal entities in Azerbaijan must adhere to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These are only obligatory for large companies. Medium-sized companies can choose between reporting based on IFRS or IFRS-SME standards, which are specially designed for large and medium enterprises. Small and micro enterprises can choose between reporting based on IFRS, IFRS-SME, or simplified accounting procedures established by the Finance Ministry. Several U.S. companies with operations and investments in Azerbaijan previously reported they had been subjected to repeated tax audits, requests for prepayment of taxes, and court-imposed fines for violations of the tax code. These allegations have markedly decreased since 2017. On October 19, 2015, Azerbaijan suspended inspections of entrepreneurs for two years, but inspections still may occur if a complaint is lodged. This suspension was subsequently extended through January 1, 2023. Medicine quality and safety, taxes, customs, financial markets, food safety, fire safety, construction and safe usage of hazardous facilities, radioactive substances, and mining fields are not subject to this suspension order and are inspected for quality and safety. The government has also simplified its licensing regime. All licenses are now issued with indefinite validity through ASAN service centers and must be issued within 10 days of application. The Economy Ministry also reduced the number of activities requiring a license from 60 to 32. Azerbaijan has held observer status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1997 but has not made significant progress toward joining the WTO for the past several years. A working party on Azerbaijan’s accession to the WTO was established on July 16, 1997 and Azerbaijan began negotiations with WTO members in 2004. The WTO Secretariat reports Azerbaijan is less than a quarter of the way to full membership. In 2016, Azerbaijan imposed higher tariffs on a number of imported goods, including agricultural products, to promote domestic production and reduce imports. In February 2020, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev made public remarks outlining Azerbaijan’s “cautious” approach to the WTO, saying that “the time [had] not come” for Azerbaijan’s membership. Currently, Azerbaijan is negotiating bilateral market access with 19 economies. Azerbaijan’s legal system is based on civil law. Disputes or disagreements arising between foreign investors and enterprises with foreign investment, Azerbaijani state bodies and/or enterprises, and other Azerbaijani legal entities, are to be settled in the Azerbaijani court system or, upon agreement between the parties, in a court of arbitration, including international arbitration bodies. The judiciary consists of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the appellate courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, trial courts, and other specialized courts. Trial court judgments may be appealed in appellate courts and the judgments of appellate courts can be appealed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country. Under the Civil Procedure Code of Azerbaijan, appellate court judgments are published within three days of issuance or within ten days in exceptional circumstances. The Constitutional Court has the authority to review laws and court judgments for compliance with the constitution. Businesses report problems with the reliability and independence of judicial processes in Azerbaijan. While the government promotes foreign investment and the law guarantees national treatment, in practice investment disputes can arise when a foreign investor or trader’s success threatens well-connected or favored local interests. Foreign investment in Azerbaijan is regulated by a number of international treaties and agreements, as well as domestic legislation. These include the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan-European Commission Cooperation Agreement, the Law on Protection of Foreign Investment, the Law on Investment Activity, the Law on Investment Funds, the Law on Privatization of State Property, the Second Program for Privatization of State Property, and sector-specific legislation. Azerbaijani law permits foreign direct investment in any activity in which a national investor may also invest, unless otherwise prohibited (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment” for further information). A January 2018 Presidential decree called for drafting a new law on investment activities to conform to international standards. The decree also established mechanisms to protect investor rights and regulate damages, including lost profit caused to investors. The details of the proposed new law have not been publicized as of April 2022. The State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Protection under the Economy Ministry is responsible for implementing competition-related policy. The law on Antimonopoly Activity was amended in April 2016 to introduce regulations on price fixing and other anti-competitive behavior. Parliament began revising a new version of the Competition Code in late 2014, but it has not yet been adopted. Azerbaijan’s antimonopoly legislation does not constrain the size or scope of the handful of large holding companies that dominate the non-oil economy. The Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments forbids nationalization and requisition of foreign investment, except under certain circumstances. Nationalization of property can occur when authorized by parliamentary resolution, although there have been no known cases of official nationalization or requisition against foreign firms in Azerbaijan. By a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, requisition is possible in the event of natural disaster, an epidemic, or other extraordinary situation. In the event of nationalization or requisition, foreign investors are legally entitled to prompt, effective, and adequate compensation. Amendments made to Azerbaijan’s Constitution in September 2016 enabled authorities to expropriate private property when necessary for social justice and effective use of land. In one recent case U.S. citizen property owners were pressured by local authorities to relinquish property rights at rates perceived to be well below fair market value. The case has not yet been tested in the courts and the owners maintained their property, resisting government communications regarding an imminent takeover and indicating that the attempted expropriation was not being lawfully carried out under the terms of the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Azerbaijani law. The Azerbaijani government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons by way of direct expropriations. Azerbaijan’s Bankruptcy Law applies only to legal entities and entrepreneurs, not to private individuals. Either a debtor facing insolvency or any creditor may initiate bankruptcy proceedings. In general, the legislation focuses on liquidation procedures. The bankruptcy law in Azerbaijan is underdeveloped, which restricts private sector economic development by deterring entrepreneurship. Amendments to Azerbaijan’s bankruptcy law adopted in 2017 extended the obligations of bankruptcy administrators and defined new rights for creditors. 4. Industrial Policies Since early 2016, the government has introduced tax and investment incentives for entrepreneurs and legal entities in non-oil export sectors as part of the overall economic reform and economic diversification efforts. These measures include certain partial, temporary exemptions from corporate and property taxes; favorable tax treatment for manufacturing facilities and imports of manufacturing equipment; and subsidies for certain exports. Investment certificate holders are exempt from paying 50 percent of the assessed income tax, 100 percent of the land tax, and 100 percent of customs duties on imported machinery, equipment, and devices. Certificates are issued for seven years to projects in priority non-oil sectors. The Law of Azerbaijan “On the Use of Renewable Energy Sources in the Production of Electricity”, was signed into law by the President and published on July 14, 2021, together with a Presidential Decree on the implementation of the Renewable Energy Law. The Renewable Energy Law addresses guaranteed tariffs, foreign investment and other support mechanisms, such as scientific research and the promotion of active consumers. The law prescribes two methods for selecting investors for the generation of electricity using renewable energy sources (RES): auctions and direct negotiations. If the selection of an investor is conducted in the form of an auction, the winner of the auction shall be the lowest bidder in relation to the purchase price for electricity subject to guaranteed offtake. The Ministry of Energy is the authorized body to organize RES auctions. In addition, the government is considering other incentives for investors in RES projects in Azerbaijan, including guaranteed offtake, guaranteed connection, priority in transmission and distribution and long-term land leases. A government decree established the Alat Free Economic Zone (AFEZ) next to the Port of Alat, located approximately 50 miles south of Baku in March 2016. President Aliyev signed legislation setting forth the incentives and regulations governing the AFEZ in June 2018. The law exempts all businesses in the AFEZ from taxes and customs; charges the AFEZ’s administration with setting up its own employment, migration, dispute resolution, and arbitration regulations; provides protections from nationalization; and guarantees the free flow of funds in and out of the free trade area. While the legal framework is in place and initial construction has begun, the AFEZ is not yet fully operational. The Ministry of Digital Development and Transport has discussed plans to create other special economic zones, including a petrochemical complex and regional innovation zones to boost telecommunications sector development. Currently, legal entities and individuals involved in entrepreneurial activities in one of five state-designated industrial or technological parks are exempt from income tax, property tax, land tax, and VAT on imported machinery and equipment until 2023. The Azerbaijani government does not mandate local employment, although some Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) in the oil sector include localization provisions. While performance requirements are not generally imposed on new investments, the government is seeking to increase the number of value-added services and processes performed in Azerbaijan. American companies have reported that government-connected companies often pressure current or potential partners to establish joint ventures, initiate local production of certain components, facilitate technology transfer, or otherwise invest in Azerbaijan in order to maintain or expand cooperation. Azerbaijan does not have any data localization requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights International organizations, foreign citizens, and foreign legal entities may not own land or be granted a purchase option on a lease, but they are permitted to lease land. Following independence, the government implemented land reforms that divided state-owned farms into privately held small plots. Due to poor recordkeeping and titling in rural areas, it is often difficult to determine definitively who owns a plot. Amendments made to Azerbaijan’s Constitution in September 2016 enabled authorities to expropriate private property with compensation in instances where necessary for “social justice and efficient use of the land.” Azerbaijan’s State Real Estate Registry Service at the Committee for Property Issues registers real estate. April 2016 amendments to the Law on Immovable Property Register cut the time to register property from 20 to 10 working days. The legal structure covering intellectual property protections in Azerbaijan is relatively strong, but experts and businesspeople report the level of enforcement within the country is weak. Piracy and blatant infringements on intellectual property rights (IPR) of both digital and physical goods are commonplace and stifle foreign investment and local entrepreneurship. The Business Software Alliance estimated the prevalence of software piracy at 84 percent in 2015, including in government ministries. U.S. companies routinely list weak IPR protections as a key concern. With strong Embassy encouragement, the government is taking steps to increase the use of licensed software in government institutions, but progress thus far has been uneven. IPR in Azerbaijan are regulated by the Law on Copyrights and Related Rights, the Law on Trademarks and Geographic Designations, the Law on Patents, the Law on the Topology of Integrated Microcircuits, the Law on Unfair Competition, and the Law on Securing Intellectual Property Rights and Combating Piracy. Azerbaijan is a party to the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Azerbaijan is also a party to the Geneva Phonograms Convention and acceded to the two WIPO Internet treaties in 2005. Violation of IPR can result in civil, criminal, and administrative charges. Azerbaijan tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods but does not publish statistics on this effort. Azerbaijan is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report, nor is it included in USTR’s Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Access to capital is a critical impediment to business development in Azerbaijan. An effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment, foreign or domestic, is not fully in place. Though the Baku Stock Exchange opened in 2000, there is insufficient liquidity in the market to enter or exit sizeable positions. The Central Bank assumed control over all financial regulation in January 2020, following disbandment of a formerly independent regulator. Non-bank financial sector staples such as capital markets, insurance, and private equity are in the early stages of development. The Capital Market Modernization Project is an attempt by the government to build the foundation for a modern financial capital market, including developing market infrastructure and automation systems, and strengthening the legal and market frameworks for capital transactions. One major hindrance to the stock market’s growth is the difficulty in encouraging established Azerbaijani businesses to adapt to standard investor-friendly disclosure practices, which are generally required for publicly listed companies. Azerbaijan’s government and Central Bank do not restrict payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors are permitted to obtain credit on the local market, but smaller companies and firms without an established credit history often struggle to obtain loans on reasonable commercial terms. Limited access to capital remains a barrier to development, particularly for small and medium enterprises. The country’s financial services sector – of which banking comprises more than 90 percent – is underdeveloped, which constrains economic growth and diversification. The drop in world oil prices in 2014-2015 and the resulting strain on Azerbaijan’s foreign currency earnings and the state budget exacerbated existing problems in the country’s banking sector and led to rising non-performing loans (NPLs) and high dollarization. Subsequent reforms have improved overall sector stability. President Aliyev signed a decree in February 2019 to provide partial relief to retail borrowers on foreign-currency denominated loans that meet certain criteria. As of January 1, 2022, 26 banks were registered in Azerbaijan, including 12 banks with foreign capital and two state-owned banks. These banks employ 20,601 people and have a combined 480 branches and 2,920 ATMs nationwide. Total banking sector assets stood at approximately USD 22.3 billion as of January 2022, with the top five banks holding almost 60 percent of this amount. In December 2019, Azerbaijan carried out a banking management reform that gave the Central Bank of Azerbaijan control over banks and credit institutions, closing the Chamber for Control over Financial Markets, which had held regulatory powers following Azerbaijan’s 2014/2015 economic crisis and resulting currency devaluations. Concurrently, the Central Bank announced “recovery of the banking sector” would be one of the main challenges it would tackle in 2020. The Central Bank closed four insolvent banks (Atabank, AGBank, NBCBank, and Amrah Bank) in April/May 2020, bringing the number of banks in the country down from 30 to 26. Only six banks are able to conduct correspondent banking transactions with the United States. Foreign banks are permitted in Azerbaijan and may take the form of representative offices, branches, joint ventures, and wholly owned subsidiaries. These banks are subject to the same regulations as domestic banks, with certain additional restrictions. Foreign individuals and entities are also permitted to open accounts with domestic or foreign banks in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s sovereign wealth fund is the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). Its mission is to transform hydrocarbon reserves into financial assets generating perpetual income for current and future generations and to finance strategically important infrastructure and social projects of national scale. While its main statutory focus is investing in assets outside of the country, since it was established in 1999 SOFAZ has financed several socially beneficial projects in Azerbaijan related to infrastructure, housing, energy, and education. The government’s newly adopted fiscal rule places limits on pro-cyclical spending, with the aim of increasing hydrocarbon revenue savings. SOFAZ publishes an annual report which it submits for independent audit. The fund’s assets totaled USD 45 billion as of January 1, 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Azerbaijan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the oil and gas, power generation, communications, water supply, railway, and air passenger and cargo sectors, among others. There is no published list of SOEs. While there are no SOEs that officially have been delegated governmental powers, companies such as the SOCAR, Azerenerji (the national electricity utility), and Azersu (the national water utility) – all of which are closed joint-stock companies with majority state ownership and limited private investment – enjoy quasi-governmental or near-monopoly status in their respective sectors. SOCAR is wholly owned by the government of Azerbaijan and takes part in all oil and gas activities in the country. It publishes regular reports on production volumes, the value of its exports, estimates of investments in exploration and development, production costs, the names of foreign companies operating in the country, production data by company, quasi-fiscal activities, and the government’s portion of production-sharing contracts. SOCAR is also responsible for negotiating PSAs with all foreign partners for hydrocarbon development. SOCAR’s annual financial reports are audited by an independent external auditor and include the consolidated accounts of all SOCAR’s subsidiaries, although revenue data is incomplete. There have been instances where state-owned enterprises have used their regulatory authority to block new entrants into the market. SOEs are, in principle, subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. However, in sectors that are open to both private and foreign competition, SOEs generally receive a larger percentage of government contracts or business than their private sector competitors. While SOEs regularly purchase or supply goods or services from private sector firms, domestic and foreign private enterprises have reported problems competing with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, information, products and services, and incentives. Private enterprises do not have the same access (including terms) to financing as SOEs. SOEs are also afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials – advantages that are not available to private enterprises. There is little information available on Azerbaijani SOEs’ budget constraints, due to the limited transparency in their financial accounts. A renewed privatization process started with the May 2016 presidential decree implementing additional measures to improve the process of state property privatization and the July 2016 decree on measures to accelerate privatization and improve the management efficiency of state property. The State Committee on Property Issues launched a portal to provide privatization information in July 2016. The portal contains information about the properties, their addresses, location, and initial costs with the aim of facilitating privatization. Azerbaijan’s current privatization efforts focus on smaller state-owned properties. While there are no immediate plans to privatize large SOEs, Azerbaijan is moving 21 major government-owned companies to a new state holding company tasked to improve efficiency and corporate governance as well as prepare them for possible privatization. However, the government has no plans to sell stakes in state companies in 2022, including in state oil company SOCAR. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible business conduct (RBC) is a relatively new concept in Azerbaijan. Producers and consumers tend not to prioritize responsible business conduct, including environmental, social, and governance issues. No information is available on legal corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders in Azerbaijan. Larger foreign entities tend to follow generally accepted RBC principles consistent with parent company guidelines and aim to educate their local partners, who generally consider basic charitable donations and paying taxes as acts of social responsibility. AmCham established a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Committee in October 2011 to encourage companies to embrace social responsibility through activities and dialogue with relevant stakeholders. AmCham also published a corporate social responsibility guide on CSR for businesses in Azerbaijan. In 2011, the Economy Ministry established standards for corporate governance, which included an evaluation methodology for these standards and a code of ethical behavior. The Economy Ministry has been tasked with explaining the importance of corporate governance standards to entrepreneurs. Some companies report that government restrictions on NGO registration have complicated CSR corporate social responsibility efforts. Azerbaijan’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) status was downgraded from “compliant” to “candidate” in April 2015, due to concerns about Azerbaijani civil society’s ability to engage critically in the EITI process. Following the EITI Secretariat’s evaluation in March 2017 that Azerbaijan had not sufficiently implemented required “corrective actions,” Azerbaijan withdrew from the EITI and established a domestic Extractive Industries Transparency Commission in April 2017 to ensure transparency and accountability in the extractive industries of the country. The Commission has published two Reports on Transparency in the Extractive Industries but has not met since 2019 and does not conform with EITI standards. Azerbaijan has signed and ratified the Paris Climate Agreement. In its 2017 Nationally Determined Contributions, the country outlined climate change mitigation actions in several sectors and set a goal to reduce carbon emissions by 35 percent (from 1990 levels) by 2030. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Azerbaijan has signed and ratified the Paris Climate Agreement. In its 2017 Nationally Determined Contributions, the country outlined climate change mitigation actions in several sectors and set a goal to reduce carbon emissions by 35 percent (from 1990 levels) by 2030. 9. Corruption Corruption is a major challenge for firms operating in Azerbaijan and is a barrier to foreign investment despite government efforts to reduce low-level corruption. Azerbaijan does not require that private companies establish internal codes of conduct to prohibit bribery of public officials, nor does it provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. U.S. firms have identified corruption in government procurement, licensing, dispute settlement, regulation, customs, and taxation as significant obstacles to investment. The Azerbaijani government publicly acknowledges problems with corruption but does not effectively or consistently enforce anticorruption laws and regulations. Azerbaijan has made modest progress in implementing a 2005 Anti-corruption Law, which created a commission with the authority to require full financial disclosure from government officials. The government has achieved a degree of success reducing red tape and opportunities for bribery through a focus on e-government and government service delivery through centralized ASAN service centers, which first opened in February 2013. ASAN centers provide more transparent, efficient, and accountable services through a “one window” model that reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and petty government corruption and have become a model for other initiatives aimed at improving government service delivery. Despite progress in reducing corruption in public services delivery, the civil service, public procurement apparatus, and the judiciary still suffer from corruption. Tax reforms announced in January 2019 were aimed partially at reducing corruption in tax administration and received praise from the local business community. Azerbaijan signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention and is a signatory to the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions. Azerbaijan is not currently a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 10. Political and Security Environment On multiple occasions in 2019 and 2020, authorities selectively blocked mobile and fixed-line internet access, temporarily restricted access to foreign media and social networking sites and imposed blocks on virtual private network (VPN) services, apparently in response to political protests and as part of national restrictions during and after Azerbaijan’s armed conflict with Armenian forces in September-November 2020. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are among the sites permanently blocked in Azerbaijan. The increase in frequency and lack of transparency regarding internet disruptions raise serious concerns about future Azerbaijani government efforts to control access to information in ways that impede foreign business interests. There have been no known acts of political violence against U.S. businesses or assets, nor against any foreign owned entity. It is unlikely that civil disturbances, should they occur, would be directed against U.S. businesses or the U.S. community. During 44 days of intensive fighting from September 27 to November 10, 2020, involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Armenia-supported separatists, significant casualties and atrocities were reported by all sides. After Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, reestablished control over four surrounding territories controlled by separatists since 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire arrangement announced by Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 9 resulted in the peaceful transfer of control over three additional territories to Azerbaijan, as well as the introduction of Russian peacekeepers to the region. The ceasefire has largely held, but tensions remain high, particularly along the international border, which has not been fully demarcated. Russian forces have played a role in controlling access along highways near the border and into the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government has suspended or threatened to suspend the operations of U.S. companies in Azerbaijan whose products or services are provided in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh in which Russian peacekeepers are currently deployed and has banned the entry into Azerbaijan of some persons who have visited Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as access is restricted. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The 1999 Labor Code regulates overall labor relations and recognizes international labor rights. The work week generally is 40 hours. The right to strike exists, though industrial strikes are rare. Azerbaijan is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has ratified more than 57 ILO Conventions. In practice, labor unions are strongly tied to political interests of the government. Collective bargaining is not practiced. Azerbaijan has regulations to monitor labor abuses, health, and safety standards in low-wage assembly operations, but enforcement is less effective. Employment relations are established by an employment contract, which, in most cases, does not necessarily indicate a fixed term of employment. While a number of workers still work without contracts in Azerbaijan’s informal economy, recent tax and customs reforms have provided incentives for individuals to register their employment to benefit from state financial support. Under national law, an employer must give an employee two months’ notice of termination, with certain exceptions. An employee can terminate his/her employment contract at any time but must give one month’s notice. Upon termination of formally registered employment, employers must pay departing employees monetary compensation for unused vacation leave. A formally registered employee who becomes unemployed is entitled to 70 percent of his/her average monthly wage, calculated over the past 12 months at the last place of work. An employee must have worked under a valid labor contract in order to obtain unemployment benefits. The law “On Unemployment Insurance” signed in August 2017 allows for payments to unemployed individuals registered with the State Employment Fund. Azerbaijan has an abundant supply of semi-skilled and unskilled laborers. An estimated 35 percent of the Azerbaijani population works in agriculture, although this sector only contributes around 6 percent of the country’s GDP. The construction sector tends to use temporary and contract workers; reportedly many of these workers’ agreements are not formally registered with the government. The relatively limited supply of highly skilled labor is one of the biggest challenges in Azerbaijan’s labor market. The average monthly wage as of January 2022 was AZN 766 (USD 451), and the official minimum wage increased in 2022 to AZN 300 (USD 176) per month, compared to the previous level of AZN 250 (USD 147) per month. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection took measures to avoid unjustified dismissals, redundancies of employees in a public sector, as well as to preserve salaries of the employees sent on vacation and ensured expansion of unemployment insurance benefits, and the establishment of a proactive support mechanism in this area. Part of the reform program was to expand services to ensure employment, ensure transparency and prevent corruption. The number of legalized labor contracts increased by 30 percent during 2017-2021. In Azerbaijan, the COVID-19 crisis has deepened socio-economic vulnerabilities and widened disparities across regions, firm sizes, and between the formal and informal sides of the economy. To respond to the pandemic, a Presidential Decree outlining the emergency response package of measures was signed in March 2020, and the COVID-19 Response Action Plan was agreed by the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2020. The government extended and scaled up existing support programs and designed new schemes. The initial size of the support package in 2020 was AZN 3.3 billion (around 4.8 per cent of GDP), later increased to include additional tax benefits and a one-off extension of social assistance. The package included social protection measures such as direct cash transfers and an expansion of unemployment insurance to support the unemployed and informal workers, more targeted social assistance to support low-income households and vulnerable groups, the creation of additional public jobs, and energy and education subsidies. The main interventions to support businesses were cash payments to entrepreneurs and employers in COVID-19-affected areas, interest rate subsidies and guarantees for both new and old loans in affected sectors, as well as support to the transport sector and subsidized government rents. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $42,607 2019 $48,048 . Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP No reliable data 2020 77% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: Azerbaijan State Statistical Committee Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Thousands) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $4,795,271 100% Total Outward $825,793 100% United Kingdom $1,586,614 33% Turkey $280,542 34% Turkey $700,186 14.6% United Kingdom $122,306 15% United States $507,391 5 10.6% United States $65,967 8% Malaysia $416,620 9% Georgia $64,111 8% Cyprus $317,602 6.6% Malta $48,503 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source: Central Bank of Azerbaijan 14. Contact for More Information Courtney Brasier Economic and Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan +994-12-488-3300 BakuCommercial@state.gov Bahrain Executive Summary The investment climate in the Kingdom of Bahrain is positive and relatively stable. Bahrain maintains a business-friendly attitude and liberal approach to attracting foreign investment and business. In an economy dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOE), Bahrain aims to foster a greater role for the private sector to promote economic growth. Government of Bahrain (GOB) efforts focus on encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing, logistics, information and communications technology (ICT), financial services, tourism, health, and education sectors. Bahrain’s total FDI stock reached BD 11.537 billion ($30.683 billion) in 2020. Annual FDI inflows dropped from BD 603 million ($1.6 billion) in 2018 to BD 355 million ($942 million) in 2019 and BD 333 million ($885 million) in 2020. The financial services, manufacturing, logistics, education, healthcare, real estate, tourism, and ICT sectors have attracted the majority of Bahrain’s FDI. Bahrain’s economy saw a major recovery in 2021, following the slowdown of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise in global oil prices. In addition, the continuity of some key provisions from the BD 4.3 billion ($11.4 billion) financial relief package, that was launched in 2020 to help support businesses and individuals, helped boost Bahrain’s revenues and economic growth. In November 2021, the government announced a new economic recovery plan focused on five pillars: (1) creating quality jobs for citizens; (2) streamlining commercial procedures to attract $2.5 billion in yearly FDI by 2025; (3) launching $30 billion in major strategic projects; (4) developing strategic priority sectors; and (5) achieving fiscal sustainability and economic stability, including by extending Bahrain’s Fiscal Balance Program to 2024. Since then, the government has released detailed development strategies for the industrial, tourism, financial services, oil and gas, telecommunications and logistics sectors and identified 22 signature infrastructure projects, including the creation of five new island cities, that will stimulate post-pandemic growth and drive the economic recovery plan. The government has not identified funding sources to finance these projects or its sector modernization strategies. Bahrain’s Vision 2030 outlines measures to protect the natural environment, reduce carbon emissions, minimize pollution, and promote sustainable energy. Bahrain’s Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA), within the Ministry of Electricity and Water Affairs, designs energy efficiency policies and promotes renewable energy technologies that support Bahrain’s long-term climate action and environmental protection ambitions. Endorsed by Bahrain’s Cabinet and monitored by SEA, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) set national energy efficiency and national renewable energy 2025 targets of 6 and 5 percent, respectively, with the NREAP target increasing to 10 percent by 2035. To strengthen Bahrain’s position as a regional startup hub and to enhance its investment ecosystem, the GOB launched Bahrain FinTech Bay in 2018; issued new pro-business laws; and established several funds to encourage start-up investments including the $100 million Al Waha Fund of Funds and the Hope Fund to support startup growth. Since 2017, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) has operated a financial technology regulatory sandbox to enable startups in Bahrain, including cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies, and regulate conventional and Sharia-compliant businesses. The U.S.-Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entered into force in 2001 and protects U.S. investors in Bahrain by providing most-favored nation treatment and national treatment, the right to make financial transfers freely and without delay, international law standards for expropriation and compensation cases, and access to international arbitration. Bahrain permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial entities and the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without Bahraini sponsors or local partners. In 2017, the GOB expanded the number of sectors in which foreigners are permitted to maintain 100 percent ownership in companies to include tourism services, sporting events production, mining and quarrying, real estate, water distribution, water transport operations, and crop cultivation and propagation. In May 2019, the GOB loosened foreign ownership restrictions in the oil and gas sector, allowing 100 percent foreign ownership in oil and gas extraction projects under certain conditions. The U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in 2006. Under the FTA, Bahrain committed to world-class Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection. Despite the GOB’s transparent, rules-based government procurement system, U.S. companies sometimes report operating at a disadvantage compared with other firms. Many ministries require firms to maintain a local commercial registration or pre-qualify prior to bidding on a local tender, often rendering firms with little or no prior experience in Bahrain ineligible to bid on major tenders. In February 2022, Bahrain’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism broke ground on the United States Trade Zone (USTZ) to incentivize U.S. companies to build out full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in Bahrain to access the wider GCC market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 78 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 78 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $571 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $19,900 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOB has a liberal approach to foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign investors and businesses. Increasing FDI is a top GOB priority. The GOB permits 100 percent foreign ownership of a business or branch office, without the need for a sponsor or local business partner. The GOB does not tax corporate income, personal income, wealth, capital gains, withholding or death/inheritance. There are no restrictions on repatriation of capital, profits or dividends, aside from income generated by companies in the oil and gas sector, where profits are taxable at the rate of 46 percent. Bahrain Economic Development Board (EDB), charged with promoting FDI in Bahrain, places particular emphasis on attracting FDI to the manufacturing, logistics, ICT, financial services, tourism, health, and education sectors. As a reflection of Bahrain’s openness to FDI, the EDB won the 2019 United Nations Top Investment Promotion Agency in the Middle East award for its role in attracting large-scale investments. U.S. investors have never alleged any legal or practical discrimination against them based on nationality. In January 2021, the U.S. Commerce Secretary and the Bahraini Commerce Minister signed an MOU to establish the United States Trade Zone (USTZ) in Bahrain. Located near Bahrain’s critical port, aviation, and logistics facilities, the USTZ will enable U.S. companies to own and operate full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in a unified commercial zone in order to access the wider GCC market. In February 2022, the Bahraini government allocated a small land plot and organized an expedited groundbreaking ceremony to formally open the USTZ to accommodate initial U.S. company interest. The Bahraini government must now tender out dredging and other construction services to reclaim land from the sea before building out the bulk of the USTZ’s infrastructure, which could take up to three years. The GOB permits foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. The GOB imposes only minimal limits on foreign control, and the right of ownership and establishment of a business. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism (MoICT) maintains a small list of business activities that are restricted to Bahraini ownership, including press and publications, Islamic pilgrimage, clearance offices – such as expeditors and document clearance companies — and workforce agencies. The U.S.-Bahrain FTA outlines all activities in which the two countries restrict foreign ownership. U.S citizens may own and operate companies in Bahrain, though many such individuals choose to integrate influential local partners into the ownership structure to facilitate quicker resolution of bureaucratic issues such as labor permits, issuance of foreign visas, and access to industrial zones. The most common challenges faced by U.S firms are those related to bureaucratic government processes, lack of market information, customs clearance, and preregistration requirements to bid on local tenders. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review of Bahrain in November 2021. Bahrain ranked 43 out of 190 countries on the World Bank’s overall Ease of Doing Business Indicator in 2020. The CBB’s regulatory sandbox allows local and international FinTech firms and digitally focused financial institutions to test innovative solutions in a regulated environment, allowing successful firms to obtain licensing upon successful product application. The MoICT operates the online commercial registration portal “Sijilat” ( www.sijilat.bh ) to facilitate the commercial registration process. Through Sijilat, local and foreign business owners can obtain a business license and requisite approvals from relevant ministries. The business registration process normally takes two to three weeks, from start to finish, but can take longer if a business requires specialized approvals. In practice, some business owners retain an attorney or clearing agent to assist them through the commercial registration process. In addition to obtaining primary approval to register a company, most business owners must also obtain licenses from the following entities to operate their businesses: MoICT Electricity and Water Authority The Municipality in which their business will be located Labour Market Regulatory Authority General Organization for Social Insurance National Bureau for Revenue (Mandatory if the business revenue exceeds BD 37,500) To incentivize foreign investment in Bahrain’s targeted sectors and investment zones, the GOB provides industrial lands at reduced rental rates; customs duty exemptions for industrial and manufacturing projects, including imports of raw material, plant machinery equipment, and spare parts; and a five-year exemption of the “Bahrainization” recruitment restriction. The GOB neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment. The GOB does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime In 2018, the GOB issued a competition law, a personal data protection law, a bankruptcy law, and a health insurance law to enhance the country’s investment eco-system. The Law of Commerce (Legislative Decree No. 7, passed in 1987) addresses the concept of unfair competition and prohibits acts that would have a damaging effect on competition. Companies also are forbidden from undertaking practices detrimental to their competitors or from attracting the customers of their competitors through anti-competitive means. There is no official competition authority in Bahrain and the country has yet to institute comprehensive anti-monopoly laws or an independent anti-corruption agency. Bahrain’s industrial sector is dominated by state-controlled companies such as Aluminum Bahrain (ALBA), Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), and Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC). De facto monopolies also exist in some industries led by individuals or family-run businesses. The GOB uses International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as part of its implementation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). IFRS are used by domestic listed and unlisted companies in their consolidated financial statements for external financial reporting. Bahrain adopted International Accounting Standard 1 (IAS 1) in 1994 in the absence of other local standards. Non-listed banks and other business enterprises use IASs in the preparation of financial statements. The 2001 Bahrain Commercial Companies Law requires each registered entity to produce a balance sheet, a profit-and-loss account and the director’s report for each financial year. All branches of foreign companies, limited liability companies and corporations, must submit annual audited financial statements to the Directorate of Commerce and Company Affairs at the MoICT, along with the company’s articles and /or articles of association. Depending on the company’s business, financial statements may be subject to other regulatory agencies such as the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) and the Bahrain Stock Exchange (banks and listed companies). Bahrain encourages firms to adhere to both the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Bahrain’s Code of Corporate Governance. Bahrain-based companies by and large remain in compliance with IAS-1 disclosure requirements. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. According to the World Bank, the GOB does not have the legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment but bills that are discussed by Parliament may be reported in the local news. The text of the proposed regulations is publicly available one day, two weeks or thirty days after it is published in the Official Gazette. Bahrain, therefore, ranks among the countries with low rule-making transparency. Bahrain’s laws can be drafted or proposed by the Cabinet or originate in the bicameral National Assembly, comprised of an elected, lower house Council of Representatives (COR) and an appointed, upper house Consultative Council (“Shura”). The independent Legislation and Legal Opinion Commission drafts legislation based on the proposals. The King’s signature is required to ratify any laws following parliamentary approval; laws are in force once published in the Official Gazette. The King may issue royal orders and royal decrees that are immediately effective once issued. For matters deemed urgent, the King can also decree-laws when COR is in recess. These decree-laws must be approved by both chambers with no changes within a month of the COR resuming session, or they are considered null. GOB ministers and heads of agencies are authorized to issue regulations that pertain to the administration of their respective bodies. Bahrain is a member of the GCC, which created a Unified Economic Agreement to expedite trade and the movement of people and goods within GCC borders. The GCC has also adopted several unified model laws, such as the GCC Trademark Law. Bahrain is a signatory to the Apostille Convention and is a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It is a dualist state, therefore, international treaties are not directly incorporated into its law and must be approved by the National Assembly and ratified by the King. Commercial regulations can be proposed by the EDB, MoICT, Cabinet, or COR. Draft regulations are debated within the COR and Shura Council. The Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry board of directors may raise concerns over draft legislation at committee meetings or send written comments for review by Members of Parliament; bills are otherwise not available for public comment. The Cabinet issues final approval of regulations. The e-Government portal and the Legislation and Legal Opinion Commission website list laws by category and date of issuance. Some laws are translated into English. The National Audit Office publishes results of its annual audits of government ministries and parastatals. As a GCC member, Bahrain has agreed to enforce GCC standards and regulations where they exist, and not to create any domestic rules that contradict established GCC-wide standards and regulations. In certain cases, the GOB applies international standards where domestic or GCC standards have not been developed. Bahrain is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Bahrain ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in September 2016 through Law No. 17 of 2016. Bahrain’s Constitution defines the Kingdom as a sovereign, independent, Arab Muslim State. Article 2 of the Constitution states that Islamic Sharia (Islamic law) is the main source of legislation; however, general matters and private transactions are governed mainly by laws derived from international law. Three types of courts are present in Bahrain: civil, criminal, and family (Sharia) courts. The civil court system consists of lower courts, courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation – the highest appellate court in the Kingdom, hearing a variety of civil, criminal, and family cases. Civil courts deal with all administrative, commercial, and civil cases, as well as disputes related to the personal status of non-Muslims. Family courts deal primarily with personal status matters, such as marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. High-ranking judges in Bahrain are often from prominent families but may be non-Bahraini citizens. On January 19, 2022, the king appointed nine English-speaking foreign judges and legal experts to the Court of Cassation, all of whom are commercial arbitration specialists. Bahraini law borrows elements from European or other Arab states’ legal codes. Bahrain has a long-established framework of commercial law. English is widely used, and several well-known international (including U.S.) law firms, working in association with local partners, are authorized to practice law in Bahrain and provide expert legal services nationally and regionally. Fees are charged according to internationally accepted practices. Non-Bahraini lawyers can represent clients in Bahraini courts. In April 2007, the government permitted international law firms to be established in Bahrain. These firms provide services such as commercial and financial consultancy in legal matters. Investors report general satisfaction with government cooperation and support. Foreign competitors have occasionally perceived that legal interpretation and application varied between Ministries and was influenced by prominent local business interests or the stature and connections of an investor’s local partner. Such departures from the consistent, transparent application of regulations and the law are uncommon. The GOB is eager to develop its legal framework. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) has conducted training and capacity-building programs in Bahrain for years, in cooperation with the National Assembly; Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments; Supreme Judicial Council; Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution; Judicial and Legal Studies Institute; and MoICT. Judgments of foreign courts are recognized and enforceable under local courts. Article nine of the U.S.-Bahrain BIT outlines the disposition of U.S. investment cases within the Bahraini legal system. The most common investment-related concern in Bahrain has been the slow or incomplete application of the law. Although some international law and human rights monitoring organizations have collected anecdotal evidence pointing to a lack of transparency, the judicial process in civil courts is generally considered fair, and cases can be appealed. The U.S.-Bahrain BIT provides benefits and protection to U.S. investors in Bahrain, such as most-favored nation and national treatment, the right to make financial transfers freely and immediately, the application of international legal standards for expropriation and compensation cases, and access to international arbitration. The BIT guarantees national treatment for U.S. investments across most sectors, with exceptions of a limited list of activities, including ownership of television, radio or other media, fisheries, real estate brokerages, and land transportation. Bahrain provides most-favored nation or national treatment status to U.S. investments in air transportation, the purchase or ownership of land, and the purchase or ownership of shares traded on the Bahrain Bourse. The national treatment clause in the BIT ensures American firms interested in selling products exclusively in Bahrain are no longer required to appoint a commercial agent, though they may opt to do so. A commercial agent is any Bahraini party appointed by a foreign party to represent the foreign party’s product or service in Bahrain. Bahrain generally permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial entities and the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without local sponsors or business partners. Wholly foreign-owned companies may be set up for regional distribution services and may operate within the domestic market provided they do not exclusively pursue domestic commercial sales. Private investment (foreign or Bahraini) in petroleum extraction is permitted. Expatriates may own land in designated areas in Bahrain. Non-GCC nationals, including Americans, may own high-rise commercial and residential properties, as well as properties used for tourism, banking, financial and health projects, and training centers. Bahrain issued Bankruptcy Law No. 22 in May 2018 governing corporate reorganization and insolvency. The law is based on U.S. Chapter 11 insolvency legislation and provides companies in financial difficulty with an opportunity to restructure under court supervision. Below is a link to a site designed to assist foreign investors to navigate the laws, rules, and procedures related to investing in Bahrain: http://cbb.complinet.com/cbb/microsite/laws.html The GOB issued Competition Law No. 31 in July 2018 to prevent the formation of monopolies or the practice of anti-competitive behavior. This law makes it easier for new businesses to enter existing markets and compete with significant players. MoICT’s Consumer Protection Directorate is responsible for ensuring that the law determining price controls is implemented and that violators are punished. There have been no expropriations in recent years, and there are no cases in contention. The U.S.-Bahrain BIT protects U.S. investments by banning all expropriations (including “creeping” and “measures tantamount to”) except those for a public purpose. Such transactions must be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, with due process, and prompt, adequate, effective compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Bahrain uses multiple international and regional conventions to enhance its commercial arbitration legal framework. Bahrain is a party to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the New York Convention, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the GCC Convention for Execution of Judgments, among others. These conventions and international agreements established the foundation for the GCC Arbitration Centre, and the Bahrain Chamber for Disputes & Resolution (BCDR). Bahrain’s Constitution stipulates international conventions and treaties have the power of law. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Article 9 of The U.S.-Bahrain BIT provides for three dispute settlement options: Submitting the dispute to a local court or administrative tribunals of the host country. Invoking dispute-resolution procedures previously agreed upon by the foreign investor or company and the host country government; or, Submitting the dispute for binding arbitration to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or, the Additional Facility of ICSID, or ad hoc arbitration using the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or any other arbitral institution or rules agreed upon by both parties. Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution Court The Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) Court was established by Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2009. It operates in partnership with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). BCDR’s casework emanates from disputes brought before the BCDR Court and BCDR’s international arbitration wing, BCDR-AAA. The BCDR Court administers disputes in excess of 500,000 Bahraini Dinars (approximately $1.3 million) in which at least one party is a financial institution licensed by the Central Bank of Bahrain, or the dispute is of an international commercial nature. Since its establishment in 2010, BCDR has administered more than 350 cases under its jurisdiction as a court with monetary claims totaling over $6.2 billion. In February 2022, the Minister of Justice clarified the use of travel bans against insolvent debtors (individuals and companies). The new Enforcement Law in Civil and Commercial Matters 22/2021 stated that the insolvent debtor must disclose any owned assets, within seven days from the beginning of the judicial proceedings. Companies can settle their debts within 21 days. The justice ministry said it would coordinate with debt collectors from the private sector to expedite the enforcement process. BCDR-AAA International Arbitration Center BCDR-AAA is an international arbitration center with jurisdiction over disputes with respect to which the parties have agreed in writing that the BCDR-AAA Arbitration Rules shall apply. As of December 2020, BCDR-AAA registered 17 cases under its jurisdiction as an international arbitration center, one in 2013, one in 2015, three in 2016, five in 2017, two in 2019, and five in 2020. Of these cases, only seven are ongoing: one that was filed in 2017 and one filed in 2019, five that were filed in 2020. The remainder were awarded or settled. Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution Suite 301, Park Plaza Bldg. 247, Road 1704 P.O. Box 20006 Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain Tel: + (973) 17-511-311 Website: www.bcdr-aaa.org The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that Bahrain faced its first known Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) claim in 2017. The case involved investor claims over the CBB’s 2016 move to close the Manama branch of Future Bank, a commercial bank whose shareholders included Iranian banks. Bahrain and Iran are party to a BIT. UNCTAD reported another investor-state dispute case involving Qatar Airways in 2020. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Arbitration procedures are largely a contractual matter in Bahrain. Disputes historically have been referred to an arbitration body as specified in the contract, or to the local courts. In dealings with both local and foreign firms, Bahraini companies have increasingly included arbitration procedures in their contracts. Most commercial disputes are resolved privately without recourse to the courts or formal arbitration. Resolution under Bahraini law is generally specified in all contracts for the settlement of disputes that reach the stage of formal resolution but is optional in those designating the BCDR. Bahrain’s court system has adequately handled occasional lawsuits against individuals or companies for nonpayment of debts. Bahrain Law No. 9 of 2015 promulgating the Arbitration Law (the “New Arbitration Law”) came into effect on August 9, 2015. The law provides that the UNCITRAL 1985 Model Law with its 2006 amendments on international commercial arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Law”) will apply to any arbitration, taking place in Bahrain or abroad, if the parties to the dispute agreed to be subject to the UNCITRAL Law. The GCC Commercial Arbitration Center, established in 1995, serves as a regional specialized body providing arbitration services. It assists in resolving disputes among GCC countries or between other parties and GCC countries. The Center implements rules and regulations in line with accepted international practice. Thus far, few cases have been brought to arbitration. The Center conducts seminars, symposia, and workshops to help educate and update its members on any new arbitration-related matters. GCC Commercial Arbitration Center P.O. Box 2338 Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain Arbitration Boards’ Secretariat Tel: + (973) 17278000 Email: case@gcccac.org Website: http://www.gcccac.org/en/ The GOB enacted its original bankruptcy and insolvency law through Decree by Law No. 11 in 1987. In May 2018, the GOB issued and ratified Law No. 22, updating the original legislation. Modeled on U.S. Chapter 11 legislation, the law introduces reorganization whereby a company’s management may continue business operations during the administration of a case. The Bankruptcy Law also includes provisions for cross-border insolvency, and special insolvency provisions for small and medium-sized enterprises that were further amended in July 2020 and enhanced creditors rights and expediting liquidation proceedings. The Bahrain credit reference bureau, known as “BENEFIT,” is licensed by the CBB and operates as the credit monitoring authority in Bahrain. As part of a wider effort to promote sustainability and transparency in Bahrain’s capital market, Bahrain’s national stock market, the Bahrain Bourse (BHB), announced in 2020 new Environmental Social & Governance (ESG) reporting guidelines for listed companies . The voluntary reporting guidance aims to assist listed companies to integrate ESG issues in their reporting cycle and better meet the demands of institutional investors for material ESG information. The ESG reporting guidance encourages listed companies to disclose a set of 32 ESG metrics and indicators in alignment with the recommendations of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative and the World Federation of Exchanges, Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) standards, and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The guidance explains the key regional and international drivers for adoption of ESG reporting, the importance of ESG reporting, the ways to report on ESG, and emphasizes Bahrain Bourse’s efforts in promoting sustainability. 4. Industrial Policies The GOB offers a variety of incentives to attract FDI. The Bahrain EDB, the Bahrain Logistics Zone (BLZ), Bahrain Development Bank (BDB), Bahrain International Investment Park (BIIP), U.S. Trade Zone (USTZ), and labor market fund Tamkeen offer incentives to encourage FDI. Some examples of incentives include assistance in registering and opening business operations, financial grants, exemption from import duties on raw materials and equipment, and duty-free access to other GCC markets for products manufactured in Bahrain. Khalifa bin Salman Port, Bahrain’s primary commercial seaport, provides a free transit zone to facilitate the duty-free import of equipment and machinery. The GOB has developed two main industrial zones, one to the north of Sitra and the other in Hidd. The Hidd location, known as BIIP, is adjacent to a logistics zone, known as BLZ. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities in these zones as Bahraini companies. MoICT operates BIIP, a 2.5 million square-meter, tax-free zone located minutes from Bahrain’s main Khalifa bin Salman port. Many U.S. companies operate out of this park. BIIP is most suited to manufacturing and services companies interested in exporting from Bahrain. The park offers manufacturing companies the ability to ship their products duty free to countries in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. BIIP has space available for potential investors, including some plots of vacant land designated for new construction, and some warehouse facilities for rental. BIIP offers several incentives for international companies, including: competitive land-lease rental rates starting at $2.66 sqm/year; competitive utility costs; 100 percent foreign ownership; corporate and income tax exemptions; duty-free access to the GCC and U.S. markets; 5 percent customs duty exemption on raw materials, plant machinery, and spare parts imported for manufacturing; grants for funding, machinery, training, and employment; and a five year exemption from hiring Bahraini nationals. BLZ is a boutique logistics park. Regulated and managed by the Ports and Maritime Affairs at the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, BLZ offers local and international companies a base from which to operate in a customs-bonded area to export products and services to the northern Gulf and GCC markets. The park accommodates logistics companies engaged in: Third-party logistics (3PL) and freight forwarding services. General and specialized storage and distribution activities for re-export purposes. Value-added logistics services such as component assembly, packing and packaging, labeling, testing and repair, mixing, weighing and filling, and other light manufacturing activities. BLZ offers several incentives for international companies, including: competitive land-lease rental rates starting at $11 sqm/year; 100 percent foreign ownership; corporate and income tax exemptions; 12-month grace period on utility payments for water, sewage, electricity, and telecommunication services. A 1999 law requires investors in industrial or industry-related zones to launch a project within one year from the date of receiving the land, and development must conform to the specifications, terms, and drawings submitted with the application. Changes are not permitted without approval from MoICT. In February 2021, MoICT inaugurated the USTZ to attract U.S. companies to build, own, and operate full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in a unified commercial zone that will facilitate streamlined access to the wider GCC market. MoICT expects the USTZ to include many of the same land lease discounts, customs exemptions, and other incentivized features as the BIIP and BLZ. Companies in Bahrain are obliged to comply with so-called “Bahrainization” employment targets, under which the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) mandates that a certain percentage of each company’s employees are Bahraini nationals. Companies may contact LMRA to determine the “Bahrainization” rate, which differs based on sector, or use a calculator to determine the rate: http://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/193 . The applicable Bahrainization rate is mandatory across a company’s corporate structure. Per Cabinet Resolution Number 27 of 2016, LMRA announced that companies unable to comply with the rates would only be eligible to apply for new work permits and sponsorship transfers by paying an additional annual fee of BD 250 ($663) per non-Bahraini worker. LMRA may apply fines to companies that do not comply with “Bahrainization” requirements. The GOB introduced the National Employment Program initiative in 2019 to enhance Bahraini nationals’ employment through trainings and qualification programs. The program, in its two versions, worked on replacing expat employment with Bahraini nationals in several occupations, mainly, in the health, education, and telecommunication sectors. The GOB issued Law No. 1 in March 2019 amending Article 14 of the Private Health Establishments Law, which gives priority to recruiting qualified Bahraini physicians, technicians, and nursing staff in private health establishments. There is no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirement inhibiting the mobility of foreign investors or their employees in Bahrain. Americans and citizens of many other countries can obtain a two-week visa with relative ease upon arrival in Bahrain or online. Bahrain also offers American citizens a five-year, multiple-entry visa, if required. Bahrain has a liberal approach to foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign investors and businesses; no product localization is enforced, and foreign investors are not obliged to use domestic content in goods or technology. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest, including tariff and non-tariff barriers, on American investments. There are no special performance requirements imposed on foreign investors. The U.S.-Bahrain BIT forbids mandated performance requirements as a condition for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or operation of a covered investment. Foreign and Bahraini-owned companies must meet the same requirements and comply with the same environmental, safety, health, and labor requirements. Officials at the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, LMRA, and MoICT supervise companies operating in Bahrain on a non-discriminatory basis. The CBB regulates financial institutions and foreign exchange offices. Foreign and locally owned companies must comply with the same rules, policies, and regulations. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or to provide access to surveillance. Bahrain enacted Law No. 30 of 2018 with respect to Personal Data Protection on July 12, 2018. The nationwide Data Protection Law, which went into force on August 1, 2019, promotes the efficient and secure processing of big data for commercial use and provides guidelines for the effective transfer of data across borders. 5. Protection of Property Rights The GOB enforces property rights protections for land and homeowners. Most land has a clear title. Ownership of land is highly concentrated among royal family members; certain areas may be closed to Bahraini investors as well as expatriates. Foreign firms and GCC nationals are permitted to purchase land in certain areas in Bahrain. Non-GCC nationals can acquire high-rise commercial and residential properties in designated areas. Foreign investors may purchase property to operate businesses in various fields of business including, but not limited to, manufacturing, tourism, banking and financial services, education and training, design, and advertising. Foreign investors may own commercial property in the following geographic areas: Ahmed Al-Fateh (Juffair) district Hoora district Bu Ghazal district Seef district Northern Manama, including the Diplomatic Area, where the main international corporations are located Foreign investors may own residential property in the following tourist areas: Durrat Al Bahrain Riffa Views Amwaj Islands Bahrain Financial Harbor Bahrain Bay Reef Island Diyyar Al Muharraq Some areas in Saar Most of the new development projects in Bahrain permit expatriates and international investors to own houses, buildings, outlets, or freehold apartments. Legally purchased property cannot revert to other owners, even if such property is unoccupied. Under the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, the GOB committed to enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) protections. Bahrain signed the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Patent Cooperation Treaty, Nice Agreement, Madrid Agreement, Budapest Treaty, Trademark Law Treaty, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1996. The GOB ratified revised legislation in 2006 to implement Bahrain’s obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The GOB has passed laws related to IPR to bring Bahrain’s local laws into compliance with its Paris Convention commitment, and in anticipation of acceding to the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks and the Locarno Agreement on establishing an international classification for industrial designs, and the International Patent Classification (IPC). Bahrain has acceded to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Bahrain ratified Law No. 31 on the Protection of New Plants Varieties in 2021 and is expected to accede to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants by the end of 2022. The GOB has made progress in reducing copyright piracy and there are few reports of significant violations of U.S. patents and trademarks in Bahrain. The GOB’s copyright enforcement campaign began in late 1997 and was based on inspections, closures, and improved public awareness. The campaign targeted the video, audio and software industries with impressive results. Commercially pirated video and audio markets have been mostly eliminated. However, audio, video, and software piracy by end-users remain problematic. There are no technology transfer requirements that force firms to share or divulge technology through compulsory licensing to a domestic partner, nor are firms required to undertake research and development activities in Bahrain. In May 2016, the GOB issued the Implementing Regulations for the Trademark Law of the GCC, which had originally been approved by Law No. 6 of 2014. Law No. 6 provided a unified trademark regime for all six GCC countries. Bahrain is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. Bahrain does not track or report on seizures of counterfeit goods. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . The Embassy’s webpage also offers a link to local lawyers, some of whom specialize in IPR and/or patent law: https://bh.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/ Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965-2259-1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Consistent with the GOB’s liberal approach to foreign investment, government policies facilitate the free flow of financial transactions and portfolio investments. Expatriates and Bahraini nationals have ready access to credit on market terms. Generally, credit terms are variable, but often are limited to 10 years for loans under $50 million. For major infrastructure investments, banks often offer to assume a part of the risk, and Bahrain’s wholesale and retail banks have shown extensive cooperation in syndicating loans for larger risks. Commercial credit is available to private organizations in Bahrain but has been increasingly crowded out by the government’s local bond issuances. In 2016, the GOB launched a new fund designed to inject greater liquidity in the Bahrain Bourse, worth $100 million. The Bahrain Liquidity Fund is supported by several market participants and acts as a market maker, providing two-way quotes on most of the listed stocks with a reasonable spread to allow investors to actively trade their stocks. Despite these efforts, the market remains small in comparison to others in the region. In October 2019, the GOB established a BD 130 million ($344 million) Liquidity Fund to assist distressed companies in restructuring financial obligations, which was expanded in March 2020 to BD 200 million ($530 million) in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The GOB and the CBB are members of the IMF and fully compliant with Article VIII. The CBB is the single regulator of the entire financial sector, with an integrated regulatory framework covering all financial services provided by conventional and Islamic financial institutions. Bahrain’s banking sector remained healthy despite sustained lower global oil prices. Bahrain’s banks are well capitalized, and there is sufficient liquidity to ensure a healthy rate of investment. Bahrain remains a financial center for the GCC region, though many financial firms moved their regional headquarters to Dubai over the last decade. The GOB continues to drive innovation and expansion in the Islamic finance sector. In 2021, Bahrain ranked as the second in the MENA Islamic finance market and placed fourth globally, according to the ICD-Thomson Reuters Islamic Finance Development Indicator (IFDI). Bahrain has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The CBB has fully implemented Basel II standards and is attempting to bring Bahraini banks into compliance with Basel III standards. Bahrain’s banking sector includes 89 banks, of which 30 are retail banks, 59 are wholesale banks, 17 are branches of foreign banks, and 13 are locally incorporated. Of these, nine are representative offices, and 16 are Islamic banks. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts or corporate accounts. Bahrain is home to many prominent financial institutions, among them Citibank, American Express, and JP Morgan Chase. Ahli United Bank is Bahrain’s largest bank with total assets estimated at $41.9 billion as of December 2021. Bahrain implemented the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System and the Scripless Securities Settlement (SSS) System in 2007 to enable banks to carry out their payment and securities-related transactions securely on a real time basis. In 2017, Bahrain became the first in the GCC to introduce fintech “sandbox” regulations that enabled the launch of cryptocurrency and blockchain startups. The same year, the CBB released additional regulations for conventional and Sharia-compliant financing-based crowdfunding businesses. Any firm operating electronic financing/lending platforms must be licensed in Bahrain under the CBB Rulebook Volume 5 – Financing Based Crowdfunding Platform Operator. In February 2019, the CBB issued cryptocurrency regulations. Foreign Exchange Bahrain has no restrictions on the repatriation of profits or capital and no exchange controls. Bahrain’s currency, the Bahraini Dinar (BD), is fully and freely convertible at the fixed rate of USD 1.00 = BD 0.377 (1 BD = USD 2.659). There is no black market or parallel exchange rate. There are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds, regardless of whether they are associated with an investment. Remittance Policies The CBB is responsible for regulating remittances, and its regulations are based on the Central Bank Law ratified in 2006. Foreign workers comprise most of the labor force in Bahrain and many remit significant quantities of funds to their countries of origin. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses are licensed to provide remittances services. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses require two forms of identification before processing a routine remittance request, and any transaction exceeding $10,000 must include a documented source of the income. Bahrain enables foreign investors to remit funds through a legal parallel market, with no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOB does not engage in currency manipulation tactics. The GCC is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) which is headquartered in Bahrain. Participating countries commit to combat the financing of terrorist groups and activities in all its forms and to implement FATF recommendations. Bahrain established a sovereign wealth fund, Mumtalakat, in 2006. Mumtalakat, which maintains an investment portfolio valued at roughly BD 6.6 billion ($17.6 billion) as of 2020, issues an annual report online. The annual report follows international financial reporting standards and is audited by external auditing firms. By law, subsidiaries of Mumtalakat are audited and monitored by the National Audit Office. In 2020, Mumtalakat received the highest-possible ranking in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for the seventh consecutive year, which specializes in ranking the transparency of sovereign wealth funds. However, Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund does not follow the Santiago Principles. Mumtalakat holds majority stakes in several firms. Mumtalakat invests 62 percent of its funds in the Middle East, 30 percent in Europe, and eight percent in the United States. The fund is diversified across a variety of business sectors including real estate and tourism, financial services, food and agriculture, and industrial manufacturing. Mumtalakat acts more like an active asset management company than a sovereign wealth fund, including by taking an active role in managing SOEs. Most notably, Mumtalakat has been instrumental in helping Gulf Air, Bahrain’s state-owned airline, restructure and contain losses. A significant portion of Mumtalakat’s portfolio is invested in 29 Bahrain-based SOEs. Mumtalakat did not directly contribute to the State Budget through 2016. However, beginning in September 2017, Mumtalakat annually contributed $53 million to the State Budget, which was increased to $106 million in the 2021-2022 State Budget. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Ministry of Labour and Social Development in 2011 authorized the creation of the Bahrain Corporate Social Responsibility Society (BCSRS) as a social and cultural entity. Though there are no measures in Bahrain to compel businesses to follow codes of responsible business conduct, the BCSRS has sought to raise awareness of corporate social responsibility in the business community, and in 2021 hosted the GCC International Conference on Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development. The Society is a founding member of the Arab Association for Social Responsibility, which includes representatives of most Arab countries. In 2003, Bahrain established a National Steering Committee on Corporate Governance to improve corporate governance practices. The MoICT promulgated the new Corporate Governance Code pursuant to Decree No. 19 of 2018. The new code expanded the base of companies obligated to implement responsible governance, as per the country’s Corporate Governance Code issued in 2010, to include all locally incorporated closed joint stock companies. The law stipulates minimum standards required for corporate governance and applies to all companies incorporated in Bahrain, other than companies that provide regulated financial services licensed by the CBB. The GOB drafted a Corporate Governance Code to establish a set of best practices for corporate governance and provide protection for investors and other company stakeholders through compliance with those principles. The GOB enforces the code through a combined monitoring system comprising the MoICT, CBB, Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE), Bahrain Courts, and other professional firms, including auditors, lawyers, and investment advisers. The code does not create new penalties for non-complying companies, but states that the MoICT (working closely with the CBB and the BSE) may exercise penalty powers granted to it under the Commercial Companies Law 2001. The GOB has put in place advanced regulations and laws protecting labor rights, including vulnerable categories such as migrant workers from South and Southeast Asia. Despite legislative guarantees of certain rights, workers may be exposed to unfair labor practices such as unpaid overtime, denied vacation, or nonpayment of wages. Labor courts have not been fully effective in settling labor disputes between employers and employees. However, there have been reports of cases that were settled in favor of employees in Bahraini labor courts. Bahrain is a class five country on the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Global Rights Index for freedom of association and workers’ rights, with the index ranging from one to five in ascending order from best to worst. Beginning in 2022, all companies must integrate into the Wage Protection System (WPS) to pay employees’ salaries via prepaid card or financial transfers through a bank or financial institution approved by the Central Bank of Bahrain. Domestic workers and Flexi-Permit holders are exempt from the mandate. The LMRA has the authority to review employer-employee transactions in the system. Law Number 35 of 2012, the Consumer Protection Law, ensures quality control, combats unfair business practices, and imposes sanctions for breaches of the law’s provisions. MoICT is highly effective in implementing the law. Bahrain’s amended Corporate Governance Law enhances transparency and ethical business conduct standards. Among the changes, the GOB urged companies to submit audited ratified accounts to the MoICT. The GOB does not maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines, nor does it participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Bahrain’s Vision 2030 outlines measures to protect the natural environment, reduce carbon emissions, minimize pollution, and promote sustainable energy. Bahrain’s Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA), within the Ministry of Electricity and Water Affairs, designs energy efficiency policies and promotes renewable energy technologies that support Bahrain’s long-term climate action and environmental protection ambitions. Endorsed by Bahrain’s Cabinet and monitored by SEA, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) set national energy efficiency and national renewable energy 2025 targets of 6 and 5 percent, respectively, with the NREAP target increasing to 10 percent by 2035. 9. Corruption Senior GOB officials have advocated publicly to reduce corruption. Legislation countering corruption is outlined in Bahrain’s Economic Vision 2030 and National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Bahrain joined the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003. Bahrain ratified its penal code on combatting bribery in the public and private sectors in 2008, mandating criminal penalties for official corruption. In December 2013, the Ministry of Interior launched the National Strategy to Combat Corruption. Under Bahraini law, government employees are subject to prosecution and punishments of up to 10 years imprisonment if they use their positions to engage in embezzlement or bribery, either directly or indirectly. The law does not require GOB officials to make financial disclosures. In 2010, Bahrain ratified the UNCAC and the Arab Convention Against Corruption, and in 2016, joined the International Anti-Corruption Academy. In December 2021, the Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Anti-Corruption and Economic and Electronic Security initiated 96 embezzlement, bribery and abuse of authority cases and three economic infractions that were referred from the Cabinet. In January 2022, the Public Prosecution Office referred seven corruption cases, 12 tax evasion and 10 money laundering cases to the courts, in addition to two tax evasion cases and five money laundering cases that have been pending since 2021. Giving or accepting a bribe is illegal. The GOB, however, has not fully implemented the law, and some officials reportedly continue to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. The National Audit Office, established in 2002, is mandated to publish annual reports that highlight fiscal irregularities within GOB ministries and other public sector entities. The reports enable legislators to exercise oversight and call for investigations of fiscal discrepancies in GOB accounts. In 2013, the Crown Prince established an Investigation Committee to oversee cases noted in the National Audit Office annual report, which lists violations by GOB state bodies. On March 1, 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa stressed the importance of consolidating responsibility and accountability to protect public funds and directed all agencies to cooperate with the National Audit Office. The Minister for Follow-Up Affairs was designated in 2015 to execute recommendations made in that year’s National Audit Office annual report. The Crown Prince, who concurrently has served as Prime Minister since November 2020, urged all GOB entities and the COR to work closely to implement the report’s recommendations. The Ministry of Interior’s Anti-Corruption and Economic and Electronic Security Directorate signed an MOU with the United Nations Development Programme to enhance the anti-corruption directorate’s capabilities. Bahrain has conflict-of-interest laws in place, however, their application in awarding contacts is not fully enforced. Local non-governmental organizations generally do not focus on corruption-related issues, though civil society activists have spoken out against corrupt practices in the public sector. Few cases have been registered by U.S. companies reporting corruption as an obstacle to their investments in Bahrain. Bahrain signed and ratified the United Nations Anticorruption Convention in 2005 and 2010, respectively. Bahrain, however, is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. In 2018, Bahrain joined the OECD’s Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Resources to Report Corruption Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: General Directorate of Anti- Corruption & Economic & Electronic Security Ministry of Interior P. O. Box 26698, Manama, Bahrain Hotline: 992 Contact at “watchdog” organization: Dr. Hussain al-Rubaie President Bahrain Transparency Society P.O. Box 26059 Adliya, Bahrain Phone: +973 39642452 10. Political and Security Environment Bahrain is an open, liberal Gulf state that enjoys close diplomatic ties with the United States. Bahrain has experienced intermittent cycles of violence, with the most recent period of unrest taking place in 2011-2014. In 2017 and 2018, the GOB dissolved the country’s two largest opposition political societies and closed the country’s only opposition-leaning independent newspaper in 2017. On May 13, 2018, the Parliament passed a law banning members of political societies dissolved by the GOB from running in elections that took place later that year. Since 2017, protests centered on sociopolitical or economic demands have occurred in isolated neighborhoods but have largely been controlled by GOB authorities. Elections of the popularly elected lower house of the National Assembly, also known as the Council of Representatives, are scheduled for November 2022. Neither demonstrators nor violent extremists have generally targeted Americans or other Western expatriates. American citizens visiting Bahrain and companies interested in investing in Bahrain should visit the Embassy’s website to receive the most up-to-date information about the security situation and register with the Embassy’s consular section. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In 2006, the King ratified the Labor Reforms Law, which established the LMRA and the capacity-building labor fund known as Tamkeen. The law imposed a monthly fee of BD 10 ($26.67) on each expatriate employed by any company registered in Bahrain. The revenues collected under this program are earmarked to provide job training for Bahraini nationals. Companies pay BD 5 ($13.35) for the first five foreign workers and BD 10 ($26.67) for every additional employee. The COR regularly discusses amending the fee structure. Bahrain’s Labor Law No. 36 of 2012 guarantees employees’ rights by requiring clear contractual terms for employing domestic staff, and prohibiting discrimination practices of wages based on gender, ethnicity, religion, or language. Bahrain’s Labor Law has introduced enhancements for annual leave, maternity leave, sick leave entitlement, and resolution of labor disputes. Expatriate workers should be registered by their employer with LMRA to receive a valid residence permit and work permit. Employers are prohibited from employing foreigners without a valid work permit. To work in Bahrain, foreign employees should be medically fit, have entered the country lawfully, possess a valid passport, and retain residence and work permits. As of the first quarter of 2021, the LMRA estimated Bahrain’s labor force in the private sector to be 522,164 foreign workers (including housekeepers). Eighty percent of Bahrain’s total workforce is comprised of foreigners, the majority being unskilled construction workers. According to Bahrain’s Information and eGovernment Authority, foreigners comprised about 53 percent of Bahrain’s population in 2020. The GOB’s primary initiative for combating unemployment among Bahraini nationals is “Bahrainization,” a policy that mandates employers hire Bahraini nationals instead of foreign workers. Companies occasionally experience difficulty obtaining mandatory work permits and residence visas for expatriate employees due to “Bahrainization” policies. Bahrain’s Ministry of Labor and Social Development reported that 2,775 private companies have implemented the “Bahrainization” system as of June 2020. According to the Minister of Labour and Social Development, over 26,000 jobseekers and 12,000 recent graduates were hired in 2021. The GOB stipulated through Decree No. 1 of 2019 that priority will be given to Bahraini physicians, technicians, and nurses with the required qualifications and experience. Since July 2020, the LMRA requires private sector companies to advertise job vacancies in local newspapers for two weeks and provide Bahraini nationals with priority access to applying, before considering expatriates. “Bahrainization” requirements may be temporarily waived for FDI in Bahrain’s special economic zones, including BIIP and BLZ. According to the LMRA, as of March 2021 there are nearly 50,000 out-of-status workers in Bahrain – that is, workers without a visa or valid work permit. This number is down from nearly 65,000 out-of-status workers in early 2020. In April 2020, the GOB implemented a temporary amnesty to allow thousands of out-of-status workers to regularize their immigration status. In August 2020, the Cabinet approved new regulations for the flexible work permit, also known as the “flexi” permit, which allows foreign workers to live freely and work in a non-specialized occupation without a sponsor for a renewable period of one to two years. The new regulations empower LMRA to increase inspection visits on “flexi” permit employers to ensure they are not working in professional activities that require a specialized work permit. The Labor Law of 2012 allows an employer to terminate an employee in the event of the total or partial closure of an establishment. The employer must render a notice and reason for termination to the Ministry of Labour and Social Development at least 30 days prior to serving notice of termination to the affected employee. The amount of compensation due an employee for termination is set by law and is based in part on length of service. In September 2021, migrant workers contracted by Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) gathered to protest poor living and working conditions. An agreement was reached among the employer, contractor, and workers. In 2007, the Minister of Labour and Social Development introduced an unemployment allowance to be paid from a general labor fund. The fund is financed by deducting one percent from the wages of all workers and is the first such program in the GCC. In 2002, the King approved the Workers Trade Union Law of 2002 that recognizes the right of workers to collectively organize, to form trade unions, and to strike, with some restrictions. The law prohibits workers from striking in certain sectors deemed vital by the Prime Minster, including security, aviation, ports, hospitals, and utilities. The law does not provide for the right to collective bargaining. With the exception of domestic workers, foreign employees are allowed to join trade unions. The law prohibits employers from dismissing an employee for trade union activities. In 2011, the King issued a decree that changed Bahrain’s labor law as it pertained to trade unions and federations. Union leadership criticized the new law for provisions that appear to inhibit freedom of association. The 2012 law prohibits multi-sectoral labor federations and prohibits individuals convicted of felonies from holding union leadership posts. While the amendment allowed for the formation of multiple trade union federations, it gave the Ministry of Labour and Social Development the right to select the federation to represent the country’s workers in international fora and in national-level bargaining. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor and Bahrain Ministry of Labour and Social Development convened the first meeting of the U.S.-Bahrain Sub-Committee on Labor Affairs, as established under the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. At the meeting, they reaffirmed their obligations under the FTA related to internationally recognized labor rights, including their obligations as members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and commitments stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). Bahrain has maintained “Tier 1” status in the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report since 2018. There were no instances of child labor and no violence against labor rights defenders during the most recent reporting period. Forced labor including nonpayment of wages, debt bondage, involuntary sex work, and other instances of human trafficking are documented in the report. During the civil unrest of 2011, Bahraini employees were dismissed from private and public-sector jobs. In June 2011, the AFL-CIO filed a petition with the Department of Labor accusing Bahrain of violating the labor rights terms of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. The November 2011 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report concluded that most of these dismissals were motivated by retaliation against employees suspected of being involved in civil demonstrations. By the end of 2012, the majority of the dismissed workers in the public and private sectors were reinstated, with the GOB working to resolve the remaining cases. In March 2014, the Minister of Labour and Social Development, Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions signed a tripartite agreement to resolve the remaining worker reinstatement cases. Subsequently, the ILO dropped a related complaint it initiated in 2011. Bilateral consultations are ongoing between the U.S. and Bahrain – invoked under the Labor Chapter of the FTA in response to the 2011 AFL-CIO complaint. 14. Contact for More Information Manama Commercial Office U.S. Embassy Manama P.O. Box 26431 Bldg. 979, Rd. 3119 Block 331, Zinj Kingdom of Bahrain Telephone No. +973 1724-2700 E-mail address: manamacommercial@state.gov Bangladesh Executive Summary Bangladesh is the most densely populated non-city-state country in the world, with the eighth largest population (over 165 million) within a territory the size of Iowa. Bangladesh is situated in the northeastern corner of the Indian subcontinent, sharing a 4,100 km border with India and a 247-kilometer border with Burma. With sustained economic growth over the past decade, a large, young, and hard-working workforce, strategic location between the large South and Southeast Asian markets, and vibrant private sector, Bangladesh will likely continue to attract increasing investment, despite severe economic headwinds created by the global outbreak of COVID-19. Buoyed by a young workforce and a growing consumer base, Bangladesh has enjoyed consistent annual GDP growth of more than six percent over the past decade, with the exception of the COVID-induced economic slowdown in 2020. Much of this growth continues to be driven by the ready-made garment (RMG) industry, which exported $35.81 billion of apparel products in fiscal year (FY) 2021, second only to China, and continued remittance inflows, reaching a record $24.77 billion in FY 2021. (Note: The Bangladeshi fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30; fiscal year 2021 ended on June 30, 2021.) The country’s RMG exports increased more than 30 percent year-over-year in FY 2021 as the global demand for apparel products accelerated after the COVID shock. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) actively seeks foreign investment. Sectors with active investments from overseas include agribusiness, garment/textiles, leather/leather goods, light manufacturing, power and energy, electronics, light engineering, information and communications technology (ICT), plastic, healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceutical, ship building, and infrastructure. The GOB offers a range of investment incentives under its industrial policy and export-oriented growth strategy with few formal distinctions between foreign and domestic private investors. Bangladesh’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock was $20.87 billion through the end of September 2021, with the United States being the top investing country with $4.1 billion in accumulated investments. Bangladesh received $2.56 billion FDI in 2020, according to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The rate of FDI inflows was only 0.77 percent of GDP, one of the lowest of rates in Asia. Bangladesh has made gradual progress in reducing some constraints on investment, including taking steps to better ensure reliable electricity, but inadequate infrastructure, limited financing instruments, bureaucratic delays, lax enforcement of labor laws, and corruption continue to hinder foreign investment. Government efforts to improve the business environment in recent years show promise but implementation has yet to materialize. Slow adoption of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and sluggish judicial processes impede the enforcement of contracts and the resolution of business disputes. As a traditionally moderate, secular, peaceful, and stable country, Bangladesh experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in recent years, accompanied by an increase in terrorism-related investigations and arrests following the Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in 2016. A December 2018 national election marred by irregularities, violence, and intimidation consolidated the power of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling party, the Awami League. This allowed the government to adopt legislation and policies diminishing space for the political opposition, undermining judicial independence, and threatening freedom of the media and NGOs. Bangladesh continues to host one of the world’s largest refugee populations. According to UN High Commission for Refugees, more than 923,000 Rohingya from Burma were in Bangladesh as of February 2022. This humanitarian crisis will likely require notable financial and political support until a return to Burma in a voluntary and sustainable manner is possible. International retail brands selling Bangladesh-made products and the international community continue to press the Government of Bangladesh to meaningfully address worker rights and factory safety problems in Bangladesh. With unprecedented support from the international community and the private sector, the Bangladesh garment sector has made significant progress on fire and structural safety. Critical work remains on safeguarding workers’ rights to freely associate and bargain collectively, including in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The Bangladeshi government has limited resources devoted to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and counterfeit goods are readily available in Bangladesh. Government policies in the ICT sector are still under development. Current policies grant the government broad powers to intervene in that sector. Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector is still highly dependent on banks. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 147 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 116 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 723 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Bangladesh actively seeks foreign investment. Sectors with active investments from overseas include agribusiness, garment and textiles, leather and leather goods, light manufacturing, electronics, light engineering, energy and power, ICT, plastic, healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceutical, ship building, and infrastructure. It offers a range of investment incentives under its industrial policy and export-oriented growth strategy with few formal distinctions between foreign and domestic private investors. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of business enterprises. Four sectors, however, are reserved for government investment: Arms and ammunition and other defense equipment and machinery. Forest plantation and mechanized extraction within the bounds of reserved forests. Production of nuclear energy. Security printing (items such as currency, visa foils, and tax stamps). The Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) is the principal authority tasked with supervising and promoting private investment. The BIDA Act of 2016 approved the merger of the now-disbanded Board of Investment and the Privatization Committee. BIDA is directly supervised by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Executive Chairman of BIDA holds a rank equivalent to Senior Secretary, the highest rank within the civil service. BIDA performs the following functions: Provides pre-investment counseling services. Registers and approves private industrial projects. Issues approval of branch/liaison/representative offices. Issues work permits for foreign nationals. Issues approval of royalty remittances, technical know-how, and technical assistance fees. Facilitates import of capital machinery and raw materials. Issues approvals of foreign loans and supplier credits. Provides aftercare facilities. BIDA’s website has aggregated information regarding Bangladesh investment policies, incentives, and ease of doing business indicators: http://bida.gov.bd/ In addition to BIDA, there are three other Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) responsible for promoting investments in their respective jurisdictions. Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) promotes investments in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The first EPZ was established in the 1980s and there are currently eight EPZs in the country. Website: Bangladesh Economic Zones Authority (BEZA) plans to establish approximately 100 Economic Zones (EZs) throughout the country over the next several years. Site selections for 97 EZs have been completed as of February 2022, of which 10 private EZs are already licensed and operational while development of several other public and private sector EZs are underway. While EPZs accommodate exporting companies only, EZs are open for both export- and domestic-oriented companies. Website: Bangladesh Hi-Tech Park Authority (BHTPA) is responsible for attracting and facilitating investments in the high-tech parks Bangladesh is establishing across the country. Website: Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of business enterprises. Bangladesh allows private investment in power generation and natural gas exploration, but efforts to allow full foreign participation in petroleum marketing and gas distribution have stalled. Regulations in the area of telecommunication infrastructure currently include provisions for 60 percent foreign ownership (70 percent for tower sharing). In addition to the four sectors reserved for government investment, there are 17 controlled sectors that require prior clearance/ permission from the respective line ministries/authorities. These are: Fishing in the deep sea. Bank/financial institutions in the private sector. Insurance companies in the private sector. Generation, supply, and distribution of power in the private sector. Exploration, extraction, and supply of natural gas/oil. Exploration, extraction, and supply of coal. Exploration, extraction, and supply of other mineral resources. Large-scale infrastructure projects (e.g., elevated expressway, monorail, economic zone, inland container depot/container freight station). Crude oil refinery (recycling/refining of lube oil used as fuel). Medium and large industries using natural gas/condensate and other minerals as raw material. Telecommunications service (mobile/cellular and land phone). Satellite channels. Cargo/passenger aviation. Sea-bound ship transport. Seaports/deep seaports. VOIP/IP telephone. Industries using heavy minerals accumulated from sea beaches. While discrimination against foreign investors is not widespread, the government frequently promotes local industries, and some discriminatory policies and regulations exist. For example, the government closely controls approvals for imported medicines that compete with domestically manufactured pharmaceutical products and it has required majority local ownership of new shipping and insurance companies, albeit with exemptions for existing foreign-owned firms. In practical terms, foreign investors frequently find it necessary to have a local partner even though this requirement may not be statutorily defined. In certain strategic sectors, the GOB has placed unofficial barriers on foreign companies’ ability to divest from the country. BIDA is responsible for screening, reviewing, and approving investments in Bangladesh, except for investments in EPZs, EZs, and High-Tech Parks, which are supervised by BEPZA, BEZA, and BHTPA respectively. Both foreign and domestic companies are required to obtain approval from relevant ministries and agencies with regulatory oversight. In certain sectors (e.g., healthcare), foreign companies may be required to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the relevant ministry or agency stating the specific investment will not hinder local manufacturers and is in line with the guidelines of the ministry concerned. Since Bangladesh actively seeks foreign investments, instances where one of the Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) declines investment proposals are rare. In 2013 Bangladesh completed an investment policy review (IPR) with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=756 A Trade Policy Review was done by the World Trade Organization in April 2019 and can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp485_e.htm In February 2018, the Bangladesh Parliament passed the “One Stop Service Bill 2018,” which aims to streamline business and investment registration processes. The four IPAs – BIDA, BEPZA, BEZA, and BHTPA – are mandated to provide one-stop services (OSS) to local and foreign investors under their respective jurisdictions. Expected streamlined services include company registration, taxpayer’s identification number (TIN) and value added tax (VAT) registration, work permit issuance, power and utilities connections, capital and profit repatriation, and environment clearance. In 2019 Bangladesh made reforms in three key areas: starting a business, getting electricity, and getting credit. BIDA offers 56 services under its OSS as of February 2022and has a plan to expand to 154 services covering 35 agencies. The GOB is also planning to integrate the services of all four investment promotion agencies under a single online platform. Progress on realizing a comprehensive OSS for businesses has been slowed by bureaucratic delays and a lack of interagency coordination. Companies can register their businesses at the Office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms (RJSC): www.roc.gov.bd . However, the online business registration process, while improving, can at times be unclear and inconsistent. Additionally, BIDA facilitates company registration services as part of its OSS, which is available at: https://bidaquickserv.org . BIDA also facilitates other services including office set-up approval, work permits for foreign employees, environmental clearance, outward remittance approval, and tax registration with National Board of Revenue. Other agencies with which a company must typically register are: City Corporation – Trade License. National Board of Revenue – Tax & VAT Registration. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments – Employment of Workers Notification. It takes approximately 20 days to start a business in the country according to the World Bank. The company registration process at the RJSC generally takes one or two days to complete. The process for trade licensing, tax registration, and VAT registration required as of 2021 seven days, one day, and one week respectively. Outward foreign direct investment is generally restricted through the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947. As a result, the Bangladesh Bank plays a key role in limiting outbound investment. In September 2015, the government amended the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947 by adding a “conditional provision” that permits outbound investment for export-related enterprises. Private sector contacts note the few international investments approved by the Bangladesh Bank have been limited to large exporting companies with international experience. However, the government is considering an overseas investment guideline to allow outbound investment opportunities for local exporters and any company operating in the domestic market for 10 years. This will allow local companies and NGOs with outbound investments to enlist in foreign stock markets. However, Bangladesh’s total outbound investment in a single fiscal year would be capped at 5 percent of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves for that fiscal year under the regulation being considered. Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) has been working to formulate a workable policy regarding this since 2016. 3. Legal Regime Since 1989, the government has gradually moved to decrease regulatory obstruction of private business. Various chambers of commerce have called for privatization and for a greater voice for the private sector in government decisions, but at the same time many chambers support protectionism and subsidies for their own industries. The result is policy and regulations which are often unclear, inconsistent, or little publicized. Registration and regulatory processes are frequently alleged by businesses to be used as rent-seeking opportunities. The major rule-making and regulatory authority exists at the national level under each Ministry with many final decisions being made at the top-most levels, including the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The PMO is actively engaged in directing policies, as well as foreign investment in government-controlled projects. Bangladesh has made incremental progress in using information technology both to improve the transparency and efficiency of some government services and develop independent agencies to regulate the energy and telecommunication sectors. Some investors cited government laws, regulations, and lack of implementation as impediments to investment. The government has historically limited opportunities for the private sector to comment on proposed regulations. In 2009, Bangladesh adopted the Right to Information Act providing for multilevel stakeholder consultations through workshops or media outreach. Although the consultation process exists, it is still weak and in need of further improvement. The Environment Conservation Act 1995 (ECA ’95) as amended in 2010 and the Biodiversity Act of 2018 are the main acts governing environmental protection in Bangladesh. The ECA ’95 replaced the earlier environment pollution control ordinance of 1992 and provides the legal basis for Environment Conservation Rules, 1997 (ECR’97). The objective of the Biodiversity Act is equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of biological resources. The main objectives of ECA’95 are conservation of the natural environment, improvement of environmental standards, and control and mitigation of environmental pollution. According to the act, all industrial projects require before being undertaken an Environmental Clearance Certificate from the Director General. In issuing the certificate, the projects are classified into the following four categories – Green, Orange-A, Orange-B, and Red. Environmental Clearance for the Green category is through a comparatively simple procedure. In the case of Orange-A, Orange-B and Red Categories, site clearance is mandatory at the beginning, then Environmental Impact Assessment approval and finally Environmental Clearance is issued. The Environment Clearance is to be renewed after three years for the Green category and one year for Orange-A, Orange-B and Red categories. Red Category projects require an Environmental Impact Statement prior to approval. Ministries and regulatory agencies do not generally publish or solicit comments on draft proposed legislation or regulations. However, several government organizations, including the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank), Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission, BIDA, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission have occasionally posted draft legislation and regulations online and solicited feedback from the business community. In some instances, parliamentary committees have also reached out to relevant stakeholders for input on draft legislation. The media continues to be the main information source for the public on many draft proposals. There is also no legal obligation to publish proposed regulations, consider alternatives to proposed regulation, or solicit comments from the general public. The government printing office, The Bangladesh Government Press ( http://www.dpp.gov.bd/bgpress/ ), publishes the “Bangladesh Gazette” every Thursday and Extraordinary Gazettes as and when needed. The Gazette provides official notice of government actions, including issuance of government rules and regulations and the transfer and promotion of government employees. Laws can also be accessed at http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/ . Bangladesh passed the Financial Reporting Act of 2015 which created the Financial Reporting Council in 2016 aimed at establishing transparency and accountability in the accounting and auditing system. The country follows Bangladesh Accounting Standards and Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards, which are largely derived from International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards. However, the quality of reporting varies widely. Internationally known firms have begun establishing local offices in Bangladesh and their presence is positively influencing the accounting norms in the country. Some firms can provide financial reports audited to international standards while others maintain unreliable (or multiple) sets of accounting records. Regulatory agencies do not conduct impact assessments for proposed regulations; consequently, regulations are often not reviewed based on data-driven assessments. Not all national budget documents are prepared according to internationally accepted standards. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) aims to integrate regional regulatory systems among Bangladesh, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. However, efforts to advance regional cooperation measures have stalled in recent years and regulatory systems remain uncoordinated. Local laws are based on the English common law system but most fall short of international standards. The country’s regulatory system remains weak and many of the laws and regulations are not enforced and standards are not maintained. Bangladesh has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. WTO requires all signatories to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) to establish a National Inquiry Point and Notification Authority to gather and efficiently distribute trade-related regulatory, standards, and conformity assessment information to the WTO Member community. The Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institute (BSTI) has been working as the National Enquiry Point for the WTO-TBT Agreement since 2002. There is an internal committee on WTO affairs in BSTI and it participates in notifying WTO activities through the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industries. General Contact for WTO-TBT National Enquiry Point: Email: bsti_std@bangla.net; bsti_ad@bangla.net Website: http://www.bsti.gov.bd/ Focal Point for TBT: Mr. Md. Golam Baki,Deputy Director (Certification Marks), BSTI Email: bakibsti@gmail.comTel: +88-02-48116665Cell: +8801799828826, +8801712240702 Focal Point for other WTO related matters, except sanitary and phytosanitary systems: Mr. Md. Hafizur Rahman,Director General, WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce Email: dg.wto@mincom.gov.bdTel: +880-2-9545383Cell: +88 0171 1861056 Mr. Mohammad Ileas Mia,Director-1, WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce Email: director1.wto@mincom.gov.bdTel: +880-2-9540580Cell: +88 01786698321 Bangladesh is a common law-based jurisdiction. Many of the basic laws, such as the penal code, civil and criminal procedural codes, contract law, and company law are influenced by English common law. However, family laws, such as laws relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, and inheritance are based on religious scripts and therefore differ among religious communities. The Bangladeshi legal system is based on a written constitution and the laws often take statutory forms that are enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the higher courts. Ordinarily, executive authorities and statutory corporations cannot make any law, but can make by-laws to the extent authorized by the legislature. Such subordinate legislation is known as rules or regulations and is also enforceable by the courts. However, as a common law system, the statutes are short and set out basic rights and responsibilities but are elaborated by the courts in the application and interpretation of those laws. The Bangladeshi judiciary acts through: (1) The Superior Judiciary, having appellate, revision, and original jurisdiction; and (2) The Sub-Ordinate Judiciary, having original jurisdiction. Since 1971, Bangladesh has updated its legal system concerning company, banking, bankruptcy, and money loan court laws, and other commercial laws. An important impediment to investment in Bangladesh is its weak and slow legal system in which the enforceability of contracts is uncertain. The judicial system does not provide for interest to be charged in tort judgments, which means procedural delays carry no penalties. Bangladesh does not have a separate court or court division dedicated solely to commercial cases. The Joint District Judge court (a civil court) is responsible for enforcing contracts. Some notable commercial laws include: The Contract Act, 1872 (Act No. IX of 1930). The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Act No. III of 1930). The Partnership Act, 1932 (Act No. IX of 1932). The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. XXVI of 1881). The Bankruptcy Act, 1997 (Act No. X of 1997). The Arbitration Act, 2001 (Act No. I of 2001). The judicial system of Bangladesh has never been completely independent from interference by the executive branch of the government. In a significant milestone, the government in 2007 separated the country’s judiciary from the executive but the executive retains strong influence over the judiciary through control of judicial appointments. Other pillars of the justice system, including the police, courts, and legal profession, are also closely aligned with the executive branch. In lower courts, corruption is widely perceived as a serious problem. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable under the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Major laws affecting foreign investment include: the Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1980, the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority Act of 1980, the Companies Act of 1994, the Telecommunications Act of 2001, and the Bangladesh Economic Zones Act of 2010. Bangladesh industrial policy offers incentives for “green” (environmental) high-tech or “transformative” industries. It allows foreigners who invest $1 million or transfer $2 million to a recognized financial institution to apply for Bangladeshi citizenship. The GOB will provide financial and policy support for high-priority industries (those creating large-scale employment and earning substantial export revenue) and creative industries – architecture, arts and antiques, fashion design, film and video, interactive laser software, software, and computer and media programming. Specific importance is given to agriculture and food processing, RMG, ICT and software, pharmaceuticals, leather and leather products, and jute and jute goods. In addition, Petrobangla, the state-owned oil and gas company, has modified its production sharing agreement contract for offshore gas exploration to include an option to export gas. In 2019, Parliament approved the Bangladesh Flag Vessels (Protection) Act 2019 with a provision to ensure Bangladeshi flagged vessels carry at least 50 percent of foreign cargo, up from 40 percent. In 2020, the Ministry of Commerce amended the digital commerce policy to allow fully foreign-owned e-commerce companies in Bangladesh and remove a previous joint venture requirement. The One Stop Service (OSS) Act of 2018 mandated the four IPAs to provide OSS to local and foreign investors in their respective jurisdictions. The move aims to facilitate business services on behalf of multiple government agencies to improve ease of doing business. In 2020, BIDA issued time-bound rules to implement the Act of 2018. Although the IPAs have started to offer a few services under the OSS, corruption and excessive bureaucracy have held back the complete and effective roll out of the OSS. BIDA has a “one-stop” website that provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors at: http://www.bida.gov.bd/ . Aside from information on relevant business laws and licenses, the website includes information on Bangladesh’s investment climate, opportunities for businesses, potential sectors, and how to do business in Bangladesh. The website also has an eService Portal for Investors which provides services such as visa recommendations for foreign investors, approval/extension of work permits for expatriates, approval of foreign borrowing, and approval/renewal of branch/liaison and representative offices. Bangladesh formed an independent agency in 2011 called the “Bangladesh Competition Commission (BCC)” under the Ministry of Commerce. Parliament then passed the Competition Act in 2012. However, the BCC has not received sufficient resources to operate effectively. In 2018, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) finalized Significant Market Power (SMP) regulations to promote competition in the industry. In 2019, BTRC declared the country’s largest telecom operator, Grameenphone (GP), the first SMP based on its revenue share of more than 50 percent and customer shares of about 47 percent. Since the declaration, the BTRC has attempted to impose restrictions on GP’s operations, which GP has challenged in the judicial system. Since the Foreign Investment Act of 1980 banned nationalization or expropriation without adequate compensation, Bangladesh has not nationalized or expropriated property from foreign investors. In the years immediately following independence in 1971, widespread nationalization resulted in government ownership of more than 90 percent of fixed assets in the modern manufacturing sector, including the textile, jute and sugar industries and all banking and insurance interests, except those in foreign (but non-Pakistani) hands. However, the government has taken steps to privatize many of these industries since the late 1970s and the private sector has developed into a main driver of the country’s sustained economic growth. Many laws affecting investment in Bangladesh are outdated. Bankruptcy laws, which apply mainly to individual insolvency, are sometimes disregarded in business cases because of the numerous falsified assets and uncollectible cross-indebtedness supporting insolvent banks and companies. A Bankruptcy Act was passed by Parliament in 1997 but has been ineffective in addressing these issues. Some bankruptcy cases fall under the Money Loan Court Act-2003 which has more stringent and timely procedures. 4. Industrial Policies Current regulations permit a tax holiday for designated “thrust” (strategic) sectors and infrastructure projects established between July 1, 2019 and June 30, 2024. The thrust sectors enjoy tax exemptions graduated from 90 percent to 20 percent over a period of five to ten years depending on the zone where the business is established. Industries set up in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are also eligible for tax holidays. Details of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives are available on the following websites: BIDA: http://bida.gov.bd/?page_id=146 BEPZA: https://www.bepza.gov.bd/content/incentives-facilities BEZA: https://www.beza.gov.bd/investing-in-zones/incentive-package/ Strategic sectors eligible for tax exemptions include: certain pharmaceuticals, automobile manufacturing, contraceptives, rubber latex, chemicals or dyes, certain electronics, bicycles, fertilizer, biotechnology, commercial boilers, certain brickmaking technologies, compressors, computer hardware, home appliances, insecticides, pesticides, petrochemicals, fruit and vegetable processing, textile machinery, tissue grafting, tire manufacturing industries, agricultural machineries, furniture, leather and leather goods, cell phones, plastic recycling, and toy manufacturing. Eligible physical infrastructure projects are allowed tax exemptions graduated from 90 percent to 20 percent over a period of 10 years. Physical infrastructure projects eligible for exemptions include deep seaports, elevated expressways, road overpasses, toll roads and bridges, EPZs, gas pipelines, information technology parks, industrial waste and water treatment facilities, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, electricity transmission, rapid transit projects, renewable energy projects, and ports. Independent non-coal fired power plants (IPPs) commencing production after January 1, 2015 are granted a 100 percent tax exemption for five years, a 50 percent exemption for years six to eight, and a 25 percent exemption for years nine to 10. For new coal-fired IPPs commencing production before June 30, 2023 (provided operators contracted with the government before June 30, 2020), the tax exemption rate is 100 percent for the first 15 years of operations. For power projects, import duties are waived for imports of capital machinery and spare parts. The valued-added tax (VAT) rate on exports is zero. For companies exporting only, duties are waived on imports of capital machinery and spare parts. For companies primarily exporting (80 percent of production and above), an import duty rate of 1 percent is charged for imports of capital machinery and spare parts identified and listed in notifications to relevant regulators. Import duties are also waived for EPZ industries and other export-oriented industries for imports of raw materials consumed in production. The GOB provides special incentives to encourage non-resident Bangladeshis to invest in the country. Incentives include the ability to buy newly issued shares and debentures in Bangladeshi companies. Further, non-resident Bangladeshis can maintain foreign currency deposits in Non-resident Foreign Currency Deposit (NFCD) accounts. In the past several years, U.S. companies have experienced difficulties securing the investment incentives initially offered by Bangladesh. Several companies have reported instances where infrastructure guarantees (ranging from electricity to gas connections) are not fully delivered or tax exemptions are delayed, either temporarily or indefinitely. These challenges are not specific to U.S. or foreign companies and reflect broader challenges in the business environment. Bangladesh government does not provide any specific incentives for businesses owned by women. In 2020, the Government of Bangladesh established that all power generation companies will enjoy full tax exemption with the exception of coal-based generation. This incentive will be available to all power generation companies who start operation before December 31, 2022. The government is seeking to increase use of renewable energy and has offered incentives such as tax breaks for net-metered solar rooftop installation. Under the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority Act of 1980, the government established the first EPZ in Chattogram in 1983. Additional EPZs now operate in Dhaka (Savar), Mongla, Ishwardi, Cumilla, Uttara, Karnaphuli (Chattogram), and Adamjee (Dhaka). Korean investors are also operating a separate and private EPZ in Chattogram. Joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned investments, and wholly Bangladeshi-owned companies are all permitted to operate and enjoy equal treatment in the EPZs. In 2010, Bangladesh enacted the Special Economic Zone Act allowing for the creation of privately owned SEZs to produce for export and domestic markets. The SEZs provide special fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to domestic and foreign investors in designated underdeveloped areas throughout Bangladesh. 5. Protection of Property Rights Although land, whether for purchase or lease, is often critical for investment and as security against loans, antiquated real property laws and poor record-keeping systems can complicate land and property transactions. Instruments take effect from the date of execution, not the date of registration, so a bona fide purchaser can often be uncertain of title. Land registration records have been historically prone to competing claims. Land disputes are common, and both U.S. companies and citizens have filed complaints about fraudulent land sales. For example, sellers fraudulently claiming ownership have transferred land to good faith purchasers while the actual owners were living outside of Bangladesh. In other instances, U.S.-Bangladeshi dual citizens have purchased land from legitimate owners only to have third parties make fraudulent claims of title to extort settlement compensation. A 2015 study by leading Bangladeshi think tank Policy Research Institute (PRI) revealed one in seven households in the country faced land disputes. Bangladesh ranks 184 among 190 countries for ease of registering property in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 Report. While property owners can obtain mortgages, parties generally avoid registering mortgages, liens, and encumbrances due to the high cost of stamp duties (i.e., transaction taxes based on property value) and other charges. There are also concerns that non-registered mortgages are often unenforceable. Article 42 of the Bangladesh Constitution guarantees a right to property for all citizens, but property rights are often not protected due to a weak judicial system. The Transfer of Property Act of 1882 and the Registration Act of 1908 are the two main laws regulating transfer of property in Bangladesh but these laws have no specific provisions covering foreign and/or non-resident investors. Currently, foreigners and non-residents can incorporate a company with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms. The company would be considered a local entity and would be able to buy land in its name. Intellectual property rights (IPR) and rights enforcement is not a priority for the Government of Bangladesh and it has not invested heavily in IPR protection. As a result, counterfeit goods are readily available in Bangladesh, and a significant portion of business software is pirated. Several U.S. firms, including fast-moving consumer goods manufacturers, film studios, pharmaceutical products, apparel goods, and software firms, have reported systematic violations of their IPRs. Investors note police are willing to investigate counterfeit goods producers when informed but are unlikely to initiate independent investigations. The Government of Bangladesh has recently taken steps to develop its IP system. In February 2021, the Cabinet gave its final approval of a draft Bangladesh Patents Bill and in-principal approval of a draft Bangladesh Industry-Designs Bill to replace the Patents and Designs Act 1911. The bills aim to make necessary updates to existing regulations and improve IPR in Bangladesh. However, as of March 2022 the potential impact of the bills remains uncertain because the government had yet to make the drafts public for stakeholder review. The bills require approval by the Parliament before going into effect. A National IP policy was developed in 2018 but has not been fully implemented. Public awareness of IPR is slowly growing through efforts from industry associations like the Intellectual Property Rights Association of Bangladesh, AMCHAM, Bangladesh, and REACT. Bangladesh is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and acceded to the Paris Convention on Intellectual Property in 1991. Bangladesh has slowly made progress toward bringing its legislative framework into compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The government enacted a Copyright Law in 2000 (amended in 2005), a Trademarks Act in 2009, and a Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act in 2013, in addition to the recent action on bills replacing the Patents and Designs Act. Several government agencies are empowered to act against counterfeiting, including the National Board of Revenue (NBR), Customs, Mobile Courts, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and the Bangladesh Police. However, enforcement agencies do not have appropriate resources nor are given the appropriate attention or priority to execute complaints filed by IP right holders. Accordingly, enforcement actions such as raids and seizures have become costly, time-consuming, and often nonproductive. In a positive development, in December 2019, the National Board of Revenue implemented the Intellectual Property Rights of Receipts of Imports: Rules of Implementation 2018. The rules intend to help stakeholders, though the bond requirement, for taking any enforcement action is a concern for the stakeholders. As per Rule 5 of the Intellectual Property Rights (Imported Goods) Enforcement Rules,2007, Industry is required to execute a specific bond of an amount equal to 110 percent of the value of the goods and furnish security in the form of a Bank Guarantee of an amount equal to 25 percent of the bond value within three days from date of confiscation of the goods. It is an issue as it is challenging to get all internal approval and get the bond executed within three days. Secondly, the bond is on hold until the case is disposed of, and thirdly it isn’t easy to do the valuation of a product. The Department of National Consumer Rights Protection (DNCRP) is charged with tracking and reporting on counterfeit goods, and the NBR/Customs tracks counterfeit goods seizures at ports of entry. However, reports are not publicly available. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: John Cabeca Intellectual Property Counselor for South Asia U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Foreign Commercial Service email: john.cabeca@trade.gov website: https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-attache-program tel: +91-11-2347-2000 For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector remains highly dependent on bank lending. Current regulatory infrastructure inhibits the development of a tradeable bond market. Bangladesh is home to the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), both of which are regulated by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), a statutory body formed in 1993 and attached to the Ministry of Finance. The DSE market capitalization stood at $64.8 billion at the end of January 2022, rising 16.3 percent year-over-year as stock prices rose amid speculative behavior and increased liquidity due to relaxed monetary policy. Although the Bangladeshi government has a positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investors, participation in the exchanges remains low due to what is still limited liquidity for shares and the lack of publicly available and reliable company information. The DSE has attracted some foreign portfolio investors to the country’s capital market. However, the volume of foreign investment in Bangladesh remains a small fraction of total market capitalization. As a result, foreign portfolio investment has had limited influence on market trends and Bangladesh’s capital markets have been largely insulated from the volatility of international financial markets. Bangladeshi markets continue to rely primarily on domestic investors. In 2019, BSEC undertook a number of initiatives to launch derivatives products, allow short selling, and invigorate the bond market. To this end, BSEC introduced three rules: Exchange Traded Derivatives Rules 2019, Short-Sale Rules 2019, and Investment Sukuk Rules 2019. Other recent, notable BSEC initiatives include forming a central clearing and settlement company – the Central Counterparty Bangladesh Limited (CCBL) – and promoting private equity and venture capital firms under the 2015 Alternative Investment Rules. In 2013, BSEC became a full signatory of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Memorandum of Understanding. BSEC has taken steps to improve regulatory oversight, including installing a modern surveillance system, the “Instant Market Watch,” providing real time connectivity with exchanges and depository institutions. As a result, the market abuse detection capabilities of BSEC have improved significantly. A mandatory Corporate Governance Code for listed companies was introduced in 2012 but the overall quality of corporate governance remains substandard. Demutualization of both the DSE and CSE was completed in 2013 to separate ownership of the exchanges from trading rights. A majority of the members of the Demutualization Board, including the Chairman, are independent directors. Apart from this, a separate tribunal has been established to resolve capital market-related criminal cases expeditiously. However, both domestic and foreign investor confidence on the stock exchanges’ governance standards remains low. The Demutualization Act 2013 also directed DSE to pursue a strategic investor who would acquire a 25 percent stake in the bourse. Through a bidding process DSE selected a consortium of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in China as its strategic partner, with the consortium buying the 25 percent share of DSE for taka 9.47 billion ($112.7 million). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh is an Article VIII member and maintains restrictions on the unapproved exchange, conversion, and/or transfer of proceeds of international transactions into non-resident taka-denominated accounts. Since 2015, authorities have relaxed restrictions by allowing some debits of balances in such accounts for outward remittances, but there is currently no established timetable for the complete removal of the restrictions. The Bangladesh Bank (BB) acts as the central bank of Bangladesh. It was established through the enactment of the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. General supervision and strategic direction of the BB has been entrusted to a nine-member Board of Directors, which is headed by the BB Governor. A list of the bank’s departments and branches is on its website: https://www.bb.org.bd/aboutus/dept/depts.php . According to the BB, four types of banks operate in the formal financial system: State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), Specialized Banks, Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), and Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs). Some 61 “scheduled” banks in Bangladesh operate under the control and supervision of the central bank as per the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. The scheduled banks, include six SOCBs, three specialized government banks established for specific objectives such as agricultural or industrial development or expatriates’ welfare, 43 PCBs, and nine FCBs as of February 2021. The scheduled banks are licensed to operate under the Bank Company Act of 1991 (Amended 2013). There are also five non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh, including Nobel Prize recipient Grameen Bank, established for special and definite objectives and operating under legislation enacted to meet those objectives. Currently, 34 non-bank financial institutions (FIs) are operating in Bangladesh. They are regulated under the Financial Institution Act, 1993 and controlled by the BB. Of these, two are fully government-owned, one is a subsidiary of a state-owned commercial bank, and the rest are private financial institutions. Major sources of funds for these financial institutions are term deposits (at least three months’ tenure), credit facilities from banks and other financial institutions, and call money, as well as bonds and securitization. Unlike banks, FIs are prohibited from: Issuing checks, pay-orders, or demand drafts. Receiving demand deposits. Involvement in foreign exchange financing. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain the dominant players in rural financial markets. The Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), the primary regulator of this sector, oversees 746 licensed microfinance institutions as of October 2021, excluding Grameen Bank which is governed under a separate law. In 2020, the MRA-listed microfinance institutions had 33.3 million members while Grameen Bank had an additional 9.3 million members. The banking sector has had a mixed record of performance over the past several years. Industry experts have reported a rise in risky assets because of poor governance as well as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total domestic credit stood at 50.4 percent of gross domestic product at end of November 2021. The state-owned Sonali Bank is the largest bank in the country while Islami Bank Bangladesh and Standard Chartered Bangladesh are the largest local private and foreign banks respectively. The gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was 8.1 percent at the end of September 2021, down from 8.9 percent in September 2020. However, the decline in the NPLs was primarily caused by regulatory forbearance rather than actual reduction of stressed loans. At 20.1 percent SCBs had the highest NPL ratio, followed by 11.4 percent of Specialized Banks, 5.5 percent of PCBs, and4.1 percent of FCBs as of September 2021. In 2017, the BB issued a circular warning citizens and financial institutions about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies. The circular noted that using cryptocurrencies may violate existing money laundering and terrorist financing regulations and cautioned users may incur financial losses. The BB issued similar warnings against cryptocurrencies in 2014. Foreign investors may open temporary bank accounts called Non-Resident Taka Accounts (NRTA) in the proposed company name without prior approval from the BB to receive incoming capital remittances and encashment certificates. Once the proposed company is registered, it can open a new account to transfer capital from the NRTA account. Branch, representative, or liaison offices of foreign companies can open bank accounts to receive initial suspense payments from headquarters without opening NRTA accounts. In 2019, the BB relaxed regulations on the types of bank branches foreigners could use to open NRTAs, removing a previous requirement limiting use of NRTA’s solely to Authorized Dealers (ADs). In 2015, the Bangladesh Finance Ministry announced it was exploring establishing a sovereign wealth fund in which to invest a portion of Bangladesh’s foreign currency reserves. In 2017, the Cabinet initially approved a $10 billion “Bangladesh Sovereign Wealth Fund,” (BSWF) to be created with funds from excess foreign exchange reserves but the plan was subsequently scrapped by the Finance Ministry. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The business community is increasingly aware of and engaged in responsible business conduct (RBC) activities with multinational firms leading the way. While many firms in Bangladesh fall short on RBC activities and instead often focus on philanthropic giving, some of the leading local conglomerates have begun to incorporate increasingly rigorous environmental and safety standards in their workplaces. U.S. companies present in Bangladesh maintain diverse RBC activities. Consumers in Bangladesh are generally less aware of RBC, and consumers and shareholders exert little pressure on companies to engage in RBC activities. While many international firms are aware of OECD guidelines and international best practices concerning RBC, many local firms have limited familiarity with international standards. There are currently two RBC NGOs active in Bangladesh: CSR Bangladesh: CSR Centre Bangladesh: Along with the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, the CSR Centre is the joint focal point for the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and its corporate social responsibility principles in Bangladesh. The UN Global Compact is the world’s largest corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative. The Centre is a member of a regional RBC platform called the South Asian Network on Sustainability and Responsibility, with members including Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. While several NGOs have proposed National Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines, the government has yet to adopt any such standards for RBC. As a result, the government encourages enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles but does not mandate any specific guidelines. Bangladesh has natural resources, but it has not joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The country does not adhere to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world. The government established the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) to address the adverse effects of climate change. In this plan, 44 programs under six thematic areas were identified. The Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) was created in 2010 from the Government’s own revenue sources to combat climate change impacts as well as to implement the BCCSAP. The BCCTF has funded $449.3M in approximately 800 projects to implement key aspects of the BCCSAP. Taking into account the challenges of environment, environment and biodiversity conservation and management, the government has finalized the National Environment Policy 2018 and published it in 2019 with the aim of developing the overall environmental conservation management of the country. The Department of Environment, under the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, has adopted a “blue-economy” action plan to conserve marine environment, prevent marine pollution, ensure environmental management, and conserve marine and coastal biodiversity while ensuring marine resource extraction and mainstream development activities. Bangladesh aims to reach 30 percent renewable energy by 2030 and at least 40 percent by 2041. Bangladesh launched the Mujib Climate Prosperity Plan (MCPP) in November 2021. The MCPP is built on the foundation of the Eighth Five Year Plan (2021-2025) and shifts Bangladesh’s trajectory from one of vulnerability to resilience and then prosperity. The plan highlights engagement with domestic implementation partners including the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Authority and the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA). The MCPP expects investment opportunities of approximately $80 billion in resilient projects in energy, water, transport, supply chains and value chains. Optimized finance structures to attract FDI and mobilize domestic private sector capital include the use of public private partnerships as a key solution to climate investment with the PPP Authority. The Bangladesh Bank can use different tools to incentivize investment in low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure. The MCPP further outlines opportunities for technology-transfer partnerships and building manufacturing capacity in Bangladesh including in areas such as green hydrogen, solar, electric vehicles, modernized power grid and other resilient infrastructure. According to a BloombergNEF’s Climatescope report, in 2021 Bangladesh ranked 24 among 109 countries as an emerging attractive market for energy transition investment. Bangladesh ranks 69th in the MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index. The overall ranking shows the performance of the economies relative to each other and aggregates scores generated across the following five pillars: carbon emissions, energy transition, green society, clean innovation and climate policy. In the Global Green Growth Institute’s Global Green Growth Index, Bangladesh Ranked 18th among 33 Asian countries. This index measures sustainability targets for four green growth dimensions – efficient and sustainable resource use, natural capital protection, green economic opportunities, and social inclusion. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a serious impediment to investment and economic growth in Bangladesh. While the government has established legislation to combat bribery, embezzlement, and other forms of corruption, enforcement is inconsistent. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is the main institutional anti-corruption watchdog. With amendments to the Money Laundering Prevention Act, the ACC is no longer the sole authority to probe money-laundering offenses. Although it still has primary authority for bribery and corruption, other agencies will now investigate related offenses, including: The Bangladesh Police (Criminal Investigation Department) – Most predicate offenses. The National Board of Revenue – VAT, taxation, and customs offenses. The Department of Narcotics Control – drug related offenses. The current Awami League-led government has publicly underscored its commitment to fighting corruption and reaffirmed the need for a strong ACC, but opposition parties claim the ACC is used by the government to harass political opponents. Efforts to ease public procurement rules and a recent constitutional amendment diminishing the independence of the ACC may undermine institutional safeguards against corruption. Bangladesh is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention but has not joined the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Officials. Corruption is common in public procurement, tax and customs collection, and among regulatory authorities. Corruption, including bribery, raises the costs and risks of doing business. By some estimates, off-the-record payments by firms may result in an annual reduction of two to three percent of GDP. Corruption has a corrosive impact on the broader business climate market and opportunities for U.S. companies in Bangladesh. It also deters investment, stifles economic growth and development, distorts prices, and undermines the rule of law. Mohammad Moinuddin AbdullahChairmanAnti-Corruption Commission, Bangladesh1, Segun Bagicha, Dhaka 1000+88-02-8333350 chairman@acc.org.bd Contact at “watchdog” organization: Mr. Iftekharuzzaman Executive Director Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) MIDAS Centre (Level 4 & 5), House-5, Road-16 (New) 27 (Old) Dhanmondi, Dhaka -1209+880 2 912 4788 / 4789 / 4792 edtib@ti-bangladesh.org, info@ti-bangladesh.org, advocacy@ti-bangladesh.org 10. Political and Security Environment Prime Minister Hasina’s ruling Awami League party won 289 parliamentary seats out of 300 in a December 30, 2018 election marred by wide-spread vote-rigging, ballot-box stuffing and intimidation. Intimidation, harassment, and violence during the pre-election period made it difficult for many opposition candidates and their supporters to meet, hold rallies, and/or campaign freely. The clashes between rival political parties and general strikes that previously characterized the political environment in Bangladesh have become far less frequent in the wake of the Awami League’s increasing dominance and crackdown on dissent. Many civil society groups have expressed concern about the trend toward a one-party state and the marginalization of all political opposition groups. Americans are advised to exercise increased caution due to crime and terrorism when traveling to Bangladesh. Travel in some areas have higher risks. For further information, see the State Department’s travel website for the Worldwide Caution, Travel Advisories, and Bangladesh Country Specific Information. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Bangladesh’s comparative advantage in cheap labor for manufacturing is partially offset by lower productivity due to poor skills development, inefficient management, pervasive corruption, and inadequate infrastructure. According to the 2016-2017 Labor Force Survey, 85 percent of the Bangladeshi labor force is employed in the informal economy. Bangladeshi workers have a strong reputation for hard work, entrepreneurial spirit, and a positive and optimistic attitude. With an average age of 26 years, the country boasts one of the largest and youngest labor forces in the world. However, training is not well aligned with labor demand. Bangladesh’s labor laws specify acceptable employment conditions, working hours, minimum wage levels, leave policies, health and sanitary conditions, and compensation for injured workers. Freedom of association and the right to join unions are guaranteed in the constitution. In practice, however, compliance and enforcement of labor laws are weak, and companies frequently discourage or prevent formation of worker-led labor unions, preferring pro-factory management unions. In a notable exception to the national labor law, Export Processing Zones (EPZs) do not allow trade unions and heavily restrict other labor activity normally permitted under the broader Bangladesh Labor Act. The EPZ labor law does allow worker welfare associations, to which 74 percent of workers belong, according to the government. Since two back-to-back tragedies killed over 1,250 workers – the Tazreen Fashions fire in 2012 and the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013 – Bangladesh made significant progress in garment factory fire and structural safety remediation, thanks mostly to two Western brand-led initiatives, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance), comprised of North American brands, and the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Accord), which was formed by European brands. Major accidents and workplace deaths in the garment sector dropped precipitously as a result – only four workers died in 2021. Monitoring and remediation of RMG factories exporting to non-Western countries was overseen by the government, with assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) under the National Initiative. By 2021, fewer than half the factories under the National Initiative had completed initial remediation of safety issues, and both the Alliance and Accord had closed their Bangladesh operations. North American brands continued to monitor manufacturers’ safety maintenance and training through a new organization, Nirapon. The Accord, under High Court order, transitioned its staff and operations to the newly formed RMG Sustainability Council (RSC), overseen by a board consisting of manufacturers, brands, and worker representatives. The government has announced plans to form an Industrial Safety Unit to oversee factory safety in National Initiative garment factories as well as all manufacturing. On July 8, 2021, a devastating fire at the Hashem Foods Factory Ltd took the lives of 54 workers including 19 children. In the wake of the fire on July 15, the Prime Minister’s Office announced the formation of a 24-member national committee led by the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) and headed by the Prime Minister’s Private Sector Advisor Salman Rahman. The committee prioritized 32 industrial sectors considering their propensity for and likelihood of accidents. BIDA announced in December 2021 it would produce a sector-wide report after analyzing the inspection data and will take steps to enforce workplace safety compliance in the non-export sectors. The U.S. government suspended Bangladesh’s access to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) over labor rights violations following a six-year formal review conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative. The decision, announced in 2013 in the months following the Rana Plaza collapse, was accompanied by a 16-point GSP Action Plan to help start Bangladesh’s path to reinstatement of the trade benefits. While some progress was made in the intervening years, several key issues have not been adequately addressed. Despite revisions intended to make Bangladesh more compliant with international labor standards, the Bangladesh Labor Act (BLA) and EPZ Labor Act (ELA) still restrict the freedom of association and formation of unions and maintain separate administrative systems for workers inside and outside of export processing zones. Under the current BLA, legally registered unions are entitled to submit charters of demands and bargain collectively with employers, but this has rarely occurred in practice. The government counts nearly 1,000 registered trade unions, but labor leaders estimate there are fewer than 100 active trade unions in the country’s dominant sector, RMG, and only 30 to 40 are capable enough to negotiate with owners. The law provides criminal penalties for conducting unfair labor practices such as retaliation against union members for exercising their legal rights, but charges are rarely brought against employers and the labor courts have a large backlog of cases. Labor organizations reported most workers did not exercise their rights to form unions, attend meetings, or bargain collectively due to fear of reprisal. From January to December 2021, a total of 6 workers died and 163 were injured due to police interference and about 137 of them belonged to the garment sector. The garment sector is reeling from the skilled labor crisis and missing opportunities to secure new orders from eager buyers coming to Bangladesh to procure garments after COVID-19-related factory closures in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma. The local apparel industry has long courted buyers who historically have sourced from other countries to buy from Bangladesh producers. However, in 2020, at the peak of Covid-19, Bangladesh apparel industries furloughed around 357,000 workers; following lockdown restrictions, the sector re-hired just a handful of the workers. Some of those furloughed returned to their villages and others switched to new professions. Industry groups are focusing on developing automation technologies and processes to boost productivity and increase production capacity. The labor law differentiates between layoffs and terminations; no severance is paid if a worker is fired for misconduct. In the case of downsizing or “retrenchment,” workers must be notified and paid 30 days’ wages for each year of service. The law requires factories and establishments to notify Bangladesh’s Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments a week prior to temporarily laying off workers due to a shortage of work or material. Laid off workers are entitled to their full housing allowance. For the first 45 days, they are also entitled to half their basic wages, then 25 percent thereafter. Workers who were employed for less than one year are not eligible for compensation during a layoff. However, the press and trade unions report employers not only fail to pay workers their severance or benefits, but also their regular wages. In 2021 alone, workers and organizers staged 172 labor protests in the garment sector over back wages, factory layoffs, and demands to reopen closed factories. No unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs exist, although the government had begun discussing how to establish them with the help of development partners and brands. In early 2022, the Government of Bangladesh announced a universal pension scheme from fiscal year (FY) 2022-23. The government does not consistently and effectively enforce applicable labor laws. For example, the law establishes mechanisms for conciliation, arbitration, and dispute resolution by a labor court and workers in a collective bargaining union have the right to strike in the event of a failure to reach a settlement. In practice, few strikers followed the cumbersome and time-consuming legal requirements for settlements and strikes or walkouts often occur spontaneously. The government was partnered with the ILO to introduce a dispute settlement system within its Department of Labor. The BLA guarantees workers the right to conduct lawful strikes, but with many limitations. For example, the government may prohibit a strike deemed to pose a “serious hardship to the community” and may terminate any strike lasting more than 30 days. The BLA also prohibits strikes at factories in the first three years of commercial production, and at factories controlled by foreign investors. The U.S. government funds efforts to improve occupational safety and health alongside labor rights in the readymade garment sector in partnership with other international partners, civil society, businesses, and the Bangladeshi government. The United States works with other governments and the International Labor Organization (ILO) to discuss and assist with additional labor reforms needed to fully comply with international labor conventions. In early 2021, the government submitted a draft action plan to the EU and ILO describing how it planned to bring its laws and practices into compliance with international labor standards over time. In February 2022, the government submitted the progress report to ILO and the report will be discussed in the ILO Governing Body on March 21. The U.S. government is closely monitoring the development and implementation of the plan to ensure it sufficiently addresses long-standing recommendations. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020-21 $354,242 2020 $323,057 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020-21 $4055 2020 $723 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $2 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020-21 5.71% 2020 6.01% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Host Country Source: Bangladesh Bank, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (December 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $18,439 100% Total Outward $314 100% The United States $3,823 20.7% United Kingdom $88 28.0% The United Kingdom $2,140 11.6% China, P.R. Mainland $49 15.6% The Netherlands $1,608 8.7% India $47 15.0% Singapore $1,504 8.2% Nepal $47 15.0% China, P.R. Mainland $986 5.3% United Arab Emirates $39 12.4% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Economic/Commercial Section Embassy of the United States of America Madani Avenue, BaridharaDhaka — 1212 Tel: +880 2 5566-2000 Email: USTC-Dhaka@state.gov Barbados Executive Summary With a $4.4 billion economy, Barbados is the largest economy in the Eastern Caribbean. The shutdown of the tourism sector in 2020 due to the pandemic led to an 18 percent GDP contraction. The economy began to recover in 2021 with 1.4 percent growth, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts 2022 growth at 8.5 percent. Unemployment was estimated at approximately 40 percent in the first quarter of 2021, representing a 30 percent increase from the same period last year. The Government of Barbados entered a standby arrangement with the IMF in late 2018. The $290 million ($580 million Barbados dollars) Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) program aims to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, strengthen the balance of payments, and stimulate growth. While the government was on track to meet its IMF targets pre-pandemic, the program dampened income and spending power due to public sector layoffs, the introduction of new indirect taxes, and a decline in the construction sector. The impact of the pandemic required the IMF to adjust the program targets downwards several times. The IMF also approved additional lending into the program twice in 2020. The country’s services sector continues to hold the largest growth potential, especially in the areas of international financial services, information technology, global education services, health, and cultural services. The gradual decline of the sugar industry has opened land for other agricultural uses. Investment opportunities exist in the areas of agricultural processing and alternative and renewable energy. Uncertainty about the trajectory of economic recovery of the tourism, commercial aviation, and cruise industries impacts the potential for projects in those sectors. The government has identified renewable energy and climate resilience projects as top priorities. In 2021, Barbados joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) framework seeking to harmonize global corporate minimum tax rates at 15 percent. Barbados bases its legal system on the British common law system. It does not have a bilateral investment agreement with the United States, but it does have a double-taxation treaty and a tax information exchange agreement. In 2015, Barbados signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Barbados to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 29 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 14,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Barbados, through Invest Barbados, welcomes foreign direct investment with the stated goals of creating jobs, earning foreign exchange, transferring technology, enhancing skills, and contributing to economic growth. In 2021, the government announced plans to focus on encouraging foreign direct investment in renewable energy, manufacturing, technology, and biogenetic engineering. According to Invest Barbados, Barbados encourages investment in the following key sectors: international financial services, information technology, and ship registration, as well as emerging sectors like financial technology, creative industries, agricultural processing, medical schools, medical tourism, and renewable energy. In the international financial services sector, the government maintains regulatory oversight via the Central Bank of Barbados to prevent money laundering and tax evasion. Through Invest Barbados, the government facilitates domestic and foreign private investment. Invest Barbados’ mandate is to actively promote Barbados as a desirable investment location, to provide advice, and to assist prospective investors. Invest Barbados also provides customized support for investors to assist with the expansion and sustainability of the initial investment. It also serves as the primary liaison for existing investors. In 2021, the government announced plans to establish a Barbados Free Economic Zone to help attract foreign direct investment. Investors interested in doing business in Barbados must register with the country’s Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO). In 2021, the Government of Barbados fully digitized the registration process and all other services provided by CAIPO. Local laws do not place any limits on foreign control in Barbados. Nationals and non-nationals may establish and own private enterprises and private property in Barbados. These rights extend to the acquisition and disposition of interests in private enterprises. No industries are closed to private enterprise, although the government reserves the right not to allow certain investments. Some activities, such as telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting, franchises, banking, and insurance require a government license. There are no quotas or other restrictions on foreign ownership of a local enterprise or participation in a joint venture. In 2012, the government introduced a special entry permit for high net-worth individuals who wish to reside in Barbados while working remotely. Individuals must have one of the following to apply: a net worth of USD five million, property valued above USD two million, and skills of critical need to the development of the country. Applicants must generally be 60 years or older although special provisions can be made for applicants under 60 years of age. The program is administered by the Barbados Immigration Department. In 2020, the government introduced the Barbados Welcome Stamp visa program, which allows eligible remote workers to apply for special residency status for up to one year. Under this program, the visa holder is exempt from local income taxes. The visa holder can also apply for an extension of the visa with the repayment of applicable fees. The program is administered through the Ministry of Tourism and International Transport. Barbados has not conducted a trade policy review in the last three years. No civil society organization has provided a review of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. Invest Barbados is the main investment promotion agency that attracts and facilitates foreign investment. Invest Barbados offers guidance and direction to new and established investors seeking to pursue investment opportunities in Barbados. The process is transparent and considers the size of capital investment as well as the economic impact of a proposed project. Invest Barbados offers a website that is useful for navigating applicable laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. This is available at http://www.investbarbados.org . Invest Barbados’ iGuide website is an online guide that provides local and foreign investors with up-to-date information required to make certain investment decisions, including steps for setting up a business, opportunities for investment, labor and other business costs, and legal requirements, among other data. This is available at https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/barbados . The Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) maintains an online e-registry filing service for matters pertaining to the Corporate Registry. It is available to registered agents, who are usually attorneys. Information is available at www.caipo.gov.bb . In general, when starting a business, companies retain an attorney to prepare relevant incorporation documents. The business must register with CAIPO, the Barbados Revenue Authority, the Customs and Excise Department, and any relevant sector-specific licensing agencies. The Government of Barbados continues to facilitate programs and partnerships to assist entrepreneurs who are women and/or people with disabilities. The Government of Barbados remains committed to working with civil society and other organizations to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. While no incentives are offered, Barbados generally encourages local companies to invest in other countries, particularly within the Caribbean region. The government actively encourages local companies in Barbados to take advantage of export opportunities related to the country’s membership in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The Barbados Investment Development Corporation provides market development support for domestic companies seeking to enhance their export potential. 3. Legal Regime Barbados’ legal framework establishes clear rules for foreign and domestic investors regarding tax, labor, environmental, health, and safety concerns. These regulations are in accord with international standards. The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Investment and Invest Barbados provide oversight aimed at ensuring the transparency of investment. Rulemaking and regulatory authority rest with the bicameral parliament of the Government of Barbados. The House of Assembly consists of 30 members who are elected in single-seat constituencies. The Senate consists of 21 members who are appointed by the President. Responsibility for Senate appointments shifted in 2021 when Barbados removed the UK’s Queen Elizabeth as head of state and became a republic. Foreign investment into Barbados is governed by a series of laws and implementing regulations. These laws and regulations are developed with the participation of relevant ministries, drafted by the Office of the Attorney General, and enforced by the relevant ministry or ministries. Additional compliance supervision is delegated to specific agencies, by sector, as follows: Banking and financial services – Central Bank of Barbados (CBB) Insurance and non-banking financial services – Financial Services Commission (FSC) International business – International Business Unit, Ministry of International Business and Industry Business incorporation and intellectual property – CAIPO The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Investment monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. All foreign businesses must be registered or incorporated through CAIPO and will be regulated by one of the other agencies depending on the nature of the business. Although Barbados does not have formal legislation that guarantees access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available. The government maintains a website and an information service to facilitate the dissemination of information such as government office directories and press releases. The government also maintains a parliamentary website at http://www.barbadosparliament.com where it posts legislation prior to parliamentary debate and live streams House sittings. The government budget is also available on this website. Although some bills are not subject to public consultation, input from various stakeholder groups and agencies is enlisted during the initial drafting of legislation. Public awareness campaigns, through print and electronic media, are used to inform the public. Copies of regulations are circulated to stakeholders and are published in the Official Gazette after passage in parliament. The Official Gazette is available at https://gisbarbados.gov.bb/the-official-gazette . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent. Publicly listed companies publish annual financial statements and changes in portfolio shareholdings, including share value. Service providers are required to adhere to international best practice standards including International Financial Reporting Standards, International Standards on Auditing, and International Public Sector Accounting Standards for government and public sector bodies. They must also comply with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Prevention and Control Act. Accounting professionals must engage in continuous professional development. The Corporate and Trust Service Providers Act regulates Barbados financial service providers. Failure to adhere to these laws and regulations may result in the revocation of a company’s business license and/or cancellation of work permit(s). The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Barbados to be largely compliant. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. The Office of the Ombudsman is established by the constitution to guard against abuses of power by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Office of the Ombudsman aims to provide quality service in an impartial and expeditious manner when investigating complaints by Barbadian nationals or residents who consider the conduct of a government body or official unreasonable, improper, inadequate, or unjust. The Office of the Auditor General is also established by the constitution and is regulated by the Financial Administration and Audit Act. The Auditor General is responsible for the audit and inspection of all public accounts of the Supreme Court, the Senate, the House of Assembly, all government ministries, government departments, government-controlled entities, and statutory bodies. The Office of the Auditor General’s annual reports can be found on the Barbados Parliament website. The OECD recognized Barbados as largely compliant with international regulatory standards. Barbados is a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, and the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Matters to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Sharing. The Barbados National Standards Institution (BNSI) oversees a laboratory complex housing metrology, textile, engineering, and chemistry/microbiology laboratories. The primary functions of the BSNI include the preparation, promotion, and implementation of standards in all sectors of the economy, including the promotion of quality systems, quality control, and certification. The Standards Act (2006) and the Weights and Measures Act (1977) and Regulations (1985) govern the work of the BNSI. As a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement to Technical Barriers to Trade, Barbados is obligated to harmonize all national standards through the BNSI to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Barbados ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2018. The Agreement improves the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitates trade costs reduction, and enhances participation in the global value chain. In 2019 Barbados implemented the Automated System for Customs Data, which streamlined document compliance and inspections by port authorities. The government also increased issuance fees for certificates of origin, making trade more expensive. Barbados’ legal system is based on the British common law. Modern corporate law is modeled on the Canadian Business Corporations Act. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in Barbados. The Supreme Court consists of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The High Court hears criminal and civil (commercial) matters and makes determinations based on interpretation of the constitution. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC). In 2005, Barbados became a full member of the CCJ, making the body its final court of appeal and original jurisdiction of the RTC. The United States and Barbados are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Invest Barbados’ foreign direct investment policy is to promote Barbados as a desirable investment location, to provide advice, and to assist prospective investors. The main laws concerning investment in Barbados are the Barbados International Business Promotion Act (2005), the Tourism Development Act (2005), and the Companies Act. There is also a framework of legislation that supports the jurisdiction as a global hub for business including insurance, shipping registration, and wealth management. All proposals for investment concessions are reviewed by Invest Barbados to ensure proposed projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Barbados provides complimentary “one-stop shop” facilitation services for investors to guide them through the investment process. It offers a website useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors: http://www.investbarbados.org . Chapter 8 of the RTC outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for facilitating the implementation of the rules of competition. At the CARICOM level, a regional Caribbean Competition Commission (CCC) applies the rules of competition. The CARICOM competition policy addresses anticompetitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Community and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within the Community. The Fair Competition Act codified the establishment of the Barbados Fair Trading Commission (FTC) in 2001. The FTC is responsible for the promotion and maintenance of fair competition participates in the CCC. The FTC regulates the principles, rates, and standards of service for public utilities and other regulated service providers. The Telecommunications Act regulates competition in the telecommunications sector. The Barbados constitution and the Companies Act (Chap. 308) contain provisions permitting the government to acquire property for public use upon prompt payment of compensation at fair market value. U.S. Embassy Bridgetown is not aware of any outstanding expropriation claims or nationalization of foreign enterprises in Barbados. Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (2002), Barbados has a bankruptcy framework that recognizes certain debtor and creditor rights. The act gives a potentially bankrupt company three options: bankruptcy (voluntary or involuntary), receivership, or reorganization of the company. The Companies Act provides for the insolvency and/or liquidation of a company incorporated under this act. In 2019, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act was amended to include the establishment of a commercial division in the High Court which will oversee proceedings connected to bankruptcy and insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies In 2019, Barbados repealed its Fiscal Incentives Act, bringing the country into conformity with its obligations under the WTO and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Manufacturers may still benefit from some concessions. Further information is available from Invest Barbados. The Small Business Development Act (1999) defines a small business as having no more than 25 employees. Small businesses must be registered under the Companies Act, which applies to domestic and foreign-owned micro- and small enterprises. Small businesses are not eligible for incentives under the Tourism Development Act, the Special Development Areas Act, or the Shipping Incentives Act. Enterprises generating export profits (other than from exports within CARICOM) may receive an export allowance expressed as a rebate of corporate tax on those profits. The maximum rebate of 93 percent applies if more than 81 percent of an enterprise’s profits result from extra-regional exports. The export development allowance permits a company to deduct from taxable income an additional 50 percent of what the company spends in developing export markets outside CARICOM. Initial allowances or investment allowances of up to 40 percent on capital expenditure are available for businesses making capital expenditures on machinery and plants or on an industrial building or structure. The government also allows annual depreciation allowances on such expenditures. In the tourism sector, the government’s market development allowance permits a company to deduct an additional 50 percent of what it spends to encourage tourists to visit Barbados. Under the Tourism Development Act of 2002, businesses and individuals that invest in the tourism sector can write off capital expenditures and 150 percent of interest. These entities are also exempt from import duties and environmental levies on furniture, fixtures and equipment, building materials, supplies, and equity financing. The act expands the definition of the tourist sector beyond accommodation to include restaurants, tourist recreational facilities, and tourism-related services. The act encourages the development of attractions that emphasize the country’s natural, historic, and cultural heritage, and encourages construction of properties in non-coastal areas. Barbados has harmonized the legislative and tax frameworks for domestic and international companies in the international business sector. Companies conducting international business operate with a tax rate from 1 to 5.5 percent. Companies exporting 100 percent of their services or products can apply for a foreign currency permit. All corporate entities are taxed on a sliding scale: Taxable Income USD Rate % Up to 500,000 5.50 Above 500,000 to 10 million 3.00 Above 10 million to 15 million 2.50 Above 15 million 1.00 There are no withholdings taxes on dividends, interest, royalties, or management fees paid to non-residents. The Government of Barbados offers various incentives to business owners engaged in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors. A pamphlet outlining these incentives is available on the Invest Barbados website. There are currently no foreign trade zones or free ports in Barbados. In 2021, the government announced plans to establish a Barbados Free Economic Zone to help attract foreign direct investment. Foreign investors must finance their investments from external sources or from income that the investment generates. When a foreign investment generates significant employment or other tangible benefits for Barbados, the authorities may allow the company to borrow locally for working capital. Invest Barbados may provide a training grant to qualifying manufacturing and information and communication technology enterprises during the initial operating period. Except in the case of its medicinal cannabis and renewable energy industries, Barbados does not require that its citizens own shares of a foreign investor’s enterprise. Some restrictions may apply to share transfers. The Companies Act does not permit bearer shares. Foreign investors do not need to establish facilities in any specific location, although there are some zoning restrictions on residential and commercial construction for environmental reasons. There is no requirement that enterprises must purchase a fixed percentage of goods from local sources. Investors, particularly within the hospitality industry, are encouraged to use local products whenever possible. Barbados labor and immigration laws stipulate that non-nationals seeking to work in Barbados must apply for work permits, including for all managerial and technical staff. Nationals from CARICOM member states are exempt from this requirement. The work permit is specific to the job and employer and the permit may be granted for a period of up to five years. Short-term permits of up to six months are also available. To grant a work permit, the government requires that the expatriate must bring to the job special skills or knowledge not readily available in Barbados. While work permits are generally granted to senior management, the government may restrict the number of permits approved depending on the number of people employed by the local company. There are no restrictions regarding foreign directors of boards. More information is available at http://www.immigration.gov.bb/pages/WorkPermit.aspx . There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source codes and/or provide access to surveillance. The Barbados Data Protection Act (BDPA) became law in 2021. The BDPA created a data protection authority under a Data Protection Commissioner responsible for the general administration of the act. The BDPA prohibits the transfer of personal data out of Barbados unless the destination country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects vis-à-vis the processing of their personal data. Violations under the BDPA are subject to fines ranging from $5,000 to $250,000 (10,000 to 500,000 Barbados dollars) and allow for criminal convictions resulting in prison sentences ranging from two months to three years. As a member of the WTO, Barbados is party to the Agreement to the Trade Related Investment Measures. 5. Protection of Property Rights There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of property in Barbados. Foreign investors and locals are treated equally regarding property taxes. Civil law protects physical property and mortgage claims. The CBB must verify real property purchases for non-residents. If a non-resident uses foreign funds and pays for the property in Barbados, the CBB will normally endorse the transaction. The sale of property is subject to a 2.5 percent property transfer tax in addition to a one percent stamp duty. Brokerage and legal fees are not included in these levies. Buyers should seek the advice of a local attorney when purchasing property. Commercial, industrial, hotel, and villa properties are subject to a 0.95 percent land tax on the improved value of the property. Holders of a certificate from the Barbados Tourism Authority enjoy rebates of 50 percent for hotels and 25 percent from villas. The Commissioner of Land Tax charges an annual fee based on the assessed property value on residential property as follows: 0% on the first $75,000 (150,000 Barbados dollars) 0% on the first $75,000 (150,000 Barbados dollars) 0.1% on amounts between $75,001 and $225,000 (150,001 and 550,000 Barbados dollars) 0.7% on amounts between $225,001 and $425,000 (550,001 and 850,000 Barbados dollars) 1.0% on amounts greater than $425,000 (850,000 Barbados dollars) 0.8% on vacant land under 4,000 square feet 1.0% on all other vacant land The government has included an additional procedure that has increased the time to record the conveyance at the Land Registry and pay transfer fees and stamp duties. This has made transferring property more onerous. The Land Registry has digitized records dating back to 1952 and plans to further digitize deeds dating back to 1640. A landowner may lose his or her title to land if a trespasser or squatter takes possession for a period of ten years. Barbados has a legislative framework governing intellectual property rights (IPR), though enforcement needs improvement. Barbados is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks. The Government of Barbados has enacted IPR legislation on topics including patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, integrated circuits topography, plant breeders’ rights, geographical indications, and protection against unfair competition. Barbados’ Trademark and Industrial Designs Act meets international standards. Barbados remains on the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report Watch List in 2021. Barbados acceded to the WIPO Internet Treaties in 2019 and has convened a public-private Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights to redraft its Copyright Act. Once passed by Parliament, this will enable Barbados to implement its WIPO Internet Treaties obligations. CAIPO will be reorganized into two separate entities, one for business registration and one for IPR registration. The former CAIPO director was appointed as Master of the High Court in 2020, which deepened the court’s IPR expertise. These measures, along with the updates and upgrades to CAIPO’s database in 2021, were intended to strengthen IPR enforcement. Currently, Barbados’ judicial system is unable to provide timely and effective relief on IPR violations due to a serious case backlog across all types of civil and criminal matters. Ongoing cases include the unauthorized transmission of U.S. broadcasts and cable programming by local cable operators, including state-owned broadcasters, without adequate compensation to U.S. right holders, and the refusal of Barbadian television and radio broadcasters and cable and satellite operators to pay for public performances of music. Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME commits all 15 members to implement stronger intellectual property rights protection and enforcement. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA contains the most detailed obligations regarding intellectual property in any trade agreement to which Barbados is a party. The EPA provides for protection and enforcement of IPR. Article 139 of the EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties and of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.” It is the responsibility of the importer to pay for and destroy counterfeit goods. Failure to observe certain standards regarding the importation of goods may result in a recommendation to the Comptroller of Barbados’ Custom and Excises Department to have the goods destroyed. If the goods fall under the Ministry of Health’s jurisdiction, they are destroyed under that ministry’s guidance. If the goods are prohibited and do not pertain to the Ministry of Health, the Customs and Excise Department will destroy them as appropriate. Information on the prevalence of counterfeit goods in the local market is not readily available, as there is no tracking method in place to collect data. Barbados is not listed in USTR’s 2022 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector Barbados has a small stock exchange, an active banking sector, and opportunities for portfolio investment. Local policies seek to facilitate the free flow of financial resources, although some restrictions may be imposed during exceptional periods of low liquidity. The CBB independently raises or lowers interest rates without government intervention. There are a variety of credit instruments in the commercial and public sectors that local and foreign investors may access. Barbados continues to review legislation in the financial sector to strengthen and improve the regulatory regime and attract and facilitate retention of foreign portfolio investments. The government continues to improve its legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks to strengthen the banking system. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority and its operating arm, the government’s Financial Intelligence Unit, review anti-money laundering policy documents and analyze prudential returns. The Securities Exchange Act of 1982 established the Securities Exchange of Barbados, which was reincorporated as the Barbados Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2001. The BSE operates a two-tier electronic trading system comprised of a regular market and an innovation and growth market (formerly the junior market). Companies applying for listing on the regular market must observe and comply with certain requirements. Specifically, they must have assets of at least $500,000 (1 million Barbados dollars) and adequate working capital based on the last three years of their financial performance, as well as three-year performance projections. Companies must also demonstrate competent management and be incorporated under the laws of Barbados or another regulated jurisdiction approved by the Financial Services Commission. Applications for listing on the innovation and growth market are less onerous, requiring minimum equity of one million shares at a stated minimum value of $100,000 (200,000 Barbados dollars). Reporting and disclosure requirements for all listed companies include interim financial statements and an annual report and questionnaire. Non-nationals must obtain exchange control approval from the CBB to trade securities on the BSE. The BSE has computerized clearance and settlement of share certificates through the Barbados Central Securities Depository Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the BSE. Under the Property Transfer Tax Act, the FSC can accommodate investors requiring a traditional certificate for a small fee. The FSC also regulates mutual funds in accordance with the Mutual Funds Act. The BSE adheres to rules in accordance with International Organization of Securities Commissions guidelines designed to protect investors; ensure a fair, efficient, and transparent market; and reduce systemic risk. Public companies must file audited financial statements with the BSE no later than 90 days after the close of their financial year. The authorities may impose a fine not exceeding $5,000 (10,000 Barbados dollars) for any person under the jurisdiction of the BSE who contravenes or is not in compliance with any regulatory requirements. The BSE launched the International Securities Market (ISM) in 2016. It is designed to operate as a separate market, allowing issuers from Barbados and other international markets. To date, the ISM has four listing sponsors. The BSE collaborates with its regional partners, the Jamaica Stock Exchange and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange, through shared trading software. The capacity for this inter-exchange connectivity provides a wealth of potential investment opportunities for local and regional investors. The BSE obtained designated recognized stock exchange status from the UK in 2019. It is also a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. Barbados has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on current account transactions. The government established the CBB in 1972. The CBB manages Barbados’ currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Barbados Deposit Insurance Corporation (BDIC) provides protection for depositors. Oversight of the entire financial system is conducted by the Financial Oversight Management Committee, which consists of the CBB, the BDIC, and the FSC. The private sector has access to financing on the local market through short-term borrowing and credit, asset financing, project financing, and mortgage financing. Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions set their own interest rates. The CBB requires banks to hold 17.5 percent of their domestic deposits in stipulated securities. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities could do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. According to Bitt, it has no immediate plans to launch DCash in Barbados and focused first on Barbados’ Eastern Caribbean neighbors. Bitt also offers a digital access exchange, remittance channel, and merchant-processing gateway available via mMoney, a mobile application. In early 2022, the DCash platform crashed for almost two months, raising questions about the initiative’s long-term prospects. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks in recent years due to concerns that the region is high-risk. Currently, the CBB does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. In the past, the government announced plans to create a sovereign wealth fund to ensure national wealth is available for present and future generations of Barbados. Barbadians 18 years and older are expected to gain a stake in the fund after it is established. It is envisioned that the fund will hold governmental assets, including on- and offshore real property, revenues from oil and gas products, and non-tangible assets such as trademarks, patents, and intellectual property. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Barbados work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit, and carry out certain ministerial responsibilities. There are 33 SOEs in Barbados operating in areas such as travel and tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, sanitation services, sports, and culture. Pre-pandemic total net income was estimated at $60 million (120 million Barbados dollars). SOEs in Barbados are not found in the key areas earmarked for investment. They are all wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which their senior management reports. As part of the ongoing IMF BERT program, the Government of Barbados is addressing the expenditure position of the SOEs by defining clear objectives for SOE reforms, reducing the wage bill of these entities, and implementing other necessary reform measures. Barbados does not currently have a targeted privatization program. The government has announced plans for public-private partnerships in airport management and broadcasting services, which will still see the government retaining ownership of these entities. The process remains open to foreign investors and is transparent. More information can be obtained at http://www.gisbarbados.gov.bb . 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including in support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. The non-governmental organization (NGO) community, while comparatively small, is involved in fundraising and volunteerism in gender, health, environmental, and community projects. The government periodically partners with NGOs and encourages philanthropy. Barbados was on the Tier 2 Watch List for trafficking in persons for from 2019-2021, however, there are no known human or labor rights concerns relating to responsible business conduct of which foreign businesses should be aware. Adoption of broad corporate governance codes such as the OECD guidelines is voluntary, as is disclosure of corporate governance practices. In practice, many companies in Barbados are influenced by international best practices. CBB and FSC guidelines regulate the purpose and role of the board of directors. The accounting profession is regulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Barbados, which is a member of the International Federation of Accountants. Barbados is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Barbados published a national climate change strategy in 2012. Since then, the government has submitted both an initial and updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). It does not have a specific strategy for monitoring natural capital, including biodiversity and ecosystem services. The government hopes to achieve a fossil fuel-free economy by 2030. The government has also indicated that substantial support from the international community will be necessary to achieve this goal. Public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth considerations. The Government of Barbados offers various incentives to business owners engaged in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors. A pamphlet outlining these incentives is available on the Invest Barbados website. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented these laws effectively. Barbados signed but did not yet ratify the UN Convention on Corruption and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. In 2012, Barbados enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act, which includes standards of integrity in public life. It has not been proclaimed by the President and consequently is not in force. The Integrity of Public Life Bill 2020, which mandated declaration of assets by all politicians, senior public officers, chair people, and high-ranking managers of SOEs, passed in Barbados’ Parliament but was ultimately defeated in the Senate. Prime Minister Mia Mottley’s administration plans to bring the bill back to Parliament in 2022 but has acknowledged the need to reach agreement with opposing forces in the Senate. The Government of Barbados has announced its intention to establish a public investment dashboard to provide information relevant to public sector investment projects, including cost overruns, procurement procedures, and company selection. The government also plans to establish an independent statistics and data analytics authority and to introduce a Freedom of Information Act. A government minister with the previous administration was arrested in the United States on charges of laundering proceeds from bribes paid in Barbados. In 2020, he was found guilty on two charges of money laundering and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Barbados is a member of the regional Association of Integrity Commissions and Anti-Corruption Bodies in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Director Financial Intelligence Unit P.O. Box 1327, Bridgetown 246-436-4734 director@barbadosfiu.gov.bb 10. Political and Security Environment Barbados does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil unrest. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Barbados’ labor force was 141,940 people at the end of 2020. In the first quarter of 2021, the total average unemployment rate was approximately 40 percent, an increase of 30 percent from the same period the previous year due to ongoing economic distress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy began to recover in 2021 with 1.4 percent growth, and the IMF forecasts 2022 growth at 8.5 percent, a faster rate of recovery than previously expected. Labor regulations in Barbados are guided by a framework of laws including the Holidays with Pay Act, the Sick Leave Act, the Public Holidays Act, and the Protection of Wages Act, as well as policies regarding maternity leave, national insurance (social security) contributions, unemployment benefits, and severance pay. Barbados has ratified the eight core conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Barbados upholds the ratified conventions and is guided by the ILO’s other conventions. Wages in Barbados are some of the highest in the Caribbean. Minimum wages are administratively established for only a few categories of workers and are enforced by the Ministry of Labour’s Labour Department. The minimum wage for shop assistants is currently $4.25 (8.50 Barbados dollars) per hour. The Ministry of Labour recommends that companies recognize this as the de facto minimum wage, though most employees earn more than this. The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in five days, and the law provides employees with three weeks of paid holiday for persons with less than five years’ service and four weeks of paid holiday leave after five years’ service. The law requires overtime payment of time and a half for hours worked in excess of the legal standard and prescribes that all overtime must be voluntary. The law does not set a maximum number of overtime hours. Workers are covered by unemployment benefits legislation and national insurance legislation after 52 weeks of continuous employment. The government sets occupational safety and health standards. Workers are legally allowed to form and join unions and conduct strikes, but there is no specific legal recognition of the right to collective bargaining. Most major employers choose to recognize unions when more than 50 percent of employees request recognition. Smaller companies are less frequently unionized. Companies are sometimes hesitant to engage in collective bargaining with recognized unions, but in most instances they eventually do so. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and protects workers engaged in union activity. Private-sector employees can strike, but strikes are prohibited by workers in essential services such as police, firefighting, electricity, and water. In general, the government effectively enforces labor laws, and penalties are sufficient to deter violations. The law gives employees the right to have allegations of unfair dismissal tried before the Employment Rights Tribunal, but the process often has lengthy delays. Workers’ rights are generally respected. Unions receive periodic complaints of violations of collective bargaining agreements, but most complaints are resolved through established mechanisms. The law provides for a minimum working age of 16. Compulsory primary and secondary education policies reinforce minimum age requirements. The Labour Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot investigations of enterprises and check records to verify compliance with the law. These inspectors may take legal action against an employer who is found to have underage workers. Under the Severance Payments Act, an employer is obligated to pay an employee a severance payment where the employee is terminated on account of redundancy. The Employee Rights Act, section 31, provides that dismissal of an employee on account of redundancy does not contravene the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Qualifying workers who are laid off for economic reasons are generally entitled to receive a severance payment on a graduating scale that starts at 2.5 weeks’ pay for every completed year of employment. All unemployed workers are eligible for unemployment benefits upon meeting the qualifying contribution periods established by the National Insurance and Social Security scheme. The Occupational Health at Work Act governs the general health and safety of workers in all workplaces except the armed forces and private household domestic service. The law requires firms employing more than 50 workers (fewer in certain sectors) to create a safety committee that may challenge the decisions of management concerning occupational safety and health. The Labour Department also enforces health and safety standards and follows up to ensure that management corrects problems. Trade union monitors can identify safety problems for government factory inspectors. The Labour Department’s Inspection Unit conducts routine annual inspections of government-operated corporations and manufacturing plants. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous or hazardous job situations without jeopardizing their continued employment. According to government figures, the growing informal economy represents between 30 and 40 percent of GDP. The government has stated that by avoiding taxes and regulations, informal firms have an unfair advantage over more efficient formal firms, undermining economic growth and progress. In general, most sectors of the Barbados informal economy do not overlap with potential investment sectors for U.S. and other foreign businesses. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $4,690 2020 $4,418 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $45,400 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $57,053 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 186% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Barbados (CBB) http://www.centralbank.org.bb Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Phone Number: 246-227-4000 Email: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Belarus 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI is one of the government’s stated foreign policy priorities. Net inflows of FDI have been included in the list of government performance targets since December 2015. The GOB plans to attract a total of $5.5 billion net FDI in 2021-2025, largely through the China-Belarus “Great Stone” industrial park and Belarus’ six free economic zones. The imposition of wide-ranging sanctions by the United States and many likeminded countries due to Belarus’ facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made Belarus a less attractive destination for FDI. So, too, have the numerous restrictions and fees placed on investments from “unfriendly countries” by the GOB. An official decree signed by Lukashenka on March 14 provides for special fees for any early termination of contracts; prevents business partners from “unfriendly” countries from selling their shares in Belarusian joint stocks; increases taxation on any income of foreign partners, including dividends, royalties, and interests; and orders all debts to foreign partners be paid in Belarusian rubles. Belarus does not have any specific requirements for foreigners wishing to establish a business. On paper, investors, whether Belarusian or foreign, receive legal protections and have the same right to conduct business operations in Belarus by incorporating legal entities. However, selective application of existing laws and practices often discriminate against the private sector, including foreign investors, regardless of the country of their origin. Belarus’ investment promotion agency is the National Agency of Investments and Privatization (NAIP). The NAIP is tasked with representing the interests of Belarus as it seeks to attract FDI. The NAIP is a one-stop shop with services available to all investors, including: organizing fact-finding missions to Belarus; assisting with visa formalities; providing information on investment opportunities, special regimes and benefits, and procedures necessary for making investment decisions; selecting investment projects; and providing solutions and post-project support. NAIP has a 24/7 support hotline service via a Telegram channel and email account to help foreign investors address their problems and concerns in Belarus. To maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors, Belarus has established the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC), chaired by the Prime Minister. FIAC activities include developing proposals to improve investment legislation; participating in examining corresponding regulatory and legal acts; and approaching government agencies for the purpose of adopting, repealing or modifying the regulatory and legal acts that restrict the rights of investors. FIAC includes the heads of government agencies and other state organizations subordinate to the GOB, as well as heads of international organizations and foreign companies and corporations. According to representatives of major foreign investors in Belarus, there were no reports of FIAC taking any meaningful effort to promote the FDI agenda in 2021 or 2022. While the GOB claims foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, in reality the GOB imposes limits on a case-by-case basis. The limits on foreign equity participation in Belarus in terms of the size of individual investments are above average for the 20 countries covered by the World Bank Group’s Investing Across Borders indicators for Eastern Europe and the Central Asia region. In particular, Belarus limits foreign equity ownership in service industries. Sectors such as fixed-line telecommunications services, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and railway freight transportation are closed to foreign equity ownership. In addition, a comparatively large number of sectors are dominated by government monopolies, including, but not limited to, those mentioned above. These monopolies make it difficult for foreign companies to invest in Belarus. Finally, the government may restrict investments in the interests of national security (including environmental protection, historical, and cultural values), public order, morality protection, and public health, as well as rights and freedoms of people. While Belarus has no formal national security investment screening mechanism, it retains significant elements of a Soviet-style command economy and screens investments through an informal and hierarchical process that escalates through the bureaucracy depending on the size of the investment or the size of incentives an investor seeks from the GOB. Lukashenka and his administration review and approve even multi-million-dollar foreign investments. Additionally, Belarus’ Ministry of Antimonopoly Regulation and Trade is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns (whether domestic or international). The UN Conference on Trade and Development reviewed Belarus’ investment policy in 2009 and made recommendations regarding the improvement of its investment climate: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb200910_en.pdf Individuals and legal persons can apply for business registration via the web portal of the Single State Register ( http://egr.gov.by/egrn/index.jsp?language=en ) – a resource that includes all relevant information on establishing a business and provides a single window for securing all necessary clearances and permissions from municipal authorities, tax and social security administrations, etc. Business registration normally takes no more than one day. Belarus has a regime allowing for a simplified taxation system for all foreign-owned businesses. Under the 2010 law on supporting small and medium-sized entrepreneurship Belarus defines enterprises as follows: Micro enterprises – fewer than 15 employees; Small enterprises – from 16 to 100 employees; Medium-sized enterprises – from 101 to 250 employees. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. According to government statistics, Belarusian businesses’ outward investments in January-June 2021 totaled USD 2.78 billion, of which FDI was 94 percent. The GOB classified investment data following this period and no further investment information is publicly available. 3. Legal Regime According to Belarusian law, drafts of laws and regulations pertaining to investment and doing business are subject to public discussion, though authorities rarely pay heed to public views. The government alleges its policies are transparent, and the implementation of laws is consistent with international norms to foster competition and establish clear rules of the road. However, independent economic experts note that private sector businesses are often discriminated against in favor of public sector businesses. In particular, SOEs often receive government subsidies, benefits, and exemptions like cheaper loans and debt forgiveness that are generally unavailable to private sector companies unless such companies have close connections with Belarus’ ruling circles. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been a part of Belarus’ legislative framework since 2016. Public-interest entities, which include banks, insurance companies, and public corporations with subsidiary companies, are required to publish their financial statements, which comply with the IFRS. Such statements are subject to statutory audit. The IFRS in Belarus can be accessed at http://www.minfin.gov.by/ru/accounting/inter_standards/docs/ Belarus’ Ministry of Finance posts regular updates and information on budgetary policy, public finances, and debt obligations on its website: http://www.minfin.gov.by/en/budgetary_policy/ and http://www.minfin.gov.by/en/public_debt/ . On March 24, 2022, the WTO announced it had suspended Belarus’ application to join the organization because of the GOB’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Belarus had been working to join the WTO since 1993. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); EAEU regulations and decisions supersede the national regulatory system. Belarus has a civil law system with a legal separation of branches and institutions and with the main source of law being legal acts, not precedent. For example, Article 44 of Belarus’ Constitution guarantees the inviolability of property. Article 11 of the Civil Code officially safeguards property rights, but presidential edicts and decrees, controlled exclusively by Lukashenka, typically carry more force than legal acts adopted by the legislature. This weakens investor protections and incentives previously passed into law. There is sometimes a public comment process during drafting of legislation or presidential decrees, but the process is not transparent or sufficiently inclusive of investors’ concerns. Belarus has broadly codified commercial laws, but the laws contain inconsistencies and are not considered business friendly. According to the 2021 Human Rights Report, “The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but authorities did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. Observers believed corruption, inefficiency, and political interference with judicial decisions were widespread.” Businesses complain the authorities selectively enforce regulations and criminal laws and that cases are often politically motivated. At the February 2021 All Belarusian People’s Assembly, for example, Lukashenka announced he had ordered the closure of over 200 private businesses because of their “illegal support” for the political opposition. Each of Belarus’ six regions and the capital city of Minsk have economic courts to address commercial and economic issues. In addition, the Supreme Court has a judicial panel on economic issues. In 2000, Belarus established a judicial panel to enforce intellectual property rights. Under the Labor Code, any claims of unfair labor practices are heard by regular civil courts or commissions on labor issues. However, the judiciary’s lack of independence from the executive branch prevents it from acting as a reliable and impartial mechanism for resolving disputes, whether labor, economic, political, commercial, or otherwise. According to Freedom House’s 2021 Nations in Transit report, for example, thousands of people were brutally repressed by Belarusian authorities following the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections. No security officials were ever investigated for wrongdoing and none of the protestors who were prosecuted by the state received a fair trial. Local economic court proceedings normally do not exceed two months. Court cases involving foreign persons are typically resolved within seven months unless an international agreement signed by Belarus dictates the resolution must take place sooner. Foreign investment in Belarus is governed by the 2013 laws “On Investments” and “On Concessions,” the 2009 Presidential Decree No. 10 “On the Creation of Additional Conditions for Investment Activity in Belarus,” and other legislation as well as international and investment agreements signed and ratified by Belarus. Issued in 2016, Presidential decree number 188 authorizes the Ministry of Antimonopoly Regulation and Trade to counteract monopolistic activities and promote market competition. According to Article 12 of the Investment Code, neither party may expropriate or nationalize investments both directly and indirectly by means of measures similar to expropriation or nationalization, for other purposes than for the public benefit and on a nondiscriminatory basis; according to the appropriate legal procedure; and on conditions of compensation payment. However, Belarus has no law provisions that establish clear procedures for fair and timely compensation of an investor’s nationalized property. Belarus has signed 70 bilateral agreements on the mutual protection and encouragement of investments which include obligations regarding expropriation. In 2021, there were no nationally-reported cases of nationalization, and there have been no instances of confiscation of business property as a penalty for violations of law. It should be noted, however, an official decree signed by Lukashenka on March 14 provides for special fees and penalties for businesses from “unfriendly” countries, including the United States, looking to leave the Belarusian market. Belarus’ recent actions in response to Western sanctions indicate the government is prepared to violate its commitments under international agreements and domestic law. However, Belarus is party to the following dispute resolution mechanisms: Belarus and the United States signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), but entry into force is pending exchange of instruments of ratification. This is unlikely to take place in the near future given the breakdown of relations between the two countries over Belarus’ continued human rights abuses and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Most of the BITs concluded by Belarus include a provision on international investment arbitration as a mechanism for settling investor-State disputes and recognize the binding force of the awards issued by tribunals. Under Belarusian law, if an international treaty signed by Belarus establishes rules other than those established by local law, the rules of the international treaty prevail. Since 2017, Belarus has faced three investment arbitration claims involving investors from the Netherlands and Russia. There were no known investment disputes between Belarusian government authorities and U.S. investors in 2021. Judgments of foreign courts are accepted and enforced if there is a relevant international agreement signed by Belarus. Courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The Belarusian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has an International Arbitration Court. The 2013 “Law on Mediation,” as well as codes of civil and economic procedures, established various alternative ways of addressing investment disputes. Belarus’ 2012 bankruptcy law, related presidential edicts, and government resolutions are not always consistently applied. Additional legal acts, such as the Civil Code and Code of Economic Procedures, also include certain regulations on bankruptcy-related issues. Under the bankruptcy law, foreign creditors have the same rights as Belarusian creditors. Belarusian law criminalizes false and intentional insolvency as well as concealing insolvency. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, Belarus was ranked 74 in Resolving Insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies According to the GOB’s Strategy for Attracting FDI, priority sectors include pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical equipment, nanotechnologies and nanomaterials, optics and electronics, production of construction materials, electric transport vehicles and light industry products, 5G communications networks, and the information technology and telecommunications sector generally. Potential investors should be aware, however, that following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, approximately one-third of all IT workers in Belarus have left the country. Industry insiders expect the outflow of tech workers to continue. The GOB offers various incentives and programs for FDI depending on the sector and industry. GOB enters into specific investment agreements with other governments and may accord preferential incentives and benefits including but not limited to: Allocation of a land plot without auctioning the right to lease it; Removal of vegetation without compensation during construction; Full VAT deduction for the purchase of goods, services (works), or property rights; Exemption from import tariffs and VAT on the imports of production equipment; Exemption from fees for the right to conclude a land lease; Exemption from duties for employing foreign nationals; Exemption from compensation for losses sustained by the agriculture and/or forestry industries due to the use of a land plot under the investment agreement; Exemption from land tax on land plots in government or private ownership, and from rent on land plots in government ownership, for a period starting from the first day of the month in which the investment agreement came into effect until December 31 of the year following the year in which the last of the facilities scheduled under the investment agreement started operations. Investment agreements concluded under the decision of the Belarusian Council of Ministers and with the permission of the President of Belarus may offer additional incentives and benefits not expressly provided for in legislation. Such incentives are provided on a case-by-case basis. In 2021, Belarus did not develop or introduce any incentives for investment in green energy production or distribution. Each of Belarus’ six regions has its own free economic zone (FEZ): Minsk, Brest, Gomel-Raton, Mogilev, Grodno Invest, and Vitebsk. The tax and regulatory pattern applicable to businesses in these zones is simpler and lower than elsewhere in Belarus. To become a FEZ resident, an investor needs to make a minimal investment of EUR 1 million, or at least EUR 500,000 provided the entire sum is invested during a three-year period, as well as engage in the production of import-substituting products or goods for export. In 2005, Lukashenka signed the edict that established uniform rules for all FEZs. The list of main tax benefits for FEZ residents was revised in 2016 to include certain exemptions from the corporate profit tax (CPT), real estate tax, land tax, and rent on government-owned land plots located within the boundaries of the FEZ, among others. As of 2017, FEZ residents benefit from a simplified procedure of export-import operations. Resident enterprises are exempt from customs duties and taxes on facilities, construction materials, other equipment used in implementation of their investment projects. They are also exempt from customs duties and taxes on raw materials and materials used in the process of manufacture of the products sold outside the territory of the Eurasian Economic Union. Otherwise, FEZ residents pay VAT, excise duties, ecological tax, natural resource extraction tax, state duty, patent duties, offshore duty, stamp duty, customs duties and fees, local taxes and duties, and contributions to the Social Security Fund according to the general guidelines. For more details please visit: FEZ Minsk: http://www.fezminsk.by/en/ FEZ Gomel: http://www.gomelraton.com/en/ FEZ Vitebsk: http://www.fez-vitebsk.com/en/ FEZ Brest: http://fezbrest.com/en/ FEZ Mogilev: http://www.fezmogilev.by/ FEZ GrondoInvest: https://grodnoinvest.by/en/ FEZ Brest: http://fezbrest.com/en/ Employing five percent of Belarus total workforce in 2021, Belarus’ six FEZs attracted 23 percent of all FDI, accounted for 21 percent of total exports, generated 18 percent of all industrial production, and contributed five percent of the country’s GDP. Created in 2005 to foster development of the IT and software industry, the High Technology Park (Hi-Tech Park or HTP) is a “virtual” legal regime that extends over the entire territory of Belarus. A physical campus of the HTP is found in the eastern part of Minsk and a satellite campus is located in Hrodna. The legislation behind the HTP was updated in 2017 with the signing of Presidential Decree No. 8 “On the Development of the Digital Economy.” The decree extended the HTP preferences from 2022 until 2049 and expanded the list of business activities in which HTP residents may engage, including but not limited to software development; data processing; cryptocurrency and token-related activity; data center services; development and deployment of Internet-of-Things technologies; ICT education; and cybersports. The HTP provides residents with beneficial tax preferences, including but not limited to exemptions from VAT and CPT on sale of goods or services; exemptions from customs duty and VAT on certain kinds of equipment imported into Belarus for use in investment projects; immovable property tax and land tax benefits with regard to buildings and land within the boundaries of the HTP campuses; and caps on personal income tax at five percent for foreign entities. However, a cap on personal income tax at nine percent for employees was removed in late 2020 and the HTP’s employees must now pay a regular income tax of 13 percent. Following continued human rights abuses by Belarusian authorities in response to the protests and the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, approximately one-third of all IT professionals have relocated outside of Belarus. Industry insiders expect the outflow to continue as the government continues its repressive tactics and as Western sanctions make doing business with international partners more difficult. In a January 28, 2022 address to parliament, Lukashenka suggested tech workers employed by foreign companies were disloyal and likely received politically-motivated instructions from their employers. Lukashenka said he was weighing whether the HTP was doing the country more good or harm. He hinted that he would insist on a renegotiation of many of the benefits of residency at the HTP, but the exodus of IT professionals caused the government to change course and offer as yet undeclared incentives for companies to keep their employees at the park. Foreign nationals who are hired on contract by an HTP resident company, who are founders of a HTP resident company, or who are employed by such founders are eligible for visa-free entry into Belarus for a stay of up to 180 days per year. Foreigners employed by HTP residents are not required to have working permit in Belarus and are entitled to apply for a temporary residence permit for the duration of their contract. For more information on HTP, please visit: http://www.park.by/ The Great Stone Industrial Park is a special economic zone of approximately 112.5 square kilometers located adjacent to the Minsk National Airport and Belarusian highway M1, which extends from Moscow to Berlin. Before the launch of Western sanctions against Belarus and the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Great Stone resident companies had access to Lithuania’s Klaipeda seaport on the Baltic Sea. According to a master plan approved in 2013, Great Stone was planned to eventually include production facilities, dormitories and residential areas for workers, offices and shopping malls, and financial and research centers. Great Stone is primarily a Belarus-China joint venture but any company – regardless of its country of origin – can apply to join the industrial park. Interested companies must submit either a business project worth at least USD 500,000, to be invested within three years from the moment of the business’ registration; submit a business project worth at least USD 5 million without any time limit for investment; or submit a business project worth at least USD 500,000 tied to research and development. As of 2020, Great Stone residents receive, among other preferences, certain exemptions on income tax, real estate and land taxes, and dividend income; the right to import goods, including raw materials, under a preferential customs regime; full VAT repayment on goods used for the design, building, and equipment of facilities in Great Stone; exemptions from environmental compensatory payments; and a preferential entry/exit program allowing Great Stone residents and their employees to stay in Belarus without a visa for up to 180 days. Great Stone residents are also exempt from any new taxes or fees through 2027 should the government make adverse changes to the tax code. Great Stone residents are permitted to purchase land in the zone whereas foreign land ownership in the rest of Belarus is highly restricted. The special preferential legal regime of Great Stone will be valid until 2062. The list of priorities planned for implementation in the park include projects in electronics, biomedicine, chemistry, and mechanical engineering. Following the start of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022, several residents of Great Stone have terminated their operations in the special economic zone and departed Belarus. Small and medium-sized cities and rural areas in Belarus are defined by a 2012 presidential decree as settlements with populations under 60,000. Individual entrepreneurs and legal entities working in rural settlements of less than 2,000 people receive additional tax benefits and exemptions. Since 2012, companies and individual entrepreneurs operating in all rural areas and towns enjoy the following benefits in the first seven years after registration: exemption from profit tax on the sale of goods, work, and services of a company’s own production; exemption from other taxes and duties, except for VAT, excise tax, offshore duty, land tax, ecological tax, natural resources tax, customs duties and fees, state duties, patent duties, and stamp duty; exemption from mandatory sale of foreign currency received from sale of goods, work, and services of a company’s own production, and from leasing property; no restrictions on insuring risks with foreign insurers; exemption from import tariffs on certain goods brought into Belarus that contribute to the charter fund of a newly established business. The special legal regime does not apply to banks, insurance companies, investment funds, professional participants in the securities market, businesses operating under other preferential legal regimes (e.g. FEZ or HTP), and certain other businesses. The GOB does not mandate local employment. Foreign investors have the right to invite foreign citizens and stateless persons, including those without permanent residence permits, to work in Belarus provided their labor contracts comply with Belarusian law. The GOB often imposes various conditions on permission to invest and pursues localization policies. Other performance requirements are often applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. According to official Belarusian sources, licenses are not required for data storage. Law enforcement regulations governing electronic communications do not include any requirements specifically for foreign internet service providers. Beginning in 2016, internet service providers are required by law to maintain all electronic communications for a one-year period. IT companies operating in Belarus were not aware of any requirements for IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. According to the 2021 Human Rights Report, the government monitored internet communications without appropriate legal authority and filtered and blocked internet traffic. For several days following the August 2020 election, internet access and mobile communications were severely restricted. While authorities blamed foreign cyberattacks for the disruptions, independent experts attributed the disruptions to the government. Since August 2020, there have been repeated internet and mobile communications disruptions, usually coinciding with major protests and police actions to disperse them. Private internet service providers notified customers that the shutdowns were requested by the government on national security grounds. Telecommunications companies reported that authorities ordered them to restrict mobile internet data severely on the days when large-scale demonstrations occurred. On March 24, 2022, Lukashenka instructed authorities to explore banning YouTube and social media applications because they were ostensibly casting Belarus’ facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bad light. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are enforced by the Civil Code. Mortgages and liens are available, and the property registry system is reliable. Investors and/or duly established commercial organizations with the participation of a foreign investor (investors) have the right to rent plots of land for up to 99 years. According to the Belarusian Land Code, foreign legal persons and individuals are denied land ownership except for land in the Great Stone Industrial Park, which foreign persons can acquire. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked Belarus 14th on ease of property registration ( http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/belarus ). Belarus has made progress in improving legislation to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) and prosecute violators. However, challenges for effective enforcement include a lack of sufficiently qualified officers. According to information provided by Belarus’ National Center of Intellectual Property, Belarus adopted a law upon Belarus’ accession to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Marrakesh Treaty on facilitating access for the blind and visually impaired persons or people with other disabilities to printed information. Belarus received the status of a full member under this agreement in October 2020. In 2018, the government amended Article 4.5 of the Administrative Code to allow greater prosecution of industrial property and IPR violations. Authorities reported there was one criminal and 89 administrative cases pursued in 2020. No criminal and 178 administrative cases were prosecuted in 2021. In 2020 and in 2021 the National Center of Intellectual Property registered no complaints from U.S. companies or their representatives regarding violations of intellectual property rights. In July 2021, the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs of July 2, 1999 (the Geneva Act) came into effect in Belarus and the country became the 66th member state to accede to the Geneva Act and became the 75th member of the Hague Union. In November 2021, Belarus adopted an IPR strategy through 2030 defining significant aspects of the country’s IPR system that need to be strengthened. In December 2021, Belarus acceded to the Industrial Design Protection Protocol to the September 9, 1994 Eurasian Patent Convention. The accession is set to come into effect in April 2022. Belarus was removed from USTR’s Special 301 Report in 2016 and is not included in the Notorious Markets List. Belarus is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to the Bern Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, among others. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Belarusian government officially claims to welcome portfolio investment. There have been no reports in 2021 on any impediments to such investment. In 2019 and 2020, Belarus received $500 million and $1.34 billion worth of portfolio investments, respectively. The Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange is open to foreign investors, but it is still largely undeveloped because the government only allows companies to trade stocks if they meet certain and often burdensome criteria. Private companies must be profitable and have net assets of at least EUR 1 million. In addition, any income from resulting operations is taxed at 24 percent. Finally, the state owns more than 70 percent of all stocks in the country, and the government appears hesitant and unwilling to trade in them freely. Bonds are the predominant financial instrument on Belarus’ corporate securities market. In 2001, Belarus joined Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, undertaking to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers under current international transactions. Loans are allocated on market terms and are available to foreign investors. However, the discount rate of 12 percent established in March, 2022 makes credit too expensive for many private businesses, which, unlike many SOEs, do not receive subsidized or reduced-interest loans. Belarus’ National Bank had predicted a rate of 9-10 percent in 2022 but the war in Ukraine, which prompted the fall of the Belarusian ruble against major foreign currencies, combined with a year-on-year inflation rate of 10 percent in January-February forced the National Bank to revise its outlook. Businesses buy and sell foreign exchange at the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange through their banks. Belarus used to require businesses to sell 10-20 percent of foreign currency revenues through the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange; however, in late 2018 the National Bank abolished the mandatory sale rule. The Belarus Affairs Unit at U.S. Embassy Vilnius Economic Section telephone: +370 (5) 266-5500; e-mail: usembassyminsk@state.gov Sanctions imposed by the United States have prohibited any commercial activity with some Belarusian banks, including Dabrabyt Bank and Belinvestbank. Belarusian subsidiaries of sanctioned Russian banks are also under sanctions and include Bel/VEB, VTB Bank Belarus, and Sberbank Belarus. Potential investors should review the Department of Treasury website at https://home.treasury.gov/ for updates as trade restrictions on Belarusian banks continue to develop. Sanctions introduced by the EU prohibit contact with the National Bank of Belarus and have blocked access to the SWIFT secure messaging system for a number of banks, including Dabrabyt Bank, the Development Bank of Belarus, and Belagroprombank. Potential investors should review the website of the European Commission for updates and further details at https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en . Belarus has a central banking system led by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, which represents the interest of the state and is the main regulator of the country’s banking system. The president of Belarus appoints the chair and members of the Board of the National Bank, designates auditing organizations to examine its activities, and approves its annual report. Although the National Bank officially operates independently from the government, there is a history of government interference in monetary and exchange rate policies. In February 2021, the banking system of Belarus included 23 commercial banks and three non-banking credit and finance organizations. According to the National Bank, the share of non-performing loans in the banking sector was 5.3 percent as of January 1, 2022. At the beginning of 2022, the country’s six largest commercial banks of systemic importance, all of which have some government share, accounted for 85 percent of the approximately 92.3 billion Belarusian rubles in total assets across the country’s banking sector. There are five representative offices of foreign banks in Belarus, with China’s Development Bank opening most recently in 2018. Regular banking services are widely available to customers regardless of national origin. Belarusian law does not allow foreign banks to establish branches in Belarus. Subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to operate in Belarus and are subject to prudential measures and other regulations like any Belarusian bank. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of Belarus losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Foreign nationals are allowed to establish a bank account in Belarus without establishing residency status. According to the IMF, Belarus’ state-dominated financial sector faces deep domestic structural problems and external sector challenges. Domestic structural problems include heavy state involvement in the banking and corporate sector, the lack of hard budget constraints for SOEs given state support, and high dollarization. Externally, Belarus’ economy remains exposed to spillovers from the Russian economy and Belarus’ foreign currency reserves offer a limited buffer to potential external shocks. The banking sector remains vulnerable to external shocks, given the high level of dollarization and the exposure to government and SOE debt. In March 2022, S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s ratings services all downgraded Belarus’ debt rating to CCC or Ca “highly vulnerable to defaults.” Belarus does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The GOB manages the State Budget Fund of National Development, which supports major economic and social projects in the country. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Although SOEs are outnumbered by private businesses, SOEs dominate the economy in terms of value. According to the Belarusian ministry of taxes and duties, the share of small and medium-sized private enterprises in the revenues of the country’s consolidated budget was 35 percent in 2021, the same as in 2020. Belarus does not consider joint stock companies, even those with 100 percent government ownership of the stocks, to be state-owned and generally refers to them as part of the non-state sector, rendering official government statistics regarding the role of SOEs in the economy misleading. According to media reports, SOEs receive preferential access to government contracts, subsidized credits, and debt forgiveness. While SOEs are generally subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, private enterprises do not have the same preferential access to land and raw materials. Since Belarus is not a WTO member, it is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The GOB officially claims to welcome “strategic investors,” including foreign investors, and says that any state-owned or state-controlled enterprise can be privatized. However, Belarus’ privatization program is extremely limited in practice as the government only sells enterprises which operate at a loss and in which the state holds a minority share of less than 25 percent. Lukashenka has expressed skepticism of privatization and during the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in February 2021 claimed privatization in Belarus was only in the interests of his political opposition. Notably, in April 2020, the government sold its controlling share in Belarus’ fifteenth-largest bank, Paritetbank. Otherwise, there was no privatization of state-controlled companies from 2018 to 2020. The State Property Committee occasionally organizes and holds privatization auctions. Many of the auctions organized by the State Property Committee have low demand as the government often places strict requirements on privitizations, including preserving or creating jobs, continuing in the same line of work or production, or launching a successful business project within a limited timeframe. In 2016, Belarusian joint stocks were allowed trans-border placement via issuing depositary receipts, but to date this instrument of attracting investments has not been used in Belarus. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Belarusian laws and policies include no notion or definition of responsible business conduct and, consequently, take no measures to encourage it. Independent trade unions and business associations promote the concept of responsible business conduct. In the aftermath of the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections, civil society organizations and opposition political figures sought to draw the attention of multinational companies and foreign investors to the human rights situation in Belarus. For example, the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions worked with a Norwegian fertilizer company Yara through its relationship with state-owned potash producer Belaruskali to improve respect for workers’ rights and safety at Belaruskali. Yara later suspended its dealings with Belaruskali due in large part to Western sanctions. Civil society organizations outside of Belarus continue to engage foreign investors and companies on political considerations inside the country. Many multinational corporations decided in 2021 and 2022 to withdraw from the Belarusian market and terminate advertising contracts with state-owned Belarusian media because of continued human rights abuses by the GOB and its support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Belarus does not allow private military or security companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. While Belarus officially recognizes the need to develop and implement environmentally friendly economic policies, no significant action was taken by the GOB in 2021. 9. Corruption Official sources claim that most corruption cases involve soliciting and accepting bribes, fraud, and abuse of power, although anecdotal evidence indicates such corruption usually does not occur as part of day-to-day interaction between citizens and minor state officials. In Belarus, bribery is considered a form of corruption and is punishable with a maximum sentence of 10 years in jail and confiscation of property. The most corrupt sectors are considered to be state administration and procurement, the industrial sector, agriculture, trade, and the construction industry. In 2020, Belarusian courts convicted 684 individuals “on corruption-related charges.” However, corruption and financial crimes charges are often used by the government for political purposes. Furthermore, the absence of independent judicial and law enforcement systems, the lack of separation of powers, and the lack of independent press make it difficult to gauge the true scale of corruption. Belarus has anti-corruption legislation consisting of certain provisions of the Criminal Code and Administrative Code as well as the Law on Public Service and the Law on Combating Corruption. The latter is the country’s main anti-corruption document and was adopted in 2015. Belarusian anti-corruption law covers family members of government officials and political figures. In December 2021, Belarus’ parliament adopted in the first reading amendments to its anti-corruption law, seeking to improve prevention and streamline the interaction of government agencies in fighting corruption. The country’s regulations require addressing any potential conflict of interest of parties seeking to win a government procurement contract. The list of these regulations includes the July 13, 2012 law “On public procurement of goods (works, services),” the December 31, 2013 presidential decree “On conducting procurement procedures,” and the March 15, 2012 Council of Ministers resolution on the procurement of goods (works, services). Government organizations directly engaged in anti-corruption efforts are prosecutors’ offices, internal affairs, state security and state control agencies. Belarus is party to several international anti-corruption conventions and agreements. The Republic of Belarus has ratified major international anti-corruption treaties, such as the Convention of the Council of Europe 173 on criminal liability for corruption (S 173) (concluded in Strasbourg on 27 January, 1999); the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, signed by Belarus in Palermo on 24 December, 2000, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (concluded in New York on 31 October, 2003); and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (concluded in Strasbourg on 4 November, 1999) (ratified in 2005). Belarus also signed several the intergovernmental agreements to address corruption. In 2019, the Council of Europe’s (COE) Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) publicly declared Belarus non-compliant with GRECO’s anti-corruption standards. This was GRECO’s first ever declaration of non-compliance. According to the COE, Belarus failed to address 20 out of 24 recommendations made in 2012; had not authorized the publication of the 2012 report or related compliance reports; and was non-responsive since 2017 to requests from GRECO to organize a high-level mission to Belarus. The majority of GRECO’s recommendations related to fundamental anti-corruption requirements, such as strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office, as well as increasing the operational autonomy of law enforcement and limiting the immunity protections provided to certain categories of persons. However, the COE contends that limited reporting indicates that corruption is particularly alarming higher up in the government hierarchy and in procurement for state-run enterprises. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, Belarus fell from 63rd down to 82nd place out of 180 countries in the rankings and received 41 of 100 possible points on its scale, down from 47 in 2020. For comparison in 2021, Poland ranked 42nd, Lithuania 34th, Latvia 37th, Ukraine 122nd, and Russia 136th. General Prosecutor’s Office Internatsionalnaya Street 22 Minsk, Belarus +375 17 337-43-57 info@prokuratura.gov.by Ms. Oksana Drebezova Belarus National Contact Transparency International Levkova Street 15-113, 220007 Minsk, Belarus+375 29 619 71 25 drebezovaoksana@gmail.com In 2021, the GOB repressed, imprisoned, or forced out of the country tens of thousands of peaceful protestors who had taken to the streets in opposition to the fraudulent August 2020 presidential election. There were numerous reports of beatings and torture of those arrested at the hands of security forces. Politically motivated trials against members of the opposition and rival presidential candidates and their supporters resulted in prison sentences of up to 17 years for organizing and taking part in protests. Protests against Belarus’ facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine similarly resulted in repression, arrests, and unjust prison terms for protestors across Belarus. As of March 2022, human rights organizations report at least 1,100 political prisoners in Belarus. Many international businesses have suspended their operations in Belarus as a result of the ongoing human rights violations. Belarus has a highly skilled, well-educated workforce due to its advanced system of higher and specialized education. Wages are lower than in Western Europe, the United States, and Russia. Belarus has been a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1954 and is a party to almost 50 ILO conventions. In 2004, the ILO made several recommendations regarding workers’ rights to organize and freedom of association. However, Belarus has not adequately responded to the 2004 ILO Commission of Inquiry. The Constitution, the Labor Code, and presidential decrees are the main documents regulating the Labor Market in Belarus. Prior to the 1999 Presidential Decree No. 29, most labor contracts in the country were open-ended work agreements. Decree No. 29 established a new option to employ workers on 1-5 year-long term contracts and to transfer current employees to these new type contracts. Provisions of Decree No 29 were included in the country’s Labor Code in January 2020. In 2020, more than 90 percent of employees in Belarus were working on term contracts. The term contract system generally favors the employer. The employer can choose not to renew a contract upon its expiration without giving the employee a cause for dismissal. Technically, the employer can also refuse an employee’s proposed resignation before the contract term is up, which would then require the employee to argue their case in court. The employer, on the other hand, can terminate the contract at will. There are several protected employee groups that are exempt from early termination: pregnant women, women with children of up to 3 years old, and single parents with children under 14 years old. Additionally, the employer is obligated to renew contracts with women on maternity leave and with those employees who are approaching retirement age at the end of their prior contract. Retirement age in 2021 was 58 years for women and 63 years for men. Severance pay in the case of reduction in force is prescribed in law as 13 weeks of salary and eight weeks’ notice is required for dismissal. However, severance pay only applies to workers on open-ended work agreements which comprise less than 10 percent of all labor contracts in 2020. The law provides a standard workweek of 40 hours and at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Under the law, Belarusians receive mandatory overtime and nine days of holiday pay. Overtime is limited to 10 hours a week, with a maximum of 180 hours of overtime per year. A non-standard work regime is allowed provided that the employee is provided with up to seven days of additional annual leave. In general, employees must be granted at least 24 calendar days of paid leave per year. There are special provisions for employing foreign citizens without a permanent residence permit. Such citizens must secure a work permit, which is usually granted only if an unemployed Belarusian citizen cannot perform the required work. This is verified by local Belarusian employment offices. In practice, however, few firms, excluding Belarus’ IT sector, employ significant numbers of foreigners. Those that do, tend to hire Russian citizens, who benefit from Russia’s and Belarus’ common employment regulations, streamlined thanks to the developing Union State of Russian and Belarus, and Belarus’ membership in the EAEU. Although the law provides for the rights of workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join independent unions and to strike, it places serious restrictions on the exercise of these rights. The government severely restricts independent unions. The law provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, but does not protect against anti-union discrimination and the government does not respect freedom of association or collective bargaining. Following the post-presidential election protests in late 2020 and early 2021, the GOB ordered the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus to push private firms and companies across the country form pro-government unions. Independent economic experts say at least half of all privately-owned businesses in Belarus made a show of establishing these unions to satisfy the government, but the new unions are ineffectual and unpopular. The Department of State’s Report on Human Rights Practices for 2020 provides more information: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/belarus/ The official unemployment rate in Belarus has been steady at or just below one percent for many years. According to ILO methodology, unemployment in Belarus was approximately four percent. Belarus has been a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank since December 1992. In July 2011, Belarus ratified amendments to the Convention on Establishing MIGA and concluded agreements on the legal protection of guaranteed foreign investment and the use of local currency. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Economy, these agreements finalized procedures for Belarus to become a full member of MIGA. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC – formerly known as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) is not active in Belarus and does not provide political risk insurance for investments in this country. Under Section 5 (Sense of Congress Relating to Sanctions Against Belarus), paragraph C (Prohibition on Loans and Investment) of the Belarus Democracy Act signed by the president on October 20, 2004, no loan, credit guarantee, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance should be extended by any agency of the United States government (including the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government of Belarus, except with respect to the provision of humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical products. The Belarus Democracy Act of 2020 updates this provision of the 2004 law to extend these restrictions to the IDFC. In 2021, Belarus received $1.33 billion worth of FDI, much of which came from reinvested profits from foreign investments in the manufacturing and banking sectors. Following the introduction of sanctions in response to Belarus’ facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the GOB classified all information about FDI ostensibly for national security reasons. Available statistics indicate FDI in 2021 was down 6.2 percent from the previous year and down 26.7 compared to 2014. The banking sector, in particular, saw a drop in FDI of 42.5 percent in 2021 which independent economic experts attribute to sanctions on Belarusian state-owned banks. Russia, the Netherlands, Cyprus, the Baltic countries, and Germany were the largest investors in Belarusian economy in 2021. Minsk and the Minsk region accounted for approximately two thirds of all FDI in 2021. * Please note, some data from host country data sources is not currently available outside of Belarus due to government restrictions on internet access. This includes data from the National Bank of Belarus ( http://www.nbrb.by ); Ministry of Economy ( https://www.economy.gov.by/ ); and National Statistical Committee ( https://www.belstat.gov.by/en/ ). Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $68.2 2020 $60.2 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD? locations=BY Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $21 2020 42 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $8 2019 $4 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 (not on net basis) 10% 2018 34.8% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 14,417 100% Total Outward 1,440 100% Russian Federation 4,537 31.4% Russian Federation 1,152 80% Cyprus 2,956 20.5% Ukraine 87 6.0% The Netherlands 597 4.1% Cyprus 71 4.9% Austria 573 3.9% Lithuania 41 2.8% Turkey 557 3.8% Venezuela 29 2.0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Belarus Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy Vilnius Political/Economic Section Akmenu g. 6 Vilnius, 03106, Lithuania tel. +370 (5) 266-5500 email: usembassyminsk@state.gov Belgium Executive Summary According to its most recent report, the Belgian central bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) to grow 2.6% in 2022 despite economic headwinds linked to global supply chain bottlenecks, spiking energy costs, and uncertainty related to COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts project that Belgium’s growth rate will slow but remain above potential, dipping slightly to 2.4% in 2023 and further to 1.6% in 2024. The labor market remains strong as overall job numbers continue to increase, and analysts anticipate that the unemployment rate will decline steadily to 5.7% by 2024. The inflation rate will likely continue to increase, largely driven by rising energy prices. The Belgian central bank expects the rate to peak in 2022 at 4.9% and then decline as energy markets stabilize. Belgium’s budget deficit is projected to reach 6.3% of GDP for 2021 – down from a high of 9.1% in 2020 – and will likely remain above 4% of GDP through 2024. The level of government debt will hold steady, with most experts projecting 108.9% of GDP in 2021, 106.3% in 2022 and 107.5% in 2023. Belgium is a major logistical hub and gateway to Europe, a position that helps drives its economic growth. Since June 2015, the Belgian government has undertaken a series of measures to reduce the tax burden on labor and to increase Belgium’s economic competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign investment. A July 2017 decision to lower the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% further improved the investment climate. The current coalition government has not signaled any intention to revise this tax rate. Belgium boasts an open market well connected to the major economies of the world. As a logistical gateway to Europe, host to major EU institutions, and a central location closely tied to the major European economies, Belgium is an attractive market and location for U.S. investors. Belgium is a highly developed, long-time economic partner of the United States that benefits from an extremely well-educated workforce, world-renowned research centers, and the infrastructure to support a broad range of economic activities Belgium has a dynamic economy and attracts significant levels of investment in chemicals, petrochemicals, plastics and composites; environmental technologies; food processing and packaging; health technologies; information and communication; and textiles, apparel and sporting goods, among other sectors. In 2021, Belgian exports to the U.S. market totaled $27.7 billion, registering the United States as Belgium’s fourth largest export destination. Key exports included chemicals (37.6%), machinery and equipment (10.9%), and precious metals and stones (5.9%). In terms of imports, the United States ranked as Belgium’s fourth largest supplier of imports, with the value of imported goods totaling $27.6 billion in 2021. Key imports from the United States included chemicals (38.8%), machinery and equipment (11%), and plastics (10.7%). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 22 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 45,750USD https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Belgium maintains an open economy, and its prosperity is highly dependent on international trade. Since WWII, making Belgium attractive to foreign investors has been the cornerstone of successive Belgian governments’ foreign and commercial policy. Competence over policies that weigh on the attractiveness of Belgium as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) lie predominantly with the federal government, which is responsible for developing domestic competition policy, wage setting policies, labor law, and most of the energy and fiscal policies. Attracting FDI, however, is the responsibility of Belgium’s three regional governments in Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region. Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT), Wallonia Foreign Trade and Investment Agency (AWEX) and Brussels Invest and Export (BIE) are the three investment promotion agencies responsible for attracting FDI to Belgium. One of their most visible activities is organizing the Royal Trade Missions, which are led by Princess Astrid (the king’s sister), as well as the economic part of the state visits by King Philippe. In June 2022, Princess Astrid plans to lead a Royal Trade Mission to Atlanta, New York City, and Boston with more than 500 participants. Neither the federal nor the regional governments currently maintain a formal dialogue with investors. There are no laws in place that discriminate against foreign investors. [While U.S. companies continue to play key and long-standing roles in the development of the Belgian economy, a major U.S.-based multinational firm operating in the chemical cluster near the Port of Antwerp has raised concerns that Flemish government officials have unfairly regulated the company and subjected it to strict limitations not applied to other companies operating in the same sector and space. The firm and the Flemish government remain in regular contact to seek a fair and equitable solution; however, the perceived lack of regulatory certainty could lead to a reduction of industry investment and operations in Belgium if unresolved. There are currently no limits on foreign ownership or control in Belgium, and there are no distinctions between Belgian and foreign companies when establishing or owning a business or setting up a remunerative activity. Belgian authorities are, however, developing a national security-based investment screening law that will likely establish certain restrictions based on national security concerns. The draft law is not expected to be finalized and delivered to Parliament for vote before the end of 2022. In July 2019 the OECD published an in-depth productivity review of Belgium: https://www.oecd.org/belgium/in-depth-productivity-review-of-belgium-88aefcd5-en.htm . Belgium was included in the WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Union which took place February 18-20, 2020: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp495_e.htm . In June 2021, Belgium was subject of an IMF Article IV mission: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/29/mcs062921-belgium-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2021-article-iv-mission To set up a business in Belgium, one must: 1. Deposit at least 20% of the initial capital with a Belgian credit institution and obtain a standard certification confirming that the amount is held in a blocked capital account; 2. Deposit a financial plan with a notary, and sign the deed of incorporation and the by-laws in the presence of a notary, who authenticates the documents and registers the deed of incorporation. The authentication act must be drawn up in French, Dutch, or German (Belgium’s three official languages); and 3. Register with one of the Registers of legal entities, VAT and social security at a centralized company docket and obtain a company number. In most cases, the business registration process can be completed within one week. https://www.business.belgium.be/en/setting_up_your_business Based on the number of employees, the projected annual turnover, and the shareholder class, a company will qualify as a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) according to the terms of the Promotion of Independent Enterprise Act of February 10, 1998. For a small or medium-sized enterprise, registration is possible once a certificate of competence has been obtained. The person in charge of the daily management of the company must prove his or her knowledge of business management with diplomas and/or practical experience. A company is expected to allow trade union delegations when employing 20 or more full-time equivalents (FTEs). The three Belgian regions each have their own investment promotion agency, whose services are available to all foreign investors. Flanders: Flanders Investment & Trade, https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/en Wallonia: Invest in Wallonia, http://www.investinwallonia.be/home Brussels: Why Brussels, http://why.brussels/ Belgium does not actively promote outward investment. There are no restrictions for domestic investors to invest in certain countries, other than those that fall under UN or EU sanction regimes. In June 2022, the Belgian government plans to lead a Royal Trade Mission to Atlanta, New York City, and Boston with more than 500 participants. The mission will promote both Belgian investment into the United States and encourage foreign direct investment into Belgium. 3. Legal Regime The Belgian government has adopted a generally transparent competition policy. The government has implemented tax, labor, health, safety, and other laws and policies to avoid distortions or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of investment, comparable to those in other EU member states. While U.S. companies continue to play key and long-standing roles in the development of the Belgian economy, a major U.S.-based multinational firm operating in the chemical cluster near the Port of Antwerp has raised concerns that Flemish government officials have unfairly regulated the company and subjected it to strict limitations not applied to other companies operating in the same sector and space. The firm and the Flemish government remain in regular contact to seek a fair and equitable solution; however, the perceived lack of regulatory certainty could lead to a reduction of industry investment and operations in Belgium if unresolved. Political competences in Belgium are shared between the federal government, the three regions – Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital – and the French and German linguistic communities. (Note. Flanders merged the Flemish linguistic community into its regional government. End Note.) Notwithstanding the fact that the regions in Belgium are responsible for attracting foreign investors, most regulations impacting the business environment (taxes, labor market, energy) are controlled at the federal level. In contrast, environmental regulations are developed mostly at the regional level. A regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is mandatory for all primary and some subordinate legislation submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers at the federal level and is usually shared with social partners as a basis for consultation. Belgium publishes all its relevant legislation and administrative guidelines in an official Gazette, called Het Staatsblad/Le Moniteur Belge (https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/welcome.pl ). Recognizing the need to streamline administrative procedures in many areas, in 2015 the federal government set up a special task force to simplify official procedures. Traditionally, scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted on the impact of regulations are made publicly available for comment. However, not all stakeholder comments received by regulators are made public. Accounting standards are regulated by the Belgian law of January 30, 2001, and balance sheet and profit and loss statements are in line with international accounting norms. Cash flow positions and reporting changes in non-borrowed capital formation are not required. However, contrary to IAS/IFRS standards, Belgian accounting rules do require an extensive annual policy report. Regarding Environmental, Social and Governance Impacts reporting (ESG), the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) was transposed into Belgian law in 2017. The NFRD requires very large public interest entities (PIEs) to report environmental, social and employee, human rights, anti-bribery, and corruption information on an annual basis. On April 21, 2021, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which will update the NFRD. The CSRD aims to be applicable as of fiscal year 2023 and will significantly extend the scope of reporting requirements to all large companies and all companies listed on regulated markets (except listed micro-enterprises). Regarding oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure governments follow administrative processes, local courts are expected to enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government. Recourse to the courts is available if necessary. Public finances and debt obligations are generally transparent. Details on government budgets are available online, and the debt agency (https://www.debtagency.be/en ) publishes all relevant data concerning government debt. Belgium is a founding member of the EU, whose directives and regulations are enforced. On May 25, 2018, Belgium implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679, an EU regulation on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union. Through the European Union, Belgium is a member of the WTO, and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Belgium does not maintain any measures that are inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. Belgium’s (civil) legal system is independent of the government and is a means for resolving commercial disputes or protecting property rights. Belgium has a wide-ranging codified law system since 1830. There are specialized commercial courts which apply the existing commercial and contractual laws. As in many countries, the Belgian courts labor under a growing caseload and ongoing budget cuts causing backlogs and delays. There are several levels of appeal. Payments and transfers within Belgium and with foreign countries require no prior authorization. Transactions may be executed in euros as well as in other currencies. Belgium has no debt-to-equity requirements. Dividends may be remitted freely except in cases in which distribution would reduce net assets to less than paid-up capital. No further withholding tax or other tax is due on repatriation of the original investment or on the profits of a branch, either during active operations or upon the closing of the branch. Belgian authorities are currently developing a national security-based investment screening law that will likely establish certain restrictions based on national security concerns. The law likely will not be finalized and delivered to Parliament for a vote before the end of 2022. There are three different regional Investment Authorities: Flanders: http://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com Wallonia: http://www.awex.be Brussels: https://be.brussels/brussels The contact address for competition-related concerns: Federal Competition Authority City Atrium, 6th floor Vooruitgangsstraat 50 1210 Brussels tel: +32 2 277 5272 fax: +32 2 277 5323 email: info@bma-abc.be EU member states are responsible for competition and anti-trust regulations if there are cross-border dimensions. If cross-border effects are present, EU law applies, and European institutions are competent. There are no outstanding expropriation or nationalization cases in Belgium with U.S. investors. There is no pattern of discrimination against foreign investment in Belgium. When the Belgian government uses its eminent domain powers to acquire property compulsorily for a public purpose, current market value is paid to the property owners. Recourse to the courts is available if necessary. The only expropriations that occurred during the last decade were related to infrastructure projects such as port expansions, roads, and railroads. Belgian bankruptcy law falls is under the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. The commercial court appoints a judge-auditor to preside over the bankruptcy proceeding and whose primary task is to supervise the management and liquidation of the bankrupt estate, in particular with respect to the claims of the employees. Belgian bankruptcy law recognizes several classes of preferred or secured creditors. A person who has been declared bankrupt may subsequently start a new business unless the person is found guilty of certain criminal offences that are directly related to the bankruptcy. The Business Continuity Act of 2009 provides the possibility for companies in financial difficulty to enter into a judicial reorganization. These proceedings are to some extent similar to Chapter 11 as the aim is to facilitate business recovery. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, Belgium ranks number 9 (out of 190) for the ease of resolving insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies In Belgium, investment incentives and subsidies are the responsibility of Belgian’s three regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital. Nonetheless, most tax measures remain under the control of the federal government as do the parameters (social security, wage agreements) that govern general salary and benefit levels. In general, all regional and national incentives are available to foreign and domestic investors alike. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Belgian investment incentive programs at all levels of government are limited by EU regulations and are normally kept in line with those of the other EU member states. The European Commission has tended to discourage certain investment incentives in the belief that they distort the single market, impair structural change, and threaten EU convergence, as well as social and economic cohesion. In their investment policies, the regional governments emphasize innovation promotion, research and development, energy savings, environmental protection, exports, and employment. In order achieve this, a wide variety of tax benefits and incentives is available at both the federal and regional levels. The three regional agencies have staff specializing on specific regions of the world, including the United States, and have representation offices in different countries. In addition, the Finance Ministry has a foreign investment tax unit to provide assistance and to make the tax administration more “user friendly” to foreign investors. More information about investing in Belgium, the Belgian tax system, tax benefits and incentives can be found at: https://business.belgium.be/en . Tax advice and support can be requested, free of charge at the Foreign Investment Tax Unit of the Federal Public Service Finance ( taxinvest@minfin.fed.be ). There are no foreign trade zones or free ports as such in Belgium. However, the country utilizes the concept of customs warehouses. A customs warehouse is approved by the customs authorities where imported goods may be stored without payment of customs duties and VAT. Only non-EU goods can be placed under a customs warehouse regime. In principle, non-EU goods of any kind may be admitted, regardless of their nature, quantity, and country of origin or destination. Individuals and companies wishing to operate a customs warehouse must be established in the EU and obtain authorization from the customs authorities. Authorization may be obtained by filing a written request and by demonstrating an economic need for the warehouse. Performance requirements in Belgium usually relate to the number of jobs created. There are no national requirement rules for senior management or board of directors. There are no known cases where export targets or local purchase requirements were imposed, with the exception of military offset programs. While the government reserves the right to reclaim incentives if the investor fails to meet his employment commitments, enforcement is rare. However, in 2012, with the announced closure of an automotive plant in Flanders, the Flanders regional government successfully reclaimed training subsidies that had been provided to the company. There is currently no requirement for foreign IT providers to share source code and/or provide access to surveillance agencies. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights in Belgium are well protected by law, and the courts are independent and considered effective in enforcing property rights. Mortgages and liens exist through a reliable recording system operated by the Belgian notaries. Industrial spaces that are unused and neglected can be subject to levies. Owners of building plots are not required to build on them within a certain period. However, exceptions exist for plots that retain construction obligations. On those plots, owners are obliged to build within a certain timeframe. Belgium generally meets very high standards for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). The EU has issued a number of directives to promote the protection and enforcement of IPR, which EU Member States are required to implement. National laws that do not conflict with those of the EU also apply. Belgium is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and so is party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Belgium is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. IPR is administered by the Belgian Office of Intellectual Property (OPRI), which is part of the Directorate-General for Economic Regulation in the Ministry for Economic Affairs: https://economie.fgov.be/en/themes/intellectual-property/institutions-and-actors/belgian-office-intellectual . This office manages and provides Belgian IPR titles, oversees public awareness campaigns, drafts legislation, and advises Belgian authorities with regard to national and international issues. The Belgian Ministry of Justice is responsible for enforcement of IPR. Belgium experiences a rate of commercial and digital infringement – particularly internet music piracy and illegal copying of software – similar to most EU Member States. Belgium is not included on USTR’s Special 301 Report. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Belgium has policies in place to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Credit is allocated at market rates and is available to foreign and domestic investors without discrimination. Belgium is fully served by the international banking community and is implementing all relevant EU financial directives. Bruges established the world’s first stock market almost 600 years ago, and the Belgian stock exchange is well-established today. On Euronext, a company may increase its capital either by capitalizing reserves or by issuing new shares. An increase in capital requires a legal registration procedure, and new shares may be offered either to the public or to existing shareholders. A public notice is not required if the offer is to existing shareholders, who may subscribe to the new shares directly. An issue of bonds to the public is subject to the same requirements as a public issue of shares: the company’s capital must be entirely paid up, and existing shareholders must be given preferential subscription rights. In 2016, the Belgian government passed legislation to improve entrepreneurial financing through crowdfunding and more flexible capital venture rules. Because the Belgian economy is directed toward international trade, more than half of its banking activities involve foreign countries. Belgium’s major banks are represented in the financial and commercial centers of dozens of countries by subsidiaries, branch offices, and representative offices. The country does have a central bank, the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), whose governor is also a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being a Eurozone member state, the NBB is part of the Euro system, meaning that it has transferred the sovereignty over monetary policy to the ECB. Since 2017, the supervision of systemically important Belgian banks lies with the ECB. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are there any correspondent banking relationships currently in jeopardy. The Belgian non-performing Loan Ratio stood at 0.7% in 2021. Total bank assets amount to about 90% of GDP. Opening a bank account in the country is linked to residency status. The U.S. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) requires Belgian banks to report information on U.S. account holders directly to the Belgian tax authorities, who then release the information to the IRS. Belgium implemented a basic banking service law in 2021 which aims to give entrepreneurs otherwise unable to open a bank account the right to do so. For example, companies that have been refused the ability to open a bank account by three credit institutions are entitled to a basic banking service. According to the law, a basic banking service room – administered by the government – will confirm evidence of three refusals, and designate a credit institution in Belgium that must offer the basic banking service to the company. Even though the law is still not fully implemented, authorities anticipate nationwide implementation in 2022. Belgium has a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in the form of the Federal Holding and Investment Company (FPIM-SFPI), a quasi-independent entity created in 2006 and now mainly used as a vehicle to manage the banking assets which were taken on board during the 2008 banking crisis. The SWF has a board whose members reflect the composition of the governing coalition and are regularly audited by the “Cour des Comptes” or national auditor. At the end of 2020, its total assets amounted to €1.96 billion. Most of the funds are invested domestically. Its role is to allow public entities to recoup their investments and support Belgian banks. The SWF is required by law to publish an annual report and is subject to the same domestic and international accounting standards and rules. The SWF routinely fulfills all legal obligations. However, it is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belgium has around 80,000 employees working in SOEs, mainly in the railways, telecoms and general utility sectors. There are also several regional-owned enterprises where the regions often have a controlling majority. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions, but since the EU started to liberalize network industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and railways, there have been regular complaints in Belgium about unfair competition from the former state monopolists. Complaints have ranged from lower salaries (railways) to lower VAT rates (gas and electricity) to regulators with a conflict of interest (telecom). Although these complaints have now largely subsided, many of these former monopolies are now market leaders in their sector, due mainly to their ability to charge high access costs to legacy networks that were fully amortized years ago. Belgium currently has no scheduled privatizations. There are no indications that foreign investors would be excluded from eventual privatizations. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Belgian government encourages both foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted Corporate Social Responsibility principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The Belgian government also encourages adherence to the OECD Due Diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected areas. When it comes to human rights, labor rights, consumer and environmental protection, or laws/regulations which would protect individuals from adverse business impacts, the Belgian government is generally considered to enforce domestic laws in a fair and effective manner. There is a general awareness of corporate social responsibility among producers and consumers. Boards of directors are encouraged to pay attention to corporate social responsibility in the 2009 Belgian Code on corporate governance. This Code, also known as the ‘Code Buysse II’ stresses the importance of sound entrepreneurship, good corporate governance, an active board of directors and an advisory council. It deals with unlisted companies and is complementary to existing Belgian legislation. However, adherence to the Code Buysse II is not factored into public procurement decisions. For listed companies, far stricter guidelines apply, which are monitored by the Financial Services and Markets Authority. Belgium is part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. There are currently no alleged or reported human or labor rights concerns relating to responsible business conduct (RBC) that foreign businesses should be aware of. In cases of violations, the Belgian government generally enforces domestic laws effectively and fairly. NGOs and unions that promote or monitor RBC can do so freely. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Trafficking in Persons Report Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Due to the federal state structure of Belgium and the different areas of competence and responsibility, climate policy is divided between the regions and the federal state. More information about Belgian climate policies, as well as the implementation of EU and UN climate-related agreements and guidelines, can be found here: https://klimaat.be/klimaatbeleid/belgisch/nationaal/langetermijnstrategie#:~:text=De%20Belgische%20langetermijnstrategie&text=Deze%20strategie%20omvat%20streefdoelen%20voor,om%20deze%20streefdoelen%20te%20bereiken . As a member of the EU, Belgium subscribes to the system of emissions trading (the European Emissions Trading System or EU ETS) for industrial installations. The system is applicable to large installations (with a thermal input of more than 20 MW) in industries such as electricity production and aviation, among others. Depending on the concrete activities and characteristics of a company, different environmental permits may be required. Being a regional matter, these requirements can differ depending on the region in which a company is active: Flanders: https://www.vlaanderen.be/omgevingsvergunning Wallonia: https://www.wallonie.be/fr/demarches/demander-un-permis-denvironnement-ou-un-permis-unique-pour-un-etablissement-de-classe-1-ou-2 Brussels-Capital: https://urbanisme.irisnet.be/lepermisdurbanisme/autres-premis-et-certificats/le-permis-unique?set_language=fr 9. Corruption Belgian has extensive anti-bribery laws in place. Bribing foreign officials is a criminal offense in Belgium. Belgium has been a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and is a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Anti-bribery legislation provides for jurisdiction in certain cases over persons (foreign as well as Belgian nationals) who commit bribery offenses outside the territory of Belgium. Various limitations apply, however. For example, if the bribe recipient exercises a public function in an EU member state, Belgian prosecution may not proceed without the formal consent of the other state. Under Belgian law bribery is considered passive if a government official or employer requests or accepts a benefit for him or herself or for somebody else in exchange for behaving in a certain way. Active bribery is defined as the proposal of a promise or benefit in exchange for undertaking a specific action. Corruption by public officials carries heavy fines and/or imprisonment between 5 (five) and 10 years. Private individuals face similar fines and slightly shorter prison terms (between six months and two years). The current law not only holds individuals accountable, but also the company for which they work. Recent court cases in Belgium suggest that corruption is most prevalent in government procurement and public works contracting. American companies have not, however, identified corruption as a barrier to investment. The responsibility for enforcing corruption laws is shared by the Ministry of Justice through investigating magistrates of the courts, and the Ministry of the Interior through the Belgian federal police, which has jurisdiction over all criminal cases. A special unit, the Central Service for Combating Corruption, has been created for enforcement purposes but continues to lack the necessary staff. Belgium is also an active participant in the Global Forum on Asset Recovery. The Belgian Employers Federation encourages its members to establish internal codes of conduct aimed at prohibiting bribery. To date, U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Office of the Federal Prosecutor of Belgium Transparency International Belgium Resources to Report Corruption Wolstraat 66-1 – 1000 Brussels T 02 55 777 64 F 02 55 777 94 Transparency Belgium Nijverheidsstraat 10, 1000 Brussels tel: +32 (0)2 893 2584 email: info@transparencybelgium.be NOTE TO DRAFTER: In preparation of this section, drafters should consult with the Post Human Rights Reporting Officer, to ensure consistency with the Corruption section and other sections of the Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 10. Political and Security Environment Belgium is a peaceful, democratic nation comprised of federal, regional, and municipal political units: the Belgian federal government, the regional governments of Flanders, Wallonia, the Brussels-Capital region, and communes (municipalities). Political divisions do exist between the Flemish and the Walloons, but they are addressed in democratic institutions and generally resolved through compromise. The Federal Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, remains in office as long as it retains the confidence of the lower house (Chamber of Representatives) of the bicameral parliament. In 2021, a seven-year-long investigation into an attempted sabotage of the Doel nuclear power plant – perpetrated in 2014 – ended inconclusively in 2021. Investigators concluded that the incident was likely carried out by a plant employee or subcontractor who had a legitimate reason to be in the area where the sabotage occurred. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Belgian labor force is generally well trained, highly motivated and very productive. Workers have an excellent command of foreign languages, particularly in Flanders. There is a low unemployment rate among skilled workers. EU Enlargement facilitated the entry of skilled workers into Belgium from newer member states. Non-EU nationals must apply for work permits before they can be employed. Minimum wages vary according to the age and responsibility level of the employee and are adjusted for the cost of living. Belgian workers are highly unionized and usually enjoy good salaries and benefits. Belgian wage and social security contributions, along with those in Germany, are among the highest in Western Europe. For 2019, Belgium’s harmonized unemployment figure was 5.4 percent, below the EU28 average of 6.4 percent (OECD). High wage levels and pockets of high unemployment coexist, reflecting both strong productivity in new technology sector investments and weak skills of Belgium’s long-term unemployed, whose overall education level is significantly lower than that of the general population. There are also significant differences in regional unemployment levels (2019 figures): 3.3 percent in Flanders, against 7.2 percent in Wallonia and 12.7 percent in Brussels. At the same time, shortages exist, mainly of workers with a degree in the sciences, mathematics, ICT, and engineering. Given the nature of the informal economy, relatively few reliable figures are available. However, according to the IMF, the importance of the Belgian informal sector stood at around 17% of GDP at the end of 2015. This relatively high percentage can be attributed mainly to the high Belgian personal income tax rates that often make it financially worthwhile to avoid the payment of such taxes through formalized employers. The Belgian Central Bank states the informal economy is mainly based in the construction, catering, and household services sectors. Belgian’s comprehensive social security package is composed of five major elements: family allowance, unemployment insurance, retirement, medical benefits and a sick leave program that guarantees salary in event of illness. Currently, average employer payments to the social security system stand at 25 percent of salary while employee contributions comprise 13 percent. In addition, many private companies offer supplemental programs for medical benefits and retirement. Belgian labor unions, while maintaining a national superstructure, are, in effect, divided along linguistic lines. The two main confederations, the Confederation of Christian Unions and the General Labor Federation of Belgium exert a strong influence in the country, politically and socially. A national bargaining process covers inter-professional agreements that the trade union confederations negotiate biennially with the government and the employers’ associations. In addition to these negotiations, bargaining on wages and working conditions takes place in the various industrial sectors and at the plant level. About 51 percent of employees from the public service and private sector are labor union members. Wage negotiations in Belgium often lead to large manifestations and strikes, which sometimes force public transport and major roads to close temporarily. Firing a Belgian employee can be very expensive. An employee may be dismissed immediately for cause, such an illegal activity, but when a reduction in force occurs, the procedure is far more complicated. In those instances where the employer and employee cannot agree on the amount of severance pay or indemnity, the case is referred to the labor courts for a decision. To avoid these complications, some firms include a “trial period” (of up to one year) in any employer-employee contract. Belgium is a strict adherent to ILO labor conventions. Belgium was one of the first countries in the EU to harmonize its legislation with the EU Works Council Directive of December 1994. Its flexible approach to the consultation and information requirements specified in the Directive compares favorably with that of other EU member states. In 2015, the Belgian government increased the retirement age from the current age of 65 to 66 as of 2027 and 67 as of 2030. Under the 2015 retirement plan, various schemes for early retirement before the age of 65 will be gradually phased out, and unemployment benefits will decrease over time as an incentive for the unemployed to regain employment. Wage increases are negotiated by sector within the parameters set by automatic wage indexation and the 1996 Law on Competitiveness. The purpose of automatic wage indexation is to establish a bottom margin that protects employees against inflation: for every increase in consumer price index above 2 percent, wages must be increased by (at least) 2 percent as well. The top margin is determined by the competitiveness law, which requires the Central Economic Council (CCE) to study wage projections in neighboring countries and make a recommendation on the maximum margin that will ensure Belgian competitiveness. The CCE is made up of civil society organizations, primarily representatives from employer and employee organizations, and its mission is to promote a socio-economic compromise in Belgium by providing informed recommendations to the government. The CCE’s projected increases in neighboring countries have historically been higher than their real increases, however, and have caused Belgium’s wages to increase more rapidly than its neighbors. Since 2016 however, that wage gap has decreased substantially. Belgian labor law provides for dispute settlement procedures, with the labor minister appointing an official as mediator between the employers and employee representatives. In February 2022, the federal government reached an agreement on a plan to reform aspects of the labor market, including the introduction of a voluntary four-day work week, relaxed rules allowing employees to work longer into the night (8:00 p.m. – 12:00 a.m.) and the right to “disconnect,” a privilege already afforded to civil servants who are no longer obliged to respond to work-related messages during off-hours. 14. Contact for More Information Pieter-Jan VAN STEENKISTE Economic Specialist Regentlaan, 27 – BE1000 Brussels 0032 475 706 529 vansteenkistepj@state.gov Belize Executive Summary Belize has the smallest economy in Central America, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US $1.3 billion in 2021, a 12.5 percent expansion over the previous year. Due to mounting fiscal pressures and a need to diversify and expand its economy, the Government of Belize (GoB) is open to, and actively seeks, foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the small population of the country (2021 estimate – 432,516 persons), high cost of doing business, high public debt, bureaucratic delays, often insufficient infrastructure, and corruption constitute investment challenges. The Central Bank of Belize projects the country’s GDP will likely expand 6.0 percent in 2022 while the IMF’s projects 6.5 percent growth, led by a rebound of activity in the construction, retail and wholesale trade, transport and communication, and tourism sectors. Public debt declined from 133 percent of GDP in 2020 to 108 percent in 2021. This was in large part due to the Blue Bond Agreement, a successful marine protection and conservation-driven financial transaction. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which the authorities are keeping as reserve. Belize’s government encourages FDI to relieve fiscal pressure and transform the economy. The Central Bank of Belize recorded increased inflows of FDI at US $152.25 million in 2021 and outflows at US $24.4 million in the same period. FDI inflows were concentrated primarily in real estate, construction, financial intermediation, and the hotel and restaurant industries. Generally, Belize has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control of companies; however, foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. The Government of Belize (GoB) made progress on the ease of doing business through trade license, stamp duty, exchange control, and land reforms to streamline business applications and related processes. The banking system remains stable but fragile. Since January 2020, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent banking relationship, a significant portion of the sector. In March 2022, the GoB lowered the business tax on the net interest income charged to banks and financial institutions to encourage lending in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sectors. There were incidents of property destruction at two American companies involved in sugar cane industry in the last year. In response, a prominent agro-productive organization wrote to the Government in January 2022 expressing concerns that the Belizean government’s failure to protect and support private sector investors in these instances led to damaging the investment climate and the Belizean economy. Belize is categorized as a small island developing state (SIDS) that is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and is a relatively minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. Belize’s updated National Determined Contributions (NDC) is nonetheless committed to developing a long-term strategy aligned with achieving net zero global emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 64 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,110 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Belize’s government encourages FDI to relieve fiscal pressure and transform the economy. In November 2021, the Government of Belize hosted its first national Investment Summit under the theme “Belize: Open for Business.” The Government of Belize also conducted trade missions to the United States to promote itself as an investment destination and credible export market. In April 2022, senior Belizean government representatives hosted a diaspora tour in the United States to encourage Belizean-Americans to invest in Belize. The estimated Belize diaspora is 300,000 persons. While the government is interested in attracting FDI, certain bureaucratic and regulatory requirements impede investment and growth. Public debt declined from 133 percent of GDP in 2020 to 108 percent in 2021. This was in large part due to the Blue Bond Agreement, a successful marine protection and conservation-driven financial transaction. Under this deal, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) lent funds to Belize to buy back its Superbond (totaling US $553 million or 30 percent of GDP) at a discounted price of 55 cents per dollar. In exchange, Belize committed to increase expenditure on marine conservation until 2041 and to expand its Biodiversity Protection Zones to 30 percent by 2026. There are no laws that explicitly discriminate against foreign investors. In practice, however, investors complain that lack of transparency, land insecurity, bureaucracy, delays, and corruption are factors that make it difficult to do business in Belize. U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement, and dispute settlement processes, in particular relating to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The Belize Trade and Investment Development Service (BELTRAIDE; www.belizeinvest.org.bz ) is the investment and export promotion agency. It promotes FDI through various incentive packages and identified priority sectors. Export-orientated businesses operating in less developed areas also receive preferential treatment. The Economic Development Council, https://edc.gov.bz , is a public-private sector advisory body established to advance public sector reforms, to promote private sector development and to inform policies for growth and development. Belize acknowledges the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. Foreign and domestic entities must first register their business before engaging in business. They must also register for the appropriate taxes, including business tax and general sales tax, as well as obtain a social security number and trade license. Generally, Belize has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control of companies; however, foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. To register a business name, foreigners must apply with a Belizean partner or someone with a permanent residence. Requirements differ based on the applicant’s residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local or foreign currency account. Foreign investments must be registered and obtain an “Approved Status” from the Central Bank to facilitate inflows and outflows of foreign currency and repatriate funds gained from profits, dividends, loan payments, and interest. The Exchange Control Regulation Act was amended in 2020 to relax the requirement for non-residents to obtain prior permission from the Central Bank to conduct transaction in securities and real estate. The amendment now requires for prior written notice to the Central Bank with full particulars of the transaction. Some investment incentives show preference to Belizean-owned companies. For example, to qualify for a tour operator license, a business must be majority-owned by Belizeans or permanent residents of Belize ( http://www.belizetourismboard.org ). This qualification is negotiable, particularly where a tour operation would expand into a new sector of the market and does not result in competition with local operators. The government does not impose any intellectual property transfer requirements. Foreign investors seeking to avail themselves of various incentives programs are required to adhere to screening guidelines outlined in the specific program. These may include updating their shareholders registry, obtaining requisite Central Bank of Belize approvals, and fulfilling performance requirements. Foreign investors undertaking large capital investments are also advised to adhere to environmental laws and regulations. The government requires developers to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for certain projects. When purchasing land or planning to develop in or near an ecologically sensitive zone, the government recommends the EIA fully address any measures by the investor to mitigate environmental risks. The Department of Environment website, http://www.doe.gov.bz has more information on the Environmental Protection Act and other regulations, applications, and guidelines. In the past three years, there has been no investment policy review of Belize by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Belize concluded its third Trade Policy Review in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2017. In the past five years, civil society organizations concerned with investment policy lobbied directly with government. As an example, the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Belize Network of NGOs, and the opposition were represented on the National Oversight Committee during the height of the COVID- 19 pandemic. BELTRAIDE ( http://www.belizeinvest.org.bz ), a statutory body of the Government of Belize, operates as the country’s investment and export promotion agency. Its investment facilitation services are open to all investors, foreign and domestic. While there are support measures to advance greater inclusion of women and minorities in entrepreneurial initiatives and training, the business facilitation measures do not generally distinguish by gender or economic status. The GoB made progress on the ease of doing business through trade license, stamp duty, exchange control, and land reforms to streamline business applications and related processes. Myriad government services are going digital. Business and personal income tax offices amalgamated into the Belize Tax Service which launched an online tax payment system. Belize’s Financial Inclusion Strategy also expands access of financial services to underserved populations. Businesses must register with the tax department and local government to pay business and general sales tax and obtain a trade license. An employer should also register employees for social security. Permission from the Central Bank is required for all overseas investments between residents and non-residents The Belize Companies and Corporate Affairs Registry (tel: +501 822 0421; email: info@belizecompaniesregistry.gov.bz ; website: https://belizecompaniesregistry.gov.bz ) is responsible for the registration process of all local businesses and companies. Belize does not promote or incentivize outward investments. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, the Central Bank places currency controls on investment abroad, with Central Bank approval required prior to foreign currency outflows. 3. Legal Regime There are no reports of government policies, processes, or laws significantly distort or discriminate against foreign investors. Nonetheless, some investors have complained of systematic shortfalls such as unreliable land titles and bureaucratic delays or corruption, which hinder doing business in Belize. U.S. firms have also identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement, and dispute settlement processes, particular to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). There are no nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations that manage regulatory processes. NGOs and private sector associations do lobby on behalf of their members but have no statutory authority. Regulatory authority exists both at the local and national levels with national laws and regulations being most relevant to foreign businesses. The cabinet dictates government policies that are enacted by the legislature and implemented by the various government authorities. Some quasi-governmental organizations are also mandated by law to manage specific regulatory processes, e.g., the Belize Tourism Board, BELTRAIDE, and the Belize Agricultural Health Authority. Regulations exist at the local level, primarily relating to property taxes and registering for trade licenses to operate businesses in the municipality. Some supra-national organizations and regulatory structures exist. For example, some elements of international trade affecting U.S. businesses are affected by CARICOM treaties, as in the case of the export of sugar within CARICOM. Accounting, legal, and regulatory systems are consistent with international norms. Publicly owned companies generally receive audits annually, and the reports are in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and International Standards on Auditing. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Draft bills or regulations are generally made available for public comment through a public consultation process. Once introduced in the House of Representatives, draft bills are sent to the relevant standing committee, which then meet and invite the public and interested persons to review, recommend changes, or object to draft laws prior to further debate. The mechanism for drafting bills, and enacting regulations and legislation generally applies across the board and includes investment laws and regulations. Public comments on draft legislation are not generally posted online nor made publicly available. In a few instances, laws are passed quickly without meaningful publication, public review, or public debate. The government does not generally disclose the basis on which it reviews regulations. Some government agencies make scientific studies publicly available. Printed copies of the Belize Government Gazette contain proposed as well as enacted laws and regulations and are publicly available for a subscription fee. Additionally, enacted laws are published free of cost on the website of the National Assembly or Parliament, but there is a delay in updating the website. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable with regulatory decisions subject to judicial review. The Office of the Ombudsman also may investigate allegations of official wrongdoing but has no legal authority to bring judicial charges. Reports of wrongdoing are submitted to the affected ministry. Additionally, the Annual Report of the Ombudsman is presented to the National Assembly and is a publicly available document. The offices for business and personal income tax amalgamated into the Belize Tax Service, which launched an online tax payment system in August 2021. The Companies Registries, along with the court system, are being digitized to facilitate e-filing of documents and online payment of fees. In March 2022, the government lowered business tax on the net interest income charged to banks and financial institutions with a view to incentivizing lending in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors and at the same time increased the tax on specific sectors to disincentivize personal and distribution loans. The amendments to the tax system will improve tax collection and a stem leakage. Other anticipated reforms are expected to improve the ease of doing business, provide greater transparency and stimulate economic growth with lending to foreign exchange earning sectors. Information on public finance, both the government’s budget and its debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) are widely accessible to the public, with most documents available online. The budget documents do not include information on contingent or state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt unless the GoB guarantees or is paying these debts. Nonetheless, the audited annual reports of all major SOEs were publicly available on their websites. The Auditor General’s report on government spending, however, is often significantly delayed. As a full member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Belize’s foreign, economic and trade policies vis-a-vis non-member states are coordinated regionally. The country’s import tariffs are largely defined by CARICOM’s Common External Tariff. Besides CARICOM, Belize is a member of the Central American Integration System (SICA) at a political level, but is not a part of the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) that supports economic integration with Central America. Belize is also a member of the WTO and adheres to the Organization’s agreements and reporting system. The Belize Bureau of Standards (BBS) is the national standards body responsible for preparing, promoting, and implementing standards for goods, services, and processes. The BBS operates in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the CARICOM Regional Organization for Standards and Quality. The BBS is also a member of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Codex Alimentarius. As a former British colony, Belize follows the English Common Law legal system. The Belize Constitution is the supreme law and founded on the principle of a separation of powers with independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches of government. Belize has a written Contract Act, but no specialized courts to deal with commercial disputes or cases. The judicial system remains generally independent of the executive branch. Case law exists where the judiciary has ruled against the government, and its judgements are respected and authoritative. The highest appellate court exists outside of Belize at the Caribbean Court of Justice, providing a level of independence for the judiciary. The judiciary remains underfunded and understaffed resulting in frequent adjournments, delays, poor case-flow management and a backlog of cases. General information relating to Belize’s judicial and legal system, including links to Belize’s Constitution, Laws and judicial decisions are available at the Judiciary of Belize website www.belizejudiciary.org . Businesses and citizens may appeal regulations and enforcement actions. Regulatory decisions are also subject to judicial review. Judgments by the Belize Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org . The Caribbean Court of Justice has two jurisdictions, appellate and original, in relation to CARICOM Members States. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ is the final court of appeal for both civil and criminal matters emanating from CARICOM Member States. In its original jurisdiction, this Court is responsible for interpreting and applying the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The country has an English Common Law legal system supplemented by local legislation and regulations. The legal system does not generally discriminate against foreign investment and there are no restrictions to foreign ownership. The Exchange Control Act and its subsidiary laws and regulations, however, provide the legal framework that applies to foreign ownership and control. Other laws stipulate that foreign investment can qualify for incentives; citizens have the right to private property; contracts are legally binding and enforceable, and regulations are subject to judicial review among other provisions favorable to foreign investment. Major laws enacted or amended are generally available in the National Assembly’s website at www.nationalassembly.gov.bz . For the previous year, these include the Blue Bond Loan Act, 2021; Companies (Amendment) Act, 2021; Data Protection Act, 2021; Electronic Evidence Bill, 2021; Electronic Transactions Act, 2021; Electronic Transfer of Funds Crime Act, 2021; Immigration (Amendment) Act,, 2021; Patents (Amendment) Act, 2021; Public Sector Data Sharing Act, 2021; Securities Industry Act, 2021; Stamp Duties (Amendment) Act, 2021; Sugar Industry (Amendment) Act, 2021; Trademarks (Amendment) Act, 2021; Tax Administration and Procedures (Amendment) Act, 2021; Central Bank of Belize (Amendment) Act, 2022; and Income and Business Tax (Amendment) Act, 2022. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment, and the laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements related to investors differ depending on the nature of the investment. BELTRAIDE provides advisory services for foreign investors relating to procedures for doing business in Belize and what incentives might be available to qualifying investors. Further information is available at the BELTRAIDE website: http://www.belizeinvest.org.bz Belize does not have any laws governing competition, but there are attempts to limit outside competition in certain industries (such as food and agriculture) by levying high import duties and import licensing requirements. The government used the right of eminent domain in several cases to expropriate private property, including land belonging to foreign investors. There were no new expropriation cases in 2021. However, claimants in previous cases of expropriation assert the GoB failed to honor agreements entered into by a previous administration. Belizean law requires that the government assess and compensate according to fair market value. Expropriation cases can take several years to settle and there are a few cases where compensation is still pending. Belize nationalized two companies in public-private partnership: Belize Electricity Limited and Belize Telemedia Limited. These actions were challenged in the courts and resolved in 2015 and 2017, respectively. The Caribbean Court of Justice delivered a judgment relating to the Belmopan Land Development Corporation Limited (BLDCL) in January 2022, wherein it upheld the decision of the trial judge in favor of BLDCL. The case pertained to compensation owed by the government for 1,394 acres of land expropriated in 2013. After negotiations for market value failed, the matter was taken before local courts. The CCJ upheld the trial judge’s quantum of damages to BLDCL for just over US $8 million. The Bankruptcy Act of Belize provides for bankruptcy filings. The Act provides for the establishment of receivership, trustees, adjudication, and seizures of the property of the bankrupt. The court may order the arrest of the debtor as well as the seizure of assets and documents in the event the debtor may flee or avoid payment to creditors. The Director of Public Prosecutions may institute proceedings for offenses related to the bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy law generally outlines actions a creditor may take to recoup losses. Bankruptcy protections are not as comprehensive as U.S. bankruptcy law. 4. Industrial Policies The legal framework authorizing and providing for investment incentives include the Fiscal Incentives Act, the Designated Processing Areas Act, the Free Zones Act, the International Business Companies Act, the Retired Persons Incentives Act, the Diaspora Retiree Incentive Program, the Trusts Act, the Offshore Banking Act, and the Gaming Control Act. These acts offer a range of incentives including tax deferments, tax reductions, access to land and capital, and preferential access to some government concessions. While government policies support public private partnerships, they do not generally issue guarantees or joint financing of foreign direct investment projects. In exceptional circumstances, guarantees have been issued for SOE investments to purse funding from development institutions. In October 2021, the GoB approved a draft public private partnership policy (PPP) and the creation of the PPP unit to mobilize private sector capital to support large-scale investments in infrastructure and other development projects. In March 2022, the government amended the Income and Business Tax Act to decrease the incentive lending rate from 15 percent to 12 percent in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors including tourism, agriculture, and business processing outsourcing. The Central Bank of Belize and the Government of Belize also established the Emergency Business Support Program (EBSP) in the last year to provide financing through domestic banks and the Development Finance Corporation to businesses affected by the COVID –19 pandemic. The Designated Processing Areas Act (DPA) was passed in 2018 to replace the former Export Processing Zone Act. The DPA remains a tool to attract local and foreign investments that follow value-added business models to boost production for export markets. Approved companies under this program receive a DPA status for a period of up to ten years and may qualify for various tax exemptions. Approved companies are given certain exemptions, including from the Trade Licensing Act requirements for operating in a municipality and the Supplies Control Act, in relation to the importation of raw materials for production that are not available in Belize. Companies may maintain a foreign currency account in a domestic or international bank located in Belize as well as sell, lease, or transfer goods and services between DPA companies. While subject to the Income and Business Tax, businesses may qualify for a preferential tax rate on chargeable income. They may also be eligible for an annual quota for fuel solely for specified uses. A Free Zone Act passed in 2019 amended the Commercial Free Zone (CFZ) Act. Belize currently has two CFZs, one on the northern border with Mexico and a small zone on the western border with Guatemala. The legislation limited the activities allowed in CFZ to specific sectors. Banks and financial institutions licensed under the laws of Belize are allowed to operate within a CFZ, but their transactions are limited to only CFZ-centered business. Companies may operate both in the national customs territory and in the Free Zone, but must maintain separate accounts in respect of business activities. Additionally, goods entering the customs territory are subject to customs duties. The Commercial Free Zone Management Agency (CFZMA) monitors and administers the free zones. Incentives include exemptions from import duties, income tax, taxes on dividends, capital gains tax, or any new corporate tax levied by the government during the first ten years of operation. In addition, imports and exports of a CFZ are exempt from customs duties, consumption taxes, excise taxes, or in-transit taxes, except those destined for or directly entering areas subject to the national customs territory. Domestic and foreign investors seeking to access incentives offered under the various incentive programs must comply with the program conditions including performance requirements. Investments that have been approved for incentives generally report to the authorizing agency, namely BELTRAIDE or the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment, to ensure they meet stipulations on the concession. The Fiscal Incentives Act awards a qualified entity a development concession during the start-up or expansion stages to foster growth by offsetting custom duties. According to BELTRAIDE (www.belizeinvest.org.bz), two programs are offered under this Act: the Regular Program for investments exceeding US $150,000 and the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) program for investments of less than US $150,000. In general, investment incentives are applicable to both domestic and foreign investors. The Fiscal Incentives SME Program, however, is aimed at smaller enterprises with a minimum of 51 percent Belizean ownership. The SME Program offers the same benefits of the Regular Program, except for the allowable timeframe for duty exemptions. Under this program, companies are allowed a maximum of five years of development concessions, with the expectation that after this period, companies can mature into the Regular Program. The Qualified Retirement Program (QRP) was created to facilitate eligible persons who have met the income requirements to permanently live and retire in Belize. The Belize Tourism Board oversees this program designed to benefit retired persons over 45 years of age. To qualify, applicants need proof of income not less than US $2,000 per month through a pension or annuity generated outside of Belize. An approved QRP is allowed to import personal effects as well as approved means of transportation, free of customs duties and taxes. Under the program, beneficiaries cannot engage in employment, own a business or invest in Belize. In November 2021, Belize passed the Data Protection Act, which is partially aligned with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Act mandates the sharing of data between governmental agencies and categorizes financial records as sensitive personal data. It also lays out fines are as high as US $250,000. The Act creates a carve-out for international transfers of data to cloud storage outside Belize whereby no consent is required from data subjects. Additionally, the Act gives a three-day window as the default for notifying the Commissioner and data subjects of breaches. 5. Protection of Property Rights The preamble of the Belize Constitution preserves the right of the individual to own private property to operate private businesses. Common law, Belize legislation, and case law all reinforce property rights and interests. Private entities, whether foreign or local, have the right to freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in property and business enterprises. Generally, the country has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control; however, foreign investments in Belize must be registered at the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. Mortgages and liens exist, and related real estate is recorded with the registry of the Lands and Survey Department. The Lands and Survey Department has a history of corruption, and there have been charges of land fraud, abuses, and cronyism leveled against the Department during each administration. As part of its land reform policy, the Lands Department continues to engage with the public through mobile clinics, where Lands Department personnel visit communities across to country to address land concerns, including issuing freehold titles. Investors are nonetheless advised to perform due diligence prior to purchasing property. Foreign and/or non-resident investors are not allowed to acquire national lease property but may acquire titled privately owned property. The Central Bank regulates real estate transactions involving non-residents for exchange control purposes. Additionally, the rate of stamp duty chargeable on land transfers involving foreign persons or a foreign controlled company is 8 percent for land transfers valued in excess of US $10,000, as opposed to 5 percent on transfers involving Belizeans and CARICOM nationals. There are three different types of titles to freehold property in Belize: Deed of Conveyance, Transfer of Certificate of Title, and Land Certificate. Leasehold property from the government is available to Belizeans who can then apply for conversion to a fee simple title. Squatters’ rights exist but are only enforceable by order of the Supreme Court after the resident has proven uninterrupted possession for at least 30 years on national lands or at least 12 years on registered lands. Belize is a member of the WTO and has implemented the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Generally, Intellectual Property (IP) rights must be registered and enforced in Belize. IP protections are enforceable through civil proceedings initiated by the IP holder. The Belize Intellectual Property Office (BELIPO) (http://belipo.bz) was established to administer IP laws and functions as the country’s national intellectual property registry. Its mandate covers the protection of copyrights, industrial designs, patents, trademarks, new plant varieties, and topographies of integrated circuits. In practice, however, there is no active enforcement of IP protections, though there is active pursuit and prosecution of contraband. Bootleg CDs and DVDs are widespread and are marketed throughout the country and are especially prevalent in the Free Zones. During the past year, Belize enacted the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2021 and the Trademarks (Amendment) Act, 2021. Both amendments allow the Registrar of Intellectual Property to delegate certain function to the Deputy Registrar. There has been no report on seizures of counterfeit goods and no prosecution of IPR violations in the last year. Belize is not listed in the 2021 USTR’s Special 301 report nor the 2021 notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Belize’s financial system is small with little to no foreign portfolio investment transactions. It does not have a stock exchange and capital market operations are rudimentary. In 2021, Belize passed the Securities Industry Act for the modernization of the laws on securities and capital markets. The Central Bank of Belize must approve capital transactions, such as the purchase and sale of land, company shares, financial assets, and other investments that the transfer of assets between foreign and local entities. The Central Bank advised that, effective April 2022, it would only accept electronic applications for the approval of portfolio and capital investments and land transfers. Belize accepted the obligations of Article VIII, and the exchange regime is free of restrictions or multiple currency practices. Credit is made available on market terms with interest rates largely set by prevailing local market conditions within the commercial banks. The credit instruments accessible to the private sector include loans, overdrafts, lines of credit, credit cards, and bank guarantees. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. Under the International Banking Act, foreign investors/nonresidents may access credit from international banks registered and licensed in Belize. However, permission to access credit from the domestic banks requires Central Bank approval. The Belize Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a state-owned development bank, offers loan financing services in various sectors. To qualify for a loan from DFC, an individual must be a Belizean resident or citizen, while a company must be majority 51 percent Belizean owned. The National Bank of Belize is a state-owned bank that provides concessionary credit primarily to public officers, teachers, and low-income Belizeans. A financial inclusion survey undertaken by the Central Bank of Belize in 2019 showed that approximately 65.5 percent of adult Belizeans had access to a financial account. In response, the banking sector has begun introducing digital wallet solutions to reach “unbanked” segments of the population. Belize’s financial system remains underdeveloped with a banking sector that may be characterized as stable but fragile. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which Belizean authorities are keeping as reserve. Regulatory capital is still well above minimum requirements, while the gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at the end of February 2022 stood at 5.58 percent of loans. However, the Central Bank is reviewing domestic banks and credit unions self-assessments as the expired forbearance measures from 2020 could represent a risk as a fraction of their loan portfolio could turn into NPLs. The Central Bank of Belize (CBB) ( https://www.centralbank.org.bz ) is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy focusing on the stability of the exchange rate and economic growth. Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Belize. Regulations differ based on residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local bank account or a foreign currency account. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to operate in the country with all banks subject to Central Bank measures and regulations. Since January 2020 to present, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent bank. Belize’s financial system comprises five domestic banks, three international banks, and ten credit unions. Correspondent banks discontinued offered correspondent banking relationships (CBR) to Scotiabank (Belize) Limited following the acquisition of the Scotiabank (Belize) Limited by the Caribbean International Holdings Limited. As of February 2022, the estimated total assets of the country’s largest bank were US $1.09 billion. In the last few years, Belize continues reforms to strengthen the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism-financing regime, including conducting an interagency national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment. Belize does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) exist largely in the utilities sectors, generally as a result of nationalization. The government is the majority shareholder in the Belize Water Services Limited, the country’s sole provider of water services, the Belize Electricity Limited, the sole distributor of electricity, and the Belize Telemedia Limited, the largest telecommunications provider in the country. The Public Utilities Commission regulates all utilities. SOEs usually select senior government officials, members of local business bureaus and chambers of commerce, labor organizations, and quasi-governmental agencies to staff these companies’ boards of directors. The board serves to direct policy and shape business decisions of the ostensibly independent SOE. Current and previous administrations have been accused of nepotism and cronyism and criticized for having conflicts of interest when board members or directors are also represented in organizations that do business with the SOEs. There is no published list of SOEs. The following are the major SOEs operating in the country. Information relating to their operations is available on their websites: Belize Electricity Limited http://www.bel.com.bz ; Belize Telemedia Limited at https://www.livedigi.com ; Belize Water Services Limited http://www.bws.bz There is no public third-party market analysis that evaluate whether SOEs receive non-market advantages by the government. The Belize Electricity Limited and the Belize Water Services Limited are the only service providers in their respective sectors. The Belize Telemedia Limited, on the other hand, competes with one other provider for mobile connectivity and there are multiple players that provide internet and data services. U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement and dispute settlement processes, particular to SOEs. The Government of Belize does not currently have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Belize generally lacks broad awareness of the expectations and standards for responsible business conduct (RBC). However, many foreign and local companies engage in responsible corporate behaviors and partner with NGOs or international organizations to reinvest in community development and charitable work. Companies sponsor educational scholarships, sports-related activities, community enhancement projects, and entrepreneurship activities, among other programs. There is a strong thread of environmental awareness that also impacts business decision-making. BELTRAIDE, in its official public outreach, promotes civic responsibility, especially in its outreach to entrepreneurs and aspiring businesspeople. The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints of official corruption and abuse of power. As required by law, the Ombudsman is active in filing annual reports to the National Assembly and investigating incidents of alleged misconduct, particularly of police abuses. This office continues to be constrained by the lack of enforcement powers, political pressure, and limited resources. Belize has no recent cases of private-sector impact on human rights and no NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations specifically promote or monitor RBC. Certain projects require the Department of the Environment’s approval for Environmental Impact Assessments or Environmental Compliance Plans. The Department of Environment website, http://www.doe.gov.bz , has more information on the Environmental Protection Act, various regulations, applications, and guidelines. Belize has not adopted a particular accounting framework as its national standard. The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required for domestic banks under the Domestic Bank and Financial Institutions Act (DBFIA) of Belize. Also, under the DBFIA, the Central Bank of Belize issues practice direction, directives, guidance, and advisories on corporate governance applicable to all banks and financial institutions operating and supervised by the Central Bank. For other companies, Belize permits the use of IFRS Standards and the IFRS for SMEs as the standard financial reporting framework for preparing financial statements. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Belize regards IFRS Standards as an allowed accounting framework under its professional standards. Alternatively, non-bank companies are permitted to use other internationally recognized standards. The U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Canadian GAAP are often used. There are no government measures relating executive compensation standards and RBC policies are not factored into procurement decisions. Opposition party political pronouncements often target official malfeasance in procurement and cronyism in government contracts, but these concerns are historically muted once the opposition takes power. There are similarly no alleged or reported human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC. In recent years, labor unions and business associations have become actively engaged in advocating for stronger measures against corruption. Belize does not have a developed mineral sector and is not a conflict or high-risk country. As such, it does not adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Belize’s extractive/mining industry is not developed, and it does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and/or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The country is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor is it a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers and is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Over the last decade, Belize has developed several important climate policy frameworks. These include the National Climate Resilience Investment Plan, Growth and Sustainable Development Strategy 2012 – 2017, and the National Climate Change Policy, Strategy and Action Plan (2015 – 2020. More recently in 2021, Belize submitted its updated National Determined Contributions (NDC), as well as its National Climate Finance Strategy, to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions as it responds to climate change. Belize is categorized as a small island developing state (SIDS) that is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate changes and is a relatively minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. Belize’s updated National Determined Contributions (NDC) is nonetheless committed to developing a long-term strategy aligned with achieving net zero global emissions by 2050. Government strategies do specify expectations on private sector contributions as well as support required to the private sector to achieve climate targets, particularly as they relate to the electricity, transportation, and waste management sectors. Belize has a wide array of government policies that contribute to its climate and conservation agenda, including over one hundred terrestrial and marine protected areas through co-management arrangements between the government, non-government organizations, and community-based organizations. These are complemented by sustainable forest management, fisheries management, and other ecosystem management plans. Belize is hopeful for greater climate financing from multilateral institutions and creditors to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. In January 2022, the government established the Climate Finance Unit (CFU) to maximize Belize’s access to climate finance to enhance resilience and sustainable development. Some procurement policies do include environment and green growth considerations, particularly if projects are funded by external donors. 9. Corruption Belize has anticorruption laws that are seldom enforced. Under the Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act, public officials are required to make annual financial disclosures, but there is little adherence and poor enforcement. The Act criminalizes acts of corruption by public officials and includes measures on the use of office for private gain; code of conduct breaches; the misuse of public funds; and bribery. This Act also established an Integrity Commission mandated to monitor, prevent, and combat corruption by examining declarations of physical assets and financial positions filed by public officers. In practice, the office is understaffed and charges are almost never brought against officials. It is not uncommon for politicians disgraced in corruption scandals to return to government after a short period of time has elapsed. The Money Laundering and Terrorism (Prevention) Act identifies “politically exposed persons” to include family members or close associates of any politician. The Ministry of Finance issues the Belize Stores Orders and Financial Orders – policies and procedures for government procurement. The Manual for the Control of Public Finances provides the framework for the registration and use of public funds to procure goods and services. Private companies are neither required to establish internal codes of conduct, ethics, or compliance programs, nor is it common to use them. In June 2001, the Government of Belize signed the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Convention on Corruption, which calls for periodic reviews. In December 2016, Belize acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) amid public pressure and demonstrations from the teachers’ unions. The Belizean government continues to be criticized for the lack of political will to fully implement UNCAC. There are few non-governmental institutions that monitor government activities. The most active, the National Trade Union Congress of Belize (NTUCB), lobbies within narrow labor-related areas. Environmental NGOs and the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) often make statements regarding government policy as it affects their respective spheres of activity. The government does not provide protection to NGOs investigating corruption. Despite these measures, many businesspeople complain that both major political parties practice bias that creates an unlevel playing field related to businesses seeking licenses, the importation of goods, winning government contracts for procurement of goods and services, and transfer of government land to private owners. Some middle-class citizens and business owners have complained of government officials, including police, soliciting bribes. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Office of the Ombudsman 91 Freetown Road Belize City, Belize T: +501-223-3594 E: ombudsman@btl.net W: www.ombudsman.gov.bz Office of the Auditor General Corner of Douglas Jones Street & New Road Belize City, Belize Mountain View Boulevard Belmopan City, Belize 501-222-5181, 222-5086, 822-2850, 822-0208 Belize Integrity Commission National Assembly Building, Independence Hill Belmopan, Belize 501-822-0121 For specific complaints within the police force: Professional Standards Branch 1902 Constitutions Drive Belmopan, Belize T: +501-822-2218 or 822-2674 10. Political and Security Environment Belize has traditionally enjoyed one of the most stable political environments in the region, having held peaceful and transparent democratic elections since gaining independence on September 21, 1981. In general elections, the two major political parties usually trade leadership. The current People’s United Party gained an overwhelming majority in the November 2020 General Elections, winning twenty-six of the thirty-one electoral divisions. The few times political candidates have questioned the result of elections, these have been settled by the court. There were incidents of property destruction at two American companies involved in sugar cane industry in the last year. In December 2021, cane farmers from Belize’s largest cane farmers association blockaded the access road to a major American investment in Orange Walk for three days, preventing other farmers from delivering cane to the factory. An impasse between the cane farmer association and the sugar mill for a contract to deliver cane sparked the incident. The American investment subsequently initiated two legal suits against the cane farmer’s association for destruction to property and economic losses incurred. The second company located in the Cayo District, suffered arson in January 2022, presumably related to a conflict associated with land rights. Over 1,200 acres of sugar cane was lost in the fire, an estimated loss of US $1.15 million. In response, a prominent agro-productive organization wrote to the Government in January 2022 expressing concerns that the Belizean government’s failure to protect and support private sector investors in these instances led to damaging the investment climate and Belizean economy still further. Neighboring Guatemala’s long-standing territorial claim on Belize has persisted for almost two centuries. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is currently deliberating the territorial dispute. In December 2020, Guatemala filed its claim to Belize’s continental land, islands, and seas, and Belize will file its counter claim in June 2022. Despite legal efforts to resolve the claim, the Friends for Conservation and Development (FCD), a local Belizean NGO, continues to document illegal encroachments and settlements in and beyond the adjacency zone in Belize. In July 2021, FCD rangers accompanied by Belize Defence Force (BDF) members were fired upon by Guatemalan civilians as the former attempted to destroy illegal plantations in the Chiquibul forest reserve in Belize. The BDF retaliated, which in turn instigated the response of the Guatemalan Armed Forces (GAF). The incident did not escalate further and there were no casualties. The second major security concern is the high level of crime countrywide. While Belize has a high murder rate per capita, it is primarily focused on the urban areas of Belize City. Corruption, human and drug trafficking, money laundering (institutional and trade-based), and local criminal gang activity remain significant problems exacerbated by the low conviction rate. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the Statistical Institute of Belize (SIB), the population was estimated to be 432,516 as of September 2021. The labor force was 191,881 as of September 2021. Of this, the unemployed amounted to 17,644 persons for an unemployment rate of 9.2 percent, representing a 4.5 percent decrease from September 2020. The report noted that about 48 percent of working aged women participated in the labor force and 76.1 percent of men. The main reason women did not look for work was due to personal or family responsibilities, while men did not look for work mainly due to school or training. In its Labor Force Survey of September 2021, the Statistical Institute of Belize estimated the number of persons in informal employment was 72,433 accounting for about 41.6 percent of all employed persons. Persons in informal employment earned about US $420 per month. A 2018/2019 Household Budget Survey assessed the country’s poverty level had increased from 41.3 percent in 2009 to 52 percent in 2012. The poverty line in 2018 was assessed at US $3,980 per annum or US $331.66 monthly. The Government of Belize asserts the COVID-19 pandemic raised the poverty rate, which hovers at almost 60 percent, and sparked significant growth of the informal sector. The agriculture sector has identified shortage of unskilled labor in the agriculture sector. The health sector faces a shortage of qualified nurses and high. In general, there are no restrictions on employers adjusting their labor force in response to fluctuating market conditions. Employers are flexible in offering salary increases, which are normally justified based on cost of living and prevailing practice consideration. Severance payment is subject to local labor law, the Labour Act Chapter 297. This Act differentiates between layoffs (voluntary termination and redundancy) and firing (dismissal). In the cases of voluntary termination and redundancy, the law provides for an appropriate notice period, payment in lieu of notice, severance, etc. In the case of redundancy, the employer must notify, where applicable, the recognized trade union or workers’ representative as well as the Labour Commissioner. In addition to the general Social Security system, the government maintains a National Health Insurance scheme in certain marginalized communities throughout the country. The government also provides some assistance to unemployed persons who represent marginalized sectors of the community, e.g., single women, single mothers, and young unemployed persons. Foreign investors who have a development concession are permitted to bring in skilled personnel to complement their local labor force and, if appropriate, establish training programs for Belizean nationals. Labor laws are not generally waived to attract or retain investment. Belize has eleven trade unions and an umbrella organization, the National Trade Union Congress of Belize (NTUCB). Belize has ratified 50 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, of which 45 are in force, including Convention 182 against the worst forms of child labor. Trade unions are independent of the government and employers both in practice and in law. The Department of Labour recognizes registered unions and employers’ associations. Trade union laws establish procedures for the registration and status of trade unions and employers’ organizations and for collective bargaining. Unions are common in the public sector (teachers, general public servants), the Social Security Board, the utility and agriculture sectors, and among port stevedores. Where employees are unionized, employers must refer to the laws relating to the operation of unions as well as the terms of existing collective bargaining agreements between the employer and unions. Where disputes arise between an employer and employee in the private sector and where the employee is not represented by a union, both parties may approach the Labour Department to mediate discussions for an amicable solution. Failing a resolution, the matter is then first referred to the labor tribunal then to the court. The national fire service, postal service, monetary and financial services, civil aviation and airport security services, and port authority pilots and security services are all deemed essential services. The law allows authorities to refer disputes involving employees who provide “essential services” to compulsory arbitration, prohibit strikes, and terminate actions. On January 21, 2022, stevedores at the port in Belize City undertook industrial action against the port. The Essential Services Arbitration Tribunal delivered a notice on January 27, 2022, mandating the port management confirm the selected stevedores as registered stevedores, pay contributions to retirement savings for stevedores, and commence negotiations for the payment of redundancy packages. Port management countered with a lawsuit that remains before the courts, claiming US $500,000 in damages and loss of business. Belize does have laws and regulations relating to international labor standards. There is also a system in place for labor inspectors to advocate on labor-related concerns and complaints, as well as to visit and inspect business facilities to ensure adherence to local labor laws. Belize’s legislation does not address a situation in which child labor is contracted between a parent and the employer. The penalty for employing a child below minimum age is a fine not exceeding US $10 or imprisonment not exceeding two months. Additionally, while there are laws that prohibit a wide range of discrimination in the workplace, they are not effectively enforced and do not explicitly provide protections for persons with disabilities or against discrimination related to sexual orientation and/or gender identity. There is anecdotal evidence that certain vulnerable sectors, particularly migrant workers, undocumented persons, young service workers, and agricultural laborers, were regularly paid below the minimum wage and classified as contract and nonpermanent employees to avoid providing certain benefits. The GoB established a minimum wage task force to oversee the implementation of the five-dollar minimum wage in a phased approach, which is expected to commence by July 1, 2022. 14. Contact for More Information Andrea De Arment Chief of Political/Economic Section 4 Floral Park Road Belmopan, Belize T: +501-822-4011 BelmopanPolEcon@state.gov Vincent Lowney Environmental, Science, Technology and Health Officer 4 Floral Park Road Belmopan, Belize T: +501-822-4011 BelmopanPolEcon@state.gov Carmen Silva Economic/Commercial Assistant 4 Floral Park Road Belmopan, Belize T: +501-822-4011 BelmopanPolEcon@state.gov Benin Executive Summary Benin transitioned to a democracy in 1990, enjoying a reputation for regular, peaceful, and, until recently, inclusive elections. In 2019 and 2021, the government held legislative and presidential elections, respectively, which were not fully inclusive nor competitive. Elections-related unrest in 2019 and 2021 resulted in several deaths. In April 2021, President Patrice Talon was re-elected for a second, and pursuant to Benin’s constitution, final five-year term. Benin’s overall macroeconomic conditions were positive in 2020, though growth declined compared to previous years. According to the World Bank, GDP growth slowed from 6.9 percent in 2019 to 3.8 percent in 2020. Most of the slowdown in 2019 and 2020 was driven by the COVID-19 pandemic and Nigeria’s partial closure of its borders that lasted from August 2019 to December 2020. In December 2021, Benin’s National Assembly unanimously passed the Government of Benin (GOB) 2022 budget, which projects economic growth to accelerate to seven percent in 2022, higher than estimates from multilateral institutions. The IMF projection for growth in 2022 is 6.5 percent, and the African Development Bank projects a growth rate recovery from 4.8 in 2021 to 6.5 percent in 2022 if Covid-19 is brought under control. Port activity and the cotton sector are the largest drivers of economic growth. Telecommunications, agriculture, energy, cement production, and construction are other significant components of the economy. Benin also has a large informal sector. The country’s GDP is roughly 51 percent services, 26 percent agriculture, and 23 percent manufacturing. In January 2022, the Talon administration released its second government action plan (French acronym-PAG) estimated at $20.6 billion. The PAG lists 342 projects (half of which are carried forward from the Talon administration’s first PAG covering 2016-2021) across 23 sectors. With the goals of strengthening the administration of justice, fostering a structural transformation of the economy, and improving living conditions, the projects are concentrated in infrastructure, agriculture and agribusiness, tourism, health, energy, telecomuncation, and education. The government estimates that full implementation of the PAG will result in the creation of 500,000 new jobs and a leap in national economic and social conditions. The government intended that 48 percent of the PAG be funded through public funds and the remainder through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Through the end of 2021 a limited number of public-private partnerships had been secured. Government critics allege that the Talon administration is using the PAG in part to channel resources and contracts to administration insiders. Benin continues efforts to attract private investment in support of economic growth amidst reports of high-level corruption among government insiders and occasional failure to respect foreign investment contracts. The Investment and Exports Promotion Agency (APIEX) is a one-stop-shop for promoting new investments, business startups, and foreign trade. In 2020, APIEX worked with foreign companies to facilitate new investments, though some companies reported that the agency was under-resourced and hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape in other agencies and ministries. APIEX reported that business creation increased to 40,000 in 2020 from 13,000 in 2015. The construction of a Special Economic Zone, located at Glo-Djigbé, is also a major component of the second PAG. Located 30 miles north of Benin’s capital Cotonou, the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ) is currently in the works under the direction of Benin’s Industry Promotion and Investment Company (SIPI), a public private partnership. The GDIZ is structured such that the GOB owns a 35 percent stake in it with the the Mauritanian-Singaporean firm Arise Integrated International Platfoms (Arise-IIP) owning 65 percent. Glo-Djigbé seeks to transform numerous locally produced agricultural products and high-tech goods for export. Though no businesses have started operating in GDIZ yet, approximately 25 have signed contracts to begin operations there, including Oryx and JNP (both petroleum services); NKS (cashew processing), Groupe Aigle (cotton processing), and SIDDIH (pharmaceuticals). The GDIZ is expected to increase Benin’s GDP by $7 billion over the next decade and boost export revenues. The primary target markets will be the United States, the European Union, and other African countries. The GDIZ covers 1,640 hectares with 400 hectares being developed currently. Benin’s second MCC power compact, valued at $391million entered into force in June 2017. This compact aims to strengthen the national power utility, attract private sector investment into solar power generation, and fund infrastructure investments in electricity distribution as well as off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. It is also advancing policy reforms to bolster financing for the electricity sector and strengthen regulation and utility management. Through the compact MCC is expanding the capacity and increasing the reliability of Benin’s power grid in southern and northern Benin. As two thirds of Benin’s population does not have access to electricity, the compact also includes a significant off-grid electrification project via a clean energy grant facility that supports private sector investment in off-grid power systems. Benin’s second MCC compact follows its first compact (2006-2011) which modernized the Port of Cotonou and improved land administration, the justice sector, and access to credit. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 2 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Beninese government encourages foreign investment, which it views as critical for economic development and successful implementation of the $20.6 billion PAG. In 2021 alone, the GOB raised €1.5 billion on the international Eurobond market. APIEX is dedicated to increasing Beninese exports and foreign direct investment and reducing administrative barriers to doing business. APIEX serves as the single investment promotion center and conduit of information between foreign investors and the Beninese government. It is the technical body responsible for reviewing applications for approval under the Investment Code and the administrative authority for SEZs. The agency has significantly reduced processing times for registering new companies (from 15 days to one day) and issuing construction permits (from 90 to 30 days). In practice, APIEX faces capacity constraints, processing times can be longer than stated, and its website is often out of date and lacks information on the latest regulations and laws. The Investment Code, amended in 2020, establishes conditions, advantages, and rules applicable to domestic and foreign direct investment. Additional information on business startup is available at https://monentreprise.bj/ . Beninese law guarantees the right to own and transfer private property. The court system enforces contracts, but the judicial process is inefficient and suffers from corruption. Enforcement of rulings is problematic. Most firms entering the market work with an established local partner and retain a competent Beninese attorney. In 2015, the Beninese government conducted the most recent joint investment policy review (IPR), with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Further to a 2016 fact-finding mission, the UNCTAD Report on the Implementation of the IPR of Benin assesses progress in implementing the original recommendations of the IPR and highlights policy issues to be addressed in the investment climate. The full report may be found at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-review/23/benin In an effort to facilitate business travel and tourism, Benin implements a visa-free system for African nationals and an online e-visa system for other foreign nationals. The country is working to open four new trade offices abroad to enhance Benin’s international business opportunities. One is already underway in Shenzhen, China Benin’s 2017 Property Code made property registration simpler and less expensive in order to boost the real estate market, improve access to credit, and reduce corruption in the registration process. The measures apply to real personal property, estate and mortgage taxes, and property purchase receipts. In order to register property, individuals and businesses must present a taxpayer identification number (registration for which is free). Land registration and property purchase certifications are free, but there is a fee for obtaining a property title. The GOB has announced that as of 2023 real personal property transactions cannot take place without producing a land title. Benin Control is charged with expediting customs clearances and minimizing processing barriers to clearing cargo at the Port of Cotonou. Benin Control makes it possible to obtain cargo clearance within as little as 48 hours after its off-loading at the Port, though in practice this can take longer. The reinstitution of the cargo inspection and scanning program known as PVI, first tried in 2012, resumed operations at the Port in 2017. Under the PVI program, Benin Control scans between 30 and 45 randomly selected shipping containers per hour. Benin Control bills all containers exiting the Port– regardless of whether they are selected for scanning – at the rate of $60 (XOF 35,400) for a 20-foot container and $79 (XOF 47,200) for a 40-foot container (https://benincontrol.com/services/scanning). The government, through the state-owned Benin Water Company (SONEB) and Beninese Electric Energy Company (SBEE), provides service connections to potable water and electricity free of charge to small and medium size enterprises and industries. Eligible companies are responsible for paying the water and electricity meter installation fees. Online application is available at https://www.soneb.bj/soneb15/pme-pmi-raccordement-gratuit and https://www.sbee.bj/site/demande-de-raccordement-des-pme-pmi-conditions/. The Beninese government has no policies or incentives in place to encourage Beninese businesspeople to invest abroad. The Beninese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Benin is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Foreign and domestic investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations at https://unctad.org/news/how-un-helped-benin-become-worlds-fastest-place-start-business-mobile-phone , including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. There is no rule to prevent a monopoly over a particular business sector. The Benin Private Investment Council ( http://www.cipb.bj/ ) is the only business-related think-tank or body that advocates for investors. Generally, draft bills are not available for public comment though promulgated laws are available at https://sgg.gouv.bj/documentheque/lois/ . Individuals, including non-citizens, have the option to file appeals about or challenge enacted laws with the Constitutional Court. Benin is a member of WAEMU and the Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law (OHADA) and has adopted OHADA’s Universal Commercial Code (codified law) to manage commercial disputes and bankruptcies within member countries. Benin is also a member of OHADA’s Common Court of Justice and Arbitration and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). OHADA provisions govern bankruptcy. Debtors may file for reorganization only, and the creditors may file for liquidation only. Benin is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the organization’s Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Benin has a civil law system. The legal framework includes various legislative and regulatory texts covering family law, land law, labor law, criminal law, criminal procedure, and civil, commercial, social, and administrative proceedings. The Cotonou commercial court, created in 2017, enforces commercial laws and regulations. In 2018, Benin created an anti-terrorism, drugs, and economic crimes court (CRIET), which until recently lacked a mechanism for substantive appeal. The CRIET has convicted and sentenced numerous government detractors and political opponents, raising concerns about its independence. In February 2020, Benin created an appeals chamber within the CRIET. In general, judicial processes are slow, and challenges to the enforcement of court decisions are common. Magistrates and judges are appointed by the President of the Republic. Benin’s courts enforce rulings of foreign courts and international arbitration. The Investment Code provides the legal framework for foreign direct investment. The Code establishes conditions, advantages, and rules applicable to domestic and foreign direct investment. The GOB websites https://benindoingbusiness.bj/ and https://gdiz-benin.com/ make available online information on foreign direct investment regulations and procedures, though at times these websites may be out of date. Benin is a member of OHADA’s Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Investors may include arbitration provisions in their contracts in order to avoid prolonged entanglements in the Beninese courts. The United Nations investment guide for Benin ( https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/benin/ ) provides a general guide for foreign direct investment steps and procedures. Benin’s legal framework does not address anti-trust or competition issues. The government does not have an agency or office that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Local laws forbid the government from nationalizing private enterprises operating in Benin. In July 2020 West African hotel developer Teyliom International filed a request for arbitration with the World Bank International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in relation to the Beninese government’s expropriation of a hotel the company had been constructing in Cotonou. This arbitration case is currently pending at ICSID. OHADA provisions govern bankruptcy. Debtors may file for reorganization only, and creditors may file for liquidation only. 4. Industrial Policies Depending on the size of the investment, investors may benefit from reduced tax liability on profits or imported industrial equipment for up to one year from the date of business registration. Investors must meet several criteria including employing a minimum number of Beninese nationals, safeguarding the environment, and meeting nationally accepted accounting standards. The Investment Control Commission monitors companies that receive these incentives to ensure compliance. The GDIZ also offers many investment incentives, notably tax breaks and government services located on-site to expedite business start-up requests. The Investment Code allows for the creation of SEZs and establishes incentives such as tax reductions for investors. SEZ investors may benefit from reduced tax liability on profits and exemptions for import and export duties. Investors must meet several criteria including employing a minimum number of Beninese nationals, safeguarding the environment, and meeting nationally accepted accounting standards. Local entities and foreign investors enjoy the same opportunities. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest and there is no “forced localization” policy pertaining to the use of domestic content in goods or technology. Moreover, there are no requirements in place for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. The Benin Post and Communications Regulatory Authority (ARCEP) ensures the confidentiality of the content of all communications by the service provider or operator, whether this is information or other data the service provider obtains in the course of providing the services offered. No information may be disclosed without the written consent of ARCEP or a signed order of the competent judicial authority. Additional information may be found at www.arcep.bj . 5. Protection of Property Rights The Land Act, amended in 2017, codifies real property rights. Land ownership disputes account for roughly 80 percent of the cases seen by Beninese tribunals. The Land Act is designed to ensure fair access to land and protect ownership rights. The Land Act establishes a transparent legal procedure for obtaining and documenting ownership, reduces property speculation in urban and rural areas, and encourages land development. The Land Act stipulates that development projects financed by international or multinational agencies cannot implement or result in forced evictions. The state is obligated to do everything possible at each stage of project development to ensure due respect of economic, social, and cultural rights recognized by international conventions and the Beninese constitution. Secured interests in real and personal property are recognized and enforced. Secured interests in property are registered with the Land Office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. However, it is recommended that foreign and non-resident investors buy land with title deeds and the services of a notary public in order to avoid land disputes that may result from the acquisition process. Large land leases for investment in rural areas are enforced by local city halls in conformity with the Land Act. Additional information regarding the acquisition of property may be found at the Beninese Land Agency’s website at https://www.andf.bj/. Beginning in 2023, the government will require a title deed for all transactions involving real property. The 2005 Law on Copyright and Related Rights regulates intellectual property rights. Benin is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and has acceded to WIPO treaties and conventions on copyrights and intellectual property protection. However, enforcement of intellectual property rights in Benin is constrained by the government’s limited capacity. Benin is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector Government policy supports free financial markets, subject to oversight by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Foreign investors may seek credit from Benin’s private financial institutions and the WAEMU Regional Stock Exchange (Bureau Regional des Valeurs Mobilieres – BRVM) headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, with local branches in each WAEMU member country. There are no restrictions for foreign investors to establish a bank account in Benin and obtain loans on the local market. However, proof of residency or evidence of company registration is required to open a bank account. The banking sector is generally reliable. Twelve private commercial banks operate in Benin in addition to the BCEAO; planning is under way to open a subsidiary of the African Development Bank. Taking into account microfinance institutions, roughly 31.2 percent of the population had access to banking services in 2020, the latest year for which data is available. In recent years, non-performing loans have been growing; 15 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. The BCEAO regulates Beninese banks. Foreign banks are required to obtain a banking license before operating branches in Benin. They are subject to the same prudential regulations as local or regional banks. Benin has lost no correspondent banking relationships during the last three years. There is no known current correspondent banking relationship in jeopardy. Foreigners are required to present proof of residency to open bank accounts. Benin does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In general, government policies and public tenders are made public online and in the newspapers. Anti-corruption and human rights NGOs and activists are active in Benin, though their ability to report misconduct and violations of good governance has weakened under the Talon administration. The government-funded agencies in charge of monitoring business conduct include the High Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (HCPC), the Court of Accounts, the National Financial Information Processing Unit, and the National Commission on Systems and Freedom. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Benin has a 2016-2025 national climate change strategy. It is a cross-sectorial, thematic, short to medium-term strategy and responds to Benin’s dual needs to address the adverse effects of climate through the identification, adoption, dissemination, ownership of adaptation measures, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The vision of the strategy is “By 2025, Benin is a country of low carbon instensity and resilient to climate change.” This vision stems from Benin’s longer 25-year strategy, known locally as Alafia, which calls for “Benin by 2025 to be a flagship, well-governed, united and peaceful country that enjoys a prosperous and competitive economy.” Through its climate change strategy and Alafia, Benin seeks to contribute to sustainable development through the integration of climate considerations in strategic sectorial operational plans of the country. The strategy focuses on reducing emissions resulting from deforestation, reducing human activity-induced greenhouse gas emission, and increasing carbon capture. As part of this strategy, the GOB is offering incentives for private investment in the renewable energy sector. The second PAG’s public procurement policies include environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. 9. Corruption Benin has laws aimed at combatting corruption and has made progress combatting the most common forms of corruption, but work remains in rooting it out. The new HCPC is the lead government entity on corruption issues and has the authority to refer corruption cases to court. The HCPC has the authority to combat money laundering, electoral fraud, and economic fraud in the public and private sectors. Benin’s State Audit Office is also responsible for identifying and acting against corruption in the public sector. The CRIET processes cases related to economic crimes, which include corruption. In 2018, the National Assembly approved the lifting of parliamentary immunity of a small number of opposition parliamentarians accused of corruption or embezzlement during their past positions in former governments. Bribery is illegal and subject to up to 10 years’ imprisonment, but enforcement remains inconsistent. Beninese procurement law allows for open and closed bid processes. Contracts are often awarded based on government solicitations to short-listed companies with industry-specific expertise, often identified based on companies’ commercial activities conducted in other overseas markets. The government often uses sole sourcing for projects, including for PAG implementation, and in these cases does not publish procurement requests before selecting a vendor. Foreign companies have expressed concerns about unfair treatment, biased consideration, and improper practices specific to the process of selecting short-listed companies. Benin is a signatory of the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Government of Benin Haut-Commissariat a la Prevention de la Corruption (HCPC) 01 BP 7060 Cotonou, Benin +229 21 308 686 anlc.benin@yahoo.fr Social Watch Benin Ms. Blanche Sonon, President 02 BP 937, Cotonou, Benin +229 21042012 – 229 95961644 swbenin@socialwatch-benin.org 10. Political and Security Environment Benin transitioned to a democracy in 1990, enjoying a reputation for regular, peaceful, and, until recently, inclusive elections. In 2018, the National Assembly adopted, and the government implemented stringent rules for political parties to qualify to participate in legislative elections. In 2019 and 2021 the government held legislative and presidential elections, respectively, neither of which was fully competitive. The National Assembly is currently made up exclusively by two pro-government parties. Elections-related unrest in 2019 and 2021 resulted in several deaths. In April 2021, President Patrice Talon was re-elected for a second and final five-year term, pursuant to Benin’s constitution. The largest security issues facing Benin are the threat of terrorism spilling across its porous northern borders and piracy offshore in the Gulf of Guinea. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The government adheres to internationally recognized rights and labor standards. Benin’s constitution guarantees workers’ freedom to organize, assemble, and strike. Government authorities may declare strikes illegal if they are deemed a threat to public order or the economy and may require those on strike to maintain minimum services. In 2018, the Constitutional Court reinstated a law prohibiting public employees in the defense, health, justice, and security sectors from striking. A 2018 law limited strikes to a maximum of 10 days per year for private-sector workers and public employees not covered by the existing ban. Approximately 75 percent of salaried employees belong to unions. Unions are obliged to operate independently of government and political parties. Benin’s labor code, as revised in 2017, is favorable to employers. The World Bank official unemployment rate for Benin in 2020 was 2.54 percent, though estimates of actual unemployment figures are significantly higher. Unskilled and skilled labor and qualified professionals are generally available. Nearly 90 percent of youth between the ages of 15 and 29 work in the informal sector. The standard legal workweek is 40 hours and payment of overtime is allowed. In 2017, the government adopted a law enshrining the framework for private sector and government employment, termination of employment, and placement of labor in Benin. The law sets a maximum limit of three to nine months’ salary (calculated using the last 12 months of salary) to be paid to an employee in case of abusive termination of employment or layoffs. If fired for cause (not including a crime or crimes), an employee with a minimum of one year on the job is entitled to receive two months’ salary as severance pay. The law also allows for multiple renewals of limited term contracts. Under the former law, private companies who dismissed employees for unsatisfactory performance were routinely sued. Benin’s Ministry of Economy and Finance reported in 2012 (the most recent year available) that the informal sector contribution to the country’s annual GDP rangeds between 60 and 70 percent. Additionally, according to a 2020 International Labour Organization report, 95 percent of businesses operating in Benin are estimated to be in the informal economy. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $14,262 2020 $15,650 www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $2 BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 18.6% UNCTAD: https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Recent GOB data not available Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $3,429 100% Total Outward $541 100% France $1,219 35.54% France $146 26.98% India $420 12.24% Togo $81 14.97% Nigeria $381 11.11% Niger $72 13.30% China PR: Mainland $342 9.97% Côte-d’Ivoire $65 12.01% Côte d’Ivoire $215 6.27% Gabon $45 8.31% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Political and Economic Section U.S. Embassy, Boulevard de la Marina, Cotonou 00229-21300650 Elliot Repko and Marius Lotsu: RepkoEM@state.gov and LotsuML@state.gov Bolivia Executive Summary In general, Bolivia is open to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2021, gross FDI flows received reached USD 440 million, higher than in 2020 when Bolivia registered a significant divestment of USD 1,018 million. FDI flows were greatest in the sectors of hydrocarbons, manufacturing, industry, and commerce, together representing over 80 percent of the total. Additional sectors receiving some FDI included the transport sector, storage and communications, insurance companies, and real estate services. The year 2021 was economically characterized as a rebound after the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, in which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 8.9 percent, the largest contraction in over 50 years. The leading sectors were mining, construction, and transport, registering double digit growth rates. International financial institutions estimated GDP growth between 5-5.5 percent for 2021. Bolivia was the fastest growing economy in the continent from 2014-2016 and in the top three until the start of the pandemic. Bolivia abrogated the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) it had with the United States and several other countries in 2012. The Bolivian government claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S. – Bolivia BIT will be covered by its terms until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012, are not covered. Notwithstanding the uncertain political situation, Bolivia’s investment climate has remained relatively steady over the past several years. Lack of legal security, corruption allegations, and unclear investment incentives are all impediments to investment in Bolivia. There is no significant FDI from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no initiatives designed to encourage U.S. investment specifically. Bolivia’s current macroeconomic stability, abundant natural resources, and strategic location in the heart of South America make it a prospective country for investment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bolivian government took several economic measures to support families, such as authorizing postponement in the payment of basic services (water, electricity, natural gas, telecommunications) and credit payment deferral for the private sector. These measures ended in 2021. Bolivia’s Mother Earth Law stipulates climate change mitigation and adaptation. Bolivia last updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) for implementing the Paris Agreement in 2015. Bolivia does not have any regulatory “green” incentives for investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128/ 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 104/ 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 432 https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD In 2021, the investment rate as a percentage of GDP (18 percent) was in line with regional averages. There has also been a shift from private to public investment. In recent years, private investment was particularly low because of the deterioration of the business environment. From 2006 to 2021, private investment, including local and foreign investment, averaged 7 percent of GDP. During the same period, public investment grew significantly, reaching an annual average of 12 percent of GDP. FDI is highly concentrated in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons and mining, which account for nearly two-thirds of FDI in Bolivia. Since 2006, the net flow of FDI averaged 1.6 percent of GDP. Before 2006, it averaged around 6.7 percent of GDP. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment In general, Bolivia remains open to FDI. The 2014 Investment Law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms. However, it also stipulates that public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign) and that the Bolivian government will determine which sectors require private investment. Bolivia abrogated the BIT it signed with the United States in 2012. The government under former president Evo Morales claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S.–Bolivia BIT will be covered under its terms until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012, are not covered. Pursuant to Article 320 of the 2009 Constitution, Bolivia no longer recognizes international arbitration forums for disputes involving the government. The parties also cannot settle the dispute in an international court. Specifically, Article 320 of the Bolivian Constitution states: Bolivian investment takes priority over foreign investment. Every foreign investment will be subject to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws, and authorities, and no one may invoke a situation for exception, nor appeal to diplomatic claims to obtain more favorable treatment. Economic relations with foreign states or enterprises shall be conducted under conditions of independence, mutual respect, and equity. More favorable conditions may not be granted to foreign states or enterprises than those established for Bolivians. The state makes all decisions on internal economic policy and will not accept demands or conditions imposed on this policy by states, banks or Bolivian/foreign financial institutions, multilateral entities, or transnational enterprises. Public policies will promote internal consumption of products made in Bolivia. Article 262 of the Constitution states: “The fifty kilometers from the border constitute the zone of border security. No foreign person, individual, or company may acquire property in this space, directly or indirectly, nor possess any property right in the waters, soil or subsoil, except in the case of state necessity declared by express law approved by two-thirds of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. The property or the possession affected in case of non-compliance with this prohibition will pass to the benefit of the state, without any indemnity.” The judicial system faces a huge backlog of cases, limited staffing, scarce resources. It is also believed to be influenced by political actors. Swift resolution of cases, either initiated by investors or against them, is unlikely. The Marcelo Quiroga Anti-Corruption law of 2010 makes companies and their signatories criminally liable for breach of contract with the government, and the law can be applied retroactively. Authorities can use this threat of criminal prosecution to force settlement of disputes. Commercial disputes can often lead to criminal charges, and cases are often processed slowly. See our Human Rights Report as background on the judicial system, labor rights, and other important issues. Article 129 of the Bolivian Arbitration Law No. 708, established that all controversies and disputes that arise regarding investment in Bolivia will have to be addressed inside Bolivia under Bolivian laws. Consequently, international arbitration is not allowed for disputes involving the Bolivian government or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bolivia does not have an investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. Investors may judge that preferential treatment is being given to their Bolivian competitors, for example, in key sectors where private companies compete with state-owned enterprises. Additionally, foreign investment is not allowed in matters relating directly to national security. The Constitution specifies that all hydrocarbon resources are the property of the Bolivian people and that the state will assume control over their exploration, exploitation, industrialization, transport, and marketing (Articles 348 and 351). Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) is an SOE that manages hydrocarbons transport and sales and is responsible for ensuring that the domestic market demand is satisfied at prices set by the hydrocarbons regulator before allowing any hydrocarbon exports. YPFB benefitted from government action in 2006 that required operators to turn over their production to YPFB and to sign new contracts that gave YPFB control over the distribution of gasoline, diesel, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to gas stations. The law allows YPFB to enter joint venture contracts with national or foreign individuals, and with companies wishing to exploit/trade hydrocarbons or their derivatives. For companies working in the industry, contracts are negotiated on a service-contract basis, and there are no restrictions on ownership percentages of the companies providing the services. The Constitution (Article 366) specifies that every foreign enterprise that conducts activities in the hydrocarbons production chain will submit to the sovereignty of the state, and to the laws and authority of the state. No foreign court case or foreign jurisdiction will be recognized, and foreign investors may not invoke any exceptional situation for international arbitration, nor appeal to diplomatic claims. According to the Constitution, no concessions or contracts may transfer the ownership of natural resources or other strategic industries to private interests. Instead, temporary authorizations to use these resources may be requested at the pertinent ministry (mining, water and environment, public works, etc.). The Bolivian government needs to renegotiate commercial agreements related to forestry, mining, telecommunications, electricity, and water services, to comply with these regulations. The Telecommunications, Technology and Communications General Law from 2012 (Law 164, Article 28) stipulates that the licenses for radio broadcasts will not be given to foreign persons or entities. Further, in the case of broadcasting associations, the share of foreign investors cannot exceed 25 percent of the total investment, except in those cases approved by the state or by international treaties. The Central Bank of Bolivia is responsible for registering all foreign investments. According to the 2014 Investment Law, any investment will be monitored by the relevant ministry for each sector. Each Ministry assesses industry compliance with the incentive objectives. To date, only the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy proposed incentives that were enacted by Congress to incentivize the exploration and production of hydrocarbons. Bolivia underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in 2017. In his concluding remarks, the WTO Chair noted several WTO members raised challenges impacting investor confidence in Bolivia, due primarily to Bolivia’s abrogation of 22 BITs following the passage of its 2009 constitution. However, some WTO members also commended Bolivia for enacting a new investment promotion law in 2014 and a law on conciliation and arbitration, both of which increased legal certainty for investors, according to those members. As of April 2022, the functions of FUNDEMPRESA, which used to register and certify new businesses, were turned over to the Servicio Plurinacional de Registro de Comercio (SEPREC). SEPREC is a public entity overseen by the Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy. The steps to register a business are: (1) register and receive a certificate from SEPREC; (2) register with the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales) and receive a tax identification number; (3) register and receive authorization to operate from the municipal government in which the company will be established; (4) if the company has employees, it must register with the national health insurance service and the national retirement pension agency in order to contribute on the employees’ behalf; and (5) register with the Ministry of Labor (if the company has employees). The process takes about 30 days from start to finish. All steps are required, and there is no simplified business creation regime. A user can download the required forms from the website and fill them out online but then must either mail or deliver the completed forms to the relevant offices. The forms ask for a national identification card, but foreign users can enter their passport numbers instead. The registration process takes between 2-4 working days after all requirements are submitted. Bolivia does not have a national investment screening mechanism. The Bolivian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Nor does the government restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Bolivia abrogated the BIT it signed with the United States and 22 other countries. The BIT with Bolivia was the first to be terminated by a U.S. treaty partner. In October 2007, Bolivia became the first country to withdraw from the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Bolivia does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the U.S. Bolivia has various agreements with other countries aimed at avoiding double taxation, including: Argentina, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Andean Community countries. Bolivia is not a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 3. Legal Regime Bolivia has no laws or policies that directly foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. However, Article 66 of the Commercial Code (Law 14379, 1977) states that unfair competition, such as maintaining an import, production, or distribution monopoly, should be penalized according to criminal law. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Regulatory authority regarding investment exists solely at the national level in Bolivia. There are no subnational regulatory procedures. The Commercial Code requires that all companies keep adequate accounting records and legal records for transparency. However, there is a large informal sector that does not follow these practices. Most accounting regulations follow international principles, but the regulations do not always conform to international standards. Large private companies and some government institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Banking Supervision Authority, have transparent and consistent accounting systems. Formal bureaucratic procedures have been reported to be lengthy, difficult to manage and navigate, and sometimes debilitating. Many firms complain that a lack of administrative infrastructure, corruption, and political motives impede their ability to perform. The one exception has been when registering a new company in Bolivia. There is no established public comment process allowing social, political, and economic interests to provide advice and comment on new laws and decrees. However, the government generally — but not always — discusses proposed laws with the relevant sector. The lack of laws to implement the 2009 Constitution creates legal discrepancies between constitutional guarantees and the dated policies currently enforced, and thus an uncertain investment climate. Online regulatory disclosures by the Bolivian government can be found in the Official Gazette ( http://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/ ). Supreme Decree 71 in 2009 created a Business Auditing Authority (AEMP), which is tasked with regulating the business activities of public, private, mixed, or cooperative entities across all business sectors. AEMP’s decisions are legally reviewable through appeal. However, should an entity wish to file a second appeal, the ultimate decision-making responsibility rests with the Bolivian government ministry with jurisdiction over the economic sector in question. This has led to a perception that enforcement mechanisms are neither transparent nor independent. Environmental regulations can slow projects due to the constitutional requirement of “prior consultation” for any projects that could affect local and indigenous communities. This has affected projects related to the exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, as well as public works projects. Issuance of environmental licenses has been slow and subject to political influence and corruption. In 2010, the new pension fund was enacted increasing companies’ contributions from 1.71 percent of payroll to 4.71 percent. Bolivia is a full member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), which includes Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Bolivia is also in the process of joining the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) as a full (rather than associate) member. The CAN’s norms are considered supranational in character and have automatic application in the regional economic block’s member countries. The government does notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade regarding draft technical regulations. Property and contractual rights are enforced in Bolivian courts under a civil law system, but some have complained that the legal process is time consuming and has been subject to political influence and corruption. Although many of its provisions have been modified and supplanted by more specific legislation, Bolivia’s Commercial Code continues to provide general guidance for commercial activities. The constitution has precedence over international law and treaties (Article 410) and stipulates that the state will be directly involved in resolving conflicts between employers and employees (Article 50). Corruption within the judiciary is pervasive. Regulatory and enforcement actions are appealable. No major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions impacting foreign investment came out in the past year. There is no primary, central point-of-contact for investment that provides all the relevant information to investors. Bolivia does not have a competition law, but cases related to unfair competition can be presented to AEMP. Article 314 of the 2009 Constitution prohibits private monopolies. Based on this article, in 2009 the Bolivian government created an office to supervise and control private companies ( http://www.autoridadempresas.gob.bo/ ). Among its most important goals are: regulating, promoting, and protecting free competition. trade relations between traders; implementing control mechanisms, social projects, and voluntary corporate responsibility. corporate restructuring, supervising, verifying, and monitoring companies with economic activities in the country in the field of commercial registration and seeking compliance with legal and financial development of its activities. qualifying institutional management efficiency, timeliness, transparency, and social commitment to contribute to the achievement of corporate goals. The Bolivian Constitution allows the central government or local governments to expropriate property for the public good or when the property does not fulfill a “social purpose” (Article 57). In the case of land, “Economic Social Purpose” (known as FES in Spanish) is understood as “sustainable land use to develop productive activities, according to its best use capacity, for the benefit of society, the collective interest and its owner.” The Bolivian government has no official definition of “collective interest” and makes decisions on a case-by-case basis. Noncompliance with the social function of land, tax evasion, or the holding of large acreage is cause for reversion, at which point the land passes to “the Bolivian people” (Article 401). In cases where the expropriation of land is deemed a necessity of the state or for the public good, just indemnification is required by law. However, in cases where there is non-compliance in fulfilling this “Economic Social Purpose,” the Bolivian government is not required to pay for the land and the land title reverts to the state. The Constitution also gives workers the right to reactivate and reorganize companies that are in the process of bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, or those closed in an unjust manner, into employee-owned cooperatives (Article 54). The mining code of 1997 (last updated in 2007) and hydrocarbons law of 2005 both outline procedures for expropriating land to develop underlying concessions. The Bolivian government between 2006 and 2014, nationalized companies in the hydrocarbons sector, most of the electricity sector, some mining companies (including mines and a tin smelting plant), and a cement plant. To do so, the government forced private entities to sell shares to the government, often at below market prices. Some of the affected companies have cases pending with international arbitration bodies. All outsourcing, private contracts were canceled and assigned to public companies (such as airport administration and water provision). Countries affected included the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Argentina, and Chile. Bolivian governments have previously nationalized private interests to appease social groups protesting. The average time to complete bankruptcy procedures to close a business in Bolivia is 20 months. The Bolivian Commercial Code includes (Article 1654) three different categories of bankruptcy: No Fault Bankruptcy – when the owner of the company is not directly responsible for its inability to pay its obligations. At-Fault Bankruptcy – when the owner is guilty or liable due to the lack of due diligence to avoid harm to the company. Bankruptcy due to Fraud – when the owner intentionally tries to cause harm to the company. In general, the application of laws related to commercial disputes and bankruptcy has been perceived as inconsistent, and corruption charges are common. Foreign creditors often have little redress beyond Bolivian courts, and judgments are generally more favorable to local claimants than international ones. If a company declares bankruptcy, the company must pay employee benefits before other obligations. Workers have broad-ranging rights to recover pay and benefits from foreign firms in bankruptcy, and criminal actions can be taken against individuals the Bolivian government deems responsible for failure to pay in these matters. No credit bureaus or credit monitoring authorities serve the Bolivian market. In 2018, the Bolivian government enacted a new law (No. 1055) called the Creation of Social Enterprises. The law allows for employees of a company to assert ownership rights over companies under financial distress heading into bankruptcy. Passage of the law was controversial, with numerous business chambers asserting that the law could incentivize employees and labor unions to undermine the performance of companies in order to force bankruptcy and gain control of company assets. 4. Industrial Policies To attract more investment, the government enacted an investment law in 2014 stating each Ministry will provide incentives for sector-specific investment. Article 14 of the 2014 investment law requires technology transfer from foreign companies operating in Bolivia to Bolivian workers and institutions. The law also specifies that Bolivians should work in operational, administrative, and executive offices of foreign companies. Finally, Article 14 states companies investing in Bolivia should donate equipment and machinery to universities and technical schools in the same area as the investment, and conduct research activities that will find solutions that contribute to public welfare. Article 21 of the investment law stipulates that the government can incentivize investment in certain sectors that contribute to the economic and social development of the country. Law 767 from 2015 aims to promote investments in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. However, many companies considered this regulation as skewed to production and insufficient to incentivize new exploration. In 2016, Supreme Decree 2830 was issued, providing a 12 percent reduction in the payment of the direct tax on hydrocarbons and other incentives in order to better incentive exploration. The Bolivian government does not offer business incentives for direct foreign investment. It also does not offer any direct green investment or clean energy incentives. There are opportunities to obtain such green incentives through private funding. In 2016, Supreme Decree 2779 was enacted, approving regulations for a new system of free trade zones in Bolivia. The decree establishes a period of one year for existing free trade zones to transform into free industrial zones, which allow for industrial operations and assembly. Free industrial zones exist in El Alto, Patacamaya, Oruro, Puerto Suarez, and Warnes. Cobija is the only remaining free trade zone under this new system, with operations approved until 2038. Concessions within free industrial zones last 15 years and are renewable. The decree also eased customs procedures for goods entering the zones and established stronger government support for the promotion of productive investments in the zones. Bolivia does not have special economic zones. Bolivian labor law requires businesses to limit foreign employees to 15 percent of their total work force and requires foreign hires be technical staff. These workers require a work visa that can be obtained in any Bolivian consulate, and in the case that they work for a Bolivian company, both the company and the workers should also contribute to the Bolivian Pension System (Pension Law Article 104.1) Supreme Decree 27328 regulates national and local level government procurement, which give priority to national sourcing. If an item required is not produced in Bolivia, buying decisions are made based on price. Supreme Decree 28271 (Article 10), establishes the following preference margins for sourcing with Bolivian products: Except for national tenders, 10 percent preference margin for Bolivian products regardless of the origin of materials. For national public tenders, if the cost of Bolivian materials represents more than 50 percent of the total cost of the product, the producers receive a 10 percent preference margin over other sellers. In national and international public tenders, if Bolivian inputs and labor represent more than the 50 percent of the total cost of the product, the seller receives a 25 percent preference margin over other sellers. If the Bolivian inputs and labor represent between 30-50 percent of the total cost of the product, the seller receives a 15 percent preference margin over other sellers. Under the Bolivian Criminal Code (Article 226), it is a crime to raise or lower the price of a product based on false information, interests, or actions. For those caught doing so, punishment is six months to three years in prison. It is also a crime to hoard or conceal products in order to raise prices. The Bolivian government has applied these provisions in a number of cases, applying regulations that allow them to request accounting records and audit companies’ financial actions looking for evidence of speculation. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are legally protected and registered in the Real Estate Office, where titles or deeds are recorded, and mortgages/liens are registered. The recording system is reliable, although there have been complaints regarding the amount of time required to register a property. The Office of Property Registry oversees the acquisition and disposition of land, real estate, and mortgages. Mortgages usually take no more than 60 days to obtain a standard loan. However, challenges to land titles are common due to bureaucratic delays encountered while registering properties, especially in rural areas. Competing claims to land titles and the absence of a reliable dispute resolution process create risk and uncertainty in real property acquisition. Nevertheless, illegal occupation of rural private property is decreasing since the passage of Law 477 combatting land seizures. The Bolivian Constitution grants citizens and foreigners the right to private property but stipulates that the property must serve a social or economic function. If the government determines that a given property is not sufficiently useful (according to its own unclear criteria), the constitution allows the government to expropriate. The agricultural sector has been most hard hit by this policy due to uncertainty from year-to-year about whether farmland would be productive. In 2015, the government eliminated annual productivity inspections, reducing their frequency to every five years. There are other laws that limit access to land, forest, water, and other natural resources by foreigners in Bolivia. The constitution also grants formal, collective land titles to indigenous communities, to restore their former territories (Article 394.3), stating that public land will be granted to indigenous farmers, migrant indigenous communities, Afro-Bolivians, and small farmer communities that do not possess or who have insufficient land (Article 395). Foreigners cannot acquire land from the Bolivian government (Article 396). Under law 3545, passed in 2006, the government will not grant public lands to non-indigenous people or agriculture companies. The Mother Earth Integral Development Law to Live Well (Mother Earth Law, or Law #300) passed in October 2012 specifies that the state controls access to natural resources, particularly when foreign use is involved. In action, the law limits access to land, forest, water, and other natural resources by foreigners in Bolivia. According to Bolivia’s Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), approximately 25 percent of all land in Bolivia lacks clear title, and as a result, squatting is a problem. In some cases, squatters can make a legal claim to the land. While the Criminal Code criminalizes illegal occupation, the judicial system is slow and ineffective in its enforcement of the law. Financial mechanisms are available for securitization of properties for lending purposes, although the threat of reversion for properties failing to fulfill a social function discourages the use of land as collateral. The Bolivian Intellectual Property Service (SENAPI) leads the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) within Bolivia. SENAPI maintains and regularly updates a complete set of IPR regulations currently in force within Bolivia. The list is available on SENAPI’s website: https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normas . SENAPI also maintains an updated version of the services they provide, along with associated costs, at: https://www.senapi.gob.bo/propiedad-intelectual/tasas . The existing copyright law recognizes copyright infringement as a public offense and the 2001 Bolivian Criminal Procedures Code provides for the criminal prosecution of IPR violations. However, it is not common for prosecutors to file criminal charges, and civil suits, if pursued, face long delays. Criminal penalties carry a maximum of five years in jail, and civil penalties are restricted to the recovery of direct economic damages. SENAPI has established a conciliation process to solve IPR controversies to prevent parties from going to trial, which is now the most common procedure to solve these disputes. Bolivia does not have an area of civil law specifically related to industrial property, but it has a century-old industrial privileges law still in force. Bolivia is a signatory of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). SENAPI is aware of Bolivia’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, and it sets out the minimum standards of IPR protection in compliance with this agreement. SENAPI sustains its position that Bolivia complies with the substantive obligations of the main conventions of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) in their most recent versions. According to SENAPI, Bolivia complies with WTO’s dispute settlement procedures in accordance with its TRIPS obligations. However, Bolivia falls short on the implementation of domestic procedures and providing legal remedies for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Bolivia is a signatory country of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty; however, it did not ratify any of those treaties domestically. Bolivia is not a member of the Madrid Protocol on Trademarks, the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs, or the Patent Law Treaty. Bolivia is a signatory of Andean Community (CAN) Decision 486, which deals with industrial property and trade secrets and is legally binding in Bolivia. Decision 486 states that each member country shall accord the Andean Community countries, the World Trade Organization, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own nationals regarding IPR protection. Besides its international obligations, Bolivia has not passed any domestic laws protecting trade secrets. CAN Decision 486 also enforces patent registrations in Bolivia. SENAPI reviews patent registrations for form and substance and publishes notices of proposed registrations in the Official Gazette. If there are no objections within 30 working days, the organization grants patents for a period of 20 years. The registration of trademarks parallels that of patents. Once obtained, a trademark is valid for a 10-year renewable period. It can be cancelled if not used within three years of the date of grant. Law 1134, the “Bolivian Cinema and Audiovisual Arts Law” created a fund to promote Bolivian cinema by charging foreign movie distributors and exhibitors’ three percent of their total monthly revenue. Article 27 of the law strengthens IPR protections for visual works and allows Bolivian Customs to pursue criminal prosecution, but it is unlikely that foreign works would be protected in practice. Bolivian Customs lacks the human and financial resources needed to intercept counterfeit goods shipments at international borders effectively. Customs authorities act only when industries trying to protect their brands file complaints. Moreover, the informal sector has a sense of unregulated capitalism regarding the sale of counterfeit goods. Many importers believe the payment of customs fees will “legalize” the sale of counterfeit products. Sellers either do not know about or consider IPR, particularly in the textile, electrical appliances, and entertainment markets. Large quantities of counterfeit electrical appliances imported from China bearing well-known and clearly non-original brands are available for purchase in local markets. There is also a flourishing market of textile products made in Bolivia and marketed using counterfeit labels of major U.S. brands. While most counterfeit items come with the illegal brand already attached, brands and logos are available for purchase on the street and can easily be affixed to goods. Although court actions against IPR infringements are infrequent, there have been some significant cases. The Industrial Property Director at SENAPI reported that the number of indictments related to counterfeit products increased steadily over the years. According to SENAPI, this does not necessarily represent an increase in the total volume of counterfeit products. Rather, the increase in indictments is due to SENAPI’s emphasis on enforcement efforts and the public’s greater awareness of IPR rights. Because of publicly reported problems of counterfeit COVID-19 medicines in 2020 and 2021, the Bolivian Police task force launched several raids to counter groups of counterfeit medicine smugglers. These groups reportedly smuggled products from Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil. Bolivia is listed on the Watch List of the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2022 Special 301 Report and is not named in its 2021 Review of Notorious Market for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral. Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities. Bolivian capital markets have sought to expand their handling of local corporate bond issues and equity instruments. Over the last few years, several Bolivian companies and some foreign firms have been able to raise funds through local capital markets. However, the stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments (more than 95 percent of transactions). The number of total transactions in 2021 was around 28 percent of GDP. From 2008-2019, the financial markets experienced high liquidity, which led to historically low interest rates. However, liquidity has been more limited in recent years, and there are some pressures to increase interest rates. The Bolivian financial system is not well integrated with the international system and there is only one foreign bank among the top ten banks of Bolivia. In October 2012, Bolivia returned to global credit markets for the first time in nearly a century. In 2017, Bolivia sold USD 1 billion at 4.5 percent for ten years, with U.S. financial institutions managing the deal. The resources gained from the sales were largely used to finance infrastructure projects. A sovereign bond issuance of up to $2 billion was approved by the National Assembly for 2022 but had not yet occurred as of April 2022. The Bolivian government’s attempt to refinance $2 billion in sovereign debt in February 2022 fell short, with only $850 million sold. The government had also hoped the new issuance would be for a 10-year term but had to settle for eight years (a 2030 maturity) for all the resold bonds. The interest rate for the new bonds is 7.5%, compared to interest rates of approximately 5% for the original bonds. The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia can get credits on the local market. However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks. Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market. The 2013 Financial Services Law directs credit towards the productive sectors and caps interest rates. The Bolivian banking system is small, composed of 16 consumer banks, six banks specialized in mortgage lending, three private financial funds, 30 savings and credit cooperatives, and eight institutions specialized in microcredit. Of the total number of personal deposits made in Bolivia through December 2021 (USD 30 billion), the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of the total financial system. Similarly, of the total loans and credits made to private individuals (USD 29 billion) through December 2021, 80 percent were made by the banking sector, while private financial funds and the savings and credit cooperatives accounted for the other 20 percent. Bolivian banks have developed the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms. The banking sector was stable and healthy with delinquency rates at 1.6 percent in 2021. In 2021, delinquency rates rose after the government permitted clients to defer bank loan payments until June 2021 and to reprogram their debt through 2022 without penalty as a mitigating measure for the COVID-19 pandemic. While delinquency rates remain relatively low, there are concerns this measure could potentially harm the banking sector’s stability. In 2013, a new Financial Services Law entered into force. This new law enacted major changes to the banking sector, including deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings, mandatory lending allocations to certain sectors of the economy and an upgrade of banks’ solvency requirements in line with the international Basel standards. The law also requires banks to spend more on improving consumer protection, as well as providing increased access to financing in rural parts of the country. Credit is now allocated on government-established rates for productive activities, but foreign investors may find it difficult to qualify for loans from local banks due to the requirement that domestic loans be issued exclusively against domestic collateral. Since commercial credit is generally extended on a short-term basis, most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit abroad. Most Bolivian borrowers are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2007, the government created a Productive Development Bank to boost the production of small, medium-sized, and family-run businesses. The bank was created to provide loans to credit institutions which meet specific development conditions and goals, for example by giving out loans to farmers, small businesses, and other development focused investors. The loans are long term and have lower interest rates than private banks can offer to allow for growth of investments and poverty reduction. In September 2010, the Bolivian government bought the local private bank Banco Union as part of a plan to gain partial control of the financial sector. Banco Union is one of the largest banks, with a share of 10.8 percent of total national credits and 12.7 percent of the total deposits; one of its principal activities is managing public sector accounts. Bolivian government ownership of Banco Union was illegal until December 2012, when the government enacted the State Bank Law, allowing for state participation in the banking sector. There is no strong evidence of “cross-shareholding” and “stable-shareholding” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment, and the 2009 Constitution forbids monopolies and supports antitrust measures. In addition, there is no evidence of hostile takeovers (other than government nationalizations that took place from 2006-14). The financial sector is regulated by ASFI (Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions), a decentralized institution that is under the Ministry of Economy. The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort. The BCB is the only monetary authority and oversees managing the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate. Foreigners can establish bank accounts only with residency status in Bolivia. Blockchain technologies in Bolivia are still in the early stages. Currently, the banking sector is analyzing blockchain technologies and the sector intends to propose a regulatory framework in coordination with ASFI in the future. Three different settlement mechanisms are available in Bolivia: (1) the high-value payment system administered by the Central Bank for inter-bank operations; (2) a system of low value payments utilizing checks and credit and debit cards administered by the local association of private banks (ASOBAN); and (3) the deferred settlement payment system designed for small financial institutions such as credit cooperatives. This mechanism is also administered by the Central Bank. Neither the Bolivian government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Bolivian government has set up companies in sectors it considers strategic to the national interest and social well-being. It has also stated that it plans to do so in every sector it considers strategic or where there is either a monopoly or oligopoly. The Bolivian government owns and operates more than 60 businesses, including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, a bank, a sugar factory, an airline, a packaging plant, paper and cardboard factories, and milk and Brazil nut processing factories, among others. In 2005, income from SOEs in Bolivia other than gas exports represented only a fraction of a percent of GDP. As of 2019, public sector contribution to GDP (including SOEs, investments, and consumption of goods and services) has risen to over 40 percent of GDP. The largest SOEs can acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms. Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy. Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials, and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard. In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage. The government registered budget surpluses from 2006 until 2013 but began experiencing budget deficits in 2014. The 2009 Constitution requires all SOEs to publish an annual report and makes them subject to financial audits. Additionally, SOEs are required to present an annual testimony in front of civil society and social movements, a practice known as social control. There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Bolivia has laws that regulate aspects related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Both producers and consumers in Bolivia are generally aware of CSR, but consumer decisions are ultimately based on price and quality. The Bolivian Constitution stipulates that economic activity cannot damage the collective good (Article 47). Though Bolivia is not part of the OECD, it has participated in several Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtables since 2000. Neither the Bolivian government nor its organizations use the OECD Guidelines for CSR. Instead, Bolivian companies and organizations are focused on trying to accomplish the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and they use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) methodology in order to show economic, social and environmental results. While the Bolivian government, private companies, and non-profits are focused on the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, only a few private companies and NGOs focus on following the UN standard ISO 26000 guidelines and methodologies. Another methodology widely accepted in Bolivia is the one developed by the ETHOS Institute, which provides measurable indicators accepted by PLARSE (Programa Latinoamericano de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa), the Latin American Program for CSR. The Bolivian government issued a 2013 supreme decree that requires financial entities to allocate six percent of profits to CSR-related projects. The 1942 General Labor Law is the basis for employment rights in Bolivia, but this law has been modified more than 2,000 times via 60 supreme decrees since 1942. As a result of these modifications, the General Labor Law has become a complex web of regulations that is difficult to enforce or understand. An example of the lack of enforcement is the Comprehensive System for Protection of the Disabled (Law 25689), which stipulates that at least four percent of the total work force in public institutions, SOEs, and private companies should be disabled. Neither the public nor private sectors are close to fulfilling this requirement, and most buildings lack even basic access modifications to allow for disabled workers. In support of consumer protection rights, the Vice Ministry of Defense of User and Consumer Rights was created in 2009 (Supreme Decree 29894) under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice (which became the Ministry of Justice and Transparency in 2017). Also in 2009, the Consumer Protection Law (Supreme Decree 0065) was enacted, which gave the newly created Vice Ministry the authority to request information, verify, and follow up on consumer complaints. The Mother Earth Law (Law 071) approved in October 2012 promotes CSR elements as part of its principles (Article 2), such as collective good, harmony, respect, and defense of rights. The Ministry of Environment and Water oversees the implementation of this law, but the implementing regulations and new institutions needed to enforce this law are still incomplete. Although there are no specific claims regarding improper allocation of land or natural resources, indigenous communities do object to the government giving mine concessions in national parks and in areas where indigenous communities live, contaminating their water and destroying the environment. Even though Bolivia promotes the development of CSR practices in its laws, the government gives no advantage to businesses that implement these practices. Instead, businesses implement CSRs in order to gain the public support necessary to pass the prior consultation requirements or strengthen their support when mounting a legal defense against claims that they are not using land to fulfill a socially valuable purpose, as defined in the Community Land Reform laws (# 1775 and #3545). In April 2009, the Bolivian government reorganized the supervisory agencies of the government (formerly “Superintendencias”) to include social groups, thus creating the “Authorities of Supervision and Social Control” (Supreme Decree 0071). This authority controls and supervises the following sectors: telecommunications and transportation, water and sanitation, forests and land, pensions, electricity, and enterprises. Each sector has an Authority of Supervision and Social Control assigned to its oversight, and each Authority has the right to audit the activities in the sectors and the right to request the public disclosure of information, ranging from financial disclosures to investigation of management decisions. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Under the Mother Earth Law, the Ministry of Environment and Water oversees climate change mitigation, with a Sub-Secretary of Climate Change. Bolivia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) include increasing water, energy, forest, and agriculture capacities. Specifically, Bolivia intends to increase renewable energy use to 81 percent by 2030. Bolivia does not have a fossil-fuel phase out policy. Bolivia does not have regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity or other ecological benefits. Public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption Bolivian law stipulates criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the laws are not often implemented properly. Governmental lack of transparency, and police and judicial corruption, remain significant problems. The Ministry of Justice and Transparency and the Prosecutor’s Office are both responsible for combating corruption. Cases involving allegations of corruption against the president and vice president require congressional approval before prosecutors may initiate legal proceedings, and cases against pro-government public officials are rarely allowed to proceed. Despite the court ruling that awarding immunity for corruption charges is unconstitutional, their rulings were ignored by the government. Police corruption remains a significant problem. There are also reports of widespread corruption in the country’s judiciary.In August 2021, the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), formed from an agreement between the Bolivian government and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, found that the Bolivian government needs to implement profound reforms in its justice system to guarantee that the judiciary and attorney general’s office are not used for political purposes by the government in power, to guarantee due process, and so that preventive detention is only used as a last resort in criminal proceedings. The 2021 Transparency International corruption perception index ranked Bolivia 128 out of 180 countries and found that Bolivian citizens believe the most corrupt institutions in Bolivia are the judiciary, the police, and executive branch, Bolivia has laws in place that govern public sector-related contracts (Law 1178 and Supreme Decree 181), including contracts for the acquisition of goods, services, and consulting jobs. Bribery of public officials is also a criminal offense under Articles 145 and 158 of Bolivia’s Criminal Code. Laws also exist that provide protection for citizens filing complaints against corruption. Bolivia signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in December 2003 and ratified it in December 2005. Bolivia is also party to the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Bolivia is not a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: Vice Minister of Justice and the Fight Against Corruption Ministry of Justice Calle Capitan Ravelo 2101, La Paz +591-2-115773 http://www.transparencia.gob.bo/ 10. Political and Security Environment Bolivia is prone to social unrest, which can include violence. Given the country’s reliance on a few key thoroughfares, conflict often disrupts transportation and distribution networks. Most civil disturbances are related to domestic issues, usually workers pressuring the government for concessions by marching or closing major transportation arteries. Bolivia held peaceful and transparent elections in 2020 that gave a victory to Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) presidential candidate Luis Arce with over 55 percent of the vote. During his administration, political tensions in Bolivia have remained high, but there have been relatively few multi-day protests. While Bolivia has low levels of personal crime, with a homicide rate well below the regional average, there is a growing concern about increased criminality, especially a recent increase in femicides. Production of coca leaf is legal in Bolivia, and the country is a known source and transit country for cocaine and other illicit drugs that are mostly destined for Brazil and Europe but may also find their way to the United States. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Approximately two-thirds of Bolivia’s population is considered “economically active.” Between 60 and 80 percent of workers participate in the informal economy, where no contractual employer-employee relationship exists. Relatively low education and literacy levels limit labor productivity, a fact reflected in wage rates. Unskilled labor is readily available, but skilled workers are often harder to find. The labor market experienced a recovery during 2021. In June 2020, due to the pandemic and the quarantine from March-May, the unemployment rate reached almost 12 percent. During 2021, with the normalization of the economy, the unemployment rate dropped to 5.4 percent. Male unemployment was 4.8 percent while women’s unemployment reached 6 percent. There is a 26 percent gap in the labor market between men and women, with women taking the brunt of domestic duties and childcare. Most labor creation during the current recovery is in the informal sector. Article 3 of the Labor Code limits to 15 percent the number of foreign nationals that can be employed by any business. Due to the limited number of labor inspectors, enforcement of the law is uneven. The 2009 Constitution specifies that unjustified firing from jobs is forbidden and that the state will resolve conflicts between employers and employees (Articles 49.3 and 50). Bolivian labor law guarantees workers the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. Most companies are unionized, and nearly all unions belong to the Confederation of Bolivian Workers (COB). Labor laws, including related regulations and statutory instruments, provide for the freedom of association, the right to strike, and the right to organize and bargain collectively. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law does not require government approval for strikes and allows peaceful strikers to occupy businesses or government offices. General and solidarity strikes are protected by the constitution, as is the right of any working individual to join a union. Workers may form a union in any private company of 20 or more employees, but the law requires that at least 50 percent of the workforce be in favor of forming a union. The law requires prior government authorization to establish a union and confirm its elected leadership, permits only one union per enterprise, and allows the government to dissolve unions by administrative fiat. The law also requires that members of union executive boards be Bolivian by birth. The labor code prohibits most public employees from forming unions, but some public-sector workers (including teachers, transportation workers, and health-care workers) were legally unionized and actively participate as members of the Bolivian Workers’ Union without penalty. Freedom of association is limited by the government and under-resourced labor courts. Moreover, the 20-worker threshold for forming a union proved an onerous restriction, as an estimated 72 percent of enterprises had fewer than 20 employees. Labor inspectors may attend union meetings and monitor union activities. Collective bargaining and voluntary direct negotiations between employers and workers without government participation was limited. Most collective bargaining agreements were restricted to addressing wages. Originally passed in 1942, Bolivia’s labor law has changed frequently due to new regulations. Labor attorneys estimate that the law has been amended over two-thousand times, with many amendments directly contradicting others. Attorneys comment that it is virtually impossible to understand the rules clearly, creating significant uncertainty for both employers and employees. Bolivia has no unemployment insurance or employment-related social, safety net programs. However, if an employee is laid off due to economic or technical reasons, employers are required to pay three months of salary as compensation. Nevertheless, employees generally have more negotiating leverage in Bolivia than employers, and many employers choose to pay additional compensation to avoid retaliation. The Ministry of Labor has labor-related conflict resolution mechanisms, but, these processes are skewed towards employees. If parties cannot reach an agreement, employees are able to initiate legal proceedings, with appeals to Bolivia’s Supreme Court possible. The National Labor Court handles complaints of antiunion discrimination, but rulings generally take a year or more. In some cases, the court rules in favor of discharged workers and requires their reinstatement. Union leaders state that problems are often resolved or are no longer relevant by the time the court rules. For this reason, government remedies and penalties are often ineffective and insufficient to deter violations. Violence during labor demonstrations continues to be a serious problem. In August 2016, striking miners kidnapped and murdered Vice Minister Rodolfo Illanes during a conflict between miners and the government on the La Paz-Oruro highway. Several miners were also shot and killed. The case is still under investigation. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $37,898 2020 $36,572 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $432 2020 $432 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 30 2020 30 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 27.6% 2020 27.6% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: BEA, UNCTAD, World Bank Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 10,479 100% Total Outward 789 100% Spain 2,527 24.1% Netherlands 339 43.0% Sweden 1,318 12.6% Peru 77 9.7 Peru 1,247 11.9% Panama 67 8.5% Netherlands 885 8.4% Brazil 40 5.1% France 605 5.8% Canada 37 4.8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Maridela Ortiz Economic Officer OrtizMM@state.gov Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is open to foreign investment, but to succeed, investors must overcome endemic corruption, complex legal/regulatory frameworks and government structures, non-transparent business procedures, insufficient protection of property rights, and a weak judicial system under the indue influence of ethno-nationalist parties and their patronage networks. Economic reforms to complete the transition from a socialist past to a market-oriented future have proceeded slowly and the country has a low level of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the BiH Central Bank preliminary data, in the first nine months of 2021 FDI in BiH was USD 617 million, a 65% increase from the same period in 2020. In the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report, BiH was among the least attractive business environments in Southeast Europe, with a ranking of 90 out of 190 global economies. (Note: Beginning in 2021, the World Bank discontinued the worldwide assessment in the Doing Business Report.) The World Bank 2020 report ranked BiH particularly low for its lengthy and arduous processes to start a new business and obtain construction permits. According to the World Bank estimates, real GDP is expected to grow 4 percent in 2021 after contracting 3.2 percent in 2020. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expects BiH’s GDP to grow by 4.5% in 2021. EBRD announced that BiH’s economic recovery has been stronger than expected mostly due to the recovery in external markets and strong expansion of domestic private consumption, backed by higher exports of goods and services. BiH is tied closely to global value chains as it primarily exports goods rather than services. U.S. investment in BiH is low due to its small market size, relatively low income levels, distance from the United States, challenging business climate, and the lack of investment opportunities. Most U.S. companies in BiH are represented by small sales offices that are concentrated on selling U.S. goods and services, with minimal longer-term investments. U.S. companies with offices in BiH include major multinational companies and market leaders in their respective sectors, such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle, Pfizer, McDonalds, Marriott, Caterpillar, Johnson & Johnson, FedEx, UPS, Philip Morris, KPMG, PwC and others. Nonetheless, BiH offers business opportunities to well-prepared and persistent exporters and investors. Companies that overcome the challenges of establishing a presence in BiH often make a return on their investment over time. A major U.S. investment fund was able to enter the market with a regional investment in the telecom/cable sector in 2014 and exit its majority position in 2019 with a good return. There is an active international community, but lack of political will has stalled the many reform efforts that would improve the business climate as BiH pursues eventual European Union membership. The country is open to foreign investment and offers a liberal trade regime and its simplified tax structure is one of the lowest in the region (17 percent VAT and 10 percent flat income tax). The complex institutional and territorial structure of BiH complicates the economic landscape of the country and may lead to further disruptions in Foreign Direct Investment. In July 2021, the Republika Srpska (RS) entity began a blockade of state institutions and in October 2021 began to take unconstitutional steps to return competencies to the entity-level government. This near-virtual decision-making blockade and attempts to withdraw the RS from state institutions and agencies have created questionsfor many investors and businesses. The duplicative nature of the proposed RS-based parallel institutions and agencies will complicate the investment landscape and create regulatory and legal confusion. While no new parallel RS agencies are yet operational, the RS has taken concrete legislative and regulatory steps to lay the groundwork for their full implementation in the near to mid-term. Investors should exercise all due diligence and take into account ongoing and potential Constitutional Court challenges and the fact these RS moves violate the Dayton Peace Agreement when deciding whether to conduct business with these nascent agencies or operate under constitutionally questionable legal frameworks established by the RS. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity also has functionality issues, with 2018 election results yet unimplemented, and a legislative body that struggles to pass basic economic reforms. Potential investors are urged to read the legal reviews and statements of the High Representative to BiH. BiH is pursuing World Trade Organization membership and hopes to join in the future. It is also richly endowed with natural resources, providing potential opportunities in energy (hydro, wind, solar, along with traditional thermal), agriculture, timber, and tourism. The best business opportunities for U.S. exporters to BiH include energy generation and transmission equipment, telecommunication and IT equipment and services, transport infrastructure and equipment, engineering and construction services, medical equipment, agricultural products, and raw materials and chemicals for industrial processing. In 2021, U.S. exports to BiH totaled USD 322 million, a 37 percent increase from 2020, and held around 3 percent share of total BiH imports. BiH exports to the United States in 2021 totaled USD 94 million, an increase of 135 percent from 2020. U.S. exports to BiH are primarily in the areas of raw materials for industrial processing, food and agricultural products, machinery and transport equipment, and mineral fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 75 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/home U.S. FDI in partner country 2021 $9 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles to attract foreign investment. Complex labor and pension laws, the lack of a single economic space, and inadequate judicial and regulatory protections deter investment. Under the BiH constitution, established through the Dayton Accords that ended the 1990s war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth “the state”) is comprised of two “entities,” the Federation of BiH (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). A third, smaller area, the Brčko District, operates under a special status. The Federation includes ten cantons, each with its own government and responsibilities. There are also 143 municipalities in BiH: 63 in the RS and 80 in the Federation. As a result, BiH has a multi-tiered legal and regulatory framework that can be duplicative and contradictory, and is not conducive to attracting foreign investors. Employers bear a heavy burden toward governments. They must contribute 69 percent on top of wages in the Federation and 52 percent in the RS to the health, unemployment, and pension systems. The labor and pension laws are also deterrents to investment, though both are being reformed to decrease burdens on employers. While corporate income taxes in the two entities and Brčko District are now harmonized at 10 percent, entity business registration requirements are not harmonized. The RS has its own registration requirements, which apply to the entire entity. Each of the Federation’s ten cantons has different business regulations and administrative procedures affecting companies. Simplifying and streamlining this framework is essential to improving the investment climate. EU reforms target changes that should improve the investment climate by clarifying and simplifying regulation and procedures while decreasing fees faced by businesses at the entity, canton, and municipal levels — but lack of political will has stalled even the most basic of reforms. Generally, BiH’s legal framework does not discriminate against foreign investors. However, given the high level of corruption, foreign investors can be at a significant disadvantage in relation to entrenched local companies as well as some foreign investors, such as the People’s Republic of China, especially those with formal or informal backing by BiH’s various levels of government. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) is a state-level organization mandated by the Council of Ministers to facilitate and support FDI ( www.fipa.gov.ba ). FIPA provides data, analysis, and advice on the business and investment climate to foreign investors. All FIPA services are free of charge. BiH does not maintain an ongoing, formal dialogue with foreign investors. Sporadically, high-ranking government officials give media statements inviting foreign investments in the energy, transportation, and agriculture industries; however, the announcements are rarely supported by tangible, commercially-viable investment opportunities. According to the Law on the Policy of FDI, foreign investors are entitled to invest in any sector of the economy in the same form and under the same conditions as those defined for local residents. Exceptions include the defense industry and some areas of publishing and media where foreign ownership is restricted to 49 percent; and electric power transmission, which is closed to foreign investment. In practice, additional sectors are dominated by government monopolies (such as airport operation), or characterized by oligopolistic market structures (such as telecommunications and electricity generation), making it difficult for foreign investors to engage. There have been no significant privatizations of government-owned enterprises in the past few years. In the past three years, the BiH government has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the World Trade Organization (WTO); or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Establishing a business in BiH can be an extremely burdensome and time-consuming process for investors. The World Bank estimates there are an average of 13 procedures (actual number depends on the type of business), taking a total of 81 days, to register a new business in the capital city of Sarajevo. Registration in BiH can sometimes be expedited if companies retain a local lawyer to follow up at each step of the process. The RS established a one-stop shop for business registration in the entity. On paper, this dramatically reduced the time required to register a business in the RS, bringing the government-reported time to register a company down to an average of 7 to 14 days. Some businesses, however, report that in practice it can take significantly longer. The entity, cantonal, and municipal levels of government each establish their own laws and regulations on business operations, creating redundant and inconsistent procedures that facilitate corruption. It is often difficult to understand all the laws and rules that might apply to certain business activities, given overlapping jurisdictions and the lack of a central information source. It is therefore critical that foreign investors obtain local assistance and advice. Investors in the Federation may register their business as a branch in the RS and vice versa. The most common U.S. business presence found in BiH are representative offices. A representative office is not considered to be a legal entity and its activities are limited to market research, contract or investment preparations, technical cooperation, and similar business facilitation activities. The BiH Law on Foreign Trade Policy governs the establishment of a representative office. To open a representative office, a company must register with the Registry of Representative Offices, maintained by the BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Affairs (MoFTER), and the appropriate entity’s ministry of trade. Additional English-language information on the business registration process can be found at: BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Relations (MoFTER): Ph: +387-33-220-093 www.mvteo.gov.ba BiH Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA): Ph: + 387 33 278 080 www.fipa.gov.ba Republika Srpska Company Registration Website: http://www.investsrpska.net The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. There are no programs to promote or incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The government has adequate laws to foster competition; however, due to corruption, laws are often not implemented transparently or efficiently. Additionally, political dysfunction results in lengthy delays in adapting and/or updating regulations necessary to implement legislation. The multitude of state, entity, cantonal (in the Federation only), and municipal administrations – each with the power to establish laws and/or regulations affecting business – creates a heavily bureaucratic, non-transparent system. Ministries and/or regulatory agencies are not typically obligated to publish the text of proposed regulations before they are enacted. Some local and international companies have expressed frustration with generally limited opportunities to provide input and influence/improve draft legislation that impacts the business community. Foreign investors have criticized government and public procurement tenders for a lack of openness and transparency. Dispute resolution is also challenging as the judicial system moves slowly, often does not adhere to existing deadlines, and provides no recourse if the company in question re-registers under a different name. In an effort to promote the growth of business in its entity, the Republika Srpska government created a RS one-stop-shop for business registration in 2013. This institution centralizes the process of registering a business, ostensibly making it easier, faster, and cheaper for new business owners to register their companies in the RS. The Federation’s announced plans to establish a one-stop-shop have long been delayed. Businesses are subject to inspections from a number of entity and cantonal/municipal agencies, including the financial police, labor inspectorate, market inspectorate, sanitary inspectorate, health inspectorate, fire-fighting inspectorate, environmental inspectorate, institution for the protection of cultural monuments, tourism and food inspectorate, construction inspectorate, communal inspectorate, and veterinary inspectorate. Some investors have complained about non-transparent fees levied during inspections, changing rules and regulations, and an ineffective appeals process to protest these fines. BiH is not a part of the EU, the WTO, nor a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). BiH has an overloaded court system and it often takes many years for a case to be brought to trial. Moreover, commercial cases with subject matter that judges do not have experience adjudicating, such as intellectual property rights, are often left unresolved for lengthy periods of time. Most judges have little to no in-depth knowledge of adjudicating international commercial disputes and require training on applicable international treaties and laws. Regulations or enforcement actions can be appealed, and appeals are adjudicated in the national court system. The U.S. government has provided training to judges, trustees, attorneys, and other stakeholders at the state and entity levels to assist in the development of bankruptcy and intellectual property laws. Those laws are now in effect at both the entity and state levels, but have not been fully implemented. The state-level Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment accords foreign investors the same rights as domestic investors and guarantees foreign investors national treatment, protection against nationalization/expropriation, and the right to dispose of profits and transfer funds. In practice, most business sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully open to foreign equity ownership. Notable exceptions to this general rule are select strategic sectors, such as defense; electric power transmission, which is closed to foreign investment; and some areas of publishing and media, where foreign ownership is restricted to 49 percent (see below). However, the sub-national governments — Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska — may decide to exempt companies from these restrictions. According to legal amendments adopted in March 2015, foreign investors can own more than 49 percent of capital business entities dealing with media activities, such as publishing newspapers, magazines and other journals, publishing of periodical publications, production and distribution of television programs, privately owned broadcasting of radio and TV programs, and other forms of daily or periodic publications. The 2015 law maintains the restriction that foreign investors cannot own more than 49 percent of public television and radio services. It also sets conditions to enhance legal security and clarity for foreign direct investment flows. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency maintains a list of laws relevant to investors on its website: http://www.fipa.gov.ba/publikacije_materijali/zakoni/default.aspx?id=317&langTag=en-US The complex legal environment in BiH underscores the utility of local legal representation for foreign investors. Attorneys in BiH have limited experience with respect to legal questions and the issues that arise in a market-oriented economy. However, local lawyers are quickly gaining experience in working with international organizations and companies operating in BiH. Companies’ in-house legal counsel should be prepared to oversee their in-country counsel, with explicit explanations and directions regarding objectives. The U.S. Embassy maintains a list of local lawyers willing to represent U.S. citizens and companies in BiH. The list can be accessed at https://ba.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ BiH has a Competition Council, designed to be an independent public institution to enforce anti-trust laws, prevent monopolies, and enhance private sector competition. The Council reviews and approves foreign investments in cases of mergers and acquisitions of local companies by foreign companies. The Competition Council consists of six members appointed for six-year terms of office with the possibility of one reappointment. The BiH Council of Ministers appoints three Competition Council members, the Federation Government appoints two members, and the RS Government appoints one member. From the six-member Competition Council, the BiH Council of Ministers affirms a president of the Council for a one-year term without the possibility of reappointment. BiH investment law forbids expropriation of investments, except in the public interest. According to Article 16, “Foreign investment shall not be subject to any act of nationalization, expropriation, requisition, or measures that have similar effects, except where the public interest may require otherwise.” In such cases of public interest, expropriation of investments would be executed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, be free from discrimination, and include payment of appropriate compensation. Neither the entity governments nor the state government have expropriated any foreign investments to date. Both the Federation and Republika Srpska entities have Laws on Bankruptcy. However, bankruptcy proceedings are not resolved in a timely manner, and there is insufficient emphasis placed on companies’ rehabilitation and/or reorganization. The entities’ laws define the rights of creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts. Foreign contract holders enjoy the same rights as local contract holders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The U.S. government provided recent training to judges on international bankruptcy principles. 4. Industrial Policies There are some incentives for foreign direct investment, including exemptions from payment of customs duties and customs fees. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into three jurisdictions for direct tax purposes: the Federation, the RS, and the Brčko District. In the Federation, RS, and Brčko District, the corporate income tax allows offsetting of losses against profits over a five-year period. The corporate tax rate is 10 percent across the country. Foreign investors can open bank accounts in all jurisdictions and transfer their profits abroad without any restrictions. The rights and benefits of foreign investors granted and obligations imposed by the Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment cannot be terminated or overruled by subsequent laws and regulations. Should a subsequent law or regulation be more favorable to foreign investors, the investor has the right to choose the most beneficial regulations. In addition to the BiH-wide incentives listed above, the two entities and the Brčko District have specific incentives. In the Brčko District, investments in fixed assets are subject to tax relief. In the Federation: A taxpayer who invests KM 20 million (approx. USD 12 million) over a period of five years is exempted from paying corporate income tax for the period of five years beginning from the first investment year. A taxpayer who does not make the prescribed investment in the period of five years loses the right of tax exemption. In that case, unpaid corporate income tax is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Corporate Income Tax augmented with a penalty and interest for late payment of public revenues. Qualifying investments include fixed assets such as real estate, plants, and equipment for carrying out production activity. A taxpayer loses the right to tax exemption if the corporation makes a dividend payment during first three years of investment. A taxpayer whose workforce is more than 50 percent disabled persons and persons with special needs in any given year is exempted from paying corporate income tax. The exemption applies to the applicable year in which disabled persons and persons with special needs met the required threshold. Employees must have been with the company for longer than one year to be considered. In the Republika Srpska: In its Amendments to the Law on Profit Tax, the RS reduced taxes on investments in equipment intended for company production and investment in plants and immovable property used for manufacturing and processing. For employers with at least 30 workers during a calendar year, there is a tax base reduction in personal income tax and mandatory employer contribution of the employer. Employees must be officially listed with the RS Employment Office. The 2012 RS Decree on Conditions and Implementation of the Investment and Employment Support Program (Official Gazette of RS No. 70/12) also established incentives meant to encourage and support direct investments, employment growth, and transfer of new knowledge and technologies. To qualify for the incentives, participants must have existing investment projects in the RS manufacturing sector, a minimum investment value of KM 2 million (USD 1.2 million), and new employment for at least 20 workers. The total funding awarded is proportional to the investment value, the number of newly employed, and the development level of the investment location. In 2015, the RS government passed the Law on Property Tax, which imposes a flat rate for property taxes in all municipalities; the Law on Income Tax, which exempts dividends and profit shares from taxation; the Law on Corporate Income Tax, which broadens the scope of deductible expenses and harmonizes taxes for foreign investors; and the Law on Contributions, which decreases tax contributions employers pay on salaries by 1.4 percent. The BiH’s renewable energy incentives use a feed-in tariff model, under which the producer must obtain the status of privileged producer of electricity and meet other prescribed requirements. All the technologies in the system are based on a feed-in tariff. The BiH Law on Free Trade Zones allows the establishment of free trade zones (FTZs) as part of the customs territory of BiH. Currently there are four free trade zones in BiH: Vogošća, Visoko, Herzegovina-Mostar, and Holc Lukavac. One or more domestic or foreign legal entities registered in BiH may create a FTZ. FTZ users do not pay taxes and contributions, with the exception of those related to salaries and wages. Investors are free to invest capital in the FTZ, transfer their profits, and retransfer capital. Customs and tariffs are not paid on imports into FTZs. An FTZ is considered economically justified if the submitted feasibility study and other evidence can prove that the value of goods exported from a free zone will exceed at least 50 percent of the total value of goods imported to the free zone within the period of 12 months. The BiH government does not have a “forced localization” policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content or sourcing in goods, human capital, or technology. Also, there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. There are no mechanisms in place used to enforce rules on maintaining a certain amount of data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked BiH at number 96 out of 190 in the ease of registering property, which takes 7 procedures and an average of 35 days. Registration of real property titles is generally acknowledged as a significant barrier to the real property and mortgage market development. The present system consists of separate geodetic administrations for the Federation and the RS, which are responsible for real property cadasters. Real property cadasters describe and certify the legal object, e.g. land, house, etc. Separately, the land registry establishes legal ownership and rights for the specific object and is maintained by the municipal courts. A significant portion of land and real estate property does not have a clear title due to restitution issues. Foreigners must register a local company to purchase property; the company then makes the purchase and is recorded as the landowner. The exception to this rule is if the foreigners’ country of citizenship has a reciprocal land ownership agreement with BiH. In that case, the foreigner may directly own land. Companies should have a comprehensive intellectual property rights (IPR) strategy in BiH since rights must be registered and enforced according to local law. BiH’s IPR framework consists of seven laws adopted and put into force by the Parliament in 2010. This legislation is compliant with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and EU legislation. BiH is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to a number of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty. Registration of patents and trademarks is on a first-in-time, first-in-right basis, so businesses should consider applying for trademark and patent protection prior to introducing their products or services in the BiH market. Companies may wish to seek advice from local attorneys who are experts in IPR law. Although existing legislation provides a basic level of protection, BiH’s civil and criminal enforcement remains weak. Jurisdiction over IPR investigations is split between customs officials, entity inspectorates, and state and entity law enforcement agencies, none of which has specialized IPR investigation teams. IPR crimes are prosecuted primarily at the state level. Cases in which companies are indicted often involve fairly low-level violators. More significant cases have sometimes languished for years with little action from prosecutors or judges. Some BiH government entities have been using licensed software for a number of years, such as the state-level government which came into compliance in 2009, a significant step forward in the government’s commitment to IPR protection. However, some of the Cantonal governments continue using unlicensed software as some officials still do not understand the implications for IPR infringement. In BiH’s private sector, awareness of IPR, particularly the importance of copyright protection, remains low, though the emergence of a local software development industry is helping to raise awareness. Curbing business software piracy could significantly improve the local economy by creating new jobs and generating tax revenue. The failure to recognize the importance of preventing copyright infringement makes software producers and official distributors less competitive and the establishment of a legitimate market more difficult. According to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the rate of illegal software installed on personal computers in BiH currently remains at 66 percent, which is the regional average. Collective copyright protection and enforcement also remains a challenge in BiH. There is no established local representative to collect and distribute royalties for visual artists, filmmakers, and literary authors. The Association of Composers and Musical Authors is the only licensed collective management organization for music authors in BiH, and it faces enforcement challenges since both musical artists and consumers remain skeptical and unfamiliar with collective management protection. The U.S. Government, in conjunction with local partners, has made IPR awareness within the BiH enforcement community a priority through judicial engagement and public awareness programs. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain underdeveloped in BiH. Both entities have created their own modern stock market infrastructure with separate stock exchanges in Sarajevo (SASE) and Banja Luka (BLSE), both of which started trading in 2002. The small size of the markets, lack of privatization, weak shareholder protection, and public mistrust of previous privatization programs has impeded the development of the capital market. Both the RS and Federation issued government securities for the first time during 2011, as part of their plans to raise capital in support of their budget deficits during this period of economic stress. Both entity governments continue to issue government securities in order to fill budget gaps. These securities are also available for secondary market trading on the stock exchanges. In February 2022, the international rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) affirmed the credit rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “B” with a stable outlook. The agency stated that “the stable outlook balances the risks stemming from BiH’s complex and confrontational political dynamics over the next 12 months against some comparatively strong economic fundamentals, such as contained net general government debt, an improving external position, and a resilient banking sector. The outlook is based on the expectation that the ongoing political crisis between RS on one side and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the central government on the other will ultimately deescalate, with RS remaining in BiH on largely the same terms as previously. The ratings on BiH are supported by the modest level and favorable structure of public debt.” The banking and financial system has been stable with the most significant investments coming from Austria. As of March 2022, there are 20 commercial banks operating in BiH: 13 with headquarters in the Federation and 7 in the Republika Srpska. Twenty-one commercial banks are members of a deposit insurance program, which provides for deposit insurance of KM 50,000 (USD 28,000). The banking sector is divided between the two entities, with entity banking agencies responsible for banking supervision. The BiH Central Bank maintains monetary stability through its currency board arrangement and supports and maintains payment and settlement systems. It also coordinates the activities of the entity Banking Agencies, which are in charge of bank licensing and supervision. Reforms of the banking sector, mandated by the IMF and performed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, are in progress. BiH passed a state-level framework law in 2010 mandating the use of international accounting standards, and both entities passed legislation that eliminated differences in standards between the entities and Brčko District. All governments have implemented accounting practices that are fully in line with international norms. BiH does not have a government-affiliated Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In BiH, subnational governments (the two entities and ten cantons) own the vast majority of government-owned companies. Private enterprises can compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives. In practice, however, SOEs have the advantage over private enterprises, especially in sectors such as telecommunications and electricity, where government-owned enterprises have traditionally held near-monopolies and are able to influence regulators and courts in their favor. Generally, government-owned companies are controlled by political parties, increasing the possibilities for corruption and inefficient company management. With the exception of SOEs in the telecom, electricity, and defense sectors, many of the remaining public companies are bankrupt or on the verge of insolvency, and represent a growing liability to the government. The country is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. There have been no significant privatizations in the past few years. Privatization offerings are scarce and often require unfavorable terms. Some formerly successful state-owned enterprises have accrued significant debts from unpaid health and pension contributions, and potential investors are required to assume these debts and maintain the existing workforce. Under the state-level FDI Law, foreign investors may bid on privatization tenders. International financial organizations, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are seeking to be engaged on privatization and restructuring efforts across the remaining portfolio of state owned enterprises. Historically, the privatization process in BiH has resulted in economic loss due to corruption. Since 1999 more than 1,000 companies have been fully privatized, while around 100 have been partially privatized. Some privatizations led to the loss of value of state property and many of the privatized companies were weakened or ruined in the privatization process. The history of corrupt privatizations has raised concerns that further privatization would only lead to additional unemployment and the enrichment of a few politically-connected individuals. Successful privatizations and restructurings that improve service delivery, business productivity, and employment would be very beneficial for the BiH economy, could help the image of privatization, and would build support for a long overdue shift away from a government-led economy. The Federation government is focused on privatizing or restructuring some SOEs based on the Federation Agency for Privatization’s 2019 privatization plan. The privatization plan includes the fuel retailer Energopetrol dd. Sarajevo, the engineering company Energoinvest, and the insurer Sarajevo-Osiguranje. The remaining companies listed in the privatization plan have posted losses and suffered significant declines in their value, while others have only a small amount of government ownership. The Federation government rejected media speculation that it plans to privatize the two majority entity government-owned telecom companies, BH Telecom (90 percent stake) and HT Mostar (50.1 percent stake). At the same time, it has completed due diligence on the two telecom companies as part of its arrangement with the IMF. The privatization process in the RS is carried out by the RS Investment Development Bank (IRBRS). Many prospective companies have been already privatized, and out of 163 not yet privatized companies, many are being liquidated or undergoing bankruptcy. In 2016, the RS government announced plans to sell its capital in 22 companies but the plan has not been implemented. The plan envisions the privatizations to take place via the sale of government shares on the stock exchange. Although the RS National Assembly passed a decision that the entity has no plans to privatize the energy sector, the RS government maintains the possibility of joint ventures in the energy sector. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Foreign and local companies conduct some corporate social responsibility activities and there is a general awareness of standards for responsible business conduct. More could be done in this area to respond to BiH’s various social and economic needs. In general, consumers tend to view favorably companies that initiate and carry out charitable activities in the local market. Corporate governance is not part of the broader economic mindset, and shareholder protection is not a priority. The financial system is not yet developed enough to understand and apply principles of corporate governance and shareholder protection. The BiH Consumer Ombudsman leads efforts to ensure that consumers are aware of their rights and takes action against organizations that have been accused of violating consumer rights. The local American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) has an Ethics and Compliance Committee to raise awareness about responsible business conduct and make it a more routine part of doing business in BiH. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) adopted an Environmental Approximation Strategy in 2017, laying out a broad framework for the country’s transposition of EU environmental legislation into domestic law, but implementation is lagging. A countrywide Environmental Protection Strategy remains pending. In 2013, BiH adopted its first Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change and Low-Emission Development. An updated strategy for 2020-2030 is being finalized. The strategy’s goal is to increase BiH’s resilience to climate variability and climate change, prevent environmental degradation, gradually reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and ensure economic progress. As a signatory of the Paris Agreement, BiH submitted its revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2020-2030 to the UNFCCC in April 2021. According to the revised NDC, BiH plans to reduce GHG emissions by slightly over a third by 2030, and almost two thirds by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels). By signing on to the Sofia Declaration on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans in November 2020, BiH committed to develop and implement an integrated National Energy and Climate Plan outlining clear measures designed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by integrating climate action into all relevant sectoral policies. At the same time, BiH committed to develop and implement a Western Balkans 2030 Biodiversity Strategic Plan together with Western Balkan counterparts. However, BiH continues to lack a legal framework at the state level that would facilitate meeting and monitoring implementation of its climate obligations. The role of BiH’s private sector in meeting relevant targets also remains largely undefined. BiH is currently committed to aligning with the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Following the EU’s announcement of a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), some discussions have begun about introducing a similar mechanism in BiH that may secure BiH’s opt-out from the CBAM. However, no legislative activities have been launched in that respect. BiH’s public procurement policies do not specifically stipulate any environmental and green growth considerations. BiH has recently made certain progress in declaring protected areas at the level of the two entities, and BiH joined the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use at the COP26 summit. The country’s Green Growth Index is among the lowest in Europe per Global Green Growth Institute indicators (Green Growth Index 2020). 9. Corruption Corruption remains endemic in many political and economic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and raises the costs and risks of doing business. BiH’s overly complex business registration and licensing process is particularly vulnerable to corruption. The multitude of state, entity, cantonal, and municipal administrations, each with the power to establish laws and regulations affecting business, creates a system that lacks transparency and opens opportunities for corruption. Paying bribes to obtain necessary business licenses and construction permits, or simply to expedite the approval process, occurs regularly. Foreign investors have criticized government and public procurement tenders for a lack of openness and transparency. Public procurement reform, which would establish rules and regulations to close off some of the avenues for corruption in public contracting, has been stalled due to opposition from leading political parties. Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 Corruption Perception Index ranked BiH 110 out of 180 countries. According to TI, relevant institutions lack the will to actively fight corruption; law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are not effective in the prosecution of corruption cases and are visibly exposed to political pressures or under the outright control of politicians and their patronage networks; and prosecutors complain that citizens generally do not report instances of corruption and do not want to testify in these cases. In 2011, BiH established a state-level agency to coordinate efforts to combat corruption; while officially active, the agency has shown limited results. Nascent efforts to, with U.S. support, establish cantonal-level Anti-Corruption Offices are underway throughout the FBiH, but efforts to undermine their independence and obstruct investigations are widespread. Corruption has a corrosive impact on both market opportunities overseas for U.S. companies and the broader business climate. Several BiH individuals and one business entity are under OFAC sanctions for destabilizing activities and corruption, while others have been designated by the Department of State under 7031(c) authorities barring their entry to the United States. Most prominent among these is Serb member of the BiH Presidency and President of the SNSD political party Milorad Dodik. Other individuals have been sanctioned for war crimes. Corruption deters foreign investment, stifles economic growth and development, distorts prices, and undermines the rule of law. U.S. companies must carefully assess the business climate and develop an effective compliance program and measures to prevent and detect corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms should take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption laws of the United States and of BiH at all levels of government in order to properly comply, and where appropriate, seek the advice of legal counsel. The U.S. government seeks to level the global playing field for U.S. businesses by encouraging other countries to take steps to criminalize their own companies’ acts of corruption, including bribery of foreign public officials, and uphold obligations under relevant international conventions. A U.S. firm that believes a competitor is seeking to use bribery of a foreign public official to secure a contract should bring this to the attention of appropriate U.S. agencies. While the U.S. Department of Commerce cannot provide legal advice on local laws, the Department’s U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service can provide assistance with navigating the host country’s legal system and obtaining a list of local legal counsel. The U.S. Department of Commerce offers a number of services to aid U.S. businesses. For example, the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service can provide services that may assist U.S. companies in conducting due diligence when choosing business partners or agents overseas and provide support for qualified U.S. companies bidding on foreign government contracts. For a list of U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service offices, please visit the Commercial Service website: www.trade.gov/cs Alleged corruption by foreign governments or competitors can be brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. government officials, including U.S. Embassy personnel or through the Department of Commerce Trade Compliance Center “Report a Trade Barrier” Website at: https://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: BiH Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption Phone: +387 57 322 540 email: kontakt@apik.ba www.apik.ba Contact at “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption): Transparency International BiH Phone: +387 51 216928 Fax: +387 51 216369 email: info@ti-bih.org www.ti-bih.org BiH signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in October 2006. BiH is also party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 10. Political and Security Environment Bosnia and Herzegovina has been at peace since the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. There have been no attacks targeting foreign investments. In mid-June 2013 and early 2014, large groups of citizens protested the country’s economic stagnation and the government’s apparent inability to improve the situation. The vast majority of protests were peaceful with relatively small numbers of participants, but some protests in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla resulted in attacks on government buildings, destruction of government property, and injuries. There were no reports of foreign investors being directly targeted in the protests. However, there are still risks from occasional, localized political and criminal violence. The political environment in BiH has deteriorated since July 2021 when the RS entity began blockading the work of state level institutions and agencies and in October 2021 proceeded with unconstitutional steps to withdraw from state-level institutions and create parallel institutions and agencies. Since this blockade began, little progress has been made by state level institutions to enact necessary reforms strengthening the business environment. RS moves to pull out of state level institutions and form parallel entity level institutions, such as the Medicine and Medical Equipment Agency, threaten to create legal ambiguities that further complicate the business environment, disrupt the economy, and hinder investment. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity also has functionality issues, including a government that has not yet implemented 2018 election results. 11. Labor Policies and Practices BiH has a workforce with low labor costs by Western standards, and university enrollments have been increasing for a number of years. However, several sectors such as construction, information technology, and health care have experienced a significant loss of skills over the past decade due to a lack of education and job training opportunities, as well as emigration. Mandatory contributions on labor are high, discouraging employment of new workers and increasing incentives for unregistered employment. Each entity has its own pension and health care systems, and the systems are not harmonized. Companies working in both entities have two sets of rules to follow related to employment, wages, and contributions. Employees and employers share the costs of health care, pension, and unemployment insurance in the Federation, while in the Republika Srpska employers cover all of these costs, as well as childcare and unemployment contributions. Many employers underreport their labor force to avoid paying taxes and benefits, creating a significant gray market. The official rate of registered unemployment according to the BiH Statistical Agency was approximately 31.2 percent in January 2022. However, unemployment based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition, which factors in unregistered workers in the “gray economy,” was approximately 20.5 percent, and estimates the share of informal employment in total employment was 30 percent in 2021. The youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world at 36.6 percent, driven by widespread corruption, nepotism, and economic stagnation. BiH suffers from mass emigration to European countries as citizens see limited opportunities for employment and securing a better future for their families. The majority of unemployed persons are skilled workers. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $19.9 billion* 2020 $19.9 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $250 million (Post estimate) N/A N/A N/A FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Total inbound stock of FDI as % GDP ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A *Source: BiH Statistics Agency Table 3: Sources of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations 1994-2022 (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $8,882 100% Total Outward 524 100% Austria $1,635 18.4% Croatia 130 24.8% Croatia $1,421 15.9% Germany 97 18.5% Serbia $1,288 14.5% Montenegro 87 16.6% Slovenia $692 7.7% Serbia 74 14.1% Germany $501 5.6% Romania 37 7.0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. According to the BiH Central Bank preliminary data for 2021, FDI inflow in Bosnia and Herzegovina increased significantly by 65% comparing to the same period of 2020 and amounted to USD 617 million. The all-time high for FDI was USD 2.1 billion in 2007. Most investments in 2014-2021 came from Croatia, Austria, Russia, Serbia, Germany, The Netherlands, UAE, and the United Kingdom. 14. Contact for More Information United States Embassy Sarajevo Economic/Commercial Section Robert C. Frasure 1 71000 Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina tel. +387-33-704-000 fax. +387-33-659-722 email: sarajevocommercialservice@state.gov website: https://ba.usembassy.gov/business/ Botswana Executive Summary Botswana is a small country with a population of about 2.35 million (World Bank, 2020) and nestled between South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Its central location in southern Africa enables it to serve as a gateway to the region. Botswana has historically enjoyed high economic growth rates and its export-driven economy is highly correlated with global economic trends. Development has been driven mainly by revenue from diamond mining, which has enabled Botswana to develop infrastructure and provide social welfare programs for vulnerable members of the population, and these programs will be maintained despite financial challenges in the current financial year, which runs from April 2022 to March 2023. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was significant as evidenced by an economic growth of negative 8.5 percent in 2020; economic growth was estimated to reach 9.7 percent in 2021. Unemployment also rose from 22.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (prior to the pandemic) to 26 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021. The fiscal impact of the pandemic has also been significant, resulting in large budget deficits of $1.4 billion in 2020 and $0.87 billion in 2021 compared to the $0.68 billion surplus that the government had forecasted for 2021 in its National Development Plan (NDP). In the first quarter of 2021, diamond revenues recovered, but international tourism revenues did not. In recent years, inflation has remained at the bottom end of the central bank’s three to six percent acceptable range; however, since the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation rose to a 13-year high of 10.6 percent in January 2022 and stayed at that level in February 2022. The World Bank classifies Botswana as an upper middle-income country based on its per capita income of $6,405 in 2020, although it declined from $7,203 in 2019. Botswana is a stable, democratic country with an independent judiciary system. It maintains a sound macroeconomic environment, fiscal discipline, a well-capitalized banking system, and a crawling peg exchange rate system. In March 2021, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) maintained Botswana’s sovereign credit rating for long and short-term foreign and domestic currency bonds at “BBB+/A-2” with a negative outlook, which reflects the risks COVID-19 will continue to pose on Botswana’s economic and fiscal performance over the next 12 months. In November 2021, Moody’s revised its credit rating for Botswana from A2 to A3 with a stable outlook. These agencies’ ratings are highly influenced by Botswana’s continued dependence on diamonds, which contribute to at least a quarter of Botswana’s GDP and are susceptible to external shocks which places the country at a much higher risk. The diamond industry has however been experiencing a recovery, setting Botswana on a positive trajectory. Botswana has minimal labor strife. The country has been cited in the 2020 Global Competitiveness Report as one of 30 countries out of 141 in which hiring of foreign labor has become significantly harder than it was in 2008. Botswana is a member state to both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the 1958 New York Convention. Corruption in Botswana remains less pervasive than in other parts of Africa; nevertheless, foreign and national companies have noted increasing tender-related corruption. The Government of Botswana (GoB) created the Botswana Investment and Trade Centre (BITC) to assist foreign investors. Botswana offers low tax rates and has no foreign exchange controls. The BITC’s topline economic goals are to promote export-led growth, ensure efficient government spending and financing, build human capital, and to ensure the provision of appropriate infrastructure. GoB entities, including BITC, use these criteria to determine the level of support to give foreign investors. The GoB has committed to streamline business-related procedures, and remove bureaucratic impediments based on World Bank recommendations in a business reform roadmap. Under this framework, the GoB introduced electronic tax and customs processes in 2016 and 2017. The Companies and Intellectual Property Authority (CIPA) built and successfully integrated the Online Business Registration System (OBRS) with Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS) and the Immigration Office. OBRS is designed to reduce the business registration process by more than 10 days. On March 2022, Parliament passed the Intellectual Property Policy to leverage Botswana’s IP potential for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) will from April 1, 2022, be transitioned to Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority (PPRA) and no longer adjudicate on government tenders. The GoB also established the Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA) to streamline sector-targeted investment in Botswana’s different geographic areas. The Ministry of Investment, Trade & Industry (MITI) is developing a Trading Service Strategy to facilitate economic diversification and is also working on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Implementation Strategy. Due to COVID-19-related economic shortfalls, Botswana drew down heavily on its foreign exchange reserves and government savings. Sectors such as mining, tourism, trade, hotels and restaurants, construction, and manufacturing suffered significantly; however, rough diamond sales recovered somewhat in the second half of 2020. In April 2021, the government put in place several interventions to raise revenues including a Value Added Tax (VAT) increase from 12 percent to 14 percent, an increase on Withholding Tax on dividend income from 7.5 percent to 10 percent and increases in several fees and levies charged for government services (source: 2021, Budget Speech). The government moved swiftly to implement relevant statutory instruments to curb the likelihood of companies exploiting COVID-19 to collude to set exorbitant prices. The 2020 statutory instrument 61 regulated the prices of essential supplies and basic food commodities for the duration of the 18-month COVID-19 related state of emergency. Interventions like the Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan (ERTP) and the Reset Agenda augmented the short-term economic relief package that included wage subsidies, tax amnesties, waivers of certain levies due to government, loan guarantee schemes to support firms’ access to bank credit, and provision of food relief. The president’s Reset Agenda seeks to adjust some priorities in light of new and unexpected challenges and to find smarter ways to implement projects in a timely manner and within stipulated budgets. The ERTP aims to reinforce support already given to affected businesses and also to take advantage of opportunities that have emerged because of the pandemic such as digital services and e-commerce. Botswana is committed to reducing greenhouse emissions to 15 percent by 2030 through renewable energy projects already underway and listed in the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). Botswana also adopted a Climate Change Policy in 2021 which seeks to promote access to carbon markets, climate finance, and clean technologies. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 173 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 21.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 6,640 USD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoB publicly emphasizes the importance of attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and drafted an investment facilitation law recommended by the 2014 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Investment Review. While the draft was completed in 2016 with technical assistance from UNCTAD, it was never enacted. The draft is still under review and will be presented to Parliament for approval. The GoB has launched initiatives to promote economic activity and foreign investment in specific areas, such as establishing a diamond hub which brought more value-added businesses (i.e., cutting and polishing) into the country. Additional investment opportunities in Botswana include large water projects, electricity, transportation, telecommunication infrastructure projects, horticultural production, and agro processing. Economists have also noted Botswana’s considerable potential in the mining, mineral processing, beef, tourism, solar energy, and financial services sectors. BITC assists foreign investors with projects intended to diversify export revenue, create employment, and transfer skills to the citizens of Botswana. The High-Level Consultative Council (HLCC), chaired by the President, and an Exporter Roundtable organized by BITC and Botswana’s Exporters and Manufacturers Association (BEMA), are mechanisms employed by the GoB to focus on a healthy business environment for FDI. Botswana’s 2003 Trade Act reserves licenses for citizens in 19 sectors, including general trading establishments, gas stations, liquor stores, supermarkets (excluding chain stores), bars (other than those associated with hotels), certain types of restaurants, boutiques, auctioneers, car washes, domestic cleaning services, curio shops, fresh produce vendors, funeral homes, hairdressers, various types of rental/hire services, laundromats, specific types of government construction projects under a certain dollar amount, certain activities related to road and railway construction and maintenance, and certain types of manufacturing activities including the production of furniture for schools, welding, and bricklaying. The law allows foreigners to participate in these sectors as minority joint venture partners in medium-sized businesses. Foreigners can hold the majority share if they obtain written approval from the trade minister. Foreign companies have access to about 46 trading licenses in different categories. It takes approximately five working days to obtain a license. The Ministry of Investment, Trade, and Industry (MITI) administers the citizen participation initiative and takes an expansive interpretation of the term chain stores, so that it encompasses any store with more than one outlet. This broad interpretation has resulted in the need to apply exemptions to certain supermarkets, simple specialty operations, and general trading stores. These exceptions were generally granted prior to 2015 and many large general merchandise markets, restaurants, and grocery networks are owned by foreigners as a result. Since 2015, the GoB has denied some exception requests, but reports they have approved some based on localization agreements directly negotiated between the ministry and the applying company. These agreements reportedly include commitments to purchase supplies locally and capacity building for local workers and industry. BITC conducts due diligence on companies that are looking to invest in the country and the Directorate of Intelligence Services (DIS) handles background checks for national security. Botswana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. In 2016, the WTO conducted a trade policy review of the Southern African Customs Union to which Botswana belongs ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp322_e.htm ). Botswana underwent an ICT Policy Review and e-Commerce strategy review with UNCTAD and the report was released in October 2021 (https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d4_en.pdf). Botswana sees this as a critical move to diversify the economy and position the country to be a bigger player in the global economy. To operate a business in Botswana, one needs to register a company with the GoB’s CIPA through the OBRS at: https://www.cipa.co.bw/types-of-entities CIPA asserts that the company registration process can be completed in a day and is integrated with BURS which allows for a fast-tracked tax registration in 30 days. Additional work is required to open bank accounts and obtain necessary licenses and permits. BITC ( www.bitc.co.bw ), the GoB’s integrated investment and trade promotion authority, was designed to serve as a one-stop shop to assist investors in setting up a business and finding a location for operation. BITC’s ability to streamline procedures varies based on GoB entity and bureaucratic requirements. BITC assesses investment projects on their ability to diversify the economy away from its continued dependence on diamond mining, contribute towards export-led growth, and job creation for and skills transfer to Batswana citizens. BITC also hosts the Botswana Trade Portal ( https://www.botswanatradeportal.org.bw ) that is designed to ease trade across borders. It is a single point of contact for all information relating to import and export to and from Botswana and represents relevant ministries and parastatals. Botswana has several incentives and preferences for both citizen-owned and locally based companies. Foreign-owned companies can benefit from local procurement preferences which are usually required for government tenders. MITI instituted a program in 2015 to give locally based small companies a 15 percent preferential price margin in GoB procurement, with mid-sized companies receiving a 10 percent margin, and large companies a five percent margin. Under this policy, MITI defines small companies as having less than five million pula in annual revenue reflected in their financial statements, medium companies with five to 20 million pula in revenue, and large companies with revenues exceeding 20 million pula. The directive applies to 27 categories of goods and services ranging from textiles, chemicals, and food, as well as a broad range of consultancy services. The government can also offer up to 50 million pula in funding through the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) to joint ventures between foreign and citizen owned companies. For Companies Act registration purposes, enterprises are classified as: Micro Enterprises – fewer than six employees including the owner and an annual revenue below 60 thousand pula; Small Enterprises – fewer than 25 employees and an annual revenue between 60 thousand and 1.5 million pula; Medium Enterprises – fewer than 100 employees and annual revenue between 1.5 and 5 million pula; Large Enterprises – over 100 employees and an annual revenue of at least 5 million pula. This classification system permits foreigners to participate as minority shareholders in medium-sized enterprises in the 35 business sectors reserved for citizens. The GoB neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Bureaucratic procedures necessary to start and maintain a business tend to be transparent, though slow, and regulatory procedures can be cumbersome to navigate. In 2018, Botswana launched a Regulatory Impact Assessment Strategy to improve the regulatory environment, ensure legislation is necessary and cost effective, reduce administrative burdens imposed by the regulatory environment to businesses, and to improve transparency, consultation, and government accountability. Most complaints by foreign investors are about the inefficiency and/or unresponsiveness of mid- and low-level government bureaucrats. The GoB has introduced a Performance Management System to improve the service and accountability of its employees. Additionally, President Masisi presented a Reset Agenda in May 2021 and one of its priorities is to align government’s machinery to the presidential agenda. This will ensure transformation and improved service delivery in the public service by bringing significant reforms in all public institutions. Unfair business practices or conduct can be reported to the Competition Authority, which seeks to level the playing field for all business operators and foster a conducive environment for business. The GoB does not require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers to distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. However, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are a requirement and taken very seriously when undertaking infrastructural developments projects. Bills in Botswana, including investment laws, go through a public consultation process and are available for public comment. Bills are also debated in Parliament sessions that are open to the public. The Companies Act of 2004 requires all companies registered in Botswana to prepare annual financial statements on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles. It further requires every public company, including non-exempt private companies, to prepare their Financial Statement in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards. The GoB’s procuring entity, Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) has since April 1, 2022, transitioned to a regulatory authority, Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority (PPRA), under a new procurement act. The new act dictates for all government procurements to be adjudicated and awarded from the relevant procuring ministries/government entities. PPRA will play an oversight role, ensuring that all procurement processes are followed according to the new act. Further, PPRA will provide necessary and relevant training and capacity building to align the local procurement processes with international best practices. Prospective government contractors are still required to register with the PPRA. An independent body from the PPRA known as the Public Procurement Tribunal will be established to adjudicate on any disputes. The PPRA will use a national eProcurement system which will serve as an electronic end-to-end One Stop information and transaction portal for any public procurement. Since 2014, PPADB has partnered with the United States Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) Global Procurement Initiative in a shared commitment to utilize best-value determination procurement practices and to professionalize procurement. Through training, USTDA also assisted PPADB’s transition to PPRA. Online services are available at https://ipms.ppadb.co.bw/login The PPRA Act shall from time-to-time call for preferential procurement of citizen-owned contractors for works, service, and supplies. To be eligible for a specific reservation or preference the contractor is required to attach to the bidding package proof of eligibility from the issuing authority. Parliament enacted an Economic Inclusion Act to provide for the establishment of the office of the Coordinator of the Economic Empowerment office that will promote the effective participation of targeted citizens in the growth and development of the economy and facilitate enforcement of the economic empowerment initiatives. Targeted citizen according to this act means a citizen whose access to economic resources has been constrained by various factors as may be prescribed by the minister from time to time. Health and safety laws, embodied in the Factories Act of 1973, provide basic protection for workers from unsafe working conditions. Minimum working conditions required on work premises include cleanliness of the premises, adequate ventilation and sanitation, sufficient lighting, and the provision of safety precautions. Health inspectors and the Botswana Bureau of Standards carry out periodic checks at both new and operating factories. Botswana is a member of SACU and SADC. Neither has authority over member state national regulatory systems. Botswana is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary system. Botswana’s legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English common law. This type of system exists with legislation, judicial decisions, and local customary law. The courts enforce commercial contracts, and the judicial system is widely regarded as being fair. Both foreign and domestic investors have equal access to the judicial system. Botswana does not have a dedicated commercial court. The Industrial Court, set up by the Trade Dispute Act of 2004, primarily addresses labor matters. The GoB is planning to create a corps of commercially specialized judges within the civil court system. Under the new system, commercial cases will be overseen by these commercial judges to expedite handling and ensure relevant expertise. Botswana already has a specialized anti-corruption court that handles all corruption cases. Some U.S. litigants have reported that the time to obtain and enforce a judgment in a commercial dispute is unreasonably long. The turnaround time for civil cases is approximately two years. To improve adjudications efficiency, the GoB has established a land tribunal, and industrial, small claims, and corruption courts. In the past several years, some dockets have improved, but progress has been uneven. Local laws are accessible through the Botswana Attorney General’s Office website ( www.elaws.gov.bw ). It can take up to 24 months for a law, once passed, to appear on the website. Under Botswana’s Company Act, foreigners who wish to operate a business are required to register, as well as obtain, the relevant licenses and permits as prescribed by the Trade Act of 2008. Licenses are required for a wide spectrum of businesses, including banking, non-bank financial services, transportation, medical services, mining, energy provision, and alcohol sales. Although amendments to the Trade Act have eliminated the catchall miscellaneous business license category, investors have reported on local authorities insisting a business apply for a license even when it does not fall within the established categories. In addition, some businesses have observed the enforcement of licenses, as well as the time taken for inspections to comply with licensing requirements, varies widely across local government authorities. Botswana has anti-trust legislation and policies to ensure appropriate and fair competition in business. Under the Competition Act, the Competition Authority (CA) monitors mergers and acquisitions. In 2019, the CA expanded its mandate by taking over the operations of the Consumer Protection Act from MITI and rebranded itself as the Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA). The CCA’s mandate is to prevent and rectify anti-competitive practices and protect the interests of consumers through the control of unfair business practices. During the year 2020/2021, the CCA engaged in the Financial Inclusion Program with other stakeholders. While the aim of the program is to reach out to populations that are excluded from financial services, the CCA’s participation ensures that consumers’ interests are taken into consideration, especially the interests of people in remote areas or with limited education. On the competition side, the authority ramped up its public outreach using digital platforms and increased its engagement on public platforms, resulting in an increase in the number of complaints lodged online. The authority handled 41 mergers in 2020/21 financial year, a 26 percent decrease from 56 mergers handled in 2019/20. The decrease could be attributable to the 18-month COVID-19 related State of Emergency that started in March 2020, under which the authority temporarily suspended receipt of new mergers. The CCA investigated a total of 25 competition related cases with 15 of them being carried over from the previous financial year, while 10 were new cases and successfully closed off four cases; the remaining 21 cases are under investigation and have been carried over to the 2021/22 financial year. The CCA is empowered to reject mergers deemed not in the public interest. CCA interprets this power to mean that it can prohibit mergers that concentrate most shares in the hands of foreign investors. For consumer complaints, a total of 1,158 cases were lodged in the year under review with most complaints related to motor vehicles, motor parts and services (mostly involving grey imports) at 23.7 percent, followed by cellphones and accessories at 18.7 percent, electronic category at 16.2 percent, furniture complaints at 11.2 percent, and e-commerce transactions at 0.45 percent. A total of 1,267 of these complaints or 90.3 percent were resolved while 136 of these were still pending at the end of the financial year. During the 2020/21 financial year, the CCA also carried out a research study on cement as a policy advisory instrument to the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) and will use the policy paper to shape the development of a cement sector in Botswana. Section 8 of Botswana’s Constitution prohibits the nationalization of private property. The Constitution is currently under review and a committee has been set up to do consultations and gather public opinion across the country. The GoB has never pursued a forced nationalization policy and is highly unlikely to adopt one. The Acquisition of Property Act provides a process for any expropriation, including parameters to determine market value and receive compensation. The 2007 Amendment to the Electricity Supply Act allows the GoB to revoke an Independent Power Producer’s license and confiscate the operations, with compensation, for public interest purposes. Botswana’s commercial and bankruptcy laws are comprehensive. Secured and unsecured creditors enjoy similar rights under bankruptcy proceedings as those they would enjoy in the United States. 4. Industrial Policies Botswana has several mechanisms in place to attract FDI. BITC assists local and foreign investors. BITC is responsible for promoting FDI, investor aftercare, and promoting locally manufactured goods in export markets. Through its one-stop service center, BITC assists investors with company registration, land acquisition, factory shells, utility connections, and work and residence permit for essential staff. Investors’ requests for support from BITC and other agencies are evaluated based on the proposed project’s potential to diversify Botswana’s economy, grow priority sectors, and provide employment and training to Botswana citizens. The GoB also makes grants available to investors who partner with citizens and will extend credit to investors presenting proposals that have undergone appropriate due diligence and that have completed a feasibility study. Foreign investors are encouraged to transfer technology to Botswana and skills to Botswana citizens with a view to preparing them for promotion into management positions. Botswana’s tax rates are relatively low at 22 percent on corporate taxable income of resident companies and 10 percent withholding tax on all dividends distributed. However, non-resident companies’ tax is charged at 30 percent. MITI can grant manufacturing companies the reduced level of 15 percent taxable income. Companies can pay the reduced rate of 15 percent of profit with accreditation from the Innovation Hub or the International Financial Services Centre on approved operations. The Minister of Finance and Economic Development has the authority to issue development approval orders that are used for specific projects, which include providing tax holidays, education, and training grants. The Minister must be satisfied the proposed project will benefit Botswana’s economy. Any firm, local or foreign, may apply for a Development Approval Order through the Permanent Secretary at the finance ministry. Applications are evaluated against the following criteria: job creation for Botswana citizens; the company’s training plans for Botswana citizens; the company’s plans to localize non-citizen positions; Botswana citizen participation in company management; amount of equity held by Botswana citizens in the company; the location of the proposed investment; the project’s effect on the stimulation of other economic activities; and the project’s effect on reducing local consumer prices. MITI also offers rebates on imported materials for manufacturers that produce products for export. In 2017, Parliament approved and implemented a special incentive package for Selebi-Phikwe geared to promote economic growth and diversification. Some of the incentives include reduced corporate tax of five percent for the first five years and 10 percent thereafter (versus the 22 percent national tax rate), zero customs duty on imported raw materials, rebates for customs duty and value-added tax for any exports outside the SACU, and a minimum of 50 years on land leases (instead of the standard lease of 25 years). The GoB is actively encouraging green energy investment through independent power producer (IPP) developed renewable energy projects that have been outlined in the Integrated Resource Plan, and these include solar power plants, wind energy power projects, and biogas. In 2020 the GoB, with the assistance of USAID’s Southern Africa Energy Program (SAEP), launched the Rooftop Solar program. The program allows domestic consumers to install their own solar systems to generate electricity and permits consumers to sell their excess electricity to the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC). The Botswana Energy Regulatory Authority (BERA) regulates investment in the energy sector and is responsible for setting feed-in tariffs for IPPs. The GoB includes the Mega Solar Program (a multi-donor partnership coordinated by the USG through Power Africa) in its renewable energy plans and will be using it to fast-track existing renewable energy (solar and wind) projects. The Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA) was established with the mandate to develop and operate special economic zones around the country. It earmarked five geographic areas with a total of eight zones and is actively recruiting investors, private developers, and manufacturers. In 2015, Parliament approved a Special Economic Zones (SEZ) law to streamline investment in sector-targeted geographic areas including two Gaborone area SEZs (multi-use, diamond processing, and financial services); two Selebi-Phikwe SEZs (mineral processing and horticulture); and additional SEZs in Lobatse (beef, leather, biogas); Palapye (energy); Pandamatenga (agriculture); and Francistown (mining and logistics). The Gaborone financial services zone is fully operational, servicing of land has begun in the Gaborone multi-use/diamond zone, construction of silos and factory shells is underway in the Pandamatenga zone, while the rest are still to be developed. The Special Economic Zones Act is available for sale in hard copy at the GoB bookshop. The Selebi-Phikwe Economic Diversification Unit (SPEDU), another economic diversification agency, though regional and only focused in the greater Selebi-Phikwe region (eastern part of the country), was set up to transform its region into a vibrant economic zone. The region has its own special incentive packet that was approved by parliament in 2017. Some of the incentives include a five percent corporate tax for the first five years and 10 percent thereafter, zero customs duty on imported raw materials, minimum 50-year land leases, dedicated One-Stop Services for the region, etc. BURS has also introduced an electronic Customs Management System to replace the Automated System for Customs Data and launched the National Single Window, an electronic trade platform that makes trading more secure and efficient. Performance requirements are not imposed as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment in Botswana. Foreign investors are encouraged, but not compelled, to establish joint ventures with citizens or citizen-owned companies. Several incentives have been set for local companies, encouraging foreign companies in a way to register companies locally. Foreign investors wishing to invest in Botswana are required to register the company in accordance with the Companies Act and comply with other applicable legislation. Investors are encouraged, but not required, to purchase from local sources. The GoB does not require investors to locate in specific geographical areas, use a specific percentage of local content, permit local equity in projects, manufacture substitutes for imports, meet export requirements or targets, or use national sources of financing for private-sector investments. However, GoB entities, including BITC, use the criteria of diversifying the economy, creating employment, and transferring skills to Botswana citizens in determining whether to assist foreign investors. As a matter of policy, the GoB encourages foreign firms to hire qualified Botswana nationals rather than expatriates. The granting of work permits for foreign workers may be made contingent upon establishment of demonstrable localization efforts. The government may additionally require evidence that a local is being trained to assume duties currently being fulfilled by a foreign worker, specially focused at the middle-management level. The GoB offers incentives to companies that train local employees, including the deduction of 200 percent of training expenses when an accredited institution conducts the training. Business leaders cite difficulty securing work permits combined with local skills deficits and constrained labor productivity among the foremost business constraints in Botswana. However, since President Masisi assumed power in April 2018, GoB reports indicate permits for foreign workers have increased with approval rates exceeding 90 percent. Select grants are available to foreign investors who partner with Botswana citizens. The Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency has established a venture capital fund to provide equity to citizens and ventures between citizens and foreign investors. Most GoB loans and grants are designed specifically for citizen-owned contracting firms or for small enterprises and are therefore not available to foreign investors. However, the National Development Bank (NDB) finances both citizens and non-citizens, joint ventures, partnerships, and locally registered foreign owned companies, and covers different sectors of the economy (agriculture, property, education, retail, commerce, etc.). The GoB, the largest procuring entity in the country, has directed central government, local authorities, and state-owned enterprises to purchase all products and services from locally based manufacturers and service providers if the goods and services are locally available, competitively priced, and meet tender specifications in terms of quality standards as certified or recognized by the Botswana Bureau of Standards. Local preferences arise from numerous sources. In 2015, MITI instituted a preferential procurement program for local companies based on company size – small companies receive a 15 percent preferential price margin on GoB procurement, mid-sized companies receive a 10 percent margin, and large companies a five percent margin. The directive applies to 27 categories of goods and services ranging from textiles to chemicals, and food, in addition to a broad range of consultancy services. In 2014, the GoB and the Chamber of Mines created a committee to oversee the purchase of mining supplies with a 10 percent preference towards those produced locally. The 2012 Citizen Economic Empowerment Policy also emphasized the preference for local companies. In 2020, the GoB announced a new policy that all government contracts less than $900,000 were reserved for citizen-owned businesses. The GoB has recently enacted the Economic Inclusion Act to make provision for the establishment of an Economic Empowerment Office, whose mandate is to empower targeted citizens by facilitating their participation in the development and growth of the economy and facilitating the enforcement of various sets of economic empowerment initiatives such as the ones mentioned above. For a foreign firm to qualify with the Department of Industrial Affairs as a local manufacturer or service provider to sell goods or services to the GoB, the firm must be registered with the Registrar of Companies and possess a relevant license or waiver letter. These procedures can be completed online, however, companies may choose to engage the services of a Company Secretary to perform these and other required documentation services. Tenders are generally designed based on the products available in the local market and with locally based companies in mind. In addition, many tenders require local registration as a prerequisite for bids and the GoB frequently breaks up large-scale projects into a series of tenders. These requirements make it difficult to compete for tenders from outside Botswana. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are enforced in Botswana. There are three main categories of land in Botswana: freehold, state land, and tribal land. Tribal and state land cannot be sold to foreigners. There are no restrictions on the sale of freehold land, but only an approximate five percent of land in Botswana is freehold. All minerals in Botswana, even those on private lands, are viewed as property of the State. In the capital city of Gaborone, the number of freehold plots is limited. In 2019, the GoB increased the rate of Transfer Duty on the sale and transfer of property to non-citizens (both individuals and companies) from five percent to 30 percent. State land represents about 25 percent of land in Botswana. On application to the Department of Lands, both foreign-owned and local enterprises registered in Botswana may lease state land for industrial or residential use. Commercial use leases are for 50 years, and residential leases are for 99 years. Waiting periods tend to be long for leasehold applications, but subleases from current leaseholders are available. In 2014, the GoB changed its implementing regulation to allow companies with fewer than five employees to operate in residential areas if their operations do not pose a health or safety risk to residents. Tribal land represents 70 percent of land in Botswana. To obtain a lease for tribal land, the investor must approach the relevant local Land Board. Processes are unlikely to be streamlined or consistent across Land Boards. Since independence, the trend in Botswana has been to increase the area of tribal land at the expense of both state and freehold land. Landlord-tenant law in Botswana tends to be moderately pro-landlord. In addition to helping investors who meet its criteria obtain appropriate land leaseholds, BITC has also built factory units for lease to industrialists with the option to purchase at market value. Botswana’s legal intellectual property rights (IPR) structure is adequate, although some improvements are needed. The key challenge facing the GoB is effective implementation. CIPA was established in 2014 and is comprised of three offices: the Companies and Business Office, the Industrial Property Office, and the Copyright Office. Intellectual property is registered through CIPA. CIPA’s priorities are to strengthen and implement Botswana’s IPR regime and to improve interagency cooperation. IPR infringement occurs in Botswana primarily through the sale of counterfeit items in low-end sales outlets. According to CIPA, targeted raids by local law enforcement have reduced the availability of counterfeit goods across the country. Several spot checks that were conducted in Gaborone revealed that most of the shops that used to sell counterfeit products were no longer selling them. Of the raids that were done, 456 were works with no holograms, 34 pirated works and 1,454 were products infringing on trademarks such as Nike, Fila, Soviet, Adidas, Puma, Converse, etc. Most of these were found with street hawkers. The U.S. government continues to work with the GoB to modernize and improve enforcement of IPR. IPR is protected under the Industrial Property Act of 2010, which provides protections on patents, trademarks, utility designs, handicrafts, traditional knowledge, and geographic indicators. The 2000 Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act also protects art and literary works, and the 1975 Registration of Business Names Act oversees corporate name and registration procedures. On March 31, 2022, the Parliament passed the Intellectual Property Policy which was developed with the assistance of the World Intellectual Property Authority (WIPO). Its primary aim is to leverage Botswana’s IP potential for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. Other IPR-related laws include the Competition Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Botswana Penal Code, the Customs and Excise Duty Act, the Monuments and Relics Act, the Broadcasting Act, and the Societies Act. Botswana is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. Botswana is a signatory to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The government encourages foreign portfolio investment, although there are limits on foreign ownership in certain sectors. It also embraces the establishment of new and diverse financial institutions to support increased foreign and domestic investment and to fill existing gaps where finance is not commercially available. There are nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one offshore bank, three statutory deposit-taking institutions, and one credit union operating in Botswana. All have corresponding relationships with U.S. banks. Additional financial institutions include various pension funds, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, stock brokerage companies, asset management companies, statutory finance institutions, collective investment undertakings, and statutory funds. Historically, commercial banks have accounted for 93.7 percent of total deposits and 93.5 percent of total loans in Botswana. Access to banking services measured by the number of depositors on adult population improved from 72 percent in 2019 to 76.6 percent in 2020. Additionally, banks introduced new products and services that included enhancement of transactional accounts, introduction of cross border payment services, collaborative arrangements with money-transfer service providers to widen the financial inclusion efforts for the unbanked population. The central bank, the Bank of Botswana, acts as banker and financial advisor to the GoB and is responsible for the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the administration of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the country. Monetary policy in Botswana is widely regarded as prudent, and the GoB has historically managed to maintain a sensible exchange rate and a stable inflation rate, generally within the target of three to six percent. But the COVID-19 pandemic pushed inflation to new heights, reaching 10.6 percent in January and February 2022, the highest level on record in over a decade. Banks may lend to non-resident-controlled companies without seeking approval from the Bank of Botswana. Foreign investors usually enjoy better access to credit than local firms do. In July 2014, USAID’s Development Credit Authority (now DFC – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), in collaboration with ABSA (formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana), implemented a seven-year program to allow small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to access up to US$ 15 million in loans in an effort to diversify the economy. So far, the program that was initially scheduled to come to an end in June 2021 is at 83 percent utilization and has been extended to July 2024. To date ABSA has disbursed US$ 12.5 million and has up to June 2023 to disburse the remaining US$ 2.5 million. At the end of 2020, there were 24 companies on the Domestic Board and eight companies on the Foreign Equities Board of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE). In addition, there were 46 listed bonds and three exchange traded funds listed on the Exchange. The Domestic Company Index (DCI) declined by 8.2 percent in 2020, while it declined by 4.6 percent in 2019, reflecting how the pandemic affected the economy. According to the BSE 2020 Annual Report, all sectors in the domestic equity board experienced a decline which contributed a negative 8.4 percent points to the DCI’s depreciation of 8.2 percent except for one sector, Retail & Wholesale. The total market capitalization for listed companies at year-end 2020 was US$ 33.5 billion, with domestic companies’ capitalization standing at US$ 3 billion while foreign companies’ capitalization stood at US$ 30.5 billion. The Mining and Minerals sector continued to dominate the foreign equity board as it contributed 94.7 percent of the foreign companies’ market capitalization in 2020 and contributed 0.97 percentage points to the Foreign Company Index (FCI) depreciation of 1 percent. The BSE is still highly illiquid compared to larger African markets and is dominated by mining companies which adds to index volatility. Laws prohibiting insider trading and securities fraud are clearly stipulated under Section 35 – 37 of the Securities Act, 2014 and charges for contravening these laws are listed under Section 54 of the same Act. The government has legitimized offshore capital investments and allows foreign investors, individuals and corporate bodies, and companies incorporated in Botswana, to open foreign currency accounts in specified currencies. The designated currencies are U.S. Dollar, British Pound sterling, Euro, and the South African Rand. There are no known practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment participation or control in domestic enterprises. Private firms are not permitted to adopt articles of incorporation or association which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. In general, Botswana exercises careful control over credit expansion, the pula exchange rate, interest rates, and foreign and domestic borrowing. Banking legislation is largely in line with industry norms for regulation, supervision, and payments. However, Botswana failed to meet the compliance requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), resulting in a grey listing in October 2018. Botswana worked to implement the necessary regulatory legislations to address the identified technical compliance deficiencies and was subsequently removed from the FATF grey list in October 2021, and then in February 2022, removed from the EU blacklist of high risk third countries with regard to AML/CFT. The government continues to work on its regulatory environment to avoid falling back into the grey list. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) was established in 2008 and provides regulatory oversight for the non-banking sector. It extends know-your-customer practices to non-banking financial institutions to help deter money laundering and terrorist financing. NBFIRA is also responsible for regulating the International Financial Services Centre, a hub charged with promoting the financial services industry in Botswana. The Bank of Botswana maintains a long-term sovereign wealth fund, known as the Pula Fund, in addition to a regular foreign reserve account providing basic import cover. The Pula Fund was established under the Bank of Botswana Act and forms part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily funded by diamond revenues. The Pula Fund is wholly invested in foreign currency-denominated assets and is managed by the Bank of Botswana Board with input from recognized international financial management and investment firms. All realized market and currency gains, or losses are reported in the Bank of Botswana’s income statement. The Fund has been affected severely by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the GoB making withdrawals to address significant COVID-19-related revenue shortfalls. As a result, the Pula Fund, which provides long fiscal cushion against economic shocks, is significantly depleted from 20 percent of GDP in 2011 to seven percent of GDP as of mid-2020 – from $1.69 billion to $510 million – a decline of more than 70 percent. Botswana is a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Fund and was one of the architects of the Santiago Principles in 2008. More information is available at: https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/BOTSWANA-PULA-FUND-SANTIAGO-PRINCIPLES.pdf 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB. There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal ( www.gov.bw ), with profiles of financial and development SOEs. Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation. The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises. No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs. Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted. GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance. Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement. Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. The GOB has committed to privatization on paper. It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process. Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only. In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization. In 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission would be placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization, but this has yet to occur. Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years. A Rationalization Strategy covering all parastatals has been developed and its implementation will address issues such as duplication of activities, overlapping mandates and issues of corporate governance. This may finally result in some SOEs being privatized or merged while some may be closed. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The GoB, some foreign and local firms, and customers, recognized and embraced Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), although Botswana is not an adherent of the OECD’s RBC Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and has not specified its definition of RBC. Large companies in the mining, communications technology, food supply, and financial services sectors have established RBC programs, sponsor projects, and support local nonprofit concerns. However, the ethos has not taken hold in many smaller firms. The U.S. Embassy worked with the local chamber of commerce, Business Botswana, on the issue of corporate social responsibility and ethical compliance, to help enlist companies to sign onto a Corporate Code of Conduct that covers, among other things, conflicts of interest, bribery, political interference, political party funding, procurement and bidding, and issues surrounding residence and work permits. To date more than 300 firms have signed the Code of Conduct. The Companies Act also sets out the expectations of business conduct and governance for directors and shareholders for both private and public companies. Botswana is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Botswana’s Mines and Minerals Act and associated regulations govern mineral contracts and licenses. Botswana’s laws and procedures for awarding mining contracts are fairly well developed. Mining licenses are required to undergo a public comment period before they are awarded, and that rule is followed. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The GoB is committed to reducing carbon emissions to 15 percent by 2030 and thus adopted a Climate Change Policy in April 2021. The policy promotes access to carbon markets, climate finance, and clean technologies such as solar and wind energy. Botswana has mobilized $30 million from the Green Climate Fund to implement agriculture related adaptation interventions for three districts (Ngamiland, Bobirwa, and Kgalagadi). The GoB has also, in collaboration with the UNDP, been rolling out a Biogas Technology program that aims to deliver small scale digester plants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 1,650,000 million tons of carbon dioxide by 2023. The gas is used for cooking, heating, and lighting. 231 units have been installed, mostly in the southern part of the country. Standards have been developed to monitor emission concentrations in the country and the GoB has expanded its air monitoring network to cover more areas in the country. The level of ambient air quality in the country is 95 percent. 9. Corruption Botswana’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has deteriorated significantly, eroding its previously held reputation as the ‘least corrupt country in Africa’. Transparency International ranks Botswana at 45 out of 180 countries in 2021 falling from 35th place in 2020 with a score of 55 out of 100, a change of negative 5 from the previous year. The Human Rights Report (HRR) 2020 for Botswana also notes increased media reports of government corruption, mostly related to COVID-19 projects. The HRR also states that a poll conducted by Transparency International in 2019, indicated that 7 percent of those polled had paid bribes to government officials, jumping from only 1 percent in 2015. Private sector representatives also note rising corruption levels in government tender procurements. The major corruption investigation body is the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). Anecdotal reports on the DCEC’s effectiveness vary. The DCEC has embarked on an education campaign to raise public awareness about the cost of corruption and is also working with GoB departments to reform their accountability procedures. Corruption is punishable by a prison term of up to 10 years, a fine of $50,000, or both. The GoB has prosecuted high-level officials. Corruption trials and investigations of some government officials on cases of money laundering, abuse of office, receiving bribes and embezzlement of funds continued during 2020 and are still on-going. Human rights issues reported in the HRR included restrictions on press and internet freedom of expression, interference with freedom of association, child labor including commercial sexual exploitation of children. On a positive note, while such crimes exist, the GoB officials were reported to be cooperative and responsive to domestic NGO’s views on most subjects and placed no restrictions on domestic and international human rights groups nor did they interfere with their investigations and publishing findings on human rights cases. The 2000 Proceeds of Serious Crime Act expanded the DCEC’s mandate to include combatting money laundering. The 2009 Financial Intelligence Act provides a comprehensive legal framework to address money laundering and establishes a financial intelligence agency (FIA). The FIA, which operates under the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, cooperates with various institutions, such as Directorate of Public Prosecutions, Botswana Police Service, Bank of Botswana, the Non-Banking Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, the DCEC, and foreign FIAs to uncover and investigate suspicious financial transactions. Botswana is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a regional standards-setting body for ensuring appropriate laws, policies, and practices to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In 2021, Botswana was removed from the FATF grey list on which it had been placed on in October 2018 and was subsequently removed from the EU blacklist. Botswana is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, but it is a party to the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption. Contacts for agencies responsible for combating corruption: Mr. Tymon Katlholo Director General Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime Madirelo Extension 6, Gaborone, Botswana +267 3914002/+267 3604200 dcec@gov.bw Ms. Tumelo Motsumi (Acting) Executive Director Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board Private Bag 0058, Gaborone, Botswana +267 3602000 bmaster@ppadb.co.bw tmotsumi@ppadb.co.bw Ms. Bopelokgale Soko Director Financial Intelligence Agency Private Bag 0190, Gaborone, Botswana +267 3998400 ethibe@gov.bw kmosimanengaka@gov.bw Complainants can also reach out to ministers of the relevant ministries for a particular tender and provide a copy of the complaint to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) Executive Chairperson. 10. Political and Security Environment The threat of political violence is low in Botswana. Public demonstrations are rare and seldom turn violent. The last large-scale strikes, which involved public sector employees, occurred April-June 2011 and were not violent. In September 2015, roughly 200 people participated in a peaceful march organized by an opposition political party to protest water shortages in the capital. In August 2016, police forcefully dispersed a small demonstration protesting unemployment outside the National Assembly. In February and March 2017, some student-led protests occurred at tertiary institutions necessitating police deployment but were not overtly political. There were multiple reports of police brutality, including the use of rubber whips and rubber bullets. Another peaceful march against corruption was held in March 2018. This followed allegations of embezzlement of the National Petroleum Fund by a company charged with the management of the funds together with some GoB officials. In late 2019, following general election, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) held a peaceful march of no more than 200 people protesting the election results. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Botswana has a high unemployment rate and a constricted worker skills base. In her 2022 budget speech, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development reported an unemployment rate of 26 percent, up from 20 percent reported by Statistics Botswana in 2019, showing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. Employers can expect to engage in significant training efforts, depending on the industry, due to shortage of skills. Retention of workers and absenteeism can pose problems. In addition, managers often cite workforce productivity as a point of frustration. The lack of trained local citizen professionals is generally addressed by contracting expatriates if they can secure work permits. There is minimal labor strife in Botswana. In 2015, there were a handful of small and peaceful strikes, the most notable of these was by a portion of BURS officials, but as with most unions across sectors, only a portion of BURS officials were unionized, allowing the GoB to maintain customs operations. The Employment Act provides basic guidelines for employment in Botswana. The legislation sets requirements for a minimum wage, length of the workweek, annual and maternity leave, hiring and termination. Standards set by the Act are consistent with international best practice as described by International Labor Organization (ILO) model legislation and guidelines. Employment-related litigation occurs and is both an example of trust in the court system and a cost to doing business in Botswana. Employers avoid considerable expense and frustration if they observe the provisions of the Employment Act, relevant labor regulations, and prudence in advance of potential litigation. Before a potential litigant goes to one of 11 labor courts, the parties must attempt mediation through the Department of Labor. Court cases offering severance terms for employees laid off due to fluctuating market conditions are also common. Section 25 of the Employment Act allows employers to terminate contracts for reducing the size of their work force, known as redundancy, using the first-in-last-out principle. This method of terminating contracts is separate from firing for serious misconduct as specified by Section 26 of the Act. The GoB has social safety net programs in place to assist the unemployed and destitute. Collective bargaining is common in government and the private sector, and the Labor Commissioner can grant collective bargaining authority upon request. The largest unions are comprised of public sector workers. In August 2016 Parliament passed a Trade Disputes Act with a list of services deemed “essential” and barred from striking that exceeds international labor standards. The Ministry of Employment, Labor Productivity, and Skills Development is coordinating with the ILO and other partners to review labor laws to ensure they align with ILO standards. The tri-partite labor law committee recommended that all services listed as essential be cancelled except aviation, health, electrical, water and sanitation, fire, and air traffic control services. 14. Contact for More Information Goitseone Montsho Economic/Commercial Specialist +267 395-3982 / 373-2431 MontshoG@state.gov Brazil Executive Summary Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the twelfth largest economy in the world (in nominal terms) according to the World Bank. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the seventh largest destination for global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2021 with inflows of $58 billion, an increase of 133percent in comparison to 2020 but still below pre-pandemic levels (in 2019, inflows totaled $65.8 billion). In recent years, Brazil has received more than half of South America’s total amount of incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. According to Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) measurements, U.S. stock was 24 percent ($123.9 billion) of all FDI in Brazil as of the end of 2020, the largest single-country stock by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), while International Monetary Fund (IMF) measurements assessed the United States had the second largest single-country stock of FDI by UBO, representing 18.7 percent of all FDI in Brazil ($105 billion) and second only to the Netherlands’ 19.9 percent ($112.5 billion). The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in its infrastructure and energy sectors during 2018 and 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 delayed planned privatization efforts and despite government efforts to resume in 2021, economic and political conditions hampered the process. The Brazilian economy resumed growth in 2017, ending the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history. However, after three years of modest recovery, Brazil entered a recession following the onset of the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 4.6 percent in 2021, in comparison to a 4.1 percent contraction in 2020. As of February 2022, analysts had forecasted 0.3 percent 2022 GDP growth. The unemployment rate was 11.1 percent at the end of 2021, with over one-quarter of the labor force unemployed or underutilized. The nominal budget deficit stood at 4.4 percent of GDP ($72.4 billion) in 2021, and is projected to rise to 6.8 percent by the end of 2022 according to Brazilian government estimates. Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 89.4 percent in 2020 and fell to around 82 percent by the end of 2021. The National Treasury projections show the debt-to-GDP ratio rising to 86.7 percent by the end of 2022, while the Independent Financial Institution (IFI) of Brazil’s Senate projects an 84.8 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The BCB increased its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate from 2 percent at the end of 2020 to 9.25 percent at the end of 2021, and 11.75 percent in March 2022. The BCB’s Monetary Committee (COPOM) anticipates raising the Selic rate to 12.25 percent before the end of 2022. President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, and in that same year signed a much-needed pension system reform into law and made additional economic reforms a top priority. Bolsonaro and his economic team outlined an agenda of further reforms to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system and complicated code of labor laws in the country, but the legislative agenda in 2020 was largely consumed by the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the Brazilian government passed a major forex regulatory framework and strengthened the Central Bank’s autonomy in executing its mandate. The government also passed a variety of new regulatory frameworks in transportation and energy sectors, including a major reform of the natural gas market. In addition, the government passed a law seeking to improve the ease of doing business as well as advance the privatization of its major state-owned enterprise Electrobras. Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors. Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are foreign investment restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, and maritime sectors. The Brazilian congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property. Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil. Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $70,742 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,850 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Brazil was the world’s seventh-largest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2019, with inflows of $58 billion, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The GoB actively encourages FDI – particularly in the automobile, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, mining, and transportation infrastructure sectors – to introduce greater innovation into Brazil’s economy and to generate economic growth. GoB investment incentives include tax exemptions and low-cost financing with no distinction made between domestic and foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign investment is restricted in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, and insurance sectors. The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-Brasil) plays a leading role in attracting FDI to Brazil by working to identify business opportunities, promoting strategic events, and lending support to foreign investors willing to allocate resources to Brazil. APEX-Brasil is not a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors, but the agency can assist in all steps of the investor’s decision-making process, to include identifying and contacting potential industry segments, sector and market analyses, and general guidelines on legal and fiscal issues. Their services are free of charge. The website for APEX-Brasil is: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en . In 2016, the Ministry of Economy created the Direct Investments Ombudsman (OID) at the Board of Foreign Trade and Investments (CAMEX), to provide assistance to foreign investors through a single body for issues related to FDI in Brazil. This structure aims to help and eventually speed up foreign investments in Brazil, providing foreign and national investors with a simpler process for establishing new businesses and implementing additional investments in their current companies. Since 2019, the OID has acted as a “single window” of the Brazilian government for FDI. It supports and guides investors in their requests, recommending solutions to their complaints (Policy Advocacy) as well as proposing improvements to the legislation or administrative procedures to public agencies whenever necessary. The OID is responsible for receiving requests and inquiries on matters related to foreign investments, to be answered together with government agencies and entities (federal, state and municipal) involved in each case (Focal Points Network). This new structure provides a centralized support system to foreign investors, and must respond in a timely manner to investors’ requests. A 1995 constitutional amendment (EC 6/1995) eliminated distinctions between foreign and local capital, ending favorable treatment (i.e. tax incentives, preference for winning bids) for companies using only local capital. However, constitutional law restricts foreign investment in healthcare (Law 8080/1990, altered by 13097/2015), mass media (Law 10610/2002), telecommunications (Law 12485/2011), aerospace (Law 7565/1986 a, Decree 6834/2009, updated by Law 12970/2014, Law 13133/2015, and Law 13319/2016), rural property (Law 5709/1971), maritime (Law 9432/1997, Decree 2256/1997), and insurance (Law 11371/2006). Brazil does not have a national security-based foreign investment screening process. Foreign investors in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil. In cases of investments involving royalties and technology transfer, investors must register with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). Since the approval of the Doing Business Law in 2021, companies are no longer required to have an administrator residing in Brazil, but they must appoint a local proxy attorney to receive legal notifications. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM). Brazil does not have an investment screening mechanism based on national security interests. A bill was proposed in the Chamber of Deputies in 2020 (PL 2491) to change the parameters under which to review foreign investments could be reviewed, but the bill has not yet been analyzed by the necessary commissions. To enter Brazil’s insurance and reinsurance market, U.S. companies must establish a subsidiary, enter a joint venture, acquire a local firm, or enter a partnership with a local company. The BCB reviews banking license applications on a case-by-case basis. Foreign interests own or control 20 of the top 50 banks in Brazil, but Santander is the only major wholly foreign-owned retail bank. Since June 2019, foreign investors may own 100 percent of capital in Brazilian airline companies. While 2015 and 2017 legislative and regulatory changes relaxed some restrictions on insurance and reinsurance, rules on preferential offers to local reinsurers remain unchanged. Foreign reinsurance firms must have a representational office in Brazil to qualify as an admitted reinsurer. Insurance and reinsurance companies must maintain an active registration with Brazil’s insurance regulator, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), and maintain a solvency classification issued by a risk classification agency equal to Standard & Poor’s or Fitch ratings of at least BBB-. Foreign ownership of cable TV companies is allowed, and telecom companies may offer television packages with their service. Content quotas require every channel to air at least three and a half hours per week of Brazilian programming during primetime. Additionally, one-third of all channels included in any TV package must be Brazilian. The National Land Reform and Settlement Institute administers the purchase and lease of Brazilian agricultural land by foreigners. Under the applicable rules, the area of agricultural land bought or leased by foreigners cannot account for more than 25 percent of the overall land area in a given municipal district. Additionally, no more than 10 percent of agricultural land in any given municipal district may be owned or leased by foreign nationals from the same country. The law also states that prior consent is needed for purchase of land in areas considered indispensable to national security and for land along the border. The rules also make it necessary to obtain congressional approval before large plots of agricultural land can be purchased by foreign nationals, foreign companies, or Brazilian companies with majority foreign shareholding. In December 2020, the Senate approved a bill (PL 2963/2019; source: https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/136853 ) to ease restrictions on foreign land ownership and the Chamber of Deputies began to deliberate on the bill; however, the bill was shelved with no plans to advance it further after President Bolsonaro expressed concerns regarding the legislation. Brazil is not yet a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but submitted its application for accession in May 2020. In February 2021, Brazil formalized its initial offer to start negotiations. The submission establishes a series of thresholds above which foreign sellers will be allowed to bid for procurements. Such thresholds vary for different procuring entities and types of procurements. The proposal also includes procurements by some states and municipalities (with restrictions) as well as state-owned enterprises, but it excludes certain sensitive categories, such as financial services, strategic health products, and specific information technologies. Brazil’s submission is currently under review with GPA members. By statute, a Brazilian state enterprise may subcontract services to a foreign firm only if domestic expertise is unavailable. Additionally, U.S. and other foreign firms may only bid to provide technical services when there are no qualified Brazilian firms. U.S. companies need to enter into partnerships with local firms or have operations in Brazil in order to be eligible for “margins of preference” offered to domestic firms participating in Brazil’s public sector procurement to help these firms win government tenders. Nevertheless, foreign companies are often successful in obtaining subcontracting opportunities with large Brazilian firms that win government contracts, and since October 2020 foreign companies are allowed to participate in bids without the need for an in-country corporate presence (although establishing such a presence is mandatory if the bid is successful). A revised Government Procurement Protocol of the trade bloc Mercosul (Mercosur in Spanish) signed in 2017 would entitle member nations Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay to non-discriminatory treatment of government-procured goods, services, and public works originating from each other’s suppliers and providers. However, none of the bloc’s members have ratified the protocol, so it has not entered into force. Despite the restrictions within Mercosul, in January 2022 Brazil and Chile entered into an agreement which includes government procurement. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) December 2021 Economic Forecast Summary of Brazil summarized that with the COVID-19 vaccination campaign accelerating throughout the year, economic activity underpinned by reduced private consumption and investment restarted as restrictions were lifted, and exports benefited from the global recovery, the robust demand for commodities, and a weak exchange rate. However, supply bottlenecks, lower purchasing power, higher interest rates, and policy uncertainty have slowed the pace of recovery. The labor market is experiencing a lag in recovering from the pandemic, and by the end of 2021 unemployment remained above pre-pandemic levels. The residual effect of the government’s significant fiscal stimulus spending in 2020 to reinvigorate the economy contributed to inflationary pressure, further compounded by constrained global supply chains pushing prices up. In response, the COPOM chose to incrementally increase its benchmark SELIC rate from 2 percent in March 2021 to 11.75 percent in March 2022. The COPOM announced that it would continue tightening its monetary policy in an effort to curb inflation and anchor expectations. Prospects for economic growth are weak for 2022 and 2023. The OECD recommended that Brazil strengthen and adhere to its fiscal rules to increase market confidence in establishing sustainable finances and exercising more efficient public spending to create fiscal space for growth-enhancing policies, along with developing a more inclusive social protection program. The IMF’s 2021 Country Report No. 2021/217 (published in September 2021) for Brazil highlighted that its economic performance for the year had been better than expected, partly due to the government’s fiscal response to the pandemic which propelled the economy back to pre-pandemic levels for most sectors. In addition, the IMF noted a favorable economic momentum supported by booming trade and robust private sector credit growth. The IMF assessed that currency depreciation and a surge in commodity prices had led to headline inflation, and that expectations remained negative. The report noted Brazil’s lagging labor market, especially among youths, women, and Afro-Brazilians. The IMF also expressed concerns that emergency cash transfers (which expired in December 2021) were only a short-term solution, and recommended addressing poverty and inequality by strengthening a more permanent social safety net. The IMF concluded that near-term fiscal risks were low, but the high level of public debt continued to pose a medium-term risk. Restoring high and sustained growth, increasing employment, raising productivity, improving living standards, and reducing vulnerabilities would require longer-term policy efforts to eliminate bottlenecks and foster private sector-led investment. The WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Brazil noted the country’s open stance towards foreign investment, but also pointed to the many sector-specific limitations (see above). The three reports listed below, with links to the reports, highlight the uncertainty regarding reform plans as the most significant political risk to the economy. OECD Report: IMF Report: WTO Report: A company must register with the National Revenue Service (Receita Federal) to obtain a business license and be placed on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ). Brazil’s Export Promotion and Investment Agency (APEX) has a mandate to facilitate foreign investment in Brazil. The agency’s services are available to all investors, foreign and domestic. Foreign companies interested in investing in Brazil have access to many benefits and tax incentives granted by the Brazilian government at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Most incentives target specific sectors, amounts invested, and job generation. Brazil’s business registration website can be found at: https://www.gov.br/pt-br/servicos/inscrever-ou-atualizar-cadastro-nacional-de-pessoas-juridicas . Brazil enacted its “Doing Business” law, which entered into force on August 26, 2021. The law simplified the process to open a business, sought to facilitate foreign trade by eliminating redundancy as well as further automating its trade processes, and expand the powers of minority shareholders in private companies. Adopted in September 2019, the Economic Freedom Law 13.874 established the Economic Freedom Declaration of Rights and provides for free market guarantees. The law includes several provisions to simplify regulations and establish norms for the protection of free enterprise and free exercise of economic activity. On August 20, 2021, the Brazilian government included the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) in the Brazilian Authorized Economic Operator Program (Programa OEA), run by Receita Federal (Internal Federal Revenue service), allowing Government of Brazil-designated OEA certified operators to maintain a low-level risk to achieve benefits in their foreign trade operations related to drawback suspension and exemption regimes. Through the digital transformation initiative in Brazil, foreign companies can open branches via the internet. Since 2019, it has been easier for foreign businesspeople to request authorization from the Brazilian federal government. After filling out the registration, creating an account, and sending the necessary documentation, business entities can make the authorization request on the Brazilian government’s online portal through a legal representative. The electronic documents will then be analyzed by the Brazilian National Department of Business Registration and Integration (DREI) team. DREI will inform the applicant of any missing documentation via the portal and e-mail and give a 60-day period for the applicant to submit any additional information. The legal representative of the foreign company, or another third party who holds a power of attorney, may request registration through this link: https://acesso.gov.br/acesso/#/primeiro-acesso?clientDetails=eyJjbGllbnRVcmkiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvYWNlc3NvLmdvdi5iciIsImNsaWVudE5hbWUiOiJQb3J0YWwgZ292LmJyIiwiY2xpZW50VmVyaWZpZWRVc2VyIjp0cnVlfQ%3D%3D The regulation of foreign companies opening businesses in Brazil is governed by article 1,134 of the Brazilian Civil Code and article 1 of DREI Normative Instruction 77/2020. English-language general guidelines to open a foreign company in Brazil are not yet available, but the Portuguese version is available at the following link: https://www.gov.br/economia/pt-br/assuntos/drei/empresas-estrangeiras . For foreign companies that will be a partner or shareholder of a Brazilian national company, the governing regulation is DREI Normative Instruction 81/2020 (https://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/instrucao-normativa-n-81-de-10-de-junho-de-2020-261499054 ). The contact information of the DREI is drei@economia.gov.br and +55 (61) 2020-2302. References: provides investment measures, laws and treaties enacted by selected countries. provides links to business registration sites worldwide. Brazil does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. APEX-Brasil supports Brazilian companies’ efforts to invest abroad under its “internationalization program”: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/como-a-apex-brasil-pode-ajudar-na-internacionalizacao-de-sua-empresa . APEX-Brasil frequently highlights the United States as a worthwhile destination for outbound investment. APEX-Brasil and SelectUSA (U.S. Department of Commerce) signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2014 to promote bilateral investment. Brazil incentivizes outward investment. APEX-Brasil organizes several initiatives aimed at promoting Brazilian investments abroad. The agency´s efforts include trade missions, business round tables, promoting the participation of Brazilian companies in major international trade fairs, and arranging technical visits for foreign buyers to Brazil as well as facilitating travel for decision-makers seeking to learn about the Brazilian market and performing other commercial activities designed to strengthen the country’s branding abroad. The main sectors of Brazilian investments abroad are financial services and assets (totaling 62.9 percent of total investments abroad); oil and gas extraction (12 percent); and mineral metal extraction (6.5 percent). Including all sectors, Brazilian investments abroad totaled $448 billion in 2020. The regions that received the largest share of Brazilian outward investments are the Caribbean (43.3 percent), concentrated in the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and Bahamas, and Europe (37.9 percent), primarily the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Regulations on investments abroad are outlined in BCB Ordinance 3,689/2013 (foreign capital in Brazil and Brazilian capital abroad): https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/busca/downloadNormativo.asp?arquivo=/Lists/Normativos/Attachments/48812/Circ_3689_v1_O.pdf Sales of cross-border mutual funds are only allowed to certain categories of investors, not to the general public. In 2020, international financial services companies active in Brazil submitted a proposal to Brazilian regulators to allow opening these mutual funds to the general public, and the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to approve their recommendation by June 2022. Discussions with regulators about increasing the share percentages that pension funds and insurers can invest abroad (currently 10 percent for pension funds, 20 percent for insurers, and 40 percent for qualified investors) are ongoing, along with discussions about tax deferral mechanisms to incentivize Brazilian investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime According to the World Bank, it takes approximately 17 days to start a business in Brazil. Brazil is seeking to streamline the process and decrease the amount of time it takes to open a small- or medium-sized enterprise (SME) to only five days through its RedeSimples Program. Similarly, the government has reduced regulatory compliance burdens for SMEs through the continued use of the SIMPLES program, which simplifies the collection of up to eight federal, state, and municipal-level taxes into one single payment. The Doing Business law (14.195/2021) included provisions to streamline the process, such as unifying federal, state and municipal registrations and eliminating requirements such as address analysis and pre-checking business names. In 2020, the World Bank noted that Brazil’s lowest-ranked component in its Ease of Doing Business score was the annual administrative burden for a medium-sized business to comply with Brazilian tax codes with an average of 1,501 hours per year, a significant improvement from 2019’s 1,958 hour average but still much higher than the 160.7 hour average of OECD high-income countries. The total tax rate for a medium-sized business in Brazil is 65.1 percent of profits, compared to the average of 40.1 percent in OECD high-income countries. Business managers often complain of not being able to understand complex and sometimes contradictory tax regulations, despite having large local tax and accounting departments in their companies. Tax regulations, while burdensome and numerous, do not generally differentiate between foreign and domestic firms. However, some investors complain that in certain instances the processing of rebates for exported goods of the value-added tax collected by individual states (ICMS) favors local companies. Exporters in many states report difficulty receiving their ICMS rebates when their goods are exported. Taxes on commercial and financial transactions are particularly burdensome, and businesses complain that these taxes hinder the international competitiveness of Brazilian-made products. Of Brazil’s ten federal regulatory agencies, the most prominent include: ANVISA, the Brazilian counterpart to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which has regulatory authority over the production and marketing of food, drugs, and medical devices ANATEL, the country’s telecommunications regulatory agency, which handles telecommunications as well as the licensing and assigning of radio spectrum bandwidth (the Brazilian FCC counterpart) ANP, the National Petroleum Agency, which regulates oil and gas contracts and oversees auctions for oil and natural gas exploration and production ANAC, Brazil’s civil aviation agency IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental licensing and enforcement agency ANEEL, Brazil’s electricity regulator that regulates Brazil’s power sector and oversees auctions for electricity transmission, generation, and distribution contracts In addition to these federal regulatory agencies, Brazil has dozens of state- and municipal-level regulatory agencies. The United States and Brazil conduct regular discussions on customs and trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, standards and conformity assessment, digital issues, and intellectual property protection. Discussions in all these areas occurred during the 19th plenary of the Commercial Dialogue which took place virtually in October 2021, and continue through ongoing regular exchanges at the working level between the U.S. Department of Commerce, Brazil’s Ministry of Economy, and other agencies and regulators throughout the year. Regulatory agencies complete Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) on a voluntary basis. The Brazilian congress passed Law 13.848 in June 2019 on Governance and Accountability (PLS 52/2013 in the Senate, and PL 6621/2016 in the Chamber). Among other provisions, the law makes RIAs mandatory for regulations that affect “the general interest.” The Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, and the Office of the Presidency maintain websites providing public access to both approved and proposed federal legislation. Brazil is seeking to improve its public comment and stakeholder input process. In 2004, the GoB opened an online “Transparency Portal” with data on funds transferred to and from federal, state, and city governments, as well as to and from foreign countries. It also includes information on civil servant salaries. In December 2021, Brazil’s Securities and Exchange Commision (CMV) issued Resolution 59/2021, establishing the first transparency mechanism for environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) practices in the country. The goal of the change was to provide more comprehensive information to potential investors, therefore allowing the market environment to drive changes in business behavior. According to the resolution, starting in January 2023, listed companies will be required to inform the CVM whether they disclose information on ESG indicators and provide details on their reports, such as existence of independent audits, which indicators were used, and if UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been considered. The new requirement will also include questions regarding the companies’ consideration of the Task Force on Climate Change-Related Financial Disclosures or other recognized entities’ recommendations, the existence of a gas emission inventory, and the role of management bodies in assessing climate-related risks. Regarding diversity issues, companies will be required to disclose information showing the diversity of the body of administrators and employees as well as salary disparities between executives and staff. In 2022, the Department of State concluded in its annual 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report that Brazil had met minimum fiscal transparency requirements. The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index ranked Brazil slightly ahead of the United States in terms of budget transparency in its most recent (2019) index. The Brazilian government demonstrates adequate fiscal transparency in managing its federal accounts, although there is room for improvement in terms of completeness of federal budget documentation. Brazil’s budget documents are publicly available, widely accessible, and sufficiently detailed. They provide a relatively full picture of the GoB’s planned expenditures and revenue streams. The information in publicly available budget documents is considered credible and reasonably accurate. Brazil is a member of Mercosul – a South American trade bloc whose full members include Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil routinely implements Mercosul common regulations. Brazil is a member of the WTO and the government regularly notifies draft technical regulations, such as potential agricultural trade barriers, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Brazil has a civil legal system with state and federal courts. Investors can seek to enforce contracts through the court system or via mediation, although both processes can be lengthy. The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must accept foreign contract enforcement rulings for the rulings to be considered valid in Brazil. Among other considerations, the foreign judgment must not contradict any prior decisions by a Brazilian court in the same dispute. The Brazilian Civil Code regulates commercial disputes, although commercial cases involving maritime law follow an older Commercial Code which has been otherwise largely superseded. Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the Brazilian State, and also, rule on lawsuits between a foreign state or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil. The judicial system is generally independent. The Supreme Federal Court (STF), charged with constitutional cases, frequently rules on politically sensitive issues. State court judges and federal level judges below the STF are career officials selected through a meritocratic examination process. The judicial system is backlogged, and disputes or trials frequently take several years to arrive at a final resolution, including all available appeals. Regulations and enforcement actions can be litigated in the court system, which contains mechanisms for appeal depending upon the level at which the case is filed. The STF is the ultimate court of appeal on constitutional grounds; the STJ is the ultimate court of appeal for cases not involving constitutional issues. In 2019, Brazil established a “one-stop shop” for international investors. The one-stop shop, the Direct Investments Ombudsman (DIO), is a ‘single window’ for investors provided by the Executive Secretariat of CAMEX. It is responsible for receiving requests and inquiries about investments, to be answered jointly with the public agency responsible for the matter (at the federal, state and municipal levels) involved in each case (the Network of Focal Points). This new structure allows for supporting the investor via a single governmental body in charge of responding to investor requests within a short time. Private investors have noted the single window is better than the previous system, but does not yet provide all the services of a true “one-stop shop” to facilitate international investment. The DIO’s website in English is: http://oid.economia.gov.br/en/menus/8 The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for enforcing competition laws, consumer protection, and carrying out regulatory reviews of proposed mergers and acquisitions. CADE was reorganized in 2011 through Law 12529, combining the antitrust functions of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. The law brought Brazil in line with U.S. and European merger review practices and allows CADE to perform pre-merger reviews, in contrast to the prior legal framework that directed the government to review mergers after they had already been completed. In October 2012, CADE performed Brazil’s first pre-merger review. In 2021, CADE conducted 611 total formal investigations. It approved 165 merger and/or acquisition requests and did not reject any requests. Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution assures property rights of both Brazilians and foreigners that own property in Brazil. The Constitution does not address nationalization or expropriation. Decree-Law 3365 allows the government to exercise eminent domain under certain criteria that include, but are not limited to, national security, public transportation, safety, health, and urbanization projects. In cases of eminent domain, the government compensates owners at fair market value. There are no signs that the current federal government is contemplating expropriation actions in Brazil against foreign interests. Brazilian courts have previously ruled in U.S. citizens’ favor for some claims regarding state-level land expropriations. However, as states have filed appeals of these decisions, the compensation process for foreign entities can be lengthy and have uncertain final outcomes. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 2002, Brazil ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards. Brazil is not a member of the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Brazil joined the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2010, and its membership will expire in 2022. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Article 34 of the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act (Law 9307) defines a foreign arbitration judgment as any judgment rendered outside of the national territory. The law established that the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must ratify foreign arbitration awards. Law 9307, updated by Law 13129/2015, also stipulates that a foreign arbitration award will be recognized or executed in Brazil in conformity with the international agreements ratified by the country and, in their absence, with domestic law. A 2001 Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) ruling established that the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act, permitting international arbitration subject to STJ ratification of arbitration decisions, does not violate the federal constitution’s provision that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power.” Contract disputes in Brazil can be lengthy and complex. Brazil has both a federal and a state court system, and jurisprudence is based on civil code and contract law. Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the State and rule on lawsuits between a foreign State or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil. Five regional federal courts hear appeals of federal judges’ decisions. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Brazil ratified the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) and the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards (Montevideo Convention). Law 9307/1996 amplifies Brazilian law on arbitration and provides guidance on governing principles and rights of participating parties. Brazil developed a new Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) model in 2015 (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ), but it does not include ISDS mechanisms. (See sections on bilateral investment agreements and responsible business conduct.) Brazil’s commercial code governs most aspects of commercial association, while the civil code governs professional services corporations. In December 2020, Brazil approved a new bankruptcy law (Law 14.112) which largely models the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and addresses criticisms that its previous bankruptcy legislation favored holders of equity over holders of debt. The new law facilitates the judicial and extrajudicial resolution process between debtors and creditors and accelerates reorganization and liquidation processes. Both debtors and creditors are allowed to provide reorganization plans that would eliminate non-performing activities and sell-off assets, thus avoiding bankruptcy. The new law also establishes a framework for cross-border insolvencies that recognizes legal proceedings outside of Brazil. 4. Industrial Policies The GoB extends tax benefits for investments in less-developed parts of the country, including the Northeast and the Amazon regions, with equal application to foreign and domestic investors. These incentives were successful in attracting major foreign plants to areas like the Manaus Free Trade Zone in Amazonas State, but most foreign investment remains concentrated in the more industrialized southeastern states in Brazil. Individual states seek to attract private investment by offering tax benefits and infrastructure support to companies, negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Competition among states to attract employment-generating investment leads some states to challenge such tax benefits as beggar-thy-neighbor fiscal competition. While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, the state-owned National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) is the traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit as well as export credits. BNDES provides foreign- and domestically-owned companies operating in Brazil financing for the manufacturing and marketing of capital goods and primary infrastructure projects. BNDES provides much of its financing at subsidized interest rates. As part of implementing a fiscal tightening policy, in December 2014 the GoB announced its intention to scale back the expansionary activities of BNDES and ended direct treasury support to the bank. Law 13.483, from September 2017, created a new Long-Term Lending Rate (TLP) for BNDES. On January 1, 2018, BNDES began phasing in the TLP to replace the prior subsidized loan rates. After a five-year phase in period, the TLP will float with the market and reflect a premium over Brazil’s five-year bond yield (which incorporates inflation). Although the GoB plans to reduce BNDES’s role further as it continues to promote the development of long-term private capital markets, BNDES will continue to play a large role, particularly in concession financing, such as Rio de Janeiro’s water and sanitation privatization projects, in which BNDES can finance up to 65 percent of direct investments. BNDES also established the Finame low carbon program, which provides financing for the acquisition and sale of solar and wind energy generation systems, solar heaters, buses and trucks that are either electric hybrids or powered exclusively by biofuel, and other machines and equipment with higher energy efficiency rates or that contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The program allows for the financing of up to 100 percent of the investment on energy efficient products with payment terms of up to ten years with a two-year grace period, however, the products must be new, manufactured in Brazil, and accredited by the Finame program. Financing conditions are defined with BNDES’s financial partners, which currently include seven commercial banks. In December 2018, Brazil approved a new auto sector incentive package – Rota 2030 – providing exemptions from Industrial Product Tax (IPI) for research and development (R&D) spending. Rota 2030 replaced the Inovar-Auto program, which was found to violate WTO rules. Rota 2030 increases standards for energy efficiency, structural performance, and the availability of assistive technologies; provides exemptions for investments in R&D and manufacturing process automation; incentivizes the use of biofuels; and funds technical training and professional qualification in the mobility and logistics sectors. To qualify for the tax incentives, businesses must meet conditions including demonstrating profit, investing a minimum amount of funds in R&D, and not having any outstanding tax liabilities. Brazil’s Special Regime for the Reinstatement of Taxes for Exporters, or Reintegra Program, provides a tax subsidy of two percent of the value of goods exported. Brazil provides tax reductions and exemptions on many domestically-produced information and communication technology (ICT) and digital goods that qualify for status under the Basic Production Process (PPB). The PPB is product-specific and stipulates which stages of the manufacturing process must be carried out in Brazil in order for an ICT product to be considered produced in Brazil. Brazil’s Internet for All program, launched in 2018, aims to ensure broadband internet to all municipalities by offering tax incentives to operators in rural municipalities. Law 12.598/2012 offers tax incentives to firms in the defense sector. The law’s principal aspects are to: 1) establish special rules for the acquisition, contract, and development of defense products and systems; 2) establish incentives for the development of the strategic defense industry sector by creating the Special Tax Regime for the Defense Industry (RETID); and 3) provide access to financing programs, projects, and actions related to Strategic Defense Products (PED). In April 2020, the Brazilian Defense and Security Industry Association (ABIMDE) requested the Minister of Defense to consider implementing improvements to Law 12.598 by allowing all its members to: 1) have access to special bidding terms (TLE) for defense and security materials; and 2) automatically utilize their RETID status, rather than being required to individually apply to the Ministry of Defense for certification, per the current process. However, as of March 2022 the Ministry of Defense is still reviewing the proposed improvements to the law. A RETID beneficiary, known as a Strategic Defense Company (EED), is accredited by the Ministry of Defense. An EED is a legal entity that produces or develops parts, tools, and components to be used in the production or development of defense assets. It can also be a legal entity that provides services used as inputs in the production or development of defense goods. RETID benefits include sale price credit and tax rate reduction for the manufacturing supply chain, including taxes on imported components. Additionally, RETID provides exemption from certain federal taxes on the purchase of materials for the manufacture of defense products and services provided by EEDs. The federal government grants tax benefits to certain free trade zones. Most of these free trade zones aim to attract investment to the country’s relatively underdeveloped North and Northeast regions. The most prominent of these is the Manaus Free Trade Zone, in Amazonas State, which has attracted significant foreign investment, including from U.S. companies. Constitutional amendment 83/2014 extended the status of Manaus Free Trade Zone until the year 2073. The GoB maintains a variety of localization barriers to trade in response to the weak competitiveness of its domestic tech industry. These include: Tax incentives for locally-sourced information and communication technology (ICT) goods and equipment (Law 8248/1991, amended by Law 13.969/2019 and Decree 87/2013) Government procurement preferences for local ICT hardware and software (2014 Decrees 8184, 8185, 8186, 8194, and 2013 Decree 7903); and the CERTICS Decree 8186, which aims to certify that software programs are the result of development and technological innovation in Brazil In 2019, Brazil adopted the New Informatic Law which revised the tax and incentives regime for the ICT sector. The regime is aligned with the requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), following complaints from Japan and the European Union that numerous Brazilian tax programs favored domestic products in contravention of WTO rules. The New Informatic Law provides tax incentives to ICT goods manufacturers that invest in research, development, and innovation (RD&I) in Brazil. To receive the incentives, the companies must meet a minimum nationalization requirement for production, but the nationalization content is reduced commensurate with increasing local RD&I investment. At least 60 percent of the production process is required to take place in Brazil to ensure eligibility. The Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) (an executive branch body that advises the presidency on security affairs) mandated the localization of all government data stored in the cloud during a review of cloud computing services contracted by the Brazilian government in Ordinance No. 9 (previously NC 14), issued in March 2018. While it does allow the use of cloud computing for non-classified information, it imposes a data localization requirement on all use of cloud computing by the Brazil government. Investors in certain sectors in Brazil must adhere to the country’s regulated prices, which fall into one of two groups: prices regulated at the federal level by a federal company or agency, and prices set by sub-national governments (states or municipalities). Regulated prices managed at the federal level include telephone services, certain refined oil and gas products (such as bottled cooking gas), electricity, and healthcare plans. Regulated prices controlled by sub-national governments include water and sewage fees, and most fees for public transportation such as local bus and rail services. For firms employing three or more people, Brazilian nationals must constitute at least two-thirds of all employees and receive at least two-thirds of total payroll, according to Labor Law Articles 352 to 354. This calculation excludes foreign specialists in fields where Brazilians are unavailable. There is a draft bill in congress (PL 2456/2019) to remove the mandatory requirement for national employment; however, the bill would maintain preferential treatment for companies that continue to employ a majority of Brazilian nationals. Decree 7174/2010, which regulates the procurement of information technology goods and services, requires federal agencies and parastatal entities to give preferential treatment to domestically produced computer products and goods or services with technology developed in Brazil based on a complicated price/technology matrix. Brazil’s Marco Civil, the framework law governing internet user rights and company responsibilities, states that data collected or processed in Brazil must respect Brazilian law, even if the data is subsequently stored outside of the country. Penalties for non-compliance could include fines of up to 10 percent of gross Brazilian revenues and/or the suspension or prohibition of related operations. Under the law, internet connection and application providers must retain access logs for specified periods of time or face sanctions. Brazil’s General Law for Protection of Personal Data (LGPD) went into effect in August 2020. The LGPD governs the processing and transfer of the personal data of subjects in Brazil by people or entities, regardless of the type of processing, the country where the data is located, or the headquarters of the entity processing the data. It also established a National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) to administer the law’s provisions, responsible for oversight and sanctions (which will go into effect August 2021) which can total up to R$50 million (approximately $10 million) per infringement. 5. Protection of Property Rights Brazil has a system in place for mortgage registration, but implementation is uneven and there is no standardized contract. Foreign individuals or foreign-owned companies can purchase real estate property in Brazil. Foreign buyers frequently arrange alternative financing in their own countries, where interest rates may be more attractive. Law 9514/1997 helped to boost the mortgage industry by establishing a legal framework for a secondary market in mortgages and streamlining the foreclosure process, but the mortgage market in Brazil is still underdeveloped, and foreigners may have difficulty obtaining local financing. Large U.S. real estate firms are, nonetheless, expanding their portfolios in Brazil. Intellectual property (IP) rights holders in Brazil continue to face challenges. Brazil has remained on the “Watch List” of the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report since 2017. The U.S. Government has long-standing concerns about Brazil’s enforcement regime and specific problems like the excessively high rates of online piracy. Brazil has one physical market located in São Paulo that is listed on USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. The Rua 25 de Março area is identified in the review as a distribution center for counterfeit and pirated goods throughout São Paulo. Government officials continue to take enforcement actions in this region, and authorities have used these enforcement actions as a basis to take civil measures against some of the other stores that have been identified for selling counterfeit goods in the area. According to the National Forum Against Piracy, contraband, pirated, counterfeit, and stolen goods cost Brazil approximately $54 billion in 2020. (https://www.fncp.org.br/areas-de-atuacao.html#combate-ao-mercado-ilegal ) (Yearly average currency exchange rate: 1 USD = 5.3 BRL) For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s country profiles: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . Additional information is also available from the USPTO IP Attaché in Brazil: https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-attache-program/regions/brazil . 6. Financial Sector The Brazil Central Bank (BCB) in October 2016 implemented a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to a record-low 2 percent by the end of 2020. The downward trend was reversed by an increase to 2.75 percent in March 2021 and reached 10.75 percent in February 2022. Brazil’s banking sector projects that the Selic will reach 12.25 percent by the end of 2022. Inflation for 2021 ended at an annualized 10.06 percent, above the target of 4 percent plus/minus 1.5 percent. The BCB’s Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) set the BCB’s inflation target at 3.5 percent for 2022 and .25 percent in 2023 (plus/minus 1.5 percent), but as of February 2022 the BCB estimates that inflation will reach 5.4 percent in 2022, above the target again. As of mid-March 2022, Brazil’s annual inflation rate is at 10.75 percent. Brazil’s muddled fiscal policy and heavy public debt burden factor into most analysts’ forecasts that the “neutral” policy rate will remain higher than target rates among Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the reporting period. According to the BCB, in 2021 the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 81.1 percent, compared to a record 89.4 percent in 2020. Analysts project that the debt/GDP ratio may rise to around 85 percent by the end of 2023. The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, but showed a reduction in 2020 due to the pandemic. As of January 2022, public banks accounted for about 50 percent of total loans to the private sector (compared to 48.9 percent in 2018). Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose, and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital. While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional source of long-term credit in Brazil. BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES decreased 4 percent in 2021 from 2020, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital. The sole stock market in Brazil is B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão), created through the 2008 merger of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) with the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F), forming the fourth-largest exchange in the Western hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges. In 2020, there were 463 companies traded on the B3 exchange. The B3’s broadest index, the Ibovespa, decreased 11.93 percent in valuation during 2021, due to economic uncertainties related to rising and persistent inflation, particularly in the second half of the year. Foreign investors, both institutional and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives; however, they are limited to trading those investments only on established markets. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil. Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks. The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated. Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies. Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates. According to BCB data collected for 2020, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks to non-financial corporations was 11.7 percent. The banking sector in Brazil is highly concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the five largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 82 percent of the commercial banking credit market totaling $800 billion by the end of 2020. Three of the five largest banks by assets in the country, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and BNDES, are partially or completely federally-owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies. Citibank sold its consumer business to Itaú Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the only U.S. bank operating in the country. Increasing competitiveness in the financial sector, including in the emerging fintech space, is a vital part of the Brazilian government’s strategy to improve access to and the affordability of financial services in Brazil. On November 16, 2020, the BCB launched its instant payment system called “PIX”. PIX is a 24/7 system that offers transfers of any value for people-people (P2P), people-business (P2B), business-people (B2P), business-business (B2B), and government-government (G2G). Brazilian customers in 2021 overwhelmingly embraced PIX, particularly for P2P transfers (which are free), replacing both cash payments and legacy bank electronic transfers which charged relatively high fees and could only take place during business hours. In February 2021, the BCB implemented the first two of four phases of its Open Banking Initiative in an effort to open Brazil’s insulated banking system dominated by relatively few players. The first phase required Brazilian financial institutions to facilitate digitized access to their customer service channels, products, and services related to demand deposit or savings accounts, payment accounts, and credit operations. The second phase of the initiative expanded sharing customer data across a widening scope of bank products including loans. The other two phases, which are scheduled to go into effect in 2022, seek to include sharing customer data on foreign exchange, investments, and pension funds. The BCB expects that increased access to customer information will allow other financial institutions, including competitor banks and fintechs, to offer better and cheaper banking services to incumbent banks’ clients, thereby breaking up the dominance of the six large, incumbent banking institutions. In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately. It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In December 2020, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 28 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative after the agency had lowered the outlook on the Brazilian system in April 2020 due to economic difficulties. As of March 2021, the rating remained as stable. The Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies, assessing penalties in instances of insider trading. To open an account with a Brazilian bank, foreign account holders must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number (CPF) issued by the Brazilian government, either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income. On average, this process from application to account opening can take more than three months. Foreign Exchange Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small. The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements conducted in December 2019 showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps, and currency options) was $18.8 billion, down from $19.7 billion in 2016. This was equivalent to around 0.22 percent of the global market in 2019, down from 0.3 percent in 2016. On December 29, 2021, Brazil approved a new Foreign Exchange Regulatory framework, to go into effect in December 2022, which replaces more than 40 separate regulations with a single law and eases foreign investments in the Brazilian market incentivizing increased foreign investment and assisting Brazilian businesses in integrating into global value chains. The new law aims to streamline currency exchange operations and authorizes more enterprises, including fintechs and small businesses, to conduct operations in foreign currencies bypassing retail banks and increasing their competitiveness. In addition, the law expands the list of qualifying activities transacted in foreign-currency denominated accounts (previously restricted only to import/export firms and for loans in which the debtor or creditor was based outside Brazil). Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rate spreads and fees. According to an October 2021 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, the banking system remains solid, with growing capitalization indices, and continues to rebuild its capital base. All institutions are able to meet the minimum prudential requirements, and solvency does not pose a risk to financial stability. Stress testing demonstrated that the banking system has adequate loss-absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios. There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil. Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market, where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces. All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized. The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans. In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.” In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity. Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB. Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB. Early payments can also be made without additional approvals if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt. Remittance Policies Brazilian Federal Revenue Service regulates withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities residing or domiciled outside Brazil. Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties. Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes. Under Law 13.259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds. The capital gains marginal tax rates are 15 percent for up to $1,000,000 in gains; 17.5 percent for $1,000,000 to $10,000,000 in gains; 20 percent for $10,000,000 to $60,000,000 in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than $60,000,000 in gains. Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962. Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax. Brazil had a sovereign fund from 2008 – 2018, when it was abolished, and the money was used to repay foreign debt. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Most state-owned and private sector corporations of any significant size in Brazil pursue corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Brazil’s new CFIAs (see sections on bilateral investment agreements and dispute settlement) contain CSR provisions. Some corporations use CSR programs to meet local content requirements, particularly in information technology manufacturing. Many corporations support local education, health, and other programs in the communities where they have a presence. Brazilian consumers, especially the local residents where a corporation has or is planning a local presence, generally expect CSR activity. Corporate officials frequently meet with community members prior to building a new facility to review the types of local services the corporation will commit to providing. Foreign and local enterprises in Brazil often advance United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of their CSR activity, and will cite their local contributions to SDGs, such as universal primary education and environmental sustainability. Brazilian prosecutors and civil society can be very proactive in bringing cases against companies for failure to implement the requirements of the environmental licenses for their investments and operations. National and international nongovernmental organizations monitor corporate activities for perceived threats to Brazil’s biodiversity and tropical forests and can mount strong campaigns against alleged misdeeds. A common challenge for foreign businesses, especially as it relates to child and forced labor, is a lack of transparency in supply chains. The U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil supports U.S. business CSR activities through the +Unidos Group (Mais Unidos), a group of multinational companies established in Brazil, which support public and private CSR alliances in Brazil. Additional information can be found at: www.maisunidos.org Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Brazil is the world’s 12th largest greenhouse gas emitter. At COP 26 in November 2021, Brazil committed to achieving net zero emissions by 2050, ten years ahead of its previous commitment, ending illegal deforestation by 2028, and announced a plan to implement a Brazilian carbon market in 2022. However, rates of illegal deforestation continue to rise from a 2012 low; in 2021, illegal deforestation increased by 22 percent from the previous year. Private sector operators, especially in the agricultural sector, are concerned that consumer reaction to environmental issues in Brazil, especially deforestation in the Amazon Basin, could result in the boycott of Brazilian exports and a loss of market share. Such boycotts have already occurred in some supermarket chains in Europe. Brazil established a National Policy on Climate Change in 2009 for climate change mitigation, adaptation, and consolidation of a low carbon economy. During COP 26 in Glasgow, Brazil published guidelines to update its national climate strategy, focusing on consolidating various initiatives to develop a low carbon economy. The strategy includes goals such as eliminating illegal deforestation, restoring forests, a “National Green Growth Plan,” and financing directed at developing a green economy. In biodiversity, the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment coordinates and supports actions aimed at identifying species of native fauna and flora, monitoring and evaluating the conservation status of an increasingly significant portion of these species. To ensure the conservation of native species, the Ministry creates development models that encourage the sustainable use of biodiversity, along the lines of what is encouraged under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In October 2021, the government launched the National Green Growth Program. The Program uses new resources from the BRICS Development Bank for forest conservation projects, the rational use of natural resources, and the generation of green jobs. The new program will have national and international resources, public and private, reimbursable and non-reimbursable impact funds and risk investments. The plan focuses on six areas: renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, low-emission industry, basic sanitation, waste treatment, and ecotourism. At the program launch, the Brazilian Ministry of Environment stated that the federal government has a total credit line of 411 billion reais ($82.2 million) allocated for green projects. However, critics argue that the program is just a repackaging of several initiatives that already existed in the government, claiming that of the 400 billion reais planned, only 12 billion ($2.4 million, 3 percent of the total) were new funds. At COP 26, Brazil signed the Global Methane Pledge to reduce global methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030. In February 2022, the Ministry of Environment announced that it would soon present a “Methane Zero” plan that would incentivize biomethane capture/production from landfills, sugar cane waste, and dairy barns; however, as of March 2022 the plan has not been announced. The government expects active participation from the private sector through contributions to the Ministry of Environment’s projects. For example, the “Adopt-a-Park” program was established to gather resources for the conservation of national parks and is directed at national and foreign companies or individuals that are interested in contributing to environmental protection in Brazil. Through the program, resources are invested by the adopter in services such as remote monitoring, wildland firefighting and prevention, actions against illegal deforestation, and recovery of degraded areas. In 2019, Brazil launched the National Biofuels Policy (RenovaBio) to comply with its Paris Agreement commitments by promoting the expansion of biofuels in the energy matrix and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The policy established annual national decarbonization targets for the fuel sector, divided into mandatory individual targets for fuel distributors. To comply with the targets, fuel distributors purchase Decarbonization Credits (CBIO), a financial asset tradable on the stock exchange since 2020 derived from the certification of the biofuel production process and that corresponds to one ton of carbon dioxide. According to the Brazilian government, the program reached 85 percent of its targets in 2021, preventing the emission of 24 million tons of greenhouse gases and trading $212 million-worth of CBIOs in the stock market. 9. Corruption Brazil has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but enforcement activities against corruption are inconsistent. Several bills to revise the country’s regulation of the lobbying/government relations industry have been pending before Congress for years. Bribery is illegal, and a bribe by a Brazilian-based company to a foreign government official can result in criminal penalties for individuals and administrative penalties for companies, including fines and potential disqualification from government contracts. A company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from its taxes. While federal government authorities generally investigate allegations of corruption, there are inconsistencies in the level of enforcement among individual states. Corruption is problematic in business dealings with some authorities, particularly at the municipal level. U.S. companies operating in Brazil are subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Brazil signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2005. Brazil is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. It was one of the founders, along with the United States, of the intergovernmental Open Government Partnership, which seeks to help governments increase transparency. In 1996, Brazil signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC), developed within the Organization of American States (OAS). It was incorporated in Brazil by Legislative Decree 152 and went into force in 2002. In 2020, Brazil ranked 96th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. The full report can be found at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 From 2014-2021, the complex federal criminal investigation known as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Carwash) investigated and prosecuted a complex web of public sector corruption, contract fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion stemming from systematic overcharging for government contracts, particularly at parastatal oil company Petrobras. The investigation led to the arrests and convictions of Petrobras executives, oil industry suppliers, executives from Brazil’s largest construction companies, money launderers, former politicians, and political party operators. Appeals of convictions and sentences continue to work their way through the Brazilian court system. On December 25, 2019, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro signed a packet of anti-crime legislation into law, which included several anti-corruption measures. The new measures include regulation of immunity agreements – information provided by a subject in exchange for reduced sentence – which were widely used during Operation Carwash. The legislation also strengthens Brazil’s whistleblower mechanisms, permitting anonymous information about crimes against the public administration and related offenses. Operation Carwash was dissolved in February 2021. In March 2021, the OECD established a working group to monitor anticorruption efforts in Brazil. In December 2016, Brazilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht and its chemical manufacturing arm Braskem agreed to pay the largest FCPA penalty in U.S. history and plead guilty to charges filed in the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland that alleged the companies paid hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to government officials around the world. The U.S. Department of Justice case stemmed directly from the Lava Jato investigation and focused on violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Details on the case can be found at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve In January 2018, Petrobras settled a class-action lawsuit with investors in U.S. federal court for $3 billion, which was one of the largest securities class action settlements in U.S. history. The investors alleged that Petrobras officials accepted bribes and made decisions that had a negative impact on Petrobras’ share value. In September 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Petrobras would pay a fine of $853.2 million to settle charges that former executives and directors violated the FCPA through fraudulent accounting used to conceal bribe payments from investors and regulators. In October 2020, Brazilian meatpacking and animal protein company JBS reached two settlements in the United States to pay fines to settle charges of corruption. The company is part of the J&F Group, which was also a part of the settlements. The group agreed to pay over $155 million in fines for violations of U.S. laws due to misconduct by J&F and failure to maintain accounting records by JBS. Lava Jato investigations also resulted in the arrest of several JBS executives who also signed plea bargains in the 2020 settlements. Resources to Report Corruption Secretaria de Cooperação Internacional – Ministério Público Federal SAF Sul Quadra 04 Conjunto C Bloco “B” Sala 509/512 pgr-internacional@mpf.mp.br stpc.dpc@cgu.gov.br https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/anticorrupcao Transparência BrasilR. Bela Cintra, 409; Sao Paulo, Brasil+55 (11) 3259-6986http://www.transparencia.org.br/contato 10. Political and Security Environment Strikes and demonstrations occasionally occur in urban areas and may cause temporary disruption to public transportation. Brazil has over 41,000 murders annually, with low rates of murder investigation case completions and convictions. Non-violent pro- and anti-government demonstrations have occurred periodically in recent years. Although U.S. citizens usually are not targeted during such events, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Brazil are advised to take common-sense precautions and avoid any large gatherings or any other event where crowds have congregated to demonstrate or protest. For the latest U.S. State Department guidance on travel in Brazil, please consult www.travel.state.gov. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Brazilian labor market is composed of approximately 107.8 million workers, including employed (95.7 million) and unemployed (12 million). Among employed workers, 38.95 million (40.7 percent) work in the informal sector. Brazil had an unemployment rate of 11.1 percent in the last quarter of 2021, although that rate was more than double (22.8 percent) for workers ages 18-24. Low-skilled employment dominates Brazil’s labor market. The nearly 40 million workers in the informal sector do not receive the full benefits that formal workers enjoy under Brazil’s labor and social welfare system. The informal market represents approximately 16.8 percent of Brazil’s GDP. In 2021, employees’ average monthly income reached the lowest level in recorded history, at R$ 2,587 ($488). Since 2012, women have on average been unemployed at a higher rate than their male counterparts, a scenario worsened by the pandemic. Between 2012 and 2019, the difference in average employment rates between men and women was 3.3 percentage points. In 2020, the average rate difference reached 4.5 percentage points and in 2021, 5.8 percentage points. In the last quarter of 2021, the Brazilian men’s unemployment rate was 9 percent, while the women’s unemployment rate was 13.9 percent. This discrepancy in employment rates is also traditionally observed for people of color in Brazil: while unemployment rates for whites is 9 percent (below the national average), blacks and mixed-race unemployment rates are significantly higher, at 13.6 percent and 12.6 percent respectively. Foreign workers made up less than one percent of the overall labor force, but the arrival of more than 305,000 economic migrants and refugees from Venezuela since 2016 has led to large local concentrations of foreign workers in the border state of Roraima and the city of Manaus. Since April 2018, the Brazilian government, through Operation Welcome’s voluntary interiorization strategy, has relocated more than 68,000 Venezuelans from the northern border region to cities with more economic opportunities. Migrant workers within Brazil play a significant role in the agricultural sector. Workers in the formal sector contribute to the Time of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) the amount of one month’s salary over the course of a year. If a company terminates an employee, the employee can access the full amount of their FGTS contributions, or if the employee leaves voluntarily they are entitled to 20 percent of their contributions. Brazil’s labor code guarantees formal sector workers 30 days of annual leave and severance pay in the case of dismissal without cause. Unemployment insurance also exists for laid-off workers, equal to the country’s minimum salary (or more depending on previous income levels) for six months. The government does not waive any labor laws to attract investment. Collective bargaining is common, and there are 17,630 labor unions operating in Brazil in 2022. Labor unions, especially in sectors such as metalworking and banking, are well organized in advocating for wages and working conditions. In some sectors, federal regulations mandate collective bargaining negotiations across the entire industry. A new labor law in November 2017 ended mandatory union contributions, which has reduced union finances by as much as 90 percent according to the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE). According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the share of unionized workers dropped to 11.2 percent of the workforce in 2019. The Ministry of Labor reported 7,854 collective bargaining agreements in 2021, an increase compared to the 6,118 agreements reported in 2020. Employer federations also play a significant role in both public policy and labor relations. Each state has its own federations of industry and commerce, which report respectively to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), headquartered in Brasilia, and the National Confederation of Commerce (CNC), headquartered in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has a dedicated system of labor courts that are charged with resolving routine cases involving unfair dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances. Labor courts have the power to impose an agreement on employers and unions if negotiations break down and either side appeals to the court system. As a result, labor courts routinely are called upon to determine wages and working conditions in various industries across the country. The labor courts system has millions of pending legal cases on its docket, although the number of new filings has decreased since November 2017 labor law reforms. Strikes occur periodically, particularly among public sector unions. A strike organized by truckers’ unions protesting increased fuel prices paralyzed the Brazilian economy in May 2018 and led to billions of dollars in losses to the economy. Trucker strikes in 2021, however, had more limited impact. Brazil has ratified 98 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and is party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and major ILO conventions concerning the prohibition of child labor, forced labor, and discrimination. For the past four years (2018-2021), the Department of Labor, in its annual publication “Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor,” has recognized Brazil for its moderate advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. On July 28, 2021, President Jair Bolsonaro re-established the Ministry of Labor and Welfare as a separate ministry, reversing its January 2019 merger into the Ministry of Economy. In 2021, the GoB inspected 443 properties, resulting in the rescue of 1,937 victims of forced labor. Additionally, in 2020 GoB officials removed 810 child workers from situations of child labor, compared to 1,040 children in 2019. Brunei Executive Summary Brunei is a small, energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population, excellent infrastructure, and a government intent on attracting foreign investment and projects. In parallel with Brunei’s efforts to attract foreign investment and create an open and transparent investment regime, the country has taken steps to streamline the process for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses and has improved its protections for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Despite ambitions to diversify, Brunei’s economy remains dependent on the income derived from sales of oil and gas, contributing about 50 percent to the country’s GDP. Substantial revenue from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. These two revenue streams provide a comfortable quality of life for Bruneians by regional standards. Citizens are not required to pay taxes and have access to free education through the university level, free medical care, and subsidized housing and car fuel. Brunei has a stable political climate and is generally sheltered from natural disasters. Its central location in Southeast Asia, with good telecommunications and airline connections, business tax credits in specified sectors, and no income, sales, or export taxes, offers a welcoming climate for potential investors. Sectors offering U.S. business opportunities in Brunei include aerospace and defense, agribusiness, construction, petrochemicals, energy and mining, environmental technologies, food processing and packaging, franchising, health technologies, information and communication, digital finance, and services. Brunei has ambitious climate change goals, aspiring to lower greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 percent and increase its share of renewable energy to 30 percent of total capacity by 2035. Brunei continues to take a cautious approach against the COVID-19 pandemic despite having fully immunized 95 percent of the population. As of March 2022, although the country is not under lockdown, Brunei has not fully opened its borders to non-essential travel. Travelers entering the country are required to obtain permission from the Prime Minister’s Office. In 2014, Brunei began implementing sections of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC) that expanded preexisting restrictions on activities such as alcohol consumption, eating in public during the fasting hours in the month of Ramadan, and indecent behavior, with possible punishments including fines and imprisonment. The SPC functions in parallel with Brunei’s common law-based civil penal code. The government commenced full implementation of the SPC in 2019, introducing the possibility of corporal and capital punishments including, under certain evidentiary circumstances, amputation for theft and death by stoning for offenses including sodomy, adultery, and blasphemy. Government officials emphasize that sentencing to the most severe punishments is highly improbable due to the very high standard of proof required for conviction under the SPC. While the SPC does not specifically address business-related matters, potential investors should be aware that the SPC generated global controversy when it was implemented due to its draconian punishments and inherent discrimination toward LGBT communities. The sultan declared a moratorium on the death penalty for sharia crimes in response to the outcry and there have been no recorded incidents of U.S. citizens or U.S. investments directly affected by sharia law. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 35 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 82 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $11.0 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $31,510 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Brunei has an open economy favorable to foreign trade and FDI as the government continues its economic diversification efforts to limit its long reliance on oil and gas exports. FDI is important to Brunei as it plays a key role in the country’s economic and technological development. Brunei encourages FDI in the domestic economy through various investment incentives offered by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Improving Brunei’s Ease of Doing Business status by upgrading the domestic business regulatory environment through a whole-of-nation approach has been a priority for the government. The World Bank Ease of Doing Business report indicated that Brunei ranked 66th overall out of 190 world economies in 2019. Brunei ranked first in the report’s “Getting Credit” category, tied with New Zealand, indicative of Brunei’s strong credit reporting mechanisms. Brunei amended its laws to make it easier and quicker for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses. The Business License Act (Amendment) of 2016 exempts several business activities (eateries, boarding and lodging houses or other places of public resort; street vendors and stalls; motor vehicle dealers; petrol stations, including places for storing petrol and inflammable material; timber store and furniture factories; and retail shops and workshops) from needing to obtain a business license. The Miscellaneous License Act (Amendment) of 2015 reduced the wait times for new business registrants to start operations, with low-risk businesses like eateries and shops able to start operations immediately. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of companies incorporated in Brunei. The Companies Act requires locally incorporated companies to have at least one of the two directors—or if more than two directors, at least two of them—to be residents of Brunei, but companies may request exceptions. The corporate income tax rate is the same whether the company is locally or foreign owned and managed. All businesses in Brunei must be registered with the Registry of Companies and Business Names at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Foreign investors can fully own incorporated companies, foreign company branches, or representative offices, but not sole proprietorships or partnerships. Brunei does maintain its right to screen investment to ensure that foreign investments do not contradict and cause negative impact to the overall National Development Plan and to the national interest. More information on incorporation of companies can be found on the Ministry of Finance and Economy website . The World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat prepared a Trade Policy Review of Brunei in December 2014 and a revision in February 2015. As part of Brunei’s effort to attract foreign investment, the government established the Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB) and Darussalam Enterprise (DARe) as facilitating agents under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. These organizations work together to smooth the process of obtaining permits, approvals, and licenses. Facilitating services are now consolidated into one government website . BEDB is the government’s frontline agency that promotes and facilitates foreign investment into Brunei. BEDB is responsible for evaluating investment proposals, liaising with government agencies, and obtaining project approval from the government’s Foreign Direct Investment and Downstream Industry Committee. Outward Investment A major share of outward investment is made by the government through its sovereign wealth funds, which are managed by the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. No data is available on the total investment amount due to a strict policy of secrecy. It is believed that the majority of sovereign wealth funds are invested in foreign portfolio investments and real estate. Despite the limited availability of public information regarding the amount, the funds are generally viewed positively and managed well by BIA. 3. Legal Regime Brunei’s regulatory system has limited transparency, particularly in lawmaking processesand impact assessments. Each ministry is responsible for coordinating with the Attorney General’s Chambers to draft proposed legislation. Legislation does not receive broad review and little input is provided from outside of the originating ministry. The sultan has final authority to approve proposed legislation. Laws and regulations are readily accessible on the Attorney General’s Chambers website . Brunei encourages environment, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure but does not mandate it. Brunei is an active member of ASEAN, through which it has concluded FTAs with Australia & New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea. Brunei became a WTO member in 1995 and a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. Brunei’s constitution does not specifically provide for judicial independence, but in practice the court system operates without government interference. Brunei’s legal system includes two parallel systems: one based on common law and the other based on Islamic law. The common law judicial system is presided over by the Supreme Court, which comprises the Court of Appeal and the High Court. Recognizing the importance of protecting investors’ rights and contract enforcement, Brunei established a Commercial Court in 2016. In 2014, Brunei implemented the first phase of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC), which expanded existing restrictions on minor offenses—such as eating during Ramadan—that are punishable by fines or imprisonment. On April 3, 2019 Brunei commenced full implementation of the SPC, introducing the possibility of harsher punishments such as stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran. However, these forms of punishment require higher standards of proof than the common-law-based penal code (for example, four pious men must personally witness an act of fornication to support a sharia-based harsh sentence), placing them under a de facto moratorium. The sultan confirmed the moratorium in a 2019 public statement. The basic legislation on investment includes the Investment Incentive Order 2001 and the Income Tax (As Amended) Order 2001. Investment Order 2001 supports economic development in strategically important industrial and economic enterprises and, through the Ministry of Finance and Economy, offers investment incentives through a favorable tax regime. Although Brunei does not have a stock exchange, the government is reportedly planning to establish a securities market. Foreign ownership of companies is not restricted, although under the Companies Act, at least one of two directors of a locally incorporated company must be a resident of Brunei, unless granted an exemption from the appropriate authorities. Brunei’s Competition Order, published in 2015 to promote and maintain fair and healthy competition to enhance market efficiency and consumer welfare, entered into force on January 1, 2020. The sultan also announced the establishment of the Competition Commission in 2017 to oversee and act on competition issues that include adjudicating anti-competitive cases and imposing penalties on companies that violate the Competition Order. Brunei is a signatory to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. There is no history of expropriation of foreign owned property in Brunei, but there have been cases of domestically owned private property being expropriated for infrastructure development. The government provided compensation in such cases and claimants were afforded due process. In 2012, amendments to Brunei’s Bankruptcy Act increased the minimum threshold for a creditor to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor from BND 500 to BND 10,000 (USD350 to USD7,060) and enabled an appointed bankruptcy trustee to direct the Controller of Immigration to impound and retain the debtor’s passport, certificate of identity, or travel document to prevent the debtor from leaving the country. The amendment also requires the debtor to deliver all property under the debtor’s possession to the trustee. Information about Brunei’s bankruptcy laws is available on the judiciary’s website . 4. Industrial Policies Companies involved in the exportation of agriculture, forestry, and fishery products can apply for tax relief on export profits. Tax exemption may be available for pioneer industry companies. For non-pioneer enterprises, the tax relief period is eight years and up to 11 years for pioneer enterprises. In 2015, the government reduced the corporate income tax rate in Brunei from 20 percent to 18.5 percent. Sole proprietorships and partnerships are not subject to tax. Individuals do not pay any capital gains tax, and profits arising from the sale of capital assets are not taxable. Brunei has double-taxation agreements with the United Kingdom, Indonesia, China, Singapore, Vietnam, Bahrain, Oman, Japan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Laos, Kuwait, Tajikistan, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. Under the Income Tax (Petroleum) Act, a company is subject to taxes of up to 55 percent for any petroleum operation pursuant to production sharing agreements. Darussalam Assets is a private limited company established in December 2012 under the purview of the Ministry of Finance and Economy to spur the growth of government-linked companies (GLC) through active ownership and management of its GLC portfolio based on commercial principles, in line with Brunei’s 2035 development vision. More info on Darussalam Assets may be found at their website . In 2017, Brunei announced the creation of its first Free Trade Zone, Terunjing Industrial Park, a 235-acre site located between two main highways near Brunei International Airport and Muara Port. Darussalam Enterprise (DARe), under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, works closely with other relevant government agencies to facilitate the implementation of investors’ projects. DARe oversees and manages 26 industrial parks across Brunei. The government of Brunei seeks to increase the number of Bruneians working in the private sector. Brunei’s Local Business Development Framework seeks to increase the use of local goods and services, train a domestic workforce, and develop Bruneian businesses by placing requirements on all companies operating in the oil and gas industry in Brunei to meet local hiring and contracting targets. These requirements also apply to information and communication technology firms that work on government projects. The Framework sets local content targets based on the difficulty of the project and the value of the contract, with more flexible local content requirements for projects requiring highly specialized technologies or with a high contract value. In 2019, senior officials stated an intent to extend local hiring targets to additional sectors of the economy. Expatriate employment is controlled by a labor quota system administered by the Labor Department and the issuance of employment passes by the Immigration Department. Brunei allows new companies to apply for special approval to expedite the recruitment of expatriate workers in select positions. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the special approval is only available to new companies for up to six months and covers businesses such as restaurants and retail stores. The special approval cuts the waiting time for a quota from 21 days to seven. Brunei has not announced any specific legislation pertaining to data storage and data localization requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Mortgages are recognized and enforced in Brunei; however, only Bruneian citizens can own land property in Brunei indefinitely. Foreigners and permanent residents can only own properties for up to 99 years. Brunei’s Department of Economic Planning and Development does not publish FDI data for real estate. Each transfer of ownership in Brunei requires the approval of “His Majesty in Council” which is a council of officials representing the Sultan. This process can be lengthy and opaque. Brunei is considering amending the Land Code are being considered to ban past practices of proxy land sales to foreigners and permanent residents using power of attorney and trust deeds. The amendments to the Land Code have eliminated the recognition of powers of attorney and trust deeds as mechanisms in land transactions involving non-citizens. The government may grant temporary occupation permits over state land to applicants for licenses to occupy land for agricultural, commercial, housing or industrial purposes. These licenses are granted for renewable annual terms. Brunei’s intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement regime is still in development but is increasingly strong and effective. The country was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 report in 2013 in recognition of its improving IPR protections, increasing enforcement, and efforts to educate the public about the importance of IPR. Brunei finalized and adopted the Copyright (Amendment) Order 2013 in December 2013, a development long requested by the U.S. government. The amendment enhanced enforcement provisions for copyright infringement by increasing the penalties for IP offenses; adding new offenses; strengthening the enforcement powers of the Royal Brunei Police Force and the Ministry of Finance and Economy’s Customs and Excise Department; and allowing for sanctioned private prosecution. The amendments are designed to deter copyright infringements with fines of BND 10,000 (USD7,400) to BND 20,000 (USD14,800) per infringing copy, imprisonment for a term up to five years, or both. Enforcement agencies are authorized to enter premises and arrest without warrant; to stop, search, and board vehicles; and to access computerized and digitized data. The amendments further allow for admissibility of evidence obtained covertly and protect the identity of informants. Statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods are unavailable. Brunei established the Brunei Intellectual Property Office (BruIPO) in 2013 under the Attorney General’s Chambers. The establishment of BruIPO expanded the country’s Patents Registry Office’s (PRO) ability to accept applications for trademarks registration in addition to patents and industrial designs. In September 2013, Brunei acceded to the Geneva (1999) Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs to protect IP from industrial designs, making it the second ASEAN Member country, following Singapore, to accede. The accession emphasized Brunei’s commitment under the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 2011 – 2015. Brunei has also publicly committed to acceding to other World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) treaties including the Madrid Protocol for the International Registration of Marks, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), and the UPOV Convention 1991 for the protection of New Varieties of Plants (PV). For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector In March 2021, the Minister of Finance and Economy II renewed its annual budget of USD292 million to fund infrastructure, technology, and socio-economic studies related to the implementation of Brunei’s own stock exchange, which is expected to launch in the next few years. In 2013, Brunei signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) designed to strengthen collaboration in the development of fair and efficient capital markets in the two countries. It also provided a framework to facilitate greater cross-border capital market activities and cooperation in the areas of regulation as well as capacity building and human capital development, particularly in Islamic capital markets. The capital market industry in Brunei is primarily governed by the Securities Markets Order, 2013 and the Securities Markets Regulations, 2015 which are both administered by Brunei Darussalam Central Bank. In addition, securities with any Shariah or Islamic component would be additionally governed by the Syariah Financial Supervisory Board Order, 2006. Brunei has accepted the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions and multiple currency practices. Brunei has a small banking sector which includes both conventional and Islamic banking. The Brunei Darussalam Central Bank (BDCB) is the sole central authority for the banking sector, in addition to its role as the country’s central bank. Banks have high levels of liquidity, good capital adequacy ratios, and well-managed levels of non-performing loans. Several foreign banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of China (Hong Kong) have established operations in Brunei. In March 2018, HSBC officially ended its operations in Brunei after announcing its planned departure from Brunei in late 2016. All banks fall under the supervision of BDCB, which has also established a credit bureau that centralizes information on applicants’ credit worthiness. The Brunei dollar (BND) is pegged to the Singapore dollar, and each currency is accepted in both countries. The Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) manages Brunei’s General Reserve Fund and their external assets. Established in 1983, BIA’s assets are estimated to be USD60-75 billion. BIA’s activities are not publicly disclosed and are ranked the lowest in transparency ratings by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Brunei’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), managed by Darussalam Assets under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, lead key sectors of the economy including oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, and energy generation and distribution. These enterprises also receive preferential treatment when responding to government tenders. Some of the largest SOEs include the following: The telecommunications industry is dominated by government-linked companies. The service providers are Datastream Digital, Imagine, and Progresif. In 2019, the government consolidated the infrastructure of all three companies under a state-owned wholesale network operator called Unified National Networks (UNN). Royal Brunei Technical Services (RBTS), established in 1988 as a government owned corporation, is responsible for managing the acquisition of a wide range of systems and equipment. Brunei Energy Services and Trading (BEST) is the national oil company owned by the Brunei government. The company was granted all mineral rights in eight prime onshore and offshore petroleum blocks totaling 20,552 sq. km. PB manages contracts with Shell and Petronas, which are exploring Brunei’s onshore and deep-water offshore blocks. The government continues to modify BEST’s role in the oil and gas industry. In 2019, the government established Petroleum Authority as the oil and gas sector’s regulatory body, a function which had been filled by BEST. Royal Brunei Airlines started operations in 1974 and is the country’s national carrier. The airline flies a combination of Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Brunei’s Ministry of Transportation and Info-Communication has made corporatization and privatization part of its strategic plan, which calls for the Ministry to shift its role from a service provider to a regulatory body with policy-setting responsibilities. The Ministry is studying initiatives to privatize a few state-owned agencies, including the Postal Services Department and public transportation services. These services are not yet completely privatized and there is no timeline for privatization. Guidelines regarding the role of foreign investors and the bidding process are not yet available. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible business conduct is a relatively new concept in Brunei, and there are no specific government programs encouraging foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles. However, there is broad awareness of CSR among producers and consumers, and individual private and public sector organizations have formalized CSR programs and policies. There are no reporting requirements and no independent NGOs in Brunei that promote or monitor CSR. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Since 1982, Brunei has enforced the Emergency (Prevention of Corruption) Act. In 1984, the Act was renamed the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 131) . The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was established in 1982 for the purpose of enforcing the Act. The Prevention of Corruption Act provides specific powers to the ACB for the purpose of investigating accusations of corruption. The Act authorizes ACB to investigate certain offences under other written laws, provided such offences were disclosed during the course of ACB investigation. Corrupt practices are punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which also applies to Brunei citizens abroad. Brunei is a member of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. In 2019, Brunei was ranked 35th of 180 countries worldwide in Transparency International’s corruption perception index. U.S. companies do not generally identify corruption as an obstacle to conducting business in Brunei. The level and extent of reported corruption in Brunei is generally low. In January 2020, however, the government convicted two former judges with embezzling large sums from the court system. The sultan has repeatedly stated in public addresses that corruption is unacceptable. Apart from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, there are no international, regional, local, or nongovernmental organizations operating in Brunei that monitor corruption. Brunei has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. Resources to Report Corruption Government Point of Contact: Name: Hjh Anifa Rafiza Hj Abdul Ghani Title: Director Organization: Anti-Corruption Bureau Brunei Darussalam Address: Old Airport Berakas, BB 3510 Brunei Darussalam Tel: +673 238-3575 Fax: +673 238-3193 Mobile: +673 8721002 / +673 8130002 Email: info.bmr@acb.gov.bn 10. Political and Security Environment Brunei is an absolute monarchy and has no recent history of political violence. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is an experienced and popular monarch who rules the country as Prime Minister while also retaining the titles of Minister of Finance and Economy, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country experienced an uprising in 1962 when it was a British protectorate, which ended through the intervention of British troops. The country has been ruled peacefully under emergency law ever since. Brunei has managed to avoid demands for political reform by making use of its hydrocarbon revenues to provide its citizens with generous welfare benefits and subsidies. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Brunei relies heavily on foreign labor in lower-skill and lower-paying positions, with approximately 25 percent of the labor force coming in from abroad to fulfill specific contracts. The largest percentage of foreign employees work in construction, followed by wholesale and retail trade, with the balance serving in professional, technical, administrative and support roles. Most unskilled laborers in Brunei are from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and enter the country on renewable two-year contracts. The skilled labor pool includes both foreign workers on short-term visas and Bruneian citizens and permanent residents, who often are well-educated but who generally prefer to work for the government due to generous benefits such as bonuses, education allowances, interest-free loans, and housing allowances. In 2019, the Labor Force Survey stated that approximately 33.8 percent of the labor force was employed in the public sector. In 2016, the Department of Labor under the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced an improved Foreign Workers License process with stricter policies to create more employment opportunities for Brunei citizens. While the law permits the formation of trade union federations, it forbids affiliation with international labor organizations unless there is consent from the Minister of Home Affairs and the Department of Labor. Under the Trade Unions Act of 1961, unions must be registered with the government. The government prohibits strikes, and the law makes no explicit provision for the right to collective bargaining. The law prohibits employers from discriminating against workers in connection with union activities, but it does not provide for reinstatement for dismissal related to union activity. All workers, including civil servants other than those serving in the military and those working as prison guards or police officers, may form and join trade unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements. The only active union in the country, which is composed of Brunei Shell Petroleum workers, appears to have had minimal activity in recent years. There are no other active unions or worker organizations. Various domestic laws prohibit the employment of children under the age of 16. Parental consent and approval by the Labor Commission are required for those under the age of 18. Female workers under 18 years of age may not work at night or on offshore oil platforms. The Department of Labor enforces laws related to the employment of children. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws. The law does not set a minimum wage. The public sector pay scale covers all workers in government jobs. Wages for employed foreign residents are wide ranging. Some foreign embassies set minimum wage requirements for their nationals working in the country. Government data indicated approximately 94,200 foreigners live in Brunei, although government officials have publicly stated the number exceeds 100,000. Foreign workers receive a mandatory brief on labor rights from the Department of Labor when they sign their contract. The government also inspects workplaces and maintains a telephone hotline for worker complaints. Immigration law allows prison sentences and caning for workers who overstay their work permits and for workers who fall into irregular status due to their employers’ negligence. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $12.211 billion 2020 $12.006 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $2.6 million 2020 $11.0 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A No data available Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $7.45 billion 2020 63.2% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Economy Brunei Darussalam Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment (Not Available) Total Inward 7,589 100% Total Outward Amount 100% China 2,646 35% Country #1 Amount X% United Kingdom 2,608 34% Country #2 Amount X% The Netherlands 855 11% Country #3 Amount X% Singapore 387 5% Country #4 Amount X% Japan 259 3% Country #5 Amount X% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2020) 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Commercial Section Simpang 336-52-16-9 Jalan Duta BC 4115 (+673) 238-4616 +637 238-4616 ext. 2232 BSBCommercial@state.gov Bulgaria Executive Summary Bulgaria is seen by many investors as an attractive low-cost investment destination, with government incentives for new investment. The country offers some of the least expensive labor in the European Union (EU) and low and flat corporate and income taxes. However, Bulgaria has the lowest labor productivity rate in the EU, and a rapidly shrinking population could exacerbate the trend. In 2021 Bulgaria continued to suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic and related shutdowns, although the impact on the economy was less severe than in many other European countries. In 2021 the government updated the budget to include more public funding of COVID-related measures, such as increased pensions. Tourism, logistics, the service industries, and the automotive sector were particularly hard hit by the pandemic. The Bulgarian economy declined 4.4 percent in 2020, rebounded to 4.2 percent growth in 2021, and is projected to grow by 4.8 percent in 2022. This recovery is being driven by higher consumption and public investment funds. The war in Ukraine and rising energy and food prices, however, threaten these growth expectations. Bulgaria is expected to receive EUR 6.2 billion over a six-year period (2021-2026) from the EU’s post-COVID recovery grant funds to improve its economy in areas such as green energy, digitalization, and private sector development. The government expects to adopt the Euro in early 2024, after having joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020 and the EU’s Banking Union in October 2020. The adoption of the euro will eliminate currency risk and help reduce transaction costs with some of the country’s key European trading partners. There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of firms. With some exceptions, foreign entities are given the same treatment as national firms and their investments are not screened or otherwise restricted. There is strong growth in software development, technical support, and business process outsourcing. The Information Technology (IT) and back-office outsourcing sectors have attracted a number of U.S. and European companies to Bulgaria, and many have established global and regional service centers in the country. The automotive sector has also attracted U.S. and foreign investors in recent years. Foreign investors remain concerned about rule of law in Bulgaria. Along with endemic corruption, investors cite other problems impeding investment including difficulty obtaining needed permits, unpredictability due to frequent regulatory and legislative changes, sporadic attempts to negate long-term government contracts, and an inefficient judicial system. The new government coalition which came to power in December 2021 cited rule of law reform as its highest priority. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 35 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 USD 608 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 9,630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of firms. With some exceptions, foreign entities are given the same treatment as national firms and their investments are not screened or otherwise restricted. The Invest Bulgaria Agency (IBA), the government’s investment attraction body, provides information, administrative services, and incentive assessments to prospective foreign investors. Its website (www.investbg.government.bg/en) contains general information for foreign investors. IBA serves as a one-stop shop for foreign investors and certifies proposed investments for eligibility for administrative services. There are no limits to foreign and domestic private entities establishing and owning businesses in Bulgaria. The Offshore Company Act lists 28 activities (including government procurement, natural resource exploitation, national park management, banking, insurance) in which companies registered in offshore jurisdictions with more than 10 percent foreign participation are banned from participating. The law, however, allows those companies to do business if the physical owners of the parent company are Bulgarian citizens and known to the public, if the parent company’s stock is publicly traded, or if the parent company is registered in a jurisdiction with which Bulgaria enjoys a bilateral tax treaty for the avoidance of double taxation (including the United States). Bulgaria has no specific law or coordinated mechanism in place for screening individual foreign investments. A potential foreign investment can be scrutinized on the grounds of its potential national security risk or through the Law on the Measures against Money Laundering. As each ministry is responsible for screening investments within its purview, interagency coordination is lacking, and there are no common standards. As of April 2022, Bulgaria has not publicly reported any initiative on the introduction of a national investment screening mechanism. There have been no recent Investment Policy Reviews of Bulgaria by multilateral economic organizations. An Investment Policy Review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is planned for 2022. In January 2022 the OECD decided to open accession discussions with Bulgaria. A key milestone toward Bulgaria’s overarching OECD Action Plan was its having joined the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in January 2021. In 2019, the OECD published reviews of Bulgaria’s healthcare sector and state-owned enterprises, and in January 2021 the OECD published an Economic Assessment in which it acknowledged the successful integration of Bulgarian manufacturing firms into global production chains and sound macroeconomic policies prior to the pandemic. At the same time the report highlighted as key policy challenges Bulgaria’s high income inequality, relative poverty, and an ageing and rapidly shrinking population. In February 2021 the OECD published a study of Bulgarian municipalities that acknowledged solid progress in local governance standards but also noted insufficient progress in bridging regional disparities. Bulgaria typically supports small- and medium-sized business creation and development in conjunction with EU-funded innovation and competitiveness programs and with a special emphasis on export capacity. The state-owned Bulgarian Development Bank has committed to supporting small- and medium-sized businesses in Bulgaria, including through the post-COVID-19 recovery period. Typically, a new business is expected to register an account with the state social security agency and, in some cases, with the local municipality as well. Electronic company registration is available at: https:// portal.registryagency.bg/commercial-register . Women receive equitable treatment to men, and the Bulgarian law does not discriminate against minorities doing business. There is no government agency for outward investment promotion, and no restrictions exist for local businesses to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime In general, the regulatory environment in Bulgaria is characterized by complexity, lack of transparency, and arbitrary or weak enforcement. These factors create incentives for public corruption. Public procurement rules are at times tailored to match certain local business interests. Bulgarian law lists 38 operations subject to licensing. The law requires all regulations to be justified by defined need (in terms of national security, environmental protection, or personal and material rights of citizens), and prohibits restrictions merely incidental to the stated purposes of the regulation. The law also requires the regulating authority, or the member of Parliament sponsoring the draft law containing the regulation, to perform a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed regulation. This requirement, however, is often ignored when Parliament reviews draft bills. With few exceptions, all draft bills are made available for public comment, both on the central government website and the respective agency’s website, and interested parties are given 30 days to submit their opinions. The government maintains a web platform, www.strategy.bg , on which it posts draft legislation. Тhe government posts all its decisions on: pris.government.bg . In addition, the law eliminates bureaucratic discretion in granting requests for routine economic activities and provides for silent consent (default judgement in favor of the requestor) when the government does not respond to a request in the allotted time. Local companies in which foreign partners have controlling interests may be requested to provide additional information or to meet additional mandatory requirements in order to engage in certain licensed activities, including production and export of arms and ammunition, banking and insurance, and the exploration, development, and exploitation of natural resources. The Bulgarian government licenses the export of dual-use goods and bans the export of all goods under international trade sanctions lists. The Bulgarian government’s budget is assessed as transparent and in accordance with international standards and principles. Central government debt and debt guarantees are published monthly, and debt obligations by individual state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are published every three months on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The first and only Bulgarian think tank for sustainable finance and energy, the Green Finance & Energy Centre , was launched in March 2021 by the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), in partnership with the Ministries of Finance and Energy, the Financial Supervision Commission, and the Fund of Funds. The mission of the Green Centre includes raising business awareness and upgrading corporate governance codes with environmental and social responsibility provisions. Major banks and investors increasingly recognize the importance of sustainable finance and investment in supporting economic growth while reducing environmental degradation. Bulgaria became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 1996. Under the provisions of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty), common EU trade policies are exclusively the responsibility of the EU and the European Commission (EC), which coordinates them with the 27 member states. The EC negotiates in the WTO on behalf of the Member States and coordinates issues with them within the Trade Policy Committee of the Council of the EU. The United States supports EU measures to increase digital market competition through the EU’s future Digital Market Act. Following systemic government-controlled prosecutions during Bulgaria’s communist era, the 1991 Constitution created an independent judicial branch comprised of judges, prosecutors, and magistrate-investigators. The system is governed by a 25-member Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which is responsible for the selection and disciplining of magistrates; however, according to local and international observers its decisions have been opaque and politically influenced. Eleven of the SJC members are appointed by a supermajority in Parliament, a process often leading to behind-the-scenes distribution of seats to politically convenient candidates. All 1,500 prosecutors are administratively subordinate through their chiefs to the Prosecutor General, who is also a voting member of the SJC and as such has significant decision-making power over judicial selections. Numerous well documented media and civil society investigations in recent years have alleged nepotism, corruption, and undue political and business influence over prosecutions, including with the purpose to take over lucrative businesses. Prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss cases are not subject to review by a judge, and trials, especially in criminal cases, often take years to complete because of the inefficient procedures laid out in the criminal procedure code. Polls show a consistent lack of public confidence in the Prosecutor General and the courts. There are three levels of courts. Bulgaria’s 113 regional courts exercise jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. Above them, 28 district courts, including the Sofia City Court, serve as courts of appellate review for regional court decisions and have trial-level (first-instance) jurisdiction in serious criminal cases and in civil cases where claims exceed BGN 25,000 (USD 14,320), excluding alimony, labor disputes, and financial audit discrepancies, or in property cases where the property’s value exceeds BGN 50,000 (USD 28,640). Five appellate courts review the first-instance decisions of the district courts. The Supreme Court of Cassation is the court of last resort for criminal and civil appeals. There is a separate system of 28 specialized administrative courts which rule on the legality of local and national government decisions, with the Supreme Administrative Court serving as the court of final instance. The Constitutional Court, which is separate from the rest of the judiciary, issues final rulings on the compliance of laws with the Constitution. Bulgaria’s legislation has been largely aligned with EU directives to provide adequate means of enforcing property and contractual rights. In practice, however, investors regularly complain about regulatory impediments, prosecutorial intervention in administrative cases, and inconsistent jurisprudence. Overall, the government’s handling of investment disputes has been slow, interagency coordination is poor, and intervention at the highest political level is often required. The 2004 Investment Promotion Act stipulates equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. The law encourages investment in manufacturing and high technology, knowledge intensive services, education, and human resource development. It creates investment incentives by helping investors purchase land, providing state financing for basic infrastructure, training new staff, and facilitating tax incentives and opportunities for public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the central and local governments. The most common form of PPPs are concessions, which include the lease of government property for private use for up to 35 years for a construction and service concession. The term of the concession may be extended by a maximum of one-third of the original term. In 2021, defense and security were excluded from concession-eligible sectors. Foreign investors must comply with the 1991 Commercial Law, which regulates commercial and company enterprise law, and the 1951 Law on Obligations and Contracts, which regulates civil transactions. The Invest Bulgaria Agency (IBA) is the government’s investment attraction body and serves as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors. It provides information, administrative services, and incentive assessments to prospective foreign investors. The Commission for Protection of Competition (the “Commission”) oversees market competition and enforces the Law on the Protection of Competition (the “Competition Law”). The Competition Law, enacted in 2008, is intended to implement EU rules that promote competition. The law forbids monopolies, restrictive trade practices, abuse of market power, and certain forms of unfair competition. Monopolies can only be legally established in enumerated categories of strategic industries. In practice, the Competition Law has been applied inconsistently, and some of the Commission’s decisions are questionable and appear subject to political influence. Private real property rights are legally protected by the Bulgarian Constitution. Only in the case where a public need cannot be met by other means may the Council of Ministers or a regional governor expropriate land, in which case the owner is compensated at fair market value. Expropriation actions by the Council of Ministers, by regional authorities, or by municipal mayor can be appealed at a local administrative court. In its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, Bulgaria committed to international arbitration to judge expropriation claims and other investment disputes. The 1994 Commercial Law Chapter on Bankruptcy provides for reorganization or rehabilitation of a legal entity, maximizes asset recovery, and provides for fair and equal distribution among all creditors. The law applies to all commercial entities, except public monopolies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2015 Insurance Code regulates insurance company failures, while bank failures are regulated under the 2002 Bank Insolvency Act and the 2006 Credit Institutions Act. The 2014 bankruptcy of the country’s fourth-largest bank, Corporate Commercial Bank, was a test case that showed serious deficiencies in the process of recovery and preservation of bank assets during bankruptcy proceedings. Non-performance of a financial obligation must be adjudicated before the bankruptcy court can determine whether the debtor is insolvent. There is a presumption of insolvency when the debtor is unable to perform an executable obligation under a commercial transaction or public debt or related commercial activities, has suspended all payments, or is able to pay only the claims of certain creditors. The debtor is deemed over-indebted if its assets are insufficient to cover its short-term monetary obligations. Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated on two grounds: the debtor’s insolvency, or the debtor’s excessive indebtedness. Under Part IV of the Commercial Law, debtors or creditors, including state authorities such as the National Revenue Agency, can initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The debtor must declare bankruptcy within 30 days of becoming insolvent or over-indebted. Bankruptcy proceedings supersede other court proceedings initiated against the debtor except for labor cases, enforcement proceedings, and cases related to receivables securitized by third parties’ property. Such cases may be initiated even after bankruptcy proceedings begin. Creditors must declare to the trustee all debts owed to them within one month of the start of bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee then has seven days to compile a list of debts. A rehabilitation plan must be proposed within one month after publication of the list of debts in the Commercial Register. After creditors’ approval, the court endorses the rehabilitation plan, terminates the bankruptcy proceeding, and appoints a supervisory body for overseeing the implementation of the rehabilitation plan. The court must endorse the plan within seven days and put it forward to the creditors for approval. The creditors must convene to discuss the plan within a period of 45 days. The court may renew the bankruptcy proceedings if the debtor does not fulfill its obligations under the rehabilitation plan. The Bulgarian National Bank may revoke the operating license of an insolvent bank when the bank’s own capital is negative, and the bank has not been restructured according to the procedure defined in Article 51 in the Law on the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. The license of a bank may be withdrawn under the conditions set out in Article 36 of the Law on Credit Institutions. 4. Industrial Policies The 2004 Investment Promotion Act (revised in 2018) stipulates equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. The law encourages investment in manufacturing, services, high technology, education, and human resource development via a range of incentives, which include helping investors purchase municipal or state-owned land without tender, providing state financing for basic infrastructure and for training new staff, and reimbursing the employer’s portion of social security payments. The law also provides tax incentives and fast-track administrative procedures for public-private partnerships. Priority investors may receive incentives such as below-market prices when acquiring property rights (full or limited) from the central or municipal government, government grants for research and development (R&D) and education projects, and institutional support for establishing PPPs. The government policy for investment promotion excludes a number of sectors classified as strategic. Additional investment incentives include a two-year valued-added tax (VAT) exemption on equipment imports for investment projects over EUR 2.5 million, provided the project will be implemented within a two-year period and create at least 20 new jobs. The share of renewable energy (RE) in the total power mix has doubled in less than ten years due to a generous feed-in tariff that fueled a solar investment boom. In 2018, feed-in tariff contracts with RE producers with at least 4MW of capacity were terminated. Other RE producers who were receiving feed-in tariffs have been offered feed-in premium contracts. Pre-existing renewable electricity producers with a capacity below 5MW, new rooftop or facade photovoltaic installations with a maximum installed capacity of 30kW, and certain installations using combined cycle and indirect use of biomass are still eligible for a feed-in tariff. The gradual phase out of subsidized RE production aims at increasing the market volumes and achieving full energy market liberalization. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. The role of Free Trade Zones vastly diminished following Bulgaria’s full integration into the EU single market in 2007. At the same time, EU integration encouraged local authorities to seek partnerships with the private sector and provide resources (i.e., land, infrastructure, etc.) for the development of industrial zones and technological parks. Industrial zones or technology parks with the necessary technical infrastructure to attract new investment can be designated as nationally significant projects by a Council of Ministers decision following a proposal by the Minister of Economy. The government’s industrial park policy is conducted by the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Economy, and local municipalities. The Ministry of Economy keeps an electronic registry of all industrial parks. The Trakia Economic Zone in south-central Bulgaria is one of the largest industrial areas in Southeast Europe, attracting over EUR 3 billion in investment and sustaining over 50,000 jobs. In addition, the state-owned National Industrial Zones Company (NIZC) currently operates fully functioning industrial zones in Sofia, Burgas, Vidin, Ruse, Svilengrad, Stara Zagora and Varna. Under construction are future industrial zones in Suvorovo (Varna), Telish (Pleven), Kardzhali, Karlovo, and Stara Zagora. Investors in these economic zones benefit from established infrastructure, location, and transport logistics. The common thread among all these economic zones is that they are either located in regions with sufficient available labor, in poor regions where the government provides special investment incentives, or at important cross-border junctures. Sofia Tech Park is the first science and technological park in Bulgaria and has partnered with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, several local universities, and several local groups. Bulgaria does not impose export performance or local content requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. Employment visas and work permits are required for most expatriate personnel from non-EU countries. Many U.S. companies have experienced difficulties obtaining work permits for their non-Bulgarian, non-EU employees. Recently adopted changes in the Law on Labor Migration and Labor Mobility no longer mandate that Bulgarian employers canvass the local labor market before hiring non-EU labor. Non-EU workers with long-term residence permits cannot exceed 35 percent of the total workforce in Bulgarian small- and medium-sized companies, or 20 percent in large firms. In 2017 the government simplified procedures and reduced issuance time for work visas for non-EU workers. Furthermore, it is possible for non-EU students who have completed their education in Bulgaria to continue working in the country without having to reenter the country. Bulgarian law mandates that when the government purchases new software it should also have access to the source code. U.S. companies have found this requirement to be unreasonable and discriminatory. 5. Protection of Property Rights Restrictions still exist on the ownership of agricultural land by non-EU citizens. Companies whose shareholders are registered offshore are banned from acquiring or owning Bulgarian agricultural land. Non-EU citizens who have resided in Bulgaria for at least five years or their Bulgaria-registered companies can acquire Bulgarian agricultural land. Mortgages are recorded centrally with the Bulgarian Registry Agency, at registryagency.bg . Bulgaria was taken off the USTR’s Special 301 Watch List in 2018, following passage of amendments to the Copyright Law, improvements in royalty collection, and government procurement of licensed software. However, high levels of online piracy continue to exist, and IP enforcement and prosecution efforts continue to be areas of concern. The 2021 Notorious Markets Report lists two online providers of pirated content which operate from Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a member of the Convention on Granting of European Patents (European Patent Convention) and a contracting state of the European Patent Office (EPO). Bulgaria has also signed the London agreement for facilitating the validation process but has yet to amend its own law accordingly. Bulgaria is also part of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Bulgaria is a member of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration. Bulgaria enforces EU legislation for protecting geographical indications (GIs) and Traditional Specialties Guaranteed (TSG). A 2019 Law on Marks and Geographical Indications updated procedures for trademark registration. The law introduced response deadlines as short as three days. Trademarks and service marks are protected via registration with the Bulgarian Patent Office, or registration as a European Union Trademark, or an international registration under the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol that designates Bulgaria. A trademark is normally granted within ten months of application filing. Pending applications are published to allow for objections. Rejections can be appealed to the Patent Office’s Disputes Department. Decisions of this department can be appealed to the Sofia Administrative Court within three months. The Bulgarian law on patents and utility model registrations is harmonized with EU law. The latest amendments in the law provide for new electronic state registers on patents and utility models and services. The state registers are public and available on the website of the Patent Office. Trademark infringement is a significant problem in Bulgaria for U.S. cigarette and apparel producers, and smaller-scale infringement affects other U.S. products. Bulgarian legislation provides for criminal, civil, and administrative remedies against trademark violation. Bulgaria has implemented simplified border control procedures for the destruction of seized fake goods without civil or criminal trial. In addition to civil penalties prescribed by the Trademarks and Geographical Indications Act (TGIA), the Criminal Code prohibits the use of a third person’s trademark without the proprietor’s consent. In practice, criminal convictions for trademark and copyright infringement are rare and sentencing tends to be lenient. Legal entities cannot be held liable under the Criminal Code. A 2019 law on trade secret protection allows for civil action for trade secret infringement. There is no special court for cases related to trade secrets. Bulgarian customs maintain a section on its official web site customs.bg instructing rightsholders of the procedure for filing IPR infringement cases. In 2021, the main countries of origin of counterfeit goods were Turkey, China, and Hong Kong. The most frequently confiscated goods were clothing, perfumes and cosmetics, shoes, toys, bags, and wallets. Online and broadcast piracy remain an enforcement issue in Bulgaria. While the cybercrime unit at the General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP) is generally responsive to reports of online copyright infringements, investigation of other computer-based IPR crimes is slow, and few result in criminal convictions. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector The Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE), the only securities-trading venue in Bulgaria, operates under license from the Financial Supervision Commission and is majority owned by the Ministry of Finance. The 1999 Law on Public Offering of Securities regulates the issuance of securities, securities transactions, stock exchanges, and investment intermediaries. The law is aimed at providing investor protection and at developing a transparent local capital market. In 2004 BSE performed its first IPO transaction. In 2018 BSE acquired 100 percent of the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), Bulgaria’s first independent electricity platform trader. Since its 2007 entry into the EU, Bulgaria has aligned its regulation of securities markets with EU standards under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The BSE is a full member of the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) and operates under the Deutsche Boerse’s trading platform Xetra. The BSE’s total market capitalization comprised 23 percent of Bulgaria’s GDP in 2021, down slightly from 2020. Bulgarian companies strongly prefer to obtain financing from local banks instead of drawing from the local financial markets. At the end of 2018, the Financial Supervision Commission approved the ‘SME beam market,’ a special market that provides small and medium-sized businesses the opportunity to raise new capital more easily. Bulgaria’s first “unicorn” company Payhawk, a technological start-up, raised USD 1 billion of capital in 2022. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. The Bulgarian bank system is well capitalized and liquid. As of the end of September 2021, the total capital adequacy ratio was 22.4 percent, above the EU average and adequately shielding domestic banks against potential macroeconomic risks. In 2020 the Bulgarian National Bank imposed a temporary payment deferral of existing loans as an anti-COVID-19 measure. As of September 2021, there were 25 banks (including 7 branches), with total assets of BGN 132.7 billion (USD 76 billion), equivalent to 100 percent of GDP. The market share of the five significant banks (directly supervised by the ECB) was 66.1 percent, the share of less significant banks was 30.6 percent, and the share of foreign bank branches was 3.3 percent. Non-performing loans were equal to 5.01 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking system. The Bulgarian government has raised funds by issuing both Euro-denominated and Leva- denominated bonds. Commercial banks and private pension funds and insurance companies are the primary purchasers of these instruments. EU-based banks are eligible to be primary dealers of Bulgarian government bonds. Bulgaria does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government maintains a multiannual fiscal savings reserve, a farmer subsidy fund, and an electricity price premium fund. Their annual budgeting is compliant with the government’s budget plans. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Upon EU accession, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy, in which the majority of the companies are private. Significant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain, however, such as railways and the postal service. SOEs also predominate in the healthcare, infrastructure, and energy sectors; many of these are collectively managed by holding companies, which are also SOEs. Some of the SOEs receive annual government subsidies for current and capital expenditures, regardless of their actual performance. SOEs’ budgets and audit reports are posted on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The list of all SOEs can be found here: reports.appk.government.bg/public/pubic/organizations . According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI), there is a sizeable state-owned sector consisting of approximately 350 SOEs held by the central government and 580 by subnational governments. In 2020, SOEs accounted for 10.6 percent of the overall economy. Cross-subsidization is common within some government holding companies. In the energy sector, for example, the debts of some energy producers are covered by more lucrative entities within the holding structure. In 2019 Parliament approved the State Enterprise Act, introducing updated corporate standards and management practices. The law lists timeline and criteria for SOE senior management approval. SOEs are typically run by government elected boards. Public and private sector companies are in theory equally treated vis-à-vis bidding on concessions, taxation, or other government-controlled processes. Bulgaria became party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) upon its entry into the EU in 2007. No major privatizations are currently planned in Bulgaria. Parliament must approve government proposals to privatize any company with over 50 percent government ownership. All majority or minority state-owned properties are eligible for privatization, with the exception of those included in a specific list, including water management companies, state hospitals, and state sports facilities. The sale of specific parts of such companies follows a Council of Ministers decision or a decision of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control, after a proposal made by the government-owned majority holder of the company. State-owned military manufacturers can be privatized with Parliamentary approval. Municipally owned property can be privatized upon decision by a municipal council or authorized body, and upon publication of the municipal privatization list in the national gazette. The 2010 Privatization and Post-Privatization Act created a single Privatization and Post-Privatization Agency responsible for privatization oversight. The new State Enterprise Act in 2019 reshuffled and renamed the agency into the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control ( www.appk.government.bg/bg/17 ). Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In 2007 the government adopted a National Corporate Governance Code to encourage companies to adhere to the principles of responsible business conduct (RBC). In 2019, the government approved a Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the period until 2023. The non-governmental Bulgarian Network for Social and Corporate Responsibility (CSR – csr.bg) promotes CSR among Bulgarian companies and highlights good business practices. There is a growing awareness of RBC standards and business’ obligation to proactively conduct due diligence to ensure they are doing no harm, with larger international firms generally further along than smaller domestic companies. Bulgarian companies are more frequently building RBC awareness through events organized in partnership with employer associations. Bulgarian NGOs continued to report the exploitation of children in certain industries, particularly small family-owned shops, textile production, restaurants, construction businesses, and periodical sales. Children living in vulnerable situations, particularly Roma children, were exposed to harmful and exploitative work in the informal economy, mainly in agriculture, construction, and the service sector. Bulgaria is not a member of either the OECD or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Bulgaria’s Integrated Energy and Climate Plan sets out the country’s key objectives of encouraging low-carbon economic development, developing a competitive and secure energy sector, and reducing dependence on fuel and energy imports. EU Green Transition goals are reflected in Bulgaria’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), which anticipates EUR 3.7 billion to fund green transition initiatives, including EUR 1.7 billion in grants to decarbonize the energy sector. These opportunities are attracting private investment interest in renewable energy, especially large-scale solar and geo-thermal projects buttressed by battery storage. The NRRP includes projects such as: pilot projects for the production of green hydrogen and biogas; infrastructure for hydrogen transport; and a program to finance ad hoc renewable energy measures in buildings not connected to heat or gas transmission networks. Bulgaria will need to improve efficiency and coordination if it is to meet the EU target of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. To aid in implementation the green transition, the government is considering regulatory incentives. However, the current system of subsidies oftentimes benefits a small group of businesses and oligarchs associated with corruption or opposed to diversification away from traditional dominant suppliers. The government will need to overcome this resistance in order to finalize viable projects within the required timeframe, or Bulgaria could lose a percentage of its EU funds allocation, threatening fulfillment of national and international goals. While the Bulgarian Procurement Act technically requires that public procurement comply with environmental and climate protection requirements, these requirements are not easily understood or enforced; nor is the process of procurement generally transparent or effective in supporting climate protection. For this reason, the NRRP seeks to drive public procurement reforms. Bulgaria is developing pollution standards based on EU standard policies for pollution prevention and control. National level eco-labelling practices also follow EU directives. New EU legislation will grant offset opportunities and tradable permits for forests, agricultural land carbon capture, and other carbon minimization efforts. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a significant issue in Bulgaria. Bulgaria ranks 78th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2021, the worst in the EU. Human trafficking, and narcotics and contraband smuggling all contribute to corruption. With the gradual introduction of technologies in public administration, including e-filing and the electronic issuance of certificates, some progress has been made in addressing petty corruption. However, high-level corruption, particularly in public procurement, remains a serious concern. The high-profile prosecutions that do take place are often seen as selective or politically motivated and typically end in acquittals after a lengthy judicial process. The lack of serious convictions against senior officials and the need for reforms in the criminal justice sector remained high on the public agenda throughout 2021 when it took three elections to finally form a government. While the new governing coalition has demonstrated political will to undertake serious reforms, including to reorganize the Anti-Corruption Commission and increase its powers, it is yet to pass new laws and build capacity to secure final convictions for public corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission, established in 2018 on the foundations of several previously independent bodies for asset recovery and conflict of interest prevention, has been marred by leadership scandals and an insignificant anti-corruption record. The Anti-Corruption Fund (acf.bg), a civic organization created in 2017, conducts its own investigation of cases suspected either of corruption or conflict of interest among Bulgarian senior politicians and policy makers. Bulgaria has ratified the Anti-Bribery Convention and is a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Bulgaria has also ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime (1994) and Civil Convention on Corruption (1999). Bulgaria has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (2003); the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In 2018, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which transposes the 2015 EU Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. The new law required registered business groups to declare by May 2019 their beneficial owners. Some companies continue to avoid ownership publication by registering shell entities in tax heavens and offshore zones. Local capacity to detect suspicious and potentially illicit money flows remains low as evidenced by a 2019 case involving millions in money transfers from a Venezuelan state-run oil company through the Bulgarian banking system. Conflict of interest is legally defined in the Law on Combatting Corruption and Illegal Asset Forfeiture, Article 52: “Conflict of interest exists when the contracting authority, its employees or employees outside its structure who are involved in the preparation or award of the contract or who may influence the outcome of the contract have an interest, which may lead to a benefit and which could be considered to affect their impartiality and independence in connection with the award of the public contract.” Article 81 also defines conflict of interest as “receiving a material benefit” by senior public officials and related persons. In 2021 authorities levied fines on individuals in 22 conflict of interest cases. Bribery is a criminal act under Bulgarian law both for the giver and for the receiver. Individuals who mediate and facilitate a bribe are also held accountable, but according to observers, enforcement of this provision has been arbitrary as prosecutors have de facto discretion not to charge individuals who opt to cooperate as witnesses. Government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Commission on Corruption Prevention and Illegal Assets Forfeiture 6, Sveta Nedelya Sq. Sofia, 1000 Email: caciaf@caciaf.bg Mr. Boyko Stankushev Director and Member of the Managing Board Mr. Joeri Buhrer Tavanier Chairman of the Managing Board Anticorruption Fund 71, Knyaz Boris Str., Office 2 Email: acf@acf.bg Mr. Ognyan Minchev Board President Transparency International Bulgaria PO Box 72, Sofia Email: mbox@transparency.bg 10. Political and Security Environment Daily anti-government protests that took place throughout the summer of 2020 in Sofia generated sporadic reports of excessive force by protestors and police, but otherwise there has been no significant political violence in recent years. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Bulgarian Constitution recognizes workers’ rights to join trade unions and to organize. The National Council for Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) provides a forum for dialogue among the government, employer organizations, and trade unions on issues such as cost-of-living adjustments and social security contributions. Currently, there are five nationally recognized employer organizations, based on membership thresholds. Bulgaria has two large trade union confederations represented at the national level, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and the Confederation of Labor Podkrepa (Support). CITUB, the larger of the two, has an estimated membership of about 300,000. Podkrepa has a large share of unionized labor in education. There are very few restrictions on trade union activity, but employees in smaller private firms are often not represented. Unionized labor is most commonly seen in the highly subsidized railway and postal sectors. Under the Bulgarian Labor Code, employer-employee relations are regulated by employment contracts. Collective labor contracts can be concluded at the sectoral level, enterprise level, regional, and municipal levels. The Labor Code addresses worker occupational safety and health issues and mandates a minimum wage (set by the Council of Ministers). The minimum wage in 2022 is BGN 710 (USD 405) per month. The Bulgarian Labor Code provides for benefits for departing employees depending on the reason for termination of the employment contract and on whose initiative the termination was enacted. In cases of forcible termination, the employee is normally entitled to compensation from the employer, generally up to one month of gross salary. Disputes between labor and management can be referred to the courts, but resolution is often slow. The National Institute for Conciliation and Arbitration (NICA) has developed a framework for collective labor dispute mediation and arbitration. However, NICA-sponsored collective labor dispute resolutions remain few. The Bulgarian labor market continues to be rigid in classifying different forms of employment (part-time, per-hour, etc.). Driven by business disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 the Bulgarian Labor Code was amended to allow businesses to reclassify full-time workers as part-time while the state of emergency is in force. The Bulgarian Labor Code limits overtime work to 300 hours per calendar year. Undeclared work is the most common informal labor market practice. The share of the informal economy has decreased from 36.7 percent in 2010 to 22.5 percent in 2020. An EU “Blue Card” work permit can be obtained by high-skilled foreigners who have a visa or a long-term residence permit in Bulgaria. The long-term residence permit and the “Blue Card” are issued for a period of up to four years. As of March 2022, Ukrainians and members of their families with the right to temporary protection under Art. 1a, para. 3 of the Asylum and Refugees Act have the right to work in Bulgaria without a labor permit. Persons with temporary protection status can register as jobseekers with the Labor Office Directorate at their permanent or current address. Additional information about the procedure for obtaining temporary protection can be found here: (www.aref.government.bg/bg/node/499) . Ukrainian citizens have the right to seasonal work of up to 90 days in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, hotels and restaurants in Bulgaria without interruption for 12 months. For this purpose, registration with the Employment Agency is required based on a declaration submitted by the employer. As of March 2022, Bulgarian business have estimated they have the capacity to employ up to 200,000 new workers, including for eligible Ukrainians, mostly in the IT, textile, and construction sectors. Bulgarians’ literacy rate (aged 15 and older) is 98.4 percent, have an average 14.4 years of schooling, and have strong backgrounds in engineering, medicine, economics, and the sciences, but there is a shortage of professionals with management skills as well as of skilled workers. Foreign and local investors have also complained of a mismatch between the educational system and the labor market’s demands. Employers have also been slow to offer training. Emigration, particularly among young skilled professionals, has exacerbated the shortages. Bulgaria slipped two places to 56th in the UN Human Development Index for 2020, the lowest score among EU countries. The Roma community makes up an estimated 10 percent of the total population and a higher percentage of the labor force. These numbers are increasing as a result of demographic trends. The Roma community is subject to discrimination and is socially marginalized, with lower levels of educational attainment. Consequently, Roma are overrepresented among unskilled workers and in the grey economy. Large numbers of Roma also seek unskilled, seasonal employment in other EU member states. 14. Contact for More Information Liam Sullivan (Senior Economic Officer) Embassy Sofia SullivanLL@state.gov Burkina Faso Executive Summary On January 24, 2022, the Burkinabé military officers deposed the democratically-elected government of former President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, dissolved the government and national assembly, and suspended the constitution. The coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba assumed the role of president of Burkina Faso’s Transition Government. In February 2022, a transitional charter was signed by Transition President LTC Damiba laying out a three-year transition period before democratic elections could be held. Since then, a Transitional government and a Transition Legislative Assembly have been installed. Burkina Faso is a landlocked country and the world’s seventh poorest country according to the 2020 UN Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, ranked at 182 out of 189 countries. Burkina Faso has an estimated population of 22 million inhabitants (as of June 2022) according to the United Nations, and the IMF estimates its growth domestic product (GDP) at US$ 19.62 billion. Burkina Faso’s economy rebounded in 2021 and grew at an estimated 8.5 percent, attributable to increases in gold exports and the services sector, according to the World Bank. The economy is forecasted to grow at 5.6 percent in 2022. The fiscal deficit stood at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2022, but could reach 6.6 percent of GDP in 2022 as a result of the multitude of challenges Burkina Faso faces, including security, humanitarian, food, and social, etc. Over 40 percent of the Burkinabe population live below the poverty line, and the country ranks 144th out of 157 countries in the World Bank’s Human Capital Index. Some 80 percent of the country’s population is engaged in agriculture—mostly subsistence—with only a small fraction directly involved in agribusiness. In 2020, as a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Burkinabe government announced a series of socio-economic measures ranging from tax breaks to subsidies and food support to low-income families. The overall cost of the measures was estimated at US$656 million. Overall, Burkina Faso welcomes foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign partners to aid in its development. It has partially put in place the legal and regulatory framework necessary to ensure that foreign investors are treated fairly, including setting up a venue for commercial disputes and streamlining the issuance of permits and company registration requirements. More progress is needed to diminish the dominance of state-owned firms in certain sectors and to enforce intellectual property protections. Burkina Faso ranks 100th of 177 countries in the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom report 2022 Economic Freedom Index. Among the 51 African countries in the report, Burkina Faso ranked 14th, improving its 21st position in the 2021 economic freedom report. Burkina Faso’s corruption perception score improved slightly from 40 in 2020 to 42 in 2021 and improved the country’s ranking from 86th to 78th of 180 countries. The gold mining industry has boomed in the last decade, and the bulk of foreign investment is in the mining sector, mostly from Canadian firms. Moroccan, French and UAE companies control local subsidiaries in the telecommunications industry, while foreign investors are also active in sectors such as agriculture, transport and logistics, energy, and financial technology. There is a growing foreign investment interest in the security sector. In June 2015, a new mining code was approved to standardize contract terms and better regulate the sector. In 2018, the parliament adopted a new investment code that offers many advantages to foreign investors. This code offers a range of tax breaks and incentives to lure foreign investors, including exemptions from value-added tax (VAT) on certain equipment. Effective tax rates as a result are lower than the regional average, though the tax system is complex, and compliance can be burdensome. Opportunities for U.S. firms exist in many sectors, but including in agriculture and manufacturing Burkina Faso remains committed to a market-based economy without barriers to trade. Over the last 15 years, the national power utility’s Société Nationale de l’Eléctricité du Burkina (SONABEL) customer base and energy demand ballooned. Between 2015 and 2021, SONABEL customer base grew by 64%. However, supply can only meet the demand in non-peak periods. Burkina Faso imports nearly 70 percent of its electricity from neighboring Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and faces electricity reliability and affordability challenges. It also imports other energy products such as gasoline and gas through a network of foreign companies to meet local demand. the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended the US$ 500 million compact with the Government of Burkina Faso. The Compact aimed to unlock economic growth by strengthening electricity sector effectiveness, energy reliability cost-effectiveness, and grid development and access, creating a more favorable investment environment for firms in the energy sector and the wider economy and spurring further foreign direct investment in Burkina Faso. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index – Explore the… – Transparency.org Global Innovation Index 2020 115 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 NA https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $770 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | Data (worldbank.org) 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Following the 2020 reelection of former President Kabore for his second term, a new national socioeconomic development plan (PNDES-II, 2021-2025) was adopted to replace a previous plan (2016-2020). The plan covered four strategic goals: (1) the consolidation of resilience, security, social cohesion, and peace, (2) the deepening of institutional reforms and modernization of public administration, (3) improving sustainable human development, and (4) promoting high impact sectors of the economy and jobs. However, it remains unclear how PNDES II will be impacted by the January 24 coup d’état. After overthrowing the government on January 24, 2022, LTC Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba met with the private sector on February 1 to allay the concerns of the business community and other investors. A Transitional legislative assembly, a transitional government and a transitional charter and agenda were adopted on March 1, 2022, for a 36-month transition that would lead to presidential and legislative elections. However, in an April 1 address to the nation, interim president LTC Damiba indicated that the 36-month transition timeline to democracy could be revised, should the security situation improve. In a speech to the Transitional Legislative Assembly on April 04, 2022, Prime Minister (PM) Albert Ouedraogo laid out four major pillars or priorities for his government: (1) fighting terrorism and restoring territorial integrity, (2) Responding to the humanitarian crisis, (3) refoundation (or restoration) of the state and improving governance, (4) working towards national reconciliation and social cohesion. PM Ouedraogo indicated plans for a new development plan for the transition period that would incorporate major strategic projects from the PNDES II. Article 8 of the investment code stipulates that there is to be no discrimination against foreign investors. For any foreign investor to benefit from the exemptions provided for by the investment code, it is required to submit a request to the General Directorate for the Promotion of the Private Sector. Burkina Faso hosts a certain number of trade fairs and exhibitions to attract foreign investments. These initiatives encompass several sectors, including the bi-annual International Cotton and Textile Fair (SICOT), the annual West Africa Mining Activities Week (SAMAO), the bi-annual Ouagadougou International Arts and Crafts Fair (SIAO) and the bi-annual Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO). SICOT—which was supposed to place on January 27-29 but was postponed due to the coup d’état—convenes cotton sector actors to advance the cotton value chain in Burkina Faso, Africa and globally. SICOT aspires to be the international forum for promoting African cotton by marketing the sector to the world, promoting industrial processing, attracting investment, and boosting industrial cotton production. Burkina Faso is the third largest producer of cotton in Africa, producing 518,545 tons in the 2021-2022 harvest. Burkina Faso also organizes the Burkina Economic days (JEB) to engage potential investors and foster mutually beneficial partnership opportunities. Previous JEB events have been held in Ouagadougou and across the world, including Canada, Paris, Vienna, and Seoul, among others. Burkina Faso is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA). All the Uniform Acts enacted by this organization are applicable in the country. Regarding business structures, OHCLA allows most forms of companies admissible under French business law, namely public corporations, limited liability companies, limited share partnerships, sole proprietorships, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign enterprises. Each kind of company has a corresponding set of related preferences, duty exceptions, corporate tax exemptions, and operation-related taxes. From 1995 to 2018, Law 062-95, which was amended several times, governed investments in Burkina Faso. However, to adapt this code to the new exigencies of the world economy and to respond to the fierce competition between states to attract foreign investment, the National Assembly adopted a new Investment Code (Law 038) on October 30, 2018. It replaces Law 062-95 of December 14, 1995, which had several shortcomings, including the non-coverage of investments in renewable energies and other energy sources. According to Article 5 of the Investment Code, certain sectors of activity may be subject to restrictions on foreign direct investment. Foreign companies wishing to invest in these sectors must follow a specific procedure specified by decree. However, Burkina Faso has not yet established a procedure to scrutinize foreign direct investment. Under the investment code, all personal and legal entities lawfully established in Burkina Faso, both local and foreign, are entitled to the following rights: fixed property; forest and industrial rights; concessions; administrative authorizations; access to permits; and participation in government procurement process. The Investment Code establishes a special tax and customs regime for investment agreements signed by the state with large investors—from approximately US$ 162,000 (100,000,000 FCFA) to $1.62 million (1,000,000,000 FCFA). This scheme provides significant tax benefits. U.S. investors are not specifically targeted regarding ownership or control mechanisms. In March 2013, the GoBF created the Burkina Faso Investment Promotion Agency (API-BF). The establishment of the Presidential Council fulfilled recommendations of a 2009 UNCTAD Investment Policy Review. The website is www.investburkina.com . To simplify the registration process for companies wishing to establish a presence in Burkina Faso, the government created eight enterprise registration centers called Centres de Formalités des Entreprises (CEFOREs). The CEFOREs are one-stop shops for company registration. On average, a company can register its business in nine days according to the 2019 Doing Business report. The CEFOREs are in Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Tenkodogo, Koudougou, Fada N’Gourma, Kaya, Dedougou and Gaoua. In 2018, Burkina Faso strengthened protections for minority investors by enhancing access to shareholder actions and by increasing disclosure requirements on related-party transactions. The 2020 Doing Business report ranked Burkina Faso 151 of 190 in minority investor protection. Other sites of interest: Chamber of Commerce business registration: http://cci.bf/?q=fr Burkina Chamber of Mines: http://chambredesmines.bf/ Investment Promotion Agency of Burkina Faso or l’Agence de Promotion des Investissements du Burkina Faso (API-BF): http://www.investburkina.com Tax and administrative procedures: https://burkinafaso.eregulations.org/ Among the 21 countries covered by the World Bank’s Investing across Sectors indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, Burkina Faso is one of the more open economies to foreign equity ownership. Most of its sectors are fully open to foreign capital participation, although the law requires companies providing mobile or wireless communication services to have at least one domestic shareholder. Furthermore, the state automatically owns 10 percent of the shares of all companies active in the mining sector. The government is entitled to nominate one member of the board of directors for such companies. Select additional strategic sectors the oil and gas sector, and the electricity transmission and distribution sectors, are characterized by monopolistic market structures. The Burkinabe Government tries to promote inward investment via the Investment Promotion Agency of Burkina Faso or l’Agence de Promotion des Investissements du Burkina Faso (API-BF), which sits under the Presidential Council for Investment (Conseil Presidentiel pour l’Investissement). The API-BF’s mission is to promote the economic potential of Burkina Faso to attract investment and spur economic development. Burkina Faso currently imposes no restrictions for investors interested in investing abroad, within the framework of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) regional markets. 3. Legal Regime The government of Burkina Faso aims for transparency in law and policy to foster competition. By law, prices of goods and services must be established according to fair and sound competition. The Burkinabe government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high and low quality investments. However, the government believes that cartels, the abuse of dominant position, restrictive practices, refusal to sell to consumers, discriminatory practices, unauthorized sales, and selling at a loss are practices that distort free competition. At the same time, the price of some staple goods and services are still regulated by the government, including fuel, essential generic drugs, tobacco, cotton, school supplies, water, electricity, and telecommunications, and bread (e.g. baguettes). There are regulatory authorities for government procurement, for electronic communication and posts, for electricity, and for quality standards. Provinces and municipalities have the power to regulate in their jurisdiction, but that regulation has a minimal effect on business entities. There are several regulatory bodies at the national level, and they usually internalize regulations enacted by international organizations. Regulations exist at the supra-national level mostly through WAEMU and ECOWAS. Burkina Faso’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Since January 2018, Burkina Faso, as a member state of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA), adopted the revised version of the OHCLA accounting system. It is composed of the Uniform Act on Accounting and Financial Law (AUDCIF); the OHADA General Accounting Plan (PCGO); the OHADA Accounting System (SYSCOHADA) application guide, and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) application guide. The OHCLA accounting system complies with the IFRS norms. There is no online Regulatory Disclosure. However, the regulations of the National Assembly allow the various commissions to hear civil society organizations wishing to share information to inform parliamentarians when they are examining bills. Burkina Faso is a member of the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). There is a supranational relationship between these organizations and their state members. Burkina Faso is also a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA). As such, Uniform Laws adopted by the OHCLA are automatically part of the national legal system. The Government of Burkina Faso regularly notifies all the draft technical barriers to the relevant WTO Committee. In the October 2017 Trade Policy Review, the WTO congratulated WAEMU countries for their continued efforts to improve their international trading environment, especially through the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Burkina Faso has begun the ratification process of the TFA, but it has not yet completed it. However, WAEMU and ECOWAS members already implement many of the TFA provisions. The legal system of Burkina Faso is the civil law. Contracts must always be performed in good faith. Burkina Faso has commercial courts and commercial law is constituted by the uniform acts of the OHADA. The Commercial Code governs all matters that are not covered by the OHADA law. The Burkinabe judiciary is independent although there are press reports of cases of corruption of judges. The Disciplinary Commission of the Judiciary has sanctioned corrupt judges. There are three degrees of jurisdiction in Burkina Faso allowing the loser to appeal a decision rendered in first instance. In the event of a dispute over the execution of a contract, the plaintiff must first obtain a judgment from a court and if the loser does not execute, the winner can retain a bailiff. The investment code adopted by law 038-2018 demonstrates the government’s interest in attracting FDI to create industries that produce export goods and provide training and jobs for its domestic workforce. The code provides standardized guarantees to all legally established firms operating in Burkina Faso, whether foreign or domestic. It contains four investment and operations preference schemes, which are equally applicable to all investments, mergers, and acquisitions. Burkina Faso’s regulations governing the establishment of businesses include most forms of companies admissible under French business law, including public corporations, limited liability companies, limited share partnerships, sole proprietorships, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign enterprises. With each scheme, there is a corresponding set of related preferences, duty exceptions, corporate tax exemptions, and operation-related taxes. Under the investment code, all personal and legal entities lawfully established in Burkina Faso, both local and foreign, are entitled to the following rights: fixed property, forest and industrial rights, concessions, administrative authorizations, access to permits, and participation in state contracts. The National Commission for Competition and Consumption (Commission Nationale pour la Concurrence et la Consommation) reviews competition matters. Some competition matters are under the aegis of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Law No. 016-2017/AN of 27 April 2017 on organizing competition in Burkina Faso governs market competitiveness. This law is intended to create a free and transparent market, a guarantee of the development of a market economy driven by competitive and wealth-creating businesses. The Burkinabe constitution guarantees basic property rights. These rights cannot be infringed upon except in the case of public necessity, as defined by the government. This has rarely occurred. Until 2007, all land belonged to the government but could be leased to interested parties. The government reserves the right to expropriate land at any time for public use. In instances where property is expropriated, the government must compensate the property holder in advance, except in the event of an emergency. In 2007, Burkina Faso drafted a national land reform policy that recognizes and protects the rights of all rural and urban stakeholders to land and natural resources. It also clarifies the institutional framework for conflict resolution at a local level, establishes a viable institutional framework for land management, and strengthens the general capacities of the government, local communities, and civil society on land issues. A 2009 rural land management law provides for equitable access to rural lands to promote agricultural productivity, manage natural resources, encourage investment, and reduce poverty. It enables legal recognition of rights legitimated by traditional rules and practices. In rural areas, traditional land tenure rules have long governed land transactions and allocations. The 2009 law reinforces the decentralization and devolution of authority over land matters and provides for formalization of individual and collective use rights and the possibility of transforming these rights into private titles. In 2012, the government revised the 2009 law, marking the end of exclusive authority of the state over all land. The new law includes provisions to recognize local land use practices. The new law provides conciliation committees to resolve conflicts between parties prior to any legal action. There are several property rights recognition and protection acts, such as land charters, individual or collective land ownership certificates, and loan agreements that govern the nature, duration, and counterparties for transfer rights between a landowner and a third party. The first Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact (2010-2014) supported the establishment of local authorities and the issuance of titles as part of the land tenure reform process. Since Burkina Faso is a member of the OHADA, the Uniform Act on Bankruptcy is applicable. There are no bankruptcy courts in Burkina Faso. The World Bank’s 2019 “Doing Business” report ranked Burkina Faso 107 out of 190 countries for Resolving Insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies The 2018 investment code demonstrates the government’s interest in attracting FDI to create industries that produce export goods and provide training and jobs for its domestic workforce. The code provides standardized guarantees to all legally established firms operating in Burkina Faso, whether foreign or domestic. It contains five investment and operations preference schemes, which are equally applicable to all investments, mergers, and acquisitions. Since its adoption in October 2018 to date, there are approximately 195 companies which have been approved for the various schemes under the new Investment Code. The current investment does not envisage any incentives for clean energy investments such as tax incentives, feed-in tariffs, or discounts on electricity rates. Burkina Faso’s regulations governing the establishment of businesses include most forms of companies admissible under French business law, including public corporations, limited liability companies, limited share partnerships, sole proprietorships, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign enterprises. With each corporate structure, there is a corresponding set of related preferences, duty exceptions, corporate tax exemptions, and operation-related taxes. Under the investment code, all personal and legal entities lawfully established in Burkina Faso, both local and foreign, are entitled to the following rights: fixed property, forest and industrial rights, concessions, administrative authorizations, access to permits, and participation in state contracts. There are no foreign trade zones, free ports, or special economic zones in Burkina Faso. The Burkinabe investment code prohibits discrimination against foreigners. American firms not registered in Burkina Faso can compete for contracts on projects financed by international sources such as the World Bank, U.N. organizations, or the African Development Bank. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) refers to a continental geographic zone where goods and services move among member states of the AU with no restrictions. The AfCFTA aims to boost intra-African trade by providing a comprehensive and mutually beneficial trade agreement among the member states, covering trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. As of May 2022, 43 countries (including Burkina Faso) have deposited their instruments of ratification. Of the 55 AU member states, only Eritrea has yet to sign. Start of trading under the AfCFTA Agreement began on January 1,2021. The AfCFTA will be governed by five operational instruments: The Rules of Origin; the online negotiating forum; the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers; a digital payments system and the African Trade Observatory. A digital payments system was scheduled to start in 2020 but has since been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 10, 2022, the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) launched a project to support the implementation of more than 30 activities in the AfCFTA in signatory countries, including Burkina Faso. The GoBF does not mandate local employment, but in recent years has encouraged investors to promote local employment and support local economies. The GoBF does not require investors to purchase materials from local sources or to export a certain percentage of output. However, regarding the mining sector, according to the article 101 of the mining code, “Holders of mining title or authorization and their subcontractors give preference to Burkinabe enterprises for any contract of provision of services or supplies of goods in equivalence of price, quality and time.” A decree was adopted by the Burkina Faso government in September 2021 to guide the application of the provision of article 101 and provided a list of goods for which the decree is applicable. It will come into force on January 1, 2023. The GoBF does not impose “offset” requirements, which dictate that major procurements be approved only if the foreign supplier invests in Burkinabe manufacturing, research and development, or service facilities in areas related to the items being procured. Burkina Faso does not have “forced localization” policies. 5. Protection of Property Rights Since the 2009 land tenure reform law, the government of Burkina Faso has been engaged to issue titles recognizing land ownership rights. The MCC’s first compact focused on beginning this process in 47 communes, with plans for the government to expand the effort throughout the country. Only about 5,000 land titles have been granted countrywide since 1960, according to the National Land Observatory, and the majority of those were issued pursuant to the first Millennium Challenge compact. Obtaining a title is the last step in the process of land acquisition and is preceded by obtaining a use permit or an urban dwelling permit, developing the land, and paying applicable fees. The titleholder becomes the owner of the surface and the subsoil. Mortgages exist in Burkina Faso both for land and for structures. Rules governing mortgages are set at the regional level by the West African Economic and Monetary Union, specifically under the Organization for the Synchronization of Business Rights in Africa (Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique des Droits des Affaires (OHADA). Liens are not widely used. Burkina Faso’s legal system offers protection for intellectual property rights (IPR), including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and semiconductor chip design. In practice, however, government enforcement of IPR law is lax. Burkina Faso is a destination point for counterfeit medicines, which can be purchased readily in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. Burkina Faso is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO). The national investment code guarantees foreign investors the same rights and protection as Burkinabe enterprises for trademarks, patent rights, labels, copyrights, and licenses. In 1999, the government ratified both the WIPO Copyrights Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). In 2002, Burkina Faso was one of 30 countries that put the WCT and WPPT treaties into force. The government has also issued several decrees and rules to implement the two treaties. The implementation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is under the purview of two ministries. The first is the Office of Copyrights (le Bureau Burkinabe des Droits d’Auteurs, or BBDA) under the Ministry of Art, Culture and Tourism, which has the lead for copyright and related rights. The National Directorate of Industrial Property under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Handicrafts has the lead for industrial property issues. These two authorities have the technical competence to identify needs. Arrangements are underway to assess the needs for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in Burkina Faso. Statistics on the seizure of counterfeit goods are available upon request from the relevant agency. For example, the BDDA tracks seizures pertaining to artistic material, and the National Directorate of Industrial Property tracks seizures pertaining to pharmaceuticals. Burkina Faso is not cited in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Reports or the Notorious Markets List. 6. Financial Sector The government of Burkina Faso is more focused on attracting FDI and concessionary lending for development than it is on developing its capital markets. Net portfolio inflows were estimated at US$ 148.6 million ( 0.83 percent of GDP) in 2020, per the World Bank. While the government does issue some sovereign bonds to raise capital in the WAEMU regional bond market, in general the availability of different kinds of investment instruments is extremely limited. As part of its mechanism to fund its fiscal budget, the Burkina Faso government regularly issues 182-day maturity treasury bills (BAT) on the regional financial market of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French). The banking system is sound, relatively profitable, and well capitalized, but credit is highly concentrated to a small number of clients and a few sectors of the economy, according to the IMF. Only an estimated 15 percent of the population are believed to have checking accounts. Like all member states of WAEMU, Burkina Faso is a member of the Central Bank of West African States. Many foreign banks have branches in the country. The traditional banking sector is composed of twelve commercial banks and five specialized credit institutions called “établissements financiers.” In Burkina, the national strategy for inclusive finance was adopted on April 23, 2019. The use of mobile money is becoming more prevalent. In addition to two of the three main mobile carriers offering mobile money services, in 2021 other companies, both foreign and local have launched mobile money service operations and are conquering an important client base. This trend has forced traditional banks to install own mobile transfer planforms. Burkina Faso does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in 2017, the government created the Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDC-BF), an autonomous legal and financial entity whose mandate is to receive and manage assets of various funds and entities, in particular funds from dormant accounts transferred to the Public Treasury (National Social Security Fund, Autonomous Retirement Fund for Civil Servants, National Post Office). Its mandate is to invest the funds locally. The CDC-BF is not yet fully rolled out. 7. State-Owned Enterprises GoBF announcements for privatization bids are widely distributed, targeting both local and foreign investors. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, mailed to different diplomatic missions, e-mailed to interested foreign investors, and published on the Internet on sites such as http://www.dgmarket.com . 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of corporate social responsibility among both producers and consumers. The GoBF requires mining companies to invest in social infrastructure, such as health centers and schools, and other projects to benefit the local populations in the areas of their mining operations. To this end, the 2015 mining code stipulated the establishment of the Mining Fund for Local Development (FMDL). FMDL is a mechanism to decentralize national resources wealth. To fund the FMDL, the GOBF contributes 20% of the royalties it collects and the mining firms contribute about 1% of their gross revenues. FMDL entered into force in 2019 and has since distributed about US$ 129 million to 351 communes nationwide. A common practice for many companies is to provide food supplies, typically rice or millet, to their workers often at the end of the year. Larger private businesses, such as civil engineering firms, sponsor sport events like the Tour du Faso and donate sporting equipment to disadvantaged communities. SOEs such as SONABHY and LONAB frequently undertake social projects. Burkina Faso is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2008. EITI declares Burkina Faso as a compliant country, recognizing the country’s “significant progress in the implementation of the 2016 EITI Standard, with considerable improvements,” including satisfactory scores on five of the six corrective measures assessed. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Trafficking in Persons Report Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities North Korea Sanctions & Enforcement Actions Advisory Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Burkina Faso is ranked 46 in the latest Bloomberg NEF’s Climatescope rankings. The country does not appear in the ITIF’s Global Energy Innovation Index, the Global Green Growth Index, or the Green Future Index. However, Burkina Faso is engaged internationally on climate issues. Burkina Faso sent a 60-person delegation to COP26 in Glasgow. Burkina Faso continues to align itself with the positions of the African Group (AGN), Least Developed Countries (LDC) and the G77+China Group. Burkina supports the implementation of the African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), the Adaptation of Agriculture in Africa (AAA Initiative), the Sahel Climate Commission, the Congo Basin Region Commission, and the Islamic States Commission. In Glasgow, Burkina Faso reiterated its supports for initiatives related to climate adaptation, finance, and mitigation, as well as those on technology transfer, capacity building, among others. Burkina Faso has called for the international community to do more to respond to climate change challenges. 9. Corruption Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index indicates that Burkina Faso ranks 78 out of 180 countries. Nearly 82 percent of Burkinabe believe corruption is frequent or very frequent in their country, according to a report released November 2021by the National Network for Anti-corruption Fight (REN-LAC). The percentage of people who thought corruption was frequent or very frequent (82%) has risen steadily since 2019 (76%) and 2018 (67%). The Burkinabe public also believe that the fight against corruption is going in the wrong direction. The report also ranks the most corrupt public services as perceived by the public as (1) municipal police, (2) national police, (3) customs, (4) General-Directorate for Road and Maritime Transports (DGTTM), and (5) gendarmerie. The State Supreme Audit Authority (ASCE-LC) is the leading government anti-corruption body that publishes an annual report documenting financial irregularities, embezzlement, and improper use of public funds in various ministries, government agencies, and state-run companies. In 2018, the ASCE-LC opened at least two high profile corruption investigations against the Ministers of Defense and Infrastructure. The minister of defense was jailed under corruption charges and provisionally released due to health conditions. The Burkinabe government continues to grant access within its own ministries to the non-governmental watchdog REN-LAC, which examines the management of private and public-sector entities and publishes annual reports on corruption levels within the country. Legislation requires government officials, including the president, lawmakers, ministers, ambassadors, members of the military leadership, judges, and anyone charged with managing state funds, to declare their assets as well as any gifts or donations received while in office. Infractions are punishable by a maximum jail term of 20 years and fines of up to USD 41,670. In May 2020, former Minister of Defense, Jean-Claude Bouda, was arrested on “money laundering” and “illicit enrichment” charges following a complaint by the National Anti-Corruption Network. In June 2021, State Prosecutor Harouna Yoda announced that the Deputy Director General of Customs, William Alassane Kaboré, was placed under “judicial control,” for acts of illicit enrichment and money laundering amounting to 1.3 billion CFA (USD 2.2 million). Additionally, investigations are underway on the mayor of Ouagadougou and some magistrates who allegedly tried to bury this case. One of the main governmental bodies for fighting official corruption is the Superior Authority of State Control (ASCE), an entity under the authority of the Prime Minister. ASCE has the authority to investigate ethics violations and mismanagement of public funds in the public sector, including civil service employees, local and public authorities, state-owned companies, and all national organizations involved with public service missions. ASCE publishes an annual report of activities, which provides details on its investigations and issues recommendations on how to resolve them. Many of its findings are followed by judicial action. The Cour des Comptes (Court of Audit) is another institution that participates in the control of the execution of the annual budget. It draws up an annual report on the execution of the annual budget. Every year, it produces a public report, including the observations of all its audits, which is submitted to the President of Burkina Faso. It also draws up a general report for the President of Faso on the activity, management, and results of the companies it audits on a bi-annual basis. The Autorité de Régulation de la Commande Publique (ARCOP), established in July 2008, is the regulatory oversight body that ensures fairness in the procurement process by monitoring the execution of all government contracts. ARCOP may impose sanctions, initiate lawsuits, and publish the names of fraudulent or delinquent businesses. It also educates communities benefiting from public investment monies to take a more active part in monitoring contractors. ARCOP works with the media to strengthen journalists’ capacity to investigate suspected fraud cases. Since 2012, the media has noticeably increased its coverage of high-profile corruption cases. The Reseau National de Lutte Contre la Corruption (REN-LAC)’s annual state of corruption report has led to a wide range of anti-corruption initiatives and tools. REN-LAC has a 24-hour hotline that allows it to gather information on alleged corrupt practices anonymously reported by citizens. African Parliamentarians’ Network against Corruption also has a local chapter in Burkina Faso and cooperates with REN-LAC. To put an end to tax fraud, the government passed into law Article 17 of the November 21, 2013, Law No. 037-2013/AN of the 2014 Budget Law, which called for standardized invoices (Facture Normalisée) in commercial transactions. The Burkina Faso Chamber of Commerce will help facilitate its implementations. This provision however only became operational in early 2022. As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Burkina Faso has agreed to enforce a regional law against money laundering and has issued a national law against money laundering and financial crimes. Burkina Faso has taken steps to fully adopt regional and international anti-corruption frameworks, and the country ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in October 2006. According to World Bank rating for control of corruption, Burkina Faso has improved steadily since 2013 and currently ranks above the regional average. REN-LAC hotline: (+226) 8000 1122 Or contact: Sagado NACANABO Executive Secretary REN-LAC Telephone : +226 25 36 32 15 Luc Marius Ibriga Contrôleur Général d’Etat Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat et de la Lutte contre la Corruption (ASCE-LC) Telephone: +226 25 30 10 91 or +226 25 33 60 39 10. Political and Security Environment Rampant insecurity and the government’s inability to stem violent extremism contributed to the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré on January 24, 2022. In 2021, Burkina Faso recorded the highest number of attacks during its five-plus year battle with violent extremism. The result has led to a crisis resulting in the closure of schools and the massive displacement of people from their homes and communities. President Roch Marc Christian Kabore had been reelected to a second and final term in November 2020. This was the first time a democratic handover of power occurred in Burkina Faso’s history since it gained independence in 1960. During the same period legislative elections were organized and results were accepted by all political parties. However, Violent extremists remain very active in Burkina Faso. Both the Islamic State for the Greater Sahara and the Jama’ at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition have expanded their operation footprints in recent years. Security incidents include violence using tactics such as, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping, attacks, and targeted killings in an expanding part of the country in the north, east, and south. Targets appeared to shift from military and gendarmerie units to civilians and volunteer defense groups. In May 2022, VEOs carried out 61 attacks against civilians and security forces, killing a total of 173 people and injuring 40 others, The number of terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso’s southwestern Boucle du Mouhoun region rose significantly in May compared to the numbers reported for the three previous months. Since October 2021, over 799 people died in terrorist incidents, and an additional 600 individuals sustained injuries during the same period. On June 4, 2021, VEOs killed 160 civilians in Solhan in the Sahel region near the border with Niger. This was the second deadliest terrorist attack globally in 2021, according to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index. The report also indicates that 732 people died from terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso in 2021. The African Center for Strategic Studies noted in its July 2021 report that most violent attacks in the Sahel in 2020 were carried out in Burkina Faso (516 versus 361 in Mali and 118 in Niger). In April 2022, a U.S. citizen was reportedly abducted in Burkina’s Centre-Nord,. In 2018, an American citizen was abducted but was later discovered by French operatives during an unrelated mission to recover French nationals abducted by extremists. Three Europeans – two Spanish and one Irish – were killed in an attack on an anti-poaching patrol in eastern Burkina Faso on April 27, 2021. In 2021, attacks spiked in the southern part of Burkina Faso, contiguous to the north of Cote d’Ivoire. The Cascades region border area, which has suffered several attacks in the past, is seen by experts as a hide-out for armed terrorist groups and a threat for coastal countries. As of April 2022, terrorist attacks have generated around 1.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) mostly in Burkina Faso’s Sahel, Centre-Nord, Nord, and Est regions. Since 2018, the Government of Burkina Faso has maintained a state of emergency due to insecurity in many parts of the country As of May 2022, the U.S. State Department’s travel advisory to Burkina Faso is at Level 4: Do Not Travel due to terrorism, crime, and kidnapping. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Burkinabe workers have a reputation as hardworking and dedicated employees. While unskilled labor is abundantly available in Burkina Faso, skilled labor resources are limited. There is a scarcity of skilled workers, mainly in management, engineering, and the electrical trades. Construction, civil engineering, mining, and manufacturing industries employ the majority of the formal labor force. Burkinabe law allows workers, except for essential workers such as magistrates, police, military, and other security personnel, to form and join independent unions of their choice without previous authorization, and to bargain collectively. The law provides for the right to strike, but also limits this right with pre-strike requirements or restrictions (including notice submission and government’s requisition power to secure minimum service in essential services). Public servants are also entitled to engage in bargaining. In recent years, a series of public sector unions have gone on strike to demand better living and working conditions. However, increasing labor demands across multiple ministries have begun to put stress on an already strained public finance system, and have affected the tax collection processes. Although President Kabore has announced the intention to present a comprehensive labor deal (as opposed to the piecemeal settlement of strikes in different sectors that has been the case until now), it is not clear that any progress is being made on this front. The Minister of Public Service has decided to establish for civil servants. It is the GoBF’s policy to increase employment opportunities for Burkinabe workers. Therefore, in professions where there are too many registered and unemployed Burkinabe, a job-seeker card will not be issued to non-nationals. When non-nationals are hired, the Director of Labor authorizes their employment contract. According to the 1967 decree, statements must be made to the Regional Inspector of Work and Social Rules before the start-up of any new enterprise. Burkina Faso has undertaken reforms of labor policy to make the labor market more flexible while ensuring workers’ rights, including workers’ safety and health. To promote local employment, the government has established several financing instruments targeted at firms interested in obtaining start-up monies. These instruments include Fonds National d’Appui à la Promotion de l’Emploi – FONAPE (Employment Promotion Support Fund), Fonds d’Appui au Secteur Informel – FASI (Informal Sector Support Fund), Fonds d’Appui aux Activités Génératrices de Revenus des Femmes – FAARF (Women’s Income Generating Activities Support Fund), Fonds d’Appui aux Initiatives des Jeunes – FAIJ (Youth Initiative Support Fund), and Fonds Burkinabe de Développement Economique et Social – FBDES (Burkinabe Fund for Social and Economic Development). In the event of a reduction in personnel, the labor code requires the employer to first dismiss employees with the least training and seniority. The employer must advise employees of termination at least 30 days in advance. Workers terminated in a general workforce reduction have re-employment priority over other applicants for a two-year period. Employees terminated for reasons other than theft or flagrant neglect of duty have the right to termination benefits. In Burkina Faso, however, the informal sector is an important sector of the economy. A sizable part of the Burkinabe population earns a living in the informal economy, especially in agriculture and artisanal mining sectors. For instance, artisanal mining alone is estimated to employ one million to 1.3 million people directly. The value of gold extracted annually through artisanal mining is estimated at about US$1 billion, or about 20 tons of gold. However, they noted that much of Burkina Faso’s artisanal mining output is smuggled out through neighboring countries without royalties or tax revenue going to the state budget. In some regions of the country, over 90 percent of youth earn a living through artisanal mining, with some abandoning agriculture for the lure of gold mining. Nevertheless, there are no indications that the informal economy negatively impacts or crowds out investment across industries. To date, Burkina Faso has approved and ratified 43 conventions of the International Labor Organization, including conventions on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize, Abolition of Forced Labor, and the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Security and a labor court enforce the labor code. Unions are well organized, independent from the government, and defend employee interests in industrial disputes. Workers know their rights and do not hesitate to seek redress of grievances. Despite the government’s substantial efforts to reduce child labor in the past few years, 42 percent of children in Burkina Faso continue to engage in child labor, particularly in agriculture. The worst forms of child labor take place in mining. Cotton and gold are included on the U.S. government’s Executive Order 13126 List of Goods Produced by Forced and Indentured Child Labor. The 1982 Commercial Sector Collective Agreement divides employees (laborers, artisans, and senior staff) into eight categories with minimum basic pay rates from 25,000 FCFA (about USD 45) per month. Conditions for the employment of workers by enterprises are provided in Decree no. 98 of 1967. An employer should ask job candidates for their job-seeker registration card issued by the Office of Employment Promotion, which is part of the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Security. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2021 $19.2 Billion https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/BFA#countrydata Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2021 0.03% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Renaud Hien Economic and Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy Ouagadougou Secteur 15, Ouaga 2000 Avenue Sembene Ousmane, Rue 15.873 Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso +226 25 49 53 00 HienRM@state.gov Burma Executive Summary On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military seized power in a coup d’état that reversed much of the economic progress of recent years. The military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protests destabilized the country, prompted widespread opposition, and created a sharp deterioration in the investment climate. Burma’s economy shrank by 18 percent in 2021, with a forecast for one percent growth in 2022, according to the World Bank. The regime’s ongoing violence, repression, and economic mismanagement have significantly reduced Burma’s commercial activity, compounded by the pro-democracy Civil Disobedience Movement that emerged in response to the coup. Many routine business services like customs, ports, and banks are not fully operational as of April 2022. Immediately after the coup, the military detained the civilian leadership of economic and other ministries as well as the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) and replaced them with appointees who are beholden to the regime. The CBM has imposed severe foreign exchange restrictions that limit commercial activity, and the regime severely limits access to U.S. dollars. Frequent power outages and reliance on generators have dramatically raised costs for business. The regime’s suspensions of internet and other telecommunications have restricted access to information and seriously hindered business operations. Due to COVID-19 concerns, commercial international flights resumed only on April 17, 2022. Many foreign companies have suspended operations, invoked force majeure to exit investments, and evacuated foreign national staff. The rule of law is absent, regime security forces engage in random violence, there are attacks in response by pro-democracy People’s Defense Forces, and arbitrary detentions of perceived regime opponents including labor organizers and journalists. Companies invested in the market face a heightened reputational risk. There is also the potential for the regime to expropriate property or nationalize private companies. In response to the coup, the U.S. government has imposed targeted sanctions, including on members of the regime’s so-called State Administration Council (SAC), ministers, and other authorities. The U.S. has also suspended our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and instituted more stringent export controls. In the 2022 Business Advisory for Burma, the United States reaffirmed that it does not seek to curtail legitimate business and responsible investment in Burma. Nevertheless, investors should exercise extreme caution, avoid joint ventures with regime-affiliated businesses, and conduct heightened due diligence when considering new investments in this market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/mmr Global Innovation Index 2021 127 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 -6.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,350 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Although the military regime has told investors and foreign chambers of commerce it welcomes foreign investment, its actions have undercut pre-coup efforts to improve the enabling environment for investment. A number of foreign investors have withdrawn from the market, evacuated foreign national employees, or suspended their operations in Burma. The 2016 Myanmar Investment Law (MIL) and the 2018 Companies Law continue to govern treatment of foreign investment. The MIL includes a “negative list” of prohibited and restricted sectors for foreign investment. The Companies Law implemented August 1, 2018, permits foreign investment of up to 35 percent in domestic companies— which also opened the stock exchange to limited foreign participation. The Directorate for Investment and Company Administration (DICA), which is part of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations (MIFER), serves as Burma’s investment promotion agency. However, following the coup, the regime named former military major Aung Naing Oo to lead the Ministry and he terminated staff he deemed unsupportive of the regime. DICA as a consequence has limited operations because of staff boycotts and firings. Previously, DICA encouraged and facilitated foreign investment by providing information, fostering networks between investors, and providing market advice to potential investors. The regime maintains a private sector advisory forum with the Union of Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which principally includes domestic businesses. However, military authorities have summoned business leaders for command appearances rather than to conduct voluntary consultations. The U.S. Trade Representative suspended the U.S.-Myanmar Trade and Investment Framework in March 2021. Foreign Chambers of Commerce have limited interactions with the military regime following the coup, mainly by issuing letters of protest to regime economic policies that undermine the private sector. Regime-controlled media regularly praises PRC and Russian business cooperation. Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment Generally, foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity with some sectoral exceptions. Under Article 42 of the Myanmar Investment Law, the Burmese government restricts investment in certain sectors. Some sectors are only open to government or domestic investors. Other sectors require foreign investors to set up a joint-venture with a citizen of Burma or citizen-owned entity or obtain a recommendation from the relevant ministries. The State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, enacted in March 1989, stipulates that SOEs have the sole right to carry out a range of economic activities in certain sectors, including teak extraction, oil and gas, banking and insurance, and electricity generation. However, in practice many of these areas have been opened to private sector investment. For instance, the 2016 Rail Transportation Enterprise Law allows foreign and local businesses to make certain investments in railways, including in the form of public-private partnerships. The Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), “in the interest of the State,” can also make exceptions to the State-Owned Enterprises Law. The MIC has routinely granted exceptions, including through joint ventures or special licenses in the areas of insurance, mining, petroleum and natural gas extraction, telecommunications, radio and television broadcasting, and air transport services, although whether such exceptions will continue to be granted after the coup is unclear. As one of their key functions, DICA and the MIC are responsible for screening and approving inbound foreign investment to ensure it does not pose a risk to national security, as well as to determine if the investment furthers Burma’s growth and development. However, since the coup, the military regime has independently approved many foreign investments, including electricity generation projects, for example, that were not submitted to the DICA or MIC. The regime frequently favors regime-owned or affiliated businesses as well as those run by cronies. In 2020, the OECD conducted an investment review for Myanmar, which can be found at http://www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm In February 2021, the World Trade Organization produced a trade policy review for Myanmar based on pre-coup information, which can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm Following the coup, the military regime’s approach to governance has caused a sharp reduction in commercial activities including in Yangon and Mandalay. Many routine services that businesses require like customs, ports, and banks were not fully operational as of April 2022. Many companies report difficulty accessing bank funds to pay employees and suppliers, and there is limited foreign and local currency available. The security situation is volatile and unpredictable, and some companies’ local staff have been killed by security forces and foreign-owned factories have been burned. The civilian government previously provided limited business facilitation services through DICA, but services are restricted at present. The previous civilian government instituted online company registration through “MyCo” ( https://www.myco.dica.gov.mm ). Investors were able to submit forms, pay registration fees, and check availability of a company name through a searchable company registry on the “MyCo” website. However, military regime officials have publicly threatened to take down the company registration website so it may not continue to operate, and military-imposed restrictions on internet and mobile access limit businesses’ ability to access this website. The MIC is responsible for verification and approval of investment proposals above USD5 million. Companies can use the DICA website to retrieve information on requirements for MIC permit applications and submit a proposal to the MIC. If the proposal meets the criteria, it is supposed to be accepted within 15 days. If accepted, the MIC will review the proposal and is supposed to reach a decision within 90 days. In 2016, state and regional investment committees were granted the right to approve any investment of less than USD5 million. The World Bank assessed pre-coup that it takes on average seven days to start a business in Burma involving six procedures. Following the coup, it is likely to take substantially longer to register a business because of the suspension of many government services, bank closures, and internet access restrictions and suspensions. Post-coup, the MIC has approved several pending investment applications. According to DICA data, the number of new companies registered has declined 87 percent in the last 12 months compared to the year earlier. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Burma has signed and ratified bilateral investment agreements with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Philippines, and Thailand. It has also signed bilateral investment agreements with Israel and Vietnam, although those have not yet entered into force. Texts of the agreements or treaties that have come into force are available on the UNCTAD website at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/countries/144/myanmar Burma does not have a bilateral investment treaty or a free trade agreement with the United States. In March 2021, the United States suspended the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in response to the coup. Through its membership in ASEAN, Burma is also a party to the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, as well as to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, all of which contain an investment chapter that provides protection standards to qualifying foreign investors. Burma also has border trade agreements with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand. Burma does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States. Burma has Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements with the United Kingdom, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea. Burma is not a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing. The Tax Administrative Law (TAL) went into effect on October 1, 2019. This tax law provides guidance on administrative procedures on the following tax laws: the Income Tax Law; the Commercial Tax Law; the Special Goods Tax Law; and any other taxes deemed as such by the Internal Revenue Department. The law includes an advanced ruling system, an anti-avoidance provision, and the imposition of interest on unpaid or overpaid taxes. The TAL also clarified certain provisions under the existing tax laws with respect to tax filing and payment procedures, maintenance of documents, re-assessment of tax returns, changes to the appeal process, and the imposition of penalties. 3. Legal Regime The military regime has not demonstrated an interest in providing, or an ability to provide, clear rules. Regulatory and legal transparency are significant challenges for foreign investors in Burma. The military established the SAC, which is vested with authority to make and issue laws, regulations, and notifications with no oversight or transparency. Previously, government ministries drafted most laws and regulations relevant to foreign investors, which were reviewed by the Attorney General and then voted on and discussed by Parliament. The current law-making process is opaque and amendments to laws have been made without public consultation. Burma is not legally obligated to share regulatory development plans with the public or conduct public consultations. There is not a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published similar to the Federal Register in the United States. The Burmese government previously published new regulations and laws in government-run newspapers and “The State Gazette,” and also sometimes posted new regulations on government ministries’ official Facebook pages. Presently, the military regime announces some regulatory changes via state media or in the Commander-in-Chief’s public addresses, but copies of the changes are not easily accessibly or routinely posted anywhere. There are no oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure the government follows administrative processes. Foreign investors previously could appeal adverse regulatory decisions. For instance, under the Myanmar Investment Law, the MIC serves as the regulatory body and has the authority to impose penalties on any investor who violates or fails to comply with the law. Investors have the right to appeal any decision made by the MIC to the government within 60 days from the date of decision. Under the military regime, there is no demonstrated action or espoused commitment to transparent public finance and debt obligations. There are allegations that the military is incurring off-budget debt and using government funds beyond which was allocated in the government budget. Prior to the coup, public finance, and debt obligations, exclusive of contingent liabilities, were public and transparent. Budget reports were published on the Ministry of Planning, and Finance website ( https://myanmar.gov.mm/ministry-of-planning-finance ). Prior to 2021, the budget was published on the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry website (https://www.mopfi.gov.mm/en/content/budget-news). Burma has issued the annual Citizen Budget in the Burmese language since FY 2015-16. The Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry has published quarterly budget execution reports, six-month-overview-of-budget-execution reports, and annual budget execution reports on its website since FY 2015-16. However, details regarding the budget allocations for defense expenditures were not transparent, a problem that has been exacerbated since the military coup. The Burmese government also previously published its debt obligation report on the Treasury Department’s Facebook page. (See: https://www.facebook.com/pages/biz/Treasury-Department-of-Myanmar-777018172438019/ ). The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program reviewed Burma’s public finance system in 2020 ( https://www.pefa.org/about ). The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Businesses seeking to legally extract mineral resources, however, are required to prepare an environmental management plan to receive a license to mine from the regime. Burma has been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since July 1997. However, there is not a consistent relationship between ASEAN and Burma regulatory standards. As an ASEAN member state, Burma’s regulatory systems are expected to conform to harmonization principles established in the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) to support regional economic integration. Burma’s regulatory system does not consistently use international norms or standards. It contains a mix of unique Burma-developed standards and some British-colonial era standards. Prior to the coup, the government had been making progress on legal reforms to ensure the country’s regulations and standards reflected international norms or standards, including ASEAN-developed standards. In an example of ASEAN regulatory harmonization, Burma officially joined the ASEAN Single Window in March 2020 with the launch of the National Single Window Routing Platform, which streamlined the import process by adopting the ASEAN Certificate of Origin Form D. Burma is a WTO member, but it does not regularly notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Burma’s legal system is a unique combination of customary law, English common law, statutes introduced through the pre-independence India Code, and post-independence Burmese legislation. Where there is no statute regulating a particular matter, courts are to apply Burma’s general law, which is based on English common law as adopted and modified by Burmese case law. Each state and region has a High Court, with lower courts in each district and township. High Court judges are appointed by the President while district and township judges are appointed by the Chief Justice through the Office of the Supreme Court of the Union. The Union Attorney General’s Office law officers (prosecutors) operate sub-national offices in each state, region, district, and township. Immediately following the 2021 coup, the military regime replaced several members of the Supreme Court with judges seen as more reliable to its interests. After several weeks of largely peaceful protest and increasingly violent responses by security forces including arbitrary detentions, the military regimes placed several Yangon townships under martial law, where court proceedings are conducted by military judges who have meted out harsh punishments with limited to no due process rights for those accused. The Ministry of Home Affairs, led by an active-duty military minister appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, controls the Myanmar Police Force, which files cases directly with the courts. The Attorney General prosecutes criminal cases in civilian court and reviews pending legislation. The current Attorney General, Dr Thida Oo, was appointed the day after the coup by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing . The Attorney General’s Office was reorganized as a ministry on August 30, 2021. On January 31, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added Attorney General, Dr Thida Oo to its Specially Designated Nationals list. While foreign companies have the right to bring cases to and defend themselves in local courts, there are deep concerns about the impartiality and lack of independence of the courts. Burma does not have specialized civil or commercial courts. To address long-standing concerns of foreign investors regarding dispute settlement, the government acceded in 2013 to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”). In 2016, Burma’s parliament enacted the Arbitration Law, putting the New York Convention into effect and replacing arbitration legislation that was more than 70 years old. Since April 2016, foreign companies can pursue arbitration in a third country. However, the Arbitration Law does not eliminate all risks. There is a limited track record of enforcing foreign awards in Burma and inherent jurisdictional risks remain in any recourse to the local legal system. Certain regulatory actions are appealable and are adjudicated with the respective ministry. For instance, according to the Myanmar Investment Law, investment disputes that cannot be settled amicably are “settled in the competent court or the arbitral tribunal in accord with the applicable laws.” An investor dissatisfied with any enforcement action made by the regulatory body has the right to appeal to the government within 60 days from the date of administrative decision. The government may amend, revoke, or approve any decision made by the regulatory body. This decision is considered final and conclusive. The Myanmar Investment Law outlines the procedures the MIC must take when considering foreign investments. The MIC evaluates foreign investment proposals and stipulates the terms and conditions of investment permits. The MIC does not record foreign investments that do not require MIC approval. Many smaller investments may go unrecorded. Foreign companies may register locally without an MIC license, in which case they are not entitled to receive the benefits and incentives provided for in the Myanmar Investment Law. There is no “one-stop-shop” for investors except in Special Economic Zones. Burma has three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Thilawa, Dawei, and Kyauk Phyu with preferential policies for businesses that locate there, including “one-stop-shop” service. Of the three SEZs, Thilawa is the only SEZ currently in operation. A Competition Law went into effect in 2017. The objective of the law is to protect public interest from monopolistic acts, limit unfair competition, and prevent abuse of dominant market position and economic concentration that weakens competition. The Myanmar Competition Commission serves as the regulatory body to enforce the Competition Law and its rules. The Commission is chaired by the Minister of Commerce, with the Director General of the Department of Trade serving as Secretary. Members also include a mixture of representatives from relevant line ministries and professional bodies, such as lawyers and economists. The 2016 Myanmar Investment Law prohibits nationalization and states that foreign investments approved by the MIC will not be nationalized during the term of their investment. In addition, the law stipulates that the Burmese government will not terminate an enterprise without reasonable cause, and upon expiration of the contract, the Burmese government guarantees an investor the withdrawal of foreign capital in the foreign currency in which the investment was made. Finally, the law states that “the Union government guarantees that it shall not terminate an investment enterprise operating under a Permit of the Commission before the expiry of the permitted term without any sufficient reason.” However, under previous military regimes, private companies have been nationalized. The current military regime has threatened private banks with nationalization if they fail to reopen, including threatening to transfer certain deposits in private banks to state-owned or military-affiliated banks. In addition, security forces have physical cut private company’s fiber wires and the military regimes onerous restrictions and suspension of mobile internet service have deprived private telecommunication operators and internet service providers of their property without any compensation offered. The military regime has also banned a number of private media print outlets from publication and restricted citizen’s access to other private company’s internet platforms. There is a significant risk of nationalization and expropriation by the military regime, particularly in the financial and telecommunications sectors. There is no expectation of due process should the military regime pursue nationalization of private companies despite the provisions in the Myanmar Investment Law prohibiting nationalization and expropriation. In February 2020, the government of Burma passed the new Insolvency Law. The law adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency, providing greater legal certainty on transnational insolvency issues. The legislation established an insolvency regime that addresses both corporate and personal insolvency, with a focus on protecting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. With regards to personal insolvency, the new law encourages debtors to enter into a voluntary legally binding arrangement with their creditors. This agreement allows part or all of the debt to be written off over a fixed period of time. The law also provides equitable treatment for creditors by enabling an efficient liquidation process to ensure creditors receive maximum financial recovery from the property value of a non-viable business. The law also established the Myanmar Insolvency Practitioners’ Regulatory Council to act as an independent regulatory body and assigned DICA the role of Registrar with the authority to fine individuals contravening the law. In addition, the court with legal jurisdiction can order an individual to make good on the default within a specified time. 4. Industrial Policies In January 2020, the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations (MIFER) announced tax exemptions for investments made in five priority sectors in all 14 states and regions in Burma as well as the capital territory. The tax exemption period is three, five, or seven years depending on the location. For a list of priority sectors by state and regions, please see MIFER’s website at: http://www.mifer.gov.mm/region. Myanmar Investment Commission permit and endorsement holders are entitled to tax incentives and the right to use land. With a MIC permit, foreign companies can lease regional government-approved land for periods of up to 50 years with the possibility of two consecutive ten-year extensions. Burma has no established sovereign guarantee mechanism for foreign direct investments nor does it generally provide joint financing for foreign direct investment projects. The government does not offer any incentives, such as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives for clean energy investments. Burma has three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Thilawa, Dawei, and Kyauk Phyu with preferential policies for businesses that locate there. Of the three SEZs, Thilawa is the only SEZ currently in operation. Under the Myanmar Special Economic Zones Law, investors located in a Special Economic Zone may apply for income tax exemption for the first five years from the date of commencement of commercial operations, followed by a reduction of the income tax rate by 50 percent for the succeeding five-year period. Under the law, if profits during the third five-year period are re‐invested within one year, investors can apply for a 50 percent reduction of the income tax rate for profits derived from such re‐investment. In 2015, the government issued rules governing the SEZs, including the establishment of on-site one-stop-service centers to ease the approval and permitting of investments in SEZs, incorporate companies, issue entry visas, issue the relevant certificates of origin, collect taxes and duties, and approve employment permits and/or permissions for factory construction and other investments. Foreign investors must recruit at least 25 percent of their skilled employees from the local labor force in the first two years of their investment. The local employment ratio increases to 50 percent for the third and fourth years, and 75 percent for the fifth and sixth years. In August 2021, the regime recommended private banks name a citizen of Myanmar as CEO. The investors are also required to submit a report to the MIC with details of the practices and training methods that have been adopted to improve the skills of Burmese nationals. Foreign investors may appoint expatriate senior management, technical experts, and consultants, but are required to submit a copy of the expatriate’s passport, proof of ability, and profile to the MIC for approval. In part because of travel restrictions implemented in 2020 by the Burmese government to prevent the spread of COVID-19 including the suspension of international commercial flights, as well as regime-instituted additional measures, foreign investors have found it difficult to enter Burma or to travel within the country to check on investments. These restrictions were lifted on April 17, 2022. Business travelers may receive e-visas. Several foreign investors have complained about inability to secure or renew required work or residency permits for foreign employees. Foreign investors are not required to use domestic content in goods or technology. Burma is developing laws, rules, and regulations on information technology (IT) and data protection standards but does not currently have a legal requirement for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. Burma has not implemented data localization laws although the military regime proposed such laws in 2022. In 2021, the military regime has required some IT companies to disclose all wi-fi subscribers’ identities and provide all their usage data including websites visited. The regime Ministry of Transport and Communications and the State Administrative Council appear to both have authority to initiate these data requests. In January 2022, the regime proposed banning VPNs as part of an updated Cyber Security Law; no implementation has taken place to date. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are not consistently enforced. Land disputes involving foreign investments are common and land titling is opaque. Mortgages and liens exist, but there is not a reliable recording system. The Myanmar Investment Law provides that any foreign investor may enter into long-term leases with private landlords or – in the case of state-owned land – the relevant government departments or government organizations, if the investor has obtained a permit or endorsement issued by the MIC. Upon issuance of a permit or an endorsement, a foreign investor may enter into leases with an initial term of up to 50 years (with the possibility to extend for two additional terms of ten years each). The MIC may allow longer periods of land utilization or land leases to promote the development of difficult-to-access regions with lower development. The 2016 Condominium Law allows for up to 40 percent of condominium units of “saleable floor area” to be sold to foreign buyers. In accordance with the Transfer of Immovable Property Restriction Law of 1987, mortgages of immovable property are prohibited if the mortgage holder is a foreigner, foreign company, or foreign bank. In September 2018, the Burmese government amended the Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law and required occupants of these lands to register at the nearest land records office within a six-month period. The six-month deadline was intended to offer clear title to lands for investment and infrastructure construction. However, controversy exists over which lands have been designated as vacant, fallow or virgin, and whether the notification or registration period was sufficient. A continuing area of concern for foreign investors is investments involving large-scale land projects. Property rights for large plots of land for investment commonly are disputed because ownership is not well established, particularly following a half-century of military expropriations. It is not uncommon for foreign firms to face complaints and protests from local communities about inadequate consultation and compensation regarding land. In practice because of opaque land titling and unclear ownership, squatters de facto are permitted to use land that is unoccupied or land where ownership is contested or where they have an established history of living on that property. Prior to the coup, Burma had expanded its legal intellectual property protections, but enforcement was limited. Burma’s Parliament passed four intellectual property laws in 2019 – the Trademark Law, Industrial Design Law, Patent Law, and Copyright Law. Burma does not maintain publicly available data on seizures of counterfeit goods, although occasionally the government will announce seizures of counterfeit goods in government media or previously on Facebook government accounts. The Myanmar Police Force’s Criminal Investigative Department (CID) investigates and seizes counterfeit goods, including brands, documents, gold, products, and money, but not medicines. The CID currently does not record the value of the amount seized. Burma is not listed in the USTR’s Special 301 report or the notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The military regime’s attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is unknown. Previously, the Burmese government had gradually opened to foreign portfolio investment, but both the stock and bond markets are small and lack sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Burma has a small stock market with infrequent trading. In July 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that foreign individuals and entities are permitted to hold up to 35 percent of the equity in Burmese companies listed on the Yangon Stock Exchange. Burma also has a very small publicly traded debt market. Banks have been the primary buyers of government bonds issued by the CBM, which has established a nascent bond market auction system. The Central Bank issues government treasury bonds with maturities of two, three, and five years. The CBM sets commercial loan interest rates and saving deposit rates that banks can offer, so banks cannot conduct risk-based pricing for credit. Consequently, credit is not strictly allocated on market terms. Foreign investors generally seek financing outside of Burma because of the lack of sophisticated credit instruments offered by Burmese financial institutions and lack of risk-based pricing. There is limited penetration of banking services in the country, but the usage of mobile payments had grown rapidly prior to the coup. A government 2020 census found 14 percent of the population has access to a savings account through a traditional bank. The banking system is fragile with a high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs). Financial analysts estimate that NPLs at some local banks account for 40 to 50 percent of outstanding credit but accurate calculations are hard because of accounting inconsistencies about what constitutes a non-performing loan. According to Central Bank of Myanmar’s report for FY 2020-2021, total assets in Burma’s banking system were 75 trillion kyat (USD 40.5 billion). The CBM is responsible for the country’s monetary and exchange rate policies as well as regulating and supervising the banking sector. Prior to the coup, the government had gradually opened the banking sector to foreign investors. The government began awarding limited banking licenses to foreign banks in October 2014. In November 2018, the CBM published guidelines that permit foreign banks with local licenses to offer “any financing services and other banking services” to local corporations. Previously, foreign banks were only allowed to offer export financing and related banking services to foreign corporations. No U.S. banks have a correspondent relationship with Burmese banks. Following the military coup and the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Burma, including on two large military holding companies, some non-U.S. international banks are considering whether to terminate their correspondent banking relationship with Burmese banks. Foreigners are allowed to open a bank account in Burma in either U.S. dollars or Burmese kyat. In April 2022, the CBM issued rules requiring most accounts with foreign currency holdings to be converted into Myanmar kyat at a fixed rate within one business day excluding foreign investment businesses, diplomatic missions, UN missions and international development partners. To open a bank account, foreigners must provide proof of a valid visa along with proof of income or a letter from their employer. The Germany development agency GIZ published the fifth edition the GIZ Banking Report in January 2021. According to Chapter 15 of the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can convert, transfer, and repatriate profits, dividends, royalties, patent fees, license fees, technical assistance and management fees, shares and other current income resulting from any investment made under this law. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The intermittent closure of banks following the coup, shortage of U.S. dollars, and low cash withdrawal limits, and CBM restrictions on holding foreign currency have further limited investors’ ability to conduct foreign exchange transactions and other necessary business operations. Under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, transfer of funds can be made only through licensed foreign exchange dealers, using freely usable currencies. The CBM grants final approval on any new loans or loan transfers by foreign investors. According to a new regulation in the Foreign Exchange Management Law, foreign investors applying for an offshore loan must get approval from the CBM. Applications are submitted through the MIC by providing a company profile, audited financial statements, draft loan agreement, and a recent bank credit statement. In April 2022, the Central Bank fixed the exchange rate at 1850 kyat/1 USD. In April 2022, the black-market exchange rate was roughly 2010 kyat/1 USD. According to the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can remit foreign currency through authorized banks. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The military coup and the regime’s economic policies, including restrictions placed on holding and transferring foreign currencies, has further exacerbated these investment remittance challenges. The challenge of repatriating remittances through the formal banking system are also reflected in the continued use of informal remittance services (such as the “hundi system”) by both the public and businesses. On November 15, 2019, the CBM adopted the Remittance Business Regulation in order to bring these informal networks into the official financial system. The regulations require remittance business licenses to conduct inward and outward remittance businesses from the Central Bank. It is unclear how the military regime will proceed with this regulation and the training of businesses to grant them a license to conduct remittances. Burma does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Burma are active in various sectors, including natural resource extraction, print news, energy production and distribution, banking, mobile telecommunications, and transportation. SOEs employ approximately 145,000 people, according to a 2018 report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. The 1989 State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law does not establish a system of monitoring enterprise operations, hence detailed information on Burmese SOEs is difficult to obtain. However, according to commercial statements, the total net income of all SOEs during fiscal year 2020`21 was approximately USD 828 million. The top profit-making SOEs are found in the natural resource sector, namely the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, Myanma Gems Enterprise, and Myanma Timber Enterprise. Within Burma, there are 32 SOEs managed directly by six ministries without independent boards. SOEs enjoy several advantages including serving in some cases as the market regulator, preferential land access, and access to low-interest credit. According to the State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, SOEs wield regulatory powers that provide SOEs a significant market advantage, including through an ability to recommend specific tax exemptions to the MIC on behalf of private sector joint-venture partners and to monitor private sector companies’ compliance with contracts. In addition, the law stipulates that SOE managers have sole discretion in awarding contracts and licenses to private sector partners with limited oversight. SOEs can secure loans at low interest rates from state-owned banks, with approval from the cabinet. Private enterprises, unlike SOEs, are forced to provide land or other real estate as collateral in order to be considered for a loan. SOEs have historically had an advantage over private entities in land access because under the Constitution the State owns all the land. In April 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned three Burmese SOEs for their roles in financing the military regime: the Myanma Gems Enterprise, the Myanma Timber Enterprise; and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury also sanctioned two Myanmar military holding companies: Myanmar Economic Corporation and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, and those sanctions also apply to entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked entities or persons. Investors should conduct careful due diligence, including by consulting the Special Designated National list, to identify which entities are subject to U.S. sanctions given the broad scope of these firms and their privileged position in the economy. The military regime has not publicly announced any plans or timeline for privatization and in the past has preferred nationalization and supporting state-owned enterprises. Prior to the coup, the civilian government had been implementing a privatization plan, which permitted foreign investment. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The military regime has not demonstrated any awareness or commitment to responsible business. On the contrary, the regime had enacted policies and practices that undermine economic governance and the rule of law. Moreover, security forces are engaged in an escalating pattern of human rights abuses including mass detentions, extrajudicial killings, and violence deliberately targeting civilians. These human rights abuses have seriously also impacted the business community. Two foreign national business advisors were detained and put under house arrest without charge and one economic advisor was charged for violation of the official secrets acts, with no credible evidence provided to support the charge. Local businesspeople have been interrogated and subject to detention without charges by security forces. Several employees of local businesses have been killed by security forces. Although there are labor unions, independent NGOs, and business associations in Burma, their ability to operate has been several constrained and in some cases these organizations have been openly targeted by the military regime’s security forces. Child and forced labor are present in Burma. For more information on the human rights and labor situation, please refer to the additional resources. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Secretariat suspended Burma’s participation in the EITI initiative following the military coup. Burmese government officials do not regularly participate in meetings of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, although several businesses, civil society organization, and diplomats participate in Burma country discussions. The regime has not demonstrated an interest in protecting the environment. On the contrary, the regime has pursued environmentally destructive projects like hydro-electric dams. Illegal timber harvesting and mining have increased under the regime with little regard to existing environmental regulations. The government of Burma is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers, or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business is a civil society member of the International Code of Conduct Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/); Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/); Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/) and; North Korea Sanctions & Enforcement Actions Advisory ( https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_supplychain_advisory_07232018.pdf ). Department of Labor Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings ); List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods ); Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab ) and; Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ ). 9. Corruption Although the pre-coup civilian government made some progress in addressing corruption, including opening — with U.S. support — two new Anti-Corruption Commission branch offices in November 2020, law enforcement and judicial institutions do not have the independence or capacity to be effective in the fight against corruption under the new military regime. Corruption is rampant within the military, and the post-coup military regime appointed new members to the Anti-Corruption Commission. The military regime has used the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to investigate politically motivated corruption charges, including against deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and deposed President Win Myint. Business leaders whom the regime believes are not adequately supportive of the regime have been detained and charged with corruption and/or tax evasion. In 2018, the government amended its anti-corruption law to give the ACC authority to scrutinize government procurements. Family members of politicians can also be prosecuted under the anti-corruption law, though office holders face higher penalties. Some companies are legally required to have compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Under Burma’s Anti-Money Laundering Law, law firms, banks, and companies operating in the insurance and gemstone sectors are required to appoint compliance officers and conduct heightened due diligence on certain customers. Burma does not have laws to counter conflicts-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. However, prior to the coup the President’s office issued orders to prevent conflicts-of-interest for construction contracts and several ministries had put in place internal rules to avoid conflicts-of-interest in awarding tenders. In the private sector, some of Burma’s largest companies have developed anti-corruption policies, which they have published on-line. Burma signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005 and ratified it on December 20, 2012. Burma is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The military regime does not provide protection to NGOs investigating corruption. Anti Corruption Commission Cluster (1), Sports’ Village, Wunna Theikdi Ward Nay Pyi Taw Phone: + 95 67 810 334 7 Email: myanmaracc2014@gmail.com http://www.accm.gov.mm 10. Political and Security Environment Burma has a long history of civil wars and military coups marked by violence. In the aftermath of the February coup, Burmese security forces launched a brutal crackdown against the people of Burma, who peacefully protested the coup and the military’s upending of their democratic transition. In the face of brutal force by the regime, the people of Burma have disrupted the military’s ability to govern by launching a nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement, including general strikes and protests. Burma is also home to multiple long-running insurgencies in border regions, where the military competes for control with various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Shortly after the February 2021 coup, the military launched brutal and unprovoked attacks against EAOs, perceived opponents, and peaceful demonstrators across the country seeking to terrorize the public into submission. On September 7, 2021, the National United Government (NUG) announced a “People’s Defensive War against the military regime.” Violence is widespread and could continue to escalate. There have been several reported fires and explosion targeting foreign businesses since the coup, including at Chinese-owned factories, an agricultural storage facility, and military related companies. Attacks resulting in destruction of property and injuries have also been reported at banks and ATMs as well. Foreign businesses are concerned about the potential for violence and destruction of property to escalate, although principally the targets have been companies or infrastructure associated with the military or companies that are perceived to be supportive of the military. The Chinese government has reportedly sought increased regime protection for an oil and gas pipeline that runs through Burma to China because of the deteriorating security situation. The military regime has also declared martial law in several industrial townships in Yangon, suspending even the veneer of civil liberties and allowing security forces to be more aggressive in response to protests. Protestors and military opponents have organized boycotts of businesses that have ties to the military regime with great success. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Due to the February 1, 2021 coup, progress on labor reforms stalled and in most cases reversed. The national labor tripartite dialogue among the government, employers, and union leaders, which had been an important forum for advancing workers’ rights before the coup, dissolved in February after several large labor unions withdrew in protest. Burma’s labor union leaders, who have been active in organizing strikes and peaceful demonstrations against the regime since February 1, have been openly targeted by the military, and several union leaders have been killed or arrested. The regime has responded to organized labor’s participation in the CDM, declaring 16 labor-related organizations illegal and issuing warrants for the arrest of more 70 union organizers. The U.S. government released a statement noting it is closely monitoring the labor situation and potential impact on Burma’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) eligibility. The EU has made similar statements questioning future GSP eligibility if labor practices continue to deteriorate. Burma has a large supply of mostly unskilled workers. Skilled labor and managerial staff are in high demand and short supply. According to the government, 70 percent of Burma’s population is employed in agriculture. From the World Bank’s 2014 “Ending Poverty and Boosting Prosperity in a Time of Transition” report on Burma, 73 percent of the total labor force in Burma was employed in the informal sector in 2010, or 57 percent if one excludes agricultural workers. Casual laborers represented another 18 percent, mainly from the rural areas. Unpaid family workers represent another 15 percent. Many companies struggle to find and retain skilled labor. The military’s nationalization of schools in 1964, its discouragement of English language classes in favor of Burmese, the lack of investment in education by the previous governments of Burma, and the repeated closing of Burmese universities from 1988 to the mid-2000’s have taken a toll on the country’s workforce. Most people in the 15- to 39-year-old demographic lack technical skills and English proficiency. To address this skilled labor shortage, Burma’s Employment and Skill Development Law went into effect in December 2013. The law provides for compulsory contributions on the part of employers to a “skill development fund,” although this provision has not been implemented. In October 2011, the Burmese government passed the Labor Organization Law, which legalized the formation of trade unions and allows workers to strike. As of April 2019, roughly 2,900 enterprise-level unions had been formed in a variety of industries ranging from garments and textiles to agriculture to heavy industry. The passage of the Labor Organization Law engendered a labor movement in Burma, and there has been a low, yet increasing, level of awareness of labor issues among workers, employers, and even civilian government officials. Still, at present, the use of collective bargaining remains limited. Strikes are increasingly common in the post-coup environment as a form of political protest against the military regime and pre-coup were common in response to employment grievances, particularly in factories. Prior to the military coup, the Burmese government was bringing the legal system into compliance with international labor standards. The civilian government had passed a number of labor reforms and amended a range of labor-related laws, such as the Shops and Establishment Law, the Payment of Wages Law, and the Occupational Safety and Health Law. In 2019, Parliament also passed the Settlement of Labor Disputes Law. Under this law, parties to labor disputes can seek mediation through arbitration councils. All stakeholders have a say in the selection of arbitration mediators. If arbitration fails, disputes enter the court system. Parliament approved Burma’s ratification of an international treaty to abolish child labor in the country (Minimum Age Convention 138) in December 2019. A mechanism to submit forced labor complaints became operational in February 2020 although it is unclear if the current military regime is accepting or investigating complaints under this mechanism. Complaints of forced labor made against the military itself are resolved through internal military procedures and the outcome of these complaints are not shared publicly. In March 2022, the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization (ILO) decided to establish a Commission of Inquiry due to the deterioration of International Labor Standards in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $76.19 billion 2021 N/A www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 -$1 million 2020 N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 44.3% 2021 N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Chad Wilton Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Rangoon 110 University Avenue/Kamayut Township 11041 Rangoon, Burma +95-1-753-6509 wiltoncl@state.gov Burundi Executive Summary Located in Central Africa, Burundi is one of the seven member states of the East African Community (EAC). Burundi is one of the world’s most impoverished countries, with 87 percent of the population living below the World Bank’s poverty measure of $1.90 per day, 80-90 percent of the population reliant on agriculture (mostly subsistence farming) and a youth unemployment rate of about 65 percent. Economic growth is insufficient to create employment for Burundi’s rapidly growing population and President Ndayishimiye, in power since June 2020, has actively promoted good political and economic governance to improve the business environment by fighting corruption and promoting fiscal transparency. His administration is actively seeking to increase existing value chains to find new sources of employment and revenue and to find new revenue streams. The Government of Burundi (GoB) is also seeking to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Since taking office President Ndayishimiye has made or hosted multiple state visits with potential trade and development partners. Given the importance of agriculture, the GoB is promoting initiatives to modernize and diversify agricultural production, seeking to increase production of crops beyond coffee and tea. To attract FDI, the GoB must address an array of longstanding challenges, including: poor governance and weak institutional capacity; pervasive corruption; an exchange rate gap between the official and parallel market rates that fluctuates between 50-70 percent; financial restrictions and capital controls that limit access to and expatriation of foreign exchange; a low-skilled workforce; only 12 percent electrification nationwide; poor internet connectivity; and limited availability of reliable economic statistics. The GoB is working to develop infrastructure, including photovoltaic and hydroelectric power plants, roads construction, rehabilitation of Bujumbura Port and the construction of a railway joining Burundi, DRC and Tanzania to improve access to the country, reduce transportation costs and boost regional trade. The demand for electricity and water significantly exceeds capacity, and the transmission system is old and poorly maintained, leading to rolling blackouts and outages. In the mining sector, the GoB is introducing a new mining code and industry-wide regulations it says will promote greater transparency. As of March 2022, all foreign mining companies’ operations remain pending revision and renegotiation of new contracts/agreements based on a “win-win” principle and implementation of the new mining code. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated border closures resulted in a sharp economic slowdown in 2020, and the IMF estimates GDP shrank by around 1 percent, before rebounding by 3.6 percent in 2021. Testing capacity is low and vaccination rates remain among the lowest in the world. Burundian authorities have prepared a COVID-19 response plan to limit the disease spread and cushion its macroeconomic and social impacts; however, its implementation has been constrained by limited financing and domestic resistance, including from some at high levels of government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 230 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Burundi (GoB) is generally supportive of FDI and seeks investments to promote economic growth. During the reporting period, the GoB implemented new laws and regulations, including a revised June 2021 investment code (last updated in 2008), and the first national industrialization policy and its accompanying implementation strategy. These regulations offer the same advantages to both Burundian and foreign investors. The regulations also raised the minimum investment amounts to be eligible for certain benefits in the investment code from $50,000 to $500,000 for all investors, with the stated purpose of attracting only quality investments that will create decent jobs. Industry experts believe the new investment regulations will boost development of the industrial sector, which so far contributes only about 17 percent of GDP. An overview of the legal framework for foreign investment can be found at: https://www.investburundi.bi/index.php/espace-medias1/publications/depliants-et-brochures Along with the new investment code, the Burundi Development Agency (ADB) officially replaced the Investment Promotion Agency (API). The ADB has taken over all the missions of the API and is currently the only entry portal and interlocutor for all investors looking for business opportunities in Burundi. The ADB is the government authority responsible for promoting investment, improving the business climate, and facilitating market entry for investors in Burundi. ADB offers a range of services to potential investors, including assistance in acquiring the licenses, certificates, approvals, authorizations, and permits required by law to set up and operate a business enterprise in Burundi. ADB has set up a “one-stop shop” to facilitate and simplify business registration in Burundi, although investors must be physically present in country to register with ADB. ADB is also tasked with providing investors with information on investment and export promotion, assisting them with legal formalities, including obtaining the required documents, and intervening when laws and regulations are not properly applied. While ADB is the initial and primary point of entry for investors, relevant government ministries also regularly meet with private investors to discuss regulatory and legal issues. Foreign and domestic companies have the same rights to establish and own businesses in the country and engage in all forms of activities. However, there are restrictions on foreign investments in weaponry, ammunition, and any sort of military or para-military enterprises. There are no other restrictions nor are there any other sectors in which foreign investors are denied the same treatment as domestic firms. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Article 63 of the 2013 mining code stipulates that the GoB must own at least 10 percent of shares in any foreign company with an industrial mining license and state participation cannot be diluted in the event of an increase in the share capital. Burundi does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. No investment policy review from a multilateral organization has taken place in the last three years. The most recent review was performed in 2010 by UNCTAD. In addition to fiscal advantages provided in the new investment code, Burundi has approved reforms designed to improve ease of doing business, including reinforcing the capabilities of the one-stop shop at ADB, simplifying tax procedures for small and medium enterprises, reducing the time and cost of registering a business (about four hours at the cost of approximately $21), launching an electronic single window for business transactions, and harmonizing commercial laws within the East African Community. For more details and information on registration procedures, deadlines and costs, investors can visit the ADB at https://www.investburundi.bi/. The ADB is also responsible for assisting investors in obtaining entry visas, work permits and operating licenses, connections to water and electricity, amicable resolution of disputes between investors and state-owned entities, as well as any other related appropriate assistance. During the reporting period, the ADB indicates it assisted registering more than 4,000 Burundian companies, certified eight foreign investors with a capital of more than $25 million and granted 21 certificates of eligibility for the advantages provided in the 2021 investment code to investors with a combined capital of more than $170 million. ADB reports the companies created and during the rating period have already invested more than $85 million in Burundi and have created more than 2,327 jobs. There is no specific mechanism for ensuring equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities. The host government does not have mechanisms for promoting or incentivizing outward investment. The host government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Although parts of the government are working to create more transparent policies for fostering competition, Burundi lacks much of the necessary regulatory framework. Many policies for foreign investment are not transparent, and laws or regulations on the books are often ineffective or unenforced. Burundi’s regulatory and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms on paper, but a lack of capacity or training for staff and political constraints sometimes limit the regularity and transparency of their implementation. Rule-making and regulatory authority is exercised exclusively at the national level. Relevant ministries and the Council of Ministers exercise regulatory and rule-making authority, based on laws passed by the Senate and National Assembly. In practice, government officials sometimes exercise influence over the application and interpretation of rules and regulations outside of formal structures. The government sometimes discusses proposed legislation and rule-making with private sector interlocutors and civil society but does not have a formal public comment process. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations. Draft bills or regulations are not subject to a public consultation process. There are no conferences that involve citizens in a consultative process to give them an opportunity to make comments or contributions, especially at the time of project development, and, even if this were the case, the public does not have access to the detailed information needed to participate in this process. Burundi does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published; however, regulatory actions are sometimes posted on the websites of GoB institutions (typically that of the Office of the President or respective ministries). Burundi has sectoral regulatory agencies covering taxes and revenues, mining and energy, water, and agriculture. Regulatory actions are reviewable by courts. There have been no recent reforms to the regulatory enforcement system. The government generally issues terms of reference and recruits private consultants who prepare a study on the draft legislation for review and comment by the private sector. The government analyzes these comments and takes them into consideration when drafting new regulations. New regulations can be issued by a presidential decree or Parliament can make them into a law. This mechanism applies to laws and regulations on investment. Information on public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) is published in the Burundi Central Bank’s Reports and on its website: https://www.brb.bi/ . However, some publications on the website are not up to date. Burundi is a member of the East African Community (EAC), a regional economic bloc composed of seven member states, the republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the recently admitted Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EAC integration process is anchored on four pillars: a customs union, a common market, a monetary union, and political federation. Each member state must harmonize its national regulatory system with that of the EAC. Burundian law and regulations reference several standards, including the East African Standards, Codex Alimentarius Standards, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Burundi’s own standards. ISO remains the main standard of reference. The country joined the WTO on July 23, 1995. According to the Ministry of Trade, Transport, Industry and Tourism, Burundi has not notified the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all its draft technical regulations. The country’s legal system is civil (Roman), based on German and French civil codes. For local civil matters, customary law also applies. Burundi’s legal system contains standard provisions guaranteeing the right to private property and the enforcement of contracts. The country has a written commercial law and a commercial court. The investment code offers plaintiffs recourse in the national court system and to international arbitration. The judicial system is not effectively independent of the executive branch. A lack of capacity hinders judicial effectiveness, and judicial procedures are not rigorously observed. In June 2021, the GoB adopted a revised investment code and the first national industrialization policy and its accompanying implementation strategy. Along with the new investment code, the Burundi Development Agency (ADB) officially replaced the Investment Promotion Agency (API) (See Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment above). There is no agency in charge of reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Burundian law allows the GoB to expropriate property for exceptional and state-approved reasons, but the GoB is then committed to provide compensation based on the fair market value prior to expropriation. There are no recent cases involving expropriation of foreign investments nor do any foreign firms have active pending complaints regarding compensation in Burundian courts. Burundi has two laws governing or pertaining to bankruptcy: Law N°1/07 of March 15, 2006, on bankruptcy and Law N°1/08 of March 15, 2006, on legal settlement of insolvent companies. Under Burundian law, creditors have the right to file for liquidation and the right to request personal or financial information about the debtors from the legal bankruptcy agent. The bankruptcy framework does not require that creditors approve the selection of the bankruptcy agent and does not provide creditors the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims. 4. Industrial Policies The updated investment code grants potential fiscal and customs benefits for up to five years, or up to ten years for certain sectors as determined by presidential decree and based on the country’s development needs. Benefits include exemption from transfer duties for the acquisition of land or buildings, exemption from Value Added Tax (VAT) and customs duties on the importation of construction materials and production inputs, and reduced tax rates on profits ranging from 5 to 25 percent for the first five years, after which the corporate tax rate is set at 30 percent. The GoB does not issue guarantees, but does co-finance foreign direct investment projects, albeit typically on an in-kind basis, such as by granting land for facilities. Burundi belongs to the trading blocs of the EAC, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community of the States of Central Africa (CEEAC). During the reporting period, Burundi ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement, accepting all conditions of the agreement. The GoB has set up an ad hoc committee to continue working on AfCFTA integration and Burundi hopes to benefit from AfCFTA’s market due to its strategic location and natural resources. The government indicates it aims to accelerate integration into other trading blocs, such as the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) between COMESA, EAC and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The GoB also began harmonizing its policies and legal framework with those of regional entities to advance regional integration, improve its competitiveness, and take better advantage of external economic potentials. However, as the enabling regulations do not yet exist, Burundi does not yet have operational free economic zones. The GoB is working to establish its first Special Economic Zone (ZESB) in order to enhance growth and development. ZESB is still under construction on the Warubondo site (a strategic location of 5.43 square kilometers located between Burundi and neighboring DRC with easy access to Bujumbura city, Bujumbura International Airport, Bujumbura Port and Lake Tanganyika). ZESB is a result of a business partnership between the GoB and private foreign investors and its main objective is to revive the industrial sector and to promote exports. The economic model behind this partnership is that the zone will be a window for foreign investors, but all the products produced within the zone will bear the label “Made in Burundi.” The current government policy for both domestic and foreign companies is mandatory employment of local workers unless it is not possible to find a local candidate with the required skills or expertise. The number of expatriate employees is limited to 20 percent of the total workforce. There is no policy mandating foreign companies to appoint local personnel to senior management or boards of directors. Burundian visa requirements are not excessively onerous and do not generally inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees. During the reporting period, Burundi reauthorized visitors to apply for a visa upon arrival at the airport. A foreigner holding a residency visa is permitted to work in Burundi. A two-year residence visa (renewable) costs $500 and it can only be issued after making a refundable deposit of $1,500 in a local bank (BANCOBU). The 2000 Arusha Agreements for peace and reconciliation for Burundi and the Constitution recommend ethnic and gender quotas for new hires (60 percent from the Hutu ethnic group, 40 percent from the Tutsi ethnic group and 30 percent women) in state and security institutions. However, neither the Constitution nor the Arusha Agreements mention ethnic or gender quotas for the private sector. In 2017, a law was passed obliging International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) to recruit local staff while respecting the ethnic and gender quotas that apply to state institutions. There are no requirements that investors purchase from local sources. However, the mining code currently requires a commitment from investors to recruit staff or subcontractors of Burundian nationality as a precondition for granting a mining license, with mandatory quotas currently in place (although the mining code is under revision as of March 2022). The GoB imposes no performance requirements on investors as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding their investments or for access to tax and investment incentives. There are no laws requiring foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption except for a law requiring that companies share user information with law enforcement authorities during terrorism investigations; this law applies equally to Burundian and foreign companies. There are no laws that prevent companies from transmitting data outside the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in both real and movable property are nominally recognized under Burundian law. The Burundi land code, adopted in 2011, recognizes the right to property and protection for Burundians and for foreigners. Foreigners enjoy the same rights and protection as nationals, subject to the principle of reciprocity. The state can give property to foreigners for industrial, commercial, and cultural use, and can rent them out, but full ownership is reserved for Burundians. Land titling in Burundi has historically been a lengthy, opaque, and centralized process. The Land Titles Service registers real estate and security instruments, such as mortgages. Property titles are accepted as a guarantee by commercial banks, but documents for properties located outside the capital city of Bujumbura are less readily accepted because of conflicts and crime related to land disputes in rural areas (more than 80 percent of criminal court cases are related to conflicts over land). The legal system and the investment code do not differentiate between local and foreign investors regarding land acquisition or lease. However, the possibility for land acquisition is based on reciprocity between Burundi and the investor’s home country. When a property has been legally purchased, it cannot be legally confiscated by the state except when it is the subject of an expropriation procedure in accordance with legal and regulatory procedures. Burundi has adopted the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS), which introduced global minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of virtually all intellectual property rights (IPR). The legal system and the investment code aim to protect and facilitate the acquisition and disposition of all property rights, including IPR. The law also guarantees protection for patents, copyrights, and trademarks. However, there is no record of enforcement action on IPR infringement violations. No IPR-related law has been enacted during the past year and no bills are pending. Agents of Burundian institutions in charge of the fight against piracy and counterfeiting (Burundian Revenue Office, Ministries of Trade and Public Health) have already benefited from various sources of support in terms of capacity building on industrial property rights and the fight against piracy and counterfeiting on the part of multilateral partners, but these institutions lack modern tools for detecting counterfeits. Although these institutions have already committed themselves to carrying out reforms in this sector (a multisectoral committee responsible for promoting procedures to combat counterfeiting and piracy and monitoring has been set up), they still need to set up a database of recognized trademarks, in which all the information on trademarks registered at customs is compiled and to require this procedure for all companies or representatives of multinationals to be effective. For now, the Burundi Bureau of Standardization (BBN) is the state authority responsible for monitoring the quality of consumer products on the market; however, this Bureau lacks the necessary expertise and resources to be effective. Counterfeiters who are apprehended are fined and their products are seized. There are no statistics available on seizures of counterfeit goods. Burundi is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Market List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Although there are no regulatory restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, Burundi does not have capital markets that would enable it. Capital allocation within Burundi is entirely dependent on commercial banks. The country does not have its own stock market. There is no regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies do not actively facilitate nor impede the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. There is no regulation restricting international transactions. In practice, however, the government restricts payments and transfers for international transactions due to a shortage of foreign currency, which impedes doing business in a number of ways. In theory, foreign investors have access to all existing credit instruments and on market terms. In practice, available credit is extremely limited. The financial sector includes 15 credit institutions, 40 microfinance institutions, 16 insurance companies, three social security institutions and three payment institutions. All these institutions aim at reducing unemployment by creating job opportunities, particularly small and medium-scale entrepreneurship. The banking market is dominated by the three largest and systemically important banks: Credit Bank of Bujumbura (BCB), Burundi Commercial Bank (BANCOBU), and Interbank Burundi (IBB). Burundi’s population has very limited access to banking services, according to the most recent national survey on financial inclusion conducted by the central bank. In this 2016 survey, the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB) found a penetration level of approximately 22 percent, although the government opened two banks, one for youth entrepreneurs and one for women, over the last 1.5 years in an effort to address this challenge. The government is a minority shareholder in six banks, including the country’s three largest banks and is the main shareholders in the two new banks BIJE (Banque d’Investissement des Jeunes/Youth Investment Bank) and BIDF (Banque d’Investissement et de Développement pour les Femmes/Investment and Development Bank for Women). Several local commercial banks have branches in urban centers and micro-finance institutions mostly serve rural areas. Foreign banks can establish operations in the country. Foreign banks operating in the country include ECOBANK (Pan African Bank-West Africa), CRDB (Tanzanian Bank), DTB and KCB (both Kenyan Banks). The central bank directs banking regulatory policy, including prudential measures for the banking system. Foreigners and locals are subject to the same conditions when opening a bank account; the only requirement is the presentation of identification. Burundi does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are five SOEs in Burundi with 100 percent government ownership: REGIDESO (public utility company), ONATEL (telecom), SOSUMO (sugar), OTB (tea), COGERCO (cotton) and ODECA (Coffee). No statistics on assets are available for these companies as their reports are not available to the public. Board members for SOEs are appointed by the GoB and report to its ministries. The GoB also has a minority (40 percent) share in Brarudi brewing company, a branch of the Heineken Group, the country’s largest taxpayer. There is no published list of SOEs. SOEs have no market-based advantages and compete with other investors under the same terms and conditions; however, Burundi does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. In 2002, Burundi entered an active phase of political stabilization, national reconciliation, and economic reform. In 2004, it received an emergency post-conflict program from the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (PRSP). After the 2005 elections, the GoB made the decision to open several state-owned enterprises in different sectors of the economy to private investment, including foreign investment. The Burundian government, considering coffee a strategic sector of its economy, decided to opt for the privatization of the coffee sector first in an effort to modernize it. However, following the crisis of 2015, the GoB decided to suspend the privatization program. At that time, it had not yet privatized other sectors such as tea or sugar. In late 2019, the GoB regained control of the coffee sector, citing as its rationale perceived mismanagement on the part of the privatized companies during 2015-2019. It is unclear if or when the privatization program will continue. 8. Responsible Business Conduct According to the investment code, any new enterprise is required to consider environmental issues and employee rights in its investment and business plan. The government has taken no comprehensive measures to implement policies or international standards regarding responsible business practices. The government routinely engages investors about including public and community benefits in investment projects, but has no clearly defined standards. There have not been any high-profile or controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights violations in the recent past. No reliable information is available on the maintenance and enforcement of domestic laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protections, and environmental protections. In January 2019, the BRB issued a regulation relating to the protection of consumers of financial products and services in view of the complexity and growing diversity of the range of the services and products offered in Burundi. There are no corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards in place to protect the interests of shareholders. There are no organizations focused specifically on RBC in the country. As a member of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the government has acceded to the OECD due diligence mechanism and the regional system for certification and traceability of certain minerals extracted from national mines (tin, tantalum, and tungsten), as well as against conflict minerals that can be smuggled from the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, some civil society organizations report a noticeable lack of transparency in the Burundian mining sector (including alleged involvement of GoB officials in the trafficking of gold from the DRC). The government does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. There are no domestic transparency measures/policies that require the disclosure of payments made to the government. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Burundi first made commitments to contribute to the fight against climate change through its original Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2015 during the twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP 21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Paris in 2015 and Burundi ratified the agreement in 2018. During the reporting period, Burundi submitted an updated 2020 NDC to the UNFCCC’s Secretariat in November 2021 at the Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) as well as an initial National Adaptation Plan (NAP). The interim NDC evaluation report of March 2021 noted some achievements in the forestry sector, although there were few results on energy sector commitments. The report found the GoB lacked adequate funding and technical capacity for implementation. Burundi contributes less than 0.1 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions but remains vulnerable to global climate impacts. Burundi’s NAP on climate change calls for a range of responses. In agriculture, Burundi is planning to increase irrigation and diversify climate-resilient, high-yield food crop varieties. For ecosystems and landscapes, efforts will focus on reforestation of degraded lands and floodplain protection. Water priorities include expanding integrated watershed management and rainwater harvesting. Health efforts highlight the collection of environmental health data and the development of a health sector NAP. Energy efforts will center on hydroelectric and solar power, increasing biogas, and improved cooking stoves. Burundi’s infrastructure plans hope to improve waterways and structures around the Lake Tanganyika port area and rehabilitate existing road networks. 9. Corruption The government has an anti-corruption law as well as constitutional provisions on corruption, although these have not been implemented. Cabinet members, parliamentarians, and officials appointed by presidential decree have immunity from prosecution on corruption charges, insulating them from accountability. Laws designed to combat corruption do not extend to family members of officials or to political parties. Article 60 of the April 2016 law “Bearing Measures for the Prevention and Punishment of Corruption and Related Offenses” regulates conflicts of interest, including in awarding government procurement. Burundian legislation criminalizes bribery of public officials, but there is no specific requirement for private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. Burundi is a signatory to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Burundi has also been a member of the East African Anti-Corruption Authority since joining the EAC in 2007. The country does not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. A number of U.S. firms have noted corruption is an obstacle to direct investment in Burundi. Corruption is most pervasive in the award of licenses and concessions, which takes place in a non-transparent environment with frequent allegations of bribery and cronyism. Many customs officials are also reportedly corrupt, regularly extorting bribes from exporters and importers. In April 2021, the National Assembly approved a law disbanding the anti-corruption court and the anti-corruption police unit. The anti-corruption court’s authorities were transferred to the office of the attorney general and courts of appeals and the anticorruption police unit’s authorities were delegated to the judicial police. President Ndayishimiye continued with anti-corruption initiatives including dismissing high-level officials as well as hundreds of other low-level officials accused of malfeasance. In May 2021, President Ndayishimiye fired the Minister of Trade, Transport, Industry and Tourism over acts that risked compromising the country’s economy and tarnishing its image, reportedly in connection with the improper disposition of state property. He also fired the succeeding Minister of Trade, Transport, Industry and Tourism for tarnishing the image of the country after it came to light that she included family members and friends in official delegations abroad. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Name: Roger Ndikumana Title: Commissaire Général Organization: Anti-Corruption Brigade Address: PO Box 890 Bujumbura Telephone Number: (+257) 22 25 62 37 Email Address: brigadeanticorruption@yahoo.fr Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Name: Gabriel Rufyiri Title: President Organization: OLUCOME Address: 47, Chaussée Prince Louis Rwagasore, n°47, 1st Floor Telephone Number: (+257) 79 30 82 97 Email Address: rufyiriga@gmail.com / olucome2003@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Burundi has experienced cycles of ethnic and political violence since its independence in 1962. Periods before and after national elections have often been marked by political violence and civil disturbance. The May 2020 elections were largely peaceful, and the GoB has since consolidated power and security gains. Political tensions between the ruling party and opposition remain. The new administration has made efforts to reduce tensions with neighboring countries, including Rwanda, and to increase participation in regional security cooperation. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Unskilled local labor is widely available, while there are shortages for skilled workers in some sectors; no statistics are available on the shortage of specialized labor skills. According to government policy, the hiring of nationals should be prioritized except in cases in which no local expertise is available. Formal sector employment is limited, and official figures for unemployment are unreliable. Youth unemployment is estimated at approximately 65 percent. According to the investment code, any new enterprise is required to take into account environmental issues and employee rights in its investment and business plan. The government has taken no comprehensive measures to implement policies or international standards regarding responsible business practices. The government routinely engages investors about including public and community benefits in investment projects but has no clearly defined standards. No reliable information is available on the maintenance and enforcement of domestic laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protections, and environmental protections. There are no known examples of labor laws being waived in order to attract or retain investment. The labor code allows for employers to respond to fluctuating market conditions with layoffs of workers. Labor laws do not differentiate between layoffs and firing for severance. The government has a social insurance program that provides limited coverage to workers laid off for economic reasons. Burundi is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and its domestic labor law is in compliance with international labor standards. Workers’ unions are legally authorized, and there are laws and regulations that prohibit child and forced labor and any kind of discrimination. In practice, child labor occurs, and some union activity is restricted. Burundi has ratified all of the ILO fundamental conventions protecting workers’ rights; however, protection of core labor rights continues to be inadequate. The Ministry of Labor conducts inspections both in response to complaints or allegations of labor law violations and conducts routine, planned inspections, primarily of large employers. The Ministry of Justice has the ability to prosecute people who use children for work which, by their nature or the conditions in which they work, are likely to harm their health, safety and morals as provided by the law. However, child labor is common in the informal sector and largely goes unnoticed there. In the private sector, labor-management relations are usually conducted according to international standards that allow for collective bargaining. Burundi’s Labor Inspectorate has the authority to settle disputes between workers and employers, which can also be managed through civil judicial procedures. No strikes that posed an investment risk occurred during the past year. In November 2020, the government adopted a new labor code, replacing the 1993 code, with the main objective of complying with the various conventions that the country has since ratified, and above all responding to criteria for regional and international integration. This new code includes protections for employees and more flexibility and surety of contracts. In order to advance anti-trafficking in persons (TIP) efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffed its new Department for the Promotion of Safe Labor Migration, which is tasked with producing new and stronger labor recruitment regulations that are currently under review. The government worked on bilateral agreements on migrant worker rights with four major destination countries, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and to date has signed cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia. Agreements with the remaining three Gulf destination countries are ongoing. The Ministry of Justice also increased the number of employees whose job is to monitor and report on TIP cases. 14. Contact for More Information Andrew Partin Economic Affairs Officer Embassy of the United States of America in Bujumbura (+257) 22 20 73 10 partinaj@state.gov Tresor Ntandikiye Economic Specialist Embassy of the United States of America in Bujumbura (+257) 22 20 74 26 BujumburaEcon@state.gov Cabo Verde Executive Summary The Government of Cabo Verde welcomes international investment, provides prospective investors “one-stop shop” assistance through its investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest, and offers incentives and tax breaks for investments in multiple sectors, most notably tourism and information and communication technology. Growth is projected to slowly accelerate in 2022 as tourism inflows from Europe increase and the COVID-19 pandemic recedes, helped by an efficient vaccination rollout throughout the country. However, increases in food and energy costs stemming from the Ukraine crisis could hinder economic recovery. Cabo Verde’s political stability, democratic institutions, and economic freedom lend predictability to its business environment. Free and fair elections, good governance, prudent macroeconomic management, openness to trade, increasing integration into the global economy, and the adoption of effective social development policies all contribute to a favorable climate for investment. Cabo Verde receives high marks on international indicators for transparency and lack of corruption. There are few regulatory barriers to foreign investment in Cabo Verde, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as Cabo Verdean nationals regarding taxes, licenses and registration, and access to foreign exchange. The country’s strategic location and growing connectivity with other West African nations make it a potential gateway for investors interested in a foothold from which to expand to the continent. As Cabo Verde’s low proportion of arable land, scant rainfall, lack of natural resources, territorial discontinuity, and small population make it a high-cost economy with few economies of scale, the country relies on foreign investment, imports, development aid, and remittances. Despite the challenges, in 2007 the country became one of the first to graduate from least developed country status, and it met most of its Millennium Development Goals by 2015. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the economy’s dependence on tourism, which accounted directly for 25 percent of GDP and more than 40 percent indirectly pre-pandemic, makes it vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, the pandemic caused the government to put plans to privatize state-owned enterprises on hold, though privatization of ports and airports management and water and electricity could move forward later. While the business and investment climates continue to improve, there remain bureaucratic, linguistic (relatively few English or French speakers), and cultural challenges to overcome. The government’s new Cabo Verde Ambition 2030 plan builds on its Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development and promises to open opportunities in sustainable tourism, renewable energy, blue and digital economies, and the transformation of Cabo Verde into a transportation and logistics platform. Cabo Verde aims to generate 50 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and 100 percent by 2040. Diversification of the economy remains a priority, but high public debt levels, which reached a record estimated 158.4 percent of GDP in 2021, limit government funding capacity. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 39 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 89 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Cabo Verde seeks both domestic and foreign investment to drive economic recovery, diversification, and growth following the COVID-19 crisis. The government’s Ambition 2030 strategy emphasizes development of sustainable tourism, transformation of the country into a transportation and logistics platform, renewable energy, blue and digital economy, and export-oriented industries. The government promotes a market-oriented economic model under which all investors, regardless of nationality, have the same rights and are subject to the same duties and obligations under the law. Improving the business climate to attract investment remains an economic priority, as does reducing the state’s role in the economy, though the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed back plans to privatize state-owned enterprises. In 2021, approved investment projects reached an all-time high of USD 1.9 billion, confirming continued investor confidence in Cabo Verde despite pandemic uncertainties. Foreign investment continues to be concentrated in tourism and light manufacturing. In 2021, over 98 percent of the approved investment projects were in the tourism sector. Cabo Verdean law offers tax benefits and grants permanent residence to foreign citizens with an investment exceeding 180 million escudos (USD 2 million). In December 2021, the government approved creation of a permanent residence permit for foreigners who own second homes in Cabo Verde. The new law also allows for exemption from excise duties on assets. The legal framework establishes conditions for investment in the country by Cabo Verdean emigrants, including fiscal incentives. Investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest (CVTI) is a one-stop shop for all investors. Through CVTI, the government maintains dialogue with investors using personalized and virtual meetings, round tables, conferences, and workshops. CVTI offers investors a “One-Stop Shop for Investments” electronic platform and help in formalizing expressions of interest and monitoring the investment process. It also provides investors and exporters information about trade agreements and benefits (including those related to the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Cabo Verde’s membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)), market information, details on trade fairs and events, and contacts with other state institutions and potential partners. In addition, CVTI can assist with securing authorizations and licensing, tax and customs incentives, work permits for foreign workers, visas for company workers, social security registration for workers, and introductions to service providers, such as banks, lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents. For investments of less than USD 500,000, government entities Pro-Empresa and the Casa do Cidadao (Commercial Registry Department) provide similar services. The International Business Center (Centro Internacional de Negocios – CIN) provides tax and customs benefits for companies that do international business, with the aim of promoting, supporting, and strengthening the emergence of new industrial, commercial, and service provision activities in Cabo Verde. The Investment Law applies to both foreign and domestic investors, and it enshrines the principle of freedom of investment regardless of nationality. However, sector-specific legislation requires that foreign operators have at least 51 percent participation from Cabo Verdean partners in the fisheries sector and at least 25 percent in interisland maritime transport. The Investment Law further protects against direct and indirect expropriation. Private property is protected from unilateral requisition and nationalization, except for public interest reasons, in accordance with the law and the principle of non-discrimination, subject to prompt, full, and fair compensation. An approval process serves as a screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. The process begins with submission of a formal expression of interest to investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest in accordance with the Investment Law. Relevant government entities (depending on the sector and of the nature of the investment) then conduct an integrated review of the investment project and provide an opinion. If the opinion is favorable, Cabo Verde TradeInvest, in coordination with relevant agencies, approves the project and issues an investor certificate no later than 45 days from the submission of interest. Tourism-related projects can obtain tourism utility status in addition to the certificate, and for investments considered of special national interest based on the volume of investment and number of jobs created, the government may offer exceptional fiscal and other incentives. During 2018, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an Investment Policy Review (IPR) at the request of the Government of Cabo Verde. The report contains strategic analysis on how Cabo Verde can utilize foreign direct investment (FDI) in the tourism sector to advance sustainable development objectives. https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2248 In the last five years, civil society organizations have not conducted reviews of investment policy concerns. Cabo Verde offers benefits to attract private-sector investment. Although equality of treatment and non-discrimination are granted to all investors, certain investment projects, given their nature or size, may receive special treatment and support from the government. In an effort to reduce approval time for investment projects, the government has established a maximum period of 15 days for analysis and 30 days for approval of investment and export projects. In addition, Cabo Verde has adopted measures to facilitate and stimulate business activity, including lowering the maximum personal income tax (IRPS) one percentage point to 24 percent, eliminating double taxation, and waiving tax installment payments for taxpayers who had negative results or began their business activity in the previous year. Investments of at least 500 million escudos (USD 4.8 million) qualify for contractual benefits such as reduction of or exemption from customs and stamp duties, property taxes, and some other fiscal duties. Those investments that create a minimum number of jobs or expand into new strategic sectors qualify for a 50 percent investment credit, which can be deducted over 15 years. The law commits the government to paying its bills within 45 days and interest on late payments to ensure predictability in the payment of the state’s obligations to companies. The 2021 budget prioritizes expenditures on assistance for families and support for companies and jobs in the context of the pandemic. It also includes benefits to attract private sector investments and improve the business environment. Registering a company is straightforward. The Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao) is a one-stop shop where a company can be created and registered in less than a day. Information on business registration procedures is available at https://portondinosilhas.gov.cv/ and http://caboverde.eregulations.org/show-list.asp?l=pt&mid=1 . Step-by-step information on procedures, time, and cost involved in starting a company can be found at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cabo-verde/starting-a-business/ . The CVTI website also offers information on investing in Cabo Verde, including Cabo Verde’s Investment Law, the Code of Fiscal Benefits, and the Contractual Tax Benefits-Incentives: https://cvtradeinvest.com/ . The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. There is no data available on outward investments. 3. Legal Regime Cabo Verde is a regional model of transparency and good governance. The government is committed to improving conditions for foreign investment and encouraging a more transparent and competitive economic environment. Laws to promote exports and free-zone enterprises stress the government’s commitment to encouraging investment in export-oriented industries. The tax regime encourages entrepreneurial activity, and government policies support free trade and open markets. Environmental issues are a priority in Cabo Verde’s sustainable development strategic planning. Legislation requires promotion of an ecologically balanced environment by private companies. Local companies and foreign investment projects must complete environmental-impact studies for assessment of potential impacts by relevant government authorities. The government promotes the disclosure from companies on the social and corporate governance aspects of their businesses. Many companies, including those operating in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, pharmaceuticals, and laboratories, disclose the information in reports, normally available online. There is free online access to all laws through the government’s official register website, https://kiosk.incv.cv/ . Regulations on economic activity can also be viewed on the Cabo Verde TradeInvest website, http://cvtradeinvest.com/ . Cabo Verde’s regulatory agencies do not solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public, according to the World Bank . Public finance and debt obligations are in line with international norms and standards on budget credibility, thoroughness, and fiscal transparency. Cabo Verde continues to improve its processes for the planning, execution, and control of its budgets. The Ministry of Finance uses a digital platform to publish public accounts. With this web portal, any institution or citizen can observe the execution of the budget in real time. A Public Finance Council independently assesses the sustainability of the budget and policies. Cabo Verde has an independent Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), which operates in accordance with International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions and the Mexico Declaration and is responsible for verifying and publishing the government’s annual financial statements. In February 2022, Cabo Verde submitted the instrument of ratification of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Regionally, Cabo Verde is committed to integration into ECOWAS but has announced postponement of implementation of the ECOWAS Common External Tariffs to later in 2022 and does not foresee adoption of an ECOWAS single currency. Cabo Verde formally acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008. Cabo Verde has not notified the WTO of any measures that are inconsistent with its Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM)s obligations. Cabo Verde’s legal system is based on the civil law system of Portugal. The 1992 constitution provides for a judiciary independent from the executive branch. The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and regional courts. Judges cannot be affiliated with political parties. The Ministry of Justice appoints local judges. The judiciary generally provides due process rights; however, an overburdened and understaffed judicial system constrains the right to an expeditious trial. Cabo Verde has modern commercial and contractual laws. The judicial system in Cabo Verde is transparent and independent. There is no government interference in the court system, but judicial decisions are often delayed, sometimes for years. The right to private ownership is guaranteed under the constitution. Property rights are also recognized and guaranteed by several laws. There is a legal entity that records secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. The legal system also protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Cabo Verdean laws concerning FDI include the Investment Law of 2012, which applies to both foreign and domestic investors and preserves the principle of freedom of investment. The Industrial Development Statute regulates incentives and the investment approval process. Law 41/2016 defines the mandate of Cabo Verde TradeInvest ( https://cvtradeinvest.com/ ) as a one-stop shop for external investors. Cabo Verde does not have an agency charged with regulating competition, though the government has explored the creation of one. The law protects competition in all economic activities. The Investment Law protects against direct and indirect expropriation. Private property is protected against requisition and nationalization, except for public interest reasons (Investment Law, article 6.1). Under the law, in the event of expropriation, the government is to compensate the owner on the basis of prevailing market prices or the actual market value of the property. To date there have been no cases of unlawful expropriation or claims of discriminatory behavior by the government against foreigners. In case of noncompliance of investment projects, the law states that land can be recovered by the state and made available to new investment projects. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 2011, Cabo Verde became a contracting state to the ICSID convention. In 2018 Cabo Verde became a state party to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement Disputes between the government and investors concerning the interpretation and application of the law that cannot be resolved amicably or via negotiation are submitted for resolution by judicial authorities in accordance with Cabo Verdean law. Disputes between the government and foreign investors on investments authorized and made in the country are settled by arbitration if no other process has been agreed upon. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The law favors arbitration as a mechanism for settling investment disputes between the Government of Cabo Verde and foreign investors, under national and international dispute resolution rules. Courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. Generally, arbitration is conducted in Cabo Verde and in Portuguese unless the parties agree on another location and language. The decision of the single referee or the arbitration committee is final and not subject to appeal. In 2018, the Tax Arbitration Center was created to resolve disputes regarding tax matters. Cabo Verdean law provides for a reorganization procedure and a framework that allows creditors involvement in insolvency proceedings. 4. Industrial Policies Cabo Verde reduced the corporate income tax CIT rate to 22 percent from 25 percent in 2019. The Investment Law establishes incentives for investment by foreigners and Cabo Verdean emigrants. For industrial activity, corporate tax credits are available for up to 50 percent of eligible investments, and unused tax credits can be carried forward up to 10 years. Industrial activities may benefit from exemption from property tax on acquisition of immovable property exclusively used for industrial purposes and on customs duties on machinery and raw material. Renewable energy projects may benefit from a corporate income tax credit for up to 30 percent of the eligible investment and property tax incentives. There are additional customs tax benefits for renewable energy projects and acquisition of new electric vehicles for collective transport of passengers. Companies must obtain authorization and define areas of economic activity in industrial, commercial, or financial services to be eligible to take part in special economic zones. Fiscal benefits and incentives will be available on a case-by-case basis for participation in the government’s Maritime Special Economic Zone in Sao Vicente (ZEEM-SV). The International Business Center will assess investments and incentives that apply. The government also plans to create a tax-free Special Economic Zone for Technology (ZEET) with incentives to attract international companies. In March 2022, parliament approved a Special Economic Zone for the Island of Maio (ZEEIM), and there are plans to expand tax-free zones to the island of Fogo. Access to work and residence permits for foreign workers, managers, and investors is regulated by the Labor Code and Law 80/VIII/2014. Foreigners are required to apply for a work permit, but the authorization process is not onerous. There is no “forced localization” in any sector in Cabo Verde. Investors are granted work and residence permits independently of the amount they invest. The regime for foreign hires differs depending on category. The Labor Code regulates residence permits for foreign workers, managers, and investors. There are four categories of permits for foreigners: investors, employees, independent professionals, and highly qualified employees. 5. Protection of Property Rights Access, use, and transfer of land and real estate are recognized under the constitution, Civil Code, and Legislative Decree 2/2007 (Land Law). Everyone, regardless of nationality, may acquire ownership rights or obtain special permits to occupy and use land. A legal entity records secured interests in property. Ownership documents (Certidao de Registo Predial) are obtained through the land registry department, including an official map with the property’s exact location (Planta de Localizaçao). A tax information certificate (Certidao Matricial) is requested from the municipality. If the property is unregistered, it is possible to register the property with a certificate confirming that the property is not registered in anyone else’s name (Certidao Negativa) and a tax certificate confirming status of property tax payment. Under its second Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, Cabo Verde finalized a land information management system for the country and clarified parcel rights and boundaries for the islands of Sal, Boa Vista, and Maio and rural and high-potential tourism zone parcels on the island of Sao Vicente. Legislation on intellectual property rights (IPR) aligns with international standards. The legal framework has been revised in accordance with provisions of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) agreements and those of the WTO. The body responsible for standardization in Cabo Verde is the Institute of Quality and Intellectual Property (IGOPC), https://igqpi.cv/ . Officially, the IGOPC protects against IP infringement, but enforcement capacity is limited due to resource constraints including inadequate digitalization (though online registration and search of trademarks were made available recently), judicial system capacity constraints, and lack of awareness of intellectual property rights among businesses and consumers. Cabo Verde is a party to international copyright treaties. Cabo Verde is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Market Report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Cabo Verde. The Cabo Verdean stock market, Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (BVC), is fully operational. It has been most active in the issuance of bonds. Foreign investors must open an account with a bank in Cabo Verde before buying stocks or bonds from BVC. Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Cabo Verdeans. The IMF’s April 2021 country report on Cabo Verde noted that “the government did not impose or intensify restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions nor introduce multiple currency practices. Similarly, it did not conclude bilateral payment agreements inconsistent with Article VIII nor impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes.” Cabo Verde has a small financial sector supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Cabo Verde (BCV). According to 2020 data from BCV, 82.8 percent of Cabo Verde’s adult population has a bank account. Internet-based tools and services in the banking sector continue to grow in Cabo Verde, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, changing the model of the client-bank relationship. New information and communications technology products allow customers online alternatives to in-person support. Banking represents more than 80 percent of the assets of the entire Cabo Verdean financial system. Two banks – Banco Comercial do Atlantico (BCA) and Caixa Economica de Cabo Verde (CECV) – together held 57.7 percent of market share in 2020, according to BCV data. Legislation approved in January 2020 terminated the issuance of restricted licenses for offshore banking operations, calling for generic licenses and operations with resident clients. BCV subsequently announced that banks with a restricted license (offshore) serving non-residents would have to adjust to the new requirements or face revocation of their license and enforced administrative liquidation. Offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde had until December 2021 to complete the transition. One did, two opted for liquidation, and BCV revoked the license of a fourth. Currently there are no offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde. To establish a bank account, clients must provide proper identification and obtain a taxpayer number from the Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao), a process that takes approximately 10 minutes. Bank credit is available to foreign investors under the same conditions as for domestic investors. The private sector has access to credit instruments such as loans, letters of credit, and lines of credit. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector, government, and regulators are increasingly aware of the importance of environmental and corporate social responsibility in Cabo Verde. The government encourages companies to engage in responsible business conduct. Many companies conduct campaigns to promote social awareness in areas such as health, environmental protection, and cultural preservation. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, private companies supported vulnerable populations with essential goods. Women represent 37.5 percent of elected parliamentarians, 33 percent of the government, and more than 30 percent of leadership in businesses. 9. Corruption Cabo Verde has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. In Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Cabo Verde scored 58 points, ranked 39 in the world and second in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Under Cabo Verdean law, giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act punishable by up to eight years in prison. The Penal Code details punishments for crimes committed by an official during the exercise of public duties. The Penal Code and the Electoral Code address corruption in the context of electoral crimes, particularly the offering of advantages to voters by political parties or other actors involved in elections. Cabo Verde’s Public Procurement Code requires that public officials involved in a public procurement process provide written disclosure of any personal interest resulting from a special connection to a bidder or potential bidder and recuse themselves from participation in the process. In 2020, the Cabo Verdean government provided for the creation of the Corruption Prevention Council, an administrative body that will lead corruption prevention efforts in the country. In early 2022, the Prime Minister announced that the government would soon form the Council. Other institutions active in combating corruption include the Judicial Police, the Prosecuting Counsel, and the courts. 10. Political and Security Environment Cabo Verde is a model of political stability with a tradition of peaceful transitions of power. There have been no political, social, or religious conflicts resulting in violence in recent years. Civil liberties are generally protected, but access to justice is impaired by an overburdened court system, and crime remains a concern. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Labor is widely available in Cabo Verde. Unskilled labor represents 30 to 40 percent of the total labor force. Technical, managerial, and professional talent with English and French language skills is more difficult to find. Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is a significant challenge, aggravated by the toll the COVID-19 pandemic has taken on the tourism sector and small business. Migrants from China, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Nigeria, and Guinea may receive wages below minimum wage and work without contracts, creating vulnerabilities. The government continues efforts to reduce vulnerability to exploitation of migrants from West Africa employed in the construction and hospitality sectors and increase their integration into society. According to a 2020 International Labor Organization (ILO) study, although women represented more than 50 percent of qualified workers, they earned on average 7 percent less than men. According to data from the National Statistics Institute, the underemployment rate for women is of 27.2 percent (globally the underemployment rate is 21.7 percent). Activity in the informal economy – mostly in urban areas in sectors such as small industry, commerce, informal sales, and other services – accounted for 12 percent of GDP. Women constitute a majority of informal economy workers. As part of its post-pandemic relaunch plan for the private sector, the government is assessing mechanisms to promote transition from the informal to formal economy and raise employer compliance with tax and social security obligations. Cabo Verde has ratified all of the ILO’s eight fundamental conventions. Minimum wage is currently 13,000 escudos (USD 141) per month. The National Social Security Institute (INPS) manages unemployment benefits. The legal workweek is limited to 44 hours for adults, with 12 consecutive hours per week for rest and premium rates of pay for overtime mandatory. Larger employers generally respect this restriction, but agricultural and domestic laborers often work longer hours. Labor strikes are generally peaceful. All workers except those in restricted sectors are free to form and join unions without interference from the government. The government respects workers’ right to strike, but the law allows the government to act in emergency situations or when essential services might be affected. Few companies have adopted collective bargaining, but the ILO has worked with local unions and government bodies to provide guidance on conducting dialogue between parties. The Directorate General for Labor (DGT) has a conciliation mechanism to promote dialogue. There have been no instances in which labor laws were waived in order to attract or retain investment. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and African Development Bank (AfDB) consider the rigidity of labor laws and severance pay requirements to be an obstacle to industrial investment and development. 14. Contact for More Information Economic and Commercial Section U.S. Embassy Praia – Cabo Verde Rua Abilio Macedo no. 6 Tel: +238 260 8900 Praia-SP-PolEcon-Members@state.gov Cambodia Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on Cambodia’s economy. Despite a surge of cases in 2021, Cambodia’s economy demonstrated resilience in some sectors (agriculture, manufacturing) and showed signs of gradual recovery from the previous year’s economic disruptions, achieving 2.2 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This follows a 3.1 percent contraction of its GDP in 2020. Having adopted a “living with COVID” stance to reopen its economy and attract international tourists, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) in March 2022 dropped all quarantine and testing requirements for fully vaccinated travelers. The World Bank predicts Cambodia’s GDP growth to rebound to 4.5 percent in 2022. The RGC has made attracting investment from abroad a top priority, and in October 2021 passed a new Law on Investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) incentives available to investors include 100 percent foreign ownership of companies, corporate tax holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, duty-free import of capital goods, and no restrictions on capital repatriation. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government enacted economic recovery measures to boost competitiveness and support the economy, including a long-awaited Competition Law, a Public-Private Partnership Law, and provided tax breaks to the hardest hit businesses, such as those in the tourism and restaurant sectors. The government also delayed the implementation of a capital gains tax to 2024 and established an SME Bank of Cambodia to support small- and medium-sized enterprises. Despite these incentives, Cambodia has not attracted significant U.S. investment. Apart from the country’s relatively small market size, other factors dissuading U.S. investors include: systemic corruption, a limited supply of skilled labor, inadequate infrastructure (including high energy costs), a lack of transparency in some government approval processes, and preferential treatment given to local or other foreign companies that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s weak regulatory environment. Foreign and local investors alike lament the government’s failure to adequately consult the business community on new economic policies and regulations. In light of these concerns, on November 10, 2021, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce issued a business advisory to caution U.S. businesses currently operating in, or considering operating, in Cambodia to be mindful of interactions with entities involved in corrupt business practices, criminal activities, and human rights abuses. Notwithstanding these challenges, several large American companies maintain investments in the country, for example, Coca-Cola’s $100 million bottling plant and a $21 million Ford vehicle assembly plant slated to open in 2022. In recent years, Chinese FDI — largely from state-run or associated firms — has surged and has become a significant driver of growth in Cambodia. Chinese businesses, many of which are state-owned enterprises, may not assess the challenges in Cambodia’s business environment in the same manner as U.S. businesses. In 2021, Cambodia recorded FDI inflows of $655 million, with approximately 52 percent reportedly coming from the PRC. Physical infrastructure projects, including commercial and residential real estate developments, continue to attract the bulk of FDI. However, there has been some increased investments in manufacturing, including garment and travel goods factories, as well as agro-processing. In 2022, both the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement entered into force. Climate change remains a critical issue in Cambodia due to its vulnerability to extreme weather occurrences, high rates of deforestation, and low environmental accountability. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 109 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 1994-2021 $1.58 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,500 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Cambodia has a liberal foreign investment regime and actively courts FDI. In 2021, the RGC enacted a new Law on Investment to attract more FDI in emerging sectors including agro-processing, electronics/machinery, health, industrial parts, infrastructure, and green energy. The government permits 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in most sectors. In a handful of sectors, such as cigarette manufacturing, movie production, rice milling, and gemstone mining and processing, foreign investment is subject to local equity participation or prior authorization from authorities. While there is little or no official legal discrimination against foreign investors, some foreign businesses report disadvantages vis-a-vis Cambodian or other foreign rivals that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s weak regulatory environment. The Council for the Development of Cambodia ( CDC ) is the principal government agency responsible for providing incentives to stimulate investment. Investors are required to submit an investment proposal to either the CDC or the Provincial-Municipal Investment Sub-committee to obtain a Qualified Investment Project (QIP) status depending on capital level and location of the investment in question. QIPs are then eligible for specific investment incentives. The CDC also serves as the secretariat to Cambodia’s Government-Private Sector Forum (G-PSF), a public-private consultation mechanism that facilitates dialogue within and among 10 government/private sector working groups. Cambodia has created special economic zones (SEZs) to further facilitate foreign investment. As of 2021, there are 25 SEZs in Cambodia. These zones provide companies with access to land, infrastructure, and services to facilitate the set-up and operation of businesses. Services provided include utilities, tax services, customs clearance, and other administrative services designed to support import-export processes. Cambodia offers incentives to projects within the SEZs such as tax holidays, zero rate VAT, and import duty exemptions for raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The primary authority responsible for Cambodia’s SEZs is the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB). The largest of its SEZs is in Sihanoukville and hosts primarily Chinese companies. There are few limitations on foreign control and ownership of business enterprises in Cambodia. Foreign investors may own 100 percent of investment projects except in the sectors mentioned above. According to Cambodia’s new Law on Investment and related sub-decrees, there are no limitations based on shareholder nationality nor discrimination against foreign investors except for land ownership as stipulated in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. For property, land title must be held by one or more Cambodian citizens. For state-owned enterprises, the Law on Public Enterprise provides that the Cambodian government must directly or indirectly hold more than 51 percent of the capital or veto rights in state-owned enterprises. For agriculture investments, foreign investors may request economic land concessions, if they meet certain criteria including provisions on land use, productivities, job creation, and environmental protection and natural resource management. There are some limitations on the employment of foreigners in Cambodia. A QIP allows employers to obtain visas and work permits for foreign citizens as skilled workers, but the employer may be required to prove to the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training that the skillset is not available among Cambodia workers. The Cambodian Bar has periodically taken actions to restrict or impede the work of foreign lawyers or foreign law firms in the country. The OECD Investment Policy Review of Cambodia in 2018 is available at the following link . The World Trade Organization (WTO) last reviewed Cambodia’s trade policies in 2017, which can be found at this link . All businesses are required to register with the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the General Department of Taxation (GDT), and the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT). Registration with MOC is possible through an online business registration portal at this link , while the GDT’s online portal is also available here . To further facilitate the process, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in 2020 launched the “ Single Portal ” – found at here , where businesses can register at the three ministries through a single online platform. In addition, new businesses may also be required to register with other relevant ministries governing their sector and business activities. For example, travel agencies must also register with the Ministry of Tourism, and private universities must also register with the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport. There are no restrictions on Cambodian citizens investing abroad. Some Cambodian companies have invested in neighboring countries – notably, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar. Cambodia’s foreign direct investment abroad reached approximately $127 million in 2020. 3. Legal Regime Cambodia’s regulatory system, while improving, still lacks transparency. This is the result of a lack of legislation and the limited capacity of key institutions, which is further exacerbated by a weak court system. Investors often complain that the decisions of Cambodian regulatory agencies are inconsistent, arbitrary, and influenced by corruption. For example, in May 2016, in what was perceived as a populist move, the government set caps on retail fuel prices, with little consultation with petroleum companies. In April 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia introduced an interest rate cap on loans provided by the microfinance industry with no consultation with relevant stakeholders. More recently, investors have regularly expressed concern overdraft legislation that has not been subject to stakeholder consultations. Cambodian ministries and regulatory agencies are not legally obligated to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. Draft regulations are only selectively and inconsistently available for public consultation with relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector, or other parties before their enactment. Approved or passed laws are available on websites of some ministries but are not always up to date. The Council of Jurists, the government body that reviews laws and regulations, publishes a list of updated laws and regulations on its website. Businesses are not required to have audited financial statements or publish their financial reports unless they are financial institutions (banks/microfinance institutions) or publicly listed companies. The RGC does not mandate companies to make environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures with respect to investments. As a member of ASEAN since 1999, Cambodia is required to comply with certain rules and regulations regarding free trade agreements with the 10 ASEAN member states. These include tariff-free importation of information and communication technology (ICT) equipment, harmonizing custom coding, harmonizing the medical device market, as well as compliance with tax regulations on multi-activity businesses, among others. As a member of the WTO since 2004, Cambodia has both drafted and modified laws and regulations to comply with WTO rules. Relevant laws and regulations are notified to the WTO legal committee only after their adoption. A list of Cambodian legal updates in compliance with the WTO is described in the above section regarding Other Investment Policy Reviews. The Cambodian legal system is primarily based on French civil law. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King is the head of state and the elected Prime Minister is the head of government. Legislative power is vested in a bicameral parliament, while the judiciary makes up the third branch of government. Contractual enforcement is governed by Decree Number 38 D Referring to Contract and Other Liabilities. More information on this decree can be found at this link . Although the Cambodian Constitution calls for an independent judiciary, both local and foreign businesses report problems with inconsistent judicial rulings, corruption, and difficulty enforcing judgments. For these reasons, many commercial disputes are resolved through negotiations facilitated by the Ministry of Commerce, the Council for the Development of Cambodia, the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce, and other institutions. Foreign investors often build into their contracts clauses that dictate that investment disputes must be resolved in a third country, such as Singapore. Cambodia’s new Law on Investment, passed in October 2021, regulates the approval process for FDI and provides incentives to potential investors, both domestic and foreign. Sub-decree No. 111 (2005) lays out detailed procedures for registering a QIP with the CDC and provincial/municipal investment subcommittees. The new Law on Investment introduces an online registration process for QIP applications and shortens the timeline for the CDC’s issuance of a Registration Certificate to 20 working days. The portal for QIP registration with CDC can be found at this link . Information about investment procedures and incentives in Cambodia may be found on the CDC’s website . Cambodia’s Competition Law was signed in October 2021, following the enactment of a Law on Consumer Protection in 2019. Cambodia’s Consumer Protection Competition and Fraud Repression Directorate-General ( CCF ), is mandated to enforce these laws and investigate complaints. When disputes arise, individuals or businesses can file complaints with the CCF, with courts acting as the final arbitrator. Land rights are a contentious issue in Cambodia, complicated by the fact that most property holders do not have legal documentation of their ownership because of the policies and social upheaval during Khmer Rouge era in the 1970s. Numerous cases have been reported of influential individuals or groups acquiring land titles or concessions through political and/or financial connections and then using force to displace communities to make way for commercial enterprises. In late 2009, the National Assembly approved the Law on Expropriation, which sets broad guidelines on land-taking procedures for public interest purposes. It defines public interest activities to include construction, rehabilitation, preservation, or expansion of infrastructure projects, and development of buildings for national defense and civil security. These provisions include construction of border crossing posts, facilities for research and exploitation of natural resources, and oil pipeline and gas networks. Property can also be expropriated for natural disasters and emergencies, as determined by the government. Legal procedures regarding compensation and appeals are expected to be established in a forthcoming sub-decree, which is under internal discussion at the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The government has shown willingness to use tax issues for political purposes. For instance, in 2017, a U.S.-owned independent newspaper had its bank account frozen purportedly for failure to pay taxes. It is believed that, while the company may have had some tax liability, the General Department of Taxation inflated the assessment to pressure the newspaper to halt operations. The action took place in the context of a widespread government crackdown on independent media in the country. Cambodia’s 2007 Law on Insolvency is intended to provide collective, orderly, and fair satisfaction of creditor claims from debtor properties and, where appropriate, the rehabilitation of the debtor’s business. The law applies to the assets of all businesspeople and legal entities in Cambodia. In 2012, Credit Bureau Cambodia (CBC) was established to create a more transparent credit market in the country. CBC’s main role is to provide credit scores to banks and financial institutions and to improve access to credit information. 4. Industrial Policies Cambodia’s new Law on Investment offers varying types of investment incentives for projects that meet specified criteria. Investors seeking incentives as part of a QIP must submit an application to the CDC and pay an application fee of KHR 7 million (approximately $1,750), which covers securing necessary approvals, authorizations, licenses, or registrations from all relevant ministries and entities, including stamp duties. The new Law on Investment provides investment incentives to QIPs classified into three types: basic incentives, additional incentives, and special incentives. Basic incentives include income tax exemptions, special depreciation rates, and eligibility for customs duty exemptions and VAT exemptions for the import of construction equipment and materials. Additional incentives include VAT exemptions for the purchase of locally produced production inputs, while special incentives may be granted to investment projects that have a high potential to contribute to national economic development. Investment projects located in designated special promotion zones or export-processing zones are also entitled to the same incentives. More information about the criteria and investment areas eligible for incentives can be found at the following link . The CDC is required to seek approval from the Council of Ministers for investment proposals that involve capital of $50 million or more, politically sensitive issues, the exploration and exploitation of mineral or natural resources, or infrastructure concessions. The CDC is also required to seek approval for investment proposals that will have a negative impact on the environment or the government’s long-term strategy. To facilitate the country’s development, the Cambodian government has shown great interest in increasing exports via geographically defined special economic zones (SEZs). Cambodia is currently drafting a Law on Special Economic Zones, which is now undergoing technical review within the CDC. There are currently 25 special SEZs, which are located in Phnom Penh, Koh Kong, Kandal, Kampot, Sihanoukville, and the borders of Thailand and Vietnam. The main investment sectors in these zones include garments, shoes, bicycles, food processing, auto parts, motorcycle assembly, and electrical equipment manufacturing. Cambodia permits investors to hire foreign nationals for employment as managers, technicians, or skilled workers if the qualifications/expertise are not available in Cambodia. According to Cambodia’s Labor Law, the number of foreign employees should not exceed ten percent of the total number of Cambodian employees. In practice, Cambodia can request an increase in this allotment from the Ministry of Labor. Cambodia does not have any forced localization policy that obligates foreign investors to use domestic contents in goods or technology. Cambodia also does not currently require foreign information technology providers to turn over source code. 5. Protection of Property Rights Mortgages exist in Cambodia and Cambodian banks often require certificates of property ownership as collateral before approving loans. The mortgage recordation system, which is handled by private banks, is generally considered reliable. Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law provides a framework for real property security and a system for recording titles and ownership. Land titles issued prior to the end of the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-79) are not recognized due to the severe dislocations that occurred during that period. The government is making efforts to accelerate the issuance of land titles, but in practice, the titling system is cumbersome, expensive, and subject to corruption. Most property owners lack documentation proving ownership. Even where title records exist, recognition of legal titles to land has not been uniform, and there are reports of court cases in which judges have sought additional proof of ownership. Foreigners are constitutionally forbidden to own land in Cambodia; however, the 2001 Land Law allows long and short-term leases to foreigners. Cambodia also allows foreign ownership in multi-story buildings, such as condominiums, from the second floor up. Infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) is prevalent in Cambodia. Counterfeit apparel, footwear, cigarettes, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods, and pirated software, music, and books are some of the examples of IPR-infringing goods found in the country. Though Cambodia is not a major center for the production or export of counterfeit or pirated materials, local businesses report that the problem is growing because of the lack of enforcement. To date, Cambodia has not been listed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in its annual Special 301 Report, which identifies trade barriers to U.S. companies due to the IPR environment. To combat the trade in counterfeit goods, the Cambodian Counter Counterfeit Committee (CCCC) was established in 2014 under the Ministry of Interior to investigate claims, seize illegal goods, and prosecute counterfeiters. The Economic Police, Customs, the Cambodia Import-Export Inspection and Fraud Repression Directorate General, and the Ministry of Commerce also have IPR enforcement responsibilities; however, the division of responsibility among each agency is not clearly defined. This causes confusion to rights owners and muddles the overall IPR environment. Though there has been an increase in the number of seizures of counterfeit goods in recent years, in general such actions are not taken unless a formal complaint is made. In 2020, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Cambodia on accelerated patent recognition, creating a simplified procedure for U.S. patents to be registered in Cambodia. The patent recognition application form can be found at this link . For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at this link . 6. Financial Sector To address the need for capital markets in Cambodia, the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was founded in 2011 and started trading in 2012. Though the CSX is one of the world’s smallest securities markets, with nine listed companies, it has taken steps to increase the number of listed companies, including attracting SMEs. In 2021, market capitalization stood at $2.4 billion, and the daily trading value averaged $246,000. In September 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) adopted a regulation on the Conditions for Banking and Financial Institutions to be listed on CSX. The regulation sets additional requirements for banks and financial institutions that intend to issue securities to the public. This includes prior approval from the NBC and minimum equity of KHR 60 billion (approximately $15 million). Cambodia’s bond market is at the beginning stages of development. The regulatory framework for corporate bonds was bolstered in 2017 through the publication of several regulations covering public offering of debt securities, the accreditation of bondholders’ representatives, and the accreditation of credit rating agencies. The country’s first corporate bond was issued in 2018, and there are currently eight corporate bonds listed on the CSX. There is currently no sovereign bond market, but the government has stated its intention of making government securities available to investors in 2022. The NBC regulates the operations of Cambodia’s banks. Foreign banks and branches are freely allowed to register and operate in the country. There are 54 commercial banks, 10 specialized banks (set up to finance specific turn-key projects such as real estate development), 79 licensed microfinance institutions (MFIs), and five licensed microfinance deposit taking institutions in Cambodia. The NBC has also granted licenses to 17 financial leasing companies and one credit bureau company to improve transparency and credit risk management and encourage lending to small- and medium-sized enterprise customers. The banking sector’s assets, including those of MFIs, rose 16 percent year-over-year in 2020 to KHR 241 trillion ($59.4 billion) and customer loans increased 15 percent to KHR 151 trillion ($37.3 billion). In 2020, the number of deposit accounts reached 8.9 million (out of a population of roughly 17 million), while credit accounts reached 3.2 million. The government does not use the regulation of capital markets to restrict foreign investment. Banks have been free to set their own interest rates since 1995, and increased competition between local institutions has led to a gradual lowering of interest rates from year to year. However, in April 2017, at the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the NBC capped interest rates on loans offered by MFIs at 18 percent per annum. The move was designed to protect borrowers, many of whom are poor and uneducated, from excessive interest rates. In March 2016, the NBC doubled the minimum capital reserve requirement for banks to $75 million for commercial banks and $15 million for specialized banks. Based on the new regulations, deposit-taking microfinance institutions now have a $30 million reserve requirement, while traditional microfinance institutions have a $1.5 million reserve requirement. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NBC adopted measures to maintain financial stability and ensure liquidity in the banking system. These measures included allowing banks to maintain their capital conservation buffer at 50 percent, reducing the reserve requirement rate, and allowing banks to restructure loans for clients impacted by COVID. Financial technology (Fintech) in Cambodia is developing rapidly. Available technologies include mobile payments, QR codes, and e-wallet accounts for domestic and cross-border payments and transfers. In 2012, the NBC launched retail payments for checks and credit remittances. A “Fast and Secure Transfer” (FAST) payment system was introduced in 2016 to facilitate instant fund transfers. The Cambodian Shared Switch (CSS) system was launched in October 2017 to facilitate the access to network automated teller machines (ATMs) and point of sale (POS) machines. In February 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) cited Cambodia for being “deficient” with regard to its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls and policies and included Cambodia on its “grey list.” The RGC committed to working with FATF to address these deficiencies through a joint action plan, although Cambodia remains on the grey list as of 2022. Should Cambodia not take appropriate action, FATF could move it to the “black list,” which could negatively impact the cost of capital as well as the banking sector’s ability to access international capital markets. In addition to Cambodia’s weak AML/CFT regime, vulnerabilities include a largely cash-based, dollarized economy and porous borders. Both legal and illicit transactions, regardless of size, are frequently conducted outside of regulated financial institutions. Cash proceeds from crime are readily channeled into land, housing, luxury goods and vehicles, and other forms of property, without passing through the banking sector. Moreover, a lack of judicial independence and transparency constrains effective enforcement of laws against financial crimes. The judicial branch lacks efficiency and cannot assure impartiality, and judicial officials, up to and including the chief of the Supreme Court, have simultaneously held positions in the political ruling party. Refer to Section II: “Illicit Finance and Corrupt Activities in Cambodia” of the U.S. government’s Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions released on November 10, 2021, for more information. Cambodia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a small but growing awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) among businesses in Cambodia despite the fact that the government does not have explicit policies to promote them. RBC and CSR programs are most commonly found at larger and multinational companies in the country. U.S. companies, for example, have implemented a wide range of CSR activities to promote skills training, the environment, general health and well-being, and financial education. These programs have been warmly received by both the public and the government. A number of economic land concessions in Cambodia have led to high profile land rights cases. The Cambodian government has recognized the problem, but in general, has not effectively and fairly resolved land rights claims. The Cambodian government does not have a national contact point for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) multinational enterprises guidelines and does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Cambodia ranks among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, and environmental problems such as deforestation and natural resource exploitation are increasingly rampant. Despite growing number of legal environmental frameworks, regulatory enforcement remains weak. The government estimates Cambodia could lose over $15 billion or 10 percent of its GDP by 2050 due to the impacts of climate change. In the Global Green Growth Index 2019, Cambodia obtained a score of 34.5 points, revealing a gap to reach the sustainability target of 100. “Green economic opportunities dimension” scores the lowest among all dimensions at 5.9, due to low green trade, green employment, and green innovation. Cambodia has a complex and overlapping series of legislative and regulatory measures that govern environmental protection. A Royal Decree in 1993 defined the country’s first protected areas. The Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management was promulgated in 1996, followed by subsequent environment-related sub-decrees on water, air, noise, land, forests, and fisheries. The government has also released its National Strategic Plan on Green Growth 2013–2030, Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan 2014-2023, and the National Environment Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2023. In 2020, the government issued ministerial proclamation (Prakas) No. 021 on the Classification of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the Development Project 2020, an implementing measure of a Sub-Decree on the 1999 EIA Process, which requires all public and private companies to have environmental protection contracts and conduct environmental impact assessments. Cambodia unveiled its Long-term Strategy for Carbon Neutrality 2050 at the end of 2021. The Environmental and Natural Resources Code remains in draft and has not yet been finalized. These laws and regulations do not have specific goals or targets for private companies to reach and most have yet to be widely and effectively implemented. Corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, and poor enforcement remain the major barriers to Cambodia’s transition to sustainable development. The new Law on Investment redefines incentives for priority sectors: environmental management, biodiversity conservation, the circular economy, green energy, and technology contributing toward climate change adaptation and mitigation. Details on how the incentives are to be determined are to be spelled out in a forthcoming sub-decree. 9. Corruption Corruption in Cambodia is endemic and widespread. An increase in foreign investment from investors willing to engage in corrupt practices, combined with sometimes opaque official and unofficial investment processes, further drives the overall rise in corruption. In its Global Competitiveness Report 2019, the World Economic Forum ranked Cambodia 134th out of 141 countries for incidence of corruption. Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception index ranked Cambodia 157 of 180 countries globally, the lowest ranking among ASEAN member states. Those engaged in business have identified corruption, particularly within the judiciary, customs services, and tax authorities, as one of the greatest deterrents to investment in Cambodia. Foreign investors from countries that overlook or encourage bribery have significant advantages over foreign investors from countries that criminalize such activity. In light of these concerns, on November 10, 2021, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce issued a business advisory to caution U.S. businesses currently operating in, or considering operating, in Cambodia to be mindful of interactions with entities involved in corrupt business practices, criminal activities, and human rights abuses. Cambodia adopted an Anti-Corruption Law in 2010 to combat corruption by criminalizing bribery, abuse of office, extortion, facilitation payments, and accepting bribes in the form of donations or promises. Under the law, all civil servants must also declare their financial assets to the government every two years. Cambodia’s Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), established the same year, has investigative powers and a mandate to provide education and training to government institutions and the public on anti-corruption compliance. Since its formation, the ACU has launched a few high-profile prosecutions against public officials, including members of the police and judiciary, and has tackled the issue of ghost workers in the government, in which salaries are collected for non-existent employees. The ACU, in collaboration with the private sector, has also established guidelines encouraging companies to create internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery and corrupt practices. Companies can sign an MOU with the ACU pledging to operate corruption-free and to cooperate on anti-corruption efforts. Since the program started in 2015, more than 80 private companies have signed an MOU with the ACU. In 2018, the ACU completed a first draft of a code of conduct for public officials, which has not yet been finalized. Despite the passage of the Anti-Corruption Law and creation of the ACU, enforcement remains weak. Local and foreign businesses report that they must often make informal payments to expedite business transactions. Since 2013, Cambodia has published the official fees for public services, but the practice of paying additional fees remains common. Cambodia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007 and endorsed the Action Plan of the Asian Development Bank / OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in 2003. Cambodia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Om Yentieng President, Anti-Corruption Unit No. 54, Preah Norodom Blvd, Sangkat Phsar Thmey 3, Khan Daun Penh, Phnom Penh Telephone: +855-23-223-954 Email: info@acu.gov.kh Transparency International Cambodia #13 Street 554, Phnom Penh Telephone: +855-23-214430 Email: info@ticambodia.org 10. Political and Security Environment Incidents of violence directed at businesses are rare. The Embassy is unaware of any incidents of political violence directed at U.S. or other non-regional interests. In the past, authorities have used force to disperse protestors. Nevertheless, political tensions remain. After relatively competitive communal elections in June 2017, where Cambodia’s opposition party won 43 percent of available seats, the government banned the opposition party and imprisoned its leader on charges of treason. With no meaningful opposition, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 parliamentary seats. The government has also taken steps to limit free speech and stifle independent media, including forcing independent news outlets and radio stations to cease operations. While there are few overt signs the country is growing less secure today, the possibility for insecurity exists going forward, particularly if COVID-driven economic problems persist and if a large percentage of the population remains disenfranchised. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on Cambodia’s labor sector. In particular, Cambodia’s garment and manufacturing sector, which is heavily reliant on global supply chains for inputs and on demand from the United States and Europe, experienced severe disruptions due to COVID-19. Cambodia’s labor force numbers about 9.2 million people. A small number of Vietnamese, Thai, and Bangladeshi migrant workers are employed in Cambodia, and in recent years Chinese-run infrastructure projects and other businesses imported an increasing number of Chinese laborers, who typically earn more than their Cambodian counterparts. Cambodia’s garment sector employs 800,000 people, mostly female. Most of Cambodia’s factories producing for export are foreign-owned, and top managers are also almost all foreign. Around 65 percent of the population is under the age of 30. The United Nations estimates that around 300,000 new job seekers enter the labor market each year. The agricultural sector employs about 40 percent of the labor force. The country has a substantial number of informal workers. Estimates vary, but only 19 percent of the nearly 9.2 million-strong workforce enjoy social protection under the National Social Security Fund, with the remaining 81 percent therefore meeting a common definition of informal workers. Such workers dominate the agricultural sector. These workers are not covered by wage, hour and occupational safety and health laws and inspections. Cambodia’s 2016 Trade Union Law (TUL) erects barriers to freedom of association and the rights to organize and bargain freely. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has stated publicly that the law could hinder Cambodia’s obligations to international labor conventions 87 and 98. To address those concerns, Cambodia passed an amended TUL in early 2020, but the amended law does not fully address ILO, NGO, and union concerns about the law’s curbs on freedom of association. In addition, Cambodia has only implemented and enforced a minimum wage in the export garment and footwear sectors. All labor laws apply in Cambodia’s SEZs, but independent unions report that zone and SEZ factory management are often hostile to unions and that union formation and activity is particularly difficult in SEZs. Unresolved labor disputes are mediated first on the shop floor, after which they are brought to the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training. If reconciliation fails, then the cases may be brought to the Arbitration Council, an independent state body that interprets labor regulations in collective disputes, such as when multiple employees are dismissed. Since the 2016 Trade Union Law went into force, Arbitration Council cases have decreased from over 30 per month to fewer than five. A strike and demonstration at Cambodia’s largest casino and hotel complex that began in December 2021 has drawn global attention from the ILO, international unions, and media, and may pose an investment risk. Rights groups and the ILO have expressed concerns in particular about the criminalization of peaceful union activity; government authorities charged 11 union leaders and members with “incitement” and put them in pre-trial detention for more than two months. In response to this dispute and broader concerns over freedom of association, the ILO sent a fact-finding mission to Cambodia in March 2022. 14. Contact for More Information Moses An Economic and Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh No. 1, Street 96, Sangkat Wat Phnom, Phnom Penh, Cambodia Phone: (855) 23-728-000 Email: CamInvestment@state.gov Cameroon Executive Summary Cameroon, the largest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), continues to face the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic; however, growth has started to recover from a 2020 recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Cameroon’s gross domestic product (GDP) to increase by 4.6 percent in 2022. Cameroon’s current account balance also improved in 2021 and early 2022. The government continues to implement its 2020-2030 National Development Strategy and development projects, especially in road infrastructure, transport, energy, and health, albeit with delays. Cameroon utilized its hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations soccer tournament in early 2022 to hasten the completion of some long-awaited projects and promote Cameroon to investors. Cameroon maintains strong competitive advantages because of a bilingual population, a relatively diversified economy, and its location as a gateway to the Central African region. It offers immense investment potential in infrastructure, extractive industries, consumer markets, and modern communication technology (for example, internet broadband, fiber optic cable, and data centers). However, Cameroon’s telecommunication infrastructure is overutilized and in need of upgrades, which often results in network outages. Agricultural processing and transport infrastructure, such as seaports, airports, and rail, need investments, especially for modernization and maintenance. More investment opportunities exist in the financial sector as only 15 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. Corruption and weak governance structures continue to hamper Cameroon’s business climate. The IMF approved a three-year, $689.5 million hybrid Extended Credit Facility-Extended Fund Facility arrangement in July 2021 to advance structural fiscal reforms, improve governance, and continue mitigating the health, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic while ensuring domestic and external sustainability. Cameroon’s 2022 budget aligns with its National Development Strategy and IMF program and sets a target to reduce the budget deficit from -3.2 percent in 2021 to -2 percent in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 123 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-19 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,520 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Creating a conducive business environment to attract foreign direct investments is a corner stone of Cameroon’s development strategy. Governance and strategic management of the state constitutes one of the four pillars of the 2020-2030 National Development Strategy 2030, which was launched November 2020. The Government of Cameroon acknowledges that the challenging nature of the domestic business climate remains a concern. To fight corruption, rebuild a weak legal system, and modernize an inefficient public service, the National Development Strategy has adopted a holistic approach to governance, which includes political and institutional governance, administrative governance, economic and financial governance, regional governance, and social and cultural governance. Cameroon has put in place an arsenal of institutions and laws to improve governance. The government created the Special Crime Tribunal on corruption and economic crimes in 2012 to prosecute crimes related to the misappropriation of public funds of $100,000 or more. The Court specifically targets custodians of public funds as well as officials who have the authority to collect or spend money on behalf of the state. The Court reported it had tried 225 cases and recovered $323 million as of July 2020. Another institution, the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court, reports directly to the President and is charged with conducting audits and investigations of public funds. The National Anti-Corruption Commission also reports to the President and investigates corruption allegations. However, corruption and administrative mismanagement continue to hamper the business climate in Cameroon. Cameroon consistently ranks in the bottom half of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (144 of 180 in 2021). In 2020, Cameroon ranked 167 of 190 on the Ease of Doing Business index. Despite the active presence of state-owned companies in important sectors of the economy, private entities – both domestic and foreign – can create and own businesses that engage in all forms of legal remunerative activities. They can also enter joint ventures and public-private partnerships with the government. The Cameroon Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) was created in 2010 and is a state-owned entity with a mission of attracting investment to Cameroon in collaboration with other state institutions. The agency seeks also to foster an enabling environment for investments in Cameroon. As of 2021, CIPA had signed 172 investment agreements and generated the creation of over 60,000 jobs. CIPA offers investment incentives covering existing and emerging economic sectors. The agency also serves as a one-stop-shop facilitator through the assistance it provides to foreign and domestic investors. It processes application files for approval in compliance with its investment charter and assists in the alignment of projects with the general tax code. It can support potential foreign investors for visa applications. The agency also follows up to monitor the implementation of commitments made by approved companies. CIPA’s sector coverage Sources: National Institute of Statistics, IMF, estimates 2019-2020 The government maintains dialogue with business associations such as the Groupement Inter-Patronal du Cameroun (GICAM) and Enterprise Cameroon through the Cameroon Business Forum, which is sponsored by the World Bank. Over the past two years, GICAM has been critical of the government’s handling of the negative impacts of COVID-19 and global inflationary pressures on business. There are no general economy-wide (statutory, de facto, or otherwise) limits on foreign ownership or control. Apart from the national defense and security areas, there are no sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to foreign ownership and control. Despite an active government presence in most sectors of the economy, private entities – both domestic and foreign – can create and own businesses that engage in all forms of legal remunerative activities. They can also enter joint ventures and public-private partnerships with the government. Cameroon has no laws or regulations that expressly prohibit investment, equity caps, mandatory domestic joint venture partners, licensing restrictions, or mandatory intellectual property/technology transfer requirements. Cameroon has a screening process, which is applicable to all domestic and foreign investments. This screening process ensures that investors meet the criteria, such as employment and export quantities, to qualify for private investment incentives. The IMF approved a three-year, $689.5 million hybrid Extended Credit Facility-Extended Fund Facility arrangement in July 2021. The arrangements are built around five pillars: (i) mitigating the health, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic while ensuring domestic and external sustainability; (ii) reinforcing good governance and strengthening transparency and the anti-corruption framework; (iii) accelerating structural fiscal reforms to modernize tax and customs administrations, mobilize revenue, improve public financial management, increase public investment efficiency, and reduce fiscal risks from state-owned enterprises; (iv) strengthening debt management and reduce debt vulnerabilities; and (v) implementing structural reforms to accelerate economic diversification, boost financial sector resilience and inclusion, and promote gender equality and a greener economy. The IMF completed a First Review of the program on February 23, 2022 and found Cameroon’s overall program performance to be mixed. While macroeconomic performance is broadly satisfactory, and efforts to promote good governance and transparency are gaining momentum, progress on structural reforms is slow. Copies of the review can be found on the IMF website . Civil society organizations and business associations have provided investment related policy recommendations. Following the introduction of an electronic payment tax, which includes mobile money, in the 2022 finance law, Cameroon’s largest business association GICAM noted “mobile money taxes can have a negative impact on excise tax receipts as consumers are pushed into non-traceable cash transactions, and on the size of remittances from abroad.” GICAM recommended the government enhance consumer purchasing power by reducing some taxes, reviewing remuneration policy, and amending its price regulation policies. Following reform proposals from the road transport syndicate on freight conditions on the Douala-Bangui Corridor, the government approved the construction of rest areas along the corridor as well as the reduction of police checkpoints in 2021. Entrepreneurs obtain a unique tax identifying number when they open a company in Cameroon. Within 15 days after the registration for a new business, the Directorate General of Taxation issues a permanent taxpayer identification number, known as the Unique Identification Number (UIN). According to the World Bank, it takes 14 procedures and 82 days to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company in Douala, Cameroon’s largest city and economic capital. This process is longer and more complex than regional and global averages. For foreign investors, a declaration of foreign investment to the Ministry of Finance is mandatory 30 days prior to the beginning of operations. In addition, if the company wants to engage in international trade, registration in the importers’ file is required to obtain an automated customs systems number (Système Douanier Automatisé, or “sydonia”). This number facilitates the entry and exit of goods produced by the company. The authentication of the parent company’s documentation abroad is required only to establish a subsidiary. Foreign-owned resident companies that wish to maintain foreign currency bank accounts must obtain prior approval. The Minister of Finance issues such authorization, which is subject to approval from the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) as per Section 24 of the exchange control regulations. This approval takes on average 38 days to obtain. There is a minimum paid-in capital requirement of CFA 1,000,000 (~$1,800) for establishing LLCs. In Cameroon, business registration is most often manual, although the Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises launched an electronic registration portal designed to automate the process at https://cameroun.eregistrations.org/ . Due to internet access challenges, the website is not always operational. To manually register, entrepreneurs must go to a Ministry of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises regional center for the creation of enterprises, which can complete the registration procedure within one week. The Cameroonian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Cameroon’s laws are consistent with international business and legal norms. Cameroon’s legal architecture is made up of national, regional CEMAC, and supra-national regulations, most of which are applicable to domestic and foreign businesses. Weak implementation and investigative capacity, a lack of understanding of international business practices, and corruption in the judiciary limit the effectiveness of the rule of law. In many circumstances, judicial loopholes persist, leading to arbitrary interpretations of the texts. Some government ministries, though not all, consult with public and private sector organizations through targeted outreach with stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. There is no formal process for such consultations. Ministries do not report the results of consultations, but there is no evidence that such processes disadvantage U.S. or other foreign investors. Cameroon’s National Assembly and Senate pass laws. The Executive proposes bills and then executes laws. Though there is technically a separation of powers, the Presidency is the supreme rule-making and regulatory authority. Decentralized institutions in the regions and municipalities have little additional regulatory authority. Draft bills and regulations are not made available for public comment. The website for the Office of the Prime Minister (www.spm.gov.cm) contains PDF versions of most new regulatory actions published in the Cameroon Tribune, the country’s newspaper of record. Ministries and regulatory agencies do not have a list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended to be adopted/implemented within a specified period. Ministries do not have a legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. There is no period set by law for the text of the proposed regulations to be publicly available. There is no specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. Cameroon has administrative courts that specialize in the application and enforcement of public laws. From a strictly legal perspective, the Supreme Court has oversight on enforcement mechanisms, but a lack of separation of powers prevents the judiciary from carrying out its responsibilities. There have been no new regulatory or enforcement reforms announced since the 2021 Investment Climate Statement. Cameroon does not meet the minimum standards of fiscal transparency. This is partly because many of the state-owned enterprises do not have public accounts. Companies that are listed or aspire to be listed on the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE) have more stringent transparency requirements. There are only four publicly listed companies on the CASE. All four use the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) accounting system, which does not align completely with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Cameroon is a member of CEMAC and is thus subject to its regulations, though implementation remains weak. CEMAC’s central bank, the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), controls monetary policy and is the de facto finance sector regulator, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. The National Institute of Statistics (INS) conducts surveys and produces statistics, which are meant to inform policy decisions. Some of these statistics are cited in government documents when ministries are drafting legislative proposals or during parliamentary debates. Quantitative analysis conducted by the INS has often been used by multilateral lenders such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. However, empirical evaluation and data-driven assessments of the impact of new and existing regulations are limited. Similarly, public comments are not the main drivers of regulations. However, some consultations take place for the national budget, which is produced each year, but there is little oversight to ensure adherence to the document. The government does not require companies to have environmental, social, or governance disclosures. Cameroon is a CEMAC member state. CEMAC regulations supersede those of individual members, though areas such as the free movement of people, goods, and services are not respected by some states. Recent reforms by CEMAC’s central bank, BEAC, have met stiff resistance and delays in their application by individual member states, including Cameroon. The government requires use of OHADA accounting standards, which are used by 14 African nations. No other norms or standards are referenced in the country’s regulatory system. Cameroon joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 13, 1995 and was previously a member of the General Agreement on Taxes and Tariffs. Cameroon did not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in 2020 and submitted eight notifications between 1995 and 2020. The Cameroonian legal system is a legacy of French (Civil Law), German (Codified Laws), English (Common Law), and domestic national customs, which vary for each ethnic group. The government wants to harmonize these different legal traditions to equip Cameroon with laws that are applicable across the country and to reduce the need to navigate different legal opinions. This project, however, is being met with stiff resistance from English-speaking lawyers, who believe that the initiative will undermine the English system to which they are accustomed. In terms of standards, Cameroon’s commercial legal system follows the OHADA rules, which are supposed to be aligned with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Enforcement is weak, partly because of lack of capacity. There are not enough specialized judges in the commercial and economic fields. Consequently, poor enforcement of laws and accounting standards tend to create confusion for foreign investors. Despite efforts to align OHADA standards to international norms, government accounting regulations remain obsolete in the context of rapid developments in international finance and capital markets. To circumvent the problem, U.S. enterprises and investors often maintain two sets of accounting records, one in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or suitable international standards, and another set to address the OHADA standards and government reporting requirements. Arbitration is becoming the solution of choice to solve business disputes in Cameroon. Arbitration is in the OHADA corporate law and business associations can choose to use OHADA law to run arbitration councils. Since OHADA is a supra-national law, Cameroon is bound by its decisions. In OHADA, regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and they can also be adjudicated in the national court system. In Cameroon, businesses mostly use the GICAM and Abidjan Arbitration Councils. Foreign direct investments are governed by Law No. 2013/004 of April 18, 2013, which defines incentives for private investment in Cameroon, while proposing generic and special incentives and affirming the government’s responsibilities towards private investors. The law applies to both domestic and foreign investors. Additional laws and regulations that refer to specific economic sectors are available on the website of the Ministry of Finance ( http://www.minfi.gov.cm/index.php/en/documents ). The 2022 finance law is the newest legal instrument to have been published in the past year. The 2021 finance law created new taxes, while maintaining some existing exonerations, notably on value-added taxes and life insurance savings. The 2022 law created new taxes as well, including a tax on electronic payments. CIPA maintains a list of relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors ( https://www.investincameroon.net/language/en/ ). The National Competition Commission handles anti-competition and anti-trust disputes. In some cases, the regulator of a specific economic sector can play the anti-trust role. State-owned enterprises tend to have quasi-monopoly or monopsony status in their markets. Decree No.85-9 of July 4, 1985 and the subsequent implementation of Decree N°.87-1872 of December 16, 1987, outline the procedures governing expropriation for public purposes and conditions for compensation. Some of the provisions of these legal texts were repealed by Instruction No. 005/I/Y.25/MINDAF/D220 of December 29, 2005. Essentially, for the public interest, the state may expropriate privately-owned land. The laws also explain the formalities to be observed within the context of the procedure, both at the central and local levels. In recent years, the government of Cameroon has expropriated large infrastructure road and hydroelectric dam projects. The government has a compensation process in place to meet the losses of those affected by such decisions. Despite weakness in the actual implementation and execution of laws on the ground, compensation after expropriation generally follows a due process. There are no cases of indirect expropriation, confiscatory tax regimes, or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. However, serious allegations of corruption have plagued compensation procedures over the last decade. These incidents, often carried out by civil servants, have undermined trust in the process. 4. Industrial Policies Cameroon’s investment incentives remain in place. The 2013 investment law lists several types of investment incentives for investors and specifies the conditions that they must meet to benefit from those incentives. This law specifies incentives available to Cameroonian or foreign legal entities, whether established in Cameroon, conducting business therein, or holding shares in Cameroonian companies, to encourage private investment and boost national production. For example, during the establishment phase (which cannot exceed five years), the code provides for exemptions from VAT and duties on key services/assets (including an exemption from stamp duties on the lease of immovable property). During the operation phase (which cannot exceed 10 years), further exemptions from, or reductions of, other taxes (including a corporate tax), duties (such as a stamp duty on loans), and other fees are granted. Overall, the law seeks to facilitate, promote, and attract productive investment to develop activities geared towards strong, sustainable, and shared economic growth as well as job creation. In a context where businesses must navigate between national and regional incentives, U.S. companies and investors must seek local and regional expertise if they plan to operate in the CEMAC region. Common incentives are granted to investors during the establishment and operation phases. During the operation phase, which may not exceed 10 years, the investor may enjoy exemptions from or reductions of payment of several taxes, duties, and other fees including corporate tax, tax on profit and stamp duties on loans. In addition, any investor may benefit from a tax credit provided he or she meets one of the following criteria: (1) employs at least five graduates each year, (2) combats pollution, or (3) develops public interest activities in rural areas. BEAC foreign exchange regulations govern how investors in Cameroon open foreign currency accounts and carry out transactions on such accounts. The regulations also stipulate how funds are transferred abroad. Notwithstanding BEAC regulations, the investor shall enjoy the following benefits during establishment phase, which may not exceed five years, with effect from the date of issuance of the approval: Exemption from stamp duty on establishment or capital increase; Exemption from stamp duty if immovable property used exclusively for professional purposes and that is part of an integral part of the investment program; Exemption from transfer taxes on the acquisition of immovable property, land, and buildings essential for the implementation of the investment program; Exemption from stamp duties on contracts for the supply of equipment and construction of buildings and installations that are essential for the implementation of their investment program; Full deduction of technical assistance fees in proportion to the amount of the investment made, calculated on the basis of the total amount of the investment; Exemption from VAT on the provision of services related to the execution of the project and obtained from abroad; Exemption from stamp duty on concession contracts; Exemption from business license tax; Exemption from taxes and duties on all equipment and materials related to the investment program; Exemption from VAT on the importation of equipment and materials; Immediate removal of equipment and material related investment program during clearance operations; The right to freely keep abroad dividends and proceeds of any kind from capital invested, as well as proceeds from the liquidation or sale of their assets; The right to directly pay abroad non-resident suppliers of goods and services essential for conduct of business; and, Free transfer of dividends and proceeds from the sale of shares in case of disinvestment. With respect to foreign staff employed by the investor and resident in Cameroon, they shall enjoy free conversion and free transfer to their country of origin of all or part of amounts due them, subject to prior payment of various taxes and social security contributions to which they are liable in compliance with the regulations in force. Finally, the government shall institute facilities necessary for the establishment of a specific visa and a reception counter at all airports throughout the national territory for investors, subject to their presentation of a formal invitation from the body in charge of investment promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. There are additional incentives in priority economic sectors. In addition to the above-mentioned incentives, specific incentives may be provided to enterprises, which carry out investments that contribute to the attainment of the following priority objectives: Development of agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and plant, animal or fishery product packaging activities; Development of tourism and leisure facilities, social economy, and handicrafts; Development of housing, including social housing; Promotion of agroindustry, manufacturing industries, industry, construction materials, iron and steel industry, construction, maritime and navigation activities; Development of energy and water supply; encouragement of regional development and decentralization; The fight against pollution and environmental protection; Promotion and transfer of innovative technologies and research and development; Promotion of exports; and, Promotion of employment and vocational training. The government does not offer incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors such as women. The government does not offer incentives for clean energy investments. In Cameroon, Foreign Trade Zones (FTZ) are demarcated and fenced geographic areas, with controlled access, where some standard trade barriers, tariffs, quotas, or other bureaucratic requirements are lifted or lowered to attract investments. Cameroon passed a special law instituting FTZs in 1990. An Industrial Free Zone (IFZ) is a type of FTZ in Cameroon. Applications for an authorization to establish an IFZ are submitted to the National Office for Industrial Free Zones. The Minister in Charge of Industrial Development grants authorization to establish an IFZ. To qualify for industrial free zone status, a company must export 80 percent of its products. The status of FTZs has not changed since the last reporting period. Additionally, Law No. 2013/11 of December16, 2013 defines an economic zone as an area made up of one or more geographical areas that are serviced, developed, and equipped with infrastructure, with a view to enabling the entities located there to produce goods and services in optimal conditions. Decree No. 2019/195 of April 17, 2019, also establishes the modalities for the creation and management of economic zones in Cameroon. The ports of Douala and Kribi have economic zones. The government of Cameroon does not mandate local employment except as an incentive to entice foreign investment. It encourages investors to create jobs and employ local labor. There are no compulsory or legal requirements on senior management and boards of directors either, although local managers can facilitate the understanding of the domestic business environment. Prospective investors and their employees can travel to Cameroon on standard international visas. The fees may vary per country of application. Once they settle in Cameroon, they can apply for long-term residence permits. The government of Cameroon applies the visa reciprocity rules to a limited extent, but companies have in the past complained about the difficulty of obtaining work permits or the fact that work visas expire after six months and frequently are single entry. Longer term work permits are now said to be available, but they have not been issued to U.S. Embassy Yaoundé’s interlocutors unless included as residency work permits, a different category with more complicated application procedures. The government does not impose conditions on permission to invest in Cameroon. It gives incentives to investors to transform local raw materials, goods, and services in their production or their projects. There is no “forced localization” policy. Enforcement procedures for performance requirements are not yet standardized, but the government generally develops terms of reference on a case-by-case basis for contract performance. The government has not stated intentions to maintain, increase, or decrease performance requirements. Investment incentives, described above, are available to both domestic and foreign investors. Foreign information technology providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, but they can be required to provide them in cases of cybercrime under the national cybercrime law. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any measures designed to prevent or impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside of Cameroon. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are recognized by law, but Cameroon’s weak judiciary makes enforcement sporadic. For mortgage transactions between two private parties, a proper contract is required for the agreement to be binding and enforceable in the courts. Liens must be recorded in the contract. A registry of land title exists in Cameroon. The land rights of indigenous peoples, tribes, and farmers are recognized in the Constitution. Existing legislation does not discriminate against foreign landowners. Records from the Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure indicate that land registration rates have not significantly increased since colonial times. Between 1884 and 2005, only 125,000 title deeds were issued. On average, this represents approximately 1,000 titles per year, covering less than two percent of the land in Cameroon. In 2009, a study by the African Development Bank (AfDB) identified other distinctive patterns in land ownership. For example, formal land registration is more common in urban (60 percent) than in rural areas. According to the World Bank, the registration process can cost up to 13.7 percent of the property value. Land disputes are common among Cameroonian citizens. The disputes are generally caused by non-respect of commercial sales contracts or by informal sales of land. Illegal occupations of property are also common. Globally, Cameroon ranked 175th out of 190 economies on the ease of registering property in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020. The legal structure for intellectual property rights (IPR) and corresponding enforcement mechanisms are weak. IP infringement and theft are especially common in the media, pharmaceuticals, software, and print industries. To secure a trademark registration right, a Cameroonian attorney must prepare and file a trademark application with the African Organization for Intellectual Property (OAPI), which is headquartered in Yaoundé. The courts are responsible for enforcement. There were no new IPR-related laws or regulations enacted during the previous year. The government seizes and publicly burns counterfeit goods. These actions are not documented systematically, and no cumulative data exist on the seizures. Cameroon is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The Cameroonian government is open to portfolio investment. With the encouragement of the IMF and BEAC, Cameroon and other members of the CEMAC region have designed policies that facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The Financial Markets Commission of Cameroon merged operations with the Libreville-based Central African Financial Market Supervisory Board in February 2019. The merger has led to the establishment of a unique regional stock exchange called the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE). Cameroon’s financial sector is underdeveloped, and government policies have limited bearing on the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market and the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. In 2016, Cameroon sought to encourage the development of capital markets through Law No 2016/010 of July 12, 2016, governing undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities in Cameroon. Cameroon is connected to the international banking payment system. The country is a CEMAC member, which maintains a central bank, BEAC. CEMAC’s central bank works with the IMF on monetary policies and public finance reform. BEAC respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Despite generally respecting Article VIII, BEAC has instituted several restrictions on payments to boost foreign exchange reserves. Financial institutions and importers complain of a backlog of requests for foreign exchange. BEAC is currently negotiating with several international oil companies on repatriation of revenues before external payments. Investors should be aware that timely repatriation of profits may be a stumbling block. In 2020, with the support of the IMF, BEAC took steps to address the economic impact of COVID-19 in the region. The central bank eased monetary policy and introduced accommodative measures to ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system to supporting internal and external stability. Concomitantly, the regional banking sector controller (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale or COBAC) eased prudential regulations to help banks delay pandemic-related losses. Less than 20 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. The Cameroonian government has often spoken of increasing access, but no coherent policy or action has been taken to alleviate the problem. Mobile money, introduced by local and international telecom providers, is the closest tool to banking services that most Cameroonians can access. In its 2022 finance law, the government introduced a tax on electronic payment transfers, including the ubiquitously used “Mobile Money.” The banking sector is generally healthy. Large, international commercial banks do most of the lending. One local bank, Afriland, operates in Cameroon and multiple other countries. Most smaller banks deal in small loans of short duration. Retail banking is not common. According to the World Bank, non-performing loans were 10.31 percent of total bank loans in 2016. The Cameroonian government does not keep statistics on non-performing assets. According to Cameroon’s National Credit Council, Afriland First Bank, Societe General Cameroun (SGC), Banque Internationale du Cameroun pour l’Epargne et le Credit (BICEC), and Societe Commerciale de Banque Cameroun (SCB) are the most important banks in the national banking system, accounting for 52 percent of the banking system’s total consolidated balance sheet, 54 percent of total loans, and 54 percent of customer deposits in 2020. Foreign banks can establish operations in Cameroon. Most notably, Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank have operated in Cameroon for more than 20 years. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any lost correspondent banking relationships within the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing bank accounts, credit instruments, business financing, or other such transactions. The country has 412 registered microfinance institutions, 19 insurance companies, four electronic money institutions, and one Post Office bank. Two major money transfer operators are also present, essentially offering over-the-counter services. The Cameroon market is at the startup stage for its digital financial system. This emerging market segment is currently provided by banks in partnership with telecom operators. According to a 2021 BEAC report on the state of electronic payments in the CEMAC zone, electronic money payments in the CEMAC region increased 21.8 percent from 2019 to 2020, totaling approximately $51 million in 2020 compared to $42 million in 2019. Cameroon represented the largest amount of electronic payment transfers, accounting for 73 percent of all CEMAC transactions and totaling over $20 million in 2020. Financial inclusion is low despite some progress brought about by mobile telephony. The World Bank estimates there were 25 million mobile cellular subscriptions in Cameroon in 2020. Putting aside the multi-SIM effect, the penetration rate in terms of unique subscribers was about 50 percent at the end of 2019, which puts Cameroon in the lower end in the Central African region. Cameroon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of a formal definition of responsible business conduct (RBC) within the Cameroonian government. It does not have a national ombudsman for stakeholders to get information or raise concerns about RBC. The government has not conducted a national action plan on RBC nor does it factor RBC into its procurement decisions. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are not aware of any recent high-profile instances of private sector impact on human rights. Cameroon does not have laws that regulate responsible business conduct. However, the government of Cameroon has enacted laws that cover issues related to what is locally considered corporate social responsibility. There are additional initiatives in the private sector to foster a corporate social responsibility culture. All major infrastructure projects in Cameroon are compelled to conduct an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) to establish the impact of projects on people and nature. Cameroon’s ESIA law strives to follow World Bank standards. An August 1996 master law related to environmental management prescribes an environmental impact assessment for all projects that can cause environmental degradation. The Cameroonian government struggles to enforce laws in relation to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection. There is little corporate governance law in Cameroon, mostly since very few companies are open to portfolio investment. The Business Council for Good Governance, the American Chamber of Commerce, Rotary International, and Transparency International promote RBC in Cameroon, though their ability to monitor RBC is limited. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any government efforts to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Cameroon participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments are lacking. The economy of Cameroon is modernizing, but most sectors experience disruptions from informal activities. The informal sector provides crucial livelihoods to the most vulnerable in urban environments; however, labor conditions are generally precarious. In the agricultural sector, the government estimates that 70 percent of labor is informal with instances of child labor in subsistence agriculture. In other sectors, for example mining, allegations of human or labor rights abuses by Chinese mining companies have surfaced in the recent past. Indigenous forest communities also complain the government does not enforce logging concession laws. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Cameroon revised its nationally determined contributions in November 2021. Cameroon’s mitigation target is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 35 percent by 2035. Mitigation targets are focused on forest management, energy, agriculture, and waste. Cameroon developed a National Adaptation Plan in 2015. Cameroon’s adaptation strategies include integrating adaptation planning into national sectoral strategies and policies, reducing the vulnerability of major economic sectors and agro-ecological zones to climate change, and raising awareness among the population. Cameroon does not yet have a national climate strategy or strategy for monitoring its natural capital, although the U.S. government is supporting Cameroon to build capacity to collect, monitor, and analyze climate data. With U.S. government support, Cameroon published its first atlas of land coverage in 2021. Cameroon developed a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan in 2012 to integrate the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programs, and policies. Cameroon does not have policies to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, but the government recognizes the huge role its forests, which are in the Congo Basin Forest region, will play as a carbon sink and focused mitigation targets on the forestry sector. Cameroon does not specify expectations on private sector contributions to achieving relevant climate targets. There are currently no climate-related regulatory incentives for private sector. All infrastructure projects are compelled to conduct an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment to establish the impact of projects on people and nature. The National Development Strategy has integrated environmental protection into its objectives. 9. Corruption Corruption is punishable under sections 134 and 134 (a) of the Pena1 Code of Cameroon. Despite these rules, corruption remains endemic in the country. In 2021, Cameroon ranked 144 of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Anti-corruption laws are applicable to all citizens and institutions throughout the national territory. Article 66 of the constitution requires civil servants and elected officials to declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure of office, but it has never been enforced, since the adoption of the constitution in 1996. Similarly, the Civil Service Statute contains provisions and the procedures to be followed in the event of a conflict of interest. These provisions are enshrined in Law No. 003/2006 of April 25, 2006, which also created the Commission for the declaration of property and assets. Other codes of conduct in different public institutions have created gift registers to prevent bribes, but they are not implemented. In terms of public contracts, Decree No. 2018/0001/PM of January 5, 2018 created a portal called Cameroon Online E-procurement System (Coleps) for the digitalization, including application processing, award, and monitoring and evaluation of all tenders. Since the launch of the portal, technical issues and disregard by civil servants have curbed its effectiveness, leading to the parallel continuation of the bribe-prone paper-based procurement system. U.S. firms indicate that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, award of licenses or concessions, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory system, customs, and taxation. Since its inception in 2006 (Presidential Decree No. 2006/088 of March 11, 2006), the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) has encouraged private companies to establish internal codes of conduct and ethics committees to review practices. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of how many companies have instituted either program. Bribery of government officials remains common. While some companies use internal controls to detect and prevent such bribery, U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of how widespread these internal controls are. Cameroon is signatory to the United Nations and the African Union anti-corruption initiatives, but the international initiatives have limited practical effects on the enforcement of laws in the country. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any NGO’s involvement in investigating corruption. The government prefers the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) to investigate potential cases. U.S. companies cite corruption as among the top obstacles to investing in Cameroon and report its being most pervasive in government procurement, the award of licenses and concessions, customs, and taxation. Rev. Dieudonné MASSI GAMS Chairman National Anti-Corruption Commission B.P. 33200 Yaoundé Cameroon (+237) 22 20 37 32 www.conac-cameroun.net infos@conac-cameroun.net Transparency International Cameroon Nouvelle route Bastos, rue 1.839, BP: 4562 Yaoundé (+237) 22 68 23 30 ticameroon@yahoo.fr https://ti-cameroun.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment Cameroon faces several security challenges. Violence by non-state armed groups against security forces and the local population is in its sixth year in the primarily English-speaking Southwest and Northwest Regions. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa continue to attack civilians and security forces in the Far North Region. In the Adamoua and East Regions, a wave of kidnappings and the presence of refugees from the Central African Republic has led to increased military presence. Terrorists and separatists alike have targeted economic assets and public infrastructure to effect political change. In the Northwest and Southwest regions, leaders of non-state armed groups have claimed responsibility on social media for the killing of government officials, arsons that destroyed hospitals, schools, bridges, roads, and the seizure of state-run utilities. Non-state armed groups have also posted videos on social media of executions and beheadings of security officers while also claiming responsibility for multiple kidnappings for ransom of persons perceived to be against their cause. Human rights organizations and local citizens have accused soldiers and separatists of grave human rights abuses. In the Far North of Cameroon, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa fighters have looted villages and cattle, kidnapped, and abused women. Consequently, several infrastructures projects have ground to a halt. 11. Labor Policies and Practices COVID-19 has had a significant impact on the labor market. Data from the National Institute of Statistics show that a large proportion of workers have seen a drastic reduction in wages (68 percent) and temporary job suspension (31.6 percent). Also, the unemployment rate reached 6.1 percent in 2021 according to the National Institute of Statistics. Most of the youth who possess skills that could be used in the economy are under-employed in the informal sector. Under-employment, which is generally under-reported, has continued to hover around 75 percent for youth under 30. Most Cameroonians find occupation in the informal sector, where unskilled labor is prevalent, especially in the agricultural and service sectors, manufacturing, commerce, technical trades, and mid-management jobs. Other structural problems in the labor market include the chronic shortage of technical trade skills, for example for maintenance and repair of industrial machinery, in every sector of the economy. Truck and automotive maintenance are widely practiced in the informal sector, while rudimentary or artisanal agriculture, fishing, and textile manufacturing continue to hamper industrialization with unskilled labor. The government of Cameroon does not require foreign companies to hire Cameroonian nationals. Foreign nationals are required, however, to obtain work permits prior to formal employment. While foreign nationals are automatically issued work permits for companies of the Industrial Free Zones regime, their number may not exceed 20 percent of the total work force of a company after the fifth year of operation in Cameroon. Although union and contract agreements vary widely from sector to sector, in general, Cameroon functions as an “employment at will” economy, and labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. Layoffs are not caused by the fault of the employees and are often considered as alternative solutions to dismissing workers based on performance fault or economic grounds. There is no special treatment of labor in special economic zones, foreign trade zones, or free ports. While the Labor Code applies to enterprises of the Industrial Free Zone regime, some matters are governed by special provisions under the 1990 law establishing Industrial Free Zones. These include the employer’s right to determine salaries according to productivity, free negotiation of work contracts, and automatic issuance of work permits for foreign workers. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security monitors labor abuses, health and safety standards, and other related issues, but enforcement is poor. Labor laws are waived within the framework of Industrial Free Zones to attract or retain investment. The waivers include the employer’s right to determine salaries according to productivity, free negotiation of work contracts, and automatic issuance of work permits for foreign nationals. There are independent labor unions and others affiliated with the government that operate under existing laws and regulations. Over 100 trade unions and 12 union confederations are active in the country. However, the labor union movement is highly fractured and somewhat ineffective in promoting workers’ rights. Some union leaders accuse the government and company managers of promoting division within trade unions to weaken them, as well as protecting non-representative trade union leaders with whom they can negotiate more easily. Cameroon’s labor dispute resolution mechanisms are outlined in the labor code. The procedure differs depending on whether the dispute is individual or collective. Individual disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the civil court dealing with labor matters in the place of employment or residence of the worker. The legal procedure is initiated after the labor inspector fails to settle the dispute amicably out of the court system. Settlement of collective labor disputes is subject to conciliation and arbitration, and any strike or lock-out started after the procedures have been exhausted and have failed is deemed legitimate. While the conciliation procedure is conducted by the labor inspector, arbitration of any collective dispute that has not been settled by conciliation is handled by an arbitration board, chaired by the competent judicial officer of the competent court of appeal. Workers who ignore procedures to conduct a legal strike can be dismissed or fined. Strikes occur regularly and are generally repressed by the police, though they are often due to lack of payment by the employer (including when the employer is the government) and are resolved quickly. Recent strikes involved public sector employees. The National Potable Water Employee Union launched a strike in February 2022, citing management concerns of the state-owned water utility, CAMWATER. The union also cited concern about the absence of a plan for the construction of new water infrastructure, and a maintenance and rehabilitation plan for existing networks. In response, the Minister of Energy and Water Resources, who supervises CAMWATER, engaged the union directly in negotiations. In another public sector strike, teachers launched a broad, nation-wide strike in February 2022 to demand better working conditions and compensation for unpaid wages and benefits, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. The government has called for dialogue and offered to pay a portion of the amount teachers demanded. Cameroonian labor code lays down principles of labor laws regarding employment, dismissal, remedies for wrongful dismissal, compensation for industrial injuries, and trade unions. But most jobs do not have binding contracts, and employers generally seem to have the upper hand in labor disputes. There is informality even in the formal sector, which is against the law. Because of this landscape, it is important for U.S. companies to ensure compliance with the local labor laws and to abide by international best practices. There were no new labor-related laws or regulations enacted during the last year. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any pending draft bills. The Cameroon National Institute of Statistics estimates that every sector has a level of informality. Likewise, the IMF estimates the informal economy contributes 20-30 percent to Cameroon’s GDP every year and provides jobs to 84 percent of the active working population. Additionally, informal employment comprises over 90 percent of the agricultural sector. Prevalence of informality in the economy of Cameroon Key Sectors % of GDP Example of informality 1 Agriculture 19 Unlicensed transport 2 Transportation 5.3 Motorbike taxis/Cross border trade 3 Information, Communication Technology (ICT) 5 Maintenance, repair, retail market 4 Extractive industry (Oil, Gas, Mining) 9 Artisanal mining/cross border trade 5 Banking and Finance 8.5 Informal microfinance institutions 6 Services and consumer retail market 12 Support services/home workers 7 Utilities (Electricity, Water, domestic gas, waste disposal-management) 3.1 Maintenance and repair 8 Real Estate and Infrastructure Construction 10.8 Labor, rental activities 9 Manufacturing 4 Artisanal manufacturing 10 Health services and pharmaceuticals 1 Counterfeit medicine 11 Public Administration 8 Unlicensed institutions and labor 12 Tourism, media, and Leisure – Unlicensed institutions and labor (Source: Cameroon Ministry of Finance, Finance laws 2016-2020) 14. Contact for More Information Christina Hardaway Deputy Chief, Political-Economic Section U.S. Embassy Yaounde HardawayCED@state.gov Canada Executive Summary Canada and the United States have one of the largest and most comprehensive investment relationships in the world. U.S. investors are attracted to Canada’s strong economic fundamentals, proximity to the U.S. market, highly skilled work force, and abundant resources. Canada encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) by promoting stability, global market access, and infrastructure. The United States is Canada’s largest investor, accounting for 44 percent of total FDI. As of 2020, the amount of U.S. FDI totaled USD 422 billion, a 5 percent increase from the previous year. Canada’s FDI stock in the United States totaled USD 570 billion, a 15 percent increase from the previous year. Canada attracted USD 61 billion inward FDI flows in 2021 (the highest since 2007), a rebound from COVID-19-related decreases in 2020 according to Canada’s national statistical office. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) came into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The USMCA supports a strong investment framework beneficial to U.S. investors. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated by the Investment Canada Act (ICA). The purpose of the ICA is to review significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. In March 2021, the Canadian government announced revised ICA foreign investment screening guidelines that include additional national security considerations such as sensitive technology areas, critical minerals, and sensitive personal data. The guidelines followed an April 2020 ICA update, which provides for greater scrutiny of foreign investments by state-owned investors, as well as investments involving the supply of critical goods and services. Despite a generally welcoming foreign investment environment, Canada maintains investment stifling prohibitions in the telecommunication, airline, banking, and cultural sectors. The 2022 budget proposal included language that could limit foreign ownership of real estate for a two-year period (to cool an overheated market and lack of housing for Canadians). Ownership and corporate board restrictions prevent significant foreign telecommunication and aviation investment, and there are deposit acceptance limitations for foreign banks. Investments in cultural industries such as book publishing are required to be compatible with national cultural policies and be of net benefit to Canada. In addition, non-tariff barriers to trade across provinces and territories contribute to structural issues that have held back the productivity and competitiveness of Canada’s business sector. Canada has taken steps to address the climate crisis by establishing the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act that enshrines in law the Government of Canada’s commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and issuing the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan that describes the measures Canada is undertaking to reduce emissions to 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 16 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 402,255 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 43,580 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Canada actively encourages FDI and maintains a sound enabling environment. Investors are attracted to Canada’s proximity to the United States, highly skilled workforce, strong legal protections, and abundant natural resources. Once established, foreign-owned investments are treated equally to domestic investments. As of 2020, the United States had a stock of USD 422 billion of foreign direct investment in Canada. U.S. FDI stock in Canada represents 44 percent of Canada’s total investment. Canada’s FDI stock in the United States totaled USD 570 billion. The USMCA modernizes the previous NAFTA investment protection rules and investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Parties to the USMCA agree to treat investors and investments of the other Parties in accordance with the highest international standards, and consistent with U.S. law and practice, while safeguarding each Party’s sovereignty and promoting domestic investment. Invest in Canada is Canada’s investment attraction and promotion agency. It provides information and advice on doing business in Canada, strategic market intelligence on specific industries, site visits, and introductions to provincial, territorial, and municipal investment promotion agencies. Still, non-tariff barriers to trade across provinces and territories contribute to structural issues that have held back the productivity and competitiveness of Canada’s business sector. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated under the provisions of the Investment Canada Act (ICA). U.S. FDI in Canada is also subject to the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the USMCA, and the NAFTA. The ICA mandates the review of significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. Canada is not a party to the USMCA’s chapter on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Ongoing NAFTA arbitrations are not affected by the USMCA, and investors can file new NAFTA claims by July 1, 2023, provided the investment(s) were “established or acquired” when NAFTA was still in force and remained “in existence” on the date the USMCA entered into force. An ISDS mechanism between the United States and Canada will cease following a three-year window for NAFTA-protected legacy investments. The Canadian government announced revised ICA foreign investment screening guidelines on March 24, 2021. The revised guidelines include additional national security considerations such as sensitive technology areas, critical minerals, and sensitive personal data. The new guidelines are aligned with Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada’s April 2020 update on greater scrutiny for foreign investments by state-owned investors, as well as investments involving the supply of critical goods and services. The 2020-21 Investment Canada Act Annual Report (released February 2, 2022) indicated a record high 24 investments were subject either to formal national security review or heightened screening despite historically fewer total foreign investments in Canada due to COVID-19-related factors. In contrast, a total of 21 investments were subject to similar screening in the four years from 2016 to 2020. Still, some Canadian elected officials and national security experts assess national security standards should be heightened. The government is exploring proposed amendments to the National Security Review of Investments Regulations which would introduce a voluntary filing mechanism for investments by non-Canadians that do not require an application or a notification. Foreign ownership limits apply to Canadian telecommunication, airline, banking, and cultural sectors. Telecommunication carriers, including internet service providers, that own and operate transmission facilities are subject to foreign investment restrictions if they hold a 10 percent or greater share of total Canadian communication annual market revenues as mandated by The Telecommunications Act. These investments require Canadian ownership of 80 percent of voting shares, Canadians holding 80 percent of director positions, and no indirect control by non-Canadians. If the company is a subsidiary, the parent corporation must be incorporated in Canada and Canadians must hold a minimum of 66.6 percent of the parent’s voting shares. Foreign ownership of Canadian airlines is limited to 49 percent with no individual non-Canadian able to control more than 25 percent by mandate of the 2018 Transportation Modernization Act. Canadian airlines cannot be directly or indirectly controlled by non-Canadians to meet Canadian Transportation Agency “control in fact” licensure requirements. Foreign banks can establish operations in Canada but are generally prohibited from accepting deposits of less than USD 112,000. Foreign banks must receive Department of Finance and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) approval to enter the Canadian market. Investment in cultural industries also carries restrictions, including a provision under the ICA that foreign investment in book publishing and distribution must be compatible with Canada’s national cultural policies and be of net benefit to Canada. The World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review of Canada in 2019. The report is available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp489_e.htm . The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development completed an Economic Forecast Summary and released the results in December 2021. The report is available at: http://www.oecd.org/economy/canada-economic-snapshot/ . Individuals from Canadian civil society organizations, industry, and academic institutions regularly comment on and assess investment policy-related concerns. In January and February 2022, for example, subject matter experts gave evidence to Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology regarding an investment policy decision concerning a high-profile critical mineral sector investment. The Canadian government provides information necessary for starting a business at: https://www.canada.ca/en/services/business/start.html . Business registration requires federal or provincial government-based incorporation, the application of a federal business number and corporation income tax account from the Canada Revenue Agency, the registration as an extra-provincial or extra-territorial corporation in all other Canadian jurisdictions of business operations, and the application of relevant permits and licenses. In some cases, registration for these accounts is streamlined (a business can receive its business number, tax accounts, and provincial registrations as part of the incorporation process); however, this is not true for all provinces and territories. Canada prioritizes export promotion and outward investment as a means to enhance future Canadian competitiveness and productivity. Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service offers a number of funding opportunities and support programs for Canadian businesses to break into and expand in international markets: https://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/funding_support_programs-programmes_de_financement_de_soutien.aspx?lang=eng&wbdisable=true . Canada does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad except when recipient countries or businesses are designated under the government’s sanctions regime. 3. Legal Regime Canada’s regulatory transparency is similar to the United States. Regulatory and accounting systems, including those related to debt obligations, are transparent and consistent with international norms. Proposed legislation is subject to parliamentary debate and public hearings, and regulations are issued in draft form for public comment prior to implementation in the Canada Gazette, the government’s official journal of record. While federal and/or provincial licenses or permits may be needed to engage in economic activities, regulation of these activities is generally for statistical or tax compliance reasons. Under the USMCA, parties agreed to make publicly available any written comments they receive, except to the extent necessary to protect confidential information or withhold personal identifying information or inappropriate content. Canada published regulatory roadmaps for clean technology, digitalization and technology neutrality, and international standards in June 2021. These roadmaps, part of the federal government’s multi-year Targeted Regulatory Review program, lay out plans to advance regulatory modernization to support economic growth and innovation. Canadian securities legislation does not currently mandate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure for public or private companies. The Canadian Securities Administrators, an umbrella organization of all provincial and territorial securities regulators, released two proposed ESG disclosure policies for public comment between October 2021 and February 2022. The policies would require climate-related governance disclosures and climate-related strategy, risk management and metrics and targets disclosures if adopted. Canada publishes an annual budget and debt management report. According to the Ministry of Finance, the design and implementation of the domestic debt program are guided by the key principles of transparency, regularity, prudence, and liquidity. Canada addresses international regulatory norms through its FTAs and actively engages in bilateral and multilateral regulatory discussions. U.S.-Canada regulatory cooperation is guided by Chapter 28 of the USMCA “Good Regulatory Practices” and the bilateral Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC). The USMCA aims to promote regulatory quality through greater transparency, objective analysis, accountability, and predictability. The RCC is a bilateral forum focused on harmonizing health, safety, and environmental regulatory differences. Canada-EU regulatory cooperation is guided by Chapter 21 “Regulatory Cooperation” of the CETA and the Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF). CETA encourages regulators to exchange experiences and information and identify areas of mutual cooperation. The RCF seeks to reconstitute regulatory cooperation under the previous Canada-EU Framework on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. The RCF is mandated to seek regulatory convergence where feasible to facilitate trade. CPTPP Chapter 25 “Regulatory Coherence” seeks to encourage the use of good regulatory practices to promote international trade and investment, economic growth, and employment. The CPTPP also established a Committee on Regulatory Coherence charged with considering developments to regulatory best practices in order to make recommendations to the CPTPP Commission for improving the chapter provisions and enhancing benefits to the trade agreement. Canada is a member of the WTO and notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Canada is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which it ratified in December 2016. Canada’s legal system is based on English common law, except for Quebec, which follows civil law. Law-making responsibility is split between the Parliament of Canada (federal law) and provincial/territorial legislatures (provincial/territorial law). Canada has both written commercial law and contractual law, and specialized commercial and civil courts. Canada’s Commercial Law Directorate provides advisory and litigation services to federal departments and agencies whose mandate includes a commercial component and has legal counsel in Montréal and Ottawa. The judicial branch of government is independent of the executive branch and the current judicial process is considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. The provinces administer justice in their jurisdictions, including management of civil and criminal provincial courts. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated under the provisions of the ICA. U.S. FDI in Canada is also subject to the provisions of the WTO, the USMCA, and the NAFTA. The purpose of the ICA is to review significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. Canada relies on its Invest In Canada promotion agency to provide relevant information to foreign investors: https://www.investcanada.ca/ Competition Bureau Canada is an independent law enforcement agency charged with ensuring Canadian businesses and consumers prosper in a competitive and innovative marketplace as stipulated under the Competition Act, the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, the Textile Labelling Act, and the Precious Metals Marking Act. The Bureau is housed under the Department of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) and is headed by a Commissioner of Competition. Competition cases, excluding criminal cases, are brought before the Competition Tribunal, an adjudicative body independent from the government. The Competition Bureau and Tribunal adhere to transparent norms and procedures. Appeals to Tribunal decisions may be filed with the Federal Court of Appeal as per section 13 of the Competition Tribunal Act. Criminal violations of competition law are investigated by the Competition Bureau and are referred to Canada’s Public Prosecution Service for prosecution in federal court. The federal government announced in February 2022 an intention to review competition law and policy including specific evaluation of loopholes that allow for harmful conduct, drip pricing, wage fixing agreements, access to justice for those injured by harmful conduct, adaptions to the digital economy, and penalty regime modernization. The announcement cited competition as a key tool to strengthen Canadian post-pandemic economic recovery. In September 2020, the Bureau signed the Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities (MMAC) with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the New Zealand Commerce Commission, the United Kingdom Competition & Markets Authority, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U. S. Federal Trade Commission. The MMAC aims to improve international cooperation through information sharing and inter-organizational training. Canadian federal and provincial laws recognize both the right of the government to expropriate private property for a public purpose and the obligation to pay compensation. The federal government has not nationalized a foreign firm since the nationalization of Axis property during World War II. Both the federal and provincial governments have assumed control of private firms, usually financially distressed companies, after reaching agreement with the former owners. The USMCA, like the NAFTA, requires expropriation only be used for a public purpose and done in a nondiscriminatory manner, with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law. Bankruptcy in Canada is governed at the federal level in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act. Each province also has specific laws for dealing with bankruptcy. Canada’s bankruptcy laws stipulate that unsecured creditors may apply for court-imposed bankruptcy orders. Debtors and unsecured creditors normally work through appointed trustees to resolve claims. Trustees will generally make payments to creditors after selling the debtors assets. Equity claimants are subordinate to all other creditor claims and are paid only after other creditors have been paid in full per Canada’s insolvency ladder. In all claims, provisions are made for cross-border insolvencies and the recognition of foreign proceedings. Secured creditors generally have the right to take independent actions and fall outside the scope of the BIA. 4. Industrial Policies Federal and provincial governments offer a wide array of investment incentives designed to advance broader policy goals, such as boosting research and development, and promoting regional economies. The funds are available to qualified domestic and foreign investors. Export Development Canada offers financial support to inward investments under certain conditions. The government maintains a Strategic Innovation Fund that offers funding to firms advancing “the Canadian innovative ecosystem.” Canada also provides incentives through the Innovation Superclusters Initiative, which is investing more than USD 700 million over five years (2017‑2022) to accelerate economic and investment growth in Canada. The five superclusters focus on digital technology, protein industries, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and the ocean. Foreign firms may apply for supercluster funding. A 2020 Canada Parliamentary Budget Office report concluded Supercluster Initiative spending lagged budgetary targets and the Initiative was unlikely to meet its ten-year goal to increase GDP by USD 37 billion. Several provinces also offer incentive programs available to foreign firms. These incentives are normally restricted to firms established in the province or that agree to establish a facility in the province. Quebec is implementing “Plan Nord” (Northern Plan), a 25-year program to incentivize natural resource development in its northern and Arctic regions. The program provides financing to facilitate infrastructure, mining, tourism, and other investments. Ontario provides financial support to investments in targeted sectors (e.g., life sciences) and provincial areas including Northern Ontario, southwest Ontario, rural Ontario, and Eastern Ontario. Alberta offers companies a provincial tax credit worth up to USD 220,000 annually for scientific research and experimental development, as well as Alberta Innovation Vouchers worth up to USD 75,000 to help small early-stage technology and knowledge-driven businesses get their ideas and products to market faster. The federal government and several provincial governments offer specific incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors. The Black Entrepreneurship Program, for example, is a partnership between the Government of Canada, Black-led business organizations, and financial institutions which will provide up to USD 160 million over four years (2021-2025) in loans to help Black Canadian business owners and entrepreneurs grow their businesses. The federal government and several provincial governments offer incentives aimed at attracting and facilitating green investment. The federal government’s Clean Growth in Natural Resource Sectors Program is a USD 120 million fund to incentivize clean technology investment in the energy, mining, and forestry sectors. In April 2022, the federal government proposed a 50 percent tax credit for the construction of carbon capture, utilization, and storage projects for heavy greenhouse gas emitters. Incentives for investment in cultural industries at both the federal and provincial level are generally available only to Canadian-controlled firms. Incentives may take the form of grants, loans, loan guarantees, venture capital, or tax credits. Provincial incentive programs for film production in Canada are available to foreign filmmakers. Under the USMCA, Canada operates as a free trade zone for products made in the United States. Most U.S.-made goods enter Canada duty free. As a general rule, foreign firms establishing themselves in Canada are not subject to local employment or forced localization requirements, although Canada has some requirements on local employment for boards of directors. Ordinarily, at least 25 percent of the directors of a corporation must be resident Canadians. If a corporation has fewer than four directors, however, at least one of them must be a resident Canadian. In addition, corporations operating in sectors subject to ownership restrictions (such as airlines and telecommunications) or corporations in certain cultural sectors (such as book retailing, video, or film distribution) must have a majority resident Canadian director. Data localization is an evolving issue in Canada. The province of Quebec adopted a law in September 2021 that amends its data protection regime. Under the new law, the transfer of personal data outside of Quebec is limited to jurisdictions with data protection regimes possessing an adequate level of protection based on generally accepted data protection principles. Implementation of the law will be phased in 2021-2024. The federal government failed to pass a bill to modernize data protection and privacy standards in 2021, but pledged to re-introduce privacy legislation. Privacy rules in Nova Scotia mandate that personal information in the custody of a public body must be stored and accessed only in Canada unless one of the few limited exceptions applies. The law prevents public bodies such as primary and secondary schools, universities, hospitals, government-owned utilities, and public agencies from using non-Canadian hosting services. British Columbia maintained similar rules, however, the province passed legislation November 25, 2021 permitting some public bodies to disclose and store personal information outside of Canada to ensure operations, including meeting public health demand during the pandemic. Under the USMCA, parties are prevented from imposing data-localization requirements. The Canada Revenue Agency stipulates that tax records must be kept at a filer’s place of business or residence in Canada. Current regulations were written over 30 years ago and do not consider current technical realities concerning data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights Foreign investors have full and fair access to Canada’s legal system, with private property rights limited only by the rights of governments to establish monopolies and to expropriate for public purposes. Investors under the USMCA have mechanisms available for dispute resolution regarding property expropriation by the Government of Canada. The recording system for mortgages and liens is reliable. Canada is ranked 36 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s “Ease of Registering Property” 2020 rankings. Approximately 89 percent of Canada’s land area is government owned (Crown Land). Ownership is divided between by federal (41 percent) and provincial (48 percent) governments. The remaining 11 percent of Canadian land is privately owned. British Columbia and Ontario tax foreign buyers of real property. In British Colombia, foreign buyers of real property in Metro Vancouver, the Fraser Valley, the central Okanagan regional district, Nanaimo, and the Capital Regional District are taxed at 20 percent of the property’s fair market value. In 2018, British Columbia broadened taxation on foreign ownership in Metro Vancouver and enacted a 0.5 percent Speculation and Vacancy Tax, targeting vacant foreign-owned homes. In 2019, the British Colombia Ministry of Finance increased the tax to 2 percent. The tax includes foreign owners and satellite families defined as those who earn most of their income outside of Canada. In Ontario, non-resident buyers of real property are subject to a non-resident speculation tax (NRST) at 15 percent of the property’s fair market value. Ontario extended the NRST in 2022 to apply to real property throughout the province. In 2022, Nova Scotia began levying property taxes on non-residents of Nova Scotia. Residential properties owned by non-residents of Nova Scotia (with exceptions for multi-unit buildings and properties leased for at least twelve months) are subject to a two percent property tax. In addition, non-residents who buy property and do not move to Nova Scotia within six months of closing have to pay a transfer tax of five percent of the property’s value. A federal one percent tax on the value of non-resident, non-Canadian owned residential real estate considered to be vacant or underused is undergoing parliamentary review as of March 2022. In April 2022, the federal government announced a proposed two year ban on sales of residential properties to non-Canadian residents. In terms of non-resident access to land, including farmland, Ontario, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia have no restrictions on foreign ownership of land. Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan maintain measures aimed at prohibiting or limiting land acquisition by foreigners. The acreage limits vary by province, from as low as five acres in Prince Edward Island to as high as 40 acres in Manitoba. In certain cases, provincial authorities may grant exemptions from these limits, including for investment projects. In British Columbia, Crown land cannot be acquired by foreigners, while there are no restrictions on acquisition of other land. Canada took significant steps to improve its intellectual property (IP) provisions when the USMCA came into force July 1, 2020, addressing areas with long-standing concerns, including full national treatment for copyright protections, transparency, and due process with respect to new geographical indications (GIs), more expansive trade secret protection, authority to seize counterfeit goods in transit to other countries, and enforcement measures in the digital environment. Canada must implement three additional provisions, including legislation to implement patent term adjustments to compensate for unreasonable patent prosecution delays by December 2024, legislation to extend copyright protections from 50 years to 70 years after the life of the author by December 2022, and accession to the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite by July 2024. The Canadian courts have established meaningful penalties against circumvention devices and services. In 2019, Canada made positive reforms to the Copyright Board related to tariff-setting procedures for the use of copyrighted works, and efforts remain ongoing to implement those measures Various challenges to IP protection in Canada remain despite this strong legal framework. Canadian IP enforcement of counterfeit and pirated goods at the border and within Canada remains limited. Canada’s system for providing patent term restoration for delays in obtaining marketing approval is also limited in duration, eligibility, and scope of protection. Canada’s ambiguous education-related exemption included in the 2012 copyright law undermines the market for educational publishers and authors. Canada is on the 2022 Watch List in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report to Congress. The Pacific Mall located in Toronto, Ontario was listed in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Canada’s capital markets are open, accessible, and regulated. Credit is allocated on market terms, the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Canada has several securities markets, the largest of which is the Toronto Stock Exchange, and there is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. The Canadian government and Bank of Canada do not place restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The Canadian banking system is composed of 35 domestic banks and 16 foreign bank subsidiaries. Six major domestic banks are dominant players in the market and manage close to USD 5.4 trillion in assets. Many large international banks have a presence in Canada through a subsidiary, representative office, or branch. Ninety-nine percent of Canadians have an account with a financial institution. The Canadian banking system is viewed as very stable due to high capitalization rates that are well above the norms set by the Bank for International Settlements. The OSFI, Canada’s primary banking regulator, announced in January 2022 revised capital, leverage, liquidity, and disclosure rules that incorporate the final Basel III banking reforms with additional adjustments to make them suitable for federally regulated deposit-taking institutions. Most of the revised rules will take effect in the second fiscal quarter of 2023, with those related to market risk and credit valuation adjustment risk taking effect in early 2024. Foreign financial firms interested in investing submit their applications to the OSFI for approval by the Minister of Finance. U.S. and other foreign banks can establish banking subsidiaries in Canada. Several U.S. financial institutions maintain commercially focused operations, principally in the areas of lending, investment banking, and credit card issuance. Foreigners can open bank accounts in Canada with proper identification and residency information. The Bank of Canada is the nation’s central bank. Its principal role is “to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada,” as defined in the Bank of Canada Act. The Bank’s four main areas of responsibility are: monetary policy; promoting a safe, sound, and efficient financial system; issuing and distributing currency; and being the fiscal agent for Canada. Canada does not have a federal sovereign wealth fund. The province of Alberta maintains the Heritage Savings Trust Fund to manage the province’s share of non-renewable resource revenue. The fund’s net financial assets were valued at USD 14 billion as of December 31, 2021. The Fund invests in a globally diversified portfolio of public and private equity, fixed income, and real assets. The Fund follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the “Santiago Principles” and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group of SWFs. The Heritage Fund holds approximately 50 percent of its value in equity investments, seventeen percent of which are domestic. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Canada defines responsible business conduct (RBC) as “Canadian companies doing business abroad responsibly in an economic, social, and environmentally sustainable manner.” The Government of Canada has publicly committed to promoting RBC and expects and encourages Canadian companies working internationally to respect human rights and all applicable laws, to meet or exceed international RBC guidelines and standards, to operate transparently and in consultation with host governments and local communities, and to conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner. Canada encourages RBC by providing RBC-related guidance to the Canadian business community, including through Canadian embassies and missions abroad. Through its Fund for RBC, Global Affairs Canada provides funding to roughly 50 projects and initiatives annually. Canada also promotes RBC multilaterally through the OECD, the G7 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation, and the Organization of American States. Canada promotes RBC through its trade and investment agreements via voluntary provisions for corporate social responsibility. Global Affairs Canada and the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service issued an Advisory to Canadian companies active abroad or with ties to Xinjiang, China in January 2021. The Advisory set clear compliance expectations for Canadian businesses with respect to forced labor and human rights involving Xinjiang. The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise is charged with receiving and reviewing claims of alleged human rights abuses involving Canadian companies foreign operations in the mining, oil and gas, and garment sectors. Contact information for making a complaint is available at: https://core-ombuds.canada.ca/core_ombuds-ocre_ombuds/index.aspx?lang=eng . Canada is active in improving transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. The Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act was brought into force on June 1, 2015. The Act requires extractive entities active in Canada to publicly disclose, on an annual basis, specific payments made to all governments in Canada and abroad. Canada joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in February 2007, as a supporting country and donor. Canada’s Corporate Social Responsibility strategy, “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad” is available on the Global Affairs Canada website: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx?lang=eng . A comprehensive overview of Canadian RBC information is available at: https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng#:~:text=RBC%20is%20about%20Canadian%20companies,laws%20and%20internationally%20recognized%20standards . Canada is working toward reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples including through the settlement of historical claims. The claims, made by First Nations against the Government of Canada, relate to the administration of land and other First Nation assets. As of March 2018 (the latest data provided by Canada), the Government of Canada has negotiated settlements on more than 460 specific claims. Hundreds of specific claims remain outstanding including 250 accepted for negotiation, 71 before the Specific Claims Tribunal, and 160 under review or assessment. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act enshrines in law the Government of Canada’s commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The Act establishes a legally binding process to set five-year national emissions-reduction targets as well as develop credible, science-based emissions-reduction plans to achieve each target. It establishes the 2030 greenhouse gas emissions target of reductions of 40-45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 as Canada’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. The Act also establishes a requirement to set national emissions reduction targets for 2035, 2040, and 2045, ten years in advance. Canada issued on March 29, 2022, the first Emissions Reduction Plan under the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act. Progress under the plan will be reviewed in progress reports produced in 2023, 2025, and 2027. The 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan describes the measures Canada is undertaking to reduce emissions to 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. This Plan reflects economy-wide measures such as carbon pricing and clean fuels, while also targeting actions sector by sector ranging from buildings to vehicles to industry and agriculture. The 2030 plan is designed to be evergreen and governments, businesses, non-profits, and communities across the country are expected to work together to reach these targets. Canada’s 2020 Natural Climate Solutions Fund has three separate programs to encourage nature-based solutions including the Planting Two Billion Trees Program, Nature Smart Climate Solutions Fund, and the Agricultural Climate Solutions Program. Canada’s Greening Government Strategy commits that the Government of Canada’s operations will be net-zero emissions by 2050 including government-owned and leased real property; government fleets, business travel, and commuting; procurement of goods and services; and national safety and security operations. The government intends to aid in the net-zero transition through green procurement that includes life-cycle assessment principles and the adoption of clean technologies and green products by including criteria that address greenhouse gas emissions reduction, sustainable plastics, and broader environmental benefits into procurements, among other efforts. 9. Corruption Corruption in Canada is low and similar to that found in the United States. Corruption is not an obstacle to foreign investment. Canada is a party to the UN Convention Against Corruption, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Canada’s Criminal Code prohibits corruption, bribery, influence peddling, extortion, and abuse of office. The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act prohibits individuals and businesses from bribing foreign government officials to obtain influence and prohibits destruction or falsification of books and records to conceal corrupt payments. The law has extended jurisdiction that permits Canadian courts to prosecute corruption committed by Canadian companies and individuals abroad. Canada’s anti-corruption legislation is vigorously enforced, and companies and officials guilty of violating Canadian law are effectively investigated, prosecuted, and convicted of corruption-related crimes. In March 2014, Public Works and Government Services Canada (now Public Services and Procurement Canada, or PSPC) revised its Integrity Framework for government procurement to ban companies or their foreign affiliates for 10 years from winning government contracts if they have been convicted of corruption. In August 2015, the Canadian government revised the framework to allow suppliers to apply to have their ineligibility reduced to five years where the causes of conduct are addressed and no longer penalizes a supplier for the actions of an affiliate in which it was not involved. PSPC has a Code of Conduct for Procurement, which counters conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts. Canadian firms operating abroad must declare whether they or an affiliate are under charge or have been convicted under Canada’s anti-corruption laws during the past five years to receive assistance from the Trade Commissioner Service. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Mario Dion Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (for appointed and elected officials, House of Commons) Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Parliament of Canada 66 Slater Street, 22nd Floor Ottawa, Ontario (Mailing address) Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Parliament of Canada Centre Block, P.O. Box 16 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6 Pierre Legault Office of the Senate Ethics Officer (for appointed Senators) Thomas D’Arcy McGee Building Parliament of Canada 90 Sparks St., Room 526 Ottawa, ON K1P 5B4 10. Political and Security Environment Canada is politically stable with rare instances of civil disturbance. In January and February 2022, however, various groups of protestors occupied large parts of the downtown core of Ottawa and blocked commercial trade at several U.S.-Canada ports of entry. The initial protest movement of several hundred individuals claimed to be focused on the reversal of cross-border vaccine mandates. The movement attracted thousands of additional followers with a spectrum of political philosophies and grievances including far right extremist and anti-government groups. The protestors hindered hundreds of millions of dollars in daily two-way trade causing production slowdowns at several factories on both sides of the border. Many Ottawa residents complained of acts of harassment, desecration, and destruction by the protestors including deafening horn honking. The federal government invoked the never-before-used Emergencies Act to provide additional police powers to end the protests. Some commentators characterized the protests as a demonstration of growing politization within Canada. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The federal government and provincial/territorial governments share jurisdiction for labor regulation and standards. Federal employees and those employed in federally regulated industries, including the railroad, airline, and banking sectors, are covered under the federally administered Canada Labor Code. Employees in other sectors are regulated by provincial labor codes. As the laws vary somewhat from one jurisdiction to another, it is advisable to contact a federal or provincial labor office for specifics, such as minimum wage and benefit requirements. Although labor needs vary by province, Canada faces a national labor shortage in skilled trades professions such as carpenters, engineers, and electricians. Canada launched several initiatives such as the Global Skills Visa to address its skilled labor shortage, including through immigration reform, the inclusion of labor mobility provisions in free trade agreements, including the Canada-EU CETA agreement, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), and the International Mobility Program. The TFWP is jointly managed by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). The International Mobility Program (IMP) primarily includes high skill/high wage professions and is not subject to a labor market impact assessment. The number of temporary foreign workers a business can employ is limited. For more information, see the TFWP website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers.html The impact of COVID-19 on the labor force has yet to be fully realized. As of February 2022, the unemployment rate was 5.5 percent, below the pre-COVID 5.7 percent reported in February 2020. Statistics indicate women and marginalized communities were disproportionately affected by job and other economic losses during the height of the pandemic. The Canadian government administered an emergency wage benefit in response to a significant increase in unemployment caused by the pandemic. Many minority groups including women and Indigenous populations have experienced notable employment gains since the depths of the pandemic. Canadian labor unions are independent from the government. Canada has labor dispute mechanisms in place and unions practice collective bargaining. As of 2015 (the most recent year of available data), there were 776 unions in Canada. Eight of those unions – five of which were national and three international – represented 100,000 or more workers each and comprised 45 percent of all unionized workers in Canada (https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/collective-bargaining-data/labour-organizations.html). Less than one third of Canadian employees belonged to a union or were covered by a collective agreement as of 2015. In June 2017, Parliament repealed legislation public service unions had claimed contravened International Labor Organization conventions by limiting the number of persons who could strike. In March 2022, 3,000 Canadian Pacific Railway workers participated in a 2-day strike and concurrent lockout over wage, benefit, and pension concerns. The parties agreed to binding arbitration following federal government mediation. In August 2021, 9,000 Canadian border agents went on strike over pay and work conditions. The Canadian government and border agents reached a tentative agreement on a new contract following the one-day strike. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section 490 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario 613-688-5335 Chad Executive Summary Chad is Africa’s fifth largest country by surface area, encompassing three bioclimatic zones. Chad is landlocked, bordering Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, Central African Republic (CAR) to the south, and Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger to the west (with which it shares Lake Chad). The nearest port — Douala, Cameroon — is 1,700 km from the capital, N’Djamena. Chad is one of six countries that constitute the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), a common market. Chad’s human development is one of the lowest in the world according to the UN Human Development Index (HDI). Poverty afflicts a large proportion of the population. The Government of Chad (GOC) actively solicits foreign investment, especially from North America. Opportunities for foreign investment exist in Agribusiness; Agricultural, Construction, Building & Heavy Equipment; Automotive & Ground Transportation; Education; Energy & Mining; Environmental Technologies; Food Processing & Packaging; Health Technologies; Information Technology; Industrial Equipment & Supplies; Information & Communication; and Services. Since oil production began in 2003, the petroleum sector has dominated economic activity and been the largest target of foreign investment, including from U.S. companies. Agriculture and livestock breeding are also important economic activities, employing most of the population. In recent years, the GOC has prioritized agriculture, solar energy production, gold mining, livestock breeding and processing, and information technology to diversify the economy and lessen fiscal dependence on volatile global energy markets. Chad’s investment climate is challenging. Private sector development suffers from a lack of transport infrastructure, GDP growth, skilled labor, reliable electricity, adequate contract enforcement, good governance, and attractive tax rates. Frequent border closures with neighboring countries complicate trade. The COVID-19 pandemic, and associated restrictions, halted Chad’s modest 2019 economic recovery following several years of recession caused by low global oil prices and disruptive debt payments to Glencore. Overall vaccination rates remain low. Existing IMF and World Bank programs aim to improve governance, increase transparency, and reduce internal arrears. Private sector financing is limited, and low GDP growth constrains government investment. Corruption and historically frequent replacement of senior level government figures present further roadblocks, as does cumbersome French-based labor law. The GOC’s interest in maintaining a stake in investment projects, while facilitating access to key decision makers, also introduces financial and operational risks. Despite these challenges, the success of several foreign investments into Chad illustrates opportunities for experienced, dedicated, and patient investors. Successful investors typically operate with trusted local partners. The oil sector will mark 20 years of operations in 2023. Singapore-based Olam International entered Chad’s cotton market in 2018. Mindful of the imperative to enact reforms, the GOC operationalized a Presidential Council to Improve the Business Climate in January 2021. With rich natural resources, minimally developed agriculture and meat processing sectors, ample sunshine, increasing telecommunications coverage, and a rapidly growing population, Chad presents an opportunity for targeted investment in key sectors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 164 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOC’s policies towards foreign direct investment (FDI) are generally positive. Chad’s laws and regulations encourage FDI, and there are few formal restrictions on foreign trade and investment. Under Chadian law, foreign and domestic entities may establish and own business enterprises. The National Investment Charter of 2008 permits full foreign ownership of companies in Chad. The only limit on foreign control is on ownership of companies deemed related to national security. The National Investment Charter guarantees both foreign companies and individuals equal standing with Chadian companies and individuals in the privatization process. In principle, tenders for foreign investment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and for government contracts are conducted through open international bid procedures. The National Investment Charter also offers incentives to certain foreign companies establishing significant operations in Chad, including up to five years of tax-exempt status. Chad’s National Agency for Investment and Exports (ANIE, Agence Nationale des Investissements et des Exports), an agency of the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development & Private Sector Promotion, facilitates foreign investment. ANIE’s mandate is to contribute to the creation of a business environment that meets international standing, promote investment and exports, support the development of SMEs, and inform GOC decision makers about economic policy. ANIE acts as a one-stop shop for new investors. Chad has demonstrated few signs of prioritizing investment retention or maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors, such as through a formal business roundtable or Ombudsman. The Presidential Council for Improving the Investment Climate has met only twice since its 2021 establishment and is still working to clarify its work plan. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. There are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access for U.S. or other foreign investors, and no de facto anti-foreign discriminatory practices. In terms of investment screening mechanisms, the government reviews potential investment projects in a holistic and project-by-project way but has not made public any fixed criteria or standardized methodology. UNCTAD published a French-language Investment Policy Review (IPR) on Chad in July 2019 ( https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1212/investment-policy-review-of-chad ). The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a joint trade policy review for Chad, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Central African Republic in 2013 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp385_e.htm ), and a standalone trade policy review for Chad in 2007 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp275_e.htm ). The OECD has not published any investment policy reviews of Chad. Civil society groups have not shared useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns, though many Chadians at large have voiced concern about the negative effects of Chad’s onerous and lethargic tourist visa process as dissuading potential foreign investment, compared to other countries which boast inexpensive, hassle-free visas on arrival. To date, the government has shown little interest in addressing this common complaint. A Chamber of Commerce does exist, though has published little information regarding policy-related investment concerns. Foreign businesses interested in investing in or establishing an office in Chad should contact ANIE, which offers a one-stop shop for filing the legal forms needed to start a business. The process officially takes 72 hours and is the most important legal requirement for investment. ANIE’s website ( www.anie-tchad.com ) provides additional information. An easy step to facilitate business (that the government has not taken) would be completing online business registration via the Global Enterprise Registration web site ( www.GER.co ) and the Business Facilitation Program ( www.businessfacilitation.org ). The World Bank estimated in 2019 that it took, on average, 58 days to start a business in Chad. Contracts are tailored to each investment and often include additional incentives and concessions, such as permissions to import labor or agreements to work with specific local suppliers. Some contracts are confidential. Occasionally, government ministries attempt to change the terms of contracts or apply new laws broadly, even to companies that have pre-existing agreements that exempt them. Chad’s judicial system is weak, and rulings, including those relating to contract disputes, are susceptible to government interference. There is limited capacity within the judiciary to address commercial issues, including contract disputes. Frivolous lawsuits are expensive and difficult to resolve. Parties usually settle disputes directly or through arbitration provided by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture, Mining, and Crafts (CCIAMA) or through an outside entity, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. The GOC does not offer any programs or incentives encouraging outward investment. The GOC does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Chad implements laws to foster competition and establish clear rules based on Uniform Acts produced by the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA, Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, www.ohada.com ). However, certain Chadian and foreign companies may encounter difficulties from well-established companies with a corner on the market, discouraging competition. Regulations and financial policies generally do not impede competition in the financial sector. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems pertaining to banking are transparent and consistent with international norms. Chad began using OHADA’s accounting system in 2002, bringing its national standards into harmony with accounting systems throughout the region. Several international accounting firms have offices in Chad. However, while accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are consistent with international norms, some local firms do not use generally accepted standards and procedures in their business practices. Chad develops forward regulatory plans to encourage foreign investment and budget support. Government ministries draft regulations, subject to approval by the Secretary General of the Government, Council of Ministers, National Assembly, and President. National regulations are most relevant to foreign investors. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The GOC occasionally provides opportunities for local associations, such as the National Council of Employers (CNPT, Conseil National du Patronat Tchadien) or the CCIAMA to comment on proposed laws and regulations pertaining to investment. All contracts and practices are subject to legal review, which can be weak. The government publishes all budget information, including on the Ministry of Finance and Budget website. Other proposed laws and regulations are not published in draft form for public comment. The Observatory on Public Finance is an online framework for the dissemination of public finance data and the operationalization of the Code of Transparency and Good Governance. This code is an implementation of one of the six CEMAC directives on the December 2011 harmonized framework for public financial management that set 2020 as its goal for complete implementation. The Presidential Council to Improve the Business Climate was announced in 2018, met once in late 2019, and formally launched in January 2021 due to the negative impact of COVID-19 in 2020. This effort to reform Chad’s investment climate and improve Chad’s performance in World Bank assessments is still in its embryonic stage. The government has not registered Chad on UNCTAD’s website for helping governments simplify, digitize, and automate administrative procedures, www.businessfacilitation.org , despite the website’s ability to be customized for any procedure or level of government without changing any of its laws. To date, the government has not promoted or required companies environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between the quality of potential investments. While the government publishes both its general budget and a simplified “citizen” budget to the website of the Ministry of Finance and Budget and to the Observatory on Public Finance website, it does not allow transparency into its debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. Chad has been a member of the WTO since October 19, 1996, and a member of GATT since July 12, 1963. Chad is a member of OHADA and the CEMAC ( www.cemac.int ). Since 2017, Chad is gradually implementing business and economic laws and regulations based on CEMAC standards and OHADA Uniform Acts. Chad’s banking sector is regulated by COBAC (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale), a regional agency. Chad’s legal system and commercial law are based on the French Civil Code which gives rise to the proliferation of frivolous lawsuits and judicial abuse by corrupt authorities. The constitution recognizes customary and traditional law if it does not interfere with public order or constitutional rights. Chad’s judicial system, which often lacks access to printed versions of Chad’s own laws, rules on commercial disputes in a limited technical capacity. Courts normally award monetary judgments in local currency, although it may designate awards in foreign currencies based on the circumstances of the disputed transaction. Historically, the Chadian President appointed judges without National Assembly confirmation, and thus the judiciary may have been subject to executive influence. Following the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council, its members appointed 93 members to an interim legislative body known as the Transitional National Council (CNT). Many Chadian civil society groups criticized the CNT’s appointment, rather than popular election, as well as its makeup as disproportionately reflecting individuals aligned with former President Deby, and for resulting perceptions of a lack of neutrality. Chad’s commercial laws are based on standards promulgated by CEMAC, OHADA, and the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC, Communaute Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale, http://www.ceeac-eccas.org ). The government is in the process of adopting legislation to comply fully with all these provisions. Specialized commercial tribunal courts were authorized in 1998 and operationalized in 2004. These tribunals exist in five major cities but lack adequate technical capacity to perform their duties. Firms not satisfied with judgments in these tribunals may appeal to OHADA’s regional court in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, that ensures uniformity and consistent legal interpretations across its member countries. Several Chadian companies have done so. OHADA also allows foreign companies to utilize tribunals outside of Chad, generally in Paris, France, to adjudicate business disputes. Finally, CEMAC established a regional court in N’Djamena in 2001 to hear business disputes, but this body is not widely used. Contracts and investment agreements can stipulate arbitration procedures and jurisdictions for settlement of disputes. If both parties agree, and settlements do not violate Chadian law, Chadian courts uphold the decision of the court in the nation where an agreement was signed, such as the United States. This principle also applies to disputes between foreign companies and the Chadian Government. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) can arbitrate such disputes and foreign companies frequently choose to include clauses in their contract to mandate ICC arbitration. Bilateral judicial cooperation is in effect between Chad and certain nations. Chad signed the Antananarivo Convention in 1970, covering the discharge of judicial decisions and serving of legal documents, with eleven other former French colonies (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal). Chad has similar arrangements in place with France, Nigeria, and Sudan. The National Investment Charter encourages foreign direct investment. Chad is a member of CEMAC and OHADA. Since 2017, Chad has gradually implemented business and economic laws and regulations based on CEMAC standards and OHADA Uniform Acts. Foreign investors using the court system are not generally subject to executive interference. In addition, the OHADA Treaty allows foreign companies to utilize tribunals outside of Chad, e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, France, to adjudicate any disputes. Companies may also access the OHADA’s court located in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Foreign businesses interested in investing in or establishing an office in Chad should contact ANIE, which offers a one-stop shop for filing the legal forms needed to start a business. The process officially takes 72 hours and is the most important legal requirement for investment. ANIE’s website ( www.anie-tchad.com ) provides additional information. Regulation of competition is covered by the OHADA Uniform Acts that form the basis for Chadian business and economic laws and regulations. The Office of Competition in Chad’s Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development & Private Sector Promotion reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Chadian law protects businesses from nationalization and expropriation, except in cases where expropriation is in the public interest. There were no direct government expropriations of foreign-owned property in 2021, though the government maintains indirect expropriation measures, such as a confiscatory tax regime that boasts the third-highest corporate tax rate in the world. There are no indications that the GOC intends to directly expropriate foreign property in the near term, though foreign businesses have reported difficulty repatriating profits from Chadian bank accounts and the open-source reporting indicates that the Chadian government has demanded an extralegal multi-million dollar exit payment from a large multinational. Historically, a 1967 Land Law has prohibited since its passage the deprivation of ownership without due process, stipulating that the state may not take possession of expropriated properties until 15 days after the payment of compensation. While the government continues to work on reform of the 1967 Land Law, the May 2018 constitution (amended in December 2020), prohibited in its Article 45 the seizure of private property, except in cases of urgent public need — of which there are no known cases. The transitional government’s constitutional charter, which came into place in April 2021 upon the dissolution of Chad’s constitution by the Transitional Military Council, likewise prohibits expropriation outside the framework of the law in its Article 26, though without inclusion of “public utility” or “fair and prior compensation” that were present in the 2018 document. Chad’s bankruptcy laws are based on OHADA Uniform Acts. According to Section 3, Articles 234 – 239 of OHADA’s Uniform Insolvency Act, creditors and equity shareholders may designate trustees to lodge complaints or claims to the commercial court collectively or individually. The OHADA provisions grant Chad the discretion to apply its own sentences. 4. Industrial Policies The Chadian tax code (CGI, Code General des Impôts) offers incentives to new business start-ups, new activities, or substantial extensions of existing activities. Eligible economic activities are limited to the industrial, mining, agricultural, forestry, and real estate sectors, and may not compete with existing enterprises already operating in a satisfactory manner (Articles 16 and 118 of the National Investment Charter). To spur investment into target sectors, the GOC authorized tax credits, discounts, and exemptions for investments in the agriculture, animal husbandry, solar and wind energy, information technology, oil, and plastics sectors in the 2021 Finance Law. Foreign investors may ask the GOC for other incentives through investment-specific negotiations. Large companies usually sign separate agreements with the government, which contain negotiated incentives and obligations. The possibility of special tax exemptions exists for some public procurement contracts, and a preferential tax regime applies to contractors and sub-contractors for major oil projects. The government occasionally offers lower license fees in addition to ad hoc tax exemptions. Incentives tend to increase with the size of a given investment, its potential for job creation, and the location of the investment, with rural development being a GOC priority. Investors may address inquiries about possible incentives directly to the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development and Private Sector Promotion. The GOC does not issue guarantees but jointly finances some foreign direct investments, with mixed results. There are currently no foreign trade zones in Chad. The Chadian Agency for Investment and Exportation (ANIE) is examining the possibility of creating a duty-free zone. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) estimated in 2014 that Chad received less than one percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa. There are no Special Economic Zones and none currently planned. Given poor infrastructure, lack of port access, and high cost of air transport (especially for relatively heavy agricultural or livestock products that result from the large percentage of the unskilled population employed in those industries), Chad’s non-oil exports have historically been extremely limited. Intra-African trade is no different; UNCTAD estimates that Chad accounts for 0.2 percent of intra-African exports (the lowest on the continent). Chad does not follow forced localization, the policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. Foreign companies are legally required to employ Chadian nationals for 98 percent of their staff. Firms can formally apply for permission from the Labor Promotion Office (ONAPE) to employ more than two percent expatriates if they can demonstrate that skilled local workers are not available. Most foreign firms operating in Chad have obtained these permissions. Foreign workers require work permits in Chad, renewable annually. Companies must present personnel files of local candidates not hired to the GOC for comparison against the profiles of foreign workers. Multinational companies and international non-governmental organizations routinely protest these measures. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (backdoors into hardware and software or turn over keys for encryption). There are no rules on maintaining a certain amount of data storage within Chad. 5. Protection of Property Rights Real Property The Chadian Civil Code protects property rights. Since 2013, landowners may register land titles with the One-Stop Land Titling Office (Guichet Unique pour les Affaires Foncieres). However, enforcement of these rights is difficult because most landowners do not have a title or a deed for their property. In 2022, an effort by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to advise the government on a more systematic framework to approach property issues marked the first major effort in many years to address property rights conflicts. The office of Domain and Registration (Direction de Domaine et Enregistrement) in the Ministry of Finance and Budget is responsible for recording property deeds and mortgages. In practice, this office asserts authority only in urban areas; rural property titles are managed by traditional leaders who apply customary law. Chadian courts frequently deal with cases of multiple or conflicting titles to the same property. A significant portion of the legal system’s bandwidth is involved in ongoing land disputes. In cases of multiple titles, the earliest title issued usually has precedence. Fraud is common in property transactions. By law, all land for which no title exists is owned by the government and can only be given to a separate entity by presidential decree. There have been incidents in which the government has reclaimed land for which individuals held titles, which government officials then granted to other individuals without the backing of presidential decrees. The GOC does not provide clear definitions and protections of traditional use rights of indigenous peoples, tribes, or farmers. Chad is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Chad ratified the revised Bangui Agreement (1999) in 2000 and the Berne Convention in 1971. The GOC adheres to OAPI rules within the constraints of its administrative capacity. Within the ministry responsible for trade, the Department of Industrial Property and Technology addresses intellectual property rights (IPR) issues. This department is the National Liaison Unit (SNL) within the OAPI and is the designated point of contact under Article 69 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Intellectual property violations are widespread. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals and pirated artistic works, such as music and films, are common in Chad. Imported counterfeit watches, athletic apparel, footwear, denim jeans, cosmetics, perfumes, and other goods are also readily available. Despite limited resources, Chadian customs officials make occasional efforts to enforce copyright laws, normally by seizing and burning counterfeit medicines, CDs, and mobile phones, though the government does not regularly track or report on seizures of counterfeit goods or on prosecution of IPR violations. Occasionally, Chadian authorities will, however, announce such a seizure in the local press. Customs officers have the authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods ex officio. The government pays for storage and destruction of such goods. In 2021, the government did not enact any new intellectual policy laws or regulations. Chad is not listed on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Chad’s financial system is underdeveloped. There are no capital markets or money markets in Chad. A limited number of financial instruments are available to the private sector, including letters of credit, short- and medium-term loans, foreign exchange services, and long-term savings instruments. Chad maintains an exchange system that is free from restrictions and multiple currency practices on payments and transfers for current international transactions. This includes due to any actions delegated to BEAC. Commercial banks offer credit on market terms, often at rates of 12 to 25 percent for short-term loans. Access to credit is available but is prohibitively expensive for most Chadians in the private sector. Medium-term loans are difficult to obtain, as lending criteria are rigid. Most large businesses maintain accounts with foreign banks and borrow money outside of Chad. There are ATMs in some major hotels, most neighborhoods of N’Djamena, the N’Djamena airport, and in major cities. Chad does not have a stock market and has no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate portfolio investments. A small regional stock exchange, known as the Central African Stock Exchange, in Libreville, Gabon, was established by CEMAC countries in 2006. Cameroon, a CEMAC member, launched its own market in 2005. Both exchanges are poorly capitalized. Chad’s banking sector is small and continues to streamline lending practices and reduce the volume of bad debt accumulated before and during the 2016-2017 economic crisis. While Chad’s banking rate remains low due to low aggregate savings and limited trust in and exposure to banks, according to the World Bank it increased from nine to 22 percent between 2009 and 2017. Chad’s four largest banks have been privatized. The former Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Tchad (BIAT) became a part of Togo-based Ecobank; the former Banque Tchadienne de Credit et de Depôt was re-organized as the Societe Generale Tchad; the former Financial Bank became part of Togo-based Orabank; and the former Banque de Developpement du Tchad (BDT) was reorganized as Commercial Bank Tchad (CBT), in partnership with Cameroon-based Commercial Bank of Cameroon. There are two Libyan banks in Chad, BCC (formerly Banque Libyenne) and BSCIC (Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce), along with one Nigerian bank — United Bank for Africa (UBA). In 2018, the GOC funded a new bank Banque de l’Habitat du Tchad (BHT) with the GOC as majority shareholder with 50 percent of the shares and two public companies, the National Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale de Prevoyance Sociale, CNPS) and the Chadian Petroleum Company (Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad, SHT), each holding 25 percent. Chad, as a CEMAC member, shares a central bank with Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon — the Central African Economic Bank (BEAC, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale), headquartered in Yaounde, Cameroon. Foreigners must establish legal residency in order to establish a bank account. The GOC does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises All Chadian SOEs operate under the umbrella of government ministries. SOE senior management reports to the minister responsible for the relevant sector, as well as a board of directors and an executive board. Historically, the president appointed members of SOE boards of directors, executive boards, and CEOs though no new appointments have happened since the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council. The boards of directors give general directives over the year, while the executive boards manage general guidelines set by the boards of directors. Some executive directors consult with their respective ministries before making business decisions. The GOC operates SOEs in several sectors, including Energy and Environmental Industries; Agribusiness; Construction, Building and Heavy Equipment; and Information and Communication. The percentage of their annual budget that SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D) is unpublished. There were no reports of discriminatory action taken by SOEs against the interests of foreign investors in 2021. Some foreign companies operated in direct competition with SOEs. Chad’s Public Tender Code (PTC) provides preferential treatment for domestic competitors, including SOEs. SOEs are not subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors and are often afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs receive government subsidies under the national budget, which the government does not publish. SOEs often comingle government and SOE funds, which complicates their financial picture. Chad is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement within the framework of the WTO. Chadian practices are not consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. (Please use DOC key words for industries in this section; list available at https://www.export.gov/industries ). Foreign investors are permitted and encouraged to participate in the privatization process. There is a public, non-discriminatory bidding process. Having a local contact in Chad to assist with the bidding process is important. To combat corruption, the GOC has recently hired private international companies to oversee the bidding process for government tenders. The Chamber of Commerce submitted a ‘white paper’ (livre blanc) in 2018 with recommendations for the GOC to facilitate and simplify private sector operations, including establishing a Business Observatory and a Presidential Council, which would implement over 70 recommendations to improve the investment climate in Chad. The Presidential Council became operational in January 2021. The GOC has expressed general willingness to privatize its generally unprofitable SOEs, including to foreign investors. As an example, in 2018, it sold a majority stake in cotton export company CotonTchad Société Nouvelle (CotonTchad SN) to the Singaporean Olam International. Qatari investors recently purchased a slaughterhouse in Moundou as well. Investors from the UAE are under talks to purchase a slaughterhouse in Farcha, though their progress has stalled. Chad is considering privatization in the following industries: Information & Communication (SOTEL Tchad) Food Processing & Packaging (the Société Tchadienne de Jus de Fruit (STJF), which produces fruit juice in Doba Agricultural Products (Société Moderne de Abbatoires (SMA), a slaughterhouse and meat packaging company in Farcha) In addition, a 2019 law opened the market for power generation to private companies, though involvement in transmission remains under the control of the state-owned Societe Nationale d’Electricite du Tchad (SNE), which is reportedly unprofitable. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) among firms in Chad. Most Western firms operating in Chad adhere to RBC, particularly those in the petroleum and telecommunications sectors. For example, Esso Exploration and Production Chad, Inc. (EEPCI), a significant oil producer, has implemented Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), prioritizing hiring local residents and local purchase of goods and services, establishing international safety standards, and protecting biodiversity. A critical part of EMP has been the Land Use Management Action Plan (LUMAP) that compensates individuals and communities for land used by the project. LUMAP has distributed approximately $1.7 million in cash, in-kind goods, and training. EMP’s efforts are complemented by the ExxonMobil Foundation, which supports projects to improve girls’ education and fight malaria. Many foreign firms commit to extensive skill-building of local staff, purchasing local goods, and donating excess equipment to charities or local governments. Internet companies Airtel and Moov, as well as some banks, continue to engage in RBC focused on public awareness campaigns countering violent extremism and promoting social cohesion. While work safety and environmental protection regulations exist, the government does not always enforce them, and companies do not always adhere to them. There are several local NGOs, particularly in the southern oil-producing regions, which monitor safety and environmental protection in the oil sector, and which have held government and private companies publicly accountable. EEPCI adheres to U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) guidelines for recording accidents and injuries and implements a rigorous program of safety procedures and protocols. Chad joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2010. While private security companies do operate within Chad, they typically employ unarmed guards at private residences and business premises. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices () Trafficking in Persons Report () Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities () Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( ) List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor () Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World () Comply Chain () 9. Corruption Foreign investors should be aware that corruption is endemic in Chad and constitutes a significant deterrent to nearly all economic activity, including foreign direct investment. Corruption is pervasive in many areas of government, including procurement, the awarding of licenses or concessions, dispute settlement, regulation enforcement, customs, and taxation. Chad is not a signatory country of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Chad is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”). There is an independent Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes), equivalent to a supreme audit institution (SAI), to enhance independent oversight of government decisions, although its members are nominated by presidential decree. Concurrently, the GOC created a General Inspectorate for State Control within the Presidency to oversee government accountability. No reports have been published, however. In addition to these bodies, prior to the April 2021 dissolution of the National Assembly, its Finance Committee had carried out verifications of the GOC’s annual financial statement though typically did not make audits publicly available. The creation of the transitional legislature’s (CNT) Commission Controle Budget Automone is currently expected to carry out a similar responsibility, though, to date, they have not published any verifications of the GOC’s annual financial statement. A February 2000 anti-corruption law stipulates penalties for corruption. The law does not single out family members and political parties. As in many other developing countries, weak institutional capacity, a widespread and largely accepted practice of rent seeking, low salaries for most civil servants, judicial employees, and law enforcement officials, have contributed to pervasive corruption in Chad. According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2021 report, selective prosecutions of high-level officials were widely viewed as efforts to discredit those posing a threat to the former president or his allies. The report stated that security forces routinely stopped citizens on pretexts of minor traffic violations to extort money or confiscate goods. To fight corruption and embezzlement, the Ministry of Finance and Budget set up a toll-free number (700), though it has not been working since 2018, after less than a full calendar year of connectivity. According to the Minister of Finance and Budget, the toll-free number 700 was designed to allow members of the public to alert the Inspectorate General of Finance to denounce any member of government who directly or indirectly solicits a bribe related their official duties, such as regarding administrative documents or tax payments. As of April 2022, the ministry confirms that they rely on postal mail for the lodging of these complaints and have no clear date for reestablishment of the compliant line. In addition to an unworking complaint line, there are no specific laws to counter conflict of interest, nor does the GOC require or encourage private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials. Local NGO Center for Studies and Research on Governance, Extractive Industries, and Sustainable Development (CERGIED), formerly GRAMP-TC (Groupe Alternatif de Recherche et de Monitoring de Petrole – Tchad), tracks government expenditures of oil revenue. There are no indications that anti-corruption laws are enforced differently for foreign investors than for Chadian citizens. There is no specific protection for NGOs involved in investigating corruption, which, to avoid repercussions, results in self-censorship of complaints about corrupt officials. 10. Political and Security Environment Chad enjoyed relative political stability from 2010 to April 2021, when armed groups entered from Libya and engaged in armed hostilities with Chadian government forces following the government’s announcement of former President Idriss Déby having won a sixth term. During this incursion, Deby, who had ruled the country since 1990, was killed. A group of 15 generals called the Transitional Military Council, with former President Deby’s son Mahamat Deby at the head, dissolved Chad’s constitution and legislative National Assembly in favor of a constitutional charter and interim legislature (Transitional National Council, CNT) based on an 18-month mandate. During these 18 months, set to end in October 2022, the government plans to hold a National Dialogue in May on a range of social, economic, political, and security issues pertinent to the country to inform the drafting of a new constitution to be adopted by referendum a possible pre-election census, and parliamentary and presidential elections to return to civilian-led government. Following the creation of the transitional government, Chad has entered a period of tenuous peace as the government engages in negotiations with armed political groups over their possible terms for participation in the May National Dialogue as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into Chadian society. Cross-border intercommunal violence near neighboring Darfur threatens to hamstring the prospect of a lasting peace, as do widespread frustrations over poor socio-economic conditions and impunity for excessive use of force by government security forces. Prior to July 2021, the government typically denied permits for demonstrations or suppressed them using tear gas while arresting participants and organizers. Since then, the transitional government has allowed limited protests in N’Djamena while insisting on rigid adherence to pre-approved routes with occasional use of tear gas to disperse protestors. On the other hand, state security forces outside N’Djamena repressed public demonstrations, including live ammunition that resulted in fatalities, to quell political dissent. In December 2021, in northern Chad’s city of Faya, government forces used live ammunition to disperse protestors frustrated with changes in customs procedures, reportedly resulting in one fatality. In January, in the eastern city of Abeche, government security forces violently confronted protestors frustrated with appointment of traditional official, leaving a reported 14 dead and 64 wounded. There were no reports of politically motivated damage to investment projects and/or installations in recent years, including during incursions by armed groups into Chad in 2008 and 2021. While Chad, which depends on oil for nearly 80 percent of its export revenues, has faced the stresses of an extended period of reduced oil revenues, recent increases in oil prices have begun to alleviate this issue. The COVID-19 pandemic, despite a low estimated incidence rate in Chad, strains Chad’s limited medical infrastructure, disrupts trade routes with neighboring countries, and complicates international air travel. Regional violent extremist organizations threaten regional stability and foreign investments along the Lake Chad Basin and. Armed non-governmental groups operate along the Libyan border in northern Chad. Violent attacks by Boko Haram have choked off vital trade routes with Nigeria and the road between N’Djamena and Douala, Cameroon, the principal port serving Chad. This has increased costs for imports and decreased exports. U.S. businesses and organizations in Chad are welcome to inquire at the Embassy about joining the Overseas Security Advisory Committee (OSAC). For up-to-date information on political and security conditions in Chad, please refer to the Consular Affairs Bureau’s Travel Warning and Country Specific Information at http://www.travel.state.gov. The Embassy encourages all U.S. Citizens in Chad to enroll online with the Smart Traveler Enrollment (STEP) program or with the Embassy upon arrival to receive the latest safety and security updates via email. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Chad’s population demonstrates a significant youth bulge, leading to widespread youth unemployment. While some government ministries and SOEs provide job-related training to their employees, Chad has a shortage of skilled labor in most sectors and, at best, a nascent pipeline of human resource development to address this need. Local universities produce a surplus of graduates able to fill entry-level management and administrative positions though jobs in Chad’s anemic formal sector remain scarce. Skilled workers even more rare. Thus, given rampant unemployment and underemployment, approximately 80 percent of the Chadian labor force survive in the informal sector, despite the economic output of these primarily subsistence activities of farming, herding, and fishing accounting for only roughly 35 percent of GDP. The International Labor Organization (ILO) reports that Chad has managed, compared to its average share of non-agricultural informal economy employment average from 1990-1999, to reduce this average by nearly five percentage points compared to the 2010-2014 period. As a result, unskilled and day laborers are readily available and motivated, but frequently uneducated; Chad’s literacy rate is approximately 22 percent. While few Chadians speak English, translators and interpreters are available. Chad has never been an attractive destination for regular labor migration given widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and a weak economy, though northeastern gold mines have reportedly drawn some migrant workers, often en route to Libya or Europe from the Horn of Africa region. Significant gender inequality exists in Chad, as social norms have historically limited most women to the home and early marriages are common. Access to modern family planning methods is scant, which contributes to a leaky pipeline of women into the workforce as expectations of child-rearing tasks following unplanned pregnancies often impel their exit from the labor force. This results in approximately 50 percent of women participating in Chad’s workforce in some way, compared to approximately 75 percent of men. The government has recognized this as an issue, and taken some minor steps to address it, such as mandating 30 percent women for the transitional government’s interim legislature (CNT). Same-sex activity became illegal in Chad via a March 2017 update to its penal code #2017-01, whose. Article 354 stipulated penalties of three months to two years in prison plus 50,000 to 500,000 CFA. The lack of social protections and widespread homophobia result in widespread self-censorship of full expression of identity by underrepresented workers, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals. As a result, little data exists regarding their participation in the labor market. More broadly, given entrenched patronage networks and their obstruction of the development of a meritocratic, rather than a connections- or ethnic-based system of hiring, individuals not connected to the Zaghawa group of former president Deby are underrepresented in government and military positions, especially at senior levels. Child labor remains a problem. Children were involved in the following sectors: street begging in urban centers, street work as hawkers and porters, carpentry, vehicle garages, gold mining in the north of the country, service industries such as waiters/waitresses, and as domestic workers. Child labor is common in the agriculture sector. Children are also involved in cattle-herding and charcoal production. In some regions, children are involved in catching, smoking, and selling fish. Chadian cattle are included on the U.S. Government’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. Chad has ratified all eight Fundamental Conventions of the International Labor Organization. International labor rights such as freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, child labor, employment discrimination, minimum wage, occupational safety and health, and weekly work hours are recognized within the labor code. However, significant gaps remain in law and practice. Chadian labor law derives from French law and tends to provide strong protection for Chadian workers; priority is given to Chadian nationals; foreign investors cite these provisions as unproductive and wearisome, especially for termination of underperforming employees. Labor unions operate independently from the government and, in fact, often challenge the government. The two main labor federations, the Confederation Libre des Travailleurs du Tchad (CLTT) and the Union des Syndicats du Tchad (UST), to which most individual unions belong, are the most influential. The labor court is the labor dispute mechanism in Chad. In case of a dispute, the aggrieved party contacts a labor inspector directly or through the labor union to settle the dispute or lodge a complaint with the labor court. Labor unions practice collective bargaining, and the labor code monitors labor abuses, health, and safety standards in low-wage assembly operations. The enforcement of the code is not effectively conducted; most disputes are based on contract termination. The GOC did not pass any new labor laws in 2021. The GOC may provide incentives for foreign businesses but does not waive laws to attract or retain investment. Companies report constant frustration with ambiguous and archaic French-based labor law and its outsized worker-based provisions making any reductions in their workforce extremely difficult and often quite expensive, even following in cases of well-documented flagrant misconduct or criminality, to say nothing of employers merely adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions. Companies are often forced to settle frivolous lawsuits out of pocket sometimes based, in part, on pressure by corrupt judicial officials looking to exploit legal technicalities for personal gain. The law mandates severance packages for all employees whose employment ends, and larger packages for those who are laid off for reasons out of their control than for those fired for cause. No unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs exist, nor has the public received notice about discussions having happened regarding the possible implementation in the future of such programs. Beginning in summer, the national teacher’s union went on strike, demanding unpaid compensation and calling for an improved learning environment at different universities throughout the country, including the southern city of Moundou, the eastern city of Abeche, and in N’Djamena. They also called for payment of salaries, bonuses, and overtime arrears. Throughout the latter half of 2021, workers at ExxonMobil’s Doba oilfield participated in a labor strike after the company announced it was in talks with Savannah Energy to sell its interests in the project. The workers demanded pre-sale compensation and their strike caused ExxonMobil to temporarily decrease production. ExxonMobil actively engaged in discussions with the workers and the government to resolve the dispute, which lasted for months. 14. Contact for More Information Economic and Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy N’Djamena Rondpoint Chagoua BP 413 N’Djamena Chad +235 2251-5017 Ext 24408 and 24289 NDjamena-Commercial@state.gov Chile Executive Summary With the second highest GDP per capita in Latin America (behind Uruguay), Chile has historically enjoyed among the highest levels of stability and prosperity in the region. However, widespread civil unrest broke out throughout the country in 2019 in protest of the government’s handling of the economy and perceived systemic inequality. Pursuant to a political accord, Chile held a plebiscite in October 2020 in which citizens chose to redraft the constitution. Uncertainty about the outcome of the redrafting process may impact investment. Due to Chile’s solid macroeconomic policy framework, the country boasts one of the strongest sovereign bond ratings in Latin America, which has provided fiscal space for the Chilean government to respond to the economic contraction resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic through stimulus packages and other measures. As a result, Chile’s economic growth in 2021 was, according to the Central Bank’s latest estimation, between 11.5 percent and 12 percent. The same institution forecasts Chile’s economic growth in 2022 will be in the range of 1 to 2 percent due largely to the gradual elimination of COVID-19 economic stimulus programs. Chile has successfully attracted large amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) despite its relatively small domestic market. The country’s market-oriented policies have created significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic growth. Chile has a sound legal framework and there is general respect for private property rights. Sectors that attract significant FDI include mining, finance/insurance, energy, telecommunications, chemical manufacturing, and wholesale trade. Mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory are restricted from foreign ownership, but companies may enter into contracts with the government to extract these resources. Corruption exists in Chile but on a much smaller scale than in most Latin American countries, ranking 27 – along with the United States – out of 180 countries worldwide and second in Latin America in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Although Chile is an attractive destination for foreign investment, challenges remain. Legislative and constitutional reforms proposed in response to the social unrest and the pandemic have generated concerns about the future government policies on property rights, rule of law, tax structure, the role of government in the economy, and many other issues. Importantly, the legislation enabling the constitutional reform process requires that the new constitution must respect Chile’s character as a democratic republic, its judicial sentences, and its international treaties (including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement). Despite a general respect for intellectual property (IP) rights, Chile has not fully complied with its IP obligations set forth in the U.S.-Chile FTA and remains on the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report for not adequately enforcing IP rights. Environmental permitting processes, indigenous consultation requirements, and cumbersome court proceedings have made large project approvals increasingly time consuming and unpredictable, especially in cases with political sensitivities. The current administration has stated its willingness to continue attracting foreign investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 27 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 53 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (US$ billion, historical stock positions) 2020 23.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (US$) 2020 13,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Historically and for more than four decades, promoting FDI has been an essential part of the Chilean government’s national development strategy. The country’s market-oriented economic policy creates significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate. Laws and practices are not discriminatory against foreign investors, who receive treatment similar to Chilean nationals. Chile’s business climate is generally straightforward and transparent, and its policy framework has remained consistent despite developments such as civil unrest in 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the permitting process for infrastructure, mining, and energy projects is contentious, especially regarding politically sensitive environmental impact assessments, water rights issues, and indigenous consultations. In July 2021, Chile began a constitutional reform process that is expected to produce a new constitution by July that Chileans will vote on whether to enact in September. Key issues under discussion through the Constitutional Assembly process include the political structure of the country, water rights, mining rights, environmental regulation, and the status of indigenous communities. InvestChile is the government agency in charge of facilitating the entry and retention of FDI into Chile. It provides services related to investment attraction (information about investment opportunities); pre-investment (sector-specific advisory services, including legal); landing (access to certificates, funds and networks); and after-care (including assistance for exporting and re-investment). Regarding government-investor dialogue, in May 2018, the Ministry of Economy created the Sustainable Projects Management Office (GPS). This agency provides support to investment projects, both domestic and foreign, serving as a first point of contact with the government and coordinating with different agencies in charge of evaluating investment projects, which aims to help resolve issues that emerge during the permitting process. Foreign investors have access to all productive activities, except for the domestic maritime freight sector, in which foreign ownership of companies is capped at 49 percent. Maritime transportation between Chilean ports is open since 2019 to foreign cruise vessels with more than 400 passengers. Some international reciprocity restrictions exist for fishing. Most enterprises in Chile may be 100 percent owned by foreigners. Chile only restricts the right to private ownership or establishment in what it defines as certain “strategic” sectors, such as nuclear energy and mining. The current Constitution establishes the “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and permanent domain” of the Chilean state over all mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory. However, Chilean law allows the government to grant concession rights and lease agreements to individuals and companies for exploration and exploitation activities, and to assign contracts to private investors, without discrimination against foreign investors. The Constitutional Assembly is reviewing proposals that if enacted could affect mining operations of foreign investors. Chile has not implemented an investment screening mechanism to protect key national security priorities. FDI is subject to pro forma screening by InvestChile. Businesses in general do not consider these screening mechanisms as barriers to investment because approval procedures are expeditious, and investments are usually approved. Some transactions require an anti-trust review by the office of the national economic prosecutor (Fiscalía Nacional Económica) and possibly by sector-specific regulators. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has not conducted a Trade Policy Review for Chile since June 2015 (available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp415_e.htm ). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has not conducted an Investment Policy Review for Chile since 1997 (available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/34384328.pdf ), and the country is not part of the countries covered to date by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Reviews. The Chilean government took significant steps towards business facilitation during the past decade. Starting in 2018, the government introduced updated electronic and online systems for providing some tax information, complaints related to contract enforcement, and online registration of closed corporations (non-public corporations). In June 2019, the Ministry of Economy launched the Unified System for Permits (SUPER), a new online single-window platform that brings together 182 license and permit procedures, simplifying the process of obtaining permits for investment projects. According to the World Bank, Chile has one of the shortest and smoothest processes among Latin American and Caribbean countries – 11 procedures and 29 days – to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC). Drafting statutes of a company and obtaining an authorization number can be done online at the platform HYPERLINK hError! Hyperlink reference not valid.. Electronic signature and invoicing allow foreign investors to register a company, obtain a tax payer ID number and get legal receipts, invoices, credit and debit notes, and accountant registries. A company typically needs to register with Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, obtain a business license from a municipality, and register either with the Institute of Occupational Safety (public) or with one of three private nonprofit entities that provide work-related accident insurance, which is mandatory for employers. In addition to the steps required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing a subsidiary in Chile must authenticate the parent company’s documents abroad and register the incoming capital with the Central Bank. This procedure, established under Chapter XIV of the Foreign Exchange Regulations, requires a notice of conversion of foreign currency into Chilean pesos when the investment exceeds $10,000. The registration process at the Registry of Commerce of Santiago is available online. The Government of Chile does not have an active policy of promotion or incentives for outward investment, nor does it impose restrictions on it. 3. Legal Regime Chile’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and provide clear rules for competition and a level playing field for foreigners. They are consistent with international norms; however, environmental regulations – which include mandatory indigenous consultation required by the International Labor Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) – and other permitting processes have become lengthy and unpredictable, especially in politically sensitive cases. Chile does not have a regulatory oversight body. Four institutions play key roles in the rule-making process: The General-Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, and the General Comptroller of the Republic. Most regulations come from the national government; however, some, in particular those related to land use, are decided at the local level. Both national and local governments are involved in the issuance of environmental permits. Regulatory processes are managed by governmental entities. NGOs and private sector associations may participate in public hearings or comment periods. In Chile, non-listed companies follow norms issued by the Accountants Professional Association, while publicly listed companies use the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since January 2018, IFRS 9 entered into force for companies in all sectors except for banking, in which IFRS 15 will be applied. IFRS 16 entered into force in January 2019. On January 1, 2022, Chile’s Financial Market Commission (CMF) began implementation of the IFRS 17 accounting standards in the Chilean insurance market. The legislation process in Chile allows for public hearings during discussion of draft bills in both chambers of Congress. Draft bills submitted by the Executive Branch to the Congress are readily available for public comment. Ministries and regulatory agencies are required by law to give notice of proposed regulations, but there is no formal requirement in Chile for consultation with the general public, conducting regulatory impact assessments of proposed regulations, requesting comments, or reporting results of consultations. For lower-level regulations or norms that do not need congressional approval, there are no formal provisions for public hearing or comment. As a result, Chilean regulators and rulemaking bodies normally consult with stakeholders, but in a less formal manner. All decrees and laws are published in the Diario Oficial (roughly similar to the Federal Register in the United States), but other types of regulations will not necessarily be found there. There are no other centralized online locations where regulations in Chile are published. According to the OECD, compliance rates in Chile are generally high. The approach to enforcement remains punitive rather than preventive, and regulators still prefer to inspect rather than collaborate with regulated entities on fostering compliance. Each institution with regulation enforcement responsibilities has its own sanction procedures. Law 19.880 from 2003 establishes the principles for reversal and hierarchical recourse against decisions by the administration. An administrative act can be challenged by lodging an action in the ordinary courts of justice, or by administrative means with a petition to the Comptroller General of the Republic. Affected parties may also make a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court against a specific regulation. Chile still lacks a comprehensive, “whole of government” regulatory reform program. The OECD’s April 2016 “Regulatory Policy in Chile” report asserts that Chile took steps to improve its rule-making process, but still lags behind the OECD average in assessing the impact of regulations, consulting with outside parties on their design and evaluating them over time. The World Bank´s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance project finds that Chile is not part of the countries that have improved their regulatory governance framework since 2017. Chile’s level of fiscal transparency is excellent. Information on the budget and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, is easily accessible online. Chile does not share regulatory sovereignty with any regional economic bloc. However, several international norms or standards from multilateral organizations (UN, WIPO, ILO, among others) are referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory system. As a member of the WTO, the Chile notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Chile’s legal system is based on civil law. Chile’s legal and regulatory framework provides for effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Laws governing issues of interest to foreign investors are found in several statutes, including the Commercial Code of 1868, the Civil Code, the Labor Code and the General Banking Act. Chile has specialized courts for dealing with tax and labor issues. The judicial system in Chile is generally transparent and independent. The likelihood of government intervention in court cases is low. If a state-owned firm is involved in the dispute, the Government of Chile may become directly involved through the State Defense Council, which represents the government interests in litigation cases related to expropriations. Regulations can be challenged before the court system, the National Comptroller, or the Constitutional Court, depending on the nature of the claim. Law 20,848 of 2015, established a new framework for foreign investment in Chile and created the Agency for the Promotion of Foreign Investment (APIE), successor to the former Foreign Investment Committee and which also acts under the name of “InvestChile.” The InvestChile website provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. For more on FDI regulations and services for foreign investors, see the section on Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment. Chile’s anti-trust law prohibits mergers or acquisitions that would prevent free competition in the industry at issue. An investor may voluntarily seek a ruling by an Anti-trust Court that a planned investment would not have competition implications. The national economic prosecutor (FNE) is an active institution in conducting investigations for competition-related cases and filing complaints before the Free Competition Tribunal (TDLC), which rules on those cases. In January and March 2021, the TDLC approved two extra-judicial settlements between the FNE and Nestle, after the company faced two cases of anti-competitive clauses in the contracts with fresh milk producers. The settlement included a US$ 1.8 million payment from Nestle. On the other hand, in April 2021, the FNE cleared Nestle´s acquisition of Chilean premium chocolate maker La Fete, after finding that the two companies serve different market segments. In March 2021, the FNE cleared Chinese state-owned enterprise State Grid International Development Limited’s (SGIDL) acquisition of Chilean energy company Compañia General de Electricidad (CGE). In September 2020, the FNE imposed fines amounting to US$ 4.1 million on the Walt Disney Company and its subsidiary TWDC Enterprises 18 Corp. for failing to provide accurate information to adopt adequate mitigation measures during the approval process for its acquisition of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. In June 2021, the TDLC approved the payment of a US$ 220,000 fine for the second charge, while the investigation for the main charge remains ongoing. In October 2021, the TDLC approved remedies agreed upon by Delta and LATAM airlines with the FNE to mitigate the risks to competition arising from Delta’s acquisition of a 20% minority stake in LATAM’s share capital, along with a joint venture and code share agreements for direct routes between the United States and Canada and between certain South American countries with the United States. In October 2021, the FNE presented a collusion case against the three main securities transport companies that operate in Chile -Brink’s Chile S.A., Prosegur and Loomis-, for having entered into an agreement to fix the prices of its services between 2017 and 2018. The FNE asked the TDLC to apply fines amounting to US$ 63.4 million against the firms (US$30.5 million for Brink’s Chile S.A., US$25.8 million for Prosegur and US$6.4 million for Loomis), as well as fines between US$ 88,000 and US$ 135,000 against the general managers and the regional heads who were in charge of the Chile offices. Chilean law grants the government authority to expropriate property, including property of foreign investors, only on public interest or national interest grounds, on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process. The government has not nationalized a private firm since 1973. Expropriations of private land take place in a transparent manner, and typically only when the purpose is to build roads or other types of infrastructure. The law requires the payment of immediate compensation at fair market value, in addition to any applicable interest. Chile’s Insolvency Law from 1982 was updated in October 2014. The current law aims to clarify and simplify liquidation and reorganization procedures for businesses to prevent criminalizing bankruptcy. It also established the new Superintendence of Insolvency and created specialized insolvency courts. The new insolvency law requires creditors’ approval to select the insolvency representative and to sell debtors’ substantial assets. The creditor also has the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims. However, the creditor cannot request information from the insolvency representative. The creditor may file for insolvency of the debtor, but for liquidation purposes only. The creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the reorganization plan; each class votes separately, and creditors in the same class are treated equally. 4. Industrial Policies The Chilean government generally does not subsidize foreign investment, nor does it issue guarantees or joint financing for FDI projects. There are, however, some incentives directed toward isolated geographical zones and to the information technology sector. These benefits relate to co-financing of feasibility studies as well as to incentives for the purchase of land in industrial zones, the hiring of local labor, and the facilitation of project financing. Other important incentives include accelerated depreciation accounting for tax purposes and legal guarantees for remitting profits and capital. Additionally, the Start-Up Chile program provides selected entrepreneurs with grants of up to US$ 80,000, along with a Chilean work visa to develop a “startup” business in Chile over a period of four to seven months. Chile has other special incentive programs aimed at promoting investment and employment in remote regions, as well as other areas that suffer development lags. Chile has two free trade zones: one in the northern port city of Iquique (Tarapaca Region) and the other in the far south port city of Punta Arenas (Magallanes Region). Merchants and manufacturers in these zones are exempt from corporate income tax, value added taxes (VAT) – on operations and services that take place inside the free trade zone – and customs duties. The same exemptions also apply to manufacturers in the Chacalluta and Las Americas Industrial Park in Arica (Arica and Parinacota Region). Mining, fishing, and financial services are not eligible for free zone concessions. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities in these zones as Chilean firms. The process for setting up a subsidiary is the same inside as outside the zones, regardless of whether the company is domestic or foreign-owned. Chile mandates that 85 percent of a firm’s workers must be local employees. Exceptions are described in Section 11. The costs associated with migration regulations do not significantly inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees. Chile does not follow “forced localization.” A draft bill that is pending in Chile’s Congress could result in additional requirements (owner’s consent) for international data transfers in cases involving jurisdictions with data protection regimes below Chile’s standards. The bill, modeled after the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also proposes the creation of an independent Chilean Data Protection Agency that would be responsible for enforcing data protection standards. Neither Chile’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency nor the Central Bank applies performance requirements in their reviews of proposed investment projects. The investment chapter in the U.S.–Chile FTA establishes rules prohibiting performance requirements that apply to all investments, whether by a third party or domestic investors. The FTA investment chapter also regulates the use of mandatory performance requirements as a condition for receiving incentives and spells out certain exceptions. These include government procurement, qualifications for export and foreign aid programs, and non-discriminatory health, safety, and environmental requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are recognized and generally enforced in Chile. Chile ranked 63 out of 190 economies in the “Registering Property” category of the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report. There is a recognized and generally reliable system for recording mortgages and other forms of liens. There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of buildings and land, and no time limit on the property rights acquired by them. The only exception, based on national security grounds, is for land located in border territories, which may not be owned by nationals or firms from border countries, without prior authorization of the President of Chile. There are no restrictions to foreign and/or non-resident investors regarding land leases or acquisitions. In the Doing Business specific index for “quality of land administration” (which includes reliability of infrastructure, transparency of information, geographic coverage and land dispute resolution), Chile obtains a score of 14 out of 30. Unoccupied properties can always be claimed by their legal owners and, as usurpation is a criminal offense, several kinds of eviction procedures are allowed by the law, though they can sometimes be onerous and lengthy. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s International IP Index, Chile’s legal framework provides for fair and transparent use of compulsory licensing; extends necessary exclusive rights to copyright holders and maintains a voluntary notification system; and provides for civil and procedural remedies. However, IP protection challenges remain. Chile’s framework for trade secret protection has been deemed insufficient by private stakeholders. Pharmaceutical products suffer from relatively weak patenting procedures, the absence of an effective patent enforcement and resolution mechanism, and some gaps in regulation governing data protection. Two important IP-related laws are pending in the Chilean Congress. A draft bill submitted to Congress in October 2018 would reform Chile’s Industrial Property Law. The new IP bill aims to reduce timeframes, modernize procedures, and increase legal certainty for patents and trademarks registration. On April 9, 2019, the bill was passed by the Lower Chamber and sent to the Senate. Meanwhile, a reform bill on Chile’s pharmaceutical drugs law called “Ley de Fármacos II”, originated in the Senate but was extensively amended by the opposition-controlled Lower Chamber, and has been under review by a mixed committee of both houses of the Chilean Congress since May 2020. While the pharmaceutical industry reports that the reconciliation process addressed some of their concerns regarding the new regulations, it identified the lack of coverage being offered in price regulations as an outstanding issue of concern. A new legislation that modernizes certain aspects of Chile’s patent and IP regime – Ley Corta 21335 – entered into force on January 5, 2022. The new law modernizes procedures for industrial designs and trademarks registration; criminalizes trademark falsification with stronger fines and introducing prison terms of up to three years; introduces provisional patents, so that innovators can initiate a patent registration procedure while being afforded 12 months to gather necessary information; strengthens patent enforcement measures, allowing affected patent owners to request the transfer of an infringing registered patent and not only its annulment; and broadens the definition of trade secrets. On February 7, 2022, a new law against trade in illicit and counterfeit goods, with a focus on disrupting organized criminal activity, entered into force. The scope of the law covers counterfeiting, the reproduction or unauthorized sale of literary, artistic, and scientific works protected by IPR, as well as phonograms, videos, phonographic records, cassettes, videocassettes, films or motion pictures, and computer programs. The Intellectual Property Brigade (BRIDEPI) of the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI) reported that it seized 41,349 counterfeit products in 2021, worth a total of US$ 491,844, and arrested nine individuals on charges related to IPR infringement. Additionally, the National Customs Service reported that, between January and September 2021 (latest data available) it seized more than 4.9 million counterfeit products worth a total of US$ 54 million. Chile’s IPR enforcement remains relatively lax, particularly in relation to piracy, copyright, and patent protection, while prosecution of IP infringement is hindered by gaps in the legal framework and a lack of expertise in IP law among judges. Rights holders indicate a need for greater resources devoted to customs operations and a better-defined procedure for dealing with small packages containing infringing goods. The legal basis for detaining and seizing suspected transshipments is also insufficiently clear. Since 2007, Chile has been on the Special 301 Priority Watch List (PWL). In October 2018, Chile’s Congress successfully passed a law that criminalizes satellite piracy. In December 2021, the Ministry of Culture, Arts, and Heritage took positive action by introducing legislation in the Chilean Congress to implement a legal framework to penalize the circumvention of technology protection measures (TPM) by amending Chile’s existing IPR law. This legislation remains pending in Congress. However, other challenges remain, related to longstanding IPR issues under the U.S.-Chile FTA: the pending implementation of UPOV 91; the implementation of an effective patent linkage in connection with applications to market pharmaceutical products; adequate protection for undisclosed data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products; and amendments to Chile’s Internet Service Provider liability regime to permit effective action against Internet piracy. Chile is not listed in the USTR’s Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at HYPERLINK hError! Hyperlink reference not valid.. 6. Financial Sector Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors. Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds. Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up significantly its insurance sector, with very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America. However, when compared to other OECD countries, it has lower market liquidity. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity export-dependent economy. Chile accepted the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank reserves the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists. To date, this authority has not been exercised. Nearly one fourth of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but less than 20 percent have a checking account. However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile. The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards. The new General Banking Act (LGB), published in January 2019, defined general guidelines for establishing a capital adequacy system in line with Basel standards, and gave the CMF the authority to establish the capital framework. All Basel III regulations were published in December 2020, and the CMF started the implementation process of Basel III requirements to last to December 1, 2025. The system’s liquidity position (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) remains above regulatory limits (70%). Capital adequacy ratio of the system equaled 14.9 percent as of December 2021 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans decreased after August 2020 due to government relief measures for households, including legislation authorizing two rounds of withdrawals from pension accounts. As of January 2022, non-performing loans equaled 1.26 percent compared to 1.54 percent as of January 2021) when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion. As of November 2021, the total assets of the Chilean banking system amounted to US$ 428.6 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. The largest six banks (Banco de Crédito e Inversiones, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco Estado, Banco de Chile, Scotiabank Chile and Itaú-Corpbanca) accounted for 88 percent of the system’s assets. Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks. Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile, comprising three out of the six largest banks of the system. Out of 17 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established banks in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks. Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile. There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile. In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints. The Government of Chile maintains two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) built with savings from years with fiscal surpluses. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at US$ 6.4 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FEES is to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to US$ 7.2 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold. Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles. Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs entirely abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies, including sovereign bonds and related instruments, corporate and high-yield bonds, mortgage-backed securities from U.S. agencies, and stocks. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Chile had 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in operation as of 2020. Twenty-seven SOEs are commercial companies and the newest one (FOINSA) is an infrastructure fund that was created to facilitate public-private partnership projects. 25 SOEs are not listed and are fully owned by the government, while the remaining three are majority government owned. Ten Chilean SOEs operate in the port management sector, six in the services sector, three in the defense sector, three in the mining sector (including CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer, and ENAP, an oil and gas company), two in transportation, one in the water sector, one is a TV station, and one is a state-owned bank (Banco Estado). The state holds a minority stake in four water companies as a result of a privatization process. In 2020, total assets of Chilean SOEs amounted to US$ 89.3 billion, while their total net income was US$ 833.7 million. SOEs employed 47,225 people in 2020. Twenty SOEs in Chile fall under the supervision of the Public Enterprises System (SEP), a state holding in charge of overseeing SOE governance. The rest – including the largest SOEs such as CODELCO, ENAP and Banco Estado – have their own governance and report to government ministries. Allocation of seats on the boards of Chilean SOEs is determined by the SEP, as described above, or outlined by the laws that regulate them. In CODELCO’s corporate governance, there is a mix between seats appointed by recommendation from an independent high-level civil service committee, and seats allocated by political authorities in the government. A list of SOEs made by the Budget Directorate, including their financial management information, is available in the following link: http://www.dipres.gob.cl/599/w3-propertyvalue-20890.html. In general, Chilean SOEs work under hard budget constraints and compete under the same regulatory and tax frameworks as private firms. The exception is ENAP, which is the only company allowed to refine oil in Chile. As an OECD member, Chile adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Chile does not have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of the need to ensure corporate social responsibility has grown over the last two decades in Chile. However, NGOs and academics who monitor this issue believe that risk mapping and management practices still do not sufficiently reflect its importance. The government of Chile encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) principles and uses the United Nations’ Rio+20 Conference statements as its principal reference. Chile adhered in 1997 to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. It also recognizes the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; the UN Global Compact’s Ten Principles and the ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility. The government established a National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD MNE guidelines located at the Undersecretariat for International Economic Relations, and has a Responsible Business Conduct Division, whose chief is also the NCP. In August 2017, Chile released its National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights based on the UN Guiding Principles. Separately, the Council on Social Responsibility for Sustainable Development, coordinated by Chile’s Ministry of Economy, is currently developing a National Policy on Social Responsibility. On January 31, 2020, the CMF closed the public comments period on proposed new annual reporting requirements on social responsibility and sustainable development by publicly traded companies. Regarding procurement decisions, ChileCompra, the agency in charge of centralizing Chile’s public procurement, incorporates the existence of a Clean Production Certificate and an ISO 14001-2004 certificate on environmental management as part of its criteria to assign public purchases. No high profile or controversial instances of corporate impact on human rights have occurred in Chile in recent years. The Chilean government effectively and fairly enforces domestic labor, employment, consumer, and environmental protection laws. There are no dispute settlement cases against Chile related to the Labor and Environment Chapters of the Free Trade Agreements signed by Chile. Regarding the protection of shareholders, the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance (SVS) has the responsibility of regulating and supervising all listed companies in Chile. Companies are generally required to have an audit committee, a directors committee, an anti-money laundering committee and an anti-terrorism finance committee. Laws do not require companies to have a nominating/corporate governance committee or a compensation committee. Compensation programs are typically established by the board of directors and/or the directors committee. Independent NGOs in Chile promote and freely monitor RBC. Examples include NGO Accion RSE: http://www.accionrse.cl/, the Catholic University of Valparaiso’s Center for Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development VINCULAR: http://www.vincular.cl/, ProHumana Foundation and the Andres Bello University’s Center Vitrina Ambiental. Chile is an OECD member, but is not participating actively in the implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Chile is not part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Chile joined The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in 2009. However, there are no private security companies based in Chile participating in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Chile is a signatory to the Paris Agreement. The Environment Ministry published the country’s 2050 Long-Term Climate Strategy (ECLP) roadmap to fulfill Chile’s climate change commitments over a 30-year timeframe. The ECLP was incorporated into Law 21.455, the Framework Law of Climate Change, that was enacted on June 13, 2022. The law includes Chile’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement, including mitigation and adaptation measures related to climate change. Chile committed to reach net zero emissions by 2050. To reach this goal, the government outlined its main policy measures along six categories: sustainable industry and mining; green hydrogen production; sustainable construction of housing and public/commercial buildings; electromobility in the public transport system; phasing out coal-fired power generation plants; and other energy efficiency measures. Under the Framework Law of Climate Change, the Environment Ministry is responsible for drawing up an emissions mitigation plan with limits for each productive sector. The plan is expected to include specific strategies and goals for the main sectors contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. These are expected to include: in the energy sector, phasing out coal-fired power plants, with an aim to close 18 plants by 2025 and the remaining plants by 2040; in the mining sector, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to a minimum level by 2050 under the ECLP (both for emissions generated from the extraction and production processes, and indirectly, such as from electric power consumption); in the agricultural sector, Chile adhered to the COP26 goal to reduce methane (CH4) emissions by 30% by 2030. Chile introduced an emissions compensation mechanism in 2020 for companies that pay green taxes, which are currently applied to emissions of particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide. This mechanism created a form of regulated carbon market, which allows industries to reduce their tax burden by financing emission reduction or emission absorption projects carried out by NGOs, foundations, or other institutions. Some examples of projects that can use this mechanism include energy efficiency initiatives, heater replacement, clean transportation, and reforestation. Chile has previously sought to incorporate environmental considerations into public procurements. In 2012, the government published the Socially Responsible Purchasing Policy, which contained strategic sustainability guidelines, which are non-binding recommendations. In 2016, the Ministry of the Environment launched a public procurement policy with environmental criteria, both for the bidder’s operations and the characteristics of the products purchased. 9. Corruption Chile applies, in a non-discriminatory manner, various laws to combat corruption of public officials, including the 2009 Transparency Law that mandated disclosure of public information related to all areas of government and created an autonomous Transparency Council in charge of overseeing its application. Subsequent amendments expanded the number of public trust positions required to release financial disclosure, mandated disclosure in greater detail, and allowed for stronger penalties for noncompliance. In March 2020, the administration of former President Piñera proposed new legislation aimed at combatting corruption, as well as economic and electoral crimes. The four new pieces of legislation, part of the Piñera administration’s “anti-abuse agenda” launched in December 2019 in response to societal demands to increase penalties for white-collar crimes, seeks to strengthen enforcement and increase penalties for collusion among firms; increase penalties for insider trading; provide protections for whistleblowers seeking to expose state corruption; and expand the statute of limitations for electoral crimes. Anti-corruption laws, in particular mandatory asset disclosure, do extend to family members of officials. Political parties are subject to laws that limit campaign financing and require transparency in party governance and contributions to parties and campaigns. Regarding government procurement, the website of ChileCompra (central public procurement agency) allows users to anonymously report irregularities in procurement. There is a decree that defines sanctions for public officials who do not adequately justify direct contracts. The Corporate Criminal Liability Law provides that corporate entities can have their compliance programs certified. Chile’s Securities and Insurance Superintendence (SVS) authorizes a group of local firms to review companies’ compliance programs and certify them as sufficient. Certifying firms are listed on the SVS website. Private companies have increasingly incorporated internal control measures, as well as ethics committees as part of their corporate governance, and compliance management sections. Additionally, Chile Transparente (Chilean branch of Transparency International) developed a Corruption Prevention System to provide assistance to private firms to facilitate their compliance with the Corporate Criminal Liability Law. Chile signed and ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Corruption. The country also ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention on September 13, 2006. Chile is also an active member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and, as an OECD member, adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. NGOs that investigate corruption operate in a free and adequately protected manner. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. David Ibaceta Medina Director General Consejo para la Transparencia Morande 360 piso 7 (+56)-(2)-2495-2000 contacto@consejotransparencia.cl Maria JaraquemadaExecutive Director Chile Transparente (Chile branch of Transparency International) Perez Valenzuela 1687, piso 1, Providencia, Santiago, Chile (+56)-(2)-2236 4507 chiletransparente@chiletransparente.cl Octavio Del Favero Executive Director Ciudadania Inteligente Holanda 895, Providencia, Santiago, Chile (+56)-(2)-2419-2770 https://ciudadaniai.org/contact Pía Mundaca Executive Director Espacio Publico Santa Lucía 188, piso 7, Santiago, Chile T: (+56) (9) 6258 3871 contacto@espaciopublico.cl Observatorio Anticorrupción (Run by Espacio Publico and Ciudadania Inteligente) https://observatorioanticorrupcion.cl/ Orlando Rojas Executive Director Observatorio Fiscal (focused on public spending) Don Carlos 2983, Oficina 3, Las Condes, Santiago, Chile (+562) (2) 4572 975 contacto@observatoriofiscal.cl 10. Political and Security Environment Pursuant to a political accord in response to the 2019 civil unrest, Chile held a plebiscite in October 2020 in which citizens voted to draft a new constitution. The process to create and ratify the new constitution launched on July 4, 2021 and will continue to mid-2022. Uncertainty over what changes could be made to Chile’s political and regulatory environment could negatively impact investor confidence. Importantly, the legislation enabling the constitutional reform process requires that the new constitution must respect Chile’s character as a democratic republic, its judicial sentences, and its international treaties (including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement). Prior to 2019, there were generally few incidents of politically motivated attacks on investment projects or installations with the exception of the southern Araucania region and its neighboring Arauco province in the southwest of Bio-Bio region. This area, home to nearly half a million indigenous inhabitants, has seen an ongoing trend of politically motivated violence and organized criminal activity. Land claims and conflicts with forestry companies are the main grievances underneath the radicalization of a relatively small number of indigenous Mapuche communities, which has led to the rise of organized groups that pursue their demands by violent means. Incidents include arson attacks on churches, farms, forestry plantations, forestry contractors’ machinery and vehicles, and private vehicles, as well as occupation of private lands, resulting in over a half-dozen deaths (including some by police forces), injuries, and damage to property. The indigenous issue has been further politicized due to anger among landowners, forestry transport contractors, and farmers affected by violence, as well as the illegal killing of a young Mapuche activist by special police forces in 2018 and the controversy over accusations of fraud by the police during the investigation of indigenous organized groups. In March 2020, a truck driver died in an arson attack on his vehicle. Since 2007, Chile has experienced a number of small-scale attacks with explosive and incendiary devices, targeting mostly banks, police stations, and public spaces throughout Santiago, including metro stations, universities, and churches. ATMs have been blown up in the late evenings or early mornings. Anarchist groups often claim responsibility for these acts, as well as violent incidents during student and labor protests. In January 2017, an eco-terrorist group claimed responsibility for a parcel bomb that detonated at the home of the chairman of the board of Chilean state-owned mining giant CODELCO. The same group detonated a bomb of similar characteristics in 2019 at a bus stop in downtown Santiago, causing five injuries, and sent a letter bomb to the office of the president of the Metro system, which was defused by police. One suspect was arrested in 2019 and the investigation of the crimes is ongoing. Another group sent package bombs to a police station in the Santiago metro area, wounding 8 police officers, and to a former Interior Minister, which was defused by police. Two suspects were arrested in 2020, and the investigation remains ongoing at the time of this report. Then-President Piñera announced a 15-day State of Emergency in October 2021 in four southern provinces in the Araucania and Biobio regions. Piñera emphasized the State of Emergency was intended to combat drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. The enactment of the State of Emergency placed the respective zones under a military authority designated by the president and empowered the armed forces to support law enforcement functions, prohibit public gatherings, and control the entry and exit of people in the four provinces, which have large populations of indigenous Mapuche among its 1.6 million residents. Congress authorized multiple extensions to the State of Emergency until March 26. On March 15, the Minister of Interior traveled to the Araucania region to initiate dialogue on the conflict between indigenous Mapuche communities and the Chilean government, however, armed gunmen prevented the minister from entering the community of Temucuicui. The State of Emergency lapsed on March 26 after the Boric government decided not to seek an extension from Congress. While the security environment is generally safe, street crime, carjackings, telephone scams, and residential break-ins are common, especially in larger cities. Vehicle thefts are a serious problem in Valparaiso and northern Chile (from Iquique to Arica). On occasion, illegal activity by striking workers resulted in damage to corporate property or a disruption of operations. Some firms have publicly expressed concern that during a contentious strike, law enforcement has appeared to be reluctant to protect private property. After a truck driver died in Antofagasta February 10 following an altercation with irregular immigrants from Venezuela, federations of northern truck drivers created road blockages and supply-chain disruptions to demand the Piñera administration implement increased safety measures. On February 14, the government initiated a State of Emergency in provinces along Chile’s northern border with Bolivia and Peru, sending soldiers to support law enforcement efforts. The State of Emergency is set to expire on April 15. Chilean civil society is active and demonstrations occur frequently. Although the vast majority of demonstrations are peaceful, criminal elements have taken advantage of civil society protests to loot stores along the protest route and clash with the police. Annual demonstrations to mark March 29, the Day of the Young Combatant; September 11, the anniversary of the 1973 coup against the government of President Salvador Allende; and October 18, the anniversary of the outbreak of the 2019 civil unrest, have resulted in damage to property, looting, and scuffles between police and protesters. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Unemployment in Chile averaged 9.1 percent of the labor force during 2021, while the labor participation rate was 58.5 percent of the working age population. Data on the labor participation of migrants is still pending. Chilean workers are adequately skilled and some sectors such as mining, agriculture, and fishing employ highly skilled workers. In general, there is an adequate availability of technicians and professionals. Estimates made by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) suggest informal employment in Chile constitutes 28.3 percent of the workforce. Article 19 of the Labor Code stipulates that employers must hire Chileans for at least 85 percent of their staff, except in the case of firms with less than 25 employees. However, Article 20 of the Labor Code includes several provisions under which foreign employees can exceed 25 percent, independent of the size of the company. In general, employees who have been working for at least one year are entitled to a statutory severance pay, upon dismissal without cause, equivalent to 30 days of the last monthly remuneration earned, for each year of service. The upper limit is 330 days (11 years of service) for workers with a contract in force for one year or more. The same amount is payable to a worker whose contract is terminated for economic reasons. Upon termination, regardless of the reason, domestic workers are entitled to an unemployment insurance benefit funded by the employee and employer contributions to an individual unemployment fund equivalent to three percent of the monthly remuneration. The employer’s contributions shall be paid for a maximum of 11 years by the same employer. Another fund made up of employer and government contributions is used for complementary unemployment payments when needed. Labor and environmental laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investments. During 2020, Labor Directorate data showed that 12,355 unions and 2,524 workers federations were active. In the same period, 273,706 workers were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining coverage rates are higher in the manufacturing (47,083), wholesale and retail; motor vehicles and motorcycles repair (43,676), and transportation and storage (20,468). Unions can form nationwide labor associations and can affiliate with international labor federations. Contracts are normally negotiated at the company level. Workers in public institutions do not have collective bargaining rights, but national public workers’ associations undertake annual negotiations with the government. The Labor Directorate under the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing labor laws and regulations. Both employers and workers may request labor mediation from the Labor Directorate, which is an alternate dispute resolution model aimed at facilitating communication and agreement between both parties. Labor Directorate data shows that 494 legal strikes occurred in 2020, involving 86,152 workers. As legal strikes in Chile have a restricted scope and duration, in general they do not present a risk for foreign investment. Chile has and generally enforces laws and regulations in accordance with internationally recognized labor rights of: freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of forced labor, child labor, including the minimum age for work, discrimination with respect to employment and occupation, and acceptable conditions of work related to minimum wage, occupational safety and health, and hours of work. The maximum number of labor hours allowed per week in Chile is 45. On January 1, 2022, Chile raised its monthly minimum wage to CLP 350,000 – US$ 437 – for all occupations, including household domestic staff, more than twice the official poverty line. Workers older than 64 or younger than 19 years old are eligible for a special minimum wage of CLP 261,092 (US$ 326) a month. Information on potential gaps in law or practice with international labor standards by the International Labor Organization is pending. Collective bargaining is not allowed in companies or organizations dependent upon the Defense Ministry or whose employees are prohibited from striking, such as in health care, law enforcement, and public utilities. Labor courts can require workers to resume work upon a determination that a strike causes serious risk to health, national security, the supply of goods or services to the population, or to the national economy. The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2004. The FTA requires the United States and Chile to maintain effective labor and environmental enforcement. On November 16, 2021, the government enacted a law enabling teleworking for workers who are the legal guardians of children in preschool or below the age of 12 and for those workers who are the caregivers of individuals with specials needs or with limited physical mobility whenever the government declares a State of Constitutional Exception as a result of a public calamity (such as events produced by the nature) or public health events (including a pandemic). A bill lowering the maximum number of labor hours allowed per week in Chile from 45 to 40 hours is still pending approval by the Senate. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M US$) 2020 $252.9 2020 $252.940 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (US$ billion, stock positions) 2020 $31.84 2020 23.01 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (US$ billion, stock positions) 2020 $12.9 2019 3.0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 109.9% 2020 41.4% OECD data available at https://data.oecd.org/ * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Chile. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 188,885 100% Total Outward 71,705 100% Canada 30,592 13.6% Brazil 13,102 16.5% United States 28,994 13.5% United States 10,095 9.9% Spain 21,451 13.5% Peru 10,043 9.2% The Netherlands 19,526 8.1% Colombia 6,734 7.1% United Kingdom 15,740 7.4% Argentina 5,291 7.0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- US$ 500,000. According to the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), total stock of FDI in Chile in 2020 amounted to US$ 188.9 billion, compared to US$ 254.3 billion in 2019. Canada, the United States and Spain are the main sources of FDI to Chile with US$ 30.6 billion, US$ 29.0 billion and US$ 21.5 billion, respectively, concentrating 42.9 percent of the total. Chile’s outward direct investment stock in 2020 amounted to US$ 188.9 billion, compared to US$ 71.7 billion in 2020, a significant decrease compared to US$ 130.2 billion in 2019. It remains concentrated in South America, where Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Argentina together represented 49 percent of total Chilean outward FDI. The United States accounted for 14.1 percent of the total, an increase compared to 2019 when it represented 9.2 percent of the total. The data below is consistent with host country statistics. Although not included in the table below, tax havens are relevant destinations of outward FDI to Chile, with the British Virgin Islands, Panama, Luxembourg, and Cayman Islands ranking sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth in inbound sources of FDI, respectively, according to the Central Bank of Chile. The Cayman Islands and Bermuda rank sixth and seventh and tenth, respectively, among Chile´s main inward FDI source. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment According to the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), total stock of portfolio investment in Chile as of June 2021 amounted to US$ 200.4 billion, of which US$ 164.6 billion were equity and investment funds shares, and the rest were debt securities. The United States and Luxembourg (a tax haven) were the main sources of portfolio investment to Chile with US $71.3 billion and $54.9 billion, representing 35.6 percent and 27.4 percent of the total, respectively. Both countries also represent 65 percent of the total of equity investment. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany are the following top sources of equity portfolio investment to Chile, while the United States, Mexico and Japan are the top sources of debt securities investment. 14. Contact for More Information Alexis Gutiérrez Economic Specialist Avenida Andrés Bello 2800, Las Condes, Santiago, Chile (56-9) 4268 9005 gutierrezaj@state.gov China Executive Summary In 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the number two global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination, behind the United States. As the world’s second-largest economy, with a large consumer base and integrated supply chains, China’s economic recovery following COVID-19 reassured investors and contributed to high FDI and portfolio investments. The PRC implemented major legislation in 2021, including the Data Security Law in September and the Personal Information Protection Law in November. China remains a relatively restrictive investment environment for foreign investors due to restrictions in key sectors and regulatory uncertainties. Obstacles include ownership caps and requirements to form joint venture (JV) partnerships with local firms, industrial policies to develop indigenous capacity or technological self-sufficiency, and pressures to transfer technology as a prerequisite to gaining market access. New data and financial rules announced in 2021 also created significant uncertainty surrounding the financial regulatory environment. The PRC’s pandemic-related visa and travel restrictions significantly affected foreign businesses operations, increasing labor and input costs. An assertive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and emphasis on national companies and self-reliance has heightened foreign investors’ concerns about the pace of economic reforms. Key developments in 2021 included: The Rules for Security Reviews on Foreign Investments came into effect January 18, expanding PRC vetting of foreign investment that may affect national security. The National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law on June 10. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued draft revisions to its Cybersecurity Review Measures to broaden PRC approval authority over PRC companies’ overseas listings on July 10. China formally applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on September 16. On November 1, the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) went into effect and China formally applied to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). On December 23, President Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The law prohibits importing goods into the United States that are mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the PRC, especially from Xinjiang. On December 27, the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) updated its foreign FDI investment “negative lists.” While PRC pronouncements of greater market access and fair treatment of foreign investment are welcome, details and effective implementation are needed to ensure equitable treatment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 12 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 123.8 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 10,550 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment FDI has played an essential role in China’s economic development. Though the PRC remains a relatively restrictive environment for foreign investors, PRC government officials tout openness to FDI, promising market access expansion and non-discriminatory, “national treatment” for foreign enterprises through improvements to the business environment. They also have made efforts to strengthen China’s regulatory framework to enhance market-based competition. MOFCOM reported FDI flows grew by about 15 percent year-on-year, reaching USD 173 billion, however, foreign businesses continue to express concerns over China’s pandemic restrictions. In 2021, U.S. businesses’ concerns with China’s COVID-19 restrictive travel restrictions were at the top of the agenda, along with concerns over PRC’s excessive cyber security and data-related requirements, preferential treatment for domestic companies – including state-owned enterprises – under various industrial policies, preference for domestic technologies and products in the procurement process, an opaque regulatory system, and inconsistent application of laws protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). U.S.-China geopolitical tensions were also cited as a significant concern. See the following: American Chamber of Commerce China 2021 American Business in China White Paper American Chamber of Commerce China 2021 Business Climate Survey U.S.-China Business Council’s 2021 China Business Environment Member Survey China’s International Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA), under MOFCOM, oversees attracting foreign investment and promoting China’s overseas investment. Duties include implementing overseas investment policy; guiding domestic sub-national and international investment promotion agencies; promoting investment in industrial parks at the national, subnational, and cross-border level; organizing trainings in China and abroad for overseas investment projects; and, engaging international and multilateral economic organizations, foreign investment promotion agencies, chambers of commerce, and business associations. The agency has offices worldwide, including CIPA Europe in Hungary, CIPA Germany, and a representative office in the Hague to promote investment in the Benelux area. CIPA maintains an “Invest in China” website which lists laws, regulations, and rules relevant to foreign investors. The China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investments (CAEFI) is a non-profit organization overseen by MOFCOM. The association and corresponding provincial institutions have hotlines to receive foreign investor complaints. Entry into China’s market is regulated by the country’s “negative lists,” which identify the sectors in which foreign investment is restricted or prohibited, and a catalogue for encouraged foreign investment, which identifies the sectors and locations (often less developed regions) in which the government encourages investment. The Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access to Pilot Free Trade Zones (the “FTZ Negative List”) applies to China’s 20 FTZs and one free trade port. The Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (̈the “Nationwide Negative List”) came into effect on January 1, 2022. The Industry Catalogue for Encouraged Foreign Investment (released December 27, 2020) encourages FDI inflows to key sectors, in particular semiconductors and other high-tech industries. The Industrial Catalogue for Encouraged Foreign Investment in Western Region. The “encouraged list” is subdivided into a cross-sector nationwide catalogue and a separate catalogue for western and central regions, China’s least developed regions. In restricted industries, foreign investors face equity caps or JV requirements to ensure control by a PRC national and enterprise. Due to these requirements, foreign investors that wish to participate in China’s market must enter partnerships, which sometimes require transfer of technology. However, even in “open” sectors, a variety of factors, including ability to access local government officials and preferences, enhanced ability to impact local rules and standards, perceptions of better understanding of the PRC market, and access to procurement opportunities, led many foreign companies to rely on the JV structure to operate in the PRC market. Below are a few examples of industries where investment restrictions apply: Preschool to higher education institutes require a PRC partner with a dominant role. Establishment of clinical trials for new drugs require a PRC partner who holds the IPR tied to data drawn from the clinical research. Examples of foreign investment sectors requiring PRC majority stake include: Radio/television market survey. Basic telecommunication services outside free trade zones. The 2021 negative lists made minor modifications to some industries, reducing the number of restrictions and prohibitions from 33 to 31 in the nationwide negative list, and from 30 to 27 in China’s pilot FTZs. Notable changes included openings in the automotive and satellite television broadcasting manufacturing sectors. Sectors that remain closed to foreign investment include rare earths, film production and distribution, and tobacco products. However, the government continues to constrain foreign investors in a myriad of ways beyond caps on ownerships. For instance, in the pharmaceutical sector, while JV requirements were eliminated in the 1990s, foreign companies must partner with local PRC institutions for clinical trials. Other requirements that place undue burden on foreign investors include but are not limited to: applying higher standards for quality-related testing, prohibitions on foreign parties in JVs conducting certain business activities, challenges in obtaining licenses and permits, mandatory intellectual property sharing related to certain biological material, and other implicit and explicit downstream regulatory approval barriers. The negative list regulating pilot FTZ zones will lift all barriers to foreign investment in all manufacturing sectors, widen foreign investor access to some service sectors, and allow foreign investment into the radio and TV-based market research sector. For the market research sector, caveats include a 33 percent foreign investor ownership cap and PRC citizenship requirements for legal representatives. While U.S. businesses welcomed market openings, foreign investors remained underwhelmed by the PRC’s lack of ambition and refusal to provide more significant liberalization. Foreign investors noted the automotive sector openings were inconsequential since the more lucrative electric vehicle (EV) sector was opened to foreign investors in 2018, whereas the conventional auto sector is saturated. Foreign investors cited this was in line with the government announcing liberalization mainly in industries that domestic PRC companies already dominate. In addition to the PRC’s system for managing foreign investments, MOFCOM and NDRC also maintain a system for managing which segments of the economy are open to non-state-owned investors. The most recent Market Access Negative List was issued on December 10, 2020. The Measures for Security Reviews on Foreign Investments came into effect January 18, 2021, revising the PRC’s framework for vetting foreign investments that could affect national security. The NDRC and the Ministry of Commerce will administer the new measures which establish a mechanism for reviewing investment activities across a range of sectors perceived to implicate PRC national security, including agriculture, energy and resources, cultural products, and more. China is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), but the OECD Council established a country program of dialogue and co-operation with China in October 1995. The OECD completed its most recent investment policy review for China in 2022. OECD 2022 Report China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) boosted its economic growth and advanced its legal and governmental reforms. The WTO completed its most recent trade policy review for China in 2021, highlighting FDI grew at a slower pace than in previous periods but remains a major driver of global growth and a key market for multinational companies. WTO Trade Policy Review for China USTR 2021 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance International Monetary Fund (IMF) information on China Created in 2018, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is responsible for business registration processes. Under SAMR’s registration system, parties are required to report when they (1) establish a Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE); (2) establish a representative office in China; (3) acquire stocks, shares, assets or other similar equity of a domestic China-based company; (4) re-invest and establish subsidiaries in China; and (5) invest in new projects. Foreign companies still report challenges setting up a business relative to their PRC competitors. Many companies offer consulting, legal, and accounting services for establishing operations in China. Investors should review their options carefully with an experienced advisor before investing. Invest in China The State Council Information on Doing Business in China Filing a Complaint as a Foreign Company Nationwide Government Service Platform Since 2001, China has pursued a “going-out” investment policy. At first, the PRC encouraged SOEs to invest overseas, but in recent years, China’s overseas investments have diversified with both state and private enterprises investing in nearly all industries and economic sectors. China remains a major global investor and in 2021, total outbound direct investment (ODI) increased for the first time in four years to reach $153.7 billion, a 12 percent increase year-on-year, according to the 2020 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment . China’s government created “encouraged,” “restricted,” and “prohibited” outbound investment categories to suppress significant capital outflow pressure in 2016 and to guide PRC investors to more “strategic sectors.” The Sensitive Industrial-Specified Catalogue of 2018 further restricted outbound investment in sectors like property, cinemas, sports teams, and non-entity investment platforms and encouraged outbound investment in sectors that supported PRC national objectives by acquiring advanced manufacturing and high-tech assets. PRC firms involved in sectors cited as priorities in the Strategic Emerging Industries, New Infrastructure Initiative, and MIC 2025 often receive preferential government financing and subsidies for outbound investment. In 2006, the PRC established the Qualified (QDII) program to channel domestic funds into offshore assets through financial institutions. While the quota tied to this program has fluctuated over the years based on capital flight concerns, in 2021 the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) approved new quotas for 17 institutions under the program to allow a potential $147.3 billion in outbound investment. In 2013, the PRC government established a pilot program allowing global asset management companies more opportunities to raise RMB-denominated funds from high net-worth PRC-based individuals and institutional investors to invest overseas. These programs include the Qualified Domestic Limited Partnership (QDLP) pilot program and the Shenzhen-specific Qualified Domestic Investment Entity (QDIE) program. In 2021, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and SAFE expanded the pilot areas to at least seven jurisdictions and quotas for the QDLP to $10 billion, respectively. In April, the Shenzhen Financial Regulatory Bureau amended the Administrative Measures of Shenzhen for Implementation of the Pilot Program for Overseas Investment by Qualified Domestic Investors (“Shenzhen QDIE Measures”) to include investments in the securities market that aligns it with the QLDP program. 3. Legal Regime One of China’s WTO accession commitments was to establish an official journal dedicated to the publication of laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade related aspects of IPR (TRIPS), and the control of foreign exchange. Despite mandatory 30-day public comment periods, PRC ministries continue to post only some draft administrative regulations and departmental rules online, often with a public comment period of less than 30 days. As part of the Phase One Agreement, China committed to providing at least 45 days for public comment on all proposed laws, regulations, and other measures implementing the Phase One Agreement. While China has made some progress, U.S. businesses operating in China consistently cite arbitrary legal enforcement and the lack of regulatory transparency among the top challenges of doing business in China. In China’s state-dominated economic system, the relationships between the CCP, the PRC government, PRC business (state- and private-owned), and other PRC stakeholders are blurred. Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) perceive that China prioritizes political goals, industrial policies, and a desire to protect social stability at the expense of foreign investors, fairness, and the rule of law. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance gave China a composite score of 1.75 out 5 points, attributing China’s relatively low score to stakeholders not having easily accessible and updated laws and regulations; the lack of impact assessments conducted prior to issuing new laws; and other concerns about transparency. For accounting standards, PRC companies use the Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) for all financial reporting within mainland China. Companies listed overseas or in Hong Kong may choose to use ASBE, the International Financial Reporting Standards, or Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards. While the government of China made many policy announcements in 2021 that will provide impetus to ESG reporting, stock exchanges on mainland China (not including Hong Kong) have not made ESG reporting mandatory. For instance, currently eighteen PRC companies are signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment. While the PRC government did announce its green finance taxonomy known as China’s “Catalogue of Green Bond Supported Projects”, experts cited the taxonomy lacks mandatory reporting and verification. On November 4, the People’s Bank of China and the European Commission also jointly launched a sustainable finance taxonomy to create comparable standards on green finance products. Mainland ESG efforts were also primarily focused on environmental and social impact-related, and less so on governance-related reporting. China’s goal to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060 will drive reporting on decarbonization plans and targets and could increase alignment with international standards such as those outlined in the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations. The PRC government also incorporated non-mandatory ESG-like principles into overseas development initiatives such as its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) via its Guiding Opinions on Promoting Green Belt and Road Construction. For instance, the PRC adopted the Green Investment Principles (GIP) for greening investment for BRI projects; under this initiative members – including major PRC policy banks funding BRI projects – are expected to provide their first TCFD disclosure by 2023. Obstacles contacts cited include a shortage of quality data and ESG professionals, such as third-party auditors which are required to support evidence based ESG reporting. In December, MEE issued new disclosure rules requiring five types of domestic entities to disclose environmental information on an annual basis, effective February 8, 2022. The rules will apply only to listed companies and bond issuers that were subject to environmental penalties the previous year and other MEE-identified entities, including those that discharged high levels of pollutants. Entities must disclose information on environmental management, pollution generation, carbon emissions, and contingency planning for environmental emergencies. These same companies and bond issuers must also disclose climate change and environmental protection information related to investment and financing transactions. On June 28, the CSRC issued final amendments requiring listed companies disclose environmental penalties and encouraging carbon emissions disclosures. It also issued guidelines on the format and content of annual reports and half-year reports of listed companies, requiring them to set up a separate “Section 5 Environmental and Social Responsibility” to encourage carbon emission reduction related disclosure. In May, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) issued a plan for strengthening environmental disclosure requirements by 2025. Most contacts assessed investors are the key drivers of increased ESG disclosures. As part of its WTO accession agreement, China agreed to notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. However, China continues to issue draft technical regulations without proper notification to the TBT Committee. The PRC is also a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force on January 1, 2022. Although RCEP has some elements of a regional economic bloc, many of its regulatory provisions (for example on data flow) are weakened by national security exemptions. On September 16, China submitted a written application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to New Zealand (the depositary of the agreement). The PRC would face challenges in addressing obligations related to SOEs, labor rights, digital trade, and increased transparency. China’s legal system borrows heavily from continental European legal systems, but with “Chinese characteristics.” The rules governing commercial activities are found in various laws, regulations, departmental rules, and Supreme People’s Court (SPC) judicial interpretations, among other sources. While China does not have specialized commercial courts, it has created specialized courts and tribunals for the hearing of intellectual property disputes (IP), including in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Hainan. The PRC’s constitution and laws are clear that PRC courts cannot exercise power independent of the Party. Further, in practice, influential businesses, local governments, and regulators routinely influence courts. Outside of the IP space, U.S. companies often hesitate in challenging administrative decisions or bringing commercial disputes before local courts due to perceptions of futility or fear of government retaliation. The PRC’s new foreign investment law, the FIL, came into force on January 1, 2020, replacing the previous foreign investment framework. The FIL provides a five-year transition period for foreign enterprises established under previous foreign investment laws, after which all foreign enterprises will be subject to the same domestic laws as PRC companies, such as the Company Law. The FIL standardized the regulatory regimes for foreign investment by including the negative list management system, a foreign investment information reporting system, and a foreign investment security review system all under one document. The FIL also seeks to address foreign investors complaints by explicitly banning forced technology transfers, promising better IPR, and the establishment of a complaint mechanism for investors to report administrative abuses. However, foreign investors remain concerned that the FIL and its implementing regulations provide PRC ministries and local officials significant regulatory discretion, including the ability to retaliate against foreign companies. The December 2020 revised investment screening mechanism under the Measures on Security Reviews on Foreign Investments (briefly discussed above) came into effect January 18 without any period for public comment or prior consultation with the business community. Foreign investors complained China’s new rules on investment screening were expansive in scope, lacked an investment threshold to trigger a review, and included green field investments – unlike most other countries. Moreover, new guidance on Neutralizing Extra-Territorial Application of Unjustified Foreign Legislation Measures, a measure often compared to “blocking statutes” from other markets, added to foreign investors’ concerns over the legal challenges they would face in trying to abide by both their host-country’s regulations and China’s. Foreign investors complained that market access in China was increasingly undermined by national security-related legislation. While not comprehensive, a list of official PRC laws and regulations is here . On June 10, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions (“Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law” or AFSL). The AFSL gives the government explicit authority to impose countermeasures related to visas, deportation, and asset freezing against individuals or organizations that broadly endanger China’s “sovereignty, security, or development interests.” The law also calls for Chinese citizens and organizations harmed by foreign “sanctions” to pursue damages via PRC civil courts. On October 13, MOF issued a circular prohibiting discrimination against foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in government procurement for products “produced in China.” The circular required that suppliers not be restricted based on ownership, organization, equity structure, investor country, or product brand, to ensure fair competition between domestic and foreign companies. The circular also required the abolition of regulations and practices violating the circular by the end of November, including the establishment of alternative databases and qualification databases. This circular may have been intended to address the issuance of Document No. 551 in May by MOF and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (without publishing on official websites), titled “Auditing guidelines for government procurement of imported products,” outlining local content requirements for hundreds of items, many of which are medical devices, including X-ray machines and magnetic resonance imaging equipment. It is unclear whether Document 551 will be rescinded or revised based on this circular. Additionally, the circular applies only to FIEs and does not provide fair treatment for imported products from companies overseas. While the circular does state FIEs should be afforded equal treatment, the circular does not address concerns about localization pressures created by Document 551. Further, the circular provides no guidance on what constitutes a “domestic product” and does not address treatment of products manufactured in China that incorporate content from other jurisdictions, key concerns for a wide range of U.S. firms. In November 2021, the PRC government announced transformation of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the SAMR, renaming it the National Anti-Monopoly Bureau, adding three new departments, and doubled staffing. The National Anti-Monopoly Bureau enforces China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and oversees competition issues at the central and provincial levels. The bureau reviews mergers and acquisitions, and investigates cartel and other anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a dominant market positions, including those related to IP, and abuse of administrative powers by government agencies. The bureau also oversees the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), which requires government agencies to conduct a review prior to issuing new and revising administrative regulations, rules, and guidelines to ensure such measures do not inhibit competition. SAMR issues implementation guidelines to fill in gaps in the AML, address new trends in China’s market, and help foster transparency in enforcement. Generally, SAMR has sought public comment on proposed measures, although comment periods are sometimes less than 30 days. In October 2021, SAMR issued draft amendments to the AML for public comment. Revisions to the AML are expected to be finalized in 2022 and likely will include changes such as stepped-up fines for AML violations and specification of the factors to consider in determining whether an undertaking in the internet sector has abused a dominant market position. In February 2021, SAMR published (after public comment) the “Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy.” The Guidelines address monopolistic behaviors of online platforms operating in China. Foreign companies have long expressed concern that the government uses AML enforcement in support of China’s industrial policies, such as promoting national champions, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors. The AML explicitly protects the lawful operations of government authorized monopolies in industries that affect the national economy or national security. U.S. companies expressed concerns that in SAMR’s consultations with other PRC agencies when reviewing M&A transactions, those agencies raise concerns not related to competition concerns to block, delay, or force transacting parties to comply with preconditions – including technology transfer – to receive approval. China’s law prohibits nationalization of FIEs, except under vaguely specified “special circumstances” where there is a national security or public interest need. PRC law requires fair compensation for an expropriated foreign investment but does not detail the method used to assess the value of the investment. The Department of State is not aware of any cases since 1979 in which China has expropriated a U.S. investment, although the Department has notified Congress through the annual 527 Investment Dispute Report of several cases of concern. The PRC introduced bankruptcy laws in 2007, under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL), which applies to all companies incorporated under PRC laws and subject to PRC regulations. In May 2020, the PRC released the Civil Code, contract and property rights rules. Despite the NPC listing amendments to the EBL as a top work priority for 2021, the NPC has not released the amendments to the public. Court-appointed administrators – law firms and accounting firms that help verify claims, organize creditors’ meetings, list, and sell assets online – look to handle more cases and process them faster. As of 2021 official statements cited 5,060 institutional administrators and 703 individual administrators. On August 18, the Law Enforcement Inspection Team of the Standing Committee of the NPC was submitted its report on the enforcement of enterprise bankruptcy to the 30th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth NPC for deliberation. While the report is unavailable publicly, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) website issued a press release noting the report found that from 2007 to 2020, courts at all levels nationwide accepted 59,604 bankruptcy cases, and concluded 48,045 bankruptcy cases (in 2020 there were 24,438 liquidation and bankruptcy cases). Of the total liquidation and bankruptcy cases recorded in that same period, 90 percent involved private enterprises. The announcement also cited the allocation of additional resources, including future establishment of at least 14 bankruptcy tribunals and 100 Liquidation & Bankruptcy Divisions and specialized collegial panels to handle bankruptcy cases. As of August 2021, bankruptcy cases are handled by 417 bankruptcy judges, 28 high people’s courts, and 284 intermediate people’s courts. In 2021 the government added a new court in Haikou. National data is unavailable for 2021, but local courts have released some information that suggest a nearly 10 percent increase in liquidation and bankruptcy cases in Jiangxi province and about a 66 percent increase in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong province. While PRC authorities are taking steps to address corporate debt and are gradually allowing some companies to fail, companies generally avoid pursing bankruptcy because of the potential for local government interference and fear of losing control over the outcome. According to the SPC, 2.899 million enterprises closed business in 2020, of which only 0.1 percent or 3,908 closed because of bankruptcy. In August 2020, Shenzhen released the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, to take effect on March 1, 2021. This is the PRC’s first regulation on personal bankruptcy. On July 19, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province, China served a ruling on Liang Wenjin approving his personal bankruptcy reorganization plan. This was the first personal bankruptcy case closed by Shenzhen Court since the implementation of the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and is the first personal bankruptcy reorganization case in China. The Personal Bankruptcy Regulations is China’s first set of rules on personal bankruptcy, which formally establishes the personal bankruptcy system in China for the first time. At present, the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations is only applicable in Shenzhen. Numerous other localities have also begun experimenting with legal remedies for personal insolvency, in part to deter debtors from taking extreme measures to address debt. 4. Industrial Policies To attract foreign investment, different provinces and municipalities offer preferential packages like a temporary reduction in taxes and/or import/export duties, reduced costs for land use, research and development subsidies, and funding for initial startups. Often, these packages stipulate that foreign investors must meet certain benchmarks for exports, local content, technology transfer, or other requirements. However, many economic sectors that China deems sensitive due to broadly defined national or economic security concerns remain closed to foreign investment. As part of efforts to attract green investment, China and the EU issued a green investment taxonomy on the sidelines of the 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) on November 4. The International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) Taxonomy Working Group issued the Common Ground Taxonomy- Climate Change Mitigation (CGT) to accelerate cross-border sustainability-focused investments and scale up the mobilization of green capital internationally. The CGT listed 80 economic activities across six industries as sustainable, including: (1) agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing; (2) electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; (3) construction; (4) water supply, and sewage, waste management and remediation activities; as well as (6) transportation and storage. The taxonomy includes criteria for calculating a project’s contribution to mitigating climate change. This taxonomy was the result of consultations held between the EU and China over the two years to conduct analyses between China’s “Catalogue of Green Bond Supported Projects” and the “EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act.” Green finance contacts reported the CGT would likely promote the issuance of cross-border green investment products and lower or avoid the cost of double certification. Environmental NGO contacts, however, noted the CGT was focused on climate change mitigation, without taking into consideration the principle of “do no significant harm.” The CGT is not legally binding for either the EU or China and is not formally endorsed by other members of the IPSF. Please see climate issues section for additional information on government incentives towards attracting green investment. In 2013, the State Council announced the Shanghai pilot FTZ to provide open and high-standard trade and investment services to foreign companies. China gradually scaled up its FTZ pilot program to a total of 20 FTZs and one Free Trade Port (FTP), which are in all or parts of Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan (FTZ and FTP), Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang provinces; Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin municipalities. The goal of China’s FTZs/FTP is to provide a trial ground for trade and investment liberalization measures and to introduce service sector reforms, especially in financial services, that China expects to eventually introduce in other parts of the domestic economy. The FTZs promise foreign investors “national treatment” investment in industries and sectors not listed on China’s negative lists. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China include: Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, (Guangdong Province); Xiamen (Fujian Province) Hainan Province; Shanghai Pudong New Area; and Tianjin Binhai New Area. In 2021, the PRC formulated the first negative list in the field of cross-border trade in services, effective in Hainan Free Trade Port. Separately, the PRC government has shortened the negative list for foreign investment in Pilot Free Trade Zones. In 2021, the seventh revision to the free trade zone negative list reduced close off sectors from 30 items to 27 items. Please see above section on negative lists for more details. 5. Protection of Property Rights The government of China owns all urban land and only the state can issue long-term land leases to individuals and companies, including foreigners, subject to many restrictions. China’s property law stipulates that residential property rights renew automatically, while commercial and industrial grants renew if it does not conflict with other public interest claims. Several foreign investors have reported revocation of land use rights so that PRC developers could pursue government-designated building projects. Investors often complain about insufficient compensation in these cases. In rural China, the registration system suffers from unclear ownership lines and disputed border claims, often at the expense of local farmers whom village leaders exclude in favor of “handshake deals” with commercial interests. China’s Securities Law defines debtor and guarantor rights, including rights to mortgage certain types of property and other tangible assets, including long-term leases. PRC law does not prohibit foreigners from buying non-performing debt, but it must be acquired through state-owned asset management firms, and it is difficult to liquidate. The PRC remained on the USTR Special 301 Report Priority Watch List in 2022 and was subject to continued Section 306 monitoring. Multiple PRC-based physical and online markets were included in the 2021 USTR Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. Of note, in 2021, the PRC government took steps toward addressing long-standing U.S. concerns on a wide range of IP issues, from patents to trademarks to copyrights and trade secrets. The reforms addressed the granting and protection of IP rights as well as their enforcement, and included changes made in support of the Phase One Trade Agreement. In September 2021, the CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly issued the “Outline for Building a Strong Intellectual Property Nation (2021-2035).” The Outline was China’s second long-term plan to promote IP development since the 2008 National IP Strategy Outline, and provided a high-level framework and specific goals for reforms of China’s entire IP ecosystem, including mechanisms to incentivize the creation and utilization of IP, as well as the systems and mechanisms for protecting and enforcing it. The State Council in October issued the “National 14th Five-year Plan IP Protection and Utilization Plan” which provided a list of IP-related tasks to achieve during 2021-2025. The Plan called for expedited revisions to the Patent Law, Trademark Law, Copyright Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, Science and Technology Advancement Law, and e-Commerce law, and to strengthen legislation in areas such as geographical indicators and trade secrets. In 2021, China’s IP progress also included the implementation of a judicial interpretation related to punitive damages on IP infringements, the gradual elimination of subsidies linked to patent applications, and administrative measures addressing trademark and patent protection and enforcement, as well as enforcement of copyright and trade secrets. Despite these reforms, IP rights remain subject to Chinese government policy objectives, which appear to have intensified in 2021. For U.S. companies in China, infringement remained both rampant and a low-risk “business strategy” for bad-faith actors. Further, enforcement and regulatory authorities continue to signal to U.S. rights holders that application of China’s IP system remains subject to the discretion of the PRC government and its policy goals. High-level remarks by PRC leader Xi Jinping and senior leaders signaled China’s commitment to cracking down on IP infringement in the years ahead. However, they also reflected China’s vision of the IP system as an important tool for limiting foreign ownership and control of critical technology and ensuring national security. While on paper China’s IP protection and enforcement mechanisms have inched closer to near parity with other foreign markets, in practice, fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory treatment will very likely continue to be denied to U.S. rights holders whose IP ownership and exploitation impede PRC economic development and national security goals. For detailed information on China’s environment for IPR protection and enforcement, please see the following reports: U.S.-China Phase One Agreement USTR Section 301 Report on China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation USTR 2021 Special 301 Report (see section on China) USTR’s 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers in China (see section on China) USTR’s 2021 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance USTR’s 2021 Notorious Market Report (see China) For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market. Since their founding over three decades ago, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, combined, are ranked the third largest stock market in the world with over USD 12.2 trillion in assets. China’s bond market has similarly expanded significantly to become the second largest worldwide, totaling approximately USD 18.6 trillion. In 2021, China took steps to open certain financial sectors such as mutual funds, securities, and asset management, but multinational companies still report barriers to entering the PRC insurance markets. As an example, in September, Black Rock was the first firm given approval to sell mutual funds to PRC nationals as the first wholly foreign owned mutual fund. Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms increased but also faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls, which obfuscate the repatriation of returns. Though the PRC is taking steps to liberalize its capital markets, PRC companies that seek overseas investment have historically tended to list in the United States or Hong Kong; PRC and U.S. regulations on exchanges and geopolitics may begin to impact this trend. As of 2021, 24 sovereign entities and private sector firms, including the Asian Development Bank, Hungary, and BMW, have since issued RMB 106.5 billion yuan, roughly USD 16.7 billion, in 72 “Panda Bonds,” Chinese renminbi (RMB)-denominated debt issued by foreign entities in China. China’s private sector can also access credit via bank loans, bond issuance, trust products, and wealth management products. However, most bank credit flows to state-owned firms, largely due to distortions in China’s banking sector that have incentivized lending to state-affiliated entities over their private sector counterparts. China has been an IMF Article VIII member since 1996 and generally refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has used administrative and preferential policies to encourage credit allocation towards national priorities, such as infrastructure investments and industrial policy. The PRC’s monetary policy is run by the PBOC, the PRC’s central bank. The PBOC has traditionally deployed various policy tools, such as open market operations, reserve requirement ratios, benchmark rates and medium-term lending facilities, to control credit growth. The PBOC had previously also set quotas on how much banks could lend but ended the practice in 1998. As part of its efforts to shift towards a more market-based system, the PBOC announced in 2019 that it will reform its one-year loan prime rate (LPR), which would serve as an anchor reference for other loans. The one-year LPR is based on the interest rate that 18 banks offer to their best customers and serves as the benchmark for rates provided for other loans. In 2020, the PBOC requested financial institutions to shift towards use of the one-year LPR for their outstanding floating-rate loan contracts from March to August. Despite these measures to move towards more market-based lending, the PRC’s financial regulators still influence the volume and destination of PRC bank loans through “window guidance” – unofficial directives delivered verbally – as well as through mandated lending targets for key economic groups, such as small and medium sized enterprises. In 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) also began issuing laws to regulate online lending by banks including internet companies such as Ant Financial and Tencent, which had previously not been subject to banking regulations. In 2021, PBOC and CBIRC issued circulars emphasizing the need to emphasize and encourage financial stability among real estate developers. The CBIRC oversees the PRC’s 4,607 lending institutions, about USD 54 trillion in total assets. China’s “Big Five” – Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – dominate the sector and are largely stable, but has experienced regional banking stress, especially among smaller lenders. Reflecting the level of weakness among these banks, in September 2021, the PBOC announced in “China Financial Stability Report 2020” that 422 or 9.6 percent of the 4,400 banking financial institutions received a “fail” rating (high risk) following an industry-wide review in in the second quarter of 2021. The assessment deemed 393 firms, all small and medium sized rural financial institutions, “extremely risky.” The official rate of non-performing loans among China’s banks is relatively low: 1.7 percent as of the end of 2021. However, analysts believed the actual figure may be significantly higher. Bank loans continue to provide most credit options (reportedly around 63.6 percent in 2021) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding in scope, reach, and sophistication in China. As part of a broad campaign to reduce debt and financial risk, Chinese regulators have implemented measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes wealth management and trust products. These measures have achieved positive results. In December 2020, CBIRC published the first “Shadow Banking Report,” and claimed that the size of China’s shadow banking had shrunk sharply since 2017 when China started tightening the sector. By the end of 2019, the size of China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to 84.8 trillion yuan from the peak of 100.4 trillion yuan in early 2017. PBOC estimated in January 2021 that the outstanding balance of China’s shadow banking was around RMB 32 trillion yuan at the end of 2020. Alternatively, Moody’s estimated that China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to RMB 57.8 trillion yuan in the first half of 2021 and shadow banking to GDP ratio dropped to 52.9 percent from 58.3 percent at the end of 2020. Foreign owned banks can now establish wholly owned banks and branches in China, however, onerous licensing requirements and an industry dominated by local players, have limited foreign banks market penetration. Foreigners are eligible to open a bank account in China but are required to present a passport and/or Chinese government issued identification. China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which was launched in 2007 to help diversify China’s foreign exchange reserves. Overall, information and updates on CIC and other funds that function like SWFs was difficult to procure. CIC is ranked the second largest SWF by total assets by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). With USD 200 billion in initial registered capital, CIC manages over USD 1.2 trillion in assets as of 2021 and invests on a 10-year time horizon. In 2021, CIC reported that during the 2020 period it increased its information technology-related holdings while cutting holdings of overseas equities and bonds. CIC has two overseas branches, CIC International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. and CIC Representative Office in New York. CIC has since evolved into three subsidiaries: CIC International was established in September 2011 with a mandate to invest in and manage overseas assets. It conducts public market equity and bond investments, hedge fund, real estate, private equity, and minority investments as a financial investor. CIC Capital was incorporated in January 2015 with a mandate to specialize in making direct investments to enhance CIC’s investments in long-term assets. Central Huijin makes equity investments in China’s state-owned financial institutions. China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimated USD 450 billion in assets in 2021; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD 10 billion in assets (2020); the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD 417.8 billion in assets; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD 40 billion in assets to foster investment in BRI countries. China’s state-run funds do not report the percentage of assets invested domestically. However, China’s state-run funds follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. While CIC affirms they do not have formal government guidance to invest funds consistent with industrial policies or designated projects, CIC is expected to pursue government objectives. 7. State-Owned Enterprises China has approximately 150,000 wholly-owned SOEs, of which 50,000 are owned by the central government, and the remainder by local or provincial governments. SOEs account for 30 to 40 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 percent of China’s total employment. Non-financial SOE assets totaled roughly USD 30 trillion. SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries. State funds are spread throughout the economy and the state may also be the majority or controlling shareholder in an ostensibly private enterprise. China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.” SOEs enjoy preferential access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals. SOEs also have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt. A comprehensive, published list of all PRC SOEs does not exist. PRC officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD guidelines to improve the SOEs independence and professionalism, including relying on Boards of Directors that are free from political influence. However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective if SOE administration and government policy remain intertwined, and PRC officials make minimal progress in primarily changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs. SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy. Among central SOEs managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), senior management positions are mainly filled by senior party members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s party secretary. SOE executives often outrank regulators in the CCP rank structure, which minimizes the effectiveness of regulators in implementing reforms. While SOEs typically pursue commercial objectives, the lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the state make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference. SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail. U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs. Since 2013, the PRC government has periodically announced reforms to SOEs that included selling SOE shares to outside investors or a mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired. The government has tried these approaches to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually infuse private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, finance, and telecommunications. For instance, during an August 25 press conference, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) officials announced that in the second half of the year central SOE reform would focus on the advanced manufacturing and technology innovation sectors. As part of these efforts, they claimed SASAC would ensure mergers and acquisitions removed redundancies, stabilize industrial supply chains, withdraw from non-competitive businesses, and streamline management structures. In practice, however, reforms have been gradual, as the PRC government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often preferred to utilize a SOE consolidation approach. Recently, Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the state as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations. SASAC issued a circular on November 20, 2020, directing tighter control over central SOEs overseas properties held by individuals on behalf of SOEs. The circular aims to prevent leakage of SOE assets held by individuals and SOE overseas variable interest entities (VIEs). According to the circular, properties held by individuals should be approved by central SOEs and filed with SASAC. In Northeast China, privatization efforts at provincial and municipal SEOs remains low, as private capital makes cautious decisions in making investment to local debt-ridden and inefficient SOEs. On the other hand, local SOEs prefer to pursue mergers and acquisitions with central SOEs to avoid being accused of losing state assets. There is no available information on whether foreign investors could participate in privatization programs. 9. Corruption Since 2012, China has undergone a large-scale anti-corruption campaign, with investigations reaching into all sectors of the government, military, and economy. CCP General Secretary Xi labeled endemic corruption an “existential threat” to the very survival of the Party. In 2018, the CCP restructured its Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) to become a state organ, calling the new body the National Supervisory Commission-Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (NSC-CCDI). The NSC-CCDI wields the power to investigate any public official. From 2012 to 2021, the NSC-CCDI claimed it investigated roughly four million cases. In the first three quarters of 2021, the NSC-CCDI investigated 470,000 cases and disciplined 414,000 individuals, of whom 22 were at or above the provincial or ministerial level. Since 2014, the PRC’s overseas fugitive-hunting campaign, called “Operation Skynet,” has led to the capture of more than 9,500 fugitives suspected of corruption who were living in other countries, including over 2,200 CCP members and government employees. In most cases, the PRC did not notify host countries of these operations. In 2021, the government reported apprehending 1,273 alleged fugitives and recovering approximately USD 2.64 billion through this program. In March 2021, the CCP Amendment 11 to the Criminal Law, which increased the maximum punishment for acts of corruption committed by private entities to life imprisonment, from the previous maximum of 15-year imprisonment, took effect. In June 2020 the CCP passed a law on Administrative Discipline for Public Officials, continuing efforts to strengthen supervision over individuals working in the public sector. The law enumerates targeted illicit activities such as bribery and misuse of public funds or assets for personal gain. Anecdotal information suggests anti-corruption measures are applied inconsistently and discretionarily. For example, to fight commercial corruption in the medical sector, the health authorities issued “blacklists” of firms and agents involved in commercial bribery, including several foreign companies. While central government leadership has welcomed increased public participation in reporting suspected corruption at lower levels, direct criticism of central leadership or policies remains off-limits and is seen as an existential threat to China’s political and social stability. China ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005 and participates in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and OECD anti-corruption initiatives. China has not signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, although PRC officials have expressed interest in participating in the OECD Working Group on Bribery as an observer. Corruption Investigations are led by government entities, and civil society has a limited scope in investigating corruption beyond reporting suspected corruption to central authorities. Liaoning set up a provincial watchdog, known as the “Liaoning Business Environment Development Department” to inspect government disciplines and provide a mechanism for the public to report corruption and misbehaviors through a “government service platform.” In 2021, Liaoning reported handling 8,091 cases and recovering approximately USD 290 million in ill-gotten gains by government agencies and SOEs through this program. The following government organization receives public reports of corruption: Anti-Corruption Reporting Center of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision, Telephone Number: +86 10 12388. 10. Political and Security Environment Foreign companies operating in China face a growing risk of political violence, most recently due to U.S.-China political tensions. PRC authorities have broad authority to prohibit travelers from leaving China and have imposed “exit bans” to compel U.S. citizens to resolve business disputes, force settlement of court orders, or facilitate PRC investigations. U.S. citizens, including children, not directly involved in legal proceedings or wrongdoing have also been subject to lengthy exit bans to compel family members or colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts or investigations. Exit bans are often issued without notification to the foreign citizen or without clear legal recourse to appeal the exit ban decision. A 2020 independent report presented evidence that since 2018, more than 570,000 Uyghurs were implicated in forced labor picking cotton. There was also reporting that Xinjiang’s polysilicon and solar panel industries are connected to forced labor. In 2021, PRC citizens, with the encouragement of the PRC government, boycotted companies that put out statements on social media affirming they do not use Xinjiang cotton in their supply chain. Some landlords forced companies to close retail outlets during this boycott due to fears of being associated with boycotted companies. The ongoing PRC crackdown on virtually all opposition voices in Hong Kong and continued attempts by PRC organs to intimidate Hong Kong’s judges threatens the judicial independence of Hong Kong’s courts – a fundamental pillar for Hong Kong’s status as an international hub for investment into and out of China. Apart from Hong Kong, the PRC government has also previously encouraged protests or boycotts of products from countries like the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Norway, Canada, and the Philippines, in retaliation for unrelated policy decisions such as the boycott campaigns against Korean retailer Lotte in 2016 and 2017 in response to the ROK government’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and the PRC’s retaliation against Canadian companies and citizens for Canada’s arrest of Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou. 11. Labor Policies and Practices For U.S. companies operating in China, finding, developing, and retaining domestic talent at the management and skilled technical staff levels remain challenging for foreign firms, especially as labor costs, including salaries and inputs continue to rise. COVID-19 control and related travel measures have also made it difficult to recruit or retain foreign staff. Foreign companies also complain of difficulty navigating China’s labor and social insurance laws, including local implementation guidelines. Compounding the complexity, due to ineffective enforcement of labor laws and high mandatory social insurance contributions, many PRC domestic employers and employees will not sign formal employment contracts, putting foreign firms at a disadvantage. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only union recognized under PRC law. Establishing independent trade unions is illegal. The law allows for “collective bargaining,” but in practice, focuses solely on collective wage negotiations. The Trade Union Law gives the ACFTU, a CCP organ chaired by a Politburo member, control over all union organizations and activities, including enterprise-level unions. ACFTU enterprise unions require employers to pay mandatory fees, often through the local tax bureau, equaling a negotiated minimum of 0.5 percent to a standard two percent of total payroll. While labor laws do not protect the right to strike, “spontaneous” protests and work stoppages occur. Official forums for mediation, arbitration, and other mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution often are ineffective in resolving labor disputes. Even when an arbitration award or legal judgment is obtained, getting local authorities to enforce judgments is problematic. The PRC has not ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on freedom of association, collective bargaining, or forced labor, but it has ratified conventions prohibiting child labor and employment discrimination. Uyghurs and members of other minority groups are subjected to forced labor in Xinjiang and throughout China via PRC government-facilitated labor transfer programs. In 2021, the U.S government updated its business advisory on risks for businesses and individuals with exposure to entities engaged in forced labor and other human rights abuses linked to Xinjiang. This update highlights the extent of the PRC’s state-sponsored forced labor and surveillance taking place amid its ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. The Advisory stresses that businesses and individuals that do not exit supply chains, ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang could run a high risk of violating U.S. law. In fiscal year 2021, CBP issued four Withhold Release Orders (WROs) against PRC goods produced with forced labor. The Commerce Department added PRC commercial and government entities to its Entity List for their complicity in human rights abuses and the Department of Treasury sanctioned Wang Junzheng, the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Chen Mingguo, Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) to hold human rights abusers accountable in Xinjiang. In June 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor added polysilicon for China to an update of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. The Department of Labor has listed 18 goods as produced by forced labor in China. Some PRC firms continued to employ North Korean workers in violation of UN Security Council sanctions. Pursuant to UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2397, all DPRK nationals earning income, subject to limited exceptions, were required to have been repatriated to the DPRK by 22 December 2019. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $14,724,435 2021 $14,343,000 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $90,190 2020 $123,875 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.html#650 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $80,048 2020 $37,995 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment -and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.html#650 Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $16.6% 2020 13% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/statistics * Source for Host Country Data: National Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $3,214,115 100% Total Outward $2,580,658 100% China, P.R., Hong Kong $1,726,212 53.7% China, P.C., Hong Kong $1,438,531 55.7% British Virgin Islands $403,903 12.5% Cayman Islands $457,027 17.7% Japan $193,338 6.0% British Virgin Islands $155,645 6% Singapore $148,721 4.6% United States $80,048 3.1% United States $86,907 2.7% Singapore $59,858 2.3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Colombia Executive Summary With improving security conditions in metropolitan areas, a market of 50 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and an educated and growing middle-class, Colombia continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investment in Latin America. Colombia ranked 67 out of 190 countries in the “Ease of Doing Business” index of the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report (most recent report). The Colombian economy grew by 10.6 percent in 2021, the largest increase in gross domestic product (GDP) since the statistical authority started keeping records in 1975. This followed a 6.8 percent collapse in 2020 due to the negative effects of the pandemic and lower oil prices, the first economic contraction in more than two decades. In July 2021, rating agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Colombia below investment grade status, citing the increasing fiscal deficit (7.1 percent of GDP for 2021) as the main reason for the downgrade. The Colombian Government passed a tax reform that entered into effect in January 2022, the Social Investment Law, that seeks to reactivate the economy, generate employment, and contribute to the fiscal stability of the country. Colombia’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The country has a comprehensive legal framework for business and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 2012 U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) has strengthened bilateral trade and investment. Colombia’s dispute settlement mechanisms have improved through the CTPA and several international conventions and treaties. Weaknesses include protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), as Colombia has yet to implement certain IPR-related provisions of the CTPA. Colombia became the 37th member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2020, bringing the obligation to adhere to OECD norms and standards in economic operations. The Colombian government has made a concerted effort to develop efficient capital markets, attract investment, and create jobs. Restrictions on foreign ownership in specific sectors still exist. FDI inflows increased 4.8 percent from 2020 to 2021, with 67 percent of the 2021 inflow dedicated to the extractives sector. Roughly half of the Colombian workforce in metropolitan areas is employed in the informal economy, a share that increases to four-fifths in rural areas. In 2021, the unemployment rate was 13.7 percent with 3.4 million people unemployed. The employed population reached 21.6 million, an increase of 0.9 percent compared to 2020. Since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity. Several powerful narco-criminal operations still pose threats to commercial activity and investment, especially in rural zones outside of government control. Corruption remains a significant challenge. The Colombian government continues to work on improving its business climate, but U.S. and other foreign investors continue to voice complaints about non-tariff, regulatory, and bureaucratic barriers to trade, investment, and market access at the national, regional, and municipal levels. Stakeholders express concern that some regulatory rulings in Colombia target specific companies, resulting in an uneven playing field. Investors generally have access at all levels of the Colombian government, but cite a lack of effective and timely consultation with regulatory agencies in decisions that affect them. Investors also note concern regarding the national competition and regulatory authority’s (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, SIC) differing rulings for different companies on similar issues, and slow processing at some regulatory agencies, such as at food and drug regulator INVIMA. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 67 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $7,767 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,790 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Colombian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). The economic liberalization reforms of the early 1990s provided for national treatment of foreign investors, lifted controls on remittance of profits and capital, and allowed foreign investment in most sectors. Colombia imposes the same investment restrictions on foreign investors that it does on national investors. Generally, foreign investors may participate in the privatization of state-owned enterprises without restrictions. All FDI involving the establishment of a commercial presence in Colombia requires registration with the Superintendence of Corporations and the local chamber of commerce. All conditions being equal during tender processes, national offers are preferred over foreign offers. Assuming equal conditions among foreign bidders, those with major Colombian national workforce resources, significant national capital, and/or better conditions to facilitate technology transfers are preferred. ProColombia is the Colombian government entity that promotes international tourism, foreign investment, and non-traditional exports. ProColombia assists foreign companies that wish to enter the Colombian market by addressing specific needs, such as identifying contacts in the public and private sectors, organizing visit agendas, and accompanying companies during visits to Colombia. All services are free of charge and confidential. Priority sectors include business process outsourcing, software and IT services, cosmetics, health services, automotive manufacturing, textiles, graphic communications, agribusiness, and electric energy. ProColombia’s “Invest in Colombia” web portal offers detailed information about opportunities in agribusiness, manufacturing, and services in Colombia ( www.investincolombia.com.co/sectors ). The Duque administration – including senior leaders at the Presidency, ProColombia, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Trade – continue to stress Colombia’s openness to foreign investors and aggressively market Colombia as an investment destination. The government of Colombia does not have a national security-based investment screening mechanism in place. Foreign investment in the financial, hydrocarbon, and mining sectors is subject to special regimes, such as investment registration and concession agreements with the Colombian government, but is not restricted in the amount of foreign capital. The following sectors require that foreign investors have a legal local representative and/or commercial presence in Colombia: travel and tourism agency services; money order operators; customs brokerage; postal and courier services; merchandise warehousing; merchandise transportation under customs control; international cargo agents; public service companies, including sewage and water works, waste disposal, electricity, gas and fuel distribution, and public telephone services; insurance firms; legal services; and special air services, including aerial fire-fighting, sightseeing, and surveying. According to the Colombian constitution and foreign investment regulations, foreign investment in Colombia receives the same treatment as an investment made by Colombian nationals. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, except in activities related to defense, national security, and toxic waste handling and disposal. There are no performance requirements explicitly applicable to the entry and establishment of foreign investment in Colombia. Foreign investors face specific exceptions and restrictions in the following sectors: Media: Only Colombian nationals or legally constituted entities may provide radio or subscription-based television services. For National Open Television and Nationwide Private Television Operators, only Colombian nationals or legal entities may be granted concessions to provide television services. Foreign investment in national television is limited to a maximum of 40 percent ownership of an operator. Accounting, Auditing, and Data Processing: To practice in Colombia, providers of accounting services must register with the Central Accountants Board and have uninterrupted domicile in Colombia for at least three years prior to registry. A legal commercial presence is required to provide data processing and information services in Colombia. Banking: Foreign investors may own 100 percent of financial institutions in Colombia, but are required to obtain approval from the Financial Superintendent before making a direct investment of ten percent or more in any one entity. Foreign banks must establish a local commercial presence and comply with the same capital and other requirements as local financial institutions. Every investment of foreign capital in portfolios must be through a Colombian administrator company, including brokerage firms, trust companies, and investment management companies. Fishing: A foreign vessel may engage in fishing activities in Colombian territorial waters only through association with a Colombian company holding a valid fishing permit. If a ship’s flag corresponds to a country with which Colombia has a complementary bilateral agreement, this agreement shall determine whether the association requirement applies for the process required to obtain a fishing license. The costs of fishing permits are greater for foreign flag vessels. Private Security and Surveillance Companies: Companies constituted with foreign capital prior to February 11, 1994 cannot increase the share of foreign capital. Those constituted after that date can only have Colombian nationals as shareholders. Transportation: Foreign companies can only provide multimodal freight services within or from Colombian territory if they have a domiciled agent or representative legally responsible for its activities in Colombia. International cabotage companies can provide cabotage services (i.e. between two points within Colombia) “only when there is no national capacity to provide the service.” Colombia prohibits foreign ownership of commercial ships licensed in Colombia. The owners of a concession providing port services must be legally constituted in Colombia, and only Colombian ships may provide port services within Colombian maritime jurisdiction, unless there are no capable Colombian-flag vessels. The WTO most recently reviewed Colombia’s trade policy in June 2018. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp472_e.htm New businesses must register with the chamber of commerce of the city in which the company will reside. Applicants also register using the Colombian tax authority’s portal at: www.dian.gov.co to obtain a taxpayer ID (RUT). Business founders must visit DIAN ( Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales) offices to obtain an electronic signature for company legal representatives, and obtain – in-person or online – an authorization for company invoices from DIAN. In 2019, Colombia made starting a business a step easier by lifting a requirement of opening a local bank account to obtain invoice authorization. Companies must submit a unified electronic form to self-assess and pay social security and payroll contributions to the Governmental Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, or SENA), the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, or ICBF), and the Family Compensation Fund (Caja de Compensación Familiar). After that, companies must register employees for public health coverage, affiliate the company to a public or private pension fund, affiliate the company and employees to an administrator of professional risks, and affiliate employees with a severance fund. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” report, recent reforms simplified starting a business, trading across borders, and resolving insolvency. According to the report, starting a company in Colombia requires seven procedures and takes an average of 10 days. Information on starting a company can be found at http://www.ccb.org.co/en/Creating-a-company/Company-start-up/Step-by-step-company-creation ; https://investincolombia.com.co/how-to-invest.html ; and http://www.dian.gov.co . Colombia does not incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Colombian legal, accounting, and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The written commercial code and other laws cover broad areas, including banking and credit, bankruptcy/reorganization, business establishment/conduct, commercial contracts, credit, corporate organization, fiduciary obligations, insurance, industrial property, and real property law. The civil code contains provisions relating to contracts, mortgages, liens, notary functions, and registries. There are no identified private-sector associations or non-governmental organizations leading informal regulatory processes. The ministries generally consult with relevant actors, both foreign and national, when drafting regulations. Proposed laws are typically published as drafts for public comment, although sometimes with limited notice. Information on Colombia’s public finances and debt obligations is readily available and is published in a timely manner. Enforcement mechanisms exist, but historically the judicial system has not taken an active role in adjudicating commercial cases. The Constitution establishes the principle of free competition as a national right for all citizens and provides the judiciary with administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. Colombia has transitioned to an oral accusatory system to make criminal investigations and trials more efficient. The new system separates the investigative functions assigned to the Office of the Attorney General from trial functions. Lack of coordination among government entities, clear lines of responsibility, as well as insufficient resources complicate timely resolution of cases. Colombia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures (see http://www.businessfacilitation.org and Colombia’s websites http://colombia.eregulations.org and https://www.colombiacompra.gov.co ). Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures for investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and people in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. In general, Colombia does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Colombia became the 37th member of the OECD in April 2020. Colombia is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government generally notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In August 2020, Colombia fully joined the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Regionally, Colombia is a member of organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Pacific Alliance, and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Colombia has a comprehensive, civil law-based legal system. Colombia’s judicial system defines the legal rights of commercial entities, reviews regulatory enforcement procedures, and adjudicates contract disputes in the business community. The judicial framework includes the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, and various departmental and district courts, which collectively are overseen administratively by the Superior Judicial Council. The 1991 Constitution provided the judiciary with greater administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through the different stages of legal court processes in Colombia. The judicial system in general remains hampered by time-consuming bureaucratic requirements. Colombia has a comprehensive legal framework for business and FDI that incorporates binding norms resulting from its membership in the Andean Community of Nations and the WTO, as well as other free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. Colombia’s official investment portal explains procedures and relevant laws for those wishing to invest (see https://investincolombia.com.co/en/how-to-invest ). The Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC), Colombia’s independent national competition authority, monitors and protects free economic competition, consumer rights, compliance with legal requirements and regulations, and protection of personal data. It also manages the national chambers of commerce. The SIC has been strengthened in recent years with the addition of personnel, including economists and lawyers. The SIC has recently investigated companies, including U.S.-based technology firms and Colombian banks, for failing to protect customer data. Other investigations include those related to pharmaceutical pricing, “business cartelization” among companies supplying public entities, and misleading advertising by a major brewing company. One U.S. gig-economy platform was temporarily barred from operating in Colombia in early 2020, although other similarly-situated companies remained; a court overturned the prohibition on appeal. U.S. companies have expressed concern about limited ability to appeal SIC orders and the SIC’s increasing reliance on orders to remedy perceived problems. Other U.S. companies have noted that SIC investigations can be drawn-out and opaque, similar to the judicial system. In general Stakeholders continue to express concern that some regulatory rulings in Colombia target specific companies, resulting in an uneven playing field and regulatory inconsistency. Investors also note concern that the SIC has ruled differently on similar issues for different companies, leading to different results. Article 58 of the Constitution governs indemnifications and expropriations and guarantees owners’ rights for legally-acquired property. For assets taken by eminent domain, Colombian law provides a right of appeal both on the basis of the decision itself and on the level of compensation. The Constitution does not specify how to proceed in compensation cases, which remains a concern for foreign investors. The Colombian government has sought to resolve such concerns through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and strong investment chapters in free trade agreements, such as the CTPA. Colombia’s 1991 Constitution grants the government the authority to intervene directly in financial or economic affairs, and this authority provides solutions similar to U.S. Chapter 11 filings for companies facing liquidation or bankruptcy. Colombia’s bankruptcy regulations have two major objectives: to regulate proceedings to ensure creditors’ protection, and to monitor the efficient recovery and preservation of still-viable companies. This was revised in 2006 to allow creditors to request judicial liquidation, which replaces the previous forced auctioning option. Now, inventories are valued, creditors’ rights are considered, and either a direct sale takes place within two months or all assets are assigned to creditors based on their share of the company’s liabilities. The insolvency regime for companies was further revised in 2010 to make proceedings more flexible and allow debtors to enter into a long-term payment agreement with creditors, giving the company a chance to recover and continue operating. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Colombia. In 2013, a bankruptcy law for individuals whose debts surpass 50 percent of their assets value entered into force. Restructuring proceedings aim to protect the debtors from bankruptcy. Once reorganization has begun, creditors cannot use collection proceedings to collect on debts owed prior to the beginning of the reorganization proceedings. All existing creditors at the moment of the reorganization are recognized during the proceedings if they present their credit. Foreign creditors, equity shareholders (including foreign equity shareholders), and holders of other financial contracts (including foreign contract holders) are recognized during the proceeding. Established creditors are guaranteed a vote in the final decision. According to the Doing Business 2020 report Colombia ranked 32nd for resolving insolvency and it takes an average of 1.7 years – the same as OECD high-income countries – to resolve insolvency; the average time in Latin America is 2.9 years. 4. Industrial Policies The Colombian government offers investment incentives such as income tax exemptions and deductions in specific priority sectors, including the so-called “orange economy” (creative industries), agriculture, and entrepreneurship. In 2020, the government announced additional incentive schemes that aim to attract large investments exceeding USD 350 million and create at least 250 local jobs, facilitate COVID-19 recovery, and generate investments in former conflict municipalities. Investment incentives through free trade agreements between Colombia and other nations include national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment of investors; establishment of liability standards assumed by countries regarding the other nation’s investors, including the minimum standard of treatment and establishment of rules for investor compensation from expropriation; establishment of rules for transfer of capital relating to investment; and specific tax treatment. The government offers tax incentives to all investors, such as preferential import tariffs, tax exemptions, and credit or risk capital. Some fiscal incentives are available for investments that generate new employment or production in areas impacted by natural disasters and former conflict-affected municipalities. Companies can apply for these directly with participating agencies. Tax and fiscal incentives are often based on regional, sector, or business size considerations. Border areas have special protections due to currency fluctuations in neighboring countries which can impact local economies. National and local governments also offer special incentives, such as tax holidays, to attract specific industries. The Colombian government introduced a variety of incentives for specific sectors as part of the 2019 tax reform. Among the incentives are: Income from hotels built, renovated, or extended through January 1, 2029 in municipalities of less than 200,000 inhabitants will be taxed at nine percent for 20 years. The same facilities in larger municipalities will be taxed at nine percent for 10 years. Income normally taxed at 33 percent that is invested in agricultural projects or orange (creative) economy initiatives will be tax free. Income from the sale of electric power generated by wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, or tidal movement will be tax free, provided carbon dioxide emission certificates are sold in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol and 50 percent of the income from the certificate sale is invested in social projects benefiting the region where the power was generated. Foreign investors can participate without discrimination in government-subsidized research programs, and most Colombian government research has been conducted with foreign institutions. Investments or grants to technological research and development projects are fully tax deductible in the year the investment was made. R&D incentives include Value-Added Tax (VAT) exemptions for imported equipment or materials used in scientific, technology, or innovation projects, and qualified investments may receive tax credits. In a tax reform passed in 2016, the Colombian government created two tax incentives to support investment in the 344 municipalities most affected by the armed conflict (ZOMAC). Small and microbusinesses that invest in ZOMACs and meet a series of other criteria will be exempt from paying any taxes through 2021, pay 25 percent of the general rate through 2024, and 50 percent through 2027. Medium and large-sized businesses will pay 50 percent of their normal taxes through 2021 and 75 percent through 2024. The second component is entitled “works for taxes” (“Obras por Impuestos”), a program through which the private sector can directly fund social investments and infrastructure projects in lieu of paying taxes. To attract foreign investment and promote the importation of capital goods, the Colombian government uses a number of duty deferral programs. One example is free trade zones (FTZs). While DIAN oversees requests to establish FTZs, the Colombian government is not involved in their operations. Benefits under the FTZ regime include a single 20 percent tax rate (compared to 31 percent normally) and no customs value-added taxes or duties on raw material imports for use in the FTZ. Each FTZ must meet specific investment and direct job creation requirements, depending on their total assets, during the first three years. These incentives were maintained in the 2021 tax reform. Colombia also has initiated Special Economic Zones for Exports in the municipalities of Buenaventura, Cucuta, Valledupar, and Ipiales to encourage investment. These zones receive the same import benefits of FTZs, and operators are exempt from some payroll taxes and surcharges. Infrastructure projects in the zones are also exempt from some income taxes. Performance requirements are not imposed on foreigners as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investments. The Colombian government does not have performance requirements, local employment requirements, or require excessively difficult visa, residency, permission, or work permit requirements for investors. Under the f, Colombia grants substantial market access across its entire services sector. The SIC, under the Deputy Office for Personal Data Protection, is the Data Protection Authority (DPA) and has the legal mandate to ensure proper data protection. It has defined adequate data protection and responsibilities with respect to international data transfers. The SIC requires data storage facilities that hold personal data to comply with government security and privacy requirements, and data storage companies have one year to register. The SIC enforces the rules on local data storage within the country through audits/investigations and imposed sanctions. Software and hardware are protected by IPR. There is no obligation to submit source code for registered software. 5. Protection of Property Rights The 1991 Constitution explicitly protects individual rights against state actions and upholds the right to private property. Secured interests in real property, and to a lesser degree movable property, are recognized and generally enforced after the property is properly registered. In terms of protecting third-party purchasers, existing law is inadequate. The concepts of a mortgage, trust, deed, and other types of liens exist, as does a reliable system of recording such secured interests. Deeds, however, present some legal risk due to the prevalence of transactions that have never been registered with the Public Instruments Registry. According to a survey made shortly before the signing of the FARC peace accord, some eight million hectares of land – 14 percent of the country – had been abandoned or acquired illegally. The government is working to title these plots and has started a formalization program for land restitution. The 2020 Doing Business report ranked Colombia 62nd for ease of registering property. In Colombia, the granting, registration, and administration of intellectual property rights (IPR) are carried out by four primary government entities. The SIC acts as the Colombian patent and trademark office. The Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) is in charge of issuing plant variety protections and data protections for agricultural products. The Ministry of Interior administers copyrights through the National Copyright Directorate (DNDA). The Ministry of Health and Social Protection handles data protection for products registered through INVIMA. Primary responsibility for enforcement resides with the Fiscalia General de la Republica (FGR), DIAN, and the Fiscal and Customs Police (POLFA). The Intersectoral Intellectual Property Commission (CIPI) serves as the interagency technical body for IPR issues. On June 22, 2021 the Colombian Congress approved the Law 2090 known as the Marrakech Treaty to facilitate access to published works for blind, visually impaired or otherwise disabled persons. On the Beijing Treaty, the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs presented to the Colombian Congress the draft bill 461 of 2021 which seeks to ratify this treaty. As of February 2022 it has been approved in first debate and three other debates remain pending for its final approval. In December 2021 Colombia’s NPD approved Conpes 4066, also known as the “Conpes on IP,” Colombia’s roadmap for leveraging IP rights and facilitating policies for IP protection. Colombia is subject to Andean Community Decision 486 on trade secret protection, which is fully implemented domestically by the Unfair Competition Law of 1996. Colombia grants utility patents that confer twenty years of protection for inventions, ten years of protection for process and design patents, and five years of protection for data collected during clinical trials. Colombia has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Watch List every year since 1991, and in 2019 was upgraded from “Priority Watch List” to “Watch List” status. The CTPA improved standards for the protection and enforcement of a broad range of IPR. Improvements include state-of-the-art protections for digital products such as software, music, text, and videos; stronger protection for U.S. patents, trademarks, and test data; and prevention of piracy and counterfeiting by criminalizing end-use piracy. However, Colombia has outstanding CTPA commitments related to IPR. Colombian officials continue discussing with the United States draft legislation regulating internet service providers on issues such as compulsory takedown of online content and the protection of intermediaries with “safe harbor” provisions for unintentional copyright infringement. The legislation has not yet been introduced to Congress. Colombia has not yet signed the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 91). Colombia maintains that the existing Andean Community Decision 345 is in effect and equivalent to UPOV 91, but this is not an interpretation shared by the United States. Colombia is a member of the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection. Colombia reformed its copyright law under Decree 1915 of July 2018. The bill extends the term of copyright protection, imposes civil liability for circumvention of technological protection measures, and strengthens enforcement of copyright and related rights. On July 31, 2019 the Colombian Constitutional Court issued ruling C-345-19 that recognizes the constitutionality of statutory damages for copyright infringement. Colombia’s success combating counterfeiting and IPR violations, and enforcement in the digital space, remains limited. In March 2021, DNDA imposed an order requiring internet providers to block IP addresses used to transmit pirated digital content, the first such order in Colombia. Industry advocates called this an important precedent for combatting IP theft. A 2015 law increased penalties for those involved in running contraband, but more effective implementation is needed. Colombian authorities coordinate with the United States on investigations, but key agencies often do not have the requisite authorities or sufficient numbers of trained personnel to effectively inspect and seize merchandise and to investigate smugglers and counterfeiters. Despite high-profile seizures of counterfeit goods, such goods remain widely available in Colombia’s “San Andresitos” markets. No Colombian markets are listed in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. U.S. stakeholders continue to raise concerns about Colombia’s regulation of the pharmaceutical sector, where regulatory barriers, a focus by the government on cost containment over health outcomes, delays in processing pharmaceutical registrations at INVIMA, and Congressional proposals to limit pharmaceutical IP restrict market entry and reduce the attractiveness of Colombia as a place to invest and do business. Colombia is on the Watch List in USTR’s 2021 Special 301 Report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Colombian Securities Exchange (BVC after its acronym in Spanish) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia. The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives. The BVC also provides listing services for issuers. Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute. These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Direct and portfolio foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification. The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions. The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements. In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence. Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment, and the country’s financial system is strong by regional standards. Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia. Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies. Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers. Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country and must set up a Colombian subsidiary in order to do so. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad. In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country. Colombia is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. Its primary investments are in fixed securities, sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt (both domestic and international), and corporate securities, with just eight percent invested in stocks. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation. In 2020, the government authorized up to 80 percent of the FAE’s USD 3.9 billion in assets to be lent to the Fund for the Mitigation of Emergencies (FOME) created in response to the pandemic. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since 2015, the Government of Colombia has concentrated its industrial and commercial enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to Ministry’s 2019 annual report, there are 105 state-owned companies, with a combined value of USD 20 billion. The government is the majority shareholder of 39 companies and a minority shareholder in the remaining 66. Among the most notable companies with a government stake are Ecopetrol (Colombia’s majority state-owned and privately-run oil company), ISA (electricity distribution), Banco Agrario de Colombia, Bancoldex, and Satena (regional airline). SOEs competing in the Colombian market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. The Ministry of Finance normally updates their annual report on SOEs every June. Decree 2111 of 2019, formalized the creation of financial holding company Grupo Bicenterario. The holding company seeks to optimize the administration of Colombia’s state-owned enterprises, centralize property rights, and incorporate recommendations from the OECD regarding the composition of their boards of directors. Colombia has privatized state-owned enterprises under article 60 of the Constitution and Law Number 226 of 1995. This law stipulates that the sale of government holdings in an enterprise should be offered to two groups: first to cooperatives and workers’ associations of the enterprise, then to the general public. During the first phase, special terms and credits must be granted, and in the second phase, foreign investors may participate along with the general public. A series of privatizations planned for 2020 were postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic. The government views stimulating private-sector investment in roads, ports, electricity, and gas infrastructure as a high priority. The government is increasingly turning to concessions and using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to secure and incentivize infrastructure development. In order to attract investment and promote PPPs, Colombian modified infrastructure regulations to clarify provisions for frequently-cited obstacles to participation, including environmental licensing, land acquisition, and the displacement of public utilities. The law puts in place a civil procedure that facilitates land expropriation during court cases, allows for expedited environmental licensing, and clarifies that the cost to move or replace public utilities affected by infrastructure projects falls on private companies. However, infrastructure development companies considering bidding on tenders have raised concerns about unacceptable levels of risk that result from a law (Ley 80) establishing the framework for public works projects. They interpret Ley 80 as not establishing liability caps on potential judgments, and that it views company officials equivalent to those with fiscal oversight authority when it comes to criminal liability for misfeasance. Municipal enterprises operate many public utilities and infrastructure services. These municipal enterprises have engaged private sector investment through concessions. There are several successful concessions involving roads. These partnerships have helped promote reforms and create a more attractive environment for private, national, and foreign investment. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In 2020, the Colombian government released its second National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights for the period 2020-2022, which responds to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Colombia also adheres to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles outlined in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. CSR cuts across many industries and Colombia encourages public and private enterprises to follow OECD CSR guidelines. Beneficiaries of CSR programs include students, children, populations vulnerable to Colombia’s armed conflict, victims of violence, and the environment. Larger companies structure their CSR programs in accordance with accepted international principles. Companies in Colombia have been recognized on an international level for their CSR initiatives, including by the State Department. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Overall, Colombia has adequate environmental laws, is proactive at the federal level in enacting environmental protections, and does not waive labor or environmental regulations to attract investors. Colombian law also has provisions requiring consultations with indigenous communities before many large projects. However, the Colombian government struggles with enforcement, particularly in more remote areas. Geography, lack of infrastructure, and lack of state presence all play a role, as does a general shortage of resources in national and regional institutions. Environmental defenders face threats from narcotics traffickers, paramilitaries, and other illegal armed groups, particularly in areas with limited state presence. The Colombian government, activists, NGOs, and the international community all agree more can be done to protect environmental defenders. Threats against environmental defenders are often related to their advocacy against land grabbing, illegal mining, deforestation, extractive projects, and fracking, according to Colombian officials. Statistics regarding the assassinations of environmental defenders vary significantly depending on source, but contacts agree there is a need to improve protections. Figures range from UN reports of six environmental defenders killed in 2020 to local NGOs reporting up to 340 killed the same year. The Environmental Chapter of the CTPA requires Colombia to maintain and enforce environmental laws, protect biodiversity, and promote opportunities for public participation. Colombia participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In parallel with its accession, the Colombian government worked with the OECD to develop and implement the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, especially related to gold mining. The Colombian government faces challenges in formalizing illegal gold mining operations. A 2021 UNODC report highlighted illegal gold output grew from 66 percent of the total gold produced in Colombia to 69 percent of the total for 2020; the proceeds from illegal gold mining are estimated at approximately USD 2.4 billion. Buyers, sellers, traders, and refiners of gold may wish to conduct additional due diligence as part of their risk management regimes to account for the influx of illegally-mined Colombian gold into existing supply chains. Throughout the country, Colombian authorities have taken some steps to dismantle illegal gold mining operations that are responsible for negative environmental, criminal, and human health impacts, and often employ forced labor. The Colombian government has focused its efforts on transnational criminal elements involved in the production, laundering, and sale of illegally-mined gold, and the fraudulent documentation that is used to obscure the origin of illegally-mined gold. Colombia is actively pursuing new policies, proposing new legislation, and changing mechanisms to enforce laws against illegal gold mining. Colombia ratified the Minamata Convention on Mercury in 2018 and banned the use of mercury in mining. It has committed to phase out mercury use from all other industries by 2023. Colombia is still determining how to enforce laws to achieve this goal. Colombia has not signed the Montreux Document. In 2020, its National Organization for Accreditation (ONAC) and Institute for Technical Standards and Certification (ICONTEC) began ISO 18788 compliance certification processes for private security companies. Colombia’s Road to Zero outlines how Colombia will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050. It is also the Colombian policy instrument that guides national, sectoral, and territorial actions to build a climate-resilient future in Colombia, while demonstrating the country’s international commitment to the achievement of the global objectives embodied in the Paris Agreement. In addition, Colombia has the Climate Change Management Plan for the Commerce, Industry and Tourism Sector (Pigccs) aiming for the reduction of 7.7 million tons of CO2 in the country. Pigccs seeks to contribute to Colombia’s national goal established on December 29, 2020, to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 51 percent by 2030, which represents a decrease of 7.7 million tons of CO2 in the same period and produce a maximum of 38.6 million tons yearly. Colombia accounts for 0.6 percent of global emissions. Colombia has put in place instruments that internalize the social and environmental costs of climate change and incentivize companies to incorporate into their production costs the negative impacts caused by the generation of GHGs or carbon. Among the most recognized instruments in this area are the carbon tax and the Emissions Trading System (carbon bonds market). 9. Corruption Corruption, and the perception of it, is a serious obstacle for companies operating or planning to invest in Colombia. Analyses of the business environment, such as the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, consistently cite corruption as a problematic factor, along with high tax rates, inadequate infrastructure, and inefficient government bureaucracy. Transparency International’s latest “Corruption Perceptions Index” ranked Colombia 87nd out of 180 countries assessed and assigned it a score of 39/100, a slight improvement from the year prior. Customs, taxation, and public works contracts are commonly-cited areas where corruption exist and there are multiple corruption convictions and investigations involving the highest levels of government, including former Supreme Court Justices, ministers, and regional governors. Colombia has adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and is a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Committee. It also passed a domestic anti-bribery law in 2016. In 2021, Colombia implemented a law that increased private sector responsibilities to implement internal prevention procedures and liability for participating in acts of corruption related to public contracting. Colombia has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention and adopted the OAS Convention against Corruption. The CTPA protects the integrity of procurement practices and criminalizes both offering and soliciting bribes to/from public officials. It requires both countries to make all laws, regulations, and procedures regarding any matter under the CTPA publicly available. Both countries must also establish procedures for reviews and appeals by any entities affected by actions, rulings, measures, or procedures under the CTPA. Useful resources and contact information for those concerned about combating corruption in Colombia include the following: The Transparency and Anti-Corruption Observatory is an interactive tool of the Colombian government aimed at promoting transparency and combating corruption available at http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/ The National Civil Commission for Fighting Corruption, or Comisión Nacional Ciudadana para la Lucha Contra la Corrupción (CNCLCC), was established by Law 1474 of 2011 to give civil society a forum to discuss and propose policies and actions to fight corruption in the country. Transparencia por Colombia is the technical secretariat of the commission. http://ciudadanoscontralacorrupcion.org/es/inicio The Presidential Secretariat of Transparency advises and assists the president to formulate, design, and coordinate the implementation of public policy about transparency and anti-corruption. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/secretaria-transparencia/Paginas/default.aspx/ Government Agency: Secretary of Transparency Calle 7 No.6-54, Bogota (+57)1 562 9300 contacto@presidencia.gov.co Watchdog Organization: Transparencia Por Colombia (local chapter of Transparency International) Cra. 45A No. 93 – 61, Barrio La Castellana, Bogota (+57)1 610 0822 comunicaciones@transparenciacolombia.org.co 10. Political and Security Environment Security in Colombia has improved significantly over recent years, most notably in large urban centers. Terrorist attacks and powerful narco-criminal group operations pose a threat to commercial activity and investment in some rural zones where government control is weak. In 2016, Colombia signed a peace agreement with the FARC to end half a century of confrontation. Congressional approval of that peace accord put in motion a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, which granted the FARC status as a legal political organization and took over 13,000 combatants off the battlefield. Currently the peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which began in 2017, are suspended. This terrorist group continues a low-cost, high-impact asymmetric insurgency, including an attack on the Colombian police academy in 2019 that killed 22 cadets. The ELN often focuses attacks on oil pipelines, mines, roads, and electricity towers to disrupt economic activity and pressure the government. The ELN also extorts businesses in their areas of operation, kidnaps personnel, and destroys property of entities that refuse to pay for protection. 11. Labor Policies and Practices An OECD economic survey of Colombia was published in February 2022. The report mentions Colombia’s economy has recovered well from the COVID-19 crisis, but that the labor market remains weak. Colombia has one of the highest levels of poverty, income inequality, and labor market informality in Latin America. At the end of 2021, 46.8 percent of the urban workforce was working in the informal economy, with the national average hovering around 60 percent. The overall unemployment rate was 13.7 percent. The Colombian workforce has a wide range of skills, including managerial-level employees who are often bilingual, but faces large skills gaps and challenges in labor productivity. Colombia has made strong efforts to incorporate Venezuelan migrants into the formal economy, most notably the February 2021 announcement of ten-year Temporary Protected Status for the country’s estimated 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants. Labor rights in Colombia are set forth in its Constitution, the Labor Code, the Procedural Code of Labor and Social Security, sector-specific legislation, and ratified international conventions, which are incorporated into national legislation. Colombia’s Constitution guarantees freedom of association and provides for collective bargaining and the right to strike (with some exceptions). It also addresses forced labor, child labor, trafficking, discrimination, protections for women and children in the workplace, minimum wages, working hours, skills training, and social security. Colombia has ratified all eight of the International Labor Organization’s (ILO’s) fundamental labor conventions, and all are in force. Colombia has also ratified conventions related to hours of work, occupational health and safety, and minimum wage. The 1991 Constitution protects the right to constitute labor unions. Pursuant to Colombia’s labor law, any group of 25 or more workers, regardless of whether they are employees of the same company or not, may form a labor union. Employees of companies with fewer than 25 employees may affiliate themselves with other labor unions. Colombia has a low trade union density (9.5 percent). Where unions are present, multiple affiliation sometimes poses challenges for collective bargaining. The largest and most influential unions are composed mostly of public-sector employees, particularly of the majority state-owned oil company and the state-run education sector. Only 6.2 percent of all salaried workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), according to the OECD. The Ministry of Labor has expressed commitment to working on decrees to incentivize sectoral collective bargaining and to strengthen union representation within companies and regulate strikes in the essential public services sector. Strikes, when held in accordance with the law, are recognized as legal instruments to obtain better working conditions, and employers are prohibited from using strike-breakers at any time during the course of a strike. After 60 days of strike action, the parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Strikes are prohibited in certain “essential public services,” as defined by law, although Colombia has been criticized for having an overly-broad interpretation of “essential.” Foreign companies operating in Colombia must follow the same hiring rules as national companies, regardless of the origin of the employer and the place of execution of the contract. No labor laws are waived to attract or retain investment. In 2010, Law 1429 eliminated the mandatory proportion requirement for foreign and national personnel; 100 percent of the workforce, including the board of directors, can be foreign nationals. Labor permits are not required in Colombia, except for minors of the minimum working age. Foreign employees have the same rights as Colombian employees. Employers may use temporary service agencies to subcontract additional workers for peaks of production. Employers must receive advance permission from the Ministry of Labor before undertaking permanent layoffs. The Ministry of Labor typically does not grant permission to lay off workers who have enhanced legal protections (for example, those with work-related injuries or union leaders). The Ministry of Labor has committed to address using temporary or contract workers for jobs that are not temporary in nature, although significant challenges remain in this area. Reputational risks to investors come with a lack of effective and systematic enforcement of labor law, especially in rural sectors. Homicides of unionists (social leaders) remain an ongoing concern. In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a public report of review in response to a submission filed under Chapter 17 (the Labor Chapter) of the CTPA by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and five Colombian workers’ organizations that alleged failures on the part of the government to protect labor rights in line with CTPA commitments. In October 2021, the Department of Labor published the second periodic review of progress to address issues identified in the submission report. For these reports and additional information on labor law enforcement see: Section 7 of Colombia’s Human Rights Report https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/colombia Lists of Goods Produced with Child or Forced Labor https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Bogota Economic Section Carrera 45 #22B-45, Bogota, Colombia (+57)1 275-2000 BogotaECONShared@state.gov Costa Rica Executive Summary Costa Rica is the oldest continuous democracy in Latin America and the newest member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with an established government institutional framework, stable society, and a diversified upper-middle-income economy. The country’s well-educated labor force, relatively low levels of corruption, geographic location, living conditions, dynamic investment promotion board, and attractive free trade zone incentives all appeal to investors. Foreign direct investment inflow in 2020 was USD 1.76 billion, or 2.8 percent of GDP, with the United States accounting for USD 1.2 billion. Costa Rica recorded 7.6 percent GDP growth in 2021 (the highest level since 2008) as it recovered from a 4.5 percent contraction in 2020 largely due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Costa Rica has had remarkable success in the last two decades in establishing and promoting an ecosystem of export-oriented technology companies, suppliers of input goods and services, associated public institutions and universities, and a trained and experienced workforce. A similar transformation took place in the tourism sector, with a plethora of smaller enterprises handling a steadily increasing flow of tourists eager to visit despite Costa Rica’s relatively high prices. Costa Rica is doubly fortunate in that these two sectors positively reinforce each other as they both require and encourage English language fluency, openness to the global community, and Costa Rican government efficiency and effectiveness. A 2019 study of the free trade zone (FTZ) economy commissioned by the Costa Rican Investment and Development Board (CINDE) shows an annual 9 percent growth from 2014 to 2018, with the net benefit of that sector reaching 7.9 percent of GDP in 2018. This sector continued to expand during the pandemic. The value of exports increased by 24 percent in 2021, representing the highest growth in 15 years. The Costa Rican investment climate is threatened by a high and persistent government fiscal deficit, underperformance in some key areas of government service provision, including health care and education, high energy costs, and deterioration of basic infrastructure. The Covid-19 world recession damaged the Costa Rican tourism industry, although it is recovering. Furthermore, the government has very little budget flexibility to address the economic fallout and is struggling to find ways to achieve debt relief, unemployment response, and the longer-term policy solutions necessary to continue compliance under the current stabilizing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the plus side, the Costa Rican government has competently managed the crisis despite its tight budget and Costa Rican exports are proving resilient; the portion of the export sector that manufactures medical devices, for example, is facing relatively good economic prospects and companies providing services exports are specialized in virtual support for their clients in a world that is forced to move in that direction. Moreover, Costa Rica’s accession in 2021 to the Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD) has exerted a positive influence by pushing the country to address its economic weaknesses through executive decrees and legislative reforms in a process that began in 2015. Also in the plus column, the export and investment promotion agencies CINDE and the Costa Rican Foreign Trade Promoter (PROCOMER) have done an excellent job of protecting the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) from new taxes by highlighting the benefits of the regime, promoting local supply chains, and using the FTZs as examples for other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, Costa Rica’s political and economic leadership faces a difficult balancing act over the coming years as the country must simultaneously exercise budget discipline and respond to demands for improved government-provided infrastructure and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 39 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/ index/cri Global Innovation Index 2021 56 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis- indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.0bill https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 11,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP. PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Costa Rica actively courts FDI, placing a high priority on attracting and retaining high-quality foreign investment. PROCOMER and CINDE lead Costa Rica’s investment promotion efforts. CINDE has had great success over the last several decades in attracting and retaining investment in specific areas, currently services, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, light manufacturing, and the food industry. In addition, the Tourism Institute (ICT) attends to potential investors in the tourism sector. CINDE, PROCOMER, and ICT are strong and effective guides and advocates for their client companies, prioritizing investment retention and maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors. Costa Rica recognizes and encourages the right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in most forms of remunerative activity. The exceptions are in sectors that are reserved for the state (legal monopolies – see #7 below “State Owned Enterprises, first paragraph) or that require participation of at least a certain percentage of Costa Rican citizens or residents (electrical power generation, transport services, professional services, and aspects of broadcasting). Properties in the Maritime Zone (from 50 to 200 meters above the mean high-tide mark) may only be leased from the state and with residency requirements. In the areas of medical services, telecommunications, finance and insurance, state-owned entities dominate, but that does not preclude private sector competition. Costa Rica does not have an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment, beyond those applied under anti-money laundering procedures. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any control mechanism or sector restrictions; to the contrary, U.S. investors figure prominently among the various major categories of FDI. On May 25, 2021, Costa Rica officially became the 38th OECD member. A comprehensive review of the Costa Rican economy was published by the OECD at the conclusion of the accession process, which offered valuable insights into challenges faced by the economy, “OECD Economic Surveys Costa Rica 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/oecd-economic-surveys-costa-rica-2020-2e0fea6c-en.htm . In the same context, the OECD offered a March 2020 review of international investment in Costa Rica: https://www.oecd.org/investment/OECD-Review-of-international-investment-in-Costa-Rica.pdf . For the index of OECD reports on Costa Rica, go to https://www.oecd.org/costarica/ The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its 2019 “Trade Policy Review” of Costa Rica in September of that year. Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in which member countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp492_e.htm . The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) produced in 2019 the report Overview of Economic and Trade Aspects of Fisheries and Seafood Sectors in Costa Rica: https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2583 . The Environmental Justice Atlas – https://ejatlas.org/country/costa-rica – highlights a number of environmental disputes involving foreign investors, some moribund and some ongoing. A new company in Costa Rica must typically register with the National Registry (company and capital registry), Internal Revenue Directorate of the Finance Ministry (taxpayer registration), National Insurance Institute (INS) (basic workers’ comp), Ministry of Health (sanitary permit), Social Security Administration (CCSS) (registry as employer), and the local Municipality (business permit). Legal fees are the biggest single business start-up cost, as all firms registered to individuals must hire a lawyer for a portion of the necessary paperwork. Costa Rica’s business registration website Crearempresa functions but in 2021 is rated last of 76 national business registration sites evaluated by “Global Enterprise Registration” ( www.GER.co ). Traditionally, the Costa Rican government’s small business promotion efforts have tended to focus on participation by women and underserved communities. The National Institute for Women (INAMU), National Training Institute (INA), the Ministry of Economy (MEIC), and PROCOMER through its supply chain initiative have all collaborated extensively to promote small and medium enterprise with an emphasis on women’s entrepreneurship. In 2020, INA launched a network of centers to support small and medium-sized enterprises based upon the U.S. Small Business Development Center (SBDC) model. The Costa Rican government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Neither does the government discourage or restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Costa Rican laws, regulations, and practices are generally transparent and meant to foster competition in a manner consistent with international norms, except in the sectors controlled by a state monopoly, where competition is explicitly excluded. Rule-making and regulatory authority is housed in any number of agencies specialized by function (telecom, financial, personal data, health, environmental) or location (municipalities, port authorities). Tax, labor, health, and safety laws, though highly bureaucratic, are not seen as unfairly interfering with foreign investment. It is common to have Professional Associations that play a role in policing or guiding their members. Costa Rica is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures ( http://www.businessfacilitation.org ). Within that context, the Ministry of Economy compiled the various procedures needed to do business in Costa Rica: https://tramitescr.meic.go.cr/ . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The stock and bond market regulator SUGEVAL requires International Accounting Standards Board for public companies, while the Costa Rican College of Public Accountants (Colegio de Contadores Publicos de Costa Rica -CCPA) has adopted full International Financial Reporting Standards for non-regulated companies in Costa Rica; for more, see the international federation of accountants IFAC: https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/country/costa-rica . While the government does not require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure, to facilitate transparency and better inform investors, government entities do regularly encourage commitments to environmental and social standards (e.g., within the coffee and tourism industries) beyond or complementary to purely legal requirements. Certifications with Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) components used by the Costa Rican private sector include an array of agricultural certifications, the B Corporation Certificate, the Environmental Design Certification from the Green Building Council, and the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility standard. In the banking sector, entities under the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (Financial Regulator) must comply with corporate governance regulations such as transparency and accountability to shareholders. Regulations must go through a public hearing process when being drafted. Draft bills and regulations are made available for public comment through public consultation processes that will vary in their details according to the public entity and procedure in question, generally giving interested parties sufficient time to respond. The standard period for public comment on technical regulations is 10 days. As appropriate, this process is underpinned by scientific or data-driven assessments. A similarly transparent process applies to proposed laws. The Legislative Assembly generally provides sufficient opportunity for supporters and opponents of a law to understand and comment on proposals. To become law, a proposal must be approved by the Assembly by two plenary votes. The signature of 10 legislators (out of 57) is sufficient after the first vote to send the bill to the Supreme Court for constitutional review within one month, although the court may take longer. Regulations and laws, both proposed and final, for all branches of government are published digitally in the government registry “La Gaceta”: https://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/gaceta/ . The Costa Rican American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham – http://amcham.co.cr ) and other business chambers closely monitor these processes and often coordinate responses as needed. The government has mechanisms to ensure laws and regulations are followed. The Comptroller General’s Office conducts operational as well as financial audits and as such provides the primary oversight and enforcement mechanism within the Costa Rican government to ensure that government bodies follow administrative processes. Each government body’s internal audit office and, in many cases, the customer-service comptroller (Contraloria de Servicios) provide additional support. There are several independent avenues for appealing regulatory decisions, and these are frequently pursued by persons or organizations opposed to a public sector contract or regulatory decision. The avenues include the Comptroller General (Contraloria General de la Republica), the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), the public services regulatory agency (ARESEP), and the constitutional review chamber of the Supreme Court. The State Litigator’s office (Procuraduria General) is frequently a participant in its role as the government’s attorney. Costa Rica is transparent in reporting its public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. Debt obligations are transparent; the Ministry of Finance provides updates on public debt through the year, with the debt categorized as Central Government, Central Government and Non-Financial Sector, and Central Bank of Costa Rica. https://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/12519-informacion-de-la-deuda-publica . The following chart covers contingent debt as of January 31, 2022: https://www.hacienda.go.cr/docs/6213fa8ea594c_01-2022%20DEUDA%20CONTINGENTE%20PUBLICAR.pdf The review and enforcement mechanisms described above have kept Costa Rica’s regulatory system relatively transparent and free of abuse, but have also rendered the system for public sector contract approval exceptionally slow and litigious. There have been several cases in which these review bodies have overturned already-executed contracts, thereby interjecting uncertainty into the process. Bureaucratic procedures are frequently long, involved and can be discouraging to new investors. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s product market regulations are more stringent than in any other OECD country, according to the OECD’s 2020 Product Market Regulations Indicator, leading to market inefficiencies. Find this explanation as well as a detailed review of the regulatory challenges Costa Rica faces in the September 2020 OECD report on regulatory reform: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/enhancing-business-dynamism-and-consumer-welfare-in-costa-rica-with-regulatory-reform-53250d35-en.htm While Costa Rica does consult with its neighbors on some regulations through participation in the Central American Integration System (SICA) ( http://www.sica.int/sica/sica_breve.aspx ), Costa Rica’s lawmakers and regulatory bodies habitually refer to sample regulations or legislation from OECD members and others. Costa Rica’s commitment to OECD standards as an OECD member has accentuated this traditional use of best-practices and model legislation. Costa Rica regularly notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers in Trade (TBT). Costa Rica uses the civil law system. The fundamental law is the country’s political constitution of 1949, which grants the unicameral legislature a particularly strong role. Jurisprudence or case law does not constitute legal precedent but can be persuasive if used in legal proceedings. For example, the Chambers of the Supreme Court regularly cite their own precedents. The civil and commercial codes govern commercial transactions. The courts are independent, and their authority is respected. The roles of public prosecutor and government attorney are distinct: the Chief Prosecuting Attorney or Attorney General (Fiscal General) operates a semi-autonomous department within the judicial branch while the government attorney or State Litigator (Procuraduria General) works within the Ministry of Justice and Peace in the Executive branch. The primary criminal investigative body “Organismo de Investigacion Judicial” OIJ, is a semi-autonomous department within the Judicial Branch. Judgments and awards of foreign courts and arbitration panels may be accepted and enforced in Costa Rica through the exequatur process. The Constitution specifically prohibits discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals. The Costa Rican Judicial System addresses the full range of civil, administrative, and criminal cases with a number of specialized courts. The judicial system generally upholds contracts, but caution should be exercised when making investments in sectors reserved or protected by the Constitution or by laws for public operation. Regulations and enforcement actions may be, and often are, appealed to the courts. Costa Rica’s commercial code details all business requirements necessary to operate in Costa Rica. The laws of public administration and public finance contain most requirements for contracting with the state. The legal process to resolve cases involving squatting on land can be especially cumbersome. Land registries are at times incomplete or even contradictory. Buyers should retain experienced legal counsel to help them determine the necessary due diligence regarding the purchase of property. Costa Rican websites are useful to help navigate laws, rules and procedures including that of the investment promotion agency CINDE, http://www.cinde.org/en , the export promotion authority PROCOMER, http://www.procomer.com/ (“inversionista”), and the Health Ministry, https://www.ministeriodesalud.go.cr/ (product registration and import/export). In addition, the State Litigator’s office ( www.pgr.go.cr, the “SCIJ” tab) compiles relevant laws. Two public institutions are responsible for consumer protection as it relates to monopolistic and anti-competitive practices. The “Commission for the Promotion of Competition” (COPROCOM), an autonomous agency housed in the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, is charged with investigating and correcting anti-competitive behavior across the economy. The Telecommunications Superintendence (SUTEL) shares that responsibility with COPROCOM in the Telecommunications sector. Both agencies are charged with defense of competition, deregulation of economic activity, and consumer protection. Their decisions may be appealed judicially. For the OECD assessment of competition law and policy in Costa Rica, see this July 2020 report: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/costarica-competition.htm. The three principal expropriating government agencies in recent years have been the Ministry of Public Works – MOPT (highway rights-of-way), the state-owned Costa Rican Electrical Institute – ICE (energy infrastructure), and the Ministry of Environment and Energy – MINAE (National Parks and protected areas). Expropriations generally conform to Costa Rica’s laws and treaty obligations. Article 45 of Costa Rica’s Constitution stipulates that private property can be expropriated without proof that it is done for public interest. The 1995 Law 7495 on expropriations further stipulates that expropriations require full and prior payment, and upon full deposit of the calculated amount the government may take possession of land despite the former owner’s dispute of the price. The law makes no distinction between foreigners and nationals. The expropriations law was amended in 1998, 2006, and 2015 to clarify and expedite some procedures, including those necessary to expropriate land for the construction of new roads. (For full detail go to https://PGRweb.go.cr/SCIJ . When reviewing the articles of the law go to the most recent version of each article.) There is no discernible bias against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives during the expropriations process. Costa Rican public institutions follow the law as outlined above and generally act in a way acceptable to the affected landowners. However, when landowners and government differ significantly in their appraisal of the expropriated lands’ value, the resultant judicial processes generally take years to resolve. In addition, landowners have, on occasion, been prevented from developing land which has not yet been formally expropriated for parks or protected areas; the courts will eventually order the government to proceed with the expropriations but the process can be long. The Costa Rican bankruptcy law, addressed in both the commercial code and the civil procedures code, has long been similar to corresponding U.S. law. In February 2021, Costa Rica’s National Assembly approved a comprehensive bankruptcy law #9957 “Ley Concursal”, in effect since December 1, 2021. The new law eases bankruptcy processes and help companies in financial distress to move through the “administrative intervention” intended to save the companies. The previous law too often ended with otherwise viable companies ceasing operations, rather than allowing them to recover, due to a bias towards dissolution of companies in distress. As in the United States, penal law will also apply to criminal malfeasance in some bankruptcy cases. 4. Industrial Policies Four investment incentive programs operate in Costa Rica: the free trade zone system, an inward-processing regime, a duty drawback procedure, and the tourism development incentives regime. These incentives are available equally to foreign and domestic investors, and include tax holidays, training of specialized labor force, and facilitation of bureaucratic procedures. PROCOMER is in charge of the first three programs and companies may choose only one of the three. As of early 2022, 568 companies are in the free trade zone regime, 90 in the inward processing regime, and 10 in duty drawback. ICT administers the tourism incentives; through early 2022, 1,133 tourism firms are declared as such with access to incentives of various types depending on the firm’s operations (hotels, rent-a-car, travel agencies, airlines and aquatic transport). The free trade zone regime is based on the 1990 law #7210, updated in 2010 by law #8794 and attendant regulations, while inward processing and duty drawback derive from the General Customs Law #7557. Tourism incentives are based on the 1985 law #6990, most recently amended in 2001. The inward-processing regime suspends duties on imported raw materials of qualifying companies and then exempts the inputs from those taxes when the finished goods are exported. The goods must be re-exported within a non-renewable period of one year. Companies within this regime may sell to the domestic market if they have registered to do so and pay applicable local taxes. The drawback procedure provides for rebates of duties or other taxes that were paid by an importer for goods subsequently incorporated into an exported good. Finally, the tourism development incentives regime provides a set of advantages, including duty exemption – local and customs taxes – for construction and equipment to tourism companies, especially hotels and marinas, which sign a tourism agreement with ICT. Costa Rica has not established distinct incentives for under-represented investors, for example women. Incentives for environmentally “green” investment tend towards structural or institutional facilitation rather than subsidy. Electricity tariffs, including net-metering and access tariffs for rooftop solar installation, are designed to encourage renewable energy generation and use without creating a clear subsidy of those activities. Green hydrogen production is encouraged through several executive decrees that provide import tariff exemptions for equipment and seek to establish a flexible and enabling regulatory framework for the use of national grid surpluses in the development of a green hydrogen economy in Costa Rica. Individual companies are able to create industrial parks that qualify for free trade zone (FTZ) status by meeting specific criteria and applying for such status with PROCOMER. Companies in FTZs receive exemption from virtually all taxes for eight years and at a reduced rate for some years to follow. Established companies may be able to renew this exemption through additional investment. In addition to the tax benefits, companies operating in FTZs enjoy simplified investment, trade, and customs procedures, which provide a convenient way to avoid Costa Rica’s burdensome business licensing process. Call centers, logistics providers, and software developers are among the companies that may benefit from FTZ status but do not physically export goods. Such service providers have become increasingly important participants in the free trade zone regime. PROCOMER and CINDE are traditionally proactive in working with FTZ companies to streamline and improve law, regulation and procedures touching upon the FTZ regime. A study of the benefits of FTZ regime for the broader economy is available on PROCOMER’s website. Costa Rica does not impose requirements that foreign investors transfer technology or proprietary business information or purchase a certain percentage of inputs from local sources. However, the Costa Rican agencies involved in investment and export promotion do explicitly focus on categories of foreign investor who are likely to encourage technology transfer, local supply chain development, employment of local residents, and cooperation with local universities. The export promotion agency PROCOMER operates an export linkages department focused on increasing the percentage of local content inputs used by large multinational enterprises. Costa Rica does not have excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements designed to inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees, although the procedures necessary to obtain residency in Costa Rica are often perceived to be long and bureaucratic. Existing immigration measures do not appear to have inhibited foreign investors’ and their employees’ mobility to the extent that they affect foreign direct investment in the country. The government is responsible for monitoring so that foreign nationals do not displace local employees in employment, and the Immigration Law and Labor Ministry regulations establish a mechanism to determine in which cases the national labor force would need protection. However, investors in the country do not generally perceive Costa Rica as unfairly mandating local employment. The Labor Ministry prepares a list of recommended and not recommended jobs to be filled by foreign nationals. Costa Rica does not have government/authority-imposed conditions on any permission to invest. Costa Rica does not require Costa Rican data to be stored on Costa Rican soil. Under law #8968 ‒ Personal Data Protection Law – and its corresponding regulation, companies must notify the Data Protection Agency (PRODHAB) of all existing databases from which personal information is sold or traded. Costa Rica does not impose measures that unduly impede companies from securing and freely transmitting customer or other business-related data. While Costa Rica in the next several years is looking to modernize its law pertaining to data privacy and cross border data transfer, Costa Rica’s vibrant digital services industry will likely ensure that the new regulations do not interfere unduly with legitimate digital services business. 5. Protection of Property Rights The laws governing investments in land, buildings, and mortgages are generally transparent. Secured interests in both chattel and real property are recognized and enforced. Mortgage and title recording are mandatory and the vast majority of land in Costa Rica has clear title. However, the National Registry, the government entity that records property titles, has been successfully targeted on occasion with fraudulent filing, which has led in some cases to overlapping title to real property. Costa Rican law allows long-time occupants of a property belonging to someone else (i.e. squatters) to eventually take legal possession of that property if unopposed by the property owner. Potential investors in Costa Rican real estate should also be aware that the right to use traditional paths is enshrined in law and can be used to obtain court-ordered easements on land bearing private title; disputes over easements are particularly common when access to a beach is an issue. Foreigners are subject to the same land lease and acquisition laws and regulations as Costa Ricans with the exception of concessions within the Maritime Zone (Zona Maritima Terrestre – ZMT). Almost all beachfront is public property for a distance of 200 meters from the mean high tide line, with an exception for long-established port cities and a few beaches such as Jaco. The first 50 meters from the mean high tide line is severely restricted. The next 150 meters, also owned by the state, is the Maritime Zone and can only be leased from the local municipalities or the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) for specified periods and particular uses, such as tourism installation or vacation homes. Concessions in this zone cannot be given to foreigners or foreign-owned companies. Costa Rica’s legal structure for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) is quite strong, but enforcement is sporadic and does not always get the attention and resources required to be effective. In the 2019 United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report, USTR noted the substantial progress made by Costa Rica in protecting IPR. As a result, USTR did not include Costa Rica in the 2020 or 2021 Special 301 reports. Costa Rica was not listed in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. Costa Rica is a signatory of many major international agreements and conventions regarding intellectual property. Building on the existent regulatory and legal framework, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) required Costa Rica to strengthen and clarify its IPR regime further, with several new IPR laws added to the books in 2008. Prior to that, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) took effect in Costa Rica on January 1, 2000. In 2002, Costa Rica ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. On June 22, 2020, the General Directorate of the National Registry merged the Registry of Industrial Property and the Registry of Copyright and Related Rights into a single Registry of Intellectual Property, improving the National Registry’s efficiency. While online piracy remains a concern for the country, in February 2019 Costa Rica modified the existing regulation on internet service providers (ISPs) to shorten significantly the 45 days previously allowed for notice and takedown of pirated online content, creating an expeditious safe harbor system for ISPs in Costa Rica. In August 2020, Costa Rica’s Intellectual Property Registry launched a WIPO online platform that will allow interested parties to submit online applications to register trademarks. The online service has improved efficiency and encouraged registrations from small-to-medium-sized companies across the country. In 2021, the Intellectual Property Registry launched the development of the second stage of WIPO File that will allow for online filing of applications for patents, models, and industrial designs. In 2019, the National Registry of Industrial Property announced the implementation of TMview and DesignView, search tools that allow users to consult trademarks and industrial design data. The Costa Rican government does not release official statistics on the seizure of counterfeit goods, but the Chamber of Commerce compiles statistics from Costa Rican government sources: http://observatorio.co.cr/ In the first six months of 2021, Costa Rica’s Economic Crimes Prosecutor investigated 26 IPR cases, up from the total of 14 cases in 2020. As in years past, prosecutors ultimately dismissed several cases due to lack of interest, collaboration, and follow-up by the representatives of trademark rights holders. Government authorities complained that the lack of response by trademark representatives is a recurring behavior dating back to at least 2016 and may explain the drop in IPR cases. In 2020, the Prosecutor’s Office established a specialized cybercrime unit with the purpose of improving the country’s response toward computer-oriented crimes, including copyrights infringements. On September 4, 2019, Costa Rican Customs issued an executive decree titled “Contact of the Representatives of Intellectual Property Rights for Enforcement Issues” establishing a formal customs recordation system for trademarks that allows customs officers to make full use of their ex officio authority to inspect and detain goods. Under the decree, customs offices have the power to include new trademark rights holders in a formal database for use by customs officials in the field. As of 2021, 173 trademarks are included in this database. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Costa Rican government’s general attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is prudently welcoming, seeking to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the economy while minimizing the instability that might be caused by the sudden entry or exit of funds. The securities exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) is small and is dominated by trading in bonds. Stock trading is of limited significance and involves less than 10 of the country’s larger companies, resulting in an illiquid secondary market. There is a small secondary market in commercial paper and repurchase agreements. The Costa Rican government has in recent years explicitly welcomed foreign institutional investors purchasing significant volumes of Costa Rican dollar-denominated government debt in the local market. The securities exchange regulator (SUGEVAL) is generally perceived to be effective. Costa Rica accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements, except with IMF approval. There are no controls on capital flows in or out of Costa Rica or on portfolio investment in publicly traded companies. Some capital flows are subject to a withholding tax (see section on Foreign Exchange and Remittances). Within Costa Rica, credit is largely allocated on market terms, although long-term capital is scarce. Favorable lending terms for USD-denominated loans compared to colon-denominated loans have made USD-denominated mortgage financing popular and common. Foreign investors are able to borrow in the local market; they are also free to borrow from abroad, although a 15% withholding tax on interest paid will apply when the creditor is a non-tax resident in the country, under the reasoning that the interest payment constitutes income from a Costa Rican source. Potential overseas borrowers must also consider Costa Rica’s limitation on the deductibility of financial expenses by the debtor when the creditor is not an entity regulated in its country of origin by a body like the Costa Rican financial supervisory authority (SUGEF). In such cases, deductible interest for the current fiscal year is around 30% of EBITDA -Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization. Costa Rica’s financial system boasts a relatively high financial inclusion rate, estimated by the Central Bank through August 2020 at 81.5 percent (the percentage of adults over the age of 15 holding a bank account). Non-resident foreigners may open what are termed “simplified accounts” in Costa Rican financial institutions, while resident foreigners have full access to all banking services. The banking sector is healthy and well-regulated, although the 2020 non-performing loan ratio of 2.4 percent of active loans as of December 2021 (2.8 percent in state-owned banks) would be significantly higher if not for Covid-19 temporary regulatory measures allowing banks to readjust loans. The country hosts a large number of smaller private banks, credit unions, and factoring houses, although the four state-owned banks (two commercial, one mortgage and one workers’) are still dominant, accounting for 46 percent of the country’s financial system assets. Consolidated total assets of those state-owned banks were USD 29.6 billion, while combined assets of the regulated financial sector (public banks, private banks, savings-and-loans and others) were almost USD 64 billion as of December 2021. Costa Rica’s Central Bank performs the functions of a central bank while also providing support to the four autonomous financial superintendencies (Banking, Securities, Pensions and Insurance) under the supervision of the national council for the supervision of the financial system (CONASSIF). The Central Bank developed and operates the financial system’s transaction settlement and direct transfer mechanism “SINPE” through which clients transfer money to and from accounts with any other account in the financial system. The Central Bank’s governance structure is strong, with a significant degree of autonomy from the Executive Branch. Foreign banks may establish both full operations and branch operations in the country under the supervision of the banking regulator SUGEF. The Central Bank has a good reputation and has had no problem maintaining sufficient correspondent relationships. Costa Rica is steadily improving its ability to ensure the efficacy of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism finance. The Costa Rican financial sector in broad terms appears to be satisfied to date with the available correspondent banking services. The OECD 2020 report “review of the financial system” for Costa Rica is an excellent resource for those seeking more detail on the current state of Costa Rica’s financial system: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/Costa-Rica-Review-of-Financial-System-2020.pdf . Costa Rica does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Costa Rica’s total of 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly known by their abbreviated names. They include monopolies in petroleum-derived fuels (RECOPE), lottery (JPS), railroads (INCOFER), local production of ethanol (CNP/FANAL), water distribution (AyA), and electrical distribution (ICE, CNFL, JASEC, ESPH). SOEs have market dominance in insurance (INS), telecommunications (ICE, RACSA, JASEC, ESPH) and finance (BNCR, BCR, Banco Popular, BANHVI, INVU, INFOCOOP). They have significant market participation in parcel and mail delivery (Correos) and ports operation (INCOP and JAPDEVA). Six of those SOEs hold significant economic power with revenues exceeding 1 percent of GDP: ICE, RECOPE, INS, BNCR, BCR and Banco Popular. The 2020 OECD report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica” reports that Costa Rican SOE employment is 1.9% of total employment, somewhat below the OECD average of 2.5%. Audited returns for each SOE may be found on each company’s website, while basic revenue and costs for each SOE are available on the General Controller’s Office (CGR) “Sistema de Planes y Presupuestos” https://www.cgr.go.cr/02-consultas/consulta-pp.html . The Costa Rican government does not currently hold minority stakes in commercial enterprises. Costa Rican state-owned enterprises have not in recent decades required continuous and substantial state subsidy to survive. Several (notably ICE, AyA and RECOPE) registered major losses in pandemic year 2020, while others (INS, BCR, BNCR) registered substantial profits, which are allocated as dictated by law and boards of directors. Financial allocations to and earnings from SOEs may be found in the CGR “Sistema de Informacion de Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP)”. U.S. investors and their advocates cite some of the following ways in which Costa Rican SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages because of their status as state-owned entities. According to Law 7200, electricity generated privately must be purchased by public entities and the installed capacity of the private sector is limited to 30 percent of total electrical installed capacity in the country: 15 percent to small privately-owned renewable energy plants and 15 percent to larger “buildoperatetransfer” (BOT) operations. Telecoms and technology sector companies have called attention to the fact that government agencies often choose SOEs as their telecom services providers despite a full assortment of private-sector telecom companies. The Information and Telecommunications Business Chamber (CAMTIC) has long protested against what its members feel to be unfair use by government entities of a provision (Article 2) in the public contracting law that allows noncompetitive award of contracts to public entities (also termed “direct purchase”) when functionaries of the awarding entity certify the award to be an efficient use of public funds. CAMTIC has compiled detailed statistics showing that while the yearly total dollar value of Costa Rican government direct purchases in the IT sector under Article 2 has dropped considerably from USD 226 million in 2017, to USD 72.5 million in 2018, USD 27.5 million in 2019, USD 54 million in 2020, and USD 5 million in 2021, the number of purchases has actually increased from 56 purchases in both 2017 and 2018 to 86 in 2019, 104 in 2020, and 115 in 2021. The state-owned insurance provider National Insurance Institute (INS) has been adjusting to private sector competition since 2009 but in 2021 still registered 66 percent of total insurance premiums paid; 13 insurers are now registered with insurance regulator SUGESE: ( https://www.sugese.fi.cr/SitePages/index.aspx ). Competitors point to unfair advantages enjoyed by the stateowned insurer INS, including a strong tendency among SOE’s to contract their insurance with INS. Costa Rica is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) although it is registered as an observer. Costa Rica is working to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs ( www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm ). For more information on Costa Rica’s SOE’s, see the OECD Accession report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica”, dated October 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/corporate-governance-in-costa-rica-b313ec37-en.htm . Costa Rica does not have a privatization program and the markets that have been opened to competition in recent decades – banking, telecommunications, insurance and Atlantic Coast container port operations – were opened without privatizing the corresponding state-owned enterprises (SOs). Two relatively minor SOEs, the state liquor company (Fanal) and the International Bank of Costa Rica (Bicsa), are the most likely targets for privatization if such political sentiment grows. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporations in Costa Rica, particularly those in the export and tourism sectors, generally enjoy a positive reputation within the country as engines of growth and practitioners of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). The Costa Rica government actively highlights its role in attracting high-tech companies to Costa Rica; the strong RBC culture that many of those companies cultivate has become part of that winning package. Large multinational companies commonly pursue RBC goals in line with their corporate goals and have found it beneficial to publicize RBC orientation and activities in Costa Rica. Many smaller companies, particularly in the tourism sector, have integrated community outreach activities into their way of doing business. There is a general awareness of RBC among both producers and consumers in Costa Rica. Multinational enterprises in Costa Rica have not been associated in recent decades in any systematic or high-profile way with alleged human or labor rights violations. The Costa Rican government maintains and enforces laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protection and environmental protection. Costa Rica has no legal mineral extraction industry with its accompanying issues, but illegal small scale gold mining, particularly in the north of the country, is a focal point of serious environmental damage, organized crime, and social disruption. Large scale industrial agriculture is also occasionally the focus of health or environmental complaints, including in recent years the pineapple industry for allegedly affecting water supplies and a banana producer with many workers with rashes allegedly induced by pesticide use. The government appears to respond appropriately. Indigenous communities in specific areas of the country have longstanding grievances against non-indigenous encroachment on their reserves, which has led to recent incidents of violence. Costa Rica encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE) and maintains a national contact point for OECD MNE guidelines within the Ministry of Foreign Trade (see https://www.comex.go.cr/punto-nacional-de-contacto/ or http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm ). Costa Rica has been a participant since 2011 in the Montreux Document reaffirming the obligations of states regarding private military and security companies during armed conflict. Costa Rica has a national climate strategy and a sophisticated system for monitoring natural capital, biodiversity, and ecosystem services. While the Central Bank compiles environmental accounts ( https://www.bccr.fi.cr/en/Economic-Indicators/environmental-accounts ), the Ministry of Environment and Energy oversees policies on environmental impact assessments and emissions. As part of Costa Rica’s nationally determined contribution to the United National Framework on Climate Change, Costa Rica targets maximum national net emissions in 2030 of 9.11 million tons of CO2. This number is consistent with the targeted trajectory of their National Decarbonization Plan which seeks to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Within the transportation sector Costa Rica aims to adopt standards to migrate towards a zero-emission motorcycle fleet by 2025, have 8% of their fleet of small vehicles be electric, and by 2030 have 8% of the public transportation fleet fully electric. There are currently no regulatory incentives or rebates for private sector contributions to achieve these goals. Costa Rican government efforts to reach net-zero emissions are largely limited to encouraging purchase and use of electric vehicles through tax reduction. In the absence of any significant budget for climate change response, the Costa Rican government necessarily relies on the private sector and international donors to implement its ambitions to be net zero by 2050. Costa Rica supports labels or designations meant to encourage good behavior with some considerable success: blue flag program at beaches and the Costa Rican country brand “Essential Costa Rica”. Official procurement policies do not include environmental or green growth considerations beyond those otherwise mandated by law. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Costa Rica has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption. Though the resources available to enforce those laws are limited, Costa Rica’s institutional framework is strong, such that those cases that are prosecuted are generally perceived as legitimate. Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, contemplate conflict-of-interest in both procurement and contract award, and penalize bribery by local businessmen of both local and foreign government officials. Public officials convicted of receiving bribes are subject to prison sentences up to ten years, according to the Costa Rican Criminal Code (Articles 347-360). Entrepreneurs may not deduct the costs of bribes or any other criminal activity as business expenses. In recent decades, Costa Rica saw several publicized cases of firms prosecuted under the terms of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Costa Rica ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1997. This initiative of the OECD and the Organization of American States (OAS) obligates subscribing nations to implement criminal sanctions for corruption and implies a series of follow up actions: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cri.htm . Costa Rica also ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in March 2007, has been a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) since 2012, and as of July 2017 is a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. The Costa Rican government has encouraged civil society interest in good governance, open government and fiscal transparency, with a number of NGO’s operating unimpeded in this space. While U.S. firms do not identify corruption as a major obstacle to doing business in Costa Rica, some have made allegations of corruption in the administration of public tenders and in approvals or timely processing of permits. Developers of tourism facilities periodically cite municipal-level corruption as a problem when attempting to gain a concession to build and operate in the restricted maritime zone. For further material on anti-bribery and corruption in Costa Rica, see the 2020 OECD study: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/costa-rica-has-improved-its-foreign-bribery-legislation-but-must-strengthen-enforcement-and-close-legal-loopholes.htm Also on the OECD website, information relating to Costa Rica’s membership in the OECD anti-bribery convention: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/costarica-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm Name: José Armando López Baltodano Title: Procurador Director, Procuraduría de la Ética Pública. Organization: Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) Address: Avenida 2 y 6, Calle 13. San José, Costa Rica. Telephone Number: 2243-8330, 2243-8321 Email Address: armandolb@pgr.go.cr evelynhk@pgr.go.cr Contact at “watchdog” organization: Evelyn Villarreal F. Asociación Costa Rica Íntegra Tel:. (506) 8355 3762 Email: evelyn.villarreal@cr.transparency.org 10. Political and Security Environment Since 1948, Costa Rica has not experienced significant domestic political violence. There are no indigenous or external movements likely to produce political or social instability. However, Costa Ricans occasionally follow a long tradition of blocking public roads for a few hours as a way of pressuring the government to address grievances; the traditional government response has been to react slowly, thus giving the grievances time to air. This practice on the part of peaceful protesters can cause logistical problems. Crime increased in Costa Rica in recent decades and U.S. citizen visitors and residents are frequent victims. While petty theft is the main problem, criminals show an increased tendency to use violence. Some crime in Costa Rica is associated with the illegal drug trade. Please see the State Department’s Travel Advisory page for Costa Rica for the latest information- https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/costa-rica-travel-advisory.html 11. Labor Policies and Practices Although the unemployment rate fell in 2021, unemployment remains a major issue for Costa Rica’s economy. According to the National Statistics Institute (INEC) as of January 2022, the unemployment rate was 13.1 percent, or 319,000 unemployed workers. The unemployment rate among the male population was estimated at 10.6 percent and the female population at 16.8 percent. When comparing these figures with the same quarter in 2020-21, there was a 4.6 percent decrease among males and a 7.8 percent reduction among females. 45.7 percent of work was in the informal sector (45.7 percent among males and 45.6 percent among females) with no significant variation compared to the same period in 2020-21. From the percentage of individuals with informal employment, 91.5 percent were self-employed, and 29.4 percent received a salary. INEC reported that from November 2021 to January 2022, 532,000 persons in the labor force (employed and unemployed) were negatively affected by COVID-19. Of the country’s employed population, 213,000 had a reduction in salary or income associated with suspension or reduction in working hours or had to suspend their own activity or business during the pandemic, which represented 10.1 percent of the employed population, of which 63.5 percent were male, and 36.5 percent were female. Of the total number of unemployed persons, 318,000 were negatively affected by the pandemic. Of those, 48.7 percent were men and 51.3 percent were women. Of the total number of unemployed persons affected, 97.5 percent indicated that they could not find a job due to COVID-19; and 2.5 percent stated that they were fired, suspended, or closed their business or activity. INEC reported that during the pandemic more formal jobs were preserved and more informal jobs were lost. It is possible that some of the informal businesses that survived the pandemic chose to seek formal work, given increased demand for health insurance. Some of the activities most affected by health restrictions and the consequences of the pandemic (such as tourism, commerce, construction, and entertainment activities) had high demand for workers, including informal workers, before the pandemic. According to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, formal employment returned to levels registered before the beginning of the pandemic, while as of November 2021, the number of informally employed persons was 11.4 percent lower than in February 2020. The recovery of employment for workers operating in the informal sector and those with medium qualifications has been much slower than that of the most qualified and those who work in the formal sector. Workers in the informal sector were not covered by wage, hour, and occupational health and safety laws and inspections, nor were they enrolled in the public health system. The Costa Rican labor force has high educational standards. The country boasts an extensive network of publicly funded schools and universities while Costa Rica’s national vocational training institute (INA) and private sector groups provide technical and vocational training. The growth of Costa Rica’s service, tourism, and technology sectors has stimulated demand for English-language speakers. The pool of job candidates with English and technical skills in the Central Valley is sufficient to meet current demand. However, the current finite number of job candidates with these skills limits the ability of foreign and local businesses to expand operations. The government implemented a controlled entry of foreign migrant workers (Migration Traceability System, SITLAM) through the northern and southern borders. In a joint effort, the Costa Rican Social Security System (CCSS), Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS) and the Costa Rican Coffee Institute implemented a program to enroll coffee workers in the health insurance system while taking into account turnover, migratory conditions, and harvest seasons while protecting the families of the workers. The government does not keep track of shortages or surpluses of specialized labor skills. Foreign nationals have the same rights, duties, and benefits as local employees. The government is responsible for ensuring that foreign nationals do not displace local employees in employment. Labor law provisions apply equally across the nation, both within and outside free trade zones. The Immigration Law and the Labor Ministry’s regulations establish a mechanism to determine in which cases the national labor force would need protection. The Labor Ministry prepares a list of recommended and not-recommended jobs to be filled by foreign nationals. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions. The law does not differentiate between layoffs and dismissal without cause. There are concepts established in the law related to unemployment and dismissals such as the mandatory savings plan (Labor Capitalization Fund or Fondo de Capitalizacion Laboral, FCL), as well as the notice of termination of employment (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantia). The FCL, which is funded through employer contributions, functions as an unemployment insurance; the employee can withdraw the savings every five years if the employee has worked without interruption for the same employer. Costa Rican labor law requires that employees released without cause receive full severance pay, which can amount to close to a full year’s pay in some cases. Although there is no insurance for workers laid off for economic reasons, employers may voluntarily establish an unemployment fund. In response to government-ordered temporary business closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic, in 2020, the Labor Ministry implemented the temporary suspension of employment contracts, a procedure established in the Labor Code, which grants employers the option of stopping the payment of wages temporarily during an emergency. Executive orders (Nos. 42522-MTSS and 42248-MTSS) established the procedures for employers to request the temporary suspension of labor contracts with their employees. Employers requested the suspension of contracts through the Labor Inspectorate of the Labor Ministry. In 2021, the Labor Ministry continued implementing the temporary suspension of employment contracts but only in sectors most adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic due to the restrictions and closures imposed by authorities. The National Assembly approved a law (Law 9832) in 2020 to reduce working hours during the pandemic. Under the law, if income in a company decreases by 20 percent, compared to the income during the same month in 2019 or compared to the income of the previous three months, the employer can reduce the employees’ hours and salary up to 50 percent. If the decrease in income is greater than 60 percent, the reduction in salary can reach 75 percent. Legislators initially authorized this reduction for three months and employers could request extensions for two equal terms (9 months) and then to five terms (15 months) as the emergency continued. In May 2021, the National Assembly approved an extension (Legislative Order No. 9982) in the tourism sector which authorizes a reduction for four equal terms with previous approval from the Labor Ministry. In 2020, the National Assembly authorized employees, whose labor contracts were terminated or suspended or whose salaries were reduced during the state of emergency declaration, to withdraw their contributions to the FCL plan (Law 9839). Costa Rican labor law and practice allows some flexibility in alternate schedules; nevertheless, it is based on a 48-hour week made up of eight-hour days. Workers are entitled to one day of rest after six consecutive days of work. The labor code stipulates that the workday may not exceed 12 hours. Use of temporary or contract workers for jobs that are not temporary in nature to lower labor costs and avoid payroll taxes does occur, particularly in construction and in agricultural activities dedicated to domestic (rather than export) markets. No labor laws are waived to attract or retain investment‒all labor laws apply in all Costa Rican territory, including free trade zones. The government has been actively exploring ways to introduce more flexibility into the labor code to facilitate teleworking and flexible work schedules. Costa Rican law guarantees the right of workers to join labor unions of their choosing without prior authorization. Unions operate independently of government control and may form federations and confederations and affiliate internationally. Most unions are in the public sector, including in state-run enterprises. Collective bargaining agreements are common in the public sector. “Permanent committees of employees” informally represent employees in some enterprises of the private sector and directly negotiate with employers; these negotiations are expressed in “direct agreements,” which have a legal status. Based on 2021 statistics, 15 percent of employees were union members. The Labor Ministry reported that from 2019 to 2021, they approved 27 collective agreements and accompanied 43 negotiation processes and handled 7 conciliation processes of a social economic nature. In 2021, the Ministry reported that collective bargaining agreements covered 10.6 percent of the working population, 50.7 percent within public sector entities and 1.1 percent within the private sector. The Ministry reported that 13,897 workers were covered by “direct agreements” in different sectors (agriculture and manufacturing industry) during 2021. In the private sector, many Costa Rican workers join “solidarity associations,” through which employers provide easy access to saving plans, low-interest loans, health clinics, recreation centers, and other benefits. A 2011 law solidified that status by giving solidarity associations constitutional recognition comparable to that afforded labor unions. Solidarity associations and labor unions coexist at some workplaces, primarily in the public sector. Business groups claim that worker participation in permanent committees and/or solidarity associations provides for better labor relations compared to firms with workers represented only by unions. However, some labor unions allege private businesses use permanent committees and solidarity associations to hinder union organization while permanent workers’ committees displace labor unions on collective bargaining issues in contravention of internationally recognized labor rights. The Ministry of Labor has a formal dispute-resolution body and will engage in dispute-resolution when necessary; labor disputes may also be resolved through the judicial process. The Ministry of Labor’s regulations establish that conciliation is the mechanism to solve individual labor disputes, as defined in the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Law (No. 7727, dated 9 December 1997). The Labor Code and ADR Law establish the following mechanisms: dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. The Labor Law promotes alternative dispute resolution in judicial, administrative, and private proceedings. The law establishes three specific mechanisms: arbitration to resolve individual or collective labor disputes (including a Labor Ministry’s arbitrator roster list); conciliation in socio-economic collective disputes (introducing private conciliation processes); and arbitration in socio-economic collective disputes (with a neutral arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators issuing a decision). The Labor Ministry also participates as mediator in collective conflicts, facilitating and promoting dialogue among interested parties. The law provides for protection from dismissal for union organizers and members and requires employers found guilty of anti-union discrimination to reinstate workers fired for union activities. The law provides for the right of workers to conduct legal strikes, but it prohibits strikes in public services considered essential (police, hospitals, and ports). Strikes affecting the private sector are rare and do not pose a risk for investment. Child and adolescent labor is uncommon in Costa Rica, and it occurs mainly in agriculture in the informal sector. In 2020, the government published the results of a child labor risk identification model and a strategy to design preventive measures at local level. In 2021, the government continued a pilot project for the prevention of child labor in two at-risk cantons in the province of Limón. The government also activated the Houses of Joy (“Casas de la Alegría”) during the coffee harvest season 2021-2022. These are daycare centers for children of workers in different coffee regions of the country, mainly in the Brunca, Los Santos, and Western Valley regions. Chapter 16 of the U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement obliges Costa Rica to enforce laws that defend core international labor standards. The government, organized labor, employer organizations, and the International Labor Organization signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Decent Work Program for the period 2019-2023, which aims to improve labor conditions and facilitate employability for vulnerable groups through government-labor-business tripartite dialogue. The National Assembly recently approved a public employment reform bill that aims to establish the same salary for equal responsibilities in the public sector, eliminating different wage systems and salary bonus structures, which is projected to reduce the fiscal deficit.The legislation will take effect in March 2023. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $62,158 2020 $61,847 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $26,306 2020 $2,000 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $124 2020 $-86 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 1.2% 2020 2.9% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Costa Rican Central Bank. The “FDI Stock” positions detailed here are an accounting expression of the accumulation of FDI through 2020, while the “FDI inflow” statistic given in the first paragraph of the executive summary is the sum of foreign direct investment made in Costa Rica during calendar year 2020, as reported by the Costa Rican Central Bank. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 46,115 100% Total Outward 3,578 100 United States 26,306 57% Nicaragua 1,065 30% Spain 2,810 6% Guatemala 1,023 29% Mexico 2,173 5% Panama 867 24% The Netherlands 1,777 4% United States 124 4% Colombia 1,681 4% Luxembourg 90 3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Attention: Investment Climate Statement Economic Section Embassy San Jose, Costa Rica 2519-2000 SanJoseEcon@state.gov Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) offers a welcoming environment for U.S. investment. The Ivoirian government wants to deepen commercial cooperation with the U.S. The Ivoirian and foreign business community in CDI considers the 2018 investment code generous with welcome incentives and few restrictions on foreign investors. Côte d’Ivoire’s resiliency to the COVID-19 crisis led to quick economic recovery. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stayed positive at two percent in 2020 and rebounded to 6.5 percent in 2021, with government of CDI projecting average growth at 7.65 percent during the period 2021-2025. International credit rating agency Fitch upgraded the country’s political risk rating in July 2021 from B+ to BB-, while the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) assessment confirms CDI’s economic resilience, despite the Omicron variant of COVID. However, possible repetition of 2021 energy shortages, poor transparency, and delays in reforms could dampen confidence. U.S. businesses operate successfully in several Ivoirian sectors including oil and gas exploration and production; agriculture and value-added agribusiness processing; power generation and renewable energy; IT services; the digital economy; banking; insurance; and infrastructure. The competitiveness of U.S. companies in IT services is exemplified by one company that altered the local payment system by introducing a digital payment system that rapidly increased its market share, forcing competitors to lower prices. Côte d’Ivoire is well poised to attract increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) based on the government’s strong response to the pandemic, the buoyancy of the economy, high-level support for private sector investment, and clear priorities set forth in the new 2021-2025 National Development Plan (PND – Plan National de Développement). An important factor is Côte d’Ivoire’s resurgence as a regional economic and transportation hub. Government authorities are continuing to implement structural reforms to improve the business environment, modernize public administration, increase human capital, and boost productivity and private sector development. However, this will not come without challenges and uncertainties in the medium term, particularly regarding the evolution of the pandemic and global recovery as well as regulatory and transparency concerns. Government authorities underscore their commitment to strengthening peace and security systems in the northern zone of the country, while striving for inclusive growth in the context of post-pandemic recovery. Finally, recent political instability in northern and western neighboring countries Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, could impede investor confidence in the region, especially when it comes to security. Doing business with the Ivoirian government remains a significant challenge in some areas such as procurement, taxation, and regulatory processes. Some new public procurement procedures adopted in 2019 were only implemented in 2021, including implementation of an e-procurement module, and improved evaluation, prioritization, selection, and monitoring procedures. This is a work in process, and concerns remain that these procedures are not consistently and transparently applied. Similar concerns circulate about tax procedures, especially retroactive assessments based on changes in tax formulas. An overly complicated tax system and slow, opaque government decision-making processes hinder investment. Government has identified VAT (Value Added Tax), mining, digitalization, and property taxes as key areas for broadening the tax base and improving state revenues. Other challenges include low levels of literacy and income, weak access to credit for small businesses, corruption, and the need to broaden the tax base to relieve some of the tax-paying burden on businesses. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 110 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings Global Innovation Index 2021 114 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -$495 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government actively encourages FDI and is committed to increasing it. The preparation of the 2021-2025 PND was informed by a comprehensive review of the previous 2016-2020 PND to identify the main achievements, remaining challenges and additional strategic priorities. The 2021-2025 PND process was collaborative, including consultations with civil society, private sector, local government, and development finance institutions (DFIs). The government recognizes it cannot achieve its ambitious PND investment goals without increasing foreign investment and private investment to a target of 72 percent of total investment. Prime Minister Achi’s March 2022 visit to the U.S. profiled CDI as an attractive trade and investment partner that offers a conducive environment to accommodate foreign companies. Achi broadcast the government’s objective to use the private sector as a principal element of development, urging U.S. companies to invest in Côte d’Ivoire. He highlighted CDI’s success in delivering peace and stability through its commitment to political dialogue. Part of CDI’s vision by 2030 is to process domestically at least 50 percent of its raw export commodities. Foreign companies are free to invest and list on the Regional Stock Exchange (BVRM – Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières), which is based in Abidjan and covers the eight countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). WAEMU members are part of the Regional Council for Savings and Investment (CREPMF – Conseil Régional de l’Épargne Publique et des Marchés Financiers), a West African securities regulatory body. BRVM has only 46 companies, 34 of which are Ivorian. Looking ahead, the market is slowly going digital, with online trading platforms. Licensed stock broking companies already execute most investors’ trades through an automated trading system. Nevertheless, investor and corporate sentiment remain low. Companies are reluctant to list, and investors do not yet see the market as an alternative way to make profit. There is a need to expand and deepen markets to support international trade, including forward and futures markets. In most sectors, there are no laws that limit foreign investment. There are restrictions, however, on foreign investment in the health sector, law and accounting firms, and travel agencies (see the section below). The Ivoirian government’s investment promotion agency, the Center for the Promotion of Investment in Côte d’Ivoire (CEPICI), promotes and attracts national and foreign investment. Its services are available to all investors and are provided through a one-stop shop intended to facilitate business creation, operation, and expansion. CEPICI ensures that investors receive incentives outlined in the investment code and facilitates access to industrial land. More information is available at http://www.cepici.gouv.ci/. In 2019, the government added a Ministry of Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development, charged with investment promotion activities and development of industrial zones, including economic and free zones. The Ministry oversees the CEPICI and the Ivoirian Enterprise Institute (INIE – Institut Ivoirien de l’Entreprise), charged with programs targeting Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) development. This overlaps with the mandate of the Ministry of SMEs (Ministère de la Promotion des PME, de l’artisanat et de la Transformation du Secteur informel). Côte d’Ivoire maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors through various business networks and platforms, such as the CEPICI, the Ivoirian Chamber of Commerce (CCI-CI), the association of large enterprises (CGECI), and the bankers’ association. CGECI regularly proposes reforms to be adopted by the government regarding private sector financing and investment. CGECI workshops and conferences are venues to discuss issues ranging from tax to access to debt issues. Foreign investors generally have access to all forms of remunerative activity on terms equal to those enjoyed by Ivoirians. The government encourages foreign investment, including investor participation in state-owned firms that the government is privatizing, although in most cases of privatization the state reserves an equity stake in the new company. There are no general, economy-wide limits on foreign ownership or control, and few sector-specific restrictions. There are no laws specifically directing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control in those firms, and no such practices have been reported. Non-citizens and foreign entities can buy stocks listed on the regional stock exchange located in Abidjan. Banks and insurance companies are subject to licensing requirements, but there are no restrictions designed to limit foreign ownership or to limit establishment of subsidiaries of foreign companies in this sector. Investments in health, law and accounting, and travel agencies are subject to prior approval and require appropriate licenses and association with an Ivoirian partner. The Ivoirian government has, on a case-by-case basis, mandated using local providers, hiring local employees, or arranging for eventual transfer to local control. The government has implemented local content requirement for companies in the oil and gas sectors. Local content includes an obligation to employ local employees and to work with local SMEs. The government does not have an official policy to screen investments; its overall economic and industrial strategy does not discriminate against foreign-owned firms. There are indications in some instances of preferential treatment for firms from countries with longstanding commercial ties to CDI. In some sectors, such as cocoa and cashew processing, the government gives preferential treatment to Ivoirian companies. For instance, 20 percent of the national cocoa production is exclusively granted to local cocoa exporting companies. Côte d’Ivoire has not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) through the OECD. The WTO last conducted a Trade Policy Review in October 2017, which can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp462_e.htm. UNCTAD published an Investment Policy Review for Côte d’Ivoire in February 2020, which can be found at https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-cote-divoire. The Government of CDI provides information about sector policies and business opportunities in publicly available reports. More information can be found at: https://www.cepici.gouv.ci/. The National Development Plan 2021-2025 outlines the key sectors and priorities of the government regarding investment. The CEPICI manages CDI’s online information portal containing all documents dedicated to business creation and registration (https://cotedivoire.eregulations.org/). All the necessary documentation for registration is available online, however actual registration must be done in person. Further information on business registration is also available on CEPICI’s website (http://www.cepici.gouv.ci/). Businesses can register at the CEPICI’s One-Stop Shop (Guichet Unique) in Abidjan. The One-Stop Shop allows businesses to register with the commercial registrar (Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Immobilier), the tax authority (Direction Générale d’Impôts) and the social security institute (Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale). The One-Stop Shop also publishes the legal notice of incorporation on CEPICI’s website. All necessary documents for registration are also available on the website. Registration takes between one and three days, while preparation of necessary documents can take more time. The business licensing process, controlled by sector-specific governing bodies, is separate from the registration process. Women have equal access to the registration process. There have not been any reports of discrimination in that regard. International financial institutions are recommending that government authorities better and more transparently address concerns from the private sector in the following general areas: 1) enhancing the regulatory framework, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and improving the provision of public sector services, for example by simplifying and harmonizing the process for issuing business licenses and approvals; 2) promoting digitalization, both in the provision of public services and in public finance management; 3) reducing labor market rigidities by broadening professional training programs; 4) safeguarding property rights, particularly with respect to ownership and transfer of land; 5) deepening financial inclusion and facilitating access to financial markets, also via mobile systems and digital platforms; and 6) reducing uncertainty in the timing of government payments. Government authorities are stepping up efforts to strengthen macroeconomic statistics. The National Strategy for the development of statistics aims to broaden the competencies of the National Institute of Statistics, reinforce its independence, and create a national fund for the development of statistics. Côte d’Ivoire does not promote or incentivize outward investment. However, the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The government aims for transparency in law and policy to foster competition and provide clear rules of the game and a level playing field for domestic and foreign investors. However, at the operational level, lack of regulatory transparency is a concern. Publication of draft legislation and regulations is not required. Foreign and Ivoirian companies complain that new regulations are issued with little warning and without a period for public comment. For instance, new duties and taxes on products are generally reported in the fiscal annexes towards the end of the year and take immediate effect at the beginning of the next year. The Ministry of Commerce supports introducing a period for public comment on new regulations and changes in regulation before they are implemented, and government often holds ad hoc public seminars and workshops to discuss proposed plans with trade and industry associations. Further work in this area would boost investor confidence. Regulatory actions, once adopted, are published on the government website at enforcement stage. They are also published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d’Ivoire) , which is available for purchase at newsstands and by subscription on the Journal’s website http://www.sgg.gouv.ci/jo.php and at https://abidjan.net/. The National Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement (ANRMP – Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics) polices transparency in public procurement and private sector compliance with public procurement rules. Consumers, trade associations, private companies, and individuals have the right to file complaints with ANRMP to hold the government to its own administrative processes. Since 2019, public tenders’ audits have not been published on the ANRMP official website. Regulatory bodies regularly publish and promote access to their data for the business community and development partners, allowing for scientific and data-driven reviews and assessments. Quantitative analysis and public comments are made available. Regulatory authority and decision-making exist only at the national level. Sub-national jurisdictions do not regulate business. For most industries or sectors, regulations are developed through the ministry responsible for that sector. In the telecommunications, electricity, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and cashew sectors, the government has established control boards or independent agencies to regulate the sector and pricing. Companies have complained that rules for buying prices determined by the agriculture commodity regulatory agencies tend to be opaque and local prices are set arbitrarily without reference to world prices. Côte d’Ivoire’s agency regulating cocoa and coffee (CCC – Conseil Café et Cacao) has identified the need for a single mechanism to control traceability to prevent child labor and deforestation. The private sector and non-governmental stakeholders agree on the need for increased accountability and traceability, but generally prefer a multi-prong approach which incorporates the work already being done in this area outside of government. Growing international awareness of child labor and environmental challenges in CDI, and the possibility that this could impact exports, are catalysts for action. The government publishes tender notices in the local press and sometimes in international magazines and newspapers. On occasion, there is a charge for the bidding documents. Côte d’Ivoire has a generally decentralized government procurement system, with most ministries undertaking their own procurements. The National Bureau of Technical and Development Studies, the government’s technical and investment planning agency and think tank, occasionally serves as an executing agency in major projects to be financed by international institutions. The Public Procurement Department is a centralized office of public tenders in the Ministry of Finance tasked with ensuring compliance with international bidding practices. Côte d’Ivoire’s update to its public procurement code in 2019 introduced electronic procurement bidding, provisions for sustainable public procurement, and promotion of socially responsible vendors as a bidding qualification. While the public procurement process is open by law, in practice it is often opaque and government contracts are occasionally awarded outside of public tenders. During negotiations on a tender, the Ivorian Government at times imposes local content requirements on foreign companies. There are specific regulations governing the government’s use of sole source procurements and the government has awarded sole source bids without tenders, citing the high technical capacity of a firm or a declared emergency. Many firms continue to cite corruption as an obstacle to a transparent understanding of procurement decisions. The National Authority for Regulation of Public Procurement (ANRMP) regulates public procurement with a view to improving governance and transparency. It has the authority to audit and sanction private-sector entities that do not comply with public-procurement regulations, and to provide recommendations to ministries to address irregularities. Côte d’Ivoire’s accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are consistent with international norms, though both foreign and Ivoirian businesses often complain about the government’s poor communication. Côte d’Ivoire is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law (OHADA), which is common to 16 countries and adheres to the WAEMU accounting system. In accounting, companies use the WAEMU system, which complies with international norms and is a source of economic and financial data. Banking regulation follows the Central Bank (BCEAO) monetary policy covering the eight countries of WAEMU. Ivoirian authorities have limited power to conduct monetary policy. The Central Bank regulates interest rates to control the money supply. IMF assessments confirm CDI’s creditworthiness, with strong financial oversight. The Ivoirian government promotes transparency of public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) with the publication of this information through the following websites: http://budget.gouv.ci https://www.tresor.gouv.ci/tres/fr_FR/rapport-de-la-dette-publique/ The Ivoirian government incorporates WAEMU directives into its public procurement bidding policy, processes, and auditing. This includes separating auditing and regulatory functions and increasing advance payment for the initial procurement of goods and services from 25 to 30 percent. Côte d’Ivoire is part of the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), whose mandate is to protect economies, reinforce cooperation among member states, harmonize measures, and evaluate current strategies against money laundering and terrorism financing. The government hopes to adopt the draft national strategy to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in 2022. Once adopted, this strategy will put in place regulations and institutions that protect the Ivoirian financial system against money laundering and the financing of terrorism . CDI’s National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF – Cellule nationale de Traitement des Informations financières) analyzes, processes, exploits, and circulates information from atypical financial transactions transmitted by professions subject to the law, in the form of “suspicious transaction reports.” Ivoirian laws, codes, professional-association standards, and regional-body membership obligations are incorporated in the country’s regulatory system. The private sector often follows European norms to take advantage of the Ivoirian trade agreement with the EU – CDI’slargest market. Côte d’Ivoire has been a WTO member since 1995 but has not notified all the draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Côte d’Ivoire signed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in December 2013 and ratified it in December 2015. The National TFA Committee (NTFC) coordinates TFA implementation. Consistent with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Côte d’Ivoire applies a Common External Tariff (CET) on goods importations. The Ivoirian legal system is based on the French civil-law model. The law guarantees to all the right to own and transfer private property. Rural land, however, is governed by a separate set of laws, which makes ownership and transfer very difficult. The court system enforces contracts. The Commercial Court of Abidjan adjudicates corporate law cases and contract disputes. Mediation is also available through the Ivoirian legal framework in addition to the Commercial Court and the Arbitration Tribunal. The Commercial Court of Abidjan retains jurisdiction for the entire country. The Ivoirian judicial system is ostensibly independent, but magistrates are sometimes subject to political or financial influence. Judges sometimes fail to prove that their decisions are based on the legal or contractual merits of a case and often rule against foreign investors in favor of entrenched interests. A frequent complaint from investors is the slow dispute-resolution process. Cases are often postponed or appealed without a reasonable explanation, moving from court to court for years or even decades. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated through the national court system. The 2018 Investment Code is the primary governing authority for investment conduct. The Code does not restrict foreign investment or the repatriation of funds. The Code offers a mixture of fiscal incentives, combining tax exoneration, patents and licenses contribution and tax credits to encourage investment. The government also offers incentives to promote small businesses and entrepreneurs, low-cost housing construction, factories, and infrastructure development, which the government considers key to the country’s economic development. Concessionary agreements that exempt investors from tax payments require the additional approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The clearance procedure for planned investments, if the investor seeks tax breaks, is time consuming and confusing. Even when companies have complied fully with the requirements, the Tax Office sometimes denies tax exemptions with little explanation, giving rise to accusations of favoritism. Some sectors have additional laws that govern investment activity in those sectors. In mining, for example, the Mining Code allows for a ten-year holding period for permits with an option to extend for an two additional years on a limited permit area of 400 square kilometers. The government drafted not yet passed in the National Assembly that would impose local-content requirements in the oil and gas sector such as the requirement that companies hire locals, finance personnel training, and support local SMEs. The government is actively seeking to increase the share of local processing of raw agricultural commodities for export from 10 percent to 50 percent by 2025 and is looking for private investments to help reach this goal. Côte d’Ivoire was once a net energy exporter and it is making investments to retake that position as the sub-region’s energy hub. According to 2020 data, the country produces 38,000 barrels-per-day (bpd) of oil from four blocks and 213 million cubic-feet-per-day of gas. The country has divided its offshore Exclusive Economic Zone into 51 hydrocarbons blocks, of which 18 blocks remain available for bid. Currently, the production of gas is entirely used for electricity production. The government seeks to attract more foreign companies to invest in the oil and gas sector. In 2021, the large Italian oil company ENI discovered oil and gas at an offshore well site called “Baleine.” The CEPICI provides a one-stop shop website to assist investors. More information on Côte d’Ivoire’s laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements can be found at: www.apex-ci.org/ www.cepici.gouv.ci/ The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Small Business Promotion, through the Commission on Anti-Competition Practices, is responsible for reviewing competition–related concerns under the 1991 competition law, which was updated in 2013. ANRMP is responsible for reviewing the awarding of contracts. No significant competition cases were reported over the past year. The Ivoirian constitution guarantees the right to own property and freedom from expropriation without compensation. The government may expropriate property with due compensation (fair market value) at the time of expropriation in the case of “public interest.” Perceived corruption and weak judicial and security capacity, however, have resulted in poor enforcement of private property rights, particularly when the entity in question is foreign and the plaintiff is Ivoirian or a long-established foreign resident. Côte d’Ivoire is ranked 85 out of 190 countries for ease of resolving insolvency, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. As a member of OHADA, CDI has both commercial and bankruptcy laws that address the liquidation of business liabilities. OHADA is a regional system of uniform laws on bankruptcy, debt collection, and rules governing business transactions. OHADA permits three different types of bankruptcy liquidation: an ordered suspension of payment to permit a negotiated settlement; an ordered suspension of payment to permit restructuring of the company, like Chapter 11; and the complete liquidation of assets, similar to Chapter 7. Creditors’ rights, irrespective of nationality, are protected equally by the Act. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. Court-ordered monetary settlements resulting from declarations of bankruptcy are usually paid out in local currency. The joint venture Credit Info – Volo West Africa manages regional credit bureaus in WAEMU. 4. Industrial Policies The 2018 Investment Code offers a mixture of fiscal incentives, combining tax exoneration and tax credits focusing on agriculture, agri-business, tourism, health, and education. These may include a full exoneration of customs duties or suspended VAT, and tax exemptions to business operations in some remote areas, with incentives based on the type of investment, phase of operation, local content, and participation. There are also incentives to promote small businesses and entrepreneurship, low-cost housing construction, factories, and infrastructure development, which the government considers key to the country’s broad-scale economic development. The Investment Code, the Petroleum Code and the Mining Code delineate incentives available to new investors in Côte d’Ivoire. Bloomfield Investment stated that, in 2021, the Ivoirian government implemented subsidies and incentives to enhance the performance of the rubber industry. The government provided fiscal incentives for investments regarding rubber transformation. Following the peak of the COVID-pandemic, the government subsidized the construction sector by easing access to bank loans, reducing taxes on cement, capping cement prices, reducing the time needed to register land, and encouraging foreign investors to take up social housing projects by providing loan guarantees. Though not a common practice, the government occasionally guarantees loans or jointly finances foreign direct investment projects. Created in 2008, the Ivoirian free trade zone (FTZ) for information technology and biotechnology (VITIB) is in the town of Grand Bassam in the greater Abidjan area. In 2014, VITIB established the Mahatma Gandhi Technology Park at Grand Bassam. Bonded warehouses exist, and bonded zones within factories are allowed. High port costs and maritime freight rates have inhibited the development of in-bond manufacturing or processing, and there are consequently no general foreign trade zones. A FTZ exists at the Port of Abidjan specifically for fish processing. In force since December 2005, this FTZ is reserved for companies that earn at least 90% of their turnover from exports. Eligible companies are exempt from all duties and taxes, including on imported and exported goods and services. They also enjoy preferential rates for water, electricity, telephone, and fuel supplied by public or semi-public establishments. A fee applies to FTZ companies, the amount of which is fixed by decree. Côte d’Ivoire’s ports (the Autonomous Port of Abidjan and the Autonomous Port of San-Pedro) follow the ISPS security code (International Ship and Port Facility Security Code). In November 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard assessed Ivorian ports to be a trusted maritime security partner, having achieved overall progress and maturity in port operations. The government strongly encourages investors and firms to hire Ivoirian employees via incentives outlined in the Investment Code, but this is not a requirement. In March 2021, the government implemented the law on local content in the oil and gas sector. This law gives preference to Ivoirian companies and Ivoirian employees. The country aims to build “National Champions” in the oil and gas sector, while transferring knowledge and technical know-how to local employees. It also provides incentives and access to financial services and local insurance. The 2018 Investment Code guarantees the freedom to designate senior management and board members. Citizens of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries can legally work in Côte d’Ivoire without additional permissions and do not need a residency permit. For other nationalities, visas and permits for work and residency are required. The investment promotion agency CEPICI facilitates the visa and permit process. The process is not onerous and does not inhibit the ability of foreign investors and their employees to enter and exit the country. There are no government-imposed trade restrictions on investment, including tariff and non-tariff barriers. However, all imports are subject to the External Common Tariff for all ECOWAS countries. The government does occasionally place conditions on location, local content, equity ownership, import substitution, export requirements, host country employment, and technology. For example, the Ivoirian government required that one U.S. fast food franchise use locally sourced key ingredients, which it can do. The government also makes use of tax exemptions and customs exonerations to incentivize companies to do more value-added processing in CDI. There are no performance requirements for investments. Cellular telephone companies must meet technology performance requirements to maintain their licenses. The U.S. government does not know of any requirements that CDI imposes on foreign information technology firms to give the government source code or provide access to encryption. Sometimes, the government advocates for fair competition between companies. ART-CI is responsible for the oversight of local data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Ivoirian civil code provides for the enforcement of private property rights, and the government has undertaken reform efforts to secure property rights. The cost of capital is high, and mortgages are costly, which inhibits investment. Secured interests in property are enforced by the Land Registry Office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, Côte d’Ivoire is ranked 112 out of 190 countries for ease of registering property. Land tenure is a complicated and sensitive issue. Land tenure disputes exist all over the country owing to multiple forms of traditional collective tenure and the lack of formal private land ownership in most areas. Companies wishing to purchase land must have the property surveyed before obtaining title and obtaining construction authorization. Surveying is tightly controlled by a small group of companies and can often cost more than the value of the parcel of land. This has led to corrupt back-channel authorizations, which, together with improper inspections, has resulted in shoddy construction and building collapses. In 2021, the government began streamlining and regularizing this process to accelerate construction authorizations and ensure quality construction. The Ministry of Construction has established a department to help individuals obtain land title and resolve disputes. Freehold land tenure in rural areas remains difficult to negotiate, however, and can inhibit foreign investment. Most businesses, including agribusinesses and forestry companies, circumvent the complicated land purchase process by acquiring long-term leases instead. There are regulations designed to control land speculation in urban areas, but they do not prevent foreigners from owning land. Foreign and/or nonresident investors who wish to lease land must obtain a permit for the development of the site, as well as a prefectural or sub-prefectural order recognizing occupation of the site. The Audace Institute, an independent Ivoirian think tank, estimates that 96 percent of land does not have a clear title. The World Bank estimates that only 30 percent of property owners have clear title. There have been several attempts by the government to require rural landowners register their lands, the most recent set a deadline of 2023 with a consequence that unregistered lands will be transferred to government ownership. However, land registration is onerous and many owners are unable to afford the complex process. As with other aspects of Ivoirian law, follow-up and enforcement is uneven. The Ivoirian Civil Code includes measures to protect intellectual property rights (IPR), but the government has limited capacity to enforce them. Inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights remains a serious problem. The government’s Office of Intellectual Property (OIPI – Office ivoirien de la propriété intellectuelle) is charged with ensuring the protection of patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and commercial names. Patents are valid for 10 years, with the possibility of two extensions of five years each. Trademarks are valid for 10 years and are renewable indefinitely. Copyrights are valid for the life of the author plus an additional 70 years. The Ivoirian Copyright Office (BURIDA- Bureau ivoirien du droit d’auteur) has a labeling system in place to prevent counterfeiting and to protect audio, video, literary, and artistic property rights in music and computer programs. A new cell charged with IPR and combating counterfeiting was inaugurated in November 2021. This cell gathers large and small enterprises around counterfeiting practices and best methods to fight them. While Ivoirian IPR law is in conformity with standards established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the country lacks adequate customs inspections at its porous borders, limiting the law’s impact. The government has not adopted any IPR-related laws or regulations in 2021. In 2020, the Ministry of Culture, Art, and Entertainment Business established committees that study and make recommendations for the reform and restructuring of BURIDA. The National Committee to Combat Counterfeiting (CNLC – Comité national de la lutte contre la contrefaçon) coordinates national efforts against counterfeit and pirated goods. By law, the government must protect intellectual property on both exported and imported goods. Customs has the power to seize imported products that violate IPR laws even if installed with other equipment, including equipment detained, marketed, or illegally supplied. Such seizures, generally of counterfeit consumer goods (increasingly medicines), are routinely publicized on government websites and media outlets, although statistics on seizures are unavailable. IPR violations are prosecuted, and penalties vary from imprisonment of three months to two years and fines from 100,000 to 5,000,000 CFA (approx. $166 to $8,333 based on an average exchange rate of 600 CFA to one dollar). Côte d’Ivoire is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Government policies generally encourage foreign portfolio investment. The Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM) is in Abidjan and the BRVM lists companies from the eight countries of the WAEMU. The existing regulatory system effectively facilitates portfolio investment through the West African Central Bank (BCEAO). The Regional Council for Savings Investments (CREPMF) sets the rules and regulations regarding the market participants and market structure. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. However, the market follows a limit-order mechanism. Besides traditional foreign trade risk management tools offered by commercial banks (i.e., export credits, trade bills), the stock exchange does not provide markets for forwards, futures, or options derivative instruments. Market volatility is low. The market benchmark BRVM Composite rose to 6.63 percent in 2021. Government policies allow the free flow of financial resources into investing in financial assets. The BCEAO respects IMF Article VIII on payment and transfers for current international transactions. Credit allocation is based on market terms and has increased to support the private sector and economic growth, specifically for large businesses. The Central Bank monitors inflation, money supply, and business cycles to ensure efficient monetary policy. The average interbank interest rate was 2.61 percent compared to 3.01 percent in 2021, demonstrating the will of WAEMU nations to boost commercial banks’ liquidity and support private sector investment. Foreign investors can acquire credit on the local market. This year the government facilitated access to capital, lowering borrowing interest rates for real estate companies. As of December 2021, there were 29 commercial banks and two credit institutions in Côte d’Ivoire. Banks are expanding their national networks, especially in the secondary cities outside Abidjan, as domestic investment has increased up-country. The total number of bank branches has more than doubled from 324 in 2010 to 725 branches in 2019 (latest data available). According to the World Bank, in 2017 (latest data available) 41 percent of the population over the age of 15 have a bank account. Alternative financial services available include mobile money and microfinance for bill payments and transfers. Many Ivoirians prefer mobile money over banking, but mobile money does not yet offer the same breadth of financial services as banks. Most Ivoirian banks are compliant with the BCEAO’s minimum capital requirements. The government facilitated mortgages for foreign investors in housing in Côte d’Ivoire. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Côte d’Ivoire; at least one has been in Côte d’Ivoire for decades. They are subject to the WAEMU Banking Commission’s prudential measures and regulations. There have been no reports of Côte d’Ivoire losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. No correspondent banking relationships are known to be in jeopardy. Côte d’Ivoire does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Rothschild Bank was reported in the press to have been awarded the contract to create one. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Companies owned or controlled by the state are subject to national laws and the tax code. The Ivoirian government still holds substantial interests in many firms, including the refinery SIR (49 percent), the public transport firm (60 percent), the national television station RTI (98 percent), the national lottery (80 percent), the national airline Air Côte d’Ivoire (58 percent), and the land management agency Agence de Gestion Foncière AGEF (35 percent). Total assets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were $796 million and total net income of SOEs was $116 million in 2018 (latest figures). Of the 82 SOEs, 28 are wholly government-owned and 12 are majority government-owned, the government owns a blocking minority in seven and holds minority shares in 35. Each SOE has an independent board. The government has begun the process of divestiture for some SOEs (see next section). There are active SOEs in the banking, agri-business, mining, and telecom industries. The published list of SOEs is available at https://dgpe.gouv.ci/ind ex.php?p=portefeuille_etat SOEs competing in the domestic market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. They are subject to the same tax burdens and policies as private companies. Côte d’Ivoire does not adhere to OECD guidelines for SOE corporate governance (it is not a member of OECD). In 2021, audits of several SOEs highlighted serious irregularities (alleged embezzlement estimated at several tens or even hundreds of billions of FCFA, i.e. up to hundreds of millions of dollars. The SOEs include FER, FDFP, ARTCI, and ANSUT, whose leaders have been removed and replaced. The government has been pursuing SOE privatization for decades the most recent of which was in 2018. That year, the government sold 51 percent of the Housing Bank of Côte d’Ivoire (BHCI – Banque d’Habitat de Côte d’Ivoire). See previous Investment Climate Statements for past privatization efforts. Contracts for participation in SOE privatization are competed through a French-language public tendering process, for which foreign investors are encouraged to submit bids. The Privatization Committee, which reports to the Prime Minister, maintains a website. The 2019 (latest) report is available at: http://privatisation.gouv.ci. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector, the government, NGOs, and local communities are becoming progressively aware of the importance of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) regarding environmental, social, and governance issues in CDI. Investors seeking to implement projects in energy, infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, waste management, and extractive industries are required by decree to provide an environmental impact study prior to approval. Under the new development plan and sustainable finance regime, government has laid down specific criteria to review, select, fund, and monitor private investment with the goal of channeling funds into priority sectors. Foreign businesses, particularly in mining, energy, and agriculture, often provide social infrastructure, including schools and health care clinics, to communities close to their sites of operation. Companies are not required under Ivoirian law to disclose information relating to RBC, although many companies, especially in the cocoa sector, publicize their work. Cocoa companies publicize efforts to improve sustainability and combat the worst forms of child labor. As a part of public-procurement reform, the Ministry of Budget plans to include social needs in public-procurement contracts to support job creation, fair trade, decent working conditions, social inclusion, and compliance with social standards. On the environment, suggested reforms include the selection of goods and services that have a smaller impact on the environment. There are reports of children subjected to forced labor in agricultural work, particularly on cocoa farms. In February 2021, several individuals from Mali sued major international chocolate companies, claiming that the cocoa they bought came from farms in Côte d’Ivoire where the plaintiffs were subjected to abuse. The government, through the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection, sets workplace health and safety standards and is responsible for enforcing labor laws. The OHADA outlines corporate governance standards that protect shareholders. There are government-funded agencies in charge of monitoring business conduct. Human rights, environmental protection, and other NGOs report misconduct and violations of good governance practices. Côte d’Ivoire participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and discloses revenues and payments in the oil, gas, and mineral sectors. More information can be found at: www.cnitie.ci/. Côte d’Ivoire is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Some private security companies operating in the country are participants of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA). This year, government took active measures against State Owned Enterprises not paying their local contractors, generally SMEs. After the FER general manager was removed, the acting manager made immediate payments to concerned SMEs. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In 2000, Conservation International designated the tropical Guinean forests of West Africa, an area which includes CDI’s forests, as one of 36 biodiversity hotspots – the most biologically rich, yet threatened terrestrial regions on Earth. Half a century ago, tropical forest covered 16 million hectares in CDI. Today, less than 2.9 million hectares of forest remain, mainly the result of land conversion for agricultural crops (primarily cocoa) and logging. The government accords priority to investment that enhances environmental sustainability. It has developed policies to combat forest degradation, namely the National Policy on Forest Preservation, Rehabilitation, and Expansion in 2018 and the new Forest Code in 2019. These create an economically viable route to promote reforesting. Further progress will require the government to define carbon rights in the Ivoirian legal code and address crucial legal issues such as time limits for the land certificate registration process, guidelines for lumber sales by legitimate owners, and how to relocate people who have settled illegally in the protected forests. In 2021, the European Commission proposed to the European Parliament new legislation that would prohibit products that contributed to deforestation in their countries of origin from entering the EU market. The proposed legislation would prohibit products associated with forested areas from entering the EU market unless they are certified “zero deforestation,” are in line with country-specific legislation, and meet additional due-diligence requirements laid out in the draft legislation. According to the Ivoirian government’s analysis, CDI’s most affected products (cocoa, coffee, wood, palm oil) total about 76 percent of the value of Ivoirian exports to the EU. Côte d’Ivoire is a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) Paris Agreement and has submitted its revised nationally determined contributions (NDCs), committing to action both on adaptation to climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (30 percent by 2030). Côte d’Ivoire is also involved in a multi-country effort coordinated by the World Bank to develop a national climate-smart agricultural investment plan (CSAIP). The national plan prioritizes a set of 12 investments and actions needed to boost crop resilience and enhance yields. 9. Corruption Many companies cite corruption as the most significant obstacle to investment. Corruption in many forms is deeply ingrained in public- and private-sector practices and remains a serious impediment to investment and economic growth in CDI. It has the greatest impact on judicial proceedings, contract awards, customs, and tax issues. Lack of transparency and the government’s failure to follow its own tendering procedures in the awarding of contracts lead businesses to conclude bribery was involved. Businesses have reported encountering corruption at every level of the civil service, with some judges appearing to base their decisions on bribes. Clearance of goods at the ports often requires substantial “commissions.” The demand for bribes can mean that containers stay at the Port of Abidjan for months, incurring substantial demurrage charges, despite companies having the proper paperwork. In 2013, the Ivoirian government issued Executive Order number 2013-660 related to preventing and combatting corruption. The High Authority for Good Governance serves as the government’s anti-corruption authority. Its mandate includes raising awareness about corruption, investigating corruption in the public and private sectors, and collecting mandated asset disclosures from certain public officials (e.g., the president, ministers, and mayors) upon entering and leaving office. The High Authority for Good Governance, however, does not have a mandate to prosecute; it must refer cases to the Attorney General who decides whether to take up those cases. The country’s financial intelligence office, CENTIF, has broad authority to investigate suspicious financial transactions, including those of government officials. Despite the establishment of these bodies and credible allegations of widespread corruption, there have been few charges filed, and few prosecutions and judgments against prominent people for corruption. The domestic business community generally assesses that these watchdog agencies lack the power and/or will to combat corruption effectively. In April 2021, the government formally added Good Governance and Anti-Corruption to the title and portfolio of the Ministry of Capacity Building. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, but the country is not a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (which is open to non-OECD members). In 2016, Côte d’Ivoire joined the Partnership on Illicit Finance, which obliges it to develop an action plan to combat corruption. Under the Ivoirian Penal Code, a bribe by a local company to a foreign official is a criminal act. Some private companies use compliance programs or measures to prevent bribery of government officials. U.S. firms underscore to their Ivoirian counterparts that they are subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties. The country’s Code of Public Procurement No. 259 and the associated WAEMU directives cover conflicts-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. There are no special protections for NGOs involved in investigating corruption. Whistleblower protections are also weak. Resources to Report Corruption Inspector General of Finance (Brigade de Lutte Contre la Corruption) Mr. Lassina Sylla Inspector General TELEPHONE: +225 20212000/2252 9797 FAX: +225 20211082/2252 9798 HOTLINE: +225 8000 0380 http://www.igf.finances.gouv.ci/ info@igf.finances.gouv.ci High Authority for Good Governance (Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance) Mr. N’Golo Coulibaly President TELEPHONE: +225 272 2479 5000 FAX: +225 2247 8261 https://habg.ci/ Email: info@habg.ci Police Anti-Racketeering Unit (Unité de Lutte Contre le Racket –ULCR) Mr. Alain Oura Unit Commander TELEPHONE: +225 272 244 9256 info@ulcr.ci Social Justice (Initiative pour la Justice Sociale, la Transparence et la Bonne Gouvernance en Côte d’Ivoire) Ananeraie face pharmacie Mamie Adjoua Abidjan TELEPHONE: +225 272 177 6373 socialjustice.ci@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Following peaceful and inclusive legislative elections in March 2021, CDI entered a period of stability. Major opposition parties participated and won a meaningful number of seats in elections internationally deemed credible. The political leadership clearly recognizes that internal and regional security are prerequisites for sustained economic growth and longer-term stability. All political parties participated in a structured Political Dialogue aimed at fostering reconciliation and strengthening democratic institutions, including dispute resolution mechanisms. The fifth round of the Political Dialogue concluded in March 2022 and produced a consensus list of tangible recommendations to the President of the Republic. The next presidential election is not due until 2025, so there is now a window of opportunity for the country’s political leaders to focus on difficult reforms. The Ivoirian government has demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing insecurity in the region by strengthening its capacity to counter terrorism, strengthen social resilience, professionalize law enforcement, strengthen its justice system, and improve border security. In June 2021, CDI and France inaugurated the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) near Jacqueville, west of Abidjan. The aim of this academy is to train relevant cadres (e.g., prosecutors, forensic investigators) and security forces from the African continent to strengthen capacity to prevail against self-styled jihadists within respect for law and human rights, thereby reinforcing ties between the population and the state. This comes at a time of increased security challenges emanating from the Sahel and spilling over into CDI’s northern region. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The official unemployment rate is 3.5 percent, 5.5 percent in the 15-24 age group; however, unemployment is difficult to measure in the informal sector, which is estimated to account for as much as 80 percent of the Ivoirian economy. Of the non-agricultural workforce, 47 percent is employed in the informal economy. Official statistics fail to fully account for the large informal economy throughout the country, and do not accurately portray the general dearth of well-paying employment opportunities. Despite the government’s efforts, child labor remained a widespread problem in rural and urban areas, notably on cocoa and coffee plantations, as well as in artisanal gold mining areas and in domestic work. There are significant shortages of skilled labor in fields requiring higher education, including information technology, engineering, finance, management, health, and science. The Ivoirian government is working with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to build and develop four technical and vocational training centers as part of a six-year Compact valued at some $536 million that will end in August 2025. The Compact comprises two projects: road transportation and education. Labor laws favor the employment of Ivoirians in private enterprises. Any vacant position must be advertised for two months. If after two months no qualified Ivoirian is found, the employer may recruit a foreigner provided it plans to recruit an Ivoirian to fill the position within the next two years. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment in response to fluctuating market conditions. Employees terminated for reasons other than theft or flagrant neglect of duty have the right to termination benefits. Unemployment insurance and other social-safety programs exist for employees laid off for economic reasons. For the roughly 60-80% percent of workers employed in the informal sector, unemployment insurance is not an option. However, there are other social-safety-net programs that apply to informal economy workers, including monthly stipends and waiving of universal health care fees. Labor laws are not waived to attract or retain investment. Collective bargaining agreements are in effect in many major business enterprises and sectors of the civil service. A prolonged teachers’ strike in 2019 was submitted for arbitration but due to the fractured nature of the teachers’ unions, not all parties agreed to the decision. Labor disputes are submitted to the labor inspector for amicable settlement before engaging in any legal proceedings. If this attempt to settle the dispute fails, then the labor court can be engaged to resolve the dispute. No strike has posed an investment risk during the last year. There are no gaps between Ivoirian and international labor standards in law or practice that pose a reputational risk to investors. The government did not adopt any new labor-related laws or regulations in 2021. In 2017, the government passed a law forbidding most forms of child labor for children under 12 and restricting it for minors aged 13 to 17. The law’s passage put Ivoirian law on par with ILO standards for child labor. The government established the National Surveillance Council (Conseil National de Surveillance, or CNS) and the Interministerial Committee (CIM – Conseil Interministériel). These agencies deal with child labor issues, especially in the cocoa sector. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $61,349 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -$1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 2.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/ Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $11,997 Total Outward $2,520 France $2,532 21.1% Burkina Faso $426 16.9% Canada $1,217 10.1% Mali $246 9.8% United Kingdom $986 8.2% Liberia $227 9% Morocco $801 6.7% Ghana $180 7.1% Mauritius $664 5.5% Benin $177 7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Abidjan Political/Economic Section Cocody Riviera Golf BP 730 Abidjan Cidex 03 Republic of Côte d’Ivoire Phone: (+225) 27-22-49-40-00 Croatia Executive Summary Croatia’s EU membership has enhanced its economic stability and provided new opportunities for trade and investment. Characteristics that make Croatia an attractive destination for foreign investment include a geostrategic location with diverse topography and temperate climate, well-developed infrastructure, and a well-educated multilingual workforce. The Croatian government settled a longstanding investment dispute with a U.S. investor in December 2021. Historically, the most promising sectors for investment in Croatia have been tourism, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and banking. Investment opportunities are growing in Croatia’s robust IT sector, and the coming years will offer new opportunities related to the energy transition. Croatia also offers visas for so-called “digital nomads” to work in Croatia for up to one year without having to pay local taxes. Despite the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy experienced a robust rebound of 10.4 percent growth in 2021. Tourism in 2021 exceeded all expectations, and the sector, which accounts for as much as 20 percent of GDP, achieved 88 percent of record-breaking 2019 revenues. Throughout the pandemic, the government distributed more than $1.5 billion in job-retention and economic stabilization measures that significantly helped maintain employment. Unemployment in January 2022 was at 7.8 percent. In early 2022, the government announced nearly $800 million worth of measures to help citizens and businesses cope with rising energy costs. The European Commission estimates the Croatian economy will grow 4.8 percent in 2022 and 3.0 percent in 2023. Croatia will receive more than $30 billion in EU funding through 2030, including approximately $7 billion through the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which has the potential to provide a significant boost to the economy if the government directs the funds to productive activities that stimulate job creation and economic growth. The government intends to spend approximately 40 percent of RRF funds in support of climate-related and clean energy objectives, including initiatives to improve energy efficiency in public and private buildings, accelerate development of renewable sources of energy, modernize the electricity distribution and transmission grid to facilitate the integration of renewable energy sources, and promote greater investments in geothermal energy. Croatia joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020, and the government expects to enter the eurozone on January 1, 2023. Croatia also received an invitation from the OECD in early 2022 to begin the accession process. The Croatian government has taken some positive steps to improve the business climate, but it has been slow to reform the judiciary, which is most often mentioned as one of the greatest barriers to investment. In addition, the economy is burdened by a large government bureaucracy, underperforming state-owned enterprises, and low regulatory transparency. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digitalization efforts, which has helped decrease excessive bureaucratic procedures for both citizens and companies. Government reforms also seek to liberalize the services market, diversify capital markets and improve access to alternative financing, and reform tax incentives for research and development. Croatia’s labor laws provide strong protections to workers and there are no risks to doing business responsibly in terms of labor laws and human rights. The government is willing to meet at senior levels with interested investors and to assist in resolving problems. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 63 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/hrv Global Innovation Index 2021 48 of 128 https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021.pdf U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $295 million https://www.hnb.hr/en/statistics/statistical-data/rest-of-the-world/foreign-direct-investments World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $27,185 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.KD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Croatia is generally open to foreign investment and the Croatian government continues to make efforts, through financial incentives, to attract foreign investors. All investors, both foreign and domestic, are guaranteed equal treatment by law, with a handful of exceptions described below. However, bureaucratic and political barriers remain. Investors highlight that an unpredictable regulatory framework, lack of transparency, judicial inefficiencies, lengthy administrative procedures, lack of structural reforms, and unresolved property ownership issues all weigh heavily upon the investment climate. Croatia is partnered with the World Bank through European Commission Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support on the “Croatia Business Environment Reform” project which intends to help Croatia implement various business reforms. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Directorate for Internationalization assists investors, including by offering services such as providing information on investment opportunities, offering support through all phases of business development, organizing tours of investment locations and arranging meetings, and promoting Croatia as an investment destination. For more information, see: http://investcroatia.gov.hr/ . The Strategic Investment Act fast-tracks and streamlines bureaucratic processes for large projects valued at $10.7 million or more on the investor’s behalf. Various business groups, including the American Chamber of Commerce, Foreign Investors’ Council, and the Croatian Employers’ Association, are in dialogue with the government about ways to make doing business easier and to keep investment retention as a priority. Croatian law allows for all entities, both foreign and domestic, to establish and own businesses and to engage in all forms of remunerative activities. Article 49 of the Constitution states all entrepreneurs have equal legal status. However, the Croatian government restricts foreign ownership or control of services for a handful of strategic sectors: inland waterways transport, maritime transport, rail transport, air to ground handling, freight-forwarding, publishing, ski instruction, and primary mandated healthcare. Apart from these, the only regulatory requirements to market access involve occupational licensing requirements (architect, auditor, engineer, lawyer, and veterinarian, etc.), about which detailed information can be found at http://psc.hr/en/sectoral-requirements/ . Business services such as consulting, marketing, creative industries, accounting (bookkeeping), and IT are not licensed. Relevant international comparison of the level of regulatory restrictiveness (including for Croatia and the U.S. which is represented by NY and TX) is available at https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/indicators-of-product-market-regulation/ . Over 90 percent of the banking sector is foreign owned. Croatia does not have a foreign investment screening mechanism, but the government designated the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Internationalization Directorate as the “National Contact Point” for reviewing direct investments and responding to requests for information from EU Member States or the European Commission, per European Union Directive 2019/452. The latest International Monetary Fund Article IV Staff Report from September 2021 includes a broad overview of economic and financial developments and is available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/09/10/Republic-of-Croatia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-465424 The American Chamber of Commerce in Croatia publishes position papers on various topics related to the economy and investment climate, which can be found at: https://www.amcham.hr/en/position-papers-d207 . The European Commission’s Country Report Croatia 2020 assesses the country’s economic situation and outlook: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1584545612721&uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0510 . B. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were no civil society organizations that provided useful reviews of investment policy related concerns. In March 2020, the Voice of Entrepreneurs business association was formed to advocate for economic measures and reforms to stimulate private sector growth. The association has not yet published its policy recommendations. The Croatian government offers two e-government options for on-line business registration, www.hitro.hr and start.gov.hr , both of which provide 24-hour access. Start.gov.hr provides complete business registration for a limited liability company (d.o.o.), simple limited company (j.d.o.o.), or general business, without any need to physically enter a public administration office. The procedure guarantees a short turnaround on requests and provides deadlines by which the company can expect to be registered. The Start.gov.hr procedure eliminates fees for public notaries, proxies, seals and stamps, and reduces court registration fees by 50 percent. Hitro.hr also provides on-line services but maintains offices in 60 Croatian cities and towns for those who want to register their business in person. In 2021, the Global Enterprise Registration website ( www.GER.co ) rated Croatia’s business registration process 7 out of 10, up from 4 out of 10 in 2020. The government pledged to improve conditions for business registration and continues to identify areas for removing burdensome regulations and processes. Croatia’s business facilitation mechanism provides for equitable treatment to all interested in registering a business, regardless of gender or ethnicity. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provides an outline of investment facilitation proposals at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/53/croatia . Croatian foreign direct investment totals approximately $85.84 million in the United States, according to Croatian National Bank figures. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Croatia has no restrictions on domestic investors who wish to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime Croatian legislation, which is harmonized with European Union legislation (acquis communautaire), affords transparent policies and fosters a climate in which all investors are treated equally. Nevertheless, bureaucracy and regulations can be complex and time-consuming, although the government is working to remove unnecessary regulations. There are no informal regulatory processes, and investors should rely solely on government-issued legislation to conduct business. The Croatian Parliament promulgates national legislation, which is implemented at every level of government, although local regulations vary from county to county. Members of Government and Members of Parliament, through working groups or caucuses, are responsible for presenting legislation. Responsible ministries draft and present new legislation to the government for approval. When the Government approves a draft text, it is sent to Parliament for approval. The approved act becomes official on the date defined by Parliament and when it is published in the National Gazette. Citizens maintain the right to initiate a law through their district Member of Parliament. New legislation and changes to existing legislation which have a significant impact on citizens are made available for public commentary at https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/Dashboard . The Law on the Review of the Impact of Regulations defines the procedure for impact assessment, planning of legislative activities, and communication with the public, as well as the entities responsible for implementing the impact assessment procedure. The complete text of all legislation is published both online and in the National Gazette, available at: www.nn.hr . Croatia adheres to international accounting standards and abides by international practices through the Accounting Act, which is applied to all accounting businesses. Publicly listed companies must adhere to these accounting standards by law. The Croatian government does not promote or require companies to disclose ESG standards, but the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) oversees implementation of the EU directive on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial sector. HANFA also publishes information regarding sustainable financing, and in March 2021 published guidelines to encourage companies listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange to start regularly publishing their best practices for sustainability, in order to attract investors interested in sustainable investments. Croatian courts are responsible for ensuring that laws are enforced correctly. If an investor believes that the law or an administrative procedure is not implemented correctly, the investor may initiate a case against the government at the appropriate court. However, judicial remedies are frequently ineffective due to delays or political influence. The Enforcement Act defines the procedure for enforcing claims and seizures carried out by the Financial Agency (FINA), the state-owned company responsible for offering various financial services to include securing payment to claimants following a court enforced order. FINA also has the authority to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the person or legal entity that owes the claim. Enforcement proceedings are regulated by the Enforcement Act, last amended in 2017, and by laws regulating its execution, such as the Act on Implementation of the Enforcement over Monetary Assets, amended in 2020. The legislation incorporates European Parliament and European Commission provisions for easily enforcing cross-border financial claims in both business and private instances. Enforcement proceedings are conducted on the basis of enforcement title documents which specify the creditor and debtor, the subject, type, scope, and payment deadline. More information can be found at www.fina.hr . Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and available on the Ministry of Finance website, in Croatian only, at https://mfin.gov.hr/ . Croatia, as an EU member, transposes all EU directives. Domestic legislation is applied nationally and – while local regulations vary from county to county — there is no locally-based legislation that overrides national legislation. Local governments determine zoning for construction and therefore have considerable power in commercial or residential building projects. International accounting, arbitration, financial, and labor norms are incorporated into Croatia’s regulatory system. Croatia has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000. Croatia submits all draft technical regulations to the WTO, in coordination with the European Commission. The legal system in Croatia is civil and provides for ownership of property and enforcement of legal contracts. The Commercial Company Act defines the forms of legal organization for domestic and foreign investors. It covers general commercial partnerships, limited partnerships, joint stock companies, limited liability companies and economic interest groupings. The Obligatory Relations Act serves to enforce commercial contracts and includes the provision of goods and services in commercial agency contracts. The Croatian constitution provides for an independent judiciary. The judicial system consists of courts of general and specialized jurisdictions. Core structures are the Supreme Court, County Courts, Municipal Courts, and Magistrate/Petty Crimes Courts. Specialized courts include the Administrative Court and High and Lower Commercial Courts. The Constitutional Court determines the constitutionality of laws and government actions and protects and enforces constitutional rights. Municipal courts are courts of first instance for civil and juvenile/criminal cases. The High Commercial Court is located in Zagreb and has appellate review of lower commercial court decisions. The Administrative Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of administrative bodies of all levels of government. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and, as such, enjoys jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. It hears appeals from the County Courts, High Commercial Court, and Administrative Court. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. On January 1, 2021 the government established a High Criminal Court, headquartered in Zagreb, with responsibility for adjudication of second instance appeals against decisions made by County Courts in cases that involve criminal acts. The Ministry of Justice and Public Administration continues to pursue a court reorganization plan intended to increase efficiency and reduce the backlog of judicial cases. The World Bank approved a $110 million loan to Croatia for the Justice for Business Project in March 2020, to support ICT infrastructure upgrades, court process improvements, and other reforms to judicial services to improve the business climate. This initiative will last until 2024. The government is undertaking additional reforms, but significant challenges remain in relation to land registration, training court officers, providing adequate resources to meet the court case load, and reducing the length of bankruptcy procedures. Investors often face problems with unusually protracted court procedures, lack of clarity in legal proceedings, contract enforcement, and judicial efficiency. Croatian courts have decreased the number of civil, criminal, and commercial cases and decreased the disposition time for resolution of those cases, however there is still a significant case backlog. The last available European Commission Country Report for Croatia from 2020 assessed that the length of court proceedings continues to be a burden for business. There are no specific laws aimed at foreign investment; both foreign and domestic market participants in Croatia are protected under the same legislation. The Company Act defines the forms of legal organization for domestic and foreign investors. The following entity types are permitted for foreigners: general partnerships; limited partnerships; branch offices; limited liability companies; and joint stock companies. The Obligatory Relations Act regulates commercial contracts. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Internationalization Directorate (https://investcroatia.gov.hr/en/ ) facilitates both foreign and domestic investment. The directorate’s website offers relevant information on business and investment legislation and includes an investment guide. According to Croatian commercial law, significant or “strategic” business decisions must be approved by 75 percent of the company’s shareholders. Minority investors with at least 25 percent ownership plus one share have what is colloquially called a “golden share,” meaning they can block or veto “strategic” decisions requiring a 75 percent vote. The law calls for minimum 75 percent shareholder approval to remove a supervisory board member, authorize a supervisory board member to make a business decision, revoke preferential shares, change company agreements, authorize mergers or liquidations, and to purchase or invest in something on behalf of the company that is worth more than 20 percent of the company’s initial capita (Note: This list is not exhaustive). The Competition Act defines the rules and methods for promoting and protecting competition. In theory, competitive equality is the standard applied with respect to market access, credit and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. In practice, however, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-designated “strategic” firms may still receive preferential treatment. The Croatian Competition Agency is the country’s competition watchdog, determining whether anti-competitive practices exist and punishing infringements. The Agency adheres to international norms and standards. It has determined in the past that some subsidies to SOEs constituted unlawful state aid, however state aid issues are now handled by the Ministry of Finance. Information on authorities of the Agency and past rulings can be found at www.aztn.hr . The website includes a “call to the public” inviting citizens to provide information on competition-related concerns. Croatia’s Law on Expropriation and Compensation gives the government broad authority to expropriate real property in economic and security-related circumstances, including eminent domain. The Law on Strategic Investments also provides for expropriation for projects that meet the criteria for “strategic” projects. However, it includes provisions that guarantee adequate compensation, in either the form of monetary compensation or real estate of equal value to the expropriated property, in the same town or city. The law includes an appeals mechanism to challenge expropriation decisions by means of a complaint to the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration within 15 days of the expropriation order. The law does not describe the Ministry’s adjudication process. Parties not pleased with the outcome of a Ministry decision can pursue administrative action against the decision, but no appeal to the decision is allowed. There is not a history of alleged expropriations since Croatia declared independence in 1991. The government has not taken measures alleged to be indirect expropriation. Article III of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) covers both direct and indirect expropriations. The BIT bars all expropriations or nationalizations except those that are for a public purpose, carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process of law, and subject to prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1998 Croatia ratified the Washington Convention that established the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Croatia is a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Acceptance and Execution of Foreign Arbitration Decisions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Croatian Law on Arbitration addresses both national and international proceedings in Croatia. Parties to arbitration cases are free to appoint arbitrators of any nationality or professional qualifications and Article 12 of the Law on Arbitration requires impartiality and independence of arbitrators. Croatia recognizes binding international arbitration, which may be defined in investment agreements as a means of dispute resolution. Croatia is a signatory to the following international conventions regulating the mutual acceptance and enforcement of foreign arbitration: the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitration Decisions, and the 1961 European Convention on International Business Arbitration. The Arbitration Act covers domestic arbitration, recognition and enforcement of arbitration rulings, and jurisdictional matters. Once an arbitration decision has been reached, the judgment is executed by court order. If no payment is made by the established deadline, the party benefiting from the decision notifies the Commercial Court, which becomes responsible for enforcing compliance. Arbitration rulings have the force of a final judgment, but can be appealed within three months. In regard to implementation of foreign arbitral awards, Article 19 of the Act on Enforcement states that judgments of foreign courts may be executed only if they “fulfill the conditions for recognition and execution as prescribed by an international agreement or the law.” More detailed requirements for executing foreign arbitral awards are set out in Article 40 of the Arbitration Act. The two main requirements that must be met are: 1) Croatian law must allow for the subject matter to be resolved by arbitration, and 2) recognizing and enforcing the foreign decision would not be contrary to Croatian public order. Moreover, an arbitral award will be recognized in Croatia only if it was not contested by one of the parties on any of the legally prescribed grounds and subsequently annulled by a court. If the arbitral award has not yet become binding for the parties, or if it has been annulled by a court of the country in which it was rendered or if its legal effects were delayed, then the Croatian courts will not recognise such an arbitral award. The Act on Enforcement provides for the collection of financial claims and seizures by the Financial Agency (FINA), which is authorised to implement court decisions ordering enforcement. FINA has the authority to instruct a bank to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the debtor. FINA also has the authority to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the person or legal entity that owes the claim. More information can be found at www.fina.hr. Article Ten of the U.S.-Croatia BIT sets forth mechanisms for the resolution of investment disputes, defined as any dispute arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an investment agreement, or an alleged breach of rights conferred, created, or recognized by the BIT with respect to a covered investment. Croatia has no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. There is currently one known case filed by a U.S. investor in Croatian courts in 2016, following an investment dispute with a municipality that began in the early 2000s. The investor has announced plans to file a claim at international arbitration courts, citing the U.S.-Croatia BIT as the basis for the action, if an agreement with the government cannot be reached. The Croatian government settled a second longstanding investment dispute with a U.S. investor in December 2021. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts To reduce the backlog of court cases in the Croatian judiciary, non-disputed cases are passed to public notaries, but before those decisions are final and enforceable, they can be contested, in which case procedures will be continued before the competent court. Both mediation and arbitration services are available through the Croatian Chamber of Economy. The Chamber’s permanent arbitration court has been in operation since 1965. Arbitration is voluntary and conforms to UNCITRAL procedures. The Chamber of Economy’s Mediation Center has been operating since 2002 – see https://www.hok-cba.hr/centar-za-mirenje/. There are no major investment disputes currently underway involving state-owned enterprises, other than a dispute between the Croatian government and a Hungarian energy company over implementation of a purchase agreement with a Croatian oil and gas company. There is no evidence that domestic courts rule in favor of state-owned enterprises. Croatia’s Bankruptcy Act corresponds to the EU regulation on insolvency proceedings and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. All stakeholders in the bankruptcy proceeding, foreign and domestic, are treated equally in terms of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy is not considered a criminal act. The Financial Operations and Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Act helps expedite proceedings and establish timeframes for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. One of the most important provisions of pre-bankruptcy is that it allows a firm that has been unable to pay all its bills to remain open during the proceedings, thereby allowing it to continue operations and generate cash under financial supervision in hopes that it can recover financial health and avoid closure. The Commercial Court of the county in which a bankrupt company is headquartered has exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. A bankruptcy tribunal decides on initiating formal bankruptcy proceedings, appoints a trustee, reviews creditor complaints, approves the settlement for creditors, and decides on the closing of proceedings. A bankruptcy judge supervises the trustee (who represents the debtor) and the operations of the creditors’ committee, which is convened to protect the interests of all creditors, oversee the trustee’s work and report back to creditors. The Act establishes the priority of creditor claims, assigning higher priority to those related to taxes and revenues of state, local and administration budgets. It also allows for a debtor or the trustee to petition to reorganize the firm, an alternative aimed at maximizing asset recovery and providing fair and equitable distribution among all creditors. 4. Industrial Policies The Investment Promotion Act (IPA), amended in 2021, offers incentives to investment projects in manufacturing and processing activities, development and innovation activities, business support activities and high added value services. The incentives are either tax refunds or cash grants. After they are approved for implementation, they are not distributed immediately. Those who receive cash grants are required to provide documentation proving they have fulfilled the criteria under which the request was granted for every year they have received approval for the incentive. Tax refunds are provided to companies on an annual basis, based on information provided in tax returns. Incentive measures can be combined or used individually up to the allowed maximum rate for the investment project. Also as of 2022, applicants for EU funds can apply for a maximum of 70 percent of investment costs for projects in the Pannonian and North Croatia region, 60 percent for areas along the Adriatic coast, and 55 percent for micro and small enterprises in the capital city Zagreb. The IPA provides the following incentive measures: tax refunds for microenterprises; tax advantages for small, medium and large enterprises; cash grants for eligible costs of new jobs linked to the investment project; cash grants for eligible training costs linked to the investment project; additional aid for development and innovation activities, business support and high value-added services; cash grants for capital costs of investment projects; cash grants for labor intensive investment projects; incentives for investments which utilize inactive government-owned property; and incentives to modernize business processes through automation and digitalization of production and manufacturing processes. Historically, the government has given incentives or grants to underrepresented investors such as women and minorities, however there were no such incentives provided in 2021. Under Croatia’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan, the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development plans on creating new incentive programs targeted to minority and women investors. Substantial tax cuts on profits are available depending on the size of the investment and the number of new jobs created. A 50 percent tax reduction applies for up to 10 years for companies that invest up to $1.1 million and create at least five new jobs (three jobs for microenterprises or 10 jobs for companies investing in ICT system and software development centers). This reduction increases to 75 percent for companies investing $1.1-3.26 million and creating at least 10 new jobs, and up to 100 percent for companies that invest over $3.26 million and create at least 15 new jobs. Tax cuts on profits are also available at the same rates as above for investments to modernize the manufacturing industry. These projects must include a minimum fixed asset investment of $545,000, all employees must be retained for the project duration, and the per-employee productivity after three years must increase at least 10 percent compared to the one-year period prior to the project’s start. Cash grants for the creation of new jobs can be from 10 to 30 percent of costs per new position, depending on the unemployment rate in the county where the investment is located and the category of the person employed. Additional incentives are offered for labor-intensive investment projects within the first three years of the project start date, depending on the number of jobs created, and for development and innovation activities in the manufacturing, industrial engineering, ICT, logistics, tourism, and creative industries sectors. There are also programs to reimburse costs for employee education and training connected to an investment project which can cover up to 50 percent of the education and training costs for large companies, up to 60 percent for medium sized companies or if training is given to workers with disabilities, or up to 70 percent for small businesses and microenterprises. Cash grants for the capital costs of investment projects are approved for investments over $5.5 million which generate 50 new positions within 3 years of the start of the investment. The grants cover 10 percent of the cost of new factory construction, production facility construction, or the purchase of new equipment (up to $550,000) in counties where the unemployment rate is from 10-20 percent. This incentive increases to 20 percent of the investment cost (up to $1.1 million) in counties where the unemployment rate is above 20 percent, with the condition that at least 40 percent of the investment is in machines or equipment and at least 50 percent of those machines or equipment are of high-value technology. There are also grants for buying equipment or machinery for research and development activities up to 20 percent of the cost of the equipment, or up to $550,000. There are incentives for investment projects which revitalize inactive state-owned property and provide free land leases for investors investing $3.26 million and creating at least 15 new jobs. Additional information regarding the types of incentives offered by the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development, as well as an investment incentives calculator, can be found at https://investcroatia.gov.hr/en/ . The Act on Strategic Investment Projects, amended in 2018, accelerates administrative procedures for projects deemed to be of strategic interest for Croatia. The minimum amount for an investment to be considered strategic is approximately $11 million. Investments may also be treated as strategic if they are valued at $1.4 million or more and are implemented in underserved areas or on the islands, or are in the agriculture, fisheries, and forestry sector. A guide and application materials for private investors interested in applying for status under the Act on Strategic Investment Projects is located at https://investcroatia.gov.hr/en/ . The Construction Act allows investors to secure permits through an e-licensing system. The investor may obtain a license valid for three years, which allows for a three percent change in the dimensions of the project from start to finish. The e-licensing system can be accessed at https://dozvola.mgipu.hr/ . In 2021, the government implemented a new aid scheme in the form of a premium power tariff to support electricity production from renewable sources. The Croatian Energy Market Operator (HROTE) publishes tenders for market premiums and tenders for guaranteed purchase prices of electricity from renewable sources. The amounts for premiums cannot be higher than the difference between the average production cost and the market price. To date, the incentives have proven successful, with the renewable sector growing rapidly and more than 11,000 MW of projects in the pipeline. There are 11 operational duty-free zones in Croatia, of which seven are land-based and four are at seaports. Contact information for each of the zones can be found at https://www.croatianfreezones.org/primjer-stranice . Both domestic and foreign investors are afforded equal treatment in the zones. Since Croatia’s entrance to the European Union, many of these zones have transitioned to industrial/business zones, which also offer investment incentives. For more information regarding business zones go to https://investcroatia.gov.hr/zone/ Croatian law does not impose performance requirements on or mandate employment requirements for foreign or domestic investors, nor are senior management or board of directors’ positions mandated in private companies. Regarding U.S. investors, Article VII of the U.S.-Croatia BIT prohibits mandating or enforcing specified performance requirements as a condition for a covered investment. Although procedures for obtaining business visas are generally clear, they can be cumbersome and time-consuming. Foreign investors should familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Act on Foreigners. Questions relating to visas and work permits should be directed to the Croatian Embassy or a Croatian Consulate in the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Zagreb maintains a website with information on this subject at https://hr.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/entry-residence-requirements/. The amended Law on Foreigners also allows for digital nomads, defined as “a third country national who is employed or performs work through communication technology for a company or their own company that is not registered in the Republic of Croatia and does not work or provide services to employers in the Republic of Croatia.” Temporary stay for this purpose is granted for up to one year and cannot be extended. There are no government-imposed conditions for investment, nor are there “forced localization” policies for investors in terms of goods and technology. Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code or give access to surveillance. There are no measures that prevent companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory. There are no requirements for investors to maintain or store data within the territory of Croatia. 5. Protection of Property Rights The right to ownership of private property is enshrined in Croatia’s Constitution and in numerous acts and regulations. The Ownership and Property Rights Act establishes procedures for foreigners to acquire property by inheritance as well as through legal transactions such as purchases, deeds, and trusts. Croatia has a well-functioning banking system, which provides mortgages, while courts and cadaster offices handle property records. Real property ownership can be particularly challenging in Croatia owing to unique titling issues, separate ownership of buildings and the land on which they sit, reciprocity laws, special treatment of agricultural land and coastal regions, and zoning disputes. Inheritance laws have led to situations in which some properties have claims by dozens of legal owners, some of whom are deceased and others who have emigrated and cannot be found. For all these reasons, investors should seek competent, independent legal advice in this area. The U.S. Embassy maintains a list of English-speaking attorneys ( https://hr.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/). The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Directorate for Internationalization helps those seeking information about property status in Croatia. For more information, see: http://investcroatia.gov.hr/ . While the cadaster offices reliably maintain records, there is a portion of property in Croatia which has changed hands without appropriate documentation for various reasons, including avoidance of paying the title transfer fees or hiding wealth. Historically, individuals and companies spent years in court attempting to resolve improper real estate documentation. For this reason, potential buyers should seek to verify that the seller possesses clear title to both the land and buildings (which can be titled and owned separately). A foreign investor, incorporated as a Croatian legal entity, may acquire and own property without ministry approval, with the caveat that the purchase by any private party of certain types of land (principally land directly adjacent to the sea or in certain geographically designated areas) can be restricted to foreign investors for purposes of national security. In order to acquire property by means other than inheritance or as an incorporated Croatian legal entity, foreign citizens must receive approval from the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration, a process which can be lengthy due to the need for interagency clearance. While EU citizens are afforded the same rights as Croatian citizens in terms of purchasing property, the right of all other foreigners to acquire property in Croatia is based on reciprocity. In the case of the United States, reciprocity exists on a state-by-state basis. Croatia’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs has confirmed the existence of positive reciprocity for real estate purchases for residents of states listed in the table in the “S.A.D” line at https://mpu.gov.hr/informacije-o-uzajamnosti-u-stjecanju-prava-vlasnistva-nekretnina-izmedju-republike-hrvatske-i-drzava-izvan-europske-unije-republike-island-knezevine-lihtenstajn-kraljevine-norveske-te-svicarske-konfederacije/6186 . Alternatively, for U.S. citizens from Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Vermont, property acquisition is only allowed with the condition of Croatian permanent residence. Residents of other states could face longer waiting periods. Land ownership is distinct from ownership of buildings or facilities on the land. Investors interested in acquiring state-owned companies from the Ministry of Physical Planning, Construction, and State Assets should seek legal advice to determine whether any deal also includes the right to ownership of the land on which a business is located, or merely the right to lease the land through a concession. Inconsistent regulations and restrictions on coastal property ownership and construction have also provided challenges for foreign investors in the past. Croatian law restricts construction and commercial use within 70 meters of the coastline. It is important to verify zoning regulations and the existence of necessary building permits, as some newer structures in coastal areas have been subject to destruction at the owner’s expense and without compensation for not conforming to local zoning regulations. Investors should be particularly wary of promises that structures built without permits will be regularized retroactively. The Act on Legalization of Buildings and Illegal Construction is intended to resolve ambiguities regarding ownership of real estate. When purchasing land for construction purposes, potential buyers should determine whether the property is classified as agricultural or construction land. The Agricultural Land Act provides for additional fees for re-zoning of up to 50 percent of the value of the land that is diverted from agriculture to construction purposes. The Agricultural Land Agency works with local governments to review potential agricultural land purchases. The sale of privately owned farmland is treated solely as the subject of a sales agreement between the parties. Buyers of this type of land should still proceed with caution and be aware of potentially unresolved legacy issues with land ownership. Land in Croatia is either publicly or privately owned and cannot be transferred to squatters solely based on physical presence. The Ministry of Justice and Public Administration and the State Geodetic Office co-manage the National Program for Resolving Land Registration and Cadaster Issues. This program includes a One Stop Shop system, which is a single point for accessing land registry and cadaster data. For more information see http://www.uredjenazemlja.hr/default.aspx?id=17 where information is available in English. Croatia is also working with the World Bank on implementation of the Integrated Land Administration System project (ILAS) to modernize the land administration and management system. Croatia continues to process a backlog of cases and potential investors should seek a full explanation of land ownership rights before purchasing property. There is no property tax in Croatia. Note that Croatia’s land records are available online at https://www.katastar.hr/en/#/ . Katastar.hr includes information on over 14 million pieces of land throughout the country and provides information in English. Croatian intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation includes the Patent Act amended in January 2020, the Trademark Act, the Industrial Design Act, the Act on the Geographical Indications of Products and Services, the Act on the Protection of Layout Design of Integrated Circuits, and the Act on Copyrights and Related Rights, which was entirely rewritten and adopted in 2021. The Law on Protecting Unpublished Information with Market Value went into force in 2018. These acts define the process for protecting and enforcing IPR in Croatia. Texts of these laws are available on the website of the State Intellectual Property Office at https://www.dziv.hr/en/ip-legislation/national-legislation/ . The Law on Fees for the Intellectual Property Sector was adopted in 2021 in addition to the Regulation on Fees in the Intellectual Property Sector and Expert Services of the State Intellectual Property Office. All laws are harmonized with EU legislation. The legal structure is strong, enforcement is good, and infringement of rights and theft of intellectual property are not common, although there are isolated incidents. Croatian law enforcement officials keep public records of seized counterfeit goods. According to a 2021 report from the Croatian Customs Office, officials stopped 472 international imports on the grounds of intellectual property rights violations, resulting in 657 procedures for temporary detainment of goods for a total of 209,972 items. Customs also issued 94 domestic violations, seized 22,957 counterfeit goods, and initiated 26 criminal proceedings against individuals involved in violation of trademarks. Croatian customs officials and the Ministry of Interior work together to locate and seize infringing goods. Although some areas of IPR protection and enforcement remain problematic, Croatia is currently not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. Problem areas are piracy of digital media and counterfeiting. Due to its geographic location, Croatia is also a transit route for various illegal products bound for other countries in the region. There have been no problems reported with regard to registration of IPR in Croatia by American companies. The American Chamber of Commerce maintains dialogue with the Croatian government on IPR issues. As a WTO member, Croatia is party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Croatia is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. For a list of international conventions to which Croatia is a signatory, consult the State Intellectual Property Office’s website at http://www.dziv.hr/hr/zakonodavstvo/medjunarodni-ugovori/ . For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Croatia’s securities and financial markets are open equally to domestic and foreign investment. Foreign residents may open non-resident accounts and may do business both domestically and abroad. Specifically, Article 24 of the Foreign Currency Act states that non-residents may subscribe, pay in, purchase, or sell securities in Croatia in accordance with regulations governing securities transactions. Non-residents and residents are afforded the same treatment in spending and borrowing. These and other non-resident financial activities regarding securities are covered by the Foreign Currency Act, available on the central bank website (www.hnb.hr). Securities are traded on the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE). Regulations that govern activity and participation in the ZSE can be found (in English) at: https://zse.hr/en/legal-regulations/234 . There are three tiers of securities traded on the ZSE. The Capital Markets Act regulates all aspects of securities and investment services and defines the responsibilities of the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA). More information can be found (in English) at: http://www.hanfa.hr/regulations/capital-market/ . There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. There are no policies that hinder the free flow of financial resources. There are no restrictions on international payments or transfers, in accordance with IMF Article VIII. The private sector, both domestic and foreign-owned, enjoys open access to credit and a variety of credit instruments on the local market, available on market terms. The banking sector is mostly privatized and is highly developed, competitive, resilient, and increasingly offering a diversity of products to businesses (foreign and domestic) and consumers. According to conclusions from an IMF Virtual Visit with Croatia in November 2020, the banking sector is one of the strongest sectors of the Croatian economy. French, German, Italian, and Austrian companies own over 90 percent of Croatia’s banks. As of December 31, 2021, there were 20 commercial banks and three savings banks, with assets totaling $78.75 billion. The largest bank in Croatia is Italian-owned Zagrebacka Banka, with assets of $20.82 billion and a market share of 26.5 percent. The second largest bank is Italian-owned Privredna Banka Zagreb, with assets totaling $16.46 billion and 20.9 percent market share. The third largest is Austrian Erste Bank, with assets totaling $13.01 billion and a 16.52 percent market share. According to Croatian National Bank statistics, the non-performing loans (NPL) rate for Croatia was 4.3 in 2021, down from 5.4 percent in 2020. The country has a central bank system and all information regarding the Croatian National Bank can be found at https://www.hnb.hr/en/ . In an extraordinary move facilitated by the Croatian National Bank, state-owned Croatian Postal Bank (HPB) bought Sberbank Croatia, a subsidiary of Sberbank Europe, on March 1, reportedly paying $11 million for Sberbank’s assets. The sale saved Sberbank Croatia from bankruptcy following the collapse of Sberbank Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the sale, Sberbank Croatia had roughly 60,000 clients and represented 2.21 percent of total bank assets in Croatia. Non-residents are able to open bank accounts without restrictions or delays. The Croatian government has not introduced or announced any intention to introduce block chain technologies in banking transactions. The Croatian Constitution guarantees the free transfer, conversion, and repatriation of profits and invested capital for foreign investments. Article VI of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) establishes protection for American investors from government exchange controls. The BIT obliges both countries to permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of each other’s territory. Transfers of currency are additionally protected by Article VII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art7 ). The Croatian Foreign Exchange Act permits foreigners to maintain foreign currency accounts and to make external payments. The Foreign Exchange Act also defines foreign direct investment (FDI) in a manner that includes use of retained earnings for new investments/acquisitions, but excludes financial investments made by institutional investors such as insurance, pension, and investment funds. The law also allows Croatian entities and individuals to invest abroad. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency. On July 10, 2020 the European Central Bank and European Commission announced that Croatia had fulfilled its commitments and the Croatian kuna (HRK) was admitted into the Banking Union and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), with the exchange rate between the kuna and the euro (EUR) pegged at EUR 1 to 7.5345 HRK. Any risk of currency devaluation or significant depreciation is generally low. The Croatian government intends to adopt the euro on January 1, 2023. Remittance Policies No limitations exist, either temporal or by volume, on remittances. The U.S. Embassy in Zagreb has not received any complaints from American companies regarding transfers and remittances. Croatia does not own any sovereign wealth funds. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of societal expectations regarding responsible business conduct which is regulated by law. The Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency has established a Corporate Governance Code of Ethics for all Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE) participants, and the Company Act, Audit Law, Accounting Law and Credit Institutions Law are the sources for corporate governance provisions. Publicly listed companies are required to upload their annual corporate governance reports on the ZSE website. The Governance Code lays out guidelines for ensuring transparency of business operations, avoidance of conflicts of interest, efficient internal control, and effective division of responsibilities. No high profile or controversial instances of private sector labor rights violations have occurred in Croatia. There were no claims during the last five years by indigenous or other communities that a government entity improperly allocated land or natural resources. Forced labor, forced evictions of indigenous peoples, or arrests of and violence against environmental defenders are not permitted by law. The government effectively implements and enforces domestic laws to maintain consumer and environmental protection and avoid infringement of human and labor rights. Sometimes these regulations exceed EU standards. Croatia implements all EU legislation which requires a due diligence approach to responsible business conduct. Labor unions are considered watchdogs for responsible business conduct and draw attention to issues they find to be impeding on labor, environmental, or consumer rights in the business sector. In terms of security, the government employs private security companies for security of buildings. Security for defense purposes is handled by Croatian state authorities, such as the army or police forces. Croatia became a signatory of the Montreaux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in May 2013. Croatia is not currently a supporter of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, nor a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association. Although Croatia is not a member, Croatia supports the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas and considers minerals from conflict affected areas to be illegal. Croatia does not participate in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. Various laws related to forest and water management, concessions, and environmental protection are implemented in extractive and mining businesses to maintain high environmental and human rights standards. All procedures for mining or extraction tenders are publicly available and transparent. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Croatia has a number of climate-related strategies including a “Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030-2050,” “Energy Development Strategy 2030-2050,” an “Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan,” and a “Climate Change Adaptation Strategy.” The Climate Change Adaptation Strategy focuses on the vulnerability of eight key sectors – water resources, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, biodiversity, energy, tourism and health – and two cross-cutting thematic areas – spatial planning and risk management. A total of 83 climate change adaptation measures are defined for all the sectors. Croatia has committed to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and joined the Global Methane Pledge. In addition, Croatia’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan, under which the country will have access to more than $7 billion in EU funds, has a strong focus on climate-related reforms and projects. Some of the proposed projects are electricity grid modernization to facilitate increased renewable energy source connections, greater co-financing opportunities for alternative fuel vehicles and investments in hydrogen-powered heavy vehicles, and renovation and reconstruction of buildings and homes to improve energy efficiency. 9. Corruption Croatia has a suitable legal framework, including laws and penalties, to combat corruption. The Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act define the tools and sanctions available to the investigative authorities to fight corruption and both acts provide for asset seizure and forfeiture. In terms of a corruption case, where the defendant has assets that are determined to be disproportionate to his/her lawful income, it is presumed by law that the defendant’s property was acquired through criminal means. In such cases, the onus is on the defendant to prove the legal origin of the assets in question. Financial gain, if it is in possession of a third party in such cases can also be confiscated if it is determined the gain was not acquired in good faith. However, the good faith principle does not apply to a spouse, relatives, or family members. Croatian laws and provisions regarding corruption apply equally to domestic and foreign investors, to public officials, their family members and political parties. The Croatian Criminal Code covers such acts as trading in influence, abuse of official functions, bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of private property, money laundering, concealment and obstruction of justice. The Act on the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime provides broad authority to prosecute tax fraud linked to organized crime and corruption cases. The Croatian Parliament adopted a new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2030 to strengthen existing anti-corruption administrative and legal mechanisms. It also aims to identify new, systemic solutions to raise awareness of the harmful effects of corruption, increase citizen involvement, and utilize civil society and the media as indispensable institutional partners to prevent and fight corruption. Croatian prosecutors have secured corruption convictions and launched investigations against a number of high-level former government officials, former ministers, other high-ranking officials, and senior managers from state-owned enterprises, although many such convictions have later been overturned. The Law on Public Procurement is harmonized with EU legislation and prescribes transparency and fairness for all public procurement activities. Government officials use public speeches to encourage ethical business. The Croatian Chamber of Economy created a Code of Business Ethics which it encourages all companies in Croatia to abide by, but it is not mandatory. The Code can be found in Croatian at: https://www.hgk.hr/documents/kodeksposlovneetikehrweb581354cae65c8.pdf . Additional laws for the suppression of corruption include: the State Attorney’s Office Act; the Public Procurement Act; the Act on Procedure for Forfeiture of Assets Attained Through Criminal Acts and Misdemeanors; the Budget Act; the Conflict of Interest Prevention Act; the Corporate Criminal Liability Act; the Money Laundering Prevention Act; the Witness Protection Act; the Personal Data Protection Act; the Right to Access Information Act; and the Act on Civil Services. Other regulations include the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and the Code of Judicial Ethics. Whistleblowers are protected by the Law on the Protection of Irregularities, as well as by provisions in the Labor Law and the Civil Servants Act. Croatia has requested to join the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Croatia is a member and currently chairs the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), a peer monitoring organization that allows members to assess anticorruption efforts on a continuing basis. Croatia has been a member of INTERPOL since 1992. Croatia cooperates regionally through the Southeast European Co-operative Initiative (SECI), the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA), and the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI). Croatia is a member of Eurojust, the EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit, and is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption. Croatian legislation provides protection for NGOs involved in investigating or drawing attention to corruption. GONG, a non-partisan citizens’ organization founded in 1997, which also acts as a government watchdog, monitors election processes, educates citizens about their rights and duties, encourages communication between citizens and their elected representatives, promotes transparency within public services, manages public advocacy campaigns, and assists citizens in self-organizing initiatives. A new anti-corruption association, Udruga Pomak, was formed by a group of prominent whistleblowers to advocate for greater whistleblower protections. Even though the law provides for the protection of whistleblowers, in practice there are still issues. The business community has identified corruption in the healthcare and construction sectors, as well as lack of transparency in the public procurement process as obstacles to foreign investment. The State Prosecutor’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) is tasked with directing police investigations and prosecuting cases. USKOK is headquartered in Zagreb, with offices in Split, Rijeka, and Osijek. In addition, the National Police Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (PN-USKOK) conducts corruption-related investigations and is based in the same cities. Specialized criminal judges in the four largest county courts in Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, and Osijek are responsible for adjudicating corruption and organized crime cases. The cases receive high priority in the justice system, but still encounter excessive delays and lengthy proceedings. The Ministry of Interior, the Office for Suppression of Money Laundering, the Tax Administration, and the Anti-Corruption Sector of the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration all have a proactive role in combating and preventing corruption. Contact information below: Office of the State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia Gajeva 30, 10000 Zagreb, Republic of Croatia +385 1 4591 855 tajnistvo.dorh@dorh.hr Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime Vlaska 116, 10000 Zagreb, Republic of Croatia +385 1 2375 654 tajnistvo@uskok.dorh.hr GONG Vodnikova cesta 4. Zagreb 10 000., 10000 Zagreb, Republic of Croatia +385 1 4825 444 gong@gong.hr 10. Political and Security Environment The risk of political violence in Croatia is low. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars in the region, Croatia has emerged as a stable, democratic country and is a member of NATO and the EU. Relations with neighboring countries are generally fair and improving, although some disagreements regarding border demarcation and residual war-related issues persist. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Croatia has an educated, highly skilled, and relatively high-value labor force compared to regional averages, but labor remains relatively low cost compared to the entire EU. Employment is regulated by the constitution, international conventions, treaties, labor law, collective agreements, and employment agreements. A list of International Labor Organization conventions implemented into labor legislation can be found at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102700 . There are no recent reliable reports on the size of the grey economy, but estimates range from 10 percent to 35 percent of GDP. According to the latest report available from the Croatian Employment Agency, unemployment in the third quarter of 2021 decreased to 6.3 percent from 7.5 for the same period in 2020 due to the government’s financial support packages for job retention throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the latest available statistics from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, of the total number of employed persons in December 2021, 47.8 percent were women and 52.2 percent were men. The Labor Law governs employment and prescribes general labor regulations. Among other items, the Labor Law prohibits discrimination, defines various types of leave including maternity, and provides terms for striking, salaries, and other labor related issues. The government is committed to increasing jobs, especially for youth, through various programs funded by the EU. Companies report that Croatia’s labor law makes it relatively expensive to hire and dismiss employees in comparison to the United States and other countries in Europe at the same level of development. There are currently labor shortages reported in the construction, food production, and tourism sectors. The Law on Foreigners was amended in November 2020 to abolish employment quotas for foreign workers. Foreign or migrant workers do not play a significant role in any sector yet, but there are growing numbers of foreign workers in the construction sector. Croatia continues to experience a brain drain, with an estimated 60,000 Croatians (mostly young and educated) leaving the country annually. The government has indicated, however, that a significant number of Croatians returned to Croatia during the COVID-19 pandemic as jobs became scarce in other EU countries. The Government maintains the www.mjere.hr website with information regarding measures to keep workers in Croatia. These measures are divided into nine categories and include financial support for employers and the self-employed, as well as for training and seasonal work programs. A large portion of the funding is intended to support active employment, while a portion will fund specialized programs for groups that have a hard time entering the labor market. Croatian law does not require the hiring of Croatian nationals. Employers are bound by law to offer severance pay to individuals laid off due to restructuring or down-sizing. The labor law defines the conditions and amounts of severance pay. To be eligible for severance: 1) the employer must terminate the employee, 2) the termination must not be the result of behavioral issues, and 3) the employee must have been employed for two consecutive years. The Croatian Employment Agency provides unemployment payments for those laid off due to economic reasons. Labor laws are strictly implemented and not waived to retain or attract investment. Collective bargaining is a common tool, mostly implemented by unions, which overwhelmingly represent workers associated with government spending and state-owned enterprises. The http://baza.kolektivni-ugovori.info/ website provides an updated database of collective agreements signed in 1995 to date. The Labor Law provides a mechanism for resolving collective and individual labor disputes by arbitration. No appeal is permitted against an arbitration award. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $65,675 2020 $56.8 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $295 million N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $85.84 million N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 57.7% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * GDP for 2021 estimate and FDI for Q1-Q3 2021 at www.hnb.hr Note: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis do not have GDP or FDI data available for 2020 at time of publishing. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $37,922 100% Total Outward $5,983 100% The Netherlands $6,615 17.4% Slovenia $1,646 27.5% Austria $5,096 13.4% Bosnia Herzegovina $1,405 23.4% Luxembourg $4,308 11.4% Serbia $1,045 17.5% Germany $3,923 10.3% Switzerland $296 4.9% Italy $3,659 9.6% Montenegro $290 4.8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *FDI at www.hnb.hr for Q1-Q3 2020 14. Contact for More Information For more information on the investment climate in Croatia, you may contact: Political-Economic Section U.S. Embassy Zagreb Ulica Thomasa Jeffersona 2, 10010 Zagreb Tel (+385 1) 661-2200 E-mail: InvestmentClimateCroatia@state.gov TAGS Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Croatia Cyprus Executive Summary Cyprus is the eastern-most member of the European Union (EU), situated at the crossroads of three continents – Europe, Africa, and Asia – and thus occupies a strategic place in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) eagerly welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI). The ROC is a member of the eurozone. English is widely spoken. The legal system is based on UK common law. Legal and accounting services for foreign investors are highly developed. Invest Cyprus, an independent, government-funded entity, aggressively promotes investment in the traditional sectors of shipping, tourism, banking, and financial and professional services. Newer sectors for FDI include energy, film production, investment funds, education, research & development, information technology, and regional headquartering. The discovery of significant hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone (and in the surrounding Eastern Mediterranean region) has driven major new FDI by multinational companies in recent years. The ROC has generally handled the pandemic effectively, mitigating its impact on investment to the greatest extent possible. As of March 2022, around 85 percent of the adult population was double-vaccinated, with many people having received a third dose. COVID case loads generally follow trends in continental Europe. COVID cases are again rising, consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in Europe, the government has a highly effective testing regime in place and has demonstrated competence in managing the local epidemic. The ROC has also demonstrated commitment to promoting green investments, with significant funding allocated to securing a green transition (see Section 8). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 28 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4,900 https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 26,440 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized government on the island, but since 1974 the northern third of Cyprus has been administered by Turkish Cypriots. This area proclaimed itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in 1983. The United States does not recognize the “TRNC” as a government, nor does any country other than Turkey. A substantial number of Turkish troops remain in the northern part of the island. A buffer zone, or “green line,” patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), separates the two parts. The Republic of Cyprus and the area administered by Turkish Cypriots are addressed separately below. U.S. citizens can travel to the north / Turkish Cypriot area, however, additional COVID-19 measures may apply when crossing. U.S. companies can invest in the north but should be aware of legal complications and risks due to the lack of international recognition, tensions between the two communities, and isolation of the north from the eurozone. Turkish Cypriot businesses are interested in working with American companies in the fields of agriculture, hospitality, renewable energy, and retail franchising. Significant Turkish aid and investment flows to the “TRNC.” A political settlement between the communities would be a powerful catalyst for island-wide Cypriot economic growth and prosperity. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROC has a favorable attitude towards FDI and welcomes U.S. investors. There is no discrimination against U.S. investment; however, there are some ownership limitations and licensing restrictions set by law on non-EU investment in certain sectors, such as private land ownership, media, and construction (see Limits on Foreign Control, below). The ROC promotes FDI through a dedicated agency, Invest Cyprus, which is tasked with attracting FDI in the key economic sectors of shipping, education, real estate, tourism and hospitality, energy, investment funds, filming, and innovation and startups. Invest Cyprus is the first point of contact for investors, and provides detailed information on the legal, tax, and business regulatory framework. The ROC and Invest Cyprus also promote an ongoing dialogue with investors through a series of promotion seminars each year. The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) is a robust organization with country-specific bilateral chambers, including the American Chamber (AmCham Cyprus), that is dedicated to promoting FDI and serving the business interests of foreign companies and trade partners operating in Cyprus. For more information: Invest Cyprus 9 Makariou III Avenue Severis Building, 4th Floor 1965 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel: +357 22 441133 Fax: +357 22 441134 Email: info@investcyprus.org.cy Website: https://www.investcyprus.org.cy Cyprus Embassy Trade Center – New York 13 East 40th Street New York, NY 10016 Phone: (212) 213-9100Fax: (212) 213-9100 Website: https://www.cyprustradeny.org/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Turkish Cypriots welcome FDI and are eager to attract investments, particularly those that will lead to the transfer of advanced technology and technical skills. Priority is also given to investments in export-oriented industries. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against FDI. The “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency (YAGA)” provides investment consultancy services, guidance on the legal framework, sector specific advice, and information about investor incentives. “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency” (“YAGA”) Tel: +90 392 – 22 82317 Website: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC does not currently have a mandatory foreign investment screening mechanism that grants approval to FDI other than sector-specific licenses granted by relevant ministries. Invest Cyprus does grant approvals for investment under the film production incentive scheme. Invest Cyprus often refers projects for review to other agencies. The following restrictions apply to investing in the ROC: Non-EU entities (persons and companies) may purchase only two real estate properties for private use (two holiday homes or a holiday home and a shop or office). This restriction does not apply if the investment property is purchased through a domestic Cypriot company or a corporation elsewhere in the EU. U.S. investment in such companies is welcome. Non-EU entities cannot invest in the production, transfer, and provision of electrical energy. The Council of Ministers may refuse granting a license for investment in hydrocarbons prospecting, exploration, and exploitation to a third-country national or company if that third country does not allow similar investment by Cyprus or other EU member states. ROC hydrocarbon exploration is currently led by two U.S. companies. Individual non-EU investors may not own more than five percent of a local television or radio station, and total non-EU ownership of any single local TV or radio station is restricted to a maximum of 25 percent. The right to register as a building contractor in Cyprus is reserved for citizens of EU member states. Non-EU entities are not allowed to own a majority stake in a local construction company. Non-EU physical persons or legal entities may bid on specific construction projects but only after obtaining a special license from the Council of Ministers. Non-EU entities cannot invest directly in private tertiary education institutions but may do so through ownership of Cypriot or EU companies. The provision of healthcare services on the island is subject to certain restrictions, applying equally to all non-residents. The Central Bank of Cyprus’s prior approval is necessary before any individual person or entity, whether Cypriot or foreign, can acquire more than 9.99 percent of a bank incorporated in Cyprus. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS According to the “Registrar of Companies Office,” all non-Turkish Cypriot ownership of construction companies is capped at 49 percent. Currently, the travel agency sector is closed to foreign investment. Registered foreign investors may buy property for investment purposes but are limited to one parcel or property. Foreign natural persons also have the option of forming private liability companies, and foreign investors can form mutual partnerships with one or more foreign or domestic investors. Nothing to report. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry (MECI) provides a “One Stop Shop” business facilitation service; contact details below. The One-Stop-Shop offers assistance with the logistics of registering a business in Cyprus to all investors, regardless of origin and size. Additionally, since September 2020, MECI offers a Fast Track Business Activation mechanism to provide efficient business registration services to eligible foreign investors who want to establish a physical presence on the island. This program has already generated interest from abroad, attracting several firms in the technology, IT, and communications sectors. One-Stop-Shop & Point of Single Contact Ministry of Energy, Commerce, and Industry (MECI) 13-15 Andreas Araouzos 1421 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel. +357 22 409318 or 321 Fax: +357 22 409432 Email 1: onestopshop@meci.gov.cy Email 2: psccyprus@meci.gov.cy Website: www.businessincyprus.gov.cy MECI’s Department of the Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver (DRCOR) provides the following services: Registration of domestic and overseas companies, partnerships, and business names; bankruptcies and liquidations; and trademarks, patents, and intellectual property matters. Domestic and foreign investors may establish any of the following legal entities or businesses in the ROC: Companies (private or public); General or limited partnerships; Business/trade name; European Company (SE); and Branches of overseas companies. The registration process takes approximately two working days and involves completing an application for approval/change of name, followed by the steps outlined in the following link: http://www.businessincyprus.gov.cy/mcit/psc/psc.nsf/All/A2E29870C32D7F17C2257857002E18C9?OpenDocument. At the end of 2021, there were a total of 203,545 companies registered in the ROC, 12,604 of which had been registered in 2021 (for more statistics on company registrations, please see: https://www.companies.gov.cy/en/ ). In addition to registering a business, foreign investors, like domestic business owners, are required to obtain all permits that may be necessary under Cypriot law. At a minimum, they must obtain residence and employment permits, register for social insurance, and register with the tax authorities for both income tax and Valued Added Tax (VAT). In order to use any building or premises for business, including commerce, industry, or any other income-earning activity, one also needs to obtain a municipal license. Additionally, town planning or building permits are required for building new offices or converting existing buildings. There are many sector-specific procedures. Information on all the above procedures is available online at the link above. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ( http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings) ranked Cyprus 54th out of 190 countries for ease of doing business. Among the ten sub-categories that make up this index, Cyprus performed best in the areas of protecting minority investors (21/190) and paying taxes (29/190), and worst in the areas of enforcing contracts (142/190) and dealing with construction permits (125/190). Cyprus has recorded small gains in almost all subcategories since the 2019 report, with a substantial improvement in the area of paying taxes, achieving a small overall climb in its ranking since last year. Using another metric, in the Global Competitiveness Index, issued by the World Economic Forum, Cyprus maintained its ranking of 44th out of 141 countries in the 2019 edition. The two areas where Cyprus performed the worst in this report were its small market size and relatively low innovation capability. Since 2020, the World Bank Group has discontinued the Doing Business project and is now formulating a new approach to assessing the business and investment climate in economies worldwide. The ROC follows the EU definition of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and foreign-owned MSMEs are free to take advantage of programs in Cyprus designed to help such companies. https://www.fundingprogrammesportal.gov.cy/en/call/enabling-discovery-and-interoperability-of-federated-research-objects-across-scientific-communities/ Foreign investors can take advantage of the services and expertise of Invest Cyprus, an agency registered under the companies’ law and funded mainly by the state, dedicated to attracting investment. Invest Cyprus 9A Makarios III Ave Severis Bldg., 4th Flr. 1065 Nicosia Tel. +357 22 441133 Fax: +357 22 441134 Email: info@investcyprus.org.cy Website: http://www.investcyprus.org.cy/ Additionally, the Association of Large Investment Projects, under the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, can provide useful information on large ongoing investment projects: Association of Large Investment Projects 38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave. & 3 Deligiorgis Str., P.O.Box 21455 1509 Nicosia Tel: +357 22 889890 Fax: +357 22 667593 Email: bigprojects@ccci.org.cy Lastly, the Cyprus Country Profiler website offers some useful background on the ROC: https://www.cyprusprofile.com/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Information available on the “Registrar of Companies’” website is available only in Turkish: http://www.rkmmd.gov.ct.tr/. An online registration process for domestic or foreign companies does not exist and registration needs to be completed in person. The “YAGA” website ( https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr /) provides explanations and guides in English on how to register a company in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots. As of March 2021, the “Registrar of Companies Office” statistics indicated there were 23,133 registered companies, 429 foreign companies; and 516 offshore companies. The area administered by Turkish Cypriots defines MSMEs as entities having fewer than 250 employees. There are several grant programs financed through Turkish aid and EU aid targeting MSMEs. The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) publishes an annual Competitiveness Report on the Turkish Cypriot economy, based on the World Economic Forum’s methodology. KTTO’s 2019-2020 report ranked Northern Cyprus 107 among 141 economies, dropping eighteen places from its ranking in 2019. KTTO has not published reports since 2020. For more information and requirements on establishing a company, obtaining licenses, and doing business visit: “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency” (“YAGA”) Tel: +90 392 – 22 82317 Website: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) https://www.ktto.net/en/ Tel: +90 392 – 228 37 60 / 228 36 45 Fax: +90 392 – 227 07 82 REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC does not restrict outward investment, other than in compliance with international obligations such as specific UN Security Council Resolutions. In terms of programs to encourage investment, businesses in Cyprus have access to several EU programs promoting entrepreneurship, such as the European Commission’s Next Generation EU economic recovery package, or the Erasmus program for Young Entrepreneurs, in addition to the European Investment Bank’s guarantee facilities for SMEs for projects under USD 4.8 million (EUR 4 million). AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Turkish Cypriot “officials” do not incentivize or promote outward investment. The Turkish Cypriot authorities do not restrict domestic investors. 3. Legal Regime REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC achieved a score of 4 out of 6 in the World Bank’s composite Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance score (based on data collected December 2015 to April 2016) designed to explore good regulatory practices in three core areas: publication of proposed regulations, consultation around their content, and the use of regulatory impact assessments. For more information, please see: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/cyprus . U.S. companies competing for ROC government tenders have noted concerns about opaque rules and possible bias by technical committees responsible for preparing specifications and reviewing tender submissions. Overall, however, procedures and regulations are transparent and applied in practice by the government without bias towards foreign investors. The ROC actively promotes good governance and transparency as part of its administrative reform action plan. In line with the above plan and EU requirements, the ROC launched the National Open Data Portal ( https://www.data.gov.cy/ ) in 2016 to increase transparency in government services. Government agencies are now required to post publicly available information, data, and records, on the entire spectrum of their activities. The number of data sets available through this portal has been growing rapidly, although much of it is in Greek only. Several agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) share competency on fostering competition and transparency, including the ROC Commission for the Protection of Competition ( http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument ), the Competition and Consumer Protection Service, under MECI ( https://meci.gov.cy/en/departments-services/consumer-protection-service ), the Cyprus Consumers Association ( https://www.katanalotis.org.cy/ ), and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission ( https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/home/ ). Government and independent oversight agencies such as the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission actively promote companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency. In 2017, the European Commission published guidelines to help companies disclose environmental and social information, which it supplemented in 2019 with guidelines on reporting climate-related information. These guidelines are not mandatory, but many progressive local companies are adopting them to secure their sustainability and long-term gains. Most laws and regulations are published only in Greek and obtaining official English translations can be difficult, but expert analysis in English is generally available from local law and accounting firms when the regulation affects international investment or business activity. When passing new legislation or regulations, Cypriot authorities follow the EU acquis communautaire – the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all EU members. A formal procedure of public notice and comment is not required in Cyprus, except for specific types of laws. In general, the ROC will seek stakeholder feedback directly. Draft legislation must be published in the Official Gazette before it is debated in the House to allow stakeholders an opportunity to submit comments. The ROC House of Representatives typically invites specific stakeholders to offer their feedback when debating bills. Draft regulations, on the other hand, need not be published in the Official Gazette prior to being approved. In an effort to contribute to global tax transparency, the ROC has adopted the Standard of Automatic Exchange of Information developed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) known as Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Since 2016, the ROC Tax Department requires all financial institutions to confirm their clients’ jurisdiction(s) of Tax Residence and Respective Tax Identification Number, if applicable. Additionally, the ROC has signed the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), allowing Cypriot tax authorities to share information with U.S. counterparts. Public finances and debt obligations are published as part of the annual budget process. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The level of transparency for “lawmaking” and adoption of “regulations” in the “TRNC” lags behind U.S. and EU standards. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Draft legislation or regulations are made available for public comment for 21 days after the legislation is sent to “parliament.” Almost all legislation and regulations are published only in Turkish. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS As an EU member state since May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus must ensure compliance with the acquis communautaire. The acquis is constantly evolving and comprises of Treaties, international agreements, legislation, declarations, resolutions, and other legal instruments. EU legislation, for its part, is subdivided into: Regulations, which are directly applicable to member states and require no further action to have legal effect; Directives, which are addressed to and are binding on member states, but the member state may choose the method by which to implement the directive. Generally, a member state must enact national legislation to comply with a directive; Decisions, which are binding on those parties to whom they are addressed; and Recommendations and opinions, which have no binding force. When there is conflict between European law and the law of any member state, European law prevails; the norms of national law have to be set aside, under the principle of EU law primacy or supremacy. The ROC is often slow to transpose EU directives into local law, but transposition is generally consistent with EU intent when it happens. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The entire island of Cyprus is considered EU territory, but the acquis communautaire is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots and the north is not considered to be within the EU customs area. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Cyprus is a common law jurisdiction and its legal system is based on English Common Law for both substantive and procedural matters. Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due process, the right to appeal, and the right to a fair public trial. Courts in Cyprus possess the necessary powers to enforce compliance by parties who fail to obey judgments and orders made against them. Public confidence in the integrity of the Cypriot legal system remains strong, although long delays in courts, and the perceived failure of the system collectively to punish those responsible for the island’s financial troubles in 2013 have tended to undermine this trust in recent years. International disputes are resolved through litigation in Cypriot courts or by alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation or arbitration. Businesses often complain of court gridlock and judgments on cases generally taking years to be issued, particularly for claims involving property foreclosure. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Investors should note the EU’s acquis communautaire is suspended in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. The “TRNC” is a common law jurisdiction. Judicial power other than the “Supreme Court” is exercised by the “Heavy Penalty Courts,” “District Courts,” and “Family Courts.” Turkish Cypriots inherited many elements of their legal system from British colonial rule before 1960, including the right to appeal and the right to a fair public trial. There is a high level of public confidence in the judicial system in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots. The judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Foreign investors can make use of all the rights guaranteed to Turkish Cypriots. Commercial courts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are not available in the “TRNC.” The resolution of commercial or investment disputes through the “judicial system” can take several years. The Turkish Cypriot administration has trade and industry “law” and contractual “law.” The Turkish Cypriot administration has several trade and economic cooperation agreements with Turkey. For more information about “legislation,” visit https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ . Because the “TRNC” is not recognized internationally, “TRNC court” decisions and orders may be difficult to enforce outside of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS For more information on laws affecting incoming foreign investment see https://www.investcyprus.org.cy/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Visit the “YAGA” website, for more information about laws and regulations on FDI: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The oversight agency for competition is the Commission for the Protection of Competition: http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The oversight “agency” for competition is the “Competition Board:” http://www.rekabet.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Private property may, in exceptional instances, be expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, and in accordance with established principles of international law and consistent with EU law, rights, and directives. The expropriation process entitles investors to proper compensation, whether through mutual agreement, arbitration, or the local courts. Foreign investors may claim damages resulting from an act of illegal expropriation by means other than litigation. Investors and lenders to expropriated entities receive compensation in the currency in which the investment was made. In the event of any delay in the payment of compensation, the Government is also liable for the payment of interest based on the prevailing six-month interest rate for the relevant currency. Like most other jurisdictions, banks in Cyprus are expected to complete the switch from the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) by June 2023. Following a financial crisis in 2013, the ROC took extraordinary steps as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Republic of Cyprus and international lenders (European Commission, European Central Bank, and the IMF – the “troika”). Depositors in two of the largest Cypriot banks were forced to take a cut on almost half of their deposits exceeding insured limits. This action sparked 3,000 lawsuits against the ROC and the banks, but the European Court of Justice ruled that the MOU with the troika was not an unlawful act and dismissed actions for compensation. The ROC has not taken any similar extraordinary actions since. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Private property may be expropriated for public purposes. The expropriation process entitles investors to proper compensation. Foreign investors may claim damages resulting from an act of illegal expropriation by means other than litigation. In expropriation cases involving private owners, they are first notified, the property is then inspected, and, if an agreement is reached regarding the amount, then the owner is compensated. In cases where the owner declines the compensation package, the case relegated to local “courts” for a final decision. Because the “TRNC” is not recognized internationally, “TRNC court” decisions and orders may be difficult to enforce outside of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS New insolvency legislation introduced in 2015 helped overhaul bankruptcy procedures, with a view to resolving the island’s high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). Bankruptcy procedures can be initiated by a creditor through compulsory liquidation or by the debtor through voluntary liquidation. The court can impose debt rescheduling, in cases where aggregate liabilities do not exceed USD 409,500 (EUR 350,000) and individuals with minimal assets and income may apply to the court via the Insolvency Service for a debt relief order of up to USD 29,250 (EUR 25,000). Discharge from bankruptcy is automatic after three years, provided all debtor assets are sold and the proceeds distributed to creditors. Fraudulent alienation of assets prior to bankruptcy and non-disclosure of assets draws criminal sanctions under the new legislation. Cypriot authorities are closely monitoring implementation of the new insolvency framework. Despite concerted efforts by Cypriot authorities and the banks NPLs remained stubbornly high at 28.5 percent of total loans at the end of 2019, compared to 30.3 percent a year earlier, although two major banks are in the process of selling significant NPL portfolios to investors. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranked Cyprus 31st from the top among 190 countries in terms of the ease with which it resolves insolvency. For additional information, please see: https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/cyprus#DB_ri . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In 2013, the “TRNC” passed a debt restructuring “law” aimed at providing incentives to restructure debts and NPLs separately. Turkish Cypriots also have a bankruptcy “law” that defines “collecting power;” conditions under which a creditor can file a bankruptcy application; and the debtor’s bankruptcy application, and agreement plans. As of the end of the third quarter of 2021, NPLs were 1.5 billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million). 4. Industrial Policies REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC offers investors one of the lowest corporate tax rates in the EU at 12.5 percent, although this rate will likely increase to 15.0 percent in the foreseeable future, in line with global trends. Cyprus’ other tax advantages include: One of the EU’s lowest top statutory personal income tax rates at 35 percent; An extensive double tax treaties network with 67 countries, enabling lower withholding tax rates on dividend or other income received from the subsidiaries abroad; No withholding tax on dividend income received from subsidiary companies abroad under certain conditions. No withholding tax on dividends received from EU subsidiaries; and Low Tonnage Tax for shipping. Effective November 1, 2020, the ROC abolished a program offering Cypriot citizenship through foreign investment, due to abuses. The abrupt abolition of the citizenship program has left a considerable number of high-end residential properties (each valued at around USD 2 million or more) up for sale. The ROC continues to offer a Residency by Investment program, requiring a minimum investment of USD 360,000 (EUR 300,000). In recent years, the ROC has harmonized and enhanced its regulations regarding investment funds, becoming a more attractive jurisdiction for managing and home-basing investment funds. As a result, the number of financial services companies regulated by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) has tripled in the last eight years, from 249 in 2012 to 746 in 2019, with total assets under management reaching USD 10.2 billion (EUR 9.1 billion) in 2019. Brexit, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU since January 31, 2020, has also prompted several financial services companies based in the UK to relocate to Cyprus over the past year – a trend ROC authorities are trying to encourage. Since 2017, the ROC also offers a program to attract foreign investment to Cyprus through third country – i.e., non-European Union – innovative start-ups. The plan invites third-country nationals with start-up capital of at least USD 58,500 (EUR 50,000), undergraduate-level education, and fluent either in Greek or English, to set up their headquarters and tax residence in Cyprus, provided their proposed business is certifiably innovative. The plan made 150 visas available to eligible investors, valid for two years, provided the relevant business is successful. The program was renewed in February 2019 for two more years. In May 2021, the European Commission approved the ROC’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), which forms part of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument, envisioning broad-reaching reforms from 2021-26 in exchange for $1.3 billion in EU funding ($1.1 billion in grants and $220 million in loans). Around 41 percent of this funding will go to green transition projects, and another 23 percent to digital transition, with residual funding for many other reforms, including encouraging innovation and advancing the role of women in business. More information on Cyprus’ RRP available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/recovery-coronavirus/recovery-and-resilience-facility/cyprus-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There are incentives for tourism and industrial-related investments, including: 100 to 200 percent investment allowance on the initial fixed capital investment expenditure for certain regions and sectors; Exemption from corporate tax and income tax until the above-mentioned allowance percentages are met; Exemption from custom duties when importing machinery and equipment the projects; Exemption from construction license fees; Exemption from VAT for both imported and locally purchased machinery and equipment; and Reduction of stamp duty and mortgage procedure fees. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The lead government agency handling areas subject to a special customs regime is the Department of Customs and Excise. Specific rules for the two main areas, namely Customs Warehouses and Free Zones, are listed below and are fully harmonized with equivalent EU norms: https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/customs/customs.nsf/All/6D61C14C3E95345CC22572A6003BCBD5?OpenDocument . There are two types of Free Zones: Control Type I Free Zone, in which controls are principally based on the existence of a fence; and Control Type II Free Zone, in which controls are principally based on the formalities carried out in accordance with the requirements of the customs warehousing procedure. Cyprus has two Control Type II Free Zones (FZs) located in the main seaports of Limassol and Larnaca, which are used for transit trade. These areas are treated as outside normal EU customs territory. Consequently, non-EU goods placed in FZs are not subject to import duties, VAT, or excise tax. FZs are governed under the provisions of relevant EU and ROC legislation. The Department of Customs has jurisdiction over both normal zones and FZs and can impose restrictions or prohibitions on certain activities, depending on the nature of the goods. Additionally, the MECI has management oversight over the Larnaca FZ. A Customs Warehouse can be set up anywhere in the ROC, provided the right criteria are met and meet with the approval of the Department of Customs. For more information, interested parties may contact: Department of Customs and ExciseMichali Karaoli Str.1096 NicosiaTel. +357 22 601754 or 55Fax: +357 22 302018Email: headquarters@customs.mof.gov.cy Website: https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/customs/customs.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument When larger projects are involved, potential investors interested in establishing their own customs warehouse or seeking to engage existing customs warehouses may also contact the One Stop Shop ( https://www.businessincyprus.gov.cy/ ) for guidance on identifying suitable locations. Additional information on the Limassol and Larnaca FZs can be obtained from: Cyprus Ports AuthorityP.O. Box 220071516 Nicosia23 Kritis Street1061 NicosiaTel. +357 22 817200, X-0Fax: +357 22 762050Email: cpa@cpa.gov.cy Website: https://www.cpa.gov.cy/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Famagusta has a “free port and zone,” which is regulated by the Free Ports and Free Zones “Law.” Operations and activities permitted there include: Engaging in all kinds of industry, manufacturing, and production; Storage and export of goods imported to the “Free Port and Zone”; Assembly and repair of goods imported to the “Free Port and Zone”; Building, repair, and assembly of ships; and Banking and insurance services. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS There are no requirements for local sourcing, ownership, or employment. Hiring Cypriot and EU staff is quite easy, though a tight labor market prior to the COVID-19 pandemic strained labor supply in certain fields. Securing work permits for non-EU staff can be difficult, particularly in sectors where there is abundant local labor readily available. In order to overcome this problem, a foreign investor must explain to the satisfaction of ROC authorities why the non-EU staff in question is essential to the business. As with other such matters, Invest Cyprus can assist investors in overcoming hiring problems (see Section 2 on Business Facilitation, and Section 12 on Labor Policies and Practices.) AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In order to recruit foreign labor, companies or investors apply to the local labor authorities for “work permits.” Once they apply, the vacancy is announced locally. Priority is given to local “TRNC citizens” with the required expertise or skillset. If the skillset is not available locally, employers can recruit foreign labor. In evaluating a foreign investment incentives application, the “State Planning Office” carries out a feasibility study regarding the type of investment. For more information on employment, visit the labor authorities’ website: http://csgb.gov.ct.tr/en-us/ . 5. Protection of Property Rights REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS EU nationals and companies domiciled in any EU country are not subject to any restrictions when buying property in the ROC. By contrast, Cypriot law imposes significant restrictions on direct foreign ownership of real estate by non-EU individuals. Non-EU persons and entities may purchase a maximum of two real estate properties for private use (defined as a holiday home built on land of up to 4,014 square meters; plus a second home or office of up to 250 square meters, or shop of up to 100 square meters). Exceptions can be made for projects requiring larger plots of land but are difficult to obtain and rarely granted. This restriction applies to non-EU citizens or non-EU companies. Foreign investment in Cypriot or EU companies is welcome, but a legal entity is deemed to be controlled by non-EU citizens if it meets any of the conditions listed below: 50 percent or more of its board members are non-EU citizens; or 50 percent or more of its share capital belongs to non-EU citizens; or Control (50 percent or more) belongs to non-EU citizens; or Either the company’s Memorandum or Articles of Association provides authority to a non-EU citizen securing the company’s activities are conducted based on his/her will during the real estate acquisition period. In the case that the authority is provided to two or more persons, a legal entity is considered to be controlled by non-EU citizens if 50 percent or more of the people granted such authority are non-EU citizens. Legal requirements and procedures for acquiring and disposing of property in Cyprus are complex, but professional help from real estate agents and developers to ease the burden is readily available. The ROC Department of Lands and Surveys keeps excellent records and follows internationally accepted procedures. Non-residents are allowed to sell their property and transfer abroad the amount originally paid, plus interest or profits, without restriction. Additionally, there are restrictions on investing in Turkish Cypriot property located in the ROC. The Turkish Cypriot Property Management Service (TCPMS), established in 1991, administers properties of Turkish Cypriots who are not ordinarily residents of the government-controlled area. This service acts as the temporary custodian for such properties until a comprehensive political settlement is reached. The TCPMS is mandated to administer properties under its custodianship “in the manner most beneficial for the owner.” Ownership of Turkish Cypriot properties cannot change (except for inheritance purposes) except in exceptional cases when this is deemed beneficial for the owner or necessary for the public interest. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranked Cyprus 71st among 190 countries in terms of efficiency and quality for registering property. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Special Note: Investors are advised to consider the risks associated with investing in immovable property in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots. Potential investors are strongly advised to obtain independent legal advice prior to purchasing or leasing property there. Purchase or use of property in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots is a contentious issue in Cyprus, as per the following note posted on the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/properties/occupiedarea_properties.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument . For property in the Turkish Cypriot-administered areas, only pre-1974 title deeds are uncontested. In response to the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) 2005 ruling that Turkey’s “subordinate local authorities” in Cyprus had not provided an adequate local remedy for property disputes, Turkish Cypriot authorities established an Immovable Property Commission (IPC) to handle property claimed by Greek Cypriots. In a March 2010 ruling, the ECHR recognized the IPC as a domestic remedy, but the ROC does not consider the IPC to be a legitimate body. As of March 9, 2022, the IPC had received 7,085 applications, of which 1, 311 have been concluded through friendly settlements, and 34 through formal hearings. On January 19, 2010, the UK Court of Appeal enforced an earlier court decision taken in the ROC in support of a Greek Cypriot person’s trespassing claim effectively voiding the transfers of Greek Cypriot property in the Turkish Cypriot-administered areas. This landmark decision also establishes precedent in cases where foreign investors purchasing disputed properties outside of the ROC-controlled area can be found liable for damages. There are significant restrictions on the foreign ownership of real estate. A 2008 “law” requires non- “TRNC” residents to apply to the “Council of Ministers” for permission to purchase real estate, and non-residents are limited to a single small property. Foreigners can, however, own or control more real estate through a “TRNC” registered company. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS ROC intellectual property rights (IPR) law is harmonized with EU directives and the ROC is party to major international IPR instruments. The country promotes itself as a low-tax, high protection (i.e., EU standards) destination for IPR. Cypriot law (Law 207(I) (2012)) places the burden of proof on the defendant in cases of IPR infringement. The law also allows the police to assess samples of pirated articles in lieu of the whole shipment and introduces the alternative for out-of-court settlement in some cases. Other important IPR laws include Law 103 (2007) on unfair commercial practices and Law 133(I) (2006) strengthening earlier legislation targeting copyright infringement. The Department of Customs and the Police confiscate thousands of counterfeit items every year, including articles of clothing, luggage, accessories, and pirated optical media. Primary responsibility for enforcing ROC IPR legislation rests with the Cyprus Police and the Department of Customs. The Competition and Consumer Protection Service of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, and Industry (MECI) also plays a supportive role, while the Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver handles administration of patents and copyrights. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE), launched in 1996, is one of the EU’s smallest stock exchanges, with a capitalization of USD 3.7 billion (EUR 3.4 billion) as of March 2022. The CSE and the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) have operated from a joint trading platform since 2006, allowing capital to move more freely from one exchange to the other, even though both exchanges retain their autonomy and independence. The joint platform has increased capital available to Cypriot firms and improved the CSE’s liquidity, although its small size remains a constraint. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, which has been enhanced through the operation of private venture capital firms. Credit is allocated on market terms to foreign and local investors alike. Foreign investors may acquire up to 100 percent of the share capital of Cypriot companies listed on the CSE with the notable exception of companies in the banking sector. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no stock exchange in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots and no foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors are able to get credit from the local market, provided they have established domestic legal presence, majority-owned (at least 51 percent) by domestic companies or persons. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS At the end of November 2021, the value of total deposits in ROC banks was USD 56.3 billion (EUR 51.2 billion), and the value of total loans was USD 32.6 billion (EUR 29.6 billion). Currently, there are seven local banks in Cyprus offering a full range of retail and corporate banking services – the largest two of which are the Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic Bank – plus another two dozen or so subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks offering more specialized services. The full list of authorized credit institutions in Cyprus is available on the Central bank of Cyprus website: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/register-of-credit-institutions-operating-in-cyprus . The banking sector has made significant progress since the 2013 financial crisis resulted in a “haircut” of uninsured deposits, followed by numerous bankruptcies and consolidation. The island’s two largest banks – Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic – are now adequately capitalized and have returned to profitability. However, the profitability of the banking sector as a whole is challenged by low interest margins, a high level of liquidity, and a still-elevated volume of NPLs. NPLs in Cyprus are the second-highest in the EU at 15.1 percent of total loans at the end of November 2021, compared to 19.1 percent a year earlier, albeit considerably lower than in 2014, when they reached 47.8 percent. Banks continue striving to reduce NPLs further, either by selling off portfolios of NPLs or using recently amended insolvency and foreclosure frameworks. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and political pressure to protect citizens under the current extraordinary circumstances makes reducing NPLs difficult. Aggregate banking sector data is available here: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/aggregate-cyprus-banking-sector-data . Cyprus has a central bank – the Central Bank of Cyprus – which forms part of the European Central Bank. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Cyprus. They are subject to Central Bank of Cyprus supervision, just like domestic banks. JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC currently provide U.S. dollar correspondent banking services to ROC banks. Opening a personal or corporate bank account in Cyprus is straightforward, requiring routine documents. But because of a history of money-laundering concerns, banks now carefully scrutinize these documents and can conduct extensive due diligence checks on sources of wealth and income. A local bank account is not necessary for personal household expenses. Opening a corporate bank account is mandatory when registering a company in Cyprus. Since 2018, Cyprus has taken steps to address recognized regulatory shortcomings in combatting illicit finance in its international banking and financial services sector, tightening controls over non-resident shell companies and bank accounts. Cyprus’ first National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing, released in November 2018, is available at: http://mof.gov.cy/en/press-office/announcements/national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-cyprus . Cyprus is a member of the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation report of the Cypriot banking sector, released December 2021, can be found at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/jurisdictions/cyprus . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The “Central Bank” oversees and regulates local, foreign, and private banks. In addition to the “Central Bank” and the “Development Bank”, there are 21 banks in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, of which 16 are Turkish Cypriot-owned banks, and five are branch banks from Turkey. Banks are required to follow “know-your-customer” (KYC) and AML “laws,” which are regulated by the “Ministry of Economy and Energy,” and supervised by the “Central Bank,” but AML practices do not meet international standards. Due to non-recognition issues, Turkish Cypriot banks do not qualify for a SWIFT number to facilitate international transactions. All international transfers depend on routing through Turkish banks. In the third quarter of 2021, total deposits, which have the largest share in the sector’s total liabilities, reached 48,8 billion TL (USD 3.3 billion). As of the end of the third quarter of 2021 , NPLs reached 1.5 Billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million). REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Parliament passed legislation in March 2019 providing for the establishment of a National Investment Fund (NIF) to manage future offshore hydrocarbons and other natural resources revenue. Section 29 of the NIF Law specifies that the Corporation to be set up shall invest the Fund in a diversified manner with a view to maximizing risk-adjusted financial returns and in a manner consistent with the portfolio management by a prudent institutional investor. The Fund is precluded from investing in securities issued by a Cypriot issuer (including the state) or in real estate located in Cyprus. This provision safeguards against the possibility of speculative development catering to the Fund and political interference favoring domestic investments for purposes other than the best interests of the Fund and the Cypriot people as a whole. Additionally, Section 30 of the law provides that the fund cannot invest, directly or indirectly, to acquire more than five percent of any one company or legal entity. The fund is not yet operational. Regulations for the NIF are being drafted and will require legislative approval, and it will be several years before there are any revenues generated from the ROC’s hydrocarbon assets. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no established sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC maintains exclusive or majority-owned stakes in more than 40 SOEs and is making slow progress towards privatizing some of them (see sections on Privatization and OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs). There is no comprehensive list of all SOEs available but the most significant are the following: Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC); Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA); Cyprus Sports Organization; Cyprus Ports Authority; Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC); Cyprus Theatrical Organization; and Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organization. These SOEs operate in a competitive environment (domestically and internationally) and are increasingly responsive to market conditions. The state-owned EAC monopoly on electricity generation and distribution ended in 2014, although competition remains difficult given the small market size and delays in implementing new market rules. As an EU Member State, Cyprus is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance are not mandatory for ROC SOEs, although some of the larger SOEs have started adopting elements of corporate governance best practices in their operating procedures. Each of the SOEs is subject to dedicated legislation. Most are governed by a board of directors, typically appointed by the government at the start of its term, and for the duration of its term in office. SOE board chairs are typically technocrats, affiliated with the ruling party. Representatives of labor unions and minority shareholders contribute to decision making. Although they enjoy a fair amount of independence, they report to the relevant minister. SOEs are required by law to publish annual reports and submit their books to the Auditor General. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there are several “state-owned enterprises” and “semi-state-owned enterprises,” usually common utilities and essential services. In the Turkish Cypriot administered area, the below-listed institutions are known as “public economic enterprises” (POEs), “semi-public enterprises” and “public institutions,” which aim to provide common utilities and essential services. Some of these organizations include: Turkish Cypriot Electricity Board (KIBTEK); BRTK – State Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation; Cyprus Turkish News Agency; Turkish Cypriot Milk Industry; Cypruvex Ltd. – Citrus Facility; EMU – Eastern Mediterranean Foundation Board; Agricultural Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Tobacco Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Alcoholic Products LTD; Coastal Safety and Salvage Services LTD; and Turkish Cypriot Development Bank. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC has made limited progress towards privatizations, despite earlier commitments to international creditors in 2013 to raise USD 1.6 billion (EUR 1.4 billion) from privatizations by 2018. In 2017, opposition parties passed legislation abolishing the Privatizations Unit, an independent body established March 2014. A bill providing the transfer of Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA) commercial activities to a private legal entity, with the government retaining majority ownership, has been pending since March 2018. In December 2015, under the threat of strikes, the government reversed earlier plans to privatize the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC). However, in recent years, the EAC has been forced to unbundle its operations in line with Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) recommendations and EU regulations. The EAC has created independent units for its core regulated activities, namely Transmission, Distribution, Generation, and Supply. Private firms have been offering renewable energy generation since 2003 and electricity supply since January 1, 2021. Despite slow progress in electricity and telecommunications, the current administration continues pursuing privatizations in other areas. In August 2020, the government assigned the Larnaca marina and port privatization project to a Cyprus-Israeli consortium, based on a 40-year lease agreement. The project, starting in April 2022, will be completed in four phases by 2037. It provides for port infrastructure, a marina, land redevelopment, a road network, green areas, parks and pedestrian areas as well as residential units and catering and recreation establishments. At a cost of about EUR1.2 billion, this project will be the biggest investment in Cyprus so far. The government also continues efforts to sell the state lottery, find long-term investors to lease state-owned properties in the Troodos area, and forge a strategic plan on how to handle the Cyprus Stock Exchange. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The airport at Ercan and K-Pet Petroleum Corporation have been converted into public-private partnerships. The concept of privatization continues to be controversial in the Turkish Cypriot community. In March 2015, Turkish Cypriot authorities signed a public-private partnership agreement with Turkey regarding the management and operation of the water obtained from an underwater pipeline funded by Turkey. Within the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there has also been discussion about privatizing the electricity authority “KIBTEK”, Turkish Cypriot telecommunications operations, and the seaports. 8. Responsible Business Conduct REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS In recent years, responsible business conduct (RBC) awareness among both producers and consumers is growing in Cyprus. Leading foreign and domestic enterprises tend to follow generally accepted RBC principles, and firms pursuing these practices tend to be viewed more favorably by the public. The Cyprus Stock Exchange is among the entities imposing a responsible code of conduct. Most professional associations also promote ethical business conduct among their members, including the Cyprus Bar Association, and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus. For example, the Cyprus Integrity Forum promotes transparency and accountability in business through its Business Integrity Forum certification program – see: https://cyprusintegrityforum.org/business-integrity-forum/ . The ROC does not specifically adhere to OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; however, multinationals are expected to follow generally accepted RBC principles. ROC authorities have made some initial soundings considering the possibility of eventually joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI – https://www.eiti.org/ ). AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS RBC awareness has grown among both producers, consumers and business in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots. Firms pursuing these practices tend to be viewed favorably by the public. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Promoting green investments is high on the ROC government’s agenda as it looks to make gains toward a green transition. The ROC Recovery and Resilience Plan under the EU’s Next Generation EU recovery instrument envisions a total of 58 reforms in exchange for $1.3 billion in EU funding ($1.1 billion in grants and $220 million in loans). Fully 41 percent of the plan’s allocation for reforms and investments support climate objectives, ranging from green taxation, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and promoting more sustainable transport modes. 9. Corruption REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Corruption continues to undermine growth and investment in the ROC, despite the existence of a strong-anti corruption framework. Ninety-five percent of Cypriots think the problem of corruption is widespread, compared to an average of 71 percent in the EU, according to a Eurobarometer survey on corruption conducted by the European Commission in December 2019. In the same survey, 60 percent of Cypriots said they were personally affected by corruption in their daily life, compared to an average of just 26 across the EU. Perhaps even more alarmingly, 69 percent of Cypriots said they thought the level corruption had increased in the past three years, against 42 percent in the EU, who thought the same for their countries. Cypriots put political parties at the top of their list of groups they thought perpetrated corruption (at 63 percent), followed by the healthcare system (59 percent), the police/customs (53 percent), and officials awarding public tenders (52 percent). Corruption, both in the public and private sectors, constitutes a criminal offense. Under the Constitution, the Auditor General controls all government disbursements and receipts and has the right to inspect all accounts on behalf of the Republic, and fear of the Auditor General’s scrutiny is widespread. Government officials sometimes manage procurement efforts with greater concern for the Auditor General than for getting the best outcome for the taxpayer. Private sector concerns focus on the inertia in the system, as reflected in the Auditor General’s annual reports, listing hundreds of alleged incidents of corruption and mismanagement in public administration that usually remain unpunished or unrectified. Transparency International, the global anti-corruption watchdog, ranked Cyprus 52nd out of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perception Index – from 42nd the year before. Disagreements between the Berlin-based headquarters of Transparency International and its Cypriot division in 2017 led to the dis-accreditation of the latter in 2017 and the launch of a successor organization on the island called the Cyprus Integrity Forum (contact details follow). GAN Integrity, a business anti-corruption portal with offices in the United States and Denmark, released a report on corruption in Cyprus April 2018 noting the following: “Although Cyprus is generally free from corruption, high-profile corruption cases in recent years have highlighted the presence of corruption risks in the Cypriot banking sector, public procurement, and land administration sector. Businesses may encounter demands for irregular payments, but the government has established a strong legal framework to combat corruption and generally implements it effectively. Bribery, facilitation payments and giving or receiving gifts are criminal offenses under Cypriot law. The government has a strong anti-corruption framework and has developed effective e-governance systems (the Point of Single Contact and the e-Government Gateway project) to assist businesses.” The report can be accessed at: https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/cyprus/ . Cyprus cooperates closely with EU and other international authorities to fight corruption and provide mutual assistance in criminal investigations. Cyprus ratified the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Cyprus also uses the foreign Tribunal Evidence Law, Chapter 12, to execute requests from other countries for obtaining evidence in Cyprus in criminal matters. Additionally, Cyprus is an active participant in the Council of Europe’s Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption. Cyprus signed and ratified the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and has joined the Group of States against Corruption in the Council of Europe (GRECO). GRECO’s second compliance report on Cyprus, released November 17, 2020, is available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/cyprus . Cyprus is also a member of the UN Anticorruption Convention but it is not a member of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Financial Crime Unit Cyprus Police Headquarters Athalassa 1478 Nicosia Tel. +357 22 808080 E-mail: fcu@police.gov.cy Website: https://www.police.gov.cy/police/police.nsf/index_gr/index_gr?opendocument Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS) 7 Pericleous Str. 2020 Strovolos Tel. +357 22 446004 E-mail: mokas@mokas.law.gov.cy Website: http://www.law.gov.cy/law/mokas/mokas.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument Auditor General of the Republic 6 Deligiorgi Str. 1406 Nicosia Tel. +357 22 401300 E-mail: omichaelides@audit.gov.cy Website: http://www.audit.gov.cy/audit/audit.nsf/home/home?opendocument Anti-corruption NGO: Cyprus Integrity Forum (CIF) 38 Grivas Dhigenis Avenue & 3 Deligiorgis Street PO Box 21455 1509 Nicosia T. +357 22 025772 F. +357 22 025773 E-mail: info@cyprusintegrityforum.org Website: https://cyprusintegrityforum.org/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Corruption in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots continues to be a major problem, mainly in the public sector, allegedly involving politicians, political parties, and bureaucrats. Given its small size and disputed status, international anti-corruption organizations do not evaluate conditions in the north. According to a 2020 Corruption Perception Report carried out by Turkish Cypriot researchers at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), a non-profit foundation funded by the German Government, 88 percent of businesspeople responding to the survey believe bribery and corruption occurs in Northern Cyprus, while 58 percent believe corruption is a “very serious problem.” Respondents said bribery is most common in “allocation and lease of public land and buildings” (55 percent), “incentives” (46 per cent), and “public contracts and licenses” (45 per cent). The “Audit Office” controls all disbursements and receipts and has the right to inspect all accounts. In its annual report, this office identifies specific instances of mismanagement or deviation from proper procedures and anecdotal evidence suggests corruption and patronage continue to be a factor in the economy. 10. Political and Security Environment REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS There have been no incidents of politically-motivated damage to foreign projects and or installations since 1974. U.S. companies have not been the target of violence. There were numerous relatively peaceful protests against the ROC government following the financial crisis of March 2013 and in response to the forced conversion of deposits into equity. Since then, protests against additional austerity measures have been fairly calm. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There have been no incidents of politically-motivated damage to foreign projects and or installations since 1974. U.S. companies have not been the target of violence. Protests and demonstrations, usually targeting the “government,” are commonplace. They are generally peaceful and well-regulated; however, some demonstrations result in scuffles with police or minor damage to buildings. 11. Labor Policies and Practices REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS As an EU country, Cyprus has robust labor standards, safeguarding the freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. The Department of Labor Inspection and other bodies effectively guard against forced labor, child labor, employment discrimination, and secure acceptable working conditions with respect to minimum wage, occupational safety and health, and hours of work. There are several social safety net programs, including unemployment insurance. There is likely some undeclared income in the ROC, as in most developed countries, but there are no indications the informal economy plays a decisive role here. Illegal migrants are sometimes used as cheap labor but this does not appear to be a systemic problem, and authorities do not hesitate to fine employers of illegal laborers. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate of unemployment in the ROC had been declining steadily, dropping from 16.1 percent in 2014 to 8.1 percent in Q3 2020 – at par with the Eurozone area. According to Eurostat, Cyprus has a tertiary education attainment level of 36.3 percent of the total population – well above the EU average of 26.7 percent, and one of the highest in the EU. Many of these graduates are from UK and U.S. colleges and universities, resulting in an abundant supply of English-speaking staff. Cyprus’s total labor force was estimated at 402,000 persons in 2020, broken down as follows: services, 77.8 percent; industry and construction, 19.5 percent; and agriculture, 2.7 percent. More women are joining the labor force and their percentage participation has risen from 33.4 percent in 1980 to 47.6 percent today. Applications for work permits for non-EU workers must be submitted to the Civil Registry and Migration Department by the intended employer and should be accompanied by a work contract stamped by the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance. This ministry must certify that there are no available or adequately qualified Cypriots to carry out the work in question. Cypriot labor law differentiates between layoffs and firing on redundancy grounds. In order to be eligible for redundancy pay, an employee must have worked in the same position for more than two years and must be laid off either due to: (a) budget constraints leading the employer to abolish the position, or (b) inability on the part of the employee to keep up with technological advances. Employees laid off by their employer are entitled to a redundancy payment depending on their length of service. Redundancy payments are equivalent to between two and four weeks of pay per year of service depending on length of service for up to 25 years, with a maximum of 75 weeks of pay or USD 64,350 (EUR 55,000) per employee, whichever is greater. Redundancy payments come out of a government fund, supported with employer and employee contributions. In addition to redundancy pay, a handful of employers, including banks and SOEs, offer severance pay to their employees, although this is not common in the private sector. Some employers hire temporary workers or employ staff on personal contract to avoid hiring unionized labor, often offering less than the going rate under collective agreements. Similarly, some employers hire employees for a year in order to benefit from a wage subsidy of up to USD 1,290 (EUR 1,100) per month by the Human Resources Development Authority and then dismiss them as soon as the subsidy expires. International companies are not required by law to hire union labor, but investors should be aware Cyprus tends to have strong unions in several sectors. As of March 2021, the percentage of the labor force belonging to unions was unofficially estimated at approximately 50 percent, compared to the EU average of approximately 33 percent. The unions remain vocal opponents to privatizations and general austerity measures. ROC public sector working hours are 07:30 – 15:00, Monday to Friday. Cyprus imposes a minimum wage for certain professions as follows (unchanged since March 2016): Clerks/secretaries, sales assistants, paramedical, live-in maids/domestic helpers, school assistants/child-caregivers: USD 1,044 (EUR 870) per month, rising to USD 1,108 (EUR 924) after six months’ employment. Security guards: USD 5.88 (EUR 4.90) per hour, rising to USD 6.24 (EUR 5.20) after six months’ employment. Cleaning personnel: USD 5.46 (EUR 4.55) per hour, rising to USD 5.81 (EUR 4.84) after six months’ employment. Non-EU, live-in domestic servants have a separate minimum wage, set at USD 552 (EUR 460) per month, plus their room and board. For all other professions, there is no minimum wage and wages are set by the employer and employee. Collective bargaining agreements between trade unions and employers cover most sectors of the economy. Wages set in these agreements are typically significantly higher than the legislated minimum wage. In June 2021, the Ministry of Labour initiated consultations with unions and employers to introduce a national minimum wage, but these discussions have so far been inconclusive. Under the EU single market, EU citizens benefit from the right to free movement of workers. Employers are required to seek work visas for third-country nationals from the Civil Registry and Migration Department. The ROC caps the number of third-country nationals a company may employ. Some companies have noted seeking visas for their third-country national staff can be lengthy and cumbersome. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS According to the 2019-2020 Turkish Cypriot Competitiveness Report published by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, the greatest obstacle to doing business was an insufficiently trained workforce. Reliable labor statistics are often difficult to obtain. The “State Planning Office” (“SPO”) estimated the total number of people employed in 2021 was 125,739. The labor force in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots has a high per capita level of university graduates, including many from U.S. and European universities, and offers an abundant supply of white-collar workers. The unemployment rate was 7.8 percent as of December 2021. Women accounted for approximately 34.9 percent of the labor force. Around 10 percent of private sector workers and more than 65 percent of “semi-public” and “public sector” workers belong to labor unions. Workers are allowed to form and become members of unions. As of February 2021, the minimum wage was USD 410 (6,090 Turkish Lira) per month. Foreign persons are required to obtain work permits through their employer. Foreign entities may import their key personnel from abroad and are also permitted to hire trainees and part-time workers. A full-time work week is 40 hours for “public sector” employees. Private sector employees can work up to 8 hours a day. After 8 hours, employees can continue to work up to 4 hours of overtime a day. Overtime during weekdays is paid at 110 percent of the base rate. On weekends and holidays, overtime is paid at 150 percent of the base rate. Employees cannot work on Sundays unless there is an emergency, or an approval by “labor authorities.” Workers are able to exercise their right to bargain collectively, mainly in the public sector. “Public sector” and “semi-public sector” employees benefit from collective bargaining agreements. The “law” provides for collective bargaining. According to “authorities,” the majority of foreign workers are from Turkey and work in the service (hotel, restaurant, catering) and construction sectors. 14. Contact for More Information George F. Demetriou Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Metochiou & Ploutarchou Streets 2407 Engomi Nicosia, Cyprus Tel: +357 22 393361 Email: DemetriouGF@state.gov Czechia Executive Summary The Czech Republic is a medium-sized, open economy with 71 percent of its GDP based on exports, mostly from the automotive and engineering industries. According to the Czech Statistical Office, most of the country’s exports go to the European Union (EU), with 32.4 percent going to Germany alone. The United States is the Czech Republic’s second largest non-EU export destination, following the United Kingdom. While the Czech GDP dropped by 5.6 percent due to the economic impact of COVID-19 in 2020, it rebounded in 2021 to 3.3 percent according to the Czech Statistical Office. The Ministry of Finance forecasts 3.1 percent growth for 2022. The “Bill on Screening of Foreign Investments” entered into force May 1, 2021. The law gives the government the ability to screen greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU investors. The Czech Republic has taken strides to diversify its traditional investments in engineering into new fields of research and development (R&D) and innovative technologies. EU structural funding has enabled the country to open a number of world-class scientific and high-tech centers. EU member states are the largest investors in the Czech Republic. The United States announced on February 15, 2020 plans to provide up to USD 1 billion in financing through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, the dedicated investment vehicle for the Three Seas Initiative and its participating Central and Eastern European countries. The Three Seas Initiative seeks to reinforce security and economic growth in the region through the development of energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure. In December 2020 the DFC approved the first tranche of U.S. financial support for the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund amounting to USD 300 million. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) agreed March 24, 2021, to a request from the Czech cabinet to return as an investor to the Czech Republic after a 13-year pause to help mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. The EBRD’s investments in the Czech Republic primarily focus on private sector assistance and should reach EUR 100 – 200 million annually (USD109-218 million). The EBRD plans to be involved in investment projects in the Czech Republic temporarily (maximum five years). The continued economic fallout from COVID-19 resulted in the Czech Republic’s highest historic state budget deficit of 419.7 billion crowns (USD 18.2 billion) in 2021. In 2021, the Czech Republic appropriated approximately USD17 billion for the COVID-19 response, including USD7.7 billion in direct support, USD 6.7 billion in healthcare and social services expenses, and USD2.3 billion in loan guarantees. The Czech Republic has adopted environmental strategies and policies to address the climate crisis. Public procurement policies include environmental considerations, and the government provides subsidies to companies for using modern low-carbon technologies, renewables, and resource-effective processes. There are no significant risks to doing business responsibly in areas such as labor and human rights in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic fully complies with EU and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) standards for labor laws and equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Wages continue to trail those in neighboring Western European countries (Czech wages are roughly one-third of comparable German wages). While wage growth slowed in 2020 following the coronavirus pandemic, resulting in a 3.1 percent year-on-year increase, wages rose by 6.1 percent in 2021, according to the Czech Statistical Office. As of the fourth quarter of 2021, wages grew primarily in the real estate, accommodation, and hospitality sectors. As of January 2022, the unemployment rate remained the lowest in the EU, at only 2.3 percent. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 24 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 5,629 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 22,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Czech government actively seeks to attract foreign investment via policies that make the country a competitive destination for companies to locate, operate, and expand. The Czech investment incentives legislation (amended Act No. 72/2000 Coll., effective as of September 6, 2019) creates incentive payments for high value-added investments that focus on R&D and create jobs for university graduates. The law eliminates incentives for investments targeting low-skilled labor and establishes more favorable rules for technological investments in sectors such as aerospace, information and communication technology, life sciences, nanotechnology, and advanced segments of the automotive industry. In addition, due to COVID-19, the government approved November 30, 2020, an amendment to this statute, which enables producers of personal protective equipment, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals to more easily obtain investment incentives. CzechInvest, the government investment promotion agency that operates under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), negotiates on behalf of the Czech government with foreign investors. In addition, CzechInvest provides assistance during implementation of investment projects, consulting services for foreign investors entering the Czech market, support for suppliers, and assistance for the development of innovative start-up firms. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. The Czech Republic is a recipient of substantial FDI. Total foreign investment in the Czech Republic (equity capital + reinvested earnings + other capital) equaled USD 192.5 billion at the end of 2020, compared to USD 171.3 billion in 2019. As a medium-sized, open, export-driven economy, the Czech market is strongly dependent on foreign demand, especially from EU partners. In 2021, 84 percent of Czech exports went to fellow EU member states, with 32.4 percent to the Czech Republic’s largest trading partner, Germany, according to the Czech Statistical Office. Since emerging from recession in 2013, the economy had enjoyed some of the highest GDP growth rates of the European Union until the COVID-19 outbreak. While GDP declined by 5.6 percent in 2020, it rebounded in 2021 and grew by 3.3 percent. The Ministry of Finance is forecasting 3.1 percent growth for 2022. The Czech Republic has no plans to adopt the euro as it believes having its own currency and independent monetary policy is helpful for managing economic crises such as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The slow pace of legislative and judicial reforms has posed obstacles to investment, competitiveness, and company restructuring. The Czech government has harmonized its laws with EU legislation and the acquis communautaire. This effort involved positive reforms of the judicial system, civil administration, financial markets regulation, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and in many other areas important to investors. While there have been many success stories involving American and other foreign investors, a handful have experienced problems, for example in the media industry. Both foreign and domestic businesses voice concerns about corruption. Long-term economic challenges include dealing with an aging population and diversifying the economy away from manufacturing toward a more high-tech, services-based, knowledge economy. Foreign individuals or entities can operate a business under the same conditions as Czechs. Foreign entities need to register their permanent branches with the Czech Commercial Register. Some professionals, such as architects, physicians, lawyers, auditors, and tax advisors, must register for membership in the appropriate professional chamber. In general, licensing and membership requirements apply equally to foreign and domestic professionals. In response to the European Commission’s September 2017 investment screening directive, the Czech government adopted foreign investment screening legislation. The law came into effect on May 1, 2021, and gives the government the ability to review greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU foreign investors. The law allows the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) to screen FDI in virtually any sector of the Czech economy but specifies four high-risk sectors for which investment screening is mandatory: critical infrastructure, ICT systems used for critical infrastructure, military equipment, and sensitive dual use items. Outside these critical sectors, non-EU investors are under no obligation to report acquisitions or greenfield investments, but MOIT can retroactively review investments at any point within five years if security concerns arise. Screening of acquisitions is triggered when a non-EU buyer attempts to make a purchase that would give it at least 10 percent of the voting rights of a Czech company. However, screening is possible at an even lower threshold in cases where the foreign investor has additional means of exerting potentially malign control over a Czech company, such as through appointment of staff to key positions. Furthermore, the law gives regulators considerable leeway to designate an investor as “non-EU” if the investor is “indirectly controlled” by non-EU business or individuals. As of early 2012, U.S. and other non-EU nationals could purchase real estate, including agricultural land, in the Czech Republic without restrictions. However, following the implementation of the investment screening law as of May 1, 2021, land purchases by non-EU investors may be screened if located near critical infrastructure, such as military installations. Enterprises are permitted to engage in any legal activity with the previously noted limitations in sensitive sectors. The right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises is guaranteed by law. Laws on auditing, accounting, and bankruptcy are in force, including the use of international accounting standards (IAS). The OECD last conducted an economic survey of the government in 2020. Individuals must complete a number of bureaucratic requirements to set up a business or operate as a freelancer or contractor. MOIT provides an electronic guide for obtaining a business license. The guide offers step-by-step assistance, including links to related legislation and statistical data, and specifying authorities with whom to work (such as business registration, tax administration, social security, and municipal authorities). The guide is available at: https://www.mpo.cz/en/business/licensed-trades/guide-to-licensed-trades/. MOIT also has established regional information points to provide consulting services related to doing business in the Czech Republic and EU. A list of contact points is available at: https://www.businessinfo.cz/en/starting-a-business/starting-up-points-of-single-contact-psc/addresses-points-of-single-contact-psc/. The average time required to start a business is 25 days according to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ Index. The Czech Republic’s Business Register is publicly accessible and provides details on business entities including legal addresses and major executives. An application for an entry into the Business Register can be submitted in a hard copy, via a direct entry by a public notary, or electronically, subject to meeting online registration criteria requirements. The Business Register is publicly available at: https://or.justice.cz/ias/ui/rejstrik. The Czech Republic’s Trade Register is an online information system that collects and provides information on entities facilitating small trade and craft-oriented business activities, as specifically determined by related legislation. It is available online at: http://www.rzp.cz/eng/index.html. The Czech government does not incentivize outward investment. The volume of outward investment is lower than incoming FDI. According to the latest data from the Czech National Bank, Czech outward investments amounted to USD51.3 billion in 2020, compared to inward investments of USD 195.2 billion. However, according to the Export Guarantee and Insurance Corporation (EGAP), Czech companies increasingly invest abroad to get closer to their customers, save on transport costs, and shorten delivery times. As part of EU sanctions, there is a total ban on EU investment in North Korea as of 2017. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties The Czech Republic and the United States have shared a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) for decades. The government of Czechoslovakia signed the original BIT with the United States in 1992, and the Czech Republic adopted this treaty in 1993, after the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs amended the treaty in 2003, along with other new EU entrants that had U.S. BITs, following negotiations with the European Commission about conflicts within the EU acquis communautaire. Several dozen countries have signed and ratified investment agreements with the Czech Republic, and some are in the process of ratification. The full list of agreements, including ratification dates, can be found on the Ministry of Finance website in Czech language only at: http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/dohody-o-podpore-a-ochrane-investic/prehled-platnych-dohod-o-podpore-a-ochra. The list of all BITs between the Czech Republic and other countries is available in English at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/55/czechia. A bilateral U.S.-Czech Convention on Avoidance of Double Taxation has been in force since 1993. In 2007, the U.S. and Czech governments signed a bilateral Totalization Agreement that exempts Americans working in the Czech Republic from paying into both the Czech and U.S. social security systems. The agreement took effect January 1, 2009. In 2013, the U.S. and Czech governments signed a Supplementary Totalization Agreement amending the original agreement to reflect new Czech legislation on health insurance. In 2014, the United States and the Czech Republic signed an Agreement on Improvement of International Tax Compliance and to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The Czech Republic is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and a party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. 3. Legal Regime Tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws generally do not distort or impede investment. Policy frameworks are consistent with a market economy. Fair market competition is overseen by the Office for the Protection of Competition (UOHS) (http://www.uohs.cz/en/homepage.html). UOHS is a central administrative body entirely independent in its decision-making practice. The office is mandated to create conditions for support and protection of competition and to supervise public procurement and state aid. The government requires companies with over 500 employees to undertake environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency. All laws and regulations in the Czech Republic are published before they enter into force. Opportunities for prior consultation on pending regulations exist, and all interested parties, including foreign entities, can participate. A biannual governmental plan of legislative and non-legislative work is available online, along with information on draft laws and regulations (often only in the Czech language). Business associations, consumer groups, and other non-governmental organizations, including the American Chamber of Commerce, can submit comments on laws and regulations. Laws on auditing, accounting, and bankruptcy are in force. These laws include the use of international accounting standards (IAS) for consolidated corporate groups. Public finances are transparent. The government’s budget and information on debt obligations are publicly available and published online. Membership in the EU requires the Czech Republic to adopt EU laws and regulations, including rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Czechoslovakia was a founding member of the GATT in 1947 and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU in 2004, the European Commission – an independent body representing all EU members – oversees Czech equities in the WTO and in trade negotiations. The Czech Commercial Code and Civil Code are largely based on the German legal approach, which follows a continental legal system where the principal areas of law and procedures are codified. The commercial code details rules pertaining to legal entities and is analogous to corporate law in the United States. The civil code deals primarily with contractual relationships among parties. The Czech Civil Code, Act. No. 89/2012 Coll. and the Act on Business Corporations, Act No. 90/2012 Coll. (Corporations Act) govern business and investment activities. The Act on Business Corporations introduced substantial changes to Czech corporate law such as supervision over the performance of a company’s management team, decision-making process, and remuneration and damage liability. Detailed provisions for mergers and time limits on decisions by the authorities on registration of companies are covered, as well as protection of creditors and minority shareholders. The judiciary is independent of the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and the judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. The Foreign Direct Investment agenda is governed by the Civil Code and by the Act on Business Corporations. In addition, the newly adopted investment screening law, which came into effect on May 1, 2020, gives the government the ability to screen greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU investors for national security considerations. The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade maintains a “one-stop-shop” website available in Czech only at https://www.businessinfo.cz/, which aids foreign companies in establishing and managing a foreign-owned business in the Czech Republic, including navigating the legal requirements, licensing, and operating in the EU market. The Office for the Protection of Competition (UOHS) is the central authority responsible for creating conditions that favor and protect competition. UOHS also supervises public procurement and monitors state aid (subsidy) programs. UOHS is led by a chairperson who is appointed by the president of the Czech Republic for a six-year term. Government acquisition of property is done only for public purposes in a non-discriminatory manner and in full compliance with international law. The process of tracing the history of property and land acquisition can be complex and time-consuming, but it is necessary to ensure clear title. Investors participating in privatization of state-owned companies are protected from restitution claims through a binding contract with the government. The government amended the bankruptcy law on June 1, 2019, expanding the categories of debtors qualified for debt discharge. The basic debt relief period for individuals is currently five years. However, if the debtor is a pensioner, disabled, his or her debt was created prior 18 years of age, or manages to repay at least 60 percent of debt, then the debt relief period shortened to three years. 4. Industrial Policies The Czech Republic offers incentives to foreign and domestic firms alike that invest in the manufacturing sector, technology and R&D centers, and business support centers. The amended Act No. 72/2000 Coll. came into force September 6, 2019, and shifted availability of incentive programs from all types of investments to only those requiring R&D and that create jobs for university graduates, as well as in specialized sectors such as aerospace, information and communication technology, life sciences, nanotechnology and advanced segments of the automotive industry. Incentives are funded from the Czech Republic’s national budget as well as from EU Structural Funds. The government provides investment incentives in the form of corporate income tax relief for 10 years, cash grants for job creation up to USD13,000 per job, cash grants for training up to 70 percent of training costs, and cash grants for the purchase of fixed assets up to 20 percent of eligible costs. In response to COVID-19, the government approved November 30, 2020, an amendment to this law, which enables producers of personal protective equipment and medical products to more easily obtain investment incentives, because the state considers these products strategic for the protection of citizens’ lives and health during the pandemic. In addition, film industry incentives cover up to 20 percent of eligible costs of foreign filmmakers. The government does not typically issuing guarantees or engaging in joint financing for FDI projects. The government primarily provides subsidies, as opposed to incentives (such as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives) for clean energy investments. Both Czech and EU laws permit foreign investors involved in joint ventures to take advantage of commercial or industrial customs-free zones into which goods may be imported and later exported without depositing customs duties. Free trade zone treatment means duties need to be paid only in the event that the goods brought into the free trade zone are introduced into the local economy. Since the Czech Republic became part of the single customs territory of the European Community and now offers various exemptions on customs tariffs, the original tariff-driven use of these free trade zones has declined. The Czech Republic does not have special economic zones. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest. The host government does not follow “forced localization.” The visa process for non-EU foreign investors and their employees is the same for domestic, EU, and non-EU companies. The Czech Republic abides by EU law governing data localization and performance. The Czech Republic strongly supported creating the EU Regulation on free flow of non-personal data which came into effect in May 2019, stating that it would boost the competitive data economy and accelerate the development of artificial intelligence. The July 16, 2020 ruling of the EU’s highest court in the Schrems II case, which invalidated the legal basis for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework, has put a significant burden on companies transferring personal data from the Czech Republic to the United States. The “Bill on Digitalization of Public Authorities (“Cloud Bill”) came into force February 1, 2022, marking the latest step in the country’s efforts to move government data to the cloud. The legislation enables government ministries to partner with global cloud service providers to migrate government data to the cloud. The legislation seeks to operationalize a “Cloud Catalogue” of cloud service providers that are certified as secure and trustworthy partners for government data. The legislation mandates that sensitive government data be stored in the EU but allows global cloud services providers (including U.S. companies) to transfer data overseas for routine maintenance purposes. The legislation also allows cloud service providers managing Czech government data to comply with the U.S. CLOUD Act, which gives U.S. law enforcement agencies the right to access personal data stored outside the United States. 5. Protection of Property Rights Real estate (land and buildings) located in the Czech Republic must be registered in the national Cadastral Register under the Cadastral Office. The Cadastral Register contains information on plots of land and buildings, housing units and non-residential premises, liens, and other information and is publicly available online in Czech only at: https://nahlizenidokn.cuzk.cz/. Transfer of ownership title to real estate (e.g., sale and purchase agreement) is effective from the date of execution of a written agreement and registration of the transfer of the ownership title in the Cadastral Register. There is a negligible proportion of land that does not have clear title. If property legally purchased becomes unoccupied, property ownership does not revert to squatters. The Czech Republic is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Domestic legislation protects all intellectual property rights (IPR), including patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, and utility models. Amendments to the trademark law and the copyright law have brought Czech law into compliance with relevant EU directives and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The Criminal Code sets the maximum penalty of eight years of imprisonment for trademark, industrial rights, and copyright violations. The Customs Administration of the Czech Republic and the Czech Commercial Inspection have legal authority to seize counterfeit goods. Information on seizures of counterfeit goods and cases of IPR infringement are tracked by the Customs Administration. Information is available in Czech at https://www.celnisprava.cz/cz/statistiky/Stranky/dusevni-vlastnictvi.aspx. The Czech Republic was removed from the Watch List of the U.S. Trade Representative Special 301 Report in 2011. While online piracy in the Czech Republic has been cited by some U.S. entities as an area of concern, the legal framework for protecting and enforcing IPR has been tested and proven successful in punishing infringers. In response to the 2019 EU Copyright Directive, the Czech government proposed in November 2020 an amendment to their Copyright Act. The amendment will clarify the right of copyright holders to receive payment for online distribution of their content by third parties. The Czech Republic is not listed as hosting any physical markets in USTR’s 2021 Notorious Markets Report, but it reportedly hosts a website containing infringing content. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The Czech Republic is open to portfolio investment. There are 54 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). The overall trade volume of stocks increased from CZK108.78 billion (USD4.7 billion) in 2019 to CZK125.31 (USD5.4 billion) in 2020, with an average daily trading volume of CZK501.23 million (USD21.7 million). In March 2007, the PSE created the Prague Energy Exchange (PXE), which was later re-named to Power Exchange Central Europe, to trade electricity in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and, later, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. PXE’s goal is to increase liquidity in the electricity market and create a standardized platform for trading energy. In 2016, the German power exchange EEX acquired two thirds of PXE shares. Following the acquisition, the PXE benefited from both an increased number of traders and increased trade volume. The Czech National Bank, as the financial market supervisory authority, sets rules to safeguard the stability of the banking sector, capital markets, and insurance and pension scheme industries, and systematically regulates, supervises and, where appropriate, issues penalties for non-compliance with these rules. The Central Credit Register (CCR) is an information system that pools information on the credit commitments of individual entrepreneurs and legal entities, facilitating the efficient exchange of information between CCR participants. CCR participants consist of all banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the Czech Republic, as well as other individuals included in a special law. As an EU member country, the local market provides credits and credit instruments on market terms that are available to foreign investors. The Czech Republic respects IMF Article VIII. Large domestic banks belong to European banking groups. Most operate conservatively and concentrate almost exclusively on the domestic Czech market. Despite the COVID-19 crisis, Czech banks remain healthy. Results of regular banking sector stress tests, as conducted by the Czech National Bank, repeatedly confirm the strong state of the Czech banking sector which is deemed resistant to potential shocks. Results of the most recent stress test conducted by the Czech National Bank are available at: https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/stress-testing/banking-sector/. As of January 31, 2022, the total assets of commercial banks stood at CZK9,405 billion (approximately USD409 billion). Foreign investors have access to bank credit on the local market, and credit is generally allocated on market terms. The Czech National Bank has 10 correspondent banking relationships, including JP Morgan Chase Bank in New York and the Royal Bank of Canada in Toronto. The Czech Republic has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, and there are no relationships in jeopardy. The Czech Republic does not currently regulate cryptocurrencies. The Czech government does not operate a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Ministry of Finance administers state ownership policies. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are structured as joint-stock companies, state enterprises, national enterprises, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships. SOEs are owned by the individual ministries but are managed according to their business organizational structure as defined by law and are required to publish an annual report, disclose their accounting books, and submit to an independent audit. Potential conflicts of interest are covered by existing Act No. 159/2006 on Conflicts of Interest, and Act No. 14/2017 on Amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest. Legislation on the civil service, which took effect January 1, 2015, established measures to prevent political influence over public administration, including operation of SOEs. Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, government contracts and other business operations. SOEs purchase or supply goods and services from private sector and foreign firms. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards, rules, and taxation policies as their private competitors, and are not given any material advantages compared to private entities. State-owned or majority state-owned companies are present in several (strategic) sectors, including the energy, postal service, information and communication, and transport sectors. The Czech Republic has 52 wholly owned SOEs and three majority owned SOEs (excluding those in liquidation). Wholly owned SOEs employ roughly 78,000 people and own more than CZK487 billion (approximately USD21.1 billion) in assets. A list of all companies with a percentage of state ownership is available in Czech at: https://www.komora.cz/legislation/167-19-strategie-vlastnicke-politiky-statu-t-20-12-2019/. As an OECD member, the Czech Republic promotes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the affiliated Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same legislation as private enterprises regarding their commercial activities. As a result of several waves of privatization, the vast majority of the Czech economy is now in private hands. Privatizations have generally been open to foreign investors. In fact, most major SOEs were privatized with foreign participation. The government evaluates all investment offers for SOEs. Many competitors have alleged non-transparent or unfair practices in connection with past privatizations. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The concept of responsible business conduct (RBC) is now widely understood, and every year is implemented by more companies in the Czech Republic. As an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE) and to the United Nations Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights, the government promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR) and encourages local as well as foreign enterprises to adopt a ‘due diligence’ approach to RBC principles. The Czech National Contact Point (NCP) has operated since 2013 at MOIT: https://www.mpo.cz/dokument75865.html. The NCP working group consists of representatives of the government, employer organizations (Confederation of Industry and Trade), employee organizations (Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions), and NGOs. The NCP closely and actively cooperates with other regional NCPs to share best practices, procedures, and experience. In conjunction with the UN Commission on Business and Human Rights, in 2019 the Czech government approved a National Action Plan (NAP) for CSR for the years 2019-2023. The major goal of the NAP is to establish fundamental principles and to motivate businesses and public administration to voluntarily implement specific CSR projects. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Section of the Quality Council of the Czech Republic created a national Informational CSR Portal that provides businesses, NGOs, representatives of state administration, and the public with updates related to CSR in the Czech Republic. The government strictly and effectively enforces legislation in the area of human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. Domestic standards are generally very high. Negligence or failure to comply with this legislation results in serious consequences. Shareholders are protected by legislation that clearly describes legal processes, organizational structures, administration, and management of all business components, including stakeholders. Companies are not required to publicly disclose information about their RBC or CSR activities. Various local NGOs monitor and advise CSR programs, such as the Association for Corporate Social Responsibility, the Business Leaders Forum, and Business for Society. The Association for CSR is the host entity in the Czech Republic for the UN Global Compact, a UN strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with 10 universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption. Payments for extraction of minerals in the Czech Republic abide by the Mining Law, which requires that payments are processed for extracted minerals as well as for mined areas. International trade with oil, natural gas, and minerals is not subject to any special legislation; it follows the general rules of international trade. The Czech Republic is not an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)-compliant country or an EITI candidate. The Czech government adheres to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. MOIT is responsible for implementation and compliance. The Czech Republic joined The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies on November 14, 2013. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In statements to the public, the government has repeatedly endorsed the EU’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. A key step toward that goal will be the country’s planned exit from coal by 2033 which currently contributes to one-third of the Czech Republic’s electricity production. Switching from coal will offer commercial opportunities in alternative sources of power and the infrastructure and energy storage capabilities necessary to bring it to market. Nuclear energy is widely seen as the best alternative to coal, but solar, wind and to some extent, green hydrogen, will attract investment. Two of the stated priorities for the Ministry of Environment include energy efficiency and adaptation. In September 2021, the government approved an updated version of the national Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2021 – 2030, which is in line with the EU Adaptation Strategy. The adaptation strategy addresses all significant manifestations of climate change in the Czech Republic and aims to reduce vulnerability and increase the resilience of society and ecosystems to climate change and thus reduce its negative impacts. The Strategy’s implementation document is the National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change which assigns specific tasks to relevant ministries. The Climate Protection Policy of the Czech Republic 2017 – 2030 defines the main goals and measures in the field of climate protection at the national level to ensure compliance with greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in line with international agreements, and thus contribute to transition to a sustainable low-emission economy. By the end of 2023, the Ministry of Environment should submit to the government an update of the Climate Protection Policy, which will contain new measures the Czech Republic will have to take in the coming years to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. In 2022, the Czech Parliament is expected to pass legislation banning single use plastic. Although the government strategies do not specify requirements for private sector contributions to achieving relevant targets, they include examples of positive and negative forms of financial motivation to encourage companies towards contributing to climate goals. The Czech government offers a range of subsidy programs to achieve environmental goals. For example, manufacturing companies can receive subsidies for installing low-carbon and smart technologies, using renewable resources, increasing energy savings, and reducing losses in heat distribution. Companies can receive subsidies and soft loans from the EU Operational Program Environment (OPE) 2021-2027 which supports projects in the field of protection of nature, biodiversity, green infrastructure, circular economy, sustainable water management, renewable resources, energy efficiency and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Public procurement policies include environmental considerations, including resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. 9. Corruption Current law criminalizes both payment and receipt of bribes, regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality. Prison sentences for bribery or abuse of power can be as high as 12 years for officials. There have been several successful cases prosecuting corruption, though some experts have noted proceedings can be lengthy and subject to delays. The National Center for Organized Crime (NCOZ) is primarily responsible for investigating high-level corruption cases, however some experts have raised concerns about cumbersome procedural requirements. Anti-corruption laws authorize seizures of proceeds or instruments of crime and apply equally to Czech and foreign investors. Czech law obliges legislators, members of the cabinet, and other selected public officials to declare their assets annually. Summarized declarations are available online and complete declarations are available upon request from the Ministry of Justice, which can impose penalties of up to CZK50,000 (approximately USD2,170) for non-compliance. The law also requires judges, prosecutors and directors of research institutions to disclose their assets, however their declarations are not publicly available for security reasons. In addition to the financial disclosure law, the government regulates political parties financing, public procurements, and the register of public contracts. The law on the register of public contracts requires all national, regional, and local authorities as well as private companies to make publicly available all newly concluded contracts (including subsidies and repayable financial assistance) valued at CZK50,000 (USD2,170) or more within 30 days; noncompliance renders contracts null and void. Additionally, as of November 2019, major state-owned companies are required to publish all contracts, except in limited circumstances. The Registry of Contracts has a website in Czech only at: https://smlouvy.gov.cz/. Public procurement law requires every contracting authority to post winning contracts on its website within 15 working days of signing. Subject to limited exceptions, the law mandates more than one bidder for all public procurements and requires bidders to disclose their ownership structure prior to bidding. In addition to general conflict-of-interest law, the procurement law also addresses some conflict-of-interest issues related to government procurements. The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) evaluation report listed missing whistleblower protection and regulation of lobbying as problematic. The “Beneficial Ownership Bill” came into force in June 1, 2021. The law is a part of a transposition of an EU convention on anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing and requires transparency regarding the real (or “beneficial”) ownership of companies seeking subsidies or public contracts. The law bars anonymously owned companies from applying for public subsidies or tenders, although it does not empower officials to challenge discrepancies or irregularities in a company’s ownership structure, absent a court finding. However, the European Commission asserted in December 2021 that the Czech law does not meet EU requirements, because it allows two types of owners to be listed for one company: one with “final influence” and one who is the “final recipient of benefits”. The European Commission also criticized the carveout that public research institutions, SOEs, political parties, schools, and some other associations are not required to declare their beneficial ownership. The Czech government reported March 2022 it would make changes to the law to comply with EU requirements. According to a law which came into force in January 2020, candidates filling supervisory board positions in state-owned companies must be selected in a clear, transparent process that prioritizes technical expertise and is reviewed by an advisory committee whose members are apolitical experts. Separately, the government recommends companies maintain internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. The Council of Europe’s anti-money laundering body MONEYVAL reported at the end of 2021 that the Czech Republic has considerably improved its implementation of measures against money laundering and terrorist financing since 2020. The government ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2000 and the UN Convention against Corruption in 2014. According to the 2017 OECD Phase 4 Evaluation Report, the Czech Republic should take steps to improve enforcement of its foreign bribery laws, enhance efforts to detect, investigate, and prosecute foreign bribes, increase protections for whistleblowers, and better implement the criminal liability of the legal entities law. Several NGOs such as Frank Bold, Transparency International, and Anticorruption Endowment Fund receive corruption reports online. The reports most frequently involve minor offenses, such as attempts to bribe police officers or other public officials to receive benefits or avoid liability. While there is not a specific law to protect NGOs involved in investigating corruption, NGO activities are protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedom that protects civil society and free speech. Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption: Conflict of Interest and Anti-Corruption Department Anti-Corruption Unit Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic Vyšehradská 16 12800 Prague 2 https://www.justice.cz/ +420 221 997 595 korupce@msp.justice.cz Contact at “watchdog” organizations: Transparency International Czech Republic Sokolovska 260/143 +420-224 240 895 posta@transparency.cz https://www.transparency.cz/ Frank Bold Udolni 33, Brno tel: +420 545 213 975 info@frankbold.org https://frankbold.org/ Anticorruption Endowment Fund Nadacni Fond Proti Korupci Revoluční 8, building A, 5th floor, 110 00 Praha 1 +420 226 209 047 info@nfpk.cz https://www.nfpk.cz/ Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa and one of the richest in the world in terms of natural resources. With 80 million hectares (197 million acres) of arable land and 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the resources to achieve prosperity for its people. Despite its potential, the DRC often cannot provide adequate food, security, infrastructure, and health care to its estimated 100 million inhabitants, of which 75 percent live on less than two dollars a day. The ascension of Felix Tshisekedi to the presidency in 2019 and his government’s commitment to attracting international, and particularly U.S. investment, have raised the hopes of the business community for greater openness and transparency. In January 2021, the DRC government (GDRC) became eligible for preferential trade preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), reflecting progress made on human rights, anti-corruption, and labor. Tshisekedi created a presidential unit to address business climate issues. In late 2020 Tshisekedi ejected former President Joseph Kabila’s party from the ruling coalition and in April 2021 he appointed a new cabinet. Overall investment is on the rise, fueled by multilateral donor financing and private domestic and international finance. The natural resource sector has historically attracted the most foreign investment and continues to attract investors’ attention as global demand for the DRC’s minerals grows. The primary minerals sector is the country’s main source of revenue, as exports of copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, diamond, tin, and tungsten provide over 95 percent of the DRC’s export revenue. The highly competitive telecommunications industry has also experienced significant investment, as has the energy sector through green sources such as hydroelectric and solar power generation. Several breweries and bottlers, some large construction firms, and limited textiles production are active. Given the vast needs, there are commercial opportunities in aviation, road, rail, border security, water transport, and the ports. The agricultural and forestry sectors present opportunities for sustainable economic diversification in the DRC, and companies are expressing interest in developing carbon credit markets to fund investment. Overall, businesses in the DRC face numerous challenges, including poor infrastructure, a predatory taxation system, and corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed economic growth and worsened the country’s food security, and the Russia’s attacks on Ukraine have raised global prices on imported foods and gasoline. Armed groups remain active in the eastern part of the country, making for a fragile security situation that negatively affects the business environment. Reform of a non-transparent and often corrupt legal system is underway. While laws protecting investors are in effect, the court system is often very slow to make decisions or follow the law, allowing numerous investment disputes to last for years Concerns over the use of child labor in the artisanal mining of copper and cobalt have served to discourage potential purchasers. USG assistance programs to build capacity for labor inspections and enforcement are helping to address these concerns. The government’s announced priorities include greater efforts to address corruption, election reform, a review of mining contracts signed under the Kabila regime, and improvements to mining sector revenue collection. The economy experienced increased growth in 2021 based on renewed demand for its minerals. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $25 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $550 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ascension of Felix Tshisekedi to the Presidency in January 2019 and his welcoming attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from the United States, have raised hopes that the GDRC can impose and monitor investor-friendly policies. FDI-friendly laws exist, but the judicial system is slow to protect investors’ rights and is susceptible to political pressure and corruption. Investors hope that Tshisekedi can create a more favorable environment by improving the rule of law and tackling corruption. The DRC’s rich endowment of natural resources, large population, and generally open trading system offer significant potential opportunities for U.S. investors. For more than a decade, the DRC has undertaken reforms related to investment in order to make its business environment competitive and attractive including reforms to the investment code, the mining code, the insurance code, the agricultural Act, the Act on the liberalization of electricity, and the telecommunications code. The GDRC has also promoted improvements in the tax, customs, parafiscal, non-tax and foreign exchange regimes, which are applicable to collaboration agreements and cooperation projects, as well as the decree on the strategic partnership on value chains, the Industrial Property Act, the Public-Private Partnership Act, the Competition Act, and the Special Economic Zones Act. The main regulations governing FDI are found in the Investment Code Act (No. 004/2002 of February 21, 2002). Current regulations reserve the practice of small-scale commerce and retail commerce in DRC to nationals and prohibit majority ownership by foreigners of agricultural enterprises. The ordinance of “August 8, 1990” clearly states that “small business may only be carried out by Congolese”. Foreign investors must limit themselves to import trade and wholesale and semi-wholesale trade. Investors fear that the ban on foreign agricultural ownership will stifle any attempt to revive the agrarian sector. The National Investment Promotion Agency (ANAPI) is the official investment agency, providing investment facilitation services for initial investments above $200,000. It is mandated to promote the positive image of the DRC and specific investment opportunities; advocate for the improvement of the business climate in the country; and provide administrative support to new foreign investors who decide to establish or expand their economic activities on the national territory. More information is available at https://www.investindrc.cd/ . The GDRC maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors to hear their concerns. There are several public and private sector forums that address the government on the investment climate in specific sectors. In 2019, the GDRC created the Business Climate Unit (CCA) to monitor and improve the business enabling environment in the DRC, and to interface with the business community. In June 2020, the CCA presented a roadmap for reforms. In December 2021, the CCA developed a digital tool for monitoring and evaluating reforms and missions within the public administration, to allow the highest authorities, including the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, to follow in real time the progress of the implementation of reforms by the various ministers. The Public-Private mining group Financial and Technical Partners (PTF) represents countries with significant mining investments in the DRC. On March 1, 2022, the GDRC created, by decree, the Agency for the Steering, Coordination and Monitoring of Cooperation Agreements between the DRC and its Private Partners (APCSC). This agency will oversee the implementation of cooperation agreements that the DRC has concluded with private companies, particularly in the areas of basic infrastructure and natural resources. The APCSC serves as an interface between the various parties and entities interested in projects resulting from collaboration or cooperation agreements in basic infrastructure and natural resources, including the GDRC, private companies and/or groups of companies, as well as any joint venture or monitoring structure created for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, or marketing natural resources and/or carrying out infrastructure work. The Federation of Congolese Enterprises (FEC), a private sector organization that partners with the government and workers’ unions, maintains a dialogue on business interests with the government. The GDRC provides the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Foreign ownership or control is possible except in certain excepted sectors. The DRC law reserves small-scale commerce and retail trade to Congolese nationals and there is a foreign ownership limit of 49 percent for agricultural concerns, which limits agricultural investment. Many investors note that in practice the GDRC requires foreign investors to hire local agents and participate in joint ventures with the government or local partners. The new telecommunications law enacted in 2022 includes a 25 percent ownership requirement. Some foreign investors in the mining sector note that the 2018 mining code raised royalty rates from two to ten percent, raising tax rates on “strategic” metals, and imposing a surcharge on the “super profits” of mining companies. The code also removed a stability clause that protected investors from any new taxes or duties for ten years. The Tshisekedi government has indicated that it is prepared to reopen discussions on the mining code. The GDRC does not maintain an organization to screen inbound investment. The Presidency and the ministries serve this purpose de facto. In May 2021 President Tshisekedi announced his intention to review the content of and compliance with mining contracts signed under former President Kabila, a process that is still ongoing. In the past five years, has the GDRC not been subject to a third-party investment policy review (IPR) through a multilateral organization such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Cities with high custom clearance traffic use Sydonia https://asycuda.org/wp-content/uploads/Etude-de-Cas-SYDONIA-Contr%C3%B4le-de-la-Valeur-RDC.pdf , which is an advanced software system for custom administrations in compliance with ASYCUDA WORLD. (ASYCUDA is a large technical assistance software program recommended by UNCTAD for custom clearance management.) The international NGO The Sentry published a report in November 2021 on a multi-million-dollar embezzlement and bribery operation using money intended to support infrastructure development. The NGO Global Witness reported in 2019 that a DRC-based bank was involved in laundering money for Congolese officials. The GDRC operates a “one-stop-shop” for Business Creation (GUCE) that brings together all the government entities involved in the registration of a company in the DRC with an electronic tracking system of the business creation file online. The goal is to permit the quick and simple registration of companies through one office in one location. In October 2020, President Tshisekedi instructed the government to restructure GUCE in order to ease its work with the various state organizations involved in its operation. More information is available at https://guichetunique.cd/ . In December 2021, the GDRC attempted to make the GUCE more efficient for companies by implementing a system that allows for online business registration. Using the GUCE’s online portal, companies fill out a “single form,” which integrates all of the services involved in the process of creating a company including the Notary’s Office, the Registry of the Commerce and Personal Property Credit Register, the Administration of Tax Authority (DGI), a Center for Ordination of the General Directorate of Administrative, State, Judicial and Participation Revenues (DGRAD), the Administration of the National Economy, the National Fund of Social Security (CNSS), the Administration of the Environment, the National Office of Employment (ONEM), the National Institute of Professional Preparation (INPP), the General Inspection of Work; and a representation of Municipal Entities. Businesses may also need to obtain an operating permit as required by some city councils. The registration process should now take three days, but in practice it can take much longer. Some businesses have reported that the GUCE has significantly shortened and simplified the overall business registration process. The GDRC does not promote or incentivize outward investment. There are currently no government restrictions preventing domestic investors from investing abroad, and there is currently no blacklist of countries with which domestic investors are prevented from doing business. 3. Legal Regime The 2018 Law on Pricing, Freedom, and Competition (the “Competition Act”) created a Competition Commission. DRC law mandates review if a company’s turnover is equal to or exceeds the amount determined by Decree of the Prime Minister upon proposal of the Minister of the Economy; if the party in question also holds a combined market share of 25% or more; or if the contemplated transaction creates / reinforces an already dominant position. DRC law requires notification prior to a corporate merger. The DRC is a member of the regional competition bodies, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),and the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (“OHADA”), which covers francophone African countries . OHADA does not have an operational merger control regime in place, while COMESA does have merger control. Merger activities in the DRC should should comply with COMESA standards. There are no informal regulations run by private or nongovernmental organizations that discriminate against foreign investors. However, some U.S. investors perceive the regulations in the mining and agricultural sectors mandating a percentage of local ownership as discriminatory against foreign investment. Proposed laws and regulations are rarely published in draft format for public discussion and comment; discussion is typically limited to the governmental entity that proposes the draft law and Parliament prior to enactment. Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals. The Official Gazette of the DRC is a specialized service of the Presidency of the Republic, which publishes and disseminates legislative and regulatory texts, judicial decisions, acts of companies, associations and political parties, designs, industrial models, trademarks as well as any other act referred to in the law. More information is available at http://www.leganet.cd/ . There are no formal or informal GDRC provisions that systematically impede foreign investment. Companies often complain of facing administrative hurdles as laws and regulations are often poorly or unevenly applied. DRC is member of Francophone Africa’s OHADA – the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization, or Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires – a system of accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures which covers the legal framework in the areas of contract, company, and bankruptcy law and sets up an accounting system better aligned to international standards. A Coordination Committee in the DRC monitors OHADA implementation. The GDRC does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. However, some companies believe that compliance with international ESG standards can attract new financing and are taking steps to ensure that their companies are ESG compliant. These companies believe that compliance allows them to have a positive impact on the communities in which they operate and protect the environment. Draft bills or regulations are rarely made available for public comment, or through a public comment process. Discussion is usually limited to the government entity proposing the bill and to Parliament before the bill’s enactment. Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals. The Official Gazette of the DRC is a specialized service of the Presidency of the Republic, which publishes and disseminates legislative and regulatory texts, judicial decisions, acts of companies, associations and political parties, designs, industrial models, trademarks as well as any other act referred to in the law. More information is available at http://www.leganet.cd/ . Oversight mechanisms are weak, and often the law does not require audits to ensure that internal controls are in place or that administrative procedures are followed. Companies often complain that they face administrative barriers, with the government often poorly or unevenly enforcing laws and regulations. However, there are regulatory authorities in different sectors that ensure compliance with laws, regulations, conventions, etc., in order to guarantee effective and fair competition for the benefit of consumers and to provide legal and regulatory certainty for private investors. Some of them can issue, suspend, or withdraw authorizations and establish corresponding specifications. In August 2021, the GDRC established the National Agency for Export Promotion (ANAPEX), with the aim of identifying and attracting foreign investments to sectors with export potential. Following the decree signed in March 2022 by the Prime Minister, a new public establishment called the Agency for the Steering, Coordination and Monitoring of Collaboration Agreements Between the DRC and Private Partners (APCSC) was created. It replaces the Office for Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Program (BCPSC) established by former President Kabila and limited to agreements with Chinese investors. The APCSC will focus particularly on the areas of basic infrastructure and natural resources. Through the National Agency for the Promotion of Exports (ANAPEX), the DRC can take advantage of its commitments at the regional level and can also target the Asian, European, and American markets to increase exports and further diversify its international markets. APCSC will interface between the various parties and entities interested in collaborating on projects in basic infrastructure and natural resources. The enforcement process is legally reviewable, sometimes digitalized, and otherwise made accountable to the public. Public and private institutions responsible for monitoring and regulating various sectors make regulatory enforcement mechanisms publicly available. Regulatory agencies regularly publish their data and make it available to the business community and development partners, allowing for scientific and data-driven reviews and assessments. In 2021, the DRC made significant progress by producing and publicly issuing a revised budget when budget execution deviated significantly from budget projections. Information on debt obligations was publicly available, except for major State-Owned Enterprise debt information. However, the GDRC strives to promote transparency in public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) by publishing information on https://budget.gouv.cd/ . The DRC is a member of several regional economic blocs, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (“OHADA”), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). In April 2022, the DRC joined the East African Community. The Congolese Parliament must still ratify the EAC’s laws and regulations before the agreement take effect. The GDRC has made efforts to harmonize its system with these regional bodies. According to the Congolese National Standardization Committee, the DRC has adopted 470 harmonized COMESA standards, which are based on the European system. The DRC is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and seeks to comply with Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM) requirements, including notifying regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The DRC is a civil code country, and the main provisions of its private law date back to the Napoleonic Civil Code. The general characteristics of the Congolese legal system are similar to those of the Belgian system. Various local laws govern both personal status laws and property rights, including inheritance and land ownership systems in traditional communities throughout the country. The Congolese legal system consists of three branches: public law, private law, and economic law. Public law governs legal relationships involving the state or state authority; private law governs relationships between private persons; and economic law governs interactions in areas such as labor, trade, mining, and investment. The DRC has written commercial and contractual laws. The DRC has thirteen commercial courts located in its main business cities, including Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Boma, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi. These courts are designed to be led by professional judges specializing in commercial matters and exist in parallel to the judicial system. However, a lack of qualified personnel and reluctance by some DRC jurisdictions to fully recognize OHADA law and institutions have hindered the development of commercial courts. Legal documents in the DRC can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/ . The current executive branch has generally not interfered with judicial proceedings. The current judicial process is not procedurally reliable, and its rulings are not always respected. The national court system provides an appeals mechanism under the OHADA framework. The 2002 Investment Code governs most foreign direct investment (FDI) and provides for investment protection. Law n°004/2002 on the Investment Code, through the provisions of articles 23-30, which provide the mechanisms of security and guarantees for investments as well as customs, tax, and parafiscal exemptions. The country’s constitution and laws state that the property (private and collective) of all persons in the DRC is sacred. The GDRC guarantees the right to individual or collective property acquired in accordance with the law or custom. It encourages and ensures the security of private, national, and foreign investments. No one may be deprived of his or her property except for reasons of public utility and in return for fair and prior compensation granted under the conditions established by law; the State guarantees the right to private initiative to both nationals and foreigners. The Public Private Partnership (PPP) Act provides for the guarantee of execution of the partnership contract regardless of a change of government (art. 15). Taxation in this law a common application of the law, except for the reduction of the tax on profits and earnings, which is set at 15%. There are other laws that grant customs exemptions, such as the Agricultural Act, the Partnership Act in the Value Chain, etc. The law favors amicable settlement or arbitration in case of investment disputes. Specific sectoral laws govern agriculture, industry (protection of industrial property), infrastructure and civil engineering, transportation (operating license in air transport), mining research and exploitation, hydrocarbons, various electricity sub-sectors, information and communication technologies (ICT) (license to operate telecommunications services), insurance and reinsurance, healthcare, and arms production and related military activities. Notwithstanding the specific provisions governing each of these sectors, all investors are required to submit a copy of their investment file to the DRC investment agency ANAPI ( www.investindrc.cd ). The Telecommunications Law went into effect in 2021, bringing the first revision of the law since 2002. The government’s decisions in 2021 to establish an agency to monitor foreign investment in infrastructure and natural resources and to create a presidential body to review all mining contracts have affected some of the largest investments in the DRC. The GUCE provides a One-Stop Shop designed to simplify business creation. The GUCE has reduced the processing time from five months to three days and for corporations, the fee was lowered from $120 to $80. For sole proprietorships, the fee has been reduced from $40 to $30. There is also an Integral One-Stop Shop for foreign trade (GUICE), which is a neutral, transparent, and secure electronic platform, accessible 24 hours a day to the entire foreign trade community. It centralizes all regulatory, customs and logistical components related to the import, export, and transit of goods ( https://segucerdc.com ). GUICE is operated by SEGUCE RDC SA, a private operator under the framework of a public-private partnership. Competition Commission – COMCO is the regulatory and supervisory body for competition in DRC under the Organic Law no. 18/020 on Pricing Freedom and Competition and the COMESA Competition Regulation. It ensures that the rules of free competition are respected by economic operators. This commission works to allow all economic operators, according to their capacities, to exercise a fair competition, based on the quality of goods, products, and services, respecting the official price structure. Its priorities are acquisitions and mergers (investigating, evaluating, and monitoring acquisitions and mergers), business practices and exemptions (investigating anti-competitive practices), consumer welfare (acting against violators), and good practice awareness (good practices and anti-competitive consequences). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the GDRC to pay a liability judgment of $619 million to the South African company Dig Oil due to breach of contract. The GDRC is considering settling the 2020 judgment but has yet to do so. In August 2021, the Minister of Justice informed the GDRC of six emblematic cases of international litigation. The main causes of the DRC’s multiple liabilities in these cases are the poor management of the disputes by the sectoral authorities, the late transmission of files to the Ministry of Justice, and the failure to respect the findings of arbitration procedures. President Tshisekedi has called for better monitoring of cases involving the DRC before the courts in order to reduce the risk of the state being found liable for hundreds of millions of dollars. As a member of COMESA, the DRC follows the COMESA Competition Regulations and rules, and the COMESA competition body regulates competition. Agency decisions may be appealed to the courts/judicial system. The GDRC may proceed with an expropriation when it benefits the public interest, and the person or entity subject to an expropriation should receive fair compensation. There have been no expropriations of property in the past three years. Some claims have been taken to arbitration, though many arbitral judgments against the GDRC have are not resulted in a payment. Businesses report that the GDRC levies heavy fines, which is a form of financial expropriation. A government agency imposes fines because a company has not paid a tax, although often the tax system is unclear, and several government agencies impose different taxes. Companies that appeal these fines in court often face a long wait. 4. Industrial Policies The 2002 Investment Code provides for attractive customs and tax exemptions for investors who submit their investment plan to ANAPI. Once the project is approved by ANAPI within a period not exceeding 30 days, the investor benefits from the following customs, fiscal and parafiscal advantages: (1) exemption from import duties and taxes on machinery, materials, and equipment (excluding the 2% administrative tax and VAT (to be paid upstream by the promoter, but to be refunded by the tax authorities); (2) exemption from income tax; (3) exemption from property tax; and (4) exemption from proportional duties when setting up a limited liability company or increasing its share capital. The duration of the advantages granted is from three to five years depending on the economic region where the investment is located: three years for economic region A (Kinshasa, the Capital); four years for economic region B (Bas-Congo, cities of Lubumbashi, Likasi, Kolwezi); and five years for economic region C (everywhere else). The conditions for accessing the benefits of the Investment Code are simple; establishment as an economic entity under Congolese law; the overall cost of the planned investment (all expenses included) must be at least $200,000 (or at least $10,000 for SMEs/SMIs); commitment to respect environmental regulations; commitment to respect labor regulations; and a guarantee the investment has a value-added rate of at least 35%. There are no additional incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors such as women. The GDRC does not issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. Aside from the incentives offered in the Investment Code, the GDRC does not offer additional incentives for clean energy investments (including renewable energy, energy storage, energy efficiency, clean hydrogen, carbon sequestration, low-carbon transport, and fuels, and other decarbonization technologies). A group of off-grid electricity producers is pushing the government to provide an exemption from import taxes for off-grid solar products brought into the DRC. The DRC does not have any areas designated as Free Trade Zones or Duty-Free Zones. The DRC is a signatory to the SADC but is not a SADC Free Trade Area member. In February 2022, the DRC deposited its instrument of ratification and became the 42nd country to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AFCFTA). The agreement aims to facilitate imports and exports among member countries with reduced or zero tariffs, free market access and market information, and the elimination of trade barrier, and provides numerous benefits to SMEs. In March 2022, the DRC joined the East African Community (EAC) as the seventh member, massively expanding the territory of this trading bloc, giving it access to the Atlantic Ocean and greatly increasing the number of francophones in what was originally a club of former British colonies. The GDRC is committed to experimenting with Special Economic Zones (SEZ). It is in this context that it promulgated in 2014, the Law n°14/022 fixing the regime of SEZ in the DRC. To date, six areas for the creation of SEZs have been defined: the Industrial Zone of the Kinshasa Area, comprising the City Province of Kinshasa; Kongo Central Province, and the former Province of Bandundu; the Industrial Zone of the Kasaï Area, comprising the Provinces of Kasaï, Kasaï Central, Eastern Kasaï, Lomami and Sankuru; the Industrial Zone of the former Katanga Province; the Industrial Zone of Great Kivu; the Industrial Zone of the former Eastern Province; and the Industrial Zone of the former Equateur Province. According to the provisions of article 6 of this law, the administration of the SEZs in the DRC is the responsibility of a public establishment called the “Agency of Special Economic Zones (AZES).” With a view to attracting and promoting investments in SEZs, the GDRC, in accordance with the provisions of the law on SEZs, issued Decree No. 20/004 of March 5, 2020, which sets out the advantages and facilities to be granted to investors operating in SEZs in DRC. For developers: a total exemption from property, furniture, and business taxes on profits for 10 years, renewable once after evaluation; a 50 percent reduction in the tax rate set from the 21st year; a total exemption from import duties and taxes on machinery, tools and new or used equipment, capital goods, etc. for 10 years, etc. For companies: a total exemption from property, movable and professional taxes on profits for 5 years, renewable once after evaluation; a reduction of 50 percent of the tax rate from the 11th year; an application of the exceptional depreciation system; a total exemption from import duties and taxes on machinery, tools, and equipment, new or used, and capital goods for 10 years; an exemption from export duties and taxes on finished products for 10 years. On November 4, 2020, the GDRC launched the construction of the first Special Economic Zone – Maluku SEZ in Kinshasa, with the aim of attracting foreign investment and stimulating the creation of local businesses. This SEZ offers tax and regulatory advantages for investors and entrepreneurs including a 5-to-10-year tax exemption. More information is available at https://azes-rdc.com/ . In August 2021, the GDRC presented its Industrialization Master Plan (PDI) accompanied by a cost estimate of the structuring and industrializing infrastructures. The transport and communication infrastructure package (airport, rail, river, lake, maritime, road and energy), together with the densification of Special Economic Zones, is estimated at $58.3 billion. The GDRC does not follow “forced localization,” the policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. The DRC does not have specific legislation on data storage or limits on the transmission of data. There are no known enforcement procedures for performance requirements in the DRC. Investors benefiting from the Investment Code regime must guarantee the investment has a value-added rate of at least 35% The GDRC does not require IT companies to hand over encryption data. Cellular phone companies must meet technology performance requirements to maintain their license. According to officials, the Ministry of Digitalization is developing measures to prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer data or data to other companies outside the economy/country. These measures may go beyond the requirements for data transferred within the country. On November 25, 2020, President Tshisekedi enacted Law No. 20/017 on telecommunications and information and communication technologies. This law provides in its articles 126 to 133 the right to privacy and the protection of personal data in telecommunications and information technology and communication. This protection of privacy is secured by the right to secrecy of correspondence for all users of telecommunications networks and services and information and communication technologies (ICT). The law thus prohibits any interception, listening, recording, transcription and disclosure of correspondence without prior authorization from the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Cassation. The authorization from the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Cassation, for a renewable period of three months, must demonstrate the facts in a judicial file, and it must include all the identification elements of the targeted link, the offence that justifies the interception, as well as its duration. The Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Congo (ARPTC) ensures the regulation and control of personal data protection. 5. Protection of Property Rights The DRC Constitution protects private property without discriminating between foreign and domestic investors. Despite this provision, the GDRC recognized the lack of enforcement protecting property rights. The Congolese law on real property rights lists provisions for mortgages and liens. Real property (buildings and land) is protected and registered by the Office of the Registrar of Mortgages of the Ministry of Land Affairs. The registration of real property does not fully protect owners, as records are often incomplete and disputes over land transactions are common. Many property owners do not have a clear and recorded title to their property. In May 2021, the Ministry of Land Affairs presented the GDRC with its plan to digitize the land registry and secure land and property titles in the DRC. This plan will make it possible to digitize the entire land registry, to establish land security for investors and individuals alike, to electronically store all data collected in a database accessible to all public authorities, and to resolve land conflicts, which make up 80 percent of the cases handled. Article 61 of Law No. 73-021 of 1973 on the general property regime, the land and real estate regime, and the system of securities, as amended and supplemented by Law No. 80-008 of 1980, provides that “a concession is a contract by which the State recognizes the right of use of land to a community, a natural person, or a legal entity of private or public law, under the terms and conditions provided for in the present law and its implementing regulations. However, a perpetual concession is only available to Congolese individuals. Foreigners and legal entities can only have access to an ordinary concession, which cannot exceed 25 years. However, the latter is renewable at the discretion of the State. In the event of non-renewal, the law provides for compensation for the concessionaire in certain cases (long lease, surface area). This compensation may not exceed 75 percent of the current and intrinsic value of the buildings incorporated into the land. Land is owned and managed by the GDRC. Government officials with the status of Registrars of Real Property Titles issue certificates of registration to individuals in their respective land districts. Less than 10 percent of land has a clear property title, but the GDRC is in the process of promoting and encouraging people to regularize property titles by buying a final title called a “Record Certificate” (Certificat d’Enregistrement). Ownership interest in personal property (e.g., equipment, vehicles, etc.) is protected and registered through the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of the Notary. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are legally protected in the DRC, but enforcement of IPR regulations is limited and IP theft is common. Law n°82-001 of 1982 on Intellectual Property (IP) organizes the procedure of IP protection. The registration is done in three steps with the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Industry, which is the competent body for intellectual property in the DRC: (1) filing the file – after paying the official fees, the applicant must file his file. When the file is filed, the applicant receives a filing number that specifies the day and time of filing. This number is used to prove the earlier filing of the IP. (2) Examination of the application and (3) registration of the application. This administrative procedure can take between six and nine months. The applicant can carry out the procedure alone or be accompanied and assisted by an Industrial Property Agent. The law provides several tools to protect IP against those who want to appropriate or use it without the owner’s consent; in particular, the infringement action or the opposition, which makes it possible to defeat IP violations. The protection of the registered trademark is valid for a renewable period of ten years from the date of filing. The patent allows to benefit on the Congolese territory from a monopoly of exploitation on an innovation for a limited period of 20 years. The registration of a design or model offers a five-year protection that can be renewed only once. The GDRC has yet to join the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), which offers greater protection of trademarks (a protection valid in 16 African countries). In the past year, no new IP-related laws or regulations have been enacted and no reform bills are underway. The country is a signatory to agreements with international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is subject to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The country tracks and reports seizures of counterfeit goods but does not keep a public record of IPR violations. Information on these seizures is often reported by the Congolese Office of Control (OCC) – [Office Congolais de Contrôle]- which is responsible for enforcing laws, regulations, and standards on the conformity of products, goods, procedures and services. The DRC is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report. The DRC is not listed in the notorious market report. 6. Financial Sector The government welcomes investment including by foreign portfolio investors. A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry. The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants. There is no market for derivatives in the country. Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common. Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications. There is no domestic stock market. Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and difficult to use. Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, sustain its expansion, and stimulate economic growth. Inadequate risk-based controls, weak regulatory enforcement, low profitability, and over-reliance on demand deposits undermine the resilience of the financial system. The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists primarily of the issuance of Treasury bonds. The Central Bank refrains from making restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. It is possible for foreign companies to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited. Loan terms are generally limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically 16-21 percent. The inconsistent legal system, the often-burdensome business climate, and the difficulty of obtaining interbank financing discourage banks from making long-term loans. Opportunities for financing large projects in the national currency, the Congolese franc (CDF), are limited. The Congolese financial system is comprised of 15 licensed banks, a national insurance company (SONAS), the National Social Security Institute (INSS), one development bank, SOFIDE (Société Financière de Development), a savings fund (CADECO), roughly 21 microfinance institutions and 72 cooperatives, 81 money transfer institutions which are concentrated in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, former Bandundu, North and South Kivu and the former Katanga provinces, 4 electronic money institutions, and 48 foreign exchange offices. While the financial system is improving, it is fragmented and dominated by so-called “local” banks. With very different profiles (international, local, pan-African, networked, corporate, etc.) and approaches that diverge fundamentally in terms of management, governance, and terms of management and risk appetite, the so-called “local” commercial banks continue to dominate the banking sector. Pan-African banks are increasing their share, especially with the recent acquisition of the Banque Commerciale du Congo by the Kenyan Equity Group. The Central Bank controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system. Banks are mainly concentrated in the provinces of Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga. The banking penetration rate is about 7.6 percent, or about 5.3 million accounts, which places the country among the least banked nations in the world. Mobile banking has the potential to significantly increase the banking customer base, as an estimated 35 million Congolese use cell phones. In the last five years, there has been an evolution and consolidation of prudential ratios or risk indicators of the banking sector and the introduction of alternative channels for financial service delivery and inclusion, such as Agency Banking and Mobile Banking. Mobile money continues to play an increasingly important role in financial inclusion in the DRC, as mobile money is a lever for economic and social inclusion. Over the past ten years, mobile money subscriptions in the DRC have increased by 20 percent per year. There is no debt market. The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates. In 2021 asset quality measures taken by the Central Bank allowed banks to absorb the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue. Statistics on non-performing loans are not available because many banks only record the balance due and not the total amount of their non-performing loans. The financial system is primarily based on the banking sector, with total assets estimated at US$ 5.2 billion. Of the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holding companies. The five largest banks hold nearly 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total bank assets, or about $ 3.1 billion. The country has an operating central banking system with Citigroup as the only correspondent bank. All foreign banks or branches need to be accredited by the Central Bank, are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital, and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the DRC. The DRC has no declared Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), although the 2018 Mining Code refers to creating a future fund “FOMIN” that will be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues. In October 2021, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Technical Secretariat organized a workshop to develop the FOMIN decree as well as tools for managing the shares of mining royalties accruing to the provinces and local entities. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The DRC has not defined Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) for most industries, but the Labor Code includes provisions to protect employees, and there are legal provisions that require companies to protect the environment. The Global Compact Network DRC, a public-private consortium affiliated with the United Nations, encourages companies operating locally to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies. The GDRC has taken actions of limited impact to support RBC by encouraging companies to develop and adhere to a code of ethics and respect for labor rights and the environment. However, the DRC does not possess a legal framework to protect the rights of consumers, and there are no existing domestic laws to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. Reports of children working in the DRC’s artisanal mines has led to international pressure to find ways to ensure the DRC’s minerals supply chain is free of child labor. Concerns over the use of child labor in the artisanal mining of copper and cobalt have led to worries about the use of Congolese resources served to discourage potential purchasers. USG assistance programs to build capacity for labor inspections and enforcement are helping to address these concerns. Development pressures have resulted in reports of violations of environmental rights. In one case, a prominent local businessman is seeking to develop a dam in a national park in the southeastern province of Haut Katanga. There is a case in eastern DRC of a local developer pressuring an environmental defender to end his activism. There are no known high-profile and controversial cases of private sector entities having a negative impact on human rights. With regard to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other laws/regulations designed to protect individuals from the adverse effects of business, the GDRC faces many challenges in enforcing domestic laws effectively and fairly. The GDRC has no known corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. There are independent NGOs, human rights organizations, environmental organizations, worker/trade union organizations, and business associations that promote or monitor RBC and report misconduct and violation of good governance practices. They monitor and/or defend RBC and are able to do their work freely. The DRC has adopted OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas as defined by the United Nations Group of Experts, as well as various resolutions of the UN Security Council related to business and human rights in the Congolese mining sector. There are also existing domestic measures requiring supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals that may originate from conflict-affected areas in DRC. The DRC participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. More information is available at https://www.itierdc.net/ . The DRC publishes reports on its revenue from natural resources. There are domestic transparency measures requiring disclosure of payments to governments and of RBC/Business and Human Rights policies or practices. The mining code provides domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments, though they appear to be infrequently enforced. PROMINES, a technical parastatal body financed by the GDRC and the World Bank, aims to improve the transparency of the artisanal mining sector. Amnesty International and Pact Inc. have also published reports related to RBC in the DRC mining sector. The DRC has a private security industry but is not a party to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. It does not support the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers, nor does it participate in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The GDRC has a national climate strategy and/or a strategy for monitoring natural capital, such as biodiversity and ecosystem services. The GDRC has the following national climate change strategy documents: the National Policy, Strategy and Action Plan for Climate Change, the National Policy and Strategy Document on Climate Change in the DRC (2020-2024), the National Strategic Development Plan (PNSD), the Capacity Development Program for a Low Carbon Development Strategy, the Second National Communication to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the National Strategy for Biodiversity Conservation in DRC Protected Areas, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, and other key policy documents. The DRC’s vision in the fight against climate change is to promote a green, resilient, and low-carbon economy by rationally and sustainably managing its important natural resources in order to ensure ecological balance and the social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being of its population. The GDRC has not introduced any policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The DRC ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 and the Paris Agreement in 2017. To this end, the DRC is firmly committed to taking action to mitigate its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to preserve the Congo Basin Rainforest, and to adapt to the effects of climate change, in accordance with Article 41 of the Paris Agreement. It has also submitted its first three National Communications on Climate Change to the UNFCCC for 2001, 2009, and 2015 respectively, and is currently preparing its fourth National Communication and finalizing its first Biennial Update Report (BUR). Private sector organizations are key actors in the achievement of the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and the implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation activities, as they are also affected by climate change. Some examples of private sector organizations are COPEMECO (Confederation of Small and Medium Enterprises), FIB (Federation of Wood Manufacturers), FEC (Federation of Enterprises of Congo), SAFBOIS and SIFORCO, and agribusinesses. Their participation is required to make the implementation of the climate change policy and law possible, both for the implementation of mitigation and/or adaptation measures, and the realization of NDCs and the provision of data and information for the operation of the MRV and GHG inventories. The government is hoping to benefit financially by establishing carbon credits to support the preservation of the rain forest. The GDRC is working on a comprehensive national forestry plan which will govern the use and protection its part of the Congo Basin Rainforest, the second largest rainforest in the world. The forestry sector is currently regulated in the DRC by the following legal provisions: Law No. 011/2002 of August 29, 2002, on the Forestry Code; Decree No. 05/116 of October 24, 2005, setting out the modalities for converting old forest titles into forest concession contracts and, extending the moratorium on granting forest exploitation titles; Decree No. 08/09 of April 8, 2008, setting out the procedure for allocating forest concessions. Decree No. 011/27 of May 20, 2011, setting the specific rules for the allocation of conservation forest concessions. In September 2021, GDRC decided, through a Council of Ministers, to lift the current moratorium on the granting of forest titles. After the international community protested, President Tshisekedi reinstated the moratorium in December 2021. Under the DRC Public Procurement Act, environmental impact is one of the criteria for evaluating bidders’ offers. 9. Corruption The DRC constitution and legal code include laws intended to fight corruption and bribery by all citizens, including public officials. The Tshisekedi government has used public prosecutions of high-level officials and the creation of an anti-corruption unit (APLC) to improve the DRC’s anti-corruption enforcement. Prosecutions have led to jail terms but often subsequent early releases. The 2021 edition of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked the DRC 169th out of 180 countries, with a score of 19 out of 100, up from 18 out of 100 the previous year. Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and political parties. In March 2020, President Tshisekedi created the National Agency for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (APLC). Currently corruption investigations are ongoing for three Managing Directors of SOEs. The country has laws or regulations to address conflicts of interest in the awarding of public contracts or procurement. Conflicts of interest committed in the context of a public contract and a delegation of public service are punishable by a fine of USD 12,500 to USD25,000. The government through regulatory authorities encourages or requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Law 017-2002 of 2002, establishes the code of conduct for public officials, which provides rules of conduct in terms of moral integrity and professional ethics and the fight against corruption in socio-professional environments. Private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. The DRC is a signatory to both the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption but has not fully ratified the latter. The DRC is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The DRC ratified a protocol agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on fighting corruption. NGOs such as the consortium “The Congo is Not for Sale,” have an important role in revealing corrupt practices, and the law protects NGOs in a whistleblower role. However, in 2021 whistleblowers from Afriland First Bank that alleged to the international NGO Global Witness interaction between sanctioned individual Dan Gertler and the bank were subjected to prosecution and, in a private proceeding, sentenced to death in absentia. Although the government worked with Global Witness to contest the case, it remained unresolved as of early 2022. NGOs report governmental or other hindrance to their efforts to publicize and/or address corruption. The Observatory of Public Expenditure (ODEP), which works with civil society organizations, raises awareness of the social impact of the execution of finance laws in order to improve transparency and accountability in the management of public finances; to participate in the fight against corruption; and to promote citizen involvement in each stage of the budget process. U.S. firms see corruption and harassment by local security forces as one of the main hurdles to investment in the DRC, particularly in the awarding of concessions, government procurement, and taxation treatment. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Chouna Lomponda Director of Communications and Spokesperson Agence de Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption (APLC) Général Basuki, N°14C, Ngaliema, Kinshasa, RDC +243 89 33 02 819 communicationaplc@gmail.com Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Ernest MPARARO Executive Secretary Ligue Congolaise de Lutte contre la Corruption (LICOCO) Luango, N°14, Quartier 1, N’djili Kinshasa RDC +243 81 60 49 837 / +243 89 89 72 130 contact@licoco.org https://licoco.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment The DRC has a history of armed group activity, sometimes of a politicized nature and particularly in the east of the country, and of elections-related violence and civil unrest. The 2018 election, which took place after years of delay marked by protests that were in some instances violently repressed, was marred by irregularities, but most citizens accepted the announced result, and the election aftermath was calm. In January 2019, Felix Tshisekedi became President in the DRC’s first peaceful transition of power. Following President Felix Tshisekedi’s establishment of a new political alliance known as the “Sacred Union,” Tshisekedi appointed Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde as Prime Minister in April 2021. The security situation continues to be a concern and the U.S. Embassy, through its travel advisories ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDRC.html), keeps a list of areas where it does not recommend travel by U.S. citizens. The security situation in eastern DRC remains unstable. Some 15-20 significant armed groups are present and inter-communal violence can affect the political, security, and humanitarian situation. Several towns in eastern DRC continue to be reported to be under attack by armed groups or temporarily under their control. The foreign terrorist organization-designated ISIS-DRC (aka the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group) in eastern DRC is one of the country’s most notorious and intractable armed groups and its members have shown no interest in demobilizing. In May 2021, Tshisekedi declared a “state of siege” – effectively martial law – in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, installing military governors and ramping up Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) operations against ISIS-DRC/ADF and other armed groups. The state of siege has been accompanied by problematic human rights practices; the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has documented violations including extrajudicial killings by FARDC and police, while military governments have restricted civil society and political activists and prosecuted some for criticizing the state of siege. US citizens and interests are not being specifically targeted by armed groups, but anyone can easily fall victim to violence or kidnapping by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset tracks political violence in developing countries, including the DRC, https://acleddata.com/ . Kivu Security Tracker ( https://kivusecurity.org/ ) is another database for information on attacks in eastern DRC. The Department of State continues to advise U.S. citizen travelers to review the Embassy’s Travel Advisory and country information page ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDRC.html) for the latest security information. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The DRC labor market has a large, low-skilled workforce with high youth unemployment. Women make up 47 percent of the labor force. Expatriates frequently work in jobs requiring technical training in the key mining sector. Approximately 85 percent of the nonagricultural labor force works in the informal sector. About 60 percent of the total labor force works in agriculture. Informal employment dominates the labor market in the DRC. According to the World Bank, the DRC has one of the highest rates of informal work in the world, with about 80 percent of urban workers engaged in the informal economy. The Congolese trade union confederation estimates that the sector employs 97.5 percent of the country’s workforce. Informal workers in the artisanal mining sector have raised worries about the use of child labor in mining, forcing companies to go through an accreditation system to show they do not use child labor. It takes many forms and is characterized by the non-respect or non-application of labor standards related to minimum wage, working hours, safety and other social standards related to the social health system, retirement, etc. The informal sector’s share of GDP is estimated at nearly 55 percent. The EGI-ODD results show that slightly more than 91 percent of jobs in the non-agricultural sectors are informal, meaning that these workers do not have a contract, receive paid vacations, or family allowances. By gender, 94 percent of women’s jobs in the nonagricultural sector are informal, compared to 87.7 percent for men. DRC labor law stipulates that for companies with more than 100 employees, ten percent of all employees must be local. If the general manager is a foreigner, his or her deputy or secretary general must be a Congolese national. The government may waive these provisions depending on the sector of activity and available expertise. There are no onerous conditionality, visa, residency, or work permit requirements that impede the mobility of foreign investors and their employees. The DRC faces a shortage of skilled labor in all sectors. There are few formal vocational training programs, although Article 8 of the labor law requires all employers to provide training to their employees. To address the high unemployment rate, the GDRC has enacted a policy giving Congolese preference in hiring over expatriates. Laws prevent companies from laying off workers in most cases without compensation. These restrictions discouraged hiring and encouraged the use of temporary contracts instead of permanent employment. There is no government safety net to compensate laid-off workers. There are no labor laws waived in order to attract or retain investment, nor are there additional/different labor law provisions in special economic zones, foreign trade zones, or free ports compared to the general economy. The law grants and guarantees equal treatment to all national and foreign investors. Congolese law bans collective bargaining in some sectors, particularly by civil servants and public employees, and the law does not provide adequate protection against anti-union discrimination. While the right to strike is recognized, there are provisions which require unions to obtain authorization and to undergo lengthy mandatory arbitration and appeal procedures before going on strike. Unions often strike to obtain wage increases or payment of back wages and seek to make gains through negotiation with employers. The DRC government has ratified all eight core International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, but some Congolese laws continue to be inconsistent with the ILO Forced Labor Convention. No strikes in the past year have posed an investment risk and government’s reaction. According to some businesses, the government does not effectively enforce relevant employment laws. DRC law prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation based on race, gender, language, or social status. The law does not specifically protect against discrimination based on religion, age, political opinion, national origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, or HIV-positive status. Additionally, no law specifically prohibits discrimination in the employment of career public service members. Labor law defines different standard workweeks, ranging from 45 to 72 hours, for various jobs, and prescribes rest periods and premium pay for overtime. Employers in both the formal and informal sectors often do not respect these provisions. The law does not prohibit compulsory overtime. The labor code specifies health and safety standards, but the government does not effectively enforce labor standards in the informal sector, and enforcement is uneven to non-existent in the formal sector. The Ministry of Labor employs 200 labor inspectors, but the Labor Inspector General reports that funding is not enough to facilitate the conduct of efficient labor inspections. No new labor related laws or regulations have been enacted in the past year, and no bills are pending. 14. Contact for More Information Kevin Ngunza Commercial Assistant U.S. Embassy Kinshasa +243 810 556 0151 NgunzaKM@state.gov Denmark Executive Summary Denmark is regarded by many independent observers as one of the world’s most attractive business environments and ranks highly in indices measuring political, economic, and regulatory stability. It is a member of the European Union (EU), and Danish legislation and regulations conform to EU standards on virtually all issues. It maintains a fixed exchange rate policy, with the Danish Krone linked closely to the Euro. Denmark is a social welfare state with a thoroughly modern market economy heavily driven by trade in goods and services. Given that exports account for about 60 percent of GDP, the economic conditions of its major trading partners – the United States, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – have a substantial impact on Danish national accounts. Denmark is a world leader in “green technology” industries, such as offshore wind and energy efficiency, and in sectors such as shipping and life sciences. Denmark is a net exporter of food. Its manufacturing sector depends on raw material imports. Within the EU, Denmark is among the strongest supporters of liberal trade policy. Transparency International regularly ranks Denmark as being perceived as the least corrupt nation in the world. Denmark is strategically situated to link continental Europe with the Nordic and Baltic countries. Transport and communications infrastructures are efficient. The Danish economy experienced a contraction of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2020 due to COVID-19 followed by a 4.7 percent rebound in 2021, thereby weathering the pandemic with among the lowest declines in GDP in the EU. Denmark’s economic activity and employment have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels and trends, but companies across sectors cite labor shortages as a key challenge. In May 2022, the Ministry of Finance revised its GDP growth projections, forecasting 3.5 percent GDP growth in 2022, decelerating to 2 percent annual GDP growth in 2023. The Ministry projects the Danish economy will weather headwinds from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and surging energy prices, as well as elevated levels of inflation, due to its robust foundation, although economic activity will be at a slightly lower level. The Ministry anticipates the impact will mainly be through increased inflation and disruption of trade. Denmark’s underlying macroeconomic conditions, however, are healthy, and the investment climate is sound. The entrepreneurial climate, including female-led entrepreneurship, is robust. New legislation establishing a foreign investment screening mechanism to prevent threats to national security and public order came into effect on July 1, 2021. The mechanism requires mandatory notification for investments in the following five sectors: defense, IT security and processing of classified information, companies producing dual-use items, critical technology, and critical infrastructure. It allows for voluntary notification for all sectors. The legislation does not apply to Greenland or to the Faroe Islands, though both are looking into potential legislation. In 2020, the Danish parliament passed the Danish Climate Act, which established a statutory target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 70 percent from 1990 levels in 2030 and achieving net zero by 2050. In April 2022, the government presented a reform proposal on Danish energy policy to move towards the above goals and simultaneously achieve independence from Russian natural gas. The proposal includes plans for increased domestic production of biogas as well as natural gas from the North Sea, a quadrupling of combined onshore wind and solar power production capacity by 2030, and an expansion of district heating. The government also proposed green taxation to finance the transition with a differentiated carbon emission tax in addition to the EU carbon trading system. Note: Additional information on the investment climates in the constituent parts of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, can be found at the end of this report. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 1 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 9 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 9.9 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 63,010 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment As a small country with an open economy, Denmark is highly dependent on foreign trade and investment. Exports comprise the most significant component (60 percent) of GDP. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks Denmark as the world’s sixth-most attractive business environment and the leading nation in the Nordic region. The EIU characterizes Denmark’s business environment as reflecting excellent infrastructure, a friendly policy towards private enterprise and competition, low bureaucracy, and a well-developed digital sector. Principal concerns include low productivity growth, a high personal tax burden, and potential capacity constraints on the labor market. Overall, however, operating conditions for companies are broadly favorable. Denmark ranks highly in multiple categories, including its political and institutional environment, macroeconomic stability, foreign investment policy, private enterprise policy, financing, and infrastructure. As of February 2022, the EIU rated Denmark an “AA” country on its Country Risk Service, noting the country is on the “cusp of an upgrade.” Denmark ranked tenth out of 140 on the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report and sixth on the EIU 2021 Democracy Index. Denmark has an AAA rating from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Group. “Invest in Denmark,” an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and part of the Danish Trade Council, provides detailed information to potential investors. Invest in Denmark has prioritized six sectors in its strategy to attract foreign investment: tech, cleantech, life sciences, food, maritime, and design and innovation. The website for the agency is https://investindk.com . As an EU member state, Denmark is bound by EU rules on the free movement of goods, capital, persons, and certain services. Denmark welcomes foreign investment and does not discriminate between EU and other investors. Denmark’s central and regional governments actively encourage foreign investment on a national-treatment basis, with relatively few foreign control limits, nor any reported bias against foreign companies from municipal or national authorities when compared to domestic investors. A foreign investment screening mechanism came into force July 1, 2021, to prevent threats to national security and public order from foreign direct investment, but there are otherwise no additional permits required by foreign investors. The mechanism requires mandatory notification for five sectors and allows for voluntary notification for all sectors. The sectors requiring mandatory notification are defense, IT security and processing of classified information, companies producing dual-use items, critical technology, and critical infrastructure. Mandatory notification applies for investments reaching 10 percent ownership or control, and voluntary notification can be made for investments where the company reaches 25 percent ownership or control. A pre-screening process exists to determine if the investment is in the critical technology or critical infrastructure sector. Notification and guidance all take place online, handled by the Danish Business Authority: https://businessindenmark.virk.dk/topics/Economy/Investments/ A foreign or domestic private entity may freely establish, own, and dispose of a business enterprise in Denmark. The capital requirement for establishing a corporation (Aktieselskab A/S) or Limited Partnership (Partnerselskab P/S) is $63,000 (DKK 400,000) and for establishing a private limited liability company (Anpartsselskab ApS) $6.300 (DKK 40,000). In 2019, the government lowered the capital requirements to set up a private limited liability company, which brought Denmark more in line with other Scandinavian countries. No restrictions apply regarding the residency of directors and managers. Since October 2004, any private entity may establish a European public limited company (SE company) in Denmark. The legal framework of an SE company is subject to Danish corporate law, but it is possible to change the nationality of the company without liquidation and re-founding. An SE company must be registered at the Danish Business Authority if its official address is in Denmark. The minimum capital requirement is $137,000 (EUR 120,000). Danish professional certification and/or local Danish experience are required to provide professional services in Denmark. In some instances, Denmark may accept equivalent professional certification from other EU or Nordic countries on a reciprocal basis. EU-wide residency requirements apply to the provision of legal and accountancy services. In addition to investment screening cases, ownership restrictions apply to the following sectors: Oil and Gas: Requires 20 percent Danish government participation on a “non-carried interest” basis. Defense: The Minister of Justice must approve foreign investment in defense companies doing business in Denmark if such investment exceeds 40 percent of the equity or more than 20 percent of the voting rights, or if the investment gives the foreign interest a controlling share. This approval is generally granted unless there are security or other foreign policy considerations weighing against approval. Maritime Services: There are foreign (non-EU resident) ownership requirements on Danish-flagged vessels other than those owned by an enterprise incorporated in Denmark. Ships owned by Danish citizens, Danish partnerships, or Danish limited liability companies are eligible for registration in the Danish International Ships Register (DIS). Vessels owned by EU or European Economic Area (EEA) entities with a genuine, demonstrable link to Denmark are also eligible for registration. Foreign companies with a significant Danish interest can register a ship in the DIS. Civil Aviation: For an airline to be established in Denmark, it must have majority ownership and be effectively controlled by an EU state or a national of an EU state, unless otherwise provided for through an international agreement to which the EU is a signatory. Financial Services: Non-resident financial institutions may engage in securities trading on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange only through subsidiaries incorporated in Denmark. Real Estate: Ownership of holiday homes, also known as summer houses, is restricted to Danish citizens. Such homes are generally located along the Danish coastline and may not be used as full-year residences. On a case-by-case basis, the Ministry of Justice may waive the citizenship requirement for those with close familial, linguistic, cultural, or other close connections to Denmark or the specific property. In general, EU and EEA citizens may purchase full-year residential property or real estate that supports self-employment without obtaining prior authorization from the Ministry of Justice. Companies domiciled in an EU or an EEA Member State that have set up or will set up subsidiaries or agencies or will provide services in Denmark may, in general, also purchase real property in Denmark without prior authorization. Non-EU/EEA citizens must obtain authorization from the Ministry of Justice to purchase real estate in Denmark, which is generally granted to those with permanent residence in Denmark or who have lived in Denmark for a consecutive period of five years. The most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review of Denmark occurred in March 2013 and is available here: unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2013d2_en.pdf . There is no specific mention of Denmark in the latest WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Union, revised in December 2019. The EU Commission’s European Semester documents for Denmark are available here: ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/european-semester-your-country/denmark_en A 2017 Foreign Investment Regulation review by DLA Piper can be found here: www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2017/11/denmark.pdf Denmark ranked first out of 180 in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. In the IMD 2021 World Competitiveness Ranking, Denmark ranked third out of 64 countries. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ranked Denmark ninth out of 132 in its 2021 Global Innovation Index. The Danish Business Authority (DBA) is responsible for business registrations in Denmark. As a part of the DBA, “Business in Denmark” provides information on relevant Danish rules and online registrations to foreign companies in English. The Danish business registration website, www.virk.dk , is the principal digital tool for licensing and registering companies in Denmark and offers a business registration process that is clear and complete. Registration of sole proprietorships and partnerships is free of charge. For other types of businesses, online registration costs $106 (DKK 670). Registration by email or mail costs $341 (DKK 2,150). The process for establishing a new business is distinct from that of registration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “Invest in Denmark” program provides a step-by-step guide to establishing a business at https://investindk.com/publications/step-by-step-guide-to-do-business-in-denmark , along with other relevant resources at https://investindk.com/our-services/how-to-set-up-a-business-in-denmark . The services are free of charge and available to all investors, regardless of country of origin. The processing time for establishing a new business varies depending on the chosen business entity. Establishing a Danish private limited liability company (ApS), for example, generally takes four to six weeks for a standard application. Establishing a sole proprietorship (Enkeltmandsvirksomhed) is more straightforward, with processing generally taking about one week. Those providing temporary services in Denmark must provide their company details to the Registry of Foreign Service Providers (RUT). The website ( www.virk.dk ) provides English guidance on registering a service with RUT. A public digital signature, referred to as a NemID or its replacement MitID, is required for those wishing to register a foreign company in Denmark. A CPR number (a 10-digit personal identification number) and valid identification are needed to obtain a NemID/MitID. Danish citizenship is not a requirement. Denmark defines small enterprises as those with fewer than 50 employees. Annual revenue or the yearly balance sheet total must be lower than $14.1 million (DKK 89 million) or $7.0 million (DKK 44 million), respectively. Medium-sized enterprises cannot have more than 250 employees. Limits on annual revenue or the yearly balance sheet total are $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) or $24.8 million (DKK 156 million). Danish companies are not restricted from investing abroad, and Danish outward investment has exceeded inward investments for more than a decade. 3. Legal Regime Denmark’s judicial system is highly regarded and considered fair. Its legal system is independent of the government’s legislative branch and includes written and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy laws. Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2019 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Denmark as the world’s tenth most competitive economy and fourth among EU member states, characterizing it as having among the best functioning and most transparent institutions in the world. Denmark ranks high on specific WEF indices related to macroeconomic stability (first), labor market (third), business dynamism (third), institutions (seventh), ICT adoption (ninth), and skills (third). To facilitate business administration, Denmark maintains only two “legislative days” per year—January 1 and July 1—as the only days when new laws and regulations affecting the business sector can come into effect. Danish laws and policies granting national treatment to foreign investments are designed to increase FDI in Denmark. Denmark consistently applies high standards to health, environment, safety, and labor laws. Danish corporate law is generally in conformity with current EU legislation. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are relatively transparent and follow international standards. Bureaucratic procedures are streamlined and transparent; proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent. The government uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish “clear rules of the game,” consistent with international norms and applicable equally to Danish and foreign entities. The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA) works to make markets well-functioning so that businesses compete efficiently on all parameters. The CCA is a government agency under the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business, and Financial Affairs. It enforces the Danish Competition Act. This Act, along with Danish consumer legislation, aims to promote efficient resource allocation in society, promote efficient competition, create a level playing field for enterprises, and protect consumers. Corporate tax records of all companies, associations, and foundations that pay taxes in Denmark are published by the tax authorities according to public law since December 2012 and are updated annually. The corporate tax rate is 22 percent. Greenland and the Faroe Islands retain autonomy for their respective tax policies. Publicly listed companies in Denmark must adhere to the Danish Financial Statements Act when preparing their annual reports. The accounting principles are International Accounting Standards (IAS), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and Danish Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Financial statements must be prepared annually. The Danish Financial Statements Act covers all businesses. Private limited companies, public limited companies, and corporate funds are obliged to prepare financial statements under accounting classes determined by company size. There are four different accounting classes: A, B, C and D. Accounting class B is further divided into micro B and B, and C is divided into medium-sized C and large C. The smallest companies belong to accounting class A, while the largest belong to accounting class D. The classification is based on the assessed size of the company based on two out of three parameters: net revenue, balance sheet, and number of employees. Personal companies as well as companies with limited liability (Class A): Less than an annual average of 10 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $1.1 million (DKK 7 million) or net revenue not exceeding $2.2 million (DKK 14 million) during the fiscal year. According to the Danish Financial Statements Act, personally-owned businesses, personally-owned general partnerships (multiple owners), and general funds are characterized as Class A; there is no requirement to prepare financial statements unless the owner voluntarily chooses to do so. Class B. Private limited liability companies, commercial funds, and companies with limited liability. Micro businesses (Class micro B): Less than an annual average of 10 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $429,000 (DKK 2.7 million) or net revenue not exceeding $858,000 (DKK 5.4 million) during the fiscal year. Small businesses (Class B): Less than an annual average of 50 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $7.0 million (DKK 44 million) or net revenue not exceeding $14.1 million (DKK 89 million) during the fiscal year. Medium-sized enterprises (Class C medium): Less than an annual average of 250 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $24.8 million (DKK 156 million) or net revenue not exceeding $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) during the fiscal year. Large companies (Class C large): Companies that are neither small nor medium companies, and have an annual average of at least 250 full-time employees, total assets in excess of $24.8 million (DKK 156 million), or net revenue in excess of $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) during the fiscal year, but are not a class D company. Accounting class D: Publicly-traded companies and state-owned stock-based enterprises. Large companies (Class C and D) are required to report annually on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) efforts. This includes reporting on environmental; social; labor and human rights; and anti-corruption and bribery efforts. The reporting requirement covers four components: the company’s business model, material risks associated with each of the four issue areas, non-financial key performance indicators, and integrative referral to the financial amounts provided elsewhere in the annual report. There is no requirement for companies to have policies on the four issues, though they are required to follow a do-or-explain principle that requires companies to explain their policies in substance or explain why they have decided not to have a policy on the issue. For implemented policies, companies are required to disclose the substance of the policy and how they translate policies into action. The rules on reporting generally follow EU Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial information though certain issues, including reporting on the company’s impact on climate change, are stricter in Denmark than the directive. The rules on reporting on these issues allow for an exception if the companies report on similar issues using international standards such as UN Global Compact’s Communication on Progress. All government draft proposed regulations are published at “Høringsportalen” ( www.hoeringsportalen.dk ) and are available for comment from interested parties. Following the comment period, the government may revise draft regulations before publication on the Danish Parliament’s website ( www.ft.dk ). Final regulations are published at www.lovtidende.dk and www.ft.dk . All ministries and agencies are required to publish proposed regulations. Denmark has a World Bank composite score of 4.75 for the Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, on a zero to five scale. Concerning governance, the World Bank suggests the following areas for improvement: Affected parties cannot request reconsideration or appeal adopted regulations to the relevant administrative agency. There is no existing requirement that regulations be periodically reviewed to see whether they should be revised or eliminated. Denmark is a member of the European Union and is an active supporter of the internal market. As a result, many aspects of business regulation are dictated by the EU and hence aligned with other EU Member States. Denmark adheres to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); no inconsistencies have been reported. Denmark’s decision-making power is divided into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The principles of separation of power and an independent judiciary help ensure democracy and Danish citizens’ legal rights. The district courts, the high courts, and the Supreme Court represent the Danish legal system’s three basic levels. The legal system also comprises other institutions with special functions, e.g., the Maritime and Commercial Court. For further information, please see: domstol.dk/om-os/english/the-danish-judicial-system/ As an EU member state, Denmark is bound by EU rules on the free movement of goods, capital, persons, and certain services. The government agency “Invest in Denmark” is part of the Danish Trade Council and is situated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agency provides detailed information to potential investors. The website for the agency is investindk.com . The Faroese government promotes Faroese trade and investment through its website faroeislands.fo/economy-business . For further information concerning Greenland’s investment potential, please see Greenland Venture at www.venture.gl or the Greenland Tourism & Business Council at visitgreenland.com . The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA) reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. A merger or takeover is subject to approval by the CCA. Large-scale mergers also require approval from EU competition authorities. According to the Danish Competition Act, the CCA requires notification of mergers and takeovers if the aggregate annual revenue in Denmark of all undertakings involved is more than $134 million (DKK 900 million) and the aggregate yearly revenue in Denmark of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than $15.9 million (DKK 100 million), or if the aggregate annual revenue in Denmark of at least one of the undertakings involved is more than $604 million (DKK 3.8 billion) and the aggregate yearly worldwide revenue of at least one of the other undertakings concerned is more than $604 million (DKK 3.8 billion). When a merger results from the acquisition of parts of one or more undertakings, the calculation of the revenue referred to shall only comprise the share of the revenue of the seller or sellers that relates to the assets acquired. Merger control provisions are contained in Part Four of the Danish Competition Act and in the Executive Order on the Notification of Mergers . Revenue is calculated under the Executive Order on the Calculation of Turnover in the Competition Act . A full notification of a merger must include the information and documents specified in the full notification form, Annex 1 – Information for Full Notification of Mergers . A simplified notification of a merger must include the information and documents specified in the simplified notification form, Annex 2 – Information for Simplified Notification of Mergers . From August 1, 2013, merger fees are payable for merger notifications submitted to the CCA. The fee for a simplified notification amounts to $7,950 (DKK 50,000). The fee for a full notification amounts to 0.015 percent of the aggregate annual turnover in Denmark of the undertakings involved; this fee is capped at $238,400 (DKK 1,500,000). Additional information concerning notification of mergers is available in the Guidelines to the Executive Order on Notification of Mergers and on Merger Fees . More general information on Danish merger control can be found in the Merger Guidelines . By law, private property can only be expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, with reasonable compensation, and under established principles of international law. There have been no recent expropriations of significance in Denmark. Monetary judgments under the bankruptcy law are made in freely convertible Danish Kroner. The bankruptcy law addresses creditors’ claims in the following order: (1) costs and debt accrued during the treatment of the bankruptcy; (2) costs, including the court tax, relating to attempts to find a solution other than bankruptcy; (3) wage claims and holiday pay; (4) excise taxes owed to the government; and (5) all other claims. 4. Industrial Policies Performance incentives are available to both foreign and domestic investors. Examples include grants or preferential financing in designated regional development areas. Foreign subsidiaries located in Denmark can participate in government-financed or subsidized research programs on a national-treatment basis. Denmark is recognized as a global leader in green and renewable energy. The government provides a multitude of support programs to private households and companies for energy efficiency renovations. Similarly, several programs exist for maturation and tech commercialization of green technologies. In December 2021, the Danish parliament reached a political framework agreement for a total of $2.5 billion (DKK 16 billion) support for carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) between 2022 and 2030. The Energy Technology Development and Demonstration Program (EUDP) supports private companies and universities to develop and demonstrate new energy technologies, in support of Denmark’s goal of a 70 percent carbon reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. The EUDP has contributed $905.9 million (DKK 5.7 billion) to more than 1,000 projects since its inception in 2007. An overview of the programs can be found on the Danish Energy Agency’s website in Danish: https://ens.dk/service/tilskuds-stoetteordninger . The only free port in Denmark is the Copenhagen Free Port, operated by the Port of Copenhagen. The Port of Copenhagen and the Port of Malmö (Sweden) merged their commercial operations in 2001, including the free port activities, in a joint company named CMP. CMP is one of the largest port and terminal operators in the Nordic Region and one of the largest Northern European cruise ship ports; it occupies a key position in the Baltic Sea region for the distribution of cars and transit of oil. The facilities in the Free Port are mainly used for tax-free warehousing of imported goods, for exports, and for in-transit trade. Tax and duties are not payable until cargo leaves the Free Port. The processing of cargo and the preparation and finishing of imported automobiles for sale can freely be set up in the Free Port. Manufacturing operations can be established with permission of the customs authorities, which is granted if special reasons exist for having the facility in the Free Port area. The Copenhagen Free Port welcomes foreign companies establishing warehouse and storage facilities. Danish law mandates performance requirements only in connection with investments in hydrocarbon exploration, where concession terms typically require a fixed work program, including seismic surveys, and in some cases, exploratory drilling, consistent with applicable EU directives. Performance requirements are primarily designed to protect the environment, mainly by encouraging reduced energy and water use. Several environmental and energy requirements are universally applied to households as well as businesses in Denmark, both foreign and domestic. For instance, Denmark was the first of the EU countries, in January 1993, to introduce a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax on business and industry. This includes specific reimbursement schemes and subsidy measures to reduce the costs for businesses, thereby safeguarding competitiveness. Performance requirements are governed by Danish legislation and EU regulations and are applied uniformly to domestic and foreign investors. Potential violations of the rules governing this area are punishable by fines or imprisonment. The Danish government does not follow “forced localization” policies, nor does it require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. The Danish Data Protection Agency, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Culture are the entities involved with data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights in Denmark are well protected by law and in practice. Real estate is chiefly financed through the well-established Danish mortgage bond credit system, the security of which compares to that of government bonds. In compliance with the covered bond definition in the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), the Danish mortgage banking regulation allows for commercial banks to have the same opportunities as mortgage banks and ship-financing institutions to issue covered bonds. Only issuers that have been granted a license from the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) are permitted to issue Danish covered bonds. Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced in Denmark. All mortgage credits in real estate are recorded in local public registers of mortgages. Except for interests in cars and commercial ships, which are also publicly recorded, other property interests are generally unrecorded. The local public registers are a reliable system of recording security interests. Denmark ranked ninth out of 129 countries in the Property Rights Alliance’s International Property Rights Index 2021, and sixth in its region. Intellectual property rights (IPR) in Denmark are well protected and enforced. Denmark has ratified and adheres to key international conventions and treaties concerning protection of IPR, including the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and several treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en . A list of attorneys in Denmark known to accept foreign clients can be found at dk.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys. This list of attorneys and law firms is provided by the U.S. Embassy as a convenience to U.S. citizens. It is not intended to be a comprehensive list of attorneys in Denmark, and the absence of an attorney from the list is in no way a reflection on competence. A complete list of attorneys in Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands may be found at the Danish Bar Association web site: www.advokatnoeglen.dk . 6. Financial Sector Denmark has fully liberalized foreign exchange flows, including those for direct and portfolio investment purposes. Credit is allocated on market terms and is freely available. Denmark adheres to its IMF Article VIII obligations. The Danish banking system is under the regulatory oversight of the Financial Supervisory Authority. Differentiated voting rights – A and B stocks – are used to some extent, and several Danish companies are controlled by foundations, which can restrict potential hostile takeovers, including foreign takeovers. The Danish stock market functions efficiently. In 2005, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange became part of the integrated Nordic and Baltic marketplace, OMX Exchanges, which is headquartered in Stockholm. Besides Stockholm and Copenhagen, OMX also includes the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. To increase the access to capital for primarily small companies, the OMX in December 2005 opened a Nordic alternative marketplace – “First North” – in Denmark. In February 2008, the NASDAQ-OMX Group acquired the exchanges. In the World Economic Forum 2019 report, Denmark ranked 11th out of 141 on the metric “Financial System.” The Danish stock market is divided into four different branches/indexes. The C25 index contains the 25 most valuable companies in Denmark. Other large companies with a market value exceeding $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) are in the group of “Large Cap,” companies with a market value between $158 million (EU 150 million) and $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) belong to the “Mid Cap” segment, while companies with a market value smaller than $158 million (EU 150 million) belong to the “Small Cap” group. The major Danish banks are rated by international agencies, and their creditworthiness is rated as high by international standards. The European Central Bank and the Danish National Bank reported that Denmark’s major banks have passed stress tests by considerable margins. Denmark’s banking sector is relatively large; based on the ratio of consolidated banking assets to GDP, the sector is three times bigger than the national economy. By January 2022, the total of Danish shares valued $673.4 billion (DKK 4.24 trillion) and were owned 55.1 percent by foreign owners and 44.9 percent by Danish owners, including 13.5 percent held by households and 3.9 percent by the government. The three largest Danish banks – Danske Bank, Nordea Bank Danmark, and Jyske Bank – hold approximately 75 percent of the total assets in the Danish banking sector. The primary goal of the Central Bank (Nationalbanken) is to maintain the peg of the Danish currency to the Euro – with allowed fluctuations of 2.25 percent. It also functions as the general lender to Danish commercial banks and controls the money supply in the economy. As occurred in many countries, Danish banks experienced significant turbulence in 2008 – 2009. The Danish parliament subsequently passed a series of measures to establish a “safety net” program, provide government lending to financial institutions in need of capital to uphold their solvency requirements, and ensure the orderly winding down of failed banks. The parliament passed an additional measure, named Bank Package 4, in August 2011, which sought to identify systemically important financial institutions, ensure the liquidity of banks that assume control of a troubled bank, support banks acquiring troubled banks by allowing them to write off obligations of the troubled bank to the government, and change the funding mechanism for the sector-funded guarantee fund to a premiums-based, pay-as-you-go system. According to the Danish government, Bank Package 4 provides mechanisms for a sector solution to troubled banks without senior debt holder losses but does not supersede earlier legislation. As such, senior debt holder losses are still a possibility in the event of a bank failure. On October 10, 2013, the Danish Minister for Business and Growth concluded a political agreement with broad political support which, based on the most recent financial statements, identified specific financial institutions as “systemically important” (SIFI). The SIFIs in Denmark as of June 2021, the most recent designation, are Danske Bank A/S, Nykredit Realkredit A/S, Nordea Kredit Realkreditaktieselskab, Jyske Bank A/S, Sydbank A/S, DLR Kredit A/S, Spar Nord Bank A/S and A/S Arbejdernes Landsbank. The government identified these institutions based on three quantitative measures: 1) a balance sheet to GDP ratio above 6.5 percent; 2) market share of lending in Denmark above 5 percent; or 3) market share of deposits in Denmark above 3 percent. If an institution is above the requirement of any one of the three measures, it will be considered systemically important and must adhere to the stricter requirements on capitalization, liquidity, and resolution. The Faroese SIFIs are P/F BankNordik, and Betri Banki P/F, while Grønlandsbanken is the only SIFI in Greenland. The Danish government projected in May 2022 that Denmark’s debt to GDP ratio will decrease from approximately 42 percent at the end of 2020 to 33 percent by the end of 2023. The Ministry of Finance announced in May 2022 that Denmark ran a 2.3 percent budget surplus in 2021, and projects budget surpluses of 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Denmark maintains no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Denmark is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) hold dominant positions in rail, energy, utilities, and broadcast media in Denmark. Large-scale public procurement must go through public tender in accordance with EU legislation. Competition from SOEs is not considered a barrier to foreign investment in Denmark. As an OECD member, Denmark promotes and upholds the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and subsidiary SOE Guidelines. Denmark has no current plans to privatize its SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct As an OECD member, Denmark promotes, through the Danish Business Authority (DBA), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Denmark’s National Contact Point can be reached at: mneguidelines.oecd.org/National-Contact-Points-Website-Contact-Details.pdf From January 1, 2016, the largest companies must account for their responsible business conduct, including with respect to human rights and to reducing the climate impact of the company’s activities. Additionally, target figures for the gender composition of the board of directors, as well as policies for increasing the proportion of the underrepresented gender at the company’s management levels, must be reported (Danish Financial Statements Act, sections 99a and 99b). The mandate has also applied to medium-sized businesses (exempting small and micro companies) since January 2018. The DBA published a National Action Plan to advance Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) in Denmark in 2012, covering the 2012 – 2015 period. It contained 42 initiatives focusing on business-driven CSR. In October 2019, the government launched a public hearing process to “investigate how reporting can be made more comparable and create more transparency for the benefit of society and the companies themselves. The purpose is to increase transparency about whether companies are living up to their corporate social responsibility, that sustainable companies have better access to investment and that companies experience a positive value from their CSR reporting.” The government received recommendations in October 2020 and is working on new initiatives. The government hosts www.csrkompasset.dk/ (English language version www.csrcompass.com/ ), a free online tool that can help companies implement responsible supply chain management. The tool is targeted at small and medium-sized production, trade, and service companies. The structure of the CSR Compass and its advice and guidelines are in line with national and international trends and best practice standards, including the UN Global Compact, OECD’s guidelines for multinational companies, Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), the Danish Ethical Trading Initiative (DIEH), and the Danish Council on Corporate Social Responsibility’s guidelines for responsible supply chain management. Denmark is a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Denmark is considered a leading country in facilitating the green transition. It ranks in the top three on most rankings on the green transition and climate change mitigation, including second on the ITIF’s Global Energy Innovation Index, MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index, and the Global Green Growth Institute’s (GGGI) Global Green Growth Index. In 2020, the Danish parliament passed the Danish Climate Act, which established a statutory target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 70 percent from 1990 levels by 2030 and achieving net zero by 2050. The act introduced a duty to act on the government to ensure Denmark meets the targets. The Climate Act established the Danish Council on Climate Change as an independent expert advisory body, tasked with publishing an annual assessment of progress towards the targets and providing policy recommendations to meet the targets. In September 2021, the government published its “Timetable for a Green Denmark” setting out the agreements and reforms it expects to introduce by 2025 to meet the 2030 and 2050 targets. The Danish parliament has reached several broad agreements to ensure Denmark meets its green transition and net zero targets, with negotiations announced on additional proposals. An April 2022 reform proposal on Danish energy policy aims to quadruple the combined onshore wind and solar power production capacity by 2030; an expansion of district heating; and contributing to European independence from Russian gas by also increasing production of biogas as well as natural gas from the North Sea. The government subsequently announced a proposal in April 2022 for a higher and more uniform CO2 tax covering more industries to reduce CO2 emissions by 3.7 million tons in 2030, to be implemented on top of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Negotiations for the 2022 energy proposal and CO2 tax are ongoing as of May 2022. Denmark has several schemes and pools of funding to increase energy efficiency in industry and business to facilitate the green transition. A list of programs can be found in Danish on the Danish Energy Agency’s website: https://ens.dk/service/tilskuds-stoetteordninger . A multitude of programs for energy efficiency renovations for private or commercial real estate exist, as well as tech maturation and marketization programs. A 2021 agreement on carbon capture, utilization and storage intends to invest $2.5 billion (DKK 16 billion) between 2022 and 2030. The Danish government has also announced plans to build two massive “energy islands” to accelerate the movement to electrification, including via green fuels, potentially with the capacity for generation and distribution of 10 GW of electricity. In May 2022, heads of governments from Denmark, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands co-signed a joint declaration to install at least 150 GW of offshore wind in the North Sea before 2050. The joint declaration sets a combined target for total offshore wind capacity of at least 65 GW by 2030, increasing to at least 150 GW by 2050. Negotiations on agriculture and transportation sector tax reforms are scheduled for the fall of 2022. 9. Corruption Denmark is perceived as the least corrupt country in the world according to the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, which has local representation in Denmark. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for combating corruption, which is covered under the Danish Penal Code. Penalties for violations range from fines to imprisonment of up to four years for a private individual’s involvement and up to six years for a public employee’s involvement. Since 1998, Danish businesses cannot claim a tax deduction for the cost of bribes paid to officials abroad. Denmark is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, the UN Anticorruption Convention, and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. In the Working Group’s 2015 Phase 3 follow-up report on Denmark, the Working Group concluded “that Denmark has partially implemented most of its Phase 3 recommendations. However, concerns remain over Denmark’s enforcement of the foreign bribery offence.” Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: The Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime Kampmannsgade, 11604 København V Phone: +45 72 68 90 00 Fax: +45 45 15 01 19 Email: saoek@ankl.dk To report any knowledge of corruption within Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs development assistance agency DANIDA projects or among staff, or DANIDA partners: um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/Danida-transparency/anti-corruption/report-corruption/ Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International Danmark c/o CBSDalgas Have 15, 2. sal, lokale V.2.352000 Frederiksberg Email: sekretariatet@transparency.dk Contact at Embassy Copenhagen responsible for combating corruption: Aaron Daviet Political Officer U.S. Department of State Dag Hammarskjolds Alle 24, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark +45 3341 7100 CopenhagenICS@state.gov 10. Political and Security Environment Denmark is a politically stable country. Incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations are very rare. The EIU rates Denmark “AAA” for political risk. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Danish labor force is generally well-educated and efficient. English-language skills are good, and English is considered a natural second language among a very high proportion of Danes. The labor market is stable and flexible. U.S. companies operating in Denmark have indicated that Danish rules on hiring and firing employees generally enable employers to adjust the workforce quickly to changing market conditions. The Danish labor force amounted to approximately 3.08 million people at the end of 2021. Of these, 946,000 were employed in the public sector, which accounts for about 31 percent of the labor force. Denmark’s OECD-harmonized unemployment rate was 4.5 percent in March 2022, lower than the EU-27’s average rate of 6.2 percent and OECD average of 5.12 percent. Denmark faces labor shortages in certain sectors, which may be abated by the projected slowdown in growth but may otherwise present a challenge for foreign investors. The labor force participation rate for women is among the highest in the world. In 2020, 75.9 percent of working-age women participated in the labor force, and the employment rate was 72.8 percent. The working-age male labor force participation rate and employment rate were 79.4 percent and 76.3 percent, respectively. The Danish labor force is highly organized, with 66.5 percent belonging to a union in 2018, the second highest in the OECD. Labor disputes and strikes occur only sporadically. In general, private sector labor/management relations are excellent, based on dialogue and consensus rather than confrontation. Working conditions are established through a complex system of legislation and organizational agreements, where most aspects of wage and working conditions are determined through collective bargaining rather than legislation. The contractual work week for most wage earners is 37.5 hours. By law, employees are entitled to five weeks of paid annual leave. In practice, most of the labor force has the right to six weeks of paid annual leave, gained through other labor market agreements. Denmark has well-functioning unemployment insurance and sick-pay schemes, self-financed or financed by the state. Employees have a right to take maternity or paternity leave which in Denmark is a total of 52 weeks, 18 of which are reserved for the mother (four weeks prior to birth, 14 after) and two for the father to be taken within the first 14 weeks after birth. In addition, most employees have maternity/paternity leave for at least 14 weeks fully paid by the employer, while the government supports the remainder of the leave. In August 2022, the system will change due to EU legislation being implemented. Danish wages are high by international standards and have prompted the use of capital-intensive technologies in many sectors. Some investors report that the high average wage level is detrimental to Danish competitiveness. Although high wages and generous benefits, including time off, reduce competitiveness, high productivity and low direct costs to employers can result in per employee costs that are lower than in other industrialized countries. Real wages increased on average by 4.2 percent from 2020 to 2021. The government forecast that nominal wages will increase significantly in 2022, though increasing inflation will affect real wage increases. Generally, personal income tax rates in Denmark are among the highest in the world. However, foreign employees making more than an amount specified annually by the Danish Immigration Service and certain researchers may choose to be subject to a 27 percent income tax rate, plus a labor market contribution tax amounting to 32.84 percent income tax in the first seven years of working in Denmark. Certain conditions must be fulfilled for key employees to be eligible for the 27 percent tax rate: for example, since January 1, 2022, wages must total at least $11,200 (DKK 70,400) per month before the deduction of labor market contributions and after Danish labor market supplementary pension contributions. There are also limits based on an individual’s previous work history in the Danish labor market. Compared with the general Danish progressive income tax system, this is an attractive incentive. Further information can be obtained from Danish embassies or from the Danish Immigration Service ( www.nyidanmark.dk ). Danish work permits are not required for citizens of EU countries. U.S. companies have reported that in general, work permits for foreign managerial staff may be readily obtained. However, permits for non-managerial workers from countries outside the EU and the Nordic countries are granted only if substantial professional or labor-related conditions warrant. Special rules detailed by the Danish Immigration Service in its “Positive List Scheme” apply to certain professional fields experiencing a shortage of qualified manpower. The list is updated twice annually. Foreigners who have been hired in the designated fields will be immediately eligible for residence and work permits. The minimum educational level required for a position on the Positive List is an occupational Bachelor’s degree, a series of education usually 3.5 years in length combining theoretical and practical experience. In some cases, a Danish authorization must be obtained, which the Positive List will explicitly state if applicable (e.g., non-Danish trained doctors must be authorized by the Danish Patient Safety Authority). Professions covered by the Positive List Scheme include engineers, scientists, doctors, nurses, IT specialists, marine biologists, lawyers, accountants and a wide range of other master’s or bachelor’s degree positions. Persons who have been offered a highly paid job have particularly easy access to the Danish labor market through the Pay Limit Scheme. As of 2022, the Pay Limit Scheme extends to positions with an annual pay of no less than $71,200 (DKK 448,000), regardless of the field or specific nature of the job. The length of work and residence permits granted under the Pay Limit Scheme depend on the length of the employment contract in Denmark. For permanent employment contracts, work permits are granted for an initial period of four years. After this period, the permit can be extended if the same job is held. There are several other schemes meant to make it easier for certified companies to bring employees with special skills or qualifications to Denmark. These schemes vary in duration and requirements. Danish immigration law also allows issuance of residency permits of up to 18 months’ duration based on an individual evaluation, using a point system based on education, language skills, and adaptability. Denmark has ratified all eight ILO Core Conventions and been an ILO member since 1919. 14. Contact for More Information Kristen Stolt Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Denmark Dag Hammarskjölds Alle 24 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark Email: CopenhagenICS@state.gov The Faroe Islands have an open economy and multiple trade agreements with other countries. For more than two centuries, the Faroese economy has relied on fisheries and related industries. Fisheries (including agriculture, hunting, and forestry) account for 22 percent of the Faroe Islands’ domestic factor income. About 95 percent of goods exports are fish products. Salmon alone accounts for 38 percent of goods exports. As a non-EU member, the Faroe Islands had open access to the Russian market post-2014, despite Russia’s retaliatory trade embargo on certain food imports from the EU. This allowed the Faroese to sell increased quantities of salmon to the Russian market at a premium even while prices dropped significantly in the European market. The Faroese government announced in February 2022 that it supports Western sanctions against Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine and passed legislation in May to enable it to implement sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The islands exported $1.59 billion (DKK 10 billion) worth of goods in 2021, 95 percent of which were fish products, with the remainder being marine vessels and aircraft resales. In recent years, construction, transportation, banking, and other financial services sectors have grown, and offshore oil and gas exploration is developing, though commercially viable finds have not been made. In 2021, the top destination for goods exports was Russia (23.3 percent), followed by Denmark (12.6 percent), the United States (10.6 percent), and the United Kingdom (10.5 percent). Goods imports totaled $1.46 billion (DKK 9.2 billion) in 2021, with the vast majority from Europe. Of total Faroes’ goods imports, 23.2 percent came from Denmark, followed by Norway (12.8 percent), Germany (9.2 percent), the Netherlands (7.5 percent), and China (6.9 percent). Direct imports from the United States were 1.6 percent of total imports. Major import categories were inputs to industry (22.5 percent), household consumption (21.0 percent), fuels (14.5 percent), and machinery and capital equipment (10.7 percent). The Faroe Islands’ small, open, but non-diversified economy makes it vulnerable to changes in international markets. The Faroe Islands have full autonomy to set tax rates and fees, and to set levels of spending on the services they provide. Denmark provides an annual block grant indexed to Danish inflation. In 2021 it was $103.4 million (DKK 650.7 million). COVID-19 reached the Faroe Islands in March 2020. The Faroese government quickly instituted short-term measures, similar to Denmark’s, to contain the infection. The Faroes were virus-free by July 2020, and experienced brief upticks throughout 2020 and 2021, though without the need for major shutdowns. The virus returned in earnest in late 2021, culminating in January – February 2022, but without putting the hospital system under pressure. On February 28, 2022, the government lifted all remaining COVID-19 restrictions. The global economic downturn in the wake of COVID-19 and long-term uncertainty lowered worldwide demand and fish prices, the Faroes’ main export. Some fisheries used their existing supply chains to convert a large portion of their sales from restaurant customers to retail trade customers. At the same time, corporate investment appetite has remained intact, as corporations were well consolidated before the virus outbreak. This has helped mitigate some of the negative economic impact of the pandemic. Labor market compensation schemes further supported the economy. By September 2020, the government phased out its wage cost compensation scheme and employment and unemployment levels were roughly back to their pre-pandemic levels. The pandemic acutely impacted the tourism sector, but this sector makes up only a small portion of the Faroese economy. Official statistics list 2020 as the most recent year available for GDP figures, at $3.4 billion (DKK 21.2 billion). According to Statistics Faroe Islands, nominal GDP rose 8.7 percent in 2016 followed by growth of 3.7 percent in 2017, 2.3 percent in 2018, and 7.9 percent in 2019. GDP contracted by 2.8 percent in 2020 mainly due to COVID-19 and related price effects on fish prices. According to the Danish Central Bank, the strongest underlying drivers for recent years’ growth are substantial price increases for farmed salmon and larger catches of mackerel and herring in particular, combined with considerable productivity gains. Activity has been concentrated in fewer farms and shipping companies, both in aquaculture and in the pelagic fisheries, making these industries more profitable. These factors have boosted incomes and led to higher private and public sector demand. Employment has risen notably, and the labor market participation rate is high, which has pushed down unemployment from 7 percent in 2011 to 0.9 percent in 2021. The need for labor has increasingly been met via high net immigration, which has prolonged the economic upswing. According to the Danish Central Bank, all industries are experiencing labor shortages. The many new inhabitants, however, have put the housing market under pressure, especially in and around the capital Tórshavn. Construction of the tunnels to the islands Eysturoy and Sandoy, with an expected cost of approximately $420 million (DKK 2.64 billion) or 16 percent of GDP, are proceeding as planned. The Eysturoy tunnel opened for traffic on December 19, 2020, and the Sandoy tunnel is set to open in December 2023. In the longer term, the aging Faroese population will weaken the sustainability of public finances, according to the Economic Council for the Faroe Islands. The Council suggests that in order to maintain the high level of service to citizens established over many years, the Faroese government must prioritize this issue in due course. Currently, there are four people of working age (16 to 66), for every person aged 67 or older. By 2050, the Council estimates there to be 2.1 persons for every dependent retiree. The Council estimates that a permanent fiscal improvement of 5 percent of GDP will be required to stabilize government debt, which is currently at a low level. On August 6, 2021, credit agency Moody’s maintained its Aa2 long-term issuer rating of the Government of the Faroe Islands. The Aa2 rating is the third-highest rating on Moody’s 21-tier scale. The outlook remains stable and Moody’s concludes that the Faroe Islands has a healthy degree of financial independence, a low level of refinancing risk, and that, despite a state budget deficit in 2020 and 2021 caused primarily by the COVID-19 pandemic, the debt-to-income ratio will most likely return to healthy levels in the coming years. Moody’s assesses the stable and historical relationship with Denmark as an additional strength. The Faroe Islands opened its own securities exchange in 2000; active trading of shares followed in 2005. The exchange is a collaboration with the VMF Icelandic exchange on the Nasdaq OMX Nordic Exchange Iceland. Foreign Direct Investment into the Faroe Islands totaled $22.2 million (DKK 139.4 million) in 2019, and outward FDI was $699 million (DKK 4.4 billion). The Faroese government has indicated an interest in attracting further foreign investment. “Invest in the Faroes” is the Faroese government unit promoting Faroese trade. The website is http://www.government.fo . The Faroe Islands have over the years engaged in several disputes with the EU over fishing quotas, so far culminating with the EU adopting measures that allowed it to impose sanctions on the Faroe Islands in 2012. In March 2013, the Faroe Islands unilaterally increased its quota for herring and mackerel. EU member states responded by voting in favor of imposing sanctions, which went into force in August 2013. The EU lifted sanctions in 2014 after reaching a political understanding with the Faroe Islands on herring catches. Subsequently, the Faroe Islands and the other coastal states in the North Atlantic signed a five-year agreement on mackerel quotas, reducing uncertainty for fisheries and improving profitability since the agreement allows for more sustainable harvesting. The Faroe Islands negotiates reciprocal exchanges of fishing opportunities with the EU, Norway, and the United Kingdom annually. The Government of the Faroe Islands retains control over most internal affairs, including the conservation and management of living marine resources within the 200 nautical mile fisheries zone, natural resources, financial regulation and supervision, and transport. Denmark continues to exercise control over foreign affairs, security, and defense, in consultation with the Faroese government. The labor force comprised 31,968 people in 2021, of which 664 were unemployed. In many areas, the Faroese labor market model resembles other Nordic countries, with high standards of living, well-established welfare schemes, and independent labor unions. Most people in the Faroe Islands are bilingual or multilingual, with Danish and English being the most widely spoken languages after Faroese. The Islands boast well-developed physical and telecommunications infrastructure and have well-established political, legal, and social structures. The standard of living for the population of 53,664 (which exceeded 50,000 for the first time in May 2017) is high by world standards, with Gross National Disposable Income per capita similar to that of Denmark. Contact for more information on the Faroe Islands: Kristen Stolt Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Denmark Dag Hammarskjölds Alle, 242100 Copenhagen, Denmark Email: CopenhagenICS@state.gov The Greenlandic government is actively pursuing foreign investment to diversify the economy, advance climate goals, and increase trade. Greenland is a self-governing area within the Kingdom of Denmark, yet it is not an EU member. Greenland originally joined the EU with Denmark in 1973 but left in 1985 and is today one of the EU’s Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). Two-thirds of Greenland lies above the Arctic Circle, and its northern tip is less than 500 miles from the North Pole. Greenland can be reached by air from Denmark or Iceland. There are currently no direct commercial flights to or from the United States. With approximately 60 kilometers of road in the whole territory, people and goods are transported either by air or by sea. Greenland’s GDP was estimated at $3.19 billion (DKK 20.19 billion) in 2020. Denmark’s annual block grant to Greenland equals approximately 20 percent of GDP. The preponderance of jobs is in the public sector or with Government of Greenland-owned enterprises that comprise the telecommunication, power, and transportation sectors. Fishing is Greenland’s single most important commercial industry, accounting for 93 percent of exports. The sector is dominated by two companies, the Government of Greenland-owned Royal Greenland and the privately-owned Polar Seafood. The government is promoting the development of tourism and the extractive minerals sector, as well as hydropower projects. Greenland has large deposits of critical minerals and rare earth elements. Greenland owns and has disposal rights over all mineral resources, including oil and gas resources. The Greenlandic government announced in July 2021 its decision to cease issuing licenses for hydrocarbon exploration. Greenland’s status within the Kingdom of Denmark is outlined in the Self Rule Act (SRA) of 2009, which details the Greenlandic government’s right to assume a number of additional responsibilities from the Danish government, including the administration of justice, business and labor, aviation, immigration and border control, and financial regulation and supervision. Before 2009, Greenland had already acquired control over taxation, fisheries, internal labor negotiations, natural resources, and oversight of offshore labor, environment, and safety regulations. Denmark continues to have control over the Realm’s foreign affairs, security, and defense policy, in consultation with Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Denmark also retains authority over border control issues, including immigration into Greenland. The annual block grant Denmark provides to Greenland is indexed to inflation and accounts for about half of the Greenlandic government’s revenue. In 2021, this grant was $636 million (DKK 4.0 billion). The Greenlandic government seeks to increase economic growth and government revenues by promoting the further development of fisheries, extractive resources, energy production, and tourism while periodically trimming the public sector through privatization of enterprises currently owned by the government. Key initiatives include improving access to and localizing financing for new businesses and enhancing Greenland’s corporate tax competitiveness. Over the past decade, rising prices for fish and shellfish, the predominant Greenlandic exports, have generated solid earnings for large parts of the fisheries sector, though they were negatively impacted by COVID-19 border closures in China. The Greenlandic government directed state-owned enterprises to stop trading with Russia in February 2022 and announced the government’s intent to join EU sanctions against Russia. The Greenlandic parliament adopted legislation in May 2022 providing the framework for the government to impose sanctions against Russia. To meet anticipated demand, the Government of Greenland has extensive plans to improve infrastructure. The capital Nuuk (population 19,000) is growing in large part through economic migration from within the country. The government is expanding the airport to accommodate direct international flights, has a multilingual workforce, an active shipping and cruise port, and additional planned investments in roads, housing, and port expansion. The government is improving access to Greenland’s primary tourist destination Ilulissat (population 4,670) through an airport expansion. Both airport expansions in Nuuk and Ilulissat are expected to be completed in 2024. Additionally, the Government of Greenland is planning a new airport in Qaqortoq, the municipal seat of South Greenland, with plans for additional infrastructure improvements as well. Lastly Sisimiut, the second-largest town (population 5,600) in Greenland, is home to Greenland’s northernmost port that remains ice free year-round. Private partnerships are underway to expand adventure tourism from the shoreline to the polar ice cap and to increase access to the area’s UNESCO World Heritage Site. Other efforts to develop tourism include increases in hotel capacity, a reduction in passenger tax for cruise ships, and a focus on promoting foreign language education to create a more multilingual workforce. The government is calling for stricter safety requirements for navigation in Greenlandic waters. Greenland offers world-class deposits of rare earths and critical minerals. In the mineral extractives sector, two smaller mines (ruby and anorthosite) are in production. The government granted a company an exploitation license to restart a gold mine in southern Greenland. The Dundas ilmenite project is actively being developed, while an Australia-based company is working to develop one of the world’s largest zinc deposits located in northeast Greenland. Two small Australia-based companies are vying to extract rare earth elements in South Greenland. The resources in both of these projects are globally significant; each would rank in the top five worldwide if they were developed. One of the projects, Kringlerne, received an exploitation license in late 2020. The developer of the Kvanefjeld project has requested arbitration proceedings in its dispute with the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark following Greenland’s passage of a law in November 2021 banning mining of minerals containing more than 100 parts per million (ppm) of uranium, a limit which exploitation of the rare earth elements in Kvanefjeld would exceed. Greenland weathered the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic better than most other countries. While most parts of the world reported a sharp decline in activity in 2020, Greenland experienced positive growth of nearly 1 percent that year. In recent years there has been strong economic growth, mainly driven by large catches and high prices of fish and shellfish, but also supported by consumption, investments, and the resource extraction industry. The Greenlandic Economic Council (GEC) – an independent advisory council – estimated that real GDP grew on average by 2.4 percent annually from 2014 to 2018. The GEC expects growth to reach 1.8 percent for 2021 and 2.5 percent for 2022. A strong economy in recent years has led to labor shortages, both geographically and by sector, especially in connection with large construction projects. The GEC estimated unemployment declined from about 10 percent in 2014 to a projected 4.1 percent in 2021. Currently, 70 percent of all available jobs are in the capital Nuuk, and 90 percent of all available jobs are in just three locations: Nuuk (in which a third of the population resides), Sisimiut, and Pituffik (Thule Air Base). Greenland’s remote geographical location and the ability to effectively mitigate the risk of infection through travel restrictions reduced the need for lockdowns and restrictions with their attendant adverse economic consequences. The tourism and travel industries bore the brunt of the negative impacts of the pandemic, as lockdowns and travel restrictions in other countries effectively wiped out the 2020 and 2021 tourism seasons in Greenland, but the industry is expecting a sharp upturn in 2022. Following two years of no port calls by the cruise industry, cruise ship reservations for 2022 are the highest numbers Greenland has seen. The Greenland parliament (“Inatsisartut”) and the Government of Greenland (“Naalakkersuisut”) adopted a Budget Act in 2016, which mandates the budget not be in deficit over four contiguous years. The public budget had run surpluses since 2015, but the COVID pandemic forced a deficit of $21.4 million (DKK 135 million) in 2020, significantly below the initial estimates, and the 2020–2023 budget barely upheld the Budget Law requirement. The government projects a deficit of $12.1 million (DKK 76 million) in 2022. The Government of Greenland adopted a number of financial support measures, which increased public expenditures in 2020 and 2021 for health care, social benefits, and emergency aviation, while fisheries taxes fell. Public consumption in Greenland was 44.7 percent of GDP in 2020, compared to 24.7 percent in Denmark. The Budget Act is currently under revision and the new revised act will come into force in 2023 with adjustments but in line with the basic concept. The government and government-owned enterprises had a gross debt of approximately 20 percent of GDP in 2020, and the debt is projected to increase from $636 million (DKK 4 billion) in 2020 to $1.1 billion (DKK 7.2 billion) in 2024. The GEC reported initially in 2017 that “projections for the public finances show a major sustainability problem.” The GEC has reaffirmed that finding in subsequent reports, including their latest report from the fall of 2021 in which it projected the fiscal sustainability problem to amount to -5.4 percent of GDP up to 2050. The GEC has warned about the effects of increasing public expenditures as larger portions of the population age into retirement, resulting in fewer wage earners in the labor market. The GEC has also noted that a realistic plan to close the gap between expected expenditures and revenues could require the Greenlandic government to cut social spending, raise the retirement age, and increase vocational education and training. For Greenland to become a more self-sufficient economy, the GEC asserted that the extractive and tourism sectors would need further development. The GEC noted that Greenland has not sufficiently addressed its sustainability challenges and estimated that the public budget would need to be reinforced by $159 million (DKK 1 billion) annually by 2040 to accommodate the aging population. The vast majority of Greenlandic exports and imports pass through Denmark to and from the rest of the world but are reported as trade between the two. Greenland imports goods from all over the world, primarily through Denmark, and to a lesser extent, via Iceland. Some 93 percent of Greenlandic exports, measured in local currency, are fish products, with the remainder being mainly raw materials and machinery. Royal Greenland and Polar Seafood are the two main seafood exporters. Royal Greenland’s largest country market is China, and one-third of its revenues are generated in Asia, half in Europe, and 10 percent in North America, which the company views as a growth market. After experiencing major losses of exports to China in 2020 due to tightened import restrictions in China as a reaction to COVID-19, Royal Greenland has sought diversification in markets and products to spread risk. Polar Seafood has its main markets in Scandinavia, China, and Japan. Due to its vast geographic expanse, Greenland’s physical and telecommunications infrastructure is less interconnected and developed than in other parts of the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland’s government-owned telecommunications company predominantly uses Ericsson equipment and announced that it would continue to do so for future upgrades, including 5G. Danish business (CVR) registration through indberet.virk.dk is required to conduct business in Greenland. Furthermore, companies planning to have employees must register as an employer with the employer register Sulinal: https://sulinal.nanoq.gl . In July 2018, an updated Companies Act entered into force that opened new ways of establishing a company, e.g., with reduced share capital requirements with the possibility of partial payment of the share capital, and the possibility of establishing entrepreneur companies with a share capital of $0.16 (DKK 1). Foreign companies may start their businesses in Greenland either through a subsidiary (both ApS and A/S type companies) or via a registered branch office. ApS and A/S An ApS (private limited company) or A/S (public limited company) is a separate legal entity with limited liability for its shareholders. The main difference between a private (ApS) and a public (A/S) limited company is that the shares of a private limited company cannot be issued publicly. Therefore, an ApS cannot be subject to listing or otherwise issue shares to the public to secure more capital. In addition, there are a few differences concerning capital and management requirements. Under the Companies Act, the minimum share capital requirement for an ApS is $6,350 (DKK 40,000). The minimum share capital requirement for an A/S is $63,500 (DKK 400,000). However, under the Danish Companies Act, it is possible to incorporate an A/S and only pay 25 percent of this amount (i.e., $15,875 (DKK 100,000)), leaving the company with a receivable on the shareholders for the outstanding amount (i.e., $47,625 (DKK 300,000)). A founder of a company may be foreign or Greenlandic individuals or corporate entities. Both ApS and A/S companies can be registered via the Danish Business Authority’s (DBA) online system. No registration fees are required. A foreign company may typically establish a registered branch office in Greenland instead of establishing a Greenlandic company. A branch of a foreign company may be created through an application with the DBA. Companies within the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) may set up a branch in Greenland and Denmark without further approval from the DBA. However, companies outside of the EU/EEA must obtain approval before registering. A foreign company can do business in Greenland in a consecutive or non-consecutive 90-day period over 12 months without being required to register as a business. The Greenlandic tax system is based on flat-rate taxation of business profits for both resident and non-resident corporations. Greenland operates with a net income principle, where the taxable income is calculated as a total net amount after deductions. The net income principle means that all income is treated equally, regardless of whether the income comes from employment, self-employment, investment income, or pensions, etc. As the rules of taxation for businesses can be complicated, potential investors may seek to retain guidance from the Greenlandic Tax Agency ( www.aka.gl ) or professional consultants. Greenland has double taxation agreements with Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Canada, the United States, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Bermuda, Jersey, and Guernsey. Greenland signed a Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement with the United States. The corporate income tax rate is 25 percent (down from 30 percent in 2019); an additional surcharge of 6 percent of the tax payable brings the total corporate tax rate to 26.5 percent. The taxation of royalty payments is 30 percent. Greenland has no value-added tax (VAT) system, property tax, sales tax, or similar taxes. There are, however, some payable duties, such as taxes for cruise liners, ports duties, etc. There are four types of depreciation in the Greenlandic tax law. Buildings can be depreciated 5 percent annually. Ships, planes, and hydrocarbon prospecting can be depreciated 10 percent annually. Mineral licenses can be depreciated 25 percent each year for four years, and operating equipment can be depreciated at a rate of 30 percent annually. Assets with a cost of less than $15,875 (DKK 100,000) may be depreciated in the year of acquisition. Greenlandic permanent establishments of foreign companies are taxed under the same rules and rates as Greenlandic resident companies. There is no branch profits remittance tax or other similar tax on branch profits. If a foreign company has more than one location or permanent establishment in Greenland, these are treated as separate taxable entities with no possibility of consolidation. The Greenlandic labor force was 26,978 persons in 2020. Average unemployment for 2020 was 5.3 percent – lower than the OECD average of 7.2 percent, and a decrease from 10.3 percent in 2014. Unemployment has decreased significantly, especially in Nuuk. According to the most recent report by Statistics Greenland, 49.2 percent of the Greenlandic workforce in 2019 had an education beyond municipal primary and lower secondary school. Of the workforce, 27.4 percent had vocational education, while 15.6 percent had a tertiary education. Among the unemployed, 84 percent have no education beyond municipal primary and lower secondary school. In December 2012, Greenland passed legislation known as the “Large Scale Act,” which allows companies to use foreign labor during the construction phase of development when project costs exceed $795 million (DKK 5 billion) and workforce requirements exceed the local labor supply. The Act is intended for potential mining or infrastructure projects in Greenland. The Act lays out the framework for politically negotiated Impact Benefit Agreements (IBA) for the Government of Greenland and the employer to agree on the exact conditions of employment for foreign labor. The scale of Greenlandic labor utilized will be negotiated for each project and will vary depending on local capacity and the negotiated agreement for each project. Foreign workers enjoy the same legal protections as Greenlandic workers, including the same $16 (DKK 100.47) per hour minimum wage and retention of the right to strike. In 2021, Greenland implemented the Fast Track Scheme. This arrangement allows businesses in industries facing labor shortages to hire foreign workers who can begin working before they are approved for a work permit. Greenland possesses sizable discovered and undiscovered mineral resource potential. Some deposits are among the largest in the world. The country’s resources include iron and ferroalloys (iron, nickel, molybdenum, tungsten, and others), base metals (copper, zinc, and lead), specialty metals (rare earth elements, uranium, niobium, tantalum, and others), precious metals (platinum, gold, and others) and gemstones (diamonds, rubies, and sapphires). Mining industry experts anticipate that Greenland’s retreating ice will make the island’s rich stores of raw materials more easily accessible. However, exploration and exploitation projects will still face higher costs because of remote locations, lack of infrastructure, harsh climate, and distance to world markets. In 2021 the government implemented a limit of 100 ppm for uranium collocated with these deposits and granted the government authority to ban or limit mineral resource extraction for other types of radioactive elements. With the 2009 SRA, Greenland gained rights to its mineral and hydrocarbon resources, and it acquired the regulatory authority over these on January 1, 2010. The SRA also created a revenue mechanism: if Greenland’s natural resources’ exploitation becomes commercially viable, Greenland will keep the first $11.92 million (DKK 75 million) in annual revenues derived from these resources. Additional revenues will be split equally between the Danish and Greenlandic governments. Denmark’s share will be transferred by deducting the equivalent amount from the annual block grant to Greenland of $636 million (DKK 4.0 billion). Once the block grant’s total value is reached, any additional revenue will be subject to negotiations between the Danish and Greenlandic governments. In 2021, the Greenlandic government determined it would no longer permit hydrocarbon exploration. Most of Greenland’s identified rare earth deposits are licensed by the Mineral License and Safety Authority, and some have reached advanced stages of exploration. In 2021, Greenland dropped significantly in the Canadian Fraser Institute’s Investment Attractiveness Index from 41st out of 77 jurisdictions to 61st of 84 jurisdictions. The survey highlights the ban on exploration and production of uranium, political instability, and the lack of qualified officials as creating uncertainty for investors. Information about the Greenlandic government can be found at http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en . Information from the Greenlandic government on natural resource exploration and extraction can be found at http://www.govmin.gl . Information about doing business in Greenland can be found at https://www.businessingreenland.gl/en . Statistics on Greenland can be found at http://www.stat.gl/default.asp?lang=en . By law, private property can only be expropriated for public purposes in areas where the Greenlandic government has the competencies, in a non-discriminatory manner, and with reasonable compensation. There have been no recent expropriations of significance in Greenland. In Greenland it is not possible to acquire private ownership of land, but a right of use may be sold for an area, i.e. if you buy property, you own the building, not the land on which it sits. There have been no significant disputes over foreign investment in Greenland in recent years, however, in March 2022, Australia-based Greenland Minerals requested arbitration in its dispute with the Governments of Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark over the future of its Kvanefjeld rare earths project. While it is common that disputes are settled in Greenlandic courts, the Danish Supreme Court remains the highest appeals court for disputes in Greenland. If a dispute is very specialized and within the purview of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, the parties involved can choose the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court as a court of first instance. While Greenland’s democratic institutions and legal framework in general are strong, there have been some concerns about legislation being passed by parliament without significant hearing processes and public input. Louise Grønvold Political and Economic Specialist U.S. Consulate Nuuk, Greenland Email: USConsulateNuuk@state.gov Djibouti Executive Summary Djibouti, a country with few resources, recognizes the crucial need for foreign direct investment (FDI) to stimulate economic development. The country’s assets include a strategic geographic location, free zones, an open trade regime, and a stable currency. Djibouti has identified a number of priority sectors for investment, including transport and logistics, real estate, energy, agriculture, and tourism. Djibouti’s investment climate has improved in recent years, which has led to interest by U.S. and other foreign firms. There are, however, a number of reforms still needed to promote investment. In 2020, according to the UN Conference of Trade and Development, FDI stock represented 58.53% of GDP, up from 52.5% in 2018. Real GDP growth has remained between 5% and a little over 8% per year for the last five years. Inflation decreased to 0.1 % in 2018 then peaked at an estimated 3.3% in 2019 and decreased to 2.9% in 2020. In recent years, Djibouti undertook a surge of foreign-backed infrastructure loans to posture themselves as the “Singapore of Africa.” Major projects have included a new gas terminal and pipeline to Ethiopia, a new port, free zones, improved road systems, a railroad connecting Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and a water pipeline from Ethiopia. Djibouti launched the first phase of an ambitious port and free zone project, Djibouti Damerjog Industrial Development (DDID) free-trade zone, scheduled to be built in three phases of five years each. The project includes a multipurpose port, a liquefied natural gas terminal, a livestock terminal, dry docks and a ship repair area, a power plant and a factory that will produce construction materials. DDID, which is expected to attract foreign investors, will offer all the preferential policies guaranteed by the free zone authority, such as tax exemption, minimized restrictions on foreign labor and competitive water and electricity rates. In April 2018, the Government of Djibouti enacted tax, labor, and financial reforms to improve its investment climate. Various business climate reforms were introduced in 2020 with the objectives of improving competitiveness both regionally and internationally. These reforms included starting online registration for companies and the creation of the Djibouti Port Community System platform which is a portal that provides a comprehensive set of online services to the business community. Economic development and foreign investment are hindered by high electricity costs, high unemployment, an unskilled workforce, a large informal sector, regional instability, opaque business practices, compliance risks, corruption, and a weak financial sector. The World Bank estimated the government’s public debt-to-GDP ratio was 66.7% in 2019 with a projection of 69.9% in 2020 which will gradually decrease over the years. The majority of the debt is owed to Chinese entities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 128 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,310 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Djibouti’s laws encourage FDI, with the government as a driving force behind Djibouti’s economic growth. Faced with an unemployment rate of over 47%, FDI is expected to generate jobs. There are no laws, practices, or mechanisms that discriminate against foreign investors. Navigating the bureaucracy, however, can be complicated. FDI is encouraged by policy and foreign companies are often able to negotiate favorable tax terms on a case-by-case basis. The government is gradually opening public sector entities, including state owned utilities, to private investment. In 2021 the government invited proposals for a strategic investor in the state-owned telecommunications monopoly. The energy sector remains open to competition through power purchase agreements; however, the state-owned electric utility retains all rights to the transmission and distribution of electricity. This liberalization of production has resulted in the private development of wind, solar, and waste to energy resources. Djibouti’s National Investment Promotion Agency (NIPA), created in 2001, promotes private-sector investment, facilitates investment operations, and works to modernize the country’s regulatory framework. NIPA assists foreign and domestic investors by disseminating information and streamlining administrative procedures. Since 2017, NIPA’s one-stop-shop, which houses several agencies under one roof, has simplified business registration. NIPA has identified several priority sectors for investment, including infrastructure and renewable energy. The Secretariat of State in charge of Investment and Private Sector Development, established in May 2021, is in charge of implementing the business climate policy, investment promotion and private sector development. This agency works in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It ensures that the business environment is internationally competitive and conducive to private initiatives. It identifies administrative reforms that remove obstacles to the proper functioning of the private sector. Foreign and domestic private entities have equal rights in establishing and owning business enterprises and engaging in all forms of remunerative activity. Furthermore, foreign investors are not required by law to have a local partner except in the insurance industry, and then, only if the company is registered as a local company and not as a branch of an existing foreign company. Nevertheless, some foreign companies choose to have a local partner to help them better navigate the local bureaucracy and cultural sensitivities. There is no established screening process for FDI. The OECD, WTO, and the UNCTAD have not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) for Djibouti in the last five years. The Business and Human Rights Resource Center conducted a review in 2022 of Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port (DMP) which focused on the DMP’s financing by China Eximbank. The government of Djibouti has facilitated the registration of business by reducing the capital needed for investment, simplifying the formalities needed to register and simplifying certain tax procedures. The most important facilitation effort is the one-stop-shop, or Guichet Unique, managed by NIPA. The Guichet Unique (http://www.guichet-unique.dj ) brings together all the agencies with which a company must register. Typically, a company registers with the following Djiboutian offices: Office of Intellectual Property, Tax office, and the Social Security office. Online registration is not possible; the normal registration process takes 14 days, according to the World Bank. In Djibouti, new businesses must have every document notarized to begin operations. The government neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Government policies are sometimes not transparent, and do not foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. Likewise, the legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not always transparent nor are they consistent with international norms. Rule-making and regulatory authority exists at the state level. The Djiboutian accounting system is loosely based on the French accounting system as it existed at independence (1977) with subsequent updates. The regulatory regime is written in a way that promotes open competition, but application of the rules is not always consistent. Draft bills are initiated by the relevant ministry in consultation with stakeholders from relevant ministries or public institutions. Laws are then proposed by the relevant ministry, and then debated and passed by the parliament. The promulgation by the president is the last stage. Regulatory actions including laws and decrees are available online: https://www.presidence.dj/jord . Ministries and regulatory agencies do not develop forward regulatory plans – that is, a public list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended to be adopted/implemented within a specified time frame The government has no environmental, social, and governance disclosure requirement. The State Inspector General (SGI) is tasked with ensuring human and material resources in the public sector are properly utilized. It also acts as an enforcement mechanism to ensure administrative processes are followed. Public finances and the terms of debt obligations are opaque. Djibouti is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The regulatory systems in these countries are not yet harmonized. European norms and standards, especially French, are referenced in Djibouti. Djibouti is a member of the WTO. Djibouti’s legal system is based on Civil law, inherited from the French Napoleonic Code. It consists of three courts: a Court of First Instance presided over by a single judge; a Court of Appeals, with three judges; and the Supreme Court. In addition, Islamic law (shariah) and traditional law is practiced. Djibouti has a written commercial code and specialized courts, including commercial, criminal, administrative, and civilian courts. The court system is de jure independent from executive power, but may be susceptible to political pressure. Most investors request the right to counsel, including agreements for arbitration, in a recognized international court. International lawyers practicing in Djibouti have reported effective application of maritime and other commercial laws, but in the past, foreign companies operating in Djibouti have reported that court deliberations were biased or delayed. The country’s legal system has no discriminatory policy against foreign investment, and frequently negotiates extended tax breaks and other incentives to attract larger investments. In conjunction with UNCTAD, NIPA developed an investment guide that provides useful information: https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/djibouti. The Djibouti Office of Industrial and Commercial Protection (ODPIC) is the agency in charge of registering businesses. Its website contains information about the registration process: https://odpic.net/ . In 2008, Djibouti adopted a law on competition and consumer protection, which does not cover state-owned enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications. Under this law, the Government of Djibouti regulates prices in areas where competition remains limited. For example, the government regulates postal services, telecommunications, utilities, and urban transport services. Djibouti does not have an agency that specifically promotes competition and does not have a comprehensive strategy to restrict market monopolies. Foreign companies enjoy the same benefits as domestic companies under Djibouti’s Investment Code. The Investment Code stipulates that “no partial or total, temporary or permanent expropriation will take place without equitable compensation for the damages suffered.” There are no known recent cases of U.S. companies in Djibouti being subject to expropriation. There have been cases of foreign companies facing de facto expropriation via fines, while other companies have had their concession to run a public service unilaterally revoked (see discussion below about DP World). The government may expropriate land when it is needed for public utility. In that case, the government will compensate the landowner by providing land at a different location or by cash settlement. ICSID Convention and New York Convention On April 12, 2019, Djibouti signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention, also known as the Washington Convention). Djibouti made its deposit of ratification on June 9, 2020 for an entry into force on July 9, 2020. Djibouti is a contracting member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Djibouti’s government has had only a few investment disputes in the past several years, none with U.S. businesses. In some cases, the disputes have been settled in international arbitration courts and the government has abided by those decisions. In other cases, there has been de facto expropriation through large fines. As in any country, a strong, enforceable contract is important. The government passed a law in November 2017 permitting the government to unilaterally alter or terminate contracts. Using this law, in February 2018, Djibouti’s president issued a decree abrogating the government’s contract with the Emirati company, DP World, concerning the Doraleh Container Terminal, later nationalizing the equipment, physical assets, and land. DP World continued to hold 33.33% of shares until July 2018, when the government terminated the shareholders’ agreement with DP World and later nationalized all shares. Throughout, DP World has continued to claim that the 30-year 2006 Doraleh Container Terminal concession agreement remains in force. In July 2021, the London Court of International Arbitration decided, in a seventh ruling, that Djibouti should restore DP World’s rights to operate Doraleh Container Terminal in line with the original deal and receive compensation. Djibouti has not yet officially replied, but responded to a similar London Court of International Arbitration ruling in January 2020 with an official communiqué rejecting the court ruling, stating “As the Republic of Djibouti has consistently indicated since the termination of the concession, the only possible outcome is allocation of fair compensation in accordance with international law.” International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts There is no domestic arbitration body within the country. In February 2014, the IGAD countries agreed to set up an international Business Arbitration Center in Djibouti. This institution provides a mechanism for resolving business disputes and helps create a more transparent business environment in the region by reinforcing the principles of contract law and increasing the number of lawyers practicing commercial and contract law in Djibouti. Investment dispute cases are not made public. Djibouti has bankruptcy laws, and bankruptcy is not criminalized. 4. Industrial Policies Tax benefits and incentives fall under two categories detailed in the investment code. Investments greater than DJF 50 million (USD 282,486) that create several permanent jobs may be exempted from license and registration fees, property taxes, taxes on industrial and commercial profits, and taxes on the profits of corporate entities. Imported raw materials used in manufacturing are exempted from the internal consumption tax. These exemptions apply for up to a maximum of ten years after companies start producing materials in Djibouti. Incentives are often unique to an individual company or investment and are agreed upon with relevant ministries. Projects can be delayed if all relevant ministries are not consulted during negotiations. To promote exports, Djibouti has multiple free zones where companies enjoy full exemption from direct and indirect taxes for a period of up to ten years. The Djibouti Free Zone (DFZ) is located on 40 hectares and offers office space, warehouses, light industrial units, and hangars. Businesses located in the Free Zone do not pay corporate taxes, have a simplified registration process, and receive other benefits such as assistance obtaining work permits and visas. Currently, 180 companies from more than 30 countries operate out of the Free Zone. In December 2013, the DAM Commercial Free Zone opened in the Damerjog region, south of Djibouti City. In March 2018, the Djibouti Ports and Free Zone Authority and China Merchants Group began construction on a large free zone called Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ). The first phase, a 240-hectare pilot zone is currently operational. It consists of four industrial clusters which will focus on trade and logistics, export processing, business, and financial support services, as well as manufacturing and duty-free merchandise retail. When complete it will cover 4,800 hectares and offer office space, warehouses, industrial units, and will be connected directly with the ports in later phases. It will be the largest free zone in Africa. Djibouti Damerjog Industrial Development (DDID) free-trade zone is in its first of three five-year phases. The project includes a multipurpose port, a liquefied natural gas terminal, a livestock terminal, dry docks and a ship repair area, a power plant and a factory that will produce construction materials. DDID will offer all the preferential policies guaranteed by the free zone authority, such as tax exemption, minimized restrictions on foreign labor and competitive water and electricity rates. According to local regulations, companies are required to hire locally as long as the qualifications or expertise is available on the local market. However, these schemes are not equally applied to senior management and board of directors where foreign employment is more readily accepted. The process for visas, work permits, and other requirements in order to operate as a foreign employee is not onerous and is easily accessible through Djibouti’s Guichet Unique. Work permits follow a graduated fee schedule: 200,000 Djibouti francs (USD 1,124), 100,000 Djibouti francs (USD 563) and 50,000 Djibouti francs (USD 281) according to the qualifications required for a position. The government does not follow “forced localization.” The Djiboutian investment code guarantees investors the right to freely import all goods, equipment, products, or material necessary for their investments; display products and services; determine and run marketing policy and production; choose customers and suppliers; and set prices. Performance requirements are not a pre-condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding foreign direct investments. Incentives do, however, increase with the size of the investment and the number of jobs created. There are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory. There are no rules requiring local data storage within Djibouti. 5. Protection of Property Rights Djibouti’s legal system officially protects the acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Mortgages exist and are often guaranteed by the employer, who signs a form indicating the employee’s status and salary. The employer is then obliged to inform the bank if the employee leaves the company. Local workers rely on this mechanism to secure mortgages, and they expect that their employer will perform this role. Typically, the government originally owns and sells the land. There are no specific restrictions on foreign ownership of land. All property owners who have legally obtained their land are registered. Even if unoccupied, the property belongs to the owner who legally purchased it. Djibouti’s legal structure for protecting and enforcement of IPR is weak but developing. There are few existing protections. However, the government passed a law that protects artists’ copyrights. Djibouti ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention, the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Rights, and the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literature and Art Works. The Ministry of Communication and the Djibouti Office for Intellectual Property Rights are responsible for safeguarding intellectual property after registering products. Counterfeit products are commonly available in Djibouti’s markets. Infringing products include clothing, watches, electronics, and bags. Because of the nascent nature of IPR protections, counterfeit products are rarely seized, and no statistics on seizures are published. There have been reports of seizures of counterfeit money; however, statistics are unavailable. Djibouti is not listed in the U.S Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 report or the Notorious Markets List. Compared to other industries, the sale of counterfeit goods does not appear to be at higher risk of labor rights violations, including child labor, forced labor, and dangerous working conditions. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . The Embassy POC is Political Economic Officer Joseph Chamberlain at DjiboutiCommerce@state.gov . For a list of local lawyers, see: https://dj.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ 6. Financial Sector Djibouti is open to and receptive of foreign investors. Djibouti does not have its own stock market, but some multinational companies with investments in Djibouti are publicly traded. Portfolio investment in Djibouti is primarily done through private equity investments in a given sector, rather than through purchase of securities. Investments in Djibouti are inherently illiquid for that reason, and the purchase or sale of any sizeable investment in Djibouti affects the market accordingly. Existing policies respect IMF Article VIII and allow the free flow of funds for international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign companies do not face discrimination in obtaining it. Generally, however, only well-established businesses obtain bank credit, as the cost of credit is high. Credit is available to the private sector, whether foreign or domestic. Where credit is not available, it is primarily due to the associated risk and not structural factors. Three large banks, Bank of Africa, Bank for Commerce and Industry – Mer Rouge, and CAC bank dominate Djibouti’s banking sector. While these three banks account for the majority share of deposits in-country, there are 13 total banks, all established in the last 14 years. The 2011 banking law fixed the minimum capital requirement for financial institutions at DJF 1 billion (USD 5,651,250) and also covers financial auxiliaries, such as money transfer agencies and Islamic financial institutions. In addition to the three names banks above, foreign banks include Silkroad Bank, Bank of China, and the Burkina Faso-based International Business Bank. The banking sector suffers from a lack of consistent supervision, but it has been improving. Non-performing loans decreased from 16.26% in 2019 to 13.31% in 2020 and to 9.8% in 2021. The total assets of all the banks were estimated to be USD 3.1 billion in 2020, of which 80% were held by the four largest banks. The country has a Central Bank, which is in charge of delivering licenses to banks and supervising them. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. Djibouti has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. Some banks have begun to provide mobile and e-banking services. In June 2020, Djibouti Telecom launched D-Money, a Digital Mobile Money service which allows users to make digital money transfers and payments directly from mobile phones. Foreign Exchange Djibouti has no foreign exchange restrictions. Businesses are free to repatriate profits. There are no limitations on converting or transferring funds, or on the inflow and outflow of cash. The Djiboutian franc, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1949, is stable. The fixed exchange rate is 177.71 Djiboutian francs to the U.S. dollar. Funds can be transferred by using banks or international money transfer companies such as Western Union, all monitored by the Central Bank. Remittance Policies There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. There are no time limitations on remittances. The government does not issue bonds on the open market, and cash-like instruments are not in common use in Djibouti, so direct currency transfers are the only practical method of remitting profits. In mid-2020 the Djiboutian government announced the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. According to a government statement, the state-owned fund targets investments locally and in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. It focuses on industries including telecommunications, technology, energy, and logistics. The fund acts as a long-term investor and is required to reinvest the entire net profits of its activity. The government aims to fund it to $1.5 billion within ten years. Article 12 of Law N° 75/AN/20/8th L, creating the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti, states the fund will adopt and implement best practice in terms of transparency and performance reporting in accordance with the Santiago Principles. As of late 2021, the fund was ramping up operations. Law No. 75/AN/20/8th L establishing the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/75-an-20-8eme-l-10332 Decree No. 2020-127/PRE approving the statutes and determining certain initial resources of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-127-pre-10361 Decree No. 2020-111/PRE appointing the members of the Board of Directors and the Director General of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-111-pre-10360 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is nascent but growing awareness among both companies and consumers in Djibouti of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). Businesses which might harm the environment are, in general, obligated to conduct studies on the environmental impact before proceeding with their project. The government does not promote RBC in a systematic way, although it does acknowledge good corporate social responsibility and covers it favorably in state media. However, the government does not factor RBC policies or practices into its procurement decisions. There are no corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards to protect stakeholders. The government does not adhere to OECD guidelines in RBC matters. There have been reports that the government does not effectively and fairly enforce domestic laws relating to labor rights, environmental protections, consumer protections, and human rights. There are no independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations, or associations that monitor RBC in Djibouti. Djibouti has a salt extraction industry, but it does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain The national climate strategy includes a number of actions to strengthen or build capacity in the field with a view of reducing the vulnerability of the coastal zone to climate change. Priority is on addressing extreme floods, inundations, and marine submersion. Post is not aware of any government introduction of policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. There are government policies that establish marine protected areas in order to contribute to the conservation of Djibouti’s marine biodiversity and other desirable ecological benefits. In order to support coastal populations affected by climate change, the government has put in place a program to improve their resilience and mitigate their vulnerability while adopting a co-management approach to protect marine resources. 9. Corruption Djibouti has several laws to combat corruption by public officials. These laws were either passed by the government or contained in the Penal Code. However, there have been no records of cases to combat corruption by public officials. Corruption laws are extended to all family members of officials and across political parties, but they have not been applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Djibouti ranked 128 of 180 countries on the 2021 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Djibouti does not have laws or regulations to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. Djibouti is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption. There are two government entities responsible for investigating corruption and enforcing the regulations. The State Inspector General (SGI) is tasked with ensuring human and material resources in the public sector are properly utilized. The Court of Auditors is mandated to verify and audit all public establishments for transparency and accountability, and to implement necessary legal sanctions. Both institutions are mandated to produce annual corruption reports. Despite the legal mandates, both institutions lack the authority to push for meaningful reform. The National Commission for Anti-Corruption is also mandated to enforce the laws on combatting corruption and provide safe haven for whistleblowers. This Commission launched a program in March 2018 to urge high-ranking government officials to publicly declare all of their assets, with little success. The contracting code and other laws passed by Djibouti contain provisions to counter conflict-of-interest contracts or government procurement. According to a law passed in 2013, the government requires private and public companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prevent and prohibit bribery of public officials. However, these codes have not been implemented. Likewise, the government requirement that private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance to detect and prevent bribery of government officials is not enforced. Djibouti is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Djibouti is a signatory country of the UN Convention against Corruption. U.S. firms have not specifically noted corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Djibouti, but there were allegations of foreign companies having to meet requirements such as renting houses owned by senior officials or hiring certain employees as a condition of receiving government procurement contracts. In addition, one company reported harassment of employees by local competitors. Prosecution and punishment for corruption is rare. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption is listed below: Fatouma Mahamoud AbdillahiPresidentCommission Nationale Independante pour la Prevention et de Lutte Contre la CorruptionPlateau du Serpent+253 21 35 16 03 anticorruption@intnet.d j No “watchdog” organizations are present in Djibouti. 10. Political and Security Environment Djibouti has seen only very limited episodes of political violence over the last two decades. In the last ten years, there have been no known incidents of political violence leading to damage to foreign investments. Both the ruling coalition party and the recognized opposition parties favor foreign direct investment into Djibouti and local attitudes towards foreigners are positive. Djibouti held presidential elections April 9, 2021, with President Ismael Omar Guelleh winning a fifth consecutive term with 98% of the vote. His 22-year reign has contributed to stability and economic growth, but questions of succession and subsequent instability remain. Djibouti was recently awarded the International Peace Award by the journal Jeune Afrique for its secure environment, despite being surrounded by countries facing instability. According to data acquired by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Djibouti’s instances of violence and disorder have significantly declined in the past three years. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Djibouti’s official unemployment rate is 47%. Youth unemployment, defined locally as the share of the labor force between age 15 and 24 without work but that is available and actively seeing employment, has remained between 11% and 12% in the past three decades. Estimates of a sizeable informal labor market of up to 75% exist in Djibouti, with a larger informal market outside of the capital city of Djibouti. The informal market consists mostly of individual operating units, is poorly structured, and is concentrated in trade, import-export, construction, various services and handicrafts. In Djibouti, women are largely predominant in the activities of the informal economy. The formal labor market is heavily service- or government-oriented with growing markets in construction, logistics, and transportation. Skilled Djiboutian workers, especially in high-demand trades such as construction, are in short supply. Djibouti has complicated labor laws that favor the employee, especially in the areas of disputes and termination. Vocational and professional training facilities remain limited. The World Bank, the Ministry of Finance, USAID, and other entities are working on a variety of initiatives to address the shortage of workforce development programs. The government has promoted entrepreneurship as a means of stimulating the economy. The government, in partnership with the World Bank and European Union, opened the entrepreneurship and leadership center (CLE – Centre Leadership Entreprenariat ) to assist start-up companies. Foreign workers are legally allowed to work in Djibouti only if their qualifications or expertise are not available among the nationals, as determined by the Ministry of Labor through the National Agency for Employment, Training, and Professional Integration (ANEFIP). This requirement is not strictly implemented. In January 2017, the cost for a work permit was reviewed and classified in three different categories based on the type of profession with respective annual fees of 50,000 Djibouti francs (USD 281), 100,000 Djibouti francs (USD 563) and Djibouti francs 200,000 (USD 1,125). ANEFIP maintains a database of Djiboutian job-seekers and issues work permits to foreign workers. Employers have to abide by the Labor Code. Workers who are laid off get more compensation than employees who are fired. No unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs exist for workers laid off for economic reasons. Only those workers who contributed to the social insurance for 25 years and are sixty years of age are entitled to retirement benefits. Minimum wage is DJF 45,000 (USD 254) per month. By law, all employers are obligated to make social security payments on behalf of their employees, through the National Council for Social Security. Two large labor unions exist in Djibouti, but only the Djiboutian Workers Union is recognized by international organizations. Labor laws are not waived to attract investment, but the investment code and free zones have separate legal provisions to attract investment. By law, labor unions are independent of the government and employers. In practice they can be influenced by the government and/or employers. In case of labor disputes, the Labor Inspector will bring together the employer and the employee to settle the case acting as a mediator. If the mediation fails, then the case will be sent to the Court. The process is opaque and the results are not publicized. In November 2020, the National Assembly amended the Labor Code to require companies employing 11 or more employees to report annually on the status of its workforce. This report aims to prevent companies from hiring foreigners illegally, not respecting legally allowed pregnancy leave, and/or illegally firing employees. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $3,346 2020 $3,380 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 58.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Ministry of Finance and Economy Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Joseph Chamberlain U.S. Embassy Djibouti Lot 350-B Haramouss B.P. 185 Djibouti +253 (21) 45 30 00 djibouticommerce@state.gov Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on local citizens. Through the Invest Dominica Authority (IDA), the government instituted several investment incentives for businesses considering locating in Dominica. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, duty-free import of equipment and materials, exemption from value added tax on some capital investments, and withholding tax exemptions on dividends, interest payments, and some external payments and income. The IDA additionally provides support to approved citizenship by investment projects. The IDA launched a new Investment Promotion Strategy in 2021. The new strategy is focused on four sectors: agriculture and agri-business, renewable energy, tourism, and knowledge services such as business processing operations. Other sectors include film, music, and video production, manufacturing, bulk water export and bottled water operations, medical and nursing schools, and English language training services. The government continuously reviews these sectors. While these sectors are priorities, the government broadly welcomes FDI. Local laws do not place limits on foreign control in Dominica. Foreign investment in Dominica is not subject to restrictions, and foreign investors are entitled to receive the same treatment as nationals of Dominica. Foreign investors are entitled to hold up to 100 percent of their investment. However, there is a requirement for foreign investors seeking to purchase property for residential or commercial purposes to obtain an Alien Landholders License. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors in order to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. The OECS, of which Dominica is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. The IDA is Dominica’s main business facilitation unit. It facilitates foreign direct investment into priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment in Dominica. The IDA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It offers an online tool useful for navigating laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. Its website is http://investdominica.com . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the IDA to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Companies and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration on its website. However, this only allows for the preliminary processing of applications prior to the investor physically making a payment at the Supreme Court office. Investors are advised to seek the advice of a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.dm . Businesses must register with CIPO, the Tax Authority, and the Social Services Institute. The general practice for registration is to retain an attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Dominica are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Dominica has not signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It benefits from the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), which was implemented in January 1984. CBERA is intended to facilitate the development of stable Caribbean Basin economies by providing beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. Dominica has bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. Dominica has bilateral tax treaties with the United States and the UK. Dominica is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing and is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. Dominica is also party to the following agreements: Caribbean Community (CARICOM) The Treaty of Chaguaramas established CARICOM in 1973 to promote economic integration among its 15 member states. Investors operating in Dominica have preferential access to the entire CARICOM market. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas established the CSME, which permits the free movement of goods, capital, and labor within CARICOM member states. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States The Revised Treaty of Basseterre established the OECS. The OECS consists of seven full members: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and four associate members: Anguilla, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the British Virgin Islands. The OECS aims to promote harmonization among member states concerning foreign policy, defense and security, and economic affairs. The six independent countries of the OECS ratified the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, establishing the OECS Economic Union in 2011. The Economic Union established a single financial and economic space within which all factors of production, including goods, services, and people, move without hindrance. CARIFORUM- EU Economic Partnership Agreement The European Community and the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) states signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008. CARIFORUM consists of the independent Anglophone CARCOM member states, the Dominican Republic and Suriname. The overarching objectives of the EPA are to alleviate poverty in CARIFORUM states, to promote regional integration and economic cooperation, and to foster the gradual integration of the CARIFORUM states into the world economy by improving their trade capacity and creating an investment-conducive environment. The EPA promotes trade-related developments in areas such as competition, intellectual property, public procurement, the environment, and protection of personal data. CARIFORUM-UK Economic Partnership Agreement The UK and CARIFORUM signed an EPA in 2019, committing to trade continuity after Britain’s departure from the European Union. The CARIFORUM-UK EPA eliminates tariffs on all goods imported from CARIFORUM states into the UK, while those Caribbean states will continue to gradually cut import tariffs on most of the region’s imports from the UK. Caribbean Basin Initiative The objective of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is to promote economic development through private sector initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean by expanding foreign and domestic investment in non-traditional sectors, diversifying economies, and expanding exports. It permits duty-free entry of products manufactured or assembled in Dominica into the United States. Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement The Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) is an economic and trade development assistance program for Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Through CARIBCAN, Canada provides duty-free access to its national market for the majority of its products originating in Commonwealth Caribbean countries. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Dominica provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Finance and the IDA provide oversight of the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. Rule-making and regulatory authority lies within the unicameral parliament. The parliament has 21 members elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, nine appointed members, one speaker, and one clerk. Relevant ministries develop laws which are drafted by the Ministry of National Security and Home Affairs. FDI is governed principally through the laws that oversee the IDA and the Citizenship by Investment program. Laws are available online at http://www.dominica.gov.dm/laws-of-dominica . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government generally solicits input from various stakeholder groups in the formulation of laws. In some instances, the government convenes a special committee to make recommendations on provisions outlined in the law. The government uses public awareness campaigns to sensitize the general population on legislative reforms. Copies of proposed regulations are published in the official gazette shortly before the bills are taken to parliament. Although Dominica does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains a website and an information service on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Dominica. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman guards against excesses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints related to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice as a result of the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. The government does not promote nor require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Dominica’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. The IDA can revoke an issued investment certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the IDA Act and its regulations. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitized. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Dominica subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Dominica is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The Dominica Bureau of Standards develops, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, protecting the environment, and facilitating trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Dominica, through the Dominica Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Dominica ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Dominica has already implemented a number of TFA requirements. A full list is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/dominica/measure-breakdown . As a member of CARICOM, Dominica utilizes the Advanced Cargo Information System, a computer-based system developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to harmonize and standardize electronic cargo information in order to improve the capability to track cargo efficiently and to support regional and international trade. The Advance Cargo Information System forms a critical part of the World Customs Organization SAFE Framework of Standards. Dominica has also fully implemented the Automated System for Customs Data. Dominica bases its legal system on British common law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In 2015, Dominica acceded to the CCJ, making the CCJ its final court of appeal. The United States and Dominica are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The main laws concerning investment in Dominica are the Invest Dominica Authority Act (2007), the Tourism Act (2005), and the Fiscal Incentives Act. Regulatory amendments have been made to the Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Title by Registration Act, the Alien Landholding Regulation Act, and the Residential Levy Act. The IDA provides a full list of the relevant legislation on their website. The IDA reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Cabinet makes the final decision on investment proposals. Under Dominica’s citizenship by investment program, qualified foreign investors may obtain citizenship without voting rights. Applicants can contribute a minimum of $100,000 to the Economic Diversification Fund for a single person or invest in designated real estate with a value of at least $200,000. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate, undergo a background check, and provide evidence of the source of funds before proceeding to the final stage of an interview. The government introduced a citizen by investment certificate in order to minimize the risk of unlawful duplication. Further information is available at http://cbiu.gov.dm . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM States. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Dominica does not have domestic legislation to regulate competition. There are no known pending expropriation cases involving American citizens. In such an event, Dominica would employ a system of eminent domain to pay compensation when property must be acquired in the public interest. There were no reported tendencies of the government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws mandating local ownership in specified sectors. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1990), Dominica has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor. A full copy of the act is available for download from the government’s website . 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Dominica implemented a series of investment incentives codified in the Fiscal Incentives Act. These include tax holidays for up to 20 years for approved hotel and resort development projects, duty-free concessions on the purchase of machinery and equipment, and various tax exemptions. While there is no requirement for enterprises to purchase a fixed percentage of goods from local sources, the government encourages local sourcing. There are no requirements for participation by nationals or the government in foreign investment projects. Under the Fiscal Incentives Act, four types of enterprise qualify for tax holidays. The length of the tax holiday for the first three types of enterprises depends on the amount of value added in Dominica. The fourth type of enterprise, known as an enclave industry, must produce goods exclusively for export outside of the CARICOM region. Enterprise Value Added Maximum Tax Holiday Group I 50 percent or more 15 years Group II 25 percent to 50 percent 12 years Group III 10 percent to 25 percent 10 years Enclave Enclave 15 years Companies that qualify for tax holidays are allowed to import into Dominica duty-free all equipment, machinery, spare parts, and raw materials used in production. The Hotel Aid Act provides relief from customs duties on items brought into the country for use in construction, extension, and equipping of a hotel of not less than five bedrooms. In addition, the Income Tax Act provides special tax relief benefits for approved hotels and villa development. A tax holiday for up to 20 years is available for approved hotel and resort developments and up to 10 years for income accrued from the rental of villas in approved developments. The Cabinet must approve these developments. The standard corporate income tax rate is 25 percent. There is no capital gains tax. International businesses are exempt from tax. Corporate tax does not apply to exempt companies or to enterprises that have been granted tax concession. Dominica provides companies with a further tax concession effective at the end of the tax holiday period. In effect, it is a rebate of a portion of the income tax paid based on export profits as a percentage of total profits. Full exemption from import duties on parts, raw materials, and production machinery is also available. The government offers incentives for investors in the renewable energy sector, including the reduction or exemption of import duties and VAT on related inputs and a reduction in corporate tax. The Government of Dominica does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. There are no foreign trade zones or free ports in Dominica. Dominica does not mandate use of local equipment. The provisions of the Labor Code outline the requirements for acquiring a work permit and prohibit anyone who is not a citizen of Dominica or the OECS to engage in employment unless they have obtained a work permit. When the government grants work permits to senior managers because no qualified nationals are available for the post, the government may recommend a counterparty trainee who is a Dominican citizen. There are no excessively onerous visa, residency, or work permit requirements. As a member of the WTO, Dominica is party to the Agreement to the Trade Related Investment Measures. While there are no formal performance requirements, the government encourages investments that will create jobs and increase exports and foreign exchange earnings. There are no requirements for participation by nationals or by the government in foreign investment projects. There is no requirement that enterprises must purchase a fixed percentage of goods or technology from local sources, but the government encourages local sourcing. Foreign investors receive national treatment. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. There are no measures or draft measures that prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Civil law protects physical property and mortgage claims. There are some special license requirements for the acquisition of land, development of buildings, and expansion of existing construction, and special standards for various aspects of the tourism industry. Individuals or corporate bodies who are not citizens and who are seeking to acquire land require an Alien Landholders License prior to the execution of transactions, depending upon the amount of land in question. Local laws dictate that a foreign national may hold less than one acre of land for residential purposes or less than three acres for commercial purposes without obtaining an alien landholding license. If more land is required then a license must be obtained, and the applicant must pay a fee of $2,220 (6,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the Office of the Accountant-General. Applicants must meet all the submission requirements before Cabinet can consider granting the license. Failure to apply for the license will result in a penalty of $7,400 (20,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars). Upon acquiring land under Section 5 for an approved development, foreign investors must apply for development permission under the Physical Planning Act within six months of acquiring the land and must start construction of the approved development within one year of receipt of development permission. If property legally purchased is unoccupied for over twelve years, property ownership can revert to other owners, such as squatters. This was affirmed by the CCJ in a 2019 ruling. Dominica has a legislative framework that supports the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). While the legal structures governing IPR are generally adequate, enforcement could be strengthened. The Attorney General is responsible for the administration of IPR laws. The Companies & Intellectual Properties Office (CIPO) registers patents, trademarks, and service marks. Dominica is signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It is also a member of the UN World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) establishing the CSME commits all 15 CARICOM members to implement IPR protection and enforcement. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA contains the most detailed obligations regarding IPR in any trade agreement to which Dominica is party. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA recognizes the protection and enforcement of IPR. Article 139 of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties, and of the [WTO] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).” The Comptroller of Customs of Dominica spearheads the enforcement of IPR, which includes the detention, seizure, and forfeiture of goods. The Customs and Excise Department investigates customs offenses and administers fines and penalties. Dominica is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2021 Special 301 Report or the 2021 USTR Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. The government encourages philanthropy but does not have regulations in place to mandate such activities by private companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (); Trafficking in Persons Report (); Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities () and; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises () Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory () Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions (). Department of Labor Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor Report ( ) and; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (). Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World (); and Comply Chain (). Dominica’s climate policy is guided by its Climate Resiliency and Recovery Plan 2020-2030 and its Nationally Determined Contribution for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. It does not have a specific strategy in place for monitoring natural capital. Following the devastation wrought by 2017’s Hurricane Maria, the government plans for Dominica to become fully climate resilient. Associated activities include a full transition to renewable energy, strengthening community disaster-response resources, and adaptation of homes and infrastructure to better survive severe weather events. Dominica has indicated that quickly achieving these goals will require substantial support from the international donor community. The government offers incentives for investors in the renewable energy sector, including the reduction or exemption of import duties and VAT on related inputs and a reduction in corporate tax. Public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials; however, government implementation and enforcement of the law is inconsistent. Members of the political opposition and civil society representatives allege that officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Local media and opposition leadership continued to raise allegations of corruption within the government, including in the Citizenship by Investment program. Dominica acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2010. The country is party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Integrity in Public Office Act, 2003 and the Integrity in Public Office (Amendment) Act 2015 require government officials to account annually for their income, assets, and gifts. All offenses under the act, including the late filing of declarations, are criminalized. The Integrity Commission was established to monitor the functions under this Act. The Integrity Commission’s mandate and decisions can be found at http://www.integritycommission.gov.dm . Generally, the Integrity Commission reports on late submissions and on inappropriately completed forms but does not share financial disclosures of officials with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Integrity Commission has not updated documents on its website since 2016. The Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for prosecuting corruption offenses, but it lacks adequate personnel and resources to handle complicated money laundering and public corruption cases. Steve HyacinthChairman, Integrity CommissionCross Street, Roseau, DominicaTel: 1-767-266-3436Email: integritycommission@dominica.gov.dm 10. Political and Security Environment Dominica held parliamentary elections in December 2019. Voting was held under heightened security following weeks of protests and legal challenges seeking electoral reform. The protests were led by the United Workers’ Party, which lost the election in a landslide to the ruling Dominica Labour Party. Dominica’s economy was severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The IMF has projected that Dominica’s GDP will grow 7.9 percent in 2022. In May 2020, the government unveiled a disaster resilience strategy that was based on three key pillars: structural resilience, financial resilience, and post-disaster resilience. Both the IMF and the World Bank provided support to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The government last raised Dominica’s minimum wage in June 2008. It varies according to the category of worker, with the lowest minimum wage set at approximately $1.50 an hour and the maximum set at approximately $2.06 an hour. The standard workweek is 40 hours for five or six days of work. The law provides overtime pay for work in excess of the standard workweek. Dominica has a labor force of approximately 32,630, with a literacy rate of 95 percent. The local state college largely meets the country’s technical and training needs. There is also a small pool of professionals to draw from in fields such as law, medicine, engineering, business, information technology, and accounting. Many of the professionals in Dominica trained in the United States, Canada, the UK, or the wider Caribbean, where many of them gained work experience before returning to the country. The labor legislation in Dominica is applicable to all employees and employers. There are no waivers or exceptions regarding the application of labor laws and standards in Dominica. Employers usually advertise job vacancies in local newspapers. The government recommends that the advertisement be placed on three separate occasions to ensure transparency and equal opportunity for Dominican residents to apply. The Embassy is not aware of any instances of government interference with the employer’s right to make hiring determinations. The Labor Contract Act stipulates that an employee shall receive a contract from his/her employer within 14 days of engagement outlining the terms and conditions of employment. The labor laws clearly regulate and define layoffs and the conditions under which layoffs can occur. Severance by redundancy is also regulated by law. People employed for three years or more qualify for severance pay. Social security benefits are payable only when the employee reaches retirement age. The Industrial Relations Act provides for and regulates trade unions in both public and private sectors. Dominican law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, the right to strike, and the right of workers to bargain collectively with employers. The government generally enforces laws governing worker rights effectively, and penalties generally were sufficient to deter violations. Administrative and judicial procedures are not generally subject to lengthy delays or appeals. Government mediation and arbitration are free of charge. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination by providing that employers must reinstate workers who file a successful complaint of illegal dismissal, which can cover being fired for engaging in union activities or other grounds of wrongful dismissal. Employers generally reinstated or paid compensation to employees who obtained favorable rulings by the ministry following a complaint of legal dismissal. Collective bargaining is permitted in all firms (both public and private) where the employees are unionized. A copy of the collective bargaining agreement must be filed at the Ministry of Labor. There are no sectoral collective agreements. All unionized firms are obliged by law to negotiate terms and conditions of employment of all workers, whether or not they are members of a trade union. Dominica ratified all of the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s eight core conventions on human rights and labor administration. The government deemed emergency, port, electricity, telecommunications, and prison services employees, as well as banana, coconut, and citrus fruit cultivation workers “essential,” deterring workers in these sectors from going on the strike. The ILO noted the list of essential services is broader than international standards. Nonetheless, in practice essential workers conducted strikes and did not suffer reprisals. The procedure for essential workers to strike is cumbersome, involving appropriate notice and submitting the grievance to the labor commissioner for possible mediation. These actions are usually resolved through mediation by the Office of the Labor Commissioner, with the rest referred to the Industrial Relations Tribunal for binding arbitration. The Industrial Relations Act also mandates the establishment of the Industrial Relations Board and the Industrial Relations Tribunals as dispute resolution mechanisms. The Division of Labor acts as the first arbitrator with matters of investigation, mediation, and conciliation. Matters are referred only to the tribunals by the minister when conciliation fails or by request of any of the disputing parties. Enforcement is the responsibility of the Labor Commissioner within the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and National Security. Labor laws provide that the labor commissioner may authorize the employment of a person with disabilities at a wage lower than the minimum rate to enable that person to work. The Employment Safety Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are consistent with international standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe work environments without jeopardizing their employment and the authorities effectively enforced this right in practice. The informal economy plays a significant role in the labor market and economy of Dominica. The IMF has estimated that the informal economy averaged 46 percent of GDP over the 2011-2019 period. Nearly forty percent of informal sector workers were in wholesale and retail trade, with another 24 percent in manufacturing, 9 percent in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and 29 percent in other industries. Despite the significance of the informal economy in Dominica, there is little evidence of its impact on contracts or access to industries of interest to U.S. and other foreign investors. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $503.7 2020 $504.2 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 66.8% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIData not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic SectionU.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean, and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States246-227-4000Email: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on local citizens. Through the Invest Dominica Authority (IDA), the government instituted several investment incentives for businesses considering locating in Dominica. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, duty-free import of equipment and materials, exemption from value added tax on some capital investments, and withholding tax exemptions on dividends, interest payments, and some external payments and income. The IDA additionally provides support to approved citizenship by investment projects. The IDA launched a new Investment Promotion Strategy in 2021. The new strategy is focused on four sectors: agriculture and agri-business, renewable energy, tourism, and knowledge services such as business processing operations. Other sectors include film, music, and video production, manufacturing, bulk water export and bottled water operations, medical and nursing schools, and English language training services. The government continuously reviews these sectors. While these sectors are priorities, the government broadly welcomes FDI. Local laws do not place limits on foreign control in Dominica. Foreign investment in Dominica is not subject to restrictions, and foreign investors are entitled to receive the same treatment as nationals of Dominica. Foreign investors are entitled to hold up to 100 percent of their investment. However, there is a requirement for foreign investors seeking to purchase property for residential or commercial purposes to obtain an Alien Landholders License. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors in order to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. The OECS, of which Dominica is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. The IDA is Dominica’s main business facilitation unit. It facilitates foreign direct investment into priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment in Dominica. The IDA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It offers an online tool useful for navigating laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. Its website is http://investdominica.com . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the IDA to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Companies and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration on its website. However, this only allows for the preliminary processing of applications prior to the investor physically making a payment at the Supreme Court office. Investors are advised to seek the advice of a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.dm . Businesses must register with CIPO, the Tax Authority, and the Social Services Institute. The general practice for registration is to retain an attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Dominica are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Dominica has not signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It benefits from the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), which was implemented in January 1984. CBERA is intended to facilitate the development of stable Caribbean Basin economies by providing beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. Dominica has bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. Dominica has bilateral tax treaties with the United States and the UK. Dominica is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing and is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. Dominica is also party to the following agreements: Caribbean Community (CARICOM) The Treaty of Chaguaramas established CARICOM in 1973 to promote economic integration among its 15 member states. Investors operating in Dominica have preferential access to the entire CARICOM market. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas established the CSME, which permits the free movement of goods, capital, and labor within CARICOM member states. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States The Revised Treaty of Basseterre established the OECS. The OECS consists of seven full members: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and four associate members: Anguilla, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the British Virgin Islands. The OECS aims to promote harmonization among member states concerning foreign policy, defense and security, and economic affairs. The six independent countries of the OECS ratified the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, establishing the OECS Economic Union in 2011. The Economic Union established a single financial and economic space within which all factors of production, including goods, services, and people, move without hindrance. CARIFORUM- EU Economic Partnership Agreement The European Community and the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) states signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008. CARIFORUM consists of the independent Anglophone CARCOM member states, the Dominican Republic and Suriname. The overarching objectives of the EPA are to alleviate poverty in CARIFORUM states, to promote regional integration and economic cooperation, and to foster the gradual integration of the CARIFORUM states into the world economy by improving their trade capacity and creating an investment-conducive environment. The EPA promotes trade-related developments in areas such as competition, intellectual property, public procurement, the environment, and protection of personal data. CARIFORUM-UK Economic Partnership Agreement The UK and CARIFORUM signed an EPA in 2019, committing to trade continuity after Britain’s departure from the European Union. The CARIFORUM-UK EPA eliminates tariffs on all goods imported from CARIFORUM states into the UK, while those Caribbean states will continue to gradually cut import tariffs on most of the region’s imports from the UK. Caribbean Basin Initiative The objective of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is to promote economic development through private sector initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean by expanding foreign and domestic investment in non-traditional sectors, diversifying economies, and expanding exports. It permits duty-free entry of products manufactured or assembled in Dominica into the United States. Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement The Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) is an economic and trade development assistance program for Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Through CARIBCAN, Canada provides duty-free access to its national market for the majority of its products originating in Commonwealth Caribbean countries. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Dominica provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Finance and the IDA provide oversight of the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. Rule-making and regulatory authority lies within the unicameral parliament. The parliament has 21 members elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, nine appointed members, one speaker, and one clerk. Relevant ministries develop laws which are drafted by the Ministry of National Security and Home Affairs. FDI is governed principally through the laws that oversee the IDA and the Citizenship by Investment program. Laws are available online at http://www.dominica.gov.dm/laws-of-dominica . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government generally solicits input from various stakeholder groups in the formulation of laws. In some instances, the government convenes a special committee to make recommendations on provisions outlined in the law. The government uses public awareness campaigns to sensitize the general population on legislative reforms. Copies of proposed regulations are published in the official gazette shortly before the bills are taken to parliament. Although Dominica does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains a website and an information service on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Dominica. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman guards against excesses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints related to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice as a result of the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. The government does not promote nor require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Dominica’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. The IDA can revoke an issued investment certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the IDA Act and its regulations. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitized. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Dominica subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Dominica is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The Dominica Bureau of Standards develops, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, protecting the environment, and facilitating trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Dominica, through the Dominica Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Dominica ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Dominica has already implemented a number of TFA requirements. A full list is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/dominica/measure-breakdown . As a member of CARICOM, Dominica utilizes the Advanced Cargo Information System, a computer-based system developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to harmonize and standardize electronic cargo information in order to improve the capability to track cargo efficiently and to support regional and international trade. The Advance Cargo Information System forms a critical part of the World Customs Organization SAFE Framework of Standards. Dominica has also fully implemented the Automated System for Customs Data. Dominica bases its legal system on British common law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In 2015, Dominica acceded to the CCJ, making the CCJ its final court of appeal. The United States and Dominica are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The main laws concerning investment in Dominica are the Invest Dominica Authority Act (2007), the Tourism Act (2005), and the Fiscal Incentives Act. Regulatory amendments have been made to the Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Title by Registration Act, the Alien Landholding Regulation Act, and the Residential Levy Act. The IDA provides a full list of the relevant legislation on their website. The IDA reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Cabinet makes the final decision on investment proposals. Under Dominica’s citizenship by investment program, qualified foreign investors may obtain citizenship without voting rights. Applicants can contribute a minimum of $100,000 to the Economic Diversification Fund for a single person or invest in designated real estate with a value of at least $200,000. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate, undergo a background check, and provide evidence of the source of funds before proceeding to the final stage of an interview. The government introduced a citizen by investment certificate in order to minimize the risk of unlawful duplication. Further information is available at http://cbiu.gov.dm . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM States. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Dominica does not have domestic legislation to regulate competition. There are no known pending expropriation cases involving American citizens. In such an event, Dominica would employ a system of eminent domain to pay compensation when property must be acquired in the public interest. There were no reported tendencies of the government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws mandating local ownership in specified sectors. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1990), Dominica has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor. A full copy of the act is available for download from the government’s website . 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Dominica implemented a series of investment incentives codified in the Fiscal Incentives Act. These include tax holidays for up to 20 years for approved hotel and resort development projects, duty-free concessions on the purchase of machinery and equipment, and various tax exemptions. While there is no requirement for enterprises to purchase a fixed percentage of goods from local sources, the government encourages local sourcing. There are no requirements for participation by nationals or the government in foreign investment projects. Under the Fiscal Incentives Act, four types of enterprise qualify for tax holidays. The length of the tax holiday for the first three types of enterprises depends on the amount of value added in Dominica. The fourth type of enterprise, known as an enclave industry, must produce goods exclusively for export outside of the CARICOM region. Enterprise Value Added Maximum Tax Holiday Group I 50 percent or more 15 years Group II 25 percent to 50 percent 12 years Group III 10 percent to 25 percent 10 years Enclave Enclave 15 years Companies that qualify for tax holidays are allowed to import into Dominica duty-free all equipment, machinery, spare parts, and raw materials used in production. The Hotel Aid Act provides relief from customs duties on items brought into the country for use in construction, extension, and equipping of a hotel of not less than five bedrooms. In addition, the Income Tax Act provides special tax relief benefits for approved hotels and villa development. A tax holiday for up to 20 years is available for approved hotel and resort developments and up to 10 years for income accrued from the rental of villas in approved developments. The Cabinet must approve these developments. The standard corporate income tax rate is 25 percent. There is no capital gains tax. International businesses are exempt from tax. Corporate tax does not apply to exempt companies or to enterprises that have been granted tax concession. Dominica provides companies with a further tax concession effective at the end of the tax holiday period. In effect, it is a rebate of a portion of the income tax paid based on export profits as a percentage of total profits. Full exemption from import duties on parts, raw materials, and production machinery is also available. The government offers incentives for investors in the renewable energy sector, including the reduction or exemption of import duties and VAT on related inputs and a reduction in corporate tax. The Government of Dominica does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. There are no foreign trade zones or free ports in Dominica. Dominica does not mandate use of local equipment. The provisions of the Labor Code outline the requirements for acquiring a work permit and prohibit anyone who is not a citizen of Dominica or the OECS to engage in employment unless they have obtained a work permit. When the government grants work permits to senior managers because no qualified nationals are available for the post, the government may recommend a counterparty trainee who is a Dominican citizen. There are no excessively onerous visa, residency, or work permit requirements. As a member of the WTO, Dominica is party to the Agreement to the Trade Related Investment Measures. While there are no formal performance requirements, the government encourages investments that will create jobs and increase exports and foreign exchange earnings. There are no requirements for participation by nationals or by the government in foreign investment projects. There is no requirement that enterprises must purchase a fixed percentage of goods or technology from local sources, but the government encourages local sourcing. Foreign investors receive national treatment. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. There are no measures or draft measures that prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Civil law protects physical property and mortgage claims. There are some special license requirements for the acquisition of land, development of buildings, and expansion of existing construction, and special standards for various aspects of the tourism industry. Individuals or corporate bodies who are not citizens and who are seeking to acquire land require an Alien Landholders License prior to the execution of transactions, depending upon the amount of land in question. Local laws dictate that a foreign national may hold less than one acre of land for residential purposes or less than three acres for commercial purposes without obtaining an alien landholding license. If more land is required then a license must be obtained, and the applicant must pay a fee of $2,220 (6,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the Office of the Accountant-General. Applicants must meet all the submission requirements before Cabinet can consider granting the license. Failure to apply for the license will result in a penalty of $7,400 (20,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars). Upon acquiring land under Section 5 for an approved development, foreign investors must apply for development permission under the Physical Planning Act within six months of acquiring the land and must start construction of the approved development within one year of receipt of development permission. If property legally purchased is unoccupied for over twelve years, property ownership can revert to other owners, such as squatters. This was affirmed by the CCJ in a 2019 ruling. Dominica has a legislative framework that supports the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). While the legal structures governing IPR are generally adequate, enforcement could be strengthened. The Attorney General is responsible for the administration of IPR laws. The Companies & Intellectual Properties Office (CIPO) registers patents, trademarks, and service marks. Dominica is signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It is also a member of the UN World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) establishing the CSME commits all 15 CARICOM members to implement IPR protection and enforcement. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA contains the most detailed obligations regarding IPR in any trade agreement to which Dominica is party. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA recognizes the protection and enforcement of IPR. Article 139 of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties, and of the [WTO] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).” The Comptroller of Customs of Dominica spearheads the enforcement of IPR, which includes the detention, seizure, and forfeiture of goods. The Customs and Excise Department investigates customs offenses and administers fines and penalties. Dominica is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2021 Special 301 Report or the 2021 USTR Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. The government encourages philanthropy but does not have regulations in place to mandate such activities by private companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Dominica’s climate policy is guided by its Climate Resiliency and Recovery Plan 2020-2030 and its Nationally Determined Contribution for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. It does not have a specific strategy in place for monitoring natural capital. Following the devastation wrought by 2017’s Hurricane Maria, the government plans for Dominica to become fully climate resilient. Associated activities include a full transition to renewable energy, strengthening community disaster-response resources, and adaptation of homes and infrastructure to better survive severe weather events. Dominica has indicated that quickly achieving these goals will require substantial support from the international donor community. The government offers incentives for investors in the renewable energy sector, including the reduction or exemption of import duties and VAT on related inputs and a reduction in corporate tax. Public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials; however, government implementation and enforcement of the law is inconsistent. Members of the political opposition and civil society representatives allege that officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Local media and opposition leadership continued to raise allegations of corruption within the government, including in the Citizenship by Investment program. Dominica acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2010. The country is party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Integrity in Public Office Act, 2003 and the Integrity in Public Office (Amendment) Act 2015 require government officials to account annually for their income, assets, and gifts. All offenses under the act, including the late filing of declarations, are criminalized. The Integrity Commission was established to monitor the functions under this Act. The Integrity Commission’s mandate and decisions can be found at http://www.integritycommission.gov.dm . Generally, the Integrity Commission reports on late submissions and on inappropriately completed forms but does not share financial disclosures of officials with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Integrity Commission has not updated documents on its website since 2016. The Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for prosecuting corruption offenses, but it lacks adequate personnel and resources to handle complicated money laundering and public corruption cases. Steve Hyacinth Chairman, Integrity Commission Cross Street, Roseau, Dominica Tel: 1-767-266-3436 Email: integritycommission@dominica.gov.dm 10. Political and Security Environment Dominica held parliamentary elections in December 2019. Voting was held under heightened security following weeks of protests and legal challenges seeking electoral reform. The protests were led by the United Workers’ Party, which lost the election in a landslide to the ruling Dominica Labour Party. Dominica’s economy was severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The IMF has projected that Dominica’s GDP will grow 7.9 percent in 2022. In May 2020, the government unveiled a disaster resilience strategy that was based on three key pillars: structural resilience, financial resilience, and post-disaster resilience. Both the IMF and the World Bank provided support to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The government last raised Dominica’s minimum wage in June 2008. It varies according to the category of worker, with the lowest minimum wage set at approximately $1.50 an hour and the maximum set at approximately $2.06 an hour. The standard workweek is 40 hours for five or six days of work. The law provides overtime pay for work in excess of the standard workweek. Dominica has a labor force of approximately 32,630, with a literacy rate of 95 percent. The local state college largely meets the country’s technical and training needs. There is also a small pool of professionals to draw from in fields such as law, medicine, engineering, business, information technology, and accounting. Many of the professionals in Dominica trained in the United States, Canada, the UK, or the wider Caribbean, where many of them gained work experience before returning to the country. The labor legislation in Dominica is applicable to all employees and employers. There are no waivers or exceptions regarding the application of labor laws and standards in Dominica. Employers usually advertise job vacancies in local newspapers. The government recommends that the advertisement be placed on three separate occasions to ensure transparency and equal opportunity for Dominican residents to apply. The Embassy is not aware of any instances of government interference with the employer’s right to make hiring determinations. The Labor Contract Act stipulates that an employee shall receive a contract from his/her employer within 14 days of engagement outlining the terms and conditions of employment. The labor laws clearly regulate and define layoffs and the conditions under which layoffs can occur. Severance by redundancy is also regulated by law. People employed for three years or more qualify for severance pay. Social security benefits are payable only when the employee reaches retirement age. The Industrial Relations Act provides for and regulates trade unions in both public and private sectors. Dominican law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, the right to strike, and the right of workers to bargain collectively with employers. The government generally enforces laws governing worker rights effectively, and penalties generally were sufficient to deter violations. Administrative and judicial procedures are not generally subject to lengthy delays or appeals. Government mediation and arbitration are free of charge. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination by providing that employers must reinstate workers who file a successful complaint of illegal dismissal, which can cover being fired for engaging in union activities or other grounds of wrongful dismissal. Employers generally reinstated or paid compensation to employees who obtained favorable rulings by the ministry following a complaint of legal dismissal. Collective bargaining is permitted in all firms (both public and private) where the employees are unionized. A copy of the collective bargaining agreement must be filed at the Ministry of Labor. There are no sectoral collective agreements. All unionized firms are obliged by law to negotiate terms and conditions of employment of all workers, whether or not they are members of a trade union. Dominica ratified all of the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s eight core conventions on human rights and labor administration. The government deemed emergency, port, electricity, telecommunications, and prison services employees, as well as banana, coconut, and citrus fruit cultivation workers “essential,” deterring workers in these sectors from going on the strike. The ILO noted the list of essential services is broader than international standards. Nonetheless, in practice essential workers conducted strikes and did not suffer reprisals. The procedure for essential workers to strike is cumbersome, involving appropriate notice and submitting the grievance to the labor commissioner for possible mediation. These actions are usually resolved through mediation by the Office of the Labor Commissioner, with the rest referred to the Industrial Relations Tribunal for binding arbitration. The Industrial Relations Act also mandates the establishment of the Industrial Relations Board and the Industrial Relations Tribunals as dispute resolution mechanisms. The Division of Labor acts as the first arbitrator with matters of investigation, mediation, and conciliation. Matters are referred only to the tribunals by the minister when conciliation fails or by request of any of the disputing parties. Enforcement is the responsibility of the Labor Commissioner within the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and National Security. Labor laws provide that the labor commissioner may authorize the employment of a person with disabilities at a wage lower than the minimum rate to enable that person to work. The Employment Safety Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are consistent with international standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe work environments without jeopardizing their employment and the authorities effectively enforced this right in practice. The informal economy plays a significant role in the labor market and economy of Dominica. The IMF has estimated that the informal economy averaged 46 percent of GDP over the 2011-2019 period. Nearly forty percent of informal sector workers were in wholesale and retail trade, with another 24 percent in manufacturing, 9 percent in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and 29 percent in other industries. Despite the significance of the informal economy in Dominica, there is little evidence of its impact on contracts or access to industries of interest to U.S. and other foreign investors. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $503.7 2020 $504.2 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 66.8% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean, and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 246-227-4000 Email: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Dominican Republic Executive Summary Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for the Dominican economy, and the Dominican Republic is one of the main recipients of FDI in the Caribbean and Central America. The government actively courts FDI with generous tax exemptions and other incentives to attract businesses to the country. Historically, the tourism, real estate, telecommunications, free trade zones, mining, and financing sectors are the largest FDI recipients. Besides financial incentives, the country’s membership in the Central America Free Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) is one of the greatest advantages for foreign investors. Observers credit the agreement with increasing competition, strengthening rule of law, and expanding access to quality products in the Dominican Republic. The United States remains the single largest investor in the Dominican Republic. CAFTA-DR includes protections for member state foreign investors, including mechanisms for dispute resolution. Foreign investors report numerous systemic problems in the Dominican Republic and cite a lack of clear, standardized rules by which to compete and a lack of enforcement of existing rules. Complaints include perceptions of widespread corruption at both national and local levels of government; delays in government payments; weak intellectual property rights enforcement; bureaucratic hurdles; slow and sometimes locally biased judicial and administrative processes, and non-standard procedures in customs valuation and classification of imports. Weak land tenure laws and interference with private property rights continue to be a problem. The public perceives administrative and judicial decision-making to be inconsistent, opaque, and overly time-consuming. A lack of transparency and poor implementation of existing laws are widely discussed as key investor grievances. U.S. businesses operating in the Dominican Republic often need to take extensive measures to ensure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Many U.S. firms and investors have expressed concerns that corruption in the government, including in the judiciary, continues to constrain successful investment in the Dominican Republic. The current government, led by President Luis Abinader, made a concerted effort in its first full year of government to address issues of corruption and transparency that are a core issue for social, economic, and political prosperity, including prosecutorial independence, long-awaited electricity sector reform, and the empowerment of the supreme audit institution, the Chamber of Accounts. More work has repeatedly been promised, but passage remains uncertain as each measure is still subject to administrative or legislative processes, including approval of new public procurement legislation, passage of draft civil asset forfeiture legislation, the law for reform of the management of government assets, and a modern foreign investment law. The Dominican Republic, an upper middle-income country, has been the fastest growing economy in Latin America over the past 50 years, according to World Bank data. It grew by 12.3 percent in 2021, 4.7 percent when compared with 2019 (pre-pandemic). Tax revenues were 12.7 percent higher than what was stipulated in the Initial Budget for 2021; coupled with budgetary discipline, the government closed its deficit to 2.7 percent of GDP. However, inflation at the end of 2021 was 8.50 percent, double the target of 4.0 percent ±1.0. Despite the government efforts to reduce public spending and increase revenues, absent meaningful fiscal reform, public debt continued to grow in 2021, reaching $47.7 billion at the end of November 2021 (if debt to the Central Bank is added, the public debt reached $62.04 billion), and a total service of debt of $5.9 billion – resulting in decrease in the debt to GDP ratio, but an increase in the total value of government debt. The government continues to apply large subsidies to different sectors of the economy such as the electricity sector and hydrocarbons. In 2021, the government allocated $1.03 billion to the subsidy for Electricity Distribution Companies (EDE’s) and $266.9 million directly to fuel. According to the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index, the Dominican Republic is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change, though it represents only 0.06% of global greenhouse gas emissions. As a small island developing state, the Dominican Republic is particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, droughts, and rising sea levels. Combined with rapid economic growth (over 5 percent until 2020) and urbanization (more than 50 percent of population in cities, 30 percent in Santo Domingo), climate change could strain key socio-economic sectors such as water, agriculture and food security, human health, biodiversity, forests, marine coastal resources, infrastructure, and energy. The National Constitution calls for the efficient and sustainable use of the nation’s natural resources in accordance with the need to adapt to climate change. The government is acting, both domestically and in coordination with the international community, to mitigate the effects of climate change. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 93 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $2,806 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,260 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Dominican Republic presents both opportunities and challenges for foreign investment. The government strongly promotes inward FDI and has prioritized creating a sound enabling environment for foreign investors. While the government has established formal programs to attract FDI, a lack of clear rules and uneven enforcement of existing rules can lead to difficulties. The approval in 2021 of a National Competitiveness Strategy, including the formation of a National Competitiveness Council, seeks to respond to the indicators of the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, and should help address some of these concerns. The Dominican Republic provides tax incentives for investment in tourism, renewable energy, film production, Haiti-Dominican Republic border development, and the industrial sector. The country is also a signatory of CAFTA-DR, which mandates non-discriminatory treatment, free transferability of funds, protection against expropriation, and procedures for the resolution of investment disputes. However, some foreign investors indicate that the uneven enforcement of regulations and laws, or political interference in legal processes, creates difficulties for investment. There are two main government agencies responsible for attracting foreign investment, the Export and Investment Center of the Dominican Republic (CEI-RD) and the National Council of Free Trade Zones for Export (CNZFE). CEI-RD promotes foreign investment and aids prospective foreign investors with business registration, matching services, and identification of investment opportunities. It publishes an annual “Investment Guide of the Dominican Republic,” highlighting many of the tools, incentives, and opportunities available for prospective investors. The CEI-RD also oversees “ProDominicana,” a branding and marketing program for the country launched in 2017 that promotes the DR as an investment destination and exporter. CNZFE aids foreign companies looking to establish operations in the country’s 79 free trade zones for export outside Dominican territory. There are a variety of business associations that promote dialogue between the government and private sector, including the Association of Foreign Investor Businesses (ASIEX). Foreign Investment Law No. 16-95 states that unlimited foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, with a few exceptions for hazardous materials or materials linked to national security. Private entities, both foreign and domestic, have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all legal remunerative activity. Foreign companies are not restricted in their access to foreign exchange, there are no requirements that foreign equity be reduced over time or that technology be transferred according to defined terms, and the government imposes no conditions on foreign investors concerning location, local ownership, local content, or export requirements. See Section 3 Legal Regime for more information. The Dominican Republic does not maintain a formalized investment screening and approval mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Details on the established mechanisms for registering a business or investment are elaborated in the Business Facilitations section below. The Dominican Republic has not been reviewed recently by multilateral organizations regarding investment policy. The most recent reviews occurred in 2015. This included a trade policy review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a follow-up review by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) regarding its 2009 investment policy recommendations. 2009 UNCTAD – https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=6343 2015 WTO – https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s319_e.pdf 2015 UNCTAD – https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2016d2_en.pdf Foreign investment does not require any prior approval in the Dominican Republic, but once made it must be registered with the CEI-RD. Investments in free zones must be registered with the CNZFE, which will notify the CEI-RD. Foreign investment registration is compulsory, but failure to do so is not subject to any sanction. Law No. 16-95 Foreign Investment, Law No. 98-03 on the Creation of the CEI-RD, and Regulation 214-04 govern foreign investment in the Dominican Republic and require an interested foreign investor to file an application form at the offices of CEI-RD within 180 calendar days from the date on which the foreign investment took place. The required documents include the application for registration, containing information on the invested capital and the area of the investment; proof of entry into the country of the foreign capital or physical or tangible goods; and documents of commercial incorporation or the authorization of operation of a branch office through the setting up of legal domicile in the country. The reinvestment of profits (in the same or a different firm) must be registered within 90 days. Once the documents have been approved, the CEI-RD issues a certificate of registration within 15 business days subject to the payment of a fee which varies depending on the amount of the investment. Lack of registration does not affect the validity of the foreign investment; but the fact that it is needed to fulfill various types of procedures, makes registration necessary in practice. For example, the registration certificate has to be presented to repatriate profits or investment in the event of sale or liquidation and to purchase foreign exchange from the authorized agencies for transfers abroad, as well as to process the residency of the investor. In April 2021, CEI-RD launched an online Registry of Foreign Direct Investment, which aims to streamline and make the registration processes more transparent to investors. For more information on becoming an investor or exporter, visit the CEI-RD ProDominicana website at https://prodominicana.gob.do . The Dominican Republic has a single-window registration website for registering a limited liability company (SRL by its Spanish acronym) that offers a one-stop shop for registration needs ( https://www.formalizate.gob.do/ ). Foreign companies may use the registration website. However, this electronic method of registration is not widely used in practice and consultation with a local lawyer is recommended for company registrations. According to the “Doing Business” report, starting a SRL in the Dominican Republic is a seven-step process that requires 16.5 days. However, some businesses advise the full incorporation process can take two to three times longer than the advertised process. In order to set up a business in a free trade zone, a formal request must be made to the CNZFE, the entity responsible for issuing the operating licenses needed to be a free zone company or operator. CNZFE assesses the application and determines its feasibility. For more information on the procedure to apply for an operating license, visit the website of the CNZFE at http://www.cnzfe.gov.do. There are no legal or government restrictions on Dominican investment abroad, although the government does little to promote it. Outbound foreign investment is significantly lower than inbound investment. The largest recipient of Dominican outward investment is the United States. 3. Legal Regime The national government manages all regulatory processes. Information about regulations is often scattered among various ministry and agency websites and is sometimes only available through direct communication with officials. It is advisable for U.S. investors to consult with local attorneys or advisors to assist with locating comprehensive regulatory information. On the 2021 Global Innovations Index, the Dominican Republic’s overall rank was 93 out of 131 nations analyzed, which is a setback from its rank in 2020 by three positions. In sub-sections of the report, the Dominican Republic ranks 101 out of 131 for regulatory environment and 74 out of 131 for regulatory quality. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance report states that Dominican ministries and regulatory agencies do not publish lists of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended for adoption within a specific timeframe. Law No. 107-13 requires regulatory agencies to give notice of proposed regulations in public consultations and mandates publication of the full text of draft regulations on the relevant agency’s website. Additionally, Law No. 200-04 allows citizens in general to request information to the government on a unified website: https://saip.gob.do/ . Foreign investors, however, note that these requirements are not always met in practice since not all relevant Dominican agencies provide content, and those that do often do not keep the content up to date, and many businesses point out that the scope of SAIP’s website content is not always adequate for investors or interested parties. U.S. businesses also reported years’ long delays in the enactment of regulations supporting new legislation, even when the common legal waiting period is normally six months. The process of public consultation is not uniform across the government. Some ministries and regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed legislation from the public; however, public outreach is generally limited and depends on the responsible ministry or agency. For example, businesses report that some ministries upload proposed regulations to their websites or post them in national newspapers, while others may form working groups with key public and private sector stakeholders participating in the drafting of proposed regulations. Often the criteria used by the government to select participants in these informal exchanges are unclear, which at a minimum creates the appearance of favoritism and that undue influence is being offered to a handpicked (and often politically connected) group of firms and investors. Public comments received by the government are generally not publicly accessible. Some ministries and agencies prepare consolidated reports on the results of a consultation for direct distribution to interested stakeholders. Ministries and agencies do not conduct impact assessments of regulations or ex post reviews. Affected parties cannot request reconsideration or appeal of adopted regulations, although they could challenge any of its content if deemed unconstitutional at the Constitutional Court and contest its application before the Superior Administrative Tribunal. In February 2022, the Dominican Republic’s General Directorate of Internal Taxes (DGII) proposed to extend the existing 18% value added tax known as the ITBIS to digital services and published the draft regulation on its website (https://dgii.gov.do/Paginas/default.aspx) for public comment. The Dominican Institute of Certified Public Accountants (ICPARD) is the country’s legally recognized professional accounting organization and has authority to establish accounting standards in accordance with Law No. 479-08, which also declares that (as amended by Law No. 311-14) financial statements should be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards nationally and internationally. The ICPARD and the country’s Securities Superintendency require the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and IFRS for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs). By law, the Office of Public Credit publishes on its website a quarterly report on the status of the non-financial public sector debt, which includes a wide array of information and statistics on public borrowing ( www.creditopublico.gov.do/publicaciones/informes_trimestrales.htm ). In addition to the public debt addressed by the Office of Public Credit, the Central Bank maintains on its balance sheet nearly $10 billion in “quasi-fiscal” debt. When consolidated with central government debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio is over 60 percent, and the debt service ratio is over 30 percent. As of the end of 2020, the Dominican Republic was involved in 18 dispute settlement cases with the WTO: one as complainant, eight as respondent, and nine as a third party. In recent years, the Dominican Republic has frequently changed technical requirements (e.g., for steel rebar imports and sanitary registrations, among others) and has failed to provide proper notification under the WTO TBT agreement and CAFTA-DR. The judicial branch is an independent branch of the Dominican government. According to Article 69 of the Constitution, all persons, including foreigners, have the right to appear in court. The basic concepts of the Dominican legal system and the forms of legal reasoning derive from French law—civil law system in general. The five basic French Codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Commerce, Penal, and Criminal Procedure) were translated into Spanish and passed as legislation in 1884. Some of these codes have since been amended and parts have been replaced, including the total derogation of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002, resulting in a hybrid legal framework. There is a Commercial Code and a wide variety of laws governing business formation and activity. The main laws governing commercial disputes are the Commercial Code; Law No. 479-08, the Commercial Societies Law; Law No. 3-02, concerning Business Registration; Commercial Arbitration Law No. 489-08; Law No. 141-15 concerning Restructuring and Liquidation of Business Entities; and Law No. 126-02, concerning e-Commerce and Digital Documents and Signatures. Some investors complain of significant delays in obtaining a decision by the Judiciary. While Dominican law mandates overall time standards for the completion of key events in a civil case, these standards frequently are not met. The Judiciary has requested additional funds to hire more judges, clerks, and judicial personnel to address these concerns. In 2020 the World Bank noted that resolving complaints raised during the award and execution of a contract can take more than four years in the Dominican Republic, although some take longer. Dominican nationals and foreigners alike have the constitutional right to submit their cases to an appeal court or to request the Supreme Court review (recurso de casación in Spanish) the ruling of a lower court. If a violation of fundamental rights is alleged, the Constitutional Court might also review the case with the authority to nullify the lower court judgment. Notwithstanding, foreign investors have complained that the local court system is unreliable, is biased against them, and that special interests and powerful individuals are able to use the legal system in their favor. Others who have successfully won in courts, have struggled to get their ruling enforced. While the law provides for an independent judiciary, businesses and other external groups have noted that traditionally the government did not respect judicial independence or impartiality, and improper influence on judicial decisions was widespread. The Abinader administration has made a concerted effort to respect the autonomy of the Public Ministry and the Office of the Attorney General, and investors have noted improvements. The administration has proposed a constitutional amendment to strengthen the independence of the Office of the Attorney General, but it faces uncertain prospects in the Dominican Congress. Several large U.S. firms cite the improper and disruptive use of lower court injunctions as a way for local distributors to obtain more beneficial settlements at the end of contract periods. To engage effectively in the Dominican market, many U.S. companies seek local partners that are well-connected and understand the local business environment, but even this is a not a guarantee. The legal framework supports foreign investment. Article 221 of the Constitution declares that foreign investment shall receive the same treatment as domestic investment. Foreign Investment Law No. 16-95 states that unlimited foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, with a few exceptions. According to the law, foreign investment is not allowed in the following categories: a) disposal and remains of toxic, dangerous, or radioactive garbage not produced in the country; b) activities affecting the public health and the environmental equilibrium of the country, pursuant to the norms that apply in this regard; and c) production of materials and equipment directly linked to national defense and security, except for an express authorization from the Executive. The Export and Investment Center of the Dominican Republic (ProDominicana, formally known as CEI-RD) aims to be the one-stop shop for investment information, registration, and investor after-care services. ProDominicana maintains a user-friendly website for guidance on the government’s priority sectors for inward investment and on the range of investment incentives ( https://prodominicana.gob.do ). In February 2020, the Dominican government enacted the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) Law No. 47-20 to establish a regulatory framework for the initiation, selection, award, contracting, execution, monitoring and termination of PPPs in line with the 2030 National Development Strategy of the Dominican Republic. The law also created the General Directorate of Public-Private Partnerships (DGAPP) as the agency responsible for the promotion and regulation of public-private alliances and the National Council of Public-Private Partnerships as the highest body responsible for evaluating and determining the relevance of the PPPs. The PPP law recognizes public-private and public-private non-profit partnerships from public or private initiatives and provides for forty-year concession contracts, five-year exemptions of the tax on the transfer of goods and services (ITBIS), and accelerated depreciation and amortization regimes. The DGAPP website has the most up to date information on PPPs ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). The National Commission for the Defense of Competition (ProCompetencia) has the power to review transactions for competition-related concerns. Private sector contacts note, however, that strong public pressure is required for ProCompetencia to act. Its decisions can be challenged before the Superior Administrative Tribunal (TSA). The TSA’s ruling can be revised in its legality through a recurso de casación by the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), and if there was a constitutional violation, the case could be heard by the Constitutional Court. On June 14, 2021, ProCompetencia approved sanctions against four pharmaceuticals firms found guilty of price fixing (Profarma Internacional, S.R.L, Sued & Fargesa, S.R.L., Mercantil Farmacéutica, S.A. y J. Gassó Gassó, S.A.S) for certain drugs such as analgesics and anti-flu medicines. Total fines reached $250,000 ($14 million pesos). The Dominican constitution permits the government’s exercise of eminent domain after the President has declared a plot of land for public use by official decree; however, it also mandates fair market compensation in advance of the use of seized land. Nevertheless, there are many outstanding disputes between U.S. investors and the Dominican government concerning unpaid government contracts or expropriated property and businesses, as well indirect expropriation. Property claims make up the majority of cases. Most, but not all, expropriations have been used for infrastructure or commercial development and many claims remain unresolved for years. The Abinader administration has committed to resolve disputes over land title before government use, but in some cases the matters are protracted and there are multiple claims to the same piece of land. Traditionally, investors and lenders have reported that they typically do not receive prompt payment of fair market value for their losses. They have complained of difficulties in the subsequent enforcement even in cases in which the Dominican courts, including the Supreme Court, have ordered compensation or when the government has recognized a claim. In other cases, some indicate that lengthy delays in compensation payments are blamed on errors committed by government-contracted property assessors, slow processes to correct land title errors, a lack of budgeted funds, and other technical problems. There are also cases of regulatory action that investors say could be viewed as indirect expropriation. For example, they note that government decrees mandating atypical setbacks from roads, or establishing new protected areas can deprive investors of their ability to use purchased land in the manner initially planned, substantially affecting the economic benefit sought from the investment. Many companies report that the procedures to resolve expropriations lack transparency. Government officials are rarely, if ever, held accountable for failing to pay a recognized claim or failing to pay in a timely manner. Law 141-15 provides the legal framework for bankruptcy. It allows a debtor company to continue to operate for up to five years during reorganization proceedings by halting further legal proceedings. It also authorizes specialized bankruptcy courts; contemplates the appointment of conciliators, verifiers, experts, and employee representatives; allows the debtor to contract for new debt which will have priority status in relation to other secured and unsecured claims; stipulates civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance; and permits the possibility of coordinating cross-border proceedings based on recommendations of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1997. In March 2019, a specialized bankruptcy court was established in Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic scores lower than the regional average and comparator economies on resolving insolvency on most international indices. 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives exist in various sectors of the economy, which are available to all investors, foreign and domestic. Incentives typically take the form of preferential tax rates or exemptions, preferential interest rates or access to finance, or preferential customs treatment. Sectors where incentives exist include agriculture, construction, energy, film production, manufacturing, and tourism. Incentives for manufacturing apply principally to production in free trade zones (discussed in the subsequent section) or for the manufacturing of textiles, pharmaceutical products, tobacco and derivatives, clothing, and footwear specifically under Laws 84-99 on Re-activation and Promotion of Exports and 56-07 on Special Tax Incentives for the Textile Sector. Additionally, Law 392-07 on Competitiveness and Industrial Innovation provides a series of incentives that include exemptions on taxes and tariffs related to the acquisition of materials and machinery and special tax treatment for approved companies. Special Zones for Border Development, created by Law No. 28-01, encourage development near the Dominican Republic-Haiti border. Law No. 12-21, passed in February 2021, modified and extended incentives for direct investments in manufacturing projects in the Zones for a period of 30 years. Incentives still largely take the form of tax exemptions but can be applied for a maximum period of 30 years, versus the 20 years in the original law. These incentives include the exemption of income tax on the net taxable income of the projects, the exemption of sales tax, the exemption of import duties and tariffs and other related charges on imported equipment and machinery used exclusively in the industrial processes, as well as on imports of lubricants and fuels (except gasoline) used in the processes. Tourism is a particularly attractive area for investment and one the government encourages strongly. Law 158-01 on Tourism Incentives, as amended by Law 195-13, and its regulations, grants wide-ranging tax exemptions, for fifteen years, to qualifying new projects by local or international investors. The projects and businesses that qualify for these incentives are: (a) hotels and resorts; (b) facilities for conventions, fairs, festivals, shows and concerts; (c) amusement parks, ecological parks, and theme parks; (d) aquariums, restaurants, golf courses, and sports facilities; (e) port infrastructure for tourism, such as recreational ports and seaports; (f) utility infrastructure for the tourist industry such as aqueducts, treatment plants, environmental cleaning, and garbage and solid waste removal; (g) businesses engaged in the promotion of cruises with local ports of call; and (h) small and medium-sized tourism-related businesses such as shops or facilities for handicrafts, ornamental plants, tropical fish, and endemic reptiles. In January 2020, the government announced a special incentive plan to promote high-quality investment in tourism and infrastructure in the southwest region of Pedernales for more information contact the Ministry of Tourism at https://www.mitur.gob.do/ . For existing projects, hotels and resort-related investments that are five years or older are granted complete exemption from taxes and duties related to the acquisition of the equipment, materials and furnishings needed to renovate their premises. In addition, hotels and resort-related investments that are fifteen years or older will receive the same benefits granted to new projects if the renovation or reconstruction involves 50 percent or more of the premises. In addition, individuals and companies receive an income tax deduction for investing up to 20 percent of their annual profits in an approved tourist project. The Tourism Promotion Council (CONFOTOUR) is the government agency in charge of reviewing and approving applications by investors for these exemptions, as well as supervising and enforcing all applicable regulations. Once CONFOTOUR approves an application, the investor must start and continue work in the authorized project within a three-year period to avoid losing incentives. The Dominican Republic encourages investment in the renewable energy sector. Under Law 57-07 on the Development of Renewable Sources of Energy, investors in this area are granted, among other benefits, the following incentives: (a) no custom duties on the importation of the equipment required for the production, transmission and interconnection of renewable energy; (b) no tax on income derived from the generation and sale of electricity, hot water, steam power, biofuels or synthetic fuels generated from renewable energy sources; and (c) exemption from the goods and services tax in the acquisition or importation of certain types of equipment. Foreign investors praise the provisions of the law but have historically expressed frustration with approval and execution of potential renewable energy projects. Ongoing reforms to the energy sector discussed in Section 7 on State-Owned Enterprises should alleviate some of these concerns and have already enabled the completion of several solar power concessions over the past year. The Minister of Energy and Mines, Antonio Almonte, affirmed March 9 that the only way that the Dominican Republic has to counteract the fuel crisis in the international market is by stimulating and promoting the production of renewable energies. The Dominican government does not currently have a practice of jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. However, in some circumstances, the government has authority to offer land or infrastructure as a method of attracting and supporting investment that meets government development goals. Anticipated reforms to government-owned asset management (See Section 7) may change the institutional actors and framework for engaging with government-owned resources. In February 2020, the government passed a law on public-private partnerships (PPPs) that may encourage high-quality infrastructure projects and help catalyze private sector-led economic growth. In 2020, the Abinader administration officially launched the DGAPP as the government office responsible for planning, executing, and overseeing investment projects financed via PPPs. Their website has the most up to date information on their initiatives and mandates ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). Law 8-90 on the Promotion of Free Zones from 1990 governs operations of the Dominican Republic’s free trade zones (FTZs), while the National Council of Free Trade Zones for Export (CNZFE) exercises regulatory oversight. The law provides for complete exemption from all taxes, duties, charges, and fees affecting production and export activities in the zones. According to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Dominican Republic has established 79 free trade zones – 38 in the Northern Zone, 17 in the Santo Domingo and the National District, 13 in the Southern Zone, and seven in the Eastern Zone. Additionally, there are 734 companies operating in the zones that employ over 182,700 people. CNZFE delineates policies for the promotion and development of Free Trade Zones, as well as approving applications for operating licenses, with discretionary authority to extend the time limits on these incentives. CNZFE is comprised of representatives from the public and private sectors and is chaired by the Minister of Industry and Commerce. Border FTZs located in one of the seven provinces along the Dominican-Haitian border benefit from incentives for a 20-year period, while those located throughout the rest of the country benefit for a 15-year period. Companies operating in the FTZs do pay tax on the purchase of locally sourced inputs and relevant taxes do apply when products produced in FTZs are sold in the Dominican market. In general, firms operating in the FTZs report fewer bureaucratic and legal problems than do firms operating outside the zones. Foreign currency flows from the FTZs are handled via the free foreign exchange market. Foreign and Dominican firms are afforded the same investment opportunities both by law and in practice and Dominican companies operating in or adjacent to the FTZs benefit from exposure to international business standards and best practices. According to CNZFE’s 2020 Statistical Report, exports from FTZs totaled $5.9 billion, comprising 3.5 percent of GDP. Investments made in FTZs by U.S. companies in 2020 represented approximately 32.7 percent of total investments. Other major investors include companies registered in the Dominican Republic (39.5 percent), Canada (2.7 percent), Germany (2.6 percent), and Puerto Rico (2.3 percent). Companies registered in 38 other countries comprised the remaining investments. The top exports from FTZs are medical and pharmaceutical products, tobacco and derivatives, apparel and textiles, jewelry, electronics, and footwear. Estimates for 2021 predict over $7 billion in exports from FTZs, representing over 60% of total exports from the country. Exporters/investors seeking further information from the CNZFE may contact: Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportación Leopoldo Navarro No. 61 Edif. San Rafael, piso no. 5 Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Phone: (809) 686-8077 Fax: (809) 686-8079 Website: http://www.cnzfe.gov.do Law 16-92 on the Labor Code stipulates that 80 percent of the labor force of a foreign or national company, including free trade zone companies, must be comprised of Dominican nationals. Senior management and boards of directors of foreign companies are exempt from this regulation. The Dominican Republic does not have excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. The host government does not have a forced localization policy to compel foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology. There are no performance requirements as there is no distinction between Dominican and foreign investment. Investment incentives are applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements. In addition, there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. Law No. 172-13 on Comprehensive Protection of Personal Data restricts companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data inside the Dominican Republic or beyond the country’s borders. Under this law, companies must obtain express written consent from individuals to transmit personal data unless an exception applies. The Superintendency of Banks currently supervises and enforces these rules, but its jurisdiction generally covers banks, credit bureaus, and other financial institutions. Industry representatives recommend updating this law to designate a national data protection authority that oversees other sectors. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Dominican Constitution guarantees the right to own private property and provides that the state shall promote the acquisition of property, especially titled real property, however, a patchwork history of land titling systems and sometimes violent political change has complicated land titling in the Dominican Republic. By law, all land must be registered, and that which is not registered is considered state land. There are no restrictions or specific regulations on foreigners or non-resident owners of land. Registering property in the Dominican Republic requires 6 steps, an average of 33 days, and payment of 3.4 percent of the land value as a registration fee. Land tenure insecurity has been fueled by government land expropriations, institutional weaknesses, lack of effective law enforcement, and local community support for land invasions and squatting. Political expediency, corruption, and fraud have all been cited as practices that have complicated the issuance of titles or respect for the rights of existing title holders. Moreover, while on the decline, long-standing titling practices, such as issuing provisional titles that are never completed or providing titles to land to multiple owners without requiring individualization of parcels, have created ambiguity in property rights and undermined the reliability of existing records. In the last decade, the Dominican government received a $10-million, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan to modernize its property title registration process, address deficiencies and gaps in the land administration system, and strengthen land tenure security. The project involved digitization of land records, decentralization of registries, establishment of a fund to compensate people for title errors, separation of the legal and administrative functions within the agency, and redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of judges and courts. In 2008, the country transitioned to a new system based on GPS coordinates and has been working towards establishing clear titles, but, in March 2021, an industry source estimated that only 25 percent of all land titles were clear. The government advises that investors are ultimately responsible for due diligence and recommends partnering with experienced attorneys to ensure that all documentation, ranging from title searches to surveys, have been properly verified and processed. Mortgages and liens do exist in the Dominican Republic. The Title Registry Office maintains the system for recording titles, as well as a complementary registry of third-party rights, such as mortgages, liens, easements, and encumbrances. Property owners maintain ownership of legally purchased property whether unoccupied or occupied by squatters, however, it can be difficult and costly to enforce private rights against squatters. This may in part be due to a provision in the law known as “adverse possession,” which allows squatters to acquire legal ownership of land without a title (thereby state-owned). For investors in the tourism sector, it is important to note that the Dominican constitution guarantees public access to all beaches in the Dominican Republic. Disputes have arisen over whether this passage ensures access to sand or to the coast and may create legal risks for investors as coastlines change over time. In addition, investors or owners that might have property demarcated for sale when environmental sciences were not as developed are now subject to laws prohibiting private development any closer than 60 meters from the tideline. The Dominican Republic has strong intellectual property rights (IPR) laws and is meeting its IP obligations under international agreements such as the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Nevertheless, weak institutions and limited enforcement can present challenges for investors. Under the Abinader administration, the country’s posture toward the protection and enforcement of IPR has improved. However, many agencies continue to be under resourced, a reality that is unlikely to change in a contracting fiscal environment. Illicit and counterfeit goods, as well as online and signal piracy, are common and continue to present challenges for authorities. In the Dominican Republic, illicit or counterfeit goods include the full gamut of fashion apparel and accessories, electronics, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, cigarettes, and alcohol. Several IP authorities in the Dominican Republic grant intellectual property rights. The National Office of Industrial Property (ONAPI) issues trademarks and patents, the National Copyright Office (ONDA) issues copyrights, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (MISPAS) issues sanitary registrations required for marketing foods, pharmaceuticals, and health products, and the Directorate of International Trade (DICOEX) has jurisdiction over the implementation of geographical indications. IPR registration processes have improved in recent years, but delays and questionable adjudication decisions are still common. ONAPI started e-filing services for patents, which has helped make the registration process more efficient. However, ONDA continues to be hampered by lack of expertise and resources. The agency has the authority to investigate copyright violations but continued to shirk its responsibility of submitting formal requests to the telecommunications regulator (Indotel) to cancel licenses of those using pirated signals. As a result, copyright enforcement and prosecutions have been nonexistent. IPR Enforcement is carried out by the Customs Authority (DGA), the National Police, the National Copyright Office (ONDA), the Dominican Institute of Telecommunications (Indotel), the Special Office of the Attorney General for Matters of Health, and the Special Office of the Attorney General for High Tech Crimes. In October 2021 the Deputy Attorney General formed the National Advisory Board for Intellectual Property that should be approved by the President’s Legal Counsel in 2022. If approved as currently envisioned, the Board should be vested with the legal authority to delegate roles to the different agencies. This Board is in addition to the already functional interagency working group that has led to more coordination between the various IP agencies and the private sector. As a result, prosecution case counts have risen from 73 cases in 2018 to 217 cases in 2021. Additionally, the prospector’s office is investigating more cases. From 2018-2020 the prosecutor’s office investigated 268 cases. In 2021 alone the office investigated 468 cases. This can be attributed to better training of prosecutors at the regional level. In February 2021, the IP unit partnered with ONAPI and ONDA to launch an IP training academy for prosecutors and judges to improve the country’s judicial capacity. Since 2003, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has designated the Dominican Republic as a Special 301 Watch List country for serious IPR deficiencies. The country, however, is not listed in USTR’s Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. The Abinader administration has committed to getting the Dominican Republic removed from the Special 301 Watch List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector The Dominican Stock Market (BVRD by its Spanish acronym) is the only stock exchange in the Dominican Republic. It began operations in 1991 and is viewed as a cornerstone of the country’s integration into the global economy and domestic development. It is regulated by the Securities Market Law No. 249-17 and supervised by the Superintendency of Securities, which approves all public securities offerings. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market but tend to prefer less expensive offshore sources. The Central Bank regularly issues certificates of deposit using an auction process to determine interest rates and maturities. In recent years, the local stock market has continued to expand, in terms of the securities traded on the BVRD. There are very few publicly traded companies on the exchange, as credit from financial institutions is widely available and many of the large Dominican companies are family-owned enterprises. Most of the securities traded in the BVRD are fixed-income securities issued by the Dominican State. On August 6, 2021, the Law 163-21 for the Promotion of the Placement and Marketing of Publicly Offered Securities in the Stock Market of the Dominican Republic was enacted as a complement to Law 249-17, to promote the issuance of shares by private and public companies. This law declares of national interest the promotion and development of the public offering of securities as a financing mechanism for the revitalization of the national economy, with special emphasis on the issuance of shares of private and public companies in the stock market of the Dominican Republic. Among the incentives proposed by Law 163-21, is the exemption of listed companies from the 1% tax for capital increase when they issue new shares during their first three years of validity. Likewise, during that same 3-year period, the Law reduces to 15% the rate of Income Tax applicable to Capital gains generated by the seller of a share listed on the stock exchange. Dominican Republic’s financial sector is relatively stable, and the IMF declared the financial system satisfactory during 2021 Article IV consultations, however, directors agreed that while financial system remains resilient and well monitored, it would benefit from moving closer to international standards for supervision and regulation and enhancing the macroprudential and crisis management toolkit. According to the first National Financial Inclusion Survey from the Central Bank, published on March 22, 2020, only 46.3 percent of Dominicans have a bank account. Financial depth is relatively constrained. Private lending to GDP (around 30.5 percent, according to the IMF) is low by international and regional standards, representing around half the average for Latin America. Real interest rates, driven in part by large interest rate spreads, are also relatively high. The country’s relatively shallow financial markets can be attributed to a number of factors, including high fiscal deficits crowding out private investment; complicated and lengthy regulatory procedures for issuing securities in primary markets; and high levels of consolidation in the banking sector. Dominican banking consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. While full-service bank branches tend to be in urban areas, several banks employ sub-agents to extend services in more rural areas. Technology has also helped extend banking services throughout the country. The Monetary and Banking system is regulated by the Monetary and Financial Law No. 183-02, and is overseen by the Monetary Board, the Central Bank, and the Superintendency of Banks. The mission of the Central Bank is to maintain the stability of prices, promote the strength and stability of the financial system, and ensure the proper functioning of payment systems. The Superintendency of Banks carries out the supervision of financial intermediation entities, in order to verify compliance by said entities with the provisions of the law. Foreign banks may establish operations in the Dominican Republic, although it may require a special decree for the foreign financial institution to establish domicile in the country. Foreign banks not domiciled in the Dominican Republic may establish representative offices in accordance with current regulations. To operate, both local and foreign banks must obtain the prior authorization of the Monetary Board and the Superintendency of Banks. Major U.S. banks have a commercial presence in the country, but most focus on corporate banking services as opposed to retail banking. Some other foreign banks offer retail banking. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts, although identification requirements do apply. The Dominican government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The legacy of autocratic rule in the mid-twentieth century and the practice of distributing social services as political patronage have resulted in a relatively larger role for state-actors in the Dominican economy when compared with the United States. Since 1997, by means of the approval of the General Law of Reform of Public Companies No. 141-97, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been on the decline and do not have as significant a presence in the economy as they once did, with most functions now performed by privately held firms. Notable exceptions are in the electricity, banking, mining, and refining sectors. The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE) was established by Law No. 289 of June 30, 1966, with the purpose of managing, directing, and developing all the productive and commercial companies, goods, and rights ceded by the Dominican State as a result of the death of the dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. Among the state-owned companies that came to be managed by CORDE are the salt, gypsum, marble, and pozzolana mines. In 2017, the dissolution of CORDE was entrusted to a Commission chaired by the Legal Consultancy of the Executive Power, which assumed the operational, administrative, and financial management of this entity until the dissolution process was definitively completed. Within the framework of the dissolution process of CORDE, the ownership of the mining concessions of the Dominican State was transferred to the Patrimonial Fund of Reformed Companies (FONPER) through the Mining Concessions Transfer Agreement between CORDE and FONPER dated July 2, 2020. Shortly after being sworn into office, in August 2020, President Abinader issued Decree 422-20 forming the Commission for the Liquidation of State Organs (CLOE) under the charge of the Ministry of the Presidency. Since then, the CLOE has been in the process of dissolution and liquidation of CORDE, and on December 8, 2020, CLOE requested the FONPER Board of Directors revoke the Concessions Transfer Agreement. FONPER’s Board of Directors approved the revocation through Minutes No. 02-2021 of March 11, 2021, authorizing the president of FONPER to sign an agreement with CLOE that revokes and nullifies the Transfer Agreement. It is not clear whether this revocation has been completed. In 2021, the Office of the President proposed a bill to regulate government business assets, government participation in public trusts, and to create the National Center for Companies and Public Trusts (CENEFIP). The bill’s intent is to reform the management of state assets and replace the disgraced Patrimonial Fund of Reformed State Enterprises (FONPER), which is being investigated for alleged irregularities that may have personally benefited politically affiliated persons. The CENEFIP bill is under review in the legislature. Also in 2021, the executive branch transferred the functions and properties of the State Sugar Council [Consejo Estatal del Azúcar] to the Directorate General of National Assests [Dirección General de Bienes Nacionales]. The State Sugar Council maintains one remaining sugar mill, Porvenir. In the partially privatized electricity sector, private companies mainly provide electricity generation, while the government handles the transmission and distribution phases via the Dominican Electric Transmission Company (ETED) and the Dominican Corporation of State Electrical Companies (CDEEE). This sector is undergoing additional reforms, including the dissolution of the CDEEE and privatization of the management and operation of the distribution companies. The CDEEE and the distribution companies have traditionally been the largest SOEs in terms of government expenditures. The government also participates in the generation phase, too (most notably in hydroelectric power), and one of the distribution companies is partially privatized. The Dominican financial sector consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. The state-owned, but autonomously operated BanReservas is the largest bank in the country and is a market leader in lending and deposits. Part of this success is due to a requirement for government employees to open accounts with BanReservas in order to receive salary payments. BanReservas was also utilized to distribute government social support payments during the pandemic. Roughly a third of the bank’s lending portfolio is to government institutions. In the refining sector, the government is now the exclusive shareholder of the country’s only oil refinery; Refinery Dominicana (Refidomsa), after having extricated Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in August 2021. Refidomsa operates and manages the refinery, is the only importer of crude oil in the country, and is also the largest importer of refined fuels, with a 60 percent market share. The price for fuel products is set by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and SMEs. Fuel prices are heavily subsidized. Law No. 10-04 requires the Chamber of Accounts to audit SOEs. Audits should be published at https://www.camaradecuentas.gob.do/index.php/auditorias-publicadas . While audits have not always been publicly available, the new President of the Chamber is making a concerted effort to conduct and publish all audits required by law. Partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in foreign investors obtaining management control of former SOEs engaged in activities such as electricity generation, airport management, and sugarcane processing. In the electricity sector, these reforms were reversed between 2003 and 2009, but have largely remained in place for other sectors. Major reforms for the electricity sector, as outlined in the National Pact for Energy Reform signed February 2021, are ongoing. Plans for dissolving the CDEEE are in process, with the organization functional in name only, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines having assumed many of the authorities conferred to the CDEEE upon its founding in 2001 and across its 20-year life span. Complete dissolution and final distribution of authorities remains a legal question, which is currently being reviewed by the President’s legal advisor and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The DGAPP has taken the first step to improve the governance and performance of electricity distribution companies through the introduction of private sector participation. On November 29, 2021, the DGAPP publicly accepted for detailed evaluation an application submitted by the Board of the Electricity Distribution Companies (Consejo Unificado de las Empresas Distribuidoras de Electricidad) for a Public Private Partnership (PPP) covering the three state-owned distribution companies. The DGAPP Resolution No. 89/2021 follows the process in the PPP Law (Law No. 47-20), whereby any public or private entity wishing to propose a PPP must submit a formal proposal and justification to the DGAPP. Government officials expect the process to privatize the management and operation of the electricity distribution companies to begin in earnest in the summer of 2022 with the release of tender documents. All indications are that foreign firms will be invited to participate in these tenders. Questions should be directed toward the Ministry of Energy and Mines ( https://mem.gob.do/ ) or DGAPP ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government does not have an official position or policy on responsible business conduct, including corporate social responsibility (CSR). Although there is not a local culture of CSR, large foreign companies normally have active CSR programs, as do some of the larger local business groups. While most local firms do not follow OECD principles regarding CSR, the firms that do are viewed favorably, especially when their CSR programs are effectively publicized. There is a growing trend for businesses to align with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and small and medium enterprises are beginning to follow examples of the CSR work of the larger local business groups of being more responsible to societal and environmental issues. These entities are viewing CSR as a competitive advantage. The CSR Risk Checker is a tool designed to help companies understand some of the CSR risks associated with countries from which they may import or in which they may have production facilities. The report lists a total of 19 possible risks for the Dominican Republic, of which 11 are related to labor rights, three to human rights and ethics, three to environment, and two to fair business practices. The Dominican Constitution does guarantee consumer rights stating, “Everyone has the right to have quality goods and services, to objective, truthful and timely information about the content and characteristics of the products and services that they use and consume.” To that end, the national consumer protection agency, ProConsumidor, offers consumer advocacy services. The Dominican Republic also joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2016 ( https://eiti.org/dominican-republic) and is rated as achieving meaningful progress in its efforts to incorporate EITI standards into its regulatory framework. Its fourth country report, covering 2019 and 2020, was recently approved and can be found at https://eiti.org/document/dominican-republic-20192020-eiti-report. The Ministry of Energy and Mines, as the government entity in charge of sectoral policy, is carrying out reform processes in the area of mining and hydrocarbons, including modernizing, organizing, and streamlining its own role. Other reforms include 1) modification and modernizing of the Mining Law of 1971, which was submitted to the Presidency for review in February 2021; 2) public consultation and revision of the regulation that will govern creation and management of the 5% of the net benefits generated by the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources that accrue to the state, established in article 117 of Law No. 64-00 of Environment and Natural Resources, and 3) drafting the regulation governing Artisanal Mining. In May 2018, the Ministry of Energy and Mines presented the Shared Production Model Contract that regulates hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities in the Dominican Republic, there are separate version of the contract for on and offshore explorations. These contract models are used in the awarding of oil and gas blocks in the country, which began in November 2019. The government is exploring another licensing round, but dates have not been released. After being signed, contracts must be approved by the National Congress and promulgated by the President. On December 15, 2003, through Decree No. 1128-03, the government established the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security (SVSP) to exercises control, inspection, and surveillance, over all persons and institutions that carry out surveillance and private security activities and their users, in the Dominican Republic. Despite the sizeable sector, there do not appear to be any government, civil society, or private firms in the Dominican Republic affiliated with the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) and the government is not a signatory of the Montreaux Document. According to the 2020 List of Goods Produced with Child and Forced Labor, there are indicators of child labor in the production of baked goods, coffee, rice, and tomatoes in the Dominican Republic and indicators of child and forced labor in the production of sugarcane. Stakeholders have raised serious inquiries regarding inhumane labor conditions in the Dominican Republic’s sugar sector for many years. In December 2011, Father Christopher Hartley filed a submission under the labor chapter of DR-CAFTA alleging numerous labor violations across the Dominican Republic’s sugar production industry. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) conducted an investigation and found “evidence of apparent and potential labor violations in the sector,” including concerns regarding acceptable conditions of work, child labor, and forced labor. Since issuing its report in 2013, DOL has engaged directly with the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and Dominican Republic industry stakeholders; provided technical assistance and related program funding; and conducted six public periodic reviews. The most recent review in 2018 found that “while concerns remain, the GODR continues to take positive steps towards addressing some of the labor issues identified in the report.” Another DOL periodic review is expected to be released in 2022. At the same time, recent findings by investigative journalists assert that, despite ten years of effort, labor conditions in the Dominican Republic’s sugar sector remain abhorrent. Reports from the Washington Post, Mother Jones, and the Center for Investigative Reporting focusing on conditions at the Central Romana Corporation (owner of the world-famous Casa de Campo resort), include written and video testimonies by laborers about the conditions they experience in the bateys, colonos, sugar cane fields, and throughout the country’s sugar production. These testimonies describe poverty-level wages and crippling debt, excessive work hours, inadequate safety or protective equipment, abhorrent housing conditions with limited access to water and electricity, denial of public benefits such as pensions, social security, and medical care, and harassment, intimidation, and retaliation by supervisors, company representatives, company armed guards, and police. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. According to the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index, the Dominican Republic is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change, though it represents only 0.06% of global greenhouse gas emissions. As a small island developing state, the Dominican Republic is particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, droughts, and rising sea levels. Combined with rapid economic growth (over 5 percent until 2020) and urbanization (more than 50 percent of population in cities, 30 percent in Santo Domingo), climate change could strain key socio-economic sectors such as water, agriculture and food security, human health, biodiversity, forests, marine coastal resources, infrastructure, and energy. The National Constitution calls for the efficient and sustainable use of the nation’s natural resources in accordance with the need to adapt to climate change. The National Council for Climate Change and the Clean Development Mechanism under the Office of the Presidency is responsible for creating the National Policy on Climate Change (PNCC), the Climate Compatible Development Plan (CCDP), and the Strategic Plan for Climate Change 2011-2030 (PECC). Through these documents, the Dominican government is acting, both domestically and in coordination with the international community, to mitigate the effects of climate change. In its January 2021, report MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index ranked the Dominican Republic as 55th out of 76 countries and territories on their progress and commitment toward building a low carbon future, stating “a new national government is updating the country’s Paris Agreement commitments and developing a plan for carbon neutrality by 2050.” The full report can be found at The Green Future Index | MIT Technology Review . The Dominican Republic is also signatory to multiple international environmental conventions, corresponding protocols and agreements, and free trade agreements with environmental protection provisions. The Dominican Republic is party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). In its latest Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) from 2020, the Dominican Republic committed to a 27 percent greenhouse gas reduction by 2030 (compared to 2010 levels), with 20 percent conditional and seven percent unconditional. The country has also established the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. The NDC identifies mitigation options in the energy (generation, efficiency) and Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) sectors. Proposed actions are meant to improve electricity generation; energy efficiency; road transportation; agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU); and waste management. The Dominican Republic is also part of several regional adaptation initiatives, such as CARIFORUM, the Increasing Climate Resilience Project, the Caribbean Biological Corridor, and the Haiti-Dominican Republic Binational Cooperation Program, among others. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, which provides guidance in matters of air quality, waste disposal, forestry management, and water quality, has designated 127 protected areas across the country, and is working towards designating and protecting a total of 30 percent of the country through public and public-private management. The Dominican government also encourages support for climate change prevention and mitigation from the private sector through tax and investment incentives, such as Renewable Energy Law 50-07, which grants numerous incentives and tax exemptions to investors in renewable energy. BloombergNEF’s Climatescope report ranks the Dominican Republic as the 15th most attractive market for energy transition investment out of 107 emerging markets. The report looks at opportunities in the power, transportation, and building sectors, specifically. 9. Corruption The Dominican Republic has a legal framework that includes laws and regulations to combat corruption and provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials. While challenges remain, overall enforcement of these laws has improved thanks to a heightened focus on transparency by the Abinader administration and concerted efforts by the Office of the Attorney General. In a change from prior years, investigations targeted well-connected individuals and high-level politicians, both from prior administrations and the current one. The Dominican Republic’s rank on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index rose to 128 in 2021 from 137 in 2020 (out of 180 countries assessed). Nonetheless, U.S. companies continued to identify corruption as a barrier to FDI. Firms often complained about a lack of technical proficiency in government ministries that resulted in public tender opportunities that were not competently drafted or executed in accordance with international best practices. Some firms went so far as to suggest that more problematic tenders had been set up intentionally to favor politically connected firms. The business community has also complained about corruption at the municipal level and its relevance to such things as permitting procedures. U.S. businesses operating in the Dominican Republic often need to take extensive measures to ensure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. President Abinader has generally made good on his commitment to make fighting corruption a top priority of his administration. He appointed officials with reputations for professionalism and independence and went to great efforts to respect the independence of his appointed head of the Public Procurement General Directorate, the Chamber of Accounts (the country’s Supreme Audit Institution), and the Attorney General’s Office. In addition, the Abinader administration has publicly committed to prioritizing passage of institutional reforms that will advance the fight against corruption, such as new public procurement legislation, and a bill that would allow for civil asset forfeiture. Passage of this legislation, however, remains in question as the measures are in various levels of administrative and legislative review. In a notable change from prior administrations, investigations into corruption and arrests have targeted senior officials not just from the opposing parties, but also from the ruling coalition. These moves have sent a powerful signal that the Abinader administration no longer tolerates the sort of pervasive corruption that was seen under prior administrations. Civil society has been a critical voice in anti-corruption campaigns to date. Several non-governmental organizations are particularly active in transparency and anti-corruption, notably the Foundation for Institutionalization and Justice (FINJUS), Citizen Participation (Participacion Ciudadana), and the Dominican Alliance Against Corruption (ADOCCO). The Dominican Republic signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. The Dominican Republic is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Procuraduría Especializada contra la Corrupción Administrativa (PEPCA) [Attorney General for Investigating Administrative Corruption] Calle Hipólito Herrera Billini esq. Calle Juan B. Pérez, Centro de los Heroes, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana Telephone: (809) 533-3522 Email: pepca@pgr.gob.do La Dirección General de Ética e Integridad Gubernamental (DIGEIG) [Directorate General for Governmental Ethics and Integrity] Av. México No. 419 Esq. Leopoldo Navarro, Edificio Oficinas Gubernamentales Juan Pablo Duarte, Piso 12, Gascue, Santo Domingo, D. N. República Dominicana Telephone: (809) 685-7135 Email: info@digeig.gob.do Linea 311 [Line 311] (government service for filing complaints and denunciations] Phone: 311 (from inside the country) Email: info@311.gob.do Website: http://www.311.gob.do/ Participación Ciudadana [Citizen Participation] Wenceslao Alvarez #8, Zona Universitaria Phone: (809) 685-6200 Website: https://pciudadana.org/ Email: info@pciudadana.org 10. Political and Security Environment Despite political stability and strong pre-pandemic economic growth, citizen and public security concerns in the Dominican Republic impose significant costs on businesses and limit foreign and domestic investment. There are no known national security threats affecting foreign investment within the Dominican Republic. The U.S. Department of State has assessed Santo Domingo as a critical-threat location for crime. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project, there is a steady increase in crime-related victimization and a growing perception of insecurity in the Dominican Republic since 2010. In 2021, Fund for Peace ranked the Dominican Republic 107 out of 179 countries in its Fragile States index. Other than domestic violence, criminal activity is mostly associated with street-level incidents consisting of robberies and petty larcenies. Of these, street robbery is particularly concerning as criminals often use weapons to coerce compliance from victims. In addition, the Dominican Republic faces challenges with organized crime. Transnational criminal organizations in the Dominican Republic use land, airspace, and territorial waters for the transshipment of drugs from South America destined for the United States and Europe, transshipment of ecstasy from the Netherlands and Belgium destined for United States and Canada, substantial money laundering activity particularly by Colombian narcotics traffickers, and significant amphetamine consumption. The U.S. Department of State has assessed the Dominican Republic as being a low-threat location for terrorism and a medium-threat location for political violence. There are no known organized domestic terrorist groups in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the Dominican Republic is a likely transit point for extremists from within the Caribbean, Africa, and Europe. A porous border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic remains an ongoing concern as the security situation in Haiti has worsened after the assassination of the Haitian President Moise in August 2021 and the growing gang problem in Haiti. Dominican officials have expressed concerns about widespread civil unrest or instability in Haiti contributing to illegal flows of people and illicit goods across the border. In 2021, few protests took place. COVID-19 protocols might have had a dampening effect on the size and scale of protests. The Dominican Republic armed forces view irregular migration along the border, citizen security, illicit trafficking of arms, weapons, and drugs, as well as natural disasters as threats to their national security. As a result, they have postured their forces to support land, air, and maritime whole of government efforts to protect their sovereign territory. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Dominican labor market continues to regularize as pandemic-related economic impacts subside. An ample labor supply is available, although there is a scarcity of skilled workers and technical supervisors. Some labor shortages exist in professions requiring lengthy education or technical certification. According to 2021 Dominican Central Bank data for July-September (the latest available), the Dominican labor force consists of approximately 4.6 million workers. The labor force participation rate is 63.1 percent; 57.7 percent of the labor force works in services, 10.0 percent in industry, 9.8 percent in education and health, 7.9 percent in agriculture and livestock, 9.2 percent in construction, and 5.4 percent in public administration and defense. Approximately 41.1 percent of the labor force works in formal sectors of the economy and 58.9 percent in informal sectors. From January to September 2021, unemployment decreased from 8.0 percent to 6.8 percent as the economy continued its rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic. When factoring in discouraged workers and others who were not actively seeking employment, however, the unemployment rate increased from 6.8 percent to 13.6 percent in the period July-September 2021. Youth unemployment remained steady at 13.5 percent, indicating the pandemic had a greater impact on employment for older, more vulnerable segments of the population. Central Bank data from 2021 indicates that the labor market has nearly recovered to pre-pandemic levels, with the percentage of employment reaching 97.5 percent of the levels before the pandemic. With respect to migrant workers, the most recent reliable statistical data is from 2017 and shows a population of 334,092 Haitians aged ten or older living in the country, with 67 percent working in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Migration experts believe that this number has increased to approximately 500,000 or more since 2017. The Dominican government and the United Nations are expected to provide an updated migrant survey in 2022. The Dominican Labor Code establishes policies and procedures for many aspects of employer-employee relationships, ranging from hours of work and overtime and vacation pay to severance pay, causes for termination, and union registration. The code applies equally to migrant workers; however, many undocumented Haitian laborers and Dominicans of Haitian descent working in the construction and agricultural industries do not exercise their rights due to fear of being fired or deported. The law requires that at least 80 percent of non-management workers of a company be Dominican nationals. Exemptions and waivers are available and regularly granted. The law provides for severance payments, which are due upon layoffs or firing without just cause. The amount due is prorated based on length of employment. Although the Labor Code provides for freedom to form unions and bargain collectively, it places several restrictions on these rights, which the International Labor Organization (ILO) has characterized as excessive. For example, it restricts trade union rights by requiring unions to represent 51 percent of the workers in an enterprise to bargain collectively. In addition, the law prohibits strikes until mandatory mediation requirements have been met. Formal requirements for a strike to be legal also include the support of an absolute majority of all company workers for the strike, written notification to the Ministry of Labor, and a 10-day waiting period following notification before proceeding with the strike. Government workers and essential public service personnel, in theory, may not strike; however, in practice such employees, including healthcare workers, have protested and gone on strike. The law prohibits dismissal of employees for trade union membership or union activities. In practice, however, the law is inconsistently enforced. The majority of companies resist collective negotiating practices and union activities. Companies reportedly fire workers for union activity and blacklist trade unionists, among other anti-union practices. Workers frequently have to sign documents pledging to abstain from participating in union activities. Companies also create and support company-backed unions. Formal strikes occur but are not common. The law establishes a system of labor courts for dealing with disputes. The process is often long, with cases pending for several years. One exception is workplace injury cases, which typically conclude quickly – and often in the worker’s favor. Both workers and companies report that mediation facilitated by the Ministry of Labor was the most rapid and effective method for resolving worker-company disputes. Many of the major manufacturers in free trade zones have voluntary codes of conduct that include worker rights protection clauses generally aligned with the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; however, workers are not always aware of such codes or the principles they contain. The Ministry of Labor monitors labor abuses, health, and safety standards in all worksites where an employer-employee relationship exists, however, resources for adequate monitoring and inspection are insufficient. Labor inspectors can request remediation for violations, and if remediation is not undertaken, can refer offending employers to the public prosecutor for sanctions. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Office Embassy of the United States of America Avenida República de Colombia #57 Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic +1 (809) 567-7775 InvestmentDR@State.gov Ecuador Executive Summary The government of Ecuador under President Guillermo Lasso has adopted an ambitious economic reform agenda to drive investment. Private sector leaders in Ecuador emphasize the “Lasso Effect” in investment given the surge of optimism following the April 2021 election of the region’s most pro-business president in decades. “More Ecuador in the world and more of the world in Ecuador” – President Lasso’s key message for his presidency – includes the administration’s drive to attract $30 billion in investment over his four-year administration. Indeed, investment is growing – with both international and domestic companies searching for opportunities in this traditionally protectionist market that once garnered little attention compared to neighbors Colombia and Peru. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the cornerstone of the administration’s investment drive, including the establishment of a PPP Secretariat and the consolidation of PPP-related tax rules and regulations. The Ecuadorian government is taking positive steps to improving fiscal stability. In September 2020, the International Monetary Fund approved a $6.5 billion, 27-month Extended Fund Facility for Ecuador and has already disbursed $4.8 billion to aid in economic stabilization and reform. The IMF program is in line with the government’s efforts to correct fiscal imbalances and to improve transparency and efficiency in public finance. The Ecuadorian Central Bank reported solid GDP growth of 4.2 percent in 2021 and projects 2.8 percent GDP growth in 2022. The Ecuadorian government remains committed to the sustainability of public finances and to continue a fiscal consolidation path. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (from over 7 percent of GDP in 2020) and is expected to narrow further to a little over 2 percent of GDP in 2022 due to improved tax collection, prudent public spending, and high oil prices. Still, the Lasso administration faces major challenges to its investment agenda given the country’s long-term reputation as a high-risk country for investment. A challenging relationship with the National Assembly complicates the passage of needed economic reform legislation. While the administration’s November 2021 tax reform passed into law, the National Assembly soundly defeated President Lasso’s proposed investment promotion bill March 24. Serious budget deficits and the COVID-induced economic recession force the government to employ cost cutting measures and limit public investment. Ecuador has traditionally struggled to structure tenders and PPPs that are bankable, transparent, and competitive. This has discouraged private investment and attracted companies that lack a commitment to quality construction, accountability and transparency, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion. Corruption remains widespread, and Ecuador is ranked in the bottom half of countries surveyed for Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index. In addition, economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent changes and can increase the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. Ecuador is a dollarized economy that has few limits on foreign investment or repatriation of profits, with the exception of a currency exit tax. It has a population that generally views the United States positively, and the Lasso Administration has expanded bilateral ties and significantly increased cooperation with the United States on a broad range of economic, security, political, and cultural issues. Sectors of Interest to Foreign Investors Petroleum and Gas: Per the 2008 Constitution, all subsurface resources belong to the state, and the petroleum sector is dominated by one state-owned enterprise (SOE) that cannot be privatized. Presidential Decree 95 published July 2021 opened private sector participation in oil exploration and production, with a goal to double oil production to 1 million barrels per day by 2028. The government can offer concessions of its refineries, sell off SOE gasoline stations, issue production-sharing contracts for oil exploration and exploitation, and prepare the SOE to be listed publicly on the stock market. The government maintained its consumer fuel subsidies since May 2020. The Ecuadorian government plans three oil field tenders in 2022 including concessions for Intracampos II and III and Block 60–Sacha. Given its declining and underdeveloped gas fields, the government plans to launch a tender for its Amistad offshore gas field. Additionally, the government announced potential tenders for a South-East concession, a private operator for the Esmeraldas refinery, and another to build and operate a new Euro 5 quality refinery. Mining: The Ecuadorian government plans to accelerate mining development to increase revenues and diversify its economy. Presidential Decree 151, published August 2021, seeks to promote private sector participation in mining exploration and production. The decree allows for private sector investment, joint ventures with the state-owned mining enterprise (SOE); seeks to combat illegal mining; and establishes an Advisory Board to guide the government on best practices for responsible mining. The government announced plans to relaunch its mining cadastre in 2022, which was closed in 2018 due to irregularities in granting concessions. Ecuador has two operating mines — a gold mine operated by a Canadian company and a copper mine operated by a PRC-affiliated company. In 2021 the government issued two new mining concessions and announced plans to issue concessions for 12 additional strategic mining projects. Electricity: Hydroelectric electricity accounts for 80 percent of Ecuador’s electricity generation. The PRC-built 1500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) hydro power plant designed to provide 30 percent of Ecuador’s electricity has never generated its total installed power capacity and has been undergoing repairs since it began operating in 2016. CCS is also at risk from regressive erosion from the adjacent Coca River. The government contracted U.S. Army Corp of Engineers engineering services December 2021 to develop a solution to mitigate the river erosion. The government plans to develop wind, solar, hydro, biomass, biogas, geothermal, biofuel, combined cycle, and gas-fired electrical generation plants to diversify the energy matrix. It awarded a 200 MW solar tender and a 110 MW wind tender to private operators in 2020. It launched tenders for a 500 MW renewable energy block, a 400 MW combined cycle power plant, and a Northeast Interconnection transmission line in December 2021. The government imported its first LNG cargo December 2021 followed by a second shipment in February 2022. Telecommunications: The Lasso administration is prioritizing rural connectivity as its major telecommunications policy. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Telecommunications (MINTEL) received from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) the valuation report for the 2.5 GHz (gigahertz) and 700 MHz (megahertz) bands. The cost set is reserved. Likewise, MINTEL asked the ITU for the valuation of the 3.5 GHz, 850, 900 AWS and 1900 bands, which in turn will allow new players in the market and the future deployment of the fifth generation of technologies (5G). Three 5G technology connectivity tests have taken place in Ecuador, though there is no target date for the beginning of 5G commercial operations. Ecuador is due to renegotiate the concession contracts with the mobile network operators, which expire in 2023. New terms and conditions of the concession rights and use of frequencies are currently in the works including technical, legal, and regulatory requirements. The current negotiations do not include the frequency bands for the 5G network and are instead focused on the frequencies currently assigned to operators. E–Commerce: In 2020, E-Commerce sales reached $2.3 billion record sales, an overnight digital transformation due to the pandemic. In 2021, according to Ecuador´s Electronic Commerce Chamber, E-Commerce sales grew 20 to 40 percent ($460 to $920 million, approximately). While many Ecuadorians are interested in purchasing online, they are limited in their ability to receive international shipments due to logistics and customs problems upon arrival in Ecuador. The Ministry of Production launched the National E-Commerce Strategy in 2021, establishing a framework for facilitating the digital transformation in the country. The strategy focuses on strengthening the current legal framework, capacity building for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and improving logistics and payment gateway capabilities. Since the issuance of the National E-Commerce Strategy, no new regulations have entered into force to facilitate its application and the objectives set forth therein. The government is also promoting the development of the Andean Digital Agenda together with the other Andean Community countries, whose update will be promulgated in the first half of this year. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 91 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Ecuador is open to FDI in most sectors. The 2008 Constitution established that the state reserves the right to manage strategic sectors through state-owned or -controlled companies. The sectors identified are energy, telecommunications, non-renewable natural resources, transportation, hydrocarbon refining, water, biodiversity, and genetic patrimony (flora, fauna, and ancestral knowledge). Although in recent years Ecuador took steps to attract FDI, its overall investment climate remains challenging as economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent change. From January to September 2021 (latest information available), FDI flows to Ecuador were USD 493 million, a 50 percent decrease compared to 2020 levels (USD 986 million) and 23 percent lower than 2019 levels (USD 642 million). FDI continues to be very low compared to other countries in the region. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, but the legal complexity resulting from the inconsistent application and interpretation of existing laws and regulations increases the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. Under the prior Correa administration, disputes involving U.S. companies were politicized, especially in sensitive areas such as the energy sector. This resulted in several high-profile international investment dispute cases, with companies awarded damages in international arbitral rulings against Ecuador in the last few years. One case is still pending final arbitral ruling. [Please use U.S. Department of Commerce key words for industries in this section, list available at https://www.trade.gov/industries-0 ] Foreign and domestic private entities are allowed to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, with limitations in strategic sectors as enumerated in the Constitution. Ecuador does not have a single national-level interagency investment screening system for FDI. Each ministry analyzes investments and assesses FDI risks. One hundred precent foreign equity ownership is allowed. For license and franchise transactions, no limits exist on royalties that may be remitted, although financial outflows are subject to a 4.5 percent capital exit tax. The Lasso administration committed to the gradual phaseout of Ecuador’s capital exit tax (ISD) over the next four years starting in 2022 with a quarterly reduction of 0.25 percent. President Lasso signed September 2 executive decree 182 removing the ISD on the international aviation and maritime cargo sectors. All license and franchise agreements must be registered with the National Service for Intellectual Property Rights (SENADI). In addition to registering with the Superintendence of Companies, Securities, and Insurance, foreign investors must register investments with Ecuador’s Central Bank for statistical purposes. Ecuador conducted a trade policy review with the World Trade Organization in March 2019; information can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp483_e.htm In 2020, Ecuador conducted an investment policy review with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), published in 2021. Information can be found at: https://unctad.org/node/34311 . In the past three years, Ecuador has not conducted an investment policy review with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). ProEcuador ( https://www.proecuador.gob.ec/ ) is the government entity responsible for promoting economic development through exports, imports, and investment in Ecuador. The institution forms a Vice Ministry within the Ministry of Production, Foreign Trade, Investments and Fisheries (MPCEIP) and has 27 offices in 23 countries, including three in the United States. A newly created company will at a minimum be required to register with the Superintendence of Companies, Securities, and Insurance ( http://www.supercias.gob.ec/ ), the municipal government, the Internal Revenue Service (SRI), and the Social Security Institute (IESS). The registry with the Superintendence of Companies is a completely online process as of April 2019. The incorporation of companies in Ecuador grew 44 percent in 2021 (15,714 new companies), propelled by the introduction of the simplified joint-stock company (SAS). The SAS came into effect in May 2020 following the enactment of the Organic Law on Entrepreneurship and Innovation. Ecuador does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. ProEcuador is responsible for promoting outward investment from Ecuador. Foreign investments are subject to a 4.5 percent ISD. The 2021 Tax Reform Law enumerates several ISD payment exemptions to productive investment, under certain conditions. In July 2021, the Lasso administration announced a gradual ISD dismantling by sector, quickly followed up with an Executive Decree immediately eliminating ISD on the international aviation and maritime cargo sectors. In February 2017, voters passed a government-backed referendum prohibiting elected officials and public servants from having financial dealings in tax havens and other suspect jurisdictions. The list includes several U.S. states and territories that do not have state income taxes. The prohibition entered into force in September 2017. The United States and Ecuador signed the Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency in December 2020 under the Ecuador-U.S. Trade and Investment Council Agreement (TIC). The Protocol entered into force in August 2021 following National Assembly ratification. The agreement updates the TIC with new annexes in four areas: Trade Facilitation and Customs Administration, Good Regulatory Practices, Anti-Corruption, and SMEs. 3. Legal Regime The Lasso administration, in office since May 2021, has stressed its desire to build the capacity of Ecuador’s weak institutions and promote democracy, transparency, and governability. Combatting corruption is a top priority of the Lasso administration including developing state institutions to be more transparent and responsive to the Ecuadorian people and enhancing civil society’s role in promoting transparency and accountability. President Lasso has reaffirmed Ecuador’s commitment to pursue a trade policy that holistically supports workers, protects the environment, and fosters equitable and inclusive growth. However, economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent changes and can increase the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. National and municipal level regulations can conflict with each other. Regulatory agencies are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment, and rulemaking bodies are not required to solicit public comments on proposed regulations, although there has been some movement toward public consultative processes. Government ministries generally consult with relevant national actors when drafting regulations, but not always and not broadly. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The Government of Ecuador publishes regulatory actions in the Official Registry and posts them online at https://www.registroficial.gob.ec/ . Publicly listed companies generally adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). While there are some transparency enforcement mechanisms within the government, they tend to be weak and rarely enforced. There are no identified informal regulatory processes led by private sector associations or nongovernmental organizations. Ecuador is a member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) along with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Ecuador is an associate member of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Ecuador is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies draft regulations to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. Ecuador ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on October 16, 2018. Ecuador has a civil codified legal system. Systemic weakness in the judicial system and its susceptibility to external pressures constitute challenges faced by U.S. companies investing in Ecuador. While Ecuador updated its Commercial Code in May 2019, enforcement of contract rights, equal treatment under the law, intellectual property protections, and unstable regulatory regimes continue to be concerns for foreign investors. Ecuador does not have laws specifically on FDI, but several have effects on overall investment. The Organic Law for Production Incentives and Tax Fraud Prevention, passed in December 2014, includes provisions to improve tax stability and lower the income tax rate in the mining sector. The Organic Law of Incentives for Public-Private Associations and Foreign Investment from 2015 includes provisions to improve legal stability, reduce red tape, and exempt public private partnerships from paying income and capital exit taxes under certain conditions. The 2021 Tax Reform Law repealed the zero-tariff income tax incentives included in previous legislation and replaced them with income tax reductions. These range from three to five percentage points of the current corporate income tax rate (25 percent), provided the compliance with certain conditions. Investments done under the prior legal framework will continue to enjoy the benefits offered from that legislation. ProEcuador’s website https://www.proecuador.gob.ec/ provides a guide for investors in English and Spanish and highlights the procedures to register a company, types of incentives for investors, and relevant taxes related to investing in Ecuador. The Superintendence of Control of Market Power reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Ecuador’s 2011 Organic Law for Regulation and Control of Market Power includes mechanisms to control and sanction market power abuses, restrictive market practices, market concentration, and unfair competition. The Superintendence of Control of Market Power can fine up to 12 percent of gross revenue of companies found to be in violation of the law. The Constitution establishes that the state is responsible for managing the use and access to land, while recognizing and guaranteeing the right to private property. It also provides for the redistribution of land if it has not been in active use for more than two years. The Article 101 of the 2015 Telecommunications Law grants permission for the occupation or expropriation of private property for telecommunication network installation provided there are no other economically viable alternatives. Service providers must assume costs associated with the property’s expropriation or occupation. With the goal of protecting consumers and preventing a real estate bubble, the National Assembly approved in June 2012 a law that allows homeowners to default on their first home and car loan without penalty if they forfeit the asset. The provisions do not apply to homes with a market value of more than 500 times the basic 2022 monthly salary (currently USD 212,500) or vehicles worth more than 100 times the basic monthly salary (currently USD 42,500). In cases of foreclosure, the average time for banks to collect on debts is 5.3 years, usually taking 4.5 years for courts to approve the initiation of foreclosures. After the appointment and acceptance of an auctioneer, it takes about six months for the auction to take place. 4. Industrial Policies On November 29, 2021, a new Tax Reform Law went into effect, repealing the August 2018 National Productive Development Law that provided income tax exemptions and VAT exemptions for 12 years for certain investments. Investors who initiated the investment process under the 2018 law could obtain the 2018 tax benefits by signing with the delegating entity on behalf of the Ecuadorian government both an investment agreement by December 31, 2021 and a contract by April 30, 2022. In December 2015, Ecuador’s National Assembly approved a Public-Private Partnership law intended to attract investment. The law offers incentives, including the reduction of the income tax, value added tax, and capital exit tax, for investors in certain projects. It designates Latin American arbitration bodies as the dispute resolution mechanism. The law came into effect upon publication in the Official Registry on December 18, 2015. The Organic Law of Production Incentives and Tax Fraud Prevention, which took effect on December 30, 2014, provides tax incentives related to depreciation calculations and income tax rates, which could benefit some foreign investors. The Ecuadorian government is moving toward a Public-Private Partnership model to attract investments — particularly in the energy and transportation sectors — but does not yet offer sovereign guarantees or joint financing for those projects. Green energy incentives include a 12-year tax exemption under the Productive Development Law. However, companies are required to submit an Investment Protection Agreement by December 30, 2021, and receive approval from MPCEIP by April 30, 2022, to receive the tax exemption benefits. The government launched a 500 MW renewable energy block of tenders December 2021. Companies must provide their own financing. The 2021 Tax Reform Law repealed the zero-tariff income tax incentives included in previous legislation and replaced them with income tax reductions. These range from three to five percentage points of the current corporate income tax rate (25 percent), provided the compliance with certain conditions. Investments done under the prior legal framework will continue to enjoy the benefits offered from that legislation. The 2010 Production Code authorized the creation of Special Economic Development Zones (ZEDEs) that are subject to reduced taxes and tariffs. The government considers the extent to which projects promote technology transfer, innovation, and industrial diversification when granting ZEDE status; foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as national firms. Visa and residency requirements are relatively relaxed and do not inhibit foreign investment. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. Article 146 of the 2014 Code of the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation establishes that data related to national security and strategic sectors must be hosted in computer centers physically located in the Ecuadorian territory. Therefore, foreign companies without local data storage facilities are unable to provide cloud services to many public sector entities under this provision. The Lasso administration pledged to remove Article 146 during its term following a July 2021 ransomware attack that Ecuador’s data localization provisions may have facilitated. In May 2021, Ecuador´s first Personal Data Protection Law went into effect. One of its provisions establishes that the international transfer of personal data can only be made to organizations or economic territories that provide adequate levels of protection. Companies do not need prior authorization for data transfer. The regulating body, yet to be created, will define what these adequate levels entail. The law also establishes fines on data protection infractions that will come into force in mid-2023. The penalties range between 0.7 percent and 1.0 percent of revenues based on business volume. On October 11, 2016, Ecuador’s National Assembly passed the Code of the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation (Ingenuity Code), covering a wide range of intellectual property matters. Article 148 of the Code establishes that agencies must give preference to open-source software with content developed in Ecuador when procuring software for government use. Executive Decree 1073 of June 2020 mandated an order of preference when procuring software for the government: 1) Open-Source; 2) Ecuadorian-Developed; 3) Software with Some Ecuadorian Content; and 4) Internationally Developed. 5. Protection of Property Rights Foreign citizens are allowed to own land. Mortgages are available, and the property title registration system is generally reliable. Enforcement against intellectual property infringement in Ecuador remains challenging. In April 2016, the United States Trade Representative moved Ecuador from Priority Watch List to Watch List in its annual Special 301 Report on intellectual property, and Ecuador has remained on the Watch List since that time. In December 2020, SENADI issued implementing regulations for the Code of Knowledge, Creativity, and Innovation Social Economy (Ingenuity Code) – the legislation that covers intellectual property rights. The regulations do not address concerns raised by the U.S. Government and various stakeholders on issues related to copyright exceptions and limitations, patentable subject matter, and geographical indications (GIs), including opposition procedures for proposed GIs, the treatment of common food names, and the protection of prior trademark rights. The Lasso administration plans additional revisions to the Ingenuity Code, though has not communicated a timeframe. Enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights against widespread counterfeiting and piracy remains weak, including online and in physical marketplaces. Ecuador is also reportedly a source of unauthorized camcording. Online piracy continues to be a problem despite some increased enforcement activity, and Ecuador has not yet established notice-and-takedown and safe harbor provisions for Internet service providers. Customs enforcement on an ex-officio basis is weak, including actions against goods in transit. SENADI has limited enforcement capacity and remains hampered by a lack of funding and personnel due to budget cuts. SENADI was established in January 1999 to handle patent, trademark, and copyright registrations. SENADI reports information on its activities on its website at http://www.propiedadintelectual.gob.ec/ . For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The 2014 Law to Strengthen and Optimize Business Partnerships and Stock Markets created the Securities Market Regulation Board to oversee the stock markets. Investment options on the Quito and Guayaquil stock exchanges are very limited. Sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions does not exist in the local markets. The five percent capital exit tax also inhibits free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Ecuador is a small market that has relied almost exclusively on the financial sector to undertake medium and short-term financing operations. Foreigners can access credit on the local market. In 2021, the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) designed a new methodology to set interest rates aimed at increasing financial inclusion and including technical factors for better determination. Despite these changes, the Government continues setting interest rate ceilings and controls. Ecuador is a dollarized economy, and its banking sector is healthy. According to the Ecuadorian Central Bank’s Access to the Financial System Report, as of September 2020, 75 percent of the adult (over 15 years old) population (8.5 million people) has access to financial products and services. As of December 2021, Ecuador’s banks hold in total USD 51.9 billion in assets, with the largest banks being Banco Pichincha with USD 13.3 billion in assets, Banco del Pacifico with USD 6.9 billion, Banco de Guayaquil with USD 6.3 billion, and Produbanco with USD 6.1 billion. The Banking Association (ASOBANCA) estimates 2.3 percent of loans are non-performing. Foreigners require residency to open checking accounts in Ecuador. Ecuador’s Superintendence of Banks regulates the financial sector. Between 2012 and 2013, the financial sector was the target of numerous new restrictions. By 2012, most banks had sold off their brokerage firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies to comply with Constitutional changes following a May 2010 referendum. The amendment to Article 312 of the Constitution required banks and their senior managers and shareholders with more than six percent equity in financial entities to divest entirely from any interest in all non-financial companies by July 2012. These provisions were incorporated into the Anti-Monopoly Law passed in September 2011. The 2021 Law for the Defense of Dollarization established that the Monetary and Financial Policy and Regulation Board be divided into a Monetary Policy and Regulation Board and a Financial Policy and Regulation Board. The latter should oversee the interest rate system jointly with the BCE as the technical entity. The law gives the Financial Policy and Regulation Board the ability to prioritize certain sectors for lending from private banks. There are 24 private banks in Ecuador as of December 2021. A 2018 BCE resolution that ordered electronic money accounts closure effectively eliminated electronic currency. However, banks handle transactions by electronic or digital means for transferences and/or payments to transfer resources and/or payments according to the authorization of the Superintendence of Banks. BCE resolutions were integrated into the Codification of Monetary, Financial, Insurance, and Securities Resolutions. This regulatory body requires all financial transfers (inflows and outflows) to be channeled through the BCE’s accounts. In principle, the regulation increases monetary authorities’ oversight and prevents banks from netting their inflows and outflows to avoid paying the five percent currency exit tax. The Government of Ecuador does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Approved in July 2020, Ecuador’s Public Finance Law (COPLAFIP) established a Fiscal Stabilization Fund to invest excess revenues from extractive industries and hedge against oil and metal price fluctuations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ecuador has a total of 17 SOEs. The major SOEs include those for petroleum (Petroecuador), electricity (Electricity Corporation of Ecuador – CELEC – and the National Corporation for Electricity – CNEL), and telecommunications (National Corporation of Telecommunications – CNT). The 17 SOEs combined have approximately 30,000 employees. As part of the government’s austerity measures to deal with the COVID-19-related economic crisis, the Lasso administration continued with the SOE liquidation processes started in May 2020. As of September 2021, there were three liquidated SOEs (Manufacture Ecuador, Pharmaceutical Public Company, Public Cement Company) and eight in the process of liquidation, including the state-owned airline (TAME), railroad company (Ecuadorian Railways Company), a social development firm using profits from natural resource revenues (Strategic Ecuador), training centers for athletes (High Performance Training Centers), an agricultural storage company (National Storage Units), the public media company, and a science and technology research firm (Siembra EP, formerly Yachay City of Knowledge). In February 2021, the government announced that Ecuador Post Office will be replaced by Ecuador Postal Services (SPE). Ecuador’s Coordinator of Public Companies maintains a list of SOEs at: https://www.emco.gob.ec/Emco2/empresas-publicas-2/ . The 2009 Organic Law of Public Enterprises regulates SOEs. SOEs are most active in areas designated by the 2008 Constitution as strategic sectors. SOEs follow a special procurement regime with greater flexibility and limited oversight. The Law of Public Enterprises requires SOEs to follow generally accepted accounting principles. Still, SOEs are not required to follow the same accounting practices as the central government, nor do they have to participate in the electronic financial management system used in most of the public sector for budget and accounting management. SOEs are eligible for government guarantees and face lower tax burdens than private companies. SOEs generally do not have professionally audited financial statements. The Ministry of Economy and Finance approves SOEs’ annual budgets and often slows distribution of funds to SOEs to compensate for other government expenditures. Ecuador is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. The Ecuadorian Constitution prohibits privatization of state-owned enterprises. Still, the Ecuadorian government is seeking to offer long-term concessions and joint-venture agreements with its SOEs to operate some of its assets in strategic sectors including oil and gas exploration and production, electricity generation, and mining. In addition, MPCEIP is considering projects to be developed as potential PPPs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Article 66 of the 2008 Constitution guarantees the right to pursue economic activities in a manner that is socially and environmentally responsible. Civil society groups such as the Institute of Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ecuadorian Consortium for Social Responsibility promote responsible business conduct. Many Ecuadorian companies have programs to further responsible business conduct within their organizations. Ecuador joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in October 2020. The country still needs to comply with additional requirements to become a full member. Currently, Ecuador is preparing its Work Plan and is expected to deliver the first country report in April 2022. EITI validation will commence within two and a half years of becoming a candidate (by 5 April 2023). A number of local and indigenous communities are active in opposing extractive industry projects in their territories, though some communities have welcomed responsible mining companies that are generating employment and bringing benefits to the local people. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court affirmed communities have the right to vote on whether to allow large-scale mining projects near their water sources in a September 2020 ruling on a plebiscite proposed by the Cuenca municipality. The Ecuadorian government is also legally obligated to carry out previous consultation (consulta previa) with indigenous groups and other communities per the Ecuadorian Constitution and its commitments under International Labor Organization Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Ecuador’s Organic Law for Citizen Participation also mandates free, prior, and informed consultations (FPIC) on matters that may impact the environment, culture, and social wellbeing of local people. Ecuador’s 2018 Organic Law for the Integral Planning of the Amazon Region provides for the distribution of extractive industry income for the benefit of local communities affected by the sector’s operations. Still, few financial benefits have trickled down to local communities historically and instead royalties often serve to cover expenses from national and subnational government agencies. Ecuador has no established protocols for the consultations with indigenous groups and other local communities, leading to political tensions and protests particularly in areas with oil drilling and mining projects. Local and indigenous opposition to mining projects has stalled numerous mining concessions in recent years, including the San Carlos-Panantza Copper Mine and the Rio Blanco Gold Mine. A triumvirate of indigenous groups, including the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), filed a lawsuit October 2021 with the Constitutional Court. They demand the Court nullify President Lasso’s Executive Decree 95 related to the oil sector on the basis that the decree violates the FPIC requirement in the Constitution. Although the Constitutional Court has not ruled on the Executive Decree’s constitutionality, in February 2022 the Court called for stronger protections to guarantee indigenous communities’ rights to decide on extractive projects in their territories. Indigenous people and their organizations are seeking more equitable and transparent processes that empower indigenous nations to attract select extractives in their territories and negotiate fair royalties. Ecuadorian law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including all forms of labor exploitation and child labor. Article 42 of the labor code establishes that all companies engaged in global or domestic supply chains are required by law to pay minimum wage, ensure eight-hour workdays, and pay into social security. The Ministry of Labor’s Directorate for Control and Inspections is responsible for enforcement of labor laws. Ecuador currently has four products included on the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs list of goods that it has reason to believe are produced by child labor or forced labor in violation of international standards, as required under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005. These products include bananas, bricks, flowers, and gold. Ministry of Labor (MoL) officials received reports of child labor and conducted inspections but did not furnish specific or aggregated data on the number of inspections or child labor incidences in the production of bananas, bricks, gold, or flowers in 2020 or 2021. Ecuador’s flower production consortium, in coordination with the International Labor Organization and the MoL, undertook a series of efforts to eliminate child labor from flower farms in 2020. The MoL reported that labor inspections of large flower farms in 2020 in Pichincha province did not find instances of child labor. This positive outcome is largely because these farms are part of the Business Network for a Child-Labor-Free Ecuador and are committed to the elimination of child labor. Despite their progress, flower exporting consortiums continue to resist a diagnostic survey to demonstrate the elimination of child labor. According to international organizations, adolescents below age 15 engage in dangerous working conditions in the artisanal gold mining near the borders with Colombia and Peru. Most gold mining is in southern Ecuador near Peru. Adolescents engaged in hazardous unregulated mining operations faced exposure to mercury and other hazardous chemicals. Government officials admitted difficulty in monitoring for child labor in the unregulated artisanal gold mining sector, particularly in relatively inaccessible border areas. Government and civil society sources did not report child labor in mining for export-oriented firms. Nationally the government does not mandate local employment. However, the Organic Law of the Amazon, approved by the National Assembly on May 21, 2018, mandates that any company, national or foreign, operating within the area covered by the law (the Amazon Basin) must hire at least 70 percent of their staff locally, unless they cannot find qualified labor from that area. The 2015 Organic Law for the Special Regime of the Galapagos (LOREG) and its regulations enacted in April 2017 include the mandatory hiring of local residents. The law stipulates non-residents can be hired only if companies demonstrate there are no local candidates with the required skill set. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Ecuador adopted its National Climate Change Strategy (2012-2025) in 2012 and released a National Climate Finance Strategy in 2021. Ecuador plans to launch the development of a new national climate strategy in 2023. In April 2021, Ecuador committed to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and launched the development of its National Decarbonization Plan in September 2021. The Ministry of Environment hopes to release the plan in late 2022. The private sector is involved in the development of the National Decarbonization Plan. Major industries, such as the energy industry, are specifically highlighted in Ecuador’s Nationally Determined Contributions, but specific expectations have not been released. Article 74 of Ecuador’s constitution (2008) restricts the government from selling any natural resource, which the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment and Ecological Transition (MAATE) has interpreted to restrict Ecuador from participation in market-based emissions reduction solutions, such as carbon bonds or exchanges. MAATE is developing a general framework and regulations governing carbon offset projects and hopes to release them in mid-2022. Once the regulations have been issued, the resulting carbon offset projects should be open for investment. In 2021, Ecuador launched the “Ecuador Zero Carbon Program,” a voluntary eco-labeling initiative in which private sector entities can earn the Ecuador Zero Carbon certification based on efforts to reduce emissions. Ecuador has instituted tax incentives, income tax discounts, and other tax incentives for individuals and entities invested in carbon capture. Additionally, Environment Ministry officials consider Ecuador’s REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) projects the country’s most successful climate-related programs. Currently Ecuador is working with United Nations Development Program through the Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility-funded ProAmazonia program, which is part of the country’s Bosques Para Buen Vivir REDD+ Action Plan. In August 2021, the National Public Procurement Service (SERCOP) and the Ministry of Environment, Water and Ecological Transition (MAATE) signed an inter-institutional agreement with the aim of coordinating actions that allow generating policies that promote and facilitate the implementation of sustainable public procurement. The agreement includes commitments regarding the development of environmental sustainability criteria for government suppliers, establishment of adequate environmental management and climate compatible development, promotion of capacity building processes relevant to the achievement of this agreement, and the implementation of sustainable public procurement. SERCOP is currently developing the strategy. 9. Corruption Corruption is a serious problem in Ecuador, and one that the Lasso administration is confronting. Ecuadorian courts have recently tried numerous cases of corruption, resulting in convictions of high-level officials, including former President Rafael Correa, former Vice President Jorge Glas (although the judiciary recently released him), and former Vice President Maria Alejandra Vicuña, among others. U.S. companies have cited corruption as an obstacle to investment, with concerns related specifically to non-transparent public tenders, dispute resolution, and payment of arbitration awards. Ecuadorian law provides criminal penalties for corruption by public officials, but the government has not implemented the law effectively, and officials have engaged in corrupt practices. Ecuador ranked 105 out of 180 countries surveyed for Transparency International’s 2021 Perceptions of Corruption Index and received a score of 36 out of 100. High-profile cases of alleged official corruption involving state-owned petroleum company PetroEcuador and Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht illustrate the significant challenges that confront Ecuador with regards to corruption. The Ecuadorian National Assembly approved anti-corruption legislation in December 2020. The legislation, which reforms the Comprehensive Organic Penal Code, creates new criminal acts including circumvention of public procurement procedures, acts of corruption in the private sector, and obstruction of justice. It also includes 11 provisions reforming the laws governing the public procurement system and the Comptroller General’s Office. Illicit payments for official favors and theft of public funds reportedly take place frequently. Dispute settlement procedures are complicated by the lack of transparency and inefficiency in the judicial system. Offering or accepting a bribe is illegal and punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. The Comptroller General is responsible for the oversight of public funds, and there are frequent investigations and occasional prosecutions for irregularities. Ecuador ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in September 2005. Ecuador is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The 2008 Constitution created the Citizen Participation and Social Control Council (CPCCS), tasked with preventing and combating corruption, among other responsibilities. The 2018 national referendum converted the CPCCS from an appointed to a popularly elected body. In December 2008, President Correa issued a decree that created the National Secretariat for Transparency (SNTG) to investigate and denounce acts of corruption in the public sector. The SNTG became an undersecretariat and was merged with the National Secretariat of Public Administration June 2013. President Moreno established the Anticorruption Secretariat within the Presidency in February 2019 but disbanded it in May 2020 for allegedly intervening in corruption investigations conducted by the Office of the Attorney General. The CPCCS can receive complaints and conduct investigations into alleged acts of corruption. Responsibility for prosecution remains with the Office of the Attorney General. Alleged acts of corruption can be reported by dialing 159 within Ecuador. The CPCCS also maintains a web portal for reporting alleged acts of corruption: http://www.cpccs.gob.ec . The Office of the Attorney General actively pursues corruption cases and receives reports of corruption as well. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Consejo de Participacion Cuidadana y Control Social Santa Prisca 425 Entre Vargas y Pasaje Ibarra, Edificio Centenario, Quito +(593 2) 395 7210 Comunicacion@cpccs.gob.ec Office of the Attorney General – FGE Juan León Mera N19-36 and Av. Patria, (+593 2) 3985 800 https://www.fiscalia.gob.ec/ventanilla-virtual/ ventanillafge@fiscalia.gob.ec Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Mauricio Alarcón Executive Director Citizenship and Development Foundation – FCD Av. Eloy Alfaro and Av. 6 de Diciembre. Monasterio Plaza Bldg. Of. 1003 (+593 2) 3332 526 info@ciudadaniaydesarrollo.org 10. Political and Security Environment Widespread public protests in 1997, 2000, and 2005 contributed to the removal of three elected presidents before the end of their terms. Large-scale but peaceful demonstrations against the Correa government occurred in June 2015. Some indigenous communities opposed to natural resource development have blocked access by petroleum and mining companies. Opposition to the government’s decision to remove fuel subsidies led to nationwide violent protests in October 2019. The protests paralyzed the country for 11 days, causing significant property damage, including to petroleum and telecommunications infrastructure. A dialogue between the government and indigenous protest leaders, mediated by the United Nations and the Catholic Church, led to the government’s decision to restore the fuel subsidies. Security along the northern border with Colombia deteriorated significantly in late 2017 and early 2018, when dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia groups attacked police and military units and kidnapped civilians, resulting in several deaths. Military and police increased their presence in the zone, and violence in the northern border area calmed in 2019, although illicit activities continue. Violence related to drug-trafficking organizations increased in 2020, 2021, and continue into 2022, particularly in Ecuador’s port cities. In 2021, the Lasso administration declared an emergency in the prison system after a series of riots in various prisons that left more than 300 prisoners dead. The Executive has submitted to the National Assembly updated regulations aimed at ensuring public safety and control of prison systems. The National Assembly continues to debate and analyze security sector reforms. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court affirmed communities have the right to vote on whether to allow large-scale mining projects near their water sources, in a September 21 ruling on a plebiscite proposed by the municipality of Cuenca 11. Labor Policies and Practices As of December 2021, Ecuador’s Statistics Institute (INEC) shows a 66 percent workforce participation rate and an unemployment rate of 5.2 percent. However, the official underemployment rate is 23.2 percent and an estimated 50.6 percent of workers labor in the informal sector, illustrating significant labor vulnerabilities. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers are relatively abundant at low wages. The supply of available workers is high due to layoffs in sectors affected by Ecuador’s flat economic growth since 2014. The COVID-19-related economic crisis is estimated to have resulted in the loss of 230,000 jobs in the formal sector in 2020. In addition, first Colombian and then Venezuelan migrants have added to the informal labor pool in recent years. The National Wages Council and Ministry of Labor Relations set minimum compensation levels for private sector employees annually. The minimum basic monthly salary for 2022 is USD 425 per month. Ecuador’s Production Code requires workers be paid a dignified wage, defined as an amount that would enable a family of four with 1.6 wage earners to be able to afford basic necessities. INEC determines the cost and the products that are considered basic necessities. In February 2022, the monthly cost of basic necessities was USD 725.16, while the official family wage level is at USD 793.33. As of February 2022, INEC estimated 31.7 percent of workers had adequate employment. INEC defines adequate employment as earning at least the minimum basic salary working 40 hours per week. Ecuador’s National Assembly approved in June 2020 limited labor reforms in an emergency law (Humanitarian Law) valid for two years to address the economic impacts of COVID-19. These reforms allowed for the reduction of working hours up to 50 percent and salary up to 45 percent; ability to modify a labor contract with mutual agreement between employer and employee; new temporary contracts for new investments that can be changed to permanent contracts at the end of the temporary period; and layoffs without severance payments only when the company closes entirely. Ecuador’s National Assembly passed a labor reform law in March 2016 intended to promote youth employment, support unemployed workers, and introduce greater labor flexibility for companies suffering from reduced revenue. The law established a new unemployment insurance program, a subsidized youth employment scheme, temporary reductions in workers’ hours for financially strapped companies, and nine months of unpaid maternity or paternity leave. The Law for Labor Justice and Recognition of Work in the Home, which included several changes related to labor and social security, took effect in April 2015. The law limits the yearly bonus paid to employees, which is equal to 15 percent of companies’ profits and is required by law, to 24 times the minimum wage. Any surplus profits are to be handed over to Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS). The law also mandates that employees’ 13th and 14th-month bonuses be paid in installments throughout the year instead of in lump sums. Employees have the option to opt out of this change and continue to receive the payments in lump sums. The law eliminated fixed-term employee contracts and replaced them with indefinite contracts, which shortens the allowable trial period for employees to 90 days. The law also allows participation in social security pensions for non-paid work at home. The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour work week, 15 calendar days of annual paid vacation, restrictions and penalties for those who employ child labor, general protection of worker health and safety, minimum wages and bonuses, maternity leave, and employer-provided benefits. The 2008 Constitution bans child labor, requires hiring workers with disabilities, and prohibits strikes in most of the public sector. Unpaid internships are not permitted in Ecuador. Most workers in the private sector and at SOEs have the constitutional right to form trade unions, and local law allows for unionization of any company with more than 30 employees. Private employers are required to engage in collective bargaining with recognized unions. The Labor Code provides for resolution of conflicts through a tripartite arbitration and conciliation board process. The Code also prohibits discrimination against union members and requires that employers provide space for union activities. Workers fired for organizing a labor union are entitled to limited financial indemnification, but the law does not mandate reinstatement. The Public Service Law enacted in October 2010 prohibits public sector workers in strategic sectors from joining unions, exercising collective bargaining rights, or paralyzing public services in general. The Constitution lists health; environmental sanitation; education; justice; fire brigade; social security; electrical energy; drinking water and sewerage; hydrocarbon production; processing, transport, and distribution of fuel; public transport; and post and telecommunications as strategic sectors. Public workers who are not under the Public Service Law may join a union and bargain collectively since they are governed by the provisions under the Labor Code. Approximately 3 percent of the total workforce was unionized, with the number of public and private unions registered by the Ministry of Labor decreasing by half since 2017. Labor unions and associations reported difficulties in registering unions in the Ministry of Labor due to excessive requirements and ministry staff shortages. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2020 $98.80. 2019 $108.1 https://data.worldbank.org/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $29 2019 $681 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $36 2019 $38 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 21.4% 2019 18.2% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Ecuador. The Central Bank publishes FDI calculated as net flows only. Outward Direct Investment statistics are not published by the Central Bank. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $493.0 100% Total Outward Amount 100% Costa Rica $83.1 17% N/A N/A Switzerland $73.4 15% N/A N/A China $55.9 11% N/A N/A UK $37.4 8% N/A N/A Chile $36.1 7% N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador – September 2021 data. The Central Bank publishes FDI calculated as net flows only. The Central Bank does not publish Outward Direct Investment statistics, nor is there information available on the IMF’s CDIS website. 14. Contact for More Information US Embassy Quito E12-170 Avirigas y Eloy Alfaro Quito, Ecuador +593-2-398-5000 EcuadorCommercial@state.gov Egypt Executive Summary The Egyptian government continues to make progress on economic reforms, and while many challenges remain, Egypt’s investment climate is improving. Thanks in part to the macroeconomic reforms it completed as part of a three-year, $12-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) program from 2016 to 2019, Egypt was one of the fastest-growing emerging markets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. Egypt was also the only economy in the Middle East and North Africa to record positive economic growth in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and thanks in part to IMF assistance totaling $8 billion. Increased investor confidence and high real interest rates have attracted foreign portfolio investment and increased foreign reserves. In 2021, the Government of Egypt (GoE) announced plans to launch a second round of economic reforms aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy challenges, modernizing its industrial base, and increasing exports. The GoE increasingly understands that attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is key to addressing many of its economic challenges and has stated its intention to create a more conducive environment for FDI. FDI inflows grew 11 percent between 2018 and 2019, from $8.1 to $9 billion, before falling 39 percent to $5.5 billion in 2020 amid sharp global declines in FDI due to the pandemic, according to data from the Central Bank of Egypt and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD ranked Egypt as the top FDI destination in Africa between 2016 and 2020. Egypt has passed several regulatory reform laws, including a new investment law in 2017; a “new company” law and a bankruptcy law in 2018; and a new customs law in 2020. These laws aim to improve Egypt’s investment and business climate and help the economy realize its full potential. The 2017 Investment Law is designed to attract new investment and provides a framework for the government to offer investors more incentives, consolidate investment-related rules, and streamline procedures. The 2020 Customs Law is likewise meant to streamline aspects of import and export procedures, including through a single-window system, electronic payments, and expedited clearances for authorized companies. Egypt will host the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 27, in November 2022. Recognizing the immense challenges the country faces from the impacts of climate change, government officials announced that the Cabinet will appropriate 30 percent of government investments in the 2022/2023 budget to green investments, up from 15 percent in the current fiscal year 2021/2022, and that by 2030 all new public sector investment spending would be green. The GoE accelerated plans to generate 42 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by five years, from 2035 to 2030, and is prioritizing investments in solar and wind power, green hydrogen, water desalination, sustainable transportation, electric vehicles, smart cities and grids, and sustainable construction materials. The government continues to seek investment in several mega projects, including the construction of smart cities, and to promote mineral extraction opportunities. Egypt intends to capitalize on its location bridging the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to become a regional trade and investment gateway and energy hub and hopes to attract information and communications technology (ICT) sector investments for its digital transformation program. Egypt is a party to more than 100 bilateral investment treaties, including with the United States. It is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). In many sectors, there is no legal difference between foreign and domestic investors. Special requirements exist for foreign investment in certain sectors, such as upstream oil and gas as well as real estate, where joint ventures are required. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 94 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, on a historical-cost basis 2020 USD 11,206 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,000 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Egypt’s completion of the three-year, $12-billion IMF Extended Fund Facility between 2016 and 2019, and its associated reform package, helped stabilize Egypt’s macroeconomy, introduced important subsidy and social spending reforms, and helped restore investor confidence in the Egyptian economy. The flotation of the Egyptian Pound (EGP) in November 2016 and the restart of Egypt’s interbank foreign exchange (FX) market as part of this program was the first major step in restoring investor confidence that immediately led to increased portfolio investment and should lead to increased FDI over the long term. Other important reforms have included a new investment law and an industrial licensing law in 2017, a new bankruptcy law in 2018, a new customs law in 2020, and other reforms aimed at reducing regulatory overhang and improving the ease of doing business. In 2021, Egypt’s government announced plans to launch a second round of economic reforms aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy challenges, and modernizing its industrial base and increasing exports. As a result of the government’s increased focus on infrastructure development, Egypt’s $259 billion project finance pipeline is the third-largest in the Middle East and the largest in Africa as of March 2022, according to ratings agency Fitch. Recognizing the immense challenges the country faces from the impacts of climate change, government officials announced in 2021 that by 2030 all new public sector investment spending would be green, and accelerated plans to generate 42 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2035. Egypt will host the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, COP 27, in November 2022, and the government is developing a package of investment incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment and project finance in areas such as solar and wind power, green hydrogen, water desalination, sustainable transportation, electric vehicles, smart cities and grids, and sustainable construction materials. With few exceptions, Egypt does not legally discriminate between Egyptian nationals and foreigners in the formation and operation of private companies. The 1997 Investment Incentives Law was designed to encourage domestic and foreign investment in targeted economic sectors and to promote decentralization of industry away from the Nile Valley. The law allows 100 percent foreign ownership of investment projects and guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital. The Tenders Law (Law 89 of 1998) requires the government to consider both price and best value in awarding contracts and to issue an explanation for refusal of a bid. However, the law contains preferences for Egyptian domestic contractors, who are accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent. The Capital Markets Law (Law 95 of 1992) and its amendments, including the most recent in February 2018, and relevant regulations govern Egypt’s capital markets. Foreign investors are able to buy shares on the Egyptian Stock Exchange on the same basis as local investors. The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI, http://gafi.gov.eg) is the principal government body that regulates and facilitates foreign investment in Egypt and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Investor Service Center (ISC) is an administrative unit within GAFI that provides “one-stop-shop” services, easing the way for global investors looking for opportunities presented by Egypt’s domestic economy and the nation’s competitive advantages as an export hub for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. This is in addition to promoting Egypt’s investment opportunities in various sectors. The ISC provides a start-to-end service to the investor, including assistance related to company incorporation, establishment of company branches, approval of minutes of Board of Directors and General Assemblies, increases of capital, changes of activity, liquidation procedures, and other corporate-related matters. The Center also aims to issue licenses, approvals, and permits required for investment activities within 60 days from the date of request. Other services GAFI provides include: Advice and support to help in the evaluation of Egypt as a potential investment location; Identification of suitable locations and site selection options within Egypt; Assistance in identifying suitable Egyptian partners; and Dispute settlement services. The ISC plans to establish branches in each of Egypt’s Governorates by the end of 2021. Egypt maintains ongoing communication with investors through formal business roundtables, investment promotion events (conferences and seminars), and one-on-one investment meetings. The Egyptian Companies Law does not set any limitation on the number of foreigners, neither as shareholders nor as managers/board members, except for Limited Liability Companies where the only restriction is that one of the managers must be an Egyptian national. In addition, companies are required to obtain a commercial and tax license, and pass a security clearance process. Companies are able to operate while undergoing the often lengthy security screening process. However, if the firm is rejected, it must cease operations and may undergo a lengthy appeals process. Businesses have cited instances where Egyptian clients were hesitant to conclude long-term business contracts with foreign businesses that have yet to receive a security clearance. They have also expressed concern about seemingly arbitrary refusals, a lack of explanation when a security clearance is not issued, and the lengthy appeals process. Although the Government of Egypt has made progress streamlining the business registration process at GAFI, inconsistent treatment by banks and other government officials has in some cases led to registration delays. Sector-specific limitations to investment include restrictions on foreign shareholding of companies owning lands in the Sinai Peninsula. Likewise, the Import-Export Law requires companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians. Nevertheless, the new Investment Law does allow wholly foreign companies investing in Egypt to import goods and materials. In January 2021 the Egyptian government removed the 20-percent foreign ownership cap for international and private schools in Egypt. The ownership of land by foreigners is complicated, in that it is governed by three laws: Law 15 of 1963, Law 143 of 1981, and Law 230 of 1996. Land/Real Estate Law 15 of 1963 explicitly prohibits foreign individual or corporation ownership of agricultural land (defined as traditional agricultural land in the Nile Valley, Delta and Oases). Law 15/1963 stipulates that no foreigners, whether natural or juristic persons, may acquire agricultural land. Law 143/1981 governs the acquisition and ownership of desert land. Certain limits are placed on the number of feddans (one feddan is approximately equal to one acre) that may be owned by individuals, families, cooperatives, partnerships, and corporations regardless of nationality. Partnerships are permitted to own 10,000 feddans. Joint stock companies are permitted to own 50,000 feddans. Under Law 230/1986, non-Egyptians are allowed to own real estate (vacant or built) only under the following conditions: Ownership is limited to two real estate properties in Egypt that serve as accommodation for the owner and his family (spouses and minors) in addition to the right to own real estate needed for activities licensed by the Egyptian Government; The area of each real estate property does not exceed 4,000 m²; and The real estate is not considered a historical site. Exemption from the first and second conditions is subject to the approval of the Prime Minister. Ownership in tourist areas and new communities is subject to conditions established by the Cabinet of Ministers. Non-Egyptians owning vacant real estate in Egypt must build within a period of five years from the date their ownership is registered by a notary public. Non-Egyptians cannot sell their real estate for five years after registration of ownership, unless the Prime Minister consents to an exemption. In December 2020, the World Bank published a Country Private Sector Diagnostic report for Egypt which analyzed key structural economic reforms that the Egyptian government should adopt in order to encourage private-sector-led economic growth. The report also included recommendations for the agribusiness, manufacturing, information technology, education, and healthcare sectors. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publications_listing_page/cpsd-egypt On July 8, 2020, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released an Investment Policy Review for Egypt that highlighted the government’s progress implementing a proactive reform agenda to improve the business climate, attract more foreign and domestic investment, and reap the benefits of openness to FDI and participation in global value chains. https://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/egypt-continues-to-strengthen-its-institutional-and-legal-framework-for-investment.htm In January 2018 the World Trade Organization (WTO) published a comprehensive review of the Egyptian Government’s trade policies, including details of the Investment Law’s (Law 72 of 2017) main provisions. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s367_e.pdf The United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD) published an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy Review for Egypt in 2017, in which it highlighted the potential for investments in the ICT sector to help drive economic growth and recommended specific reforms aimed at strengthening Egypt’s performance in key ICT policy areas. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2017d3_en.pdf GAFI’s ISC ( https://gafi.gov.eg/English/Howcanwehelp/OneStopShop/Pages/default.aspx ) was launched in February 2018 and provides start-to-end service to the investor, as described above. The Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) also introduces “Ratification Offices” to facilitate obtaining necessary approvals, permits, and licenses within 10 days of issuing a Ratification Certificate. Investors may fulfill the technical requirements of obtaining the required licenses through these Ratification Offices, directly through the concerned authority, or through its representatives at the Investment Window at GAFI. The Investor Service Center is required to issue licenses within 60 days from submission. Companies can also register online. GAFI has also launched e-establishment, e-signature, and e-payment services to facilitate establishing companies. Egypt promotes and incentivizes outward investment. According to the Egyptian government’s FDI Markets database for the period from January 2003 to January 2021, outward investment featured the following: Egyptian companies implemented 278 Egyptian FDI projects. The estimated total value of the projects, which employed about 49,000 workers, was $24.26 billion; The following countries respectively received the largest amount of Egyptian outward investment in terms of total project value: The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kenya, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria; The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria accounted for about 28 percent of the total amount; Elsewedy Electric was the largest Egyptian company investing abroad, implementing 21 projects with a total investment estimated to be $2.1 billion. Egypt does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Egyptian government has made efforts to improve the transparency of government policy and to support a fair, competitive marketplace. Nevertheless, improving government transparency and consistency has proven difficult, and reformers have faced strong resistance from entrenched bureaucratic and private interests. Significant obstacles continue to hinder private investment, including the reportedly arbitrary imposition of bureaucratic impediments and the length of time needed to resolve them. Nevertheless, the impetus for positive change driven by the government reform agenda augurs well for improvement in policy implementation and transparency. Enactment of laws is the purview of the Parliament, while executive regulations are the domain of line ministries. Under the Constitution, the president, the cabinet, and any member of parliament can present draft legislation. After submission, parliamentary committees review and approve legislation, including any amendments. Upon parliamentary approval, a judicial body reviews the constitutionality of any legislation before referring it to the president for his approval. Although notice and full drafts of legislation are typically printed in the Official Gazette (similar to the Federal Register in the United States), there is no centralized online location where the government publishes comprehensive details about regulatory decisions or their summaries, and in practice consultation with the public is limited. In recent years, the Ministry of Trade and other government bodies have circulated draft legislation among concerned parties, including business associations and labor unions. This has been a welcome change from previous practice, but is not yet institutionalized across the government. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) supervises and regulates all non-banking financial markets and instruments, including capital markets, futures exchanges, insurance activities, mortgage finance, financial leasing, factoring, securitization, and microfinance. It issues rules that facilitate market efficiency and transparency. FRA has issued legislation and regulatory decisions on non-banking financial laws, which govern FRA’s work and the entities under its supervision. ( http://www.fra.gov.eg/jtags/efsa_en/index_en.jsp ) The criteria for awarding government contracts and licenses are made available when bid rounds are announced. The process actually used to award contracts is broadly consistent with the procedural requirements set forth by law. Further, set-aside requirements for small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) participation in GoE procurement are increasingly highlighted. The FRA publishes key laws and regulations to the following website: http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/laws_efsa_en.htm The Parliament and the independent “Administrative Control Authority” both ensure the government’s commitment to follow administrative processes at all levels of government. The cabinet develops and submits proposed regulations to the president following discussion and consultation with the relevant ministry and informal consultation with other interest groups. Based on the recommendations provided in the proposal, including recommendations by the presidential advisors, the president issues “Presidential Decrees” that function as implementing regulations. Presidential decrees are published in the Official Gazette for enforcement. The degree to which ministries and government agencies responsible for drafting, implementing, or enforcing a given regulation coordinate with other stakeholders varies widely. Although some government entities may attempt to analyze and debate proposed legislation or rules, there are no laws requiring scientific studies or quantitative regulatory impact analyses prior to finalizing or implementing new laws or regulations. Not all issued regulations are announced online, and not all public comments received by regulators are made public. The government made its budget documents widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. Budget documents did not include allocations to military state-owned enterprises, nor allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises. Information on government debt obligations was publicly available online, but up-to-date and clear information on state-owned enterprise debt guaranteed by the government was not available. According to information the Central Bank has provided to the World Bank, the lack of information available about publicly guaranteed private-sector debt meant that this debt was generally recorded as private-sector non-guaranteed debt, thus potentially obscuring some contingent debt liabilities. In general, international standards are the main reference for Egyptian standards. According to the Egyptian Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, approximately 7,000 national standards are aligned with international standards in various sectors. In the absence of international standards, Egypt uses other references referred to in Ministerial Decrees No. 180/1996 and No. 291/2003, which stipulate that in the absence of Egyptian standards, the producers and importers may use European standards (EN), U.S. standards (ANSI), or Japanese standards (JIS). Egypt is a member of the WTO, participates actively in various committees, and notifies technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Egypt ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in June 2017 (Presidential decree No. 149/2017) and deposited its formal notification to the WTO on June 24, 2019. Egypt notified indicative and definitive dates for implementing Category B and C commitments on June 20, 2019, but to date has not notified dates for implementing Category A commitments. In August 2020, the Egyptian Parliament passed a new Customs Law, Law 207 of 2020, that includes provisions for key TFA reforms, including advance rulings, separation of release, a single-window system, expedited customs procedures for authorized economic operators, post-clearance audits, and e-payments. Egypt’s legal system is a civil codified law system based on the French model. If contractual disputes arise, claimants can sue for remedies through the court system or seek resolution through arbitration. Egypt has written commercial and contractual laws. The country has a system of economic courts, specializing in private-sector disputes, which have jurisdiction over cases related to economic and commercial matters, including intellectual property disputes. The judiciary is set up as an independent branch of the government. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed through Egypt’s courts, though appellants often complain about the lengthy judicial process, which can often take years. To enforce judgments of foreign courts in Egypt, the party seeking to enforce the judgment must obtain an exequatur (a legal document issued by governments allowing judgements to be enforced). To apply for an exequatur, the normal procedures for initiating a lawsuit in Egypt must be satisfied. Moreover, several other conditions must be satisfied, including ensuring reciprocity between the Egyptian and foreign country’s courts, and verifying the competence of the court rendering the judgment. Judges in Egypt enjoy a high degree of public trust, according to Egyptian lawyers and opinion polls, and are the designated monitors for general elections. The Judiciary is proud of its independence and can point to a number of cases where a judge has made surprising decisions that run counter to the desires of the regime. The judge’s ability to interpret the law can sometimes lead to an uneven application of justice. No specialized court exists for foreign investments. The 2017 Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) as well as other FDI-related laws and regulations, are published on GAFI’s website, https://gafi.gov.eg/English/StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/Pages/default.aspx . In 2017, the Parliament also passed the Industrial Permits Act, which reduced the time it takes to license a new factory by mandating that the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) respond to a request for a license within 30 days of the request being filed. As of February 2020, new regulations allow IDA regional branch directors or their designees to grant conditional licenses to industrial investors until other registration requirements are complete. In 2016, the Import-Export Law was revised to allow companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians; formerly the law required 100 percent Egyptian ownership and management. Later in 2016, the inter-ministerial Supreme Investment Council also announced seventeen presidential decrees designed to spur investment or resolve longstanding issues. These include: Forming a “National Payments Council” that will work to restrict the handling of FX outside the banking sector; Producers of agricultural crops that Egypt imports or exports will get tax exemptions; Five-year tax exemptions for manufacturers of “strategic” goods that Egypt imports or exports; Five-year tax exemptions for agriculture and industrial investments in Upper Egypt; and Begin tendering land with utilities for industry in Upper Egypt for free as outlined by the Industrial Development Authority. The Egyptian Competition Law (ECL), Law 3 of 2005, provides the framework for the government’s competition rules and anti-trust policies. The ECL prohibits the abuse of dominant market positions, which it defines as a situation in which a company’s market share exceeds 25 percent and in which the company is able to influence market prices or volumes regardless of competitors’ actions. The ECL prohibits vertical agreements or contracts between purchasers and suppliers that are intended to restrict competition, and also forbids agreements among competitors such as price collusion, production-restriction agreements, market sharing, and anti-competitive arrangements in the tendering process. The ECL applies to all types of persons or enterprises carrying out economic activities, but includes exemptions for some government-controlled public utilities. In early 2019, the Egyptian Parliament endorsed a number of amendments to the ECL, including controls on price hikes and prices of essential products and higher penalties for violations. In addition to the ECL, other laws cover various aspects of competition policy. The Companies Law (Law 159/1981) contains provisions on mergers and acquisitions; the Law of Supplies and Commerce (Law 17 of 1999) forbids competition-reducing activities such as collusion and hoarding; and the Telecommunications Law (Law 10 of 2003), the Intellectual Property Law (Law 82 of 2002), and the Insurance Supervision and Control Law (Law 10 of 1981) also include provisions on competition. The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) is responsible for protecting competition and prohibiting the monopolistic practices defined within the ECL. The ECA has the authority to receive and investigate complaints, initiate its own investigations, and take decisions and necessary steps to stop anti-competitive practices. The ECA’s enforcement powers include conducting raids; using search warrants; requesting data and documentation; and imposing “cease and desist orders” on violators of the ECL. The ECA’s enforcement activities against government entities are limited to requesting data and documentation, as well as advocacy. Egypt’s Investment Incentives Law provides guarantees against nationalization or confiscation of investment projects under the law’s domain. The law also provides guarantees against seizure, requisition, blocking, and placing of assets under custody or sequestration. It offers guarantees against full or partial expropriation of real estate and investment project property. The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty also provides protection against expropriation. Private firms are able to take cases of alleged expropriation to court, but the judicial system can take several years to resolve a case. Egypt passed a Bankruptcy Law (Law 11 of 2018) in January 2018, which was designed to speed up the restructuring of troubled companies and settlement of their accounts. It also replaced the threat of imprisonment with fines in cases of bankruptcy. As of July 2020, the Egyptian government was considering but had not yet implemented amendments to the 2018 law that would allow debtors to file for bankruptcy protection, and would give creditors the ability to determine whether debtors could continue operating, be placed under administrative control, or be forced to liquidate their assets. In practice, the paperwork involved in liquidating a business remains convoluted and protracted; starting a business is much easier than shutting one down. Bankruptcy is frowned upon in Egyptian culture, and many businesspeople still believe they may be found criminally liable if they declare bankruptcy. 4. Industrial Policies Green economy and climate change incentives: In March 2022, the GoE announced in March 2022 a series of incentives for companies undertaking green projects and investments, including: The ability to deduct between 30 and 50 percent of investment costs from taxes for green hydrogen and green ammonia production, storage, and export, and for manufacturing plastics-alternatives; Projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, the New Administrative Capital, and Upper Egypt are eligible for the largest tax breaks; Companies involved in other green and renewable energy projects are eligible for other non-tax incentives that the 2017 Investment Law authorizes, but did not provide further details; and Projects in green hydrogen, green ammonia, electric vehicle manufacturing and charging, plastics alternatives, and waste management will be fast-tracked through the approvals and permit process, with a 20 working day window for making decisions on new investment and project proposals. The 2017 Investment Law The Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) gives multiple incentives to investors as described below. In August 2019, President Sisi ratified amendments to the Investment Law that allow its incentive programs to apply to expansions of existing investment projects in addition to new investments. General Incentives: All investment projects subject to the provisions of the new law enjoy the general incentives provided by it. Investors are exempted from the stamp tax, notary fees, registration of the Memorandum of Incorporation of the companies, credit facilities, and mortgage contracts associated with their business for five years from the date of registration in the Commercial Registry, in addition to the registration contracts of the lands required for a company’s establishment. If the establishment is under the provisions of the new investment law, it will benefit from a two-percent unified custom tax over all imported machinery, equipment, and devices required for the set-up of such a company. Special Incentive Programs: Investment projects established within three years of the date of the issuance of the Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) will enjoy a perpetual deduction from their net profit subject to the income tax; Fifty percent deduction of depreciated investment costs from taxes, infrastructure fees, and cost of lands for projects in regions the government has identified as most in need of development, as well as designated projects in Suez Canal Special Economic Zone and the “Golden Triangle” along the Red Sea between the cities of Safaga, Qena, and El Quseer; or Thirty percent deduction of depreciated investment costs from taxes, infrastructure fees, and land costs for projects elsewhere in Egypt; and Provided that such deduction shall not exceed 80 percent of the paid-up capital of the company, the incentive could be utilized over a maximum of seven years. Additional Incentive Program: The Cabinet of Ministers may decide to grant additional incentives for investment projects in accordance with specific rules and regulations as follows: The establishment of special customs ports for exports and imports of the investment projects. The state may incur part of the costs of the technical training for workers. Free allocation of land for a few strategic activities may apply. The government may bear in full or in part the costs incurred by the investor to invest in utility connections for the investment project. The government may refund half the price of the land allocated to industrial projects in the event of starting production within two years from receiving the land. Other Incentives related to Free Zones according to Investment Law 72 of 2017: Exemption from all taxes and customs duties. Exemption from all import/export regulations. The option to sell a certain percentage of production domestically if customs duties are paid. Limited exemptions from labor provisions. All equipment, machinery, and essential means of transport (excluding sedan cars) necessary for business operations are exempted from all customs, import duties, and sales taxes. All licensing procedures are handled by GAFI. To remain eligible for benefits, investors operating inside the free zones must export more than 50 percent of their total production. Manufacturing or assembly projects pay an annual charge of one percent of the total value of their products excluding all raw materials. Storage facilities are to pay one percent of the value of goods entering the free zones, while service projects pay one percent of total annual revenue. Goods in transit to specific destinations are exempt from any charges. Other Incentives related to the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone): 100 percent foreign ownership of companies allowed. 100 percent foreign control of import/export activities allowed. Imports are exempted from customs duties and sales tax. Customs duties on exports to Egypt imposed on imported components only, not the final product. Fast-track visa services. A full service one-stop shop for registration and licensing. Allowing enterprises access to the domestic market; duties on sales to domestic market will be assessed on the value of imported inputs only. The Tenders Law (Law 89 of 1998) requires the government to consider both price and best value in awarding contracts and to issue an explanation for refusal of a bid. However, the law contains preferences for Egyptian domestic contractors, who are accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent. The Ministry of Industry & Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Finance’s Decree 719 of 2007 provides incentives for industrial projects in the governorates of Upper Egypt (Upper Egypt refers to governorates in southern Egypt). The decree provides an incentive of 15,000 EGP (approx. $940) for each job opportunity created by the project, on the condition that the investment costs of the project exceed 15 million EGP (approx. $940,000). The decree can be implemented on both new and ongoing projects. Public and private free-trade zones are authorized under GAFI’s Investment Incentive Law 72 of 2017. Free zones are located within the national territory, but are considered to be outside Egypt’s customs boundaries, granting firms doing business within them more freedom on transactions and exchanges. Companies producing largely for export (normally 80 percent or more of total production) may be established in free-trade zones and operate using foreign currency. Free-trade zones are open to investment by foreign or domestic investors. Companies operating in free-trade zones are exempted from sales taxes or taxes and fees on capital assets and intermediate goods. The Legislative Package for the Stimulation of Investment, issued in 2015, stipulated a one-percent duty paid on the value of commodities upon entry for storage projects and a one-percent duty upon exit for manufacturing and assembly projects. There are currently nine public free trade zones in operation in the following locations: Alexandria; Damietta; Ismailia; Qeft; Media Production City; Nasr City; Port Said; Shebin el Kom; and Suez. Private free-trade zones may also be established with a decree by GAFI but are usually limited to a single project. Export-oriented industrial projects are given priority. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of capital in private free zones. The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Law (Law 83 of 2002) allows establishment of special zones for industrial, agricultural, or service activities designed specifically with the export market in mind. The law allows firms operating in these zones to import capital equipment, raw materials, and intermediate goods duty free. Companies established in the SEZs are also exempt from sales and indirect taxes and can operate under more flexible labor regulations. The first SEZ was established in the northwest Gulf of Suez. Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) authorized creation of investment zones with Prime Ministerial approval. The government regulates these zones through a board of directors, but the zones are established, built, and operated by the private sector. The government does not provide any infrastructure or utilities in these zones. Investment zones enjoy the same benefits as free zones in terms of facilitation of license-issuance, ease of dealing with other agencies, etc., but are not granted the incentives and tax/custom exemptions enjoyed in free zones. Projects in investment zones pay the same tax/customs duties applied throughout Egypt. The aim of the law is to assist the private sector in diversifying its economic activities. There are currently five investment zones located in Cairo, Giza, and Ismailia, and in 2019 GAFI approved the development of an additional 12 investment zones in the Alexandria, Dakhalia, Damietta, Fayoum, Giza, Qalyubia, and Sharkia governorates. The Suez Canal Economic Zone ( http://www.sczone.com.eg/English/Pages/default.aspx) , a major industrial and logistics services hub announced in 2014, includes upgrades and renovations to ports located along the Suez Canal corridor, including West and East Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, Adabiya, and Ain Sokhna. The Egyptian government has invited foreign investors to take part in the projects, which are expected to be built in several stages, the first of which was scheduled to be completed by mid-2020. Reported areas for investment include maritime services like ship repair services, bunkering, vessel scrapping and recycling; industrial projects, including pharmaceuticals, food processing, automotive production, consumer electronics, textiles, and petrochemicals; IT services such as research and development and software development; renewable energy; and mixed use, residential, logistics, and commercial developments. Egypt has rules on national percentages of employment and difficult visa and work permit procedures. The government plans to phase out visas for unskilled workers, but as yet has not done so. For most other jobs, employers may hire foreign workers on a temporary six-month basis, but must also hire two Egyptians to be trained to do the job during that period. Only jobs where it is not possible for Egyptians to acquire the requisite skills will remain open to foreign workers. The application of these regulations is inconsistent. The Labor Law allows Ministers to set the maximum percentage of foreign workers that may work in companies in a given sector. There are no such sector-wide maximums for the oil and gas industry, but individual concession agreements may contain language establishing limits or procedures regarding the proportion of foreign and local employees. No performance requirements are specified in the Investment Incentives Law, and the ability to fulfill local content requirements is not a prerequisite for approval to set up assembly projects. In many cases, however, assembly industries still must meet a minimum local content requirement in order to benefit from customs tariff reductions on imported industrial inputs. Decree 184 of 2013 allows for the reduction of customs tariffs on intermediate goods if the final product has a certain percentage of input from local manufacturers, beginning at 30 percent local content. As the percentage of local content rises, so does the tariff reduction, reaching up to 90 percent if the amount of local input is 60 percent or above. Exporters receive additional subsidies if they use a greater portion of local raw materials. In certain cases, a minister can grant tariff reductions of up to 40 percent in advance. Prime Minister issued Decision 3053 of 2019 regarding the formation of joint committees in the inspection yards at each customs port. These committees include representatives of the customs authority and the concerned authorities and bodies according to type of goods. The committees are responsible for completing inspection and control procedures for imported or exported goods within a period not exceeding three working days from the date of the customs declaration was registered. Manufacturers wishing to export under trade agreements between Egypt and other countries must complete certificates of origin and satisfy the local content requirements contained therein. Oil and gas exploration concessions, which do not fall under the Investment Incentives Law, have performance standards specified in each individual agreement, which generally include the drilling of a specific number of wells in each phase of the exploration period stipulated in the agreement. Egypt does not impose localization barriers on ICT firms. Egypt’s Personal Data Protection Act (Law 151 of 2020), signed into law in July 2020, will require licenses for cross-border data transfers once the law’s executive regulations are finalized, but it will not impose any data localization requirements. Similarly, Egypt does not make local production a requirement for market access, does not have local content requirements, and does not impose forced technology or intellectual property transfers as a condition of market access. But there are exceptions where the government has attempted to impose controls by requesting access to a company’s servers located offshore, or requested servers to be located in Egypt and thus under the government’s control. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Egyptian legal system provides protection for real and personal property. Laws on real estate ownership are complex and titles to real property may be difficult to establish and trace. The National Title Registration Program introduced by the Ministry of State for Administrative Development has been implemented in nine areas within Cairo. This program is intended to simplify property registration and facilitate easier mortgage financing. Real estate registration fees, long considered a major impediment to development of the real estate sector, are capped at no more than 2,000 EGP (approximately $120), irrespective of the property value. Foreigners are limited to ownership of two residences in Egypt, and specific procedures are required for purchasing real estate in certain geographical areas. The mortgage market is still undeveloped in Egypt, and in practice most purchases are still conducted in cash. Real Estate Finance Law 148/2001 authorized both banks and non-bank mortgage companies to issue mortgages. The law provides procedures for foreclosure on property of defaulting debtors, and amendments passed in 2004 allow for the issuance of mortgage-backed securities. According to the regulations, banks can offer financing in foreign currency of up to 80 percent of the value of a property. Presidential Decree 17 of 2015 permitted the government to provide land free of charge, in certain regions only, to investors meeting certain technical and financial requirements. In order to take advantage of this provision companies must provide cash collateral for five years following commencement of either production (for industrial projects) or operation (for all other projects). The ownership of land by foreigners is governed by three laws: Law 15 of 1963, Law 143 of 1981, and Law 230 of 1996. Law 15 of 1963 stipulates that no foreigners, whether natural or juristic persons, may acquire agricultural land. Law 143 of 1981 governs the acquisition and ownership of desert land. Certain limits are placed on the number of feddans (one feddan is approximately equal to one acre) that may be owned by individuals, families, cooperatives, partnerships and corporations. Partnerships are permitted to own up to 10,000 feddans. Joint stock companies are permitted to own up to 50,000 feddans. Partnerships and joint stock companies may own desert land within these limits, even if foreign partners or shareholders are involved, provided that at least 51 percent of the capital is owned by Egyptians. Upon liquidation of the company, however, the land must revert to Egyptian ownership. Law 143 defines desert land as the land lying two kilometers outside city borders. Furthermore, non-Egyptians owning non-improved real estate in Egypt must build within a period of five years from the date their ownership is registered by a notary public. Non-Egyptians may only sell their real estate five years after registration of ownership unless the Prime Minister consents to an exemption. Egypt remains on the Special 301 Watch List in 2022. Egypt’s intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation generally meets international standards, and the government has made progress enforcing those laws and reducing patent application backlogs. In 2020 and 2021, Egypt shut down a number of online illegal streaming websites. Stakeholders note continued challenges with widespread counterfeiting, opaque patent and trademark examination criteria, and the lack of an effective mechanism for the early resolution of potential patent disputes. Multinational pharmaceutical companies in the past have complained that local generic drug-producing companies infringe on their patents. The government has not yet established a system linking pharmaceutical marketing applications with patent licenses, and as a result permits for the sale of pharmaceuticals are generally issued without first cross-checking patent filings. Decree 251 of 2020, issued in January 2020, established a ministerial committee to review petitions for compulsory patent licenses. As of March 2022, the committee has not received any compulsory patent petitions, and the committee has not met or taken any actions. According to Egypt’s 2002 IPR Law (Law 82 of 2002), which allows for compulsory patent licenses in some cases, the committee has the power to issue compulsory patent licenses according to a number of criteria set forth in the law; to determine financial remuneration for the original patent owners; and to approve the expropriation of the patents. Book, music, and entertainment software piracy is prevalent in Egypt, and a significant portion of the piracy takes place online. American film studios represented by the Motion Pictures Association of America are concerned about the illegal distribution of American movies on regional satellite channels. Eight GoE ministries have the responsibility to oversee IPR concerns: Supply and Internal Trade for trademarks; Higher Education and Research for patents; Culture for copyrights; Agriculture for plants; Communications and Information Technology for copyright of computer programs; Interior for combatting IPR violations; Customs for border enforcement; and Trade and Industry for standards and technical regulations. Article 69 of Egypt’s 2014 Constitution mandates the establishment of a “specialized agency to uphold [IPR] rights and their legal protection.” A National Committee on IPR was established to address IPR matters until a permanent body is established. All IPR stakeholders are represented in the committee, and members meet every two months to discuss issues. The National Committee on IPR is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA) handles IPR enforcement at the national border and the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Investigation handles domestic cases of illegal production. The ECA cannot act unless the trademark owner files a complaint. ECA’s customs enforcement also tends to focus on protecting Egyptian goods and trademarks. The ECA is taking steps to adopt the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Interface Public-Members platform, which allows customs officers to detect counterfeit goods by scanning a product’s barcode and checking the WCO trademark database system. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://wipo.int/directory/en/. IPR Contact at Embassy Cairo: Elizabeth Stratton Trade & Investment Officer 20-2-2797-2735 StrattonEC@state.gov 6. Financial Sector To date, high returns on Egyptian government debt have crowded out Egyptian investment in productive capacity. As of February 2022, loans to the government and government-related entities accounted for 67 percent of banks’ assets, and Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 91.4 percent at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, consistently positive and relatively high real interest rates have attracted large foreign capital inflows since 2017, most of which has been volatile portfolio capital. Foreign investors sold $1.19 billion of Egyptian treasury bonds following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is Egypt’s registered securities exchange. Some 246 companies were listed on the EGX, including Nilex, as of February 2022. There were more than 3.3 million investors registered to trade on the exchange in July 2021. Stock ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The Government of Egypt issues dollar-denominated and Egyptian Pound-denominated debt instruments, for which ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. Foreign investors conducted 18.3 percent of sales on the EGX in 2021. In September 2020, the GoE issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds with a value of $750 million. The GoE issued Eurobonds worth $11.75 billion in 2020 and 2021, and issued its first $500 million Japanese Yen-dominated bond in March 2022. The government has announced its intention to issue its first sovereign sukuk bonds and additional green bonds during the remainder of 2022. The Capital Market Law 95 of 1992, along with Banking Law 94 that President Sisi ratified in September 2020, constitute the primary regulatory frameworks for the financial sector. The law grants foreigners full access to capital markets, and authorizes establishment of Egyptian and foreign companies to provide underwriting of subscriptions, brokerage services, securities and mutual funds management, clearance and settlement of security transactions, and venture capital activities. The law specifies mechanisms for arbitration and legal dispute resolution and prohibits unfair market practices. Law 10 of 2009 created the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) and brought the regulation of all non-banking financial services under its authority. In 2017, EFSA became the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA). Settlement of transactions takes one day for treasury bonds and two days for stocks. Although Egyptian law and regulations allow companies to adopt bylaws limiting or prohibiting foreign ownership of shares, virtually no listed stocks have such restrictions. A significant number of the companies listed on the exchange are family-owned or -dominated conglomerates, and free trading of shares in many of these ventures, while increasing, remains limited. Companies are de-listed from the exchange if not traded for six months. Prior to November 2020, foreign companies listing on the EGX had to possess minimum capital of $100 million. With the FRA’s passage of new rules, foreign companies joining the EGX must now meet lesser requirements matching those for Egyptian companies: $6.4 million (100 million EGP) for large companies and between $63,000 and $6.4 million (1-100 million EGP) for smaller companies, depending on their size. Foreign businesses are only eligible for these lower minimum capital requirements if the EGX is their first exchange and if they attribute more than 50 percent of their shareholders’ equites, revenues, and assets to Egyptian subsidiary companies. A capital gains tax of 10 percent on Egyptian tax residents came into force in January 2022 after more than 6 years of suspension, then it was decreased in March to 5 percent for two years. The rate will rise to 7.5 percent once this period ends. Capital increases and share-swaps between listed and unlisted companies will not be taxed. Non-tax residents and foreigners are permanently tax-exempt. The government also set the stamp tax on stock market transactions by non-tax residents at 0.125 percent and at 0.05 percent for tax residents on unlisted securities. Tax residents are exempted from stamp tax on listed securities. Foreign investors can access Egypt’s banking system by opening accounts with local banks and buying and selling all marketable securities with brokerages. The government has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to maintaining the profit repatriation system to encourage foreign investment in Egypt, especially since the pound flotation and implementation of the IMF loan program in November 2016. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported significant delays in repatriating profits due to problems with availability. Foreign firms and individuals continue to report delays in repatriating funds and problems accessing hard currency for the purpose of repatriating profits. The Egyptian credit market, open to foreigners, is vibrant and active. Repatriation of investment profits has become much easier, as there is enough available hard currency to execute foreign exchange (FX) trades. Since the flotation of the Egyptian Pound in November 2016, FX trading is considered straightforward, given the re-establishment of the interbank foreign currency trading system. There have been no reports of difficulties executing FX transactions following the CBE’s interest rate hike and currency devaluation in March, 2022. Thirty-eight banks operate in Egypt, including several foreign banks. The CBE has not issued a new commercial banking license since 1979. The only way for a new commercial bank, whether foreign or domestic, to enter the market (except as a representative office) is to purchase shares in an existing bank. According to the CBE, banks operating in Egypt held nearly $448 billion (8.6 trillion EGP) in total assets as of December 2021, generating a total profit of $6.8 billion with the five largest banks generating 74 percent, or $5 billion (79 billion EGP). Egypt’s banking sector is generally regarded as well-capitalized, due in part to its deposit-based funding structure and ample liquidity, especially since the flotation and restoration of the interbank market. The CBE declared that 3.5 percent of the banking sector’s loans were non-performing by December 2021. However, since 2011, a high level of exposure to government debt, accounting for two-thirds of banks’ assets as of February 2022, has reduced the diversity of bank balance sheets and crowded out domestic investment. Moody’s and S&P consider Egypt’s banking system to be stable, although S&P classifies it as facing high levels of economic and financial system risk due to its high exposure to sovereign debt and the government’s external funding vulnerabilities. In February 2022, S&P affirmed Egypt’s government issuer rating of B stable due to the government’s relatively low issuance of foreign currency loans and relatively low external government debt. Benefitting from the nation’s increasing economic stability, Egypt’s banks have enjoyed both ratings upgrades and continued profitability. Banking competition is serving a largely untapped retail segment and the nation’s challenging, but potentially rewarding, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) requires that banks direct 25 percent of their lending to SMEs. Over the past two years, the Central Bank has launched a subsidized loan program worth $16 billion (253 billion EGP) to spur domestic manufacturing, agriculture, and real state development. Also, with only one-third of Egypt’s adult population owning or sharing an account at a formal financial institution (according press and comments from contacts), the banking sector has potential for growth and higher inclusion, which the government and banks discuss frequently. A low median income plays a part in modest banking penetration. The CBE has taken steps to work with banks and technology companies to expand financial inclusion. The employees of the government, one of the largest employers, must now have bank accounts because salary payment is through direct deposit. The CBE approved new procedures in October 2020 to allow deposits and the opening of new bank accounts with only a government-issued ID, rather than additional documents. The maximum limits for withdrawals and account balances also increased. In July 2020, President Sisi ratified a new Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Development Law (Law 152 of 2020) that will provide incentives, tax breaks, and discounts for small, informal businesses willing to register their businesses and begin paying taxes. As an attempt to keep pace with best practices and international norms, President Sisi ratified a new Banking Law, Law 94 of 2020, in September 2020. The law establishes a National Payment Council headed by the President to move Egypt away from cash and toward electronic payments; establishes a committee headed by the Prime Minister to resolve disputes between the CBE and the Ministry of Finance; establishes a CBE unit to handle complaints of monopolistic behaviors; requires banks to increase their cash holdings to $320 million (5 billion EGP), up from the prior minimum of $32 million (500 million EGP); and requires banks to report deficiencies in their own audits to the CBE. The chairman of the EGX stated that Egypt is exploring the use of blockchain technologies across the banking community. The FRA will regulate how the banking system adopts the fast-developing blockchain systems into banks’ back-end and customer-facing processing and transactions. The Central Bank developed a national fintech and innovation strategy in March 2019, and the government has issued regulations to incentivize mobile and electronic payments. The Central Bank launched in March 2022 a new mobile application, InstaPay, which allows Egyptian banking customers to perform instant bank and payments transactions. At the end of 2021 Egypt was among the top four African countries for fintech investment, with investments in fintech startups quadrupling between 2020 and 2021, reaching $159 million. According to research firm Magnitt, Egyptian startups received $509 million in venture capital investments in 2021, with a 100 percent year-on-year compound annual growth rate between 2017 and 2021. Since 2020, the Central Bank has prohibited all dealings with cryptocurrencies: the issuance of them, trading in them, promoting them, and establishing or operating platforms for their trading. Alternative financial services in Egypt are extensive, given the large informal economy, estimated to account for between 30 and 50 percent of GDP. Informal lending is prevalent, but the total capitalization, number of loans, and types of terms in private finance is less well known. The 1992 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for free transfer of dividends, royalties, compensation for expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, contract payments, and proceeds from sales. Prior to reform implementation throughout 2016 and 2017, large corporations had been unable to repatriate local earnings for months at a time, but repatriation of funds is no longer restricted. The Investment Incentives Law (Law 72 of 2017) stipulates that non-Egyptian employees hired by projects established under the law are entitled to transfer their earnings abroad. Conversion and transfer of royalty payments are permitted when a patent, trademark, or other licensing agreement has been approved under the Investment Law. Banking Law 94 of 2020 regulates the repatriation of profits and capital. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock-exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit-repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in less than two days, though in practice some firms have reported short delays in repatriating profits due to the steps involved in processing. Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), approved by the Cabinet and launched in late 2018, holds 200 billion EGP ($12.5 billion) in authorized capital as of July 2021. The SWF aims to invest state funds locally and abroad across asset classes and manage underutilized government assets. The sovereign wealth fund focuses on sectors considered vital to the Egyptian economy, particularly industry, energy, and tourism, and has established four new sub-funds covering healthcare, financial services, real estate, and infrastructure while plans to establish another two sub-funds for education and technology. The SWF participates in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. Although Public Sector Law 203 of 1991 states that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should not receive preferential treatment from the government or be accorded exemptions from legal requirements applicable to private companies, in practice SOEs and military-owned companies enjoy significant advantages, including relief from regulatory requirements. IMF reports show that Egyptian SOEs have an average return on assets of just two percent and are only one-fourth as productive as private companies. Some 40 percent of SOEs are loss-making, despite access to subsidized capital and owning assets worth more than 50 percent of GDP. Profitable SOEs, meanwhile, tend to exploit a natural monopoly or hold exclusive rights to public assets. Few of Egypt’s 300 state-owned companies, 645 joint ventures, and 53 economic authorities release regular financial statements. SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels, & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister. The Egyptian government has announced plans to privatize shares of SOEs several times since 2018, but has only carried out a small number of sales. It sold a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company in March 2018, a 26 percent share of state-owned e-payment firm E-Finance in October 2021, and a 10 percent share of Abu Qir Fertilizers in December 2021. In December 2020 the government announced plans to sell stakes in two military-owned companies and in February 2022 added a handful of other SOEs to the list, but scaled back those plans following Russia’s war against Ukraine. The government has indefinitely delayed plans for privatizing stakes in 20 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203/1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities. Law 32 of 2014 limits the ability of third parties to challenge privatization contracts between the Egyptian government and investors. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Court cases at the time Parliament passed the law had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) programs have grown in popularity in Egypt over the last ten years. Most programs are limited to multinational and larger domestic companies as well as the banking sector and take the form of funding and sponsorship for initiatives supporting entrepreneurship and education and other social activities. Environmental and technology programs are also garnering greater participation. The Ministry of Trade has engaged constructively with corporations promoting RBC programs, supporting corporate social responsibility conferences and providing Cabinet-level representation as a sign of support to businesses promoting RBC programming. A number of organizations and corporations work to foster the development of RBC in Egypt. The American Chamber of Commerce has an active corporate social responsibility committee. Several U.S. pharmaceutical companies are actively engaged in RBC programs related to Egypt’s hepatitis-C epidemic. The Egyptian Corporate Responsibility Center, which is the UN Global Compact local network focal point in Egypt, aims to empower businesses to develop sustainable business models as well as improve the national capacity to design, apply, and monitor sustainable responsible business conduct policies. In March 2010, Egypt launched an environmental, social, and governance index, the second of its kind in the world after India’s, with training and technical assistance from Standard and Poor’s. Egypt does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Public information about Egypt’s extractive industries remains limited to the government’s annual budget. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption Egypt has a set of laws to combat corruption by public officials, including an Anti-Bribery Law (articles 103 through 111 of Egypt’s Penal Code), an Illicit Gains Law (Law 62 of 1975 and subsequent amendments in Law 97 of 2015), and a Governmental Accounting Law (Law 27 of 1981), among others. Countering corruption remains a long-term focus. However, corruption laws have not been consistently enforced. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Egypt 117 out of 180 countries in its 2021 survey. Past surveys from Transparency International reported that nearly half of Egyptians said they had paid a bribe to obtain a public service. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. There is no government requirement for private companies to establish internal codes of conduct to prohibit bribery. Egypt ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005. It has not acceded to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery or any other regional anti-corruption conventions. While NGOs are active in encouraging anti-corruption activities, dialogue between the government and civil society on this issue is almost non-existent. In a 2009 study demonstrating a trend that continues to this day, the OECD found that while government officials publicly asserted they shared civil society organizations’ goals, they rarely cooperated with NGOs, and applied relevant laws in a highly restrictive manner against NGOs critical of government practices. Media was also limited in its ability to report on corruption, with Article 188 of the Penal Code mandating heavy fines and penalties for unsubstantiated corruption allegations. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Egypt. Companies might encounter corruption in the public sector in the form of requests for bribes, using bribes to facilitate required government approvals or licenses, embezzlement, and tampering with official documents. Corruption and bribery are reported in dealing with public services, customs (import license and import duties), public utilities (water and electrical connection), construction permits, and procurement, as well as in the private sector. Businesses have described a dual system of payment for services, with one formal payment and a secondary, unofficial payment required for services to be rendered. Several agencies within the Egyptian government share responsibility for addressing corruption. Egypt’s primary anticorruption body is the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), which has jurisdiction over state administrative bodies, state-owned enterprises, public associations and institutions, private companies undertaking public work, and organizations to which the state contributes in any form. 2017 amendments to the ACA law grant the organization full technical, financial, and administrative authority to investigate corruption within the public sector (with the exception of military personnel/entities). The ACA appears well funded and well trained when compared with other Egyptian law enforcement organizations. Strong funding and the current ACA leadership’s close relationship with President Sisi reflect the importance of this organization and its mission. However, it is small (roughly 300 agents) and is often tasked with work that would not normally be conducted by a law enforcement agency. The ACA periodically engages with civil society. For example, it has met with the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt and other organizations to encourage them to seek it out when corruption issues arise. In addition to the ACA, the Central Auditing Authority (CAA) acts as an anti-corruption body, stationing monitors at state-owned companies to report corrupt practices. The Ministry of Justice’s Illicit Gains Authority is charged with referring cases in which public officials have used their office for private gain. The Public Prosecution Office’s Public Funds Prosecution Department and the Ministry of Interior’s Public Funds Investigations Office likewise share responsibility for addressing corruption in public expenditures. Minister of Interior General Directorate of Investigation of Public Funds Telephone: 02-2792-1395 / 02-2792 1396 Fax: 02-2792-2389 10. Political and Security Environment Stability and economic development remain Egypt’s priorities. The Egyptian government has taken measures to eliminate politically motivated violence while also limiting peaceful protests and political expression. Egypt’s presidential elections in March 2018 and senatorial elections in August 2020 proceeded without incident. In 2020 and 2021, all terrorist attacks took place in the Sinai Peninsula. Nevertheless, terrorist plans to target civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt and the greater Cairo region remained a concern. The government has been conducting a comprehensive counterterrorism offensive in the Sinai since early 2018 in response to terrorist attacks against military installations and personnel by ISIS-affiliated militant groups. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Official statistics put Egypt’s labor force at approximately 29 million, with an official unemployment rate of 7.3 percent at the end of 2020. Women make up 23.8 percent of the Egyptian labor force and have an unemployment rate of 17.8 percent as of late 2021. Accurate figures are difficult to determine and verify given Egypt’s large informal economy, in which some 62 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is engaged, according to International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates. The government bureaucracy and public sector enterprises are substantially over-staffed compared to the private sector and international norms. According to the World Bank, Egypt has the highest number of government workers per capita in the world, although state statistics agency CAPMAS announced in March 2022 that public sector employment dropped 8.6 percent in 2021 from 2020, or 15 percent from 2017. Businesses highlight a mismatch between labor skills and market demand, despite high numbers of university graduates in a variety of fields. Foreign companies frequently pay internationally competitive salaries to attract workers with valuable skills. The Unified Labor Law 12/2003 provides comprehensive guidelines on labor relations, including hiring, working hours, termination of employees, training, health, and safety. The law grants a qualified right for employees to strike and stipulates rules and guidelines governing mediation, arbitration, and collective bargaining between employees and employers. Non-discrimination clauses are included, and the law complies with labor-related ILO conventions regulating the employment and training of women and eligible children. Egypt ratified ILO Convention 182 on combating the Worst Forms of Child Labor in 2002. In 2018, Egypt launched the first National Action Plan on combating the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The law also created a national committee to formulate general labor policies and the National Council of Wages, whose mandate is to discuss wage-related issues and national minimum-wage policy, but it has rarely convened, and a minimum wage has rarely been enforced in the private sector. Parliament adopted a new Trade Unions Law (Law 213 of 2017) in late 2017, replacing a 1976 law, which experts said was out of compliance with Egypt’s commitments to ILO conventions. After a 2016 Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM) directive not to recognize documentation from any trade union without a stamp from the government-affiliated Egyptian Trade Union Federation, the new law established procedures for registering independent trade unions, but some of the unions noted that the directorates of the MOMM did not implement the law and placed restrictions on freedoms of association and organizing for trade union elections. Executive regulations for trade union elections stipulate a very tight deadline of three months for trade union organizations to legalize their status, and one month to hold elections, which, critics said, restricted the ability of unions to legalize their status or to campaign. The GoE registered two new independent labor unions in 2018, and a further seven in 2020 and 2021 as part of a cooperative program with the International Labor Organization. In July 2019, the Egyptian Parliament passed a series of amendments (Law 142 of 2019) to the 2017 Trade Unions Law that reduced the minimum membership required to form a trade union and abolished prison sentences for violations of the law. The amendments reduced the minimum number of workers required to form a trade union committee from 150 to 50, the number of trade union committees to form a general union from 15 to 10 committees, and the number of workers in a general union from 20,000 to 15,000. The amendments also decreased the number of unions necessary to establish a trade union federation from 10 to 7 and the number of workers in a trade union from 200,000 to 150,000. Under the new law, a trade union or workers’ committee may be formed if 150 employees in an entity express a desire to organize. Based on the new amendments to the Trade Unions Law and a request from the Egyptian government for assistance implementing them and meeting international labor standards, the International Labor Organization’s and International Finance Corporation’s joint Better Work Program launched in Egypt in March 2020. The Trade Unions law explicitly bans compulsory membership or the collection of union dues without written consent of the worker and allows members to quit unions. Each union, general union, or federation is registered as an independent legal entity, thereby enabling any such entity to exit any higher-level entity. The 2014 Constitution stipulated in Article 76 that “establishing unions and federations is a right that is guaranteed by the law.” Only courts are allowed to dissolve unions. The 2014 Constitution maintained past practice in stipulating that “one syndicate is allowed per profession.” The Egyptian constitutional legislation differentiates between white-collar syndicates (e.g., doctors, lawyers, journalists) and blue-collar workers (e.g., transportation, food, mining workers). Workers in Egypt have the right to strike peacefully, but strikers are legally obliged to notify the employer and concerned administrative officials of the reasons and time frame of the strike 10 days in advance. In addition, strike actions are not permitted to take place outside the property of businesses. The law prohibits strikes in strategic or vital establishments in which the interruption of work could result in disturbing national security or basic services provided to citizens. In practice, however, workers strike in all sectors, without following these procedures, but at risk of prosecution by the government. Collective negotiation is allowed between trade union organizations and private sector employers or their organizations. Agreements reached through negotiations are recorded in collective agreements regulated by the Unified Labor law and usually registered at MOMM. Collective bargaining is technically not permitted in the public sector, though it exists in practice. The government often intervenes to limit or manage collective bargaining negotiations in all sectors. MOMM sets worker health and safety standards, which also apply in public and private free zones and the Special Economic Zones (see below). Enforcement and inspection, however, are uneven. The Unified Labor Law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment. Egyptian labor laws allow employers to close or downsize operations for economic reasons. The government, however, has taken steps to halt downsizing in specific cases. The Unemployment Insurance Law, also known as the Emergency Subsidy Fund Law 156 of 2002, sets a fund to compensate employees whose wages are suspended due to partial or complete closure of their firm or due to its downsizing. The Fund allocates financial resources that will come from a one percent deduction from the base salaries of public and private sector employees. According to foreign investors, certain aspects of Egypt’s labor laws and policies are significant business impediments, particularly the difficulty of dismissing employees. To overcome these difficulties, companies often hire workers on temporary contracts; some employees remain on a series of one-year contracts for more than 10 years. Employers sometimes also require applicants to sign a “Form 6,” an undated voluntary resignation form which the employer can use at any time, as a condition of their employment. Negotiations on drafting a new Labor Law, which has been under consideration in the Parliament for two years, have included discussion of requiring employers to offer permanent employee status after a certain number of years with the company and declaring Form 6 or any letter of resignation null and void if signed prior to the date of termination. Egypt has a dispute resolution mechanism for workers. If a dispute concerning work conditions, terms, or employment provisions arises, both the employer and the worker have the right to ask the competent administrative authorities to initiate informal negotiations to settle the dispute. This right can be exercised only within seven days of the beginning of the dispute. If a solution is not found within 10 days from the time administrative authorities were requested, both the employer and the worker can resort to a judicial committee within 45 days of the dispute. This committee comprises two judges, a representative of MOMM, and representatives from the trade union and one of the employers’ associations. The decision of this committee is provided within 60 days. If the decision of the judicial committee concerns discharging a permanent employee, the sentence is delivered within 15 days. When the committee decides against an employer’s decision to fire, the employer must reintegrate the latter in his/her job and pay all due salaries. If the employer does not respect the sentence, the employee is entitled to receive compensation for unlawful dismissal. Labor Law 12 of 2003 sought to make it easier to terminate an employment contract in the event of “difficult economic conditions.” The Law allows an employer to close his establishment totally or partially or to reduce its size of activity for economic reasons, following approval from a committee designated by the Prime Minister. In addition, the employer must pay former employees a sum equal to one month of the employee’s total salary for each of his first five years of service and one and a half months of salary for each year of service over and above the first five years. Workers who have been dismissed have the right to appeal. Workers in the public sector enjoy lifelong job security as contracts cannot be terminated in this fashion; however, government salaries have eroded as inflation has outpaced increases. Egypt has regulations restricting access for foreigners to Egyptian worker visas, though application of these provisions has been inconsistent. The government plans to phase out visas for unskilled workers, but as yet has not done so. For most other jobs, employers may hire foreign workers on a temporary six-month basis but must also hire two Egyptians to be trained to do the job during that period. Only jobs where it is not possible for Egyptians to acquire the requisite skills will remain open to foreign workers. Application of these regulations is inconsistent. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $319,056 2020 $365,253 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 11 2020 $11,206 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 41% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Sources for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Egypt; CAPMAS; GAFI Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Elizabeth Stratton, Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy Cairo 02-2797-2735 StrattonEC@state.gov El Salvador Executive Summary El Salvador’s location and natural attributes make it an attractive investment destination. The macroeconomic context and declining rule of law present some challenges. El Salvador’s economy has registered the lowest levels of growth in the region for many years, with average annual GDP growth of 2.5 percent from 2016 to 2019. After a deep pandemic-related contraction (7.9 percent) in 2020, the Central Bank estimates GDP rebounded to 10.3 percent growth in 2021. The IMF expects the economy to grow 3.2 percent in 2022, with growth rates declining to 2 percent in the medium-term. Economic underperformance is mainly driven by fiscal constraints. Persistent budget deficits and increased government spending – exacerbated by the pandemic – have contributed to a heavy debt burden. With public debt at an estimated 88.5 percent of GDP in 2021, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) has limited capacity for public investment and job creation initiatives. Large financing needs are projected for 2022. The Bukele administration continues to make efforts to attract foreign investment and has taken measures to reduce cumbersome bureaucracy and improve security conditions. However, the implementation of the reforms has been slow, and laws and regulations are occasionally passed and implemented quickly without consulting with the private sector or assessing the impact on the business climate. After being announced in June 2021, Bitcoin became a legal tender in El Salvador on September 7, 2021, alongside the U.S. dollar. The Bitcoin Law mandates that all businesses must accept Bitcoin, with limited exceptions for those who do not have the technology to carry out transactions. Prices do not need to be expressed in Bitcoin and the U.S. dollar is the reference currency for accounting purposes. The GOES created a $150 million trust fund managed by El Salvador’s Development Bank to guarantee automatic convertibility and subsidize exchange fees. The rapid implementation caused uncertainty in the investment climate and added costs to businesses. Government of El Salvador actions have eroded separation of powers and independence of the judiciary over the past year. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly dismissed the Attorney General and all five justices of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and immediately replaced them with officials loyal to President Bukele. Furthermore, in August 2021, the legislature amended the Judicial Career Organic Law to force into retirement judges ages 60 or above and those with at least 30 years of service. The move was justified by the ruling party as an effort to root out corruption in the judiciary from past administrations. A September 2021 ruling from the newly appointed Constitutional Chamber allows for immediate presidential re-election, despite the Constitution prohibiting presidential incumbents from re-election to a consecutive term. Legal analysts believe these measures were unconstitutional and have enabled the Legislative Assembly and the Bukele administration to exert control over the judiciary. The Legislative Assembly is not required to publish draft legislation and opportunities for public engagement are limited. With the Nuevas Ideas ruling party holding a supermajority, legislation is often passed quickly with minimal analysis and debate in parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, contributing to an overall climate of regulatory uncertainty. Commonly cited challenges to doing business in El Salvador include the discretionary application of laws and regulations, lengthy and unpredictable permitting procedures, as well as customs delays. El Salvador has lagged its regional peers in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The sectors with the largest investment have historically been textiles and retail establishments, though investment in energy has increased in recent years. The Bukele administration has proposed several large infrastructure projects which could provide opportunities for U.S. investment. Project proposals include enhancing road connectivity and logistics, expanding airport capacity and improving access to water and energy, as well as sanitation. Given limited fiscal capacity for public investment, the Bukele administration has begun pursuing Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to execute infrastructure projects. In August 2021, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly approved the contract award of the first PPP project to expand the cargo terminal at the international airport. As a small energy-dependent country with no Atlantic coast, El Salvador heavily relies on trade. It is a member of the Central American Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); the United States is El Salvador’s top trading partner. Proximity to the U.S. market is a competitive advantage for El Salvador. As most Salvadoran exports travel by land to Guatemalan and Honduran ports, regional integration is crucial for competitiveness. Although El Salvador officially joined the Customs Union established by Guatemala and Honduras in 2018, implementation stalled following the Bukele administration’s decision to prioritize bilateral trade facilitation with Guatemala. In October 2021, however, the GOES announced it would proceed with Customs Union implementation. El Salvador rejoined technical level working group discussions and resumed testing of system interconnectivity. The Bukele administration has taken initial steps to facilitate trade. In 2019, the government of El Salvador (GOES) relaunched the National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC), which produced the first jointly developed private-public action plan to reduce trade barriers. The plan contained 60 strategic measures focused on simplifying procedures, reducing trade costs, and improving connectivity and border infrastructure. Measures were not fully implemented in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. In 2021, the NTFC revised the action plan to adjust measures under implementation and finalized drafting the national trade facilitation strategy, which will be launched in March 2022. In January 2022, the NFTC met to evaluate progress on the action plan. The NFTC released the action plan for 2022 on February 17th. The 2022 action plan has 29 measures to facilitate cross-border trade and improve road and border infrastructure. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 115 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 3,4133 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#209 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 3,630 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOES recognizes the benefits of attracting FDI. El Salvador does not have laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, nor does the GOES screen or prohibit FDI. However, FDI levels are among the lowest in Central America. The Central Bank reported net annual FDI inflows of $408.5 million, or approximately 1.5 percent of GDP, at the end of September 2021. The Exports and Investment Promotion Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) supports investment in seven main sectors: textiles and apparel; business services; tourism; aeronautics; agro-industry; light manufacturing; and energy. PROESA provides information for potential investors about applicable laws, regulations, procedures, and available incentives for doing business in El Salvador. Websites: https://investelsalvador.com/ and https://proesa.gob.sv/servicios/servicios-al-inversionista/ . The National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), El Salvador’s umbrella business chamber, serves as the primary private sector representative in dialogues with GOES ministries. http://www.anep.org.sv/ . In 2019, the Bukele administration created the Secretariat of Commerce and Investment, a position within the President’s Office responsible for the formulation of trade and investment policies, as well as overall coordination of the Economic Cabinet. In addition, the Bukele administration created the Presidential Commission for Strategic Projects to lead the GOES’ major infrastructure projects. Foreign citizens and private companies can freely establish businesses in El Salvador. No single natural or legal person – whether national or foreign – can own more than 245 hectares (605 acres) of land. The Salvadoran Constitution stipulates there is no restriction on foreign ownership of rural land in El Salvador except in cases where Salvadoran nationals face ownership restrictions in the corresponding country. Rural land to be used for industrial purposes is not subject to this reciprocity requirement. The Investments Law grants equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors. Apart from limitations imposed on micro businesses, which are defined as having 10 or fewer employees and yearly sales of $175,930 or less, foreign investors may freely establish any type of domestic business. Investors who begin operations with 10 or fewer employees must present plans to increase employment to the Ministry of Economy’s National Investment Office. The Investment Law provides that extractive resources are the exclusive property of the state. The GOES may grant private concessions for resource extraction, though concessions are infrequently granted. El Salvador has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. The latest trade policy review performed by the WTO was published in 2016 (document: WT/TPR/S/344/Rev.1). https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/tpr/s/*)%20and%20((%20@Title=%20el%20salvador%20)%20or%20(@CountryConcerned=%20el%20salvador))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# The latest investment policy review performed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was in 2010. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb200920_en.pdf In 2018, the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) published a position paper on investment policies, expanding on a 2015 study of the role of policies in productive development and investment. The report, written in Spanish, contains an analysis of policies, competitive advantages, constraints to investment attraction, and private sector views of the business climate. The report recommends that the government formulate a long-term development strategy, strengthen the cohesion between investment, trade facilitation and competitiveness policies, and develop an infrastructure policy that includes investment and PPP portfolios, among others. In addition, a September 2021 report on foreign direct investment in El Salvador, also by FUSADES, points out that investment attraction continues to be constrained by the lack of a comprehensive development and competitiveness strategy, poor coordination among government agencies on investment issues, including promotion and aftercare, and institutional capacity limitations. The analysis also notes that stabilizing public finances would contribute to supporting capital flows to El Salvador. http://fusades.org/publicaciones/Como_reactivar_inversiones_ES.pdf . http://fusades.org/publicaciones/la-inversion-extranjera-sigue-baja-falta-un-plan-estrategico-publico-y-privado-para-revertirla El Salvador has various laws that promote and protect investments, as well as providing benefits to local and foreign investors. These include: the Investments Law, the International Services Law; the Free Trade Zones Law; the Tourism Law, the Renewable Energy Incentives Law; the Law on Public Private Partnerships; the Special Law for Streamlining Procedures for the Promotion of Construction Projects; and the Legal Stability Law for Investments. While the government encourages Salvadoran investors to invest in El Salvador, it neither promotes nor restricts investment abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties El Salvador has bilateral investment treaties in force with Argentina, Belize, BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union), Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Republic of Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. El Salvador is one of the five Central American Common Market countries that have an investment treaty among themselves. The CAFTA-DR entered into force in 2006 between the United States and El Salvador. CAFTA-DR’s investment chapter provides protection to most categories of investment, including enterprises, debt, concessions, contract, and intellectual property. Under this agreement, U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in El Salvador on an equal footing with local investors. Among the rights afforded to U.S. investors are due process protections and the right to receive a fair market value for property in the event of expropriation. Investor rights are protected under CAFTA-DR by an effective, impartial procedure for dispute settlement that is transparent and open to the public. El Salvador also has free trade agreements (FTAs) with Mexico, Chile, Panama, Colombia, and Taiwan. Although the GOES announced the cancellation of the Taiwan FTA in February 2019, the Supreme Court halted the cancellation in March 2019. The FTA remains in force pending a Supreme Court ruling. In January 2020, the South Korea-Central America FTA became effective. This FTA includes investment provisions. El Salvador’s FTAs with Mexico, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Panama also include investment provisions. El Salvador continues trade agreement negotiations with Canada, which will likely include investment provisions. The Salvadoran government signed a Partial Scope Agreement (PSA) with Cuba in 2011 and an additional Protocol to the PSA in October 2018. El Salvador and Bolivia signed a PSA in November 2018 that is pending ratification in the Legislative Assembly. A PSA with Ecuador entered into force in 2017. El Salvador, along with Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, signed an Association Agreement with the European Union that establishes a Free Trade Area. The agreement entered into force with El Salvador in 2013. On March 1, 2022, El Salvador ratified the Protocol to the Association Agreement to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union. The United Kingdom-Central America Association Agreement entered into force in January 2021. The agreement ensures continuity of commercial ties following Brexit and provides a framework for cooperation and investment. El Salvador does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States. El Salvador has one tax agreement with Spain, in effect since 2008. El Salvador is a signatory of the Central American Mutual Assistance and Technical Cooperation Agreement in Tax and Customs Matters in force since 2012. On October 2018, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters . The jurisdictions participating in the Convention can be found at: www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf El Salvador became a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes in 2011. The OECD published El Salvador’s Phase 1 peer review report, which demonstrates its commitment to international standards for tax transparency and exchange of information, in 2015. The Phase 2 peer review on implementation of the standards, published in 2016, concluded that El Salvador is “largely compliant.” El Salvador is not a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. In November 2020, El Salvador eliminated the Security Special Contribution on Large Taxpayers (CESC). Enacted in 2015, the CESC levied a five-percent tax on companies whose net income exceeded $500,000 to finance security measures, including the GOES’ Plan Control Territorial (Territorial Control Plan). In May 2019, the legislature also approved an Authentic Interpretation of the Income Tax Law to clarify that energy distributors may deduct energy losses from the income tax, as energy losses are an unavoidable cost of distribution. Prior to the authentic interpretation, tax authorities repeatedly imposed back taxes, interest, and penalties for improper deductions. Companies successfully challenged most of the tax assessments but had incurred legal costs and increased financial exposure. 3. Legal Regime The laws and regulations of El Salvador are relatively transparent and generally foster competition, but government accountability has weakened in recent years. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. However, the discretionary application of rules can complicate routine transactions, such as customs clearances and permitting applications. Regulatory agencies are often understaffed and inexperienced in dealing with complex issues. New foreign investors should review the regulatory environment carefully. In addition to applicable national laws and regulations, localities may impose permitting requirements on investors. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures are not mandatory in El Salvador. However, the financial services industry is introducing ESG factors into investment portfolios and strategies. In 2019, 12 private banks signed the “Sustainable Finance Protocol” to develop green finance strategies, design specialized products and services for sustainable development, and implement result-based frameworks for achieving environmental and social sustainability. In June 2021, the Stock Exchange issued guidelines for the issuance of sustainability-linked bonds and announced dedicated listing segments for thematic bonds (green, social and sustainable bonds). Companies note the GOES has enacted laws and regulations without adhering to established notice and comment procedures. The Regulatory Improvement Law, which entered into force in 2019, requires GOES agencies to publish online the list of laws and regulations they plan to approve, reform, or repeal each year. Institutions cannot adopt or modify regulations and laws not included in that list. The implementation of the law is gradual; the regulatory agenda is required for the executive branch since 2020, for the legislative and judicial branches, and autonomous entities in 2022, and municipalities in 2023. Prior to adopting or amending laws or regulations, the Simplified Administrative Procedures Law requires the GOES to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) based on a standardized methodology. Proposed legislation and regulations, as well as RIAs, must be made available for public comment. In practice, however, the Legislative Assembly does not publish draft legislation on its website and does not solicit comments on pending legislation. The GOES does not yet require the use of a centralized online portal to publish regulatory actions. The reforms have not been fully implemented. In 2021, 13 ministries (out of 16) drafted and published their regulatory agendas. Only five ministries revised their regulatory agendas to publish modifications. GOES agencies performed only five RIAs prior to approving new legislation. Although the implications of the reforms are still not apparent, private sector stakeholders have expressed support for the measures. El Salvador continues to develop the National Procedures Registry, an online platform listing all investment and trade-related procedures and requirements. The registry aims at increasing transparency and legal certainty, as only registered procedures and requirements will be enforceable. Procedures and requirements of central government agencies will be registered in 2022, autonomous institutions and state-owned companies in 2023, and municipalities in 2024. In 2021, ten ministries registered their procedures and requirements. El Salvador began implementing the Simplified Administrative Procedures Law in February 2019. This law seeks to streamline and consolidate administrative processes among GOES entities to facilitate investment. In 2016, El Salvador adopted the Electronic Signature Law to facilitate e-commerce and trade. Policies, procedures and needed infrastructure (data centers and specialized hardware and software) are in place for implementation. The first digital certification providers were licensed in 2021. Six GOES agencies plan to implement electronic signature in 2022, including the Ministry of Economy, the National Directorate of Medicines, the National Registry Center, and the Planning Office of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador. El Salvador also enacted the Electronic Commerce Law, which entered into force in February 2021. The law establishes the framework for commercial and financial activities, contractual or not, carried out by electronic and digital means, introduces fair and equitable standards to protect consumers and providers, and sets processes to minimize risks arising from the use of new technologies. The law aims to support rapidly growing online businesses and financial technology (FinTech). In 2018, El Salvador enacted the Law on the Elimination of Bureaucratic Barriers, which created a specialized tribunal to verify that regulations and procedures are implemented in compliance with the law and to sanction public officials who impose administrative requirements not contemplated in the law. However, the law is pending implementation until the GOES appoints members of the tribunal. The GOES controls the price of some goods and services, including electricity, liquid propane gas, gasoline, public transport fares, and medicines. The government also directly subsidizes water services and residential electricity rates. Electricity price is set by supply and demand and traded on a spot market. The market also operates with Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and long-term contracts. The GOES took over some private buses and routes in March 2022 in an effort to confront rising inflation, which critics said violated the Constitution. The Superintendent of Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET) oversees electricity rates, telecommunications, and distribution of electromagnetic frequencies. The Salvadoran government subsidizes residential consumers for electricity use of up to 105 kWh monthly. The electricity subsidy costs the government between $50 million to $64 million annually. El Salvador’s public finances are relatively transparent, but do not fully meet international standards. Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end-of-year reports, as well as information on debt obligations are accessible to the public at: http://www.transparenciafiscal.gob.sv/ptf/es/PTF2-Index.html An independent institution, the Court of Accounts, audits the financial statements, economic performance, cash flow statements, and budget execution of all GOES ministries and agencies. The results of these audits are publicly available online. The GOES has not disclosed information on the use of public funds devoted for Bitcoin implementation, including information about bitcoin holdings and operations. In addition, the GOES continues to shield the accounts of the Intelligence Agency from Court of Accounts and has limited the Court’s capacity to audit state-owned enterprise subsidiaries. El Salvador belongs to the Central American Common Market and the Central American Integration System (SICA), organizations which are working on regional integration, (e.g., harmonization of tariffs and customs procedures). El Salvador commonly incorporates international standards, such as the Pan-American Standards Commission (Spanish acronym COPANT), into its regulatory system. El Salvador is a member of the WTO, adheres to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and has adopted the Code of Good Practice annexed to the TBT Agreement. El Salvador is also a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has notified its Categories A, B, and C commitments. In 2017, El Salvador established a National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC) as required by the TFA, which was reactivated in July 2019. El Salvador is a member of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures: https://elsalvador.eregulations.org/ Investors can find information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income-generating operations including the name and contact details for those in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases for the procedures. El Salvador’s legal system is codified law. Commercial law is based on the Commercial Code and the corresponding Commercial and Civil Code of Procedures. There are specialized commercial courts that resolve disputes. Although foreign investors may seek redress for commercial disputes through Salvadoran courts, many investors report the legal system to be slow, costly, and unproductive. Local investment and commercial dispute resolution proceedings routinely last many years. Final judgments are at times difficult to enforce. The Embassy recommends that potential investors carry out proper due diligence by hiring competent local legal counsel. According to the Constitution, the judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Recent actions by the Legislative Assembly have eroded separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly dismissed the Attorney General and all five justices of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and immediately replaced them with officials loyal to President Bukele. Furthermore, in August 2021, the legislature amended the Judicial Career Organic Law to force into retirement judges ages 60 or above and those with at least 30 years of service. The move was justified by the ruling party as an effort to root out corruption in the judiciary from past administrations. Legal analysts believe these measures were unconstitutional and enabled the Legislative Assembly and the Bukele administration to exert control over the judiciary. Miempresa is the Ministry of Economy’s website for new businesses in El Salvador. At Miempresa, investors can register new companies with the Ministry of Labor (MOL), Social Security Institute, pension fund administrators, and certain municipalities; request a tax identification number/card; and perform certain administrative functions. https://www.miempresa.gob.sv/ The country’s e-Regulations site provides information on procedures, costs, entities, and regulations involved in setting up a new business in El Salvador. https://elsalvador.eregulations.org/ The Exports and Investment Promoting Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) is responsible for attracting domestic and foreign private investment, promoting exports of goods and services, evaluating and monitoring the business climate, and driving investment and export policies. PROESA provides technical assistance to investors interested in starting operations in El Salvador, regardless of the size of the investment or number of employees. http://www.proesa.gob.sv/ The Office of the Superintendent of Competition reviews transactions for competition concerns. The OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank note the Superintendent employs enforcement standards that are consistent with global best practices and has appropriate authority to enforce the Competition Law effectively. Superintendent decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, the country´s highest court. https://www.sc.gob.sv/ The Constitution allows the government to expropriate private property for reasons of public utility or social interest. Indemnification can take place either before or after the fact. In November 2021, the Legislative Assembly passed the Eminent Domain Law for Municipal Works to enable the National Directorate of Municipal Works (DOM) to expropriate land necessary for the development of infrastructure projects in the 262 municipalities of the country. The law allows the DOM to begin works before condemnation proceedings are finalized and without depositing the estimated value of the property. Landowners can appeal the court’s determination of the compensation but cannot challenge the grounds for the seizure. Legal experts have noted that the law’s broad expropriation parameters and insufficient guarantees for landowners could lead to arbitrary land seizures. There are no recent cases of expropriation. In 1980, a rural/agricultural land reform established that no single natural or legal person could own more than 245 hectares (605 acres) of land, leading to the government expropriating the land of some large landholders. In 1980, private banks were nationalized but were subsequently returned to private ownership in 1989-90. A 2003 amendment to the Electricity Law requires energy-generating companies to obtain government approval before removing fixed capital from the country. The Commercial Code, the Commercial Code of Procedures, and the Banking Law contain sections that deal with the process for declaring bankruptcy. There is no separate bankruptcy law or court. Bankruptcy proceedings are cumbersome, lengthy, and costly. In practice, bankruptcy proceedings are uncommon. In El Salvador, real estate mortgages and pledges grant the creditor privileged rights to obtain payment from assets given in guarantee. Thus, in case of insolvency, creditors with preferred guarantees file individual lawsuits. In addition, any creditor can request the judge the appointment of a receiver, procedure much simpler than bankruptcy. Companies in financial distress can request a payment deferral from the judge to prevent bankruptcy. If approved by the judge and the creditors, the company may be able to negotiate a rescue plan with creditors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, but it can become a crime if the judge determines there was intent to defraud. 4. Industrial Policies The International Services Law, approved in 2007, established service parks and centers with incentives similar to those received by El Salvador’s free trade zones. Service Park developers are exempted from income tax for 15 years, municipal taxes for ten years, and real estate transfer taxes. Service Park administrators are exempted from income tax for 15 years and municipal taxes for ten years. Firms located in the service parks/service centers may receive the following permanent incentives: Tariff exemption for the import of capital goods, machinery, equipment, tools, supplies, accessories, furniture, and other goods needed for the development of the service activities, along with full exemption from income tax and municipal taxes on company assets. Service firms operating under the existing Free Trade Zone Law are also eligible for the incentives, though firms providing services to the Salvadoran market cannot receive the incentives. Eligible services include: international distribution, logistical international operations, call centers, information technology, research and development, marine vessels repair and maintenance, aircraft repair and maintenance, entrepreneurial processes (e.g., business process outsourcing), hospital-medical services, international financial services, container repair and maintenance, technology equipment repair, elderly and convalescent care, telemedicine, cinematography postproduction services, including subtitling and translation, and specialized services for aircraft (e.g., supply of beverages and prepared food, laundry services and management of inventory). The Tourism Law establishes tax incentives for those who invest a minimum of $25,000 in tourism-related projects in El Salvador, including: value-added tax exemption for the acquisition of real estate; import tariffs waiver for construction materials, goods, equipment (subject to limitation); and a ten-year income tax waiver. The investor also benefits from a five-year exemption from land acquisition taxes and a 50 percent reduction of municipal taxes. To take advantage of these incentives, the enterprise must contribute five percent of its profits during the exemption period to a government-administered Tourism Promotion Fund. More information about tax incentives for tourism, please visit: http://www.mitur.gob.sv/ii-aspectos-legales-en-beneficio-de-la-inversion-contemplados-en-la-ley-de-turismo/ The Renewable Energy Incentives Law promotes investment projects that use renewable energy sources. In 2015, the Legislative Assembly approved amendments to encourage the use of renewable energy sources and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. These reforms extended the incentives to power generation using renewable energy sources, such as hydro, geothermal, wind, solar, marine, biogas, and biomass. The incentives include a 10-year exemption from customs duties on the importation of machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used for the construction and expansion of substations, transmission, or sub-transmission lines. Revenues directly derived from renewable power generation enjoy full income tax exemptions for a period of five years in case of projects above 10 MW and 10 years for smaller projects. The Law also provides a tax exemption on income derived directly from the sale of certified emission reductions (CERs) under the Mechanism for Clean Development of the Kyoto Protocol, or carbon markets (CDM). El Salvador does not issue guarantees or directly co-finance foreign direct investment projects. However, El Salvador has a Public-Private Partnerships Law that allows private investment in the development of infrastructure projects, including in areas of health, education, and security. Under the second MCC Compact, El Salvador launched international tenders for two Public-Private Partnerships projects. In August 2021, the Legislative Assembly approved the contract award of the first-ever PPP project to design, expand, construct, and operate expanded cargo operations of El Salvador’s primary international airport. The estimated budget for the PPP is $57 million. A second PPP tender was released in January 2020 for the design, financing, installation, equipment, operation and maintenance of a public lighting and video surveillance systems on approximately 143 kilometers of roads in San Salvador, La Libertad and La Paz departments. The GOES, however, cancelled the tender in 2022, because the key components of the project were dated after passing nearly two years since it was initially published. It is unclear if the GOES will relaunch the tender. El Salvador has undertaken pre-feasibility studies on other potential PPP projects, including a second airport in eastern El Salvador, a toll road concession to connect its biggest port (Acajutla) to the La Hachadura border with Guatemala, and improvements of four border crossings (La Hachadura, Anguiatu, El Poy and El Amarillo) and three intermediate customs facilities (Metalio, Santa Ana and San Bartolo). The GOES has planned a total of 16 PPPs. The Free Trade Zone Law is designed to attract investment in a wide range of activities, although most of the businesses in free trade zones are textile plants. A Salvadoran partner is not needed to operate in a free trade zone, and some textile operations are completely foreign owned. There are 17 free trade zones in El Salvador. They host 206 companies in sectors including textiles, distribution, call centers, business process outsourcing, agribusiness, agriculture, electronics, and metallurgy. Owned primarily by Salvadoran, U.S., Taiwanese, and Korean investors, free trade zone firms employ more than 81,000 people. The point of contact is the Chamber of Textile, Apparel and Free Trade Zones of El Salvador (CAMTEX) at: https://www.camtex.com.sv/site/ . The Free Trade Zone Law establishes rules for free trade zones and bonded areas. The free trade zones are outside the nation’s customs jurisdiction while the bonded areas are within its jurisdiction, but subject to special treatment. Local and foreign companies can establish themselves in a free trade zone to produce goods or services for export or to provide services linked to international trade. The regulations for the bonded areas are similar. Qualifying firms located in the free trade zones and bonded areas may enjoy the following benefits: Exemption from all duties and taxes on imports of raw materials and the machinery and equipment needed to produce for export; Exemption from taxes for fuels and lubricants used for producing exports if they not domestically produced; Exemption from income tax, municipal taxes on company assets and property for either 15 years (if the company is in the metropolitan area of San Salvador) or 20 years (if the company is located outside of the metropolitan area of San Salvador); Exemption from taxes on certain real estate transfers, e.g., the acquisition of goods to be employed in the authorized activity; and Exemption from value-added tax on goods and services sourced locally to be employed in the authorized activity, including goods that are not incorporated into the final product, security and transportation services, as well as construction services and materials. Companies in the free trade zones are also allowed to sell goods or services in the Salvadoran market if they pay applicable taxes on the proportion sold locally. Additional rules apply to textile and apparel products. Regulations allow a WTO-complaint “drawback” to refund custom duties paid on imported inputs and intermediate goods exclusively used in the production of goods exported outside of the Central American region. Regulations also included the creation of a Business Production Promotion Committee with the participation of the private and public sector to work on policies to strengthen the export sector, and the creation of an Export and Import Center. All import and export procedures are handled by the Import and Export Center (Centro de Trámites de Importaciones y Exportaciones – CIEX El Salvador). More information about the procedures can be found at: https://www.ciexelsalvador.gob.sv/ciexelsalvador/ El Salvador’s Investment Law does not require investors to meet export targets, transfer technology, incorporate a specific percentage of local content, turn over source code or provide access to surveillance, or fulfill other performance criteria. In August 2021, the Legislative Assembly passed amendments to the Credit History Law. The amendments introduce data localization requirements mandating credit bureaus and economic agents that report on credit history to store data and its backup exclusively in El Salvador and grant unrestricted access to the Central Bank and the Superintendence of the Financial System. The amendments took effect September 9, 2021, with a grace period of six months for companies to comply as the Central Bank develops technical norms for implementation. U.S. stakeholders have expressed concerns that these new requirements could compromise consumer data privacy and protection. There are no restrictions on cross-border transfers of other business-related data. Foreign investors and domestic firms are eligible for the same incentives. Exports of goods and services are exempt from value-added tax. The International Services Law establishes tax benefits for businesses that invest at least $150,000 during the first year of operations, including working capital and fixed assets, hire at least 10 permanent employees, and have at least a one-year contract. For hospital/medical services, the minimum capital investment must be $1 million and a minimum of $250,000 for care services for the elderly and convalescent. Hospitals or clinics must be located outside of major metropolitan areas, and medical services must be provided only to patients with insurance. 5. Protection of Property Rights Private property, both non-real estate and real estate, is recognized and protected in El Salvador. Mortgages and real property liens exist. Companies that plan to buy property are advised to hire competent local legal counsel to guide them on the property’s title prior to purchase. Per the Constitution, no single natural or legal person- whether national or foreign- can own more than 245 hectares (605 acres) of land. Reciprocity applies to the ownership of rural land, i.e., El Salvador does not restrict the ownership of rural land by foreigners, unless Salvadoran citizens are restricted in the corresponding states. The restriction on rural land does not apply if used for industrial purposes. Real property can be transferred without government authorization. For title transfer to be valid regarding third parties, however, it needs to be properly registered. Laws regarding rental property tend to favor the interests of tenants. For instance, tenants may remain on property after their lease expires, provided they continue to pay rent. Likewise, the law limits the permissible rent and makes eviction processes extremely difficult. Squatters occupying private property in “good faith” can eventually acquire title. If the owner of the property is unknown, squatters can acquire title after 20 years of good faith possession through a judicial procedure; if the owner is known, squatters can acquire title after 30 years. Squatters may never acquire title to public land, although municipalities often grant the right of use to the squatter. Zoning is regulated by municipal rules. Municipalities have broad power regarding property use within their jurisdiction. Zoning maps, if they exist, are generally not available to the public. The perceived ineffectiveness of the judicial system discourages investments in real estate and makes execution of real estate guarantees difficult. Securitization of real estate guarantees or titles is legally permissible but does not occur frequently in practice. El Salvador’s intellectual property rights (IPR) legal framework is strong. El Salvador revised several laws to comply with CAFTA-DR´s provisions on IPR, such as extending the copyright term to 70 years. The Intellectual Property Promotion and Protection Law (1993, revised in 2005), Law of Trademarks and Other Distinctive Signs (2002, revised in 2005), and Penal Code establish the legal framework to protect IPR. Investors can register trademarks, patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property with the National Registry Center´s Intellectual Property Office. In 2008, the government enacted test data exclusivity regulations for pharmaceuticals (for five years) and agrochemicals (for 10 years) and ratified an international agreement extending protection to satellite signals. In November 2021, the National Registry Center inaugurated the first Technology and Innovation Support Center (TISC) to assist innovators and entrepreneurs create, protect, and manage IP rights. The TISC provides access to patent and non-patent (scientific and technology) databases and IP-related publications, and information on IP laws and regulations. El Salvador’s enforcement of IPR protections falls short of its written policies. Salvadoran authorities have limited resources to dedicate to enforcement of IPR laws. The National Civil Police (PNC) has an Intellectual Property Section with five investigators, while the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) has 13 prosecutors in its Private Property division that also has responsibility for other property crimes including cases of extortion. According to ASPI, the PNC section coordinates well with other government and private entities. Nevertheless, the PNC admits that a lack of resources and expertise (e.g., regarding information technology) hinders its effectiveness in combatting IPR crimes. The National Directorate of Medicines (DNM) has 38 products registered for data protection, including five in 2019 and 3 in 2022. The DNM protects the confidentiality of relevant test data and the list of such protected medications is available on the DNM https: https://www.medicamentos.gob.sv/index.php/es/servicios-m/informes/unidad-de-registro-y-visado/listado-de-productos-farmaceuticos-con-proteccion-de-datos-de-prueba . The Salvadoran Intellectual Property Association (ASPI – Asociación Salvadoreña de Propiedad Intelectual) notes that piracy is common in El Salvador because the police focus on investigating criminal networks rather than points of sale. Trade in counterfeit medicines and pirated software is common. Customs officials have identified some counterfeit products arriving directly from China through the Salvadoran seaport of Acajutla. In 2021, Customs officials seized 20 shipments based on the presumption of containing counterfeit products. These shipments primarily involved toys (e.g., Mattel and Rubin Cube), clothing, handbags, and footwear (e.g., Victoria’s Secret, Pink, Levi’s, Guess, Ralph Lauren, Cartier, Puma, Nike, Adidas, Vans, and Tommy Hilfiger), perfumes and colognes (e.g., Chanel, Dior, Hugo Boss and Lacoste), mobile phone accessories (e.g., Samsung), and accessories for vehicles (e.g., Kia and Hyundai). Contraband and counterfeit products, especially cigarettes, liquor, toothpaste, and cooking oil, remain widespread. According to the GOES and private sector contacts, most unlicensed or counterfeit products are imported to El Salvador. The Distributors Association of El Salvador (ADES) estimated in 2019 that the annual cost of illicit trade in El Salvador amounts to $1 billion. Most contraband cigarettes come in from China, Panama, South Korea, and Paraguay and undercut legitimately imported cigarettes, which are subject to a 39 percent tariff. According to ADES, most contraband cigarettes are smuggled in by gangs, with the complicity of Salvadoran authorities. The national Intellectual Property Registry has 22 registered geographical indications for El Salvador. In 2018, the GOES registered four geographical indications involving Denominations of Origin for “Jocote Barón Rojo San Lorenzo” (a sour fruit), “Pupusa de Olocuilta” (a variant of El Salvador’s traditional food), “Camarones de la Bahía de Jiquilisco” (shrimp from the Jiquilisco Bay), and “Loroco San Lorenzo” (flower used in Salvadoran cuisine). Existing geographic indications include “Balsamo de El Salvador” (balm for medical, cosmetic, and gastronomic uses – since 1935), “Café Ilamatepec” (coffee – since 2010), and “Chaparro” (Salvadoran hard liquor- since 2016). El Salvador is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report or its Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. There are no IP-related laws pending. El Salvador is a signatory of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication; the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty; the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty; the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Phonogram Producers, and Broadcasting Organizations; and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (2012), which grants performing artists certain economic rights (such as rights over broadcast, reproduction, and distribution) of live and recorded works. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=SV 6. Financial Sector The Superintendent of the Financial System ( https://www.ssf.gob.sv/ ) supervises individual and consolidated activities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, financial conglomerates, stock market participants, insurance companies, and pension fund administrators. Foreign investors may obtain credit in the local financial market under the same conditions as local investors. Interest rates are determined by market forces, with the interest rate for credit cards and loans capped at 1.6 times the weighted average effective rate established by the Central Bank. The maximum interest rate varies according to the loan amount and type of loan (consumption, credit cards, mortgages, home repair/remodeling, business, and microcredits). In January 2019, El Salvador eliminated a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), which was enacted in 2014 and greatly opposed by banks. The Securities Market Law establishes the framework for the Salvadoran securities exchange. Stocks, government and private bonds, and other financial instruments are traded on the exchange, which is regulated by the Superintendent of the Financial System. Foreigners may buy stocks, bonds, and other instruments sold on the exchange and may have their own securities listed, once approved by the Superintendent. Companies interested in listing must first register with the National Registry Center’s Registry of Commerce. In 2021, the exchange traded $3.7 billion, with average daily volumes between $12 million and $30 million. Government-regulated private pension funds, Salvadoran insurance companies, and local banks are the largest buyers on the Salvadoran securities exchange. For more information, visit: https://www.bolsadevalores.com.sv/ All but two of the major banks operating in El Salvador are regional banks owned by foreign financial institutions. Given the high level of informality, measuring the penetration of financial services is difficult; however, it remains relatively low, between 30 percent – according to the Salvadoran Banking Association (ABANSA) – and 37 percent – reported by the Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF). The banking system is sound and generally well-managed and supervised. El Salvador’s Central Bank is responsible for regulating the banking system, monitoring compliance of liquidity reserve requirements, and managing the payment systems. No bank has lost its correspondent banking relationship in recent years. There are no correspondent banking relationships known to be in jeopardy. The banking system’s total assets as of December 2021 were $21.1 billion. Under Salvadoran banking law, there is no difference in regulations between foreign and domestic banks and foreign banks can offer all the same services as domestic banks. The Cooperative Banks and Savings and Credit Associations Law regulates the organization, operation, and activities of financial institutions such as cooperative banks, credit unions, savings and credit associations, and other microfinance institutions. The Money Laundering Law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the Attorney General. Despite having regulatory scheme in place to supervise the filing of reports by cooperative banks and savings and credit associations, these entities rarely file suspicious activity reports. The Insurance Companies Law regulates the operation of both local and foreign insurance firms. Foreign firms, including U.S., Colombian, Dominican, Honduran, Panamanian, Mexican, and Spanish companies, have invested in Salvadoran insurers. El Salvador does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises El Salvador has successfully liberalized many sectors, though it maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in energy generation and transmission, water supply and sanitation, ports and airports, and the national lottery (see chart below). SOE 2022 Budgeted Revenue Number of Employees National Lottery $51,553,600 148 State-run Electricity Company (CEL) $403,309,045 795 Water Authority (ANDA) $255,939,465 4,281 Port Authority (CEPA) $186,895,990 2,551 Although the GOES privatized energy distribution in 1999, it maintains significant energy production facilities through state-owned Rio Lempa Executive Hydroelectric Commission (CEL), a significant producer of hydroelectric and geothermal energy. In October 2021, El Salvador’s legislature enacted the Creation Law of the Power, Hydrocarbons, and Mines General Directorate. The new General Directorate will be responsible for dictating the national energy policy and proposing amendments to energy legislation and by-laws, as well as implementing the energy policy. The law allows the President of the state-owned power company (CEL) to serve as the Director General of the new entity. The law will enter into force in November 2022. Industry stakeholders are concerned about the potential conflict of interest that would result from CEL making energy policy and participating in the sector as SOE. The primary water service provider is the National Water and Sewer Administration (ANDA), which provides services to 96.6 percent of urban areas and 77 percent of rural areas in El Salvador. The Autonomous Executive Port Commission (CEPA) operates both the seaports and the airports. CEL, ANDA, and CEPA Board Chairs hold Minister-level rank and report directly to the President. The Law on Public Administration Procurement and Contracting (LACAP) covers all procurement of goods and services by all Salvadoran public institutions, including the municipalities. Exceptions to LACAP include: procurement and contracting financed with funds coming from other countries (bilateral agreements) or international bodies; agreements between state institutions; and the contracting of personal services by public institutions under the provisions of the Law on Salaries, Contracts and Day Work. Additionally, LACAP allows government agencies to use the auction system of the Salvadoran Goods and Services Market (BOLPROS) for procurement. Although BOLPROS is intended for use in purchasing standardized goods (e.g., office supplies, cleaning products, and basic grains), the GOES uses BOLPROS to procure a variety of goods and services, including high-value technology equipment and sensitive security equipment. As of October 2021, public procurement using BOLPROS totaled $157.1 million. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also support government agencies in the procurement of a wide range of infrastructure projects. Procurement for municipal infrastructure works is governed by the Simplified Procurement Law for Municipal Works in force since November 2021 and centralized in the National Directorate of Municipal works created by the Bukele administration to oversee investment in infrastructure and social projects in municipalities. The GOES has created a dedicated procurement website to publish tenders by government institutions. https://www.comprasal.gob.sv/comprasal_web/ ). In August 2020, President Bukele signed an executive order allowing the submission of bids for contractual services via email and eliminating bidders’ obligation to register online with the public procurement system (Comprasal), as well as lifting the responsibility of procurement officers to keep a record of companies and individuals who receive tender documents. Transparency advocates and legal experts have noted that the order would decrease potential bidders’ ability to access and compete fairly for government tenders. The order is pending review in the Supreme Court of Justice, but without injunctive effect. Alba Petroleos is a joint venture between a consortium of mayors from the FMLN party and a subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. As majority PDVSA owned, Alba Petroleos has been subject to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions since January 2019. Alba Petroleos operates a reduced number of gasoline service stations and businesses in other industries, including energy production, food production, convenience stores, and bus transportation. Alba Petroleos has been surrounded by allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and money laundering. Critics charged that the conglomerate received preferential treatment during FMLN governments and that its commercial practices, including financial reporting, are non-transparent. In May 2019, the Attorney General’s Office initiated an investigation against Alba Petroleos and its affiliates for money laundering. Alba Petroleos’ assets are frozen by court order and some of its gasoline service stations are being managed by the National Council for Asset Administration (CONAB). El Salvador is not engaged in a privatization program and has not announced plans to privatize. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector in El Salvador, including several prominent U.S. companies, has embraced the concept of responsible business conduct (RBC). Many companies donated to COVID-19 relief efforts in 2020. Several local foundations promote RBC practices, entrepreneurial values, and philanthropic initiatives. El Salvador is also a member of international institutions such as Forum Empresa (an alliance of RBC institutions in the Western Hemisphere), AccountAbility (UK), and the InterAmerican Corporate Social Responsibility Network. Businesses have created RBC programs to provide education and training, transportation, lunch programs, and childcare. In addition, RBC programs have included inclusive hiring practices and assistance to communities in areas such as health, education, senior housing, and HIV/AIDS awareness. Organizations monitoring RBC are able to work freely. Following a reorganization under the Bukele administration, the Legal Secretariat is responsible for developing strategies and actions to promote transparency and accountability of government agencies, as well as fostering citizen participation in government. The watchdog organization Transparency International is represented in-country by the Salvadoran Foundation for Development (FUNDE). El Salvador does not waive or weaken labor laws, consumer protection, or environmental regulations to attract foreign investment. El Salvador’s ability to enforce domestic laws effectively and fairly is limited by a lack of resources. El Salvador does not allow metal mining activity. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. El Salvador has a high exposure to natural hazards, such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, including frequent occurrences of floods, droughts, and tropical storms. Climate change, contamination, and overexploitation have contributed to water insecurity. Aquifers in the coastal and central zones of El Salvador have receded by as much as 13 feet (4 meters) due to climate change and at least 90 percent of surface water sources are contaminated by untreated sewage, agricultural and industrial waste, according to a 2018 study by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN). After nearly 15 years of a polarized debate over water management, the Legislative Assembly passed the Water Resources Law in December 2021. The law prohibits the privatization of water resources and establishes access to water and sanitation as a human right, as well as prioritizes water usage towards human consumption. The law creates an all-public governing body the Salvadoran Water Authority (ASA) charged with drafting policies and guidelines for water extraction and wastewater discharge. The ASA will issue water permits for industrial purposes and other GOES ministries will issue permits relevant to their sectors. ASA will be the sole issuer of effluent discharge permits. The law will take effect in July 2022 as by-laws and regulations needed for implementation are drafted. The private sector has expressed concerns about legal uncertainty, as the law does not differentiate existing water permits from new ones and does not clearly define regulatory entity by sector. MARN released for public consultation the National Environmental Policy on February 7, 2022. The policy focuses on climate change management and adaptation, biodiversity mainstreaming in the economy, restoration and conservation of water resources, and environmental zoning. To enable implementation, three cross-cutting issues are highlighted in the policy (education and awareness- raising, research and scientific innovation, and governance) as action required by the GOES. El Salvador presented the update of its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on the Climate Change (UNFCCC) on January 6, 2022. The updated NDCs include actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the energy sector; a cumulative emissions reduction target, and activities to increase carbon sinks and reservoirs in the agricultural landscape of the agriculture, forestry, and land-use change sector if large-scale financing is obtained from international and national sources with the participation of the private sector. El Salvador carried out a capacity needs assessment as the initial phase in the process of formulating its long-term low emission development strategy. The evaluation helped identify national strengths, priority sectors, institutional framework, relevant actors, and capacity constraints, as well as served as input to draft a roadmap to guide the development and implementation of the strategy. The assessment and roadmap were published on January 18, 2022. Work is underway to design El Salvador’s 2050 Low Emission and Resilient Development Strategy. The Environmental Law creates the National Incentives and Disincentives Program and establishes parameters for its design. The program is prepared by MARN in conjunction with the Ministries for Finance and Economy. In 2021, MARN finalized drafting the program that focuses on restoration of ecosystems and productive landscapes and includes tools such as reputational incentives (National Price for the Environment), financial incentives (payments for ecosystem services and lines of credit with state-owned banks to undertake restoration actions in productive landscapes), non-financial incentives (technical assistance), and market incentives (eco-labels and certifications). The program is pending approval of the Economic Cabinet. Protected areas, use of nature-based solutions, sustainable forest management, and other ecosystem management plans are regulated in the Natural Protected Areas Law and Wildlife Conservation Law. El Salvador does not have green public procurement policies. 9. Corruption U.S. companies operating in El Salvador are subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Corruption can be a challenge to investment in El Salvador. El Salvador ranks 115 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. While El Salvador has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, their effectiveness is at times questionable. Soliciting, offering, or accepting a bribe is a criminal act in El Salvador. The Attorney General’s Anticorruption and Anti-Impunity Unit handles allegations of public corruption. The Constitution establishes a Court of Accounts that is charged with investigating public officials and entities and, when necessary, passing such cases to the Attorney General for prosecution. Executive-branch employees are subject to a code of ethics, including administrative enforcement mechanisms, and the government established an Ethics Tribunal in 2006. In June 2021, El Salvador terminated its 2019 agreement with the organization of American States (OAS) to back the International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption (CICIES). CICIES audited pandemic spending in 2020. After receiving CICIES preliminary findings in November 2021, the Attorney General’s Office began criminal investigations in 17 government agencies for alleged procurement fraud and misuse of public funds. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly passed the “Law for the Use of Products for Medical Treatments in Exceptional Public Health Situations Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic” to protect vaccine manufacturers from liability, a precondition for Pfizer to sell vaccines to El Salvador. However, the law’s broad liability shield provisions, including civil and criminal immunity for a wide range of medical product manufacturers and healthcare providers, raised concerns about the future of investigations into fraudulent purchases of medical supplies and PPE. The law was subsequently amended in October 2021 to clarify there is no immunity for acts of corruption, fraud, bribery, theft, counterfeiting or piracy and trafficking of stolen goods. Even though the reforms removed some of the most controversial aspects of the bill, investigations stalled after the Attorney General appointed by the Bukele Administration removed prosecutors working on pandemic-related probe against GOES officials. Corruption scandals at the federal, legislative, and municipal levels are commonplace and there have been credible allegations of judicial corruption. Three of the past four presidents have been indicted for corruption, a former Attorney General is in prison on corruption-related charges, and a former president of the Legislative Assembly, who also served as president of the investment promotion agency during the prior administration, faces charges for embezzlement, fraud, and money laundering. The former Minister of Defense during two FMLN governments is being prosecuted for providing illicit benefits to gangs in exchange for reducing homicides (an agreement known as the 2012-2014 Truce). In February 2020, the Attorney General’s Office indicted high-ranking members of the ARENA and FMLN parties under charges of conspiracy and electoral fraud for negotiating with gangs for political benefit during the run up to the 2014 presidential elections. In September 2020, the Attorney General’s Office launched a probe against the Director of Penal Centers, the Vice Minister of Justice, and the Chief of the Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit for covert dealings with gangs on a homicide reduction in exchange for better prison conditions. Since the appointment of the current Attorney General, the investigation into Bukele administration’s gang pacts has not progressed. U.S Treasury designated the two officials and Bukele’s Chief of Cabinet for financial sanctions in December 2021. The law provides criminal penalties for corruption, but implementation is generally perceived as ineffective. Former President Funes faces criminal charges for embezzlement, money laundering, and misappropriation of public funds. Although there are several pending arrest warrants against Funes, he has fled to Nicaragua and cannot be extradited because he was granted Nicaraguan citizenship. In 2018, former president Elias Antonio (Tony) Saca pleaded guilty to embezzling more than $300 million in public funds. The court sentenced him to 10 years in prison and ordered him to repay $260 million. The NGO Social Initiative for Democracy stated that officials, particularly in the judicial system, often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Long-standing government practices in El Salvador, including cash payments to officials, shielded budgetary accounts, and diversion of government funds, facilitate corruption and impede accountability. For example, the accepted practice of ensuring party loyalty through off-the-books cash payments to public officials (i.e., sobresueldos) persisted across five presidential administrations. President Bukele eliminated these cash payments to public officials and the “reserved spending account,” nominally for state intelligence funding. At his direction, in July 2019, the Court of Accounts began auditing reserve spending of the Sanchez Ceren administration. In July 2021, the Attorney General’s Office accused ten former FMLN legislators and former cabinet members who served in the Funes administration (2009-2014), including former President Salvador Sanchez, of money laundering, embezzlement, and illicit enrichment for allegedly receiving sobresueldos from the President’s Office reserved spending account. El Salvador has an active, free press that reports on corruption. The Illicit Enrichment Law requires appointed and elected officials to declare their assets to the Probity Section. The declarations are not available to the public, and the law only sanctions noncompliance with fines of up to $500. In 2015, the Probity Section of the Supreme Court began investigating allegations of illicit enrichment of public officials. In 2017, Supreme Court Justices ordered its Probity Section to audit legislators and their alternates. In 2019, in observance of the Constitution, the Supreme Court instructed the Probity Section to focus its investigations only on public officials who left office within ten years. In 2020, the Supreme Court issued regulations to standardize the procedures to examine asset declarations of public officials and carry out illicit enrichment investigations, as well as to set clear rules for decision-making. At the end of 2021, the Probity Section had a total of 452 active investigations on illicit enrichment. Between 2015 and 2021, the office completed economic examinations in 58 cases, but the Supreme of Court recommended civil prosecution for illicit enrichment in only 21 of those cases. In an October 2021 interview, the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court indicated that 127 illicit enrichment cases were nearing the end of the 10-year constitutional statute of limitations. In 2011, El Salvador approved the Law on Access to Public Information. The law provides for the right of access to government information, but authorities have not always effectively implemented the law. The law gives a narrow list of exceptions that outline the grounds for nondisclosure and provide for a reasonably short timeline for the relevant authority to respond, no processing fees, and administrative sanctions for non-compliance. The Bukele administration has weakened the autonomy of the Access to Public Information Agency (IAIP) – charged with ensuring compliance with the law – by reforming IAIP’s regulations to increase the President’s Office control over the appointment of its commissioners. Enacted amendments also add requirements for accessing information, including for the release of restricted information. Civil society organizations claim it is common practice of the Bukele administration to declare information to be reserved (confidential) or deny information without justification and in violation of the law to avoid citizen oversight and accountability. In 2011, El Salvador joined the Open Government Partnership. The Open Government Partnership promotes government commitments made jointly with civil society on transparency, accountability, citizen participation and use of new technologies ( http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/el-salvador ). El Salvador is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. El Salvador is a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention and the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The following government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Doctor Jose Nestor Castaneda Soto, President of the Court of Government Ethics Court of Government Ethics (Tribunal de Ética Gubernamental) 87 Avenida Sur, No.7, Colonia Escalón, San Salvador (503) 2565-9403 Email: n.castaneda@teg.gob.sv http://www.teg.gob.sv/ Licenciado Rodolfo Delgado Fiscalía General de La República (Attorney General’s Office) Edificio Farmavida, Calle Cortéz Blanco Boulevard y Colonia Santa Elena (503) 2593-7400 (503) 2528-6012 Email: radelgado@ fgr.gob.sv http://www.fiscalia.gob.sv/ Chief Justice Oscar Alberto López Jerez Avenida Juan Pablo II y 17 Avenida Norte Centro de Gobierno (503) 2271-8888 Ext. 1424 Email: oscar.lopez@oj.gob.sv http://www.csj.gob.sv Contact at “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local, or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International): Roberto Rubio-Fabián Executive Director National Development Foundation (Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo – FUNDE) Calle Arturo Ambrogi #411, entre 103 y 105 Avenida Norte, Colonia Escalón, San Salvador (503) 2209-5300 Email: direccion@funde.org Access to Public Information Institute (IAIP for its initials in Spanish) Ricardo Gómez Guerrero Commissioner President of the IAIP Prolongación Ave. Alberto Masferrer y Calle al Volcán, Edif. Oca Chang # 88 (503) 2205-3800 Email: rgomez@iaip.gob.sv 10. Political and Security Environment El Salvador’s 12-year civil war ended in 1992. Since then, there has been no political violence aimed at foreign investors. The crime threat level in El Salvador is critical, with high rates of crime and violence. Most serious crimes in El Salvador are never solved. El Salvador lacks sufficient resources to properly investigate and prosecute cases and to deter crime. For more information, visit: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/ElSalvador.html El Salvador has thousands of known gang members from several gangs including Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street (M18). Gang members engage in violence or use deadly force if resisted. These “maras” concentrate on extortion, violent street crime, carjacking, narcotics and arms trafficking, and murder for hire. Extortion is a common crime in El Salvador. U.S. citizens who visit El Salvador for extended periods are at higher risk for extortion demands. Bus companies and distributors often must pay extortion fees to operate within gang territories, and these costs are passed on to customers. The World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index reported that costs due to organized crime for businesses in El Salvador are the highest among 141 countries. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the National Directorate of Statistics and Censuses (DIGESTYC), in 2021 El Salvador had a labor force of about 2.9 million people. Female labor force participation remained low at 41.2 percent. Around 70 percent of the workers were employed in the informal sector. The number of people working in the informal sector increased during the pandemic due to high unemployment rates. These workers do not have access to government health and pension benefits, and according to the 2020-2021 Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development report, 63.9 percent of workers the informal sector belong to vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and the rural poor. http://fusades.org/publicaciones/informe-de-coyuntura-social-2020-2021 https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/negocios/trabajo-informal-pocos-incentivos-alejan-salvadorenos-tener-pension/829945/2021/ ) Labor laws require 90 percent of the workforce in plants and in clerical positions be Salvadoran citizens. While Salvadoran labor is regarded as hard-working, general education and professional skill levels are low. According to many large employers, there is a lack of middle management-level talent, which sometimes results in the need to bring in managers from abroad. Employers do not report labor-related difficulties in incorporating technology into their workplaces. The law provides for the right of most workers to form and join independent unions, to strike, and to bargain collectively. The law also prohibits anti-union discrimination, although it does not require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. Military personnel, national police, judges, and high-level public officers may not form or join unions. Workers who are representatives of the employer or in “positions of trust” also may not serve on a union’s board of directors. Only Salvadoran citizens may serve on unions’ executive committees. The labor code also bars individuals from holding membership in more than one trade union. Unions must meet complex requirements to register, including having a minimum membership of 35 individuals. If the Ministry of Labor (MOL) denies registration, the law prohibits any attempt to organize for up to six months following the denial. Collective bargaining is obligatory only if the union represents most workers. In 2021, some unions were concerned about the MOL’s delay in approving their organization’s credentials, required to continue operating as a union and to participate in various tripartite consultative committees between government, the private sector, and the unions. Without credentials, unions cannot participate in decision-making within tripartite committees on subjects such as worker social security benefits, minimum wage, housing, and other worker benefits. The members of the unions also lose their immunity from termination by their employers if their unions do not have credentials. As of January 2022, the MOL failed to grant credentials to more than 250 unions before their certifications expired. These unions represent workers in municipal, healthcare, education, and judicial trades, leaving these workers vulnerable to termination by their employers. The unions receiving their credentials quickly were those aligned with the political party of the Nuevas Ideas dominated government. The law contains cumbersome and complex procedures for conducting a legal strike. The law does not recognize the right to strike for public and municipal employees or for workers in essential services. The law does not specify which services meet this definition, and courts therefore interpret this provision on a case-by-case basis. The law requires that 30 percent of all workers in an enterprise must support a strike for it to be legal and that 51 percent must support the strike before all workers are bound by the decision to strike. Unions may strike only to obtain or modify a collective bargaining agreement or to protect the common professional interests of the workers. They must also engage in negotiation, mediation, and arbitration processes before striking, although many unions often skip or expedite these steps. The law prohibits workers from appealing a government decision declaring a strike illegal. The government did not effectively enforce the laws on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Penalties remained insufficient to deter violations. Judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals. According to union representatives, the government inconsistently enforced labor rights for public workers, maquiladora/textile workers, food manufacturing workers, subcontracted workers in the construction industry, security guards, informal-sector workers, and migrant workers. Unions functioned independently from the government and political parties, although many generally were aligned with the traditional political parties of ARENA and the FMLN. Workers at times engaged in strikes regardless of whether the strikes met legal requirements. Employers are free to hire union or non-union labor. Closed shops are illegal. Labor laws are generally in accordance with internationally recognized standards but are not enforced consistently by government authorities. Although El Salvador has improved labor rights since the CAFTA-DR entered into force and the law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, there remains room for better implementation and enforcement. The MOL is responsible for enforcing the law. The government proved more effective in enforcing the minimum wage law in the formal sector than in the informal sector. Unions reported the ministry failed to enforce the law for subcontracted workers hired for public reconstruction contracts. The government provided its inspectors updated training in both occupational safety and labor standards and conducted thousands of inspections in 2019. The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours, limited to no more than six days and to no more than eight hours per day, but allows overtime, which is to be paid at a rate of double the usual hourly wage. The law mandates that full-time employees receive pay for an eight-hour day of rest in addition to the 44-hour normal workweek. The law provides that employers must pay double time for work on designated annual holidays, a Christmas bonus based on the time of service of the employee, and 15 days of paid annual leave. The law prohibits compulsory overtime. The law states that domestic employees are obligated to work on holidays if their employer makes this request, but they are entitled to double pay in these instances. The government does not adequately enforce these laws. There is no national minimum wage; the minimum wage is determined by sector. On July 1, 2021, the government announced an increase in the minimum wage by about 20 percent for all industries in the formal sector. This was implemented on August 1, 2021, resulting in a one-month implementation period for industry. The increase had no impact on the majority of workers because most are employed in the informal sector. El Salvador adopted the Telework Regulation Law in March 2020. The law is applicable in both private and public sectors and requires a written agreement between employer and employee outlining the terms and conditions of the arrangement, including working hours, responsibilities, workload, performance evaluations, reporting and monitoring, and duration of the arrangement, among others. Legislation prescribes employers as responsible for providing the equipment, tools, and programs necessary to perform duties remotely. Employers are subject to the obligations contained in labor laws, while workers are entitled to the same rights as staff working at the employer’s premises, including benefits and freedom of association. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $27,022.64 2019 $27,023 https://data.worldank.org/country/el-salvador Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $2,104.22 2019 $3,413 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=209 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 N.A. 2019 N.A. BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 40.9% 2020 N.A, * Central Bank, El Salvador. In 2018, the Central Bank released GDP estimates using the new national accounts system from 2008 and using 2005 as the base year. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020)* From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 10,075 100% Total Outward 3.1 100% Panama 3,656 36.3% Guatemala 1.6 49.5% United States 2,104 20.9% Honduras 0.8 24.3% Spain 1,339 13.3% Costa Rica 0.5 17.3% Colombia 833 8.3% Nicaragua 0.3 8.9% Mexico 670 6.7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, International Monetary Fund 14. Contact for More Information Aaron Feit Deputy Economic Counselor U.S. Embassy San Salvador Address: Final Blvd. Santa Elena, Antiguo Cuscatlán, La Libertad, El Salvador Phone: +503 2501-2999 Email: FeitAL@state.gov To reach the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) Office, please email: Office.Sansalvador@trade.gov Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary Equatorial Guinea’s rise to become a country with one of the highest GDPs per capita in sub-Saharan Africa has been driven almost entirely by U.S. companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI) in the oil and gas sector. In the mid-2010s, the decline in both oil prices and the country’s hydrocarbon reserves caused an economic recession that has continued for six years and has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While it still ranks among the top five richest sub-Saharan countries, the country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita plummeted from $14,030 in 2013 to $5,810 in 2021. Despite its economy’s dependence on FDI, the country presents a complex, challenging environment for foreign investors. Equatorial Guinea ranks near the bottom of the list for various global indices, including those for corruption, transparency, and ease of doing business, and the government suffers from a lack of technical expertise and capacity to implement many of the reforms it proposes. Freedom of the press is limited, and public information on laws and regulations is not readily accessible, creating an opaque operating environment that many outside investors have difficulty navigating. Furthermore, both senior leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and members of the president’s extended family own a significant number of businesses in diverse industries, dominating the private sector and creating major conflicts of interest in a country known for pervasive corruption. On January 1, 2022, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), of which Equatorial Guinea is a member, began enforcing new foreign currency regulations on companies operating in extractive industries. While there continue to be negotiations on the final implementation of these regulations, they are likely to impact foreign firms’ willingness to invest in the hydrocarbon sector in Equatorial Guinea and other CEMAC countries. Finally, as a small country with an estimated population of 1.2 million residents and an underdeveloped education system, Equatorial Guinea suffers from a shortage of both skilled and unskilled labor, which affects many businesses’ abilities to operate competitively. In the face of the country’s growing economic and fiscal challenges, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $282.8 million, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement in December 2019, which required the government to implement reforms to improve transparency, good governance, and the business environment. Between 2019 and 2021, the government passed laws, issued decrees, and established institutions to comply with these requirements. It implemented a new anti-corruption law, created an Investment Promotion Center (IPC), passed an updated labor law, announced the privatization of its main state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and launched its Single Business Window to simplify the process of registering a business. Some of these initiatives have had modest success, while most exist on paper only. On the surface, Equatorial Guinea appears to provide opportunities for foreign investment. In addition to its hydrocarbon reserves, the country has rich soils, abundant fishing waters, vast forests, eye-catching landscapes, relatively developed road infrastructure, and a strategic location for maritime trade. Before investing in Equatorial Guinea, however, potential investors should conduct extensive research and carefully consider both the potential benefits and pitfalls of establishing operations in the country’s opaque and challenging environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 172 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $690 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,810 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government recognizes the critical role foreign direct investment (FDI) in its hydrocarbon sector plays in Equatorial Guinea’s development. However, chronic corruption, patronage, highly centralized decision-making, and a lack of local regulatory capacity create a challenging environment for foreign investors. Article 27 of the country’s fundamental law states “the State protects, guarantees, and controls the investment of foreign capital that contributes to the development of the country.” In Article 12 of Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime, the government again commits to fair and equitable treatment for all investors. Law No. 7/1992 also creates an Investment Promotion Center (IPC) to advise the government on investment policies, promote investments, and support both domestic and international investors with information and in the resolution of conflicts. These laws also create a National Investment Commission (NIC). Neither the IPC nor the NIC are operational. In 2015, the government directed the Ministry of Commerce and Business Promotion to create an agency to promote, integrate, and coordinate a national strategy to attract FDI. The ministry has yet to establish this agency. Historically, the president has had de facto final approval on large contracts with foreign investors; however, since 2020, the vice president has largely taken over this role. Foreign-owned companies pay higher registration fees than local companies and are often subject to taxes that more informal local businesses avoid. Equatorial Guinea’s six-year recession has motivated the government to focus on improving economic diversification and attracting new FDI. Led by the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Planning, the government is promoting its National Economic Diversification Strategy, developed in 2019 to comply with IMF-required reforms to receive a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement. One of the primary goals of the strategy is to reduce the country’s economic and fiscal dependence on the hydrocarbon sector. The government collaborates with the World Bank, IMF, UN Development Program (UNDP), and private consultants on its economic diversification strategy, including in attracting FDI, but implementation of recommendations remains mixed. In general, the government focuses its efforts on recruiting investments in large capital projects over small ventures, as large-scale projects are more likely to create new employment opportunities for Equatorial Guinea’s largely unskilled workforce and provide greater fiscal benefits for the government under its underdeveloped and poorly implemented taxation system. The government is increasingly seeking South-South FDI from new partners in countries like Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Turkey, and Venezuela. The government sometimes focuses on recruiting new partners in lieu of maintaining existing partnerships, neglecting improvements to its operating environment, and damaging its prospects for longer term returns from investments. Foreign investors are allowed to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in Equatorial Guinea. As part of its economic diversification strategy, in 2018 the government eliminated the requirement to have a domestic joint venture partner for investments in the non-oil sector. Under Equatorial Guinea’s Hydrocarbons Law No. 8/2006, however, the state-owned oil company (GE Petrol) or gas company (Sonagas) must hold a stake of at least 35 percent in foreign-owned hydrocarbon companies and must account for one third of the representatives on their Boards of Directors. Under Law 4/2009 on the Land Ownership Regime, foreigners cannot own land but can lease property from the government for up to 99 years. To secure a lease, under Decree 140/2013, a foreign national must request approval through the Office of Property Registry, who then requests authorization from the president in the form of a presidential decree. The government does, however, recognize land owned by foreign nationals before the decree entered into force in 2013, if the land was properly registered. Prior to approving an EFF in 2019, the IMF conducted several rounds of staff-monitored assessments of the governments’ structural, fiscal, and monetary reforms. The results of these assessments, which include investment policy recommendations, can be found on the IMF’s website: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GNQ . Beyond these IMF reviews, in the past five years, Equatorial Guinea has not undergone a third-party investment policy review (IPR) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Civil society organizations in Equatorial Guinea remain weak, hampered by difficulties in registering for legalization through the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations, and thus are unable to provide oversight of investment policy-related concerns. In January 2019, the Ministry of Commerce launched its Single Business Window (abbreviated VUE for its Spanish name Ventanilla Unica Empresarial) at its headquarters in Malabo. The VUE reduced the time required to register a business from an average of 33 days to five. In July 2021, the ministry opened a second VUE office in the mainland city of Bata. Registration still must take place in person, however, as there is no online registration page nor a working VUE website. Individuals choosing to register their businesses without utilizing the VUE must complete the following steps through a variety of government agencies: Process Agency Time Required Undergo criminal background check Ministry of Justice 1 day Legalize business’s articles of incorporation Ministry of Justice, Office of the Notary Public 3-14 days Add name to business registry Ministry of Justice 2-3 days Open bank account and obtain bank solvency certificate Commercial Bank 1 day Obtain tax clearance certificate (certificate of good standing) Ministry of Finances 2 days Add name to business registry Ministry of Commerce 15 days Complete small and medium enterprise (SME) registration, if applicable Ministry of Commerce 15 days Register for the Employee Guarantee Fund Ministry of Labor Obtain tax ID number Ministry of Finances 3 days Register for social security National Institute of Social Security 1 day Although Equatoguinean citizens may legally invest outside the country, the government does not actively promote foreign investment. There are no known restrictions on foreign investment, but some individuals and companies have faced delays when transferring money overseas or converting local currency into foreign exchange, which has been exacerbated by new CEMAC rules on foreign currency reserves enacted in 2019. The National Bank of Equatorial Guinea (BANGE) – majority-owned by the government – launched two subsidiary offices in neighboring Cameroon. 3. Legal Regime Regulations governing the investment environment in Equatorial Guinea are implemented at the national level and can be introduced and enacted in one of three ways: As a law, which begins as a draft bill presented by the relevant government ministry to the Council of Ministries before being submitted to Parliament for review and a vote. Through a decree (at times referred to as a “decree-law”) issued directly by the president. Through a ministerial order issued by the relevant ministry, in this case often the Ministry of Commerce and Business Promotion; the Ministry of Labor, Employment Promotion, and Social Security; or the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Planning. The government does not make draft versions of bills and regulations available for public comment at any stage of the approval process. Civil society groups complain that they are not consulted in the drafting of relevant laws and regulations. The regulatory regime suffers from both a lack of public information and shortcomings in implementation and enforcement. Online versions of laws and regulations are difficult to find and sometimes completely unavailable. To comply with the IMF’s 2019 required reforms, the Ministry of Finance created both a website ( https://minhacienda-gob.com/biblioteca-juridica/ ) and physical office to facilitate public access to commercial regulations, but in practice limited documentation is available through either resource. In 2020, the government launched the official webpage of the state bulletin ( https://boe.gob.gq/# ) to improve public access to laws and regulations. The page has not been updated since January 2021, purportedly because of delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these efforts at digitalization, most of the information on regulations is still only accessible in hard copies for a fee through the Office of the National State Bulletin. As a member country of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), Equatorial Guinea’s accounting standards are governed by the organization’s uniform act on accounting law and financial information (AUDCIF). However, due to a lack of local expertise on OHADA’s accounting standards, the government uses the Spanish model for its general accounting system. In 2020, a World Bank-sponsored program to strengthen the investment climate in the OHADA region established an office in Equatorial Guinea to train local accountants on OHADA accounting law. Of the 10 accountants registered through the office, currently only two are Equatoguineans. Officially only these accredited accountants can audit and certify companies’ financial statements. While the government has made improvements in its overall fiscal transparency since 2019, it does not meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency as established by the U.S. Department of State. While the government’s published budget provides a substantially complete picture of its planned expenditures and revenue streams, including natural resource revenues, in 2021 it failed to disclose its total debt obligations, produce audited financial statements for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or establish a supreme audited institution, which was mandated by law in 2012. Additional information is included in the Department of State’s annual Fiscal Transparency Report: https://www.state.gov/fiscal-transparency-report/. As a CEMAC member, Equatorial Guinea’s investment-related regulations are based on CEMAC policies. Implementation of some policies at the national level remains pending, such as the commitment to free movement of people and goods between member countries. Equatorial Guinea is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but has been an observer since 2002. In 2007, the government applied for full WTO membership, and its application remains in process. The Ministry of Commerce is implementing a strategic action plan for the country’s accession, including hiring an international consultant to prepare a required Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR). The legislature has yet to approve the memorandum. Equatorial Guinea’s national judicial system is not independent of the executive branch, as the president serves as the chief magistrate and has the power to appoint or remove judges at will. In 2018, the IMF highlighted numerous factors that result in a weak judiciary, including a lack of publicly accessible information on judicial decisions and limited capacity and understaffing that cause delays in rendering court decisions. Additionally, in many cases, judges are awarded percentages of the penalties they levy against defendants, which can be particularly concerning for larger U.S. companies operating in the country. While the government has committed to addressing these issues, domestic and foreign investors continue to generally distrust the judicial system. Equatorial Guinea’s legal system is a mix of civil and customary law. The country does not have an established commercial law, and so it instead refers to the uniform acts of the OHADA for arbitrating commercial cases. OHADA legislation creates a civil legal system that aims to provide a common business and legal framework across all 17 member states, while enhancing the legal certainty and predictability of international transactions in the region. In 2010, OHADA passed its Uniform Act Organizing Securities, which created a modern security law for OHADA nations and reinforced lenders’ rights by enabling them to use new, efficient security enforcement mechanisms, such as out-of-court appropriation. Other new and revised laws for the OHADA region include: Uniform Act related to general commercial law act, revised in 2010 Uniform Act related to commercial companies and economic interest groups, revised in January 2014 and effective May 2014 Uniform Act organizing collective proceedings for clearing debts, revised in September 2015 and effective December 2015 Uniform Act on the harmonization of accounting, adopted in January 2017 and effective January 2018. Each member country has the responsibility to apply these acts locally through laws and regulations, and the government in Equatorial Guinea has to date failed to implement most of them. The primary legal instrument governing foreign investment in Equatorial Guinea is Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime in Equatorial Guinea, which was last updated by in 1994 by No. 2/1994. Due to the difficulty in passing new laws, subsequent changes have mostly been implemented through more than two dozen presidential decrees, which are summarized in a document published on the Ministry of Finance’s website: https://minhacienda-gob.com/materia-de-inversion-3/ . The government published Decree 45/2020 in April 2020 reducing the minimum amount of capital needed to register a limited-liability company from one million XAF (approximately $1,650) to 100,000 XAF (approximately USD 165). Specific regulations governing investments in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors are summarized on the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbon’s website at https://mmie.gob.gq/ , although the English version of the page has not been updated since 2017. The government has yet to create a one-stop-shop for foreign investors seeking information on relevant, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements. There is no specific agency that enforces competition laws. Due to Equatorial Guinea’s membership in OHADA, OHADA competition laws should be applied to such cases. Information on all OHADA uniform acts and case law can be found at https://www.ohada.org/en/ . Law No. 7/1992 states that the government will not expropriate foreign investments except when acting in the public interest with fair, just, and proper compensation. The government does not generally nationalize or expropriate foreign investments, although there are alleged cases of local private companies cooperating with the government to expropriate property from foreign investors after falsely accusing them of breach of contract. This practice has become less common since 2018, when the government eliminated the requirement for foreign investors to identify a local business partner. The government has an extensive record, however, of expropriating locally owned property, frequently offering little or no compensation. OHADA uniform code and case law on bankruptcy apply in Equatorial Guinea. However, despite being an OHADA member country and therefore having recourse to insolvency and debt recovery proceedings, the country has no legal practice or expertise in judicial reorganization, judicial liquidation, or debt enforcement. Creditors are therefore likely to face difficulty in recovering their money through a formal legal process in insolvency cases. 4. Industrial Policies To stimulate investment and job creation, Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime establishes the following incentives, which have been in place since 1992: A reduction in the company’s tax base equivalent to 50 percent of the salary of an employee in a newly created position. A reduction in the company’s personal income tax equivalent to 200 percent of the cost of training offered to local employees. A credit worth 15 percent the value of non-traditional exports, which can be used in the payment of any fiscal obligations. Additional incentives offered to investors operating in the country’s rural areas, as described in the government’s tax law. In addition, since the start of the pandemic the government has attempted to incentivize local business creation by reducing the minimum capital investment threshold for registering an LLC. The government does not currently offer any incentives for clean energy investments or for businesses owned by underrepresented investors, such as women. In 2014, the government established Holding Equatorial Guinea (HOLDING G.E.) to manage a $1.6 million investment fund created to finance its joint ventures with private companies in sectors identified as key to its economic diversification strategy. Previously, the government allocated up to 20 percent of the country’s general budget to this fund every three years, but now it provides funding on a case-by-case basis when HOLDING G.E. identifies co-investment opportunities. Information on investment opportunities in strategic sectors is available on HOLDING G.E.’s website ( https://www.holdingequatorialguinea.com/ ), as is the agency’s “Equatorial Guinea Investment Guide,” which has not been updated since 2018. Three entities have tax-free status: the Luba Free Port, the Port of Bata, and the K5 Free Port Oil Centre. Goods that are properly cleared through a fellow CEMAC member country are not taxed when entering Equatorial Guinea. In January 2021, Presidential Decree 2/2021 introduced new regulations on cross-border trade with neighboring Cameroon and Gabon, including establishing an import-export office. Under Equatorial Guinea’s Local Content Law, a significant percentage of the goods and technology used by foreign hydrocarbon companies must be produced or assembled locally or within the CEMAC region. The Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons has fined, suspended, and expelled companies perceived to be noncompliant with local content laws, although such cases are more often related to the failure to hire local nationals rather than the failure to use equipment and technology produced in the region. The government requires internet service providers, whether local or foreign, to turn over source code or to allow surveillance. According to Article 15 of the Telecommunication Law 7, dated November 7, 2015, the Regulating Organ of Telecommunications (ORTEL) oversees official communication lines and networks. The government has no requirements regarding locating data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Despite existing laws protecting the rights of property owners, the government selectively enforces those rights and uses the judicial system to seize land “in the public interest” with little to no due process. Mortgages are offered under a “Social Housing Program” in which payments are made to the government via the commercial bank CCEI Bank. Mortgage terms vary and can be more than 20 years, and interest rates are high, ranging from 12 to 18 percent. Non-payment for six months results in foreclosure on the property. Equatorial Guinea is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). After 18 years of negotiations, Equatorial Guinea launched its Intellectual Property Documentation Center (CDPI) in September 2021 with assistance from the AIPO. The CDPI’s mission is to provide scientific and technical information on intellectual property and technological innovation. Intellectual property rights (IPR) protections fall under the Council of Scientific and Technological Research of Equatorial Guinea (CITCE). CITCE sends local applications to obtain a patent for a product to the central AIPO office in Yaoundé, Cameroon, which in turn shares them with other member offices to verify the products’ originality before granting a patent. The government established a copyright law soon after joining the AIPO. The Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Artisanal Promotion sporadically applies IPR regulations, for which public information is not readily available. In cases of alleged IPR violations, the injured party must file a complaint with the Ministry of Justice, which refers the complaint to CICTE. Intellectual property (IP) is also regulated in part by the Industrial Property Law. CICTE issues certificate of protection to the owners of industrial property once it verifies the IP’s originality. AIPO requires that member countries draft national laws regulating artistic and cultural property. The government has yet to comply with this requirement, but a European Union committee will be assisting CICTE in drafting the relevant legislation in 2022. While Equatorial Guinea still faces challenges in registering and protecting intellectual property, it was not included in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2022 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy nor in its 2022 Special 301 Report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Equatorial Guinea does not have its own stock market, but CEMAC operates a common stock market for all member states known as the Central Africa Stock Exchange (BVMAC). In August 2021, the Financial Market Supervisory Commission of Central Africa provided authorization for the National Bank of Equatorial Guinea’s (BANGE) new brokerage division, the BANGE Securities Company, to operate in the BVMAC and individual stock markets accredited within the CEMAC subregion. The BANGE Securities Company offers financial advising, portfolio management, brokerage services, and bond issuance. The government owns a 51 percent stake in BANGE, and bank shares were made available to domestic institutional investors through an initial public offering in November 2020, followed by secondary offering valued at $75 million in April 2021, which was opened to individual and foreign investors. In March 2022, BANGE advised the government to issue treasury bonds on the subregional market as one means of financing the country’s rising debt. CEMAC’s Bank of Central African States (BEAC) regulates interest rates in member countries by setting the discount rate. However, due to the high prevalence of default on loan repayment in Equatorial Guinea, local commercial banks set high interest rates for private borrowers, ranging from 12 to 18 percent for mortgages and approximately 15 percent for personal loans. Business loans generally require significant collateral, limiting opportunities for entrepreneurs, and may have rates of 20 percent or greater. There is no evidence of foreign investors obtaining credit on the local market. Equatorial Guinea’s banking system remains relatively underdeveloped, and little public information is available about the assets and health of the financial sector. The government’s National Economic and Financial Committee creates a semi-annual report on the country’s banking sector, but the report is not always made public. While banks have branches throughout the country, they are concentrated in urban centers. BANGE has the most branches (31), while CCEI/CCIW Bank de Guinea Ecuatorial, which has been wholly owned by the government since 2021, is the largest bank in the country in terms of total assets under management. BGFI Bank Guinée Equatoriale operates as a subsidiary of BGFI Holding Corporation (Gabon). Pan-African EcoBank (Togo) and Societe Générale (France) also operate in Equatorial Guinea. The construction of new bank branches is typically a result of government efforts to project an image of Equatorial Guinea as a financial center, rather than a reflection of the actual demand in the country. A small number of ATMs are located in urban centers. Banks are increasingly offering online banking services, though such services remain limited. BANGE estimates that 60 percent of the population has accessed formal financial services. CEMAC members do not have their own central banks, but instead host national BEAC branches. Three BEAC branches are located in Equatorial Guinea in Ebibeyin, Bata, and Malabo. BEAC’s Central Africa Banking Commission (COBAC) regulates the region’s banking systems and provides authorization for commercial banks to operate in each member country. The Ministry of Finance provides information on establishing a financial institution within the CEMAC region on its website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/condiciones-para-la-solicitud-de-una-acreditacion-de-actividades-financieras-en-la-cemac/ . Equatorial Guinea’s banking sector has been weighed down by a high prevalence of nonperforming loans (NPLs), as well as undercapitalization and low liquidity. At end of 2020, NPLs accounted for approximately 53 percent of all loans, driven mainly by government nonpayment of arrears on construction projects. A significant portion of the NPLs is concentrated in BANGE. Due to the continued economic recession and widespread property damage caused by explosions at a military barracks in the mainland city of Bata in March 2021, NPL rates are expected to increase in 2022. To address the NPL crisis, the government established a Partial Guarantee Fund over a decade ago to insure non-performing loans through the National Institute for Businesses Promotion, but the fund only covers small loans and so has had a limited effect on the larger problem. While the country’s economy is almost entirely cash-based, customers have reported that cash is not always available for withdrawal, a liquidity problem exacerbated by lengthy bureaucratic procedures and minimal digital record keeping. Foreigners must provide proof of residency to establish a bank account. The government established the Fund for Future Generations as its sovereign wealth fund in 2002. The fund receives 0.5% of all oil revenues and is governed and managed by BEAC. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates that the fund has approximately $165.5 million USD under management, although there is no publicly available information on its allocations or the regulations directing its maintenance and management. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government controls at least eight state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy, housing, fishing, aerospace and defense, and information and communication sectors. These include Sonagas (natural gas), GEPetrol (oil), SEGESA (electricity), GECOMSA and GETESA (telecommunications), SONAPESCA (fishing), ENPIGE (low-income housing), and Ceiba Intercontinental (national airline). The government’s annual budget includes allocations to and earnings from SOEs, but other details – such as total assets and number of employees – are not made available. SOEs also lack publicly available audited financial statements. In 2017, the government contracted Deloitte and Ernst & Young to conduct a detailed report on its SOEs, which provided a comprehensive list of these entities. The report and other information regarding SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Finance’s website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/empresas-publicas-y-entidades-autonomas/ . Following the recommendations of the IMF’s 2018 staff-monitored program, the government began efforts to improve governance of its SOEs. It established a committee for the restructuring of public entities and appointed new governing boards for each one. The IMF also required the government to contract an internationally reputable firm to audit the accounts of the state-owned oil (GEPetrol) and gas (Sonagas) companies, which the government hired at the start of 2019. As of April 2022, however, the audits had not been completed. To comply with the IMF’s recommendations, the government also committed to the privatization several of its SOEs. In April 2022, it announced that it would be privatizing GETESA, SEGESA, GITGE, and Ceiba Intercontinental, as well as its mail delivery service (GECOTEL) and vehicle inspection service (ITV). The government also stated that it will undertake privatization of undefined assets in the hospitality, health, and education sectors, as well as at the airports and ports. The government did not provide any details on the timeline or process for the privatization process, but it instructed the Ministry of Finance to establish the relevant procedures, including a transparent public bidding process that is open to international investors. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government does not have a clearly defined vision on responsible business conduct (RBC) for companies operating in the country. Rather, it encourages such practices through individual decrees and enforcement of laws and policies. The Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, for example, mandates that international oil companies invest a percentage of their proceeds in local corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects. Under the local content rules added to the Hydrocarbon Law in 2014, a significant portion of these funds are used to support the National Technological Institute of Mines and Hydrocarbons, which trains local nationals to work in the extractive sector. Some funds are invested in environmental projects through local and U.S.-based NGOs, while others support social projects like a human trafficking awareness campaign. All CSR projects must be approved by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, and the Ministry receives branding and credit for all CSR initiatives even it doesn’t contribute any funding. The Ministry oversees the entire CSR process through its Department of Local Content, including selecting the project, local implementing partner(s), and location(s). While there are significant human rights concerns in Equatorial Guinea, including arbitrary detentions and restrictions on free speech and assembly, in general these are not directly related to the investment sector. There are no alleged instances of child labor in supply chains, major land tenure issues, forced evictions of indigenous peoples, or arrests of environmental defenders. There are some cases of alleged forced labor of third country nationals working for foreign companies and foreign state-owned enterprises, which are covered in more detail in the Department of State’s Trafficking in Humans Report linked below. As a result of Equatorial Guinea’s underdeveloped and under-resourced judicial system, laws designed to protect human rights, workers, the environment, and consumers are not always effectively enforced. The absence of labor unions and weak civil society organizations result in little third-party oversight of or advocacy for improved government actions related to RBC. A high-profile case in early 2022 resulted in the arrest of six individuals accused of putting consumers at risk by falsifying the expiration dates on products at a prominent supermarket. In 2021, national police arrested multiple individuals for falsifying official signatures and documents to engage in illegal logging. Equatorial Guinea applied to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2010, but its application was delisted after the government missed the validation deadline. To comply with IMF recommendations, it reapplied in 2019, but it once again had to withdraw its application in 2020 for failure to meet all requirements. The government has been unable to identify a civil society organization to serve as part of an effective multi-stakeholder oversight mechanism, a key component of admission into the EITI. In late 2021, the Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons stated that the government would be resubmitting its application in early 2022, but as of April, no progress toward reapplying had been made public. Equatorial Guinea is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor does it participate directly in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA), although several companies in the country are members. 9. Corruption Corruption at all levels of government remains a serious issue, although the government has taken some steps to combat it. The government ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in May 2018 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in October 2019. In July 2020, the President issued Decree-Law No. 1/2020 on the Prevention and Fight against Corruption to bring its existing anti-corruption laws up to international standards in compliance with requirements from the IMF. The decree requires public officials to disclose all assets and sources of income, sets new rules to prevent conflicts of interests, prohibits officials from receiving most types of gifts, establishes a National Commission on the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption, and establishes punishments for corruption offenses, as well as protections for whistleblowers. As with the investment regulatory regime, however, anti-corruption enforcement remains weak. Some anti-corruption agencies, such as a Court of Accounts and a Commission on Ethics, have been created by law but have yet to be operationalized. Other offices, such as those of the anti-corruption prosecutor and the ombudsman, have been launched but remain weak and under-resourced. While some high-profile corruption cases against low- and mid-level officials were prosecuted in 2021, a culture of impunity remains among higher level leaders. Despite public disclosure of assets being included in both the anti-corruption law and the amended 2012 constitution, many public officials have yet to comply. Many high-level officials continue to have ownership of private sector businesses with no oversight of conflict of interest, contract negotiations, or anti-nepotism mechanisms. Law No. 2/2014 on Civil Servants of the State sets forth responsibilities and prohibited actions of public workers, and some autonomous entities and SOEs have established their own codes of conduct. In 2019, the government called for the establishment of a Commission on Ethics to facilitate reporting by public officials of acts of corruption, but it is not yet operational. Through harassment and intimidation, the government prevents civil society organizations from advocating on any issues that it considers to be political, and it does not offer protection for entities investigating corruption. NGOs of all kinds, but especially those engaging on issues of human rights and good governance, have difficulty obtaining legal registration through the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations, some waiting for years without an official answer despite multiple attempts. Corruption is reportedly present in many stages of the business cycle, including during procurement and awarding of licenses, as well as in regulatory enforcement and dispute settlement 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated arbitrary detentions do occur. Equatorial Guinea does not have a recent history of political violence or civil disturbance, due in part to significant government controls on political opposition and civil society. Over 50 percent of the population has official membership in the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE), which has maintained control of the legislative, executive, and, by extension, judicial branches since its founding in 1987. The Convergence for Social Democracy is the only legal, non-aligned opposition party, while 16 minor parties make up the “aligned opposition” and are closely affiliated with the PDGE. Legislative elections are expected to take place in 2022, with presidential elections anticipated in 2023. During its November 2021 national convention, the PDGE surprised many observers by not announcing whether President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has led the country since taking power in 1979, would run for his final constitutionally authorized term. If a new PDGE candidate is named for the 2023 presidential elections or following President Obiang’s final term, some observers predict in-fighting within the party and/or the ruling family that could lead to temporary political instability. In almost all official meetings and speeches, Equatorial Guinea’s top leaders warn of the many internal and external threats faced by the country. Some of these warnings results from thwarted coup attempts in 2004, 2009, and 2017, as well as increasing instability in West and Central Africa, but they may also be designed to solidify popular support for the PDGE and the Obiang family. Maritime piracy remains a critical threat in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). While reported attacks dropped from 81 in 2020 to 34 in 2021, all 57 of the global piracy-related kidnappings in 2021 occurred in the GoG. The year-to-year decrease in incidents was in part the result of several foreign governments sending vessels to patrol the waters of the GoG, including the Russian, Brazilian, and Danish navies. Following the 2019 hijacking of a supply vessel in transit to Exxon-Mobil’s offshore facility and the October 2020 on-land attack on an oil compound, the government required all ships operating in Equatorial Guinea’s water to have an armed security officer, provided by Equatorial Guinea’s military, on board. Some international oil companies are instead attempting to procure their own armed security vessels, although the government has yet to provide final approval. Despite these efforts, five high-profile attacks in and around Equatorial Guinea’s waters occurred in November and December 2021. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In December 2021, the Parliament passed General Labor Law No. 4/2021, updating the regulations governing Equatorial Guinea’s labor law. This new law was designed to strengthen workers’ rights and create streamlined procedures for arbitrating labor disputes. It also raised the retirement age from 60 to 65. While the government has not published the law’s text online, in March 2022 it organized a public session to provide information on the new regulations to private companies. Labor disputes may be heard by the legislature or in the courts, and decisions often favor the employee. This can be especially true for foreign firms. Labor disputes involving companies are frequently resolved through legislative hearings, after which the company may be obligated to pay a substantial compensation to the local employee. Employers are required to make significant severance payments to separated employees, even when employment demands fluctuate due to market conditions. Currently, the government does not provide any unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs to assist laid-off workers. Due to its small labor pool and underdeveloped education system, Equatorial Guinea has a consistent shortage of both skilled and unskilled local labor. Foreign laborers make up an important segment of all sectors of the economy, and dominate in highly skilled professions, including engineers, pilots, and doctors. Despite local skilled labor shortages, the National Content Law of Equatorial Guinea requires that 70 percent of foreign oil company’s staff consist of local nationals. Furthermore, before hiring an expatriate worker, these companies must demonstrate to the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons that they have been unable to find a suitable local employee during a period of 30 days. While official statistics are scarce, anecdotal evidence suggests that youth unemployment is widespread and that women remain under-represented in the formal economy. A study conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 2017 estimated that the informal sector is responsible for 32 percent of Equatorial Guinea’s GDP. This informal sector, which includes the provision of both goods and services, grew quickly following the start of an economic recession in 2015, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Aside from a union of small farmers and the taxi association, the government has not recognized any labor unions, so collective bargaining is not common. The government allows small collectives and associations to register but does not permit them to engage in labor advocacy. There have not been any strikes during the last year that posed an investment risk, as the government typically restricts strikes or protests. There is no evidence of the government waiving labor laws to attractive foreign investments. Equatorial Guinea joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1981 and has ratified the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, and the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. 14. Contact for More Information Economic-Commercial Section U.S. Embassy Malabo (+240) 333 09 57 41 malabopol-econ@state.gov Eritrea Executive Summary Except for the mining sector, Eritrea’s investment climate is not conducive to U.S. investment. Wide-ranging U.S. economic sanctions, the lack of a commercial code, disconnection from international financial systems for all but government-to-government transactions, and strict government control of all imports and exports severely limit foreign investment. Most private businesses are small, family-owned storefronts. With rare exception, businesses of size or scale are state controlled or run by the sole political party, the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). The Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) is the largest employer in the country, and most citizens are employed by country’s national service program, which often results in indefinite terms of forced labor at very low wages in a wide range of public sector positions. The national currency, the Eritrean Nakfa, is not convertible and there are restrictions on the repatriation of profits out of the country. The national budget is not public. The judiciary is not independent or transparent. There is limited freedom of the press, international journalists are often barred from entry, and the government maintains control of the media. Most profitable investments in Eritrea come about through direct negotiation with the PFDJ rather than market-based private investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 161 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $-2 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2011 $600 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Eritrean government professes a desire for more and more diversified FDI. However, strict governmental control of the economy, circulation of currency, access to foreign currency, and the means of production, and the lack of robust business and investment legal code makes private investment difficult, time-consuming, and financially risky. The official 1994 Investment Proclamation No. 59/1994 states that all sectors (excluding domestic retail, domestic wholesale, import, and commission agency companies without a bilateral agreement of reciprocity) are open to any investors. In practice, this law has been suspended and the ruling PFDJ determines those sectors in which – and defines the terms under which – private investment is accepted. The Investment Center, established in 1998, operates directly under the Office of the President; it does not publish any information related to its activities. In the past, the Center conducted public outreach to encourage members of the Eritrean diaspora to invest in Eritrea. The Center has not conducted a large public event since 2012; senior Center officials have stated that the time for investments is not appropriate because investment developments must follow political developments. There is no business ombudsman in Eritrea or other mechanisms to prioritize retention or maintain dialogue with existing investors. In practice, there is no fundamental “right” for either foreign or domestic private entities to establish or run business enterprises free from government interference. All sectors of the economy are tightly controlled by the GSE, most large enterprises are either entirely or partially owned by the government or the PFDJ, and the government can order a business to close without explanation or legal recourse. There are both statutory and de facto limits on foreign ownership and control of enterprises. All foreign-owned mines must give a 10% stake to the Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO), and ENAMCO has the option to buy another 30% equity in a project. Regulations in other fields are not well established. With some exceptions, such as mining, investment is de facto prohibited in most sectors of the economy. The government has encouraged investment in the mining sector, and mining-specific regulations were adopted in 2011. There are few other large foreign investments in the country. The few foreign enterprises operating in Eritrea do so under non-public agreements negotiated directly between the companies or countries and a small group of officials from the GSE and the PFDJ. There is no transparent GSE screening mechanism for approving inbound foreign investment. The GSE has undergone no recent third-party investment policy review. No civil society organizations have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. The government has made no known efforts to facilitate business in Eritrea although this may change for Chinese businesses following the November 2021 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for China’s Belt Road Initiative. The government does not have a business registration website. Businesses are required to register with six government offices (the Business License Office, the Ministry of Information, the Inland Revenue Department, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the local municipality), and the registration process usually takes 84 days, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business report. According to local experts, if an agreement is reached with the government and the PFDJ, this process can be expedited significantly for foreign businesses. Given the low level of capital accumulation in the economy, Eritrea is not a likely provider of foreign capital. As part of its efforts to direct capital towards development, the GSE’s laws strictly control capital flows (including payment for the importation of goods), currency exchange, and restricts domestic investors from making large investments abroad. For example, per person monthly bank withdrawals are limited to 5,000 Nakfa ($333), and Eritreans are generally unable to withdraw dollars. 3. Legal Regime The GSE is not transparent. Legal and regulatory systems are not transparent. Ministries are empowered to (and do) issue new regulations, subject to PFDJ approval, with no public debate. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernment organizations or private sector associations. New regulations come out with no public announcement; people only learn of them through word-of-mouth. There is no publicly accessible location (online or otherwise) to find key proclamations, laws, or regulatory actions. One can sometimes find the regulations for sale at bookshops. There is no public oversight of government actions nor legal recourse against government actions taken. The government does not promote any form of transparency, including promoting or requiring companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. The seeming arbitrariness of government regulation and action is a drag on the economy. Officials occasionally shutter businesses without explanation, leaving other businesses to wonder (and often spread rumors) as to what happened. Public finances and debt obligations are not made public. Eritrea is a founding member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). It also belongs to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (though it has not participated in the latter for several years.) COMESA decisions are binding on all member states, but as they are made by consensus this does not cause conflict. Eritrea is one of only 10 UN member states that has no affiliation with the WTO. The Eritrean legal system is based on the Ethiopian system that was in place at the time of independence in 1993. It is primarily a civil law system, though these laws are deeply influenced by traditional law. Eritrea has a written commercial code, derived from the Ethiopian commercial code in effect at the time of independence along with several proclamations to update the code. A full rewrite was done as part of a 2015 overhaul of the major legal codes, but these were never implemented. Any international company doing business in Eritrea will need the assistance of a local attorney versed in the complexities of the Eritrean legal system. The judicial system is not fully independent of the executive. Judges are National Service employees, and thus work for the executive branch. Many enforcement decisions, and especially those that relate to the commercial or labor codes, are adjudicated solely through the national court system and are appealable. Eritrea’s legal system plays only a minor role in foreign direct investment. All large-scale foreign direct investment is part of an opaque political process and is managed by non-public agreements negotiated directly with a small group of officials in the government and the ruling party. Eritrea does not have a website for foreign investors to learn about relevant laws, rules, procedures and reporting requirements. There have been no new major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions announced in the past year. There are no indications that the GSE makes any effort to promote market competition. All large-scale economic activity is either fully controlled by the PFDJ or jointly controlled by it in partnership with international companies operating under agreements negotiated directly with the GSE/PFDJ. There is no transparent process that would allow an individual or company to appeal any GSE expropriation of property. The most recent public case of expropriation was in 2019, when the government expropriated 22 health clinics from the Catholic Church, citing a law prohibiting religious organizations from providing social services. The Catholic Church said there was no due process or ability to appeal the decision. Bankruptcy is addressed in the Eritrean Civil Law and the proclamations amending it; however due to lack of transparency in the court system, it is impossible to determine what rights, if any, creditors, shareholders and holders of other financial contracts have in practice. No information is available on how bankruptcy is handled in practice. 4. Industrial Policies Any investment incentives offered to foreign investors, if they exist, are negotiated directly between a small group of GSE and PFDJ officials and foreign governments or companies. There is no published investment incentive framework available for review by all potential foreign investors. For mining projects, the government requires the ability to buy up to 30% of the equity in the project, in addition to the 10% equity they get by right. There are two designated Free Trade Zones in Eritrea: 1) The Free Trade Zone in the port city of Massawa, and 2) the Free Trade Zone along the common border between Eritrea and Sudan. However, neither FTZ is operational. The few large foreign enterprises allowed to operate in Eritrea are believed to employ large amounts of non-domestically produced or acquired goods and technology. However, due to a lack of transparency, it is impossible to determine if their agreements encourage or require them to use some minimal amounts of local goods or technology. There are no public or transparent procedures for establishing performance requirements for domestic or foreign enterprises. In Eritrea, there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. The lack of internet and cellphone data infrastructure (internet penetration in the country is believed to approximate 1.5%) impede data transfer from Eritrea, but there are no publicly stated policies that impede data transmission. There are no publicly stated rules on local data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights All land in Eritrea is owned by the GSE, and the right to use that land is given out based on a variety of factors to citizens. In practice, there are often disputes over ownership of buildings, though it is unclear what percentage of titles are disputed, and no effort has been made in the last five years to clean up the registries. Foreigners are forbidden by law from owning real property; however, there are a number of exceptions to that law. If a foreign business is able to invest in Eritrea, the government will often provide unused land for the business’s use. People and businesses can be summarily ejected from their property at any time. If legally purchased property stays unoccupied for years, the government can force the owner to rent it out or, in rare cases, the government can seize the property. Under Eritrean law, the Copyright section of the Civil Code addresses intellectual property (IP) rights. Due to a lack of transparency, it is difficult to determine if and how IP rights are protected in practice. Legal structures are weak, and IPR protection and enforcement are rare to non-existent. The government does not maintain publicly available statistics on law enforcement or judicial actions. Eritrea is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector There is no functioning public market for capital in Eritrea, nor is there an established stock market. The GSE fully controls the banking and financial sectors; there are no transparent mechanisms to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into portfolio investments. There is no transparency in decisions regarding credit allocation. Transfers of foreign currency are heavily restricted due, in part, to government concerns about foreign terrorist financing and maintaining adequate foreign currency reserves. The GSE does not respect the International Monetary Fund’s (IMP) Article VIII, regarding restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Due to restrictions on the use and hoarding of cash, most Eritreans now have bank accounts and use banking services. However, there are excessive regulation on banking accounts (including low monthly limits on withdrawals and restrictions on sending foreign currency abroad) and obsolete technology at the banks, which are frequently subjected to extended power cuts, forcing them to cease or limit services. There are no automated teller machines in Eritrea and there is no infrastructure to allow the use of credit or debit cards. It is unclear what the estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks are. The Bank of Eritrea is the country’s central bank. Foreign banks are not allowed to open branches or establish operations in Eritrea. Foreigners are able to establish bank accounts but are subject to the same monthly Nakfa withdrawal limits as Eritreans. Eritrea does not currently have any correspondent banking relationships. Per a 1994 regulation, locally based entities are forbidden from maintaining foreign bank accounts. Eritrea has no sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Most large enterprises in Eritrea are operated directly or jointly by the GSE or PJDF, and there is no general awareness of the concept of “responsible business conduct” (RBC). However, on some issues, especially environmental protection, many businesses take great care to act responsibly. Due to a lack of transparency, it is unknown if the GSE has taken any measures to encourage RBC; if it has, these efforts are not well publicized. According to numerous reports from international NGOs (operating outside of Eritrea), the United Nations, and the U.S. Government, the GSE does not fairly and effectively enforce its domestic laws in relation to human rights, including labor rights. Any products created by state-owned or parastatal organizations is likely to involve forced labor through the government’s national service system. However, Eritrea has rather stringent safeguards for environmental protections. There are no public capital markets inside of Eritrea and only a small number of publicly traded companies operate inside of Eritrea. Due to lack of transparency, it is impossible to determine if the GSE has established any standard of corporate governance, accounting and executive compensation to protect shareholders. There are no independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations, unions or business associations in Eritrea. Due to lack of transparency, it is impossible to determine if the GSE encourages adherence to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Individual mining companies participate in programs such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, but this participation is not mandated by the GSE. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The government is developing a “National Adaptation Plan,” which includes improving water management, planting trees, and improving degraded land. There are no expectations on private business at this point; this is a government-led effort. However, it has no plan to reach net-zero carbon emissions. 9. Corruption Eritrean laws criminalize corruption by public officials and by any who claim influence over public officials, which would include family members and political parties. Due to limited transparency within the government, it is unclear the extent to which the GSE applies these laws, though evidence suggests little corruption among high-level government officials but significant petty corruption at the local level. There are no specific provisions concerning conflicts of interest. There is no available information to suggest that the GSE requires private companies to establish internal codes that prohibit bribery of public officials, and it is unlikely that the government does so. It is likely that some, but not all, of the large foreign private companies use internal controls, ethics or compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery. Eritrea is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption or any other international anti-corruption initiatives. There are no independent NGOs in Eritrea, including those that investigate corruption. There are no U.S. firms in Eritrea to provide an opinion on corruption as an impediment to FDI, but it is unlikely to be a serious impediment. There are no government agencies that operate independently of the Office of the President and the PFDJ to whom one can report corruption. There are also no independent “watchdog” organizations working within Eritrea. 10. Political and Security Environment There is no history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. In 2015, there were public reports that a Canadian-operated mine in Eritrea was damaged by explosions caused by either bombs or mortars. The mine continued to operate and there were conflicting accounts of who was responsible for the explosion(s). This one incident does not seem to have had a continuing impact on the investment environment. Due to Eritrea’s single-party political system, it is difficult to know how politicized or secure the country is, as information on public opinion and security matters does not flow freely. However, the level of politicization and security does not seem to have changed in recent years. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The most important factor influencing the labor market in Eritrea is the GSE’s National Service program, which, in practice, due (the GSE claims) to a long-standing state of emergency, subjects a large portion of the labor force to indefinite government service, working at very low wages across a large swath of the employment spectrum and unable to pursue alternative employment on penalty of imprisonment. All university graduates require a release from National Service before they can legally pursue other employment opportunities. There is no reliable data on unemployment. Foreign labor is mostly unknown, aside from the small number of multinational companies. Migrant labor, in the sense of Eritreans moving from place to place for work, is mostly restricted to the agricultural sector, and even there it is a small part of the labor force given the dominance of subsistence farming in the agricultural sector. Female participation in the economy is high. While there are shortages of specialized labor in many sectors of the economy, particularly in the areas of administration, the international mining facilities are largely able to find enough sufficiently skilled workers; in many cases these are National Service employees seconded from a relevant ministry. Many small Eritrean companies blame National Service for the paucity of skilled employees available in the market. Leaving a National Service position without authorized release can result in imprisonment. Due to National Service, Eritrea is a Tier 3 country for Trafficking in Persons, which results in sanctions against the government. The informal economy plays a significant role in the Eritrean economy, though there is no data to show how significant. Those who evade National Service are only able to work in the informal economy. Domestic work is completely unregulated. According to the GSE’s stated policy, the large international mining facilities currently operating in Eritrea are required to hire Eritrean workers wherever possible and to offer training programs for Eritrean workers. All workers have the right under Eritrean law to severance if removed from a job, regardless of the reason for removal (termination for cause, layoff, or resignation.) The amount of severance depends on the salary and the length of accrued service. Moreover, notice must be given any time an employment agreement ends, with some exception for malfeasance on either side, again determined by how long the employee has worked. There are no known official safety nets for those laid off for economic reasons. Officially, no labor laws have been waived in order to attract or retain investment, but as most large investments are completed through private negotiations between the government and/or PFDJ and the outside entity, it is impossible to know the exact nature of provisions of these agreements. There is one legal labor union in Eritrea, the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW). The NCEW engages in collective bargaining for those workers who qualify, but as most workers are in National Service, very few benefit. The NCEW also represents workers in labor dispute management. Eritrea has a Labor Relations Board which hears disputes, made up of seven members of the NCEW, seven members of the employers’ association, and one government official. There have been no labor protests or strikes during the past year. The use of those serving in National Service for civilian jobs, and the indefinite nature of that service, continues to pose reputational risks for organizations doing work in Eritrea. A Canadian company that used to run a mine in Eritrea was sued in Canadian court over accusations that it employed National Service workers; the case was settled confidentially out of court in 2020. An EU development project has come under fire after accusations of forced labor. There are a number of other areas (informal sector, child labor, minimum wage) where Eritrean law does not meet international standards. No new laws have been introduced in the last year, nor are any new laws expected. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Asmara 179 Alaa St. Asmara, Eritrea +291 12000 AsmaraWebmaster@state.gov Estonia Executive Summary Estonia is a safe and dynamic country for investment, with a business climate very similar to the United States. As a member of the EU, the Government of Estonia (GOE) maintains liberal policies in order to attract investments and export-oriented companies. Creating favorable conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) and openness to foreign trade has been the foundation of Estonia’s economic strategy. The overall freedom to conduct business in Estonia is well protected under a transparent regulatory environment. Estonia is among the leading countries in Eastern and Central Europe regarding FDI per capita. By 2021, Estonia had attracted in total USD 38 billion (stock) of investment, of which 27 percent was made into the financial sector, 17 percent into real estate, 15 percent into retail and wholesale sector, and 13 percent into science and technology. United States FDI stock in Estonia is USD 451 million, and Estonian FDI stock in United States totals USD 349 million. The Estonian economy has recovered strongly from the pandemic crisis. The country’s GDP grew 8.3 percent in 2021, one of the fastest recoveries in Europe. Although Estonia is tightly connected to international value chains, it has experienced relatively few impacts from global supply chain issues so far, but the war in Ukraine is likely to have a more significant impact on supply chains in the region than the COVID crisis. In the area of climate and environmental policies, Estonia is working toward decarbonizing its economy including reducing its dependency on oil shale in electricity generation, increasing the energy efficiency of buildings, and introducing carbon free transport. The green transition in the business sector will require support from the government to help ensure Estonia adheres to the principles of circular economy. Estonia’s government has not yet set limitations on foreign ownership, and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing with local investors. However, the government is currently developing a framework to screen incoming FDI for national security concerns, which could have some impact on foreign investments. There are no investment incentives available to foreign investors. Foreign investors have not faced significant challenges with corruption, though Estonia has had some cases in local municipalities. The Estonian income tax system, with its flat rate of 20 percent, is considered one of the simplest tax regimes in the world. Deferral of corporate taxation payment shifts the time of taxation from the moment of earning the profits to that of their distribution. Undistributed profits are not subject to income taxation, regardless of whether these are reinvested or merely retained. This may change for companies with an annual turnover of more than 750 million euros depending on the EU’s implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax agreement. Estonia offers opportunities for businesses in a number of economic sectors including information and communication technology (ICT), green energy, wood processing, and biotechnology. Estonia has strong trade ties with Finland, Sweden, and Germany. Estonia suffers a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 21 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $451 https://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/146/r/2293/2122 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $23,170 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Estonia is open to FDI and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing with local investors, though the government is developing a screening mechanism to adhere to the EU Foreign Investment Screening Regulation entered into force on April 10, 2019. This new regulation was launched in October 2020, creating an information-sharing mechanism between Member States and allows Member States and the European Commission to comment on foreign investments foreseen in other Member States. The Estonian Investment Agency (EIA), a part of Enterprise Estonia, is a government agency promoting foreign investments in Estonia and assisting international companies in finding business opportunities in Estonia. EIA offers comprehensive, one-stop investment consultancy services, free of charge. The agency’s goal is to increase awareness of business opportunities in Estonia and promote the image of Estonia as an attractive country for investments. More info: http://www.investinestonia.com/en/estonian-investment-agency/about-the-agency Estonia’s government has not set limitations on foreign ownership. Licenses are required for foreign investors to enter the following sectors: mining, energy, gas and water supply, railroad and transport, waterways, ports, dams and other water-related structures, and telecommunications and communication networks. The Estonian Financial Supervision Authority issues licenses for foreign interests seeking to invest in or establish a bank. Additionally, the Estonian Competition Authority reviews transactions for anti-competition concerns. Government review and licensing have proven to be routine and non-discriminatory. As a member of the EU, the Government of Estonia (GOE) maintains liberal policies in order to attract investment and export-oriented companies. Creating favorable conditions for FDI and openness to foreign trade has been the foundation of Estonia’s economic strategy. Existing requirements are not intended to restrict foreign ownership but rather to regulate it and establish clear ownership responsibilities. Since becoming a member of the EU, Estonia is included in World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of the EU/EC. The fourteenth review of the trade policies and practices of the European Union took place in February 2020. Full report available here: WTO | Trade policy review -European Union (formerly EC) 2020 . The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report ranks Estonia in 18th place out of 190 countries on the ease of Starting a Business. Economic freedom, ease of doing business, per capita investments, low national debt, euro zone membership, and low corruption scores – all these factors play a role in fostering a good climate for business facilitation. In Estonia there are two ways to register your business: Electronic registration via the e-Commercial Register’s (takes between 5 minutes and 1 business day). Through a notary (takes 2-3 business days) More info on registering the business entity and link to the Register: https://www.eesti.ee/en/doing-business/establishing-a-company/comparison-of-each-form-of-business/ On July 1, 2014, an amended Taxation Act establishing the employment register entered into force, requiring all natural and legal employers to register the persons employed by them with the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The company must register itself as a value-added tax payer if the taxable turnover of the company, excluding imports of goods, exceeds EUR 40,000 as calculated from the beginning of the calendar year. There are certain areas of activity (like construction, electrical works, fire safety, financial services, security services, etc.) in which business operation requires an additional registration in the Register of Economic Activities (MTR), but this can be done after registration of the company in the Commercial Register: https://mtr.mkm.ee/ Estonia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad nor does it promote outward investment. Estonia companies have invested abroad about USD 12.5 billion, mostly into EU countries. The main sectors for outward investments are services, manufacturing, real estate and financial. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Estonia has set transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish “clear rules of the game.” Despite these measures, due to the small size of Estonia’s commercial community, instances of favoritism are not uncommon. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Financial statements should be prepared in accordance with either: accounting principles generally accepted in Estonia; or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adopted by the EU. Listed companies and financial institutions are required to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS as adopted by the EU. The Estonian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are written by the Estonian Accounting Standards Board (EASB). Estonian GAAP, effective since 2013, is based on IFRS for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs) with limited differences from IFRS for SMEs with regard to accounting policies as well as disclosure requirements. More info: https://investinestonia.com/business-in-estonia/establishing-company/accounting-requirements/ The Minister of Justice has responsibility for promoting regulatory reform. The Legislative Quality Division of the Ministry of Justice provides an oversight and coordination function for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and evaluations with regards to primary legislation. For government strategies, EU negotiations and subordinate regulations, oversight responsibilities lie within the Government Office. The Government of Estonia has placed a strong focus on accessibility and transparency of regulatory policy by making use of online tools. There is an up-to-date database of all primary and subordinate regulations ( https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/ ) in an easily searchable format. An online information system tracks all legislative developments and makes available RIAs and documents of legislative intent ( http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main ). Estonia also established the website www.osale.ee , an interactive website of all ongoing consultations where every member of the public can submit comments and review comments made by others. Regulations are reviewed on the basis of scientific and data-driven assessments. Estonia, an OECD member country, has committed at the highest political level to an explicit whole-of-government policy for regulatory quality and has established sufficient regulatory oversight. Estonia scores the same as the United States on the World Bank`s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance on whether governments publish or consult with public about proposed regulations: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/estonia . Estonia’s widely praised “e-governance” solutions and other bureaucratic procedures are generally far more streamlined and transparent than those of other countries in the region and are among the easiest to use globally. In addition, Estonia’s budget and debt obligations are widely and easily accessible to the general public on the Ministry of Finance website. Estonia is a member of the EU. An EU regulation is a legal act of the European Union that becomes immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously. Regulations can be distinguished from directives which, at least in principle, need to be transposed into national law. Regulations can be adopted by means of a variety of legislative procedures depending on their subject matter. European Standards are under the responsibility of the European Standardization Organizations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) and can be used to support EU legislation and policies. Estonia has been a member of WTO since November 13, 1999. Estonia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) since 2015. Estonia’s judiciary is independent and insulated from government influence. The legal system in Estonia is based on the Continental European civil law model and has been influenced by the German legal system. In contrast to common law countries, Estonia has detailed codifications. Estonian law is divided into private and public law. Generally, private law consists of civil law and commercial law. Public law consists of international law, constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, financial law and procedural law. Estonian arbitral tribunals can decide in cases of civil matters that have not previously been settled in court. More on Estonian court system: https://www.riigikohus.ee/en . Arbitration is usually employed because it is less time consuming and cheaper than court settlements. The following disputes can be settled in arbitral tribunals: Labor disputes; Lease disputes; Consumer complaints arguments; Insurance conflicts; Public procurement disputes; Commercial and industrial disputes. Recognition of court rulings of EU Member States is regulated by EU legislation. More: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf Estonia is part of the Continental European legal system (civil law system). The most important sources of law are legal instruments such as the Constitution, European Union law, international agreements and Acts and Regulations. Major laws affecting incoming foreign investment include the Commercial Code, Taxation Act, Income Tax Act, Value Added Tax Act, Social Tax Act, and Unemployment Insurance Payment Act. More information is available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/ . An overview of the investment-related regulations can be found here: http://www.investinestonia.com/en/investment-guide/legal-framework The Estonian Competition Authority reviews transactions for anti-competition concerns. Government review and licensing have proven to be routine and non-discriminatory. More info on specific competition cases: https://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/en Private property rights are observed in Estonia. The government has the right to expropriate for public interest related to policing the borders, public ports and airports, public streets and roads, supply to public water catchments, etc. Compensation is offered based on market value. Cases of expropriation are extremely rare in Estonia, and the Embassy is not aware of any expropriation cases involving discrimination against foreign owners. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Estonia. Bankruptcy procedures in Estonia fall under the regulations of Bankruptcy Act that came into force in February 1997. The Estonian Bankruptcy Act focuses on the protection of the debtors and creditors’ rights. According to the Act, bankruptcy proceedings in Estonia can be compulsory, in which case a court will decide to commence the procedures for debt collection, or voluntarily by company reorganization. Detailed information about creditor’s rights: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/504072016002/consolide More info from World Bank’s Doing Business Report on Estonian ranking for ease of “resolving insolvency: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.DFRN.XQ?locations=EE 4. Industrial Policies Estonia is open for FDI and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing with local investors with respect to incentives. There are no investment incentives or government guarantees available to foreign investors. As the green transition is one of the Government of Estonia’s main priorities, a wide range of assistance is available to all companies, including those with foreign ownership. Grants and co-financing are available for clean energy, energy efficiency, and circular economy projects. More info on assistance: Keskkonnainvesteeringute Keskus | (kik.ee) Estonia’s Customs Act permits the government to establish free trade zones. Goods in a free trade zone are considered to be outside the customs territory. Value-added tax, excise, import and export duties, as well as possible fees for customs services, do not have to be paid on goods brought into free trade zones for later re-export. In Estonia, there are four free trade zones: Muuga port (near Tallinn), Sillamae port (northeast Estonia), Paldiski north port (northwest Estonia) and in Valga (southern Estonia). All free trade zones are open for FDI on the same terms as Estonian investments. There are no specific performance requirements for foreign investments that differ from those required of domestic investments. The Estonian government does not mandate local employment or follow “forced localization” in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. Estonia continues to refine its immigration policies and practices. More info on work permits, visas, residence permits in Estonia: https://www.politsei.ee/en U.S. citizens are exempt from the quota regulating the number of immigration and residence permits issued, as are citizens of the EU and Switzerland. There are no requirements for foreign IT service providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (e.g., backdoors into hardware and software or turning over keys for encryption) or to maintain a certain amount of data storage in Estonia. There is no general requirement to register data processing activities in Estonia. Registration is required only if the data processor handles sensitive personal data. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force on May 25, 2018, with the goal of harmonizing the already existing data protection laws across Europe. The Estonian Personal Data Protection Act came into force on January 15, 2019. More info: https://e-estonia.com/how-to-be-compliant-gdpr-5-steps/ Restrictions on transfer of data offshore: Information on data transfer is available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523012019001/consolide or by contacting: Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate39 Tatari Street, 10134Tel: (+372) 627 4135 https://www.aki.ee/en 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. Mortgages are quite common for both residential and commercial property, and leasing as a means of financing is widespread and efficient. The legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights, including land, buildings, and mortgages. As of October 1, 2011, land reform in Estonia was almost complete. Restitution and privatization of lands commenced in 1991, but in almost every municipality there remain several complicated cases to be settled. In total, less than 4 percent of the Estonian territory (waterbodies included) lacks a clear title. Foreign individuals and companies are allowed to acquire real estate with the permission of the local authorities. There are legal restrictions on acquiring agricultural and woodland of 10 hectares or more, and permission from the county governor is needed. Foreign individuals are not allowed to acquire land located on smaller islands, or listed territories adjacent to the Russian border. Property may be taken from the owner without the owner`s consent only in the public interest, pursuant to a procedure provided by law, and for fair and immediate compensation. Everyone whose property has been taken from them without consent has the right to bring an action in the courts to contest the taking of the property, the compensation, or the amount of the compensation. More info: http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Estonia/Buying-Guide http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/estonia/registering-property#DB_rp Estonia maintains a robust IPR regime. The quality of IP protection in legal structures is strong, enforcement is good, and infringements and theft are uncommon. Estonia adheres to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, the Geneva Convention, and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Estonian legislation fully complies with EU directives granting protection to authors, performing artists, record producers, and broadcasting organizations. Equal protection against unauthorized use is provided via international conventions and treaties to foreign and Estonian authors. Companies should recognize that IP is protected differently in Estonia than in the United States, and U.S. trademark and patent registrations will not protect IP in Estonia. Registration of patents and trademarks are on a first-in-time, first-in-right basis, so companies should consider applying for trademark and patent protection before selling products or services in the Estonian market. Intellectual property is primarily a private right and the U.S. government generally cannot enforce rights for private individuals in Estonia. It is the responsibility of the rights’ holders to register, protect, and enforce their rights where relevant, retaining their own counsel and advisors. Companies may wish to seek advice from local attorneys or IP consultants. Estonia is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report or on the Notorious Markets List. Estonian Customs tracks and reports periodically on seizures of counterfeit goods. In 2021, the Estonian Tax and Customs Board processed 262 cases involving counterfeit goods resulting in seizures of 3690 items, primarily footwear, clothes, bags, toys, electronics. Most of the infringed goods were detected in mail, and the volume of goods seized by case was small. In Estonia, IPR crimes are prosecuted. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en 6. Financial Sector Estonia is a member of the Euro zone. Estonia’s financial sector is modern and efficient. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market. The private sector has access to an expanding range of credit instruments similar in variety to those offered by banks in Estonia’s Nordic neighbors, Finland and Sweden. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Security Market Law complies with EU requirements and enables EU securities brokerage firms to deal in the market without establishing a local subsidiary. The NASDAQ OMX stock exchanges in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius form the Baltic Market, which facilitates cross-border trading and attracting more investments to the region. This includes sharing the same trading system and harmonizing rules and market practices, all with the aim of reducing the costs of cross-border trading in the Baltic region. Certain investment services and products may be limited to U.S. persons in Estonia due to financial institutions’ response to the U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Estonian financial services market overview: https://www.fi.ee/en?id=12737 IMF report on Estonia: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/20/Republic-of-Estonia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-462375 Estonia’s banking system has consolidated rapidly. The banking sector is dominated by two major commercial banks, Swedbank and SEB, both owned by Swedish banking groups. These two banks control approximately 62 percent of the financial services market. The third largest bank is a local LHV bank with 14 percent of market share. There are no state-owned commercial banks or other credit institutions. More information on banks’ assets is available at: http://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/FINANTSSEKTOR/147/645 The Scandinavian-dominated Estonian banking system is modern and efficient. Local and international banks in Estonia provide both domestic and international services (including internet and mobile banking) at competitive rates, as well as a full range of financial, insurance, accounting, and legal services. Estonia has a highly-advanced internet banking system: currently 98 percent of banking transactions are conducted via the internet. The Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank) is Estonia’s independent central bank. As Estonia is part of the Euro zone, the core tasks of the Bank are to help to define the monetary policy of the European Community and to implement the monetary policy of the European Central Bank, including the circulation of cash in Estonia. Eesti Pank is also responsible for holding and managing Estonian official foreign exchange reserves as well as supervising overall financial stability and maintaining reliable and well-functioning payment systems. Neither the Central Bank nor the government hold shares in the banking sector. EU legislation requires Estonia to make its AML regime compliant with EU directives. Estonia has passed legislation that makes its AML regime compliant with EU legislation. After large-scale money laundering cases through Estonian branches of Nordic banks came to light in Estonia, regulatory and government officials are taking steps to improve the AML oversight regime. The recent changes included transformation of supervisory structures and roles as well as amendment of laws governing them. Due to strict anti-money laundering (AML) regulations and bank compliance practices, it can be difficult for non-residents to open a bank account. More information on opening a bank account for non-resident investors: https://www.lhv.ee/en/non-residents https://wise.com/gb/blog/opening-a-bank-account-in-estonia There are no sovereign wealth funds or state-owned investment funds in Estonia. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The majority of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are incorporated into Estonian legislation. The non-profit organization, Responsible Business Forum in Estonia, aims to further corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Estonia, and is a partner in the CSR360 Global Partner Network. CSR360 ) is a network of independent organizations, which work as the interface of business and society to mobilize business towards socially responsible aims. The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications works closely with CSR on educating private businesses and SOEs on responsible business conduct, recognizing best practices, and factoring RBC policies or practices into its procurement decisions. Estonia generally enforces the labor, human rights, employment rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection related laws effectively and these requirements cannot be waived to attract foreign investment. These laws apply also to the private security industry. Estonia has adhered to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises since 2001. The National Contact Point can be accessed here: https://www.mkm.ee/en/objectives-activities/economic-development/oecd-guidelines-and-surveillance%20 Natural resource extraction related revenues, including mining licenses, are less than 0.6 percent of government budget revenues and less than 0.3 percent of the GDP. The revenues are reflected in the national budget. Here you can find a summary of the strength of minority shareholder protections against misuse of corporate assets by directors for their personal gain: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/estonia/protecting-minority-investors/ Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Estonia’s 2030 National Energy and Climate Plan (ENCP), passed in 2019, is a ten-year integrated document mandated for all European Union member states in order to ensure the EU meets its overall greenhouse gases emissions targets. Estonia’s long-term objective is to transition to a low-carbon economy by gradually reforming the economy and energy system to be resource-efficient, productive, and environmentally friendly. Estonia plans to reduce the use of fossil fuels and decrease CO2 emissions through energy savings in transport, agriculture, waste management, and industrial processes, in addition to utilizing small-scale heat and power cogeneration plants in regional centers. The share of renewables will be increased by converting fossil fuel boilers to use renewable fuels, increasing electricity generation from fuel-free sources, and increasing use of biofuels in transport. In the electricity and heating sector, Estonia’s plans focus on increasing renewable sources. The Government has committed to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. 9. Corruption Estonia has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, and while corruption is not unknown, it has generally not been reported to pose a major problem for foreign investors. Both offering and taking bribes are criminal offenses which can bring imprisonment of up to five years. While “payments” that exceed the services rendered are not unknown, and “conflict of interest” is not a well-understood issue, surveys of American and other non-Estonian businesses have shown the issue of corruption is not a serious concern. In 2021, Transparency International (TI) ranked Estonia 13th out of 180 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index. Anti-corruption policy and implementation are coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and the strategy is implemented by all ministries and local governments. The Internal Security Service is effective in investigating corruption offences and criminal misconduct, leading to the conviction of several high-ranking state officials. Until recently corruption was most commonly associated with public sector activities. Recently the government-initiated efforts to educate private sector businesses about the risks of business-to-business corruption, for example within procurement activities. Estonia cooperates in fighting corruption at the international level and is a member of GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption). Estonia is a party to both the Council of Europe (CoE) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the Civil Law Convention. The Criminal Law Convention requires criminalization of a wide range of national and transnational conduct, including bribery, money-laundering, and accounting offenses. It also incorporates provisions on liability of legal persons and witness protection. The Civil Law Convention includes provisions on compensation for damage relating to corrupt acts, whistleblower protection, and validity of contracts, inter alia. More info on the corruption level in different sectors in Estonia can be found at: Estonia – Transparency.org The UN Anticorruption Convention entered into force in Estonia in 2010. Estonia has been a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business since 2004; the underlying Convention entered into force in Estonia in 2005. The Convention obligates Parties to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in the conduct of international business. The United States meets its international obligations under the OECD Anti-bribery Convention through the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Government agency contacts responsible for combating corruption: +372 6123657 Central Criminal Police corruption hotline Or e-mail: korruptsioonivihje@politsei.ee Transparency International in Estonia: Estonia – Transparency.org 10. Political and Security Environment Civil unrest generally is not a problem in Estonia, and there have been no incidents of terrorism. Public gatherings and demonstrations may occur on occasion in response to political issues, but these have proceeded, with very few exceptions, without incidence of violence in the past. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Estonia has a small population – 1.31 million people. The average monthly Estonian salary at the end of 2021 was about USD 1,900. About 75 percent of the workforce is employed in the services sector. With an aging population and a negative birth rate, Estonia, like many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, faces demographic challenges affecting its long-term supply of labor. Improving labor efficiency is a key focus for Estonia in the short-to-mid-term. At the end of 2021, the unemployment rate was 5.2 percent. More on the labor market: Labour Market Review 2/2021 | Publications | Eesti Pank The Law of Obligations Act, the Individual Labor Dispute Resolution Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act address employment and labor issues. Labor laws may not be waived in order to attract or retain investment. Labor laws are generally strict, and the principle of employee protection is applied in which the worker is considered the economically weaker party. Upon termination of an employment contract due to a lay-off, an employer must pay an employee compensation in the amount of one month’s average wage. In addition, an insurance benefit shall be paid to an employee by the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund depending on the length of service. Trade union membership remains low compared to most countries in the EU. Estonia has ratified all eight ILO Core Conventions. Estonian labor regulations on labor abuses, health and safety standards, labor disputes etc. are effectively monitored by the Estonian Labor Inspectorate: http://www.ti.ee/en/ Eswatini Executive Summary Since the 2018 election that saw a number of ministers with private sector experience join the cabinet, foreign investments have increased. The Eswatini Investment Promotion Authority (EIPA) advocates for foreign investors and facilitates regulatory approval. Recent positive developments include the country’s commercial operation of a 10 MW solar powered plant as well as the opening of a Kelloggs – Tolaram factory that produces noodles for export as well as the first 24-hour border operation between Eswatini and South Africa. After Eswatini regained AGOA eligibility, the country has worked to redefine itself through the economic recovery strategy as an export-oriented, private sector led economy. The government built or is in the process building a number of factory shells that benefit manufacturing firms. In addition to manufacturing, the Swati government is prioritizing the energy sector, particularly renewable energy, and developed a Grid Code and Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer (RE&IPP) Policy to create a transparent regulatory regime and attract investment. Eswatini generally imports 80 percent of its power from South Africa and Mozambique. With both South Africa and Mozambique experiencing electricity shortages, Eswatini is working to increase its own energy generation using renewable sources, including hydro and solar projects. With the emergence of Covid 19, the need for ICT business and infrastructure opportunities found their way to the top of the priority list as ICT became the core of the new normal. Eswatini is supporting ICT initiatives such as e-governance and further development of the Royal Science and Technology Park. The digital migration program of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also presents ICT opportunities in the country. Incentives to invest in Eswatini include repatriation of profits, fully serviced industrial sites, purpose-built factory shells at competitive rates, and duty exemptions on raw materials for manufacture of goods to be exported outside the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Financial incentives for all investors include tax allowances and deductions for new enterprises, including a 10-year exemption from withholding tax on dividends and a low corporate tax rate of 10 percent for approved investment projects. New investors also enjoy duty-free import of machinery and equipment. Special Economic Zone (SEZ) investors may benefit from a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation (followed by taxation at 5 percent); full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and other taxes payable on goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. In the year 2021, six mining licenses were granted by the king for prospecting in gold, diamonds, and coal. Eswatini’s land tenure system, where the majority of rural land is “held in trust for the Swati nation,” continues to discourage long-term investment in commercial real estate and agriculture. Eswatini has historically been a services economy with South African retail service providers being among the major employers. However, due to developments in the Africa continental free trade area, it is likely that strategic manufacturing for export will again take the lead in the near future as there is new enthusiasm towards foreign market opportunities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 120 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,723.3 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of the Kingdom of Eswatini (GKoE) regards foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of the five pillars of its Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth (SDIG) Program, and a means to drive the country’s economic growth, obtain access to foreign markets for its exports, and improve international competitiveness. While the government has strongly encouraged foreign investment over the past 15 years, it only recently adopted a formal strategy for achieving measurable progress. Eswatini does not have a unified policy on investment. Instead, individual ministries have their own investment facilitation policies, which include policies on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), agriculture, energy, transportation, mining, education, and telecommunications. Calls for more concerted action on these policies have intensified in the last few years as Eswatini has suffered from drought, fiscal challenges, and general economic recession. The Swati constitution states, generally, that non-citizens and/or companies with a majority of non-citizen shareholders may not own land unless they were vested in their ownership rights before the constitution entered into force in 2006. On the other hand, the constitution’s general prohibition “may not be used to undermine or frustrate an existing or new legitimate business undertaking of which land is a significant factor or base.” Furthermore, non-citizens and non-citizen majority-owned companies may hold long-term (up to 99 years) leases on Title and Swati Nation Land. Besides land ownership laws, there are no laws that discriminate against foreign investors. In 2019, the government listed some of its title deed land to make it available for long-term leasing for commercial purposes. In practice, most successful foreign investors associate local partners to navigate Eswatini’s complex bureaucracy. Most of the country’s land is Swati Nation Land held by the king “in trust for the Swati Nation” and cannot be purchased by foreign investors. Foreign investors that require significant land for their enterprise must engage the Land Management Board to negotiate long-term leases. The Eswatini Investment Promotion Authority (EIPA) is the state-owned enterprise (SOE) charged with designing and implementing strategies for attracting desired foreign investors. Eswatini’s Investment Policy and policies that support the business environment are online at https://investeswatini.org.sz/legal-and-regulatory-framework/ (EIPA is currently functional and helpful, but it is not yet a one-stop-shop for foreign investors). EIPA services include: Attract and promote local and foreign direct investments Identify and disseminate trade and investment opportunities Provide investor facilitation and aftercare services Promote internal and external trade Undertake research and policy analysis Facilitate company registration and business licenses/permits Facilitate work permits and visas for investors Provide a one stop shop information and support facility for businesses Export product development Facilitation of participation in external trade fairs BuyerSeller Missions The GKoE continues its attempts to improve the ease of doing business in the country through the Investor Roadmap Unit (IRU). The IRU engages with businesses and government to review and report on the progress and implementation of the investor roadmap reforms. EIPA has an aftercare division for purposes of investment retention that serves as a direct avenue for investors to communicate concerns they may have. Most investors who stay beyond the initial period during which the GKoE offers investment incentives have opted to remain long-term. Both foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish businesses and acquire and dispose of interest in business enterprises. Foreign investors own several of Eswatini’s largest private businesses, either fully or with minority participation by Swati institutions. There are no general limits on foreign ownership and control of companies, which can be 100 percent foreign owned and controlled. The only exceptions on foreign ownership and control are in the mining sector and in relation to land ownership. The Mines and Minerals Act of 2011 requires that the King (in trust for the Swati Nation) be granted a 25-percent equity stake in all mining ventures, with another 25 percent equity stake granted to the GKoE. There are also sector-specific trade exclusions that prohibit foreign control, which include business dealings in firearms, radioactive material, explosives, hazardous waste, and security printing. Foreign investments are screened only through standard background and credit checks. Under the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011, investors must submit certain documents including proof of residence and source of income for deposits. EIPA also conducts general screening of FDI monies through credit bureau checks and Interpol. This screening is not a barrier to investing in Eswatini. There are no discriminatory mechanisms applied against US foreign direct investors. There have been no investment policy reviews for Eswatini in the last 3 years. Through its membership in the Southern African Customs Union, its ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and its participation in the work of the WTO, Eswatini continues to pursue the importance of trade in development. In 2015, the WTO performed a Trade Policy Review of the Southern African Customs Union that included Namibia, Botswana, Eswatini, South Africa, and Lesotho. In 2016, the Trade Facilitation agreement was ratified, and Eswatini’s portion of that review is available online: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/country_arc_e.htm?country1=SWZ Eswatini does not have a single overarching business facilitation policy. Policies that address business facilitation are spread across the spectrum of relevant ministries. The Investors Road Map Unit (IRMU) is the public entity responsible for the review and monitoring of business environment reforms. EIPA facilitates foreign and domestic investment opportunities and has a fairly modern, up-to-date website: https://investeswatini.org.sz / , and certain GKoE application forms are available online at the EIPA website. Recent developments in the business facilitation space include the online registration of companies via the link www.online.gov.sz . As of 2020 the final steps (payment of statutory fees and registration fee) are now available offline. According to the Doing Business Report, the process of registering a company in Eswatini takes approximately 10 days. In practice, the process can take much longer for foreign investors. The main organization representing the private sector is Business Eswatini ( www.business-eswatini.co.sz ), which represents more than 80 percent of large businesses in Eswatini, works on a wide range of issues of interest to the private sector and seeks to build partnerships with the government to promote commercial development. Through Business Eswatini, the private sector is represented in a number of national working committees, including the National Trade Negotiations Team (NTNT). 3. Legal Regime In general, the laws of the country are transparent, including laws to foster competition. The Swaziland Competition Act came into force in 2007, and the Competition Commission Regulations came into effect in 2011. The Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) is a statutory body charged with the administration and enforcement of the Competition Act of 2007. The legal and regulatory environment is underdeveloped, but currently growing as the GKoE has recently established additional regulatory bodies in the financial, energy, communications, and construction procurement sectors. These bodies generally attempt to emulate the regulatory practices of South Africa or Britain. Eswatini’s rule-making and regulatory authority lies with the central government and may be delegated by the relevant line ministry to a department, parastatal, or board. The primary custodian of policy and regulation is the minister responsible for the relevant law. All laws, regulations, and policies are applied at a national level. There are no regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Regulatory enforcement actions can be reviewed through the court system, and court rulings are publicly available. Adherence to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) is required for listed companies, financial institutions, and government-owned companies. It remains optional for small and medium enterprises. Proposed laws and regulations are published in the government Gazette and have a public comment period of thirty days prior to a bill’s presentation to parliament. Ministries sometimes consult with selected members of the public and private sectors through stakeholder meetings. Most draft regulations are not available online but can be acquired in hard copy through the government printing office for a fee. Regulations are generally developed and reviewed through various stakeholder consultations. The use of science and data to inform regulatory reform is not widespread. Foreign investors coming into the country can join Business Eswatini on equal footing with Eswatini nationals. Business Eswatini often serves as the link between the private sector and the government. There are no informal regulatory processes that apply to foreign investors. Eswatini public finance and debt obligations are published online through the budget estimates book as well as the Central Bank of Eswatini’s annual report. Eswatini is part of four distinct economic blocks: the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The standards of membership in these blocks are primarily based on British law and have been domesticated accordingly into each context. Eswatini is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Eswatini signed and ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and has begun implementing its requisites. The TFA entered into force in February 2017 and requires prompt and transparent publication of trade-related information. Eswatini developed a trade portal in partnership with the World Bank to make reliable trade-related information accessible to the private sector. The GKoE approved the portal and is now at the data collection stage. Eswatini has a dual legal system consisting of a set of courts that follow Roman-Dutch law and a set of national courts that follow Swati law and custom. The former consists of a Court of Appeals (Supreme Court) and a High Court, in addition to magistrate’s courts in each of the four districts. The traditional courts deal with minor offenses and violations of traditional Swati law and custom. Sentences in traditional courts are subject to appeal and review at the Court of Appeals and High Court. The western-style court system enforces contracts and property rights. The country has various written commercial and contractual laws. Commercial and contractual disputes are handled in the magistrate court or High Court depending on the amount in dispute. There are currently no specialized commercial courts; however, the government is in the process of establishing a Small Claims Bench. Specialized Industrial Courts hear labor relations matters. The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, and the courts are generally independent of executive control or influence in nonpolitical criminal and civil cases not involving the royal family or government officials. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, although the capacity of the judiciary to handle cases in a timely manner is extremely limited, creating significant case backlogs. Enforcement of laws and regulations is appealable up to the Supreme Court. The Swaziland Investment Promotion Act of 1998 established EIPA and provides for the freedom of investment, protection of investment, and non-discrimination on the part of the government with respect to investors. The Competition Act of 2007 proscribes anti-competitive trade practices and specifies requirements for mergers and acquisitions, and protection of consumer welfare. The new economic recovery strategy (Revised National Development Strategy) has emphasized the need to promote further reforms in order to facilitate investment. In February 2018, the GKoE enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. The benefits for an SEZ investor include: a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation, followed by taxation at the rate of 5 percent; full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and all other taxes payable in respect of goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. The Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) was established in 2007 to encourage competition in Eswatini’s economy by controlling anti-competitive trade practices, mergers, and acquisitions; protecting consumer welfare; and providing an institutional mechanism for implementing these objectives. The Swaziland Competition Act ( http://www.compco.co.sz/documents/Competition%20Act%202007%20scanned18%20Februry%202010.pdf ) and Competition Commission Regulations ( http://www.compco.co.sz/documents/Competition%20Commission%20Regulations%20Notice%202010.pdf ) are available online. All entities must submit their merger and acquisition plans to the SCC for prior approval. The SCC has the power to not only investigate and regulate, but also to issue administrative decisions relating to mergers, competition, and anti-trust. There have been no rulings against foreign investors since the establishment of the Swaziland Competition Commission. The law prohibits expropriation and nationalization. The Swati constitution narrowly limits the GKoE’s powers to deprive a landowner of “property or any interest in or right over property,” except where “necessary,” conducted pursuant to a court order, and compensated by the “prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation.” Anyone whose property interests are threatened by expropriation is also expressly granted due process rights under the constitution. There have been no recent cases of foreign-owned businesses being expropriated, and when disputes have arisen in the past, there has been due process through Swati institutions and/or international tribunals. The Insolvency Act of 1955 is the law that governs bankruptcy in Eswatini. The insolvent debtor or his agent petitions the court for the acceptance of the surrender of the debtor’s estate for the benefit of his creditors. Creditors need to petition with the court and provide documents supporting their claim. Bankruptcy is only criminalized if the debtor, trustee, or sole owner does not comply with the requirements of the creditor. For example, if he/she fails to submit documents or declare assets, or if he/she obstructs or hinders a liquidator appointed under the Act in the performance of his functions, then he/she could be found guilty of an offense. The most widely used credit bureau in Eswatini is Transunion. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Eswatini ranks 121 out of 190 economies for ease of resolving insolvency. SEZ investors have access to numerous investment incentives more fully described above in “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment” and below in “Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation.” For non-SEZ investors, the Minister of Finance has the discretion to apply a reduced tax rate of 10 percent for the first ten-year period of operation, which is available for businesses that qualify under the Development Approval Order. Capital goods imported into the country for productive investments are exempt from import duties. Raw materials imported into the country to manufacture products to be exported outside the SACU area are also exempt from import duties. The law allows for repatriation of profits and dividends including salaries for expatriate staff and capital repayments. The Central Bank of Eswatini guarantees loans raised by investors for export markets. There is also provision of loss cover that a company can carry over in case it incurs a loss in the year of assessment. Eswatini has a human resources training rebate that offers a tax credit for 150 percent of the cost of training. The GKoE issues guarantees for key sectors like transportation and energy. There have been no reports of government jointly financing FDI projects. In February 2018, the GKoE enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. The Act establishes two designated SEZs: the Royal Science and Technology Park and King Mswati III International Airport. According to the Act, investors may establish additional SEZs outside of these designated areas by satisfying the minimum requirements and submitting an application to the Minister of Commerce. Under the Act, foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Swati entities. To operate within an SEZ, a beneficiary company must meet the following minimum requirements (among others): at least 90 percent of its employees must be paid at or above the threshold for income taxation (approximately USD 330/month); at least two thirds of its employees must be Swati citizens; and the minimum capital investment must be E30 million (USD 2.1 million) for sole companies and E70 million (USD 5 million) for joint ventures. The benefits for an SEZ investor include: a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation, followed by taxation at the rate of 5 percent; full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and all other taxes payable in respect of goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s Training and Localization Unit requires the hiring of qualified Swati workers where possible, even at executive positions. The mandate of the Unit is to ensure the maximum utilization of local manpower resources and to formulate training plans in conjunction with industries so as to maximize employment. It also facilitates and provides information on the process of obtaining work permits. Foreign investors are required to apply for residence and work permits. Although they are generally awarded, businesspeople complain that the process is cumbersome. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest. The government does not follow a “forced localization” policy. However, in the manufacturing sector, if a company plans to label a product for export as “Made in Eswatini,” the government requires that the local content of such export be at least 25 percent. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. The technology industry in Eswatini is still in its infancy. The intellectual property rights index (2020) ranks Eswatini 7th in Africa and 79th globally in protection of intellectual property. https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/swaziland There are two major categories of land tenure: Swati Nation Land (SNL) and Title Deed Land (TDL), each subject to different rules and procedures. More than 60 percent of Eswatini’s territory is SNL, governed by the country’s traditional structures. SNL is “held in trust for the Swati people” by the King, who appoints chiefs to oversee its use. The chiefs keep records of who “owns” or resides on land in their chiefdoms. For TDL, the Eswatini government recognizes and enforces secured interest in property and there is a reliable system of recording security interests. The Constitution protects the right to own property, but most rural land is SNL and is not covered by this constitutional protection. Most urban property, on the other hand, is TDL. The law allows for eminent domain in limited circumstances but requires prompt payment of adequate compensation. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Eswatini ranks 104 out of 190 economies for ease of registering property. This ranking refers to property in peri-urban areas, where TDL is widely available. SNL is not titled, and lending institutions are reluctant to use it as collateral. Though foreign or non-resident individuals generally may not own land (with some exceptions), foreign-owned businesses are able to own or lease land. Legally purchased property cannot revert to other owners (must be “willing buyer, willing seller”). Protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights is currently inadequate under Swati law. Patents are currently protected under a 1936 act that automatically extends patent protection, upon proper application, to products that have been patented in either South Africa or Great Britain. Trademark protection is addressed in the Trademarks Act of 1981. Copyright protections are addressed under four statutes, dated 1912, 1918, 1933, and 1936. Laws enacted in 2018 have updated Eswatini’s intellectual property legal framework. The Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act of 2014 (replacing the Copyright Act of 1912) protects literary, musical, artistic, audio-visual, sound recordings, broadcasts, and published editions. It also criminalizes illicit recording and false representation of someone else’s work. The Act also gives the duration of copyright among other things. The Swaziland Intellectual Property Tribunal Act of 2015 established an Intellectual Property Tribunal that is responsible for hearing all matters and disputes involving intellectual property in Eswatini. The Trademarks (amendment) Act of 2015 brings the (1981) Trademarks Act into compliance with provisions of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Madrid Agreement concerning International Registration of Marks, and the Banjul Protocol on Trademarks. Eswatini does not track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods. Eswatini is not listed on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Eswatini’s capital markets are closely tied to those of South Africa and operate under conditions generally similar to the conditions in that market. In 2010, the GKoE passed the Securities Act to strengthen the regulation of portfolio investments. The Act was primarily intended to facilitate and develop an orderly, fair, and efficient capital market in the country. Eswatini has a small stock exchange with only a handful of companies currently trading. In 2010, the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) was established. This institution governs non-bank financial institutions including capital markets, insurance firms, retirement funds, building societies, micro-finance institutions, and savings and credit cooperatives. The royal wealth fund and national pension fund invest in the private equity market, but otherwise there are few professional investors. Existing policies neither inhibit nor facilitate the free flow of financial resources; the demand is simply not present. The Central Bank respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII, and credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors are able to get credit and equity from the local market. A variety of credit instruments are available to the private sector including Central Bank of Eswatini loan guarantees for the export markets and for small businesses. 54 percent of the Swati adult population is banked. According to the Central Bank of Eswatini’s Financial Stability Report, the Swati banking sector is stable and financially sound. The asset quality (the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans) stood at 9.3 per cent marginally rising from 9.2 percent. Aggregate bank liquidity to deposits stood at 38.3 per cent, increasing from 32.8 per cent the previous year. The average return on assets (ROA) and return on total equity (ROE) decreased from 2.6 percent and 16.6 percent to 1.5 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively, during the same period (June 2019 to June 2020). The estimated total assets for the country’s banks are estimated at E19.4 billion (USD 1.4 billion) as of June 2018, up from E17.9 billion (USD 1.3 billion) in March 2017. Eswatini has a central bank system. Eswatini’s banks are primarily subsidiaries of South African banks. Standard Bank is the largest bank by capital assets and employs about 400 workers. In 2018, the Central Bank of Eswatini under the Financial Institutions Act of 2005 awarded a new commercial banking license to Farmer’s Bank. Eswatini’s financial sector is liberalized and allows foreign banks or branches to operate under the supervision of the Central Bank’s laws and regulations (http://www.centralbank.org.sz). Foreigners may establish a bank account in Eswatini if they have residency in one of the CMA countries (Eswatini, South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia). There have been no bank closures or banks in jeopardy in the last three years. Hostile takeovers are uncommon. In 1968, the late King Sobhuza II created a Royal Charter that governs the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in Eswatini, Tibiyo TakaNgwane. This fund is not subject to government or parliamentary oversight and does not provide information on assets or financial performance to the public. Tibiyo TakaNgwane publishes an annual report with financials, but it is not required by law to do so as it is not registered under the Companies Act of 1912. The annual reports are not made public or submitted to any other state organ for debate or review. The SWF obtains independent audits at the discretion of its Board of Directors. Tibiyo TakaNgwane states in its objectives that it supports the government in fostering economic independence and self-sufficiency. It widely invests in the economy and holds shares in most major industries, e.g., sugar, real estate, beverages, dairy, hotels, and transportation. For its social responsibility practices, it provides some scholarships to students. The SWF and the government co-invest to exercise majority control in many instances. Tibiyo TakaNgwane invests entirely in the local economy and local subsidiaries of foreign companies. It has shares in a number of private companies. Sometimes foreign companies can form partnerships with Tibiyo, especially if the foreign company wants to raise capital and can manage the project on its own. Eswatini has 49 SOEs, which are active in agribusiness, information and communication, energy, automotive and ground transportation, health, housing, travel and tourism, building education, business development, finance, environment, and publishing, media, and entertainment . The Swati government defines SOEs as private enterprises, separated into two categories. Category A represents SOEs that are wholly owned by government. Category B represents SOEs in which government has a minority interest, or which monitor other financial institutions or a local government authority. These categories are further broken down into profit-making SOEs with a social responsibility focus, those that are profit-making and developmental, those that are regulatory, and those that are regulatory but developmental. SOEs purchase and supply goods and services to and from the private sector including foreign firms. Those in which government is a minority shareholder are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as the private sector. The Public Enterprise Act governs SOEs. The Boards of the respective SOEs review their budgets before tabling them to the relevant line ministry, which in turn, tables them to Parliament for scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. The Ministry of Finance’s Public Enterprise Unit (PEU) maintains a published list of SOEs, available on request from the PEU. SOEs do not receive non-market-based advantages from government. Eswatini SOEs generally conform to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Senior managers of SOEs report to the board and, in turn, the board reports to a line minister. The minister then works with the Standing Committee on Public Enterprise (SCOPE), which is composed of cabinet ministers. SOEs are governed by the Public Enterprises Act, which requires audits of the SOEs and public annual reports. Government is not involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs. Boards of SOEs exercise their independence and responsibility. The Public Enterprise Unit provides regular monitoring of SOEs. The line minister of the SOE appoints the board and, in some cases, the appointments are politically motivated. In some cases, the king appoints his own representative as well. Generally, court processes are nondiscriminatory in relation to SOEs. A published list of SOEs can be found on: http://www.gov.sz/index.php/component/content/article/141-test/1995-swaziland-enterprise-parastatals?Itemid=799 Eswatini SOEs operate primarily in the domestic market. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long advised the Eswatini government to privatize SOEs, particularly in the telecommunications sector and the electricity sector. In response, the government has passed several laws, and privatization efforts have begun to advance. Since Eswatini Mobile (formerly Swazi Mobile) launched in 2016, as well as other private telecommunications companies during the intervening years, prices for cellular services have come down and mobile and data offerings have improved in the country. Sectors and timelines have not been prioritized for future privatization, although it is likely that some SOEs will be privatized following the public launch of the Revised National Development Strategy. The government is working to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign electricity by promoting renewable energy production. Eswatini imports the bulk of its electricity from South Africa and Mozambique, reaching 100 percent importation during a recent drought, since domestic production comes predominantly from hydropower. With assistance from USAID’s Southern Africa Energy Program (SAEP), the government has developed a National Grid Code and a Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer (RE&IPP) Policy to provide a framework for the sector and incentivize investors. The Swati government encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted responsible business conduct (RBC) principles. Multinational enterprises in the country have robust standards for RBC, and consumers often recognize their efforts; however, smaller domestic companies are less likely to have RBC programs. The Development Approval Order, which is part of the income tax law, allows a company to receive a tax rate discounted by up to 10 percent if it makes significant RBC investments. Government enforcement is sporadic, but generally does not vary based on whether a company is domestic or foreign, and requirements are not waived to attract foreign investment. The government does not have corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. There are no independent NGOs monitoring RBC. The local courts are responsible for ensuring human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. The courts have not demonstrated a bias against foreign-owned corporations. The mining sector of Eswatini does not have enough economic significance to warrant special consideration by the government. It is treated consistent with other sectors of similar size. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engage in corrupt practices with impunity. Corruption continues to be a problem, most often involving personal relationships and bribes being used to secure government contracts on large capital projects. The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Swaziland Public Procurement Act are the two laws that combat corruption by all persons, including public officials. The Public Procurement Act prohibits public sector workers and politicians from supplying the government with goods or services; however, this prohibition does not extend to family members of officials. The Eswatini Public Procurement Agency (ESPPRA) conducted capacity building exercises nationwide with both public and private companies to increase knowledge and encourage adoption of universally practiced purchasing systems. According to Section 27 of the Public Procurement Regulations, suppliers are prohibited from offering gifts or hospitality, directly or indirectly, to staff of a procuring entity, members of the tender board, and members of the ESPPRA. While avoiding conflict of interest and establishing codes of conduct are policies that are encouraged, they are not effectively enforced. Some companies use internal controls and audit compliance programs to try to track and prevent bribery. Eswatini is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offenses and the SADC Protocol against Corruption. Eswatini has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, but it is not party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is legally allowed to investigate corruption and does so. The ACC does not provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. Given the Commission’s current capacity, “government procurement” is the most likely area to find corruption in Eswatini. The global competitiveness report ranks Swaziland 79 of 140 countries on incidence of corruption. Transparency International reports Eswatini as the 14th least corrupt country in Africa Though no US firms have cited corruption, the 2015 Africa Competitiveness report found that 12.8% of business owners saw corruption as a hurdle to doing business in Eswatini, impacting profits, contracts, and investment decisions for their companies. There is a public perception of corruption in the executive and legislative branches of government and a consensus that the government does little to combat it. There have been credible reports that a person’s relationship with government officials influenced the awarding of government contracts; the appointment, employment, and promotion of officials; recruitment into the security services; and school admissions. Authorities rarely took action on reported incidents of nepotism. Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption: Dan Dlamini Commissioner Eswatini Anti-Corruption Commission 3rd Floor, Mbandzeni House, Mbabane +268-2404-3179/0761 anticorruption@realnet.co.sz In July 2021, following COVID lockdowns and the banning of petition deliveries by citizenry protesting the death of a student, the country erupted in violence with business projects and installations being damaged or destroyed as a result. The resulting violence lasted for two days, culminating in the police and army restoring order. The king and government agreed to hold a dialogue on how the country should be governed. Although Eswatini has a long record of political stability with sporadic nonviolent protest, poor living and working conditions, widespread poverty, income inequality, and a large and growing youth population, however, continues to yield a political environment conducive to further unrest. The structure of the labor market and economic fundamentals in Eswatini are better developed than in many other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, GDP per capita is higher, the informal sector is smaller, exports are more diversified, the overall education level is higher, and the labor pool is predominantly domestic. Nevertheless, although Eswatini is considered a middle-income country, it has many characteristics of a low-income country. The minimum wage is low, inequality is high (0.51 Gini coefficient), poverty is widespread, the middle class is small, overall unemployment (especially youth unemployment) is high, and female representation is low. Eswatini has a shortage of technically skilled labor. The government has identified several sectors as priorities in terms of building skilled labor capacity: agricultural engineering, ICT, medicine, medical imaging, and occupational health. Other priority fields that the government may sponsor include physiotherapy, paramedic studies, forestry, special education, clinical and dental science, and pharmacy. The law requires that employers give first preference to Swati nationals unless they cannot find candidates with the necessary qualifications. The Employment Act states that if an employer contemplates adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions, the employer must give no less than one month’s notice to the Labor Commissioner and the trade union. The employer must provide the number of employees to be affected, their occupations and remuneration, the reasons for the adjustment, the effective date, financial statements and audited accounts of the company, and options that have been considered to avert the situation. Section 34 of the Employment Act says if the services of an employee are terminated other than being fired, a severance allowance amounting to ten working days’ wages for each completed year in excess of one year continuously employed by that employer is due. Layoffs are defined as temporary absences from work that are necessitated by the employer facing certain difficulties that are temporary in nature, while firing refers to the sacking of an employee. There are no social safety net programs for workers who are laid off. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. In 2018, Eswatini enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. In order to operate within an SEZ, a beneficiary company must meet the following minimum requirements (among others): at least 90 percent of its employees must be paid at or above the threshold for income taxation (approximately USD 330/month); at least two thirds of its employees must be Swati citizens; and the minimum capital investment must be E30 million (USD 2.1 million) for sole companies and E70 million (USD 5.0 million) for joint ventures. The law provides that workers, except for those in essential services, have the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Labor unions practice collective bargaining, but there are few industry associations and bargaining is conducted largely with individual employers in the private sector. Collective bargaining is common in the financial and textile sectors. The Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission (CMAC) serves as Eswatini’s labor dispute resolution mechanism. Labor disputes generally start at CMAC with mediation and arbitration. Either party can refuse arbitration and bring the case to the Industrial Court; however, due to severe backlogs at the court, the matter may not be heard for several years. According to the Industrial Relations Act, workers can engage in a strike action if there is an unresolved dispute. Although the law permits strikes, the right to strike is strictly regulated, and the administrative requirements to register a legal strike made striking difficult. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited in essential services, and the minister’s power to modify the list of these essential services provides for broad prohibition of strikes in nonessential sectors, including postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, and teaching. The procedure for announcing a strike action requires advance notice of at least seven days. The law details the steps to be followed when disputes arise and provides penalties for employers who conduct unauthorized lockouts. When disputes arise with civil servant unions, the government often intervenes to reduce the chances of a strike action, which may not be called legally until all avenues of negotiation are exhausted and a secret ballot of union members is conducted. Eswatini has ratified the eight core ILO conventions; however, compliance gaps with international labor standards continue to remain in both law and practice. The law provides that workers, except for those in essential services, have the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The law provides for the registration of unions and federations but grants far-reaching powers to the labor commissioner with respect to determining eligibility for registration. Unions must represent at least 50 percent of employees in a workplace and submit their constitutions to be automatically recognized. The law also gives employers discretion to recognize a union as a collective employee representative if it has less than 50 percent membership, and furthermore, allows employers to set conditions for such recognition. The Department of Labor has inspectors who verify whether companies adhere to labor regulations, health and safety standards, and wage laws. The Minister of Labor sets minimum wages through the Wages Councils. In 2018, Eswatini enacted a new Public Order Act that substantially loosened restrictions on public gatherings, including eliminating the requirement for prior consent for gatherings of fewer than 50 persons and completely removing restrictions on private gatherings. A gathering no longer requires permission, but instead only requires notice that provides basic information as to time, place, date, and logistics. Demonstrators no longer have to provide information as to the content of their planned speech. There is strong potential for a DFC program in Eswatini, particularly in the renewable energy industry; however, there has been not yet been a DFC (or OPIC) project in Eswatini. The GKoE has demonstrated a commitment towards encouraging private sector investment. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020$3.97 Billion 2020 $3.97 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country *Host Country Statistical Source: Central Bank of Eswatini Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Eswatini. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Political/Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Eswatini +268-2417-9663 Mbabane-Pol-Econ@state.gov Ethiopia Executive Summary Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria, with a growing population of over 110 million, approximately two-thirds of whom are under age 30. A reform-minded government, low-cost labor, a national airline with over 100 passenger connections, and growing consumer markets are key elements attracting foreign investment. Ethiopia faced several economic challenges in 2021 related to the COVID-19 pandemic, a drought in the southern and eastern lowlands, political tension and unrest in parts of the country, and an ongoing conflict in the north. Ethiopia’s macroeconomic position was characterized by over 30 percent inflation, meager foreign exchange reserves, a large budget deficit, and plummeting credit ratings. The IMF estimated GDP growth at 2.0 percent in 2021, a significant drop from 6.0 percent in 2020 and double-digit growth for much of the past decade. During 2021, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) made the first revisions in over 60 years to the commercial code, awarded a spectrum license to a private telecom operator, and took initial steps toward privatization of other state-owned sectors, including the telecom and sugar industries. Ethiopia is a signatory of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and it has a climate resilience green economy strategy (CRGES) to build a green and resilient economy. Ethiopia has also formulated climate-resilient sectoral policies and strategies to provide specific strategic interventions in areas such as agriculture, forestry, transport, health, urban development, and housing. In 2020-21, the GOE provided liquidity to private banks to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on businesses, to facilitate debt restructuring and to prevent bankruptcies and it also injected liquidity into the hotel and tourism sector through commercial banks. The GOE planned to allocate roughly $1 billion U.S. dollars during the same period for medical equipment purchases, healthcare worker salaries, quarantine and isolation facilities, and the procurement of disinfectants and personal protective equipment. The challenges of doing business in Ethiopia remain daunting. Companies often face long lead-times importing goods and dispatching exports due to logistical bottlenecks, corruption, high land-transportation costs, and bureaucratic delays. An acute foreign exchange shortage (the Ethiopian birr is not a freely convertible currency) impedes companies’ ability to repatriate profits and obtain investment inputs. The lack of a capital market hinders private sector growth. Export performance remains weak, as the country struggles to develop exports beyond primary commodities (coffee, gold, and oil seeds) and the Ethiopian birr remains overvalued. Ethiopia is not a signatory of major intellectual property rights treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks. Insecurity and political instability associated with various ethnic conflicts – particularly the conflict in northern Ethiopia – have negatively impacted the investment climate and dissuaded foreign direct investment (FDI). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/ethiopia Global Innovation Index 2020 126 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2018-report# U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#411 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $890 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Ethiopia needs significant inflows of FDI to meet its ambitious growth goals. Over the past year, to attract more foreign investment, the government passed a new investment law, acceded to the New York Convention on Arbitration, amended its 60-year-old commercial code, and digitized the commercial registration and business licensing processes. The government has also begun implementing the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Proclamation to allow for private investment in the power generation and road construction sectors. The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) has the mandate to promote and facilitate foreign investments in Ethiopia. To accomplish this task, the EIC is charged with 1) promoting the country’s investment opportunities to attract and retain investment; 2) issuing investment permits, business licenses, work permits, and construction permits; 3) issuing commercial registration certificates and renewals; 4) negotiating and signing bilateral investment agreements; and 5) registering technology transfer agreements. In addition, the EIC has the mandate to advise the government on policies to improve the investment climate and to hold regular and structured public-private dialogues with investors and their associations. At the local level, regional investment agencies facilitate regional investment. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) advances U.S. business interests in Ethiopia. AmCham provides a mechanism for coordination among American companies and facilitates regular meetings with government officials to discuss issues that hinder operations in Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce organizes a monthly business forum that enables the business community to discuss issues related to the investment climate with government officials. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish, acquire, own, and dispose of most forms of business enterprises. The Investment Proclamation and associated regulations outline the areas of investment reserved for government and local investors. There is no private ownership of land in Ethiopia. All land is technically owned by the state but can be leased for up to 99 years. Small-scale rural landholders have indefinite use rights, but cannot lease out holdings for extended periods, except in the Amhara Region. The 2011 Urban Land Lease Proclamation allows the government to determine the value of land in transfers of leasehold rights to curb speculation by investors. A foreign investor intending to buy an existing private enterprise or shares in an existing enterprise needs to obtain prior approval from the EIC. While foreign investors have complained about inconsistent interpretation of the regulations governing investment registration (particularly relating to accounting for in-kind investments), they generally do not face undue screening of FDI, unfavorable tax treatment, denial of licenses, discriminatory import or export policies, or inequitable tariff and non-tariff barriers. Over the past three years, the government has not undertaken any third-party investment policy review by a multilateral or non-governmental organization. The government has worked closely with some international stakeholders, such as the International Finance Corporation, in its attempt to modernize and streamline its investment regulations. The EIC has attempted to establish itself as a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors by acting as a centralized location where investors can obtain the visas, permits, and paperwork they need, thereby reducing the time and cost of investing and acquiring business licenses. The EIC has worked with international consultants to modernize its operations and has adopted a customer management system to build lasting relationships and provide post-investment assistance to investors. Despite progress, the EIC admits that many bureaucratic barriers to investment remain. U.S. investors report that the EIC, as a federal organization, has little influence at regional and local levels. Currently, more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade passes through the Port of Djibouti, with residual trade passing through the Somaliland Port of Berbera or Port Sudan. Ethiopia concluded an agreement in March of 2018 with the Somaliland Ports Authority and DP World to acquire a 19 percent stake in the joint venture developing the Port of Berbera. The agreement will help Ethiopia secure an additional logistical gateway for its increasing import and export trade. The GOE is working to improve business facilitation services by making the licensing and registration of businesses easier and faster. In February 2021, the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration (MOTRI) launched an eTrade platform ( etrade.gov.et ) for business registration licensing to enable individuals to register their companies and acquire business licenses online. The amended commercial registration and licensing law eliminates the requirement to publicize business registrations in local newspapers, allows business registration without a physical address, and reduces some other paperwork burdens associated with business registration. U.S. companies can obtain detailed information for the registration of their business in Ethiopia from an online investment guide to Ethiopia: ( https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/ethiopia ) and the EIC’s website: ( http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/index.php/investment-process/starting-a-business.html ). MOTRI has target timeframes for the registration of new businesses, but it often fails to meet its deadlines. There is no officially recorded outward investment by domestic investors from Ethiopia as citizens/local investors are not allowed to hold foreign accounts. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Ethiopia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and it has bilateral investment and protection agreements with Algeria, Austria, China, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Finland, France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. Other bilateral investment agreements have been signed but are not in force with Belgium/Luxemburg, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, India, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Ethiopia signed a protection of investment and property acquisition agreement with Djibouti. A Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, which entered into force in 1953, governs economic and consular relations with the United States. There is no double taxation treaty between the United States and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has taxation treaties with fourteen countries, including Italy, Kuwait, Romania, Russia, Tunisia, Yemen, Israel, South Africa, Sudan, and the United Kingdom. 3. Legal Regime Ethiopia’s regulatory system is generally considered fair, though there are instances in which burdensome regulatory or licensing requirements have prevented the local sale of U.S. exports, particularly health-related products. Investment decisions can involve multiple government ministries, lengthening the registration and investment process. The Constitution is the highest law of the country. The parliament enacts proclamations, which are followed by regulations that are passed by the Council of Ministers and implementing directives that are passed by ministries or agencies. The government engages the public for feedback before passage of draft legislation through public meetings, and regulatory agencies request comments on proposed regulations from stakeholders. Ministries or regulatory agencies do neither impact assessments for proposed regulations nor ex-post reviews. Parties that are affected by an adopted regulation can request reconsideration or appeal to the relevant administrative agency or court. There is no requirement to periodically review regulations to determine whether they are still relevant or should be revised. All proclamations and regulations in Ethiopia are published in official gazettes and most of them are available online: http://www.hopr.gov.et/web/guest/122 and https://chilot.me/federal-laws/2/ Legal matters related to the federal government are entertained by Federal Courts, while state matters go to state courts. To ensure consistency of legal interpretation and to promote predictability of the courts, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is empowered to give binding legal interpretation on all federal and state matters. Though there are no publicly listed companies in Ethiopia, all banks and insurance companies are obliged to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regulations related to human health and environmental pollution are often enforced. In January 2019, the Oromia Region’s Environment, Forest, and Climate Change Commission shut down three tanneries in the Oromia Region for what was said to be repeated environmental pollution offenses. The federal government also suspended the business license of MIDROC Gold Mining in May 2018 following weeks of protests by local communities who accused the company of causing health and environmental hazards in the Oromia Region. In February 2019, the Ethiopian Parliament passed a bill entitled ‘Food and Medicine Administration Proclamation number 1112/2019’, which bans smoking in all indoor workplaces, public spaces, and means of public transport and prohibits alcohol promotion on broadcasting media. In April 2020, Ethiopia published the Administrative Procedure Proclamation number 1183/2020 (APP). The APP’s aim is to allow ordinary citizens who seek administrative redress to file suits in federal courts against government institutions. Potential redress includes financial restitution. The APP’s passage will require government institutions to set up offices that will handle such complaints. Complainants are required to follow an administrative appeal process, and only after exhausting administrative remedies will a person be allowed to file a suit in federal court. Four government institutions are exempt from the APP: the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); the Ethiopian Federal Police; the Ethiopian National Defense Force, and the intelligence agencies. To foster transparency, the APP obligates all government agencies’ regulations to be registered with MOJ (https://www.eag.gov.et/en-us/Home) and be widely accessible to the public. The enactment of the APP is widely viewed as a positive step in increasing confidence in the public sector and addressing the need for governmental institutions to adhere to the rule of law. Ethiopia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information from the investment commission’s website ( https://www.invest-ethiopia.com/ ) on administrative procedures applicable to investing in Ethiopia. The GOE provides accurate, comprehensive, and detailed information on the enacted budget and overall government debt. However, fiscal transparency in Ethiopia continues to have several deficiencies, including the unavailability of executive budget proposals, a lack of publicly available information on state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt, poor legislative oversight of budget preparation and execution, and limited budget execution reports. In April 2020 Ethiopia became a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA aims to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspersons and investments. Ethiopia is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional economic block, which has 21 member countries and has introduced a 10 percent tariff reduction on goods imported from member states. Ethiopia has not yet joined the COMESA free trade area, however. Ethiopia resumed its WTO accession process in 2018, which it originally began in 2003, but which later stagnated. Ethiopian standards have a national scope and applicability and some of them, particularly those related to human health and environmental protection, are mandatory. The Ethiopian Standards Agency is the national standards body of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has codified criminal and civil laws, including commercial and contractual law. According to the contractual law, a contract agreement is binding between contracting parties. Disputes between the parties can be taken to court. There are, however, no specialized courts for commercial law cases, though there are specialized benches at both the federal and state courts. While there have been allegations of executive branch interference in judiciary cases with political implications, there is no evidence of widespread interference in purely commercial disputes. The country has a procedural code for both civil and criminal court. Enforcement actions are appealable and there are at least three appeal processes from the lower courts to the Supreme Court. The Criminal Procedure Code follows the inquisitorial system of adjudication. Companies that operate businesses in Ethiopia assert that courts lack adequate experience and staffing, particularly with respect to commercial disputes. While property and contractual rights are recognized, judges often lack understanding of commercial matters, including bankruptcy and contractual disputes. In addition, companies complain that these cases often face extended scheduling delays, and that contract enforcement remains weak. To address these issues, the federal Supreme Court issued a new court-led mediation directive, number 12/2021, which is expected to resolve disputes including commercial ones within a shortened period while reducing litigation costs for involved parties. In March 2021, the parliament revised the Commercial Code for the first time in 60 years. The revised code modernizes and simplifies business regulations, develops regulations for new technologies not covered in the prior version, and seeks to implement greater transparency and accountability in commercial activities. Investment Proclamation number 1180/2020 and its implementing regulation number 474/2020 are Ethiopia’s main legal regime related to FDI. These laws instituted the opening of new economic sectors to foreign investment, enumerated the requirements for FDI registration, and outlined the incentives that are available to investors. The investment law allows foreign investors to invest in any investment area except those that are clearly reserved for domestic investors. A few specified investment areas are possible for foreign investors only as part of a joint venture with domestic investors or the government. The Investment Proclamation has introduced an Investment Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, to accelerate implementation of the new law and to address coordination challenges investors face at the federal and regional levels. Further, the new law expanded the mandate of the EIC by allowing it to provide approvals to foreign investors proposing to buy existing enterprises. The EIC now also delivers “one stop shop” services by consolidating investor services provided by other ministries and agencies. Still, the EIC delegates licensing of investments in some areas: air transport services (the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority), energy generation and transmission (the Ethiopian Energy Authority), and telecommunication services (the Ethiopian Communications Authority). The EIC’s website ( https://www.invest-ethiopia.com/ ) provides information on the government’s policy and priorities, registration processes, and regulatory details. In addition, the Business Negarit website ( http://businessnegarit.com/a/resources1/ ) provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The MOJ Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Adjudicative Bench is responsible for reviewing merger and acquisition transactions and monopolistic business practices. The bench’s decisions can be appealed to the federal Supreme Court. Post is not aware any significant competition cases during the reporting period. The 2020 Investment Proclamation stipulates that no investment by a domestic or foreign investor or enterprise can be expropriated or nationalized, wholly or partially, except when required by public interest in compliance with the law and provided adequate compensatory payment. The former Derg military regime nationalized many properties in the 1970s. The current government’s position is that property seized lawfully by the Derg (by court order or government proclamation published in the official gazette) remains the property of the state. In most cases, property seized by oral order or other informal means is gradually being returned to the rightful owners or their heirs through a lengthy bureaucratic process. Claimants are required to pay for improvements made by the government during the time it controlled the property. The Public Enterprises Holding and Administration Agency stopped accepting requests from owners for return of expropriated properties in July of 2008. The Commercial Code (Book III) outlines bankruptcy provisions and proceedings and establishes a court system that has jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. The primary purpose of the law is to protect creditors, equity shareholders, and other contractors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. However, there is limited application of bankruptcy procedures in Ethiopia as the process can take years to settle. 4. Industrial Policies Investment Regulation 474/2020 retains the investment incentive provisions as outlined under the 2012 law. Accordingly, investors in manufacturing, agri-processing, and selected agricultural products are entitled to income tax exemptions ranging from two to five years, depending on the location of the investment. Additionally, investors in manufacturing; agriculture; ICT; electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; and producers who produce for export or supply to an exporter, or who export at least 60 percent of the products or services, are entitled to an additional two years of income tax exemption. Investors in renewable energy generation are eligible for 4-5 years of income tax exemptions. There are no special incentives for investments made by members of under-represented social groups such as women. Industrial Park Proclamation 886/2015 mandates that the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Corporation develop and administer industrial parks under the auspices of government ownership. The law designates industrial parks as duty-free zones, and domestic as well as foreign operators in the parks are exempt from income tax for up to 10 years. Investors operating in parks are also exempt from duties and other taxes on the import of capital goods, construction materials, and raw materials for production of export commodities and vehicles. An investor who operates in a designated Industrial Development Zone in or near Addis Ababa is entitled to two years of income tax exemptions, and four more years of income tax exemption if the investment is made in an industrial park in other areas, provided 80 percent or more of production is for export or constitutes input for an exporter. Industrial Parks can be developed by either government or private developers. In practice, the majority have been developed by the GOE with Chinese financing. The list of operational industrial parks is available at https://ipdc.gov.et/service/parks. Ethiopia does not impose official performance requirements on foreign investors, though foreign investors routinely encounter business visa delays and onerous paperwork requirements. In addition, foreign investors are required to comply with a $100,000 minimum capital investment requirement for architectural or engineering projects and a $200,000 requirement to projects in other sectors. For most joint investments with a domestic partner, the minimum capital investment requirement is $150,000. The minimum capital requirement is waived if the foreign investor reinvests profits or dividends generated from an existing enterprise in any investment area open to foreign investors; and if a foreign investor purchases a portion or the entirety of an existing enterprise owned by another foreign investor. There are no forced localization or data storage requirements for private investors. Local content in terms of hiring, products, and services is strongly encouraged but not required. Proclamation 808/2013 mandates that the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) control the import and export of information technology, build an information technology testing and evaluation laboratory center, and regulate cryptographic products and their transactions. 5. Protection of Property Rights The constitution recognizes and protects ownership of private property, however all land in Ethiopia belongs to “the people” and is administered by the government. Private ownership does not exist, but land-use rights have been registered in most populated areas. As land is public property, it cannot be mortgaged. Confusion with respect to the registration of urban land-use rights, particularly in Addis Ababa, is common. The GOE retains the right to expropriate land for the “common good” – which it defines as expropriation for commercial farms, industrial zones, and infrastructure development – and offer replacement land or monetary compensation to the previous owner. While the government claims to allocate only sparsely settled or empty land to investors, it has in some cases forced people to resettle. Traditional grazing land has often been defined as empty and expropriated, leading to resentment, protests, and in some cases, conflict. In addition, leasehold regulations vary in form and practice by region. Successful investors in Ethiopia conduct thorough due diligence on land titles at both regional and federal levels and conduct consultations with local communities regarding the proposed use of the land before investing. We encourage potential investors to ensure their needs are communicated clearly to the host government. It is important for investors to understand who had land-use rights preceding them, and to research the attitude of local communities to an investor’s use of that land, particularly in the region of Oromia, where conflict between international investors and local communities has occurred. The Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO) oversees intellectual property rights (IPR) issues. Ethiopia is not yet a signatory to several major IPR treaties, such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, the Berne Convention for Literary and Artistic Works, the Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks, or the Patent Cooperation Treaty. In 2020 Ethiopia ratified the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled. The government has expressed its intention to accede to the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and the Madrid Protocol. Because Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO is incomplete, it is not a party to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). EIPO is primarily tasked with protecting Ethiopian patents and copyrights and fighting software piracy. Historically, however, the EIPO has struggled with a lack of qualified staff and small budgets; further, the institution does not have law enforcement authority. Abuse of U.S. trademarks is rampant, particularly in the hospitality and retail sectors. The government does not publicly track counterfeit goods seizures, and no estimates are available. Ethiopia is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. EIPO contact and office information is available at http://www.eipo.gov.et/ For additional information about the national law and for a local WIPO point of contact, please see WIPO’s country profile at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Embassy POC: Economic Officer, USEmbassyPolEconExternal@state.gov 6. Financial Sector Ethiopia has a limited and undeveloped financial sector, and investment is largely closed off to foreign firms. Liquidity at many banks is limited, and commercial banks often require 100 percent collateral, making access to credit one of the greatest hindrances to growth in the country. Ethiopia is the largest economy in Africa without a securities market, and sales/purchases of debt are heavily regulated. Ethiopia’s concessional IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program expired in September 2021. The program aimed to reduce public sector borrowing, rein in inflation, reform the exchange rate regime, and ensure external debt sustainability. The GOE has not yet launched formal talks with the IMF on a new program. The GOE has announced, as part of its overall economic reform effort, its intention to liberalize the financial sector. The government has already made good progress by allowing non-financial Ethiopian firms to participate in mobile money activities, introducing Treasury-bill auctions with market pricing, and reducing forced lending to the government on the part of the commercial banks. The parliament approved the establishment of a capital market in June 2021, and activities are underway to set up a capital market regulatory body and the stock market. The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE, the central bank) began offering a limited number of 28-day and 91-day Treasury bills at market-determined interest rates in December 2019. Since then, more bond offerings of longer tenures have been included in the auctions. The move was part of an effort to expand the NBE’s monetary policy tools and finance the government in a more sustainable way. Previously, the NBE had only sold Treasury bills at below-market interest rates, and the only buyers were public sector enterprises, primarily the Public Social Security Agency and the Development Bank of Ethiopia. Ethiopia issued its first 10-year Eurobond in December of 2014, raising 1 billion U.S. dollars at a rate of 6.625 percent. According to the Ministry of Finance, the bond proceeds are being used to finance industrial parks, the sugar industry, and power transmission infrastructure. Due to its increasing external debt load, the Ethiopian government has committed to refrain from non-concessional financing for new projects and to shift ongoing projects to concessional financing when possible. As Ethiopia’s ability to service its external debts declined in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ethiopia participated in the World Bank Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which suspended external debt payments from May 2020 through June of 2021. Ethiopia is seeking further debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI. Ethiopia has 23 commercial banks, two of which are state-owned. The Development Bank of Ethiopia, a state-owned bank, provides loans to investors in priority sectors, notably agriculture and manufacturing. By regional standards, the 21 private commercial banks are not large (either by total assets or total lending), and their service offerings are not sophisticated. Mobile money and digital finance, for instance, remain limited in Ethiopia. Foreign banks are not permitted to provide financial services in Ethiopia; however, since April 2007, Ethiopia has allowed some foreign banks to open liaison offices in Addis Ababa to facilitate credit to companies from their countries of origins. Chinese, German, Kenyan, Turkish, and South African banks have opened liaison offices in Ethiopia, but the market remains completely closed to foreign retail banks. Foreigners of Ethiopian origin are now allowed to both establish their own banks and hold shares in financial institutions. The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia accounts for more than 50 percent of total bank deposits, bank loans, and foreign exchange in Ethiopia. The NBE controls banks’ minimum deposit rate, which now stands at 7 percent, while loan interest rates are allowed to float. Real deposit interest rates have been negative in recent years, mainly due to double digit annual inflation. Non-performing loans account for less than 3 percent of all loans. Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers approved in December 2021 the creation of Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) – Ethiopia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. EIH is currently under formation and expects to manage assets worth about $2 billion across several sectors, including telecoms, mining, banking, aviation, and logistics. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ethiopia’s roughly 40 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate major sectors of the economy. There is a state monopoly or state dominance in telecommunications, power, banking, insurance, air transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing. SOEs have considerable advantages over private firms, including priority access to credit, foreign exchange, land, and quick customs clearances. While there are no conclusive reports of credit preference for these entities, there are indications that they receive incentives, such as priority foreign exchange allocation, preferences in government tenders, and marketing assistance. Ethiopia does not publish financial data for most state-owned enterprises, but Ethiopian Airlines and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia have transparent accounts Ethiopia is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and does not adhere to the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. Corporate governance of SOEs is structured and monitored by a board of directors composed of senior government officials and politically affiliated individuals, but there is a lack of transparency in the structure of SOEs. In July 2018, the GOE announced plans to fully or partially privatize several state-owned enterprises and sectors. In 2020, Ethiopia enacted Public Enterprises Privatization Proclamation number 1206/2020 regulate and encourage transparency and private sector participation in privatization processes. The GOE will implement privatizations through public tenders open to local and foreign investors. In September 2021, the GOE tendered a 40 percent stake of state-owned Ethio telecom but later postponed the process indefinitely due in part to muted investor interest. The government has sold more than 370 public enterprises since 1995, mainly small companies in the trade and service sectors, most of which were nationalized by the Derg military regime in the 1970s. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Some larger international companies in Ethiopia have introduced corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. Most Ethiopian companies, however, do not officially practice CSR, though individual entrepreneurs engage in charity, sometimes on a large scale. There are efforts to develop CSR programs by MOTRI in collaboration with the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other institutions. The government encourages CSR programs for both local and foreign direct investors but does not maintain specific guidelines for these programs, which are inconsistently applied and not controlled or monitored. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce also has a corporate governance institute, which promotes responsible business conduct among private business enterprises. The GOE does not publish data on the number of children who are victims of forced labor. The Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency’s 2015 National Child Labor Survey and 2021 Labor Force and Migration Survey did not assess forced labor. On January 1, 2022, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that due to human rights concerns related to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, Ethiopia no longer met the eligibility criteria for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preferences. Ethiopia will continue to undergo AGOA’s annual review process and may regain eligibility once it meets the criteria. The 2020 Investment Law requires all investors to give due regard to social and environmental sustainability values including environmental protection standards and social inclusion objectives. The 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation number 299/2002 mandates any government agency issuing business licenses or permits for investment projects ensure that federal or relevant regional environmental agencies authorize the project’s implementation. In practice, environmental laws and regulations are not fully enforced due to limited capacity at government regulatory bodies. In 2014, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) admitted Ethiopia as a candidate-member. In 2019, EITI found Ethiopia made meaningful progress in implementing EITI standards. The Commercial Code requires extractive industries and other businesses to conduct statuary audits of their financial statements at the end of each financial year. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Ethiopia is a signatory of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and endorsed the Climate Resilience and Green Economy Strategy (CRGE). Ethiopia has formulated climate resilient sectoral policies and strategies to carry out environmental interventions in areas such as agriculture, forestry, transport, health, urban development, and housing. According to its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) towards the Paris Agreement goals, Ethiopia aims to reduce its carbon emissions by 68 percent by 2030 (2018 base year). The GOE Green Legacy Initiative, launched in 2019, is a tree planting campaign aimed at curbing the impact of climate change and deforestation. The 2002 Environment Impact Assessment law authorizes pertinent environmental regulatory offices to provide technical and financial incentives to projects focused on environmental rehabilitation or pollution prevention. 9. Corruption The Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Proclamation number 1236/2020 aims to combat corruption involving government officials and organizations, religious organizations, political parties, and international organizations. The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) is accountable to parliament and charged with preventing corruption among government officials by providing ethics training and education. MOJ is responsible for investigating corruption crimes and prosecutions. The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for ensuring good governance and preventing administrative abuses by public offices. Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector corruption, rated Ethiopia’s corruption at 39 (the score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of zero to 100, with the former indicating highly corrupt and the latter indicating very clean). Its comparative rank in 2021 was 87 out of 180 countries, a seven-point improvement from its 2020 rank. In 2020 the American Chamber of Commerce in Ethiopia polled its members and asked what the leading business climate challenges were; transparency and governance ranked as the 4th leading business climate challenge, ahead of licensing and registration, and public procurement. Ethiopian and foreign businesses routinely encounter corruption in tax collection, customs clearance, and land administration. Many past procurement deals for major government contracts, especially in the power generation, telecommunications, and construction sectors, were widely viewed as corrupt. Allegations of corruption in the allocation of urban land to private investors by government agencies are a major source of popular discontent in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Ethiopia is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Ethiopia is also member of the East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. Ethiopia signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003, which was eventually ratified in November 2007. It is a criminal offense to give or receive bribes, and bribes are not tax deductible. Contacts at a government agency responsible for combating corruption: Federal Police Commission Addis Ababa +251 11 861-9595 Advocacy and Legal Advice Center in Ethiopia Hayahulem Mazoria, Addis Ababa +251-11-551-0738 / +251-11-655-5508 https://www.transparencyethiopia.org 10. Political and Security Environment Ethnic conflict – often sparked by historical grievances or resource competition, including land disputes – has resulted in varying levels of violence across Ethiopia. According to the 2022 Global Humanitarian Overview, there were an estimated 4.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia at the end of 2021, with high levels of need also identified among non-displaced people living in conflict-affected areas. The primary cause of displacements was conflict and insecurity, followed by drought and seasonal floods and flash flooding. Most significantly, in early November 2020, a conflict broke out between a regional political party in the Tigray Region and the federal government. The conflict quickly enlarged, with Eritrean troops present in parts of Tigray Region, and Amhara Region forces controlling much of Western Tigray. The conflict in northern Ethiopia has led to many deaths, widespread displacements, extensive destruction of infrastructure, widespread gross human rights violations, gender-based violence, a vast reduction in public services, and widespread hunger. Insecurity, often driven by ethnic tensions, persists in many other areas, notably in the southern and western Oromia Region; eastern Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region; and in the Hararges on the border of the Somali Region. In western Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army-Shane and other unidentified armed groups have intensified attacks against public and local government officials; this violence has spilled over into other parts of Oromia. In far western Ethiopia, ethnic violence and clashes in Benishangul-Gumuz Region have continued throughout 2021 and into early 2022, leaving hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Amhara has experienced altercations in 2022 between regional security forces and youth militias. When Prime Minister Abiy came to power in 2018, political space opened significantly, although it has since regressed especially after the government declared a State of Emergency in November 2021. While the State of Emergency was lifted in February 2022, during its implementation thousands of people, mostly of Tigrayan ethnicity, were arbitrarily detained and freedom of the press was significantly curtailed. Constitutional rights, including freedoms of assembly and expression, are generally supported at the level of the federal government, though the protection of these rights remains uneven, especially at regional and local levels. While opposition parties mostly operate freely, authorities, especially at the sub-national level, have employed politically motivated procedural roadblocks to hinder opposition parties’ efforts to hold meetings or other party activities; this was especially true in the run-up to the June 2021 general election. The space for media and civil society groups has generally become freer following reforms instituted by Prime Minister Abiy. Still, journalism in the country remains undeveloped, social media is often rife with unfounded rumors, and government officials occasionally react with heavy-handedness, especially to news they feel might spur social unrest, resulting in self-censorship. Civil society reforms have spurred an expansion of the sector, though many civil society groups continue to struggle with capacity and resource issues. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The national unemployment rate in February 2021 was 8 percent according to the 2021 Labor Force and Migration Survey. The unemployment rates for men and women were 5 and 11.7 percent, respectively. The law only gives refugees and asylum seekers the opportunity to work on a development project supported by the international community that economically benefits both refugees and citizens or to earn wages through self-employment. The law prohibits discrimination with respect to employment and occupations. However, there are legal restrictions on women’s employment, including limitations on occupations deemed dangerous and in industries, such as mining and agriculture. Women have fewer employment opportunities than men. Around 46.3 percent of people were working in the informal sector nationally according to the 2021 Labor Force and Migration Survey. According to a 2020 International Labor Organization labor market assessment across all sectors, there was a generally higher demand for highly skilled workers, followed by medium-skilled workers; low-skilled workers had the lowest demand, especially in construction and manufacturing sectors. In terms of supply, there was generally an oversupply of low- and medium-skilled workers across major sectors such as agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. The Ministry of Labor and Skills, in collaboration with other international and national stakeholders, provides trainings for technical and vocational trainers. The investment law gives employment priority for nationals and provides that any investor may employ duly qualified expatriate experts in the positions of “higher management, supervision, trainers and other technical professions” required for the operation of business only when it is ascertained that Ethiopians possessing similar qualifications or experiences are not available. There is no restriction on employers adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions. The labor law allows employers to terminate employment contracts with notice when demand falls for the employer’s products or services and reduces the volume of work or profit. The law differentiates between firing and layoffs. The national labor law recognizes the right to collective bargaining, but this right was severely restricted under the law. Negotiations aimed at amending or replacing a collectively bargained agreement must take place within three months of its expiration; otherwise, the prior provisions on wages and other benefits cease to apply. The constitution and the labor law recognize the right of association for workers. Labor divisions are established at the federal and regional level. Employers and workers may also introduce social dialogue to prevent and resolve labor disputes amicably. The Ministry of Labor and Skills assigns councilors or arbitrators when a dispute is brought to the attention of the Ministry or the appropriate authority by either of the parties to the dispute. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2020/21** $111.3 2020 $107.6 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 $741 N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A N/A N/A http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020-21** 10% 2020 2.22% www.worldbank.org/en/country *National Bank of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Investment Commission **Ethiopian Fiscal Year 2020-21, which begins on July 8, 2020. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data regarding inward direct investment are not available for Ethiopia via the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) site ( http://data.imf.org/CDIS ). 14. Contact for More Information The U.S. Embassy’s main number is +251 011 130 6000. Economic Officer, USEmbassyPolEconExternal@state.gov Fiji Executive Summary Since April 2021, Fiji experienced a second wave of the COVID-19 outbreak, and at one point during the crisis, suffered among the highest infection rates in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic and a series of natural disasters had a devastating impact on the tourism-dependent economy. The government also lost over $1.51 billion in tax revenues. The gradual easing of COVID-19 restrictions, increased remittances from overseas workers, and the distribution of government-funded unemployment benefits have slightly boosted some consumption and investment activity, with GDP growth estimated at -4.1 percent in 2021, compared to -15.2 percent in 2020. The reopening of borders for tourism in December 2021 resulted in a 12-fold increase in visitor arrivals in the 12 months to February 2022, compared to the same period ending February 2021. The resumption of tourism and improved performance in the primary and industrial sectors, major exports, and the service-related sectors is expected to drive growth by 11.3 percent in 2022 and 8.5 percent in 2023. Fiji has traditionally been the economic, transportation, and academic hub of the South Pacific islands. The government welcomes foreign investment and parliament passed the Investment Act 2021 to improve the ease of doing business in Fiji. The government’s investment and trade promotion agency, Investment Fiji, registered 12 investment projects valued at $7.64 million (FJD $16.2 million) from American investors in 2021. Exports to Fiji totaled over $180 million in 2021. The United States is Fiji’s top export market. In 2021, U.S. consumers bought over $230 million in Fijian goods and services last year. Fiji has trade and investment potential, and offers incentives to encourage investments in agriculture, residential housing development, energy, audio & visual, retirement village/aged care facilities, health sector, tourism, manufacturing, and the information communication technology (ICT)/business process outsourcing (BPO) sector. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45/180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD $109.39M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $4,890.00 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Demonstrating its commitment to improving the business environment in Fiji, the Fiji Parliament passed the Investment Act 2021 which will eventually replace the Foreign Investment Act 1999. The new law aims to improve ease of doing business in Fiji by streamlining the business registration process; attracting foreign and domestic investment; and providing equity for investors with transparent, reliable, efficient, and fair rules and procedures. Previously, all foreign investors were required to register for a Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). The new law not only removes the requirement for a FIRC but also strengthens the rights and obligations of the investors. Fiji’s Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism, and Transport (MCTTT) is currently working with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to draft the regulations of the Act. The new law will come into effect once a notice in the Gazette is issued. Under the new law, both domestic and foreign investors will undergo the business registration process with the Registrar of Companies and annually report to Investment Fiji. One of the investors’ rights under the law is in reference to national treatment and the most-favored-nation principle whereby foreign investors must be treated no less favorably in like circumstances than domestic investors with respect to the acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, sale, or other disposition of investments in Fiji. Fiji’s Department of Immigration is responsible for managing investor permits for non-citizen investors. Investment Fiji is responsible for the promotion of foreign investment in the interest of national development. The three main services provided by Investment Fiji include investment promotion, investment facilitation (project management), and trade promotion. In addition to registering and assisting with the implementation of foreign investment projects, Investment Fiji hosts information seminars for visiting foreign business delegations and participates at investment missions overseas. The process of foreign investor registration by Investment Fiji will be phased out when the new law takes effect. Investment Fiji has recently placed more focus on providing facilitation support for both new and existing foreign and domestic investors. The Fijian government supports and encourages existing businesses to re-invest. Several industry associations have been established which provide a forum for companies to share concerns and ideas in the industry. Examples of these industry associations include the Textile, Clothing, and Footwear (TCF) Council of Fiji, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) Council of Fiji, and the Fiji Manufacturers Association. Investors are free to invest in all sectors and regions in Fiji provided it does not contravene the Investment Act 2021 and other laws in place. Investment in the fisheries sector requires a 30 percent local equity in the project. Some investment activities are reserved for Fiji nationals or are subject to restrictions. For all other business activities, there is no minimum investment requirement. There are currently 17 reserved activities exclusively for Fiji citizens, mainly in the services sector, and eight restricted activities that fall under the Foreign Investment Act 1999 and Foreign Investment Regulations 2009. These will soon be phased out and will be replaced with a new list of reserved and restricted activities currently being drafted for the Investment Act 2021. The current list of reserved and restricted areas can be found at https://global-uploads.webflow.com/5fc6b3ad7010ef7a53f68376/60d8f22321e2187f849ac435_Checklist%202020.pdf Investment Fiji helps vet foreign investment proposals to ensure that the projects are in the interest of national development and to support implementation of projects. The Investment Act 2021 has provisions to restrict investment for the protection of national security interests. Investments in a sector that may have potential effects on critical infrastructure such as energy, transport, communications, data storage, or financial infrastructure; critical technologies; the security of supply of critical inputs; or access to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information must have their proposals submitted for Ministerial approval. The Fiji government’s MCTTT revised the recently passed Investment Act 2021. The International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, in collaboration with foreign development partners, provided technical expertise in the review. The Fiji Civil Society Organization released a 2016-2019 report on Sustainable Development Goals. The report details ways in which civil society and community groups contribute to the achievement of the 17 SDGs in Fiji. This includes Goals 7, 8, 9 & 10 on “affordable and clean energy; and decent work and economic growth” and “industry, innovation, and infrastructure; and reduced inequality.” Australia is the largest donor for civil society in Fiji and currently supports CSOs through bilateral, regional, and global initiatives. The Fiji government’s bizFiji website ( www.business-fiji.com ) is an information portal for new and existing businesses, as well as foreign investors. The portal provides information on the business registration process, how to obtain construction permits, and included application forms and links to all the required agencies, including the Registrar of Companies, Fiji Revenue and Customs Services (FRCS), Fiji National Provident Fund, National Occupational Health and Safety Services, and Fiji National University. The government’s reforms to improve the ease and reduce the cost of doing business include the removal of the business license requirement for low-risk businesses, reducing the processing times from five days to 48 hours to issue business licenses, and the removal of several requirements for existing businesses. Since the launch of bizFiji in 2019, the government has worked to develop a single online clearance system to improve registration processes, but inefficiencies remain. For foreign investors, the bizFiji website is also linked to the Investment Fiji website. The registration form and procedures, and regulations for foreign investment is available at the Investment Fiji issue of the Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). Applications for a FIRC and payment of the requisite application fee of $1,336 (FJD$2,725) must be submitted to Investment Fiji. Investors need to meet the requirements listed under the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) and the 2009 Foreign Investment Regulation as well as ensure that the investment activity does not fall under the reserved and restricted activities lists. The registration process for investment applications takes at least five working days and sometimes longer if the paperwork is incomplete. Once the Investment Act 2021 comes into effect, the requirement to register with Investment Fiji will be removed. Investors are also required to obtain the necessary permits and licenses from other relevant authorities and should be prepared for delays. There are no special services or preferences to facilitate investment and business operations by micro, small, and medium sized enterprises, or by women. Contact: Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport, Level 2 and 3, Civic Tower, Victoria Parade, Suva; Telephone: (679) 330 5411; Website: www.mcttt.gov.fj The Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) tightened exchange controls for any outward investment by individuals, companies, and non-bank financial institutions, including the Fiji National Provident Fund, which require clearance from the RBF. 3. Legal Regime Laws passed in parliament are available to the public on the parliament website and published in an official gazette. The lack of consultation with the private sector and other stakeholders on proposed laws and regulations remains an area of concern. The business community has complained that the government enacts new regulations with little prior notice or publicity. There is a perception among foreign investors that there is a lack of transparency in government procurement and approval processes. Some foreign investors considering investment in Fiji have encountered lengthy and costly bureaucratic delays, shuffling of permits among government ministries, inconsistent and changing procedures, lack of technical capacity, costly penalties due to the interpretation of tax regulations by the Fiji Revenue and Customs Service (FRCS), and slow decision-making. The Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) regulates all food and animal products entering Fiji and has stringent and costly point-of-origin inspection and quarantine requirements for foreign goods. The government does not require companies to file an environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. Fiji’s constitution provides for public access to government information and for the correction or deletion of false or misleading information. Although the constitution requires that a freedom of information law be enacted, there is no such law yet. Proposed bills or regulations, including investment regulations, are made available and usually posted on the relevant ministry or regulatory authority’s website. The parliamentary website ( http://www.parliament.gov.fj/ ) is a centralized online location that publishes laws and regulations passed in parliament. The government’s public finances and debt obligations are also made available annually in the budget documents. Fiji is a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) that allows for the duty-free trade of goods between Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands. Fiji has been a member of the WTO since January 1996. According to Fiji’s trade profile on the WTO website, there are no records of disputes. Fiji ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2017. The legal system in Fiji developed from British law. Fiji maintains a judiciary consisting of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and magistrate courts. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal. Both companies and individuals have recourse to legal treatment through the system of local and superior courts. A foreign investor theoretically has the right of recourse to the courts and tribunals of Fiji with respect to the settlement of disputes, but government laws have been used to block foreign investors from legal recourse in investment takeovers, tax increases, or write-offs of interest to the government. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) and the 2009 Foreign Investment Regulation regulate foreign investment in Fiji. However, these laws will be replaced when the Investment Act 2021, passed in parliament in 2021, is implemented. At time of writing, all businesses with a foreign-investment component in their ownership are required to register and obtain a Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). Information on the registration procedures, regulations, and registration requirements for foreign investment is available at the Investment Fiji website: http://www.investmentfiji.org.fj . Amendments to the FIA also require that foreign investors seek approval prior to any changes in the ownership structure of the business, with penalties incurred for non-compliance. The Fiji government’s bizFiji website (www.business-fiji.com), an information portal for businesses and foreign investors, includes links to the Investment Fiji website. Since the launch of bizFiji in 2019, the government has worked to develop a single online clearance system to improve registration processes, but inefficiencies remain. The Fiji Competition and Commerce Commission (FCCC) regulates monopolies, promotes competition, and controls prices of selected hardware, basic food items, and utilities, to ensure a fair, competitive, and equitable market. Expropriation has not historically been a common phenomenon in Fiji. A foreign investor theoretically has the same right of recourse as a Fijian enterprise to the courts and other tribunals of Fiji to settle disputes. In practice, the government has acted to assert its interests with laws affecting foreign investors. In 2013, the government amended the Foreign Investment Decree with provisions to permit the forfeiture of foreign investments as well as significant fines for breaches of compliance with foreign investment registration conditions. Fiji’s Companies Act 2015 has provisions relating to solvency and negative solvency. According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business survey, prior to COVID-19, in terms of resolving insolvency, it took an estimated 1.8 years at a cost of ten percent of the estate to complete the process, with an estimated recovery rate of 46.5 percent of value. 4. Industrial Policies Fiji offers incentives for a range of sectors to encourage investments in agriculture, residential housing development, energy, audio & visual, retirement village / aged care facilities, health sector, tourism, manufacturing, and the information communication technology (ICT) / business process outsourcing (BPO) sector. Government is increasingly participating in public private partnerships. Although it does not practice issuing guarantees to foreign direct investments, it has previously offered a tax holiday for the entire period of the partnership agreement. Fiji offers tax holidays for investments in biofuel production for investments of at least $117,925 (FJD$250,000). The tax holidays range from five to 13 years depending on the level of investment. The incentive package further includes duty free importation of plant, machinery, and equipment for initial establishment of the factory and duty-free importation of chemical required for biofuel production. The importation of all agricultural items will be subject to zero duty provided a support letter is obtained from Fiji’s Ministry of Agriculture. A five-year tax holiday is offered to investors for new renewable energy projects and power cogeneration upon approval. Investment projects for electric vehicle charging station businesses will receive a seven-year tax holiday and will be granted a subsidy up to a maximum of five percent of the total capital outlay incurred in the development of electric vehicle charging stations, provided the capital expenditure is at least $47,170 (FJD$100,000), and will be allowed to carry loss forward to eight years. Any business investing in electric buses shall be allowed a tax deduction of 55 percent. The northern and selected maritime regions of Fiji have been declared Tax Free Regions (TFR) to encourage development in these isolated outposts. The specific areas include Vanua Levu, Rotuma, Kadavu, Levuka, Lomaiviti, Lau, and the Nausori-Lautoka region (from Nausori Airport side of the Rewa River (excluding township boundary) to the Ba side of the Matawalu River). Businesses established in these regions which meet the prescribed requirements enjoy a corporate tax holiday of up to 13 years and import duty exemption on raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The Wairabetia Economic Zone (WEZ) is a government project planned to be established by 2023 in Lautoka to provide the necessary facilities to support businesses with the provision of developed lots close to Lautoka Port and Nadi airport. The government does not follow “forced localization.” However, immigration “time post” permits reserved for specialist positions encourage the transfer of knowledge and skills from expatriate workers to local workers. Investors permits are granted and extended by the Department of Immigration based on recommendations submitted by Investment Fiji through a progress report. The progress report provides the Department of Immigration an update on the progress of the investment project by the foreign investor. There are performance requirements to use domestic content in goods to qualify for trade under the trade agreements between Fiji and partner countries, and to receive the “Fijian Made” branding by the MCTTT. These requirements apply to both foreign and domestic investors. Investment incentives are applied systematically. To support the implementation of newly approved investments, Investment Fiji established a monitoring system to assist companies in obtaining necessary approvals to commence operations. The investing firm must ensure that commercial production begins within 12 months for investments under $1.18 million (FJD$2.5 million) or within 18 months of the date of approval of the project for investments above $1.18 million (FJD$2.5 million). The U.S. Embassy is unaware of any policies regulating data storage or requiring foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. Under the Investment Act 2021, any new investments relating to data storage or access to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information must have their proposals vetted by the MCTTT. 5. Protection of Property Rights Land tenure and usage in Fiji is a highly complex and sensitive issue. Fiji’s Land Sales Act of 2014 restricts ownership of freehold land inside a city or town council boundaries areas to Fijian citizens. There are exceptions to allow foreigners to purchase strata title land, which is defined as ownership in part of a property including multi-level apartments or subdivisions. Foreigners are still allowed to purchase, sell, or lease freehold land for industrial or commercial purposes, residential purposes within an integrated tourism development, or for the operation of a hotel licensed under the Hotel and Guest Houses Act. The Land Sales Act also requires foreign landowners who purchase approved land to build a dwelling valued at a minimum of $117,925 (FJD$250,000) on the land within two years or face an annual tax of 20 percent of the land value (applied as ten percent every six months). Freehold land currently owned by a non-Fijian can pass to the owners’ heirs and will not be deemed a sale. Foreign landowners criticized the government of Fiji for the speed at which the act was passed and the perceived lack of consultation with landowners and developers. The application of the Land Sales Act continues to create uncertainty among foreign investors. The Fiji government has yet to provide full clarification of the act, such as defining what constitutes an integrated tourism development. The limited capacity of construction and architecture firms makes it difficult to comply with the two-year time frame for building a dwelling before tax penalties set in. According to the pre-COVID-19 World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, registering property took a total of 69 days and involved four main processes, including conducting title searches at the Titles Office, presenting transfer documents for stamping at the Stamp Duty office, obtaining tax clearance on capital gains tax, and settlement at the Registrar of Titles Office. Ethnic Fijians communally hold approximately 87 percent of all land. Crown land owned by the government accounts for four percent while the remainder is freehold land, which private individuals or companies hold. All land owned by ethnic Fijians, commonly referred to as iTaukei land, is held in a statutory trust by the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB) for the benefit of indigenous landholding units. To improve access to land, the government established a land bank in the Ministry of Lands under the land use decree for the purpose of leasing land from indigenous landowning units (collections of households; under the indigenous communal landowning system, land is not owned by individuals) through the TLTB and subleasing the land to individual tenants for lease periods of up to 99 years. The constitution includes other new provisions protecting land leases and land tenancies, but observers noted that the provisions had unintended consequences, including weakening the overall legal structure governing leases. The availability of Crown land for leasing is usually advertised. This does not, however, preclude consideration given to individual applications in cases where land is required for special purposes. Government leases for industrial purposes can last up to 99 years with rents reassessed every ten years. TLTB leases for land nearer to urban locations are normally for 50-75 years. Annual rent is reassessed every five years. The maximum rent that can be levied in both cases is six percent of unimproved capital value. Leases also usually carry development conditions that require lessees to effect improvements within a specified time. Apart from the requirements of the TLTB and Lands Department, town planning, conservation, and other requirements specified by central and local government authorities affect the use of land. Investors are urged to seek local legal advice in all transactions involving land. Fiji’s copyright laws are in conformity with World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) provisions. However, the enforcement of these laws remains weak, and capacity is a challenge. Illegal materials and reproductions of films, sound recordings, and computer programs are widely available throughout Fiji. In 2021, Fiji’s parliament passed new intellectual property laws including the protection of trademarks, patents, and designs. The laws are yet to be implemented. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The capital market is regulated and supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF). Twenty companies were listed on the Suva-based South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE). At the end of September 2021, market capitalization was $1.52 billion (FJD$3.212 billion), an annual decline of 5.9 percent compared to September 2020. To promote greater activity in the capital market, the government lowered corporate tax rates for listed companies to ten percent and exempted income earned from the trading of shares in the SPSE from income tax and capital gains tax. The RBF issued the Companies (Wholesale Corporate Bonds) Regulations 2021 to develop the domestic corporate bond market by providing a simplified process for the issuance of corporate bonds to eligible wholesale investors only. Foreign investors are allowed to get credit from authorized banks and other lending institutions without the approval of the RBF for loans up to $4.7 million (FJD$10 million), provided the debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 is satisfied. Fiji has a well-developed banking system supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji. The RBF regulates the Fiji monetary and banking systems, manages the issuance of currency notes, administers exchange controls, and provides banking and other services to the government. In addition, it provides lender-of-last-resort facilities and regulates trading bank liquidity. There are six commercial banks with established operations in Fiji: ANZ Bank, Bank of Baroda, Bank of South Pacific, Bred Bank, Home Finance Corporation (HFC), and Westpac Banking Corporation, with the HFC the only locally owned bank. Non-banking financial institutions also provide financial assistance and borrowing facilities to the commercial community and to consumers. These institutions include the Fiji Development Bank, Credit Corporation, Kontiki Finance, Merchant Finance, and insurance companies. As of December 2021, total assets of commercial banks amounted to $5.77 billion (FJD$12.223 billion). The RBF reported that liquidity reached $0.94 billion (FJD$1.99 billion) in December 2021 and were sufficient and did not pose a risk to bank solvency. However, the RBF also noted that existing levels of non-performing loans could rise, with the ending of moratoriums offered by financial institutions to COVID-19 affected customers. To open a bank account, foreign investors need to provide a copy of the Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC) issued by Investment Fiji. The Fiji government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Fiji. The country’s pension fund scheme, the Fiji National Provident Fund, which manages and invests members’ retirement savings, accounts for a third of Fiji’s financial sector assets. The fund invests in equities, bonds, commercial paper, mortgages, real estate, and various offshore investments. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Fiji are concentrated in utilities and key services and industries including aerospace (Fiji Airways, Airports Fiji Limited); agribusiness (Fiji Pine Ltd); energy (Energy Fiji Limited); food processing (Fiji Sugar Corporation, Pacific Fishing Company); information and communication (Amalgamated Telecom Holdings); and media (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Ltd). There are 25 SOEs with combined assets valued at $3.87 billion (FJD $8.2 billion) in 2019. The SOEs include 10 Government Commercial Companies which operate commercially and are fully owned by the government, five Commercial Statutory Authorities (CSA) which have regulatory functions and charge nominal fees for their services, seven Majority Owned Companies, and two Minority Owned Companies with some government equity. The SOEs that provide essential utilities, such as energy and water, also have social responsibility and non-commercial obligations. A list of SOEs is published in government’s annual budget documentation. Aside from the CSAs, SOEs do not exercise delegated governmental powers. SOEs benefit from economies of scale and may be favored in certain sectors. The Fiji Broadcasting Company Ltd (FBCL) is exempt from the Media Decree, which governs private media organizations and exposes private media to criminal libel lawsuits. The government has pursued a policy of opening or deregulating various sectors of the economy. The government is pursuing public private partnership (PPP) models in energy, aviation infrastructure, and public housing, often seeking technical assistance from development partners including the International Finance Corporation to implement these arrangements and to encourage more private sector participation. In 2021, a Japanese consortium acquired 44 percent shareholding in state utility company Energy Fiji Limited. Foreign investors are already partnering in public-private partnership arrangements in the health and maritime port sectors. In 2018, the government signed the first public private partnership agreement in the medical sector with Fiji’s pension fund and an Australian company to develop, upgrade, and operate the Ba and Lautoka hospitals, the country’s two major hospitals in the western region. The PPP arrangements were finalized and in April 2022, and the new Ba hospital opened. The Ministry of Economy publishes these opportunities as Tenders or Expressions of Interest ( http://www.economy.gov.fj/ ). 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is increasingly promoted, and the government has included legal provisions to protect the environment, consumers, human rights, and labor rights, although its monitoring and enforcement of RBC is mixed. The media, civil society organizations, and labor unions play active roles in promoting RBC. In 2019, a foreign-owned tourism development project was cancelled after the media highlighted extensive environmental degradation by the project developers. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Fiji government has identified climate change as the single largest threat to Fiji’s development aspirations. The National Climate Change Policy 2018-2030 (NCCP) is the country’s overarching policy instrument for climate change and is closely aligned to Fiji’s 20-year National Development Plan. The NCCP outlines Fiji’s priorities and strategies in reducing present and future climate risks, while maximizing the country’s long-term gains in development. The NCCP and the Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) solidifies Fiji’s commitment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. In 2021, Fiji signed a five-year agreement that will reward up to $12.5 million (approx. FJ$26 million) for its efforts to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The landmark agreement is with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), a global partnership housed at the World Bank. Fiji’s emission reductions program will address the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation through integrated land use planning, native forest conservation, and sustainable pine and mahogany plantations. The government has raised several financing initiatives to raise budgetary resources to towards implementing its climate change commitments, including the issue of its first-ever sovereign of green bond in November 2017 on the London Stock Exchange, the introduction of an Environmental and Climate Adaptation Levy (ECAL) previously applicable on prescribed services, and a plastic bag levy to promote the use of reusable bags. However, public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth standards. 9. Corruption The legal code provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but corruption cases often proceeded slowly. In 2021, parliament enacted the “high court amendment” law that created a specialized court to enable specific judges and magistrates to preside over and speedily resolve anticorruption cases. The government established the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC), which has broad powers of investigation. FICAC’s public service announcements encouraging citizens to report corrupt government activities have had some effect on systemic corruption. The government adequately funded FICAC, but some observers questioned its independence and viewed some of its high-profile prosecutions as politically motivated. The media publishes articles on FICAC investigations into abuse of office, and anonymous blogs report on government corruption. FICAC in collaboration with the United Nations Pacific Regional Anti-corruption agency (UN-PRAC) launched a nationwide anti-bribery campaign. However, Fiji’s relatively small population and limited circles of power often lead to personal relationships playing a major role in business and government decisions. Fiji acceded to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2008. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Mr. Rashmi Aslam Commissioner Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) P.O. Box 2335, Government Buildings, Suva, FIJI (679) 3310290 info@ficac.org.fj Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Civic Leaders for Clean Transactions (CLCT) Integrity Fiji 60 Robertson Road, Suva integrityfiji73@gmail.com www.facebook.com/civicleaders 10. Political and Security Environment The country held general elections in November 2018 and international observers deemed elections credible. Although civil unrest is uncommon, the Public Order Act restricts freedoms of speech, assembly, and movement to preserve public order. The Online Safety law may also restrict free speech in the digital space. In 2021, there were reports that authorities used the POA’s wide provisions to restrict freedom of expression and of association, and arrest citizens critical of the government on social media. The next elections are expected in 2022. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Labor market conditions at the end of 2021 improved with the lifting of the travel restrictions and the reopening of international borders. The number of workers in the informal sector increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), an estimated 66 percent of the workforce was in the informal sector. The ILO estimates that Fiji’s labor force in 2020 was 361,369, with a labor force participation rate of 75.4 percent for males and 56.7 percent for females. Education is compulsory until age 17, with male and female students in Fiji achieving largely the same level of education. Fiji continues to face acute labor shortages in a broad range of fields, including the medical, management, engineering, and financial sectors, and increasingly, competent trade-skilled people in the construction, electrical, and plumbing trades. Fiji participates in the Pacific Australia Labor Mobility (PALM) Scheme and Fijians were employed in meat works, hospital, accommodation, and aged care sectors. As of April 2022, close to 800 Fijians were employed in meat works under PALM. The Ministry of Employment, Productivity, and Industrial Relations has responsibility for the administration of labor laws and the encouragement of good labor relations. The Employment Relations (Amendment) Act of 2016 restored the 2007 Employment Relations Promulgation (ERP) as the primary basis for the right of workers to join trade unions. Trade unions are independent of the government. The ERP prohibits forced labor, discrimination in employment based on ethnicity, gender, and other prohibited grounds, and stipulates equal remuneration for work of equal value. There are workplace safety laws and regulations, and safety standards apply equally to both citizens and foreign workers. The government announced a rise in the national minimum hourly wage rate to $1.89 (FJD$4) in the revised FY2021-2022. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Suva 158 Princes Road, Tamavua, Suva (679) 3314466 commercialsuva@state.gov Finland Executive Summary Finland is a Nordic country situated north of the Baltic States bordering Russia, Sweden, and Norway, possessing a stable and modern economy, including a world-class investment climate. It is a member of the European Union and part of the euro area. The country has a highly skilled, educated, and multilingual labor force, with strong expertise in Information Communications Technology (ICT), emerging technologies, shipbuilding, forestry, and renewable energy. Finland offers stability, functionality, high standard of living, and a well-developed digital infrastructure. Key challenges for foreign investors include high tax rates, a rigid labor market, cumbersome bureaucracy, and lengthy and unwieldly process in opening bank accounts. An aging population and the shrinking work force are the most pressing demographic concerns for economic growth. Finland is top-ranked in COVID Recovery Index Table (CERI), reflecting its good governance and resilient health care sector. Finland’s vulnerabilities are its dependence on exports and an aging population. Finland is committed to the EU’s greenhouse emissions reduction target under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and is aiming to become the world’s first carbon-neutral society by 2035. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Finland by country is as follows: Sweden, 27 percent; the Netherlands 17 percent; Luxembourg 15 percent; Norway 7 percent; and China 5 percent. Despite its openness to trade and investment, Finland lags behind the other Nordic and Baltic countries as a destination for foreign investment. In 2019, FDI accounted for 31 percent of Finland’s GDP – less than in 2010 and well below the 49 percent regional average. To attract investment, the Government of Finland (GOF) cut the corporate tax rate in 2014 from 24.5 percent to 20 percent (the lowest rate in the Nordics), simplified its residency permit procedures, and established Business Finland as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors. The Foreign Commercial Service and Political/Economic Section at U.S. Embassy in Finland are a valuable resource for American businesses wishing to engage the Finnish market. Finland has vibrant telecommunication, energy, emerging markets, and biotech sectors, as well as Arctic expertise. With excellent transportation links to the Nordic-Baltic region, Finland is emerging as a regional transportation hub. On January 1, 2018, Finpro, the Finnish trade promotion organization, and Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation, merged to become Business Finland, which facilitates foreign direct investment in Finland and trade promotion. Business Finland employs 600 experts in 40 offices abroad and 16 offices in Finland. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 1 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 7 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $5,269 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 49,780 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime The Securities Market Act (SMA) contains regulations on corporate disclosure procedures and requirements, responsibility for flagging share ownership, insider regulations and offenses, the issuing and marketing of securities, and trading. The clearing of securities trades is subject to licensing and is supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority. The SMA is at https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2012/en20120746_20130258.pdf . See the Financial Supervisory Authority’s overview of regulations for listed companies here: https://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/en/capital-markets/issuers-and-investors/regulation-of-listed-companies/ . Finland is currently not a member of the UNCTAD Business Facilitation Program https://unctad.org/topic/enterprise-development/business-facilitation The Act on the Openness of Public Documents establishes the openness of all records in the possession of officials of the state, municipalities, registered religious communities, and corporations that perform legally mandated public duties, such as pension funds and public utilities. Exceptions can only be made by law or by an executive order for reasons such as national security. For more information, see the Ministry of Justice’s page on Openness: https://oikeusministerio.fi/en/act-on-the-openness-of-government-activities . The Act on the Openness of Government Activities can be found here: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990621 . In September 2021, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment released a Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Finance Roadmap – Finnish Roadmap for Financing a Decade of SDG Action 2021- report, where environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) is promoted, as records show increasingly a positive relation between good ESG practices and investment returns and volatility. More information here: https://tem.fi/en/developing-finlands-sustainable-finance-ecosystems . Finland ranks third on the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index (2021) regarding constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice. For more, see: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021 Finland ranks fourth on World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/finland . Availability of official information in Finland is the best in the EU, according to a report by the Center for Data Information (2017). The newly established Digital and Population Data Services Agency (2020) is responsible for developing and maintaining the national open data portal https://www.avoindata.fi/en In 2019, Finland passed the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) directive, which in parts rules conditions for the secondary use of private-sector health and social data. A single data permit authority (Findata) was established to oversee the entire data-sharing process: https://findata.fi/en/ Finland joined the Open Government Partnership Initiative (OGP) in April 2013. The global OGP-initiative aims at promoting more transparent, effective, and accountable public administration. The goal is to develop dialogue between citizens and administration and to enhance citizen engagement. The OGP aims at concrete commitments from participating countries to promote transparency, to fight corruption, to citizen participation and to the use of new technologies. Finland’s 4th national Open Government Action Plan for 2019–2023 was published in September 2019. The current Government Program (issued in December 2019) sets openness of public information, including open data, application programming interface APIs and open source software, as key goals of the administration. The status of Finland’s public finances is available at Statistics Finland, Finland’s official statistics agency: https://www.stat.fi/til/jul_en.html The status of Finland’s national debt is available at the State Treasury: https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/statistics/statistics-on-central-government-debt/ Finland respects EU common rules and expects other Member States to do the same. The Government seeks to constructively combine national and joint European interests in Finland’s EU policy and seeks better and lighter regulation that incorporates flexibility for SMEs. The Government will not increase burdens detrimental to competitiveness during its national implementation of EU acts. Finland, as a member of the WTO, is required under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) to report to the WTO all proposed technical regulations that could affect trade with other Member countries. In 2021, Finland submitted two notifications of technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO and has submitted 105 notifications since 1995. Finland is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which entered into force on February 22, 2017. Finland follows European Union (EU) internal market practices, which define Finland’s trade relations both inside the EU and with non-EU countries. Restrictions apply to certain items such as products containing alcohol, pharmaceuticals, narcotics and dangerous drugs, explosives, etc. The import of beef cattle bred on hormones is forbidden. Other restrictions apply to farm products under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In March 1997 EU commitments required the establishment of a tax border between the autonomously governed, but territorially Finnish, Aland Islands and the rest of Finland. As a result, the trade of goods and services between the Aland Islands and the rest of Finland is treated as if it were trade with a non-EU area. The Aland Islands belong to the customs territory of the EU but not to the EU fiscal territory. The tax border separates the Aland Islands from the VAT and excise territory of the EU. VAT and excise are levied on goods imported across the tax border, but no customs duty is levied. In tax border trade, goods can be sold with a tax free invoice in accordance with the detailed taxation instructions of the Finnish Tax Administration. Finland has a civil law system. European Community (EC) law is directly applicable in Finland and takes precedence over national legislation. The Market Court is a special court for rulings in commercial law, competition, and public procurement cases, and may issue injunctions and penalties against the illegal restriction of competition. It also governs mergers and acquisitions and may overturn public procurement decisions and require compensatory payments. The Court has jurisdiction over disputes regarding whether goods or services have been marketed unfairly. The Court also hears industrial and civil IPR cases. Amendments to the Finnish Competition Act (948/2011) entered into force on June 17, 2019, and on January 1, 2020. The amendments include, most notably, changes to the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority FCCA’s dawn raid practices, information exchange practices between national authorities and the calculation of merger control deadlines, which are now calculated in working days, rather than calendar days. On June 24, 2021, the Finnish Competition Act was amended to implement the EU ECN+ Directive, helping competition authorities to be more effective enforcers and to ensure proper functioning of the internal market. More information here: https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410877/competition-act-amendments-aimed-at-improving-enforcement-enter-into-force-on-24-june Finland is a party of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards since 1962. The provisions of the Convention have been included in the Arbitration Act (957/1992). The Oikeus.fi website (https://oikeus.fi/en/index.html) contains information about the Finnish judicial system and links to the websites of the independent courts, the public legal aid and guardianship districts, the National Prosecution Authority, the National Enforcement Authority Finland, and the Criminal Sanctions Agency. There is no primary or “one-stop-shop” website that provides all relevant laws, rules, procedures and reporting requirements for investors. A non-European Economic Area (EEA) resident (persons or companies) operating in Finland must obtain a license or a notification when starting a business in a regulated industry. A comprehensive list of regulated industries can be found at: https://www.suomi.fi/company/responsibilities-and-obligations/permits-and-obligations . See also the Ministry of Employment and the Economy’s Regulated Trade guidelines: https://tem.fi/en/regulation-of-business-operations . The autonomously governed Aland Islands, however are an exception. Right of domicile is acquired at birth if it is possessed by either parent. Property ownership and the right to conduct business are limited to those with the right of domicile in the Aland Islands. The Aland Government can occasionally grant exemptions from the requirement of right of domicile for those wishing to acquire real property or conduct a business in Aland. This does not prevent people from settling in, or trading with, the Aland Islands. Provided they are Finnish citizens, immigrants who have lived in Aland for five years and have adequate Swedish may apply for domicile and the Aland Government can grant exemptions. The Competition Act allows the government to block mergers where the result would harm market competition. A December 2021 study on the need to expand the merger filing obligation by the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) shows that the current national turnover thresholds allow harmful merges to escape the scrutiny of the authority. FCCA proposes that the current turnover thresholds in merger control should be lowered and, in addition, the FCCA be granted the right to require a notification when the thresholds are not met: https://www.kkv.fi/en/current/press-releases/fcca-study-expanding-the-obligation-to-notify-mergers-would-create-significant-consumer-benefit/#main-content FCCA issued merger control guidelines in 2011: https://arkisto.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/suuntaviivat/en/guidelines-1-2011-mergers.pdf EnterpriseFinland/Suomi.fi ( https://www.suomi.fi/company/ ) is a free online service offering information and services for starting, growing and developing a company. Users may also ask for advice through the My Enterprise Finland website: https://oma.yrityssuomi.fi/en#. Finnish legislation is available in the free online databank Finlex in Finnish, where some English translations can also be found: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/ . The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority FCCA protects competition by intervening in cases regarding restrictive practices, such as cartels and abuse of dominant position, and violations of the Competition Act and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Investigations occur on the FCCA’s initiative and on the basis of complaints. Where necessary, the FCCA makes proposals to the Market Court regarding penalties. In international competition matters, the FCCA’s key stakeholders are the European Commission (DG Competition), the OECD Competition Committee, the Nordic competition authorities and the International Competition Network (ICN). FCCA rulings and decisions can be found in the archive in Finnish. More information at: https://www.kkv.fi/en/facts-and-advice/competition-affairs/ . In September 2020, the Nordic Competition Authorities released a joint memorandum on digital platforms, setting out the Nordic perspective on issues of competition in digital markets in Europe. For more see: https://www.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/pm-yhteisraportit/nordic-report-2020-digital-platforms-and-the-potential-changes-to-competition-law-at-the-european-level.pdf Finnish law protects private property rights. Citizen property is protected by the Constitution which includes basic provisions in the event of expropriation. Private property is only expropriated for public purposes (eminent domain), in a non-discriminatory manner, with reasonable compensation, and in accordance with established international law. Expropriation is usually based on a permit given by the government or on a confirmed plan and is performed by the District Survey Office. An expropriation permit granted by the Government may be appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Court. Compensation is awarded at full market price, but may exclude the rise in value due only to planning decisions. Besides normal expropriation according to the Expropriation Act, a municipality or the State has the right to expropriate land for planning purposes. Expropriation is mainly for acquiring land for common needs, such as street areas, parks and civic buildings. The method is rarely used: less than one percent of land acquired by the municipalities is expropriated. Credendo Group ranks Finland’s expropriation risk as low (1), on a scale from 1 to 7: https://credendo.com/en/country-risk/finland . ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1969, Finland became a member state to the World Bank-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID; Washington Convention). Finland is a signatory to the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Finnish Arbitration Act (967/1992) is applied without distinction to both domestic and international arbitration. Sections 1 to 50 apply to arbitration in Finland and Sections 51 to 55 to arbitration agreements providing for arbitration abroad and the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Finland. Of 229 parties in 2021, the majority (208) were from Finland. There have been no reported investment disputes in Finland in recent years. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Finland has a long tradition of institutional arbitration and its legal framework dates back to 1928. Today, arbitration procedures are governed by the 1992 Arbitration Act (as amended), which largely mirrors the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (with amendments, as adopted in 2006). The UNCITRAL Model law has not yet, however, been incorporated into Finnish Law. Finland’s Act on Mediation in Civil Disputes and Certification of Settlements by Courts (394/2011) aims to facilitate alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and promote amicable settlements by encouraging mediation, and applies to settlements concluded in other EU member states: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110394.pdf . In June 2016, the Finland Arbitration Institute of the Chamber of Commerce (FAI) launched its Mediation Rules under which FAI will administer mediations: https://arbitration.fi/mediation/mediation_rules/ .Any dispute in a civil or commercial matter, international or domestic, which can be settled by agreement may be referred to arbitration. Arbitration is frequently used to settle commercial disputes and is usually faster than court proceedings. An arbitration award is final and binding. FAI promotes the settlement of disputes through arbitration, commonly using the “FAI Arbitration/Expedited Arbitration Rules”, which were updated in 2020: https://arbitration.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/01/arbitration-rules-of-the-finland-chamber-of-commerce-2020.pdf The Finland Arbitration Institute (FAI) appoints arbitrators both to domestic and international arbitration proceedings, and administers domestic and international arbitrations governed by its rules. It also appoints arbitrators in ad hoc cases when the arbitration agreement so provides, and acts as appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Finnish Arbitration Act (967/1992) states that foreign nationals can act as arbitrators. For more information see: https://arbitration.fi/arbitration/ Finland signed the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Mauritius Convention”) in March 2015. Under these rules, all documents and hearings are open to the public, interested parties may submit statements, and protection for confidential information has been strengthened. The Finnish Bankruptcy Act was amended and the amendments took effect on July 1, 2019. The main objectives of these amendments were to simplify, digitize and speed-up bankruptcy proceedings. The amended Bankruptcy Act allows administrators to send notices and invitations to creditor addresses registered in the Trade Register. This will improve accessibility for foreign companies that have established a branch in Finland. Administrators of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings must upload data and documentation to the bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings case management system (KOSTI). KOSTI is available only in Finnish for creditors located in Finland due to the strong ID requirements. The Reorganization of Enterprises Act (1993/47), https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1993/en19930047, establishes a legal framework for reorganization with the aim to provide an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings. The Act excludes credit and insurance institutions and certain other financial institutions. Recognition of restructuring or insolvency processes initiated outside of the EU requires an exequatur from a Finnish court. The bankruptcy ombudsman, https://www.konkurssiasiamies.fi/en/index.html , supervises the administration of bankruptcy estates in Finland. The Act on the Supervision of the Administration of Bankruptcy Estates dictates related Finnish law: https://www.konkurssiasiamies.fi/material/attachments/konkurssiasiamies/konkurssiasiamiehentoimistonliitteet/6JZrLGPN1/Act_on_the_Supervision_of_the_Administration_of_Bankruptcy_Estates.pdf . Finland can be considered creditor-friendly; enforcement of liabilities through bankruptcy proceedings as well as execution outside bankruptcy proceedings are both effective. Bankruptcy proceedings are creditor-driven, with no formal powers granted to the debtor and its shareholders. The rights of a secured creditor are also quite extensive. According to data collected by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency takes 11 months on average and costs 3.5 percent of the debtor’s estate. The average recovery rate is 88 cents on the dollar. Globally, Finland ranked first of 190 countries on the ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business 2020 report : https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/f/finland/FIN.pdf 4. Industrial Policies Foreign-owned companies in Finland are eligible for government and EU incentives on an equal footing with Finnish-owned companies. Support is given in the form of grants, loans, tax benefits, equity participation, guarantees, and employee training. Assistance is administered through one of Finland’s Centers for Economic Development, Transport, and the Environment (ELY) that provide advisory, training, and expert services as well as grant funding for investment and development projects. Investment aid can be granted to companies in the regional development areas, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Large companies may also qualify if they have a major employment impact in the region. Aid to business development can be granted to improve or facilitate the company’s establishment and operation, know-how, internationalization, product development or process enhancement. Subsidies for start-up companies are available for establishing and expanding business operations during the first 24 months. Transport aid may be granted for deliveries of goods produced to sparsely populated areas. Energy subsidies can be granted to companies for investments in energy efficiency and conservation. EU finance is largely also channeled through the ELY Centers. http://www.ely-keskus.fi/en/web/ely-en/business-and-industry;jsessionid=0B09A1B237B74FAC485AAD7C8E068DBF . Business Finland provides low-interest loans and grants to challenging and innovative projects potentially leading to global success stories. The organization offers funding for research and development work carried out by companies, research organizations, and public sector service providers in Finland. Besides funding technological breakthroughs, Business Finland emphasizes also service-related, design, business, and social innovations. Startups and both SMEs and large companies can benefit from Business Finland incentives. A company can use guarantees from the state-owned financing company Finnvera: https://www.finnvera.fi/eng/start/applying-for-financing-when-setting-up-a-business . Finnvera offers services to businesses in most sectors and is also Finland’s official Export Credit Agency (ECA). Business Finland helps foreign investors set up a business in Finland. Its services are free of charge, and range from data collection and matchmaking to location management. Business Finland’s innovation funding provides low-interest loans and grants to challenging and innovative projects potentially leading to global success stories. The organization offers funding for research and development work carried out by companies, research organizations, and public sector service providers in Finland: https://www.businessfinland.fi/en/do-business-with-finland/invest-in-finland/invest-in-finland. More on Business Finland’s incentives: https://www.businessfinland.fi/en/do-business-with-finland/invest-in-finland/business-environment/incentives/incentives-short and incentives fact sheet : https://mediabank.businessfinland.fi/l/CGccrMLqwN5d Support for innovative business ventures can also be obtained from the Foundation for Finnish Inventions: https://www.wipo.int/members/en/details.jsp?country_id=57 https://www.keksintosaatio.fi/en/keksintosaatio-etusivu-english/ As part of the Sustainable Growth Program (the recovery and resilience plan), Finland is promoting energy investment and energy infrastructure projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Finland and support Finland’s 2035 carbon neutrality target. The 520 million eur funding promotes climate objectives and new business opportunities in sustainable growth for companies. For more see: https://tem.fi/en/-/energy-investments-of-finland-s-sustainable-growth-programme-promote-the-green-transition ) Finland’s feed-in premium scheme for renewable electricity production (wind power, biogas, forest chips and wood fuels) entered into force in 2011 (Act No. 1396/2010). Wind power, biogas power and wood-based fuel power stations accepted in the feed-in system were paid a subsidy meeting the difference between the target price and the electricity’s market price for a 12-year period. Support for wind power was closed the end of 2017, biogas and wood-based fuel power plant end of 2018 and wood chip power plants in mid-March 2021. Finnish tax legislation provides certain tax incentives for using renewable energy sources (for example, simplified excise taxation and possibility to apply for a tax refund). For more see: https://www.vero.fi/en/About-us/newsroom/news/uutiset/2021/taxation-changes-2022/ Government aid is available for the implementation of energy audits, investments that conserve energy and investments related to the use of renewable energy as well as for European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations (ESCO) projects. For more see: https://www.motiva.fi/en/solutions/policy_instruments/energy_aid In Finland, the level of energy taxation is higher than the minimum tax levels set by the EU. According to Finnish Energy, a lobby organization for the energy sector, companies operating in Finland are disadvantaged in international competition due to Finland’s high energy taxation. Electricity tax on industry is lower than that on consumers and other businesses, but it is still high on the international scale. In Finland, the current national policy is to tax energy production based on the carbon intensity of the fuel used, leaving renewable energy sources outside this tax. These carbon-based tax incentives for renewable energy production promote technologies with higher maturity and lower subsidy needs. Free trade zone area regulations have been harmonized in the EU by the Community Customs Code. The European Union Customs Code UCC, its Delegated Act and Implementing Act entered into force on May 1, 2016, and will be implemented gradually; the free zone of control type II was abolished and the operator authorizations were changed into customs warehouse authorizations on Customs’ initiative. In Finland, uncleared goods can be stored in temporary warehouses or customs warehouses. There are no free zones or special economic zones in Finland. The Code also allows the processing of non-Union goods without import duties and other charges. For more see: https://tulli.fi/en/businesses/customs-declarations/entry-and-temporary-storage There are no performance requirements or commitments imposed on foreign investment in Finland. However, to conduct business in Finland, some residency requirements must be met. The Limited Liability Companies (LLC) Act of Finland is at: http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2006/en20060624 . A LLC must be reported for registration within three months from the signing of the memorandum of association: https://www.prh.fi/en/kaupparekisteri/yrityksen_perustaminen/osakeyhtio.html . There is no forced localization policy for foreign investments in Finland. The legal basis for the limitation on admission of third country nationals for the purpose of employment is set out in the Council Resolution C274/3 of 1994. Labor Market Tests (LMT) are mechanisms that aim to ensure that migrant workers are only admitted after employers have seriously and unsuccessfully searched for local workers. As a tool to manage labor migration and to facilitate entry of certain categories of third-country national workers, Finland applies various exemptions from the LMT for certain categories of worker, according to national labor market needs. These categories include: highly qualified workers or top specialists, inter-corporate transferees (ICTs), posted workers, persons holding high ranking positions, sports professionals, workers in the field of research, science, art, and culture. LMT for persons already working in Finland and transferring to other sectors was removed in June 2019 in order to improve the labor mobility of foreign citizens already in the labor market. To improve availability of workforce in sectors with labor shortage, a regional LMT pilot was launched in September 2021 through February 2023. Common guidelines on work permits in selected areas are introduced to increase labor mobility between regions and ease permit processes. Finland participates actively in the development of the EU’s Digital Single Market (DSM) and, aside from privacy issues, encourages a light regulatory approach in this area. Since May 2018, data transfers from Finland to non-EU countries must abide by EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679. Finland supports the EU Commission’s view on promoting European digitalization and creating a single market for data. In February 2021, an Advisory Board for Network Security (NSAB) was established to assess and develop the security of domestic communications networks and to support decision-making by the authorities. The Board operation is based on the new provisions of the Act on Electronic Communications Services that entered into force in early 2021, and is part of the implementation of the EU guidelines and 5G security toolbox in Finland. Personal data may be transferred across borders per the Finnish Personal Data Act (PDA) at: http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990523, which states that personal data may be transferred outside the European Union or the European Economic Area only if the country in question guarantees an adequate level of data protection. Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman legislation is at: https://tietosuoja.fi/en/organisations . In November 2020, the Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman and the Finnish Information Society Development Center TIEKE started a pilot program providing micro enterprises and SMEs with information and tools to help ensure effective data protection. More information here: https://tietosuoja.fi/en/-/data-protection-opening-doors-into-europe-for-smes 5. Protection of Property Rights The Finnish legal system protects and enforces property rights and secured interests in property, both movable and real. Finland ranked fourth in the world of 129 countries in the Property Rights Alliance 2021 International Property Rights Index (IPRI) which concentrates on a country’s legal and political environment, physical property rights, and intellectual property rights (IPR). Mortgages exist in Finland and can be applied to both owned and rented real estate. Finland ranks 34th out of 190 countries in the ease of Registering Property according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. In Finland, real property formation, development, land consolidation, cadastral mapping, registration of real properties, ownership and legal rights, real property valuation, and taxation are all combined within one basic cadastral system (real estate register) maintained by the National Land Survey: – https://www.maanmittauslaitos.fi/en/apartments-and-real-property . The Finnish legal system protects intellectual property rights (IPR), and Finland adheres to numerous related international agreements. One of Prime Minister Marin’s goals is to draft a National IPR Strategy for Finland. A draft government resolution has been prepared on the intellectual property rights (IRP) strategy. The aim of the draft IRP strategy, which was circulated for comment in January 2022, is that in 2030 the Finnish IPR legislation will support innovations and creative work. Treaties: Finland is a member of the World International Property Organization (WIPO) and party to a number of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention). Finland is party to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Copyrights: The Finnish Copyright Act can be found at: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/397616. Assessment of the Finnish Copyright system can be found at: https://www.cupore.fi/en/research/research-projects/assessment-of-the-finnish-copyright-system Distribution of information on copyright and surveillance of rights is performed by the Copyright Information and Anti-Piracy Centre (CIAPC). Trademarks: The new Finnish Trademarks Act entered into force in May 2019. With this Act, Finland implemented the revised EU Trademark Directive, enforces the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, and brings the 1964 trademark regulations up to date. Provisions concerning collective marks and control marks are included in the Act, which nullified the Act on Collective Marks. The Act also includes amendments to related legislation such as the Finnish Company Names Act, the Criminal Code, and relevant procedural acts. Trademark applicants or proprietors not domiciled in Finland are required to have a representative resident in the European Economic Area. Finland is party to the Madrid Protocol. Trade secrets: In August 2018, Finland adopted a new Trade Secrets Act to incorporate the provisions of the EU Directive 2016/943 on Trade Secrets. The new Act replaces the Unfair Business Practices Act and provides harmonized definitions at the EU level for trade secrets, their lawful and unlawful acquisition, and their use and disclosure. The Act also includes a whistleblower provision according to which a person (e.g. an employee) is allowed to disclose a trade secret in order to reveal malpractice or illegal activity, so long as it is done to protect the public interest and the person has significant reasons to reveal the information. The Trade Secrets Act can be found at: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2018/en20180595 . The Finnish Act implementing the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive is scheduled to be presented to Parliament in spring 2022. According to the Finnish draft act, all companies employing 50 people or more must establish an internal reporting channel, with a transition period for businesses employing 50–249 people extending to December 2023. Patents: Patent rights in Finland are consistent with international standards, and a granted patent is valid for 20 years. The Finnish Patent and Registration Office (PRH) website contains unofficial translations in English of the Patents Act, Patents Decree, and Patent Regulations https://www.prh.fi/en/patentit/lainsaadantoa.html . The regulatory framework for process patents filed before 1995, and pending in 1996, denied adequate protection to many of the top-selling U.S. pharmaceutical products currently on the Finnish market. For this reason, Finland was placed on USTR’s Special 301 Report Watch List in 2009 but was removed in 2015 when the term for relevant patents expired. Designs: Finland is party to the Locarno Agreement and the Hague Agreement for Industrial Designs, and design are protected by the Finnish Registered Designs Act. The Designs Register at the Finnish Patent and Registration Office (PRH) contains entries about national designs, i.e. design rights, applied for and registered in Finland: https://mallioikeustietopalvelu.prh.fi/en . Finnish Customs officers have ex-officio authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods. IPR enforcement in Finland is based on EU Regulation 608/2013. In 2021, according to the Grey Economy Crime statistics, Finnish customs authorities inspected 17,530 suspected counterfeit goods (with a value of USD 2 074). The number and value of counterfeit goods detained by Finnish Customs have been in decline since 2013. The long-term trend indicates a decline in counterfeit goods detected in large volume shipments. The further decline is most recently due to a steep slowdown in transports from Russia in addition to the impact of the COVID pandemic. However, due to increased online purchases, small volume shipments via postal and express freight traffic have increased in number, and these are more difficult to screen for counterfeits. Finland is mentioned in USTR’s 2021 Notorious Markets List for reportedly hosting a Flokinet server associated with infringing activity, and reportedly hosting FLVTO web server in Finland. The link to WIPO’s list of IPR legislation can be found at: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/profile/FI . For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles here: https://www.wipo.int/members/en/details.jsp?country_id=57 6. Financial Sector Finland is open to foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. According to the Bank of Finland, in end December 2021 Finland had USD 17.5 billion worth of official reserve assets, mainly in foreign currency reserves and securities. Credit is allocated on market terms and is made available to foreign investors in a non-discriminatory manner, and private sector companies have access to a variety of credit instruments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Helsinki Stock Exchange is part of OMX, referred to as NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (OMXH). NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is part of the NASDAQ OMX Nordic division, together with the Stockholm, Copenhagen, Iceland, and Baltic (Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius) stock exchanges. Finland accepts the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. It maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons in accordance with Regulations of the Council of the European Union. Banking is open to foreign competition. Due to in-group mergers, the number of credit institutions operating in Finland dropped by 18 to 228 in 2020. Total assets of the domestic banking groups and branches of foreign banks operating in Finland amounted to USD 951 billion in Q3 2021 . For more information see: https://www.finanssiala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FA-Julkaisu-Finnish_Banking_2020.pdf In October 2021, Handelsbanken, Finland’s fifth biggest banking group with a 5 percent market share, announced decision to divest its businesses in Finland. Foreign nationals can in principle open bank accounts in the same manner as Finns. However, banks must identify customers and this may prove more difficult for foreign nationals. In addition to personal and address data, the bank often needs to know the person’s identifier code (i.e. social security number), and a number of banks require a work permit, a certificate of studies, or a letter of recommendation from a trustworthy bank, and details regarding the nature of transactions to be made with the account. All authorized deposit-taking banks are members of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which guarantees customers’ deposits to a maximum of EUR 100,000 per depositor. In 2020 the capital adequacy ratio of the Finnish banking sector was 21.2 percent, above the EU average. Measured in Core Tier 1 Capital, the ratio was 18.1 percent. The capital adequacy of the Finnish banking sector remains well above the EU average. The Finnish banking sector’s return on equity (ROE) was 6.4 percent, well above the average ROE for all EU banking sectors (2.3 percent). Standard & Poor’s in March 2022 reaffirmed Finland’s AA+ long term credit rating and stable outlook while Fitch kept Finland’s credit rating at AA+ in November 2021. The Finnish banking sector is dominated by four major banks (OP Financial Group, Nordea, Municipality Finance and Danske Bank), which together hold 80 percent of the market. Nordea, which relocated its headquarters from Sweden to Finland in 2018, has the leading market position among household and corporate customers in Finland. The relocation increased the Finnish banking sector to over three times the size of Finland’s GDP. Nordea’s balance sheet is approximately twice the size of the GDP of any of the Nordic economies. Consequently, Finland’s banking sector is one of Europe’s largest relative to the size of the national economy. Nordea became a member of the “we.trade” consortium in November 2017, a blockchain based trade platform for customers of the European wide consortium of banks signed up for the platform. “we.trade” makes domestic and cross-border commerce easier for European companies by harnessing the power of distributed ledger and block chain technology. Commercially launched in January 2019, the we.trade’s technology is currently licensed by 17 banks across 15 countries. The Act on Virtual Currency providers (572/2019) entered into force in May, 2019. The Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) acts as the registration authority for virtual currency providers. The primary objective of the Act is to introduce virtual currency providers into the scope of anti-money laundering regulation. Only virtual currency providers meeting statutory requirements are able to carry on their activities in Finland, and only a FIN-FSA registered virtual currency provider may market its currency and services in Finland The Finnish Tax Administration released guidelines on the taxation of cryptocurrency in May 2018, updates were made in October 2019, and new guidelines were released in January 2020 : https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-guidance/guidance/48411/taxation-of-virtual-currencies3/ Foreign Exchange Finland adopted the Euro as its official currency in January 1999. Finland maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons. Remittance Policies There are no legal obstacles to direct foreign investment in Finnish securities or exchange controls regarding payments into and out of Finland. Banks must identify their customers and report suspected cases of money laundering or the financing of terrorism. Banks and credit institutions must also report single payments or transfers of EUR 15,000 or more. If the origin of funds is suspect, banks must immediately inform the National Bureau of Investigation. There are no restrictions on current transfers or repatriation of profits. Residents and non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts. There is no limit on dividend distributions as long as they correspond to a company’s official earnings records. Travelers carrying more than EUR 10,000 must make a declaration upon entering or leaving the EU. As a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member, Finland observes most of FATF’s 40 recommendations. In its Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, released October 5, 2021, FATF concluded that Finland’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are delivering good results, but that deficiencies on the lack of specific requirements for risk-based supervision and monitoring of non-profit organizations (NPOs) at risk of terrorist financing (TF) abuse and sharing information promptly with competent authorities remain unaddressed. Finland passed new legislation (the Act on Money Collection 2020), completed its National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (NRA 2021) in March 2021 and developed an Action Plan for National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2021– 2023. Finland’s AML/CFT legislation was amended in 2019 to introduce the Finnish Trade Register of beneficial owners of legal entities and foreign trusts. The National AML/CFT Coordination Group has also developed a public AML/CFT website to improve the understanding of ML/TF risks and provide guidance on reporting suspicious transactions for obliged entities. FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, October 2021: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/fur-finland-2021.html In Finland, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive was implemented, among other things, by means of the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System, which entered into force on May 1, 2019. In accordance with the Act, Customs has established a bank and payment accounts register and issue a regulation on a data retrieval system, which entered into force on September 1, 2020. Finland is in the process of amending the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System and the Act on the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to implement the EU Directive on access to financial information. Solidium is a holding company that is fully owned by the State of Finland. Although it is not explicitly a sovereign wealth fund, Solidium’s mission is to manage and increase the long-term value of the listed shareholdings of the Finnish State. Solidium is a minority owner in 12 listed companies; the market value of Solidium’s equity holdings is approximately USD 9.2 billion (March 2022), https://www.solidium.fi/en/holdings/holdings/ 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Government promotes Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through the Ministry of Employment and the Economy CSR Guidelines ( https://tem.fi/en/key-guidelines-on-csr ). The Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility acts as the Finnish National Contact Point (NCP) for the effective implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment: https://tem.fi/en/handling-specific-instances-of-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises . The government’s SOE policy establishes CSR as a core value of SOEs. Finnish companies perceive that the central component of responsible business conduct or corporate responsibility is to conduct due diligence to ensure compliance with law and regulations. There are no national codes for CSR in Finland; rather, Finnish companies and public authorities have promoted global CSR codes, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the UN Global Compact for Business and Human Rights; ILO principles; EMAS; ISO standards; and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). As the EU-level CSR legislation is being drafted, a proposal for an EU Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence was released in March 2022, Finland is preparing to draft national CSR legislation based on the Government Program. The Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the disclosure of non-financial information has been implemented via amendments to the Finnish Accounting Act, requiring affected organizations to report on their CSR. The obligation to report non-financial information and corporate responsibility reports apply to large public interest entities i.e. listed companies, credit institutions and insurance companies with more than 500 employees. In addition, turnover must be greater than USD 45.4 million or balance sheet exceed more than USD 22.7 million. Importing tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold from conflict zones into the EU requires new procedures from businesses as of January 2021. The Act on the placing on the market of conflict minerals and their ores, which entered into force on January 1, 2021, improves the transparency of supply chains, and brings Finland’s conflict minerals regime into line with EU regulations. Tukes, the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency, is the competent authority in Finland and Customs is given tasks related to the implementation of the Act. For more information: https://tukes.fi/en/industry/conflict-minerals . Finland is committed to the implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy by the ILO. Finland has joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which supports improved governance in resource-rich countries. Finland is not a member of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative. Finland is a supporter of the Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for states related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, but the Finnish government is not a member of ICoCA, the international Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers’ Association. The Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (TEM) has appointed a working group to support preparations on due diligence, in addition to review a judicial analysis on a CSR Act. The Committee’s term is January 2021 to December 2023. Labor and environmental laws and regulations are not waived to attract or retain investments and the Government published a guide to socially responsible public procurement in November 2017: http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/160318 . The Corporate Responsibility Network (FiBS) is the largest corporate responsibility network in the Nordic countries and has more than 300 members: https://www.fibsry.fi/briefly-in-english/ . The Human Rights Center (HRC), administratively linked to the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow the most important international norms: https://www.humanrightscentre.fi/monitoring/. The MVO Nederland CSR Risk Checker identified two country risks for Finland: Labor rights (labor conditions/contracts and working hours) and Environment (soil and ground water contamination). More info here: https://www.mvorisicochecker.nl/en/worldmap The Securities Market Association, https://cgfinland.fi/en/, developed and updated (2020) the Finnish Corporate Governance Code for companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange: https://cgfinland.fi/en/corporate-governance-code/ and https://business.nasdaq.com/list/Rules-and-Regulations/European-rules/nasdaq-helsinki/index.html . Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Finland is strongly committed to the EU’s joint reduction target under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and is aiming to become the world’s first carbon-neutral welfare society by 2035. Finland is updating the Climate Change Act to develop more stringent targets for emissions by 2030. Finland’s Annual Climate Report 2021 suggests that while emissions declined in 2020, achieving carbon neutrality by 2035 will require additional action. The national targets set in the Finnish Government Plan (2019) are more stringent than EU-imposed obligations. Under current legislation, Finland’s national target is to achieve a minimum reduction of 80 percent in emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. PM Marin’s government has set a goal to achieve carbon neutral status by 2035 and carbon negative status shortly thereafter. Finland was the first country in the world to set a carbon tax in 1990, and Finnish power plants and industries have participated in the EU Emissions Trading System since 2005. Finland supports the development of carbon markets also around the world and promote the gradual phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies. In 2020, the Finnish Government announced plans to form a Climate Fund focusing on combating climate change, boosting low-carbon industry and promoting digitalization. Approximately 65 percent of the Climate Fund’s investments relate to climate change and about 35 percent to climate-related digitalization. Depending on the funding category and target, the funding by the Climate Fund can vary between 1 and 20 million euros. Finland ranks first on the 2021 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation’s (ITIF’s) Global Energy Innovation Index (GEII). The GEII reveals varied contributions nations make to the global innovation system. Finland, a top contributor overall to the global energy innovation system, ranks first for entrepreneurial experimentation and market formation, a ranking it also held in 2016. Finland’s top score is in market readiness and technology adoption, which assesses a nation’s demand-pull on clean energy innovation through its energy efficiency and clean energy consumption. On MIT’s Green Future Index, Finland ranked sixth among 76 leading countries and territories. The index measures progress and commitment towards building low carbon future. According to the index, Finland fosters an extensive green tech R&D ecosystem, with leading-edge renewables (such as green hydrogen) and food tech. Finland ranked sixth on the 2020 Green Growth Index, measuring performance in meeting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets. Ecological sustainability is one of Finland’s main goals and Finland also aims to be a forerunner of ecological public procurement. Finland’s first National Public Procurement Strategy, launched September 2020, focuses on developing strategic management and promoting procurement expertise. To support the achievement of ecological, social and economic goals in society through public procurement it is important to develop a strong culture of knowledge-based management. For more see: https://vm.fi/en/-/national-public-procurement-strategy-identifies-concrete-ways-in-which-public-procurement-can-help-achieve-wider-goals-in-society 9. Corruption In April 2021, the Finnish Government adopted a government resolution on Finland’s national risk assessment and action plan on money laundering and terrorist financing. The assessment found that all sectors experience challenges in identifying signs of terrorist financing and sectors with the highest risk of money laundering are money remitters (hawala operators) and virtual currency providers. Finland’s money laundering and terrorist financing national action plan (2021-2023) sets out measures to reduce the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. More information here: https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/10623/highest-risk-sectors-are-money-remittances-and-provision-of-virtual-currencies The National Risk Assessment of 2018 does not list corruption as a risk in Finland, nor does the 2017 Security Strategy for Society. Over the past decade, Finland has ranked in the top three on Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In 2021, Finland was ranked first on the CPI, and ranked third in the world on the Democracy Index civil liberties score with an overall score of 9.27. Finland scored 10 in electoral process and pluralism, 9.29 in the functioning of the government, 8.89 in political participation, 8.75 in political culture and 8.41 in civil liberties. Corruption in Finland is covered by the Criminal Code and penalties range from fines to imprisonment of up to four years. The Criminal Code divides bribery offences into two categories, giving of bribes to public officials or acceptance of bribes and giving or acceptance of bribes in business. Finland has statutory tax rules concerning non-deductibility of bribes. Finland does not have an authority specifically charged to prevent corruption, instead several authorities and agencies contribute to anti-corruption work. The Ministry of Justice coordinates anti-corruption matters, but Finland’s EU anti-corruption contact is the Ministry of the Interior. The National Bureau of Investigation also monitors corruption, while the tax administration has guidelines obliging tax officials to report suspected offences, including foreign bribery, and the Ministry of Finance has guidelines on hospitality, benefits, and gifts. The Ministry of Justice describes its anti-corruption efforts at https://oikeusministerio.fi/en/anti-corruption-activities . In 2020, Ministry of Employment and Economy released an Anti-Corruption guide intended for companies, especially SMEs, to provide them with guidance and support for promoting good business practices and corruption-free business relations both in Finland and abroad. For more see: https://tem.fi/en/-/guide-offers-smes-practical-anti-corruption-tips The Ministry of Justice is maintaining an Anti-Corruption.fi website, https://korruptiontorjunta.fi/en/combating-corruption-in-finland, providing both ordinary citizens and professional operators with impartial and fact-based information on corruption and its prevention in Finland. The goal is a transparent, impartial, and corruption-free culture and society. The Act on a Candidate’s Election Funding (273/2009) delineates election funding and disclosure rules. The Act requires presidential candidates, Members of Parliament, and Deputy Members to declare total campaign financing, the financial value of each contribution, and donor names for donations exceeding EUR 1,500: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2009/en20090273.pdf . The Act on Political Parties (10/1969) concerning the funding of political parties is at: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1969/en19690010.pdf . The National Audit Office of Finland keeps a register containing election-funding disclosures at: http://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/en/index.html . Election funding disclosures must be filed with the National Audit Office of Finland within two months of election results being confirmed. Finland does not regulate lobbying; there is no requirement for lobbyists to register or report contact with public officials. However, in March 2020, a parliamentary working group was set up to establish a transparency lobbying register. In December 2021, the working group report on the Transparency Register was sent out for comments, with the aim of having the government proposal before Parliament in spring 2022. The Finnish Association of Communications Professionals (ProCom) keeps a voluntary lobbyist registry (in Finnish). The ethical Guidelines of the Finnish Prosecution Service can be found from a new website that was opened on October 1, 2019. https://syyttajalaitos.fi/en/the-ethical-guidelines . The following are ratified or in force in Finland: the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime; the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption; the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; and, the UN Anticorruption Convention. Finland is a member of the European Partners against Corruption (EPAC). Finland is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Anti-Bribery. In October 2020, the OECD working group on bribery said it recognizes Finland’s commitment to combat corruption, but is concerned about lack of foreign bribery enforcement. For more see Finland’s 4th evaluation report: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Finland-phase-4-follow-up-report-ENG.pdf . In October 2020, the Council of Europe’s anticorruption body GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) addressed 14 recommendations to Finland on preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and compliance with these recommendations. For more see GRECO’s 5th evaluation round, Finland compliance report: https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a0b0ca . The National Bureau of Investigation is responsible for the investigation of organized and international crimes, including economic crime and corruption, and operates an anti-corruption unit to detect economic offences. Finland adopted the first national anti-corruption strategy in May 2021. The Strategy is in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda) and the recommendations issued by the UN, the OECD, the Council of Europe and the European Union to Finland to reinforce its anti-corruption work. At the beginning of 2017, the Public Procurement Act based on the new EU directives on public procurement entered into force. Under the law, a foreign bribery conviction remains mandatory grounds for exclusion from public contracts (section 80: mandatory exclusion criteria). Resources to Report Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Markku Ranta-Aho Head of Financial Crime Division National Board of Investigation P.O. Box 285, 01310 Vantaa, Finland markku.ranta-aho@poliisi.fi Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Mari Laakso Chairperson Transparency Finland Mari.Laakso@transparency.fi 10. Political and Security Environment While instances of political violence in Finland are rare, extremism exists, and anti-immigration and anti-Semitic incidents do occur. Stickers and posters with anti-Semitic images and messages were on the synagogue of Helsinki’s Jewish congregation in neighborhoods with significant Jewish populations and on public property throughout 2021. The vandalism ranged from targeted to apparently random, and similar incidents had occurred numerous times over the previous three years. Some of the anti-Semitic graffiti and stickers claimed to be from the banned neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). Stickers specifically targeted Jewish community members at lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) pride events. In 2019, 15 anti-Semitic acts of vandalism against the Israeli Embassy over an 18-month period prompted an official demarche. The NRM is banned in Finland, as is its Facebook page. However, in January 2021 the daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat reported that the NRM continued to operate out of public sight and without a clear name. In June 2021 prosecutors charged nine members of the NRM with engaging in illegal association for continuing NRM activities under the organization of the group Toward Freedom! (Kohti Vapautta! in Finnish) and leading a demonstration at Tampere Central Market in October 2020. There were a few anti-Semitic incidents on International Holocaust Remembrance Day at the beginning of 2020, but the banning of NRM and COVID-19 have led to a marked decline in anti-Semitic incidents over the past two years. It is illegal in Finland to share violent content such as footage of Christchurch massacre, but it is still being disseminated and no one has been prosecuted. In August 2017, a stabbing attack took place in central Turku, in southwest Finland in which two pedestrians were killed and eight injured. Finnish authorities considered the attack a terrorist act and its perpetrator was convicted on terrorism charges, making it the first incident of its kind in Finland since the end of World War II. In December 2021, the Finnish Intelligence Service (SUPO) announced that the first terrorism investigation on the extreme right in Finland has started. Although the investigation is exceptional, it does not affect SUPO’s terrorist threat assessment, according to which the most significant threat is posed by lone operators or small groups inspired by far-right or radical Islamist ideology. According to SUPO’s most recent 2020 yearbook, released in March 2021, the danger of extreme right-wing terrorism has grown in Finland, and SUPO has identified far-right operators with the capacity and motivation to mount a terrorist attack. Some indications of concrete preparation have also emerged. The threat of radical Islamist terrorism has remained at the previous level. The Fund for Peace (FFP) ranked Finland as the most stable country in the world again in 2021 in the Fragile States Index based on political, social, and economic indicators including public services, income distribution, human rights, and the rule of law. Marsh’s Political Risk Map 2021, based on Marsh Specialty’s World Risk Review platform, provides risk ratings for 197 countries on a 0.1 to 10 scale, with 10 representing the highest risk and 0.1 the lowest. Finland was rated low risk, with ratings ranging from 1.2 to 3.9. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Finland has a long tradition of trade unions. The country has a unionization rate of 59 percent, and approximately 90 percent of employees in Finland participate in the collective bargaining system. Extensive tripartite cooperation between the government, employer’s groups, and trade unions characterize the country’s labor market system. Any trade union and employers’ association may make collective agreements, and the Ministry decides on the validity of the agreement. The Act on Employment Contracts regulates employment relationships regarding working hours, annual leave, and safety conditions, although minimum wages, actual working hours, and working conditions are determined to a large extent through collective agreements instead of parliamentary legislation. Collective bargaining and collective labor agreements are generally binding. In recent years, local labor market partners have been given more flexibility to enforce the collective agreements. In Fall 2020, the government decided to commission a report on measures to strengthen the trust and negotiating competence required for local collective bargaining within both generally binding collective agreements and normally binding collective agreements. The aim is to develop and advance local collective bargaining through the system of collective agreements. The report, launched March 2021, concluded that local bargaining continues to have a great potential in the field of so-called normally binding collective agreements. Finland adheres to most ILO conventions; enforcement of worker rights is effective. Freedom of association and collective bargaining are guaranteed by law, which provides for the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination and any obstruction of these rights. The National Conciliator under the Ministry of Employment and the Economy assists negotiating partners with labor disputes. The arbitration system is based on the Act on Mediation in Labor Disputes and the Labor Court is the highest body for settlement. The ILO’s Finland Country profile can be found here: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:102625 . The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for drafting labor legislation and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for enforcing labor laws and regulations via the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) authorities of the OSH Divisions at the Regional State Administrative Agencies, which operate under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Finnish authorities adequately enforce contract, wage, and overtime laws. New legislation concerning the hiring of foreign workers in Finland entered into force on June 18, 2016. Its objective is to intensify monitoring and to ensure improved compliance with the terms of employment in Finland. Finland allows the free movement of EU citizen workers. During 2020, there were 108 strikes in Finland, compared to 107 in 2019. Though most labor disputes are resolved relatively quickly, some recent labor disputes have been protracted and have led to supply chain disruptions affecting business operations in the United States and other markets. In September 2021, Statistics Finland reported that between 2010 and 2020, the number of working-age people has fallen by 136,000 persons, and during the next two decades the working age population is expected to decrease more slowly or by 76,000 persons by 2040. While the number of people belonging to the younger age groups declined over the period 2015 – 2020 period in Finland, the age group of 60 years and older continued to increase. By the end of 2020, the number of people aged 60 or older was over 1.6 million of Finland’s total population of roughly 5.53 million people. The government reformed social protection and unemployment security to encourage people to accept job offers, shorten unemployment periods, reduce structural unemployment, and save public resources. The unemployed are granted a labor market subsidy, which, if linked to earnings as is the case for about 60 percent of the unemployed, guarantees moderate income for a period up to 400 working days. Those without jobs after the 400-day period need to demonstrate that they are actively pursuing employment to continue receiving benefits. The period of eligibility was shortened from 500 days to 400 days starting on January 1, 2017, except for those with a work history shorter than three years (reduced to 300 days), and for those aged over 58 with an employment history of at least five years (remains 500 days). On January 1, 2017, Finnish authorities introduced a two-year, nationwide, statutory and randomized universal basic income trial. The goal was to determine whether a basic income, received without conditions, incentivizes recipients to seek paid work. The government concluded that the basic income experiment did not increase the employment of participants, but it did improve mental wellbeing, confidence, and life satisfaction. The study found a mild positive effect on employment, particularly in certain categories, such as families with children. In 2017, the center-right government of Juha Sipila introduced the “Activation Model” (AM), which mimicked the Danish unemployment insurance system. The AM became effective on January 1, 2018 and was applied to basic (flat-rate) unemployment benefits (paid by the Social Insurance Institution, Kela) and income-related schemes (paid by unemployment funds). The aim of the AM was to tighten the conditions for benefit eligibility, in order to encourage activation of the unemployed, reduce the duration of periods in unemployment and increase the employment rate. AM experiences were mixed, and union opposed the action vigorously. In a December 2019 press release, the Minister of Social Affairs and Health called the activation model unfair and announced that the model is abolished starting January 1, 2020. Transparency International estimate the size of Finland’s informal economy to be 13 percent, representing approximately USD 39 billion at GDP PPP levels. According to Finland’s Ministry of Interior, the share of the grey economy of GDP range from USD 1.2 to 16.6 billion. In June 2020, a Strategy and Action Plan for tackling the Grey Economy and Economic Crime (2020-2023) was adopted. For more see Grey Economy and Economic Crime website: https://www.vero.fi/en/grey-economy-crime/ 14. Contact for More Information HelsinkiPolEconAll@state.gov France and Monaco Executive Summary France welcomes foreign investment and has a stable business climate that attracts investors from around the world. The French government devotes significant resources to attracting foreign investment through policy incentives, marketing, overseas trade promotion offices, and investor support mechanisms. France has an educated population, first-rate universities, and a talented workforce. It has a modern business culture, sophisticated financial markets, a strong intellectual property rights regime, and innovative business leaders. The country is known for its world-class infrastructure, including high-speed passenger rail, maritime ports, extensive roadway networks, a dense network of public transportation, and efficient intermodal connections. High-speed (3G/4G) telephony is nearly ubiquitous, and France has begun its 5G roll-out in key metropolitan cities. In 2021, the United States was the leading foreign investor in France in terms of new jobs created (10,118) and second in terms of new projects invested (247). The total stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in France reached $91 billion. More than 4,500 U.S. firms operate in France, supporting over 500,000 jobs, making the United States the top foreign investor overall in terms of job creation. Following the election of French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2017, the French government implemented significant labor market and tax reforms. By relaxing the rules on companies to hire and fire employees, the government cut production taxes by 15 percent in 2021, and corporate tax will fall to 25 percent in 2022. Surveys of U.S. investors in 2021 showed the greatest optimism about the business operating environment in France since 2008. Macron’s reform agenda for pensions was derailed in 2018, however, when France’s Yellow Vest protests—a populist, grassroots movement for economic justice—rekindled class warfare and highlighted wealth and, to a lesser extent, income inequality. The onset of the pandemic in 2020 shifted Macron’s focus to mitigating France’s most severe economic crisis in the post-war era. The economy shrank 8.3 percent in 2020 compared to the year prior, but with the help of unprecedented government support for businesses and households, economic growth reached seven percent in 2021. The government’s centerpiece fiscal package was the €100 billion ($110 billion) France Relance plan, of which over half was dedicated to supporting businesses. Most of the support was accessible to U.S. firms operating in France as well. The government launched a follow-on investment package in late 2021 called “France 2030” to bolster competitiveness, increase productivity, and accelerate the ecological transition. Also in 2020, France increased its protection against foreign direct investment that poses a threat to national security. In the wake of the health crisis, France’s investment screening body expanded the scope of sensitive sectors to include biotechnology companies and lowered the threshold to review an acquisition from a 25 percent ownership stake by the acquiring firm to 10 percent, a temporary provision set to expire at the end of 2022. In 2020, the government blocked at least one transaction, which included the attempted acquisition of a French firm by a U.S. company in the defense sector. In early 2021, the French government threated to block the acquisition of French supermarket chain Carrefour by Canada’s Alimentation Couche-Tard, which eventually scuttled the deal. Key issues to watch in 2022 are: 1) the impact of the war in Ukraine and measures by the EU and French government to mitigate the fallout; 2) the degree to which COVID-19 and resulting supply chain disruptions continue to agitate the macroeconomic environment in France and across Europe, and the extent of the government’s continued support for the economic recovery; and 3) the creation of winners and losers resulting from the green transition, the degree to which will be largely determined by firms’ operating models and exposure to fossil fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 22 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 11 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 91.153 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 39.480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment France welcomes foreign investment. In the current economic climate, the French government sees foreign investment as a means to create additional jobs and stimulate growth. Investment regulations are simple, and a range of financial incentives are available to foreign investors. Surveys of U.S. investors in 2021 showed the greatest optimism about the business operating environment in France since 2008. U.S. companies find France’s good infrastructure, advanced technology, and central location in Europe attractive. France’s membership in the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone facilitates the efficient movement of people, services, capital, and goods. However, notwithstanding recent French efforts at structural reform, including a reduction in corporate and production tax, and advocacy for a global minimum tax within the European Union, perceived disincentives to investing in France include the persistently high tax environment, ongoing labor law rigidity, and a shortage of skilled labor. France is among the least restrictive countries for foreign investment. With a few exceptions in certain specified sectors, there are no statutory limits on foreign ownership of companies. Foreign entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. France maintains a national security review mechanism to screen high-risk investments. French law stipulates that control by acquisition of a domiciled company or subsidiary operating in certain sectors deemed crucial to France’s national interests relating to public order, public security and national defense are subject to prior notification, review, and approval by the Economy and Finance Minister. Other sectors requiring approval include energy infrastructure; transportation networks; public water supplies; electronic communication networks; public health protection; and installations vital to national security. In 2018, four additional categories – semiconductors, data storage, artificial intelligence and robotics – were added to the list requiring a national security review. For all listed sectors, France can block foreign takeovers of French companies according to the provisions of the 2014 Montebourg Decree. On December 31, 2019 the government issued a decree to lower the threshold for vetting of foreign investment from outside Europe from 33 to 25 percent and then lowered it again to 10 percent on July 22, 2020, a temporary provision to prevent predatory investment during the COVID-19 crisis. This lower threshold is set to expire at the end of 2022. The decree also enhanced government-imposed conditions and penalties in cases of non-compliance and introduced a mechanism to coordinate the national security review of foreign direct investments with the European Union (EU Regulation 2019/452). The new European rules entered into force on October 11, 2020. The list of strategic sectors was also expanded to include the following activities listed in the EU Regulation 2019/452: agricultural products, when such products contribute to national food supply security; the editing, printing, or distribution of press publications related to politics or general matters; and R&D activities relating to quantum technologies and energy storage technologies. Separately, France expanded the scope of sensitive sectors on April 30, 2020, to include biotechnology companies. Procedurally, the Minister of Economy, Finance, and Recovery has 30 business days following the receipt of a request for authorization to either: 1) declare that the investor is not required to obtain such authorization; 2) grant its authorization without conditions; or 3) declare that an additional review is required to determine whether a conditional authorization is sufficient to protect national interests. If an additional review is required, the Minister has an additional 45 business days to either clear the transaction (possibly subject to conditions) or prohibit it. The Minister is further allowed to deny clearance based on the investor’s ties with a foreign government or public authority. The absence of a decision within the applicable timeframe is a de facto rejection of the authorization. The government also expanded the breadth of information required in the approval request. For example, a foreign investor must now disclose any financial relationship with or significant financial support from a State or public entity; a list of French and foreign competitors of the investor and of the target; or a signed statement that the investor has not, over the past five years, been subject to any sanctions for non-compliance with French FDI regulations. In 2020, the government blocked at least one transaction—the attempted acquisition of a French firm by a U.S. company in the defense sector. In early 2021, the French government blocked the acquisition of French supermarket chain Carrefour by Canada’s Alimentation Couche-Tard on the basis that it was a threat to France’s food security and national sovereignty. France has not recently been the subject of international organizations’ investment policy reviews. The OECD Economic Survey for France (November 2021) can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/france-economic-snapshot/ . Business France is a government agency established with the purpose of promoting new foreign investment, expansion, technology partnerships, and financial investment. Business France provides services to help investors understand regulatory, tax, and employment policies as well as state and local investment incentives and government support programs. Business France also helps companies find project financing and equity capital. The agency unveiled a website in English to help prospective businesses that are considering investments in the French market ( https://www.businessfrance.fr/en/invest-in-France ). The U.S. Embassy in Paris also collaborated with Business France to create a map of U.S. investment in each region of France ( https://investinfrance.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Entreprises-americaines.pdf ). In addition, France’s public investment bank, Bpifrance, assists foreign businesses to find local investors when setting up a subsidiary in France. It also supports foreign startups in France through the government’s French Tech Ticket program, which provides them with funding, a resident’s permit, and incubation facilities. Both business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women and minorities. President Macron prioritized innovation early in his five-year mandate. In 2017, he launched a €10 billion ($11 billion) fund to back disruptive innovation in energy, the digital sector, and the climate transition by privatizing state-owned enterprises and introduced a four-year tech visa for entrepreneurs to come to France. He also introduced tax reforms that would tax capital gains, interest and dividends at a flat 30 percent, instead of the existing top rate of 45 percent. In June 2020, the French government introduced a new €1.2 billion ($1.3 billion) plan to support French startups, concentrating on the health, quantum, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity sectors. The plan included the creation of a €500 million ($550 million) investment fund to help startups overcome the COVID-19 crisis and continue to innovate. It also comprised a “French Tech Sovereignty Fund” launched in December 2020 by France’s public investment bank Bpifrance, with an initial commitment of €150 million ($165 million). In October 2021, President Macron unveiled a €34 billion ($37.4billion) innovation investment strategy between 2022 and 2027, which mirrors the priorities of the European Commission’s investments in digital innovation and decarbonisation. France will invest by 2030 in breakthrough innovation in a wide variety of areas, including small nuclear fission reactors, green hydrogen production facilities, the production of two million electric and hybrid vehicles every year, research on developing France’s first low-carbon airplane, healthy and sustainable foods, and 20 drugs for cancer and chronic diseases as well as the development of new medical devices. Major industrial groups are encouraged to work with startups, which will also benefit from funding under this new plan. This plan comes on top of the €20 billion ($22 billion) from the 2021 Fourth Future Investment Program. A new Secretary General for Investment was appointed in January 2022 to ensure the coordination of these two innovation programs. France’s sectors that traditionally attracted the most investment include aeronautics, agro-foods, digital, nuclear, rail, auto, chemicals and materials, forestry, eco-industries, shipbuilding, health, luxury, and extractive industries. However, Business France and Bpifrance are particularly interested in attracting foreign investment in the tech sector. The French government has developed the “French Tech” initiative to promote France as a location for start-ups and high-growth digital companies. French Tech offices have been established in 17 French cities and over 100 cities globally, including New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Moscow, and Berlin. French Tech has special programs to provide support to startups at various stages of their development. The latest effort has been the creation of the French Tech 120 Program, which provides financial and administrative support to some 123 most promising tech companies. In 2019, €5 billion ($5.9 billion) in venture funding was raised by French startups, an increase of nearly threefold since 2015. Venture capital investment in French startups has doubled from €5.1 billion ($5.6 billion) in 2020 to over €10 billion ($11 billion) in 2021. In March 2021, France launched, with the support of the European Commission and other member states, the Scale-Up Europe initiative bringing together over 300 start-up and scale-up founders, investors, researchers, and corporations, with the goal of creating 10 tech giants each valued at more than €100 billion ($110 billion) by 2030. French authorities supported the Scale-up Europe initiative designed to promote businesses across Europe to expand beyond their local and European markets. As part of that initiative, on February 8, 2022, France inaugurated a new European Investment Fund designed to increase European venture capital funds’ capacity to provide late-stage funding to EU-based start-ups and scale-ups. France and Germany have each committed €1 billion ($1.1 billion), along with €500 million ($565 million) from the European Investment Bank. The website Guichet Enterprises ( https://www.guichet-entreprises.fr/fr/ ) is designed to be a one-stop website for registering a business. The site, managed by the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), is available in both French and English although some fact sheets on regulated industries are only available in French on the website. French firms invest more in the United States than in any other country and support approximately 765,100 American jobs. Total French investment in the United States reached $314.9 billion in 2020. France was still our tenth largest trading partner with approximately $115.7 billion in bilateral trade in 2021. The business promotion agency Business France also assists French firms with outward investment, which it does not restrict. 3. Legal Regime The French government has made considerable progress in the last decade on the transparency and accessibility of its regulatory system. The government generally engages in industry and public consultation before drafting legislation or rulemaking through a regular but variable process directed by the relevant ministry. However, the text of draft legislation is not always publicly available before parliamentary approval. U.S. firms may also find it useful to become members of industry associations, which can play an influential role in developing government policies. Even “observer” status can offer insight into new investment opportunities and greater access to government-sponsored projects. To increase transparency in the legislative process, all ministries are required to attach an impact assessment to their draft bills. The Prime Minister’s Secretariat General (SGG for Secretariat General du Gouvernement) is responsible for ensuring that impact studies are undertaken in the early stages of the drafting process. The State Council (Conseil d’Etat), which must be consulted on all draft laws and regulations, may reject a draft bill if the impact assessment is inadequate. After experimenting with new online consultations, the Macron Administration is regularly using this means to achieve consensus on its major reform bills. These consultations are often open to professionals as well as citizens at large. Another innovation is to impose regular impact assessments after a bill has been implemented to ensure its maximum efficiency, revising, as necessary, provisions that do not work in favor of those that do. Over past decades, major reforms have extended the investigative and decision-making powers of France’s Competition Authority. On April 11, 2019, France implemented the European Competition Network (ECN) Directive, which widens the powers of all European national competition authorities to impose larger fines and temporary measures. The Authority publishes its methodology for calculating fines imposed on companies charged with abuse of a dominant position. It issues specific guidance on competition law compliance, and government ministers, companies, consumer organizations, and trade associations now have the right to petition the authority to investigate anti-competitive practices. While the Authority alone examines the impact of mergers on competition, the Minister of the Economy retains the power to request a new investigation or reverse a merger transaction decision for reasons of industrial development, competitiveness, or saving jobs. The Competition Authority continues to simplify takeover and merger notifications with online procedures via a dedicated platform in 2020 and updated guidelines in English released on January 11, 2021. Since January 2021, the Competition Authority has a new President, Benoît Cœuré, who intends to focus on the impact of the Cloud on all sectors of the French economy. France’s budget documents are comprehensive and cover all expenditures of the central government. An annex to the budget also provides estimates of cost sharing contributions, though these are not included in the budget estimates. Last September, the French government published its first “Green Budget,” as an annex to the 2021 Finance Bill. This event attests to France’s strong commitment, notably under the OECD-led “Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting” (which France joined in December 2017), to integrate “green” tools into the budget process. In its spring report each year, the National Economic Commission outlines the deficits for the two previous years, the current year, and the year ahead, including consolidated figures on taxes, debt, and expenditures. Since 1999, the budget accounts have also included contingent liabilities from government guarantees and pension liabilities. The government publishes its debt data promptly on the French Treasury’s website and in other documents. Data on nonnegotiable debt is available 15 days after the end of the month, and data on negotiable debt is available 35 days after the end of the month. Annual data on debt guaranteed by the state is published in summary in the CGAF Report and in detail in the Compte de la dette publique. More information can be found at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/fra/fiscal.htm France was the first country to include extra-financial reporting in its 2001 New Economic Regulations Law. To encourage companies to develop a social responsibility strategy and limit the negative externalities of globalized trade, the law requires French companies with more than 500 employees and annual revenues above €100 million ($106 million) to report on the social and environmental consequences of their activities and include them in their annual management report. A 2012 decree on corporate social and environmental transparency obligations requires portfolio management companies to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their investment process. France’s 2015 Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth strengthened mandatory carbon disclosure requirements for listed companies and introduced carbon reporting for institutional investors. It requires investors (defined as asset owners and investment managers) to disclose in their annual investor’s report and on their website how they factor ESG criteria and carbon-related considerations into their investment policies. The regulation concerns all asset classes: listed assets, venture capital, bonds, physical assets, etc. France is a founding member of the European Union, created in 1957. As such, France incorporates EU laws and regulatory norms into its domestic law. France has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and a member of GATT since 1948. While developing new draft regulations, the French government submits a copy to the WTO for review to ensure the prospective legislation is consistent with its WTO obligations. France ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in October 2015 and has implemented all of its TFA commitments. French law is codified into what is sometimes referred to as the Napoleonic Code, but is officially the Code Civil des Français, or French Civil Code. Private law governs interactions between individuals (e.g., civil, commercial, and employment law) and public law governs the relationship between the government and the people (e.g., criminal, administrative, and constitutional law). France has an administrative court system to challenge a decision by local governments and the national government; the State Council (Conseil d’Etat) is the appellate court. France enforces foreign legal decisions such as judgments, rulings, and arbitral awards through the procedure of exequatur introduced before the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI), which is the court of original jurisdiction in the French legal system. France’s Commercial Tribunal (Tribunal de Commerce or TDC) specializes in commercial litigation. Magistrates of the commercial tribunals are lay judges, who are well known in the business community and have experience in the sectors they represent. Decisions by the commercial courts can be appealed before the Court of Appeals. France’s judicial system is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable and is independent of the government. The judiciary – although its members are state employees – is independent of the executive branch. The judicial process in France is known to be competent, fair, thorough, and time-consuming. There is a right of appeal. The Appellate Court (cour d’appel) re-examines judgments rendered in civil, commercial, employment or criminal law cases. It re-examines the legal basis of judgments, checking for errors in due process and reexamines case facts. It may either confirm or set aside the judgment of the lower court, in whole or in part. Decisions of the Appellate Court may be appealed to the Highest Court in France (cour de cassation). The French Financial Prosecution Office (Parquet National Financier, or PNF), specialized in serious economic and financial crimes, was set up by a December 6, 2013 law and began its activities on February 1, 2014. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all sorts of remunerative activities. U.S. investment in France is subject to the provisions of the Convention of Establishment between the United States of America and France, which was signed in 1959 and remains in force. The rights it provides U.S. nationals and companies include: rights equivalent to those of French nationals in all commercial activities (excluding communications, air transportation, water transportation, banking, the exploitation of natural resources, the production of electricity, and professions of a scientific, literary, artistic, and educational nature, as well as certain regulated professions like doctors and lawyers). Treatment equivalent to that of French or third-country nationals is provided with respect to transfer of funds between France and the United States. Property is protected from expropriation except for public purposes; in that case it is accompanied by payment that is just, realizable and prompt. Potential investors can find relevant investment information and links to laws and investment regulations at http://www.businessfrance.fr/ . Major reforms have extended the investigative and decision-making powers of France’s Competition Authority. France implemented the European Competition Network, or ECN Directive, on April 11, 2019, allowing the French Competition Authority to impose heftier fines (above €3 million / $3.3 million) and temporary measures to prevent an infringement that may cause harm. The Authority issues decisions and opinions mostly on antitrust issues, but its influence on competition issues is growing. For example, following a complaint in November 2019 by several French, European, and international associations of press publishers against Google over the use of their content online without compensation, the Authority ordered the U.S. company to start negotiating in good faith with news publishers over the use of their content online. On December 20, 2019, Google was fined €150 million ($177 million) for abuse of dominant position. Following an in-depth review of the online ad sector, the Competition Authority found Google Ads to be “opaque and difficult to understand” and applied in “an unfair and random manner.” On November 17, 2021, the Competition Authority brokered a “pioneering” five-year deal between the CEOs of Google and French news agency Agence France-Presse for the search giant to pay for the French news agency’s content. The deal covers the entirety of the EU and follows 18 months of negotiations. It is the first such deal by a news agency under Article 15 of the 2019 European directive creating a neighboring right for the benefit of press agencies and press publishers when online services reproduce press publications in search engine results. France was the first EU member state to implement Article 15 through its July 24, 2019 law, which came into force on October 24, 2019. Additional U.S. firms also continue to fall under review of the Competition Authority. For example, it fined Apple $1.3 billion on March 16, 2020, for antitrust infringements involving the restriction of intra-brand competition and the rarely used French law concept of “abuse of economic dependency.” The Competition Authority launches regular in-depth investigations into various sectors of the economy, which may lead to formal investigations and fines. The Authority publishes its methodology for calculating fines imposed on companies charged with abuse of a dominant position. It issues specific guidance on competition law compliance. Government ministers, companies, consumer organizations and trade associations have the right to petition the authority to investigate anti-competitive practices. While the Authority alone examines the impact of mergers on competition, the Minister of the Economy retains the power to request a new investigation or reverse a merger transaction decision for reasons of industrial development, competitiveness, or saving jobs. A new law on Economic Growth, Activity and Equal Opportunities (known as the “Macron Law”), adopted in August 2016, vested the Competition Authority with the power to review mergers and alliances between retailers ex-ante (beforehand). The law provides that all contracts binding a retail business to a distribution network shall expire at the same time. This enables the retailer to switch to another distribution network more easily. Furthermore, distributors are prohibited from restricting a retailer’s commercial activity via post-contract terms. The civil fine incurred for restrictive practices can now amount to up to five percent of the business’s revenue earned in France. In accordance with international law, the national or local governments cannot legally expropriate property to build public infrastructure without fair market compensation. There have been no expropriations of note during the reporting period. France has extensive and detailed bankruptcy laws and regulations. Any creditor, regardless of the amount owed, may file suit in bankruptcy court against a debtor. Foreign creditors, equity shareholders and foreign contract holders have the same rights as their French counterparts. Monetary judgments by French courts on firms established in France are generally made in euros. Not bankruptcy itself, but bankruptcy fraud – the misstatement by a debtor of his financial position in the context of a bankruptcy – is criminalized. Under France’s bankruptcy code managers and other entities responsible for the bankruptcy of a French company are prevented from escaping liability by shielding their assets (Law 2012-346). France has adopted a law that enables debtors to implement a restructuring plan with financial creditors only, without affecting trade creditors. France’s Commercial Code incorporates European Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of claims on insolvent credit institutions and investment firms. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, France ranked 32nd of 190 countries on ease of resolving insolvency. The Bank of France, the country’s only credit monitor, maintains files on persons having written unfunded checks, having declared bankruptcy, or having participated in fraudulent activities. Commercial credit reporting agencies do not exist in France. 4. Industrial Policies Following the election of President Emmanuel Macron in May 2017, the French government implemented significant labor market and tax reforms. By relaxing the rules on companies to hire and fire employees and by offering investment incentives, Macron improved the operating environment in France, based on surveys of U.S. investors. However, with the onset of the pandemic, Macron put an end to his planned pension reforms and introduced his overhaul of France’s unemployment insurance in stages throughout 2021. Under his new plan, employees must work longer to qualify for unemployment benefits: they are required to work at least six of the last 25 months, instead of four of the last 28 months under previous rules. Furthermore, employees under 57 years of age, earning €4,500 ($4,952) in pre-tax monthly wages, will see their benefits decrease by 30 percent after the seventh month of unemployment. The other major aspect of this reform mandates that the rules for calculating unemployment benefits are based on an average monthly income from work rather than the number of days worked, as was the case previously. The purpose is to ensure unemployment benefits never exceed the amount of the average monthly net salary (which is currently the case for some beneficiaries). In 2021, the government’s focus shifted to mitigating France’s most severe economic crisis in the post-war era. The economy shrank 8.3 percent in 2020 compared to the year prior as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, the government implemented extensive direct fiscal support to households and businesses in 2020 and 2021. The “France Relaunch” recovery program was mainly comprised of loan guarantees, unemployment schemes that support workers’ wages, subsidies to vulnerable sectors, investment in green and developing technologies, production tax cuts and other tax benefits, and funding for research and development. The cost of the emergency measures was around €70 billion ($76.9 billion) in 2020 (2.9 percent of 2019 GDP), according to the national accounts. In 2021, the measures reached €64 billion ($70.3 billion), or 2.6 percent of 2019 GDP. The government’s agenda aims to bolster competitiveness, increase productivity, and accelerate the ecological transition. In addition, the authorities announced a new investment plan to 2030 in October 2021. The plan, called “France 2030,” allocates €30 billion ($33 billion) over five years and aims to complement France Relance recovery plan. “France 2030” targets further investment in the energy sector (€8 billion/$8.8 billion), as well as the health (€7 billion/$7 billion) and transport sectors (€4 billion/$4.4 billion). The permanent production tax cuts (€10 billion annually), included in France Relance, bring the estimated level of support to around 7.1 percent of 2019 GDP for the period 2020-27. Both “France Relaunch” and “France 2030” fiscal packages support France’s green transition, the “decarbonization of the French economy,” and the “French green hydrogen plan.” Measures include the energy renovation of public buildings, private housing, social housing, and the operating premises of VSEs (Very Small Enterprises) and SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises); support for the rail sector in order to renovate the national network and develop freight; development of green hydrogen; support for public transport and the use of bicycles; aid for industrial companies to invest in equipment that emits less CO2; and support for the green transition of agricultural. “France 2030” supports the transformation of France’s automotive, aerospace, digital, green industry, biotechnology, culture, and healthcare sectors. Its objectives include the development of small-scale nuclear reactors, becoming a leader in green hydrogen (hydrogen made using renewable energy sources), producing two million electric and hybrid vehicles, and decarbonizing France’s industry by reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 35 percent relative to 2015. Of the plan’s €30 billion ($33.8 billion) to be invested over the five years, €3-4 billion ($3.4-4.5 billion) will be spent beginning in 2022. Additionally, one-third of France’s €100 billion ($106 billion) “France Relance” pandemic recovery package is allocated to the ecological transition, including energy sector related investments. The plan also targets green technology, including the development of a hydrogen economy. With approximately two thirds of its electricity coming from nuclear power, France supports the use of nuclear energy to meet near-term emissions reductions targets. Of the developed economies, France has one of the lowest rates of greenhouse gas emissions per capita and per unit of GDP due to its reliance on nuclear power. France aims to phase out fossil fuels over the next decade, shut down the last of its coal plants by 2022, and end public financial support for fossil fuels and natural gas by 2025 and 2035, respectively. In October 2020, France announced it would phase out export guarantees for foreign projects involving fossil fuels by 2035. France’s “Ma Prime Renov” scheme allocates €1.4 billion to homeowners to finance insulation, heating, ventilation, or energy audit works for single-family house or apartments in collective housing. Such investment will finance the thermal renovation of 400,000 households. To guarantee quality standards, the renovation projects must be carried out by companies with a label classified as “recognized as guarantor of the environment.” Former PM Jean Castex presented in March 2022 France’s “Resilience Plan” to support households and businesses affected by sanctions associated with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The first portion of the plan provides support for specific sectors impacted directly by the conflict: fisheries, agriculture and livestock, transportation and trucking, and construction. There are also non-sectoral support targeting exporting firms and energy-intensive companies, plus continued state-guaranteed loans and delayed tax collection for companies facing higher energy costs and exports difficulties. The additional measures in the “Resilience Plan” will cost the government an additional €5-6 billion ($5.5-6.6 billion), on top of previously-implemented measures that include a gas price cap (€10 billion/ $11 billion), electricity price cap (€8 billion/ $8.8 billion), and energy cheques and inflation offsets (€2 billion/ $2.2 billion). France is subject to all EU free trade zone regulations. These allow member countries to designate portions of their customs’ territory as duty-free, where value-added activity is limited. France has several duty-free zones, which benefit from exemptions on customs for storage of goods coming from outside of the European Union. The French Customs Service administers them and provides details on its website ( http://www.douane.gouv.fr ). French legal texts are published online at http://legifrance.gouv.fr . In September 2018, President Macron announced the extension of 44 Urban Free Zones (ZFU) in low-income neighborhoods and municipalities with at least 10,000 residents. The program provides incentives for employers, who have created 600 new jobs since 2016. Incentives include exemption from payment of payroll taxes and certain social contributions for five years, financed by €15 million ($17.7 million) a year in State funds. While there are no mandatory performance requirements established by law, the French government will generally require commitments regarding employment or R&D from both foreign and domestic investors seeking government financial incentives. Incentives like PAT regional planning grants (Prime d’Amenagement du Territoire pour l’Industrie et les Services) and related R&D subsidies are based on the number of jobs created, and authorities have occasionally sought commitments as part of the approval process for acquisitions by foreign investors. The French government imposes the same conditions on domestic and foreign investors in cultural industries: all purveyors of movies and television programs (i.e., television broadcasters, telecoms operators, internet service providers and video services) must contribute a percentage of their revenues toward French film and television productions. They must also abide by broadcasting cultural content quotas (minimum 40 percent French, 20 percent EU). The 2018 Directive on audio-visual media services, implemented in France by a December 21, 2020 government decree, requires streaming services exceeding a certain revenue threshold to contribute 20 or 25 percent of their revenues in France to the development of French and European production, depending on how quickly they show movies after their theatrical release. For example, Netflix has signed the agreement under the new windowing rules and will benefit from having access to movies 15 months after their theatrical release. Other streaming services such as Disney Plus will have a 17-month window for new films. Netflix, Amazon, Disney Plus, and Apple TV Plus signed in December 2021 an agreement with France’s broadcasting authority CSA to start investing 20 percent of their annual revenues in French content. 5. Protection of Property Rights Real property rights are regulated by the French civil code and are uniformly enforced. The World Bank’s Doing Business Index ranks France 32nd of 190 on registering property. French civil-law notaries (notaires) – highly specialized lawyers in private practice appointed as public officers by the Justice Ministry – handle residential and commercial conveyance and registration, contract drafting, company formation, successions, and estate planning. The official system of land registration (cadastre) is maintained by the French public land registry under the auspices of the French tax authority (Direction Generale des Finances Publiques or DGFiP), available online at http://www.cadastre.gouv.fr . Mortgages are widely available, usually for a 15-year period. France is a strong defender of intellectual property rights (IPR). Under the French system, patents and trademarks protect industrial property, while copyrights protect literary/artistic property. By virtue of the Paris Convention , U.S. nationals have a priority period following filing of an application for a U.S. patent or trademark in which to file a corresponding application in France: twelve months for patents and six months for trademarks. Counterfeiting is a costly problem for French companies, and the government of France maintains strong legal protections and a robust enforcement mechanism to combat trafficking in counterfeit goods — from copies of luxury goods to fake medications — as well as the theft and illegal use of IPR. The French Intellectual Property Code has been updated repeatedly over the years to address this challenge, most recently in 2019 with the implementation of the so-called Action Plan for Business Growth and Transformation or PACTE Law (Plan d’Action pour la Croissance et la Transformation des Entreprises). This law reinforced France’s anti-counterfeiting legislation and implemented EU Directive 2015/2436 of the Trademark Reform Package. It increased the Euro amount for damages to companies that are victims of counterfeiting and extends trademark protection to smartcard technology, certain geographic indications, plants, and agricultural seeds. The legislation also increased the statute of limitations for civil suits from three to ten years and strengthened the powers of customs officials to seize fake goods sent by mail or express freight. France also adopted legislation in 2019 to implement EU Directive 2019/790 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market. The government also reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. On February 22, 2021, the government launched a new French customs action plan to combat counterfeiting for the 2021-2022 calendar year. Customs seizures in France have increased from 200,000 in 1994 to 5.64 million in 2020, and a record 9.1 million in 2021 (+ 62.5 percent compared to 2020). This new action plan focuses on improved intelligence gathering, investigation, litigation, and cooperation between all the stakeholders involved, including the Customs Office, which investigates fraud cases; the National Institute of Industrial Property, which oversees patents, trademarks, and industrial design rights; and France’s top private sector anti-counterfeiting organization, UNIFAB. France has robust laws against online piracy. A law on the regulation and protection of public access to cultural works in the digital era approved by Parliament on September 29, 2021 established the Regulatory Authority for Audiovisual and Digital Communication (ARCOM) from the merger of the French Audiovisual Authority (CSA) and the French digital piracy agency HADOPI (High Authority for the Dissemination of Artistic Works and the Protection of Rights on Internet or Haute Autorite pour la Diffusion des Œuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet). The HADOPI element of ARCOM administers a “graduated response” system of warnings and fines and has taken enforcement action against several online pirate sites. HADOPI traditionally cooperates closely with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) including pursuing voluntary arrangements to single out awareness about intermediaries that facilitate or fund pirate sites. The new law grants ARCOM wider investigative powers to close down mirror sites, as well as blacklist and block access to websites that repeatedly infringe on copyrights. The bill also introduces a fast-track remedy to prevent the illegal broadcast of sporting events. The establishment of this new authority was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the new authority was finally established in January 2022. The government also issued an order on May 12, 2021, enforcing in France the EU Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market (CDSM), which holds content-sharing platforms liable for the unauthorized communication of copyrighted content. The United States will continue to monitor ways this legislation may impact U.S. stakeholders. France does not appear on USTR’s 2020 Special 301 Report. USTR’s 2020 Notorious Market report continues to list France as host to illicit streaming and copyright infringement websites. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are no administrative restrictions on portfolio investment in France, and there is an effective regulatory system in place to facilitate portfolio investment. France’s open financial market allows foreign firms easy access to a variety of financial products, both in France and internationally. France continues to modernize its marketplace; as markets expand, foreign and domestic portfolio investment has become increasingly important. As in most EU countries, France’s listed companies are required to meet international accounting standards. Some aspects of French legal, regulatory, and accounting regimes are less transparent than U.S. systems, but they are consistent with international norms. Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches and operations in France and are subject to international prudential measures. Under IMF Article VIII, France may not impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions without the (prior) approval of the Fund. Foreign investors have access to all classic financing instruments, including short-, medium-, and long-term loans, short- and medium-term credit facilities, and secured and non-secured overdrafts offered by commercial banks. These assist in public offerings of shares and corporate debt, as well as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, and offer hedging services against interest rate and currency fluctuations. Foreign companies have access to all banking services. Most loans are provided at market rates, although subsidies are available for home mortgages and small business financing. Euronext Paris (also known as Paris Bourse) is part of a regulated cross-border stock exchange located in six European countries. Euronext Growth is an alternative exchange for medium-sized companies to list on a less regulated market (based on the legal definition of the European investment services directive), with more consumer protection than the Marché Libre still used by a couple hundred small businesses for their first stock listing. A company seeking a listing on Euronext Growth must have a sponsor with status granted by Euronext and prepare a French language prospectus for a permit from the Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers or AMF), the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) may also list on Enternext, a subsidiary of the Euronext Group created in 2013. The bourse in Paris also offers Euronext Access, an unregulated exchange for start-ups. France’s banking system recovered gradually from the 2008-2009 global financial crises and passed the 2018 stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. In the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Banking Authority (EBA) launched an EU-wide stress test exercise in January 2021 and published its results in July 2021. The results of the stress tests confirmed the resilience of the French banking system over the entire time horizon of the exercise (2021-2023), despite using a particularly severe macroeconomic and financial scenario, which envisages a prolongation of the crisis between 2021 and 2023. A new EBA EU-wide stress test will be carried out in 2023. Four French banks were ranked among the world’s 20 largest as of the end of 2020 (BNP Paribas SA; Crédit Agricole Group, Société Générale SA, Groupe BPCE). The assets of France’s top five banks totaled $7.7 trillion in 2020. Acting on a proposal from France’s central bank, Banque de France, in March 2020, the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF) instructed the country’s largest banks to decrease the “countercyclical capital buffer” from 0.25 percent to zero percent of their bank’s risk-weighted assets, thereby increasing liquidity to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic-induced recession. As of January 2022, HCSF maintained the zero percent countercyclical capital buffer but with the intention of normalizing it to its pre-crisis level at its next meeting. Banque de France is a member of the Eurosystem, which groups together the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of all countries that have adopted the euro. Banque de France is a public entity governed by the French Monetary and Financial Code. The conditions whereby it conducts its missions on national territory are set out in its Public Service Contract. The three main missions are monetary strategy; financial stability, together with the High Council of Financial Stability (HCSF) which implements macroprudential policy; and the provision of economic services to the community. In addition, it participates in the preparation and implementation of decisions taken centrally by the ECB Governing Council. Foreign banks can operate in France either as subsidiaries or branches but need to obtain a license. Credit institutions’ licenses are generally issued by France’s Prudential Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution or ACPR) which reviews whether certain conditions are met (e.g. minimum capital requirement, sound and prudent management of the bank, compliance with balance sheet requirements, etc.). Both EU law and French legislation apply to foreign banks. Foreign banks or branches are additionally subject to prudential measures and must provide periodic reports to the ACPR regarding operations in France, including detailed reports on their financial situation. At the EU level, the ‘passporting right’ allows a foreign bank settled in any EU country to provide their services across the EU, including France. There are about 944 credit institutions authorized to carry on banking activities in France; the list of foreign banks is available on this website: https://www.regafi.fr/spip.php?page=results&type=advanced&id_secteur=3&lang=en&denomination=&siren=&cib=&bic=&nom=&siren_agent=&num=&cat=01-TBR07&retrait=0 France has no sovereign wealth fund per se (none that use that nomenclature) but does operate funds with similar intents. The Public Investment Bank (Bpifrance) supports small and medium enterprises (SMEs), larger enterprises (Entreprises de Taille Intermedaire), and innovating businesses with over €36 billion ($39.6 billion) assets under management. The government strategy is defined at the national level and aims to fit with local strategies. Bpifrance may hold direct stakes in companies, hold indirect stakes via generalist or sectorial funds, venture capital, development or transfer capital. In November 2020, Bpifrance became a member of the One Planet Sovereign Wealth Funds (OPSWF) international initiative, which federates international sovereign wealth funds mobilized to contribute to the transition towards a more sustainable economy. Bpifrance stepped up its support for the ecological and energy transition, aiming to reach nearly €6 billion ($6.6 billion) per year by 2023. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The 11 listed entities in which the French State maintains stakes at the federal level are Aeroports de Paris (50.63 percent); Airbus Group (10.92 percent); Air France-KLM (28.6 percent); EDF (83.88 percent), ENGIE (23.64 percent), Eramet (27.13 percent), La Française des Jeux (FDJ) (20.46 percent), Orange (a direct 13.39 percent stake and a 9.60 percent stake through Bpifrance), Renault (15.01 percent), Safran (11.23 percent), and Thales (25.67 percent). Unlisted companies owned by the State include SNCF (rail), RATP (public transport), CDC (Caisse des depots et consignations) and La Banque Postale (bank). In all, the government maintains majority and minority stakes in 88 firms in a variety of sectors. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including from state-owned banks or other state-owned investment vehicles. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. SOEs may get subsidies and other financial resources from the government. France, as a member of the European Union, is party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Companies owned or controlled by the state behave largely like other companies in France and are subject to the same laws and tax code. The Boards of SOEs operate according to accepted French corporate governance principles as set out in the (private sector) AFEP-MEDEF Code of Corporate Governance. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report, and the French Court of Audit conducts financial audits on all entities in which the state holds a majority interest. The French government appoints representatives to the Boards of Directors of all companies in which it holds significant numbers of shares, and manages its portfolio through a special unit attached to the Ministry for the Economy and Finance Ministry, the shareholding agency APE (Agence de Participations de l’Etat). The State as a shareholder must set an example in terms of respect for the environment, gender equality and social responsibility. The report also highlighted that the State must protect its strategic assets and remain a shareholder in areas where the general interest is at stake. In 2021, the French Government increased to 29.9 percent its existing 14.3 percent stake in the Air France-KLM group in a deal that injected €4 billion ($4.5 billion) into Air France and its Holding Company under the European State aid Temporary Framework. This recapitalization, through a mix of new shares and hybrid debt, constrains the group from taking more than a 10 percent stake in any competitor until three-quarters of that aid is repaid. It follows a €7 billion ($7.7 billion) bailout the government provided earlier in 2020. The French Government has pledged to reduce its stake to the pre-crisis level of 14.3 percent by the end of 2026. The government was due to privatize many large companies in 2019, including ADP and ENGIE in order to create a €10 billion ($11 billion) fund for innovation and research. However, the program was delayed because of political opposition to the privatization of airport manager ADP, regarded as a strategic asset to be protected from foreign shareholders. The government succeeded in selling in November 2019 a 52 percent stake in gambling firm FDJ. The government continues to maintain a strong presence in some sectors, particularly power, public transport, and defense industries. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The business community has general awareness of standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) in France. The country has established a National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, coordinated and chaired by the Directorate General of the Treasury in the Ministry for the Economy and Finance. Its members represent State Administrations (Ministries in charge of Economy and Finance, Labor and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy), six French Trade Unions (CFDT, CGT, FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC, UNSA) and one employers’ organization, MEDEF. The NCP promotes the OECD Guidelines in a manner that is relevant to specific sectors. When specific instances are raised, the NCP offers its good offices to the parties (discussion, exchange of information) and may act as a mediator in disputes, if appropriate. This can involve conducting fact-finding to assist parties in resolving disputes, and posting final statements on any recommendations for future action with regard to the Guidelines. The NCP may also monitor how its recommendations are implemented by the business in question. In April 2017, the French NCP signed a two-year partnership with Global Compact France to increase sharing of information and activity between the two organizations. In France, corporate governance standards for publicly traded companies are the product of a combination of legislative provisions and the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF code (two employers’ organizations). The code, which defines principles of corporate governance by outlining rules for corporate officers, controls and transparency, meets the expectations of shareholders and various stakeholders, as well as of the European Commission. First introduced in September 2002, it is regularly updated, adding new principles for the determination of remuneration and independence of directors, and now includes corporate social and environmental responsibility standards. The latest amendments in February 2019 tackle the remuneration and post-employment benefits of Chief Executive Officers and Executive Officers: 60 percent variable remuneration based on quantitative objectives and 40 percent on quality objectives, including efforts in the corporate social responsibility. Also relating to transparency, the EU passed a new regulation in May 2017 to stem the trade in conflict minerals and, in particular, to stop conflict minerals and metals from being exported to the EU; to prevent global and EU smelters and refiners from using conflict minerals; and to protect mine workers from being abused. The regulation goes into effect January 1, 2021, and will then apply directly to French law. France has played an active role in negotiating the ISO 26000 standards, the International Finance Corporation Performance Standards, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. France has signed on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), although, it has not yet been fully implemented. Since 2017, large companies based in France and having at least 5,000 employees are now required to establish and implement a corporate plan to identify and assess any risks to human rights, fundamental freedoms, workers’ health, safety, and risk to the environment from activities of their company and its affiliates. The February 2017 “Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law” requires large companies to set up, implement, and publish a “vigilance plan” to identify risks and prevent “serious violations” of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and serious environmental damage. In 2021, France enacted a Climate and Resilience Law covering consumption and food, economy and industry, transportation, housing, and strengthening sanctions against environmental violations. The production and work chapter aligns France’s national research strategy with its national low carbon and national biodiversity strategies. All public procurement must consider environmental criteria. To protect ecosystems, the law amends several mining code provisions, including the requirement to develop a responsible extractive model. The law translates France’s multi-year energy program into regional renewable energy development objectives, creates the development of citizen renewable energy communities, and requires installation of solar panels or green roofs on commercial surfaces, offices, and parking lots. The consumption chapter requires an environmental sticker and inscription to better inform consumers of a product or service’s impact on climate. The law bans advertising of fossil fuels by 2022 and advertising of the most carbon-emitting cars (i.e., those that emit more than 123 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometer) by 2028. The law also empowered local authorities with mechanisms to reduce paper advertisements and regulate electronic advertising screens in shop windows. Large- and medium-sized stores (i.e., those with over 400 square meters of sales area) must devote 20 percent of their sales area to bulk sales by 2030. In the agriculture sector, the law sets annual emissions reduction levels concerning nitrogen fertilizers; failure to meet these objectives will trigger a tax beginning in 2024. The law’s transportation chapter extends France’s 2019 Mobility law by creating 33 low-emission zones in urban areas that have more than 150,000 inhabitants by the end of 2024, and bans cars manufactured before 1996 in these large cities. In the top 10 cities that regularly exceed air quality limits on particulates, the law will ban vehicles that have air quality certification stickers of above a certain level. The law requires regions to offer attractive fares on regional trains, bans domestic flights when there is train transportation of less than 2.5 hours, requires airlines to conduct carbon offsetting for domestic flights beginning in 2022, and creates carpool lanes. The law creates a road ecotax starting in 2024, prohibits the sale of new cars that emit more than 95 gram of carbon dioxide per kilometer by 2030 and of new trucks, buses, and coaches with 95 gCO2/km emissions by 2040, and provides incentives to develop bicycle paths, parking areas, and rail and waterway transport. The Climate and Resilience Law’s housing chapter seeks to accelerate the environmental renovation of buildings. Starting in 2023, owners of poorly insulated housing must undertake energy renovation work if they want to increase rent rates. The law forbids leasing non-insulated housing beginning in 2025 and bans leasing any type of poorly insulated housing beginning in 2028. It also provides information, incentives, and control mechanisms empowering tenants to demand landlords conduct energy renovation work. Beginning in 2022, the law requires an energy audit, including proposals, when selling poorly insulated housing. All households will have access to a financing mechanism to pay the remaining costs of their renovation work via government-guaranteed loans. The law regulates the laying of concrete, mandates a 50 percent reduction in the rate of land use by 2030, requires net zero land reclamation by 2050, and prohibits the construction of new shopping centers that lead to modifying natural environment. The law aims to protect 30 percent of France’s sensitive natural areas and supports local authorities in adapting their coastal territories against receding coastlines. The law’s final chapter focuses on environmental violations and reinforces sanctions for environmental damage, such as long-term degradation to fauna and flora (up to three years in prison and a €250,000 ($273,000) fine), as well as for the general offense of environmental pollution and “ecocide” (up to 10 years in prison and a €4.5 million ($4.9 million) fine or up to 10 times the profit obtained by the individual committing the environmental damage). The chapter uses the term “ecocide” to refer to the most serious cases of environmental damage, although the term is not defined in the law. Even if pollution has not occurred, these penalties apply as long as the individual’s behavior is considered to have put the environment in “danger.” Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption In line with President Macron’s campaign promise to clean up French politics, the French parliament adopted in September 2017 the law on “Restoring Confidence in Public Life.” The new law bans elected officials from employing family members, or working as a lobbyist or consultant while in office. It also bans lobbyists from paying parliamentary, ministerial, or presidential staff and requires parliamentarians to submit receipts for expenses. France’s “Transparency, Anti-corruption, and Economic Modernization Law,” also known as the “Loi Sapin II,” came into effect on June 1, 2017. It brought France’s legislation in line with European and international standards. Key aspects of the law include: creating a new anti-corruption agency; establishing “deferred prosecution” for defendants in corruption cases and prosecuting companies (French or foreign) suspected of bribing foreign public officials abroad; requiring lobbyists to register with national institutions; and expanding legal protections for whistleblowers. The Sapin II law also established a High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). The HATVP promotes transparency in public life by publishing the declarations of assets and interests it is legally authorized to share publicly. After review, declarations of assets and statements of interests of members of the government are published on the High Authority’s website under open license. The declarations of interests of members of Parliament and mayors of big cities and towns, but also of regions are also available on the website. In addition, the declarations of assets of parliamentarians can be accessed in certain governmental buildings, though not published on the internet. France is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The U.S. Embassy in Paris has received no specific complaints from U.S. firms of unfair competition in France in recent years. France ranked 22rd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 corruption perceptions index. See https://www.transparency.org/country/FRA . The Central Office for the Prevention of Corruption (Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption or SCPC) was replaced in 2017 by the new national anti-corruption agency – the Agence Francaise Anticorruption (AFA). The AFA is charged with preventing corruption by establishing anti-corruption programs, making recommendations, and centralizing and disseminating information to prevent and detect corrupt officials and company executives. The French anti-corruption agency guidelines can be found here: https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/2021-03/French%20AC%20Agency%20Guidelines%20.pdf . The AFA will also administrative authority to review the anticorruption compliance mechanisms in the private sector, in local authorities and in other government agencies. Contact information for Agence Française Anti-corruption (AFA): Director: Charles Duchaine 23 avenue d’Italie 75013 Paris Tel : (+33) 1 44 87 21 14 Email: charles.duchaine@afa.gouv.fr Contact information for Transparency International’s French affiliate: Transparency International France 14, passage Dubail 75010 Paris Tel: (+33) 1 84 16 95 65; Email: contact@transparency-france.org 10. Political and Security Environment France is a politically stable country. Large demonstrations and protests occur regularly (sometimes organized to occur simultaneously in multiple French cities); these can result in violence. When faced with imminent business closures, on rare occasions French trade unions have resorted to confrontational techniques such as setting plants on fire, planting bombs, or kidnapping executives or managers. From mid-November 2018 through 2019, Paris and other cities in France faced regular protests and disruptions, including “Gilets Jaunes” (Yellow Vest) demonstrations that turned violent, initiated by discontent over high cost of living, gas, taxes, and social exclusion. In the second half of 2019, most demonstrations were in response to President Macron’s proposed unemployment and pension reform. Authorities permitted peaceful protests. During some demonstrations, damage to property, including looting and arson, in popular tourist areas occurred with reckless disregard for public safety. Police response included water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas. Between 2012 and 2021, 271 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in France, including the January 2015 assault on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the November 2015 coordinated attacks at the Bataclan concert hall, national stadium, and streets of Paris, and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice. While the terrorist threat remains high, the threat is lower than its peak in 2015. Terrorist attacks have since been smaller in scale. Security services remained concerned with lone-wolf attacks, carried out by individuals already in France, inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. French security agencies continue to disrupt plots and cells effectively. Despite the spate of recent small-scale attacks, France remains a strong, stable, democratic country with a vibrant economy and culture. Americans and investors from all over the world continue to invest heavily in France. 11. Labor Policies and Practices France’s has one of the lowest unionized work forces in the developed world (between 8-11 percent of the total work force). However, unions have strong statutory protections under French law that give them the power to engage in sector- and industry-wide negotiations on behalf of all workers. As a result, an estimated 98 percent of French workers are covered by union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Any organizational change in the workplace must usually be presented to the unions for a formal consultation as part of the collective bargaining process. The number of apprenticeships in France peaked in 2021, at 718,000 (+37 percent compared with 2020), including 698,000 in the private sector, according to February 2, 2022 Labor Ministry figures. Apprenticeships, like vocational training, have been placed under the direct management of the government via a newly created agency called France Compétences. The government claims growth of apprenticeship and reform of vocational training help to explain the drop to from eight percent in 2020 to 7.4 percent in 2021. During the COVID-19 crisis, France’s partial unemployment scheme, which allows firms to retain their employees while the government continues to pay a portion of their wages, expanded dramatically in scope and size and kept unemployment at pre-crisis levels (between eight and nine percent). The reform of unemployment insurance was launched in stages in November 2017 and twice postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Labor Minister Elizabeth Borne presented on March 2, 2021, the last measures of the government’s final decree on unemployment insurance. These final measures include a new method for calculating the daily reference wage and the introduction of a tax on short-term contracts. In spite of strong labor union opposition, the government was able to enforce its reform in November 2021. Earlier measures of the reform, in place since January 1, 2021, cover a 30 percent cut in benefits of higher wage earners and an increase from one to four months of the threshold for recharging rights to unemployment benefits once they have ended. This reform is designed to tackle two issues: 1) ensuring that the jobless do not make more money from unemployment benefits than by working; and 2) reducing the deficit of France’s unemployment insurance system UNEDIC. The deficit is expected to turn to surplus by the end of 2022, according to an October 22, 2021 report by UNEDIC, due to the end of the government COVID-19 partial unemployment scheme and as a consequence of the unemployment insurance reform. Pension reform has been delayed until after the April 2022 presidential elections. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount France’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $2,542,370 2020 $ 2,630,317 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in France ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $67,195 2020 $91,153 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ France’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $213,390 2020 $314,979 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 34.1% 2019 37.2% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * French Source : INSEE database for GDP figures and French Central Bank (Banque de France) for FDI figures. Accessed on March 21, 2022. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in France Economy Data 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (U/S. Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 897,115 100% Total Outward 1,440,715 100% Luxembourg 164,501 18% The Netherlands 221,098 15% Switzerland 119,020 13% United States 213,390 15% United Kingdom 115,093 12% Belgium 166,713 11% The Netherlands 107,709 12% United Kingdom 137,138 9% Germany 98,303 10% Italy 76,091 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: Bank of France. Note: These figures represent the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), not the annual flow of FDI. The United States was the second top investor by number of projects recorded in 2021 but remained in first place for jobs generated (10,118). 14. Contact for More Information Dustin Salveson (from July 2022, Craig Pike) Economic Officer U.S. Embassy 2 Avenue Gabriel 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33.1.43.12.2000 FranceICSeditor@state.gov Gabon Executive Summary Gabon is a historically stable country in a volatile region and has significant economic advantages: a small population (roughly 2 million), an abundance of natural resources, and a strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea. After taking office in 2009, President Ali Bongo Ondimba introduced reforms to diversify Gabon’s economy away from oil and traditional investment partners, and to position Gabon as an emerging economy. Gabon promotes foreign investment across a range of sectors, particularly in oil and gas, infrastructure, timber, ecotourism, and mining. Gabon’s government depends on revenues from hydrocarbons. The Gabonese investment climate is marked by impediments related to establishing a new business, connecting to utilities, such as electricity and water, and transferring company ownership. Many companies also report difficulties in obtaining loans. Banks and other financiers struggle to release funds, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), due to a lack of guarantees and missing documentation. However, several business incubators active in the country are attempting to facilitate business activities. Gabon ranks 38th in Africa for the protection of minority investors and 43rd for the payment of taxes. Gabon adopted a new hydrocarbon code and a new mining code in July 2019, to provide a modernized basis for the legal, institutional, technical, economic, customs, and tax regimes governing these sectors and to spur investment through a more stable business climate. Economic conditions in Gabon continued to weaken throughout 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic caused two shocks to the Gabonese economy, prompting it to enter into a recession. First, the decline in global demand and the corresponding collapse in oil prices hit government revenues and the economy hard. Second, domestic demand plummeted as a result of the government’s actions taken to halt the pandemic, such as through border closures and a national curfew. A renewed wave of illnesses that began in January 2021 compounded this situation. Gabon officially launched its national vaccination campaign against COVID-19 in March 2022; a total of 499,247 doses of COVID vaccines have been administered. Assuming every person requires two doses, the number of doses is seen as enough to have vaccinated about 11.5% of the country’s population (World-coronavirus-tracker) On July 2021, the IMF Executive Board approved a USD $553.2 million, 36-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Gabon. The Board’s approval allowed for an immediate disbursement of US$115.25 million for budget support. The program aims to support the short-term response to the COVID-19 crisis and lay the foundations for green and inclusive private sector-led growth and a strong and sustainable recovery to benefit all Gabonese. A combined first and second review of the EFF was undertaken in May 2022. Historically, the mining, oil and petroleum, and wood sectors have attracted the most investment in Gabon. To attract more investors in those key sectors Gabon created a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Nkok near Libreville in 2010. This 1,350-hectare project targets local and foreign investors, provides priority access to electricity and water and on-site legal and financial services, and is near the deep-sea port of Owendo. Originally set up through a partnership between Olam International Ltd, the Gabonese government, and the Africa Finance Corporation, it operates with a mandate to develop infrastructure, enhance industrial competitiveness, and build a business-friendly ecosystem. However, corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and the lack of transparency, including through the inconsistent application of customs regulations, remain impediments to investment. Many international companies, including U.S. firms, continued to report difficulties in receiving timely payments from the government, and some oil companies have closed down operations altogether. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -172.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Gabon’s 1998 investment code conforms to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) investment regulations and provides the same rights to foreign companies operating in Gabon as to domestic firms. Gabon’s domestic and foreign investors are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party. Certain sectors, such as mining, forestry, petroleum, agriculture, and tourism, have specific investment codes, which encourage investment through customs and tax incentives. Gabon established the Investment Promotion Agency (ANPI-Gabon) with the assistance of the World Bank in 2014. Its mission is to promote investment and exports, support SMEs, manage public-private partnerships (PPPs), and help companies establish themselves. It is designed to act as the gateway for investment into the country and to reduce administrative procedures, costs, and waiting periods. Gabonese authorities have made efforts to prioritize investment. In 2017, the High Council for Investment was established to promote investment and boost the economy. This body provides a platform for dialogue between the public and private sectors, and its main objectives are to improve the economy and create jobs. Foreign investors are largely treated in the same manner as their Gabonese counterparts regarding the purchase of real estate, negotiation of licenses, and entering into commercial agreements. There is no general requirement for local participation in investments (see local labor requirements below). Many businesses find it useful to have a local partner who can help navigate the subjective aspects of the business environment. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. However, the Government of Gabon automatically owns a 20 percent stake in all petroleum development in the nation, with Gabon Oil able to purchase up to an additional 15 percent. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts following the completion of ministerial-level negotiations. The President has taken an active interest in meeting with investors. The lack of a standardized procedure for new entrants to negotiate deals with the government can lead to confusion and time-consuming negotiations. Moreover, the centralization of decision-making by a few senior officials who are exceedingly busy can delay the process. As a result, new entrants often find the process of finalizing deals time-consuming and difficult to navigate. Gabon has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. In June 2013, Gabon conducted an investment policy review with the WTO. The government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 2017. The government encourages investments in those economic sectors that contribute the greatest share to Gross National Product (GNP), including oil and gas, mining, and wood harvesting and transformation through customs and tax incentives. For example, oil and mining companies are exempt from customs duties on imported machinery and equipment specific to their industries. The Tourism Investment Code, enacted in 2000, provides tax incentives to foreign tourism investors during the first eight years of operation. The SEZ at Nkok offers tax incentives to industrial investors; the government has mused on the possibility of increasing the number of SEZs in a move to attract further investment. ANPI-Gabon covers more than 20 public and private agencies, including the Chamber of Commerce, National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and National Health Insurance and Social Security (CNAMGS). It aims to attract domestic and international investors through improved methods of approving and licensing new companies and to support public-private dialogue. It has a single window registration process that allows domestic and foreign investors to register their businesses in 48 hours. There are, however, no special mechanisms for equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in Gabon. ANPI-Gabon’s website address is: https://www.investingabon.ga/ One of ANPI-Gabon’s primary goals is to promote outward investments and exports. The Gabonese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Government policies and laws often do not establish clear rules of the game, and foreign firms can have difficulty navigating the bureaucracy. Despite reform efforts, hurdles and red tape remain, especially at the lower and mid-levels of the ministries. Lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays occasionally raise questions for companies about fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Rule-making and regulatory authority rests at the ministerial level. There are no nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations that manage informal regulatory processes. The government of Gabon has not exhibited any recent tendency to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. The government does not publish proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. There are no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. Key regulatory actions are published in the government’s printed Official Journal. It is not uncommon for legislative proposals to be provided “off the record” to the press. Gabon is affiliated with the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires, OHADA, http://www.ohada.com/ ). The Transformation Acceleration Plan (PAT) is a new structure of enforcement of mechanisms to ensure governments follow administrative processes and was launched in January 2021 in response to a request by the IMF for a transparency enforcement mechanism. The PAT will monitor the implementation of administrative processes, and regularly transmit the monitoring information necessary for decision-making to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. No new regulatory systems have been announced in the last year, and no new reforms have been implemented in the last year. Gabon lacks transparency on public finances and debt obligations, with limited availability of public documents. Gabon is a member of CEMAC, along with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. Gabon is also a member of the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is headquartered in Gabon and has 11 members: Gabon, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Both CEMAC and ECCAS work to promote economic cooperation among members. Gabon is a member of OHADA, which includes nine validated Uniform Acts: General Commercial Law, Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups, Secured Transactions Law, Debt Resolution Law, Insolvency Law, Arbitration Law, Harmonization of Corporate Accounting, Contracts for the Carriage of Goods, and Cooperatives Companies Law. Gabon has been a member of the WTO since January 1, 1995. It fulfills its duties on notification of all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Gabon’s legal system is based on French Civil Law. Regular courts handle commercial disputes in compliance with OHADA’s standards. Courts do not apply the law consistently, however, and delays are frequent in the judicial system. A lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays call into question the country’s commitment to fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Judicial capacity is weak, and many government contacts underscore the need for specialized training in technical issues, such as money laundering and environmental crimes. Foreign court and international arbitration decisions are accepted, but enforcement may be difficult. Gabon has a written code of commercial law. Gabon’s judicial system is not independent from its executive branch, making it subject to political influence, which creates uncertainty around the fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. Gabon’s 1998 investment code, which gives foreign companies operating in Gabon the same rights as domestic firms, allows foreign investors to choose freely from a wide selection of legal business structures, such as a private limited liability company or a public limited liability company. The distinctions arise primarily from the minimum capital requirements and the conditions under which shares may be re-sold. Foreign investment in Gabon is subject to local law that is in many instances unsettled or unclear, and in certain cases, Gabonese law may require local majority ownership of businesses. The state reserves the right to invest in the equity capital of ventures established in certain sectors (e.g., petroleum and mining). There are no known systemic practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment, participation, or control. No major related laws have been passed this past year. ANPI-Gabon’s website contains most investment-related information in Gabon: https://www.investingabon.ga/ . There are no specific ministries in charge of reviewing transactions and conduct for competition-related concerns. That responsibility lies with the ministry that is party to a contract. The Gabonese Law No. 14/1998 of July 23, 1998, on the Establishment of the Competition Regime of Gabon on Competition covers all aspects of competition and anti-trust measures. Foreign firms established in Gabon operate on an equal legal basis with national companies. Businesses are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party. The Gabonese government has not exhibited a tendency to expropriate, nor have there been any indications or reports of incidences of indirect expropriation. Gabon has a bankruptcy law, but it is not well developed. In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report 2020 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/134861574860295761/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Gabon.pdf ), Gabon ranked 130 out of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. Gabon’s bankruptcy law is based on OHADA regulations. According to Section 3: Art 234-239 of OHADA’s Uniform Insolvency Act, creditors and equity shareholders, collectively or individually, may designate trustees to lodge complaints or claims to the commercial court. These laws criminalize bankruptcy, and the OHADA regulations grant Gabon the discretion to apply its own remedies. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interest in property is recognized, and the recording system is relatively reliable. There are no specific regulations for foreign and/or non-resident investors regarding land lease or acquisition. Laws in Gabon for private and commercial property do not provide any restrictions on nationality for the possession and ownership of property in Gabon. Almost 85 percent of Gabon’s area (and possibly 95 percent or more) is legally owned by the state. Only 14,000 private land titles, mostly tiny urban parcels, appear to have been registered in Gabon according to a 2012 report (the most recent year for which such records exist). Urban areas constitute no more than one percent of total land area. The government created the National Agency for Urban Planning, Surveys, and the Land Registry in 2011. If legally purchased property is unoccupied by the owner, property ownership can revert to others. The Ministry of Commerce manages patents and copyrights in Gabon. Gabon is a member of the African Intellectual Property Office (OAPI), based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. OAPI aims to ensure the publication and protection of patent rights, encourage creativity and technology transfer, and create favorable conditions for research. As a member of OAPI, Gabon acceded to international agreements on patents and intellectual property (IP), including the Paris Convention, the Bern Convention, and the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. During the past year, no IP related laws or regulations were enacted. Gabon does not report on seizures of counterfeit goods, so related data is not available. Gabon is not on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. 6. Financial Sector There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in Gabon. Aside from the preference in employment given to Gabonese workers, from a general corporate law perspective, there are no specific legislative requirements. Regardless of the type of company, there must be one resident representative on the management board of all Gabonese companies. However, this resident representative can be a non-Gabonese citizen. The Government of Gabon automatically owns a 20 percent stake in all petroleum development in the nation, with Gabon Oil able to purchase up to an additional 15 percent. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts following the completion of ministerial-level negotiations. The contracting company can assign its rights and obligations under any hydrocarbon’s contracts to a third party, subject to the prior approval of the Ministry of Oil and Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Economy. The state is entitled to the right of first refusal on application to assign these rights to a third party, excluding assignments between the contracting company and its affiliates. The Gabonese government encourages and supports foreign portfolio investment, but Gabon’s capital markets are poorly developed. Gabon is the home to the Central Africa Regional Stock Exchange, which began operation in August 2008. Additionally, the Bank of Central African States is in the process of consolidating the Libreville Stock Exchange into a single CEMAC zone stock exchange to be based in Douala, Cameroon; this process began in July 2019. On June 25, 1996, Gabon formally notified the IMF that they accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement. These sections provide that members shall not impose or engage in certain measures, namely restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices, without the approval of the IMF. Foreign investors are authorized to obtain credit on the local market and have access to a variety of credit instruments offered by local banks without restriction. The banking sector is composed of seven commercial banks and is open to foreign institutions. The industry is highly concentrated, with three of the largest banks accounting for 77 percent of all loans and deposits. The lack of diversification in the economy has constrained bank growth in the country, given that the financing of the oil sector is largely undertaken by foreign international banks. Access to banking services outside major cities is limited. According to data from the Gabonese General Directorate for the Economy and Fiscal Policy, the term resources of the banking sector fell by 8% in the first half of 2020, due in particular to the negative impact of COVID-19 on economic activity. These resources stood at 552.1 billion FCFA at the end of June 2020, compared to 600 billion a year earlier. The Gabonese banking sector remains weak due to its difficulty in financing the private sector as a result of unreliable and often incomplete documentation presented by new companies. In addition, interest rates offered by banks are very high – around 15 percent – discouraging individuals and businesses. BGFI Bank Gabon is the largest Gabonese bank in both deposits and loans with approximatively 45 percent of the market share and a balance sheet total of over 3,000 billion FCFA, according to the Professional Association of Gabon Credit Institutions (APEC). The Bloomfield Investment Corporation financial rating agency gave the BGFI Bank a mark of A+ in recognition for its financial strength and management system. Gabon shares a common Central Bank (Bank of Central African States) and a common currency, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc, with the other countries of CEMAC. The CFA is pegged to the euro. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. There is one U.S. bank (Citigroup) present in Gabon. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the local economy. Gabon’s financial system is shallow and financial intermediation levels remain low. Basic documents are required for applying for a residency permit in Gabon. Gabon created a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2008. Initially called the Fund for Future Generations (Fonds des Génerations Futures) and later changed to the Sovereign Funds of the Gabonese Republic (Fonds Souverains de la République Gabonaise), the current iteration of Gabon’s SWF is referred to as Gabon’s Strategic Investment Funds (Fonds Gabonaises d’Investissements Stratégiques, or FGIS). As of September 2013, the most recent FGIS report, the FGIS had USD 2.4 billion in assets and was actively making investments. Further details are not available. Gabon’s SWF accepted the Santiago principles and joined the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs on January 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Government-appointed civil servants manage Gabonese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which operate primarily in energy, extractive industries, and public utilities. SOEs generally follow OECD guidelines on corporate governance, which usually consists of a board of directors under the authority of the related ministry. That ministry determines the board members, who may be government officials or members of the general public. The SOEs often consult with their ministry before undertaking any important business decisions. The corresponding ministry in each sector prepares and submits the budget of each SOE each year. Independent auditors examine the SOEs’ activities each year, conducting audits according to international standards. Auditors do not publish their reports, but rather submit them to the relevant ministry. There is no published list of SOEs. There are no specific laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. Although private enterprises may compete with public enterprises under open market access conditions, SOEs often have a competitive advantage in the industries in which they operate. Gabon does not have an active privatization program. However, when there is a privatization program foreign investors are usually invited to participate. The bidding process for these programs is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers; however, there are no formal rules or regulations pertaining to RBC in Gabon. Gabon has several NGO’s working primarily in the environment, human rights, and mining sectors. The political labor unions in Gabon have taken the lead in promoting and monitoring RBC, and they are able to work freely. With a push from these labor unions, Gabon fairly enforces labor rights laws and regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. However, Gabon has not effectively enforced consumer protection laws and regulations. While Gabon is widely praised as a leader in environmental protection and has been praised as a positive example in Africa, pollution remains a problem and prosecution is weak and penalties lacking. Gabon has not put in place corporate finance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. There are no domestic measures requiring supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals. Gabonese authorities state that the government is committed to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles. Gabon was a candidate for the EITI beginning in 2007. By December 2012, Gabon was required to have completed an EITI validation that demonstrated compliance with the initiative’s rules. However, due to the non-respect of deadlines and the non-performance of Gabon’s National EITI Committee, the International Council of the EITI voted on February 27, 2013, to exclude Gabon from the application process. Under the current IMF program, Gabon rejoined the EITI on October 2021. There is no information on national legislation regarding private security companies. Gabon is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Little information is available on the private security industry in Gabon. An estimate from 2015 nevertheless indicated that the sector in Gabon employs around 7,000 PSC personnel, indicating that it is a significant actor in the Gabonese security landscape. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Gabon created a National Climate Council in 2010 and established a national climate strategy in 2012 that has helped the country to reduce deforestation (in a country where 85 percent of the land still remains tropical forests) and absorb some 100 million tons of carbon dioxide a year. Thus, Gabon’s rain forests, which form a part of the Congo Basin, are often called “the world’s second lung.” Gabon created 13 national parks in 2002, which cover 11.5 percent of the country, and that are supported by the U.S. government, including USAID, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. It also created nine marine parks and 11 marine reserves in 2017. Gabon is one of the few countries that is already net carbon positive. In fact, it took a leadership role among such countries (as well as Africa) in COP 26 in Glasgow, Scotland, and is expected to do the same at COP 27 in Egypt. In June 2021, Gabon also became the first African country to receive funding ($17 million from Norway) to continue to reduce its carbon emissions, rights of which can be sold to other countries. Note that Gabon, even with its favorable emissions status, has maintained its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 percent by 2025. Although already carbon positive, Gabon launched a program in 2009 to initiate a plan to diversify the economy away from energy to one that emphasizes even more the idea of sustainable economic development in areas such as forestry and agriculture. This move towards more sustainable development remains a major commitment of the government as next year’s expected presidential elections loom large even now in the country. Gabon offers regulatory incentives in line with its climate plan. Gabon’s climate plan is a robust document that has been designed to diversify the country away from oil, which still accounts for 80 percent of exports, and more in the direction of sustainable economic development through, for example, the creation of a sovereign wealth fund, reduction of waste products flared during oil production, production of a carbon budget each year for all new projects and businesses, production of a national carbon budget every two years and production of 80 percent of energy from clean sources. 9. Corruption The Gabonese penal code criminalizes abuse of office, embezzlement, passive and active bribery, trading in influence, extortion, offering or accepting gifts, and other undue advantages in the public sector, yet enforcement remains limited and official impunity is a problem. Private sector corruption is criminalized whenever a given company is related to a public entity. Punishments for public officials found guilty of soliciting or accepting bribes include prison sentences ranging from two to 10 years, and a fine of CFA 5 million (USD $8,572). Corruption is rarely prosecuted in Gabon, except in limited high-profile cases. In 2020, Transparency International listed Gabon at 129 of 179 countries. The government established the Commission to Combat Illicit Enrichment (CNLCEI) in 2004; however, in the summer of 2018, the CNLCEI’s five-year mandate was not renewed. Its regulations did not extend to the family members of civil servants or to political parties. There are no known laws or regulations to counter conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. There is no information about any action on the part of the government to encourage or require private companies to establish codes of conduct that prohibit the bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Gabon is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’action contre le blanchiment d’argent en Afrique Centrale, or GABAC). However, no international or regional watchdog organizations operate in Gabon. Local civil society lacks the capacity to play a significant role in highlighting cases of corruption. Companies reportedly contend with a high risk of corruption when dealing with the Gabonese extractive industries. Gabon has vast oil, manganese, and timber resources; however, contracting and licensing processes lack transparency. National Financial Investigations Agency Tel : +241 01176 1773 Agence Nationale d’Investigation Financière Immeuble Arambo, Boulevard Triomphal BP :189 Libreville, Gabon contact@anif.ga 10. Political and Security Environment Violence related to politics is relatively rare in Gabon. Elections, however, can lead to heightened tensions or violence. While the 2018 legislative and local elections took place without major incident, violence did break out on August 31, 2016, after the National Electoral Commission announced that the incumbent ABO defeated his opponent Jean Ping in the presidential election by a margin of less than 2%. Protestors took to the streets, attempting to burn the National Assembly building. Non-governmental organizations stated the government’s use of excessive force to disperse demonstrators resulted in approximately 20 deaths and over 1000 arrests; the opposition claimed at least 50 people were killed. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on Gabon’s economy since March 2020. Measures to contain cases included closing several economic sectors, which increased the unemployment rate, with around 12,500 Gabonese losing their jobs (Minister of Labor announcement, January 2021). The social tension was high in February 2021 when further restrictions were announced, including a 6PM to 5AM curfew; this led to peaceful protests, occasionally marked by riots, during which two people were killed in Libreville and Port-Gentil. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Gabon has a population of approximately 2.2 million; third country nationals (TCNs) make up roughly one-third of the population. Many young Gabonese are unable to acquire vocational skills and are thus excluded from the labor market. A report in October 2018 indicated that 60% of Gabonese under 30 are unemployed. This is due to the bad quality of the basic education system, insufficient output of technical and vocational training, and a lack of resources and effectiveness in the education sector. Foreign firms report a shortage of highly skilled Gabonese labor. Chinese industrial companies, in particular, import the majority of their workers from China. Authorization from the Ministry of Labor is required to hire foreigners. Reforms adopted in 2010 in the education and research system represent a step towards developing service training and encouraging PPPs. For example, the Petroleum and Gas Institute, located in Port Gentil and supported by the Gabonese government and oil industry, has been training engineers specialized in oil-related technical areas since 2014. The COVID 19 pandemic has put a spotlight on the devastating impact it has had on Gabon’s informal sector. According to the Directorate General of Taxes (DGI), a May 2017 International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey ranked Gabon as having the “most important” informal sector in Central Africa. It was ranked 33rd out of 37 countries with the informal sector representing between 40 and 50 percent of GDP. According to the results of surveys carried out in the field by DGI teams, of the 1,400 companies identified at the biggest African market of Libreville called Mont-Bouet market, 487 were operating in the informal sector. That meant that meant that none are registered by the Administration, nor do they pay taxes. In 2011 the Gabonese Minister of Commerce estimated that 200,000 people work in the informal economy. The presence of the informal sector leads to losses of around 400 billion XAF on the state budget, he claimed. When hiring workers, firms must give priority to Gabonese nationals. If no Gabonese worker with the appropriate qualifications can be found, a firm is expected to hire a Gabonese to work along with the foreigner and, within a reasonable time, the Gabonese worker should replace that foreigner. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. There is no unemployment insurance or other social safety net program for workers laid off for economic reasons. However, the GSEZ is not subject to the same foreign labor restrictions as the rest of the country. Collective bargaining is common in Gabon. Gabon’s French-inspired labor code recognizes the right of workers to form and join independent unions and bargain collectively, and prohibits antiunion discrimination. The government observes the resolution of labor disputes and takes an active interest in labor-management relations. Unions in each sector of the economy negotiate with employers overpay scales, working conditions, and benefits. However, the right to strike is limited or restricted. Strikes may be called only after eight days’ advanced notice and only after arbitration fails. Public sector employees are not allowed to strike if public safety could be jeopardized. The law does not define essential services sectors in which workers are prohibited from striking. Nevertheless, public and private sector strikes are frequent and disruptive. From February-June 2018, Gabon court clerks were on strike, limiting the functions of the justice system. The civil servants in the financial authorities initiated strikes several times in the past few years, slowing customs processing and work done in the tax, custom, treasury, and hydrocarbons sectors. The Gabonese government strictly enforces the labor code’s mandatory retirement age of 65. Gabon has ratified most of the International Labor Organization (ILO) laws and conventions. There are no gaps in compliance in law or practice with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors. A new Gabonese Labor Code is working its way through the legislative process. The draft reforms concern several key issues, including the strengthening of protections for workers’ rights, fighting against discrimination and eliminating gender inequalities, opening up the formal labor market to new categories of work and codifying telework. The new code should also improve the employability of young people and simplify work authorization procedures for large projects. It will affect trade union representative and other professional elections. It will also strengthen apprenticeship, which brings the world of vocational training closer to that of employment and promotes professional integration and retraining. 14. Contact for More Information Frank W. Stanley Economic Chief U.S. Embassy Libreville stanleyfw@state.gov LibrevillePE@state.gov Georgia Executive Summary Georgia, located at the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe, is a small but open market that derives benefits from international trade, tourism, and transportation. While it is susceptible to global and regional shocks, the country has made sweeping economic reforms since 1991 that have produced a relatively well-functioning and stable market economy. Average growth rate was over five percent from 2005 through 2019, and its rankings improved impressively in global business, governance, corruption, and other indexes. Georgia ranked twenty sixth in the Heritage Foundations’ 2022 Economic Freedom Index, and 45th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Fiscal and monetary policy are focused on low deficits, low inflation, and a floating real exchange rate, although the latter was affected by regional developments, including sanctions on Russia and other external factors, such as a stronger U.S. Dollar. The COVID-19 pandemic reversed some of the past gains and placed significant pressure on the domestic currency and local economy. Georgia’s economy contracted six percent in 2020 with particularly steep losses in the tourism sector. Although Georgia successfully managed the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic, the infection rate surged in the second part of 2021, compelling the government to adopt a series of restrictions and shut-downs that negatively impacted economic activity. Despite this, Georgia’ economy picked up in 2021, demonstrating strong growth, 10.4 percent higher than 2020. While government and international financial partners forecasted an optimistic outlook for 2022, the economic impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia have damaged growth prospects and led to lower growth expectations. Overall, business and investment conditions are sound, and Georgia favorably compares to the regional peers. However, there is an increasing lack of confidence in the judicial sector’s ability to adjudicate commercial cases independently or in a timely, competent manner, with some business dispute cases languishing in the court system for years. Other companies complain of inefficient decision-making processes at the municipal level, shortcomings in the enforcement of intellectual property rights, lack of effective anti-trust policies, accusations of political meddling, selective enforcement of laws and regulations, including commercial laws, and difficulties resolving disputes over property rights. The Georgian government continues to work to address these issues, and despite these remaining challenges, Georgia ranks high in the region as a good place to do business. The United States and Georgia work to increase bilateral trade and investment through a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment and through the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission’s Economic, Energy, and Trade Working Group. Both countries signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1994, and Georgia is eligible to export many products duty-free to the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences program. Georgia suffered considerable instability in the immediate post-Soviet period. After regaining independence in 1991, civil war and separatist conflicts flared up along the Russian border in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2008, tensions in the region of South Ossetia culminated in a brief war between Russia and Georgia. Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia continues to occupy these Georgian regions, and the central government in Tbilisi does not have effective control over these areas. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and does not recognize the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent. Tensions still exist both inside the occupied territories and near the administrative boundary lines, but other parts of Georgia, including Tbilisi, are not directly affected. Transit and logistics are priority sectors as Georgia seeks to benefit from increased East/West trade through the country. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad has boosted Georgia’s transit prospects and the government has looked for ways to enhance trade. In 2016, the government awarded the contract to build a new port in Anaklia to a group of international investors, including a U.S. company. However, in 2020 the government terminated its contract with the group, resulting in a legal dispute with the investor. While the government has stated its commitment to the construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project, a tender has not yet been announced. Separately, logistics and port management companies in Poti and Batumi have started to develop and expand the Batumi and Poti Ports. In 2020, the owner of Georgia’s largest port, Poti Port on the Black Sea, announced its plans to create a deep-water port. In 2021, logistics companies completed two new terminal projects in Batumi and Poti ports. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 63 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $4,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Georgia is open to foreign investment. Legislation establishes favorable conditions for foreign investment, but not preferential treatment for foreign investors. The Law on Promotion and Guarantee of Investment Activity protects foreign investors from subsequent legislation that alters the condition of their investments for a period of ten years. Investment promotion authority is vested in the Investment Division of Enterprise Georgia, a legal entity of public law under the Ministry of Economic and Sustainable Development. The Investment Division’s primary role is to attract, promote, and develop foreign direct investment in Georgia. For this purpose, it acts as the moderator between foreign investors and the Georgian government, ensures access to updated information, provides a means of communication with government bodies, and serves as a “one-stop-shop” to support investors throughout the investment process. ( http://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/about ). Enterprise Georgia also operated the website for foreign investors: www.investingeorgia.org . Georgia’s Investors Council, an advisory body operating since 2015, aims to promote dialogue among the private business community, international organizations, donors, and the Georgian government for the development of a favorable, non-discriminatory, transparent, and fair business and investment climate in Georgia ( http://ics.ge ). The Business Ombudsman, who is a member of the Investors Council, is another tool for protecting investors’ rights in Georgia ( http://businessombudsman.ge ). Georgia does not have comprehensive mechanisms in place for screening foreign investment and Georgia does not have FDI thresholds. Governmental reviews of investment projects in Georgia are ad hoc. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development’s Investment Policy and Support Department is responsible for analyzing proposed foreign investment projects at the request of state agencies. Georgia’s State Security Service, National Security Council (NSC), Revenue Service, Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure, National Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Defense all have potential equities and could play a role in reviewing a foreign transaction or investment proposal for national security concerns in certain circumstances. Georgia’s NSC is currently drafting critical infrastructure protection legislation that is linked to NSC’s investment screening efforts. Foreign investors have participated in most major privatizations of state-owned property. Transparency of privatization has been an issue at times. No law or regulation authorizes private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Cross-shareholder or stable-shareholder arrangements are not used by private firms in Georgia. Georgian legislation does not protect private firms from takeovers. There are no regulations authorizing private firms to restrict foreign partners’ investment activity or limit foreign partners’ ability to gain control over domestic enterprises. There are no specific licensing requirements for foreign investment other than those that apply to all companies. The government requires licenses for activities that affect public health, national security, and the financial sector: weapons and explosives production, narcotics, poisonous and pharmaceutical substances, exploration and exploitation of renewable or non-renewable substances, exploitation of natural resource deposits, establishment of casinos and gambling houses and the organization of games and lotteries, banking, insurance, securities trading, wireless communication services, and the establishment of radio and television channels. The law requires the state to retain a controlling interest in air traffic control, shipping traffic control, railroad control systems, defense and weapons industries, and nuclear energy. For investment projects requiring licenses or permits, the relevant government ministries and agencies have the right to review the project for national security concerns. By law, the government has 30 days to make a decision on licenses, and if the licensing authority does not state a reasonable ground for rejection within that period, the government must approve the license or permit for issuance. In the real estate sector, only Georgian nationals or companies, with some exceptions, may own agricultural land. Per Georgian law, it is illegal to undertake any type of economic activity in Abkhazia or South Ossetia if such activities require permits, licenses, or registration in accordance with Georgian legislation. Laws also ban mineral exploration, money transfers, and international transit via Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Only the state may issue currency, banknotes, and certificates for goods made from precious metals, import narcotics for medical purposes, and produce control systems for the energy sector. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published an Investment Policy Review in December 2020 ( http://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-georgia-0d33d7b7-en.htm ). The most recent WTO Investment Policy Review on Georgia was done in 2016 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp428_e.htm ), and by UNCTAD in 2014. Registering a business in Georgia is relatively quick and streamlined. Registration takes one day to complete through Georgia’s single window registration process. The National Agency of Public Registry (NAPR) ( www.napr.gov.ge – webpage is in Georgian only), located in Public Service Halls (PSH) under the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, carries out company registration. The PSH website (https://www.psh.gov.ge/https://www.psh.gov.ge/main/page/2/85) outlines procedures and requirements for business registration in English. For registration purposes, the law does not require a verification of the amount or existence of charter capital. A company is not required to complete a separate tax registration; the initial registration includes both the revenue service and national business registration. The following information is required to register a business in Georgia: bio data for the founder and principal officers, articles of incorporation, and the company’s area of business activity. Other required documents depend on the type of entity to be established. To register a business, the potential owner must first pay the registration fee, register the company with the Entrepreneurial Register, and obtain an identification number and certificate of state and tax registration. Registration fees are GEL100 (around $30) for a regular registration and GEL200 (around $60) for an expedited registration, plus a GEL1 bank processing fee. The owner must also open a bank account (free). Georgia’s business facilitation mechanism provides equitable treatment of women and men. There are a variety of state-run and donor-supported projects that aim to promote women entrepreneurs through specific training or other programs, including access to financing and business training. The Georgian government does not have any specific policy on promoting or restricting domestic investors from investing abroad and Georgia’s outward investment is insignificant. According to Georgia’s central bank, the net international investment position of Georgia, which measures the difference between external financial assets and liabilities of a country, totaled negative $26.3 billion as of December 31, 2021. 3. Legal Regime Georgia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, and the Georgian government has committed to achieving even greater transparency and simplicity of regulations for these systems. In Georgia, the lawmaking process involves Parliament (drafting and consideration) and the President (signing). Under Georgia’s constitution, the following subjects have the right to initiate legislation: the President, the government, members of Parliament, a committee, faction, the representative bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara, and groups of at least 30,000 voters. A subject who does not have the right to launch a legislative initiative does, however, has the right to submit a “legislative proposal,” which should be a well-reasoned address to Parliament advocating for the adoption of a new law or of changes/amendments to existing legislation. According to Article 150 of the Law on Parliament, the following can submit a legislative proposal: citizens of Georgia, state bodies (except the establishments of the executive branch of government), the representative and executive bodies of local self-government, political and public unions registered in Georgia according to the established rule, and other legal entities. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, except their entitlement for participating in the law-making process prescribed by the above law. Publicly listed companies are required to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards. Draft bills or regulations are available for public comment. NGOs, professional associations, and business chambers actively participate in public hearings on legislation. The government publishes laws and regulations in Georgian in the official online legislative herald gazette, the Legislative Messenger, ‘Matsne’ ( www.matsne.gov.ge ). Another online tool to research Georgian legislation is www.codex.ge or the webpage of the Parliament of Georgia, www.parliament.ge . General oversight of the executive branch is vested in the parliament. The new Constitution, which entered into force in December 2018, and subsequently adopted new Parliamentary Rules and Procedures, aims to strengthen Parliament’s oversight role. Under their strengthened roles, public officials are obliged to respond to Parliament’s questions. Government institutions also submit annual reports. However, local watchdog organizations continue to raise concerns that one party controls all branches of government, undermining checks and balances. Independent agencies, such as the State Audit Office the Ombudsman’s office (including the Business Ombudsman), and business associations also provide an oversight function. Georgia maintains an active civil society that frequently reports on government activities. Georgia has six types of taxes: corporate profit tax (0% or 15%; no corporate income tax on retained and reinvested profit; profit tax applies only to distributed earnings), value added tax (VAT; 18%), property tax (up to 1%), personal income tax (20%), excise (on few selected goods), and import tax (0%, 5% or 12%). Dividend income tax is five percent. There are no dividend or capital gains taxes for publicly traded equities (a free float in excess of 25 percent). Georgia imposes excise taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, and mobile telecommunication. Most goods, except for some agricultural products, have no import tariffs. For goods with tariffs, the rates are five or 12 percent, unless excluded by an FTA. Detailed information on the types and rates of taxes applicable to businesses and individuals, as well as a payment calendar, is available on the Georgia Revenue Service website: http://www.rs.ge/ . In 2019, the Georgian government introduced new regulations to simplify the tax regime and streamline processes for small businesses. The new legislation decreased turnover tax from five percent to one percent for small businesses and defined small business as those with less than GEL 500,000 ($160,000) annual turnover, a fivefold increase from the previous GEL 100,000 ($30,000) threshold. In addition, the new regulations allow small businesses to pay taxes by the end of month, instead of requiring advance payments. For medium and large businesses, the reform introduced an automatic system of VAT returns and activated a special system whereby entrepreneurs can pay VAT returns in five to seven business days by filling out an electronic application. Enterprise Georgia operates the Business Service Center in Tbilisi, which provides domestic and foreign businesses with information on doing business in Georgia. The Business Service Center facilitates an online chat tool for interested individuals ( http://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/SERVICE-CENTER ). Additionally, the Investor’s Council provides an opportunity for the private sector to discuss legislative reforms, economic development plans, and actions to spur economic growth with the government. Different commercial chambers, such as the American Chamber of Commerce ( www.amcham.ge ), International Chamber of Commerce ( www.icc.ge ), Business Association of Georgia ( www.bag.ge ), Georgian Chamber of Commerce and Industry ( www.gcci.ge ), and EU-Georgia Business Council ( http://eugbc.net ) remain important tools for facilitating ongoing dialogue between domestic and foreign business communities and the government. International accounting standards are binding for joint stock companies, banks, insurance companies, companies operating in the insurance field, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, joint liability companies, and cooperatives. Private companies are required to perform accounting and financial reporting in accordance with international accounting standards. Sole entrepreneurs, small businesses, and non-commercial legal entities perform accounting and financial reporting according to simplified interim standards approved by the Parliamentary Accounting Commission. Shortcomings in the use of international accounting standards persist, and qualified accounting personnel are in short supply. The Law of Georgia on Free Trade and Competition provides for the establishment of an independent structure, the Competition Agency, to exercise effective state supervision over a free, fair, and competitive market environment. Nonetheless, certain companies have dominant positions in pharmaceutical, petroleum, and other sectors. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent, and Georgia’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the public through government websites including the Ministry of Finance’s site ( www.mof.gov.ge ). Georgia’s State Audit Office ( www.sao.ge ) reviews the government’s accounts and makes its reports publicly available. Georgia’s Association Agreement of 2014 with the European Union introduced a preferential trade regime, the DCFTA, which increased market access between the EU and Georgia based on better-aligned regulations. The agreement is designed to introduce European standards gradually in all spheres of Georgia’s economy and sectoral policy: infrastructure, energy, the environment, agriculture, tourism, technological development, employment and social policy, health protection, education, culture, civil society, and regional development. It also provides for the approximation of Georgian laws with nearly 300 separate European legislative acts. The DCFTA should promote a gradual approximation with European standards for food safety, establish a transparent and stable business environment in Georgia, increase Georgia’s potential to attract investment, introduce innovative approaches and new technologies, stimulate economic growth, and support the country’s economic development. The latest progress report, adopted by the European Parliament on September 17, 2020, confirmed Georgia’s continued progress on the implementation of the agreement. Georgia has been a WTO member since 2000 and consistently meets requirements and obligations included in the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures. Since WTO accession, Georgia has not introduced any Technical Barriers to Trade. In January 2016, Georgia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Georgia’s legal system is based on civil law and the country has a three-tiered court system. The first tier consists of 25 trial courts throughout the country that hear criminal, civil, and administrative cases. Two appellate courts, Tbilisi Appeal Court (East Georgia) and Kutaisi Appeal Court (West Georgia), represent the second tier. The Supreme Court of Georgia occupies the third, or the highest, instance and acts as the highest appellate court. In addition, there is a separate Constitutional Court for arbitrating constitutional disputes between branches of government and ruling on individual claims concerning human rights violations stemming from the Constitution. Georgia does not have an integrated commercial code. There are several different laws and codes (Tax Code, Law on Entrepreneurs, and Law on Insolvency) that regulate commercial activity in Georgia. There are no specialized courts, such as a commercial court, to handle commercial disputes; however, in Tbilisi there are specialized court panels that handle high value disputes, including some commercial disputes. The Ministry of Justice’s Public Service Halls provide property registration. The lack of independence of Georgia’s judiciary and political inference in the judicial system, especially in high-profile cases, is troubling. Concerns regarding the integrity of the judicial appointment process and the capacity of the courts to deliver quality outcomes continue to affect investor confidence in the court system. The Government’s hesitance to conduct a full assessment of the judicial system to ensure full compliance with Venice Commission recommendations further undermines faith in the independence of the judiciary. OECD’s 2020 IPR notes the Georgian government’s efforts to strengthen the judiciary to improve the country’s business and investment environment under its Georgia 2020 strategy. However, the report highlights that “the existing framework for adjudication of civil disputes in Georgian courts nonetheless continues to suffer from several significant problems despite the reforms. Foremost of these are persisting concerns with the independence, accountability, and capacity of the High Council of Justice and the judiciary. Many investors perceive Georgia’s court processes as slow, inefficient, lacking in transparency, and hampered by a lack of technical expertise. All these issues affect public trust in the judicial system. They are among the most pressing concerns for investors in their assessments of the investment climate in Georgia.” The full OECD report is available at https://www.oecd.org/countries/georgia/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-georgia-0d33d7b7-en.htm. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The U.S.-Georgia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) guarantees U.S. investors national treatment and most favored nation treatment. Exceptions to national treatment have been carved out for Georgia in certain sectors, such as maritime fisheries, air, and maritime transport and related activities, ownership of broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio stations, communications satellites, government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance, and landing of submarine cables. Georgia’s legal system is based on civil law. Legislation governing foreign investment includes the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Tax Code, and the Customs Code. Other relevant legislation includes the Law on Entrepreneurs, the Law on Promotion and Guarantee of Investment Activity, the Bankruptcy Law, the Law on Courts and General Jurisdiction, the Law on Limitation of Monopolistic Activity, the Accounting Law, and the Securities Market Law. Ownership and privatization of property is governed by the following acts: the Civil Code, the Law on Ownership of Agricultural Land, the Law on Private Ownership of Non-Agricultural Land, the Law on Management of State-Owned Non-Agricultural Land, and the Law on Privatization of State Property. Property rights in extractive industries are governed by the Law on Concessions, the Law on Deposits, and the Law on Oil and Gas. Intellectual property rights are protected under the Civil Code and the Law on Patents and Trademarks. Financial sector legislation includes the Law on Commercial Banks, the Law on National Banks, and the Law on Insurance Activities. Information about the procedures and requirements during the investment process is available in English Language at the Invest in Georgia (by Enterprise Georgia) website: https://investingeorgia.org/en/downloads/useful-guides The Georgian Law “On Free Trade and Competition” of 2005 that governs competition is in line with the Georgian Constitution and international agreements. The agency in charge of reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns is the Competition Agency, an independent legal entity of public law, subordinated to the Prime Minister of Georgia. The agency aims to promote market liberalization, free trade, and competition ( www.competition.ge ). Competition Agency decisions can be appealed at court. Georgia has also signed several international agreements containing competition provisions, including the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (AA). The DCFTA within the AA goes further than most FTAs, with regulatory alignment, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, and binding rules on investments and services. In July 2020, Georgia adopted the Law of Georgia on the Introduction of Anti-dumping Measures in Trade that became effective January 1, 2021. The aim of the law is to protect local industry from price dumping on imports. The Law establishes the basic conditions and rules for the introduction of anti-dumping measures to be implemented when importing goods via the customs territory of Georgia. In 2022, the Georgian Parliament adopted a bill on Consumer Protection, which is an essential component among the obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement; it establishes rules for consumer protection and prohibits “unfair commercial practices” that violate the values of “trust and good faith.” The National Competition Agency is responsible for executing the Consumer Protection law. The Georgian Constitution protects property ownership rights, including ownership, acquisition, disposal, and inheritance of property. Foreign citizens living in Georgia possess rights and obligations equal to those of the citizens of Georgia, except for certain property rights (see Section 5). The Constitution allows restriction or revocation of property rights only in cases of extreme public necessity, and then only as allowed by law. The Law on Procedures for Forfeiture of Property for Public Needs establishes the rules for expropriation in Georgia. The law allows expropriation for certain enumerated public needs, establishes a mechanism for valuation and payment of compensation, and provides for court review of the valuation at the option of any party. The Georgian Law on Investment allows expropriation of foreign investments only with appropriate compensation. Amendments to the Law on Procedures for Forfeiture of Property for Public Needs allow payment of compensation with property of equal value as well as money. Compensation includes all expenses associated with the valuation and delivery of expropriated property. Compensation must be paid without delay and must include both the value of the expropriated property as well as the loss suffered by the foreign investor because of expropriation. The foreign investor has a right to review an expropriation in a Georgian court. In 2007, Parliament passed a law generally prohibiting the government from contesting the privatization of real estate sold by the government before August 2007. The law is not applicable, however, to certain enumerated properties. The U.S.-Georgia BIT permits expropriation of covered investments only for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law and general principles of fair treatment. Expropriation disputes are not common in Georgia, although under the previous government there were cases of property transfers that lacked transparency and allegedly were implemented under coercion. On 1 April 2021, a new insolvency law, “On Rehabilitation and Collective Satisfaction of Creditors,” entered into force in Georgia. The main aim of the law is to protect the interests of the creditors, promote mechanisms for rehabilitation, strengthen the role of the courts during the insolvency proceedings, and separate and clarify the rights and responsibilities of individuals involved in the process and the creation of fair regulations. This law has eased the process for struggling businesses to return to growth. The law defines two types of creditors: secured and non-secured. Creditors can file a court claim for opening an insolvency proceeding, given certain conditions are satisfied (conditions vary, depending on the outstanding debt amount and the delayed days of repayment). Creditor meetings are held in court and chaired by a judge. The creditor meeting can decide several issues, including the appointment of a supervisor of the bankruptcy or rehabilitation proceedings, and the appointment of a member of the facilitation council. Secured creditors: Secured creditors must make unanimous decisions on approving a debtor’s new debts, the encumbrance of the debtor’s property, and suretyship. If there are no secured creditors, the creditor’s meeting is authorized to make the same decisions. The secured creditors, in a creditor’s meeting, may suspend enforcement of the material conditions of the agreement with the bankruptcy or rehabilitation supervisor or on the definition of the terms of the rehabilitation. After the debtor’s property is sold on auction, secured creditors have priority for being repaid. All secured creditors must approve the rehabilitation plan and plan amendments. New equity investment in the debtor’s company is only possible if there are prior consents from all secured creditors and the rehabilitation supervisor. Non-secured creditors: Non-secured creditors are satisfied only after all secured creditors are satisfied (unless otherwise agreed by all creditors unanimously). Non-secured creditors do not have voting rights for the rehabilitation plan approval. The priority system shall not apply to creditors whose claim is secured by financial collateral. Foreign creditors: The law provides additional time for foreign creditors to file claims. Creditors may file claims to the court and request to declare the agreements made by the insolvent debtor voidable and/or request reimbursement of damages, if such agreements inflicted damages to the creditor. The Debt Registry of the National Agency of the Public Register is Georgia’s credit monitoring authority. 4. Industrial Policies The Georgian government has created several tools to support investment in Georgia’s economy. The JSC Partnership Fund is a state-owned investment fund, established in 2011. The fund owns the largest Georgian state-owned enterprises operating in the transportation, energy, and infrastructure sectors. The Fund’s main objective is to promote domestic and foreign investment in Georgia by providing co-financing (equity, mezzanine, etc.) in projects at their initial stage of development, with a focus on tourism, manufacturing, energy, and agriculture ( www.fund.ge ). In 2013, the government launched the Georgian Co-Investment Fund (GCF) to promote foreign and domestic investments. According to the government, the GCF is a $6 billion private investment fund with a mandate of providing investors with unique access, through a private equity structure, to opportunities in Georgia’s fastest growing industries and sectors ( www.gcfund.ge ). Due to the absence of customs and import tariffs in Georgia, investors can take advantage of access to over 2.3 billion potential customers without customs tariffs. In order to support Georgia’s position as a regional hub for trade and logistics, the government invests heavily to develop infrastructure. Some recent incentives that the Georgian Government has put in place include the following: FDI Grant: The goal of the program is to promote the growth of foreign direct investments in Georgia, the inflow of technology, and the creation of new jobs. See more information and eligibility criteria at https://www.investingeorgia.org/en/agency/news-events/news/the-state-program-fdi-grant.page . International Company Status: “International Company Status” grants IT sector companies a preferential tax regime, which qualifies them for reduced rates of Corporate Tax (5%), Dividends Tax (0%), and Personal Income Tax (5%). More information is available at https://www.rs.ge/LegalEntityPreferentialTax-en?cat=10&tab=1 . Credit Guarantee Mechanism: This program aims at improving access to finance for small and medium size businesses, facilitates lending, and ensures inclusive economic growth. The program opens opportunity for small and medium size businesses which do not meet the requirements of the loan collateral. See more information at https://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/business-development/Credit-guarantee-mechanism . The government’s “Produce in Georgia” program is another tool for jointly financing foreign investment under which investors establish limited liability companies in Georgia. This program includes co-financing of the annual interest rate on loans issued by commercial banks, as well as the transfer of state property (both land and buildings) to private ownership at a symbolic price – 1 GEL (approximately $0.30), with a certain investment commitment. The program aims to develop and support entrepreneurship, encourage creation of new enterprises, and increase export potential and investment in the country. Coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development through Enterprise Georgia, the National Agency of State Property, and the Agriculture and Rural Development Agency, the project provides access to finance, access to real property, and technical assistant to entrepreneurs. The program “Produce in Georgia” unites several programs, such as Film in Georgia, Business Universal ( https://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/business-development/universal-industry ) – which in itself contains “Business Export” ( https://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/business-development/business-export ) and “Development of Agro and Eco-Tourism” ( https://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/business-development/tourism-development ). “Film in Georgia”- allows local and international producers and filmmakers to film or undertake video, audio, and other productions in Georgia, and reimburse between 20% to 25% of qualified expenses through a cashback mechanism ( https://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/business-development/filmingeorgia ). For more information please also visit http://enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/home . The National Agency of State Property oversees the Physical Infrastructure Transfer Component, the free-of-charge transfer of government-owned real property to an entrepreneur under certain investment obligations. In October 2018, Georgia’s Prime Minister introduced the concept of electronic residency, allowing citizens of 34 countries to register their companies electronically and open bank accounts in Georgia while not having a physical presence in the country. Incentives for Construction of RES Capacities: Under Article 5 of the Energy Law, one of the general principles of organization, regulation and monitoring of energy activities is promotion of the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources and of the combined generation of electricity and heat. Moreover, Article 7 of the Energy Law states The State Energy Policy shall provide measures aimed at the use of renewable energy sources for the generation of electricity and consumption of electricity produced from such sources, as well as any incentives and support mechanisms applied for the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources. The new energy legislation promotes domestic and foreign investment in rehabilitation and improving industries such as coal, natural gas, water supply, and using local hydropower and other sustainable and alternative tools. It also emphasizes the value of small power plants with an installed capacity of 15 megawatts (MW) for the effective and environmentally friendly use of renewable energy resources. Resolution No 403 of the Government of Georgia, On the approval of Support Scheme (Hydroelectric Power Plants) of the Generation and Use energy from Renewable Energy Sources Energy Support and Use Scheme from Renewable Sources, was adopted in 2020 and amended in 2021 ( https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4914589?publication=0, in Georgian). This resolution outlines support schemes for construction and operation of power plants which are initiated by the private developer and have installed capacity more than 5 MW. These schemes include the following: A 10-year support period, for eight months during each year after the commissioning starts, according to the applicable law; Premium tariff of up to 1.5 cents (in USD) per kilowatt-hour (kW/h); Premium tariff paid in the form of adding to the wholesale price recorded at the organized electricity market for the relevant hour, only in the cases when during the support period for the relevant hour generated by the Power Plant and at the organized electricity market sold wholesale electricity price is lower than 5.5 cents (in USD) per kW/h; In an organized electricity market, at the relevant hour, the difference between the wholesale price and 5.5 cents (in USD) is lower than 1.5 cents (in USD), the premium tariff is calculated in accordance with the difference. Low labor costs contribute to the attractiveness of Georgia as a foreign investment destination. Georgia is also increasingly recognized as a regional transportation hub that links Asia and Europe. Georgia’s free trade regimes provide easy access for companies to export goods produced in Georgia to foreign markets. In some cases, foreign investors can benefit from these agreements by producing goods that target these markets. In June 2007, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Free Industrial Zones, which defines the form and function of free industrial/economic zones. Financial operations in such zones may be performed in any currency. Foreign companies operating in free industrial zones are exempt from taxes on profit, property, and VAT. Currently, there are four free industrial zones (FIZ) in Georgia: Poti Free Industrial Zone (FIZ): This is the first free industrial zone in the Caucasus region, established in 2008. UAE-based RAK Investment Authority (RAKIA) initially developed the zone, but in 2017, CEFC China Energy Company Limited purchased 75 percent of shares, with the Georgian government holding the remaining 25 percent. Poti FIZ ( www.potifreezone.ge ), a 300-hectare area, benefits from its proximity to the Poti Sea Port. A 27-hectare plot in Kutaisi is home to the Egyptian company Fresh Electric, which constructed a kitchen appliances factory in 2009. The company has committed to building about one dozen textile, ceramics, and home appliances factories in the zone, and announced its intention to invest over $2 billion. Chinese private corporation “Hualing Group,” based in Urumqi, China, developed another FIZ in Kutaisi in 2015. This FIZ is a 36-hectare area that houses businesses focused on sales of wood, furniture, stone, building materials, pharmaceuticals, auto spare parts, electric vehicles, and beverages ( www.hualingfiz.ge ). The Tbilisi Free Zone (TFZ) in Tbilisi occupies 17 hectares divided into 28 plots. TFZ has access to the main cargo transportation highway, Tbilisi International Airport (30 km), and the Tbilisi city center (17 km). For more information, visit: https://www.tfz.ge/en/510/ . Performance requirements are not a condition of establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment, but the government has imposed requirements on a case-by-case basis in some privatizations of large state assets, such as commitments to maintain employment levels or to make additional investments within a specified time period. Performance requirements such as scope and time limit on licenses to extract natural resources or production sharing agreements have triggered complaints from some companies that transactions lacked transparency. Most types of performance requirements are prohibited by the U.S.-Georgia BIT. Georgia’s Law on Promotion and Guarantees of Investment Activity prohibits setting the required minimum number of Georgian citizens to be elected or appointed in leading bodies of enterprises. The government does not follow a forced localization policy though recent legislative changes have created difficulties in acquiring residence permits for foreign employees working for VAT exempt entities. Foreign investors have no obligation to use domestic content in goods or technology. In addition, there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source codes and/or provide access to surveillance. Customer and business-related data transfer is not restricted in Georgia, neither within nor outside the country, unless it concerns personal or national security matters, which are protected by the law. The Data Exchange Agency (DEA), under the Ministry of Justice, coordinates e-governance development, data exchange infrastructure, unified governmental networks, informational and communication standards, and cybersecurity policy. The DEA requires any company managing critical data to implement a number of security protocols to protect that information ( www.data.gov.ge ). 5. Protection of Property Rights Processes to register property are streamlined, transparent, and take one day to process at Public Service Halls. In June 2017, the Parliament adopted a legislative amendment that placed a moratorium on the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens and stateless persons. Under the amendment, foreigners, legal entities registered abroad, and legal entities registered by foreigners in Georgia were not able to purchase agricultural land in Georgia. Furthermore, the new Constitution that came into force in December 2018 determined that agricultural land can only be owned by the state, self-governing entities, citizens of Georgia, or a group of Georgian citizens. The Constitution also states that exclusions may be specified in organic law, which requires votes from at least two-thirds of Parliament to pass. Mortgages and liens are registered through the public registry, and information can be obtained from www.napr.gov.ge . The government has taken multiple steps to regulate land titling, including facilitating simplified procedures, free registration campaigns, and mediation services. Unclear or unregistered titling, which persists, bears the potential to hamper investment projects. Property ownership cannot revert to other owners when legally purchased property stays unoccupied. Georgia acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in 2000. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development is responsible for WTO compliance. The legal framework for protection of intellectual property in Georgia is approximated to international standards. Six laws regulate intellectual property rights (IPR) in Georgia: the Law on Patents, the Law on Trademarks, the Law on Copyrights and Neighboring Rights, the Law on Appellation of Origin and Geographic Indication of Goods, the Law on Topographies of Integrated Circuits, and the Law on IP-Related Border Measures. Georgian law now provides protection for works of literature, art, science, and sound recordings for 50 years. The Georgian Parliament adopted amendments to the IP legislation in 2017, which entered into force in 2018. These new amendments were intended to further harmonize Georgia’s IP legislation with the EU. The National Intellectual Property Center of Georgia (Sakpatenti) provides legal protection for intellectual property objects in Georgia: it issues protective documents on invention, utility model, trademark, design, geographical indication and appellation of origin, new animal breeds and plant varieties, and ensures the deposit of copyrighted work. Sakpatenti is an active and engaged partner of the United States in educating the public on IPR issues. Sakpatenti coordinates the government’s approach to IPR enforcement under the Interagency Coordination Council for IPR Enforcement. This Council is an efficient platform for government institutions to exchange their views on IPR enforcement issues. Georgia is improving enforcement, but some problems persist, including the widespread use of unlicensed software and the availability of pirated video and audio recordings and other unlicensed content available online. The U.S. government Commercial Law Development Program continues to provide assistance to Sakpatenti and other government entities to build capacity to deal with IPR-related issues effectively. The Revenue Service, which is part of the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for enforcing the protection of IPR holders that are listed in the Register of Intellectual Property Subject-Matters of the relevant service. The Revenue Service is responsible for border control and can halt import or export of items based on the register data. After the registration procedure is completed, the Revenue Service is liable to suspend counterfeit goods. According to the law, the goods may be suspended for no longer than 10 working days, which may be extended by the Revenue Service for another 10 working days. The Law of Georgia on Border Measures Related to Intellectual Property provides for the possibility of destruction of counterfeit goods based on a court decision. With the aim of further improving domestic legislation and its harmonization with international standards, Sakpatenti has engaged in adjusting laws or amendments to existing legislation regulating intellectual property. For example, in 2020, Sakpatenti prepared two draft laws – “On Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Appellations of Origin of Goods and Geographical Indications” and “On Amendments to the Patent Law of Georgia” to harmonize Georgian legislation with that of the EU. Georgia participates in the EU-Georgia Intellectual Property Project, a 2020-2023 EU-funded project that supports Sakpatenti by focusing on specific capacity-building activities, training, technical and legal support, research and data collection, awareness raising, and information sharing. Georgian legislation covers various types of liability for intellectual property right infringement. The Code of Civil Procedure of Georgia provides for the court’s authority to take provisional measures necessary for securing full and proper execution of the court’s decision. In 2021, the Ministry of Finance’s Investigation Service initiated 13 cases due to violation of Articles 196 (Unlawful use of trademark or other commercial designations) of the Criminal Code of Georgia. As a result, 62,326 counterfeit items were seized, with the total value of around $80,000. In addition, the Customs Department issued 267 orders on the suspension of goods. Out of these, in 254 cases the right holder and the owner of the goods agreed on the destruction of the goods, with a combined value of approximately $18,300. In 2021, the Tax Monitoring Department of LEPL Revenue Service revealed 20 cases of trademark infringements. The government seized 412 counterfeit items, with the total value of $1,500. Despite strong legal structure, enforcement of IP generally remains challenging. Civil cases on IPR infringement have not reflected the full extent of the situation regarding counterfeiting and piracy in Georgia, as the private sector has often not used available legal mechanisms for IPR enforcement. Infringement of industrial property rights, copyrights, performers’ rights, rights of makers of databases, trademarks or other illegal use of commercial indications can incur civil, criminal, and administrative penalties. Depending on the type and extent of the violation, penalties include fines, corrective labor, social work, or imprisonment. The Criminal Code of Georgia regulates prosecution of IPR violations, in particular: Articles 189, 1891 and 196. More detailed information can be found at https://matsne.gov.ge/document/view/16426?publication=232 . Georgia is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report or in the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The National Bank of Georgia regulates the securities market. All market participants submit their reports in line with international standards. All listed companies must make public filings, which are then uploaded to the National Bank’s website, allowing investors to evaluate a company’s financial standing. The Georgian securities market includes the following licensed participants: two Stock Exchanges, a Central Securities Depository, eight brokerage companies, and three independent securities registrars. ( https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?m=487&lng=eng ) The Georgian Stock Exchange (GSE, https://gse.ge/en/ ) is the only organized securities market in Georgia. Designed and established with the help of USAID and operating under a legal framework drafted with the assistance of U.S. experts, the GSE complies with global best practices in securities trading and offers an efficient investment facility to both local and foreign investors. The GSE’s automated trading system can accommodate thousands of securities that can be traded by brokers from workstations on the GSE floor or remotely from their offices. No law or regulation authorizes private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Cross-shareholder or stable-shareholder arrangements are not used by private firms in Georgia. Georgian legislation does not protect private firms from takeovers. There are no regulations authorizing private firms to restrict the investment activity of foreign partners or to limit the ability of foreign partners to gain control over domestic enterprises. The government and Central Bank (National Bank of Georgia) follow IMF Article VIII and do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers in current international transactions. Credit from commercial banks is available to foreign investors as well as domestic clients, although interest rates are high. Banks offer business, consumer, and mortgage loans. The government adopted a new law in 2018 that introduced an accumulative pension scheme, which became effective on January 1, 2019. The pension scheme is mandatory for legally employed people under 40. For the self-employed and those above the age of 40, enrolment in the program is voluntary. The pension savings system applies to Georgian citizens, foreign citizens living in Georgia with permanent residency in the country, and stateless persons who are employed or self-employed and receive an income. Banking is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Georgian economy. As of March 1, 2022, Georgia’s banking sector consists of 14 commercial banks, including 13 foreign-controlled banks, with 154 commercial bank branches and 756 service centers throughout the country. In March 2022, Georgian commercial banks held GEL 61.7 billion (around $19.6 billion) in total assets. The private sector Credit-to-GDP ratio reached 78%, one of the highest among regional peers. As of early 2022, there were 18 insurance companies and 38 microfinance (MFI) organizations operating in Georgia. MFIs held GEL 1.6 billion ($528 million) in total assets as of January 1, 2022. The two largest Georgian banks are listed on the London Stock Exchange: TBC Bank (listed in 2014) and the Bank of Georgia (2006). The banking system is stable, well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. The financial sector maintains solid capital and liquidity buffers against potential threats. The share of non-performing loans (5.2% as of January 1, 2022) is declining. As outlined by the 2021 IMF Financial System Stability Assessment (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/09/17/Georgia-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-465911), Georgia’s banking supervision practices and regulations have significantly progressed and are in line with Basel/EU directives. Despite substantial progress, dollarization remains the main challenge for the system, given that around half of the credit portfolio is disbursed in foreign currency, largely to unhedged borrowers. The National Bank of Georgia (NBG, www.nbg.gov.ge ) is Georgia’s central bank, as defined by the Constitution. The rights and obligations of the NBG as the central bank, the principles of its activity, and the guarantee of its independence are defined in the Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia. The National Bank supervises the financial sector to facilitate the financial stability and transparency of the financial system, as well as to protect the rights of the sector’s consumers and investors. Through the Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, a separate legal entity, the NBG undertakes measures against illicit income legalization and terrorism financing. In addition, the NBG is the government’s banker and fiscal agent. The IMF, credit rating agencies, and other international organizations positively assess the NBG’s macroeconomic framework and inflation targeting regime. In June 2021, the NBG was awarded the Transparency Award by the international publisher Central Banking. The award highlighted the improved communications on monetary policy, financial stability, consumer protection and financial education. The NBG also was nominated for the Risk Manager Award of 2021 by the same group. In 2021, Global Finance named Koba Gvenetadze, Governor of the NBG, among the Best Central Bankers for the fourth time. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), and other international development agencies have a variety of lending programs making credit available to large and small businesses in Georgia. Georgia’s two largest banks – TBC and Bank of Georgia – have correspondent banking relationships with the United States through Citibank, and some other banks have a relationship with JP Morgan. However, correspondent banking remains a major challenge for small and medium size banks. Georgia does not restrict foreigners from establishing a bank account in Georgia. Several local banks are subsidiaries of international banking groups and subject to the same regulations. The NBG and Georgian financial institutions act fully in accordance with the financial sanctions imposed by the United States and others on the Russian Federation. Compliance with international financial sanctions is systematically checked during the onsite inspections of financial institutions. In 2020, the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MoneyVal) approved the Fifth Round Evaluation Report of Georgia. The report assessed the NBG’s supervisory process and practices as having effective outcomes. The report also notes that financial institutions generally have a good understanding of risks and are part of large banking or other financial groups that have put in place sophisticated internal systems and controls which effectively mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing risks. Georgia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Georgian government privatized most state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the end of 2013, Georgian Railways (GRW), Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), Electricity System Commercial Operator (ESCO), and Enguri Hydropower plant were the major remaining SOEs. The energy-related companies largely implement the government’s energy policies and help manage the electricity market. There are also a number of Legal Entities of Public Law (LEPLs), independent bodies that carry out government functions, such as the Public Service Halls. During 2012, Georgian Railways, GOGC, GSE, and ESCO’s assets were placed under the Partnership Fund ( fund.ge ), a state-run fund to facilitate foreign investment into new projects. The fund also controlled 25 percent of shares in the TELASI Electricity Distribution Company, which it sold to private investors in 2020. Despite state ownership, SOEs act under the general terms of the Entrepreneurial Law. Georgian Railways and GOGC have supervisory boards, while GSE and ESCO do not. The SOEs’ individual charters describe their procedures and policies. Georgia encourages its SOEs to adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. The senior management of SOEs report to Supervisory Boards, where they exist (e.g., GRW, GOGC); in other cases, they report to line ministries. Governmental officials can be on the supervisory board of the SOEs, and the Partnership Fund has five key governmental officials on its board. SOEs explicitly are not obligated to consult with government officials before making business decisions, but informal consultations take place depending on the scale and importance of the issue. To ensure the transparency and accountability of state business decisions and operations, SOEs have regular outside audits and publish annual reports. SOEs with more than 50 percent state ownership are obliged to follow the State Procurement Law and make procurements via public tender. The Partnership Fund, GRW, and GOGC are subject to valuation by international rating agencies. There is no legal requirement for SOEs to publish annual report or to submit their books for independent audit, but this is done in practice. In addition, GRW and GOGC are Eurobond issuer companies and therefore are required to publish reports. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards and rules. These standards are comparable to international financial reporting standards. No SOEs exercise delegated governmental powers. In early 2021, the government announced it would start reforming state-owned enterprises and create a new council to develop a strategy to be implemented in 2021-2024. The goal of the reform is to bring the management of SOEs closer to higher standards of corporate governance. The first state-owned enterprise to undergo reforms will be the Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), an electricity transmission system operator. According to a December 20, 2021 IMF report on Georgia ( https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GEOEA2021009.ashx ), auditing, reporting, and disclosure practice in Georgia is largely consistent with international good practice. The IMF report contains concrete recommendations for further improving the financial accountability system of SOEs. Georgia’s government has privatized most large SOEs. Successful privatization projects include major assets in energy generation and distribution, telecommunications, water utilities, port facilities, and real estate sectors. A list of entities available to be privatized can be found at eauction.ge . Foreign investors are welcome to participate in privatization programs. Additional information is also available the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia website: www.amcham.ge . In 2019, the government offered mining deposits for privatization in addition to other state-owned assets through the 100 Investment Offers for Business initiative. Within the initiative, the government selected mineral resource deposits from various regions to sell at e-auctions . The mineral deposits include gold and copper-polymetallic, ore, bentonite clay, volcanic slag, peat, diatomite, tuff breccia, zeolite-containing tuff, basalt, marble, limestone, underground fresh water, and carbonated mineral water. Mining license prices vary and depend on the type of mineral resource and its price. National Agency of State Property, a Legal Entity of Public Law under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development, manages the privatization of state property, the transfer of the right of use, and the management of SOEs. The agency’s website ( http://nasp.gov.ge/ ) contains links to electronic auctions, proposals for investments, and other relevant information. 8. Responsible Business Conduct While the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a relatively new phenomenon in Georgia, it is growing. Most large companies engage in charity projects and public outreach as part of their marketing strategy. The American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia has a Corporate CSR committee that works with member companies on CSR issues. The Global Compact, a worldwide group of UN agencies, private businesses, and civil society groups promoting responsible corporate citizenship, is active in Georgia. The Eurasia Partnership Foundation launched a program on corporate social investment to promote greater private company engagement in addressing Georgia’s development needs. The Georgian government undertook an OECD CSR policy review in 2016 based on the OECD Policy Framework for Investment. The OECD completed a follow-up Investment Policy Review assessment in 2020 and noted Georgia’s significant strides ( http://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-georgia-0d33d7b7-en.htm ). Georgia participates in the OECD Eurasia Competitiveness Program, which works with countries in the region to unleash their economic and employment potential. Georgia participates in the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which provides a regional forum for promotion of anti-corruption activities, exchange of information on best practices, and donor coordination. Georgia is a member of the Task Force for the Implementation of the Environmental Action Program (EAP Task Force), which aims to address the heavy environmental legacy of the Soviet development model. Additionally, the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) program, a joint initiative of the EU and the OECD, has assisted Georgia since 2008, to strengthen public governance systems and public administration capacities. Georgia participates in the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) Project. Georgia’s civil society and workers associations are active in responding to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other concerns, as well as new laws and regulations that intend to protect or have potential adverse effects on citizens. Georgia is not a party to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and/or Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights despite extractive manganese, gold, and copper ore industries operating in Georgia. Among the local tools promoting CSR principles and policies in such industries are commercial chambers, the Public Defender’s office, the Business Ombudsman under the Prime Minister’s Office, sectoral trade unions, and Georgia’s Trade Union Confederation. Georgia has ratified The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Georgia is committed to reducing its domestic total greenhouse gas emissions by 35% below its 1990 level by 2030. According to Georgian law on the generation and consumption of energy from renewable sources, Georgia’s renewable energy consumption should reach 35% of its total energy consumption by 2030. There are currently no sector- or technology-specific renewable energy targets. Georgia’s 2030 Climate Change Strategy and 2021-2023 Action Plan includes the following: By 2030, total greenhouse gas emissions should be lower than 29.25 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent; and Target reduction of emissions in the energy generation and transmission sector is 15%, industry sector is 5%, and transportation sector is 15% by 2030, compared to business-as-usual. The Law on Public Private Partnerships was enacted in August 2018 in Georgia and provides a legal framework for cooperation between public and private partners, providing flexibility and exemptions for the energy sector. Support for renewable energy measures include the following: A Feed-In Premium (FiP) support scheme for all renewable energy installations higher than 5MW. Initially, the policy support scheme only applied to hydropower plants. An amendment at the beginning of 2021 made the FiP support scheme applicable to all renewable energy projects higher than 5 MW, not just hydropower plants. A net-metering mechanism for self-consumption has been implemented in Georgia since 2016. In summer 2020, the installation limit of the net metering mechanism for micro wind, solar, hydro and/or other renewable energy generators increased from 100 kW to 500 kW. Policy support for electric vehicles through tax reliefs and provision of free charging. There is currently no policy support for renewable energy in heating and cooling. Additional information about renewable energy in Georgia is available at https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Factsheet_Georgia-HardTalk-2021.pdf . 9. Corruption Georgia has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption. Georgia criminalizes bribery under the Criminal Code of Georgia. Chapter XXXIX of the Criminal Code, titled as Official Misconduct, among other crime, covers many corruption-related offenses committed by public servants including bribery, abuse of official powers, accepting a prohibited gift, forgery of official documentation, etc. Senior public officials must file financial disclosure forms, which are publicly available online, and Georgian legislation provides for the civil forfeiture of undocumented assets of public officials who are charged with corruption-related offenses. Penalties for accepting a bribe start at six years in prison and can extend to 15 years, depending on the circumstances. Penalties for giving a bribe can include a fine, correctional labor, house arrest, or prison sentence up to three years. In aggravated circumstances, when a bribe is given to commit an illegal act, the penalty is from four to seven years. When bribe-giving is committed by the organized group, the sentence is imprisonment for 5 to 8 years. Abuse of authority by public servants are criminal acts under Articles 332 of the criminal code and carry a maximum penalty of eight years imprisonment. The definition of a public official includes foreign public officials and employees of international organizations and courts. White collar crimes, such as bribery, fall under the investigative jurisdiction of the Prosecutor’s Office. The laws extend to family members of officials. Georgia is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Georgia has, however, ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Georgia cooperates with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies. Following its assessment of Georgia in June 2016, the OECD released a report concluding that Georgia had achieved remarkable progress in eliminating petty corruption in public administration and should now focus on combating high-level and complex corruption. The report commends Georgia’s mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of its Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, as well as the role given to civil society in this process. It also welcomes the adoption of a new Law on Civil Service and recommends that the remaining legislation to implement civil service reforms is adopted without delay. The report notes that the Civil Service Bureau and Human Resources units in state entities should be strengthened to ensure the implementation of the required reforms. The report highlights Georgia’s good track record in prosecuting corruption crimes and in using modern methods to confiscate criminal proceeds. It recommends that Georgia increase enforcement of corporate liability and the prosecution of foreign bribery to address the perception of corruption among local government officials. The full report is available at: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Georgia-Round-4-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf . In April 2021, GRECO released its Second Compliance Report of Fourth Evaluation Round on Georgia, which deals with corruption prevention with regards to members of parliament (MPs), judges, and prosecutors. According to the report, since 2019 Georgia implemented two additional recommendations – totaling seven of 16 recommendations – for preventing corruption among MPs, judges, and prosecutors. The Compliance Report said Georgia satisfactorily implemented measures to enforce objective criteria for the recruitment and promotion of prosecutors, ensured further updates of the “Code of Ethics for Employees of the Prosecution Service of Georgia,” and introduced measures for enforcing the rules. Out of the nine outstanding recommendations, two remain unaddressed while seven have been partly implemented. The sixteen recommendations were adopted in 2016, in the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Georgia, by the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body. Since 2003, Georgia has significantly improved its ranking in Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report. TI ranked Georgia 45th out of 180 countries in the 2021 edition of its CPI. While Georgia has been successful in fighting visible, low-level corruption, Georgia remains vulnerable to what TI calls “elite” corruption: high-level officials exploiting legal loopholes for personal enrichment, status, or retribution. Although the evidence is mostly anecdotal, this form of corruption, or the perception of its existence, has the potential to erode public and investor confidence in Georgia’s institutions and the investment environment. Corruption remains a potential problem in public procurement processes, public administration practices, and the judicial system due to unclear laws and ethical standards. Government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Anti-Corruption Agency at the State Security Service of Georgia Address: 72, Vazha Pshavela Ave. Tel: +995-32-241-20-28 Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia Mr. Giorgi Gochashvili, Head of Division of Criminal Prosecution of Corruption Crimes Address: 24, Gorgasali Street, Tbilisi Tel: +995-32-240-52-52 Email: ggochashvili@pog.gov.ge Government’s Administration of Georgia Secretariat of the Anti-Corruption Council Address: 7 Ingorokva Street, Tbilisi Tel: +995-32-299-09-00 (27 00) Email: ACCsecretariat@gov.ge Business Ombudsman’s Office Mr. Otar Danelia Ombudsman Address: 7, Ingorokva street Hotline: +995 32 2 282828 Email: ask@businessombudsman.ge Non-governmental organization: Transparency International Ms. Eka Gigauri, Director 26, Rustaveli Ave, 0108, Tbilisi, Georgia Telephone: +995-32-292-14-03 ekag@transparency.ge 10. Political and Security Environment The United States established diplomatic relations with Georgia in 1992, following Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since independence, Georgia has made impressive progress fighting corruption, developing modern state institutions, and enhancing global security. The United States is committed to helping Georgia deepen Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthen its democratic institutions. In August 2008, tensions in the Georgian region of South Ossetia culminated in a brief war between Russia and Georgia. Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia continues to occupy these regions – nearly 20 percent of Georgia’s territory – and the central government in Tbilisi does not have effective control over these areas. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and does not recognize the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent. Only Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela recognize them as independent states. Tensions still exist both inside the occupied territories and near the administrative boundary lines (ABLs). A Russian military build-up along the South Ossetia ABL dramatically escalated tensions in August 2019. In addition, Russian “border” guards regularly patrol the ABLs and have increasingly detained people trying to cross the ABLs. Several attacks, criminal incidents, and kidnappings have occurred near the ABLs as well. While none of the activity has been anti-American in nature, there is a high risk of travelers finding themselves in a wrong place, at the wrong time, situation. In addition, unexploded ordnance from previous conflicts poses a danger near the South Ossetia ABL. However, other parts of Georgia, including Tbilisi, are not directly affected. Per Georgian law, it is illegal to undertake any type of economic activity in Abkhazia or South Ossetia if such activities require permits, licenses, or registration in accordance with Georgian legislation. Laws also ban mineral exploration, money transfers, and international transit via Abkhazia or South Ossetia. While violent street protests are generally uncommon, there have been some recent episodes of politically motivated violence and civil disturbance. In July 2021 far-right groups violently rioted throughout Tbilisi against a planned Tbilisi Pride parade, destroying the offices of two NGOs and attacking over 50 journalists and individuals thought to be members of the LGBTQI+ community. In June 2019, when protesters attempted to enter Parliament during an anti-Russian and anti-government protest, some people were injured with some suffering severe eye injuries due to police use of rubber bullets. Generally, police have fulfilled their duty to maintain order even in cases of unannounced protests. However, in some instances the police have allowed a permissive environment for far-right violence. In 2021, Turkish company ENKA cancelled its $800 million Namakhvani hydropower plant (HPP), citing violation of the terms of the contract by the Georgian government and force majeure. The decision was preceded by months-long protests – including blocking access to the construction area – by local activists claiming the project was launched without sufficient research and thorough consideration of the risks. Following a series of protests, Georgian authorities started renegotiating with ENKA to improve the terms of the contract and involved protestors in these conversations. However, the protesting groups withdrew from the process, finally leading to the Namakhvani HPP cancelation. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Georgia offers skilled and unskilled labor at attractive costs compared not only to Western European and American standards, but also to Eastern European standards. Skilled labor availability in the engineering field remains underdeveloped. The official unemployment rate was 19 percent by the end of 2021. Georgia’s National Statistics Agency changed its methodology of calculating unemployment in 2020, and subsistence farmers are no longer categorized as employed. The change considerably increased the official unemployment rate. Some investment agreements between the Georgian government and private parties have included mandates for the contracting of local labor for positions below the management or executive level. Georgia’s Labor Code defines the minimum age for employment (16), standard work hours (40 per week), and annual leave (24 calendar days). The law allows for other wage and hour issues to be agreed between the employer and employee. The law defines the grounds for termination and severance pay for an employee at the time of termination, including the payment term. An employer is obliged to give compensation of not less than one month’s salary to an employee within thirty (30) days. Additionally, an employer is obliged to give the dismissed employee a written description of the grounds for termination within seven days after an employee’s request. The Labor Code also prescribes rules for paying overtime labor (over 40 hours), which must be paid at an increased hourly rate. The Labor Code specifies essential terms for labor contracts, including the start date and the duration of labor relations, working hours and holiday time, location of workplace, position and type of work, amount of salary and its payment, overtime work and its payment, the duration of paid and unpaid vacation and leave, and rules for granting leave. The code states that the duration of a business day for an underage person (ages 16 to 18) should not exceed 36 hours per week. Regulations prohibit interference in union activities and discrimination of an employee due to union membership. The Labor Code amendments mandate the government to reestablish a labor inspectorate to ensure adherence to labor safety standards. In 2018, Parliament passed the Occupational Safety, and Health Law, giving the government power to make unannounced inspections, in some circumstances, at companies operating among “hard, harmful, hazardous, and increased danger” occupations. Subsequent amendments that passed in September 2020 and came into force January 1, 2021, allowed unannounced inspections across all sectors of the economy. Employees are entitled to up to 183 days (six months) of paid maternity leave, which can last up to 24 months when combined with unpaid leave. The state subsidizes leave taken for pregnancy, childbirth, childcare, and adoption of a newborn. An employer and employee may agree on additional compensation. The Labor Code permits non-competition clauses in contracts; this provision may remain in force even after the termination of employment. The government adopted a new law in 2018 establishing an accumulative pension scheme, which came into effect as of January 1, 2019. The pension is mandatory for legally employed persons under 40, while for the self-employed and those above the age of 40 enrollment in the program is voluntary. Each employee, employer, and the government must each contribute two percent of the employee’s gross income to an individual retirement account. As for the self-employed, they will make a deposit of four percent of their income, and the state will match another two per cent. Employees pay a flat 20 percent income tax. The state social security system provides a modest pension and maternity benefits. The minimum monthly pension is GEL 250 ($80). The average monthly salary across the economy by the end of 2021 was GEL 1,464 (around $470). The law generally provides for the right of most workers, including government employees, to form and join independent unions, to legally strike, and to bargain collectively. Employers are not obliged, however, to engage in collective bargaining, even if a trade union or a group of employees wishes to do so. While strikes are not limited in length, the law limits lockouts to 90 days. A court may determine the legality of a strike, and violators of strike rules can face up to two years in prison. Although the law prohibits employers from discriminating against union members or union-organizing activities in general terms, it does not explicitly require reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity. Certain categories of workers related to “human life and health,” as defined by the government, were not allowed to strike. The International Labor Organization noted the government’s list of such services included some it did not believe constituted essential services directly related to human life and health. Workers generally exercised their right to strike in accordance with the law. Georgia has ratified some ILO conventions, including the Forced Labor Convention of 1930, the Paid Holiday Convention of 1936, the Anti-Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention of 1951, the Human Resources Development Convention of 1975, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949, the Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention of 1957, the Employment Policy Convention of 1964, and the Minimum Age Convention of 1973. Information on labor related issues is also available in the State Department’s annual reports: Human Right Report: http://georgia.usembassy.gov/officialreports/hrr.html. Child Labor Report: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/georgia.htm . 14. Contact for More Information United States Embassy, Political/Economic Section 29 Georgian-American Friendship Avenue, Tbilisi Jean Foster, Economic Unit Chief +995-32-2-27-700 Germany Executive Summary As Europe’s largest economy, Germany is a major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and has accumulated a vast stock of FDI over time. Germany is consistently ranked as one of the most attractive investment destinations based on its stable legal environment, reliable infrastructure, highly skilled workforce, and world-class research and development. An EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment. Foreign investment in Germany mainly originates from other European countries, the United States, and Japan, although FDI from emerging economies (and China) has grown in recent years. The United States is the leading source of non-European FDI in Germany. In 2020, total U.S. FDI in Germany was $162 billion. The key U.S. FDI sectors include chemicals ($8.7 billion), machinery ($6.5 billion), finance ($13.2 billion), and professional, scientific, and technical services ($10.1 billion). From 2019 to 2020, the industry sector “chemicals” grew significantly from $4.8 billion to $8.7 billion. Historically, machinery, information technology, finance, holding companies (nonbank), and professional, scientific, and technical services have dominated U.S. FDI in Germany. German legal, regulatory, and accounting systems can be complex but are generally transparent and consistent with developed-market norms. Businesses operate within a well-regulated, albeit relatively high-cost, environment. Foreign and domestic investors are treated equally when it comes to investment incentives or the establishment and protection of real and intellectual property. Germany’s well-established enforcement laws and official enforcement services ensure investors can assert their rights. German courts are fully available to foreign investors in an investment dispute. New investors should ensure they have the necessary legal expertise, either in-house or outside counsel, to meet all national and EU regulations. The German government continues to strengthen provisions for national security screening of inward investment in reaction to an increasing number of high-risk acquisitions of German companies by foreign investors, particularly from China, in recent years. German authorities screen acquisitions by foreign entities acquiring more than 10 percent of voting rights of German companies in critical sectors, including health care, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, specialized robots, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and quantum technology, among others. Foreign investors who seek to acquire at least 10 percent of voting rights of a German company in one of those fields are required to notify the government and potentially become subject to an investment review. Furthermore, acquisitions by foreign government-owned or -funded entities will now trigger a review. German authorities are committed to fighting money laundering and corruption. The government promotes responsible business conduct and German SMEs are aware of the need for due diligence. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 9 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 9 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 162,387 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 47,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The German government and industry actively encourage foreign investment. U.S. investment continues to account for the largest share of Germany’s FDI. The 1956 U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation affords U.S. investors national treatment and provides for the free movement of capital between the United States and Germany. As an OECD member, Germany adheres to the OECD National Treatment Instrument and the OECD Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and of Invisible Operations. The Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance provide the legal basis for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (MEC) to review acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign buyers and to assess whether these transactions pose a risk to the public order or national security (for example, when the investment pertains to critical infrastructure). For many decades Germany has experienced significant inbound investment, which is widely recognized as a considerable contributor to Germany’s growth and prosperity. The investment-related challenges facing foreign companies are broadly the same as those that face domestic firms, e.g., relatively high tax rates and energy costs, stringent environmental regulations, and labor laws that complicate hiring and dismissals. Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), the country’s economic development agency, provides extensive information for investors: https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest Under German law, a foreign-owned company registered in the Federal Republic of Germany as a GmbH (limited liability company) or an AG (joint stock company) is treated the same as a German-owned company. There are no special nationality requirements for directors or shareholders. Companies seeking to open a branch office in Germany without establishing a new legal entity, (e.g., for the provision of employee placement services, such as providing temporary office support, domestic help, or executive search services), must register and have at least one representative located in Germany. While there are no economy-wide limits on foreign ownership or control, Germany maintains an elaborate mechanism to screen foreign investments based on national security grounds. The legislative basis for the mechanism (the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance) has been amended several times in recent years to tighten parameters of the screening as technological threats evolve, particularly to address growing interest by foreign investors in both Mittelstand (mid-sized) and blue-chip German companies. Germany amended its investment screening mechanism May 1, 2021 and has now fully implemented the EU Screening Directive. With the amendment, firms must notify MEC of foreign investments and MEC can then screen investments in sensitive sectors and technologies if the buyer plans to acquire 10 percent or more of the company’s voting rights and may be required, regardless, for a non-EU company acquiring more than 25 percent of voting rights ( https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Foreign-Trade/investment-screening.html ). In the screening process, MEC considers “stockpile acquisitions” by the same investor in a German company or “atypical control investments” where an investor secures additional influence in company operations via side contractual agreements. MEC can also factor in combined acquisitions by multiple investors if all are controlled by one foreign government. The total time for the screening process, depending on the sensitivities of the investment, may take up 10 to 12 months. BMWK – Investment screening (bmwi.de) The World Bank Group’s “Doing Business 2020” Index provides additional information on Germany’s investment climate. [Note: this report is no longer updated]. The American Chamber of Commerce in Germany publishes results of an annual survey of U.S. investors in Germany (“AmCham Germany Transatlantic Business Barometer.” https://www.amcham.de/publications ). Before engaging in commercial activities, companies and business operators must register in public directories, the two most significant of which are the commercial register (Handelsregister) and the trade office register (Gewerberegister). Applications for registration at the commercial register ( www.handelsregister.de ) are electronically filed in publicly certified form through a notary. The commercial register provides information about all relevant relationships between merchants and commercial companies, including names of partners and managing directors, capital stock, liability limitations, and insolvency proceedings. Registration costs vary depending on the size of the company. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020, the median duration to register a business in Germany is eight days, though some firms have experienced longer processing times. Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), the country’s economic development agency, can assist in the registration processes ( https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest/investment-guide/establishing-a-company/business-registration-65532 ) and advises investors, including micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), on how to obtain incentives. In the EU, MSMEs are defined as follows: Micro-enterprises: fewer than 10 employees and less than €2 million annual turnover or less than €2 million in balance sheet total. Small enterprises: fewer than 50 employees and less than €10 million annual turnover or less than €10 million in balance sheet total. Medium-sized enterprises: fewer than 250 employees and less than €50 million annual turnover or less than €43 million in balance sheet total. U.S.-based exporters seeking to sell in Germany (e.g., via commercial platforms) are required to register with one specific tax authority in Bonn, which can lead to significant delays due to capacity issues. Germany’s federal government provides guarantees for investments by Germany-based companies in developing and emerging economies and countries in transition in order to insure them against political risks. In order to receive guarantees, the investment must have adequate legal protection in the host country. The Federal Government does not insure against commercial risks. In 2020, the government issued investment guarantees amounting to €900 million for investment projects in 13 countries, with the majority of those in China and India. 3. Legal Regime Germany has transparent and effective laws and policies to promote competition, including antitrust laws. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are complex but transparent and consistent with international norms. Public consultation by federal authorities is regulated by the Joint Rules of Procedure, which specify that ministries must consult early and extensively with a range of stakeholders on all new legislative proposals. In practice, laws and regulations in Germany are routinely published in draft form for public comment. According to the Joint Rules of Procedure, ministries should consult the concerned industries’ associations, consumer organizations, environmental, and other NGOs. The consultation period generally takes two to eight weeks. The German Institute for Standardization (DIN), Germany’s independent and sole national standards body representing Germany in non-governmental international standards organizations, is open to German subsidiaries of foreign companies. As a member of the European Union, Germany must observe and implement directives and regulations adopted by the EU. EU regulations are binding and enter into force as immediately applicable law. Directives, on the other hand, constitute a type of framework law that Member States transpose via their respective legislative processes. Germany regularly adheres to this process. EU Member States must transpose directives within a specified time period. Should a deadline not be met, the Member State may suffer the initiation of an “infringement procedure,” which could result in steep fines. Germany has a set of rules that prescribe how to break down any payment of fines devolving to the Federal Government and the federal states (Länder). Both bear part of the costs. Payment requirements by the individual states depend on the size of their population and the respective part they played in non-compliance. In 2020, the Commission opened 28 new infringement cases against Germany; at year-end, 79 total infringement cases remained open against Germany. In accordance with WTO membership requirements, the Federal Government notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) through the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy. German law is stable and predictable. Companies can effectively enforce property and contractual rights. Germany’s well-established enforcement laws and official enforcement services ensure investors can assert their rights. German courts are fully available to foreign investors in an investment dispute. The judicial system is independent, and the government does not interfere in the court system. The legislature sets the systemic and structural parameters, while lawyers and civil law notaries use the law to shape and organize specific situations. Judges are highly competent and impartial. International studies and empirical data have attested that Germany offers an effective court system committed to due process and the rule of law. In Germany, most important legal issues and matters are governed by comprehensive legislation in the form of statutes, codes, and regulations. Primary legislation in the area of business law includes: the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, abbreviated as BGB), which contains general rules on the formation, performance, and enforcement of contracts and on the basic types of contractual agreements for legal transactions between private entities; the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, abbreviated as HGB), which contains special rules concerning transactions among businesses and commercial partnerships; the Private Limited Companies Act (GmbH-Gesetz) and the Public Limited Companies Act (Aktiengesetz), covering the two most common corporate structures in Germany – the ‘GmbH’ and the ‘Aktiengesellschaft’; and the Act on Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, abbreviated as UWG), which prohibits misleading advertising and unfair business practices. Apart from the regular courts, which hear civil and criminal cases, Germany has specialized courts for administrative law, labor law, social law, and finance and tax law. Many civil regional courts have specialized chambers for commercial matters. In 2018, the first German regional courts for civil matters (in Frankfurt and Hamburg) established Chambers for International Commercial Disputes, introducing the possibility to hear international trade disputes in English. Other federal states are currently discussing plans to introduce these specialized chambers as well. In November 2020, Baden-Wuerttemberg opened the first commercial court in Germany with locations in Stuttgart and Mannheim, with the option to choose English– language proceedings. The Federal Patent Court hears cases on patents, trademarks, and utility rights related to decisions by the German Patent and Trademarks Office. Both the German Patent Office (Deutsches Patentamt) and the European Patent Office are headquartered in Munich. In the case of acquisitions of critical infrastructure and companies in sensitive sectors, the threshold for triggering an investment review by the government is 10 percent. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action may review acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign buyers, regardless of national security concerns, where investors seek to acquire at least 25 percent of the voting rights to assess whether these transactions pose a risk to the public order or national security of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2021, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action screened 306 foreign acquisitions and prohibited none. MEC officials told Post the mere prospect of rejection has caused foreign investors to pull out of prospective deals in sensitive sectors in the past. All national security decisions by the Ministry can be appealed in administrative courts. There is no general requirement for investors to obtain approval for any acquisition unless the target company poses a potential national security risk, such as operating or providing services relating to critical infrastructure, is a media company, or operates in the health sector. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action may launch a review within three months after obtaining knowledge of the acquisition; the review must be concluded within four months after receipt of the full set of relevant documents. An investor may also request a binding certificate of non-objection from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action in advance of the planned acquisition to obtain legal certainty at an early stage. If the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action does not open an in-depth review within two months from the receipt of the request the certificate is deemed as granted. During the review, MEC may ask to submit further documents. The acquisition may be restricted or prohibited within three months after the full set of documents has been submitted. The German government has continuously amended domestic investment screening provisions in recent years to transpose the relevant EU framework and address evolving security risks. An amendment in June 2017 clarified the scope for review and gave the government more time to conduct reviews, in reaction to an increasing number of acquisitions of German companies by foreign investors with apparent ties to national governments. The amended provisions provide a clearer definition of sectors in which foreign investment can pose a threat to public order and security, including operators of critical infrastructure, developers of software to run critical infrastructure, telecommunications operators or companies involved in telecom surveillance, cloud computing network operators and service providers, and telematics companies, and which are subject to notification requirements. The new rules also extended the time to assess a cross-sector foreign investment from two to four months, and for investments in sensitive sectors, from one to three months, and introduced the possibility of retroactively initiating assessments for a period of five years after the conclusion of an acquisition. Indirect acquisitions such as those through a Germany- or EU-based affiliate company are now also explicitly subject to the new rules. With further amendments in 2020, Germany implemented the 2019 EU Screening Regulation. The amendments a) introduced a more pro-active screening based on “prospective impairment” of public order or security by an acquisition, rather than a de facto threat, b) consider the impact on other EU member states, and c) formally suspend transactions during the screening process. Furthermore, acquisitions by foreign government-owned or -funded entities now trigger a review, and the healthcare industry is now considered a sensitive sector to which the stricter 10% threshold applies. In May 2021, a further amendment entered into force, which introduced a list of sensitive sectors and technologies (like the current list of critical infrastructures), including artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, specialized robots, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and quantum technology. Foreign investors who seek to acquire at least 10% of ownership rights of a German company in one those fields must notify the government and potentially become subject to an investment review. The screening can now also consider “stockpiling acquisitions” by the same investor, “atypical control investments” where an investor seeks additional influence in company operations via side contractual agreements, or combined acquisitions by multiple investors, if all are controlled by one foreign government. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action provides comprehensive information on Germany’s investment screening regime on its website in English: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Foreign-Trade/investment-screening.html The German Economic Development Agency (GTAI) provides extensive information for investors, including about the legal framework, labor-related issues and incentive programs, on their website: http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/investment-guide.html . The German government ensures competition on a level playing field based on two main legal codes: The Law against Limiting Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) is the legal basis for limiting cartels, merger control, and monitoring abuse. State and Federal cartel authorities are in charge of enforcing anti-trust law. In exceptional cases, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action can provide a permit under specific conditions. A June 2017 amendment to the GWB expanded the reach of the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) to include internet and data-based business models; the FCO has shown an interest in investigating large internet firms. A February 2019 FCO investigation found that Facebook had abused its dominant position in social media to harvest user data. Facebook challenged the FCO’s decision in court, but in June 2020, Germany’s highest court upheld the FCO’s action. In March 2021, the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf referred the case to the European Court of Justice for guidance. The FCO has continued to challenge the conduct of large tech platforms, particularly with regard to the use of user data. Another FCO case against Facebook, initiated in December 2020, regards the integration of the company’s Oculus virtual reality platform into its broader platform, creating mandatory registration of Facebook accounts for all Oculus users. In 2021, a further amendment to the GWB, known as the Digitalization Act, entered into force codifying tools that allow greater scrutiny of digital platforms by the FCO, in order to “better counteract abusive behavior by companies with paramount cross-market significance for competition.” The law aims to prohibit large platforms from taking certain actions that put competitors at a disadvantage, including in markets for related services or up and down the supply chain – even before the large platform becomes dominant in those secondary markets. To achieve this goal, the amendments expand the powers of the FCO to act earlier and more broadly. Due to the relatively modest number of German platforms, the amendments will primarily affect U.S. companies. The Cartel Office commenced investigations against four U.S. platforms – Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Meta/Facebook and Apple – in 2021 to assess whether they fall under the scope of the new legislation. In January 2022, the competition authority determined Alphabet/Google will be subject to abuse control measures under the scope of the new law but has not yet announced remedies. The three other investigations are still ongoing. While the focus of the GWB is to preserve market access, the Law against Unfair Competition seeks to protect competitors, consumers, and other market participants against unfair competitive behavior by companies. This law is primarily invoked in regional courts by private claimants rather than by the FCO. German law provides that private property can be expropriated for public purposes only in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of constitutional and international law. There is due process and transparency of purpose, and investors in and lenders to expropriated entities are entitled to receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The Berlin state government is currently reviewing a petition for a referendum submitted by a citizens’ initiative calling for the expropriation of residential apartments owned by large corporations. At least one party in the governing coalition officially supports the proposal. Certain long-running expropriation cases date back to the Nazi and communist regimes. German insolvency law, as enshrined in the Insolvency Code, supports and promotes restructuring. If a business or the owner of a business becomes insolvent, or a business is over-indebted, insolvency proceedings can be initiated by filing for insolvency; legal persons are obliged to do so. Insolvency itself is not a crime, but deliberately filing late for insolvency is. Under a regular insolvency procedure, the insolvent business is generally broken up in order to recover assets through the sale of individual items or rights or parts of the company. Proceeds can then be paid out to creditors in the insolvency proceedings. The distribution of monies to creditors follows detailed instructions in the Insolvency Code. Equal treatment of creditors is enshrined in the Insolvency Code. Some creditors have the right to claim property back. Post-adjudication preferred creditors are served out of insolvency assets during the insolvency procedure. Ordinary creditors are served on the basis of quotas from the remaining insolvency assets. Secondary creditors, including shareholder loans, are only served if insolvency assets remain after all others have been served. Germany ranks fourth in the global ranking of “Resolving Insolvency” in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, with a recovery rate of 79.8 cents on the dollar. In December 2020, the Bundestag passed legislation implementing the EU Restructuring Directive to modernize and make German restructuring and insolvency law more effective. The Bundestag also passed legislation granting temporary relief to companies facing insolvency due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including temporary suspensions from the obligation to file for insolvency under strict requirements. This suspension expired in May 2021. 4. Industrial Policies Federal and state investment incentives – including investment grants, labor-related and R&D incentives, public loans, and public guarantees – are available to domestic and foreign investors alike. Different incentives can be combined. In general, foreign and German investors must meet the same criteria for eligibility. Germany’s Climate Action Program provides targeted support for research and development into climate-friendly technologies, through which it aims to build on Germany’s position as a leading provider and a lead market for such technology. The Energy and Climate Fund, which is scheduled to reach a volume of $220 billion (200 billion euros) by 2026, is the main instrument for financing Germany’s energy transition and climate action measures. It facilitates investments in climate protection and security of supply. The federal government also funds a program offering subsidized loans or nonrepayable cash grants to support the purchase of equipment leading to energy savings. Up to 45 percent of energy efficiency expenditures by large enterprises and 55 percent of expenditures by SMEs are eligible for coverage under the program. Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI), Germany’s federal economic development agency, provides comprehensive information on incentives in English at: https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest/investment-guide/incentive-programs . There are currently two free ports in Germany operating under EU law: Bremerhaven and Cuxhaven. The duty-free zones within the ports also permit value-added processing and manufacturing for EU-external markets, albeit with certain requirements. All are open to both domestic and foreign entities. In recent years, falling tariffs and the progressive enlargement of the EU have eroded much of the utility and attractiveness of duty-free zones. In general, there are no discriminatory export policies or import policies affecting foreign investors: no requirements for local sourcing, export percentage, or local or national ownership. In some cases, however, there may be performance requirements tied to an incentive, such as creation of jobs or maintaining a certain level of employment for a prescribed length of time. Visa, residence, and work permit procedures for foreign investors are non-discriminatory and, for U.S. citizens (as investors or employees), generally liberal. No restrictions exist on the numbers of foreign managers brought in to supervise foreign investment projects. Work permits for managers can be granted for a maximum of three years and permits can only be renewed after a six-month “cooling off period.” U.S. companies can generally obtain the visas and work permits required to do business in Germany. U.S. citizens may apply for work and residential permits from within Germany. Germany Trade & Invest offers detailed information online at https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest/investment-guide/coming-to-germany . There are no general localization requirements for data storage in Germany. However, the invalidation of the Privacy Shield by the European Court of Justice in July 2020 in the Schrems II case has led not only to increased calls for localized data storage in Germany but also to greater scrutiny by the German data protection commissioners of U.S. service providers handling German user data. In recent years, German and European cloud providers have also sought to market the domestic location of their servers as a competitive advantage. 5. Protection of Property Rights The German Government adheres to a policy of national treatment, which considers property owned by foreigners as fully protected under German law. In Germany, mortgage approvals are based on recognized and reliable collateral. Secured interests in property, both chattel and real, are recognized and enforced. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, it takes an average of 52 days to register property in Germany. The German Land Register Act dates to 1897. The land register mirrors private real property rights and provides information on the legal relationship of the estate. It documents the owner, rights of third persons, as well as liabilities and restrictions. Any change in property of real estate must be registered in the land registry to make the contract effective. Land titles are now maintained in an electronic database and can be consulted by persons with a legitimate interest. Germany has a robust regime to protect intellectual property rights (IPR). Legal structures are strong and enforcement is good. Nonetheless, internet piracy and counterfeit goods remain issues, and specific infringing websites are occasionally included in USTR’s Notorious Markets List. Germany has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) since 1970. The German Central Customs Authority annually publishes statistics on customs seizures of counterfeit and pirated goods. The statistics for 2020 are available at https://www.zoll.de/SharedDocs/Broschueren/DE/Die-Zollverwaltung/jahresstatistik_2020.html Germany is party to the major international IPR agreements: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the Brussels Satellite Convention, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Many of the latest developments in German IPR law are derived from European legislation with the objective to make applications less burdensome and allow for European IPR protection. The following types of protection are available: Copyrights: National treatment is granted to foreign copyright holders, including remuneration for private recordings. Under the TRIPS Agreement, Germany grants legal protection for U.S. performing artists against the commercial distribution of unauthorized live recordings in Germany. Germany is party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which came into force in 2010. Most rights holder organizations regard German authorities’ enforcement of IP rights as effective. In 2008, Germany implemented the EU Directive (2004/48/EC) on IPR enforcement with a national bill, thereby strengthening the privileges of rights holders and allowing for improved enforcement action. Germany implemented the Digital Single Market Directive with the “Act to Adapt Copyright Law to the Requirements of the Digital Single Market,” which entered into force on June 7, 2021. This new law implemented necessary changes to the German Copyright Act. As part of the implementing legislation parliament passed the new Copyright Service Provider Act, which entered into force on August 1, 2021. Trademarks: National treatment is granted to foreigners seeking to register trademarks at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. Protection is valid for a period of ten years and can be extended in ten-year periods. It is possible to register for trademark and design protection nationally in Germany or for an EU Trade Mark and/or Registered Community Design at the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). These provide protection for industrial design or trademarks in the entire EU market. Both national trademarks and European Union Trade Marks (EUTMs) can be applied for from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as part of an international trademark registration system, or the applicant may apply directly for those trademarks from EUIPO at https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/home . Patents: National treatment is granted to foreigners seeking to register patents at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. Patents are granted for technical inventions that are new, involve an inventive step, and are industrially applicable. However, applicants having neither a domicile nor an establishment in Germany must appoint a patent attorney in Germany as a representative filing the patent application. The documents must be submitted in German or with a translation into German. The duration of a patent is 20 years from the patent application filing date. Patent applicants can request accelerated examination under the Global Patent Prosecution Highway (GPPH) when filing the application, provided that the patent application was previously filed at the USPTO and that at least one claim had been determined to be patentable. There are a number of differences between U.S. and German patent law, including the filing systems (“first-inventor-to-file” versus “first-to-file”, respectively), which a qualified patent attorney can explain to U.S. patent applicants. German law also offers the possibility to register designs and utility models. A U.S. applicant may file a patent in multiple European countries through the European Patent Office (EPO), which grants European patents for the contracting states to the European Patent Convention (EPC). The 38 contracting states include the entire EU membership and several additional European countries; Germany joined the EPC in 1977. It should be noted that some EPC members require a translation of the granted European patent in their language for validation purposes. The EPO provides a convenient single point to file a patent in as many of these countries as an applicant would like: https://www.epo.org/applying/basics.html . U.S. applicants seeking patent rights in multiple countries can alternatively file an international Patent Coordination Treaty (PCT) application with the USPTO. Trade Secrets: Trade secrets are protected in Germany by the Law for the Protection of Trade Secrets, which has been in force since April 2019 and implements the 2016 EU Directive (2016/943). According to the law, the illegal accessing, appropriation, and copying of trade secrets, including through social engineering, is prohibited. Explicitly exempt from the law is “reverse engineering” of a publicly available item, and appropriation, usage, or publication of a trade secret to protect a “legitimate interest,”, including journalistic research and whistleblowing. The law requires companies implement “adequate confidentiality measures” for information to be protected as a trade secret under the law. Owners of trade secrets are entitled to omission, compensation, and information about the culprit, as well as the destruction, return, recall, and ultimately the removal of the infringing products from the market. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . For additional information about how to protect IPR in Germany, please see Germany Trade & Invest website at https://www.gtai.de/en/invest/investment-guide/company-set-up Statistics on the seizure of counterfeit goods are available through the German Customs Authority (Zoll): https://www.zoll.de/SharedDocs/Broschueren/DE/Die-Zollverwaltung/statistik_gew_rechtsschutz_2019.html;jsessionid=F8B0524DFF4F1ADF99DEBB858E4CAD31.internet412?nn=305648 https://www.zoll.de/SharedDocs/Broschueren/DE/Die-Zollverwaltung/statistik_gew_rechtsschutz_2019.html;jsessionid=F8B0524DFF4F1ADF99DEBB858E4CAD31.internet412?nn=305648 Businesses can also join the Anti-counterfeiting Association (APM): http://www.markenpiraterie-apm.de/index.php?article_id=1&clang=1 6. Financial Sector As an EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment. As a member of the Eurozone, Germany does not have sole national authority over international payments, which are a shared task of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the 19 member states, including the German Central Bank (Bundesbank). A European framework for national security screening of foreign investments, which entered into force in April 2019, provides a basis under European law to restrict capital movements into Germany because of threats to national security. Global investors see Germany as a safe place to invest. German sovereign bonds continue to retain their “safe haven” status. Listed companies and market participants in Germany must comply with the Securities Trading Act, which bans insider trading and market manipulation. Compliance is monitored by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) while oversight of stock exchanges is the responsibility of the state governments in Germany (with BaFin taking on any international responsibility). Investment fund management in Germany is regulated by the Capital Investment Code (KAGB), which entered into force on July 22, 2013. The KAGB represents the implementation of additional financial market regulatory reforms, committed to in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The law went beyond the minimum requirements of the relevant EU directives and represents a comprehensive overhaul of all existing investment-related regulations in Germany with the aim of creating a system of rules to protect investors while also maintaining systemic financial stability. Although corporate financing via capital markets is on the rise, Germany’s financial system remains mostly bank-based. Bank loans are still the predominant form of funding for firms, particularly the small- and medium-sized enterprises that comprise Germany’s “Mittelstand,” or mid-sized industrial market leaders. Credit is available at market-determined rates to both domestic and foreign investors, and a variety of credit instruments are available. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international banking norms. Germany has a universal banking system regulated by federal authorities; there have been no reports of a shortage of credit in the German economy. After 2010, Germany banned some forms of speculative trading, most importantly “naked short selling.” In 2013, Germany passed a law requiring banks to separate riskier activities such as proprietary trading into a legally separate, fully- capitalized unit that has no guarantee or access to financing from the deposit-taking part of the bank. Since the creation of the European single supervisory mechanism (SSM) in November 2014, the European Central Bank directly supervises 21 banks located in Germany (as of January 2022), among them four subsidiaries of foreign banks. Germany has a modern and open banking sector characterized by a highly diversified and decentralized, small-scale structure. As a result, it is extremely competitive, profit margins notably in the retail sector are low, and the banking sector is considered “over-banked” and in need of consolidation. The country’s “three-pillar” banking system consists of private commercial banks, cooperative banks, and public banks (savings banks/Sparkassen and the regional state-owned banks/Landesbanken). This structure has remained unchanged despite marked consolidation within each “pillar” since the financial crisis in 2009. By the end of 2020 the number of state banks (Landesbanken) had dropped from 12 to 6, savings banks from 446 in 2007 to 377, and cooperative banks from 1,234 to 818. Two of the five large private-sector banks have exited the market (Dresdner, Postbank). The balance sheet total of German banks dropped from 304 percent of GDP in 2007 to 192 percent of year-end 2020 GDP with banking sector assets worth €9.1 trillion. Market shares in corporate finance of the banking groups remained largely unchanged (all figures for end of 2021): commercial banks 25.5 percent (domestic 16.2 percent, foreign banks 9.3 percent), savings banks 31.2 percent, credit cooperative banks 22 percent, regional Landesbanken 9.3 percent, and development banks/building and loan associations/mortgage banks 12 percent. Germany’s retail banking sector is healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The sector is dominated by globally active banks, Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest bank by balance sheet total) and Commerzbank (fourth largest bank), with balance sheets of €1.32 trillion and €507 billion respectively (2020 figures). Commerzbank received €18 billion in financial assistance from the federal government in 2009, for which the government took a 25 percent stake in the bank (now reduced to 15.6 percent). Merger talks between Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank failed in 2019. The second largest of the top ten German banks with €595 billion of assets per year-end 2020 is DZ Bank, the central institution of the Cooperative Finance Group (after its merger with WGZ Bank in July 2016), followed by German branches of large international banks (UniCredit Bank, ING-Diba), development banks (KfW Group, NRW Bank), and state banks (LBBW, Bayern LB, Helaba, NordLB). Bank EUR bn (December 31, 2020) Deutsche Bank AG 1,325.259 DZ Bank AG 594.573 KfW Group 546.384 Commerzbank AG 506.916 Unicredit Bank AG 338.124 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 276.449 Bayerische Landesbank 256,271 J.P. Morgan AG 244.618 Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen 219,324 ING Holding Deutschland GmbH 190.070 NRW.Bank 155.787 Norddeutsche Landesbank 126.491 DKB Deutsche Kreditbank AG 109.840 German credit institutions’ operating business proved robust in 2020 despite the prolonged low interest rate environment and the coronavirus pandemic. Operating income rose by €1.8 billion (+1.5 percent) on the year to €120.5 billion. In 2020 German credit institutions reported however a pre-tax profit of only €14.3 billion, coming in below the long-term average of €17.6 billion and significantly lower than the average of the post-financial crisis years (2010 to 2018) of €25.4 billion. Their 2020 net interest income of €81.1 billion remained below the long-term average of €87.2 billion. Credit risk provisioning rose significantly due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on economic activity, reaching €5.3 billion or 0.8 percent of big banks’ annual average lending portfolio. The banking sector’s average return on equity before tax in 2020 slipped to 2.71 percent (after tax: 1.12 percent) (with savings banks and credit cooperatives generating a higher return, and big banks a negative return). The German government does not currently have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The formal term for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Germany translates as “public funds, institutions, or companies,” and refers to entities whose budget and administration are separate from those of the government, but in which the government has more than 50 percent of the capital shares or voting rights. Appropriations for SOEs are included in public budgets, and SOEs can take two forms, either public or private law entities. Public law entities are recognized as legal personalities whose goal, tasks, and organization are established and defined via specific acts of legislation, with the best-known example being the publicly-owned promotional bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). KfW’s mandate is to promote global development. The government can also resort to ownership or participation in an entity governed by private law if the following conditions are met: doing so fulfills an important state interest, there is no better or more economical alternative, the financial responsibility of the federal government is limited, the government has appropriate supervisory influence, and yearly reports are published. Government oversight of SOEs is decentralized and handled by the ministry with the appropriate technical area of expertise. The primary goal of such involvement is promoting public interests rather than generating profits. The government is required to close its ownership stake in a private entity if tasks change or technological progress provides more effective alternatives, though certain areas, particularly science and culture, remain permanent core government obligations. German SOEs are subject to the same taxes and the same value added tax rebate policies as their private- sector competitors. There are no laws or rules that seek to ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in certain sectors or industries. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including access to state-owned banks such as KfW. The Federal Statistics Office maintains a database of SOEs from all three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) listing a total of 19,009 entities for 2019, or 0.58 percent of the total 3.35 million companies in Germany. SOEs in 2019 had €646 billion in revenue and €632 billion in expenditures. Forty-one percent of SOEs’ revenue was generated by water and energy suppliers, 12 percent by health and social services, and 11 percent by transportation-related entities. Measured by number of companies rather than size, 88 percent of SOEs are owned by municipalities, 10 percent are owned by Germany’s 16 states, and two percent are owned by the federal government. The Federal Ministry of Finance is required to publish a detailed annual report on public funds, institutions, and companies in which the federal government has direct participation (including a minority share) or an indirect participation greater than 25 percent and with a nominal capital share worth more than €50,000. The federal government held a direct participation in 106 companies and an indirect participation in 401 companies at the end of 2019 (per the Ministry’s April 2021 publication of full-year 2019 figures), most prominently Deutsche Bahn (100 percent share), Deutsche Telekom (32 percent share), and Deutsche Post (21 percent share). Federal government ownership is concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, economic development, science, administration/increasing efficiency, defense, development policy, and culture. As the result of federal financial assistance packages from the federally-controlled Financial Market Stability Fund during the global financial crisis of 2008/9, the federal government still has a partial stake in several commercial banks, including a 15.6 percent share in Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest commercial bank. In 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German government acquired shares of several large German companies, including CureVac, TUI, and Lufthansa in an attempt to prevent companies from filing for insolvency or, in the case of CureVac, to support vaccine research in Germany. The 2021 annual report (with 2019 data) can be found here: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/beteiligungsbericht-des-bundes-2021-2016812 Publicly-owned banks constitute one of the three pillars of Germany’s banking system (cooperative and commercial banks are the other two). Germany’s savings banks are mainly owned by the municipalities, while the so-called Landesbanken are typically owned by regional savings bank associations and the state governments. Given their joint market share, about 40 percent of the German banking sector is thus publicly owned. There are also many state-owned promotional/development banks which have taken on larger governmental roles in financing infrastructure. This increased role removes expenditures from public budgets, particularly helpful considering Germany’s balanced budget rules, which took effect for the states in 2020. Germany does not have any privatization programs currently. German authorities treat foreigners equally in privatizations of state-owned enterprises. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In December 2016, the Federal Government passed the National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights (NAP), applying the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights to the activities of German companies though largely voluntary measures. A 2020 review found most companies did not sufficiently fulfill due diligence measures and in 2021 Germany passed the legally binding Human Rights Due Diligence in Supply Chains Act. From 2023, the act will apply to companies with at least 3,000 employees with their central administration, principal place of business, administrative headquarters, a statutory seat, or a branch office in Germany. From 2024 it will apply to companies with at least 1000 employees. The 2021 coalition agreement between the SPD, the Greens party, and the Free Democrats Party (FDP) committed to revising the NAP in line with the Supply Chains Act. Germany promoted EU-level legislation during its 2020 Council of the European Union presidency and the EU Commission published a legislative proposal in 2022. Germany adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the National Contact Point (NCP) is housed in the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action. The NCP is supported by an advisory board composed of several ministries, business organizations, trade unions, and NGOs. This working group usually meets once a year to discuss all Guidelines-related issues. The German NCP can be contacted through the Ministry’s website: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Textsammlungen/Foreign-Trade/national-contact-point-ncp.html . There is general awareness of environmental, social, and governance issues among both producers and consumers in Germany, and surveys suggest that consumers increasingly care about the ecological and social impacts of the products they purchase. In order to encourage businesses to factor environmental, social, and governance impacts into their decision-making, the government provides information online and in hard copy. The federal government encourages corporate social responsibility (CSR) through awards and prizes, business fairs, and reports and newsletters. The government also organizes so-called “sector dialogues” to connect companies and facilitate the exchange of best practices and offers practice days to help nationally as well as internationally operating small- and medium-sized companies discern and implement their entrepreneurial due diligence under the NAP. To this end it has created a website on CSR in Germany ( http://www.csr-in-deutschland.de/EN/Home/home.html in English). The German government maintains and enforces domestic laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protections, and environmental protections. The German government does not waive labor and environmental laws to attract investment. Social reporting is currently voluntary, but publicly listed companies frequently include information on their CSR policies in annual shareholder reports and on their websites. Civil society groups that work on CSR include Amnesty International Germany, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e. V. (BUND), CorA Corporate Accountability – Netzwerk Unternehmensverantwortung, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Germanwatch, Greenpeace Germany, Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU), Sneep (Studentisches Netzwerk zu Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik), Stiftung Warentest, Südwind – Institut für Ökonomie und Ökumene, TransFair – Verein zur Förderung des Fairen Handels mit der „Dritten Welt“ e. V., Transparency International, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V., Bundesverband Die Verbraucher Initiative e.V., and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, known as the “World Wildlife Fund” in the United States). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . The government has an ambitious national climate strategy which, by law, requires the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 65 percent by 2030, 88 percent by 2040, and the achievement of complete carbon neutrality by 2045. It also aims to source 100 percent of its electricity from renewables by 2035. To achieve this objective it is investing heavily in renewables and implementing a combination of carrots and sticks for private companies to spur investment and deter continued use of climate-polluting energy sources. The country earmarked $220 billion (€200 billion) to fund industrial transformation through 2026, including climate protection, hydrogen technology, and expansion of its electric vehicle charging network. It is also removing bureaucratic hurdles for renewable projects. States must designate two percent of their land for onshore wind energy, and solar energy panels will be mandatory on new commercial buildings. Germany also intends to phase out coal “ideally” by 2030, although Russia’s February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine could lead to a delay as the government seeks alternatives to Russian oil and gas. The government aims to increase domestic rail freight transport by 25 percent, as moving freight by rail instead of trucks emits far fewer greenhouse gases, and it will advocate for EU legislation to encourage rail travel and greener forms of transport throughout the bloc. Germany is part of the EU’s greenhouse gas Emissions Trading System, which sets a price on carbon emissions from power stations, energy-intensive industries (e.g., oil refineries, steelworks, and producers of iron, aluminum, cement, paper and glass), and intra-European commercial aviation. It also instituted a national emissions trading system to cover the transport and building heating sectors in 2021. The Global Green Growth Institute ranked Germany fourth globally in its 2020 Green Growth Index. Germany ranked fifth in the category “Natural capital protection,” which takes factors such as environmental quality and biodiversity protection into consideration, and second in “Green economic opportunities,” which measures green investment, green trade, green employment, and green innovation. In 2021, Germany launched a $1 billion fund aimed at halting global biodiversity loss and providing long-term financial support for protected areas across Africa, Asia, and South America. The new government plans to significantly increase Germany’s financial commitment to global biodiversity and promote “an ambitious new global framework” at the April 2022 UN Biodiversity Conference. Public procurement policies include environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. The German Environment Agency has formulated clear requirements and recommendations for climate change mitigation at public agencies, including their procurement policies, and it has an environmental management system in place certified according to the EU Eco-Management and Audit System. The federal government and 11 of Germany’s federal states have committed to achieving greenhouse gas-neutral administration. 9. Corruption Among industrialized countries, Germany ranks 10th out of 180, according to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Some sectors including the automotive industry, construction sector, and public contracting, exert political influence and political party finance remains only partially transparent. Nevertheless, U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an impediment to investment in Germany. Germany is a signatory of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Over the last two decades, Germany has increased penalties for the bribery of German officials, corrupt practices between companies, and price-fixing by companies competing for public contracts. It has also strengthened anti-corruption provisions on financial support extended by the official export credit agency and has tightened the rules for public tenders. Government officials are forbidden from accepting gifts linked to their jobs. Most state governments and local authorities have contact points for whistleblowing and provisions for rotating personnel in areas prone to corruption. There are serious penalties for bribing officials and price fixing by companies competing for public contracts. To prevent corruption, Germany relies on the existing legal and regulatory framework consisting of various provisions under criminal law, public service law, and other rules for the administration at both federal and state levels. The framework covers internal corruption prevention, accounting standards, capital market disclosure requirements, and transparency rules, among other measures. According to the Federal Criminal Office, in 2020, 50.6 percent of all corruption cases were directed towards the public administration (down from 73 percent in 2018), 33.2 percent towards the business sector (down from 39 percent in 2019), 13.4 percent towards law enforcement and judicial authorities (up from 9 percent in 2019), and 2 percent to political officials (unchanged compared to 2018). Parliamentarians are subject to financial disclosure laws that require them to publish earnings from outside employment. Disclosures are available to the public via the Bundestag website (next to the parliamentarians’ biographies) and in the Official Handbook of the Bundestag. Penalties for noncompliance can range from an administrative fine to as much as half of a parliamentarian’s annual salary. In early 2021, several parliamentarians stepped down due to inappropriate financial gains made through personal relationships to businesses involved in the procurement of face masks during the initial stages of the pandemic. Donations by private persons or entities to political parties are legally permitted. However, if they exceed €50,000, they must be reported to the President of the Bundestag, who is required to immediately publish the name of the party, the amount of the donation, the name of the donor, the date of the donation, and the date the recipient reported the donation. Donations of €10,000 or more must be included in the party’s annual accountability report to the President of the Bundestag. State prosecutors are generally responsible for investigating corruption cases, but not all state governments have prosecutors specializing in corruption. Germany has successfully prosecuted hundreds of domestic corruption cases over the years, including large– scale cases against major companies. Media reports in past years about bribery investigations against Siemens, Daimler, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, and Ferrostaal have increased awareness of the problem of corruption. As a result, listed companies and multinationals have expanded compliance departments, tightened internal codes of conduct, and offered more training to employees. Germany was a signatory to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in 2003. The Bundestag ratified the Convention in November 2014. Germany adheres to and actively enforces the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention which criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials by German citizens and firms. The necessary tax reform legislation ending the tax write-off for bribes in Germany and abroad became law in 1999. Germany participates in the relevant EU anti-corruption measures and signed two EU conventions against corruption. However, while Germany ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2017, it has not yet ratified the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. There is no central government anti-corruption agency in Germany. Federal states are responsible for fighting corruption. Due to Germany’s federal state structure, original responsibility in the area of anti-corruption lies with the individual federal states. Further information, in particular contact persons for corruption prevention, can be found on the websites of state level law enforcement (police) or the ombudsmen of the cities, districts and municipalities. These offices, special telephone numbers or web-based contact options also offer whistleblowers or interested citizens the opportunity to contact them anonymously in individual federal states. (The Federal Ministry of the Interior’s website provides further information on corruption prevention regulations and integrity regulations at the federal level.) Claimants can contact “watchdog” organizations such as Transparency International for more information: Hartmut Bäumer, Chair Transparency International Germany Alte Schönhauser Str. 44, 10119 Berlin +49 30 549 898 0 office@transparency.de https://www.transparency.de/en/ The Federal Criminal Office publishes an annual report on corruption: “Bundeslagebild Korruption” – the latest one covers 2020. https://www.bka.de/DE/AktuelleInformationen/StatistikenLagebilder/Lagebilder/Korruption/korruption_node.html;jsessionid=95B370E07C3C5702B4A4AAEE8EAC8B3F.live0601 10. Political and Security Environment Overall, political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises are extremely rare. Most protests and demonstrations, whether political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises or any other cause or focus, remain peaceful. However, minor attacks by left-wing extremists on commercial enterprises occur. These extremists justify their attacks as a means to combat the “capitalist system” as the “source of all evil.” In the foreground, however, concrete connections such as “anti-militarism” (in the case of armament companies), “anti-repression” (in the case of companies for prison logistics or surveillance technology), or the supposed commitment to climate protection (companies from the raw materials and energy sector) are usually cited. In several key instances in larger cities with a strained housing market (low availability of affordable housing options), left-wing extremists target real estate companies in connection with the defense of autonomous “free spaces” and the fight against “anti-social urban structures.” Isolated cases of violence directed at certain minorities and asylum seekers have not targeted U.S. investments or investors. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The German labor force is generally highly skilled, well-educated, and productive. Before the economic downturn caused by COVID-19, employment in Germany had risen for 13 consecutive years and reached an all-time high of 45.3 million workers in 2019. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, employment fell to 44.8 million in 2020 and remained stagnant in 2021 at 44.79 million workers. The pandemic had a disproportionate impact on female workers, who comprise most employees in the tourism, restaurant, retail, and beauty industries. Unemployment has fallen by more than half since 2005, and, in 2019, reached the lowest average annual value since German reunification. In 2019, around 2.34 million people were registered as unemployed, corresponding to an unemployment rate of 5.2 percent, according to German Federal Employment Agency calculations. Using internationally comparable data from the European Union’s statistical office Eurostat, Germany had an average annual unemployment rate of 3.2 percent in 2019, the second lowest rate in the European Union. For the pandemic year 2020, the Federal Employment Agency reported an average unemployment rate of 5.9 percent and an average 2.7 million unemployed. In 2021, employment recovered despite the persistent pandemic, with the unemployment rate falling to 5.7 percent and the total number of unemployed dropping by 82,000. However, long-term effects on the labor market and the overall economy due to COVID-19 are not yet fully observable. All employees are by law covered by federal unemployment insurance that compensates for lack of income for up to 24 months. A government-funded temporary furlough program (“Kurzarbeit”) allows companies to decrease their workforce and labor costs with layoffs and has helped mitigate a negative labor market impact in the short term. At its peak in April 2020, the program covered more than six million employees. By December 2021 the number had decreased considerably to 790,000 but remained a key government tool to cope with the impact of COVID-19 on the labor market. The government, through the national employment agency, has spent more than €22 billion on this program, which it considers the main tool to keep unemployment low during the COVID-19 economic crisis. The government extended the program for all companies already meeting its conditions in March 2022 until the end of June 2022. Germany’s average national youth unemployment rate was 6.9 percent in 2020, the lowest in the EU. The German vocational training system has garnered international interest as a key contributor to Germany’s highly skilled workforce and its sustainably low youth unemployment rate. Germany’s so-called “dual vocational training,” a combination of theoretical courses taught at schools and practical application in the workplace, teaches and develops many of the skills employers need. Each year there are more than 500,000 apprenticeship positions available in more than 340 recognized training professions, in all sectors of the economy and public administration. Approximately 50 percent of students choose to start an apprenticeship. The government promotes apprenticeship opportunities, in partnership with industry, through the “National Pact to Promote Training and Young Skilled Workers.” An element of growing concern for German business is the country’s decreasing population, which (absent large-scale immigration) will likely shrink considerably over the next few decades. Official forecasts at the behest of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs predict the current working-age population will shrink by almost three million between 2010 and 2030, resulting in an overall shortage of workforce and skilled labor. Labor bottlenecks already constrain activity in many industries, occupations, and regions. The government has begun to enhance its efforts to ensure an adequate labor supply by improving programs to integrate women, elderly, young people, and foreign nationals into the labor market. The government has also facilitated the immigration of qualified workers. Germans consider the cooperation between labor unions and employer associations to be a fundamental principle of their social market economy and believe this collaboration has contributed to the country’s resilience during economic and financial crises. Insofar as job security for members is a core objective for German labor unions, unions often show restraint in collective bargaining in weak economic times and often can negotiate higher wages in strong economic conditions. In an international comparison, Germany is in the lower midrange with regards to strike numbers and intensity. All workers have the right to strike, except for civil servants (including teachers and police) and staff in sensitive or essential positions, such as members of the armed forces. Germany’s constitution, federal legislation, and government regulations contain provisions designed to protect the right of employees to form and join independent unions of their choice. The overwhelming majority of unionized workers are members of one of the eight largest unions — largely grouped by industry or service sector — which are affiliates of the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). Several smaller unions exist outside the DGB. Overall trade union membership has, however, been in decline over the last several years. In 2021, total DGB union membership amounted to 5.9 million. IG Metall is the largest German labor union with 2.2 million members, followed by the influential service sector union Ver.di (1.9 million members). The constitution and enabling legislation protect the right to collective bargaining, and agreements are legally binding to the parties. In 2020, 52 percent of non-self-employed workers were covered by a collective wage agreement. By law, workers can elect a works council in any private company employing at least five people. The rights of the works council include the right to be informed, to be consulted, and to participate in company decisions. Works councils often help labor and management settle problems before they become disputes and disrupt work. In addition, “co-determination” laws give the workforce in medium-sized or large companies (corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships limited by shares, co-operatives, and mutual insurance companies) significant voting representation on the firms’ supervisory boards. This co-determination in the supervisory board extends to all company activities. From 2010 to 2020, real wages grew yearly by 1.4 percent on average. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, real wages fell in 2020 by 1.1 percent over the previous year, ending a six-year period of real wage increases. Job losses and enrollment in the government’s temporary furlough program (at 70 percent of previous wage levels) were the drivers of this reduction. In 2021 employment picked up again and nominal wages increased by 3.1 percent. Inflation in 2021 of 3.1 percent resulted in another year of real wage reduction of 0.1 percent. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 €3.332,230 2020 $3.846,414 Federal Statistical Office, www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €88,748 2020 $162,387 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €324,992 2020 $564,294 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 29.7% 2020 27.9% Federal Statistical Office, Bundesbank, UNCTAD data available at https://hbs.unctad.org/foreign-direct-investment/ * Source for Host Country Data: Federal Statistical Office, www.destatis.de ; Bundesbank, www.bundesbank.de Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $1,129,900 100% Total Outward $1,955,383 100% Luxembourg $220,284 19% United States $336,475 17% The Netherlands $206,592 18% Luxembourg $291,412 15% United States $115,320 10% The Netherlands $228,609 12% Switzerland $91,434 8% United Kingdom $132,019 7% United Kingdom $748,964 7% France $99,582 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Commercial Service Pariser Platz 2, 14191 Berlin, Germany Email: office.berlin@trade.gov Ghana Executive Summary Ghana’s economy had expanded at an average of seven percent per year since 2017 until the coronavirus pandemic reduced growth to 0.4 percent in 2020, according to the Ministry of Finance. Between 2017 and 2019, the fiscal deficit narrowed, inflation decreased, and GDP growth rebounded, driven primarily by increases in oil production. Ghana saw a 9 percent growth rate in the first quarter of 2019 and closed that year with a 6.5 percent GDP growth rate. Indicating a recovery from the pandemic, the Ghana Statistical Service reported a 6.6 percent growth rate in the third quarter of 2021, marking the fastest growth in GDP since the pandemic began. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected growth to rebound to 4.7 percent in 2021 from the shock of COVID-19 and by 6.2 percent in 2022. The economy remains highly dependent on the export of primary commodities such as gold, cocoa, and oil, and consequently is vulnerable to slowdowns in the global economy and commodity price shocks. In November 2020, Ghana launched the 100 billion cedi (about $13 billion) Ghana COVID-19 Alleviation and Revitalization of Enterprises Support (Ghana CARES) Program to address the effects of the virus on the economy. In 2020, the government also launched Ghana’s National Adaptation Plan Process by which it expects to develop strategies to build resilience against the impacts of both climate change and crises such as COVID-19. In general, Ghana’s investment prospects remain favorable, as the Government of Ghana seeks to diversify and industrialize through agro-processing, mining, and manufacturing. It has made attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) a priority to support its industrialization plans and to overcome an annual infrastructure funding gap. Challenges to Ghana’s economy include high government debt, particularly energy sector debt, low internally generated revenue, and inefficient state-owned enterprises. Ghana has a population of 31 million, with over 14 million potential taxpayers, but only six million of whom filed their annual tax returns. As Ghana seeks to move beyond dependence on foreign aid, it must develop a solid domestic revenue base. On the energy front, Ghana has enough installed power capacity to meet current demand, but it needs to reduce the cost of electricity by improving the management of its state-owned power distribution system. Among the challenges hindering foreign direct investment are: costly and difficult financial services, lack of government transparency, corruption, under-developed infrastructure, a complex property market, costly and intermittent power and water supply, the high costs of cross-border trade, a burdensome bureaucracy, and an unskilled labor force. Enforcement of laws and policies is weak, even where good laws exist on the books. Public procurements are sometimes opaque, and there are often issues with delayed payments. In addition, there have been troubling trends in investment policy over the last six years, with the passage of local content regulations in the petroleum, power, and mining sectors that may discourage needed future investments. Despite these challenges, Ghana’s abundant raw materials (gold, cocoa, and oil/gas), relative security, and political stability, as well as its hosting of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat make it stand out as one of the better locations for investment in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no discrimination against foreign-owned businesses. Investment laws protect investors against expropriation and nationalization and guarantee that investors can transfer profits out of the country, although international companies have reported high levels of corruption in dealing with Ghanaian government institutions. Among the most promising sectors are agribusiness and food processing; textiles and apparel; downstream oil, gas, and minerals processing; construction; and mining-related services subsectors. The government has acknowledged the need to strengthen its enabling environment to attract FDI, and is taking steps to overhaul the regulatory system, improve the ease of doing business, and restore fiscal discipline. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 112 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Ghana ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 429 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,340 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Ghana has made increasing FDI a priority and acknowledges the importance of having an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive. Officials are implementing regulatory and other reforms such as automation and digitalization of government processes and enhancing GIPC’s own support services, to improve the ease of doing business and make investing in Ghana more attractive. The 2013 Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC) Act requires the GIPC to register, monitor, and keep records of all business enterprises in Ghana. Sector-specific laws further regulate investments in minerals and mining, oil and gas, industries within Free Zones, banking, non-bank financial institutions, insurance, fishing, securities, telecommunications, energy, and real estate. Some sector-specific laws, such as in the oil and gas sector and the power sector, include local content requirements that could discourage international investment. Foreign investors are required to satisfy the provisions of the GIPC Act as well as the provisions of sector-specific laws. GIPC leadership has pledged to collaborate more closely with the private sector to address investor concerns, but there have been no significant changes to the laws. More information on investing in Ghana can be obtained from GIPC’s website, www.gipc.gov.gh. Most of Ghana’s major sectors are fully open to foreign capital participation. U.S. investors in Ghana are treated the same as other foreign investors. All foreign investment projects must register with the GIPC. Foreign investments are subject to the following minimum capital requirements: USD 200,000 for joint ventures with a Ghanaian partner, who should have at least 10 percent of the equity; USD 500,000 for enterprises wholly owned by a non-Ghanaian; and USD 1 million for trading companies (firms that buy or sell imported goods or services) wholly owned by non-Ghanaian entities. The minimum capital requirement may be met in cash or capital goods relevant to the investment. Trading companies are also required to employ at least 20 skilled Ghanaian nationals. Ghana’s investment code excludes foreign investors from participating in eight economic sectors: petty trading; the operation of taxi and car rental services with fleets of fewer than 25 vehicles; lotteries (excluding soccer pools); the operation of beauty salons and barber shops; printing of recharge scratch cards for subscribers to telecommunications services; production of exercise books and stationery; retail of finished pharmaceutical products; and the production, supply, and retail of drinking water in sealed pouches. Sectors where foreign investors are allowed limited market access include: telecommunications, banking, fishing, mining, petroleum, and real estate. Ghana has not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) through the OECD recently. UNCTAD last conducted an IPR in 2003. The WTO last conducted a Trade Policy Review (TPR) in May 2014. The next review is scheduled for May 4-6, 2022. The 2014 TPR concluded that the 2013 amendment to the investment law raised the minimum capital that foreigners must invest to levels above those specified in Ghana’s 1994 GATS horizontal commitments and excluded new activities from foreign competition. However, it was determined that overall, this would have minimal impact on dissuading future foreign investment due to the size of the companies traditionally seeking to do business within the country. An executive summary of the findings can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp398_e.htm . Although registering a business is a relatively easy procedure and can be done online through the Registrar General’s Department (RGD) at https://rgd.gov.gh/index.html , businesses have noted that the process involved in establishing a business is lengthy and complex, and requires compliance with regulations and procedures of at least four other government agencies, including GIPC, Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Immigration Service, and the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). In 2019, Ghana passed a new Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992), which among other things, created a new independent office called the Office of the Registrar of Companies, responsible for the registration and regulation of all businesses. A new office is expected to be in place which would separate the registration process for companies from the Registrar General’s Department; the latter would continue to serve as the government’s registrar for non-business transactions such as marriages. The new law also simplifies some registration processes by scrapping the issuance of a certificate to commence business and the requirement for a company to state business objectives, which limited the activities in which a company could engage. The law also expands the role of the company secretary, which now requires educational qualifications with some background in company law practice and administration or having been trained under a company secretary for at least three years. Foreign investors must obtain a certificate of capital importation, which can take 14 days. The local authorized bank must confirm the import of capital with the Bank of Ghana, which confirms the transaction to GIPC for investment registration purposes. Per the GIPC Act, all foreign companies are required to register with GIPC after incorporation with the RGD. Registration can be completed online at www.gipc.gov.gh. While the registration process is designed to be completed within five business days, but there are often bureaucratic delays. The Ghanaian business environment is unique, and guidance can be extremely helpful. In some cases, a foreign investment may enjoy certain tax benefits under the law or additional incentives if the project is deemed critical to the country’s development. Most companies or individuals considering investing in Ghana or trading with Ghanaian counterparts find it useful to consult with a local attorney or business facilitation company. The United States Embassy in Accra maintains a list of local attorneys, which is available through the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service ( https://www.trade.gov/ghana-contact-us ) or U.S. Citizen Services ( https://gh.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/). Specific information about setting up a business is available at the GIPC website: https://gipc.gov.gh/4232-2/. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Post: P. O. Box M193, Accra-Ghana Note: Omit the (0) after the country code when dialing from abroad. Telephone: +233 (0) 302 665 125, +233 (0) 302 665 126, +233 (0) 302 665 127, +233 (0) 302 665 128, +233 (0) 302 665 129, +233 (0) 244 318 254/ +233 (0) 244 318 252 Email: info@gipc.gov.gh Note that mining or oil/gas sector companies are required to obtain licensing/approval from the following relevant bodies: Petroleum Commission Head Office Plot No. 4A, George Bush Highway, Accra, Ghana P.O. Box CT 228 Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Telephone: +233 (0) 302 953 392 | +233 (0) 302 953 393 Website: http://www.petrocom.gov.gh/ Minerals Commission Minerals House, No. 12 Switchback Road, Cantonments, Accra P. O. Box M 248 Telephone: +233 (0) 302 772 783 /+233 (0) 302 772 786 /+233 (0) 302 773 053 Website: http://www.mincom.gov.gh/ Ghana has no specific outward investment policy. It has entered into bilateral treaties, however, with a number of countries to promote and protect foreign investment on a reciprocal basis. Some Ghanaian companies have established operations in other West African countries and there are a number of active Ghanaian investments in the United States in the food processing and personal care sectors. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Ghana’s policies on trade liberalization and investment promotion are guiding its efforts to create a clear and transparent regulatory system. Ghana does not have a standardized consultation process, but ministries and Parliament generally share the text or summary of proposed regulations and solicit comments directly from stakeholders or via public meetings and hearings. All laws that are currently in effect are printed by the Ghana Publishing Company, while the notice of publication of the law, bills, or regulations are made in the Ghana Gazette (equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register). The non-profit Ghana Legal Information Institute ( Home | GhaLII ) re-publishes hard copies of the Ghana Gazette. The Government of Ghana does not publish draft regulations online, and the Parliament publishes only some draft bills ( https://www.parliament.gh/docs?type=Bills&OT ), which inhibits transparency in the approval of laws and regulations. The Government of Ghana has established regulatory bodies such as the National Communications Authority, the National Petroleum Authority, the Petroleum Commission, the Energy Commission, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission to oversee activities in the telecommunications, downstream and upstream petroleum, electricity and natural gas, and water sectors. The creation of these bodies was a positive step, but the lack of resources and the bodies’ susceptibility to political influence undermine their ability to deliver the intended level of oversight. The government launched a Business Regulatory Reform program in 2017, but implementation has been slow. The program aims to improve the ease of doing business, review all rules and regulations to identify and reduce unnecessary costs and requirements, establish an e-registry of all laws, establish a centralized public consultation web portal, provide regulatory relief for entrepreneurs, and eventually implement a regulatory impact analysis system. The government continues to work towards achieving these goals and in 2020 established the centralized public consultation web portal ( www.bcp.gov.gh ), the Ghana Business Regulatory Reforms platform. It is an interactive platform to allow policymakers to consult businesses and individuals in a transparent, inclusive, and timely manner on policy issues. Ghana adopted International Financial Reporting Standards in 2007 for all listed companies, government business enterprises, banks, insurance companies, security brokers, pension funds, and public utilities. Projects likely to have significant impacts on the environment are required to obtain environmental permits from the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency before commencement of construction and operations. The government, however, does not have a policy that requires or promotes companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Ghana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1995 and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1957. Ghana issues its own standards for many products under the auspices of the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA). The GSA has promulgated more than 500 Ghanaian standards and adopted more than 2,000 international standards including European Union and U.S. standards for certification purposes. The Ghanaian Food and Drugs Authority is responsible for enforcing standards for food, drugs, cosmetics, and health items. Ghana has a WTO obligation to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Ghana’s legal system is based on British common law and local customary law. Investors should note that the acquisition of real property is governed by both statutory and customary law. The judiciary comprises both lower courts and superior courts. The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court and Regional Tribunals. Lawsuits are permitted and usually begin in the High Court. The High Court has jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, other than those involving treason and some cases that involve the highest levels of the government – which go to the Supreme Court. There is a history of government intervention in the court system, although somewhat less so in commercial matters. The courts have entered judgments against the government. However, the courts have been slow in disposing of cases and at times face challenges in having their decisions enforced, largely due to resource constraints and institutional inefficiencies. The GIPC Act codified the government’s desire to present foreign investors with a transparent foreign investment regulatory regime. GIPC regulates foreign investment in acquisitions, mergers, takeovers and new investments, as well as portfolio investment in stocks, bonds, and other securities traded on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The GIPC Act also specifies areas of investment reserved for Ghanaian citizens, and further delineates incentives and guarantees that relate to taxation, transfer of capital, profits and dividends, and guarantees against expropriation. GIPC helps to facilitate the business registration process and provides economic, commercial, and investment information for companies and businesspeople interested in starting a business or investing in Ghana. GIPC provides assistance to enable investors to take advantage of relevant incentives. Registration can be completed online at www.gipc.gov.gh. As detailed in the previous section on “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment,” sector-specific laws regulate foreign participation/investment in telecommunications, banking, fishing, mining, petroleum, and real estate. Ghana regulates the transfer of technologies not freely available in Ghana. According to the 1992 Technology Transfer Regulations, total management and technical fee levels higher than eight percent of net sales must be approved by GIPC. The regulations do not allow agreements that impose obligations to procure personnel, inputs, and equipment from the transferor or specific source. The duration of related contracts cannot exceed ten years and cannot be renewed for more than five years. Any provisions in the agreement inconsistent with Ghanaian regulations are unenforceable in Ghana. Ghana is reportedly working on a new competition law to replace the existing legislation, the Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, 2000 (Act 589); however, the new bill is still under review. The Constitution sets out some exceptions and a clear procedure for the payment of compensation in allowable cases of expropriation or nationalization. Additionally, Ghana’s investment laws generally protect investors against expropriation and nationalization. The Government of Ghana may, however, expropriate property if it is required to protect national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and county planning, or to ensure the development or utilization of property in a manner to promote public benefit. In such cases, the GOG must provide prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation to the property owner, but the process for determining adequate compensation and making payments can be complicated and lengthy in practice. The Government of Ghana guarantees due process by allowing access to the High Court by any person who has an interest or right over the property. Ghana does not have a bankruptcy statute. A new insolvency law, the Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency Act, 2020 (Act 1015), was passed to replace the Bodies Corporate (Official Liquidations) Act, 1963 (Act 180). The new law, unlike the previous one, provides for reorganization of a company before liquidation when it is unable to pay its debts, as well as cross-border insolvency rules. The new law does not have a U.S. Chapter 11-style bankruptcy provision but allows for a process that puts the company under administration for restructuring. The new law complements the law for private liquidations under the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992), but does not apply to businesses that are under specialized regulations such as banks and insurance companies. 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives differ slightly depending upon the law under which an investor operates. For example, while all investors operating under the Free Zone Act are entitled to a ten-year corporate tax holiday, investors operating under the GIPC law are not. Tax incentives vary depending upon the sector in which the investor is operating. All investment-specific laws contain some incentives. The GIPC law allows for import and tax exemptions for plant inputs, machinery, and parts imported for the purpose of the investment. Chapters 82, 84, 85, and 89 of the Customs Harmonized Commodity and Tariff Code zero-rate these production items. In 2015, the Government of Ghana imposed a new five percent import duty on some items that were previously zero-rated to conform to the new Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) common external tariff. The Ghanaian tax system is replete with tax concessions that considerably reduce the effective tax rate. The minimum incentives are specified in the GIPC law and are not applied in an ad hoc or arbitrary manner. Once an investor has been registered under the GIPC law, the investor is entitled to the incentives provided by law. The government has discretion to grant an investor additional customs duty exemptions and tax incentives beyond the minimum stated in the law. The GIPC website ( www.gipc.gov.gh ) provides a thorough description of available incentive programs. The law also guarantees an investor all the tax incentives provided for under Ghanaian law. For example, rental income from commercial and residential property is exempt from tax for the first five years after construction. Similarly, income from a company selling or leasing out premises is income tax exempt for the first five years of operation. Rural banks and cattle ranching are exempt from income tax for ten years and pay eight percent thereafter. The corporate tax rate is 25 percent, and this applies to all sectors, except income from non-traditional exports (eight percent tax rate), companies principally engaged in the hotel industry (22 percent rate), and oil and gas exploration companies (35 percent tax rate). For some sectors there are temporary tax holidays. These sectors include Free Zone enterprises and developers (0 percent for the first ten years and 15 percent thereafter); real estate development and rental (0 percent for the first five years and 25 percent thereafter); agro-processing companies (0 percent for the first five years, after which the tax rate ranges from 0 percent to 25 percent depending on the location of the company in Ghana), and waste processing companies (0 percent for seven years and 25 percent thereafter). In December 2019, to attract investments under the Ghana Automotive Development Policy, corporate tax holidays among other import duty and value-added tax exemptions were granted to manufacturers or assemblers of semi-knocked-down vehicles (0 percent for three years) and complete knocked down vehicles (0 percent for ten years). Tax rebates are also offered in the form of incentives based on location. A capital allowance in the form of accelerated depreciation is applicable in all sectors except banking, finance, commerce, insurance, mining, and petroleum. Under the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896), all businesses can carry forward tax losses for at least three years. Ghana has no discriminatory or excessively burdensome visa requirements. While ECOWAS nationals do not require a visa to enter Ghana for 90 days, they need a work and residence permit to live and work in Ghana. The current fees for work and residence permit for ECOWAS nationals is USD 500 while that for non-ECOWAS nationals is USD 1,000. A foreign investor who invests under the GIPC Act is automatically entitled to a specific number of visas/work permits based on the size of the investment. When an investment of USD 50,000 but not more than USD 250,000 or its equivalent is made in convertible currency or machinery and equipment, the enterprise can obtain a visa/work permit for one expatriate employee. An investment of USD 250,000, but not more than USD 500,000, entitles the enterprise to two visas/work permits. An investment of USD 500,000, but not more than USD 700,000, allows the enterprise to bring in three expatriate employees. An investment of more than USD 700,000 allows an enterprise to bring in four expatriate employees. An enterprise may apply for extra visas or work permits, but the investor must justify why a foreigner must be employed rather than a Ghanaian. There are no restrictions on the issuance of work and residence permits to Free Zone investors and employees. Overall, the process of issuing work permits is not very transparent. Free Trade Zones (called Free Zones in Ghana) were first established in May 1996, with one near Tema Steelworks, Ltd., in the Greater Accra Region, and two other sites located at Mpintsin and Ashiem near Takoradi in the Western Region. The seaports of Tema and Takoradi, as well as the Kotoka International Airport in Accra and all the lands related to these areas, are part of the Free Zone. The law also permits the establishment of single factory zones outside or within the areas mentioned above. Under the law, a company qualifies to be a Free Zone company if it exports more than 70 percent of its products. Among the incentives for Free Zone companies are a ten-year corporate tax holiday and zero import duty. To make it easier for Free Zone developers to acquire the various licenses and permits to operate, the Ghana Free Zones Authority ( www.gfzb.gov.gh ) provides a “one-stop approval service” to assist in the completion of all formalities. A lack of resources has limited the effectiveness of the Authority. Foreign employees of Free Zone businesses require work and residence permits. In most sectors, Ghana does not have performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, and expanding a business. Investors are not required to purchase from local sources or employ prescribed levels of local content, except in the mining sector, the upstream petroleum sector, and the power sector, which are subject to substantial local content requirements. Similar legislation is being drafted for the downstream petroleum sector, and a National Local Content Policy is being debated by Cabinet that may extend to a broad array of sectors of the economy, but there is no clear timeline for its approval. Generally, investors are not required to export a specified percentage of their output, except for Free Zone enterprises which, in accordance with the Free Zone Act, must export at least 70 percent of their products. Government officials have intimated that local content requirements should be applied to sectors other than petroleum, power, and mining, but no local content regulations have been promulgated for other sectors. As detailed earlier in this report, there are a few areas where the GOG does impose performance requirements, including the mining, oil and gas, insurance, and telecommunications sectors. 5. Protection of Property Rights The legal system recognizes and enforces secured interest in property. However, the process to get clear title over land is difficult, complicated, and lengthy. It is important to conduct a thorough search at the Lands Commission to ascertain the identity of the true owner of any land being offered for sale. Investors should be aware that land records can be incomplete or non-existent and, therefore, clear title may be impossible to establish. Ghana passed a new land law, Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036), which revised, harmonized, and consolidated laws on land to ensure sustainable land administration and management. The new law makes it possible to transfer and create or register interests in land by electronic means to speed up conveyancing, supports decentralized land service delivery, and includes provisions relating to property rights of spouses by ensuring that spouses are deemed to be party to the interest in land that is jointly acquired during the marriage. These changes are expected to improve accessibility and secured tenure. Mortgages exist, although there are only a few thousand due to factors such as land ownership issues and scarcity of long-term finance. Mortgages are regulated by the Home Mortgages Finance Act, 2008 (Act 770), which has enhanced the process of foreclosure. A mortgage must be registered under the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036), for it to take effect. Registration with the Land Title Registry is a reliable system of recording the transaction. The protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is an evolving area of law in Ghana. There has been progress in recent years to afford protection under both local and international law. Ghana is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PTC), the Singapore Trademark Law Treaty (STLT), and the Madrid Protocol Concerning the International Registration of Marks. Ghana is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the English-speaking African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2004, Ghana’s Parliament ratified the WIPO internet treaties, namely the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty. Ghana also amended six IPR laws to comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), including: copyrights, trademarks, patents, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, geographical indications, and industrial designs. Except for the copyright law, implementing regulations necessary for fully effective promulgation have not been passed. The Government of Ghana launched a National Intellectual Property Policy and Strategy in January 2016, which aimed to strengthen the legal framework for protection, administration, and enforcement of IPR and promote innovation and awareness, although progress on implementation stalled. Enforcement remains weak, and piracy of intellectual property continues. Although precise statistics are not available for many sectors, counterfeit computer software is regularly available at street markets, and counterfeit pharmaceuticals have found their way into public hospitals. Counterfeit products have also been discovered in such disparate sectors as industrial epoxy, cosmetics, drinking spirits, and household cleaning products. Based on cases where it has been possible to trace the origin of counterfeit goods, most have been found to have been produced outside the region, usually in Asia. IPR holders have access to local courts for redress of grievances, although the few trademark, patent, and copyright infringement cases that U.S. companies have filed in Ghana have reportedly moved through the legal system slowly. Ghana is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. Please contact the following at Mission Ghana if you have further questions regarding IPR issues: U.S. Embassy, Economic Section No. 24 Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Tel: +233(0) 302 741 000 (Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad) Email: AccraICS@state.gov The United States Embassy in Accra maintains a list of local attorneys, which is available through the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service ( https://www.trade.gov/ghana-contact-us) or U.S. Citizen Services ( https://gh.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/). American Chamber of Commerce Ghana No. 10 Mensah Wood Avenue, East Legon, Accra.P.O. Box CT2869, Cantonments-Accra, Ghana Tel: +233 (0) 302 247 562/ +233 (0) 307 011 862 (Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad) Email: info@amchamghana.org Website: http://www.amchamghana.org/. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Private sector growth in Ghana is constrained by financing challenges. Businesses continue to face difficulty raising capital on the local market. While credit to the private sector has increased in nominal terms, levels as percentage of GDP have remained stagnant over the last decade, and high government borrowing has brought interest rates above 20 percent and crowded out private investment. Capital markets and portfolio investment are gradually evolving. The longest-term domestic bonds are 20 years, with Eurobonds ranging up to 41-year maturities. Foreign investors are permitted to participate in auctions of bonds only with maturities of two years or longer. In January 2022, foreign investors held about 16.6 percent (valued at USD 5 billion) of the total outstanding domestic securities. In 2015, the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) added the Ghana Fixed-Income Market (GFIM) – https://gfim.com.gh/, a specialized platform for secondary trading in debt instruments to improve liquidity. The rapid accumulation of debt over the last decade, and particularly the past three years, has raised debt sustainability concerns. Ghana received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in 2004, and began issuing Eurobonds in 2007. In February 2020, Ghana sold sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-ever Eurobond as part of a $3 billion deal with a tenor of 41 years. At the end of December 2021, total public debt, roughly evenly split between external and domestic, stood at 80 percent of GDP, according to the Bank of Ghana, partly as a result of the economic shock of COVID-19 as revenue declined and expenditures spiked. The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) has 36 listed companies. Both foreign and local companies are allowed to list on the GSE. The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates activities on the Exchange. There is an eight percent tax on dividend income. Foreigners are permitted to trade stocks listed on the GSE without restriction. There are no capital controls on the flow of retained earnings, capital gains, dividends, or interest payments. The GSE composite index (GGSECI) has exhibited mixed performance. Banks in Ghana are relatively small, with the largest in the country in terms of operating assets, Ecobank Ghana Ltd., holding assets of about USD 2.3 billion in 2020. The Central Bank’s minimum capital requirement for commercial banks is 400 million (USD 57 million), effective December 2018. As a result of the reforms and subsequent closures and mergers of some banks from 2017 to 2019, the number of commercial banks dropped from 36 to 23. Eight are domestically controlled, and the remaining 15 are foreign controlled. In total, there are over 1,500 branches distributed across the sixteen regions of the country. Overall, the banking industry in Ghana is well capitalized with a capital adequacy ratio of 19.6 percent as of December 2021, above the 11.5 percent prudential and statutory requirement. The non-performing loans ratio increased from 14.8 percent in December 2020 to 15.2 percent as of December 2021. Lending in foreign currencies to unhedged borrowers poses a risk, and widely varying standards in loan classification and provisioning may be masking weaknesses in bank balance sheets. The BoG has almost completed actions to address weaknesses in the non-bank deposit-taking institutions sector (e.g., microfinance, savings and loan, and rural banks) and has also issued new guidelines to strengthen corporate governance regulations in the banks. Recent developments in the non-banking financial sector indicate increased diversification, including new rules and regulations governing the trading of Exchange Traded Funds. Non-banking financial institutions such as leasing companies, building societies, and village savings and loan associations have increased access to finance for underserved populations, as have rural and mobile banking. Currently, Ghana has no “cross-shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions, although, as noted above, the Payments Systems and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987), does require a 30 percent Ghanaian company or Ghanaian holding by any electronic payments service provider, including banks or special deposit-taking institutions. Ghana’s main sovereign wealth fund is the Ghana Petroleum Fund (GPF), which is funded by oil profits and flows to the Ghana Heritage Fund and Ghana Stabilization Fund. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815), spells out how revenues from oil and gas should be spent and includes transparency provisions for reporting by government agencies, as well as an independent oversight group, the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). Section 48 of the PRMA requires the Fund to publish an audited annual report by the Ghana Audit Service. The Fund’s management meets the legal obligations. Management of the Ghana Petroleum Fund is a joint responsibility between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana. The minister develops the investment policy for the GPF, and is responsible for the overall management of GPF funds, consults regularly with the Investment Advisory Committee and Bank of Ghana Governor before making any decisions related to investment strategy or management of GPF funds. The minister is also in charge of establishing a management agreement with the Bank of Ghana for the oversight of the funds. The Bank of Ghana is responsible for the day-to-day operational management of the Petroleum Reserve Accounts (PRAs) under the terms of Operation Management Agreement. For additional information regarding Ghana Petroleum Fund, please visit the 2020 Petroleum Annual Report at: https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/petroleum/2020-Annual-Petroleum-Report.pdf . 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ghana has 94 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 51 of which are wholly owned, while 43 are partially owned. While the president appoints the CEO and full boards of most of the wholly owned SOEs, they are under the supervision of line ministries. Most of the partially owned investments are in the financial, mining, and oil and gas sectors. To improve the efficiency of SOEs and reduce fiscal risks they pose to the budget, in 2019 the government embarked on an exercise to tackle weak corporate governance in the SOEs as well as created the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), a single institution, to monitor all SOEs, replacing both the State Enterprises Commission and the Divestiture Implementation Committee. As of December 2021, only a handful of large SOEs remain, mainly in the transportation, water, banking, power, and extractive sectors. The largest SOEs are Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority (GPHA), Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Ghana National Gas Company Limited (GNGC), Ghana Airport Company Limited (GACL), Consolidated Bank Ghana Limited (CBG), Bui Power Authority (BPA), and Ghana Grid Company Limited (GRIDCo). Many of these receive subsidies and assistance from the government. The list of SOEs can be found at: https://siga.gov.gh/state-interest/ . While the Government of Ghana does not actively promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines, SIGA oversees corporate governance of SOEs and encourages them to be managed like Limited Liability Companies to be profit making. In addition, beginning in 2014, most SOEs were required to contract and service direct and government-guaranteed loans on their own balance sheet. The government’s goal is to stop adding these loans to “pure public” debt, paid by taxpayers directly through the budget. Ghana has no formal privatization program. The government has announced its intention, however, to prioritize the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to restructure and privatize non-performing SOEs, although progress to implement this goal has been slow. Procuring PPPs is allowed under the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana, which was adopted in June 2011. The Public Private Partnership Act, 2020 (Act 1039) was passed in December 2020. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is no specific responsible business conduct (RBC) law in Ghana, and the government has no action plan regarding OECD RBC guidelines. Ghana has been a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative since 2010. The government also enrolled in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in 2014. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining more attention among Ghanaian companies. The Ghana Club 100 is a ranking of the top performing companies, as determined by GIPC. It is based on several criteria, with a 10 percent weight assigned to corporate social responsibility, including philanthropy. Companies have noted that Ghanaian consumers are not generally interested in the CSR activities of private companies, with the exception of the extractive industries (whose CSR efforts seem to attract consumer, government, and media attention). In particular, there is a widespread expectation that extractive sector companies will involve themselves in substantial philanthropic activities in the communities in which they have operations. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Ghana’s national climate strategy is contained in the Ghana National Climate Change Policy published in 2013 and Ghana’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The revised NDCs, submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in September 2021, outline Ghana’s strategies in various sectors regarding climate change. To reduce its carbon footprint and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), Ghana aims to reduce carbon emissions by 64 MtCO2e through the adoption of 47 climate actions across 19 policy areas. Although Ghana has not officially announced a policy to reach net-zero emission by 2050, policies are being designed to reduce energy and CO2 intensity driven by the transition to renewable and low-carbon energy sources. In December 2021, the government established the .National Energy Transition Committee to prescribe risk mitigation measures towards environmental sustainability. Policies introduced to reduce carbon emissions include the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Promotion Policy, the Renewable Energy Master Plan, and improved charcoal stove distribution. Ghana has set a target of increasing the share of renewable energy (including hydropower capacity up to 100 MW) from 42.5 MW in 2015 to 1363.63 MW by 2030. The government, however, does not include environmental and green growth considerations in public procurement policies for businesses aimed at preserving biodiversity, clean air, and other ecological benefits. Corruption in Ghana is comparatively less prevalent than in most other countries in the region, according to Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index, but remains a serious problem, with Ghana scoring 45 on a scale of 100 and ranking 73 out of 180 countries in 2020. The government has a relatively strong anti-corruption legal framework in place, but enforcement of existing laws is rare and inconsistent. Corruption in government institutions is pervasive. The Government of Ghana has vowed to combat corruption and has taken some steps to promote better transparency and accountability. These include establishing an Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) in 2017 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases and passing a Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989) (similar to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act) to increase transparency. The President named a new Special Prosecutor in 2021 but the OSP still has not prosecuted a significant anti-corruption case. The Auditor-General, was appointed in an acting capacity in 2021 and was confirmed as the substantive Auditor-General in September 2021. Businesses have noted that bribery is most pervasive in the judicial system and across public services. Companies report that bribes are often exchanged in return for favorable judicial decisions. Large corruption cases are prosecuted, but proceedings are lengthy and convictions are slow. A 2015 exposé captured video of judges and other judicial officials extorting bribes from litigants to manipulate the justice system. Thirty-four judges were implicated, and 25 were dismissed following the revelations, though none have been criminally prosecuted. The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 914) was passed to address the shortcomings identified over a decade of implementation of the original 2003 law aimed at harmonizing the many public procurement guidelines used in the country and to bring public procurement into conformity with WTO standards. (Note: Ghana is a not a party to the plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement). Nevertheless, complete transparency is lacking in locally funded contracts. There continue to be allegations of corruption in the tender process, and the government has in the past set aside international tender awards in the name of alleged national interest. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) provided for stiffer sanctions and penalties for breaches, but its effectiveness in stemming corruption has yet to be demonstrated. In 2016, Ghana amended the company registration law (which has been retained in the new Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992)) to include the disclosure of beneficial owners. In September 2020, Ghana deployed a Central Beneficial Ownership Register to collect and maintain a national database on beneficial owners for all companies operating in Ghana. The law requires each person who creates a company in Ghana to report the identities of the company’s beneficial owners on the Beneficial Ownership Declaration form at the Registrar-General’s Department (RGD). There are different thresholds for reporting beneficial owners, depending on the sector the company belongs to and who the beneficial owner is. For the general threshold, a person who has direct or indirect interest of 10 percent or more in a company must be registered as a beneficial owner. A Politically Exposed Person (PEP) in Ghana who has any shares or any form of control over a company in any sector must be registered as a beneficial owner, while for a foreign PEP, shares must be five percent or more. For companies in the extractive industry, financial institutions, and businesses operating in sectors listed as high risk by the RGD, the threshold for reporting beneficial owners is five percent. Failure to comply with the requirements may attract a fine of up to 6,000 cedis (USD 856) or two years in prison, or both. The 1992 Constitution established the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). Among other things, CHRAJ is charged with investigating alleged and suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public funds by officials. CHRAJ is also authorized to take appropriate steps, including providing reports to the Attorney General and the Auditor-General in response to such investigations. The effectiveness of CHRAJ, however, is hampered by a lack of resources, as it conducts few investigations leading to prosecutions. CHRAJ issued guidelines on conflict of interest to public sector workers in 2006 and issued a new Code of Conduct for Public Officers in Ghana with guidelines on conflicts of interest in 2009. CHRAJ also developed a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan that Parliament approved in July 2014, but many of its provisions have not been implemented due to lack of resources. In November 2015, then-President John Mahama fired the CHRAJ Commissioner after she was investigated for misappropriating public funds. In 1998, the Government of Ghana also established an anti-corruption institution, called the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), to investigate corrupt practices involving both private and public institutions. The SFO’s name became the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) in 2010, and its functions were expanded to include crimes such as money laundering and other organized crimes. EOCO is empowered to initiate prosecutions and to recover proceeds from criminal activities. The government passed a “Whistle Blower” law in July 2006, intended to encourage Ghanaian citizens to volunteer information on corrupt practices to appropriate government agencies. Like most other African countries, Ghana is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The most common commercial fraud scams are procurement offers tied to alleged Ghanaian government or, more frequently, ECOWAS programs. U.S. companies frequently report being contacted by an unknown Ghanaian firm claiming to be an authorized agent of an official government procurement agency. Foreign firms that express an interest in being included in potential procurements are lured into paying a series of fees to have their companies registered or products qualified for sale in Ghana or the West Africa region. U.S. companies receiving offers from West Africa from unknown sources should contact the U.S. Commercial Service in Ghana ( Ghana (trade.gov) ), use extreme caution, and conduct significant due diligence prior to pursuing these offers. American firms can request background checks on companies with whom they wish to do business by purchasing the U.S. Commercial Service’s International Company Profile (ICP). Office of the Special Prosecutor 6 Haile Selassie Avenue South Ridge, Accra, Ghana GA-079-096 Telephone: 233 (302) 668 517; 233 (302) 668 506 corruptionreports@osp.gov.gh; info@osp.gov.gh www.osp.gov.gh The Commissioner Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) Old Parliament House, High Street, Accra Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad: +233 (0) 242 211 53 info@chraj.gov.gh http://www.chraj.gov.gh The Executive Director Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) Behind Old Parliament House, High Street, Accra Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad: +233 (0) 302 665559, +233 (0) 302 634 363 eoco@eoco.gov.gh www.eoco.gov.gh George Amoh An Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) Ghana – Transparency International Abelenkpe Rd Accra, Accra Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad: +233 (0)302 760 884 alacghana@yahoo.com https://www.transparency.org/en/report-corruption/ghana Ghana offers a relatively stable and predictable political environment for American investors when compared to the broader region and has a solid democratic tradition. In December 2020, Ghana completed its eighth consecutive peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections and transfer of power since 1992, with power transferred between the two main political parties three times during that period. On December 7, 2020 New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate (and incumbent) Nana Akufo-Addo was re-elected over the National Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate, former President John Mahama. The NDC disputed the 2020 presidential election result. The Supreme Court heard the case and ruled that Akufo-Addo had, indeed, won the election. There were isolated cases of violence during the election but no widespread civil disturbances. The next general elections are scheduled for December 7, 2024. Ghana has a large pool of unskilled labor. English is widely spoken, especially in urban areas. However, according to the Ghana Statistical Service, nationwide illiteracy remains high at 30 percent in 2021. While the unemployment rate was 13.4 percent in 2021, 32.8 percent of Ghanaians aged 15 to 24 were unemployed. About 77 percent of Ghana’s employed population are in the informal sector and contributed about a quarter of its GDP in 2020. Labor regulations and policies are generally favorable to business. Although labor-management relationships are generally positive, occasional labor disagreements stem from wage policies in Ghana’s inflationary environment. Many employers find it advantageous to maintain open lines of communication on wage calculations and incentive packages. A revised Labor Act of 2003 (Act 651) unified and modified the old labor laws to bring them into conformity with the core principles of the International Labor Convention, to which Ghana is a signatory. Under the Labor Act, the Chief Labor Officer both registers trade unions and approves applications by unions for a collective bargaining certificate. A collective bargaining certificate entitles the union to negotiate on behalf of a class of workers. The Labor Act also created a National Labor Commission to resolve labor and industrial disputes, and a National Tripartite Committee to set the national daily minimum wage and provide policy guidance on employment and labor market issues. The National Tripartite Committee includes representatives from government, employers’ organizations, and organized labor. The Labor Act sets the maximum hours of work at eight hours per day or 40 hours per week but makes provision for overtime and rest periods. Some categories of workers, including trades workers and domestic workers, are excluded from the eight hours per day or 40 hours per week maximum. The Labor Act prohibits the “unfair termination” of workers for specific reasons outlined in the law, including participation in union activities; pregnancy; or based on a protected class, such as gender, race, color, ethnicity, origin, religion, creed, social, political or economic status, or disability. The Labor Act also provides procedures companies are required to follow when laying off staff, including under certain situations providing severance pay, known locally as “redundancy pay.” Disputes over redundancy pay can be referred to the National Labor Commission. The Act’s provisions regarding fair and unfair termination of employment do not apply to some classes of contract, probationary, and casual workers. There is no legal requirement for labor participation in management. However, many businesses utilize joint consultative committees in which management and employees meet to discuss issues affecting business productivity and labor issues. There are no statutory requirements for profit sharing, but fringe benefits in the form of year-end bonuses and retirement benefits are generally included in collective bargaining agreements. Child labor remains a problem. Child labor is particularly severe in agriculture, including in cocoa and fishing. In general, worker protection provisions in the Labor Act, including health and safety provisions, are weakly enforced. Post recommends consulting a local attorney for detailed advice regarding labor issues. The U.S. Embassy in Accra maintains a list of local attorneys, which is available through the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service (https://www.trade.gov/ghana) or U.S. Citizen Services ( https://gh.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/). Ghana signed an agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC), the predecessor agency to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). DFC is active in Ghana, providing financing and insurance for a number of projects – particularly in the energy, housing, agriculture, and health sectors. All OPIC activities have been assumed by the DFC. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), African Project Development Facility (APDF), African Trade Insurance Agency, and the African investment program of the International Finance Corporation are other sources of information. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $68,519 2020 $68,532 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $429 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $2 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 61% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Ghana Statistical Service Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2019) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 13,594 100% Total Outward N/A N/A United Kingdom 3,682 27% N/A N/A N/A France 2,440 18% N/A N/A N/A Belgium 2,244 17% N/A N/A N/A British Virgin Islands 1,288 9% N/A N/A N/A South Africa 950 7% N/A N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. U.S. Embassy, Economic Section No. 24 Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Tel: +233 (0) 302 741 000 (Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad) Email: AccraICS@state.gov Greece Executive Summary The Greek economy has proven resilient in recent years as it continues to rebound from the 2007 economic crisis – including the rigid fiscal constraints demanded by creditors — and the global COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2020, COVID-19 held the potential to permanently scar an economy that still suffered from legacy issues, including high debt and non-performing loans, limited credit growth, near zero capacity for fiscal expansion, and a hollowed-out healthcare system. While continuing its aggressive reform agenda, the Mitsotakis government rose to meet the pandemic challenge, as European institutions effectively welcomed Greek debt back into the eurosystem, the IMF and EU evaluated the country’s public debt as sustainable, Moody’s upgraded Greek sovereign debt, the country began borrowing at historically low cost, and strategic investors returned, favorably considering Greece’s current and long-term value proposition. Meanwhile, over the past several years, our bilateral relationship has deepened significantly via our defense and strategic partnerships, and Greece ambitiously seeks now to bring our economic ties to similar, historic heights. Far from being the problem child of Europe or the international financial system, Greece is increasingly a source of solutions – not just in the fields of energy diplomacy and defense, but in high-tech innovation, healthcare, and green energy, improving prospects for solid economic growth and stability here and in the wider region. The Mitsotakis government was elected in July 2019 on an aggressive investment and economic reform agenda which has plowed forward despite the pandemic. During its first nine months in power, Mitostakis’s team pushed market-friendly reforms and Parliament voted through dozens of economic-related bills, including a key investment law in October 2019, designed to cut red tape, help achieve full employment, and adopt best international practices – including by digitizing government services. GDP growth reached 8.3 percent in 2021, a major leap forward following the detrimental effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Greece maintains a liquidity buffer, estimated at €30 billion, but is intent on boosting its coffers as the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic is larger than expected. So far untouched, the buffer should be sufficient to cover the country’s financing needs until at least the end of 2022, and the country’s leadership maintains its intention to reserve the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) tranche solely for sovereign debt interest payments. While capital controls were completely lifted in September 2019, Greece remains subject to enhanced supervision by Eurozone creditors. However, the European Commission’s (EC) latest positive assessment on the Greek economy, will – most likely – pave the way for the end of the country’s enhanced surveillance status in Q3 2022. Greece’s banking system, despite three recapitalizations as part of the August 2015 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) agreement, remains saddled with the largest ratio of non-performing loans in the EU, which constrains the domestic financial sector’s ability to finance the national economy. As a result, businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises, still struggle to obtain domestic financing to support operations due to inflated risk premiums in the sector. To tackle the issue, and as a requirement of the agreement with the ESM, Greece has established a secondary market for its non-performing loans (NPLs). According to the Bank of Greece, non-performing loans (NPLs) came, on a solo basis, to €58.7 billion at end-September 2020, down by €9.8 billion from December 2019 and by €48.5 billion from their March 2016 peak. The NPL-to-total loan ratio remained high in September 2020 at 35.8 percent. The high percentage of performing loans benefited from moratoria until December 31, 2020, and contained the inflow of new NPLs. Non-performing private debt remains high, irrespective of the reduction in NPLs on bank balance sheets via transfer to non-bank entities. 2020 saw substantial reforms aimed at resolving the issue of NPLs. These involved the securitization of NPLs through the activation of the “Hercules” scheme and the enactment of Law No. 4738/2020 which improves several aspects of insolvency law. Nevertheless, NPLs will remain high, and considering that there will be a new inflow of NPLs due to the pandemic, other solutions complementary to the “Hercules” scheme should be implemented. In addition to sales of securitized loan packages, banks have exploited other ways to manage bad loans. For example, nearly all of Greece’s systemic banks employ loan servicing firms to manage non-performing exposure. Greece’s secondary market for NPL servicers now includes 24 companies including: Sepal (an Alpha Bank-Aktua joint venture), FPS (a Eurobank subsidiary), Pillarstone, Independent Portfolio Management, B2Kapital, UCI Hellas, Resolute Asset Management, Thea Artemis, PQH, Qquant Master Servicer, and DV01 Asset Management. Greece’s return to economic growth has generated new investor interest in the country. Pfizer, Cisco, Deloitte, and Microsoft, to name a few, have all announced major investments in the past few years, due in part to improved protection of intellectual property rights and Greece’s delisting from the U.S. Trade Representatives Special 301 Watch List in 2020. In March 2021, Greece successfully raised €2.5 billion from its first 30-year bond sale in more than a decade, with the issue more than 10 times oversubscribed. The bond, which has so far received investor demand of more than €26.1 billion, will price at 150 basis points over the mid-swap level, resulting in a yield of 1.93 percent. In January 2022, Fitch Ratings Agency maintained Greece’s credit rating at BB and noted the country’s outlook as ‘stable’ due to the financial impact of COVID-19. On April 1, 2021, Moody’s improved its outlook of the Greek banking system from “stable” to “positive.”Standard & Poor’s affirmed its credit rating for Greece at BB-in October 2020 and also kept its outlook to “stable.” The European Central Bank (ECB) included Greek government bonds in its quantitative easing program, with €12 billion worth of Greek government debt earmarked for purchase under the ECB’s €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program in 2020. In February 2022, Greece has received the Eurogroup’s approval to repay the final tranches of bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) early, along with a small part of bilateral loans from its eurozone partners. Greece plans to repay loans worth €1.9 billion to the IMF by March, two years ahead of schedule. The Greek government was given strong marks for its initial response in limiting the spread of the pandemic and has implemented several innovative digital reforms to its economy during COVID-19. The Greek economy contracted by 10 percent in 2020 with a gross domestic product (GDP) of €189 billion but its GDP rose to €211 billion in 2021. This was largely attributed to the successful 2021tourism season, which brought in €10 billion to the Greek economy. The unemployment rate was 15.8 percent in 2021, a slight increase from 15.5 percent in 2020. In response to the pandemic, Greece’s recovery and resilience plan was among the first plans that were formally approved by the European Council, in July 2021. Greece received €4 billion of the disbursement in August. The plan will disburse €17.8 billion in grants and €12.7 billion in loans over the course of five years. Greece has earmarked funding for many climate-relevant investments and digitalization efforts. Greece was also the first Member State to finalize its Partnership Agreement for the 2021-2027 programming period. The Partnership Agreement outlines the plan for deploying of more than €21 billion worth of investments to support Greece’s economic, social and territorial cohesion. The Greek government also took measures to support businesses throughout the pandemic in 2021. In February 2021, the government approved a €500 million scheme to support small and medium-sized businesses affected by the pandemic. The state aid Temporary Framework was open to small and medium-sized enterprises active in all sectors except financial, primary agriculture, tobacco, and fisheries sectors. This public support, in the form of direct grants, sought to provide sufficient working capital for businesses affected by the pandemic. In May 2021, the European Commission approved a €793 million support measure for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises affected by the coronavirus outbreak in the form of direct grants, which is open to companies active in all sectors except the financial one. The aid aims to provide liquidity support to qualifying beneficiaries, to safeguard businesses against the risk of default, allowing them to preserve their economic activity and helping them recover after the pandemic. Rounding out 2021, the Greek government enacted a €665 million scheme in November 2021 to support households affected by the pandemic. The scheme was adopted to assist households at risk of losing their primary residence by defaulting on their mortgage loans. On 3 November 2021, the European Commission approved modifications to ensure the extension of the loan period and a reduction of the maximum aid amount per beneficiary. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/country/GRC Global Innovation Index 2021 47 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $74 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=310 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $17,930 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Greek government continues to take steps to increase foreign investment, implementing economic reforms and taking steps to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. Greece completed its EU bailout program in 2018, allowing it to borrow once again at market rates, reflected in a rising economic sentiment since 2017. Heavy bureaucracy and a slow judicial system continue to create challenges for both foreign and domestic investors. There are no laws or practices known to Post that discriminate against foreign investors. The country has investment promotion agencies to facilitate foreign investments, with “Enterprise Greece” as the official agency of the Greek state. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Enterprise Greece is responsible for promoting investment in Greece and exports from Greece, and with making Greece more attractive as an international business partner. Enterprise Greece provides the full spectrum of services related to international business relationships and domestic business development for the international market, including an Investor Ombudsman program for investment projects exceeding €2 million. The Ombudsman is available to assist with specific bureaucratic obstacles, delays, disputes, or other difficulties that impede an investment project. However, Enterprise Greece, even with its ombudsman service, is not very effective at moving investment projects forward. The General Secretariat for Strategic and Private Investments streamlines the licensing procedure for strategic investments, aiming to make the process easier and more attractive to investors. Greece has adopted the following EU definitions regarding micro, small, and medium size enterprises: Micro Enterprises: Fewer than 10 employees and an annual turnover or balance sheet below €2 million. Small Enterprises: Fewer than 50 employees and an annual turnover or balance sheet below €10 million. Medium-Sized Enterprises: Fewer than 250 employees and annual turnover below €50 million or balance sheet below €43 million. Numerous structural reforms, undertaken as part of the country’s 2015-2018 international bailout program as well as a part of the current New Democracy administration’s efforts to lower taxes and reduce bureaucracy, aim to welcome and facilitate foreign investment, and the government has publicly messaged its dedication to attracting foreign investment.The 2019 investment law simplified licensing procedures in order to facilitate investment. In December 2020, parliament passed a new law allowing non-residents who relocate their jobs to Greece to benefit from half their salary being free of income tax for up to seven years. The scheme is open to any type of job, any income level and complements other tax incentive schemes put in place, including a non-dom program for wealthy investors and a low flat tax rate for pensioners. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is another example of the government’s commitment in this area. In November 2015, the Greek government and TAP investors agreed on measures and began construction on the largest investment project since the start of the financial crisis. The pipeline began operations in December 2020 and in March 2021, TAP announced that a total of 1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from Azerbaijan entered Europe via the Greek interconnection point of Kipoi. Law 4710/2020 gave a strong push for electro-mobility, with several incentives and subsidies to those interested in acquiring an electric vehicle. The law has paved the way for greater U.S. investment. For example, Tesla has installed the first pop-up stand along with three electric vehicle (EV) charges at a major Greek shopping mall, while Blink expanded its EV network in Greece. Additionally, there are directives that have eased the bureaucracy surrounding renewable energy source (RES) projects, including establishing a deadline for the issuance of Environmental Terms Approvals (ETAs) of 120 days and limiting the environmental licensing stages to three stages instead of the previous six or seven stages required for companies to abide by. In the past decade, the country underwent one of the most significant fiscal consolidations in modern history, with broad and deep cuts to public expenditures and significant increases in labor and social security tax rates, which have offset improved labor market competitiveness achieved through significant wage devaluation. While there has been notable progress, corruption and burdensome bureaucracy continue to create barriers to market entry for new firms, permitting incumbents to maintain oligopolies in different sectors, and creating scope for arbitrary decisions and rent seeking by public servants. As a member of the EU and the European Monetary Union (the “Eurozone”), Greece is required to meet EU and eurozone investment regulations. Foreign and domestic private entities have the legal right to establish and own businesses in Greece; however, the country places restrictions on foreign equity ownership higher than those imposed on average in the other 17 high-income OECD economies, such as equity restrictions on airport operations and limits on foreign ownership in electricity and media. The government has undertaken EU-mandated reforms in its energy sector, opening much of it to foreign equity ownership. Restrictions exist on land purchases in border regions and on certain islands because of national security considerations. Foreign investors can buy or sell shares on the Athens Stock Exchange on the same basis as local investors. Greece does not maintain an investment screening mechanism. However, the Greek Government is currently working on the legislation for the development of an FDI screening mechanism. The plan is to finalize the text in mid-2022 and then present it to the European Commission. The government has not undergone an investment policy review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or worked with any other international institution to produce a public report on the general investment climate in the past three years. However, in July 2020, the OECD published a periodic economic survey describing the state of the economy and addressing foreign direct investment concerns, especially regarding needed reforms in the public sector and judicial system.In particular, the OECD report lauds the Ministry of Digital Governance’s progress in instituting digital and public administration reforms and recommends continued effort in this area. To date, the OECD has not published an economic survey for 2021, however, the economic forecast summary for Greece was published in December 2021. Although Greece has many civil society organizations (CSOs), no CSO has raised concerns related to investment policies introduced by the government of Greece. In 2020, Greece eased processes for starting a business by reducing the time to register a company and removing the requirement to obtain a tax clearance. Accessing industrial land in Greece is relatively quick, with only three weeks required to lease land from the government. Private land can be leased within 15 days. Arbitrating commercial disputes, however, can take almost a year. Establishing a limited liability company takes approximately four days with three procedures involved, including registering the business, making a company seal, and registering with the Unified Social Security Institution. Greece’s Ease of Doing Business score in 2020 is 96, for a rank of 11 for starting a business and rank of 79 overall. Greece is now one of the 37 countries listed on www.businessfacilitation.org. Greece’s business registration entity GEMI (General Commercial Register) has the basic responsibility for digitizing and automating the registration and monitoring procedures of commercial enterprises. The online business registration process is relatively clear, and although foreign companies can use it, the registration steps are currently available only in Greek. In general, a company must register with the business chamber, tax registry, social security, and local municipality. Business creation without a notary can be done for specific cases (small/personal businesses, etc.). For the establishment of larger companies, a notary is mandatory. The Greek government does not have any known outward investment incentive programs. Capital controls were eliminated in September 2019. Enterprise Greece supports the international expansion of Greek companies. While no incentives are offered, Enterprise Greece has been supportive of Greek companies attending the U.S. Government’s Annual SelectUSA Investment Summit, which promotes inbound investment to the United States, and similar industry trade events internationally. 3. Legal Regime As an EU member, Greece is required to have transparent policies and laws for fostering competition. Foreign companies consider the complexity of government regulations and procedures and their inconsistent implementation to be a significant impediment to investing and operating in Greece. Occasionally, foreign companies report cases where there are multiple laws governing the same issue, resulting in confusion over which law is applicable. Under its bailout programs, the Greek government committed to widespread reforms to simplify the legal framework for investment, including eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, redundancies, and undue regulations. The fast-track law, passed in December 2010, aimed to simplify the licensing and approval process for “strategic” investments, i.e. large-scale investments that will have a significant impact on the national economy. In 2013, Greece’s parliament passed Investment Law 4146/2013 to simplify the regulatory system and stimulate investment. This law provides additional incentives, beyond those in the fast-track law, available to domestic and foreign investors, dependent on the sector and the location of the investment. In February 2021, the EU introduced new trade enforcement regulations which apply to all member-states, including new policy countermeasures to services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR). Former trade enforcement regulations only permitted countermeasures in goods. The following enforcement mechanisms have been enacted at the EU-level: the appointment of a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer; the creation of a new Directorate in DG Trade for enforcement, market access and SMEs; and the establishment under Access2Markets of a single-entry point for complaints from EU stakeholders and businesses on trade barriers on foreign markets and violations of sustainable trade commitments in EU trade agreements. Additionally, the European Commission has also committed to developing the EU’s anti-coercion mechanism, with the goal to deter countries from restricting or threatening to restrict trade or investment. Greece’s tax regime lacked stability during the economic crisis, presenting additional obstacles to investment, both foreign and domestic. Foreign firms are not subject to discrimination in taxation. Numerous changes to tax laws and regulations since the beginning of the economic crisis injected uncertainty into Greece’s tax regime. As part of Greece’s August 2015 bailout agreement, the government converted the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate-General for Public Revenue into a fully independent tax agency effective January 2017, with a broad mandate to increase collection and develop further reforms to the tax code aimed at reducing evasion and increasing the coverage of the Greek tax regime. The government makes continued efforts to combat tax evasion by increasing inspections and crosschecks among various authorities and by using more sophisticated methods to find undeclared income. Authorities held monthly lotteries offering taxpayers rewards of €1,000 ($1,200) for using credit or debit cards, which are considered more financially transparent, in their daily transactions. Foreign investment is not legally prohibited or otherwise restricted. Proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment before Parliament takes up consideration of the legislation. The laws in force are accessible on a unified website managed by the government and printed in an official gazette. Greece introduced International Financial Reporting Standards for listed companies in 2005 in accordance with EU directives. These rules improved the transparency and accountability of publicly traded companies. Citizens of other EU member state countries may work freely in Greece. Citizens of non-EU countries may work in Greece after receiving residence and work permits. There are no discriminatory or preferential export/import policies affecting foreign investors, as EU regulations govern import and export policy, and increasingly, many other aspects of investment policy in Greece. Greece has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1, 1995, and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since March 1, 1950. Greece complies with WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) requirements. There are no performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. Performance requirements may come into play, however, when an investor wants to take advantage of certain investment incentives offered by the government. Greece has not enacted measures that are inconsistent with TRIMs requirements, and the Embassy is not aware of any measures alleged to violate Greece’s WTO TRIMs obligations. Trade policy falls within the competence and jurisdiction of the European Commission Directorate General for Trade and is generally not subject to regulation by member state national authorities. Although Greece has an independent judiciary, the court system is an extremely time-consuming and unwieldy means for enforcing property and contractual rights. According to the “Enforcing Contracts Indicator” of the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2020” survey, Greece ranks 146 among 190 countries in terms of the speed of delivery of justice, requiring 1,711 days (more than four years) on average to resolve a dispute, compared to the OECD high-income countries’ average of 589.6 days. The government committed, as part of its three bailout packages, to reforms intended to expedite the processing of commercial cases through the court system. In July 2015, the government adopted significant reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure (Law 4335/2015). These reforms aimed to accelerate judicial proceedings in support of contract enforcement and investment climate stability and entered into force in January 2016. Foreign companies report, however, that Greek courts do not consistently provide fast and effective recourse. Problems with judicial corruption reportedly still exist. Commercial and contractual laws accord with international norms, and the judicial system remains independent of the executive branch. In 2019 and 2020, Parliament passed several investment-related laws. In December 2020, Parliament passed Law 4758/2020, which introduced amendments in the current tax legislation regarding special taxation of employment services and business activity income arising in Greece, earned by individuals who transfer their tax residence in Greece. In October 2019, Parliament passed an economic development bill, Law 4635/2019, aimed at boosting economic recovery in the post-bailout era which entered into force in January 2020. The bill, called “Invest in Greece and other provisions,” simplifies processes for investors regarding environmental and urban planning regulations, speeding up bureaucratic processes. The bill also introduces changes to labor union alterations to encourage job creation and reforms the functioning of the General Commercial Registry. Law 4605/2019 expands the types of investments that qualify an individual for a residence permit, allowing investments in intangible assets. In particular, capital contribution of at least €400,000 in a real estate investment company, in a company registered in Greece, in a purchase of state bonds, corporate bonds, or shares, in a venture capital investment company, or in mutual funds, allows the investor and his or her family members a five-year residency permit in Greece. Law 4608/2019 for strategic investments was approved in April 2019, creating a favorable investment climate by providing various privileges to investors such as tax exemptions and fast track licensing. Investments in Greece operate under two main laws: the new Investment Law (4399/2016) that addresses small-scale investments and Law 4146/2013 that addresses strategic investments. In particular: Law 4399/2016, entitled “Statutory framework to the establishment of Private Investments Aid Schemes for the regional and economic development of the country” was passed in June 2016. Its key objectives include the creation of new jobs, the increase of extroversion, the reindustrialization of the country, and the attraction of FDI. The law provides aids (as incentives) for companies that invest from €50,000 (Social Cooperative Companies) up to €500,000 (large sized companies) as well as tax breaks. The Greek government provides funds to cover part of the eligible expenses of the investment plan; the amount of the subsidy is determined based on the region and the business size. Qualified companies are exempt from paying income tax on their pre-tax profits for all their activities. There is a fixed corporate income tax rate and fast licensing procedures. Eligible economic activities are manufacturing, shipbuilding, transportation/infrastructure, tourism, and energy. More about this law can be found here: https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/files/pdf/madrid2019/2-Investment-Incentives-Law.pdf. – Law 4146/2013, entitled the “Creation of a Business-Friendly Environment for Strategic and Private Investments” is the other primary investment incentive law currently in force. The law aims to modernize and improve the institutional framework for private investments, raise liquidity, accelerate investment procedures, and increase transparency. It seeks to provide an efficient institutional framework for all investors and speed the approval processes for pending and approved investment projects. The law created a general directorate for private investments within the Ministry of Development and Investment and reduced the value of investments needed to be considered strategic. The law also provides tax exemptions and incentives to investors and allows foreign nationals from non-EU countries who buy property in Greece worth over €250,000 ($285,000) to obtain five-year renewable residence permits for themselves and their families. In March 2019, the Greek government brought a bill to parliament to expand eligibility criteria of the existing program. Other investment laws include: – Law 3908/2011, which provides incentives in the form of tax relief, grants, and allowances on investments, is gradually being phased out by Law 4146 (above). – Law 3919/2011 aims to liberalize more than 150 currently regulated or closed-shop professions. – Law 3982/2011 reduced the complexity of the licensing system for manufacturing activities and technical professions and modernized certain qualification and certification requirements to lower barriers to entry. – Law 4014/2011 simplified the environmental licensing process. – Law 3894/2010 (also known as fast track) allows Enterprise Greece to expedite licensing procedures for qualifying investments in the following sectors: industry, energy, tourism, transportation, telecommunications, health services, waste management, or high-end technology/innovation. To qualify, investments must meet one of the following conditions: exceed €100 million; exceed €15 million in the industrial sector, operating in industrial zones; exceed €40 million and concurrently create at least 120 new jobs; or create 150 new jobs, regardless of the monetary value of the investment. More about fast-track licensing of strategic investments can be found online at https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/en/invest-in-greece/strategic-investments – Law 3389/2005 introduced the use of public-private partnerships (PPP). This law aimed to facilitate PPPs in the service and construction sectors by creating a market-friendly regulatory environment. – Law 3426/2005 completed Greece’s harmonization with EU Directive 2003/54/EC and provided for the gradual deregulation of the electricity market. Law 3175/2003 harmonized Greek legislation with the requirements of EU Directive 2003/54/EC on common rules for the internal electricity market. Law 2773/99 initially opened 34 percent of the Greek energy market, in compliance with EU Directive 96/92 concerning regulation of the internal electricity market. – Law 3427/2005, which amended Law 89/67, provides special tax treatment for offshore operations of foreign companies established in Greece. Special tax treatment is offered only to operations in countries that comply with OECD tax standards. – Law 2364/95 and supporting amendments govern investment in the natural gas market in Greece. – Law 2289/95, which amended Law 468/76, allows private (both foreign and domestic) participation in oil exploration and development. – Law 2246/94 and supporting amendments opened Greece’s telecommunications market to foreign investment. – Legislative Decree 2687 of 1953, in conjunction with Article 112 of the Constitution, gives approved foreign “productive investments” (primarily manufacturing and tourism enterprises) property rights, preferential tax treatment, and work permits for foreign managerial and technical staff. The Decree also provides a constitutional guarantee against unilateral changes in the terms of a foreign investor’s agreement with the government, but the guarantee does not cover changes in the tax regime. Under Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the European Commission (EC), together with member state national competition authorities, directly enforces EU competition rules. The EC Directorate-General for Competition carries out this mandate in member states, including Greece. Greece’s competition policy authority rests with the Hellenic Competition Commission, in consultation with the Ministry of Economy. The Hellenic Competition Commission protects the proper functioning of the market and ensures the enforcement of the rules on competition. It acts as an independent authority and has administrative and financial autonomy. Private property may be expropriated for public purposes, but the law requires this be done in a nondiscriminatory manner and with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Due process and transparency are mandatory, and investors and lenders receive compensation in accordance with international norms. There have been no expropriation actions involving the real property of foreign investors in recent history, although legal proceedings over expropriation claims initiated, in one instance, over a decade ago, continue to work through the judicial system. Bankruptcy laws in Greece meet international norms. Under Greek bankruptcy law 3588/2007, private creditors receive compensation after claims from the government and insurance funds have been satisfied. Monetary judgments are usually made in euros unless explicitly stipulated otherwise. Greece has a reliable system of recording security interests in property. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, resolving insolvency in Greece takes 3.5 years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome that the company will be sold piecemeal. Recovery rate is 32 cents on the dollar. Greece ranks 72 of 190 economies surveyed for ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business report (from 62 in 2019). 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives are available on an equal basis for both foreign and domestic investors in productive enterprises. The investment laws in Greece aim to increase liquidity, accelerate investment processes, and ensure transparency. They provide an efficient institutional framework for all investors and speed the approval process for pending investment projects. The basic investment incentives Law 4146/2013, “Creation of a Development Friendly Environment for Strategic and Private Investments,” aims to improve the institutional and legal framework to attract private investment. Separately, Law 3908/2011 (which replaced Law 3299/2004) provides incentives in the form of tax relief, cash grants, leasing subsidies, and soft loans on qualifying investments in all economic sectors with some exceptions. In evaluating applications for tax and other financial incentives for investment, Greek authorities consider several criteria, including the viability of the planned investment; the expected impact on the economy and regional development (job creation, export orientation, local content use, energy conservation, environmental protection); the use of innovative technology; and the creditworthiness and capacity of the investor. Progress assessments are conducted on projects receiving incentives, and companies that fail to implement projects as planned may be forced to give up incentives initially granted to them. All information transmitted to the government for the approval process is to be treated confidentially by law. Investment categories are: General Entrepreneurship Regional Cohesion Technological development Youth Entrepreneurship (18-40 years old) Large Investment Plans (above €50 million) Integrated, Multi-Annual Business Plans The entire application and evaluation process shall not exceed six months (more information can be found at https://www.ependyseis.gr). Greece offers incentive packages for green investments and expects to offer more as it receives its European Recovery and Resilience Facility allocations. In 2021, the European Commission approved a €2.27 billion Greek program to award aid for renewable energy production, including a joint competitive tendering procedure for onshore wind and solar installations and two-way contract-for-difference premiums for electricity production from renewable energy sources. The incentives have spurred increased investment in the renewable energy sector; auctions to secure long-term electricity production contracts for onshore wind and solar projects have been oversubscribed. Law 4710/2020 offers incentives to promote e-mobility, including subsidies for purchases of electric vehicles and associate charging equipment, as well as tax incentives for green investments. Law 4710/2020 offers incentives to promote e-mobility, including subsidies for purchases of electric vehicles and associate charging equipment, as well as tax incentives for green investments. In 2021, the European Commission also approved Greek plans to establish an incentive scheme to help drive renewables deployment across 47 Greek islands, for example premium payments to generators to bridge the gap between generation costs and wholesale electricity prices. Greece has four free-trade zones, located at the Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Heraklion, and Platigiali Astakos Etoloakarnias port areas. Greek and foreign-owned firms enjoy the same advantages in these zones. Goods of foreign origin may be brought into these zones without payment of customs duties or other taxes and may remain free of all duties and taxes if subsequently transshipped or re-exported. Similarly, documents pertaining to the receipt, storage, or transfer of goods within the zones are free from stamp taxes. Handling operations are carried out according to EU regulations 2504/1988 and 2562/1990. Transit goods may be held in the zones free of bond. These zones also may be used for repackaging, sorting, and re-labeling operations. Assembly and manufacture of goods are carried out on a small scale in the Thessaloniki Free Zone. Storage time is unlimited, as long as warehouse rents are paid every six months. The Greek government does not follow a policy of forced localization or mandate local employment designed to require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology, with the exception of economic development requirements in many defense contracts (see Research and Development, below). Some foreign investors partner with local companies or hire local staff/experts, however, as a way to facilitate their entry into the market. In 2019, the government enacted a new amendment to the Greek tourism legislation, which obligates tour operators from third countries who do not own a travel agency in Greece to collaborate with a local travel agency established in the country to be able to conduct its business locally. The government is not taking steps to force foreign investors to keep a specific amount of the data they collect and store within Greek national borders. Offset agreements, co-production, and technology transfers are commonplace in Greece’s procurement of defense items. Although the most recent Greek defense procurement law eliminated offset requirements, there are some remaining ongoing active offset contracts, as well as expired offset contracts with U.S. firms that are potentially subject to non-performance penalties. Defense procurements are still subject to economic development requirements, which are, in effect, similar to offsets. In 2014, the government committed to resolving offset contract disputes in a way that would satisfy both parties and avoid the imposition of penalties or fines. In general, U.S. and other foreign firms may participate in government-financed and/or subsidized research and development programs. Foreign investors do not face discriminatory or other formal inhibiting requirements. However, many potential and actual foreign investors assert the complexity of Greek regulations, the need to deal with many layers of bureaucracy, and the involvement of multiple government agencies all discourage investment. 5. Protection of Property Rights Greek laws extend the protection of property rights to both foreign and Greek nationals, and the legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Multiple layers of authority in Greece are involved in the issuance or approval of land use and zoning permits, creating disincentives to real property investment. Secured interests in property are movable and real, recognized and enforced. The concept of mortgage does exist in the market and can be recorded through the banks. The government is working to create a comprehensive electronic land registry which is expected to increase the transparency of real estate management. However, the land registry is behind schedule and is not expected to be completed until 2022, two years after its initial estimate of completion. Greece ranks 156 out of 190 countries for Ease of Registering Property in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 Report, down from 153 last year. Foreign nationals can acquire real estate property in Greece, though they first need to be issued a tax authentication number. However, for the border areas, foreign nationals first require a license from the Greek state (Law 3978/2011). In another effort to boost investment, the government passed Law 4146/2013, which allows foreign nationals who buy property in Greece worth over €250,000 ($285,000) to obtain a five-year residence permit for themselves and their families. The “Golden Visa” program has been extended to buyers of various types of Greek securities, including stocks, bonds, and bank accounts, with a value of at least €400,000. The permit can be extended for an additional five years and allows travel to other EU and Schengen countries without a visa. On April 29, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) delisted Greece from the USTR Special 301 Watch List due to progress in addressing concerns regarding IP protection and enforcement. The widespread use of unlicensed software in the public sector in Greece had been of long-standing concern to right holders. In December 2019, Greece took clear steps to address this matter by allocating over €39 million for the purchase of software licenses. In December 2020, the agreement to purchase software licenses for government workers was finalized, and the rollout is proceeding well according to government and private sector contacts. In addition, the Committee for Notification of Copyright and Related Rights Infringement on the Internet has been taking steps to address enforcement in the online environment, and Greece introduced a new law imposing fines for possessing counterfeit products. In 2019, the Ministry of Culture developed legislation which would allow for blocking of dynamic domains, in order to improve even further the protection of IP rights. Parliament passed the bill in 2020. Greece tracks seizures of counterfeit goods; however, the Ministry of Finance, Coast Guard, and Customs Service all track their data separately. In 2019, the Hellenic Coast Guard arrested 143 people during 110 cases, seizing over 9 million counterfeit cigarettes, 10 vehicles, and over 1,300 pounds of tobacco, all representing €1.8 million in attempted tax evasion. The Ministry of Finance’s Economic and Financial Crimes Unit (SDOE) conducts investigations and seizures of counterfeit goods and products. In 2019, the SDOE seized almost 600,000 counterfeit and pirated products, down from 1.1 million in 2018. The Hellenic Customs Service also conducts inspections at exit and entry points into the EU, with over 20 million counterfeit products seized in 2019, the majority of which were cigarettes. Violators can be fined for their actions, and Law 3982/2022 provides police ex officio authority to confiscate and destroy counterfeit goods. Greece is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the European Patent Convention, the Washington Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Bern Copyright Convention. As a member of the EU, Greece has harmonized its IP legislation with EU rules and regulations. The WTO-TRIPS agreement was incorporated into Greek legislation on February 28, 1995 (Law 2290/1995). The Greek government also signed and ratified the WIPO internet treaties and incorporated them into Greek legislation (Laws 3183 and 3184/2003) in 2003. Greece’s legal framework for copyright protection is found in Law 2121 of 1993 on copyrights and Law 2328 of 1995 on the media. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ Embassy Point of Contact: U.S. Embassy Athens Economic Section 91 Vas. Sofias Avenue, Athens, Greece 10160 Phone: +30-210-721-2951 Athens-ECON@state.gov A list of local attorneys is available at gr.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce 109-111 Messoghion Avenue, Politia Business Center Athens, Greece 11526 Phone: +30-210-699-3559, Fax: +30-210-698-5686 Email: info@amcham.gr 6. Financial Sector Following EU regulations, Greece is open to foreign portfolio investment. Law 3371/2005 sets an effective legal framework to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Law 3283/2004 incorporates the European Council’s Directive 2001/107, setting the legal framework for the operation of mutual funds. The Bank of Greece complies with its IMF Article VIII obligations and does not generally impose restrictions on payments. Transfers for current international transactions are allowed but are subject to specific conditions for approval. The lack of liquidity in the Athens Stock Exchange along with the challenging economic environment have hindered the allocation of credit but is accessible to foreign investors on the local market, who also have access to a variety of credit instruments. Greece’s banking system is recovering from a decade-long economic crisis that created a large stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs). In previous years, Greek banks cleared their balance sheets though the sale of their NPLs to several international funds. The strong economic recovery in Greece in 2021, coupled with accommodative monetary and fiscal policies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, contributed to improved liquidity conditions. Banks successfully continued their efforts to clean up their loan portfolios. This laid the groundwork for banks to resume their financial intermediation role and thus contribute to sustainable economic growth. However, banks continue to face challenges including the legacy stock of non-performing loans still on bank balance sheets; the low quality of Greek banks’ prudential own funds, given the large share of deferred tax assets; and low operating profitability. Currently, banks enjoy adequate liquidity and capital buffers that allow them to provide lending to the economy. In November 2015, following an Asset Quality Review and Stress Test conducted by the ECB as a requirement of the 2015 ESM agreement, a third recapitalization of Greece’s four systemic banks (National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, and Eurobank) took place. The recapitalization concluded with the banks remaining in private hands, after raising €6.5 billion from foreign investors, mostly hedge funds. In September 2020, the ratio of NPLs decreased to 35.8 percent, down from 40.6 percent in December 2019. Banks estimate that about 20 percent of non-performing exposures (NPEs) are owned by so-called “strategic defaulters” – borrowers who refrain from paying their debts to lenders to take advantage of the laws enacted during the financial crisis to protect borrowers from foreclosure or creditors’ collection even though they are able to pay their obligations. Developing an effective NPL reduction strategy has been among the most difficult challenges for the Greek economy. According to the Bank of Greece, Greek banks’ NPL ratio, at 15 percent in June 2021, remains the highest in the eurozone, well over the European average of around three percent. Under the terms of the ESM agreement, Greece remains obliged to create an NPL market through which the loans could, over time, be sold or transferred for servicing purposes to foreign investors. The Bank of Greece has licensed more than ten servicers, and the sale and securitization environment for non-performing loans continues to mature, with all of Greece’s systemic banks having conducted portfolio sales of secured and unsecured loan tranches since mid-2017. The potential sale and/or transfer of Greek NPLs continues to receive interest by many Greek and foreign companies and funds, signaling a viable market. The Greek state operates an auction platform for collateral and foreclosed assets, although the bulk of auctions still conclude with the selling bank as the purchaser of the assets. The government introduced its “Hercules” asset protection scheme in late 2019, providing guarantees to banks as an incentive to securitize €30 billion more in NPLs. The plan offloads bad debt by wrapping it into asset backed securities via special purpose vehicles that will purchase the NPLs. The sales are financed by notes issued by the special purpose vehicles with a government guarantee for senior tranches, thereby limiting the risk to the Greek state. Since all four systemic banks have availed themselves of the plan, the Greek government submitted an official request for an extension of the Hercules scheme on March 16, 2021, that will permit banks to further reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) in 2021 and 2022. Poor asset quality inhibits banks’ ability to provide systemic financing, although the situation is slowly improving. The annual growth rate of total deposits increased to 8.5 percent in 2020.Deposits increased by roughly €9 billion over 2019, up from around €200 billion in early 2019, a significant improvement from the crisis years, when deposits shrunk from their highest level of €237 billion in September 2009 to around €123 billion in September 2017. Greece’s systemic banks held the following assets at the end of 2020: Piraeus Bank, €71.6 billion; National Bank of Greece, €64.3 billion; Alpha Bank, €70 billion; and Eurobank, €67.7 billion. Few U.S. financial institutions have a retail presence in Greece. In September 2014, Alpha Bank acquired the retail operations of Citibank, including Diners Club. Bank of America serves only companies and some special classes of pensioners. There are a limited number of cross-shareholding arrangements among Greek businesses. To date, the objective of such arrangements has not been to restrict foreign investment. The same applies to hostile takeovers, a practice which has been recently introduced in the Greek market. The government actively encourages foreign portfolio investment. Greece has a reasonably efficient capital market that offers the private sector a wide variety of credit instruments. Credit is allocated on market terms prevailing in the eurozone and credit is equally accessible by Greek and foreign investors. An independent regulatory body, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, supervises brokerage firms, investment firms, mutual fund management companies, portfolio investment companies, real estate investment trusts, financial intermediation firms, clearing houses and their administrators (e.g. the Athens Stock Exchange), and investor indemnity and transaction security schemes (e.g. the Common Guarantee Fund and the Supplementary Fund), and also encourages and facilitates portfolio investments. Owner-registered bonds and shares are traded on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). It is mandatory in Greece for the shares of banking, insurance, and public utility companies to be registered. Greek corporations listed on the ASE that are also state contractors are required to have all their shares registered. Greece has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Greece. Public pension funds may invest up to 20 percent of their reserves in state or corporate bonds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Greek state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in utilities, transportation, energy, media, health, and the defense industry. There is no official website with a list of SOEs. Bank of Greece: partially owned (Greek state shares cannot exceed 35 percent); over 1,800 employees; governed by a Governor appointed by the government. Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA): majority-owned by Greek state (65 percent); Net income €131 million in 2016; Total assets €3.1 billion in 2016; governed by Ministry of Development; Government is in the process of splitting the company and privatizing its infrastructure and commercial operations. Hellenic Aerospace Industry: wholly owned; Total assets €932.5 million in 2014; Net income €13.7 million in 2014; over 1,300 employees. Hellenic Financial Stability Fund: governed by General Council and Executive Board Hellenic Post: majority-owned (90 percent by Greek state); Net income €15.5 million in 2017. Hellenic Vehicle Organization: majority-owned (51 percent owned by Greek state); around 400 employees; Total assets around €69 million; governed by Board of Directors. Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP): majority-owned (34 percent by Greek state); governed by Board of Directors. Public Power Corporation: majority-owned (51 percent by Greek state); Total assets €14.1 billion in 2018; over 16,700 employees. Most Greek SOEs are structured under the auspices of the Hellenic Corporation for Assets and Participations (HCAP), an independent holding company for state assets mandated by Greece’s 2015 bailout and formally launched in 2016. HCAP’s supervisory board is independent from the Greek state and is appointed in part by Greece’s creditor institutions. Some SOEs are still supervised by the Finance Ministry’s Special Secretariat for Public Enterprises and Organizations, established by Law 3429/2005. Private companies previously were not allowed to enter the market in sectors where the SOE functioned as a monopoly, such as water, sewage, or urban transportation. However, several of these SOEs are planned for privatization as a requirement of the country’s bailout programs, intended to liberalize markets and raise revenues for the state. Official government statements on privatization since 2015 have sometimes led to confusion among investors. Some senior officials have declared their opposition to previously approved privatization projects, while other officials have maintained the stance that the government remains committed to the sale of SOEs. The current government has expressed its commitment and is moving forward with privatizations, including DEPA and some of the port assets. Under the bailout agreement, Greece has moved forward with the deregulation of the electricity market, adopting the Target Model in November 2020. In sectors opened to private investment, such as the telecommunications market, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same nominal terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Some private sector competitors to SOEs report the government has provided preferential treatment to SOEs in obtaining licenses and leases. The government actively seeks to end many of these state monopolies and introduce private competition as part of its overall reform of the Greek economy. Greece – as a member of the EU – participates in the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. SOEs purchase goods and services from private sector and foreign firms through public tenders. SOEs are subject to budget constraints, with salary cuts imposed in the past few years on public sector jobs. The Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF, or TAIPED in Greek), an independent non-governmental privatization fund, was established in 2011 under Greece’s bailout program to manage the sale or concession of major government assets, to raise substantial state revenue, and to bring in new technology and expertise for the commercial development of these assets. These include listed and unlisted state-owned companies, infrastructure, and commercially valuable buildings and land. Foreign and domestic investor participation in the privatization program has generally not been subject to restrictions, although the economic environment during the crisis and subsequent pandemic has challenged the domestic private sector’s ability to raise funds to purchase firms slated for privatization. The August 2015 ESM bailout agreement required Greece to consolidate the HRADF, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), the Public Properties Company (ETAD), and a new entity that will manage other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (or HCAP), formed by Law 4389/2016. In March 2017, HCAP received short- and long-term guidelines from the Minister of Finance, and in September 2017, it received strategic guidelines from the Greek state (HCAP’s sole shareholder). Privatizations are subject to a public bidding process, which is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. Notable privatizations recently completed include the transfer of the 66 percent of Greece’s gas transmission system operator DESFA to Senfluga Energy Infrastructure Holdings, the sale of 67 percent of the shares of Thessaloniki Port Authority, the sale of the remaining 5 percent of the largest telecommunications provider shares to Deutsche Telecom and rolling stock maintenance and railroad availability services company Rosco. In February 2019, the government concluded the 20-year extension of the concession agreement of the Athens International Airport, worth €1.4 billion euros, and received nine expressions of interest in January 2020 for a 30 percent stake. The extension allowed for launch of the tender for the sale of the 30 percent stake in the airport. In January 2020, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) shortlisted nine parties (from 10 that have originally expressed interest) that were qualified for the next phase of the tender; the binding offers. However, with the arrival of the pandemic in Greece (February-March 2020), and the dramatic drop in the airport operations/revenues, the HRADF has decided to freeze the whole process indefinitely. In January 2020, the government of Greece launched the legal procedures necessary for privatization of ten regional ports, including Heraklion, Elefsina, and Alexandroupolis, which will be privatized through either partial concession deals or full management schemes. In January 2021, the European Commission gave the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation the approval to proceed with the construction of a road network linking the town of Trikala with the main Egnatia Motorway. In July 2020, the HRDF proceeded with two tenders for the privatization of the ports of Alexandroupoli and Kavala, that were deemed as more mature projects. In October of the same year six parties (in total) have expressed interest for both ports. In March 2021, the HRADF announced that four parties have been qualified for the binding offers phase of the tenders including two US companies (Quintana Infrastructure & Development, and Black Summit Financial Group). The project is budgeted at €442 million and is expected to promote the energy, economic and tourism development of Central Greece, Thessaly, and Western Macedonia. In March 2020, the commercial operations of DEPA received nine non-binding bids for its sale of a 65 percent stake. Hellenic Petroleum maintains the other 35 percent. The Public Power Corporation continues to consider the partial privatization of its power distribution operator. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) including environmental, social, and governance issues, has been growing over the last decade among both producers and consumers in Greece. Several enterprises, particularly large ones, in many fields of production and services, have accepted and now promote CSR principles. Several non-profit business associations have emerged in the last few years (Hellenic Network for Corporate Social Responsibility, Global Sustain, etc.) to disseminate CSR values and to promote them in the business world and society more broadly. These groups’ members have incorporated programs that contribute to the sustainable economic development of the communities in which they operate; minimize the impacts of their activities on the environment and natural resources; create healthy and safe working conditions for their employees; provide equal opportunities for employment and professional development; and provide shareholders with satisfactory returns through responsible social and environmental management. Firms that pursue CSR in Greece enhance the public acceptance and respect that they enjoy. In 2014, the government drafted a National Action Plan for Corporate Social Responsibility for the 2014-2021 period. The main goal of the plan is to increase the number of companies that recognize and use CSR to formulate their strategies. Greece has encouraged adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. There are no alleged/reported human or labor rights concerns relating to CSR that foreign businesses should be aware of. Greece is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Greece signed the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in 2009. It has also been a supporter of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and is a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). 9. Corruption Greece saw a slight increase in perceptions of corruption, as it went up one place to 59 on Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perception Index, from 60 in 2019 and 67 in 2018. By contrast, the country had improved since 2012, partly due to mandatory structural reforms. Despite these structural improvements, bureaucracy is reportedly slowing the progress. Transparency International issued a report in 2018 criticizing the government for improper public procurement actions involving Greek government ministers and the recent appointment of the close advisor to the country’s prime minister to be the head of the Hellenic Competition Commission, which oversees the enforcement of anti-trust legislation. Transparency International released another report in October 2018, warning of the corruption risks posed by golden visa programs, mentioning Greece as a top issuer of golden visas. In Transparency International’s 2020 report, the organization outlined the costs directly stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, including cases of foreign bribery occurring in the health care sector. On March 19, 2015, the government passed Law 4320, which provides for the establishment of a General Secretariat for Combatting Corruption under the authority of a new Minister of State. Under Article 12 of the Law, this entity drafts a national anti-corruption strategy, with an emphasis on coordination between anti-corruption bodies within various ministries and agencies, including the Economic Police, the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (SDOE), the Ministries’ Internal Control Units, and the Health and Welfare Services Inspection Body. Based on Law 4320, two major anti-corruption bodies, the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration (SEEDD) and the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Works (SEDE), were moved under the jurisdiction of the General Secretariat for Combatting Corruption. A Minister of State for combatting corruption was appointed to the cabinet following the January 2015 elections and given oversight of government efforts to combat corruption and economic crimes. The minister drafted coordinated plans of action, monitored their implementation, and was given operational control of the Economic Crime division of the Hellenic Police, the SDOE, ministries’ internal control units, and the Health and Welfare Services’ inspection body. Following the September 2015 national elections, the government abolished the cabinet post of Minister of State for combatting corruption and assigned those duties to a new alternate minister for combatting corruption in the Ministry of Justice, Transparency, and Human Rights. Legislation passed on May 11, 2015, provides a wider range of disciplinary sanctions against state employees accused of misconduct or breach of duty, while eliminating the immediate suspension of an accused employee prior to the completion of legal proceedings. If found guilty, offenders could be deprived of wages for up to 12 months and forced to relinquish their right to regain a senior post for a period of one to five years. Certain offenders could also be fined from €3,000 to €100,000. The law requires income and asset disclosure by appointed and elected officials, including nonpublic sector employees, such as journalists and heads of state-funded NGOs. Several different agencies are mandated to monitor and verify disclosures, including the General Inspectorate for Public Administration, the police internal affairs bureau, the Piraeus appeals prosecutor, and an independent permanent parliamentary committee. Declarations are made publicly available. The law provides for administrative and criminal sanctions for noncompliance. Penalties range from two to ten years’ imprisonment and fines from €10,000 to €1 million. On August 7, 2019, Parliament passed legislation establishing a unified transparency authority by transferring the powers and responsibilities of public administration inspection services to an independent authority. In November 2019, laws addressing the bribery of officials were amended to include a specific definition of “public official” and to make active bribery of a public official a felony instead of a misdemeanor, punishable by a prison sentence of five to eight years (as opposed to three years). On November 17, 2020, the government established the Financial Prosecutor’s Office to deal with financial crime in the wake of public complaints about an investigation by the Corruption Prosecutor’s Office into a case involving the pharmaceutical company Novartis. The new office, headed by a senior prosecutor selected by the Supreme Judicial Council of the Supreme Court, included 16 prosecutors, and became operational in November 2020. Bribery is a criminal act, and the law provides severe penalties for infractions, although diligent implementation and haphazard or uneven enforcement of the law remains an issue. Historically, the problem has been most acute in government procurement, as political influence and other considerations are widely believed to play a significant role in the evaluation of bids. Corruption related to the health care system and political party funding are areas of concern, as is the “fragmented” anti-corruption apparatus. NGOs and other observers have expressed concern over perceived high levels of official corruption. Permanent and ad hoc government entities charged with combating corruption are understaffed and underfinanced. There is a widespread perception that there are high levels of corruption in the public sector and tax evasion in the private sector, and many Greeks view corruption as the main obstacle to economic recovery. The Ministry of Justice prosecutes cases of bribery and corruption. In cases where politicians are involved, the Greek parliament can conduct investigations and/or lift parliamentary immunity to allow a special court action to proceed against the politician. A December 2014 law does not allow high ranking officials, including the prime minister, ministers, alternate, and deputy ministers, parliament deputies, European Parliament deputies, general and special secretaries, regional governors and vice governors, and mayors and deputy mayors to benefit from more lenient sentences in cases involving official bribes. In 2019, Parliament passed an amendment to Article 62 of the constitution, which limits parliamentary immunity to acts carried out in the course of parliamentary duties. In addition, Parliament amended Article 86 of the constitution, abolishing the statute of limitations for crimes committed by ministers and to disallow postponements for trials of ministers. Greece is a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention, which it signed on December 10, 2003, and ratified September 17, 2008. As a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Government Officials and all relevant EU-mandated anti-corruption agreements, the Greek government is committed in principle to penalizing those who commit bribery in Greece or abroad. The OECD Convention has been in effect since 1999. Greek accession to other relevant conventions or treaties: Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption: Signed June 8, 2000. Ratified February 21, 2002. Entry into force: November 1, 2003. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: Signed January 27, 1999. Ratified July 10, 2007. Entry into force: November 1, 2007. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Signed on December 13, 2000. Ratified January 11, 2011. Government Agency Organization: The Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration Address: 60 Sygrou Avenue, 11742, Athens Telephone number: +30-213-215-8800 Email address: seedd@seedd.gr Watchdog Organization Organization: Transparency International Greece Address: Solomou 54, 4th floor, 10682 Athens Telephone number: +30-210-722-4940 Email address: tihellas@otenet.gr 10. Political and Security Environment There have been no major terrorist incidents in Greece in recent years; however, domestic groups conduct intermittent small-scale attacks such as targeted package bombs, improvised explosive devices, and unsophisticated incendiary devices (Molotov cocktails) typically targeting properties of political figures, party offices, privately owned vehicles, ministries, police stations, and businesses. In addition, domestic anarchist groups often carry out small-scale attacks targeting government buildings and foreign missions. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the Greek government remains strong, and support from the Greek security services with respect to the protection of American interests is excellent. Demonstrations and protests are commonplace in large cities in Greece. While most of these demonstrations and strikes are peaceful and small-scale, they often cause temporary disruption to essential services and traffic, and anarchist groups are known in some cases to attach themselves to other demonstrations to create mayhem. The masterminds of Greece’s most notorious terrorist groups are currently behind bars, including leaders of November 17 and Revolutionary Popular Struggle, active between the 1970s and 1990s and responsible for hundreds of attacks and murders. Greek authorities largely eliminated these groups in advance of the 2004 Olympic Games. Following the Olympics, a new wave of organizations emerged, including Revolutionary Struggle, Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, and Sect of Revolutionaries, though authorities rounded up these groups in a wave of arrests between 2009 and 2011, and again in 2014. Domestic terrorist groups include “OLA,” also known as the Group of Popular Fighters or Popular Fighters Group, which claimed responsibility for the December 2018 bomb outside a private television station and the December 2017 bomb outside an Athens courthouse. OLA also claimed responsibility for the November 2015 bomb attack at the offices of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, which caused extensive damage to the offices and surrounding buildings, the December 2014 attack on the Israeli embassy in Athens, which resulted in no injuries and minor damage to the building, and the attack on the German Ambassador’s residence in Athens in December 2013. OLA also claimed responsibility for an indirect fire attack on a Mercedes-Benz building on January 12, 2014, and an attack in January 2013 against the headquarters of the then-governing New Democracy party in Athens. 11. Labor Policies and Practices There is an adequate supply of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor in Greece, although some highly technical skills may be lacking. Illegal immigrants predominate in the unskilled labor sector in many urban areas, and in rural areas predominately in agriculture. Greece provides residency permits to migrants for a variety of reasons, including work. In July 2015, Parliament adopted a law regulating the status of non-EU foreign nationals recruited to work in the country as seasonal workers. The law also reduces the minimum consecutive residency period in the country required for undocumented migrants to be eligible to apply for a residency permit from ten to seven years, such applications being judged on the applicant’s strong ties to the country. The same law outlines the requirements for setting work contracts, requires proof of adequate shelter for workers and imposes a €1,500 ($1,620) fine for employers who do not do so, requires prepayment of at least one month’s worth of social security for each employee, provides basic labor rights to each worker, and prohibits employers from recruiting workers if found to have previously recruited workers through fraudulent means. The law also stipulates that daily wages for non-EU foreign seasonal workers cannot be less than that of an unqualified worker. The law grants seasonal non-EU foreign workers the same rights as citizens with respect to minimum age of employment, labor conditions, the right to association, unionism, collective bargaining, education and vocational training, employment consultation services, and the right to certain goods, services and benefits under conditions. The same law also provides that non-EU nationals who are victims of abusive conditions or labor accidents could be eligible to apply for a residency permit on humanitarian grounds. The labor force today is overwhelmingly comprised of employees who have secondary or higher-level education. Relatedly, beginning in 2012, women in the labor force now possess more higher education degrees than men. In December 2021, the unemployment rate in Greece was 12.8 percent, a decrease from the 15.5 percent unemployment rate in December 2020 and from the 13.4 percent rate in November 2021. In 2021, the unemployment rate among men was 10 percent, while among women it was 16.2 percent. The unemployment rate among Greek citizens age 15-24 years remains high at 27 percent. The unemployment rate for those citizens age 25 – 74 is currently 12.1 percent. According to a report conducted by the International Monetary Fund in 2019, Greece’s informal economy is among the highest in the EU. An informal economy, or shadow economy, is the part of any economy that is neither taxed nor monitored by any form of government. The informal economy in Greece followed an upward trend until 2009, when it accounted for €56.9 billion at the current inflation rate. An OECD report published in 2021 highlights a significant increase in the shadow economy during the COVID-19 pandemic and in all of OECD’s 36 member states. In 2020, rising unemployment and a slump in GDP drove more citizens into the shadow economy to make up for lost income. In Greece, OECD estimates the shadow economy rose to 20.9 percent of GDP from 19.2 percent in 2019.From preliminary estimates, the shadow economy fell in 2021 to 20.3 percent. However, the shadow economy in Greece in 2021 increased by €1.6 billion from 2020. Asylum-seekers are eligible to apply for a work permit once they complete their first asylum interview; however, the procedures for obtaining this permit were not widely understood by asylum-seekers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or government officials. As of February 2021, the Greek Asylum Service had 74,934 cases pending, with the backlog expected to be cleared before the end of 2021. Asylum services and receipt of applications were suspended from March 13-April 10, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Recognized refugees are entitled to the same labor rights as Greek nationals. NGOs and government officials working in migrant sites reported that some asylum-seekers perform undeclared seasonal agricultural labor in rural areas. In April 2019, Greece announced a wage subsidy scheme called “Rebrain Greece,” which provides 500 talented Greeks that moved abroad during the financial crisis with a €3,000 monthly salary if they return to Greece. The program hopes to reinvigorate high-skilled sectors of the economy. In December 2020, the Greek Parliament passed Law 4758 that involved a tax break for those foreign nationals who would transfer their tax residence to Greece. Digital nomads who choose to work in Greece can take advantage of a 50 percent tax break for their first seven years of residency. Greece has ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Core Conventions. Specific legislation provides for the right of association and the rights to strike, organize, and bargain collectively. Greek labor laws set a minimum age (15) and wage for employment, determine acceptable work conditions and minimum occupational health and safety standards, define working hours, limit overtime, and apply certain rules for the dismissal of personnel. There is a difference between national minimum wage in the private sector for unspecialized workers aged 25 or older and workers below 25 years of age. The latter receive 84 percent of the salary of those over 25. A May 2015 law amended the laws prohibiting strikes during national emergencies. The 2015 law explicitly prohibits the issuance of civil mobilization orders as a means of countering strike actions before or after their proclamation. In 2017 parliament passed legislation providing for the temporary closure of businesses in cases where employers repeatedly violate the law concerning undeclared work or safety. Under the same law, employers are obliged to declare in advance their employees’ overtime or changes in their work schedules. The legislation also provided for social and welfare benefits to be granted to surrogate mothers, including protection from dismissal during pregnancy and after childbirth. Courts are required to examine complaints filed by employees against their employers for delayed payment within two months after their filing, and issue decisions within 30 days after the hearing. The government sets restrictions on mass dismissals in private and public companies employing more than 20 workers. Dismissals exceeding in number the limits set by law require consultations through the Supreme Labor Council (with worker, employer, and government representatives participating), and government authorization. Based on a ministerial decision in February 2014, the government shifted competency for approving dismissals from the Minister of Labor to the Ministry’s Secretary General. Greek law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, conduct their activities without interference, and strike. The establishment of trade unions in enterprises with fewer than 20 workers is prohibited. In July 2016, Parliament passed a law allowing armed forces personnel to form unions, while explicitly prohibiting strikes and work stoppages by those unions. Police also have the right to organize and demonstrate but not to strike. On July 10, 2020, the parliament separately passed legislation requiring prior and timely announcements – in writing or via email – of demonstrations to the appropriate police or Coast Guard authorities. The laws also make protest organizers accountable for bodily harm or property damage if they do not follow the requirements. Around 950 inspectors are authorized to conduct labor inspections, including labor inspectorate personnel and staff of the Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Social Solidarity, the Social Insurance Fund, the Economic Crimes Division of the police, and the Independent Authority for Public Revenue. Despite government efforts to increase inspections for undeclared, under-declared, and unpaid work, trade unions and the media alleged that, due to insufficient inspectorate staffing, enforcement of labor standards was inadequate in the housekeeping services, tourism, and agricultural sectors. Enforcement was also lacking among small enterprises (employing 10 or fewer persons). According to the Union of Labor Health Inspectors, authorities conducted approximately 45,000 inspections related to issues of health and safety at work and ordered fines amounting to 7 million euros ($8.4 million) between 2015 and 2016. Wage laws are not always enforced. Unions and media allege that some private businesses forced their employees to return part of their wages and mandatory seasonal bonuses, in cash, after being deposited in the bank. Several employees were reportedly registered as part-time workers but in essence worked additional hours without being paid. In other cases, employees were paid after months of delays and oftentimes with coupons and not in cash. Cases of employment for up to 30 consecutive days of work without weekends off were also reported. Such violations were mostly noted in the tourism, agriculture, and housekeeping services sectors. On July 1, 2019, Greece introduced Law 4611/2019, requiring Greek employers to provide a lawful reason when terminating employees on indefinite-term contracts, to pay social security contributions on behalf of interns and apprentices, and introduced new health and safety requirements including use of motorcycles for employment purposes. 14. Contact for More Information Carl Watson, Deputy Economic Counselor U.S. Embassy Athens, Leof. Vasilissis Sofias 91, Athina 115 21, Greece +30 210-720-2306 ATHENS-econ@state.gov Grenada Executive Summary Grenada’s legal framework for business is strong. The country is a parliamentary democracy, has a functioning court system, relatively low crime rates, and no political violence. The presence of a comprehensive investment incentive regime, stable economy, existing trade agreements, responsive investment promotion experts, and a robust citizenship by investment program contributes to a healthy and attractive investment climate. However, Grenada’s tourism-driven economy was severely impacted by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic posed unparalleled challenges for Grenada by creating macroeconomic instability that threatened to undermine years of consecutive socio-economic progress since 2013. The government’s main revenue earners – tourism and international education — were severely impacted and continue to struggle amidst efforts to revive the economy. Growth in construction, private sector projects, and the country’s Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program is fueling economic activity and forecasted to drive recovery in 2022. Following a 13.8 percent decline in growth during 2020, Grenada experienced a slower-than-expected real GDP growth of 4.8 percent compared to an initial projection of 6 percent. Grenada’s recovery is driven by growth in several sectors including construction (22.8 percent), agriculture (12.5 percent), wholesale and retail (4.4 percent), and financial intermediation (3.5 percent). Tourism and private tertiary education, which once accounted for more than 60 percent of GDP, continues to lag, but the government hopes for an uptick as students return to classes and tourists resume travel. Government finances remain significantly lower than the 2019 pre-pandemic era, but 2021 saw some positive developments compared to 2020. Revenue collection in 2021 surpassed that of 2020 but remained below 2019 performance. Grenada continues to depend on the country’s citizenship by investment program as a significant source of revenue generation. At the end of October 2020, the program received 437 applications compared to 303 the previous year. By the end of 2021 the CBI program earned more than $55.4 million in revenue – a 40 percent increase compared to the previous year. The debt-to-GDP ratio fell from 108 percent in 2013 to just under 60 percent by the end of 2020. Due to an increase in borrowing and long-term concessionary loans to finance the country’s COVID response, the debt to GDP ratio currently stands at 69 percent. The government of Grenada has a strong interest in climate resilient initiatives, renewable energy, and developing the blue economy (broadly defined as the sustainable, environmentally sensitive use of ocean resources for economic growth and job creation). Other international investments include projects in construction, manufacturing, retail, duty free outlets, and agriculture. Parliament continues to review legislature governing value added tax, property transfer tax, investment, excise tax, customs (service charge), and bankruptcy and insolvency. The government has an innovative investment incentives regime which assists with streamlining bureaucratic and legal processes to increase the attractiveness of FDI and improve the ease of doing business in Grenada. This regime ensures transparency, equitable treatment of investors, and adherence to the rule of law, thus bolstering Grenada’s marketability as an investor-friendly climate. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $41M – Outward (D) – Inward https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $9,410 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Grenada employs a liberal approach to foreign direct investment (FDI) and actively promotes foreign investment into the country. The government of Grenada identified five priority sectors for investment: Tourism and hospitality services Education and health services Information and communication technology Agribusiness Energy development The Grenada Investment Development Corporation (GIDC) is the country’s investment promotion agency. It was established in 1985 to stimulate, facilitate, and encourage the creation and development of industry. The GIDC is a “one-stop shop” offering: Investment and trade information Investment incentives Investment facilitation and aftercare Entrepreneurial/business skills training Small business support services Industrial facilities Policy advice To promote FDI, the GIDC adopts a targeted approach to promote investment opportunities, provides investor facilitation and entrepreneurial development services, and advocates for a supportive environment for investors to develop and grow businesses, trade, and industries. Investment retention is a priority in Grenada and is maintained through ongoing dialogue with investors facilitated by the GIDC. There are no economic and industrial strategies that discriminate against foreign investors. Non-Grenadian investors may be required to obtain an Alien Landholding License and pay a property transfer tax, which levies a 10 percent fee on the purchase of shares in a Grenadian registered company or real estate. In addition, the sale of such shares or real estate to non-nationals will attract a property transfer tax of 15 percent payable by the seller if the seller is a non-Grenadian. Foreign investors employed in Grenada are required to obtain a work permit, renewable annually. U.S. investors must pay a fee of USD $1,111 or XCD $3,000 for work permits. The renewal fee varies based on the investor’s country of citizenship. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control, except for enterprises deemed prejudicial to national security, the environment, public health, or national culture, or which contravene the laws of Grenada. Grenada has accepted but not yet implemented regional anti-competition obligations. U.S investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms in Grenada relative to other foreign investors. Grenada maintains an investment screening and approval mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Inbound investment is screened and approved by the Grenada Investment Development Corporation. GIDC will review the submitted proposal and advise on the requirements and processes for doing business in Grenada. Depending on the type of investment they will work with the respective ministries. Post is unaware of any notable public statements by government officials or private sector representatives about the screening mechanism. Grenada passed its most recent Investment Promotion Act in 2014. The legislation promotes, encourages, and protects investment in Grenada by providing investors with a stable framework of fundamental and enforceable rights. It seeks to guarantee and ensure security and fairness in strict accordance with the rule of law and best international standards and practices. The 2014 Act is also in compliance with WTO regulations, the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Agreement between the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and the EU. The incentives regime enacted in 2016 grants incentives to ensure that all new tax exemptions are codified, restricts discretionary exemptions, and requires that the beneficiaries of exemptions file appropriate tax returns and comply with tax requirements. It also sets streamlined, simple, and non-discretionary systems/processes for the granting of incentives. The Customs and Inland Revenue Departments (CIRD) administer exemptions through a clearly defined rule-based system in contrast with past incentive schemes that required each case to be approved at the cabinet level. Under this regime, the CIRD grants incentives to projects within the priority sectors for investment. These priority sectors are tourism, manufacturing, agriculture and agribusiness, information technology services, telecommunication providers and business process outsourcing operations, education and training, health and wellness, creative industries, energy, and research and development. Other sectors include student accommodation, heavy equipment operators, investment projects above particular investment thresholds, and projects within specific geographical locations. The incentive regime seeks to provide investment incentives on a performance basis (i.e., the more one invests, the more incentives one can receive). Therefore, based on the level of investment, CIRD grants different levels of incentives in a transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory manner. In the past three years, the government was not subject to third-party investment policy reviews through multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development. In the past five years, Post is unaware of any civil society organization, including those based in Grenada or in third countries, that provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. An investor must register a business name and identify whether it is a partnership or limited liability company. A registered business can be wholly owned or a joint venture. The official website of the GIDC includes an investor’s guide that details the procedures for starting and operating a business in Grenada. The guide has a business procedure flow chart and gives step-by-step instructions for various tasks from registering a business and owning properties to obtaining permits and licenses. Detailed information on business registration and timelines can be found at: http://grenadaidc.com/investor-centre/investors-guide/starting-up-a-business/#.WKxXdfnQe70 The GIDC provides business facilitation mechanisms and ensures the equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in the economy. The government of Grenada does not promote or incentivize outward investment. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, to which Grenada is a party, includes a chapter on service agreements under the European Partnership Agreement (EPA). Under certain circumstances, provisions in these agreements may offer incentives to the potential investor. Grenada does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Grenada recognizes that investors value transparent rules and regulations dealing with investment. The Investment Act and the investment promotion regime promote transparency by authorizing investment incentives to key sectors through the GIDC. This helps to streamline processes, standardize treatment of investors, and better define investment rights. It also provides procedural guarantees and reduces the possibility for political influence in business negotiation. Grenada also seeks to promote investment by consulting with interested parties, simplifying and codifying legislation, using plain language drafting, developing registers of existing and proposed regulation, expanding electronic dissemination of regulatory material, and publishing and reviewing administrative decisions. Tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws or policies do not distort or impede investment. Bureaucratic procedures, including those for licenses and permits, are sufficiently streamlined and transparent. However, local authorities recognize that the implementation of procedures can sometimes be slow and inefficient. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are also transparent and in keeping with international requirements. Depending on the type of investment, government will require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Not only does this facilitate transparency, but also ensures corporate responsibility and protection of the country’s social and environmental resources. Draft bills, particularly those that directly impact the public, often go through a public consultation process to address any concerns and allow for revision before being brought before cabinet and passed into law. No new regulatory systems and enforcement reforms have been announced since the last ICS report. Grenada has been a member of the WTO since 1996 and is a party to agreements established under the organization. In pursuit of WTO compliance, Grenada is in the process of negotiating trade and investment agreements that contain provisions better aligned with the provisions of the WTO. Grenada is a member of CARICOM and the CARICOM Single Market Economy, which adheres to the international norms and regulatory standards outlined by the WTO. Also, in keeping with WTO regulations the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Prime Minister and the cabinet have the executive authority to negotiate and sign international agreements and conventions with other states and international organizations. Grenada’s judicial system is based on English common law. The judiciary has four levels: the Magistrates Court, the High Court, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the UK-based Privy Council. The Magistrates Court primarily handles minor civil and criminal cases, while the High Court adjudicates cases under the purview of the Acts of Parliament. Appeals from the Magistrates Court are heard by the High Court, while appeals from the High Court are heard by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is comprised of the Chief Justice, who serves as the Head of the Judiciary; four Justices of Appeal; nineteen High Court Judges; and three Masters, who are primarily responsible for procedural and interlocutory matters. The Court of Appeal judges are based at the Court’s headquarters in Saint Lucia. The Privy Council serves as Grenada’s final Court of Appeal. However, the Caribbean Court of Justice has compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 211 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, to which Grenada is a party. The Treaty delineates rights and responsibilities within CARICOM to hear and decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch, and judicial processes are generally competent, fair, and reliable, however the process can be slow. Provisions are also made for appeals with the relevant court. Grenadian law also provides for the use of arbitration and mediation to resolve investment disputes. The economy is supported by a strong legislative and regulatory framework that encourages FDI and promotes investment initiatives. Grenada augmented the investment climate with a revitalization of its Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program. In 2016 parliament passed its most recent suite of legislative changes to enhance the investment climate in Grenada. Changes were made to the following Acts: Value Added Tax Amendment Act – Provides for VAT exemptions for qualifying investments in priority sectors. Excise Tax Amendment Act – Provides for tax incentives for investors engaged in manufacturing and investors entitled to conditional duties exemptions for motor vehicles. Property Transfer Tax Amendment Act – Establishes more favorable rates of property transfer tax for investors. Customs Service Charge Amendment Act – Removes the discretionary power of cabinet to prescribe varying rates of customs service charge (CSC) and to prescribe a new rate of CSC applicable to investors engaged in manufacturing. Investment Amendment Act– Provides for specified circumstances under which the Minister of Finance may make regulations under the Principal Act. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Amendment Act – Modernizes the law relating to bankruptcy and insolvency of individuals and companies. The act is based on the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which has been used as a model in several Caribbean countries. Income Tax Amendment Act – Provides for a waiver on withholding tax applicable on specified types of repatriated funds relating to investors engaged in tourism accommodation or health and wellness. The GIDC and the Inland Revenue and Customs Department of Grenada work to ensure adherence to the rule of law and to facilitate the procedures outlined in the revised investment regime. The legal and regulatory framework governing foreign direct investment in Grenada is described here: http://grenadaidc.com/ There are no competition laws in Grenada. A number of CARICOM and Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) proposals on competition are under consideration to strengthen market regimes under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. CARICOM established a Competition Commission and plans are underway to establish a sub-regional Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission. According to the constitution, Grenada shall not compulsorily acquire or take possession of any investment or any asset of an investor except for a purpose which is legal and non-discriminatory. If the government expropriates property for a legal purpose, it must promptly pay adequate and effective compensation. Owners of expropriated assets have the right to file claims in the High Court regarding the amount of compensation or ownership of the expropriated asset. In 2016, parliament repealed the 1994 Electricity Supply Act and opened the market to potential investors who will commit to transition to alternative sources of power generation, decreasing costs, reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels, and improving energy efficiency. This repealed the exclusive license that was granted to the country’s sole electricity provider Grenada Electricity Services (GRENLEC) and its majority shareholder, U.S.-owned WRB Enterprises. This regulatory change triggered a clause in the Share Purchase Agreement requiring Grenada to repurchase the GRENLEC shares from WRB. WRB filed a request for arbitration with ICSID, and the Grenada government was ordered to pay $74 million to the U.S. investors following a March 2020 ruling. A negotiated sum of $63 million was paid to WRB Enterprises in December 2020. In the past, Grenadian citizens had their lands expropriated to permit foreign investments but were compensated for such actions, typically at the market value. There are no sectors at greater risk of expropriation, and there are no laws requiring local ownership. All expropriations have been subject to due process. The Bankruptcy Act makes provisions for all aspects of bankruptcy and sets out procedures for creditors to apply to the High Court for a bankruptcy order against a debtor and the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy. There are provisions for the court to appoint an interim receiver pending the outcome of the application for a bankruptcy order. It also includes provisions for a process whereby an insolvent person, with leave of the court, may make an assignment of the insolvent person’s property for the general benefit of creditors of the insolvent person. The High Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction in matters related to bankruptcy. 4. Industrial Policies Grenada provides a legal package of benefits and concessions for specific investment activities. Incentives include tax waivers, import duty exemptions, repatriation of profits, and withholding tax exemptions. Trade-related incentives are notified under Article 25 and Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Concessions are available under the Income Tax Act, the Common External Tariff (SRO 42/09), the Property Transfer Act, the Petrol Tax Act, and the Customer Service Charge Act. Fiscal incentives include: 100 percent investment allowances up to 15 years 50-100 percent property transfer tax waivers 50-100 percent withholding tax waivers Tax credits of 150 percent for training, research, and development Waiver of VAT on importation of capital goods Tax exemptions and waiver of duties on building materials Non-fiscal incentives include: Equal treatment of all investors regardless of nationality or residence Conversion into freely convertible currency No discrimination among foreign investors Repatriation of profits allowed Other incentives include accelerated depreciation (10 percent on physical plant and machinery; 2 percent on industrial buildings); investment allowance (100 percent write-off on total investment); carry forward of losses for three years; reductions in the property transfer tax; and 100 percent relief from customs duties on physical plant, equipment, and raw materials. Certain incentives may be linked to the site of investment, the number of persons employed, or other factors, including for green energy investments. These investment incentives also apply to businesses owned by underrepresented investors such as women. Energy is a priority sector for investment in Grenada. This also includes any business activity that involves the production of energy, including fuel extraction, renewables, refining and distribution. The government offers the following investment incentives for the energy sector: Capital Investment Allowance 100 percent of the qualifying capital expenditure (EC$3 million and over) will be written off against taxable income for a period not exceeding 15 years. Customs Duties Exemptions on the following: Building materials, fixtures and furnishings, networking elements and computer hardware and software. Production machinery, equipment and spare parts for approved machinery and equipment for use in operations. 50-100 percent relief from import duties and taxes on a maximum of four to six commercial vehicles. Value Added Tax (VAT) Suspension/Exemption Applied to capital goods imported for the establishment of the operation. Property Transfer Tax Waivers 50 -100 percent (based on qualifying investment) property transfer tax waivers on the acquisition of property. Carry forward of losses 100 percent of losses incurred in any one year be carried forward for six years and offset against 100 percent of taxable income. Tax credit for Training: Training allowance (deductible) at the rate of 150 percent on the qualifying cost of training not exceeding EC$5000 per employee trained of taxable income and to include the following: The cost of hiring an instructor to conduct the training Tuition paid to an educational or other institution offering training A stipend paid to the individual being trained to cover subsistence during the training period but not in excess of two months for a particular individual There was no instance where Grenada needed to review an approved investor for non-compliance with incentive requirements. Grenada does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. There are no foreign trade zones or free ports in Grenada. CARICOM investors are accorded Rights of Establishment, while other foreign investors are required to obtain work permits and alien landholding licenses to invest in property. The application fee for a work permit is USD $37/XCD $100 payable to the Work Permit Division of the Ministry of Labor. Along with the completed application form, applicants must also submit four passport-sized photos, a police certificate of character from their country, certificates of qualification, and a letter of intention. In addition, investors will need a character reference from a reputable person/former employer, a copy of the passport page indicating the last date of arrival in Grenada, a business registration certificate, company stamp, National Insurance Scheme compliance certificate, and recent tax compliance and VAT receipts. The approval process takes two to three weeks, longer if there are questions, and is valid for one year. U.S. investors and workers are required to pay USD $1,111 or XCD $3,000 per year for renewal. The local government does not mandate local employment but encourages it. There is no policy of “forced localization” of data storage and Grenada does not pressure international information and communications technology providers to provide source code or encryption keys. The OECS and other stakeholders have begun to develop draft model laws on electronic regimes. Laws specific to data storage and protection have not yet made it onto the national legislative agenda. There are no measures to prevent or impede companies from transmitting customer or business-related data outside the country. There are no performance requirements. Investment incentives are applied uniformly to domestic and foreign investors on a case-by-case basis. There is no requirement for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There are no measures or draft measures that restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Aliens Landholding Regulation Act No. 29 of 1968 (last amended in 2009) is the primary legislative instrument governing the right to private ownership by non-citizens. Investors may purchase or lease privately owned land and dispose of, or transfer, interests in the land under the Act. Investors may hold state lands by grant or lease from the state. Property rights and interests are enforced under the Aliens Landholding Regulation Act. The only specific regulation regarding land lease or acquisition by a foreign or non-resident investor is the requirement to acquire an Alien Landholding License. The application process is described on the following website: http://grenadaidc.com/investor-centre/investors-guide/starting-up-a-business/#.WLBEUvnQe70 Before a deed is issued, there is a title search on the previous owner, followed by conveyance, and the registering of the property to a new owner. A clear title must first be identified before the process moves forward. Once the landholder possesses a deed, the property remains legally theirs, occupied or not, until the deed is signed over to someone else. Grenada ranked 147 out of 190 for the ease of registering property on the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report, which provides the latest statistics available. The Patents Act (Cap. 227 of the Consolidated Laws of Grenada) or the Trademarks Act (Cap. 284 of the Consolidated Laws of Grenada), or the Copyright Act Cap. 32 of 1988 (Cap. 67 of the Consolidated Laws of Grenada) guarantees the intellectual property rights of investors and investment enterprises e.g., patents, trademarks, brand names, and copyrighted materials in printed, recorded, or electronic formats. Grenada is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. In April 2021 the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, of which Grenada is a member, signed a MOU with the WIPO. This will help strengthen the regional legal and regulatory architecture necessary to support the protection and monetization of intangible assets and other forms of intellectual property in the region. Domestic legislation regarding intellectual property protection has not been fully amended to bring it in line with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. However, updates to existing legislation are currently being drafted and reviewed. Trademarks Trademarks are regulated by the Trademarks Act of 2012. Patents The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act Cap 283 of the Continuous Revised Laws of Grenada is still in force, although outdated. In accordance with the act, any person being the grantee of a patent in the United Kingdom or any person deriving right from such grantee may apply within three years from the date of issue of the patent in in the UK to have it registered in Grenada. The Patent Act Cap 227 of the Continuous Revised Laws of Grenada is not TRIPS compliant. Implementation of the Patent Act No. 16 of 2011 has been slow due to the lack of implementing regulations, but the government has indicated that this a priority. Copyright The Copyright Act No. 21 of 2011 is in force. In accordance with the Berne Convention, there is no existing formal system of registration of copyrighted works. There are current discussions with WIPO, in conjunction with the intellectual property offices in the region, to consider a voluntary system of registration for copyrighted works. Geographic Indication Bill The geographic indication bills have been drafted but not yet enacted. The 2012 Trademarks Act provides for registration of collective marks in the absence of a geographic indication act. Industrial Designs Bill The Industrial Design Bill is a work in progress. According to the Office of Corporate Affairs, its enactment is a priority. Administration of intellectual property laws in Grenada is the responsibility of the Ministry of Legal Affairs. The Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) is currently responsible for the registration of trademarks, re-registration of UK patents, and all other IP matters. Post is unaware of any current or past prosecutions of IPR violations. Grenada is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report or in the 2020 notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Grenada possesses a robust legislative and policy framework that facilitates the free flow of financial resources. Its currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, has a fixed exchange rate established by the regional Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Foreign employees of investment enterprises and their families may repatriate their earnings after paying personal income tax and all other taxes due. The government of Grenada encourages foreign investors to seek investment capital from financial institutions chartered outside Grenada due to the short domestic supply of capital. Foreign investors are more likely to tap local financial markets for working capital. The government, local banks, and the ECCB respect IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The private sector has access to the limited number of credit instruments. Grenadian stocks are traded on the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, whose limited liquidity may pose difficulties in conducting transactions. The financial industry in Grenada is regulated by two entities: The ECCB and the Grenada Authority for Regulation of the Financial Industry (GARFIN). The ECCB regulates the banking system. GARFIN oversees non-banking financial institutions through a regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The estimated total assets of the largest banks are USD $1.03 billion. Information on the percentage of non-performing assets is not available. Grenada has not experienced cross-shareholding or hostile takeovers. As of November 30, 2020, commercial banks in Grenada deferred debt service on 4,069 commercial bank loans due to job losses and a reduction in salaries caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the second highest number of deferrals in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Grenada subject to prudential measures and regulations governed by the ECCB. For the requirements and procedures, foreign banks can refer to the following website: https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/p/grenada-1 There is correspondent banking available with all licensed commercial banks. No correspondent banking relationships have been lost in the past three years. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. In addition to the banking sector, there are alternative financial services provided through credit unions. GARFIN regulates credit unions. Grenada does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Grenadian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are legislatively established by acts of Parliament. These enterprises all have boards of directors appointed by the government and answerable to the relevant ministries. Twenty-five of the 28 authorized SOEs are operational. They secure credit on commercial terms from commercial banks. SOEs submit annual reports to the Government Audit Department and are subject to audits shared with their parent ministries. SOEs manage transportation infrastructure (ports and airports), housing, education, hospitals, cement production, investment promotion, and small business development, among other functions. Generally, where they compete with the private sector, they do so on an equal basis. Grenada, like its neighbors, acknowledges the OECD guidelines. Corporate governance of SOEs is established and regulated by founding statutes. Local courts show no favoritism toward SOEs in the adjudication of investment disputes. For additional information on SOEs in Grenada see:http://www.oecd.org/countries/grenada/ Grenada does not have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate social responsibility (CSR), interchangeably used with responsible business conduct, is a concept that was introduced to Grenada relatively recently by multinational and regional corporations. Local businesses are slowly incorporating this principle into their operations. Some social responsibility initiatives undertaken by the private sector and non-governmental organizations include education programs, fitness programs, sporting activities, and cultural endeavors. These are predominantly implemented by the telecommunication companies Digicel and LIME, along with financial institutions. There is also a recent push towards environmentally friendly business practices and development projects. While firms that promote CSR are more favorably viewed by the community, there is little familiarity with international CSR standards. Activities are deemed to be responsible business conduct if they are lawful, not a threat to national security, and not detrimental to the environment, health, and culture of the Grenadian people. Other than this being a requirement for any company operating in Grenada, CSR is not built into the laws governing the operations of a company. There has been no high profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or resolution of such cases in the recent past. Grenada generally enforces domestic laws in relation to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. Local labor unions play a role in promoting and monitoring responsible business conduct. Grenada uses private security companies but is not a signatory to The Montreux Document or the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers. There are no alleged/reported human or labor rights concerns relating to responsible business conduct, that foreign businesses should be aware of, and neither has there been claims in the last five years by indigenous or other communities that a government entity improperly allocated land or natural resources, or arrests of and/or violence against environmental defenders. Climate adaptation and resilience is a priority for the government of Grenada. Climate Change priority focus areas for adaptation are driven by Grenada’s Climate Change Policy, Grenada’s National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2017-2021 and Integrated Coastal Zone Management Policy. The NAP will be updated in 2022. Priorities for climate mitigation are identified in the 2020 Grenada Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which is available at the Government of Grenada Climate Finance Portal: https://climatefinance.gov.gd/ . Climate adaptation priorities for the government of Grenada include: Ecosystem Resilience, Ecosystem Based Adaptation (NAP page 43-48) is one focus area with emphasis on protected area management and ecosystem-based adaptation approaches. Integrated Coastal Zone Management (NAP page 49-52), with emphasis on the development of management plans to implement the recently passed Integrated Coastal Zone Act (2019). Monitoring, reporting and verification for reporting to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Vulnerability and risk assessment of adaptation sectors/ program areas e.g., Tourism and Fisheries. Infrastructure resilience to slow onset events and Disaster Risk Reduction. Water resilience with emphasis on watershed resilience. Climate proofing human health. Implementation of Grenada’s NDCs. Synergizing reporting to address the three Rio conventions and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Integrating Gender considerations into climate resilience action across program areas in the NAP and NDCs. Accessing climate finance and supporting community led resilience action. There are several challenges affecting climate resilience in Grenada. These include coastal erosion, flooding of low-lying areas, saltwater intrusion into fresh-water wells, limited capacity to access finance among non-governmental actors, and data capture and analysis challenges for policy decision making and reporting obligations. Environmental challenges to climate resilience include climate change impacts on the environment, alien invasive species, over exploitation of natural capital, and pollution. Grenada is aggressively pursuing its commitment through its revised NDCs to reduce its emissions by 40 percent of its pre-2010 level by the year 2030. With the electricity and transportation sectors accounting for over 70 percent of Grenada’s carbon footprint, government is striving to reach 100 percent of electricity generation through renewable energy, and 20 percent of vehicles being powered by renewable energy sources by the 2030 deadline. Grenada’s new climate change adaptation strategy will not only address policy issues, but also the development of more resilient physical infrastructure. The climate change adaptation strategy will also speak to the designation of marine protected areas, sustainable forest management, and ecosystem management plans in an effort to achieve the 2030 outcomes. 9. Corruption Grenada is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Integrity in Public Life Act (Act No.24 of 2013) requires that all public servants report their income and assets to the independent Integrity Commission for review. The Integrity in Public Life Commission monitors and verifies disclosures, although disclosures are not made public except in court. Failure to file a disclosure should be noted in the Official Gazette. If the office holder in question fails to file in response to this notification, the commission can seek a court order to enforce compliance. The Office of the Ombudsman received 29 complaints in 2020, compared to 59 in 2019 and 64 in 2018. Of the 29 complaints, one was closed, 12 are ongoing, 7 received advice/referrals, and 9 were outside the jurisdiction of the ombudsman. Private entities received the highest number of complaints totaling 9, followed by the Ministry of Labor with 6. Of the 9 complaints, advice/referrals were given to 3, and 6 were beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Of the 6 complaints against the Ministry of Labor, 3 are ongoing, 2 received advice/referrals and1 was beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Bribery is illegal in Grenada. For the most part, the enforcement of anti-bribery laws and procedures is effective and non-discriminatory. Grenada is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The country accepted and acknowledged the UN Convention against Corruption but has not yet signed or ratified it. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Grenada. Sheldon Thomas Assistant Superintendent of Police/Head of FIUFinancial Intelligence Unit (FIU) The Carenage, St. George’s, Grenada (473) 435-2373 / 2374 gdafiu@fiu.gov.gd Ronnie Marryshow Ombudsman Office of the Ombudsman Tanteen, St. George’s, Grenada (473) 435-9315 ombudsmangd@spiceisle.com Contact at “watchdog” organization: Lady Anande Trotman-Joseph Chairperson Office of the Integrity Commission Archibald Avenue, St. George’s, Grenada (473) 439-9212/ 534-5190 office@grenadaintegritycommission.org 10. Political and Security Environment Grenada has a stable parliamentary representative democracy free from political violence. There have been no examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Grenada signed and ratified all the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) recommendations and enshrined these rights into its labor laws, including the Labor Relations Act No.1 of 1999 and the Employment Act No. 1 of 1999. Grenadian law protects the right of workers to be represented by a trade union of their choice. Employers are generally expected to recognize a union that represents most workers but are not obligated to recognize a minority union if most of the workforce does not belong to said union. In accordance with the Trade Union Recognition Act No 29 of 1979, investors shall grant union representation at any site of employment if most employees indicate the desire for union representation. Investment enterprises are also required to contribute to the social insurance and welfare programs for their workers in accordance with the National Insurance Act. The Ministry of Labor may refer disputes regarding workers in essential services to compulsory arbitration. Essential services include employees of utility companies, public health, and protection sectors, including sanitation, airport, seaport, and dock services. Grenada does not restrict the legal activities of trade unions. Most of the workforce is unionized, and labor relations are generally stable. Article 32 of the Employment Act prohibits employment of children under the age of 16 except for temporary holiday employment. Part 7 of the Employment Act provides for the protection and regulation of wages, and article 52 mandates the minimum wage. Minimum wage schedules are set by occupation. In the second quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate was 28.4 percent compared to 15.1 percent during the fourth quarter of 2019. In 2020, more than 14,000 jobs were lost from a labor force of approximately 50,000 due to the global COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the tourism sector. There have been strikes in the past year, but none posed an investment risk, and negotiations toward a satisfactory resolution continue. There are no gaps in compliance in law or practice with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors. No potential gaps were identified in law or in practice with international standards by the ILO. No new labor-related laws or regulations were enacted during the last year, and no bills are pending. The government does not legally define the informal sector and there is no data on the number or percentage of persons in this sector. Street vendors, agricultural workers, farmers, construction workers, and domestic workers are often considered small/micro businesses and were protected by wage, hour, and occupational safety and health laws. 14. Contact for More Information Breanna L Green Deputy Political and Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Grenada Tel: (246) 227-4000 Email: GreenB2@state.gov Rachér Croney Political & Economic Specialist Tel: (473) 444-1173 Email: croneyrr@state.gov Contacts for Investment-Related Inquiries: Ronald Theodore CEO, Grenada Investment Development Corporation Tel: (473) 444-1035 Email: Invest@grenadaidc.com or rtheodore@grenadaidc.com Website: www.grenadaidc.com Cathyann Alexander-Pierre Senior Specialist, Investment Promotion Agency Grenada Investment Development Corporation Tel: (473) 444-1033-35, Ext.-236 Email: calexander@grenadaidc.com Guatemala Executive Summary Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America, with a $ 85.9 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021. The economy grew by an estimated 7.5 percent in 2021 following a 1.5 percent retraction in 2020. Remittances, mostly from the United States, increased by 34.9 percent in 2021 and were equivalent to 17.8 percent of GDP. The United States is Guatemala’s most important economic partner. The Guatemalan government continues to make efforts to enhance competitiveness, promote investment opportunities, and work on legislative reforms aimed at supporting economic growth. More than 200 U.S. and other foreign firms have active investments in Guatemala, benefitting from the U.S. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was $21.4 billion in 2021, a 21.9 percent increase over 2020. FDI flows increased by 272.6 percent in 2021 mostly due to the purchase of outstanding shares of a local company by a foreign telecommunications company. Some of the activities that attracted most of the FDI flows in the last three years were information and communications, financial and insurance activities, manufacturing, commerce and vehicle repair, water, electricity, and sanitation services. Despite steps to improve Guatemala’s investment climate, international companies choosing to invest in Guatemala face significant challenges. Complex laws and regulations, inconsistent judicial decisions, bureaucratic impediments, and corruption continue to impede investment. Citing Guatemala’s CAFTA-DR obligations, the United States has raised concerns with the Guatemalan government regarding its enforcement of both its labor and environmental laws. Guatemala’s Climate Change Framework Law established the groundwork for Guatemala’s Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) and is designed to align Guatemala’s emissions and development targets with national planning documents in six sectors: energy, transportation, industry, land use, agriculture, and waste management. In November 2020, the Guatemala government endorsed the LEDS as the country’s official strategy for climate change mitigation. As part of the government’s efforts to promote economic recovery during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Economy (MINECO) began implementing an economic recovery plan in September 2020, which focuses on recovering lost jobs and generating new jobs, attracting new strategic investment, and promoting consumption of Guatemalan goods and services locally and globally. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 101 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 789 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,490 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Guatemalan government continues to promote investment opportunities and work on reforms to enhance competitiveness and the business environment. As part of the government’s efforts to promote economic recovery during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Economy (MINECO) began implementing an economic recovery plan in September 2020, which focuses on recovering lost jobs and generating new jobs, attracting new strategic investment, and promoting consumption of Guatemalan goods and services locally and globally. Private consultants contributed to the government’s September 2020 economic recovery plan, which focuses on increasing exports and attracting foreign direct investment. During 2021 and first months of 2022 the Guatemalan congress approved some key economic legislation included in the economic recovery plan to improve the investment climate and foster economic growth, such as a leasing law, amendments to the free trade zone law, a law to simplify administrative procedures and requirements, and an insolvency law. Guatemala’s investment promotion office operates within MINECO’s National Competitiveness Program (PRONACOM). PRONACOM supports potential foreign investors by offering information, assessment, coordination of country visits, contact referrals, and support with procedures and permits necessary to operate in the country. Services are offered to all investors without discrimination. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report ranked Guatemala 96 out of 190 countries, one position lower than its rank in 2019. (Word Bank discontinued its Doing Business report in September 2021.) The two areas where the country had the highest rankings that year were electricity and access to credit. The areas of the lowest ranking were protecting minority investors, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. International investors tend to engage with the Guatemalan government via chambers of commerce and industry associations, and/or directly with specific government ministries. PRONACOM began to prioritize investment retention in 2020 and continued this policy throughout 2021. The Guatemalan Constitution recognizes the right to hold private property and to engage in business activity. Foreign private entities can establish, acquire, and dispose freely of virtually any type of business interest, with the exception of some professional services as noted below. The Foreign Investment Law specifically notes that foreign investors enjoy the same rights of use, benefits, and ownership of property as Guatemalan citizens. Guatemalan law prohibits foreigners, however, from owning land immediately adjacent to rivers, oceans, and international borders. Guatemalan law does not prohibit the formation of joint ventures or the purchase of local companies by foreign investors. The absence of a developed, liquid, and efficient capital market, in which shares of publicly owned firms are traded, makes equity acquisitions in the open market difficult. Most foreign firms operate through locally incorporated subsidiaries. The law does not restrict foreign investment in the telecommunications, electrical power generation, airline, or ground-transportation sectors. The Foreign Investment Law removed limitations to foreign ownership in domestic airlines and ground-transport companies in January 2004. The Guatemalan government does not have a screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Some professional services may only be supplied by professionals with locally-recognized academic credentials. Public notaries must be Guatemalan nationals. Foreign enterprises may provide licensed, professional services in Guatemala through a contract or other relationship with a Guatemalan company. As of 2010, Guatemalan law allows foreign insurance companies to open branches in Guatemala, a requirement under CAFTA-DR. This law requires foreign insurance companies to fully capitalize in Guatemala. Guatemala has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. The Guatemalan government had its last WTO trade policy review (TPR) in November 2016. In 2011, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an investment policy review (IPR) on Guatemala. The WTO TPR highlighted Guatemala’s efforts to increase trade liberalization and economic reform efforts by eliminating export subsidies for free trade zones, export-focused manufacturing, and assembly operations (maquilas) regimes, as well as amendments to the government procurement law to improve transparency and efficiency. The WTO TPR noted that Guatemala continues to lack a general competition law and a corresponding competition authority. The UNCTAD IPR-recommended strengthening the public sector’s institutional capacity and highlighted that adopting a competition law and policy should be a priority in Guatemala’s development agenda. The government agreed to approve a competition law by November 2016 as part of its commitments under the Association Agreement with the European Union, but the draft law had not been approved as of March 2022. Other important recommendations from the UNCTAD IPR were to further explore alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the establishment of courts for commercial and land disputes, though the government had not made substantive progress on these recommendations as of March 2022. The Guatemalan government has a business registration website (https://minegocio.gt/), which facilitates on-line registration procedures for new businesses. Foreign companies that are incorporated locally are able to use the online business registration window, but the system is not yet available to other foreign companies. The commercial code amendments that entered into force in January 2018 reduced the time and costs to register a new business online. As of March 2022, the estimated time to register a new mercantile company online was from four to 36 hours and the estimated time to register a limited liability company was between 11 and 15 days.. The estimated costs to register a new mercantile company and a new limited liability company were $19 and $77, respectively, as of March 2022. The procedures allow mercantile companies to receive their business registration certificates online. Every company must register with the business registry, the tax administration authority, the social security institute, and the labor ministry. Licenses, if required from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food, and/or Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, add considerable additional time. Guatemala does not incentivize nor restrict outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Tax, labor, environment, health, and safety laws do not directly impede investment in Guatemala. Bureaucratic hurdles are common for both domestic and foreign companies, including lengthy processes to obtain permits and licenses as well as to clear shipments through Customs. The legal and regulatory systems can be confusing and administrative decisions are often not transparent. Laws and regulations often contain few explicit criteria for government administrators, resulting in ambiguous requirements that are applied inconsistently by different government agencies and the courts. Public participation in the formulation of laws or regulations is rare. In some cases, private sector groups, and to a lesser extent civil society groups are able to submit comments to the issuing government office or to the congressional committee reviewing the bill, but with limited effect. There is no legislative oversight of administrative rule making. The Guatemalan congress publishes all draft bills on its official website, but it does not make them available for public comment. The congress often does not disclose last-minute amendments before congressional decisions. Final versions of laws, once signed by the President, must be published in the official gazette before entering into force. Congress publishes scanned versions of all laws that are published in the official gazette. Information on the budget and debt obligations is publicly available at the Ministry of Finance’s primary website, but information on debt obligations does not include state-owned enterprise debt. Guatemala is a member of the Central American Common Market and has adopted the Central American uniform customs tariff schedule. As a member of the WTO, the Guatemalan government notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. The Guatemalan congress approved the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in January 2017, which entered into force for Guatemala March 8, 2017. Guatemala classified 63.9 percent of its commitments under Category A, which includes commitments implemented upon entry into the agreement; 8.8 percent under Category B, which includes commitments to be implemented between February 2019 to July 2020; and 27.3 percent under Category C, which includes commitments to be implemented between February 2020 and July 2024. In February 2022, Guatemala requested an extension of time for a commitment to implement a single window for importation, exportation, and transit of goods, established under Article 10.4.1 and 10.4.2 of the TFA from the initial date of July 2022 to January 2024. In 1996, Guatemala ratified Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO 169), which entered into force in 1997. Article 6 of the Convention requires the government to consult indigenous groups or communities prior to initiating a project that could affect them directly. Potential investors should determine whether their investment will affect indigenous groups and, if so, request that the Guatemalan government lead a consultation process in compliance with ILO 169. The Guatemalan congress began considering a draft law to create a community consultation mechanism to fulfill its ILO-mandated obligations in March 2018, but the bill was still pending congressional approval as of March 2022. The lack of a clear consultation process significantly impedes investment in large-scale projects. Guatemala has a civil law system. The codified judicial branch law stipulates that jurisprudence or case law is also a source of law. Guatemala has a written and consistently applied commercial code. Contracts in Guatemala are legally enforced when the holder of a property right that has been infringed upon files a lawsuit to enforce recognition of the infringed right or to receive compensation for the damage caused. The civil law system allows for civil cases to be brought before, after, or concurrently with criminal claims. Guatemala does not have specialized commercial courts, but it does have civil courts that hear commercial cases and specialized courts that hear labor, contraband, or tax cases. The judicial system is designed to be independent of the executive branch, and the judicial process for the most part is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. There are frequent and wide-ranging accusations of corruption within the judicial branch. More than 200 U.S. firms as well as hundreds of foreign firms have active investments in Guatemala. CAFTA-DR established a more secure and predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Guatemala. Under CAFTA-DR, all forms of investment are protected, including enterprises, debt, concessions, contracts, and intellectual property. U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in Guatemala on an equal footing with local investors in almost all circumstances. The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala places a high priority on improving the investment climate for U.S. investors. Guatemala passed a foreign investment law in 1998 to streamline and facilitate processes in foreign direct investment. In order to ensure compliance with CAFTA-DR, the Guatemalan congress approved in May 2006 a law that strengthened existing legislation on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, government procurement, trade, insurance, arbitration, and telecommunications, as well as the penal code. Congress approved an e-commerce law in August 2008, which provides legal recognition to electronically executed communications and contracts; permits electronic communications to be accepted as evidence in all administrative, legal, and private actions; and, allows for the use of electronic signatures. Guatemala previously faced two for violating its CAFTA-DR obligations—one under the labor chapter and the other under the environmental chapter. In the 2008 labor case filed by the AFL-CIO and six Guatemalan worker organizations, the arbitration panel found that the Guatemalan government failed to effectively enforce its labor laws, particularly by failing to enforce labor court orders for anti-union dismissals and to take enforcement actions in response to worker complaints. The panel determined that beyond the noted enforcement failures, evidence did not rise to a level sufficient to prove a violation of CAFTA-DR. Regarding the environmental case, the CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters suspended its investigation in 2012 when the Guatemalan government provided evidence that the relevant facts of the case were under consideration by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. The constitutional court dismissed the case on procedural grounds in 2013. Complex and confusing laws and regulations, inconsistent judicial decisions, bureaucratic impediments and corruption continue to constitute practical barriers to investment. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports for 2015 and 2016, Guatemala made paying taxes easier and less costly by improving the electronic filing and payment system (“Declaraguate”) and by lowering the corporate income tax rate. Despite these measures, World Banks Doing Business Report for 2020 (the last available) ranked Guatemala 104 of 190 countries with respect to paying taxes. The Guatemalan government developed a useful website to help navigate the laws, procedures and registration requirements for investors (http://asisehace.gt/). The website provides detailed information on laws and regulations and administrative procedures applicable to investment, including the number of steps, names, and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time and legal grounds justifying the procedures. Companies that carry out export activities or sell to exempted entities have the right to claim value added tax (VAT) credit refunds for the VAT paid to suppliers and documented with invoices for purchases of the goods and services used for production. Some local and foreign companies continue to experience significant delays in receiving refunds. Guatemala’s Tax and Customs Authority (SAT) began implementing a new plan in 2017 to streamline the process and expedite VAT credit refunds. The Guatemalan congress approved legal provisions in April 2019 that went into effect in November 2019. SAT established in December 2019 an electronic tax credit refund regime that expedites VAT credit refunds to exporters, but exporters claiming refunds outside the electronic tax credit refund regime continued to reportdelays in VAT refunds as of March 2022. As part of its 2012 income tax reform, the Guatemalan government began implementing transfer pricing provisions in 2016. The Guatemalan congress approved a leasing law in February 2021 to regulate real estate and other types of leasing operations, including lease contracts with an option to purchase. A Guatemalan law to simplify, streamline, and digitize requirements and administrative procedures that are carried out with Executive Branch’s offices entered into force in August 2021. Guatemala does not have a law to regulate monopolistic or anti-competitive practices. The Guatemalan government agreed to approve a competition law by November 2016 as part of its commitments under the Association Agreement with the European Union. The Guatemalan government submitted a draft competition law to Congress in May 2016, but it was still pending approval by Congress as of March 2022. Guatemala’s constitution prohibits expropriation, except in cases of eminent domain, national interest, or social benefit. The Foreign Investment Law requires proper compensation in cases of expropriation. Investor rights are protected under CAFTA-DR by an impartial procedure for dispute settlement that is fully transparent and open to the public. Submissions to dispute panels and dispute panel hearings are open to the public, and interested parties have the opportunity to submit their views. The Guatemalan government maintains the right to terminate a contract at any time during the life of the contract, if it determines the contract is contrary to the public welfare. It has rarely exercised this right and can only do so after providing the guarantees of due process. Guatemala does not have an independent bankruptcy law in effect as of March 2022. However, the Guatemalan congress passed an insolvency law that applies to both individuals and businesses and regulates the renegotiation procedure between debtors and creditors in case of insolvency in February 2022. The new law will enter into force in August 2022 and requires the judicial branch to create specialized bankruptcy/insolvency courts within five years of the law’s enactment. Meanwhile, individuals and businesses that are facing insolvency can continue to use the Code on Civil and Mercantile Legal Proceedings, which contains a specific chapter on bankruptcy proceedings. Under the code, creditors can request to be included in the list of creditors; request an insolvency proceeding when a debtor has suspended payments of liabilities to creditors; and constitute a general board of creditors to be informed of the proceedings against the debtor. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, but it can become a crime if a court determines there was intent to defraud. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Guatemala ranked 157 out of 190 countries in resolving insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies Guatemala’s main investment incentive programs are specified in law and are offered nationwide to both foreign and Guatemalan investors without discrimination. Guatemala’s primary incentive program – the Law for the Promotion and Development of Export Activities and Maquilas (factories that import duty-free materials and assemble products for export) – is aimed mainly at the apparel and textile sector and at services exporters such as call centers and business processes outsourcing (BPO) companies. The government grants investors in these two sectors a 10-year income tax exemption. Additional incentives include an exemption from duties and value-added taxes (VAT) on imported machinery and equipment and a one-year suspension of the same duties and taxes on imports of production inputs, samples, and packing material. The Free Trade Zone Law provides similar incentives to the incentive program described above. The Guatemalan congress approved the Law for Conservation of Employment (Decree 19-2016) in February 2016,amending Guatemala’s two major incentive programs to replace tax incentives related to exports that Guatemala dismantled on December 31, 2015, per WTO requirements. Congress approved new amendments to the Free Trade Zones (FTZ) Law in May 2021 to reincorporate some of the economic activities that had been excluded during the 2016 reforms, such as manufacturing of plastic products, medications, and electronic devices and household appliances. The amendments to the FTZ law establish that local and foreign businesses and individuals with activities already taxed in the national customs territory may not migrate to FTZ or benefit from the incentives provided by this law. However, companies already operating in country that create new businesses with different activities than those already taxed are exempt from this provision. The public Free Trade Zone of Industry and Commerce Santo Tomas de Castilla (ZOLIC) that operates contiguous to the state-owned port Santo Tomas de Castilla issued a regulation in January 2019 allowing the establishment of ZOLIC’s special public economic development zones outside of ZOLIC’s customs perimeter. The ZOLIC law grants businesses operating within the new special public economic development zones a 10-year income tax exemption. Additional exemptions include an exemption from VAT, customs duties, and other charges on imports of goods entering the area, including raw materials, supplies, machinery and equipment, as well as a VAT exemption on all taxable transactions carried out within the free trade zone when goods are exported. The law states that the incentives are available to local and foreign investors engaged in manufacturing and commercial activities as well as the provision of services. The Law on Incentives for the Development of Renewable Energy Projects (Decree 52-2003) is aimed at municipalities, the National Electricity Institute (INDE), joint ventures, individuals and businesses that develop any renewable energy projects. It grants a 10-year exemption from import duties, including value added tax on imported machinery and equipment used exclusively for the generation of electricity in the area where the renewable projects are located. This incentive is valid only during the pre-investment and construction periods. The law also provides a 10-year income tax exemption valid from the date when a project starts commercial operation. The incentive is granted only to individuals and businesses that directly develop the project and only for the project. Decree 65-89, Guatemala’s Free Trade Zones Law and its amendments approved through Decree 19-2016, Law for Conservation of Employment and Decree 6-2021, permits the establishment of free trade zones (FTZs) in any region of the country. Developers of private FTZs must obtain authorization from MINECO to install and manage a FTZ. Businesses operating within authorized FTZs also require authorization from MINECO. The law specifies investment incentives, which are available to both foreign and Guatemalan investors without discrimination. As of March 2022, there were four authorized FTZs operating in Guatemala. The Guatemalan congress approved amendments to the Free Trade Zones Law in May 2021 to reinstate tax incentives to some of the activities removed during the previous reform. Decree 22-73, ZOLIC’s law and its amendments approved through Decree 30-2018, allow the establishment of ZOLIC’s special public economic development zones outside of ZOLIC’s customs perimeter as described under the Investment Incentives subsection above. Special public economic development zones can be installed in ZOLIC’s facilities or property owned by third parties that is leased or granted in usufruct to ZOLIC. Administrators of special public economic development zones must obtain authorization from ZOLIC’s board of directors for a minimum period of 12 years. ZOLIC´s board of directors had approved nine special public economic development zones as of March 2022. Guatemalan law does not impose performance, purchase, or export requirements nor does the government require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology. Companies are not required to include local content in production. Guatemalan companies do not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code. Some industries, such as the banking and financial sector, can request that their institution or a source code facilities management company receive a copy of the source code in case of potential problems with the IT provider. 5. Protection of Property Rights Guatemala follows the real property registry system. Defects in the titles and ownership gaps in the public record can lead to conflicting claims of land ownership, especially in rural areas. The government stepped up efforts to enforce property rights by helping to provide a clear property title. Nevertheless, when rightful ownership is in dispute, it can be difficult to obtain and subsequently enforce eviction notices. Mortgages are available to finance homes and businesses. Most banks offer mortgage loans with terms as long as 25 years for residential real estate. Mortgages and liens are recorded at the real estate property registry. According to the 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report, registering property in Guatemala takes 24 days, and it costs 3.6 percent of the property value. In the 2020 report, Guatemala ranked 89 out of 190 countries in the category of Registering Property. The legal system is accessible to foreigners who may buy, sell, and file suit under the law. However, the legal system is not easily navigated without competent counsel. Foreign investors are advised to seek reliable local counsel early in the investment process. Guatemala has been a member of the WTO since 1995 and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) since 1983. It is also a signatory to the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Rome Convention, Phonograms Convention, and the Nairobi Treaty. Guatemala has ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). In June 2006, as part of CAFTA-DR implementation, Guatemala ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure. Also in June 2006, the Guatemalan congress approved the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention). Implementing legislation that would allow Guatemala to become a party to the convention, however, is still pending. The Guatemalan congress approved the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) and the Marrakesh Treaty in February 2016. Legislation to incorporate TLT provisions into local law is pending as of March 2022. The Guatemalan congress passed amendments to the Copyright and Related Rights Law to adapt Marrakesh Treaty provisions into local law in October 2018, and the Guatemalan government issued its implementing regulation in March 2022. Guatemala has a registry for intellectual property. Trademarks, copyrights, patents rights, industrial designs, and other forms of intellectual property must be registered in Guatemala to obtain protection in the country. The Guatemalan congress passed an industrial property law in August 2000, bringing the country’s intellectual property rights laws into compliance with the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. Congress modified the legislation in 2003 to provide pharmaceutical test data protection consistent with international practice and again in 2005 to comply with IPR protection requirements in CAFTA-DR. CAFTA-DR provides for improved standards for the protection and enforcement of a broad range of IPR, which are consistent with U.S. standards of protection and enforcement as well as emerging international standards. Congress approved a law to prohibit the production and sale of counterfeit medicine in November 2011. It approved amendments to the Industrial Property Law in June 2013 to allow the registration of geographical indications (GI), as required under the Association Agreement with the European Union. Guatemalan administrative authorities issued rulings on applications to register GIs that appear sound and well-reasoned for compound GI names, but U.S. exporters are concerned that 2014 rulings on single-name GIs will effectively prohibit new U.S. products in the Guatemalan market from using what appear to be generic or common names when identifying their goods locally. Guatemala remains on USTR’s Special 301 Watch List in 2022 and has been on the Watch list for more than 10 years. Despite a generally sound legal framework, IPR enforcement remains limited due to resource constraints, and limited coordination among law enforcement agencies. Piracy and copyright and trademark infringement, including those of some major U.S. food and pharmaceutical brands, remain problematic in Guatemala. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Guatemala’s capital markets lack a securities regulator. The local stock exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) deals almost exclusively in commercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos), and government bonds. The Guatemalan Central Bank (Banguat),the Superintendency of Banks (SIB), and the Ministry of Economy were drafting an updated capital markets bill that included a chapter on securitization companies and the securitization process as of March 2022. Notwithstanding the lack of a modern capital markets law, the government debt market continues to develop. Domestic treasury bonds represented 58.1 percent of total public debt as of December 2021. Guatemala lacks a market for publicly traded equities, which raises the cost of capital and complicates mergers and acquisitions. As of December 2021, borrowers faced a weighted average annual interest rate of 15.4 percent in local currency and 6.1 percent in foreign currency, with some banks charging over 40 percent on consumer or micro-credit loans. Commercial loans to large businesses offered the lowest rates and were on average 5.5 percent in local currency as of December 2021. Dollar-denominated loans typically are some percentage points lower than those issued in local currency. Foreigners rarely rely on the local credit market to finance investments. Overall, the banking system remains stable. The Monetary Board, Banguat, and SIB approved various temporary measures during 2020 to increase liquidity of the banking system during the first months of the pandemic and to allow banks to approve restructuring of loans or deferral of loans to businesses and individuals affected by the pandemic. About 5.8 percent of the total number of loans remained subject to the temporary measures approved in 2020 as of December 2021. Non-performing loans represented 1.8 percent of total loans as of January 2022. According to information from the SIB, Guatemala’s 17 commercial banks had an estimated $56 billion in assets in December 2021. The six largest banks control 88 percent of total assets. In addition, Guatemala has 11 non-bank financial institutions, which perform primarily investment banking and medium- and long-term lending, and three exchange houses. Access to financial services is very high in Guatemala City, as well as in major regional cities. Guatemala had 23.7 access points per 10,000 adults at the national level and 29.1 access points per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. There were 12,446 banking accounts per 10,000 adults at the national level and 24,915 banking accounts per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. Most banks offer a variety of online banking services. Foreigners are normally able to open a bank account by presenting their passport and a utility bill or some other proof of residence. However, requirements vary by bank. In April 2002, the Guatemalan congress passed a package of financial sector regulatory reforms that increased the regulatory and supervisory authority of the SIB, which is responsible for regulating the financial services industry. The reforms brought local practices more in line with international standards and spurred a round of bank consolidations and restructurings. The 2002 reforms required that non-performing assets held offshore be included in loan-loss-provision and capital-adequacy ratios. As a result, a number of smaller banks sought new capital, buyers, or mergers with stronger banks, reducing the number of banks from 27 in 2005 to 17 in 2021. Guatemalan banking and supervisory authorities and the Guatemalan congress actively work on new laws in the business and financial sectors. In August 2012, the Guatemalan congress approved reforms to the Banking and Financial Groups Law and to the Central Bank Organic Law that strengthened supervision and prudential regulation of the financial sector and resolution mechanisms for failed or failing banks. The Guatemalan government submitted to congress proposed amendments to the Banking and Financial Groups Law in November 2016 and an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing draft law in August 2020. Both proposed laws were pending congressional approval as of March 2022. Foreign banks may open branches or subsidiaries in Guatemala subject to Guatemalan financial controls and regulations. These include a rule requiring local subsidiaries of foreign banks and financial institutions operating in Guatemala to meet Guatemalan capital and lending requirements as if they were stand-alone operations. Groups of affiliated credit card, insurance, financial, commercial banking, leasing, and related companies must issue consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with uniform, generally accepted accounting practices. The groups are audited and supervised on a consolidated basis. The total number of correspondent banking relationships with Guatemala’s financial sector showed a slight decline in 2016, but the changes in the relationships were similar to those seen throughout the region and reflected a trend of de-risking. The situation stabilized in 2017. The number of correspondent banking relationships remained stable in 2021. Alternative financial services in Guatemala include credit and savings unions and microfinance institutions. Guatemala does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guatemala has three main state-owned enterprises: The National Electricity Institute (INDE) and two state-owned ports, Santo Tomas on the Caribbean coast, and Port Quetzal on the Pacific coast. INDE is a state-owned electricity company responsible for expanding the provision of electricity to rural communities. INDE owns approximately 14 percent of the country’s installed effective generation capacity, and it participates in the wholesale market under the same rules as its competitors. It also provides a subsidy to consumers of up to 88 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per month. Its board of directors comprises representatives from the government, municipalities, business associations, and labor unions. The board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President appoints Santo Tomas Ports’ board of directors, and the board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President also appoints the president of Port Quetzal’s board, and the president of the board appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan government also appoints the manager of state-owned telephone company GUATEL, which split off from the fixed-line telephone company during the 1998 privatization program. GUATEL’s operations are small, and it continuously fails to generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses. The GUATEL director reports to the Guatemalan President and to the board of directors. The Guatemalan government currently owns 16 percent of the shares of the Rural Development Bank (Banrural), the second largest bank in Guatemala, and holds 3 out of 10 seats on its board of directors. Banrural is a mixed capital company and operates under the same laws and regulations as other commercial banks. The Guatemalan government privatized a number of state-owned assets in industries and utilities in the late 1990s including power distribution, telephone services, and grain storage. Guatemala does not currently have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of expectations of standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) on the part of producers and service providers, as well as Guatemalan business chambers. A local organization called the Center for Socially Responsible Business Action (CentraRSE) promotes, advocates, and monitors RBC in Guatemala. They operate freely with multiple partner organizations, ranging from private sector to United Nations entities. CentraRSE currently has over 100 affiliated companies from 20 different sectors that provide employment to over 150,000 individuals. CentraRSE defines RBC as a business culture based on ethical principles, strong law enforcement, and respect for individuals, families, communities, and the environment, which contributes to businesses competitiveness, general welfare, and sustainable development. The Guatemalan government did not have a definition of RBC as of March 2022. Guatemala joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in February 2011 and was designated EITI compliant in March 2014. The EITI board suspended Guatemala in February 2019 for failing to publish the 2016 EITI report and the 2017 annual progress report by the December 31, 2018 deadline. Guatemala published the 2016-2017 EITI report and the 2017 annual progress report in February and March 2019. The EITI board suspended Guatemala again in January 2020 after deciding that Guatemala has made inadequate progress in implementing the 2016 EITI standard. The EITI board requested Guatemala to undertake corrective actions before a second validation related to the requirements started on July 23, 2021. On December 24, 2020, the EITI board postponed the date to start Guatemala’s second validation process to April 1, 2022. Guatemala published the 2018-2020 EITI report in November 2021 but remained suspended as of March 2022. The State Department has recognized U.S. companies such as McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Denimatrix for corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in Guatemala that aimed to foster safe and productive workplaces as well as provide health and education programs to workers, their families, and local communities. Communities with low levels of government funding for health, education, and infrastructure generally expect companies to implement CSR practices. Conflict surrounding certain industrial projects – in particular mining and hydroelectric projects – is frequent, and there have been several cases of violence against protestors in the recent past, including several instances of murder. On October 24, 2021, President Alejandro Giammattei declared a State of Siege in El Estor as dozens of protestors, including environmental defenders, indigenous activists, and outside agitators blocked coal trucks from accessing a nickel mine and clashed with National Police (PNC). Media reported that the government maintained a force of 500 police and military in El Estor during the 30-day State of Siege to carry out patrols, manage vehicle checkpoints, and conduct raids. Indigenous leaders, journalists, and civil society organizations alleged that they faced arbitrary detentions and persecution for participating in anti-mining protests. Lack of clarity over indigenous consultations continues to impact Guatemala’s investment climate. On December 10, 2021, the government declared the successful conclusion of the ILO consultations with those indigenous groups they designated as participants in the consultation process for the nickel mine. The community’s self-determined governance structure, the Ancestral Council of Q’eqchi Peoples, was excluded from the consultations, and critics claimed that the government purposely neglected to include the group. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Climate Change Framework Law (Decree 7-2013) outlines requirements for the government’s response to the impacts of climate change, in particular by reducing climate change vulnerability, improving adaptive capacity, and promoting mitigation activities. The law also creates a National Climate Change Information System, managed by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN), as well as a National Climate Change Council to supervise implementation of the law and its associated Climate Change Fund. The Climate Change Framework Law also enables development of the National Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) Strategy, which clarifies questions about carbon emission reduction ownership and charges MARN with the creation of the National Registry for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Projects. The law establishes the groundwork for Guatemala’s Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) and is designed to align Guatemala’s emissions and development targets with national planning documents in six sectors: energy, transportation, industry, land use, agriculture, and waste management. In November 2020, the Guatemalan government endorsed the LEDS as the country’s official strategy for climate change mitigation. In 2015, Guatemala submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Accords, pledging to reduce current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 11.2 percent by 2030 by its own means. With the support of the international community, Guatemala also committed to reducing GHG emissions by 22.6 percent compared to its emissions growth trend from 1990-2005. Guatemala’s NDC does not target net zero emissions by 2050, nor do local climate experts believe the country is likely to achieve its current goals, primarily due to resource and capacity constraints. Guatemala failed to submit a revised NDC at COP-26 in 2021 but continues to prepare a revision to its NDCs led by MARN, the Ministry of Finance (MINFIN) and SEGEPLAN with the support of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Guatemala and the NDC Partnership’s Climate Action Enhancement Package. The revised NDC pledges the same level of GHG reductions as the 2015 version. The document assigns few specific emissions reductions targets except in the agricultural and energy sectors. It does not delineate specific targets for the private sector. Critics say the NDC lacks the specific policies necessary to achieve even these modest reductions. In 2018, Guatemala submitted to the UNFCCC the second edition of its National Climate Change Action Plan known in general, as a National Adaptation Plan. It is important to highlith the updated NDC claims to integrate cross-cutting issues, such as gender and inclusion of indigenous peoples by integrating inputs from the strategy for mainstreaming gender considerations in climate change in support of the NDC (UNDP-MARN, 2020), institutional gender representatives, and the Indigenous Climate Change Roundtable. Furthermore, Guatemala stated it will undertake an analysis of available funding and gaps for implementing NDC goals, identifying capacity-building needs, and managing information. The Law on Protected Areas (Decree 4-89) created both the Guatemalan System of Protected Areas (SIGAP) and the National Council of Protected Areas (CONAP), which oversees SIGAP. The general objectives of this law are to ensure the optimal functioning of essential ecological processes and key natural systems; preserve biological diversity; attain sustained utilization of species and ecosystems in the national territory; defend and preserve the natural patrimony of the country; and establish the protected areas in the country as a matter of public utility and social interest. Protected areas are defined as those created with the purpose of conserving, managing, and restoring wild flora and fauna, other related resources, and natural and cultural interactions. Guatemala’s congress must approve the designation of a new protected area and had so designated 349 areas as of January 2021. The Protected Areas law requires CONAP to determine fines for infractions, up to and including prison sentences for crimes against the nation’s natural and cultural patrimony, illegal wildlife trafficking, and squatting in protected areas. Regulatory fines are often challenged in the courts, delaying enforcement. Within the Guatemala NDC, the Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use sectors (AFOLU) are recognized as the largest sources of GHG emissions in the country and offer opportunities for emission reductions. Guatemala has experienced some of the highest deforestation rates in Latin America. From 1990 to 2015, overall forest cover declined by more than 1.2 million hectares, which accounts for nearly 12 percent of Guatemala’s total land area. To prevent further emissions in the AFOLU sectors, the Government maintains contracts with eleven community groups in northern Guatemala that derive significant income by sustainably managing over 500,000 hectares of certified forests. Both former President Morales and current President Giammattei directed their cabinets to approve the renewal of 25-year contracts for the concessions. So far, five of the original nine have been approved and President Giamattei in 2021 established two additional community managed concessions bringing the total to eleven community forest concessions. PROBOSQUE (created by Decree 2-2015) is a forestry program that devotes one percent of the national budget to incentivize the protection of natural forests, reforestation, and the establishment of agroforestry practices. While PROBOSQUE builds on past forestry incentive programs, key differences include a wider range of eligible activities and eligible groups, a minimum project size of 0.5 hectares, and the removal of earmarks distinguishing between plantation and natural forest subsidies. The Forest Incentives Law for Owners of Small Extensions of Forest or Agroforestry Land (PINPEP, created by Decree 51-2010) is a forest incentive program for forest and agroforestry plots of fewer than 15 hectares. PINPEP provides landowners with funds to plant trees or maintain existing forests. 9. Corruption Bribery is illegal under Guatemala’s Penal Code. Guatemala scored 25 out of 100 points on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, ranking it 150 out of 180 countries globally, and 28 out of 32 countries in the region. The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the Public Ministry (MP) prosecuted very few government corruption cases. Investors find corruption pervasive in government procurement, including payment of bribes in exchange for awarding public construction contracts. Investors and importers are frequently frustrated by opaque customs transactions, particularly at ports and borders. The Tax and Customs Authority (SAT) launched a customs modernization program in 2006, which implemented an advanced electronic manifest system and resulted in the removal of many corrupt officials. However, reports of corruption within customs’ processes remain. In 2021, SAT implemented additional customs reforms that route flagged shipments to a dedicated secondary inspection team for resolution, rather than assigning the case to the original inspector. The change eliminates opportunity for an inspector to impose deliberate delays. From 2006 to 2019, the UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) undertook numerous high-profile official corruption investigations, leading to significant indictments. For example, CICIG unveiled a customs corruption scheme in 2015 that led to the resignations of the former president and vice president. Since then-President Morales terminated CICIG in 2019 and actions by Attorney General Consuelo Porras to impede anti-corruption prosecutors, impunity has increased and poses significant risks for potential new investors. Guatemala’s Government Procurement Law requires most government purchases over $116,363 to be submitted for public competitive bidding. Since March 2004, Guatemalan government entities are required to use Guatecompras ( https://www.guatecompras.gt/ ), an Internet-based electronic procurement system to track government procurement processes. Guatemalan government entities must also comply with government procurement commitments under CAFTA-DR. In August 2009, the Guatemalan congress approved reforms to the Government Procurement Law, which simplified bidding procedures; eliminated the fee previously charged to receive bidding documents; and provided an additional opportunity for suppliers to raise objections over the bidding process. Despite these reforms, large government procurements are often subject to appeals and injunctions based on claims of irregularities in the bidding process (e.g., documentation issues and lack of transparency). In November 2015, the Guatemalan congress approved additional amendments to the Government Procurement Law that tried to improve the transparency of the procurement processes by barring government contracts for some financers of political campaigns and parties, members of congress, other elected officials, government workers, and their immediate family members. However, there continue to be multiple allegations corruption and nepotism in the procurement process. The 2015 reforms expanded the scope of procurement oversight to include public trust funds and all institutions (including NGOs) executing public funds. The U.S. government continues to advocate for the use of open, fair, and transparent tenders in government procurement as well as procedures that comply with CAFTA-DR obligations, which would allow open participation by U.S. companies. Guatemala ratified the U.N. Convention against Corruption in November 2006, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in July 2001. Guatemala is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In October 2012, the Guatemalan congress approved an anti-corruption law that increased penalties for existing crimes and added new crimes such as illicit enrichment, trafficking in influence, and illegal charging of commissions. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Public Ministry Address: 23 Calle 0-22 Zona 1, Ciudad de Guatemala Phone: (502) 2251-4105; (502) 2251-4219; (502) 2251-5327; (502) 2251-8480; (502) 2251-9225 Email address: fiscaliacontracorrupcion@mp.gob.gt Comptroller General’s Office Address: 7a Avenida 7-32 Zona 13 Phone: (502) 2417-8700 Contact at “watchdog” organization: Accion Ciudadana (Guatemalan Chapter of Transparency International) Address: Avenida Reforma 12-01 Zona 10, Edificio Reforma Montufar, Nivel 17, Oficina 1701 Phone: (502) 2388- 3400 Toll free to submit corruption complaints: 1-801-8111-011 Email address: alac@accionciudadana.org.gt ; accionciudadana@accionciudadana.org 10. Political and Security Environment According to the National Civil Police (PNC), the murder rate in 2020 dropped 28 percent – from 20.8 per 100,000 to 15 per 100,000, compared to 2019, continuing a downward trend in recent years. The Guatemalan government attributed the general decline in violence to the economic downturn during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, including interdepartmental travel restrictions and the prohibition of most alcohol sales. The murder rate increased to 16.6 per 100,000 in 2021, a 9 percent increase compared to 2020. Rule of law is a challenge and the judicial system is faces significant delays in case processing and inefficiency. Local police may lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents. Major criminal groups operating in Guatemala are involved in a number of illicit activities, including violent street crime, drug trafficking, kidnaping, extortion, arms trafficking, illegal adoption rings, and environmental crimes. Although security remains a concern, foreigners are not usually singled out as targets of crime. The political climate in Guatemala, marked by its 36 years of armed conflict, is characterized by periodic civil disturbances. For example, in October 2021, President Alejandro Giammattei declared a State of Siege in El Estor as dozens of protestors, including environmental defenders, indigenous activists, and outside agitators blocked coal trucks from accessing a nickel mine and allegedly clashed with National Police (PNC) forces who attempted to clear the road for mining traffic. Protests and highway roadblocks organized by transportation workers and military veterans have caused disruption and heightened security, impacting general mobility and traffic condition, on a recurring basis in recent years. In November 2020 civil unrest sparked by congressional approval of the 2021 budget proposal, which added to long-standing grievances. Largely peaceful protests were marred by isolated acts of vandalism and violence, including fire damage to the national congress building, as well as acts of violence by both security forces against some protestors and by some protestors against security forces. The main source of tension among indigenous communities, Guatemalan authorities, and private companies is the lack of prior consultation and alleged environmental damage. Damage to projects or installations is rare. However, there were instances in October 2018 and January 2019 in which unidentified arsonists burned machinery and other equipment at the site of a hydroelectric construction project near the northern border with Mexico. Additionally, activist groups at times have engaged in blockades to prevent personnel, materials, and equipment from entering or leaving disputed installations. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the 2021 national survey of employment and income, the Guatemalan workforce consists of an estimated 2.1 million individuals employed in the formal sector. Additionally, roughly 5.1 million individuals, or 70.8 percent of the total workforce, work in the informal sector, including some who are too young for formal sector employment. According to the 2017 Survey on Employment and Income, the most recent survey with child labor data available, child labor, particularly in rural areas, remains a serious problem in certain economic activities. The informal economy represented 22 percent of GDP in 2019 according to official data. About 75.7 percent of female workers and 84.9 percent of indigenous workers were employed in the informal sector. Approximately 30 percent of the total labor force is engaged in agricultural work. The availability of a large, unskilled, and inexpensive labor force led many employers, such as construction and agricultural firms, to use labor-intensive production methods. Roughly, 14 percent of the employed workforce is illiterate. In developed urban areas, however, education levels are much higher, and a workforce with the skills necessary to staff a growing service sector emerged. Even so, highly capable technical and managerial workers remain in short supply, with secondary and tertiary education focused on social science careers. The Ministry of Labor issued a regulation in March 2022 that requires recruiters of Guatemalans being employed outside of Guatemala to be registered and to comply with all the requirements related to contracts established in Article 34 of the Labor Code. No special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws cover export-processing zones. The Ministry of Labor issued a regulation in December 2021 that allows to set different minimum wages for two economic regions of the country starting in 2023. In July 2021, the Constitutional Court revoked the provisional suspension of the Ministry of Labor’s agreement on part-time work, based on ILO Convention 175, which enabled companies to hire workers for six hours or fewer per workday for wages equivalent to the fraction of full time work they complete. The Labor Code requires that at least 90 percent of employees be Guatemalan, but the requirement does not apply to high-level positions, such as managers and directors. The Labor Code sets out: employer responsibilities regarding working conditions, especially health and safety standards; benefits; severance pay; premium pay for overtime work; minimum wages; and bonuses. Mandatory benefits, bonuses, and employer contributions to the social security system can add up to about 55 percent of an employee’s base pay. However, many workers, especially in the agricultural sector, do not receive the full compensation package mandated in the labor law. All employees are subject to a two-month trial period during which time they may resign or be discharged without any obligation on the part of the employer or employee. For any dismissal after the two-month trial period, the employer must pay unpaid wages for work already performed, proportional bonuses, and proportional vacation time. If an employer dismisses an employee without just cause, the employer must also pay severance equal to one month’s regular pay for each full year of employment. Guatemala does not have unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. Guatemala’s Constitution guarantees the right of workers to unionize and to strike, with an exception to the right to strike for security force members and workers employed in hospitals, telecommunications, and other public services considered essential to public safety. Before a strike can be declared, workers and employers must engage in mandatory conciliation and then approve a strike vote by 50 percent plus one worker in the enterprise. If conciliation fails, either party may ask the judge for a ruling on the legality of conducting a strike or lockout. Legal strikes in Guatemala are extremely rare. The Constitution also commits the state to support and protect collective bargaining and holds that international labor conventions ratified by Guatemala establish the minimum labor rights of workers if they offer greater protections than national law. In most cases, labor unions operate independently of the government and employers both by law and in practice. The law requires unions to register with the Ministry of Labor and their leadership must obtain credentials to carry out their functions. Delays in such proceedings are common. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination and employer interference in union activities and requires employers to reinstate workers dismissed for organizing union activities. A combination of inadequate allocation of budget resources for labor rights enforcement to the Ministry of Labor and other relevant state institutions, and inefficient administrative and justice sector processes, act as significant impediments for more effective enforcement of labor laws to protect these workers’ rights. As a result, investigating, prosecuting, and punishing employers who violate these guarantees remain a challenge, particularly the enforcement of labor court orders requiring reinstatement and payment of back wages resulting from dismissal. The rate of unionization in Guatemala is very low. Both the U.S. government and Guatemalan workers have filed complaints against the Guatemalan government for allegedly failing to adequately enforce its labor laws and protect the rights of workers. In September 2014, the U.S. government convened an arbitration panel alleging that Guatemala had failed to meet its obligations under CAFTA-DR to enforce effectively its labor laws related to freedom of association and collective bargaining and acceptable conditions of work. The panel held a hearing in June 2015 and issued a decision favorable to Guatemala in June 2017. Separately, the Guatemalan government faced an International Labor Organization (ILO) complaint filed by workers in 2012 alleging that the government had failed to comply with ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. The complaint called for the establishment of an ILO Commission of Inquiry, which is the ILO’s highest level of scrutiny when all other means failed to address issues of concern. In 2013, the Guatemalan government agreed to a roadmap with social partners in an attempt to avoid the establishment of a Commission. The government took some steps to implement its roadmap, including the enactment of legislation in 2017 that restored administrative sanction authority to the labor inspectorate for the first time in 15 years. As part of a tripartite agreement reached at the ILO in November 2017, a National Tripartite Commission on Labor Relations and Freedom of Association was established in February 2018 to monitor and facilitate implementation of the 2013 roadmap. Based in large part on the 2017 tripartite agreement, the ILO Governing Body closed the complaint against Guatemala in November 2018. 14. Contact for More Information John Szypula szypulaj@state.gov Trade and Investment Officer U.S. Embassy Guatemala Av. Reforma 7-01 Zona 10, Guatemala (502) 2326-4000 Guinea Executive Summary On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état. COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution. Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials. On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force. On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces. On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022. Guinea enjoys sizeable endowments of natural resources, energy opportunities, and arable land. These seeming advantages have not yet resulted in economic development, and may in fact hinder it, in an example of the famous “resource curse.” Guinea’s economy has been based on extraction of primary resources, from at least the French colonial era and the slave trade before it. This extractive paradigm and legacy of underdevelopment, combined with low levels of education, and longstanding patterns of nondemocratic governance dating back to the colonial era, limit the potential for broad-based economic growth based on value addition, innovation, and productive as opposed to extractive or rent-seeking investment. At the same time, a sense of national identity and unity, and both formal and informal practices of solidarity that tend towards wealth redistribution may prove to be assets for the country’s development, if the government and the private sector can harness them productively. The 2021 coup d’etat, persistent corruption, and fiscal mismanagement make the near-term economic prognosis for Guinea mixed. In this context, Guinea has looked to foreign investment to bolster tax and export revenues and to support infrastructure projects and overall economic growth. China, Guinea’s largest trading partner, dramatically increased its role in years leading up to the coup with a variety of infrastructure investments. Investors should proceed with caution, understanding that the potential for profits comes with significant political risk. Weak institutions mean that investors may secure lucrative concessions from the government in the short term, but these could be open to renegotiation or rescission in the long term. Prior to the coup, former President Conde’s government implemented reforms to improve various aspects of the investment climate. For example, the former government reduced property transfers fees from 2 to 1.2 percent of property value. The time required to obtain a construction permit was reduced and import procedures were improved. Since 2019, Guinea has implemented a permanent taxpayer identification number system that requires all payments to be made by “Real Time Gross System” (RTGS) immediate transfers. Since the coup d’etat, the transition government has spoken extensively about fighting corruption and increasing transparency. Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. Endowed with abundant mineral resources, Guinea has the raw materials to be an economic leader in the extractives industry. Guinea is home to a third of the world’s reserves of bauxite (aluminum ore), and bauxite accounts for over half of Guinea’s present exports. Historically, most of the country’s bauxite was exported by Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) (Bauxite Company of Guinea) [a joint venture between the Government of Guinea, U.S.-based Alcoa, the Anglo-Australian firm Rio Tinto, and Dadco Investments of the Channel Islands], via a designated port in Kamsar. While CBG still retains the largest reserves, the Societe Miniere de Boke (SMB) (Mineral Company of Boke), a Sino-Singaporean conglomerate, recently surpassed CBG as the largest single producer of bauxite. New investment by SMB and CBG, in addition to new market entrants, are expected to significantly increase Guinea’s bauxite output over the next five to ten years. Guinea also possesses over four billion tons of untapped high-grade iron ore, significant gold and diamond reserves, undetermined amounts of uranium, as well as prospective offshore oil reserves. Artisanal and medium-sized industrial gold mining in the Siguiri region is a significant contributor to the Guinean economy, but some suspect much of the gold leaves the country clandestinely, without generating any government revenue. In the long term, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government project that Guinea’s greatest potential economic driver will be the Simandou iron ore project, which is slated to be the largest greenfield project ever developed in Africa. The transition government reached an ambitious agreement with Rio Tinto and the SMB-Winning Consortium (WCS) in March 2022 to develop the rail and port infrastructure to bring ore from Simandou to market by early 2025. In 2017, the governments of Guinea and China signed a USD 20 billion framework agreement giving Guinea potentially USD 1 billion per year in infrastructure projects in exchange for increased access to mineral wealth. In 2018, the Chinese Group TBEA invested USD 2.89 billion in the bauxite and alumina sector. The project includes development of a bauxite mine, the construction of a port, railroad, and power plant to facilitate the supply chain. The project is estimated to generate USD 406 million in annual revenue for Guinea. The amended 2013 Mining Code stipulates that raw ore producers in Guinea begin processing raw ore into refined or processed products within a few years of development, depending on the terms of the individual investment and the mandate with the Ministry of Mines and Geology. In April 2022, the transition government called upon bauxite concessionaires to solidify refining plans by May 2022. U.S.-based companies are in varying stages of proposing LNG projects to furnish this upcoming tremendous energy need. China is reportedly offering coal-based solutions to meet the potential demand. Guinea’s abundant rainfall and natural geography bode well for hydroelectric and renewable energy production. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment, which likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021. A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment). If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa. In addition, U.S.-based Endeavor began operating Project Te in November 2020, a 50MW thermal plant on the outskirts of the capital. Former President Conde’s government also signed an emergency agreement in December 2019 to buy power from the 105 MW Turkish Karpowership barge anchored off Conakry’s coast. Former President Conde’s government emphasized investment in solar and other energy sources to compensate for hydroelectric deficits during Guinea’s dry season. Toward that end, former President Conde’s government entered into several Memoranda of Understanding with the private sector to develop solar projects. Agriculture and fisheries hold other areas of opportunity and growth in Guinea. Already an exporter of fruits, vegetables, and palm oil to its immediate neighbors, Guinea is climatically well suited for large-scale agricultural production and export. However, the sector has suffered from decades of neglect and mismanagement, lack of transportation infrastructure, and lack of electricity and a reliable cold chain. Guinea is an importer of rice, its primary staple crop. Guinea’s macroeconomic and financial situation is weak. The aftermath of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis left former President Conde’s government with few financial resources to invest in social services and infrastructure. Lower natural resource revenues stemming from a drop in world commodities prices and ill-advised government loans strained an already tight budget. In 2018 the government borrowed excessively from the Central Bank (BCRG), which threatened the first review of Guinea’s current International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Lower than forecast natural resource revenues in 2019 due to heavy rains and political violence threatened the fourth review, which Guinea passed in April 2020. In December 2020, the Executive Board of the IMF completed its fifth and sixth reviews of Guinea’s economic performance. The completion of these reviews enabled the immediate disbursement of USD 49.47 million – bringing total disbursements under Guinea’s third extended credit facility to USD 66.60 million before the program’s end. A shortage of credit persists, particularly for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the government is increasingly looking to international investment to increase growth, provide jobs, and kick-start the economy. On March 13, 2020, Guinea confirmed its first Covid-19 case. The pandemic negatively impacted the well-being of households, particularly those working in the informal sector, who have limited access to savings and financial services. Guinea experienced an Ebola epidemic from February to June 2021. Despite its able handling of the epidemic, which kept deaths to a minimum, cross-border trade with Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone was reduced temporarily during the outbreak. Violence surrounding the March 2020 legislative election and constitutional referendum, as well as the October 2020 presidential election, all negatively impacted Guinea’s growth prospects. The transition government has worked to maintain economic stability since the 2021 coup d’etat, though without a timeline for elections, the uncertain political situation further limits potential growth. Prior to the coup, Guinea passed and implemented an anti-corruption law, updated its Investment Code, and renewed efforts to attract international investors, including a new investment promotion website put in place in 2016 by Guinea’s investment promotion agency to increase transparency and streamline processes for new investors. However, Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system. Then President Conde inaugurated the first Trade Court of Guinea on March 20, 2018. Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. To attract foreign investment, the Private Investment Promotion Agency (APIP) and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises hosted the second annual Guinea Investment Forum (GUIF) in Dubai in February 2022, following the inaugural event in Guinea in February 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 130 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $278 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,020 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Former President Conde’s government had adopted a strong, positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI), an approach that has been echoed by the transition government. In the face of budget shortfalls and low commodity prices, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government have expressed hope FDI will help diversify the economy, spur GDP growth, and provide reliable employment. To that end, former President Conde’s government reduced land transfer fees, and improved procedures for import and construction permits. Guinea does not discriminate against foreign investors, with the exception of a prohibition on foreign media ownership. One area of concern, mining companies have negotiated different taxation rates despite mining code requirements. In some instances, short-term tax breaks end up being costly for the investor as they are then expected to “contribute” resources like electrical energy or roadbuilding as an informal quid pro quo for the lighter tax burden. According to the 2021World Investment Report, FDI in Guinea increased from USD 44 million in 2019 to 325 million in 2020. In late 2015, the U.S. Embassy facilitated the establishment of an informal international investors group to liaise with the government, although the group has not been very active since. There is the Chambre des Mines (Chamber of Mines), a government-sanctioned advisory organization that includes Guinea’s major mining firms. Guinea’s Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (APIP) provides support in the following areas: Create and register businesses Facilitate access to incentives offered under the investment code Provide information and resources to potential investors Publish targeted sector studies and statistics Provide training and technical assistance Facilitate solutions for investors in Guinea’s interior On March 13, 2021, a presidential decree changed the structure of APIP into a public agency under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Investments and Public Private Partnerships, and under the financial supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Since the September 2021 coup d’etat, APIP falls under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises. More information about APIP can be found at: http://apip.gov.gn/ Investors can register under one of four categories of business in Guinea. More information on the four types of business registration is available at http://invest.gov.gn/page/create-your-company. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control, and 100 percent ownership by foreign firms is legal in most sectors. Foreign ownership of print media, radio, and television stations is not permitted. The 2013 Mining Code gives the government the right to a 15 percent interest in any major mining operation in Guinea (the government decides when an operation has become large enough to qualify). Mining and media notwithstanding, there are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access for foreign investment. Despite this lack of official discrimination, many enterprises have discovered the licensing process to be laden with bureaucratic delays that are usually dealt with by paying consultant fees to help expedite matters. The U.S. Embassy may be able to advocate on behalf of American companies when it is aware of excessive delays. According to the Investment Code, the National Investment Commission has a role in reviewing requests for approval of foreign investment and for monitoring companies’ efforts to comply with investment obligations. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development hosts the secretariat for this commission, which grants investment approvals. The government gives approved companies, especially industrial firms, the use of the land necessary for their plant, with the duration and conditions of use set out in the terms of the approval. The land and associated buildings belong to the State but can also be rented by or transferred to another firm with government approval. There has been no investment policy review conducted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development within the past several years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a review of Guinea in 2018. The 2018 report can be viewed here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp470_e.htm. APIP promotes investment, helps register businesses, assists with the expansion of local companies, and works to improve the local business climate. APIP maintains an online guide for potential investors in Guinea (http://invest.gov.gn). Business registration can be completed in person at APIP’s office in Conakry or through their online platform: https://synergui.apipguinee.com/fr/utilisateurs/register/. The only internationally accredited business facilitation organization that assesses Guinea is the Global Enterprise Registration (GER.co), which gives Guinea’s business creation/investment website a 6/10 rating for 2021. It takes roughly seventy-two hours to register a business. APIP’s services are available to both Guinean and foreign investors. The “One Stop Shop” at APIP’s Conakry office can provide small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with requisite registration numbers, including tax administration numbers and social security numbers. Notaries are required for the creation of any other type of enterprise. An SME in Guinea is defined as a business with less than 50 employees and revenue less than 500 million Guinean francs (GNF) (around USD 50,000). SMEs are taxed at a yearly fixed rate of GNF 15 million (USD 1,500). Administrative modalities are simplified and funneled through the “One Stop Shop”. In December 2019, the Prime Minister inaugurated the “Maison des PME,” (“The SME House”) a public-private partnership between the Societe Generale bank and APIP to help local SMEs expand and develop. Guinea does not formally promote outward investment, though the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Under former President Alpha Conde, Guinea made its laws and regulations more transparent, though draft bills were not always made available for public comment. Ministries did not develop forward-looking regulatory plans and publish neither summaries nor proposed legislation. Once ratified, laws were not enforceable until published in the government’s official gazette. Since January 2022, the National Transition Council (CNT) has served as Guinea’s legislative body, tasked by the CNRD to draft a new constitution and recommend an electoral timeline to return to democratic and civilian rule. All laws relevant to international investors are posted (in French) on invest.gov.gn. When investing, it is important to engage with all levels of government to ensure each authority is aware of expectations and responsibilities on both sides. Guinea has had an independent Supreme Audit Institution since 2016. The institution is charged with making available information on public finances. The institution presented its first 2016 activities report in January 2018. The institution presented the 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 activities report to the President of CNT in February 2022 Guinea’s 2013 amended Mining Code commits the country to increasing transparency in the mining sector. In the code, the government commits to awarding mining contracts by competitive tender and to publish all past, current, and future mining contracts for public scrutiny. Members of mining sector governing bodies and employees of the Ministry of Mines are prohibited from owning shares in mining companies active in Guinea or their subcontractors. Each mining company must sign a code of good conduct and develop and implement a corruption-monitoring plan. There is a public database of mining contracts designed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (http://www.contratsminiersguinee.org/). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ensures greater transparency in the governance of Guinea’s natural resources and full disclosure of government revenues from its extractives sector. The EITI standard aims to provide a global set of conditions that ensures greater transparency of the management of a country’s oil, gas, and mineral resources. EITI reiterates the need to augment support for countries and governments that are making genuine efforts to address corruption but lack the capacity and systems necessary to manage effectively the businesses, revenues, and royalties derived from extractive industries. Guinea requires mining companies to file environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures. Guinea was accepted as EITI compliant for the first time by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City on July 2, 2014. As an EITI country, Guinea must disclose the government’s revenues from natural resources. Guinea completed its most recent report in December 2020 for the 2018 reporting period. The report is located at: https://www.itie-guinee.org/rapport-itie-guinee-2018/. While Guinea’s laws promote free enterprise and competition, there is often a lack of transparency in the law’s application. Business owners openly assert that application procedures are sufficiently opaque to allow for corruption, and regulatory activity is often instigated due to personal interests. Every year Guinea publishes budget documents and debt obligations. The yearly enacted budgets are published online LOIS DE FINANCES | Ministère du Budget Guinée (mbudget.gov.gn) https://mbudget.gov.gn/. Guinea has historically been a member of ECOWAS, but not a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and as such has its own currency. At the beginning of 2017, Guinea adopted ECOWAS’s Common Exterior Tariff (TEC), which harmonizes Guinea’s import taxes with other West African states and eliminates the need for assessing import duties at Guinea’s land border crossings, though, sometimes it is difficult to get the required certificates to export under these ECOWAS exemptions. Guinea is a member of the WTO and is not party to any trade disputes. Since the September 2021 coup, the African Union and ECOWAS have suspended Guinea’s memberships. Guinea’s legal system is codified and largely based upon French civil law. Under former President Conde, the judicial system was reported to be generally understaffed, corrupt, and opaque. Accounting practices and bookkeeping in Guinean courts are frequently unreliable. U.S. businesspersons should exercise extreme caution when negotiating contract arrangements and do so with proper local legal representation. Although the current transition charter, former constitution, and laws provide for an independent judiciary; in practice the judicial system lacks independence, is underfunded, inefficient, and is portrayed in the press as corrupt. Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, nepotism, and ethnic bias contribute to the judiciary’s challenges. Former President Conde’s administration successfully implemented some judicial reforms and increased the salaries of judges by 400 percent to discourage corruption. After the September 2021 coup, Guinea’s penal and civil code remains in force. The transition government maintained the existing legal structure and stated that “justice will be the compass guiding every Guinean citizen.” Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. There are few international investment lawyers accredited in Guinea and it is a best practice to include international arbitration clauses in all major contracts. U.S. companies have identified the absence of a dependable legal system as a major barrier to investment. Despite dispute settlement procedures set forth in Guinean law, business executives complain of the glacial pace of the adjudication of business disputes. Most legal cases take years and significant legal fees to resolve. In speaking with local business leaders, the general sentiment is that any resolution occurring within three to five years might be considered quick. In many cases, the government does not meet payment obligations to private suppliers of goods and services, either foreign or Guinean, in a timely fashion. Arrears to the private sector are a major issue that is often ignored. There is no independent enforcement mechanism for collecting debts from the government, although some contracts have international arbitration clauses. The government, while bound by law to honor judgments made by the arbitration court, often actively influences the decision itself. Although the situation has improved recently, Guinean and foreign business executives have publicly expressed concern over the rule of law in the country. In 2014, high-ranking members of the military harassed foreign managers of a telecommunications company because they did not renew a contract. American businesses experience long delays in getting required signatures and approvals from government ministries, and in some cases the presidency, under both former President Conde’s government and the transition government. Some businesses have been subject to sporadic harassment from tax authorities and demands for donations from military and police personnel. The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors. However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference. Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt. APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn. Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/. APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors. The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors. However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference. Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt. APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn. Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/. APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors. There are no agencies that review transactions for competition-related concerns. Guinea’s Investment Code states that the government will not take any steps to expropriate or nationalize investments made by individuals and companies, except for reasons of public interest. It also promises fair compensation for expropriated property. In 2011, the former President Conde’s government claimed full ownership of several languishing industrial facilities in which it had previously held partial shares as part of several joint ventures—including a canned food factory and processing plants for peanuts, tea, mangoes, and tobacco—with no compensation to the private sector partner. Each of these facilities was privatized under opaque circumstances in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By expropriating these businesses, which the Conde government deemed to be corrupt and/or ineffective, and putting them to public auction, Guinea hoped to correct past mistakes and put the assets in more productive hands. During the 1990s, a U.S. investor acquired a 67 percent stake in an explosives and munitions factory from a Canadian entity. The Guinean government owned the remaining 33 percent. From 2000 to 2008, the government halted manufacturing at the factory, nationalizing the factory in 2010. While there had not been recent large-scale expropriation cases by the end of former President Conde’s administration, some mining concession contracts have had their initial award revoked and were sold to another bidder. In 2008, the previous regime of Lansana Conde stripped Rio Tinto of 50 percent of its concession of the Simandou iron ore mine and sold it to another company. In March 2022, the transition government began seizing property they believed belonged to the state and was inappropriately sold under former President Conde’s government, in some cases demolishing houses and buildings on the disputed land before legal challenges were exhausted. Guinea, as a member of OHADA, has the same bankruptcy laws as most West African francophone countries. OHADA’s Uniform Act on the Organization of Securities enforces collective proceedings for writing off debts and defines bankruptcy in articles 227 to 233. The Uniform Act also distinguishes fraudulent from non-fraudulent bankruptcies. There is no distinction between foreign and domestic investors. The only distinction made is a privilege ranking that defines which claims must be paid first from the bankrupt company’s assets. Articles 180 to 190 of OHADA’s Uniform Act define which creditors are entitled to priority compensation. Bankruptcy is only criminalized when it occurs due to fraudulent actions and leaves criminal penalties to national authorities. Non-fraudulent bankruptcy is adjudicated though the Uniform Act. 4. Industrial Policies The Investment Code provides preferential tax treatment for investments meeting certain criteria (See Screening of FDI). Some mining companies currently benefit from preferential tax treatment. Other exemptions can be agreed to during contract negotiations with the government. The government’s priority investments categories include promotion of small- and medium-sized Guinean businesses, development of non-traditional exports, processing of local natural resources and local raw materials, and establishment of activities in economically less developed regions. Priority activities include agricultural promotion, especially of food, and rural development; commercial farming involving processing and packaging; livestock, especially when coupled with veterinary services; fisheries; fertilizer production, chemical or mechanical preparation and processing industries for vegetable, animal, or mineral products; health and education-related businesses; tourism facilities and hotel operations; socially beneficial real estate development; and investment banks or any credit institutions settled outside specified population centers. Detailed information on each of these opportunities is available at http://invest.gov.gn. Neither former President Conde’s government nor the transition government provide incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors, such as women. Guinea currently has no foreign trade zones or free ports. In 2017, a presidential decree created a special economic zone in the Boke corridor of western Guinea. Under the revised 2013 Mining Code, mining companies are required to employ Guinean citizens as a certain percentage of their staff, to eventually transition to a Guinean country director, and to award a certain percentage of contracts to Guinean-owned firms. The percentage varies based on employment category and the chronological phase of the project. The Mining Code requires that 20 percent of senior managers be Guinean; however, the Code does not define what constitutes senior management. The Code also aims to liberalize mining development and promote investment. In 2013, the Code called for the creation of a Mining Promotion and Development Center, a One Stop Shop for mining administrative processes for investors, which opened in May 2016. Guinea has no forced localization policy related to the use of domestic content in goods or technology, and there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance or to store data within Guinea. In 2019, the government launched an e-visa platform allowing for online visa applications at http://www.paf.gov.gn/. Fees vary depending on citizenship. This is the only way to apply for a visa to Guinea as Guinean embassies around the world no longer process visa applications. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Estate and Land Tenure Code of 1992 provides a legal base for documentation of property ownership. Mortgages are nearly non-existent in Guinea. As with ownership of business enterprises, both foreign and Guinean individuals have the right to own property. However, enforcement of these rights depends upon an inefficient Guinean legal and administrative system. It is not uncommon for the same piece of land to have several overlapping deeds. Furthermore, land sales and business contracts generally lack transparency. Only about 2.5 percent of the population has title to real property. The Ministry of Urban Affairs is developing an online platform that will facilitate the registration of land titles and reduce waiting times to about five days. The Ministry of Urban Development, Housing, and Regional Planning launched the Building Permit One-Stop-Shop in February 2022, which is slated to reduce building permit procurement processing from 40 to seven days. Guinea is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). OAPI is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and several other intellectual property treaties. Guinea modified its intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in 2000 to bring them into line with established international standards. There have been no formal complaints filed on behalf of American companies concerning IPR infringement in Guinea. However, it is not certain that an affirmative IPR judgment would be enforceable, given the general lack of law enforcement capability. The Property Rights office in Guinea is severely understaffed and underfunded. Guinea is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/contact.jsp?country_id=67&type=ADMIN. 6. Financial Sector Commercial credit for private enterprises is difficult and expensive to obtain in Guinea. The FY 2022 Millennium Challenge Corporation score for Access to Credit in Guinea reached 30 percent, increasing from 21 percent in FY 2021. Guinea adopted a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law in 1998, but the law was never fully implemented as the government failed to adopt the decree necessary for its implementation. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. However, in practice businesses often wait months or years to receive final approvals from one ministry or another or the President, depending on the sector. Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system. Some especially large-scale enterprises or extractives industry firms must wait for final permission from the President himself to begin operations. These facts make personal relationships with high-ranking officials desirable and indeed generally essential, though as mentioned above, this brings the risk of a project’s becoming associated with specific individuals or administrations, and thus subject to subsequent rescission. Guinea updated its Investment Code in 2015 and renewed efforts to attract international investors. The Investment Code allows income derived from investment in Guinea, the proceeds of liquidating that investment, and the compensation paid in the event of nationalization, to be transferred to any country in convertible currency. The legal and regulatory procedures, based on French civil law, are not always applied uniformly or transparently. Individuals or legal entities making foreign investments in Guinea are guaranteed the freedom to transfer the original foreign capital, profits resulting from investment, capital gains on disposal of investment, and fair compensation paid in the case of nationalization or expropriation of the investment to any country of their choice. The Guinean franc is subject to a managed floating exchange rate. The few commercial banks in Guinea are dependent on the Central Bank (BCRG) for foreign exchange liquidity, making large transfers of foreign currency difficult. Laws governing takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and cross-shareholding are limited to rules for documenting financial transactions and filing any change of status documents with the economic register. There are no laws or regulations that specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation that limit or prohibit investment. Guinea’s financial system is small and dominated by the banking sector. It comprises 19 active banks, 19 insurance companies and 19 microfinance institutions. Guinea’s banking sector is overseen by the Central Bank (BCRG), which also serves as the agent of the government treasury for overseeing banking and credit operations in Guinea and abroad. The BCRG manages foreign exchange reserves on behalf of the State. The Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury assesses that Guinea does not properly manage debt and that its treasury is too involved in the process, although improvements made in 2017-2018 point to a better future. Further information on the BCRG can be found in French at http://www.bcrg-guinee.org. Due to the difficulty of accessing funding from commercial banks, small commercial and agricultural enterprises have increasingly turned to microfinance, which has been growing rapidly with a net increase in deposits and loans. The quality of products in the microfinance sector remains mediocre, with bad debt accounting for five percent of loans with approximately 17 percent of gross loans outstanding. Guinea plans to broaden the country’s SME base through investment climate reform, improved access to finance, and the establishment of SME growth corridors. Severely limited access to finance (especially for SMEs), inadequate infrastructure, deficiencies in logistics and trade facilitation, corruption and the diminished capacity of the government, inflation, and poor education of the workforce has seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinean institutions. Guinea’s weak enabling environment for business, its history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory enforcement exacerbate the country’s poor reputation as an investment destination. As a result, private participation in the economy remains low and firms’ productivity measured by value added is one of the lowest in Africa. Firms’ links with the financial sector are weak: only 3.9 percent of firms surveyed in the 2016 World Bank Enterprise survey had a bank loan. Credit to the private sector is low, at around 8.6 percent of GDP in 2021. Commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans due to the lack of credit history reporting for potential borrowers. Through the Central Bank, Guinea is in the process of establishing a credit information bureau to overcome this asymmetry of credit information. Despite the pandemic and September 2021 coup, the banking sector remains liquid and solvent with limited credit available to the private sector. Heavy government borrowing drained the excess liquidity and crowded out private sector credit in 2021. Despite the COVID-19 slowdown and political instability, private sector credit grew by 7.36 percent from January 2021 to January 2022. Guinea is a cash-based society driven by trade, agriculture, and the informal sector, which all function outside the banking sector. The banking sector is highly concentrated in Conakry and is technologically behind. Banks in Guinea tend to favor short-term lending at high interest rates. In collaboration with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, the Central Bank began planning to implement a bank deposit insurance scheme. The deposit coverage limit has not been set yet, but the Central Bank began to collect premiums from commercial banks in 2019. While the microfinance sector grew strongly from a small base, it was hit hard during the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis. Currently it is not generally profitable and needs capacity and technology upgrades. Furthermore, many microfinance institutions struggle to meet higher minimum capital requirements imposed by the Central Bank since 2019. This heightened financial hurdle will likely lead to a consolidation of the microfinance sector. The efficiency and use of payment services by all potential users needs to be improved, with an emphasis on greater financial inclusion. The penetration of digital cellphone fund transfers is increasing. Four foreign e-money (or mobile banking) institutions lead the effort to digitize payments and improve access to financial services in underserved and rural segments of the population. However, the vast majority of operations processed by these e-money institutions remain cash-in cash-out transactions within a single network. In an effort to modernize payment methods, the transition government is continuing an initiative of former President Conde’s administration to implement a national switch — a nationwide platform that will interface all electronic payment systems and facilitate payment processing between service providers. This service was still under development in 2022, and the Central Bank is in the process of selecting a service provider. Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish bank accounts in Guinea. EcoBank is the preferred bank for most U.S. dealings with Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FACTA) reporting requirements. With the acquisition of a majority stake in BICIGUI (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de la Guinee) in July 2021, Vista Bank became the largest bank in Guinea, a first on the African continent for a U.S.-owned financial institution. Guinea does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises While all Guinea’s public utilities (water and electricity) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the former Conde administration proposed permitting private enterprises to operate in this sphere. In 2015, the French firm Veolia was contracted to manage the state-owned electric utility Electricité de Guinée (EDG) – a contract which ended in October 2019. Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s solar energy potential and gas-powered thermal plants are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and possibly to neighboring countries. Other SOEs are found in the telecommunications, road construction, lottery, and transportation sectors. There are several other mixed companies where the state owns a significant or majority share, that are typically related to the extractives industry. The hydroelectricity sector could support Guinea’s modernization, and possibly even supply regional markets. Guinea’s hydropower potential is estimated at over 6,000MW, making it a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment. A Chinese firm likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021. A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment). If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa. Plans for improving the distribution network to enable electricity export are in process with the development of the Gambia River Basin Development (OMVG) (Organization pour la Mise en Oeuvre de Fleuve Gambie, in French) transmission project connecting Guinea, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia. The OMVG project involves the construction of 1,677 kilometers of 225-volt transmission network capable of handling 800MW to provide electricity for over two million people. At the same time, Guinea is moving forward with the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, (CLSG) transmission interconnector project, which will integrate Guinea into the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and allow for energy import-export across the region. While neither former President Conde’s administration nor the transition government have published significant information concerning the financial stability of SOEs, EDG’s balance sheet is understood to be in the red. The IMF reported that as recently as 2017, up to 28 percent of Guinea’s budget went towards subsidizing electricity, and the IMF urged that EDG improve tariff collection since large numbers of its users do not pay. Former Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory Fofana announced in March 2021 that EDG subsidies cost Guinea’s government USD 350 million annually. The amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures is not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D. Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in Conakry. Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement. Corporate governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines. SOEs are supposed to report to the Office of the President, however, typically they report to a ministry. Seats on the board of governance for SOEs are usually allocated by presidential decree. The transition government is continuing the former Conde administration’s initiative to privatize the energy sector. In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state-owned electrical utility EDG. French company Veolia won the tender and attempted to manage and rehabilitate the insolvent utility until the end of 2019. In February 2020, EDG became a public limited company with its own board of directors. The new directors were appointed by former President Conde through decree, replaced with a new Board of Directors with a decree from Transition President COL Doumbouya in February 2022. Bidding processes are clearly spelled out for potential bidders; however, Guinea gives weight to competence in the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa. In spring 2015, a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The 2013 Mining Code includes Guinea’s first legal framework outlining corporate social responsibility. Under the provisions of the code, mining companies must submit social and environmental impact plans for approval before operations can begin and sign a code of good conduct, agreeing to refrain from corrupt activities and to follow the precepts of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, lack of capacity in the various ministries involved makes government monitoring and enforcement of corporate social responsibility requirements difficult, a gap that some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are filling. In February 2019, Guinea was found to have achieved meaningful progress in implementing EITI standards. The EITI Board outlined eight corrective actions, including disclosing more information on infrastructure agreements, direct subnational payments, and quasi-fiscal expenditures. The Board noted that the EITI should play a role in overseeing the new Local Economic Development Fund (FODEL). Mining companies continue to note a lack of transparency in the expenditure of revenues by the National Agency for Mining Infrastructure (ANAIM). The 2019 Environmental Code also has specific provisions regarding environmental and social due diligence on any development projects. The Code requires each development project to conduct an environmental impact study which includes a list of mitigation measures for any negative impact. Guinea has laws that protect the population from adverse business impacts however, these laws are not effectively enforced. In the last few years, there were several cases of private enterprise having an adverse impact on human rights, especially in the mining and energy sectors. The government is often reluctant to fully enforce legislation regarding responsible conduct and the mitigation of these impacts. There are several local and international organizations that are promoting and monitoring the implementation of RBCs. Guinea is not signatory of the Montreux document on Private Military and Security Companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Guinea ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. Guinea prepared an Initial National Communication in 2001 to inventory greenhouse gases (GHG), based on emissions in 1994). A second GHG inventory was completed in 2011, based on 2000 emissions. Guinea prepared its National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) in 2007 and undertook several projects to implement the plan. Prior to COP 21 in Paris in December 2015, Guinea submitted an Intended National Contribution Determination in September 2015, committing to a 13 percent decrease in GHG emissions by 2030, as compared to 1994 emission levels. In preparation for COP 26 in Edinburgh in November 2021, Guinea prepared a Nationally Determined Contribution in July 2021, making a commitment to a 17 percent reduction target across sectors, potentially reaching a 49 percent reduction by 2030 by including land-use and forestry. Guinea has not yet prepared a National Adaptation Plan. As of April 2022, Guinea does not offer any regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve climate change benefits, nor do public procurement policies include environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, Guinea lost 13 points and was ranked 150 out of 180 countries listed. Guinea passed an Anti-Corruption Law in 2017, and in April 2019, a former director of the Guinean Office of Advertising was sentenced to five years in prison for embezzling GNF 39 billion (approximately USD four million), though in June 2019, he was acquitted by the Appeals Court and was elected a member of the National Assembly in March 2020. It is not clear whether the Anti-Corruption Law was used to prosecute the case. According to a 2019 Afrobarometer survey, at least 40 percent of Guineans reported having given a government official a bribe, while a 2016 World Bank Enterprise Survey reported that of 150 firms surveyed, 48.7 percent reported that they were expected to give “gifts” to public officials to get things done, but only 7.9 percent reported having paid a bribe. The business and political culture, coupled with low salaries, have historically combined to promote and encourage corruption. Requests for bribes are a common occurrence. Though it is illegal to pay bribes in Guinea, there is little enforcement of these laws. In practice, it is difficult and time-consuming to conduct business without giving “gifts” in Guinea, leaving U.S. companies, who must comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at a disadvantage. Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption, the law does not extend to family members of government officials. It does include provisions for political parties. According to the World Bank’s 2018 Worldwide Governance Indicators, corruption continues to remain a severe problem, and Guinea is in the 13th percentile, down from being in the 15th percentile in 2012. Public funds have been diverted for private use or for illegitimate public uses, such as buying vehicles for government workers. Land sales and business contracts generally lack transparency. Guinea’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) is an autonomous agency established by presidential decree in 2004. The ANLC reports directly to the President and is currently the only state agency focused solely on fighting corruption, though it has been largely ineffective in its role with no successful convictions. The ANLC’s Bureau of Complaint Reception fields anonymous tips forwarded to the ANLC. Investigations and cases must then be prosecuted through criminal courts. According to the ANLC, during the past year there were no prosecutions as a result of tips. The agency is underfunded, understaffed, and lacks computers and vehicles. The ANLC is comprised of 52 employees in seven field offices, with a budget of USD 1.1 million in 2018. Former President Conde’s administration named corruption in both the governmental and commercial spheres as one of its top agenda items. In November 2019, Ibrahim Magu, the acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria, and President Alpha Conde reached an agreement through which the Commission will assist Guinea to establish an anti-corruption agency; however, it is not clear if that meant reforming the existing anti-corruption agency or establishing a new anti-corruption agency. In January 2021, Beny Steinmetz, an Israeli businessman and billionaire was sentenced to five years in jail in Geneva for bribing the wife of Guinea’s late President Lansana Conté to gain the rights to one of the world’s richest iron-ore deposits. He was also ordered to pay a 50 million Swiss franc (USD 56 million) fine. Steinmetz has long claimed to be a victim of a vast international conspiracy to deprive him of the rights to the Simandou project. He plans to appeal his case. Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. A 2016 survey by the ANLC, the Open Society Initiative-West Africa (OSIWA), and Transparency International found that among private households, 61 percent of the respondents stated they were asked to pay a bribe for national services and 24 percent for local services. Furthermore, 24 percent claimed to have paid traffic-related bribes to police, 24 percent for better medical treatment, 19 percent for better water or electricity services, and 8 percent for better judicial treatment. Guinea is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html Guinea is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm Since 2012, Guinea has had a Code for Public Procurement (Code de Marches Publics et Delegations de Service Public) that provides regulations for countering conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or in government procurements. In 2016, the government issued a Transparency and Ethics charter for public procurement that provides the main do’s and don’ts in public procurement, highlighting avoidance of conflict of interest as a priority. The charter also includes a template letter that companies must sign when bidding for public contracts stating that they will comply with local legislation and public procurement provisions, including practices to prevent corruption. Since April 2020, Government of Guinea officials and family must complete the asset declaration form which is available on the Court of Audit website. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: National Agency to Fight Corruption (ANLC) Cite des Nations, Villa 20, Conakry, Guinea Korak Bailo Sow, Permanent Secretary +224 622 411 796 ddiallo556@gmail.com +224 620 647 878 cc@anlcgn.org Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International Dakar, Senegal +221-33-842-40-44 forumcivil@orange.sn Guinea Association for Transparency Oumar Kanah Diallo, President +224 622 404 142 okandiallo77@gmail.com agtguinee224@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Guinea has had a long history of political repression, with more recent episodes of politically-motivated violence around elections. The country suffered under authoritarian rule from independence in 1958 until its first democratic presidential election in 2010. It has seen continued political violence associated with national and local elections since 2010, culminating in the most recent September 2021 coup d’etat. On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état. COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution. Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials. On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force. On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces. On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022. In March 2020, the former Conde administration amended the constitution through a referendum that allowed former President Conde to seek a third term in office. Observers noted the process was not transparent, inclusive, or consultative. Major opposition parties boycotted the referendum and accompanying legislative elections. This resulted in resetting presidential term limits and the ruling party, the Rally for the Guinean People, gaining a super majority in the National Assembly. Domestic and international observers raised concerns regarding widespread violence and voting irregularities in the legislative elections, including closed and ransacked polling stations. In October 2020 President Alpha Conde ran for reelection for a third term under the new constitution. International and domestic observers raised concerns about widespread electoral violence, restrictions on freedom of assembly, the lack of transparency in vote tabulation, and inconsistencies between the announced results and tally sheet results from polling stations. Violent protests during both elections closed businesses in major population centers, resulted in about 150 deaths, and the arbitrary detention of hundreds of people including several prominent opposition figures. Political intimidation and arbitrary detention of opposition members continued for several months after the election. The local populace in Boke, Bel-Air, and Sangaredi disrupted road and/or railroad traffic on at least three occasions in 2017 and at least twice in 2018, in response to grievances over employment, lack of services, and other issues. Although none of these events targeted American or foreign investors, they were disruptive to business in general and eroded confidence in the security situation under which investors must operate in Guinea. Street violence is difficult to predict or avoid, but generally does not target westerners. Presidential elections in 2015 sparked violent protests in Conakry, but clashes between police and demonstrators were largely contained. In addition to political violence, sporadic and generally peaceful protests over fuel prices, lack of electricity, labor disputes, and other issues have occurred in the capital and sometimes beyond since 2013. In February 2017, seven civilians died in confrontations with security services during large protests against education reforms. After two days of violent protests in March 2018, teachers’ unions and the government agreed to a raise of 40 percent. These protests over teacher union pay became intermingled with political protests over voting irregularities in the February 4 local elections. The political opposition claims the government is responsible for the deaths of over 90 people during political protests over the past eight years. Other instances of violence occurred in 2014 and 2015 during the Ebola epidemic when local citizens attacked the vehicles and facilities of aid workers. The Red Cross, MSF (Doctors Without Borders) and the World Health Organization (WHO) also reported cases of property damage (destroyed vehicles, ransacked warehouses, etc.). On September 16, 2014, in the Forest Region village of Womei, eight people were killed by a mob when they visited the village as part of an Ebola education campaign. The casualties included radio journalists, local officials, and Guinean health care workers. The small mining town of Zogota, located in Guinea’s Forest Region, saw the deaths of five villagers, including the village chief, during August 2012 clashes with security forces over claims that the Brazilian iron-mining company Vale was not hiring enough local employees and was instead bringing workers from other regions of Guinea. The ensuing instability led to Vale evacuating all expatriate personnel from the town. Following the death of President Lansana Conte on December 22, 2008, a military junta calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) took power in a bloodless coup. Immediately following the coup, the U.S. government suspended all but humanitarian and election assistance to Guinea. The African Union (AU) and ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s membership pending democratic elections and a relinquishment of power by the military junta. In September 2009, junta security forces attacked a political rally in a stadium in Conakry, killing 150 people, and raping over a hundred women. The state had persecuted political dissidents and opposition parties for decades. The Sekou Toure regime (1958-1984) and the Lansana Conte regime (1984-2008) were marked by political violence and human rights abuses. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Guinea has a young population and a high unemployment rate. Potential employees often lack specialized skills. The country has a poor educational system and lacks professionals in all sectors of the economy. Guinea has deficits in specialized skills needed for large-scale projects of any kind. According to a 2019 World Bank report on “Employment, productivity and inclusion of youth”, in 2017 Guinea’s economy was based on services (49 percent of GDP), mining and industry (37 percent) and agriculture (10 percent). The tendencies show that employment in Guinea is like other countries in the region, with a high level of employment in the informal sector. According to the 2018 World Bank Development Indicators, approximately 65 percent of Guineans above 15 years old, (56 percent males and 44 percent females) were employed in the formal or informal sectors. Of those employed, 52 percent were working in agricultural sector, 34 percent in commerce, and 14 percent in industry and manufacturing. In March 2020, the National Assembly revised the Children’s Code to increase protections and rights afforded to minors. The new code provides increased penalties for offenses that expose children to violence, sexuality, the display or dissemination of obscene images, and messages not intended for children. The new code also increases penalties relating to child labor, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and the fight against child pornography. Under the new code children between the ages of 12 and 14 can perform light work, which does not meet international standards, as it applies to children under age 13. In addition, the new code does not prescribe the number of hours per week permitted for light work, nor does it specify the conditions under which light work may be done. Moreover, these laws only apply to workers with written employment contracts, leaving self-employed children and children working outside of formal employment relationships vulnerable to exploitation. Guinea’s National Assembly adopted a new labor code in February 2014 which protects the rights of employees and is enforced by the Ministry of Technical Education, Vocational Training, Employment and Labor. The Labor Code sets forth guidelines in various sectors, the most stringent being the mining sector. Guidelines cover wages, holidays, work schedules, overtime pay, vacation, and sick leave. The Labor Code also outlaws all discrimination in hiring, including on the basis of sex, disability, and ethnicity. It also prohibits all forms of workplace harassment, including sexual harassment. However, the law does not provide antidiscrimination protections for persons based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity. Although the law provides for the rights of workers to organize and join independent unions, engage in strikes, and bargain collectively, the law also places restrictions on the free exercise of these rights. The Labor Code requires unions to obtain the support of 20 percent of the workers in a company, region, or trade that the union claims to represent. The code mandates that unions provide ten days’ notice to the labor ministry before striking, but the code does allow work slowdowns. Strikes are only permitted for professional claims. The Labor Code does not apply to government workers or members of the armed forces. While the Labor Code protects union officials from anti-union discrimination, it does not extend that same protection to other workers. The law prohibits child labor in the formal sector and sets forth penalties of three to ten years imprisonment and confiscation of resulting profits. The law does not protect children in the informal sector. The minimum age for employment is 16. Exceptions allow children to work at age twelve as apprentices for light work in such sectors as domestic service and agriculture, and at 14 for other work. A new child code was adopted at the National Assembly in December 2019, though it was never enacted by former President Conde. The new child code provides more severe sentences for violations related to child labor. The Labor Code allows the government to set a minimum monthly wage through the Consultative Commission for Labor and Social Laws. The minimum wage for all sectors was established in 2013 at 440,000 GNF (approximately USD 50). There is no known official poverty income level established by the government. The law mandates that regular work should not exceed ten-hour days or 48-hour weeks, and it mandates a period of at least 24 consecutive hours of rest each week, usually on Sunday. Every salaried worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at the rate of at least two workdays per month of work. There also are provisions in the law for overtime and night wages, which are a fixed percentage of the regular wage. The law stipulates a maximum of 100 hours of compulsory overtime a year. The law contains general provisions regarding occupational safety and health, but neither former President Conde’s government nor the transition government have established a set of practical workplace health and safety standards. Moreover, no orders have been issued laying out the specific safety requirements for certain occupations or for certain methods of work called for in the Labor Code. All workers, foreign and migrant included, have the right to refuse to work in unsafe conditions without penalty. Authorities rarely monitor work practices or enforced the workweek standards and the overtime rules. Teachers’ wages are low, and teachers sometimes have gone for months without pay. When salary arrears are not paid, some teachers live in abject poverty. From 2016-2018, teachers conducted regular strikes and as a result and were promised a 40 percent increase in pay. Initially they received only ten percent, but in March 2018, the government began to pay the remaining 30 percent. In February 2019, the teacher’s union accepted the government proposal at the time and returned to work. In January 2020, the teachers started an indefinite strike demanding higher wages and the re-running of a census of currently employed teachers. As of end of March 2020, the teachers’ strike was put on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite legal protection against working in unsafe conditions, many workers feared retaliation and did not exercise their right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions. Accidents in unsafe working conditions remain common. The government banned artisanal mining during the rainy season to prevent deaths from mudslides, but the practice continues. Pursuant to the Labor Code, any person is considered a worker, regardless of gender or nationality, who is engaged in any occupational activity in return for remuneration, under the direction and authority of another individual or entity, whether public or private, secular, or religious. In accordance with this code, forced or compulsory labor means any work or services extracted from an individual under threat of a penalty and for which the individual concerned has not offered himself willingly. A contract of employment is a contract under which a person agrees to be at the disposal and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration. The contract may be agreed upon for an indefinite or a fixed term and may only be agreed upon by individuals of at least 16 years of age, although minors under the age of 16 may be contracted only with the authorization of the minor’s parent or guardian. An unjustified dismissal provides the employee the right to receive compensation from the employer in an amount equal to at least six months’ salary with the last gross wage paid to the employee being used as the basis for calculating the compensation due. The Investment Code obliges new companies to prioritize hiring local employees and provide capacity training and promotion opportunities for Guineans, a sentiment echoed by public remarks from Transition President COL Doumbouya and other members of the transition government. 14. Contact for More Information Caroline Corcoran Economic and Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy Conakry +224 655 104 428 corcorance@state.gov Guyana Executive Summary Guyana is located on South America’s North Atlantic coast, bordering Venezuela, Suriname, and Brazil, and is the only English-speaking country on the continent. Guyana became an oil producing nation in 2019 and, with a population of 782,766, is poised to dramatically increase its per capita wealth. While it is currently the third poorest country in the western hemisphere, Guyana’s economy grew by 19.9 percent in 2021. Guyana’s economy is projected to grow by 47.9 percent in 2022 according to the Ministry of Finance, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Guyana’s is poised for strong economic growth over the next decade as its offshore oil and gas production quickly ramps up to over 1 million barrels per day (bpd), an unprecedented development pace for a country that just discovered commercially viable hydrocarbon resources in 2015. ExxonMobil, the majority shareholder in the consortium (which also includes Hess and the China National Offshore Oil Company) developing Guyana’s offshore oil and gas deposits, increased its estimate for commercially viable oil deposits in Guyana to over 10 billion barrels in October 2021. Industry experts expect Guyana’s total recoverable oil deposits to increase as exploration activities expand to other offshore blocks, which remain unexplored. To manage the windfall from oil and gas production, the Government of Guyana (GoG) amended its sovereign wealth fund legislation in December 2021, thereby opening its coffers for the government to spend most of the fund’s initial balance on needed infrastructure and energy developments and invest in the country’s healthcare and education systems. Guyana is quickly transforming into a regional destination for international investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Guyana increased from $1.8 billion in 2020 to $4.3 billion in 2021, mainly due to investments in its oil and gas sector. In an effort to diversify the economy away from oil and gas, the GoG is offering incentives for investment in the agriculture, business support services, health, information technology manufacturing and energy sectors, especially in outlying regions, through the Guyana Office for Investment (GOINVEST). At the same time, processes including the government tender process are slow and often opaque, with some tenders expiring and being re-issued after a year passes without decision and no pro-active communication to U.S. bidders. The GoG lifted most of its COVID-19 domestic restrictions on February 14, 2022, thanks to a significant drop in COVID cases. Proof of vaccination and a negative COVID-19 PCR, or approved antigen, test taken with 72 of travel are still required to enter Guyana. The Ministry of Health (MoH) reports that more than 60 percent of Guyana’s adult population is fully vaccinated, as are 44 percent of children ages 12 – 17. While the GoG remains wary of future variants, the government has indicated a strong resistance to resuming containment and mitigation efforts like mask mandates, nationwide curfews, and strict quarantine requirements. Climate change presents a clear and present danger to Guyana, especially in its low-lying coastal regions where 90 percent of the population lives. According to the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2021 report, Guyana’s capital, Georgetown, is forecasted to be under water by 2030 due to rising sea levels. To assist the country’s transition to a more climate resilient economy, the GoG is revising its Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), which seeks to create financial incentives for maintaining the country’s intact forests covering 87 percent of the landmass, watersheds, and unique biodiversity. The strategy is expected to be tabled in parliament in mid-2022 for approval and adoption. The GoG’s 2022 priorities include significant infrastructure investments, energy developments, improving healthcare services, diversifying and expanding agriculture sector, boosting sea and flood defenses, supporting emerging and value-added industries, and improving the business climate. Key challenges to Guyana’s development include high crime rates, some of the highest cost of electricity in the region, lengthy delays for permits, and access to land. Despite commitments from the GoG to ease regulatory hurdles and improve the business climate, Guyana’s Ease of Doing Business ranking continues to hover at 134 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2020 report. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2015 178 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,130 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoG recognizes foreign direct investment (FDI) as critical for growing and diversifying the Guyanese economy. Guyanese law does not discriminate against foreign investors. The GoG has prioritized investments in the following sectors: agriculture, agro-processing, light manufacturing, renewable energy, tourism and information and communications technology (ICT). The Guyana Office for Investment (GO-INVEST) is the GoG’s primary vehicle for promoting FDI opportunities and assisting foreign corporations with their business registrations and applying for tax concessions. Companies and investors are encouraged to do their due diligence and have robust business plans completed before approaching GOINVEST. The GoG passed the Local Content Act (LCA) on December 31, 2021, which establishes baseline requirements for foreign and local firms operating in the country’s oil and gas sector to hire Guyanese and source local materials. The legislation lists local quotas for 40 business services and material inputs, which must come from Guyanese businesses. The targets range from near total local sourcing (90 to 100 percent) for services like ground transportation of personnel, local accounting and legal services, and pest control services to lower levels (between 5 to 25 percent) for more technical items like dredging services, engineering and machining, borehole testing, environmental services and studies, and aviation support services. The GoG plans to expand this initial list of services and materials as local capacity increases, in which case foreign firms may have to enter into partnerships with local firms to comply with the LCA. Some local firms involved in joint ventures or subcontract relationships with foreign companies have expressed concerns about unclear requirements or the suggestion of new or revised tenders by the Local Content Secretariat, which could delay their operations and create conditions for undue influence and rent seeking behavior. Guyana’s constitution protects the rights of foreigners to own property in Guyana. Foreign and domestic firms possess the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of commerce, except for some oil and gas services which are now legally protected under the LCA. Private entities are governed by the 1991 Companies Act (amended in 1995) under which they have the right to establish business enterprises and are free to acquire or dispose of interest in accordance with the law. Some key sectors like oil and gas, aviation, forestry, banking, mining, and tourism are heavily regulated and require special licensing and may have limits on foreign ownership. The process to obtain licenses can be time consuming and may in some instances require ministerial approval. The LCA significantly increased the ownership criteria for a company operating in, or servicing the oil sector, to be considered Guyanese as: Guyanese nationals having at least 51 percent voting rights, holding at least 75 percent of executive and senior management positions within the company, and at least 90 percent non-managerial staff positions. As of April 2022, these limits on foreign control and ownership only apply to the initial schedule of local companies outlined in the 2021 LCA. The GoG also prohibits foreign ownership of small-and-medium-scale mining (ASM) concessions. Foreign investors interested in participating in the industry at those levels may establish joint ventures with Guyanese nationals, under which the two parties agree to jointly develop a mining property. However, this type of relationship can carry a high level of risk because arrangements are governed only by private contracts and the sector’s regulatory agency, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), offers little recourse for ASM disputes. The U.S. Embassy strongly encourages investors to thoroughly conduct their due diligence when exploring business opportunities. The GoG maintains an investment screening mechanism through GOINVEST. Under this mechanism, investment agreements are prepared by GOINVEST, followed by a review by the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA), and approval by the Minister of Finance ultimately approves the investment agreement, pending approval by the GRA. Industry specific investments can be subject to approval by the relevant ministries, like the recently established Local Content Secretariat within the Ministry of Natural Resources, which now approves all oil and gas related business operations. Government policy focuses on attracting inward FDI. The GoG applies national treatment to all economic activities, except for certain oil and gas and mining operations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published its most recent trade policy review of Guyana on March 2, 2022, in which it encouraged the GoG to invest in infrastructure and human capital development and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. The most recent report reiterated prior recommendations for the GoG to increase transparency in government procurement and modernize of the government’s treatment of intellectual property rights. World Trade Organization is available at the following link: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp522_crc_e.htm President Irfaan Ali’s administration has emphasized its desire to diversify Guyana’s economy and expand business ties with the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and others. The GoG created a Diaspora Affairs Unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to encourage business ties with the Guyanese diaspora, especially the U.S. based diaspora. All companies operating in Guyana must physically register with the Registrar of Companies, there is no online platform. Registration fees are lower for companies incorporated in Guyana than those incorporated abroad. Locally incorporated companies are subjected to a flat fee of approximately $300 and a company incorporated abroad is subject to a fee of approximately $400. Depending on the type of business, registration may take three weeks or more. Newly registered businesses are encouraged to immediately apply for a tax identification number (TIN) from the GRA. If a company employs Guyanese workers, the company must demonstrate compliance with the National Insurance Scheme (social security). Businesses in the sectors requiring specific licenses, such as oil and gas, mining, telecommunications, forestry, and banking must obtain operation licenses from the relevant authorities before commencing operations. Guyana has six municipal authorities which also assess municipal taxes: Anna Regina, Corriverton, Georgetown, Linden, New Amsterdam, and Rosehall. GOINVEST advises the GoG on the formulation and implementation of national investment policies and provides facilitation services to foreign investors, particularly in completing administrative formalities, such as commercial registration and applications for land purchases or leases. Under the Status of Aliens Act, foreign and domestic investors have the same rights to purchase and lease land. However, the process to access licensing can be complex and many foreign companies have opted to partner with local companies which may assist with acquiring a license. The Investment Act specifies that there should be no discrimination between foreign and domestic private investors, or among foreign investors from different countries. The authorities maintain that foreign investors have equal access to opportunities arising from privatization of state-owned companies. Resources Guyana Deeds and Commercial Registry: https://dcra.gov.gy/ GO-INVEST: https://goinvest.gov.gy/ Guyana Revenue Authority: https://www.gra.gov.gy/ While the GoG is focused on attracting inward investment into Guyana, there are no restrictions for domestic investors to invest abroad. GOINVEST supports Guyanese investors and exporters looking to operate overseas. In 2021, Guyana repealed and replaced its existing sovereign wealth fund legislation, the Natural Resource Fund Act. The passage of the revised NRF, along with the appointment of a board of directors, paves the way for the GoG to invest a portion of its oil revenues and royalties in global markets. 3. Legal Regime Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international norms. Guyana is a commonwealth nation and embraces the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), under which all publicly traded companies are legally required to publish their annual reports. Guyana is a democratic country, whose constitution mandates the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In practice, however, many GoG processes are opaque and consistently cause confusion for investors and exporters. Regulations are developed through stakeholder consultations followed by parliamentary debate and eventual passage in Guyana’s National Assembly (parliament). While the GoG does not require companies to disclose environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards, it actively encourages ESG through investment policies and the LCDS. Guyana’s laws are publicly available on the Ministry of Legal Affairs website. Publicly listed companies’ finances and debt obligations are relatively transparent, but Guyana’s accounting and auditing firms are severely limited in their capacity to conduct thorough audits that comply with international best practices. Oversight mechanisms for public finances include the national assembly and the Auditor General Office. As captured in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, the GoG’s bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome, often involve multiple ministries that often have overlapping regulatory responsibilities. Investors report having received conflicting messages from various officials, and difficulty determining where the authority for decision-making lies. In the absence of adequate legislation, most decision-making remains centralized. An extraordinary number of issues continue to be resolved in the presidential cabinet, a process that is perceived by many – especially new investors or bidders – as opaque and slow. Resources Ministry of Legal Affairs: https://mola.gov.gy/laws-of-guyana Guyana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and adheres to Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) guidelines. Guyana is also a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and is working to harmonize its regulatory systems with the rest of the CARICOM member states. Guyana is a member of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) initiative. Guyana has laws on intellectual property rights and patents. However, a lack of enforcement offers few protections in practice and allows for the relatively uninhibited distribution and sale of illegally obtained content. Guyana’s legal system combines civil and common laws. Guyana’s judicial system operates independently from the executive branch. The Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, is Guyana’s highest court. Registered companies are governed by the Companies Act and contracts are enforced by Guyanese courts or through a mediator. Guyana has a commercial court in its High Court, which has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Legislation exists in Guyana to support foreign direct investment, but the enforcement of these regulations continues to be inadequate. The objective of the Investment Act of 2004 and Industries and Aid and Encouragement Act of 1951 is to stimulate socio-economic development by attracting and facilitating foreign investment. Other relevant laws include: the Income Tax Act, the Customs Act, the Procurement Act of 2003, the Companies Act of 1991, the Securities Act of 1998, and the Small Business Act. Regulatory actions are still required for much of this legislation to be effectively implemented. The Companies Act provides special provisions for companies incorporated outside of Guyana called “external companies.” Most recently the 2021 Local Content Act mandates certain levels of Guyanese participation (in the form of workforce, company ownership, and sourcing of materials) in the oil and gas sector. Companies should direct their inquiries about regulations on FDI to GOINVEST. Guyana has no known examples of executive interference in the court system that have adversely affected foreign investors. The judicial system is generally perceived to be slow and ineffective in enforcing legal contracts. The 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report states that it takes 581 days to enforce a contract in Guyana. Guyana’s local content legislation was passed on December 30, 2022. The legislation ringfences 40 business lines for Guyanese businesses within the oil and gas industry. The Competition Commission of Guyana was established under the 2006 Competition and Fair-Trading Act. The Competition and Fair-Trading act seek to promote, maintain, and encourage competition; to prohibit the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, the abuse of dominant trade positions; and to promote the welfare and interests of consumers. The Competition Commission and Consumer Affairs Commission (CCAC) is responsible for investigating complaints by agencies and consumers, eliminating anti-competitive agreements, and may institute or participate in proceedings before a Court of Law. For mergers and acquisitions within of the banking sector, the Bank of Guyana has ultimate oversight and approval. The government can expropriate property in the public interest under the 2001 Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes Act, although there are no recent cases of expropriation. Adequate legislation exists to promote and protect foreign investment. However, enforcement is often ineffective. Many reports view Guyana’s judicial system as being slow and ineffective in enforcing legal contracts. All companies are encouraged to conduct due diligence and seek appropriate legal counsel for any potential questions prior to doing business in Guyana. Guyana is a party to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). Additionally, Guyana has ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), which entered into force in December 2014. Guyana does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. Negotiations began in 1993 but broke down in 1995. Since then, the two countries have not conducted subsequent negotiations. Double taxation treaties are in force with Canada (1987), the United Kingdom (1992), and CARICOM (1995). Other double taxation agreements remain under negotiation with India, Kuwait, and the Seychelles. The CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement provides for the negotiation of a double taxation agreement, but no significant developments have occurred since March 2009. There is one ongoing investment dispute involving a U.S. telecommunications company, which previously held a legal monopoly in Guyana. International arbitration decisions are enforceable under the 1931 Arbitration Act of British Guiana, as amended in 1998. The Act is based on the Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. The GoG enforces foreign awards by way of judicial decisions or action, and such awards must be in line with the policies and laws of Guyana. According to the 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report, resolving disputes in Guyana takes 581 days, and on average costs 27 percent of the value of the claim. According to many businesses, suspected corrupt practices and long delays make the courts an unattractive option for settling investment or contractual disputes, particularly for foreign investors unfamiliar with Guyana. The GoG has set up a Commercial Court to expedite commercial disputes, but this court only has one judge presiding, and companies have reported that it is overwhelmed by a backlog of cases. The Caribbean Court of Justice, based in Trinidad and Tobago, is Guyana’s court of final instance. In practice, most business disputes are settled by mediation which avoids a lengthy court battle and keeps costs low to both parties. Guyanese state-owned enterprises are not widely involved in investor disputes. To date, there are no complaints on the court process relating to judgments involving state owned enterprises. The 1998 Guyana Insolvency Act provides for the facilitation of insolvency proceedings. The 2004 Financial Institutions Act gives the Central Bank power to take temporary control of financial institutions in trouble. This Act provides legal authority for the Central Bank to take a more proactive role in helping insolvent local banks. According to data collected by the World Bank Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Guyana takes three years on average and costs 28.5% of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold piecemeal. The average recovery rate is 18 cents on the dollar. 4. Industrial Policies Guyana offers an array of incentives to foreign and domestic investors alike in the form of exemption from various taxes, accelerated depreciation rates, full and unrestricted repatriation of capital, profits, and dividends. The first point of contact in applying for tax concessions is GOINVEST. The GoG utilizes investment incentives to advance its broader policy goals, such as boosting research and development, or spurring growth in a particular region. Guyana offers fiscal incentives for clean energy investments including value added tax (VAT) and import duty exemptions for renewable energy equipment, one off corporate tax holidays of two years, and a capital expenditure write off within two years. The GoG offers co-investing options for outlying regions. Information on investment incentives in Guyana can be found on the following websites: Guyana Office for Investment: http://goinvest.gov.gy/investment/investment-guide/ The National Procurement & Tender Administration (NPTA): http://www.npta.gov.gy/ National Industrial & Commercial Investment Limited: http://www.privatisation.gov.gy / Ministry of Finance: https://finance.gov.gy/procurements Guyana does not have free trade zones, however, the GoG is contemplating establishing free trade zones in Lethem, a Guyanese town on the Brazilian border that relies heavily on cross border commerce. Guyana was the 53rd WTO member and first South American country to ratify the new Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The WTO Secretariat received Guyana’s instrument of acceptance on November 30, 2015. There are no data localization requirements in Guyana requiring foreign investors to establish or maintain a certain amount of data storage within the country. There is no visa requirement for U.S. citizens to visit Guyana. There are no government-imposed conditions to invest. However, if seeking tax concessions, an entity will be bound to an investment agreement. A requirement to hire locally at least 80 percent of employees is applied equally to domestic and foreign investment projects. The GoG formalized this requirement in the oil and gas sector through with the passage of the LCA in 2021. While there are no concrete plans to expand the LCA model to other industries at this time, the GoG has expressed interest in protecting other industries from foreign competition. Although no explicit government policy exits regarding performance requirements, some are written into contracts with foreign investors and could include the requirement of a performance bond. Some contracts require a certain minimum level of investment. Investors are not required to source locally, nor must they export a certain percentage of output. Foreign exchange is not rationed in proportion to exports, nor are there any requirements for national ownership or technology transfer. Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There are no measures to prevent or restrict companies from transmitting customer or business data. The government agencies involved for local data storage include the National Data Management Authority and the Office of the Prime Minister. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are enforced but it is often time consuming to determine the rightful owner of a particular plot of land. Ownership of property can be unclear even among government entities and potential investors are encouraged to have a local lawyer review any potential property purchase before executing the deal. Guyana has a dual registry system of property rights with distinct requirements, processes, and enforcement mechanisms. The two types of registry systems are deeds (regulated by the Deeds and Commercial Registry) and title (regulated by the Land Registry) registries that operate in separate jurisdictions, which in theory helps avoid the problem of double entry and dual registration. However, the percentage of land in Guyana that lacks a clear land title is unknown and the lack of a digital registry with which to easily verify title further complicates the transfer of property rights. Companies often complain about Guyana’s property rights being overly bureaucratic and complex, with opaque regulations that overlap and compete. Some report that this affects the proper allocation, enforcement, and effectiveness of property rights, as well as the efficiency of property-based markets, such as real estate and financial markets (especially primary ones, such as mortgage markets). As previously stated, the judicial system is generally perceived to be slow and ineffective in enforcing legal contracts. The GoG is the country’s largest landowner. Property can be reverted to squatters who have squatted for over 10 years, but in most instances the GoG repossesses the land. Frustration arises when investors who have been leased land do not proceed with planned investments, so an ability to secure financing and move forward with projects is key. Upon independence in 1966, Guyana adopted British law on intellectual property rights (IPR). Guyana’s relevant laws governing IPR are the 1956 Copyright Act and the 1973 Trademark Act and Patents and Design Act. Local contacts report that numerous attempts to pass comprehensive reforms to this legislation have been unsuccessful. However, piecemeal modernization amendments contained in the 2005 Geographic Indication Act, the 2006 Competition and Fair-Trading Act, the 2000 Business Names Registration Act, and the 1999 Deeds Registry Authority Act have offered additional protection to local products and companies. In the past year, there was no new IP laws enacted. No modern legislation exists to protect the foreign-registered rights of investors. However, investors are encouraged to seek a lawyer to register and/or make an application for intellectual property. In the case of trademarks, registration is done through writing to the registrar, which once accepted after advertisement in the official gazette, the registrar inserts the particulars and issues a registration bearing the seal of the patent office. Guyana joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and acceded to the Berne and Paris Conventions in 1994. Guyana has not ratified a bilateral intellectual property rights agreement with the United States. The previous government drafted intellectual property rights legislation which has yet to be taken up in Parliament. Many businesses report that the registration time for a patent or trademark may take in excess of six months. However, there is a lack of effective enforcement to protect intellectual property rights. Patent and trademark infringement are common, as is evident among local television broadcasts of pirated and rebroadcasted TV satellite signals. Guyana has seen seizures of counterfeited food items by the Guyana Foods and Drugs Analyst Department (GFDD). However, the GFDD is severely short staffed and unable to police all commerce effectively. Local news media sources report that piracy of foreign academic textbooks is common. Guyana’s laws have not been amended to fully conform to the requirements of the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. Guyana is not mentioned in the United States Trade Representative’s 2021 Special 301 Report, nor is it named in its 2020 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. 6. Financial Sector The GoG is indifferent to foreign portfolio investment. Guyana has its own stock market, which is supervised by the Guyana Association of Securities Companies and Intermediaries (GASCI). GASCI is a self- regulated organization. Dividends earned from the local stock exchange are tax free. Guyana’s stock market outpaced GDP growth in 2021 with a 46.1 percent increase in its market capitalization. Despite growing interest in the local stock market, however, Guyana has not seen a new company listed for over a decade. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market if they satisfy local banking requirements. Credit is allocated based on risk profile and creditworthiness. Credit is available on market terms. The private sector has access to credit instruments though limited on the local market. The Central Bank respects IMF Article VIII with regard to payments and transfers for international transactions. Guyana relies heavily on cash payments for most financial transactions, but credit cards and mobile payment options are increasingly common. The GoG’s monetary policy remains accommodative, aimed at achieving price stability and controlling liquidity within the economy. The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BoG), the country’s central bank. The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BOG), the country’s central bank. The BOG is empowered under the 1995 Financial Institutions Act and the Bank of Guyana Act to regulate the financial sector. Under these regulations a bank operating in Guyana must maintain high levels of liquidity and a strong deposit and asset base. Approval from the BOG is required before operating in Guyana. The BoG regularly performs stress tests to determine the vulnerability of licensed depository financial institutions (LDFIs). Guyanese LDFI’s ratio of reserves against non-performing loans increased by 1.9 percentage points to 37.2 percent as of mid-year 2021. Guyana’s banking system remains adequate with capital adequacy ratios (CAR) well above the prudential benchmark of 8 percent. Guyana’s banking stability index improved from 0.15 to 0.38 at the end of June 2021, reflecting improved performances in asset quality, profitability, and liquidity indicators. Non–bank financial institutions’ total assets, which includes depository and non-depository licenses and unlicensed financial institutions, grew by 8 percent. Guyana has six commercial banks. Foreign banks can provide domestic services or enter the market with a license from the BoG. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The GoG recognizes a need to improve access to finance for both the private sector and private citizens, with the current financial institutions seen as slow, overly cautious, and full of bureaucratic red tape. Guyana established a sovereign wealth fund, the Natural Resource Fund (NRF), in 2019, with the passage of the 2019 Natural Resources Act. While the NRF broadly conformed to the Santiago principles, President Irfaan Ali’s administration vowed to repeal and replace the 2019 NRF with a version that decentralized control over the fund and established a simpler withdrawal schedule. In December 2021, the Ali administration used its veto proof majority in parliament to unilaterally repeal and replace the existing law with the NRF 2021. While the revised law includes some improvements, like the creation of a board of directors and more intuitive withdraw schedule, it still affords the President broad reaching powers to appoint all the NRF’s key leadership positions, provides few limits on the investment or usage of the fund, and while a former member of the opposition was proposed for the board, the current opposition’s nominees were not accepted by the government. This prompted more concerns about transparent management of the fund moving forward. As of January 2022, the NRF holds $607.5 million, which under the revised law the GoG will be able to withdraw in its entirety in the coming year to meet 2022 budget allocations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guyana has ten state-owned enterprises (SOEs) including: National Industrial and Commercial Investments Ltd. (NICIL), Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO), MARDS Rice Complex Ltd., National Insurance Scheme (NIS), Guyana Power and Light (GPL), Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB), Guyana National Newspapers Ltd. (GNNL), Guyana National Shipping Corporation (GNSC) and Guyana National Printers Ltd. (GNPL). The private sector competes with SOEs for market share, credit, and business opportunities. It is common for SOEs in Guyana to experience political interventions, driven by boards of directors filled with political appointees. Procurement on behalf of SOEs may be passed through the National Procurement and Tender Administration or handled directly by the SOE. The Public Corporation Act requires public corporations to publish an annual report no later than six months after the end of the calendar year. These reports must be audited by an independent auditor. In the 1990s, Guyana underwent significant privatization with the divestment of many sectors. In 1993, the Privatization Policy Framework Paper known as the “Privatisation White Paper” was tabled in Parliament and led to the creation of the Privatization Unit (PU). Its function was to co-ordinate the implementation of the GoG’s privatization program and was tasked with: Combining the functions of the Public Corporations Secretariat (PCS) and the National Industrial & Commercial Investments Limited (NICIL); Preparing for the program strategy and annual program targets for privatization or liquidation Cabinet’s approval; Implementing the privatization of SOEs and assets selected for inclusion in the program; Participating in negotiations for the privatization of SOEs; Reviewing offers and making recommendations to Cabinet on the terms and conditions for the sale of SOEs; Preparing financial and administrative audits of SOEs not selected for privatization; Developing a strategy to build public understanding and support for privatization; Ensuring that transparency of the privatization program is strictly respected and followed; Monitoring operations of privatized entities in accordance with the terms and conditions of each respective contract; Preparing for Cabinet, broad guidelines on operating policies for privatization, develop action plans for implementation, conduct a public relations campaign and help to build national consensus in support of government’s program. Foreign investors have equal access to privatization opportunities. However, there are many reports that the process is opaque and favors politically connected local businesses. Currently, the GoG is interested in privatizing at least a portion of GUYSUCO. U.S. firms are generally given equal access to these projects through a public bidding process. However, many bidders continue to complain about the criteria and question their unsuccessful attempt at securing a contract. In cases where international financial institution (IFI) funding has been involved in the project, such allegations have been credibly addressed. In cases where the project relied solely on GoG funds, redress has been more problematic to achieve. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Compared to responsible business conduct (RBC) norms in North America and Europe, Guyana-based businesses lag in adopting RBC policies and activities. However, there is increasing awareness of expectations for responsible business conduct. Guyana does not have a policy to encourage RBC. Most companies conform to their business responsibilities outlined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), including human rights and labor rights, information disclosure, environment, bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation. Guyana’s laws align with the guidelines for RBC by the OECD. Despite these improvements, Guyana has human rights concerns, especially involving child labor in outlying regions and in the mining sector. The GoG enforces human rights laws but many report a lack of capacity to adequately enforce human and labor rights law Local companies have improved RBC as firms react to increased levels of competition, partly to compete or subcontract with companies in the oil and gas sector that emphasize it. Guyanese consumers are increasingly aware of RBC principles as the population becomes more sensitized. The GoG has expressed hope that large multinational companies will lead the way on RBC practices, setting an example for smaller local firms to follow, particularly in the extractive industries sector. Guyana joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a candidate country in October 2017. Guyana is not a signatory of the Montreux Document. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030 (LCDS) is an executive branch led policy framework/roadmap for the country to maintain 99.5 percent of its largely intact forests, incentivize biodiversity conservation, invest in climate resilient infrastructure, and keep carbon emissions at 2019 levels while quintupling economic growth over the next 20 years. The impetus to establish the LCDS came from the GoG’s 2009 agreement with Norway to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), which earned Guyana $250 million over ten years for reducing its annual deforestation rate from 0.12 to 0.05 percent. The latest version of the LCDS consists of four core objectives: accessing market-based mechanisms for Guyana’s forest carbon sequestration services, stimulate future growth through clean energy and sustainable economic activities, protect against climate change, and align with global climate goals. The LCDS contemplates active participation by the private sector but does not offer specific policies to incentivize their compliance. However, the GoG offers tax incentives and green loans for companies transitioning to clean energy sources. A market for tradeable permits, tax credits and pollution standards have yet to be developed and Guyana’s procurement policy does not include environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for corrupt practices by public officials. The relevant laws enacted include the Integrity Commission Act, State Assets Recovery Act, and the Audit Act. Notably, the Integrity Commission Board expired in February 2021, with no appointments made as of March 2022. Several media outlets reported on government corruption in recent years, and it remains a significant public concern. Guyana has regulations to counter conflict of interests in the award of contracts. Media and civil society organizations continued to criticize the government for being slow to prosecute corruption cases. The government passed legislation in 1997 that requires public officials to disclose their assets to an Integrity Commission prior to assuming office. There are no significant compliance programs to detect bribery of government officials. Guyana’s Integrity Commission was re-constituted in February 2018 after a 12-year hiatus, but only collects reports of asset declarations and lacks any ability to investigate suspected irregularities, complaints, or issues. The Integrity Commission can only flag asst declarations for investigation by other authorities. Widespread concerns remain about inefficiencies and corruption regarding the awarding of contracts, particularly with respect to concerns of collusion and non-transparency. In his 2020 annual report, the Auditor General noted continuous disregard for the procedures, rules, and the laws that govern public procurement system. There were reports of overpayments of contracts and procurement breaches. Nevertheless, the country has made some improvements. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Guyana ranked 87 out of 180 countries for perceptions of corruption, falling 4 spots in comparison to 2020. Companies interested in doing business in Guyana may contact a “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International) for more information: Transparency Institute of Guyana Inc. 157 Waterloo Street Second Floor Private Sector Commission Building North Cummingsburg Georgetown +592 231 9586 infotransparencygy@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Guyana has a high crime rate, and violence associated with drug and gold smuggling is on the rise. The country peacefully transitioned to a new government on August 2, 2020, after a 20 month-long extra-constitutional and electoral crisis, which saw few instances of politically incited violence. The GoG has committed to electoral reform in the wake of the 2020 electoral crisis to avoid future electoral impasses. The security environment in the country continues to be a concern for many businesses. Businesses considering investing in Guyana are strongly encouraged to develop adequate security systems. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Guyana’s labor market is tightening due to high investments in the oil and gas sector. In 2017, the total population aged 15 and above residing in Guyana was 550,831. In the first quarter of 2021, the labor force participation rate was 51.1 percent. Unemployment stood at 15.1 percent in the first quarter of 2021. A concerning trend is an increase in youth unemployment, jumping from 30.2 percent in the first quarter 2020 to 31.4 percent in first quarter 2021. Guyana has witnessed an influx of Venezuelan migrants which predominantly work in mining areas and in the restaurant industry. The Ali implementation of LCA adds pressure on an already tight labor market by offering legal protections and incentives for Guyanese companies to service the oil and gas sector, further fueling the flight of labor and investment to the industry. Guyana has a national insurance scheme, but social safety net programs do not exist for the general population. Strikes are common in the sugar industry and may vary with the public sector during collective bargaining sessions. Guyana has a significant informal economy, accounting for a range of 30 and 50 percent of the job market, this is in part attributable to many Guyanese pursuing self-employment in unregulated jobs. In April 2022, GoG leadership suggested there was a labor shortage and they planned to draft a new migration policy. Local legislation governing labor in Guyana includes the National Insurance Act, Guyana Labour Act, Occupation Health and Safety Act, and the Termination of Severance and Pay Act. Guyana’s Human Development Index for 2020 increased to 0.67 from 0.682. Guyana’s literacy rate is estimated at 90%. There is an ongoing push for information and communications technology curriculum in Guyana’s schools to develop a talent pool for the industry. Guyana has one of the highest emigration rates, 89 percent, in the world for nationals with a university degree. A significant number of businesses report challenges with staff recruitment and retention. These issues are linked to a small pool of semi-skilled and skilled workers. Companies entering Guyana should consider training and capacity building opportunities for their employees. The 1997 Trade Union Recognition Act requires businesses operating in Guyana to recognize and collectively bargain with the trade union selected by a majority of its workers. The government, on occasion, has unilaterally imposed wage increases. Guyana adheres to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention, protecting worker rights. The public sector has a minimum monthly wage of approximately $350 while the private sector minimum wage is slightly lower at $300. 14. Contact for More Information Brian Hall Political and Economic Counselor Benjamin Hulefeld Economic and Commercial Officer Richard Leo Economic and Commercial Specialist Embassy of the United States of America 100 Duke and Young Streets, Kingston Georgetown, Guyana Telephone: + (592) 225-4900-9 Ext. 4220 and Ext. 4213 Fax: + (592) 225-8597 Email: commercegeorgetown@state.gov https://gy.usembassy.gov Haiti Executive Summary Haiti, one of the most urbanized nations in Latin America and the Caribbean region, occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola. Haiti’s investment climate continues to present both important opportunities and major challenges for U.S. investors. With a market economy, ample arable land, and a young population, Haiti offers numerous opportunities for investors. Despite efforts by the Haitian government to achieve macroeconomic stability and sustainable private sector-led and market-based economic growth, Haiti’s investment climate is characterized by an unstable national currency (Haitian gourde, or HTG), persistent inflation, high unemployment, political uncertainty, and insecurity. The global outbreak of the coronavirus and resulting slowdown of economic activity, the August 2021 earthquake in the south of Haiti, the assassination of the Haitian president, and increasingly emboldened criminal actors further complicated the Haitian government’s capacity to achieve macroeconomic stability, create jobs, and encourage economic development through foreign trade and investment. In the absence of a functioning parliament and prior to President Moise’s assassination in July 2021, the Haitian government had taken additional steps to regulate commercial activity by presidential decree, with sudden regulatory changes the business community viewed as detrimental to a functioning market. As a free market system, the Haitian economy traditionally relies on its agricultural, construction, and commerce sectors, as well as the export-oriented apparel assembly industry. Although the business climate is challenging, Haiti’s legislation encourages foreign direct investment. The government has prioritized building and improving infrastructure, including boosting energy production, and has additionally designated agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism as key investment sectors. The Haitian investment code provides the same rights, privileges, and equal protection to local and foreign companies. Under Haitian law, Haiti’s business climate affords equal treatment to all investors, including women, minorities, and foreign nationals. Haiti continues to face significant challenges and civil unrest. With no dates yet announced for national elections, it is anticipated that political uncertainty and a short-term economic policy focus will complicate the workings of an already opaque bureaucracy. Prime Minister Ariel Henry has publicly announced the imminent formation of a new Provisional Electoral Council to organize elections and a National Constituent Assembly to reform the constitution. While the country maintains a liberal trade and foreign exchange regime, and largely adheres to World Bank programs to fight poverty, continuing reports of corruption and financial mismanagement have raised challenges for investment. The Government of Haiti (GoH) Post-COVID Economic Recovery Plan (PREPOC 2020-2023) includes the textile sector as one of the most important means for achieving economic transformation and diversification over the next three years. Since its launch in January 2021, the Investment Opportunity Generation Project has tried to support the industry through targeted business information as well as transactional support to increase business opportunities for investors and manufacturers. Despite the negative impact of the pandemic, most companies in the sector currently operates near full capacity. According to the World Investment Report 2021 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to Haiti fell to $30 million in 2020 from $75 million the year prior – a 60 percent decrease and the lowest level since United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) began recording FDI inflows using a consistent methodology in 2010. Inflation remains above target because of weak domestic production, a deepening government budget deficit mostly financed by monetization from the Central Bank, food price pressures, and the depreciation of the Haitian gourde against the U.S. dollar. The Haitian Central Bank (BRH) assesses that inflation is also caused by deteriorating security conditions, with armed gangs blocking key transport thoroughfares and cutting off Haiti’s southern departments from markets in Port-au-Prince and the North. The rise in commodity prices on the international market also increases the country’s import bill and amplifies inflationary pressures. Haiti’s net international reserves were $520 million at the end of March 2022. Improving the investment outlook for Haiti requires political and economic stability underscored by the enactment of institutional and structural reforms that can improve Haiti’s business and political environment. The International Monetary Fund projects a 0.3 percent growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2022. Monthly inflation was recorded at 0.6 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively in January and February 2022. Year-on-year, the inflation rate reached 25.2 percent in February 2022. The Central Bank assesses the implementation of a realistic budget and better coordination between fiscal and monetary policies through adherence to an economic and financial governance pact could limit the monetary effect in the fueling of inflationary pressures. Haiti is ranked 170 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Development Program’s 2020 Human Development Index. The World Bank’s latest household survey in 2012 reported that over 6 million Haitians live on less than $2.41 per day, and more than 2.5 million fall below $1.12 per day. The reports of damage from the 2021 earthquake indicate that nearly 54,000 houses were destroyed and 83,770 other buildings, including schools, health facilities, and public buildings, were damaged. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) report, made available on December 12, 2021, estimated the total recovery needs from the earthquake to be $1.98 billion, which is equivalent to 13.5 percent of Haiti’s 2020 GDP. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/hti World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 179 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings In September 2021, World Bank Group management decided to discontinue the Doing Business report Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $29.0M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,320 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Haiti’s legislation encourages foreign direct investment. Import and export policies are non-discriminatory and are not based on nationality. Haitian and foreign investors have the same rights, privileges, and protections under the 1987 investment code. The Haitian government has made some progress in recent years to improve the legal framework, create and strengthen core public institutions, and enhance economic governance. The Haitian Central Bank continues to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to implement measures aimed at creating a stable macroeconomic environment. The IMF concluded its most recent Article IV consultation (2019) with Haiti in January 2020. In April 2020, the IMF loaned Haiti $112 million through its rapid credit facility mechanism to provide liquidity to Haiti for expenditures to address COVID-19. Most recently, in August 2021, Haiti received an allocation of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) equivalent to $224 million. While the IMF recommended using these funds to support COVID-19 measures and earthquake relief efforts, the IMF did not stipulate how these fuds were to be used. While not discriminatory towards international investment specifically, the Haitian government’s economic policies fall short of providing a sound enabling environment for foreign direct investment. Despite the Haitian Central Bank’s periodic interventions in the foreign exchange market, the Haitian gourde continued to depreciate against the U.S. dollar. As of March 2022, the BRH benchmark rate has reached HTG/USD 104.7, having increased by 23.3 percent over the prior 12 months and the U.S. dollar banknotes remain scarce for businesses and regular citizens. Despite passing anti-money laundering and anti-corruption laws to ensure that Haiti’s legislation corresponds with international standards, the government has not strictly followed the legal framework of these laws and has also failed to incentivize investment in Haiti. In early 2017, the Parliament enacted legislation making electronic signatures and electronic transactions legally binding. Other pieces of legislation that may improve Haiti’s investment climate remain pending, including incorporation procedures, a new mining code, and an insurance code. The Finance Ministry is implementing measures to improve revenue collection and control spending. The Ministry signed an agreement with Haiti’s Central Bank in November 2020 to strengthen fiscal discipline and limit government monetary financing. Despite these measures, monetary financing of the budget deficit over Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 has grown by 15 percent from FY2020 and stood at 15.8 billion gourdes (approximately $145 million) as of March 2022, six months into the fiscal year. The Center for the Facilitation of Investments (CFI), which operates under Haitian Ministry of Commerce oversight, was established to promote domestic and international investment opportunities in Haiti. In concept, the CFI could streamline the investment process by working with other government agencies to simplify procedures related to trade and investment; providing updated economic and commercial information to local and foreign investors; making proposals on investor incentives; and promoting investment in priority sectors. The CFI aims to offer tailored services to large international investors. In practice, the CFI has made limited progress to incentivize job creation and boost national production in agriculture, apparel assembly, and tourism. As examples, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Haiti’s Tourism Association reported a 60 percent loss of jobs in the sector in 2019. The apparel sector, the largest provider of jobs in the formal private sector, has reported great difficulties operating due to insecurity and recurring fuel shortages with adverse effect on contracts and employment. The Haitian government does not impose discriminatory requirements on foreign investors. Haitian laws related to residency status and employment are reciprocal. Foreigners who are legal residents in Haiti and wish to engage in trade have, within the framework of laws and regulations, the same rights granted to Haitian citizens. However, Article 5 of the Decree on the Profession of Merchants reserves the function of manufacturer’s agent for Haitian nationals. Foreign firms are also encouraged to participate in government-financed development projects. Performance requirements are not imposed on foreign firms as a condition for establishing or expanding an investment, unless indicated in a signed contract. Foreign investors are permitted to own 100 percent of a company or subsidiary. As a Haitian entity, such companies enjoy all rights and privileges provided under the law. Additionally, foreign investors are permitted to operate businesses without equity-to-debt ratio requirements. Accounting law allows foreigners to capitalize using tangible and intangible assets in lieu of cash investments. Both Haitian and foreign investors enjoy the same rights and privileges. However, foreign investors residing in Haiti must obtain a residence permit and are expected to pay duties and taxes, in accordance with the scales and regulations applicable. Foreign investors are free to own real estate for the needs of their businesses and enjoy the same rights and prerogatives as Haitian investors. The reimbursement of debts contracted abroad for investments made in Haiti are not subject to any constraint or taxation. Foreign investors are free to enter into joint ventures with Haitian citizens. The distribution of shares is a private matter between the two parties. However, the government regulates the sale and purchase of company shares. Investment in certain sectors, such as health and agriculture, requires special Haitian government authorization. Investment in “sensitive” sectors such as electricity, water, telecommunications, and mining require a Haitian government concession as well as authorization from the appropriate governmental agency. In general, natural resources are the property of the state, and the exploitation of mineral and energy resources requires concessions and permits from the Ministry of Public Works’ Bureau of Mining and Energy. Mining, prospecting, and operating permits may only be granted to companies established and resident in Haiti, and the establishment of new industrial mines cannot take place until an elected parliament passes an updated mining law, along the lines of a draft law initially presented in 2017. Entrepreneurs are free to dispose of their properties and assets and to organize production and marketing activities in accordance with local laws. Investors in Haiti can create the following types of businesses: sole proprietorship, limited or general partnership, joint-stock company, public company (corporation), subsidiary of a foreign company, and co-operative society. The most common business structures in Haiti are corporations. A draft law (Société de Droits law), which would facilitate the creation of other types of businesses in Haiti, such as LLCs, remains pending parliamentary approval when parliament is restored. Haiti’s last investment policy review from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development occurred in 2012. In general, Haiti’s political instability, weak institutions, and inconsistent economic policies impede the country’s ability to attract and direct foreign direct investment. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 2015 Trade Policy Review stated that Haiti’s Investment Code and Law on Free Trade Zones is fully compliant with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. The full report can be viewed at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp427_e.htm . While the Haitian government has made efforts to facilitate the launching and operating of businesses, the average time to start a business in Haiti is 189 days, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report. At present, it takes between 90 and 120 days to complete registration with the Commercial Registry at the Ministry of Commerce and obtain the authorization of operations (Droit de fonctionnement). The CFI also offers a service providing pre-registered and fully authorized companies in manufacturing, agribusiness, and real estate the opportunity to reduce their registration time. Once the Inter-Ministerial Investment Commission validates these established companies, the shares are transferred to the new owners. Both foreign and domestic businesses can register at Haiti’s CFI: http://cfihaiti.com . All businesses must register with the Ministry of Commerce, the Haitian tax office, the state-owned Banque Nationale de Crédit, the social security office, and the retirement insurance office. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s internet registry allows investors to search for and verify the existence of a business in Haiti. The registry will eventually provide online registration of companies through an electronic one-stop shop. In October 2020, CFI launched Spotlight, an initiative with the aim of promoting visibility of companies already established in Haiti and registered in the CFI database. Neither the law nor the Haitian government restricts domestic investors from investing abroad. Still, Haiti’s outward investment is limited to a few enterprises with small investments. These investors are generally businesspersons with dual citizenship and others of Haitian origin who presently reside in the country in which their firms operate. The majority of these firms are service providers and not investment firms. There is no current program or incentive in place to encourage Haitian entrepreneurs to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime Haitian laws are written to allow for transparency and to be applied universally. However, Haitian officials do not uniformly enforce these laws and the bureaucratic “red tape” in the Haitian legal system is often excessive. Tax, labor, health, and safety laws and policies are also loosely enforced. The private sector often provides services, such as healthcare, to employees that are not entitled to coverage under Haitian government agencies or institutions. All regulatory processes are managed exclusively by the government and do not involve the private sector and non-governmental organizations. Draft bills or regulations are available to the public through “Le Moniteur,” the official journal of the Haitian government, and information is sometimes made available online. Le Moniteur contains public agency rules, decrees, and public notices that Les Presses Nationales d’Haiti publishes. According to the World Bank, Haitian ministries and regulatory agencies do not develop forward regulatory plans, nor do they publish proposed regulations prior to their adoption. Haitian law does not require a timeframe for public comment or review of proposed regulations. Haiti is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an organization of 15 states and dependencies established to promote regional economic integration. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), created in 1989, aims to advance the region’s integration into the global economy by facilitating free trade in goods and services, and the free movement of labor and capital. CSME became operational in January 2006 in 12 of the 15 member states. Haiti, as a member of CARICOM, has expressed an interest in participating fully in CSME. However, to become eligible, Haiti must amend its customs code to align with CARICOM and WTO standards. Haiti also adheres to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on issues of international law, and of the Caribbean Court of Justice for the settlement of trade disputes within CARICOM. Haiti is an original member of the WTO. As such, it has made several commitments to the WTO with regard to the financial services sector. These commitments include allowing foreign investment in financial services, such as retail, commercial, investment banking, and consulting. One foreign bank, Citibank, operates in Haiti. Haiti has committed to notifying the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. However, Haiti is not party to the Trade Facilitation Agreement. As a former French colony, Haiti adopted the French civil law system. Judicial power is exercised by the Superior Magistrate Council, the courts of appeal, the courts of first instance, the courts of justice of the peace, and the courts of exception. Their operations, organization and competence are set by law. The Supreme Court, also known as the Superior Magistrate Council, is the highest court of the nation, followed in descending order by the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance. Haiti’s commercial code dates back to 1826 and underwent significant revisions in 1944. There are few commercial laws in place and there are no commercial courts. Injunctive relief is based upon penal sanctions rather than securing desirable civil action. Similarly, contracts to comply with certain obligations, such as commodities futures contracts, are not enforced. Haitian judges do not have specializations, and their knowledge of commercial law is limited. Utilizing Haitian courts to settle disputes is a lengthy process and cases can remain unresolved for years. Bonds to release assets frozen through litigation are unavailable. Business litigants often pursue out-of-court settlements. Haiti’s legal system often presents challenges for U.S. citizens seeking to resolve legal disputes. In Haiti, judges are appointed for a set number of years. Public prosecutors are direct employees of the Ministry of Justice and can be transferred or suspended by the executive branch at any time. There are numerous allegations of undue political interference. Additionally, there are persistent claims that some Haitian officials use their public office to influence commercial dispute outcomes for personal gain. The Haitian government receives international assistance to increase the capacity of its oversight institutions and the capacity of the national police. The Investment Code prohibits fiscal and legal discrimination against foreign investors. The code explicitly recognizes the crucial role of foreign direct investment in promoting economic growth. It also aims to facilitate, liberalize, and stimulate private investment, and contains exemptions to promote investments that enhance competitiveness in sectors deemed priorities, especially export-oriented sectors. Tax incentives, such as reductions on taxable income and tax exemptions, are designed to promote private investment. Additionally, the code grants Haitian and foreign investors the same rights, privileges, and equal protection. Foreign investors must be legally registered and pay appropriate local taxes and fees. The code also established an Inter-Ministerial Investment Commission (CII) to examine investor eligibility for license exemptions as well as customs and tariff advantages. The Center for Facilitation of Investments (CFI) is the Technical Secretariat of the CII. The Prime Minister, or his delegate, chairs the CII, which is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Economy and Finance, Commerce, and Tourism, as well as those ministries that oversee specific areas of investment. The CII must authorize all business sales, transfers, mergers, partnerships, and fiscal exemptions within the scope of the code. The CII also manages the process of fining and sanctioning enterprises that disregard the code. The following areas are often noted by businesses as challenging aspects of Haitian law: operation of the judicial system; publication of laws, regulations, and official notices; establishment of companies; land tenure and real property law and procedures; bank and credit operations; insurance and pension regulation; accounting standards; civil status documentation; customs law and administration; international trade and investment promotion; foreign investment regulations; and regulation of market concentration and competition. Although these deficiencies hinder business activities, they are not specifically aimed at foreign firms; rather, they appear to affect both foreign and local companies. There is currently no law to regulate competition. Haiti is one of the most open economies in the region. The investment code provides the same rights, privileges, and equal protection to local and foreign investors. Anti-corruption legislation also criminalizes nepotism and the dissemination of inside information on public procurement processes. Haiti does not, however, have anti-trust legislation. The 1987 Constitution allows expropriation or dispossession only for reasons of public interest or land reform and is subject to prior payment of fair compensation as determined by an expert. If the initial project for which the expropriation occurred is abandoned, the Constitution stipulates that the expropriation will be annulled, and the property returned to the original owner. The Constitution prohibits nationalization and confiscation of real and personal property for political purposes or reasons. Title deeds are vague and often insecure. The Haitian government established the National Institute of Agrarian Reform to implement expropriations of private agricultural properties with appropriate compensation. The agrarian reform project, initiated under the Preval administration (1996-2001), was controversial among both Haitian and U.S. property owners. There have been complaints of non-compensation for the expropriation of property. Moreover, a revision of the land tenure code, intended to address issues related to the lack of access to land records, surveys, and property titles in Haiti, has been pending in parliament since 2014. A partnership between the private sector, Haitian government, and international organizations resulted in a guide on security land rights in Haiti, which was translated in 2016 and can be found here: https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Haiti-Land-Manual-2.pdf . Haiti’s bankruptcy law was enacted in 1826 and modified in 1944. There are three phases of bankruptcy under Haitian law. In the first stage, payments cease to be made and bankruptcy is declared. In the second stage, a judgment of bankruptcy is rendered, which transfers the rights to administer assets from the debtor to the Director of the Haitian Tax Authority (Direction Generale des Impots). In this phase, assets are sealed, and the debtor is confined to debtor’s prison. In the last stage, the debtor’s assets are liquidated, and the debtor’s verified debts are paid prorated according to their right. The debtor is released from prison once the debtor’s verified debts are paid. In practice, the above measures are seldom applied. Since 1955, most bankruptcy cases have been settled between the parties. The practice of mob looting remains a means for some to express their frustration with the country’s social inequities. Many companies went bankrupt after being attacked by violent protesters. Lack of insurance coverage and the complexity of compensation proceedings make it difficult for many to restart their businesses. The state does not have a court assessing the losses of businesses for state financial compensation for bodily or patrimonial damages. While the provisions of Article 356 of the Haitian Penal Code states perpetrators should be punished in hard labor in perpetuity, many of these crimes remained unsolved. Although the concepts of real property mortgages and chattel mortgages – based on collateral of movable property, such as machinery, furniture, automobiles, or livestock to secure a mortgage – exist, real estate mortgages involve antiquated procedures and may fail to be recorded against the debtor or other creditors. Property is seldom purchased through a mortgage and secured debt is difficult to arrange or collect. Liens are virtually impossible to impose and using the judicial process for foreclosure is time consuming and often futile. Banks frequently require that loans be secured in U.S. dollars. 4. Industrial Policies In order to attract investment to certain industries, the Investment Code privileges eligible firms with customs, tax, and other advantages. Investments that provide added value of at least 35 percent in the processing of local or imported raw materials are eligible for preferential status. The statute, as modified by the FY2021 budget decree in October 2020, allows for a five-year income tax exemption. Industrial or crafts-related enterprises must meet one of the following criteria in order to benefit from this exemption: Make intensive and efficient use of available local resources (i.e., advanced processing of existing goods, recycling of recoverable materials); Increase national income; Create new jobs and/or upgrade the level of professional qualifications; Reinforce the balance of payments position and/or reduce the level of dependency of the national economy on imports; Introduce or extend new technology more appropriate to local conditions (i.e., utilize non-conventional sources of energy, use labor-intensive production); Create and/or intensify backward or forward linkages in the industrial sector; Promote export-oriented production; Substitute a new product for an imported product, if the new product presents a quality/price ratio deemed acceptable by the appropriate entity and comprises a total production cost of at least 60 percent of the value added in Haiti, including the cost of local inputs used in its production; Prepare, modify, assemble, or process imported raw materials or components for finished goods that will be re-exported; Utilize local inputs at a rate equal or superior to 35 percent of the production cost. Companies that enjoy tax-exempt status are required to submit annual financial statements. Fines or withdrawal of tax advantages may be assessed to firms failing to meet the Code’s provisions. A progressive tax system applies to income, profits, and capital gains earned by individuals. A law on Free Trade Zones (FTZ) was established in 2002. The law defines the conditions for operating and managing economic FTZs, with exemption and incentive regimes granted to investment in such zones. The law is not specific to a particular activity. Instead, it defines FTZs as geographical areas to which a special regime on customs duties and controls, taxation, immigration, capital investment, and foreign trade applies, and where domestic and foreign investors can provide services, import, store, produce, export, and re-export goods. FTZs may be private or joint venture. The law provides the following incentives and benefits for enterprises located in FTZs: Full exemption from income tax for a maximum period of 15 years, followed by full taxation, per the FY2021 budget issued by decree in October 2020; Customs and tax exemptions for the import of capital goods and equipment needed to develop the area, with the exception of tourism vehicles; Exemption from all communal taxes (with the exception of proportional duties) for a period not exceeding 15 years; Registration and transfer of the balance due for all deeds relating to purchase, mortgages, and collateral. Examples of functioning FTZs include one in the northeastern city of Ouanaminthe, where a Dominican company, Grupo M, manufactures clothing for a variety of U.S. companies at its CODEVI facility. Additionally, several U.S. apparel companies lease factory space in this free zone. All the factories at CODEVI combined employ over 18,200 workers as of September 2021. In October 2012, the Haitian government, with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States government, opened the 617-acre Caracol Industrial Park in Haiti’s northeastern region. As of 2021, five companies are operating in the park: S&H Global, a South Korean company and the largest single private sector employer in Haiti; MAS Holdings, a Sri Lankan company; Everest, a Taiwanese factory; and two Haitian companies, Peintures Caraibes and Sisalco. In 2015, three major FTZs were established: Agritrans, the first agricultural free trade zone in Haiti in Trou du Nord; Digneron, an entity of the Palm Apparel Group; and Lafito, a $150 million Panamax port and industrial park. Port Lafito, located 12 miles north of Port au Prince, includes port facility business services that cater to bulk and loose cargo imports, as well as terminal services to worldwide container service shipping lines. In February 2021, the Government of Haiti authorized a new agro-industrial export free zone in the town of Savane-Diane (ZFAISD) in Artibonite Department, per the application of Haitian company Stevia Agro Industries S.A. Foreign firms are encouraged to participate in government-financed development projects. However, performance requirements are not imposed on foreign firms as a condition for establishing or expanding an investment, unless indicated in a signed contract. Under Haitian laws, foreign investors operate their businesses and use their assets to organize production freely. Companies are not forced to localize or to use local raw materials for the production of goods. Foreign information technology providers are not required to turn over source code or keys for encryption to any public agencies. 5. Protection of Property Rights Foreign investors have noted that real property interests are affected by the absence of a comprehensive civil registry (cadastre). Lease agreement regulations are the same for locals and foreign investors. Many companies report that legitimate property titles are often non-existent and, if they do exist, they often conflict with other titles for the same property. Verification of property titles can take several months, and often much longer. Mortgages exist, but real estate mortgages are expensive and involve allegedly cumbersome procedures. Additionally, mortgages are not always properly recorded under the debtor or creditor’s name. Banks are also risk-averse to issue loans or mortgages. Squatting is not a common practice but was popular in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. As a factor in its overall Ease of Doing Business ranking, the World Bank ranks Haiti 182 out of 187 among countries globally on ease of registering property. In Haiti, the measures to protect copyright date back to the 2005 decree of 9 January 1968 on the copyright of literary, scientific, and artistic works. Haitian law protects copyrights, patent rights, and inventions, as well as industrial designs and models, special manufacturers’ marks, trademarks, and business names. The law penalizes individuals or enterprises involved in infringement, fraud, or unfair competition; however, enforcement is weak. Some report that weak enforcement mechanisms, inefficient courts, and judges’ inadequate knowledge of commercial law may impede the effectiveness of statutory protections. Haiti is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Haiti has completed accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Haiti is a signatory to the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910, the Patent Law Treaty, and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances. Haiti is not mentioned in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2021 Special 301 Report or the 2021 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about the national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The scale of financial services remains modest in Haiti. The banking sector is well capitalized and profitable. In principle, there are no limitations to foreigners’ access to the Haitian credit market, but limited credit is available through commercial banks. The free and efficient flow of capital, however, is hindered by Haitian accounting practices, which are below international standards. While there are no restrictions on foreign investment through mergers or acquisitions, there is no Haitian stock market, so there is no way for investors to purchase shares in a company outside of direct transactions. As summarized in the most recent (2020) IMF Article IV consultation for Haiti, however, the country has accepted the obligations of Article VIII and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. The standards that govern the Haitian legal, regulatory, and accounting systems do not comply with international norms. Haitian laws do not require external audits of domestic companies. Local firms calculate taxes, obtain credit or insurance, prepare for regulatory review, and assess real profit and loss. Accountants use basic accounting standards set by the Organization of Certified Professional Accountants in Haiti. Administrative oversight in the banking sector is superior to oversight in other sectors. Under Haitian law, however, banks are not required to comply with internationally recognized accounting standards, and they are often not audited by internationally recognized accounting firms. Nevertheless, Haiti’s Central Bank requires that banks apply internal audit procedures. As part of their corporate governance all private banks also have in-house audit functions. Most private banks follow international accounting norms and use consolidated reporting principles. The Central Bank is generally viewed as one of the best-functioning Haitian government institutions. While there are companies that issue shares and corporate bonds through financial intermediaries, these activities are often done in informal settings and through small groups in the primary market. The Central Bank is looking to expand the financial market in Haiti by creating two sub-committees for the development of financial markets and for the implementation of financial market infrastructure. Such platforms are expected to promote the mobilization and allocation of capital, long-term growth, and a solid legal, regulatory and institutional framework. The banking sector has concentrated on credit for trade financing and in the expansion of bank branches to capture deposits and remittances. Telebanking has expanded access to banking services for Haitians. Foreign banks are free to establish operations in Haiti. Three major banking institutions (Unibank, Sogebank and Banque Nationale de Credit) hold roughly 81 percent, or 421.72 billion gourdes (approximately $3.9 billion), of total banking sector assets. With its acquisition of the Haitian operations of Scotiabank in 2017, Unibank became Haiti’s largest banking company, with a market share of 35 percent of deposits. As part of this deal, Scotiabank remains one of Unibank’s international correspondent banks. U.S.-based Citibank also has a correspondent banking relationship with Unibank. The bank also manages one of the only two privatization operations in Haiti, that of the flour mill “Les Moulins d’Haiti SEM” in which it is a partner of two U.S. companies: Continental Grain/Contigroup (New York) and Seaboard Corporation (Kansas City). The three major commercial banks also hold 76 percent of the country’s total loan portfolio, while 70 percent of total loans are monopolized by 10 percent of borrowers. The concentration of holdings and limited number of borrowers increases the Haitian banking system’s vulnerability to systemic credit risk and restricts the availability of capital. The quality of loan portfolios in the banking system has slightly improved. Per the Haitian Central Bank, the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans was 6.34 percent in December 2021, compared to 5.37 percent in December 2020. The Central Bank conducts regular inspections to ensure that financial institutions are in compliance with minimum capital requirements, asset quality, currency, and credit risk management. The Central Bank’s main challenge is maintaining sound monetary policy in the context of a larger-than-expected government deficit and a depreciating local currency. The exchange rate suffers from continued pressure on the foreign exchange market. The Central Bank has made a series of interventions with the objective of supporting the value of the gourde by increasing the dollar supply in the foreign exchange market. Selling U.S. dollars in the foreign exchange market has also allowed the Central Bank to dry up the excess liquidity of the gourde in the market with the potential effect of tempering the inflation rate. Annual inflation accelerated to 25.2 percent as of February 2022, remaining on an upward trend since August 2021. As of the end of March 2022, Haiti’s stock of net international reserves was approximately $520 million. There are no legal limitations on foreigners’ access to the domestic credit market. However, banks demand collateral of real property to grant loans. Given the lack of effective cadastral and civil registries, loan applicants face numerous challenges in obtaining credit. The banking sector is extremely conservative in its lending practices. Banks typically lend exclusively to their most trusted and credit-worthy clients. Based on a 2018 study by FinScope Haiti, only one percent of the adult population has access to a bank loan. The high concentration of assets does not allow for product innovation at major banks. To provide greater access to financial services for individuals and prospective investors, the Haitian government’s banking laws recognize tangible movable property (such as portable machinery, furniture, and tangible personal property) as collateral for loans. These laws allow individuals to buy condominiums, and banks to accept personal property, such as cars, bank accounts, etc., as collateral for loans. USAID has a loan portfolio guarantee program with a diversified group of financial institutions to encourage them to expand credit to productive small and medium enterprises, and rural micro-enterprises. Haiti has a credit rating registry in effect for users of the banking sector but does not have the relevant legislation in place to establish a credit rating bureau. Haiti’s Central Bank issued a series of monetary policy measures to alleviate the potential impact of COVID-19 on the financial system and the economy in March 2020. These measures included a reduction in the Central Bank’s policy rate to help lower interest rates on loans; the decrease of reserve requirement ratios to reduce the cost for banks to capture resources and grant loans; a reduction in the Central Bank’s refinancing rate to lower the cost of access to liquidity; the alleviation of loan repayment conditions for customers over a three-month period; the waiver of the Central Bank’s fees on interbank transfers to reduce transaction costs for customers; and the increase of limits on transactions through mobile payment services. On July 2020, a decree was issued reorganizing the National Bank for Agricultural Development (BNDA). The bank is tasked with developing the agricultural sector through the financing of the entire value chain (production, breeding, processing, marketing, and equipment) through access to basic financial services for the greatest number of people, targeting those living in semi-urban and rural areas. The bank is installed in municipal agricultural offices, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). The bank is in partnership with the National Bank of Credit (BNC) with 63.8 million gourdes (approximately $584,623) in its portfolio and 700 million gourdes (approximately $6.4 million) out of a capital of 1 billion (approximately $9 million) planned for its launch. It uses its network for cash operations, such as disbursement and reimbursement. The Haitian government published a decree dated August 2020 regulating micro-finance, with institutions granting small loans to entrepreneurs or retailers who operate according to the regulations of the Central Bank of Haiti. This decision is part of the framework of financial inclusion. Micro-finance institutions have access to the Central Bank programs and microcredits are more accessible to entrepreneurs and small traders than large financial corporations. To date Haiti does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Per information released by the Central Bank in September 2018, since 2011 Haiti has levied a tax of $1.50 on all transfers into and out of the country, with the proceeds designated for the National Fund for Education. According to a Central Bank report in September 2019, more than $150 million has been collected since July 2011 on taxes from remittances from the diaspora. Many Haitians mistrust the government because of high levels of corruption and criticize the government’s slow and ineffective response to natural disasters and social crises. Donors and critics have called for guarantees of oversight and accountability in the rebuilding process following the 2021 earthquake in the south. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Haitian government owns and operates, either wholly or in part, several State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). The Haitian commercial code governs the operations of these SOEs. The sectors include food processing and packaging (a flourmill), construction and heavy equipment (a cement factory); information and communications (a telecommunications company); energy (the state electricity company, EDH); finance (two commercial banks, the Banque Nationale de Crédit and the Banque Populaire Haïtienne); and the national port authority and the airport authority. The law defines SOEs as autonomous enterprises that are legally authorized to be involved in commercial, financial, and industrial activities. All SOEs operate under the supervision of their respective sectorial ministry and are expected to create economic and social return. Today, some SOEs are fully owned by the state, while others are jointly owned commercial enterprises. The Haitian parliament, when it is functioning, has full authority to liquidate state enterprises that are underperforming. The majority of SOEs are financially sound. However, EDH receives substantial annual subsidies from the government to stay in business. In response to the economic difficulties of the late 1990s and mismanagement of the SOEs, the government liberalized the market and allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of some Haitian state-owned enterprises. To accompany the initiative, the government established the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process. In 1998, two U.S. companies, Seaboard and Continental Grain, purchased shares of the state-owned flourmill. Each partner currently owns a third of the company, known today as Les Moulins d’Haiti. In 1999, a consortium of Colombian, Swiss, and Haitian investors purchased a majority stake in the national cement factory. In 2010, a state-owned Vietnamese corporation, Viettel, officially acquired 60 percent of the state telecommunications company Teleco (now operating as Natcom), with the Haitian government retaining 40 percent ownership. The government has allowed limited private sector investment in selected seaports. Competition is generally not distorted in favor of state-owned enterprises to the detriment of private companies. The Haitian government has allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate for EDH’s inability to generate sufficient power, though it has had contractual disputes with multiple independent power producers. Only one independent power producer, partially U.S.-owned E-Power, currently generates electricity for EDH in Port au Prince as of 2021. In 2019, the Haitian energy sector regulatory authority, ANARSE, issued a series of prequalification rounds for concessionaires to take over and expand electricity production, transmission, and distribution for several of the country’s regional grids, including the grid serving the Caracol Industrial Park. ANARSE launched a call for proposals for its “Improvement of Access to Electricity in Haiti” program. It aims to strengthen the regulatory and planning capacities of the electricity sector. ANARSE plans to establish a shortlist of firms or groups of firms for the development of a national plan for the development of the electricity sector. The plan will: Consult all stakeholders working in the energy sector to collect data; Collect and process the data collected and share the most relevant information with ANARSE and the Energy Cell of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) in electronic format; Develop the national plan for the development of the electricity sector in Haiti over a period of 10 years; Organize public consultations; and Revise the development plan to take into account the comments made during the public consultations carried out to produce a complete and final version. The Government of Haiti created the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) to ensure that government contracts are awarded through competitive bidding and to establish effective procurement controls in public administration. The CNMP publishes lists of awarded government of Haiti contracts. The procurement law of 2009 requires contracts to be routed through CNMP. In 2012, however, a presidential decree substantially raised the threshold at which public procurements must be managed by the CNMP, resulting in what companies have identified as a decrease in transparency for many smaller government contracts. Moreover, the government frequently enters into no-bid contracts, sometimes issued using “emergency” authority derived from natural disasters, even when there is no apparent connection between the alleged emergency and the government contract, according to foreign investors. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of responsible business conduct among producers and consumers is limited but growing, including corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Irish-owned telecommunications company Digicel, for example, sponsors an Entrepreneur of the Year program and has built 120 schools in Haiti. Natcom provides free internet service to several public schools throughout the country. Les Moulins d’Haiti, partially owned by U.S. firm Seaboard Marine, provides some services, including electrical power, to surrounding communities. In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, many firms provided logistical or financial support to humanitarian initiatives, and many continue to contribute to reconstruction efforts. Haiti’s various chambers of commerce have also become more supportive of business ethics and social responsibility programs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many Haitian, U.S., and other foreign-owned firms donated to prevention and treatment measures. The Haitian government has not established any incentives to encourage to responsible business conduct. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption Corruption, including bribery, raises the costs and risks of doing business in Haiti. U.S. firms have complained that corruption is a major obstacle to effective business operation in Haiti. They frequently point to requests for payment by customs officials in order to clear import shipments as examples of solicitation for bribes. Haitian law, applicable to individuals and financial institutions, criminalizes corruption and money laundering. Bribes or attempted bribes toward a public official are a criminal act and are punishable by the criminal code (Article 173) for one to three years of imprisonment. The law also contains provisions for the forfeiture and seizure of assets. In practice, however, the law is unevenly and rarely applied. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2021 ranked Haiti in the second lowest spot in the Americas region and 164 out of 180 countries worldwide, with a score of 20 out of 100 in perceived levels of public corruption. The Haitian government has made some progress in enforcing public accountability and transparency, but substantive institutional reforms are still needed. In 2004, the Government of Haiti established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ULCC), but the organization lacks the necessary resources and political independence to be effective. In 2008, parliament approved the law on disclosure of assets by civil servants and high public officials prepared by ULCC, but to date, compliance has been almost nonexistent. In February 2022, the ULCC announced the launch of the anti-Corruption circuit at the Court of Cassation. Made up of magistrates from the Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal of Haiti, the anti-corruption circuit aims to strengthen judicial efficiency and put an end to impunity in relation to corruption cases. Haiti’s Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) is currently one of Haiti’s few independent government institutions, responsible for reviewing draft government contracts; conducting audits of government expenditures; and clearing all government officials, including those at the political level, to manage public funds. In November 2020, however, the Haitian government published a decree limiting the authority of the Audit Court. The CSCCA had issued three reports in January 2019, May 2019, and August 2020 citing improper management practices by the Haitian government and the alleged wastage of nearly $2 billion of the Petrocaribe funds. Public anger over the Petrocaribe scandal has since burgeoned into a grassroots movement against widespread corruption in Haiti. The CSCCA publicly calls on Haitian authorities to take measures to influence public expenditure by implementing monitoring and evaluation and consolidating investment expenditure to better assess the effectiveness of public spending. For nearly a decade, the Haitian state has faced a structural deficit in the management of its public resources. Despite many efforts undertaken to improve fiscal performance, the Haitian State is still in a situation of insufficient resources to respond to the pressures exerted on public spending. Haiti is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Any corruption-related activity can be reported to the Haitian Anti-Corruption Unit, responsible for combatting corruption: Hans Jacques Ludwig Joseph Director General Unite de Lutte Contre la Corruption 13, rue Capotille, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, Haiti Telephone: (509) 2811-0661 / (509) 2816-7071 Email: info@ulcc.gouv.ht Marilyn B. Allien President Fondation Heritage pour Haiti Petion-Ville, Haiti Telephone: (509) 3452-1570 Email: admlfhh@yahoo.com / heritagehaiti@yahoo.com 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. government partners with Haiti in its efforts to strengthen the rule of law and enhance public security; pursue economic growth through increased domestic resource mobilization and support for private investment; and strengthen good governance and anti-corruption efforts. President Jovenel Moise was assassinated on July 7, 2022, seven months before the end his five-year term. His administration has faced repeated challenges due to frequently changing executive branch leadership, an ineffective parliament followed by a parliamentary lapse beginning in January 2020, legislative elections not being held as scheduled in October 2019, allegations of widespread corruption, weak rule of law, and a deteriorating economy. These factors have hindered both reconstruction efforts and the passage of important legislation. Sporadic protests since mid-2018 have stemmed from a number of factors, including a lack of progress in the fight against corruption and a lack of viable economic options. Haiti’s political situation remains fragile. Political and civil disorder, such as periodic demonstrations triggered by fuel shortage, increases in fuel prices and worsening insecurity often interrupt normal business operations. Gang violence continues to plague urban centers. Kidnapping, murders, and sexual and gender-based violence by gangs in their struggle to expand their territorial control have a detrimental impact on the population. The Haitian National Police is seeking to improve the effectiveness of its anti-gang operations, take a more balanced approach between prevention and repression, and increase its presence in sensitive areas. The judiciary suffers from serious structural weaknesses, as evidenced by a lack of judges at every level, high absenteeism, executive influence, and increasing numbers of prolonged pretrial detainees. In recent months, Prime Minister Ariel Henry has continued to engage in dialogue with actors from all political backgrounds in an attempt to broaden the consensus around a single, unified vision that would lead to the restoration of fully functional and democratically elected institutions. Although the government has not yet published a revised electoral calendar, momentum seems to be building around an effort to form an inclusive, credible, and effective interim electoral council that would inspire confidence among a critical mass of national stakeholders. Damage to businesses and other installations frequently occurs as a result of political and civil disorder. Over the past 10 years, multiple incidents of property damage to offices, stores, hotels, hospitals, fuel stations, and car rental companies and dealerships have been reported in the media and to the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Property destruction and vandalism ranges from broken windows to arson and looting. Employees and tourists have also been victims of violence. Kidnapping for ransom is a frequent occurrence in Port-au-Prince. While improvements in the Haitian National Police’s technical and operational capabilities have maintained some semblance of order, violent crime, including looting of businesses, remains a serious problem, along with criminal gang control of a number of Port-au-Prince’s marginalized areas. More information is available at: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Haiti.html https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/ 11. Labor Policies and Practices The special legislation of the Labor Code of 1984 establishes and governs labor regulations. Under the Code, the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor enforces the law and maintains good relationships with employers and workers. Normal working hours consist of 8-hour shifts and 48-hour workweeks. In September 2017, the Haitian government passed a labor law to permit three eight-hour shifts in a working day, although this has not been fully implemented for all sectors in Haiti. Workers’ social protection and benefits include annual leave, sick leave, health insurance, maternity insurance, insurance in case of accident at work, and other benefits for unfair dismissal. Labor unions are generally receptive to investment that creates new jobs, and support from the international labor movement, including the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), is building the capacity of unions to represent workers and engage in social dialogue. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is in the process of revising a new labor code that will better comply with international labor standards. According to U.S. and other companies, relations between labor and management in Haiti have at times been strained. In some cases, however, industries have autonomously implemented good labor practices. In addition to local entities, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has an office in Haiti and operates an ongoing project with the apparel assembly industry to improve productivity through improvement in working conditions. The ILO, with the support of the U.S. Department of Labor, launched Better Work Haiti, a program that was designed to verify compliance with international labor standards and spur job creation in the garment sector. Since the inception of Better Work Haiti, the garment sector has seen improvement in occupational safety and health across the factories. Employers have increased their efforts to improve chemical safety, and over 95 percent of local factories have initiated policies to create a safer work environment as well as provide good working conditions to garment workers. Wages vary depending on the economic sector. As of February 2022, the minimum wage for the garment sector was 685 gourdes for eight hours of work or (approximately $6.27) in the export-oriented apparel industry. Better Work Haiti’s biannual report found most factories in compliance with the labor law. The most recent report is available at: https://betterwork.org/portfolio/better-work-haiti-23rd-biannual-compliance-synthesis-report/ ort/ . 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Central Bank of Haiti USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Haiti Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $6,255 2021 $5,741 https://mef.gouv.ht/ Foreign Direct Investment Central Bank of Haiti USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Total FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) FY2020 $75 2020 $30 https://unctad.org/fr/news/2020-voit-linvestissement-direct-etranger-chuter-de-45-en-amerique-latineen.pdf Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.3% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Robert Kemp Economic Counselor Embassy of the United States of America Boulevard du 15 Octobre, Tabarre 41 Port-au-Prince, Haiti Please address email correspondence to PAPECON@state.gov. Honduras Executive Summary Honduras contains all the ingredients for a thriving, prosperous economy: strategic location next to U.S. markets with a deep-water port, a rich endowment of natural resources, breathtaking tourist destinations, and hard-working people, including a significant cadre of skilled labor. Despite these advantages, per capita income in Honduras is the third lowest in all Latin America. Investors cite corruption, crime, and poor infrastructure and weak or nonexistent rule of law as the primary reasons that Honduras does not attract more of the private investment it needs to stimulate inclusive economic growth. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), real Honduran GDP grew by 12.5 percent in 2021, a rebound from the devastating effects in 2020 of the COVID-19 pandemic and twin hurricanes Eta and Iota. The IMF predicts the economy will grow by 3.8 percent in 2022. The 2022 inauguration of Honduras first woman president, Xiomara Castro, marked the beginning of a new era in the country’s political economy. The participation of U.S. Vice President Harris at President Castro’s inauguration exemplified the strong U.S. commitment to Honduras. The two countries have committed to work jointly to address the root causes of migration, including by combating corruption and expanding economic opportunity. Since taking office, the Castro administration has launched initiatives to reduce corruption, improve education and public health, and create jobs. These laudable efforts have been frustrated by fiscal challenges, including budget planning and debt management. Although the United States and international organizations including the IMF assess Honduras as low risk for debt distress, public messaging from the administration announcing a fiscal crisis roiled international bond markets, driving up the risk premium on Honduran debt. To address these budget shortfalls, the government announced it will utilize its foreign reserves to finance operations, which could put additional inflationary pressure on the economy. To help Honduras implement its social agenda without increasing its debt burden, the United States has begun a debt management technical assistance program with the Ministry of Finance. In both public and private, the Castro administration emphasizes the need for job creation and private investment in Honduras. The government approved a new law in 2022 to facilitate the development and formalization of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The government’s Results-Based Governance system and other anti-corruption efforts are excellent examples of efforts to improve the investment climate. From the perspective of the private sector, however, these efforts have been overshadowed by policy decisions that have dramatically increased the uncertainty of investment returns. Chief among these was the May 2022 approval of a new energy law that threatens power generators with forced sale at a “just price” if they do not reduce their tariffs to the government’s satisfaction. The law provides no guarantee of future payment, stipulates that new energy investment must be majority state-owned, and all but eliminates private trade in energy. As a result of the new law, several private energy companies have discontinued planned projects in Honduras and are exploring investment opportunities in other countries in the region. The Castro administration also eliminated the special economic zones known as “ZEDEs” by their initials in Spanish. The ZEDEs were broadly unpopular, and viewed by some as a vector for corruption, but their elimination raised concerns in the business community about the government’s commitment to commercial stability and the rule of law. Another government policy contributing to uncertainty in the investment climate has been the elimination of the legal framework used by most businesses to employ per-hour workers. The law’s repeal fulfilled a Castro campaign promise, responding to criticism by labor unions that temporary work allowed companies to evade their social security obligations and exploit workers. Business representatives note, however, that many industries, including retail, tourism, and food service rely heavily on hourly labor and will be constrained by the new framework. Civil society representatives also point out that the change adversely affects women and students, who relied on hourly work to manage households and school schedules, although union leaders counter that the previous framework allowed employers to target women and young people for economic exploitation, given that their personal circumstances often do not allow them to take on full-time employment. Many foreign investors in Honduras operate thriving enterprises. At the same time, all investors face challenges including unreliable and expensive electricity, corruption, unpredictable tax application and enforcement, high crime, low education levels, and poor infrastructure. Squatting on private land is an increasingly severe problem in Honduras and anti-squatting laws are poorly enforced. Continued low-level protests and strikes are additional concerns for private investors. Despite these setbacks, over 200 American companies operate businesses in Honduras. Honduras enjoys preferential market access to the United States under CAFTA-DR, which has allowed for the development of intra-industry trade in textiles and electrical machinery, among other sectors. The proximity to the United States and established supply chain linkages means that opportunities exist to increase nearshoring sourcing to meet U.S. demand for a variety of goods. The White House “Call to Action to Deepen Investment in the Northern Triangle” is designed to coordinate increased U.S. investment in the region, including Honduras. This program, along with others, aims to support sustained and inclusive economic development in Honduras and surrounding countries. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 108 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 1,111 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2180 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Honduras is generally open to foreign investment and government leaders consistently assert their desire to attract investment. At the same time, recent government actions have increased uncertainty in the investment climate. The legal framework for investment includes the Honduran constitution, the investment chapter of CAFTA-DR (which takes precedence over most domestic law), and the 2011 Law for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The Honduran constitution requires all foreign investment to complement, but not substitute for, national investment. Honduras’ legal obligations guarantee national treatment and most favored nation treatment for U.S. investments in most sectors of the Honduran economy and include enhanced benefits in the areas of insurance and arbitration for domestic and foreign investors. CAFTA-DR has equal status with the constitution in most sectors of the Honduran economy. In addition to liberalizing trade in goods and services, CAFTA-DR includes important requirements relating to investment, customs administration and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, telecommunications, electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, transparency, and labor and environmental protection. Representatives from the international investment community have voiced concerns that several Castro administration policies have made the investment climate in Honduras less attractive. For example, after the hourly employment law was repealed in April 2022, all Honduran employees must now be salaried, eliminating flexible hiring practices vital for seasonal work. In addition, the threat of expropriation in a May 2022 energy law damaged perceptions of commercial rule of law in Honduras, increasing state control of the sector and leaving many investors wondering which other sectors will be subjected to government coercion and threats. The repeal of the framework establishing the special economic “ZEDE” zones further contributed to uncertainty over the government’s commitment to investment protections required by international treaties. And the Castro administration’s tendency to pass important laws very quickly, with little consultation or consideration of secondary and tertiary effects has created concerns about the stability and predictability of the investment environment. The National Investment Council, the Ministry of Investment Promotion, and the Ministry of Economic Development all have equities in attracting foreign investment and an ambitious job creation mandate. Critics complain that lack of clarity and overlapping responsibilities among these entities undermine the government’s ability to effectively promote Honduras as a profitable destination for foreign capital. Honduras’ Investment Law does not limit foreign ownership of businesses, except for those specifically reserved for Honduran investors, including small firms with capital less than $6,300 and the domestic air transportation industry. For all investments, at least 90 percent of companies’ labor forces must be Honduran, and companies must pay at least 85 percent of their payrolls to Hondurans. Majority ownership by Honduran citizens is required for companies in the commercial fishing sector, forestry, local transportation, radio, television, or benefiting from the Agrarian Reform Law. There is no screening or approval process specific to foreign direct investments in Honduras. Foreign investors are subject to the same requirements for environmental and other regulatory approvals as domestic investors. According to the law, investors can establish, acquire, and dispose of enterprises at market prices under freely negotiated conditions without government intervention, but some foreign business operators report difficulty closing businesses. Private enterprises fairly compete with public enterprises on market access, credit, and other business operations. Foreign investors have the right to own property, subject to certain restrictions established by the Honduran constitution and several laws relating to property rights. Investors may acquire, profit, use, and dispose of property ownership with the exception of land within 40 kilometers of international borders and shorelines. Honduran law does permit, however, foreign individuals to purchase properties close to shorelines in designated “tourism zones.” In 2020, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights conducted a review of Honduras: A/HRC/44/43/Add.2 (un.org) The Environmental Justice Atlas details 23 cases of environmental conflicts in Honduras: https://ejatlas.org/country/honduras The Business and Human Rights Centre aggregates news articles about responsible business conduct in Honduras: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&language=en&countries=HN Global Witness details concerns about environmental and human rights practices in Honduras: https://www.globalwitness.org/tagged/honduras/ The Honduran government has worked to simplify administrative procedures for establishing a company in recent years, including by offering many processes online. Government of Honduras (GOH) officials are pressing for, and have made good progress in, the digitalization of business, import, permitting and licensing, and taxation processes to increase efficiency and transparency, but procedural red tape to obtain government approval for investment activities remains common, especially at the local level. Honduras’ business registration information portal ( https://honduras.eregulations.org/ ) provides clear step-by-step information on registering a business, including fees, agencies, and required documents. Honduras does not promote or incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The GOH publishes approved regulations in the official government Gazette. Honduras lacks an indexed legal code so lawyers and judges must maintain their own libraries of law publications. The government does not have a process to solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public. CAFTA-DR requires host governments publish proposed regulations that could affect businesses or investments. Honduras made significant progress in 2019 and 2020 in relation to the publication and availability of information under CAFTA-DR. Honduras notified Article 1 technical provisions, per CAFTA-DR requirements, and the Customs Administration (ADUANAS) and Sanitary Regulatory Agency (ARSA) have improved publication of regulations through their official online portals. Some U.S. investors experience long waiting periods for environmental permits and other regulatory and legislative approvals. Sectors in which U.S. companies frequently encounter problems include infrastructure, telecoms, mining, and energy. Generally, regulatory requirements are complex and lengthy and vulnerable to rent-seeking and corruption. Regulatory approvals require congressional intervention if the time exceeds a presidential term of four years. Current regulations are available at the Honduran government’s eRegulations website ( http://honduras.eregulations.org/ ). While the majority of regulations are at the national level, municipal level regulations also exist and can be very discouraging to investment. No significant regulatory changes of relevance to foreign investors were announced since the last report. Public comments received by regulators are not published. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. As a member of the WTO, Honduras notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Honduras has a civil law system. The Honduran Commercial Code, enacted in 1950, regulates business operations and falls under the jurisdiction of the Honduran civil court system. The Civil Procedures Code, which entered into force in 2010, introduced the use of open, oral arguments for adversarial procedures. The Civil Procedures Code provides for protection of commercial transactions, property rights, and land tenure. It also established a process for the enforcement of rulings issued by foreign courts. Despite these codes, U.S. claimants have noted the lack of transparency and the slow administration of justice in the courts. U.S. firms report favoritism, external pressure, and bribes within the judicial system. They also mention the poor quality of legal representation from Honduran attorneys. Resolving an investment or commercial dispute in the local Honduran courts is often a lengthy process. Foreign investors report dispute resolution typically involves multiple appeals and decisions at different levels of the Honduran judicial system. Each decision can take months or years, and it is usually not possible for the parties to predict the time required to obtain a decision. An electronic case management system has recently been introduced with US Government support to increase transparency and reduce corruption. This system is gradually being rolled out to the different courts. Final decisions from Honduran courts or from arbitration panels often require subsequent enforcement from lower courts to take effect, requiring additional time. Foreign investors sometimes prefer to resolve disputes with suppliers, customers, or partners out of court when possible. Honduras has a very high-quality mechanism for alternate dispute resolution. Honduras’ Investment Law requires all local and foreign direct investment be registered with the Investment Office in the Ministry of Economic Development. Upon registration, the Investment Office issues certificates to guarantee international arbitration rights under CAFTA-DR. An investor who believes the government has not honored a substantive obligation under CAFTA-DR may pursue CAFTA-DR’s dispute settlement mechanism, as detailed in the Investment Chapter. The claim’s proceedings and documents are generally open to the public. The Government of Honduras requires authorization for both foreign and domestic investments in the following areas: Basic health services Telecommunications Generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity Air transport Fishing, hunting, and aquaculture Exploitation of forestry resources Agricultural and agro-industrial activities exceeding land tenancy limits established by the Agricultural Modernization Law of 1992 and the Land Reform Law of 1974 Insurance and financial services Investigation, exploration, and exploitation of mines, quarries, petroleum, and related substances. The Government of Honduras offers one-stop business set-up at its My Business Online website, which helps domestic and international investors submit initial business registry information and provides step-by-step instructions. ( https://www.miempresaenlinea.org/ ) However, formalizing a business still requires visiting a municipal chamber of commerce window for registration and permits, a process vulnerable to rent-seeking and corruption. The Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Competition (CDPC) is the Honduran government agency that reviews proposed transactions for competition-related concerns. Honduras’ Competition Law established the CDPC in 2005 as part of the effort to implement CAFTA-DR. The Honduran Congress appoints the members of the CDPC, which functions as an independent regulatory commission. Laws that grant sole companies exclusive distribution rights for imported goods have created artificial monopolies in Honduras, hindering the availability and raising the price of imported goods in the Honduran market. The Honduran government has the authority to expropriate property for purposes of land reform or public use. The National Agrarian Reform Law provides that idle land fit for farming can be expropriated and awarded to indigent and landless persons via the Honduran National Agrarian Institute. In 2013, the Honduran government passed legislation regarding recovery and reassignment of concessions on underutilized assets. Both local and foreign firms have expressed concerns that the law does not specify what the government considers “underutilized.” The government has not published implementing regulations for the law nor indicated plans to use the law against any private sector firm. The May 2022 energy law threatens energy producers with expropriation if they do not renegotiate their power-purchasing agreements to the government’s satisfaction. Government expropriation of land owned by U.S. companies is rare. CAFTA-DR’s Investment Chapter Section 10.7 states no party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly, with limited public purpose exceptions that require prompt and adequate compensation. Under the Agrarian Reform Law, the Honduran government must compensate expropriated land partly in cash and partly in 15-, 20-, or 25-year government bonds. The portion to be paid in cash cannot exceed $1,000 if the expropriated land has at least one building and it cannot exceed $500 if the land is in use but has no buildings. If the land is not in use, the government will compensate entirely in 25-year government bonds. Land invasions by squatters on both Honduran and foreign-owned land are increasingly common, especially in agricultural areas. These invasions have grown more frequent in 2022, sometimes leading to violent confrontations. Owners of disputed land have found pursuing legal avenues costly, time consuming, and ineffective at enforcing property rights. Companies that default in payment of their obligations in Honduras can declare bankruptcy. A Honduran court must ratify a bankruptcy for it to take effect. These cases are regulated by the country’s Commercial Code. The judicial ruling that declares the bankruptcy of the company establishes the value of the assets, the recognition and classification of the credits, the procedure for the sale of assets and the schedule for the payment of the obligations, in the case that it is not possible for the company to continue its operations. The ruling must be published in the Gazette. The liquidation of companies is always a judicial matter, except in the case of banking institutions which are liquidated by the National Banking and Insurance Commission. Any creditor or a company itself may initiate the liquidation procedure, which is generally a civil matter. The judge appoints a liquidator to execute the procedure. A mechanism that a company may exercise to prevent bankruptcy is to request a suspension of payments from the judge. If approved by the judge and the creditors, the company may be able to reach an agreement with its creditors that allows the same administrative board to maintain control of the company. A company may be prosecuted for fraudulently declaring bankruptcy in the case that the administrative board or shareholders withdraw their assets before the declaration, alter accounting books making it impossible to determine the real situation of the company, or favor certain creditors granting them benefits that they would not be entitled to otherwise. 4. Industrial Policies The 2017 Tourism Incentives Law offers tax exemptions for national and international investment in tourism development projects. The law provides income tax exemptions for the first 10 years of a project and permits the duty-free import of goods needed for a project, including publicity materials. To receive benefits, a business must be located in a designated tourism zone. Restaurants, casinos, nightclubs, movie theaters, and certain other businesses are not eligible for incentives under this law. Foreigners or foreign companies seeking to purchase property exceeding 3,000 square meters for tourism or other development projects in designated tourism zones must present an application to the Honduran Tourism Institute at the Ministry of Tourism. The buyer must prove a contract to purchase the property exists and present feasibility studies and plans about the proposed tourism project. The Honduran government historically has offered four primary tax-advantaged structures to incentivize investment in Honduras: the Free Trade Zone (ZOLI), the Free Tourism Zone (ZOLT), the Industrial Zone for Export Processing (ZIP) and the Temporary Import Law (RIT). Although there has been no formal announcement, the Castro administration has expressed its intentions both publicly and privately to eliminate these tax incentive structures. Both ZOLIs and ZIPs allow foreign investors tariff and tax incentives for export-only manufacturing. The following cities have been designated as free zones: Puerto Cortes, Omoa, Choloma, Tela, La Ceiba, and Amapala. The government allows the establishment of ZIPs anywhere in the country. Currently, ZIPs are located in Choloma, Buffalo, La Lima, San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and Villanueva. Companies operating in ZIPs are exempt from paying import duties and other charges on goods and capital equipment. The RIT allows exporters to introduce raw materials, parts, and capital equipment (except vehicles) into Honduras exempt from surcharges and customs duties if a manufacturer incorporates the input into a product for export (up to five percent can be sold locally). Additional information on these incentive programs is available from the National Investment Council (https://www.cni.hn). In April 2022, President Castro abolished Honduras’ Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs), the largely autonomous economic zones created by the Honduran National Congress in 2013. Opponents viewed ZEDEs as an unconstitutional abrogation of Honduran sovereignty, ceding national territory and resources to rich investors who would elude Honduras’ already weak oversight of environmental standards, property laws, human rights, and labor standards, while providing no economic benefit to ordinary Hondurans. ZEDE owners saw them as an opportunity to spur economic growth through secure, privately-run enclaves with their own tax and regulatory schemes, security forces, and dispute-resolution mechanisms, as well as a model of how life could be in Honduras with more government efficiency and less corruption. ZEDE owners, who are exploring possible litigation, say they relied in good faith on the legality of the ZEDE law and have tried to negotiate with the Castro Administration to identify a mutually satisfactory way forward, but the government has so far been unwilling to engage in talks. Honduras ratified the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in July 2016, agreeing to expedite the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. The TFA also sets out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues. According to the WTO/TFA database, Honduras’ current rate of implementation of TFA Category A notification commitments stands at 58.4 percent. The Honduran government has received significant technical assistance from the U.S. government to meet compliance requirements in publication, notification, advance rulings, border agency cooperation, and establishing a national trade facilitation committee. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador operate a trilateral customs union to foster and increase efficient cross-border trade, but implementation challenges persist. Honduras uses digitized import permits for agricultural products to reduce costs and dispatch times. Honduras and Guatemala also use an online pre-arrival screening protocol to reduce border times and transit costs for goods. With U.S. support, the GOH has advanced several initiatives to facilitate trade and reduce dispatch times and costs at key land and sea borders. Use of high-spec tablets by Aduanas (Customs) at Puerto Cortes has reduced dispatch times by over 30 percent; expansion of tablet use is envisioned to La Mesa as well (San Pedro Sula airport Customs). A streamlined inspections manual for to be adopted by Aduanas and the National Health and Agrifood Safety Entity (SENASA) as well as additional IT developments to integrate Aduanas and SENASA inspection systems will further compound time and cost reductions at key land and border crossings. Trade policy is overseen by the National Trade Committee, chaired by the Minister of Economic Development. Many U.S. companies that operate in Honduras take advantage of the commercial framework established by the Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Substantial intra-industry trade now occurs in textiles and electrical machinery, alongside continued trade in traditional Honduran exports such as coffee and bananas. The government rushed the opening in December 2021 of an incomplete, controversial new airport, Palmerola, designed to reduce costs for airlines, passengers, and shipping companies once cargo processing procedures have been fully implemented. The airport connects with a recently completed highway (the ‘Dry Canal’) to the Pacific coast and with another highway to the Caribbean coast and its deep-water port – for a sea-to-sea logistics and transit system. As of this writing, cargo functions are not operational at the airport and drive time to Tegucigalpa is approximately an hour and a half. The Honduran government encourages foreign investors to hire locally and to make use of domestic content, especially in manufacturing and agriculture. The government looks favorably on investment projects that contribute to employment growth, either directly or indirectly. U.S. investors in Honduras have not reported instances in which the government has imposed performance or localization requirements on investments. The Honduran government and courts can require foreign and domestic investors that operate in Honduras to turn over data for use in criminal investigations or civil proceedings. Honduran law enforcement, prosecutors, and civil courts have the authority to make such requests. 5. Protection of Property Rights Honduran law recognizes secured interests in movable and real property. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tegucigalpa (CCIT) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of San Pedro Sula (CCIC) both manage their own merchant records. The national property registry is managed by the Property Institute. The right for CCIT and CCIC to administer their own merchant registries is derived from a concession in Honduras’ secured transactions law. Land title procedures have been an issue leading to investment disputes involving U.S. nationals who are landowners, especially, but not limited to, the tourist destination of Roatan. Title insurance is not widely available in Honduras and approximately 80 percent of the privately held land in the country is either untitled or improperly titled. Resolution of disputes in court often takes years. There are claims of widespread corruption in land sales, deed filing, and dispute resolution, including claims against attorneys, real estate companies, judges, and local officials. Although Honduras has made some progress, the property registration system is perceived as unreliable and represents a constraint on investment, particularly in the Bay Islands. In addition, a lack of implementing regulations leads to long delays in the awarding of titles in some regions. The legislative framework for the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights , which includes the Honduran copyright law and its industrial property law, is generally adequate, but often poorly enforced. Honduras has enacted legislation to implement its obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Honduran law protects data exclusivity for a period of five years and protects process patents, but does not recognize second-use patents. The Property Institute and Public Ministry handle IP protection and enforcement. CAFTA-DR Chapter 15 on Intellectual Property Rights further provides for the protection and enforcement of a range of IP rights, which are consistent with U.S. and international standards . There are also provisions on deterrence of piracy and counterfeiting. Additionally, CAFTA-DR provides authorities the ability to confiscate pirated goods and investigate intellectual property cases on their own initiative. The Honduran legal framework provides deterrence against piracy and counterfeiting by requiring the seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of counterfeit and pirated goods and the equipment used to produce them. The law also provides for statutory damages for copyright and trademark infringement, to ensure monetary damages are awarded even when losses associated with an infringement are difficult to assign. Digital piracy is widespread and frequently ignored in Honduras, especially by telecommunications companies. The Special Prosecutor for IP will not investigate a case unless it receives a complaint from a rights holder. Often, rights holders do not submit complaints because of either the perceived bureaucratic process or the fear of losing business. In addition, sentencing for IP crimes remains ineffective to deter future violations. IP violators typically receive a three-to-six-year sentence and an approximately $2,000 fine. If a sentence is less than five years, however, the convicted party can choose to pay a larger fine and not serve any jail time. Honduras is not listed in United States Trade Representative’s 2021 Special 301 Report or its 2020 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. A list of local attorneys is available at https://hn.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/. The U.S. Commercial Service office also maintains a screened list of attorneys through its Business Service Provider (BSP) directory . The American Chamber of Commerce Honduras works with U.S. and Honduran companies that encounter commercial challenges, including intellectual property rights issues ( http://www.amchamhonduras.org/ ). For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are no government restrictions on foreign investors’ access to local credit markets, though the local banking system generally extends only limited amounts of credit. Investors should not consider local banks a significant capital resource for new foreign ventures unless they use specific business development credit lines made available by bilateral or multilateral financial institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. A limited number of credit instruments are available in the local market. The only security exchange operating in the country is the Central American Securities Exchange (BCV) in Tegucigalpa, but investors should exercise caution before buying securities listed on it. Supervised by the National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS), the BCV theoretically offers instruments to trade bankers’ acceptances, repurchase agreements, short-term promissory notes, Honduran government private debt conversion bonds, and land reform repayment bonds. In practice, however, the BCV is almost entirely composed of short- and medium-term government securities and no formal secondary market for these bonds exists. A few banks have offered fixed rate and floating rate notes with maturities of up to three years, but outside of the banks’ issuances, the private sector does not sell debt or corporate stock on the exchange. Any private business is eligible to trade its financial instruments on the BCV, and firms that participate are subject to a rigorous screening process, including public disclosure and ratings by a recognized rating agency. Historically, most traded firms have had economic ties to the other business and financial groups represented as shareholders of the exchange. As a result, risk management practices are lax and public confidence in the institution is limited. The Honduran financial system is comprised of commercial banks, state-owned banks, savings and loans institutions, and financial companies. There are currently 15 commercial banks, and 10 financial groups operating in Honduras. There is no offshore banking or homegrown blockchain technology in Honduras. Honduras has a highly professional, independent Central Bank and an effective banking regulator, the Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros. While access to credit remains limited in Honduras, especially for historically underserved populations, the financial sector is a source of economic stability in the country. Honduras does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Most state-owned enterprises are in telecommunications, electricity, water utilities, banking, and commercial ports. The main state-owned Honduran telephone company, Hondutel, has private contracts with eight foreign and domestic carriers. The GOH has yet to establish a legal framework for foreign companies to obtain licenses and concessions to provide long distance and international calling. As a result, investors remain unsure if they can become fully independent telecommunication service providers. The state-owned National Electric Energy Company (ENEE) is the single largest contributor to the country’s fiscal deficit. Due to years of mismanagement and corruption, ENEE loses over $30 million every month and its debt amounts to more than 10 percent of Honduran GDP. With the May 2022 energy law, the government has reversed energy reform legislation that called for the separation of ENEE into three independent units for distribution, transmission, and generation. The law also weakened the electricity regulator and eliminated the independent systems operator. Electricity subsector experts say that dispatch decisions have become much less transparent since the elimination of the systems operator, a disincentive for new investment. The electrical subsector faces serious structural problems, including high electricity system losses, a transmission system in need of upgrades, vulnerability of generation costs to volatile international oil prices, an electricity tariff that does not reflect actual costs, and the high costs of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which have often been awarded directly to companies with political connections instead of via a fair and transparent tendering and procurement process. Many businesses have installed on-site power generation systems to supplement or substitute for power from ENEE due to frequent blackouts and high tariffs. Honduran law grants municipalities the right to manage water distribution and to grant concessions to private enterprises. Major cities with public-private concessions include San Pedro Sula, Puerto Cortes, and Choloma. The state water authority National Autonomous Aqueduct and Sewer Service (SANAA) manages Tegucigalpa’s water distribution. Persistent water shortages are another constraint on private enterprise in Honduras, especially during the spring dry season. The Honduran National Port Company (ENP) is the state-owned organization that oversees management of the country’s government-operated maritime ports, including Puerto Cortes, La Ceiba, Puerto Castilla, and San Lorenzo. Private companies Central American Port Operators and Maritime Ports of Honduras have 30-year concessions to operate container and bulk shipping facilities at Honduras’ principal port Puerto Cortes. The Honduran government is not seeking to privatize state-owned enterprises. The May 2022 energy law aims to increase government control over the electricity sector. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of the importance of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is growing among both producers and consumers in Honduras. An increasing number of local and foreign companies operating in Honduras include conduct-related responsibility practices in their business strategies. The Honduran Corporate Social Responsibility Foundation (FUNDAHRSE) has become a strong proponent in its efforts to promote transparency in the business climate and provides the Honduran private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized businesses, with the skills to engage in responsible business practices. FUNDAHRSE’s approximately 110 members can apply for the foundation’s “Corporate Social Responsibility Enterprise” seal for exemplary responsible business conduct involving work in areas related to health, education, environment, codes of ethics, employment relations, and responsible marketing. RBC related to the environment and outreach to local communities is especially important to the success of investment projects in Honduras. Several major foreign investment projects in Honduras have stalled due to concerns about environmental impact, land rights issues, lack of transparency, and problematic consultative processes with local communities, particularly indigenous communities. Although the International Labor Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples was ratified by the GOH in 1995 and Honduras voted in favor of UN’s Indigenous People’s rights in 2007, there is still much to do in the area. There is still a need for foreign investors to build trust with local communities, while employing international best practices and standards to reduce the risk of conflict and promote sustainable and equitable development. Examples of international best practices include the following: Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . GOH has a National Adaptation and Climate Strategy and a Biodiversity Strategy. In 2022, the Castro Administration created the Environmental Cabinet comprised of Ministries of Environment, Forestry, Agriculture, Energy, Economic Development and Finance and the Protected Areas and Wildlife Institute. The purpose of this body is to coordinate interagency efforts to address climate change, biodiversity conservation and Forestry Management. The GOH has taken positive steps to implement climate related policies including a National Adaption and Climate Strategy and a Biodiversity Strategy. The GOH has not established policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. However, in collaboration with the UN, GOH conducted sectoral studies to determine Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and drafted a greenhouse gases mitigation strategy. While sectoral studies provided recommendations and targets for NDCs, these recommendations have not translated into official policy. The GOH does have an ecotax to support efforts to administer protected areas, which generally adds additional taxes on imported cars. At this time, the GOH has not implemented public procurement policies that include environmental and green growth consideration such as resources efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. 9. Corruption In February 2022, President Castro fulfilled her campaign promise to request support from the UN for an international anti-corruption commission (CICIH). A UN Technical Assistance Mission visited Honduras in May 2022 to begin work on the request. The commission would continue the work started by the OAS Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) which left Honduras in 2020 after the former administration failed to renew its mandate. Though details are still under discussion, the commission would likely fill an investigative and prosecutorial role similar to MACCIH. Its mandate would likely extend beyond the current administration. Several risks remain; notably, a broad amnesty law passed in February 2022 that would prevent the commission from investigating a significant number of cases, and unclear financing for the commission. U.S. businesses and citizens report corruption in the public sector and the judiciary is a significant constraint to investment in Honduras. Historically, corruption has been pervasive in government procurement, issuance of government permits, customs, real estate transactions (particularly land title transfers), performance requirements, and the regulatory system. Civil society groups are critical of recent legislation granting qualified immunity to government officials and a 2019 law that gave the highly politicized government audit agency a first look at corruption cases. Congress repealed the latter in 2022. In 2018, Congress passed a revision of the 1984 penal code that lowered penalties for some corruption offenses. The new code went into effect in June 2020 and was retroactively applied to several high-profile corruption cases resulting in a spate of dismissals and retrials. In late 2020, the GOH created a new Ministry of Transparency to act as the government’s lead institution in coordinating and implementing efforts to promote transparency and integrity and prevent government corruption. The Castro government further institutionalized the ministry’s anti-corruption mandate, naming it the Ministry of Transparency and the Fight against Corruption. The Castro administration’s Government by Results initiative should pay off in decreased vulnerability to corruption, and the ministers of Health and Economic Development both signed cooperation agreements with the country’s Anticorruption Council. Honduras’s Rankings on Key Corruption Indicators: Measure Year Index/Ranking TI Corruption Index 2021 23/100, 157 of 180 MCC Government Effectiveness FY 2022 -0.12 (35 percent) MCC Rule of Law FY 2022 -0.42 (10 percent) MCC Control of Corruption FY 2022 -0.40 (16 percent) The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) deems it unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign issuers of securities to make corrupt payments to foreign public officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for directing business to any person. The FCPA also applies to foreign firms and persons who take any act in furtherance of such a corrupt payment while in the United States. For more information, see the FCPA Lay-Person’s Guide: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ . Honduras ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in December 2005. The UN Convention requires countries to establish criminal penalties for a wide range of acts of corruption. The UN Convention covers a broad range of issues from basic forms of corruption such as bribery and solicitation, embezzlement, trading in influence, and the concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption. The UN Convention contains transnational business bribery provisions that are functionally similar to those in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-Bribery Convention. Honduras ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention) in1998. The OAS Convention establishes a set of preventive measures against corruption; provides for the criminalization of certain acts of corruption, including transnational bribery and illicit enrichment; and contains a series of provisions to strengthen the cooperation between its states’ parties in areas such as mutual legal assistance and technical cooperation. Companies that face corruption-related challenges in Honduras may contact the following organizations to request assistance. José Mario Salgado Director General of the Prosecutor’s Office Honduran Public Ministry Direcciongf2018@gmail.com The Public Ministry is the Honduran government agency responsible for criminal prosecutions, including corruption cases. Association for a More Just Society (ASJ) Carlos Hernandez Honduras Country Director Residencial El Trapiche, 2da etapa Bloque B, Casa #25 +504-2235-2291 info@asjhonduras.com ASJ is a nongovernmental Honduran organization that works to reduce corruption and increase transparency. It is an affiliate of Transparency International. National Anti-Corruption Council (CNA) Alejandra Ferrera Executive Board Assistant Colonia San Carlos, calle Republica de Mexico 504-2221-1181 aferrera@cna.hn CNA is a Honduran civil society organization. U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa, Honduras Attention: Economic Section Avenida La Paz Tegucigalpa M.D.C., Honduras Telephone Numbers: (504) 2236-9320, 2238-5114 Fax Number: (504) 2236-9037 Companies can also report corruption through the Department of Commerce Trade Compliance Center Report a Trade Barrier website: http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp . 10. Political and Security Environment Crime and violence rates remain high and add cost and constraint to investments. Demonstrations occur regularly in Honduras and political uncertainty poses a challenge to ongoing stability. U.S. citizens should be aware that large public gatherings might become unruly or violent quickly. For more information, consult the Department of State’s latest travel warning: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Honduras.html. Although violent crime remains a persistent problem, Honduras has successfully reduced homicides to less than 40 per 100,000 inhabitants. Cases of violence, extortion, and kidnapping are still relatively common, particularly in urban areas where gang presence is more pervasive. Drug traffickers continue to use Honduras as a transit point for cocaine and other narcotics en route to the United States and Europe, which fuels local turf battles in some areas and injects illicit funds into judicial proceedings and local governance structures to distort justice. The business community historically had been a target for ransom kidnappings, but the number of such kidnappings dropped from 92 in 2013 to 15 in 2021, primarily through the work of the USG-supported Honduran National Police National Anti-Kidnapping Unit. Although violent crime rates are trending downward, corruption and white-collar crime, including money laundering, negatively affect economic prosperity and stability for the business community. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Honduran Labor Law prescribes a maximum eight-hour workday, 44-hour workweek, and at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The Labor Code provides for paid national holidays and annual leave. Most employment sectors also receive two one-month bonuses as part of the base salary, known as the 13th and 14th month salary, issued in mid-December and mid-June, respectively. New hires receive a prorated amount based on time-in-service during their first year of employment. The Labor Code requires companies to pay one month’s salary to employees terminated without cause. Companies do not owe severance to employees who resign or are terminated for cause. Employees terminated for cause can contest the basis for the termination in court to claim severance. There are no government-provided unemployment benefits in Honduras, although unemployed individuals may have access to their accumulated pension funds. As mentioned above, in April 2022, President Castro signed the repeal of the Hourly Employment Law. Labor groups had alleged that some employers used hourly contracts to avoid responsibility for severance, provide employee benefits, and prevent union formation. The repeal did not stipulate the process for transitioning employees from hourly to salaried, but it did prevent the termination of employees. The Secretariat of Labor and Social Security (SETRASS) is responsible for registering collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Code prohibits the employment of persons under the age of 14. Minors between the ages of 14 and 18 must receive special permission from SETRASS to work. The majority of the violations of the labor-related provisions of the children’s code occur in the agricultural sector and informal economy. While Honduran labor law closely mirrors International Labor Organization standards, the U.S. Department of Labor has raised serious concerns regarding the effective enforcement of Honduran labor laws. Labor organizations allege the SETRASS fails to enforce labor laws, including laws on the right to form unions, reinstating employees unjustly fired for union activities, child labor, minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. A 2015 U.S. Department of Labor report provided recommendations to address labor concerns in Honduras and called for a monitoring and action plan (MAP) to improve labor law enforcement in Honduras following a 2012 submission brought under the labor chapter of CAFTA-DR. While the government has made significant progress toward addressing areas of concern, outstanding issues to completing the Honduran government’s obligations under the MAP include resolution of emblematic collective bargaining cases and the enforcement and collection of fines for labor violations. The U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices describes a number of labor and human rights compliance issues that affect the Honduran labor market: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/honduras/. These include employers’ anti-union discrimination, refusal to engage in collective bargaining, and employer control of unions. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. EmbassyAvenida La Paz Tegucigalpa, M.D.C. Hong Kong Executive Summary Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997, with its status defined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Under the concept of “one country, two systems,” the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government promised that Hong Kong would be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, and that its social and economic systems would remain unchanged for 50 years after reversion. The PRC’s imposition of the National Security Law (NSL) on June 30, 2020 undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy and introduced heightened uncertainty for foreign and local firms operating in Hong Kong. As a result, the U.S. Government has taken measures under Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization to eliminate or suspend aspects of Hong Kong’s differential treatment, including issuing a suspension of licenses under the Arms Export Control Act, giving notice of termination of an agreement that provided for reciprocal tax exemption on income from the international operation of ships, establishing new marking rules requiring goods made in Hong Kong to be labeled “Made in China,” and imposing sanctions against several former and current Hong Kong and PRC government officials. On March 31, 2022, the Secretary of State again certified Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. Since the imposition of the NSL in Hong Kong by Beijing, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Hong Kong may be subject to increased levels of surveillance, as well as arbitrary enforcement of laws and detention for purposes other than maintaining law and order. The PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan through 2025, which includes long-range objectives for 2035, lays out a plan for Hong Kong to become more closely integrated into the overall development of the Mainland and encourages deeper co-operation between the Mainland and Hong Kong. On March 5, 2022, PRC Premier Li Keqiang asserted that Beijing intends to exercise “overall jurisdiction over the two SARs,” referring to Hong Kong and Macau. On July 16, 2021, the Department of State, along with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security, issued an advisory to U.S. businesses regarding potential risks to their operations and activities in Hong Kong. These include risks for businesses following the imposition of the NSL; data privacy risks; risks regarding transparency and access to critical business information; and risks for businesses with exposure to sanctioned Hong Kong or PRC entities or individuals. The imposition of the NSL by Beijing, significant curtailments in protected freedoms, and the reduction of the high degree of autonomy Hong Kong enjoyed in the past has raised concerns among a number of international firms operating in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the United States’ twelfth-largest export market, thirteenth largest for total agricultural products, and sixth largest for high-value consumer food and beverage products. Hong Kong’s economy, with advanced institutions and regulatory systems, is bolstered by competitive sectors including financial and professional, trading, logistics, and tourism, although tourism has suffered devastating drops since 2020 due to COVID-19. The Hong Kong Government’s (HKG) adherence to a “Zero COVID” policy for most of the past two years has also imposed high economic costs on residents and businesses, and drastically reduced the number of visitors to the territory. Since Beijing’s 2020 imposition of the NSL on Hong Kong and the city’s implementation of COVID-19 travel restrictions, some international firms in Hong Kong have relocated entirely, while others have shifted key staff or operations elsewhere. Hong Kong provides for no distinction in law or practice between investments by foreign-controlled companies and those controlled by local interests. Foreign firms and individuals can incorporate their operations in Hong Kong, register branches of foreign operations, and set up representative offices without encountering discrimination or undue regulation. There are no restrictions on the ownership of such operations. Company directors are not required to be residents of or in Hong Kong. Reporting requirements are straightforward and are not onerous. On economic issues, Hong Kong generally pursues a free market philosophy with minimal government intervention. The HKG generally welcomes foreign investment, neither offering special incentives nor imposing disincentives for foreign investors. While Hong Kong’s legal system had been traditionally viewed as a bastion of judicial independence, authorities have placed considerable pressure on the judiciary over the previous year. Rule of law risks that were formerly limited to mainland China are now increasingly a concern in Hong Kong. In March 2020, two sitting UK judges resigned from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, with the UK government citing a systematic erosion of liberty and democracy that made it untenable for those judges to sit on Hong Kong’s highest court. The service sector accounted for more than 90 percent of Hong Kong’s nearly USD 367 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021. Hong Kong hosts a large number of regional headquarters and regional offices, though Hong Kong’s deteriorating political environment and COVID-related travel restrictions have led some firms to depart. The number of U.S. firms with regional bases in Hong Kong fell over the previous decade. Approximately 1,260 U.S. companies are based in Hong Kong, according to Hong Kong’s 2021 census data, with more than half regional in scope. Finance and related services companies, such as banks, law firms, and accountancies, dominate the pack. Seventy of the world’s 100 largest banks have operations in Hong Kong. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 12 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 14 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 92,487 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 48,630 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Hong Kong is the world’s third-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2021, with a significant amount bound for mainland China. The HKG’s InvestHK department encourages inward investment, offering free advice and services to support companies from the planning stage through to the launch and expansion of their business. U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in government financed and subsidized research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Hong Kong does not discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy. Capital gains are not taxed, nor are there withholding taxes on dividends and royalties. Profits can be freely converted and remitted. Foreign-owned and Hong Kong-owned company profits are taxed at the same rate – 16.5 percent. The tax rate on the first USD 255,000 profit for all companies is currently 8.25 percent. No preferential or discriminatory export and import policies affect foreign investors. Domestic industries receive no direct subsidies. Foreign investments face no disincentives, such as quotas, bonds, deposits, or other similar regulations. According to HKG statistics, 3,940 overseas companies had regional operations registered in Hong Kong as of June 1, 2021. The United States has the largest number with 664. Hong Kong is working to attract more start-ups as it develops its technology sector, and about 28 percent of start-ups in Hong Kong come from overseas. Hong Kong’s Business Facilitation Advisory Committee is a platform for the HKG to consult the private sector on regulatory proposals and implementation of new or proposed regulations. Foreign investors can invest in any business and own up to 100 percent of equity. Like domestic private entities, foreign investors have the right to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. The HKG owns virtually all land in Hong Kong, which the HKG administers by granting long-term leases without transferring title. Foreign residents claim that a fifteen percent Buyer’s Stamp Duty on all non-permanent-resident and corporate buyers discriminates against them. The main exceptions to the HKG’s open foreign investment policy are: Broadcasting – Voting control of free-to-air television stations by non-residents is limited to 49 percent. There are also residency requirements for the directors of broadcasting companies. Legal Services – Foreign-qualified lawyers may only practice the law of their home jurisdiction, provided the firm they are working for is licensed in Hong Kong to work in those jurisdictions. Foreign law firms may become “local” firms after satisfying certain residency and other requirements. Localized firms may thereafter hire local attorneys and must maintain at least a 1:1 ratio of local attorneys to registered-foreign lawyers, without exception. Foreign law firms can also form associations with local law firms. Hong Kong last conducted the Trade Policy Review in 2018 through the World Trade Organization (WTO). https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g380_e.pdf The Efficiency Office under the Innovation and Technology Bureau is responsible for business facilitation initiatives aimed at improving the business regulatory environment of Hong Kong. The e-Registry (https://www.eregistry.gov.hk/icris-ext/apps/por01a/index) is a convenient and integrated online platform provided by the Companies Registry and the Inland Revenue Department for applying for company incorporation and business registration. Applicants, for incorporation of local companies or for registration of non-Hong Kong companies, must first register for a free user account, presenting an original identification document or a certified true copy of the identification document. The Companies Registry normally issues the Business Registration Certificate and the Certificate of Incorporation on the same day for applications for company incorporation. For applications for registration of a non-Hong Kong company, it issues the Business Registration Certificate and the Certificate of Registration two weeks after submission. Hong Kong’s Companies Registry permits public inspection of company information such as the full identification number of company directors and secretaries and their residential addresses. This information is currently available on a paid basis. Starting October 24, 2022, the HKG will restrict public access to this information, citing a need to balance privacy protections and transparency. Those approved by the HKG as “specified persons” will continue to have unrestricted access to the Companies Registries. The ability to apply for status as a “specified person” is largely limited to those working in finance, law, and compliance. Government transparency advocates assert the changes will limit the free flow of information and facilitate fraud, corruption, and other business malfeasance. As a free market economy, Hong Kong does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Mainland China and the British Virgin Islands were the top two destinations for Hong Kong’s outward investments in 2020 (based on most recent data available). 3. Legal Regime Hong Kong’s regulations and policies typically strive to avoid distortions or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of capital and to encourage competition. Bureaucratic procedures and “red tape” are usually transparent and held to a minimum. To make or amend any legislation, including investment laws, the HKG conducts a three-month public consultation on the issue concerned, which then informs the drafting of the bill. Lawmakers then discuss draft bills and vote. Hong Kong’s regulatory and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Rule of law risks that were formerly limited to mainland China are now increasingly a concern in Hong Kong. Gazette is the official publication of the HKG. This website https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/whatsnew/whatsnew.html is the centralized online location where laws, regulations, draft bills, notices, and tenders are published. All public comments received by the HKG are published at the websites of relevant policy bureaus. The Office of the Ombudsman, established in 1989 by the Ombudsman Ordinance, is Hong Kong’s independent watchdog of public governance. Public finances are regulated by clear laws and regulations. The Basic Law prescribes that authorities strive to achieve a fiscal balance and avoid deficits. There is a clear commitment by the HKG to publish fiscal information under the Audit Ordinance and the Public Finance Ordinance, which prescribe deadlines for the publication of annual accounts and require the submission of annual spending estimates to the Legislative Council (LegCo), Hong Kong’s legislature. There are few contingent liabilities of the HKG, with details of these items published about seven months after the release of the fiscal budget. In addition, LegCo members have a responsibility to enhance budgetary transparency by urging government officials to explain the government’s rationale for the allocation of resources. All LegCo meetings are open to the public, so the government’s responses are available to the general public. However, the HKG maintains a special fund for “national security expenditures” that is not subject to public scrutiny. In February 2021, the HKG’s annual budget allocated HKD 8 billion (approximately USD 1 billion) to this fund, and the HKG refused to provide information on how this money would be spent. On June 18, 2021, a subsidiary legislation was gazetted to implement the changes authorized under the Companies Ordinance. The new changes will gradually restrict the public from accessing certain information about executives in the Company Registry (CR) over three phases. Phase one starts on August 23, 2021 and allows new companies to have the option to withhold the usual residential addresses (URA) of directors and the full identification numbers (IDN) of directors and company secretaries from public inspection in hardcopy. Phase two starts on October 24, 2022 and will automatically swap out the URA and IDN of directors and company secretaries in the online CR with correspondence addresses and partial IDNs for public inspection. Phase three starts December 27, 2023 and allows all registered companies to retroactively apply to the CR to replace the URA and IDN of directors and company secretaries with their correspondence addresses and partial IDNs in hardcopy. “Specified persons” could apply to the CR for access to the protected information of directors and other persons. Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission issued a revised guideline in June 2021 requiring asset managers to disclose more information regarding their methodology for environment, sustainability, governance (ESG) funds, including the ESG focus, ESG investment strategy, expected proportion of ESG investment, any reference benchmark, and related risks. It also requires an ESG fund to conduct periodic assessment, at least annually, to assess how the fund has attained its ESG focus. To enhance transparency of ESG funds in Hong Kong, a central database of all SFC-authorized ESG funds is accessible through the SFC’s website. Hong Kong is an independent member of the WTO and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). It notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and was the first WTO member to ratify the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Hong Kong has achieved a 100 percent rate of implementation commitments. While Hong Kong is not a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it is a participant of the OECD’s Trade Committee and the Committee on Financial Markets. The HKG is in the process of implementing the OECD’s new minimum global corporate tax initiative, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS 2.0). Hong Kong’s common law system is based on the United Kingdom’s, and judges are appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the court system. In March 2020 two sitting UK judges resigned from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, with the UK government citing a systematic erosion of liberty and democracy that made it untenable for those judges to sit on Hong Kong’s leading court. Hong Kong’s commercial law covers a wide range of issues related to doing business. Most of Hong Kong’s contract law is found in the reported decisions of the courts in Hong Kong and other common law jurisdictions. The imposition of the NSL and pressure from mainland China authorities raised serious concerns about the state of Hong Kong’s judicial independence. The NSL authorizes the mainland China judicial system, which lacks judicial independence and has a 99 percent conviction rate, to take over any national security-related case at the request of the HKG or the Office of Safeguarding National Security. Under the NSL, the Chief Executive is required to establish a list of judges to handle all cases concerning national security-related offenses. Legal scholars argued that this unprecedented involvement of the Chief Executive weakens Hong Kong’s judicial independence. Media outlets controlled by the PRC central government in both Hong Kong and mainland China repeatedly accused Hong Kong judges of bias following the acquittals of protesters accused of rioting and other crimes. Some Hong Kong and PRC central government officials questioned the existence of the “separation of powers” in Hong Kong, including some statements that judicial independence is not enshrined in Hong Kong law and that judges should follow “guidance” from the government. Hong Kong’s extensive body of commercial and company law generally follows that of the United Kingdom, including the common law and rules of equity. Most statutory law is made locally. The local court system provides for effective enforcement of contracts, dispute settlement, and protection of rights. Foreign and domestic companies register under the same rules and are subject to the same set of business regulations. The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1981) sets out general principles for acceptable standards of commercial behavior. The Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622) applies to Hong Kong-incorporated companies and contains the statutory provisions governing compulsory acquisitions. For companies incorporated in jurisdictions other than Hong Kong, relevant local company laws apply. The Companies Ordinance requires companies to retain accurate and up to date information about significant controllers. The Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571) contains provisions requiring shareholders to disclose interests in securities in listed companies and provides listed companies with the power to investigate ownership of interests in its shares. It regulates the disclosure of inside information by listed companies and restricts insider dealing and other market misconduct. The independent Competition Commission (CC) investigates anti-competitive conduct that prevents, restricts, or distorts competition in Hong Kong. In November 2021, the CC filed a case in the Competition Tribunal against three undertakings for participating in cartel conduct regarding the sale of inserters in Hong Kong. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any expropriations in the recent past. Expropriation of private property in Hong Kong may occur if it is clearly in the public interest and only for well-defined purposes such as implementation of public works projects. Expropriations are to be conducted through negotiations, and in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance with established principles of international law. Investors in and lenders to expropriated entities are to receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. If agreement cannot be reached on the amount payable, either party can refer the claim to the Land Tribunal. Hong Kong’s Bankruptcy Ordinance provides the legal framework to enable: i) a creditor to file a bankruptcy petition with the court against an individual, firm, or partner of a firm who owes him/her money; and ii) a debtor who is unable to repay his/her debts to file a bankruptcy petition against himself/herself with the court. Bankruptcy offenses are subject to criminal liability. The Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance aims to improve and modernize the corporate winding-up regime by increasing creditor protection and further enhancing the integrity of the winding-up process. The Commercial Credit Reference Agency collates information about the indebtedness and credit history of SMEs and makes such information available to members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks and the Hong Kong Association of Deposit Taking Companies. Hong Kong’s average duration of bankruptcy proceedings is just under ten months. 4. Industrial Policies The HKG does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Hong Kong imposes no export performance or local content requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding a foreign investment. There are no requirements currently that Hong Kong residents own shares, that foreign equity is reduced over time, or that technology is transferred on certain terms. However, the PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan through 2025 with long-range objectives to 2035 does lay out a plan for Hong Kong to become an international innovation and technology hub, to become better integrated into the overall development of the Mainland, and to encourage deeper co-operation between the Mainland and Hong Kong related to innovation and technology. Closer alignment between the Hong Kong and mainland authorities on policies related to investment, innovation, and technology is expected. The HKG offers an effective tax rate of around three to four percent to attract aircraft leasing companies to develop business in Hong Kong. To attract more maritime businesses to establish a presence in Hong Kong, the HKG also offers tax exemption or a reduced profit tax rate of 8.25 percent to eligible ship leasing and maritime insurance companies. The HKG allows a deduction on interest paid to overseas associated corporations and provides an 8.25 percent concessionary tax rate derived by a qualifying corporate treasury center. Hong Kong-registered companies with a significant proportion of their research, design, development, production, management, or general business activities located in Hong Kong are eligible to apply to the Innovation and Technology Fund (ITF), which provides financial support for research and development (R&D) activities in Hong Kong. Hong Kong Science & Technology Parks (Science Park) and Cyberport are HKG-owned enterprises providing subsidized rent and financial support through incubation programs to early-stage startups. The HKG offers additional tax deductions for domestic expenditure on R&D incurred by firms. Firms enjoy a 300 percent tax deduction for the first HKD 2 million (USD 255,000) qualifying R&D expenditure and a 200 percent deduction for the remainder. Since 2017, the Financial Secretary has announced over HKD 130 billion (USD 16.7 billion) in funding to support innovation and technology development in Hong Kong. These funds are largely directed at supporting and adding programs through the ITF, the Science Park, and Cyberport. In September 2021, the Securities and Futures (Amendment) Bill 2021 and Limited Partnership Fund and Business Registration Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2021 were passed to facilitate the re-domicile of foreign investment funds to Hong Kong for registration as Open-ended Fund Companies (OFCs) or Limited Partnership Funds (LPFs). To strengthen Hong Kong’s position as an asset management center, the HKG announced in March 2022 a proposal to provide tax concessions for the eligible family investment management entities managed by single‑family offices. Subject to certain conditions, the entities would be exempted from Hong Kong profits tax for its profits derived from certain qualifying transactions and incidental transactions. In May2021, the HKG launched the Green and Sustainable Finance Grant Scheme to subsidize eligible bond issuers and loan borrowers to cover their expenses on bond issuance and external review services. Hong Kong, a free port without foreign trade zones, has modern and efficient infrastructure making it a regional trade, finance, and services center. Rapid growth has placed severe demands on that infrastructure, necessitating plans for major new investments in transportation and shipping facilities, including a planned expansion of container terminal facilities, additional roadway and railway networks, major residential/commercial developments, community facilities, and environmental protection projects. Construction on a third runway at Hong Kong International Airport was completed in September 2021. Hong Kong and mainland China have a Free Trade Agreement Transshipment Facilitation Scheme that enables mainland-bound consignments passing through Hong Kong to enjoy tariff reductions in the Mainland. The arrangement covers goods traded between mainland China and its trading partners, including ASEAN members, Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Costa Rica, Georgia, Iceland, India, Japan, Mongolia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The HKG launched in December 2018 phase one of the Trade Single Window (TSW) to provide a one-stop electronic platform for submitting ten types of trade documents, promoting cross-border customs cooperation, and expediting trade declaration and customs clearance. Phase two is expected to be implemented in 2023. The latest version of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), has established principles of trade facilitation, including simplifying customs procedures, enhancing transparency, and strengthening cooperation. The HKG does not mandate local employment or performance requirements. It does not follow a forced localization policy making foreign investors use domestic content in goods or technology. Foreign nationals normally need a visa to live or work in Hong Kong. Short-term visitors are permitted to conduct business negotiations and sign contracts while on a visitor’s visa or entry permit. Companies employing people from overseas must show that a prospective employee has special skills, knowledge, or experience not readily available in Hong Kong. Hong Kong generally allows free and uncensored flow of information, though the imposition of the NSL and subsequent Hong Kong legislation created certain limits on free expression, especially that which may be viewed as critical of the HKG or the mainland government. Thus, while Hong Kong authorities did not generally disrupt open access to the internet, there were numerous reports that the Hong Kong police, exercising powers granted by the NSL, required internet providers to block access to certain websites. The freedom and privacy of communication is enshrined in Basic Law Article 30. The HKG has no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and does not interfere with data center operations. However, the NSL introduced a heightened risk of Mainland and Hong Kong authorities using expanded legal authorities to collect data from businesses and individuals in Hong Kong for actions that may violate “national security.” For more information, please refer to the Hong Kong business advisory released jointly by the Department of State, together with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security on July 16, 2021. The NSL grants Hong Kong police broad authorities to conduct wiretaps or electronic surveillance without warrants in national security-related cases. The NSL also empowers police to conduct searches, including of electronic devices, for evidence in national security cases. Police can also require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide or delete information relevant to these cases. In January 2021, the organizer of an online platform alleged that local Internet providers have made the site inaccessible for users in Hong Kong following requests from the Hong Kong government. One ISP subsequently confirmed that it blocked a website “in compliance with the requirement issued under the National Security Law.” In July 2021, Hong Kong police sent a letter to an Israel-based web hosting company demanding that the company remove a website and claiming that the website contained messages “likely to constitute offenses endangering national security.” In March 2022, Hong Kong police sent a letter to a UK-based human rights organization ordering the organization to remove its website within 72 hours or face potential fines and/or imprisonment under the NSL. Hong Kong does not currently restrict transfer of personal data outside the SAR, but Section 33 the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance would prohibit such transfers unless the personal data owner consents or other specified conditions are met. The Privacy Commissioner is authorized to bring Section 33 into effect at any time, but it has been dormant since 1995. The PRC’s Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) does not apply to data for Hong Kong-based operations, and companies that wish to transfer mainland data that falls under the PIPL to Hong Kong would be required to undergo a PRC cybersecurity review. In October 2021, the HKG amended the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance to introduce new provisions to combat doxxing acts and empower the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD) to carry out criminal investigations and institute prosecution towards doxxing-related offenses, including potentially against online platforms and service providers. The PCPD made its first arrest in December 2021 under this new legislation in which a suspect was arrested and accused of disclosing the victim’s personal details on an online platform. In December 2020, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) required licensed corporations in Hong Kong to seek the SFC’s approval before using the following for storing regulatory records: 1) premises controlled exclusively by an external data storage provider(s) located inside or outside Hong Kong, such as cloud service providers like Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, or Amazon AWS; or 2) server(s) for data storage at data centers located inside or outside Hong Kong. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Basic Law ensures protection of leaseholders’ rights in long-term leases that are the basis of the SAR’s real property system. The Basic Law also protects the lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the New Territories. The real estate sector, one of Hong Kong’s pillar industries, is equipped with a sound banking mortgage system. Land transactions in Hong Kong operate on a deeds registration system governed by the Land Registration Ordinance. The Land Titles Ordinance provides greater certainty on land title and simplifies the conveyancing process. Hong Kong generally provides strong intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and enforcement. Hong Kong has effective IPR enforcement capacity, and a judicial system that supports enforcement efforts with a public outreach program that discourages IPR-infringing activities. Despite the robustness of Hong Kong’s IP system, challenges remain, particularly in connection with copyright infringement and effective enforcement against the heavy, bi-directional flow of counterfeit goods. Hong Kong’s commercial and company laws provide for effective enforcement of contracts and protection of corporate rights. H The Intellectual Property Department, which includes the Trademarks and Patents Registries, is the focal point for the development of Hong Kong’s IP regime. The Customs and Excise Department (CED) is the sole enforcement agency for intellectual property rights (IPR). The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Universal Copyright Convention are applicable to Hong Kong. Hong Kong also continues to participate in the World Intellectual Property Organization as part of mainland China’s delegation. The HKG has seconded an officer from CED to INTERPOL in Lyon, France to further collaborate on IPR enforcement. The HKG devotes substantial resources to IPR enforcement. CED works with foreign customs agencies and the World Customs Organization to share best practices and to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations engaging in IP theft that operate in multiple countries. The government has conducted public education efforts to encourage respect for IPR. Pirated and counterfeit products remain available on a small scale at the retail level throughout Hong Kong. Other IPR challenges include end-use piracy of software and textbooks, internet peer-to-peer downloading, illegal streaming, and the illicit importation and transshipment of pirated and counterfeit goods from mainland China and other places in Asia. Hong Kong authorities have taken steps to address these challenges by strengthening collaboration with mainland Chinese authorities, prosecuting end-use software piracy, and monitoring suspect shipments at points of entry. It has also established a task force to monitor and crack down on internet-based peer-to-peer piracy. The Drug Office of Hong Kong imposes a drug registration requirement that requires applicants for new drug registrations to make a non-infringement patent declaration. The Copyright Ordinance protects any original copyrighted work created or published anywhere in the world and criminalizes unauthorized copying and distribution of protected works. The Ordinance also provides rental rights for sound recordings, computer programs, films, and comic books, and includes enhanced penalty provisions and other legal tools to facilitate enforcement. The law defines possession of an infringing copy of computer programs, movies, TV dramas, and musical recordings (including visual and sound recordings) for use in business as an offense but provides no criminal liability for other categories of works. In June 2020, Hong Kong passed legislation to implement the Marrakesh Treaty. In November 2021, HKG launched a three-month public consultation on the proposal to update the Copyright Ordinance. The proposal is based on the 2014 Copyright (Amendment) Bill, which was shelved in 2016 amid opposition by pan-democratic Legislative Council (LegCo) members. The proposal covered five key areas to modernize the copyright regime, such as giving copyright owners a “technology-neutral exclusive communication right” and providing new copyrights exemptions for three purposes, including “parody, satire, caricature and pastiche; commenting on current events; and quotation of copyright works”. The three-month consultation ended in February 2022. The HKG released a summary of the public consultation process on April 19, 2022 stating that they will proceed with submitting the 2014 Copyright (Amendment) Bill, with minimal changes, to LegCo with the first half of 2022. The Patent Ordinance allows for issuing a patent in Hong Kong based on patents issued by the United Kingdom and mainland China known as a “re-registration” system. Patents issued in Hong Kong have no effect in mainland China and vice versa. Patents issued in Hong Kong are capable of being tested for validity, rectified, amended, revoked, and enforced in Hong Kong courts. Hong Kong’s Original Grant Patent (OGP) system, which enables applicants to file patent applications directly in Hong Kong without having to go through the re-registration process, came into operation in December 2019. The OGP system co-exists with the re-registration system for the granting of patents, allowing applicants flexibility while applying for patent protections in Hong Kong. In June 2021, Hong Kong granted its first‑ever standard patent by original grant. As of end‑May 2021, the IPD received a total of 426 OGP applications, with 67 percent from non‑local Hong Kong residents. The Registered Design Ordinance is modeled on the EU design registration system. To be registered, a design must be new, and the system requires no substantive examination. The initial period of five years protection is extendable for four periods of five years each, up to 25 years. Hong Kong’s trademark law allows for registration of trademarks relating to services. All trademark registrations originally filed in Hong Kong are valid for seven years and renewable for fourteen-year periods. Owners of trademarks registered elsewhere must apply in Hong Kong and satisfy all requirements of Hong Kong law. When evidence of use is required, such use must have occurred in Hong Kong. In June 2020, Hong Kong amended its Trade Marks Ordinance to provide a basis for the application of the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol). The HKG is expected to implement the Madrid Protocol in 2023 at the earliest. Hong Kong has no specific ordinance to cover trade secrets; however, the government has a duty under its Trade Descriptions Ordinance to protect information from being disclosed to other parties. The Trade Descriptions Ordinance prohibits false trade descriptions, forged trademarks, and misstatements regarding goods and services supplied during trade. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are no impediments to the free flow of financial resources. Non-interventionist economic policies, complete freedom of capital movement, and a well-understood regulatory and legal environment make Hong Kong a regional and international financial center. It has one of the most active foreign exchange markets in Asia. Assets and wealth managed in Hong Kong amounted to USD 4.5 trillion in 2020 (the latest figure available), with almost two-thirds of that coming from overseas investors. To enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s fund industry, OFCs as well as onshore and offshore funds are offered a profits tax exemption. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s (HKMA) Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) provides a platform for pooling the efforts of investors, banks, and the financial sector to offer comprehensive financial services for infrastructure projects in emerging markets. IFFO is an advisory partner of the World Bank Group’s Global Infrastructure Facility. Under the Insurance Companies Ordinance, insurance companies are authorized by the Insurance Authority to transact business in Hong Kong. As of January 2022, there were 163 authorized insurance companies in Hong Kong; 67 of them were foreign or mainland Chinese companies. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s total market capitalization dropped by eleven percent to USD 5.4 trillion in 2021, with 2,572 listed firms at year-end. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, a listed company, operates the stock and futures exchanges. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), an independent statutory body outside the civil service, has licensing and supervisory powers to ensure the integrity of markets and protection of investors. No discriminatory legal constraints exist for foreign securities firms establishing operations in Hong Kong via branching, acquisition, or subsidiaries. Rules governing operations are the same for all firms. No laws or regulations specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. In 2021, 1,368 mainland companies were listed in Hong Kong, including a total of 296 “H” share listings on the stock exchange, with total market capitalization of around USD 4.3 trillion, or 79 percent of the market total. The Shanghai-Hong Kong and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connects allow individual investors to cross trade Hong Kong and mainland stocks. Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect launched in September 2021 in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA), which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities in the Mainland’s Guangdong Province together. The GBA, which still lacks major details, faces many challenges that are likely to stall its success, including coordinating three disparate legal systems, three different currencies, and removing barriers to the movement of capital and people. The Wealth Connect scheme will enable residents in GBA to carry out cross-boundary investment in wealth management products distributed by banks in the area. Under the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds scheme, eligible mainland and Hong Kong mutual funds were allowed to be distributed in each other’s market. Hong Kong also has mutual recognition of funds programs with Switzerland, Thailand, Ireland, France, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg. Hong Kong has developed its debt market with the Exchange Fund bills and notes program. Outstanding Hong Kong Dollar debt stood at USD 155 billion by the end of 2021. The Bond Connect, a mutual market access scheme, allows investors from mainland China and overseas to trade in each other’s respective bond markets through a financial infrastructure linkage in Hong Kong. As of December 2021, northbound trading under Bond Connect has attracted 78 out of the top 100 global asset management companies, and 3,233 international investors from 35 jurisdictions. Southbound trading under Bond Connect was launched in September 2021 to enable mainland institutional investors to invest in offshore bonds through the Hong Kong bond market. In September 2021, the SFC revised its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-financing of terrorism guidelines. The updated guidelines require financial institutions to apply additional due diligence and risk mitigation measures for cross-border correspondent relationships in the securities sector, such as determining through publicly available information whether the respondent institution has been subject to targeted financial sanctions or regulatory actions and obtaining senior management’s approval before establishing cross-border correspondent relationships. The guidelines also prohibit financial institutions from establishing or continuing a cross-border correspondent relationship with a shell financial institution. In February 2021, the HKG announced it would issue green bonds regularly and expand the scale of the Government Green Bond Program to USD 22.5 billion within the next five years. In November 2021, the HKG issued USD 3 billion worth of U.S.- and euro- denominated green bonds and its inaugural offering of renminbi-denominated bonds. In February 2022, the HKG also announced that it would issue about USD 800 million worth of retail green bonds for the first time, with proceeds from the sale used for sustainable projects in the city. The HKG requires workers and employers to contribute to retirement funds under the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme. Contributions are expected to channel roughly USD five billion annually into various investment vehicles. By December of 2021, the net asset values of MPF funds amounted to USD 152 billion. A new listing regime for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) took effect on January 1, 2022 to provide an alternative to the traditional initial public offering (IPO) route. Under the city’s listing regime, a SPAC is required to raise IPO funds of a minimum of USD 130 million, and the trading of SPAC securities is restricted to professional and institutional investors only. Aquila Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by the asset management arm of mainland Chinese brokerage CMB International, made its trading debut on March 18, 2022. As of March 2022, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has accepted a total of eleven SPAC applications. Hong Kong has a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions: licensed banks (159), restricted license banks (15), and deposit-taking companies (12). HSBC is Hong Kong’s largest banking group. With its majority-owned subsidiary Hang Seng Bank, HSBC controls more than 52.9 percent of total assets of banks in Hong Kong, followed by the Bank of China (Hong Kong), with 14.9 percent of total assets throughout 190 branches. In total, the five largest banks in Hong Kong had more than USD 2 trillion in total assets at the end of 2020. Full implementation of the Basel III capital, liquidity, and disclosure requirements was completed in 2019. Hong Kong is a burgeoning cryptocurrency and digital asset hub in Asia. Cryptocurrency exchanges remain minimally regulated, despite a largescale crackdown in the Mainland. HKMA has announced plans to increase oversight of the market in an effort to combat scams and reduce volatility. In January 2022, HKMA announced plans for new crypto regulations, including guidelines for payment with stablecoins, investor protection policies, and digital asset authorities for licensed financial institutions. Credit in Hong Kong is allocated on market terms and is available to foreign investors on a non-discriminatory basis. The private sector has access to the full spectrum of credit instruments as provided by Hong Kong’s banking and financial system. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The HKMA, the de facto central bank, is responsible for maintaining the stability of the banking system and managing the Exchange Fund that backs Hong Kong’s currency. Real Time Gross Settlement helps minimize risks in the payment system and brings Hong Kong in line with international standards. Banks in Hong Kong have in recent years strengthened anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing controls, including the adoption of more stringent customer due diligence (CDD) process for existing and new customers. The HKMA stressed that “CDD measures adopted by banks must be proportionate to the risk level and banks are not required to implement overly stringent CDD processes.” In May 2021, the HKG concluded a three-month consultation on legislative proposals to enhance Hong Kong’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime through the introduction of a licensing requirement for virtual asset services providers and a registration system for dealers in precious metals and stones. The government has yet to introduce a bill into the Legislative Council, as of end February 2022. The NSL granted police the authority to freeze assets related to national security-related crimes. In June 2021 Hong Kong authorities froze the assets of flagship pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, which was subsequently forced to close. The HKMA advised banks in Hong Kong to report any transactions suspected of violating the NSL, following the same procedures as for money laundering. Hong Kong authorities reportedly asked financial institutions to freeze the bank accounts of media companies, former lawmakers, civil society groups, and other political targets who appear to be under investigation for their pro-democracy activities. Banks are also advised to disclose related property of clients who are found in breach of the NSL, according to the October 2021 guideline developed by the Hong Kong Association of Banks. The HKMA welcomes the establishment of virtual banks, which are subject to the same set of supervisory principles and requirements applicable to conventional banks. The HKMA granted eight virtual banking licenses by the end of February 2022. The HKMA’s Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO) aims to promote Hong Kong as a fintech hub in Asia. FFO has launched the faster payment system to enable bank customers to make cross-bank/e-wallet payments easily and created a blockchain-based trade finance platform to reduce errors and risks of fraud. The HKMA has signed nine fintech co-operation agreements with the regulatory authorities of Brazil, France, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The Future Fund, Hong Kong’s wealth fund, was established in 2016 with an endowment of USD 28.2 billion. The fund seeks higher returns through long-term investments and adopts a “passive” role as a portfolio investor. About half of the Future Fund has been deployed in alternative assets, mainly global private equity and overseas real estate, over a three-year period. The rest is placed with the Exchange Fund’s Investment Portfolio, which follows the Santiago Principles, for an initial ten-year period. In February 2020, the HKG announced that it will deploy 10 percent of the Future Fund to establish a new portfolio, which is called the Hong Kong Growth Portfolio (HKGP), focusing on domestic investments to lift the city’s competitiveness in financial services, commerce, aviation, logistics and innovation. Announced in February 2022, the HKG will inject HK$10 billion (USD 1.3 billion) to the HKGP, of which half will be used to set up the Strategic Tech Fund, and the other half will be used to set up a GBA Investment Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Hong Kong has several major HKG-owned enterprises classified as “statutory bodies.” Hong Kong is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the WTO framework. Annex 3 of the GPA lists as statutory bodies the Housing Authority, the Hospital Authority, the Airport Authority, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited, and the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, which procure in accordance with the agreement. The HKG provides more than half the population with subsidized housing, along with most hospital and education services from childhood through the university level. The government also owns major business enterprises, including the stock exchange, railway, and airport. Conflicts occasionally arise between the government’s roles as owner and policymaker. Industry observers have recommended that the government establish a separate entity to coordinate its ownership of government-held enterprises and initiate a transparent process of nomination to the boards of government-affiliated entities. Other recommendations from the private sector include establishing a clear separation between industrial policy and the government’s ownership function and minimizing exemptions of government-affiliated enterprises from general laws. The Competition Law exempts all but six of the statutory bodies from the law’s purview. While the government’s private sector ownership interests do not materially impede competition in Hong Kong’s most important economic sectors, industry representatives have encouraged the government to adhere more closely to the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All major utilities in Hong Kong, except water, are owned and operated by private enterprises, usually under an agreement framework by which the HKG regulates each utility’s management. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Hong Kong Stock Exchange adopts a higher standard of disclosure – ‘comply or explain’ – about its environmental key performance indicators for listed companies. Results of a consultation process to review its ESG reporting guidelines indicate strong support for enhancing the ESG reporting framework. It has implemented proposals from the consultation process since July 2020. Hong Kong is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Under the Security Bureau, the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority is responsible for formulating issuing criteria and conditions for security company licenses and security personnel permits and determining applications for security company licenses. In October 2021, the HKG announced its Climate Action Plan 2050, outlining strategies and targets for combating climate change and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Major decarbonization strategies cover four key areas, including net-zero electricity generation by ceasing the use of coal for daily electricity generation and increasing the share of renewable energy in the fuel mix for electricity generation to 15 percent, energy savings and green buildings, green transport, and waste reduction. The HKG will devote about USD 31 billion to take forward various measures on climate change mitigation and adaptation in the next 15 to 20 years. The HKG has prioritized becoming a regional green finance hub and has introduced a number of initiatives over the last year to promote green finance, including mandating climate-related disclosures aligned with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures recommendations by 2025, conducting the first climate stress test for the banking sector, and expanding the HKG’s Green Bond Program. Additionally, the HKG has announced it is exploring options to develop Hong Kong as a regional carbon trading hub. The government offers several financial incentives to promote the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and to enhance EV charging infrastructure to attain zero vehicular emissions before 2050. The HKG extended the first registration tax concession period for EVs to March 31, 2024 and continues to allow enterprises to claim full profits tax deduction for their capital expenditure on the procurements of EVs in the first year. Gross floor area concessions were also granted to encourage developers to install more EV charging-enabled infrastructure in residential and commercial buildings. In December 2020, a USD 25.6 million Green Tech Fund (GTF) began accepting applications. The GTF provides funding support to R&D projects which can help Hong Kong decarbonize and enhance environmental protection. Announced in February 2022, the HKG will inject an additional of USD 25.6 million to the GTF. A total of fourteen projects have been approved since the GTF was launched, and most of them are initiated by universities in Hong Kong. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Mainland China ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in January 2006, and it was extended to Hong Kong in February 2006. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is responsible for combating corruption and has helped Hong Kong develop a track record for combating corruption. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. A bribe to a foreign official is a criminal act, as is the giving or accepting of bribes, for both private individuals and government employees. Offenses are punishable by imprisonment and large fines. The Hong Kong Ethics Development Center (HKEDC), established by the ICAC, promotes business and professional ethics to sustain a level-playing field in Hong Kong. The International Good Practice Guidance – Defining and Developing an Effective Code of Conduct for Organizations of the Professional Accountants in Business Committee published by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and is in use with the permission of IFAC. Simon Peh, Commissioner Independent Commission Against Corruption 303 Java Road, North Point, Hong Kong +852-2826-3111 Email: com-office@icac.org.hk 10. Political and Security Environment Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law (NSL) on June 30, 2020 has introduced heightened uncertainties for companies operating in Hong Kong. As a result, U.S. citizens traveling through or residing in Hong Kong may be subject to increased levels of surveillance, as well as arbitrary enforcement of laws and detention for purposes other than maintaining law and order. As of March 2022, police have carried out at least 160 arrests of opposition politicians and activists for alleged “national security” offenses, including one U.S. citizen, in an effort to suppress pro-democracy views and political activity in the city. Police have also reportedly issued arrest warrants under the NSL for at least thirty individuals residing abroad, including U.S. citizens. Since June 2019, police have arrested over 10,000 people on various charges in connection with largely peaceful protests against government policies. Please see the July 16, 2021 business advisory issued by the Department of State, along with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security, for a facts-based analysis of the risks for companies operating in Hong Kong. As a result of Hong Kong’s decreased autonomy from China, the Department of Commerce removed many of the Department of Commerce’s License Exceptions. U.S. Customs and Borders Protection (CBP) requires goods produced in Hong Kong to be marked to show China, rather than Hong Kong, as their country of origin. This requirement took effect November 9, 2020. It does not affect country of origin determinations for purposes of assessing ordinary duties or temporary or additional duties. Hong Kong has requested World Trade Organization dispute consultations to examine the issue. As of March 2022, the Department of Treasury has sanctioned 42 Hong Kong and PRC officials for their role in undermining Hong Kong’s high-degree of autonomy as guaranteed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The PRC government does not recognize dual nationality. In January 2021, the HKG moved to enforce existing provisions of the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China in place since 1997, effectively ending its longstanding recognition of dual citizenship in Hong Kong. The action ended consular access to two detained U.S. citizens as of March 2021 and potentially removed our ability to provide fulsome consular assistance to about half of the estimated 85,000 U.S. citizens then residing in Hong Kong. U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Hong Kong and U.S. citizens of Chinese heritage may be subject to additional scrutiny and harassment, and the mainland government may prevent the U.S. Embassy or U.S. consulate from providing consular services. Hong Kong financial regulators have conducted outreach to stress the importance of robust anti-money laundering (AML) controls and highlight potential criminal sanctions implications for failure to fulfill legal obligations under local AML laws. However, Hong Kong has a low number of prosecutions and convictions compared to the number of cases investigated. Under the President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, the United States notified the Hong Kong authorities in August 2020 of its suspension of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders and termination of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. The United States also gave notice of its termination of the Agreement Concerning Tax Exemptions from the Income Derived from the International Operation of Ships. In response, the HKG notified the United States of its purported suspension of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Hong Kong’s unemployment rate stood at 3.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021. The labor participation rate for men was 65 percent, while that for women was 54 percent. In 2021, skilled personnel working as administrators, managers, professionals, and associate professionals accounted for about 40 percent of the total working population. At the end of 2021, there were about 321,900 foreign domestic helpers, overwhelmingly women, working in Hong Kong. In 2021, about 13,800 foreign professionals, including 1,129 from the United States, came to work in the city under the city’s General Employment Policy, a five percent year-on-year decrease. The Employees Retraining Board provides skills re-training for local employees. To address a shortage of highly skilled technical and financial professionals, the HKG seeks to attract qualified foreign and mainland Chinese workers. The Employment Ordinance (EO) and the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance prohibit the termination of employment in certain circumstances: 1) Any pregnant employee who has at least four weeks’ service and who has served notice of her pregnancy; 2) Any employee who is on paid statutory sick leave and; 3) Any employee who gives evidence or information in connection with the enforcement of the EO or relating to any accident at work, cooperates in any investigation of his employer, is involved in trade union activity, or serves jury duty may not be dismissed because of those circumstances. Breach of these prohibitions is a criminal offense. According to the EO, someone employed under a continuous contract for not less than 24 months is eligible for severance payment if: 1) dismissed by reason of redundancy; 2) under a fixed term employment contract that expires without being renewed due to redundancy; or 3) laid off. Unemployment benefits are income- and asset-tested on an individual basis if living alone; if living with other family members, the total income and assets of all family members are taken into consideration for eligibility. Recipients must be between the ages of 15-59, capable of work, and actively seeking full-time employment. Parties in a labor dispute can consult the free and voluntary conciliation service offered by the Labor Department (LD). A conciliation officer appointed by the LD will help parties reach a contractually binding settlement. If there is no settlement, parties can start proceedings with the Labor Tribunal (LT), which can then be raised to the Court of First Instance, and finally the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal can grant leave only if the case concerns a question of law of general public importance. Local law provides for the rights of association and of workers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing, but the HKG took repeated actions that contrary to the principle of union independence. As of 2020, Hong Kong’s 1,355 registered employee unions had 907,839 members, a participation rate of about 25.6 percent. In 2021, however, threats and pressure from HKG and mainland officials, as well as from mainland-supported media outlets, led many unions and their confederations to disband. This included the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, Hong Kong’s largest union, as well as the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, which included more than 80 unions from a variety of trades and had more than 100,000 members. Hong Kong’s labor legislation is in line with its international law obligations. Hong Kong has implemented 41 conventions of the International Labor Organization in full, and 18 others with modifications. Workers who allege discrimination against unions have the right to a hearing by the Labor Relations Tribunal. Legislation protects the right to strike. Collective bargaining is not protected by Hong Kong law; there is no obligation to engage in it; and it is not widely used. For more information on labor regulations in Hong Kong, please visit the following website: http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/legislat/contentA.htm (Chapter 57 “Employment Ordinance”). The LT has the power to make an order for reinstatement or re-engagement without securing the employer’s approval if it deems an employee has been unreasonably and unlawfully dismissed. If the employer does not reinstate or re-engage the employee as required by the order, the employer must pay to the employee a sum amounting to three times the employee’s average monthly wages up to USD 9,300. The employer commits an offense if he/she willfully and without reasonable excuse fails to pay the additional sum. Recent changes to benefits and minimum wage are detailed as follows; as of January 2019, male employees are entitled to five days’ paternity leave (increased from three days). Effective May 2019, the statutory minimum hourly wage rate increased from USD 4.4 to USD 4.8. As of December 2020, the statutory maternity leave increased to fourteen weeks from ten weeks. In November 2021, about 300 couriers working for a food delivery company engaged in a two-day strike, demanding increases in pay and work conditions. The strike ended after the company pledged to increase workers’ pay and make changes to the way it treated workers. In February 2022, the HKG amended the EO to address issues arising from the city’s COVID measures. The amendment stipulates that employees’ absence from work for the purpose of complying with the government’s COVID restrictions under the Prevention & Control of Disease Ordinance will be deemed as sickness days under the Employment Ordinance. Laying off an employee for complying with government’s COVID restriction would be an unreasonable dismissal. In addition, the amendment allows an employer to dismiss an employee for non-compliance with the vaccination requirement or failure to produce proof of having been vaccinated, by any of the COVID vaccines recognized by HKG, after the employer requests proof after a specified period of time. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $366,874 2020 $346,586 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $46,103 2020 $92,487 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $19,705 2020 $16,547 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct- investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 536.6% 2020 539.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020, latest available data) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 1,840,307 100% Total Outward 1,909,128 100% British Virgin Islands 582,103 32% China, P.R.: Mainland 903,641 47% China, P.R.: Mainland 499,154 27% British Virgin Islands 603,218 32% Cayman Islands 184,410 10% Cayman Islands 73,346 4% United Kingdom 175,256 10% Bermuda 67,705 4% Bermuda 104,295 6% Singapore 39,974 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Eveline Tseng, Consul, Economic Affairs U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong and Macau 26 Garden Road, Central Hungary Executive Summary Hungary continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and now faces rising inflation and economic uncertainty due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite a growing deficit and energy prices, as well as a continued skilled labor shortage and corruption concerns, ratings agencies in 2021 maintained Hungary’s sovereign debt at BBB, two notches above investment grade, with a stable outlook. In December 2021, the Finance Ministry forecasted 5.9 percent economic growth and a 4.9 percent budget deficit for 2022. Analysts since then have revised their forecasts and project 2 percentage points lower economic growth for this year. Hungary, an EU member since 2004, currently has a population of 9.7 million and a GDP of $155 billion. Fellow EU member states and the United States are Hungary’s most important trade and investment partners, although Asian influence is growing; foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asian sources was five percent of total FDI in 2019 and now accounts for over 30 percent of new foreign direct investment in 2020. Macroeconomic indicators were generally strong before the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP growing by 4.9 percent in 2019. Following a 5.1 percent pandemic-induced contraction in 2020, Hungary’s GDP increased by 6.4 percent in 2021. As the Government of Hungary (GOH) increased spending to support the economy and other priorities, the 2021 budget deficit reached approximately 7.5 percent of GDP, which pushed up public debt close to 80 percent of GDP. Hungary’s central location in Europe and high-quality infrastructure have traditionally made it an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Between 1989 and 2019, Hungary received approximately $97.8 billion in FDI, mainly in the banking, automotive, software development, and life sciences sectors. The EU accounts for 89 percent of all in-bound FDI. The United States is the largest non-EU investor, whereas in terms of annual investment, South Korea was the largest investor overall in 2021. The GOH actively encourages investments in manufacturing and other sectors promising high added value and/or employment, such as research and development, defense, and service centers. Despite these advantages, Hungary’s regional economic competitiveness has declined in recent years. Since early 2016, multinationals have identified shortages of qualified labor, specifically technicians and engineers, as the largest obstacle to investment in Hungary. In certain industries, such as finance, energy, telecommunication, pharmaceuticals, and retail, unpredictable sector-specific tax and regulatory policies have favored national and government-linked companies. Additionally, persistent corruption and cronyism continue to plague the public procurement sector. According to Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hungary placed 73rd worldwide and ranked 26th out of the 27 EU member states, outperforming only Bulgaria. Analysts remain concerned that the GOH may intervene in certain priority sectors to unfairly promote domestic ownership at the expense of foreign investors. In September 2016, Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Orban announced that at least half of the banking, media, energy, and retail sectors should be in Hungarian hands. Since then, observers note that through various tax changes the GOH has pushed several foreign-owned banks out of Hungary. GOH efforts have helped increase Hungarian ownership in the banking sector to close to 60 percent, up from 40 percent in 2010. In the energy sector, foreign-owned companies’ share of total revenue fell from 70 percent in 2010 to below 50 percent by 2022. Foreign media ownership has decreased drastically as GOH-aligned businesses have consolidated control of Hungary’s media landscape: the number of media outlets owned by GOH allies increased from around 30 in 2015 to nearly 500 in 2018. In November 2018, the owners of 476 pro-GOH media outlets, constituting between 80 and 90 percent of all media, donated those outlets to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) run by individuals with ties to the ruling Fidesz party. Ostensibly in response to the COVID crisis, the Hungarian government has had uninterrupted state-of-emergency (SOE) powers since November 2020 with authority to bypass Parliament and govern by decree. Parliament passed the first SOE legislation in March 2020 as part of its COVID-19 pandemic response; this legislation did not have a sunset clause, and the government repealed it in June 2020. The GOH passed a second SOE law in November 2020, this time for a 90-day period. Following the expiration of the first 90-day term, the Parliament extended the SOE in February, May, September and most recently in December 2021 – until June 2022 – without any support from opposition parties. As part of the emergency measures, the GOH extended measures for national security screening of foreign investments from December 31, 2020, until December 31, 2022, and may extend this deadline further. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 34 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $13,295 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $15,890 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Hungary’s government actively courts FDI; net annual FDI in 2020 amounted to $3.2 billion, and gross FDI totaled $98.1 billion. EU countries account for approximately 89 percent of all FDI in Hungary in terms of direct investors and 62 percent in terms of ultimate controlling parent investor. In terms of ultimate investor – i.e., country of origin – the United States was the second largest investor after Germany in 2019. In terms of direct investor location, Germany was the largest investor, followed by the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, and then the United States; approximately 450 U.S. companies maintain a presence in Hungary. Most U.S. investment falls within the automotive, software development, and life sciences sectors. According to Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) data, U.S. foreign direct investment produced more jobs in Hungary in 2020 than investment from any other country. Total cumulative FDI from Asian sources has doubled since 2010, accounting for over five percent of total FDI stock in 2019. According to HIPA, South Korea, Japan, China, India, and other Asian countries accounted for about 40 percent of the value of new foreign investment projects in Hungary in 2020 and in 2021, with $3.1 billion in investments creating 3,500 jobs. The GOH has implemented tax changes to increase Hungary’s regional competitiveness and attract investment; the government reduced the personal income tax rate to 15 percent in 2016, the corporate income tax rate to 9 percent in 2017, the employer-paid welfare contribution to 13 percent in 2021, and employers’ payroll tax to 13 percent. Hungary’s Value-Added Tax (VAT), however, is the highest in Europe at 27 percent. As of 2016, the GOH streamlined the National Tax and Customs authority (NAV) procedure to offer fast-track VAT refunds to customers categorized as “low-risk.” In 2020 Hungary committed to join the OECD Global Minimum Tax Agreement with a 10-year transitionary period. Government policies have resulted in some foreign investors selling their stakes to the government or state-owned enterprises in other sectors, including banking and energy. Many foreign companies have expressed displeasure with the unpredictability of Hungary’s tax regime, its retroactive nature, slow response times, and the volume of legal and tax changes. According to the European Commission (EC), a series of progressively tiered taxes implemented in 2014 disproportionately penalized foreign businesses in the telecommunications, tobacco, retail, media, and advertisement industries, while simultaneously favoring Hungarian companies. Following EC infringement procedures, the GOH phased out most discriminatory tax rates by 2015 and replaced them with flat taxes. Another 2014 law required retail companies with over $53 million in annual sales to close if they report two consecutive years of losses. Retail businesses claimed the GOH specifically set the threshold to target large foreign retail chains. The EC likewise determined that the law was discriminatory and launched an infringement procedure in 2016, leading the GOH to repeal the law in November 2018. In 2017, the GOH passed a regulation that gives the government preemptive rights to purchase real estate in World Heritage areas. The rule has been used to block the purchase of real estate by foreign investors in the most desirable areas of Budapest. In April 2020 the GOH issued a decree that levied sector-specific taxes on the banking and retail sectors to fund COVID-19 pandemic economic support. This progressive tax on retail grocery outlets is structured such that it applies mainly to large foreign retail firms. In December 2021, the Parliament fast-tracked a legislation to increase the retail tax and compelled retail chains with an annual revenue over $310 million to offer their food items nearing expiry date to a state-owned nonprofit company, introducing another measure which hits only foreign-owned retailers. The GOH publicly declared its intention to reduce foreign ownership in the banking sector in 2012. Accordingly, various GOH initiatives have reduced foreign ownership from about 70 percent in 2008 to 40.5 percent by the end of 2020. These initiatives included a 2010 bank tax; a 2012 financial transaction tax levied on all cash withdrawals; and regulations enacted between 2012-2015 that obligated banks to retroactively compensate borrowers for interest rate increases on foreign currency-denominated mortgage loans, even though these increases were spelled out in the original contracts with customers and had been permitted by Hungarian law. While the pharmaceutical industry is competitive and profitable in Hungary, multinational enterprises complain of numerous financial and procedural obstacles, including high taxes on pharmaceutical products and operations, prescription directives that limit a doctor’s choice of drugs, and obscure tender procedures that negatively affect the competitiveness of certain drugs. Pharmaceutical companies also complain about the lengthy procedure to accept innovative medications in the national reimbursement system, making business planning challenging for them. The Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, encourages and supports inbound FDI. HIPA offers company and sector-specific consultancy, recommends locations for investment, acts as a mediator between large international companies and Hungarian firms to facilitate supplier relationships, organizes supplier training, and maintains active contact with trade associations. Its services are available to all investors. For more information, see: https://hipa.hu/main. Foreign investors generally report a productive dialogue with the government, both individually and through business organizations. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) enjoys an ongoing high-level dialogue with the GOH and the government has adopted many AmCham policy recommendations in recent years. In 2017, the government established a Competitiveness Council, now chaired by the Minister of Finance, which includes representatives from multinationals, chambers of commerce, and other stakeholders, to increase Hungary’s competitiveness. Many U.S. and foreign investors have signed MOUs with the GOH to facilitate one-on-one discussions and resolutions to any pending issues. The GOH has regularly consulted foreign businesses and business associations as it has developed economic support measures during the pandemic. For more information, see: HYPERLINK “https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok” HYPERLINK “https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok” https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok and https://www.amcham.hu/. The U.S.-Hungary Business Council (USHBC) – a private, non-profit organization established in 2016 – aims to facilitate and maintain dialogue between American corporate executives and top government leaders on the U.S.-Hungary commercial relationship. Most significant U.S. investors in Hungary have joined USHBC, which hosts roundtables, policy conferences, briefings, and other major events featuring senior U.S. and Hungarian officials, academics, and business leaders. For more information, see: https://www.us-hungarybusinesscouncil.com/ . Foreign ownership is permitted except for certain “strategic” sectors including farmland and defense-related industries which require special government permits. As part of its economic measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed a decree which requires foreign investors to seek approval for foreign investments in Hungary. Foreign law firms and auditing companies must sign a cooperation agreement with a Hungarian company to provide services on Hungarian legal or auditing issues. According to the Land Law, only private Hungarian citizens or EU citizens resident in Hungary with a minimum of three years of experience working in agriculture or holding a degree in an agricultural discipline can purchase farmland. Eligible individuals are limited to purchasing 300 hectares (741 acres). All others may only lease farmland. Non-EU citizens and legal entities are not allowed to purchase agricultural land. All farmland purchases must be approved by a local land committee and Hungarian authorities, and local farmers and young farmers must be offered a right of first refusal before a new non-local farmer is allowed to purchase the land. For legal entities and those who do not fulfill these requirements, the law allows the lease of farmland up to 1200 hectares for a maximum of 20 years. The GOH has invalidated any pre-existing leasing contract provisions that guaranteed the lessee the first option to purchase, provoking criticism from Austrian farmers. Austria has reported the change to the European Commission, which initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary in 2014. In March 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that the termination of land use contracts violated EU rules, opening the way for EU citizens who lost their land use rights to sue the GOH for damages. The GOH passed a national security law on investment screening in 2018 that requires foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 25-percent stake in a Hungarian company in certain sensitive sectors (defense, intelligence services, certain financial services, electric energy, gas, water utility, and electronic information systems for governments) to seek approval from the Interior Ministry. The Ministry has up to 60 days to issue an opinion and can only deny the investment if it determines that the investment is designed to conceal an activity other than normal economic activity. In 2020, as part of the measures to mitigate the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed an additional regulation requiring foreign investors to seek approval from the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) for greenfield or expansion of existing investments. Some observers have suggested this law could be used to disadvantage foreign firms or deny them access to the Hungarian market. Hungary has not had any third-party or independent civil organization investment policy reviews in the last five years. In 2006, Hungary joined the EU initiative to create a European network of “point of single contact” through which existing businesses and potential investors can access all information on the business and legal environment, as well as connect to Hungary’s investment promotion agency. In recent years, the government has strengthened investor relations, signed strategic agreements with key investors, and established a National Competitiveness Council to formulate measures to increase Hungary’s economic competitiveness. The registration of business enterprises is compulsory in Hungary. Firms must contract an attorney and register online with the county-level courts of justice operating as courts of registration. Registry courts must process applications to register limited liability and joint-enterprise companies within 15 workdays, but the process is usually complete within three workdays. If the Court fails to act within the given timeframe, the new company is automatically registered. If the company chooses to use a template corporate charter, registration can be completed in a one-day fast track procedure. Registry courts provide company information to the Tax Authority (NAV), eliminating the need for separate registration. The Court maintains a computerized registry and electronic filing system and provides public access to company information. The minimum capital requirement for a limited-liability company is HUF 3,000,000 ($8,500); for private limited companies HUF 5,000,000 ($14,300), and for public limited companies HUF 20,000,000 ($57,100). Foreign individuals or companies can establish businesses in Hungary without restrictions. Further information on business registration and the business registry can be obtained at the GOH’s information website for businesses: http://eugo.gov.hu/starting-business-hungary or at the Ministry of Justice’s Company Information Service https://ceginformaciosszolgalat.kormany.hu/elektronikus-cegeljaras , and the Tax Authority https://en.nav.gov.hu/taxation/registration/specific_rules.html. Hungarian business facilitation mechanisms offer no special preference or assistance for them in establishing a company. Outward investment is mainly in manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, services, finance and insurance, and science and technology. The stock of total Hungarian investment abroad amounted to $36.8 billion in 2019. There is no restriction in place for domestic investors to invest abroad. The GOH announced in early 2019 that it would like to increase Hungarian investment abroad and it is considering incentives to promote such investment. 3. Legal Regime Generally, legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international and EU standards. However, some executives in Hungarian subsidiaries of U.S. companies express concerns about a lack of transparency in the GOH’s policy-making process and an uneven playing field in public tendering. In recent years, there has been an uptick in the number of companies, including major U.S. multinational franchises and foreign owners of major infrastructure, reporting pressure to sell their businesses to government-affiliated investors. Those that refuse to sell report an increase in tax audits, fines, and spurious regulatory challenges and court cases. SMEs increasingly report a desire to either remain small (and therefore “under the radar” of these government-affiliated investors) or relocate their businesses outside of Hungary. For foreign investors, the most relevant regulations stem from EU directives and the laws passed by Parliament to implement them. Laws in Parliament can be found on Parliament’s website (https://www.parlament.hu/en/web/house-of-the-national-assembly). Legislation, once passed, is published in a legal gazette and available online at www.magyarkozlony.hu . The GOH can issue decrees, which also have national scope, but they cannot be contrary to laws enacted by Parliament. Local municipalities can create local decrees, limited to the local jurisdiction. As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, in March 2020, the Parliament passed a bill that established a state of emergency (SOE) in Hungary, allowing the GOH to govern by decree without parliamentary approval. The GOH used this decree to levy new sector-specific taxes, to take control of a Hungarian company that had been in an ownership dispute with the GOH, and to reallocate competencies and tax collection duties from an opposition-led municipality to a county-level body led by the ruling Fidesz party. Hungarian financial reporting standards are in line with the International Accounting Standards and the EU Fourth and Seventh Directives. The accounting law requires all businesses to prepare consolidated financial statements on an annual basis in accordance with international financial standards. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure for companies operating in Hungary. The GOH rarely invites interested parties to comment on draft legislation. Civil society organizations have complained about a loophole in the current law that allows individual Members of Parliament to submit legislation and amendments without public consultation. The average deadline for submitting public comment is often very short, usually less than one week. The Act on Legislation and the Law Soliciting Public Opinion, both passed by Parliament in 2010, govern the public consultation process. The laws require the GOH to publish draft laws on its webpage and to give adequate time for all interested parties to give an opinion on the draft. However, implementation is not uniform, and the GOH often fails to solicit public comments on proposed legislation. The legislation process – including key regulatory actions related to laws – are published on the Parliament’s webpage. Explanations attached to draft bills include a short summary on the aim of the legislation, but regulators only occasionally release public comments. Regulatory enforcement mechanisms include the county and district level government offices, whose decisions can be challenged at county-level courts. The court system generally provides efficient oversight of the GOH’s administrative processes. Hungary’s budget was widely accessible to the general public, including online through the Parliament and Finance Ministry websites and the Legal Gazette. The government made budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, the enacted budget, and the end-of-year report publicly available within a reasonable period of time. Modifications to a current budget, which in 2021 were quite substantial because of the pandemic, are not consolidated with the initial budget law and do not include economic analysis of the effects of those modifications. Information on debt obligations was publicly available, including online through the Hungarian Central Bank ( https://www.mnb.hu/en ) and Hungarian State Debt Manager’s ( https://akk.hu/ ) websites. All EU regulations are directly applicable in Hungary, even without further domestic measures. If a Hungarian law is contrary to EU legislation, the EU rule takes precedence. As a whole, labor, environment, health, and safety laws are consistent with EU regulations. Hungary follows EU foreign trade and investment policy, and all trade regulations follow EU legislation. Hungary participates in the WTO as an EU Member State. The Hungarian legal system is based on continental European (German-French and Roman law) traditions. Contracts are enforced by ordinary courts or – if stipulated by contract – arbitration centers. Investors in Hungary can agree with their partners to turn to Hungarian or foreign arbitration courts. Apart from these arbitration centers, there are no specialized courts for commercial cases; ordinary courts are entitled to judge any kind of civil case. The Civil Code of 2013 applies to civil contracts. The Hungarian judicial system includes four tiers: district courts (formerly referred to as local courts); courts of justice (formerly referred to as county courts); courts of appeal; and the Curia (the Hungarian Supreme Court). Hungary also has a Constitutional Court that reviews cases involving the constitutionality of laws and court rulings. There are no special commercial courts, but first level public administration and labor cases are judged only by the county level courts of justices. Although the GOH has criticized court decisions on several occasions, ordinary courts are considered to generally operate independently under largely fair and reliable judicial procedures. Recently, an increasing number of current and former judges have raised concerns about growing GOH influence over the court system and intimidation of judges by court administration. The European Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, issued in July 2021, cited judicial independence in Hungary as a source of concern. Most business complaints about the court system pertain to the lengthy proceedings rather than the fairness of the verdicts. The GOH has said it hopes to improve the speed and efficiency of court proceedings with an updated Civil Procedure Code that entered into force in January 2018. Regulations and law enforcement actions pertaining to investors may be appealed at ordinary courts or at the Constitutional Court. Hungarian law protects property and investment. The Hungarian state may expropriate property only in exceptional cases where there is a public interest; any such expropriations must be carried out in a lawful way, and the GOH is obliged to make immediate and full restitution for any expropriated property, without additional stipulations or conditions. The GOH passed a national security law on investment screening in 2018 that requires foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 25 percent stake in a Hungarian company in certain “sensitive sectors” (defense, intelligence services, certain financial services, electric energy, gas, water utility, and electronic information systems for governments) to seek approval from the Interior Ministry. (Please see above section on limits on foreign control for more details). Based on this law, in April 2021 the Interior Ministry blocked Austria’s Vienna Insurance Group from buying Dutch insurer Aegon’s Hungarian subsidiary. In February 2022 the European Commission decided the blocked sale violated EU rules, but by that time the GOH and VIG agreed that the state would acquire a 45 percent stake in Aegon. Additionally, in 2020, as part of the measures to mitigate the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed another regulation requiring foreign investors to seek approval from the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) for greenfield or expansion of existing investments. There is no primary website or “one-stop shop” which compiles all relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), however, facilitates establishment of businesses and provides guidance on relevant legislation. The Hungarian Competition Authority, tasked with safeguarding the public interest, enforces the provisions of the Hungarian Competition Act, and EU competition law also binds Hungary. The Competition Authority is empowered to investigate suspected violations of competition law, order changes to practices, and levy fines and penalties. According to the Authority, since 2010 the number of competition cases has decreased, but they have become more complex. Out of more than 60 cases in 2021, only a few minor cases pertained to U.S.-owned companies. Hungarian law does not consider conflict of interest to be a criminal offense. Citing evidence of conflict of interest and irregularities, in December 2017 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) recommended opening a criminal investigation into a high-profile $50 million EU-funded public procurement project, but Hungarian authorities declined to prosecute the case. Hungary’s Constitution provides protection against uncompensated expropriation, nationalization, and any other arbitrary action by the GOH except in cases of threat to national security. In such cases, immediate and full compensation is to be provided to the owner. There are no known expropriation cases where the GOH has discriminated against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. There have been some complaints from other foreign investors within the past several years that expropriations have been improperly executed and without proper remuneration. Parties involved in these cases turned to the domestic legal system for dispute settlement. There is no recent history of official GOH expropriations. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Hungary is a signatory to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), proclaimed in Hungary by Law 27 of 1978. Hungary also is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), proclaimed in Hungary by Law 25 of 1962. There is not specific legislation providing for enforcement other than the two domestic laws proclaiming the New York and ICSID Conventions. According to Law 71 of 1994, an arbitration court decision is equally binding to that of a court ruling. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and to UN’s 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Under the New York Convention, Hungary recognizes and enforces rulings of the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration. Hungary shares no Bilateral Investment Treaty or Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Since 2000 Hungary has been the respondent in 16 known investor-State arbitration claims, although none of these involve U.S. investors. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards against the GOH. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts In the last few years, parties have increasingly turned to mediation to settle disputes without engaging in lengthy court procedures. Law 60 of 2017 on domestic arbitration procedures is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Investment dispute settlement clauses are frequently included in investment contract between the foreign enterprise and GOH. Hungarian law allows the parties to set the jurisdiction of any courts or arbitration centers. The parties can also agree to set up an ad hoc arbitration court. The law also allows investors to agree on settling investment disputes by turning to foreign arbitration centers, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), UNCITRAL’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), or the Vienna International Arbitral Centre. In Hungary, foreign parties can turn to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry arbitration court, which has its own rules of proceedings (HYPERLINK “https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration” HYPERLINK “https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration” https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration ) and in financial issues to the Financial and Capital Market’s arbitration court. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign or domestic arbitral awards. An arbitral ruling may only be annulled in limited cases, and under special conditions. Domestic courts do not favor State-owned enterprises (SOEs) disproportionately. Investors can expect a fair trial even if SOEs are involved and in case of an unfavorable ruling, may elevate the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Investors do not generally complain about non-transparent or discriminatory court procedures. The Act on Bankruptcy Procedures, Liquidation Procedures, and Final Settlement of 1991, covers all commercial entities except banks (which have their own regulatory statutes), trusts, and State-owned enterprises, and brought Hungarian legislation in line with EU regulations. Debtors can initiate bankruptcy proceedings only if they have not sought bankruptcy protection within the previous three years. Within 90 days of seeking bankruptcy protection, the debtor must call a settlement conference to which all creditors are invited. Majority consent of the creditors present is required for all settlements. If agreement is not reached, the court can order liquidation. The Bankruptcy Act establishes the following priorities of claims to be paid: 1) liquidation costs; 2) secured debts; 3) claims of the individuals; 4) social security and tax obligations; 5) all other debts. Creditors may request the court to appoint a trustee to perform an independent financial examination. The trustee has the right to challenge, based on conflict of interest, any contract concluded within 12 months preceding the bankruptcy. The debtor, the creditors, the administrator, or the Criminal Court may file liquidation procedures with the court. Once a petition is filed, regardless of who filed it, the Court notifies the debtor by sending a copy of the petition. The debtor has eight days to acknowledge insolvency. If the insolvency is acknowledged, the company declares if any respite for the settlement of debts is requested. Failure to respond results in the presumption of insolvency. The Court may allow up to of 30 days for the debtor to settle the debt upon request. If the Court finds the debtor insolvent, it appoints a liquidator. Bankruptcy itself is not criminalized unless it is made in a fraudulent way, deliberately, and in bad faith to prevent the payment of debts. Law 122 of 2011 obliges banks and credit institutions to establish and maintain the Central Credit Information System to assess creditworthiness of businesses and individuals to facilitate prudent lending (HYPERLINK “http://www.bisz.hu ” HYPERLINK “http://www.bisz.hu” http://www.bisz.hu ). 4. Industrial Policies Hungary has a well-developed incentive system for investors, the cornerstone of which is a special incentive package for investments over a certain value (typically over EUR 10 million or $11 million). The incentives are designed to benefit investors who establish manufacturing facilities, logistics facilities, regional service centers, R&D facilities, and bioenergy facilities, or those who make tourism industry investments. Incentive packages may consist of cash subsidies, development tax allowances, training subsidies, and job creation subsidies. The incentive system is compliant with EU regulations on competition and state aid and is administered by the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) and managed by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). The government provides non-refundable subsidies to foreign investments in less developed areas and certain sectors including research and development, innovation, and high-tech manufacturing, based on case-by-case government decisions. In 2020, the GOH extended additional incentives or support to foreign investments as part of its economic response to the pandemic. For more information please see: https://hipa.hu/additional-favourable-changes-in-the-non-refundable-cash-incentives-system . In 2017 Hungary introduced a new Renewable Energy Support Scheme (METAR) – replacing the former feed-in tariff system (KAT) – in which producers of renewable energy can bid for state subsidies, paid as a premium over the market reference price. Newly established renewable energy producing facilities from 0.5 to 1 MW can apply for a feed-in premium in addition to the market price, and over 1 MW the support level is set through competitive auctions. Applicants can be companies with a registered office in the EU, the EEA or the Energy Community, Hungarian branch offices of foreign companies and Hungarian business entities or municipalities, but the tender is only available to projects located in Hungary. Since the first METAR tender in 2019, the Hungarian Energy Authority has launched six successful tenders, each time generating a significant interest and oversubscription from bidders. For more information on the METAR scheme, please see: HYPERLINK “http://www.mekh.hu/information-on-the-renewable-energy-support-system” http://www.mekh.hu/information-on-the-renewable-energy-support-system Foreign trade zones were eliminated because of EU accession. Hungary does not mandate the hiring of local employees. The number of work permits issued for third-country nationals is limited by law, but in recent years, this limit was well above the actual number of registered third-country employees. Residency and work permits are issued by the Immigration Office and the local labor offices. As of 2021, investments in certain strategic sectors including the military, intelligence, public utilities, financial services, and electronic information systems require investment permits issued by the Ministry of Interior; in other key sectors, the Ministry for Innovation and Technology issues permits. There are no laws in place requiring the fulfilment of special labor force related conditions to get investment permits. However, in certain cases, the GOH has established retention of workforce as a condition to award state grants to investors. Hungary has no forced data localization policy. Foreign IT providers do not need to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. Hungary follows EU rules on transfer of personal data outside the economy. Storage of personal data is regulated by a data protection law and falls under the authority of a Data Protection Ombudsman. There are no general performance requirements for investors in Hungary. However, investors may receive government subsidies in the event they meet certain performance criteria, such as job creation or investment minimums, which are available to all enterprises registered in Hungary and are applied on a systematic basis. To comply with EU rules, the GOH no longer grants tax holidays based on investment volume. There is no requirement that investors must purchase from local sources, but the EU Rule of Origin applies. Investors are not required to disclose proprietary information to the GOH as part of the regulatory process. Hungary, as an EU Member State, follows the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on transmitting data outside of the EU and local data storage requirements. The National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information is responsible for enforcing GDPR rules. 5. Protection of Property Rights Hungary maintains a reliable land registry, which provides public information for anyone on the ownership, mortgage, and usufruct rights of a real estate or land parcel. Secured interests in property (mortgages), both moveable and real, are recognized and enforced but there is no title insurance in Hungary. Please see the section on Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment for information regarding restrictions on purchasing farm landfarmland. Hungarian law allows acquisitive prescription for unoccupied real property if the user of the property occupies it continuously for at least 15 years. Real estate and land purchase contracts must be countersigned by an attorney registered in Hungary. Hungary has an adequate legal structure for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), although sentences for civil and criminal IPR infringement cases are not usually adequately harsh to serve as a deterrent. There has been no new major IPR legislation passed over the last year. According to some representatives of the pharmaceutical and software industries, enforcement could be improved if the Prosecutor General’s Office were to establish specialized IPR units. The most common IPR violations in Hungary include the sale of imported counterfeit goods, including pharmaceuticals and Internet-based piracy. Most counterfeit goods sold in Hungary are of Chinese origin. Hungary acceded to the European Patent Convention in 2003 and has accordingly amended the Hungarian Patent Act. Hungary is a party to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and many other major international IPR agreements, including some administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), such as the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty. As an EU Member State, Hungary is required to implement EU Directives and so is party to the EU Information Society Directive and EU Enforcement Directive, among others. The United States and Hungary signed a Comprehensive Bilateral Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in 1993 that addresses copyright, trademarks, and patent protection. In 2010, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Hungarian Intellectual Property Office (HIPO) launched a pilot program to facilitate patent recognition between the United States and Hungary. In 2012 the USPTO and HIPO signed a Memorandum of Understanding to further streamline and expedite bilateral patent recognition. More details about this Patent Processing Highway (PPH) program can be found on HIPO’s website at www.hipo.gov.hu/English/szabadalom/pph/ . Hungary is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at HYPERLINK “http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/” HYPERLINK “http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/” http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Resources for Rights Holders 6. Financial Sector The Hungarian financial system offers a full range of financial services with an advanced information technology infrastructure. The Hungarian Forint (HUF) has been fully convertible since 2001, and both Hungarian financial market and capital market transactions are fully liberalized. The Capital Markets Act of 2001 sets out rules on securities issues, including the conversion and marketing of securities. As of 2007, separate regulations were passed on the activities of investment service providers and commodities brokers (2007), on Investment Fund Managing Companies (2011), as well as on Collective Investments (2014), providing more sophisticated legislation than those in the Capital Markets Act. These changes aimed to create a regulatory environment where free and available equity easily matches with the best investment opportunities. The 2016 modification of the Civil Code removed remaining obstacles to promote collection of public investments in the course of establishing a public limited company. The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) re-opened in 1990 as the first post-communist stock exchange in the Central and Eastern European region. Since 2010, the BSE has been a member of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Stock Exchange Group. In 2013, the internationally recognized trading platform Xetra replaced the previous trading system. In 2021, the BSE has 23 members and 139 issuers. The issued securities are typically shares, investment notes, certificates, corporate bonds, mortgage bonds, government bonds, treasury bills, and derivatives. In December 2021, the BSE had a market capitalization of $30.2 billion, and the average monthly equity turnover volume amounted to $2.1 billion. The most traded shares are OTP Bank, pharmaceutical company Richter, MOL, Magyar Telekom, and 4iG. Financial resources flow freely into the product and factor markets. In line with IMF rules, international currency transactions are not limited and are accessible both in domestic and foreign currencies. Individuals can hold bank accounts in either domestic or foreign currencies and conduct transactions in foreign currency. Since March 2020, commercial banks introduced real time bank transfers for domestic currency transactions. Commercial banks provide credit to both Hungarian and foreign investors at market terms. Credit instruments include long-term and short-term liquidity loans. All banks publish total credit costs, which includes interest rates as well as other costs or fees. There are no rules preventing a foreigner or foreign firm from opening a bank account in Hungary. Valid personal documents (i.e., a passport) are needed and as of 2015, when the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) came into force, also a declaration of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen. Banks have not discriminated against U.S. citizens in opening bank accounts based on FATCA. The Hungarian banking system has strengthened over the past few years, and the capital position of banks is generally adequate even in the challenging economic environment created by COVID-19. Following several years of deleveraging after the 2008 crisis, the banking system is mainly deposit funded. The penetration of the banking system decreased slightly in 2019 due to a relatively high GDP growth rate. The sector’s total assets amounted to 92.6 percent of GDP. The Hungarian banking system is healthy, and banks have a stable capital position. The loan-to-deposit ratio has been gradually decreasing from its 160 percent peak in 2009 after the financial crisis to 85 percent in 2015 and has been fluctuating between this value and a 92.4 percent peak in 2019. In spring 2020, during the first wave of the COVID-19 in Hungary, it reached 91.6 percent but decreased to 81.7 percent by the end of the year. The liquidity cover ratio was 160 percent in the first wave of COVID-19, then climbed to 220.8 percent by the end of the year. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Central Bank restructured and expanded its monetary policy tools to provide liquidity to the financial sector through currency swaps, fixed-rate loans, and exemptions from minimum reserve requirements. The Central Bank also introduced instruments to influence short- and long-term term yields. It offered low-interest loans through commercial banks to the SME sector and launched a government securities purchase program on the secondary market. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased from a high of 18 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2021 as a result of portfolio cleaning, the improving economic environment, and increased lending. The banking sector became profitable after several years of losses between 2010 and 2015, reaching a return on equity (ROE) record high of 16.8 percent in 2017. Since then, ROE has decreased close to zero in 2020 as a result of the pandemic but recovered to 11.6 percent by the end of 2021. The banking sector’s total assets exceeded 112 percent of GDP in 2021, of which 73 percent were held by five banks. The largest bank in Hungary is OTP Bank, which is mostly Hungarian-owned and controls about 25 percent of the market. Hungary has a modern two-tier financial system and a developed financial sector. Between 2000 and 2013, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZAF) served as a consolidated financial supervisor, regulating all financial and securities markets. PSZAF, in conjunction with the MNB, managed a strong two-pillar system of control over the financial sector, producing stability in the market, effective regulation, and a system of checks and balances. In 2013, the MNB absorbed the PSZAF and over the past few years has efficiently strengthened its supervisory role over the financial sector and established a customer protection system. In accordance with the GOH’s stated goal of reducing foreign ownership in the financial sector, the proportion of foreign banks’ total assets in the financial sector decreased to about 40 percent in 2019, down from a peak of 70 percent before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Following the sale of Budapest Bank and merge with the other Hungarian-owned banks and the Hungarian Savings’ Bank network, it has fallen to about 40 percent by 2021. Foreign banks are subject to central bank uniform regulations and prudential measures, which are applied to Hungary’s entire financial market without discrimination. On March 2, 2020, MNB launched an immediate e-transfer system up to a maximum of HUF 10 million (about $32,000) for domestic transactions in HUF. Commercial banks have extensive direct correspondent banking relationships and are capable of transferring domestic or foreign currencies to most banks outside of Hungary. Since 2018, however, the cashing of U.S. checks is no longer possible. No loss or jeopardy of correspondent banking relations has been reported. Recent regulations restrict foreign currency loans to only those that earn income in foreign currency, an effort to eliminate the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. Foreign investors continue to have equal – if not better – access to credit on the global market, apart from special GOH credit concessions such as small business loans. Foreign Exchange The Hungarian forint (HUF) has been convertible for essentially all business transactions since January 1, 1996, and foreign currencies are freely available in all banks and exchange booths. Act 93 of 2001 on Foreign Exchange Liberalization lifted all remaining foreign exchange restrictions and allowed free movement of capital in line with EU regulations. Hungary complies with all OECD convertibility requirements and IMF Article VIII. Hungary’s EU accession agreement dictates that Hungary must adopt the Euro once it meets the relevant criteria. The GOH has not set a specific target date even though Hungary meets most of the necessary fiscal and financial criteria. According to the Ministry of Finance, Hungary’s economic performance should mirror the Eurozone average more closely before adapting the Euro. Short-term portfolio transactions, hedging, short, and long-term credit transactions, financial securities, assignments and acknowledgment of debt may be carried out without any limitation or declaration. While the Forint remains the legal tender in Hungary, parties may settle financial obligations in a foreign currency. Many Hungarians took out mortgages denominated in foreign currency prior to the global financial crisis and suffered when the Forint depreciated against the Swiss Franc and the Euro. Despite strong pressure, the Hungarian Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing inherently illegal or unconstitutional in loan agreements that are foreign currency denominated, upholding existing contract law. New consumer loans, however, are denominated in Forints only, unless the debtor receives regular income in a foreign currency. Market forces determine the value of the Hungarian Forint. Analysts note that the MNB’s consistently low interest rates have contributed to a nearly 30 percent decline in the value of the of the Forint against the Euro since 2010. Remittance Policies Sovereign Wealth Funds Hungary does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Hungary encourages multinational firms to follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which promotes a due diligence approach to responsible business conduct (RBC). The government has established a National Contact Point (NCP) in the Ministry of Finance for stakeholders to obtain information or raise concerns in the context of RBC. The Hungarian NCP has organized events to promote OECD guidelines among the business community, trade unions, government agencies, and NGOs. Members of the Hungarian NCP include representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Innovation and Technology, and Agriculture. The Hungarian NCP submits annual reports to the OECD Investment Commission, except for 2020 when its activity was strongly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information, see: http://oecd.kormany.hu/a-magyar-nemzeti-kapcsolattarto-pont . In recent years, the Hungarian NCP has organized several conferences, the last one in January 2020, to promote RBC and OECD guidelines. It announced in 2017 its intention to formulate a new National Action Plan on Businesses and Human Rights. According to the first National Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Action Plan formulated in 2015, key RBC priorities of the GOH included the employment of discriminated, disadvantaged, and disabled groups, environmental protection, and the expansion of sustainable economy. Hungary’s NCP peer review is scheduled in 2023. The Hungarian Public Relations Association, CSR Hungary, and other NGOs are involved in elaborating the second National Action Plan. The Hungarian NCP reviews complaints from trade unions against multinational companies’ subsidiaries operating in Hungary and coordinates with relevant NPCs of the multinational company’s home country. RBC does not typically play a role in GOH procurement decisions, although the 2015 Public Procurement Act integrates concepts of CSR, responsible business conduct, and good practice. Several NGOs and business associations promote RBC and CSR. The one with the most members, CSR Hungary Forum, created in 2006, established an annual award and trademark in 2008 to recognize business CSR efforts; others include the Hungarian Public Relations Association, “Kovet.” According to a 2018 survey conducted by CSR Hungary, 60 percent of businesses have a CSR policy and 44 percent of businesses attribute a CSR orientation to increased competitiveness. However, only about 34 percent of multinational and SOEs and 9 percent of SMEs report formally formulating a CSR action plan. According to a 2021 study on corporate social responsibility in Hungary, stakeholder pressure is weak, and they expect increased state-level intervention in CSR issues. In 2017, Hungary’s independent agencies for labor rights protection, consumer protection, cultural heritage protection, and environment protection were merged into relevant ministries and county-level government offices. Environmental NGOs criticized the transformation of the system and warned about the lack of independent agencies. Climate Issues In January 2020, the GOH approved and published its new long-term energy strategy and an EU-required National Energy and Climate Plan – both of which focused heavily on decarbonization and sustainable climate policy. According to the documents, Hungary aims to reduce its carbon emissions by at least 40 percent by 2030 (compared to the 1990 level), an additional 10 percent by 2040, and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Given that Hungary emits 33 percent less CO2 than it did in 1990, the real cut would be seven percent in the next eight years and 17 percent in the next 20 years. The seven percent cut would be easily achieved with the phase-out of the lignite coal fired Matra Power Plant by 2025. Experts have noted that the plan to have Hungary cut the remaining 50 percent (to achieve carbon neutrality) in the 2040-2050 period is an ambitious goal. Although in December 2020, the GOH committed itself to the new EU goal (“Fit for 55”) of reducing carbon emissions by 55 percent by 2030, the details of achieving the more ambitious goal are to be worked out. The GOH estimates the total costs of Hungary achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at $145 billion. Private sector contributions to reach the climate goals include increasing Hungary’s solar power capacity from the currently available more than 2000 MW to 6000 MW by 2030 and to 10,000 MW by 2040. In energy efficiency, the GOH’s aim is to limit Hungary’s total final energy demand on the 2005 level by 2030. To reach this goal, the GOH introduced a tax incentive for businesses investing into energy efficiency. Although the GOH strategies stress the great potential in decreasing the energy demand of households, so far there have been only limited efforts. Despite the February 2021 ruling of the European Court of Justice saying that Hungary had “systematically and persistently” breached legal limits on air pollution, the GOH still has failed to take any efficient measures to deal with the problem. Although the GOH maintains an extensive system of national parks and nature reserves, there are no other government policies, or regulatory incentives helping to preserve biodiversity. The second National Climate Change Strategy adopted in 2018 contains the National Adaptation Strategy which is based on the climate vulnerability assessment of ecosystem and industrial sectors. Although Hungary’s Public Procurement Act of 2015 allows the government to consider environmental and green growth aspects, the GOH has not yet issued a decree governing the detailed rules of green procurements. Hungary is one of the five EU member states without a national action plan on green public procurements according to the State Audit Office. In April 2021, Hungary’s Public Procurement Authority launched a sustainability working group and in September 2021 issued a Green Codex to provide some guidelines on green procurements. 9. Corruption The Hungarian Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior are responsible for combating corruption. Although a legal framework exists to support their efforts, critics have asserted that the government has done little to combat grand corruption and rarely investigates cases involving politically connected individuals, even when recommended to do so by the European Antifraud Office (OLAF). Hungary is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and has incorporated their provisions into the penal code, as well as subsequent OECD and EU requirements on the prevention of bribery. Parliament passed the Strasbourg Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 2002 and the Strasbourg Civil Code Convention on Corruption of 2004. Hungary is a member of GRECO (Group of States against Corruption), an organization established by members of Council of Europe to monitor the observance of their standards for fighting corruption. GRECO’s reports on evaluation and compliance are confidential unless the Member State authorizes the publication of its report. For several years, the GOH has kept confidential GRECO’s most recent compliance reports on prevention of corruption with respect to members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors, and a report on transparency of party financing. Following calls from the opposition, NGOs, and other GRECO Member States, and a March 2019 visit by senior GRECO officials to Budapest, the GOH agreed to publish the reports in August 2019. The reports revealed that Hungary failed to meet 13 out of 18 recommendations issued by GRECO in 2015; assessed that Hungary’s level of compliance with the recommendations was “globally unsatisfactory,” and concluded that the country would therefore remain subject to GRECO’s non-compliance procedure. The compliance report on transparency of party financing noted some progress but added that “the overall picture is disappointing.” A November 2020 GRECO report came to the same conclusion, adding that Hungary had made no progress since the prior year on implementing anticorruption recommendations for MPs, judges, and prosecutors. In December 2016, the GOH withdrew its membership in the international anti-corruption organization the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Following a letter of concern by transparency watchdogs to OGP’s Steering Committee in summer 2015, OGP launched an investigation into Hungary and issued a critical report. The OGP admonished the GOH for its harassment of NGOs and urged it to take steps to restore transparency and to ensure a positive operating environment for civil society. The GOH, only the second Member State to be reprimanded by the organization, rejected the OGP report conclusions and withdrew from the organization. In recent years, the GOH has amplified its attacks on NGOs including transparency watchdogs, accusing them of acting as foreign agents and criticizing them for allegedly working against Hungarian interests. Observers assess that this anti-NGO rhetoric endangered the continued operation of anti-corruption NGOs crucial to promoting transparency and good governance in Hungary. In 2017 and 2018, Parliament passed legislations that many civil society activists criticized for placing undue restrictions on NGOs. In its June 2018 and November 2021 rulings, the European Court of Justice found both legislations in conflict with EU law. Transparency International (TI) is active in Hungary. TI’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index rated Hungary 73 out of 180 countries. Out of the 27 EU member states, Hungary ranked 26th, outperforming only Bulgaria. TI has noted that state institutions responsible for supervising public organizations were headed by people loyal to the ruling party, limiting their ability to serve as a check on the actions of the GOH. TI and other watchdogs note that data on public spending remains difficult to access since the GOH amended the Act on Freedom of Information in 2013 and 2015. Moreover, according to watchdogs and investigative journalists, the GOH, state agencies, and SOEs are increasingly reluctant to answer questions related to public spending, resulting in lengthy court procedures to receive answers to questions. Even if the court orders the release of data, by the time it happens, the data has lost significance and has a weaker impact, watchdogs warn. In some cases, even when ordered to provide information, state agencies and SOEs release data in nearly unusable or undecipherable formats. U.S. firms – along with other investors – identify corruption as a significant problem in Hungary. According to the World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Competitiveness Report, businesses considered corruption as the second most important obstacle to making a successful business in Hungary. State corruption is also high on the list of EC concerns with Hungary. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has found high levels of fraud in EU-funded projects in Hungary and has levied fines and withheld development funds on several occasions. Over the past few years, the EC has suspended payments of EU funds several times due to irregularities in Hungary’s procurement system. TI and other anti-corruption watchdogs have highlighted EU-funded development projects as the largest source of corruption in Hungary. A TI study found indications of corruption and overpricing in up to 90 percent of EU-funded projects. Reports by Corruption Research Center (CRCB) from April and May 2020 found – after analyzing more than 240,000 public procurement contracts from 2005-2020 – that companies owned by individuals with links to senior government officials enjoy preferential treatment in public tenders and face less competition than other companies. The studies also revealed that the share of single-bidder public procurement contracts was over 40 percent in 2020, and that the corruption risk reached its highest level since 2005. In a March 2022 report CRCB found that in the 2011-2021 period, more than 20 percent of the EU-funded public contracts were won by 42 companies owned by 12 entrepreneurs closely affiliated with the government. In 2020, a year which was particularly difficult for many businesses because of the Covid-crisis, this small group of entrepreneurs won almost one-third of the EU-funded public tenders. Hungary has legislation in place to combat corruption. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal offense, as is an official’s failure to report such an incident. Penalties can include confiscation of assets, imprisonment, or both. Since Hungary’s entry into the EU, legal entities can also be prosecuted. Legislation prohibits members of parliament from serving as executives of state-owned enterprises. An extensive list of public officials and many of their family members are required to make annual declarations of assets, but there is no specified penalty for making an incomplete or inaccurate declaration. It is common for prominent politicians to be forced to amend declarations of assets following revelations in the press of omission of ownership or part-ownership of real estate and other assets in asset declarations. Politicians are not penalized for these omissions. Transparency advocates claim that Hungarian law enforcement authorities are often reluctant to prosecute cases with links to high-level politicians. For example, they reported that, in November 2018, Hungarian authorities dropped the investigation into $50 million in EU-funded public lighting tenders won by a firm co-owned by a relative of the prime minister, despite concerns raised by OLAF about evidence of conflict of interest and irregularities involving the deal. According to media reports, OLAF concluded that several of the tenders were won due to what it considered organized criminal activity. In December 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office charged a senior government politician for accepting bribes to influence cases at the request of the president of the Court Bailiff Chamber. The senior government official resigned immediately but kept his position as an MP and was left at large for the time of the investigation. Annual asset declarations for the family members of public officials are not public and only parliamentary committees can investigate them if there is a specified suspicion of fraud. Transparency watchdogs warn that this makes the system of asset declarations inefficient and easy to circumvent as politicians can hide assets and revenues in their family members’ names. The Public Procurement Act of 2015 initially included broad conflict of interest rules on excluding family members of GOH officials from participating in public tenders, but Parliament later amended the law to exclude only family members living in the same household. While considered in line with the overarching EU directive, the law still leaves room for subjective evaluations of bid proposals and tender specifications to be tailored to favored companies. While public procurement legislation is in place and complies with EU requirements, private companies and watchdog NGOs expressed concerns about pervasive corruption and favoritism in public procurements in Hungary. According to their criticism, public procurements in practice lack transparency and accountability and are characterized by uneven implementation of anti-corruption laws. Additionally, transparency NGOs calculate that government-allied firms have won a disproportionate percentage of public procurement awards. The business community and foreign governments share many of these concerns. Multinational firms have complained that competing in public procurements presents unacceptable levels of corruption and compliance risk. A 2019 European Commission study found that Hungary had the second-highest rate (40 percent) of one-bidder EU funded procurement contracts in the European Union. In addition, observers have raised concerns about the appointments of Fidesz party loyalists to head quasi-independent institutions such as the Competition Authority, the Media Council, and the State Audit Office. Because it is generally understood that companies without political connections are unlikely to win public procurement contracts, many firms lacking such connections do not bid or compete against politically connected companies. The GOH does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. Generally, larger private companies and multinationals operating in Hungary have internal codes of ethics, compliance programs, or other controls, but their efficacy is not uniform. Resources to Report Corruption GOH Office Responsible for Combatting Corruption: National Protective Service General Director Zoltan Bolcsik Phone: +36 1 433 9711 Fax: +36 1 433 9751 E-mail: nvsz@nvsz.police.hu Transparency International Hungary 1055 Budapest Falk Miksa utca 30. 4/2 Phone: +36 1 269 9534 Fax: +36 1 269 9535 E-mail: info@transparency.hu 10. Political and Security Environment The security environment is relatively stable. Politically motivated violence or civil disturbance is rare. Violent crime is low, with street crimes the most frequently reported crimes in the country. Political violence is not common in Hungary. The transition from communist authoritarianism to capitalist democracy was negotiated and peaceful, and free elections have been held consistently since 1990. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Hungary’s civilian labor force of 4.7 million is highly educated and skilled. Literacy exceeds 98 percent and about two-thirds of the work force has completed secondary, technical, or vocational education. Hungary’s record low 3.3 percent unemployment rate at the end of 2019 increased to 3.8 percent in December 2021 as a result of the pandemic, but it is lower than the EU average of 7.3 percent. Hungary’s employment rate for the population aged 15-64 years was 73.9 percent in 2021, higher than the EU average of 68.3 percent. Hungary is particularly strong in engineering, medicine, economics, and science training, although emigration of Hungarians from these sectors to other EU member states has increased in recent years. In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, out-migration temporarily declined but resumed during the second half of 2020. Multinationals increasingly cite a skilled labor shortage as their biggest challenge in Hungary and note that Hungarian vocational institutions and universities need to adapt more quickly to changes in the marketplace. An increasing number of young people are attending U.S.- and European-affiliated business schools in Hungary. Foreign language skills, especially in English and German, are becoming more widespread, yet Hungary still has the lowest level of foreign language proficiency in the EU. According to 2018 data, only 37 percent of working-age Hungarians speak at least one foreign language, while the EU average is 66 percent. As the unemployment rate has declined, certain sectors have begun to face shortages of skilled and highly educated employees. As Hungarians increasingly seek work abroad, shortages of highly educated and skilled labor are negatively affecting growth in certain regions and industries. In addition, declining OECD Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) scores may signal that the workforce is losing its ability to learn new skills and adapt to changing market conditions. The government is attempting to address labor shortage by increasing the minimum wage, offering retraining programs, incentivizing employment of young mothers and pensioners by lowering employer-paid welfare contributions, and reforming the education and vocational training system. Shortages of skilled workers, particularly in the IT, financial, and manufacturing sectors, are more acute in the northwest and central regions of the country. In the eastern half of the country, unemployment levels are above average, even though the cost of labor is lower. Wages in Hungary are still significantly lower than those in Western Europe, despite the recent increase in minimum wage. Average Hungarian labor productivity is lower than the EU average but exceeds that of other Central and Eastern European economies. In 2016, the government, trade unions, and employer representatives signed a three-year agreement to increase the minimum wage for unskilled and skilled workers. The deal also included a more than 50-percent cut in the business tax for large companies from 19 percent to 9 percent as of 2017, as well as gradually lowering the payroll tax from 21.5 percent in 2016 by 2 percent each year, down to 15.5 percent as of July 2020, to offset increasing labor costs. In subsequent years the parties signed annual minimum wage agreements which increased the minimum wage by 8 percent in 2020, by 3.6 percent in 2021, and as of January 2022, by 20 percent. The GOH also facilitates the employment of workers from neighboring countries, primarily ethnic Hungarian minority communities in those countries. The GOH requires hiring of nationals in certain strategic sectors and some areas of public administration. Labor law stipulates a severance payment in case of lay-off, as well as under certain conditions for an employee terminating a work contract. The government pays unemployment benefits for three months and offers the services of local employment offices. The GOH did not extend this benefit beyond the normal three months during the pandemic. Labor laws are uniform and there are no waivers available to attract or retain investment. Collective bargaining is increasingly common in large companies, education, public transport, retail, and medical services. The 2012 changes to the Labor Law transferred some collective bargaining rights from trade unions to work councils (Although work councils have a similar mission to those of labor unions, each firm has its own work council, and thus lacks the collective reach of an industry-wide trade union). Hungary’s trade union membership rate is below 10 percent, while the EU average is 25 percent. About 20 percent of businesses have a collective bargaining agreement on labor conditions and benefits, well below the EU average of about 80 percent. During the COVID-19 pandemic the government passed regulations that allow businesses to unilaterally terminate collective bargaining agreements, which led to a few strikes, which have been resolved by negotiations. Beginning in 2021, the GOH decreased state support to trade unions and implemented budget changes to allow discretional funding to each trade union, which replaced the previously uniform system. Hungary has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions. Labor dispute resolution includes mediation as well as court procedures. Employees, however, typically agree with employers outside court or mediation procedures. In 2019, a six-day strike at Audi Hungary was resolved with an agreement between employers and employees for a 15- to 20-percent wage increase. The success of this high-profile strike has led to a series of short-term strikes, or threats of strikes, at other companies. Most of these strikes have been resolved quickly with wage increase concessions from management and changes in overtime payment and conditions. All recent strikes have been peaceful and complied with Hungarian labor laws. Hungary has been a member of the ILO since 1955. Hungary’s labor law and practice are in line with international labor standards. Discussions between the ILO and the GOH are ongoing on certain provisions of the 2012 modification of Hungary’s labor law, including the freedom of expression, registration of trade unions, and minimum level of public service in case of strike. Hungary passed amendments to its Labor Code in December 2018 that increased the amount of overtime an employer can request and gives employers up to three years to reconcile and pay for overtime. These highly unpopular changes led to a series of large protests throughout Hungary and currently are being reviewed by the European Commission. As a part of its COVID-19 economic response plan, the government decreed in 2020 that employers can implement flexible working hours and a 24-month working time frame to calculate overtime without prior agreement from the employee or union. Local labor organizations complained that the move rolled back hard-won concessions from the 2018 labor reform and that certain businesses abuse overtime possibilities to compensate for shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic. The constitution and laws prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, gender, disability, language, sexual orientation and gender identity, infection with HIV or other communicable diseases, or social status. The labor code provides for the principles of equal treatment. The government failed to enforce these regulations effectively. Penalties were not commensurate with those under laws related to civil rights. Observers asserted that discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to Roma, women, persons with disabilities, and LGBTQI+ persons. According to NGOs, there was economic discrimination against women in the workplace, particularly against job seekers older than 50 and those who were pregnant or had returned from maternity leave. The country does not mandate equal pay for equal work. A government decree requires companies with more than 25 employees to reserve 5 percent of their work positions for persons with physical or mental disabilities. While the decree provides fines for noncompliance, many employers generally paid the fines rather than employ persons with disabilities. The National Tax and Customs Authority issued “rehabilitation cards” to persons with disabilities, which granted tax benefits for employers employing such individuals. Roma were the country’s largest ethnic minority. According to the 2011 census, approximately 315,000 persons (3 percent of the population) identified themselves as Roma. A University of Debrecen study published in 2018, however, estimated there were 876,000 Roma in the country, or approximately 9 percent of the country’s population. There were approximately 1,300 de facto segregated settlements in the country where Roma constituted the majority of the population. Romani communities are not socially integrated with broader Hungarian society and are characterized by considerably lower indicators on most socioeconomic measures than the majority population. Conditions for the community deteriorated since the collapse of communism in 1989-90 but were rooted in centuries of social exclusion. Lacking advanced education and employment skills, many Roma occupied the margins of society and experienced long-term unemployment, which bred a cycle of poverty and welfare dependence. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Political and Economic Section Szabadsag Ter 12 1054 Budapest, Hungary BUDEcon@State.gov +36 1 475 4400 Iceland Executive Summary Iceland is an island country located between North America and Europe in the Atlantic Ocean, near the Arctic Circle with an advanced economy that centers around three primary sectors: fisheries, tourism, and aluminum production. Until recently, U.S. investment in Iceland has mostly been concentrated in the aluminum sector, with Alcoa and Century Aluminum operating plants in Iceland. However, U.S. portfolio investments in Iceland have been steadily increasing in recent years. Iceland’s convenient location between the United States and Europe, its high levels of education, connectivity, and English proficiency, and a general appreciation for U.S. products make Iceland a promising market for U.S. companies. Furthermore, Americans made up a third of the tourist population that visited Iceland in 2021. There is broad recognition within the Icelandic government that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key contributor to the country’s economic revival after the 2008 financial collapse. As part of its investment promotion strategy, the Icelandic government operates a public-private agency called “Invest in Iceland” that facilitates foreign investment by providing information to potential investors and promoting investment incentives. Iceland has identified the following “key sectors” in Iceland; tourism; algae culture; data centers; and life sciences. Iceland offers incentives to foreign investors in certain industries. Tourism has been a growing force behind Iceland’s economy in the past decade, with opportunities for investors in high-end tourism, including luxury resorts and hotels. The number of tourists in Iceland grew by more than 400 percent between 2010 and 2018, reaching more than 2.3 million in 2018. However, tourism in Iceland contracted in 2019, and the COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on tourism, and the overall economy. The government implemented measures to bolster the tourism economy, thus avoiding mass bankruptcies in the sector, and has committed to building out tourism-related infrastructure. The startup and innovation communities in Iceland are flourishing, with the IT and biotech sectors growing fast, particularly pharmaceuticals and wellness, gaming, and aquaculture. Iceland’s IT sector spans all areas of the digital economy. The Icelandic energy grid derives 99 percent of its power from renewable resources, making it uniquely attractive for energy-dependent industries. For instance, the data center industry in Iceland is expanding. Iceland is working by the 2018 Climate Acton Plan, which was updated in 2020, and is designed to achieve Iceland’s national climate goals of making the country carbon neutral by 2040 and to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent by 2030 under the Paris Agreement. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 17 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $796 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $62,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of Iceland maintains an open investment climate. The Act on Incentives for Initial Investments, which came into force in 2015, is intended to “promote initial investment in commercial operations, the competitiveness of Iceland and regional development by specifying what incentives are permitted in respect of initial investments in Iceland, and how they should be used.” The Act does not apply to investments in airports, energy production, financial institutions, insurance operations, or securities. For more information, see the English translation of the act: ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/leit/$LisasticSearch/Search/?SearchQuery=Act+on+incentives+for+initial+investments+in+Iceland ). As part of its investment promotion strategy, the Icelandic government operates a public-private agency called “Invest in Iceland” that facilitates foreign investment by providing information to potential investors and promotes investment incentives. There is a debate, however, within Iceland over balancing energy intensive FDI with the environmental impact associated with certain projects. That said, energy-intensive industries long dominated by aluminum smelting, have expanded to include silicon production plants and data centers. For further resources see: ( http://www.invest.is/doing-business/incentives-and-support ). Tourism has been a growing force behind Iceland’s economy in the past decade, with opportunities for investors in high-end tourism, including luxury resorts and hotels. The number of tourists in Iceland grew by more than 400 percent between 2010 and 2018, reaching more than 2.3 million in 2018. However, tourism in Iceland contracted in 2019 with visitors falling just below 2 million, which can be largely attributed to the fall of Icelandic budget airline WOW Air. The COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on tourism, as well as on Iceland’s overall economy, which contracted by 7.1 percent in 2020, according to Statistics Iceland. Less than half a million tourists visited Iceland in 2020, with the number of tourists reaching 700,000 in 2021. Stakeholders in the industry have been generally optimistic for 2022, with hotels reporting good booking positions for the spring and summer seasons. Isavia, a public company that handles the operation and development of Keflavik International Airport has embarked on $1-2 billion capital works project to expand the airport. Projects include extension of buildings, baggage screening and baggage handling systems, self-check in stations, waiting areas and retail/dining areas, check-in areas, bag-drop off areas, security areas, airbridges/gates for remote stands, re-modelling of existing terminal, de-icing platforms, new runway, new taxiway, and a new ATC tower. The startup and innovation communities in Iceland are flourishing, with IT and biotech startups seeking investors. Foreign investment in the fisheries sector is restricted, as well as in the energy sector (hydropower and geothermal exploitation rights other than for personal use and energy processing and transportation are limited to Icelandic citizens and legal persons, and individuals and legal persons who reside in the European Economic Area). The wind energy sector is growing in Iceland, and the legal framework is still being developed for that sector. The 1991 Act on “foreign investments for commercial purposes” limits foreign ownership of fishing rights and fish processing companies (only Icelandic citizens or companies that are controlled by Icelandic citizens and have less than 25 percent foreign shareholders can own or control fishing companies); of hydropower and geothermal exploitation rights other than for personal use and energy processing and transportation (only Icelandic citizens and legal persons, and individuals and legal persons who reside in the European Economic Area (EEA) can hold those rights); and of aviation operators (Icelandic ownership of aviation companies needs to be at least 51 percent, and this does not apply to individuals and legal persons that have EEA citizenship). The law further stipulates that foreign states, sub-national governments, or other foreign authorities are prohibited from investing in Iceland for commercial purposes, although the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs may grant exemptions. The responsibility to inform the relevant ministry of both new investments and investments in companies that the party in question has already invested in lies with the investor, or with the Icelandic company that the foreign individual or entity invested in (this does not apply to EEA citizens or residents). However, the 1991 Act does not stipulate how foreign investment is screened or monitored by relevant authorities, only that the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs handles permits and monitors the execution of this legislation. The Minister can block foreign investments if s/he considers it a “threat to national security or goes against public policy, public safety or public health or if there are serious economic, societal or environmental complications in specific industries or in specific areas, that is likely to persist…” The law further states that the “Minister has the authority to stop foreign investment in systematically important companies if such investment entails systematic risk.” If an investment has already taken place, the Minister of Tourism, Industries, and Innovation has the authority to compel the foreign person or entity in question to sell. Iceland has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and a member of GATT since 1968. The WTO conducted its fifth Trade Policy Review of Iceland in 2017 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp461_e.htm ). The review notes that “with a small population and limited natural resources, apart from energy and fish, trade remains important, but the range of exports is limited to tourism, fish and fish products, and aluminum and products thereof. Therefore, the country remains vulnerable to shocks, including the appreciation of the ISK, overheating of the economy, and Brexit. Furthermore, despite uncertainties relating to Brexit, as growth picks up in the EU, Iceland’s main trading partner, opportunities for trade in goods and services should continue to improve.” The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and UN Cooperation for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have not conducted Investment Policy Reviews for Iceland. Businesses are registered with Iceland Revenue and Customs (Skatturinn) ( http://www.rsk.is/english/ ). Applications for the registration of businesses can be filled in online, however some forms are in Icelandic only and it is therefore necessary for foreign businesses to contract a local representative to complete the paperwork. The website of the Business Registry in Iceland is ( http://www.rsk.is/fyrirtaekjaskra ) (Icelandic only). More information on establishing a business in Iceland can be found here ( https://www.government.is/topics/business-and-industry/establishing-a-business-in-iceland/ ). Services offered by Invest in Iceland, a public-private agency that promotes and facilitates foreign investment in Iceland, are free of charge to all potential foreign investors ( http://www.invest.is ). Invest in Iceland can provide information on investment opportunities in Iceland; collect data on the business environment, arrange site visits and plan contacts with local authorities; arrange meetings with local business partner and professional consultants; influence legislation and lobby on behalf of foreign investors ( https://www.invest.is/at-your-service/what-we-do ). Invest in Iceland offers detailed information on how to establish a company on its website ( http://www.invest.is/doing-business/establishing-a-company ). Its sister agencies, Business Iceland (formerly Promote Iceland) ( https://www.businessiceland.is/ ) and Film in Iceland ( http://www.filminiceland.com ), aim to enhance Iceland’s reputation as a tourist destination and as a destination for filming movies and television productions. The Icelandic Government along with other stakeholders promote exports of Icelandic goods and services through the public-private agency Islandsstofa, also known as Business Iceland ( https://www.businessiceland.is/ ). Business Iceland assists Icelandic businesses in the main industry sectors to export products and services, including fisheries (seafood and technology), agricultural produce (including organic lamb meat), high-tech products and solutions (software, prosthetics, etc.), and services (tourism). Business Iceland has been very active in the United States and Canada in recent years. A trade commissioner represents the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs in New York, facilitating exports to the United States and promoting business relations between the two countries. Business Iceland also promotes exports to the U.K., Northern and Southern Europe, and more recently to Asia (China and Japan). Iceland imposed capital controls following the economic collapse in late 2008, which largely prevented Icelandic investors and pensions funds from investing outside of Iceland. The government lifted capital controls on March 14, 2017. 3. Legal Regime The regulatory system is transparent, although bureaucratic delays can occur. All proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for the public record and are open for comment. Icelandic laws regulating business practices are consistent with those of most OECD member states. Iceland’s laws are generally based on European Union directives as a result of Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), which legally obligates it to adopt EU directives and law concerning the four freedoms of the EU: free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. The Competition Authority is responsible for enforcing anti-monopoly regulations and promoting effective competition in business activities. This includes eliminating unreasonable barriers and restrictions on freedom in business operations, preventing monopolies and limitations on competition, and facilitating new competitors’ access to the market. The Consumer Agency holds primary responsibility for market surveillance of business operators, transparency of the markets with respect to safety and consumers’ legal rights, and enforcement of legislation concerning protection of consumers’ health, legal, and economic rights. For more information see the Competition Authority’s website ( https://en.samkeppni.is/ ) and the Consumer Agency website ( https://www.neytendastofa.is/English ). The Icelandic Parliament (Althingi) consists of a single chamber of 63 members; a simple majority is required for ordinary bills to become law. All bills are introduced in the parliament in draft form. Draft laws and regulations are open to public comment and are published in full on the parliament’s web page ( http://www.stjornartidindi.is ) and on the websites of the relevant ministries (often in English). Invest in Iceland also maintains an information portal website that includes information on industry sectors, the business climate, and incentives that foreign investors may find useful ( http://www.invest.is ). Ministries or regulatory agencies develop bills, which are available to the general public. Ministries or regulatory agencies publish the text of the proposed regulations before their enactment on a unified website ( https://www.stjornartidindi.is/ ). Ministries or regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed regulation form the general public. Laws and regulations are published on both the parliament’s website ( https://www.althingi.is/ ) and separate website managed by the Ministry of Justice ( https://www.stjornartidindi.is/ ). The OECD published a report on Iceland in September 2019. One of the findings of the report was that regulatory barriers were high in Iceland. “Regulation should be more commensurate with the needs of a small open economy. Product market regulation is stringent and the administrative burden for start-ups is high, holding back investment and innovation. Restrictions to foreign direct investment are among the highest of the OECD, dampening employment and productivity gains through international knowledge transfer. The government should set up a comprehensive action plan for regulatory reform, prioritizing reforms that foster competition, level the playing field between domestic and foreign firms and attract international investment” ( http://www.oecd.org/economy/iceland-economic-snapshot/ ). The Government of Iceland has worked to reduce the regulatory burden since the report was published. OECD conducted an economic survey of Iceland in 2021. The key findings are as follows: “the pandemic-related collapse of foreign tourism and international travel, which account for almost a fifth of GDP, highlighted the need to diversify the economy. Iceland needs to improve resilience and find new drivers of productivity and employment growth, in particular given the objective of emission reductions. Boosting skills across the population is hence the top priority, along with reforms to strengthen competitive forces.” The Iceland Chamber of Commerce operates an independent arbitration institute, the Nordic Arbitration Centre (NAC). The NAC provides for a dispute resolution mechanism, allowing parties to solve their dispute efficiently and safely. Both the arbitration process and the Arbitral Tribunals final awards are strictly confidential. There have been no known cases of discrimination against U.S. investors. For more information visit the Iceland Chamber of Commerce’s website ( https://www.chamber.is/arbitration ). Iceland scores 4.75 out of 5 (best possible) on The World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance index ( https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/iceland# ). Icelandic laws regulating business practices are generally consistent with other OECD members. Iceland’s laws are generally based on EU directives as a result of Iceland’s membership in the EEA, which legally obligates it to adopt EU directives and law concerning four freedoms of the EU: free movement, goods, services, persons, and capital. Iceland has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since January 1, 1995. Iceland and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in January 2009. The Icelandic civil law system enforces property rights, contractual rights, and the means to protect these rights. The Icelandic court system is independent from the parliament and government. Foreign parties must abide by the same rules as Icelandic parties, and they enjoy the same privileges in court; there is no discrimination against foreign parties in the Icelandic court system. When trade or investment disputes are settled, the settlement is usually remitted in the local currency. Iceland has a three-tier judicial system; eight District Courts (Héraðsdómstólar), the Court of Appeal (Landsréttur), and the Supreme Court (Hæstiréttur Íslands). All court actions commence at the District Courts, and conclusions can then be appealed to the Court of Appeal. In special cases the conclusions of the Court of Appeal can be referred to the Supreme Court. A new public agency, the Judicial Administration (Dómstólasýsla), along with the Court of Appeal (Landsréttur) began operating on January 1, 2018. The Landsdómur is a special high court or impeachment court to handle cases where members of the Cabinet of Iceland are suspected of criminal behavior. The Landsdómur has 15 members — five supreme court justices, a district court president, a constitutional law professor, and eight people chosen by parliament every six years. The court assembled for the first time in 2011 to prosecute a former Prime Minister for alleged gross misconduct in the events leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. He was found guilty of failing to hold regular cabinet meetings during the crisis but was not convicted of gross misconduct. Icelandic laws regulating and protecting foreign investments are consistent with OECD and EU standards. As Iceland is a member of the EEA, most EU commercial legislation and directives are in effect in Iceland. The major law governing foreign investment is the 1996 Act on Investment by Non-residents in Business Enterprises, which grants national treatment to non-residents of the EEA. The law dictates that foreign ownership of businesses is generally unrestricted, except for limits in the fishing, energy, and aviation sectors. Icelandic law also restricts the ability of non-EEA citizens to own land, but the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs may waive this. The managers and the majority of the board of directors in an Icelandic enterprise must be domiciled in Iceland or another EEA member state, although exemptions from this provision can be granted by the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs. Iceland has no automatic screening process for investments that trigger national security concerns (similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States), although bidders in privatization sales may have to go through a pre-qualification process to verify that the bidder has the financial strength to participate. Investors that intend to hold more than 10 percent of shares (“active” shareholders) in financial institutions are subject to approval from the Central Bank of Iceland ( http://en.fme.is/ ). For information on incentives and doing business in Iceland see Invest in Iceland’s website: ( https://www.invest.is/doing-business/incentives-and-support ). Competition Law no. 44/2005 is currently in place to promote competition and to prevent unreasonable barriers on economic operations. Depending on the turnover of the companies in question, the Icelandic Competition Authority is notified of mergers and acquisitions. The Authority may annul mergers or set conditions to prevent monopolies and limitations on competition. For more information see the Competition Authority’s website: ( https://en.samkeppni.is/ ). The Constitution of Iceland stipulates that no one may be obliged to surrender their property unless required by the government to serve a public interest, and that such a measure shall be provided for by law and full compensation be paid. A special committee is appointed every five years to review and proclaim the legality of expropriation cases. If the committee proclaims a case to be legal, it will negotiate an amount of compensation with the appropriate parties. If an amount cannot be agreed upon, the committee determines a fair value after hearing the case of all parties. The Icelandic government has never expropriated a foreign investment. However, some private investors described actions by the Icelandic government before and during the October 2008 financial crisis (related to the takeover of three major banks and offshore krona assets) as a type of indirect expropriation ( www.cb.is ). The 1991 Act on Bankruptcy states that “the provisions of this Act on the right to obtain a license of financial reorganization or for composition with creditors, and on bankruptcy, shall only apply to a debtor who is a natural person if the debtor’s legal domicile is in Iceland and the debtor is not exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iceland. The provisions of this Act shall however be applied to Icelandic nationals not having their legal domicile in Iceland if they are exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts of other states. Where the debtor is a company or an institution the provisions of this Act on his right to obtain a license of financial reorganization or for composition with creditors, or on bankruptcy, shall only apply if the following conditions are fulfilled: in the case of a registered company, if its registered venue is in Iceland, and in the case of an unregistered company, if its venue is on Iceland according to its articles or as provided for by law, or in the nature of the matter. The same shall apply, as applicable, to institutions.” For more information, refer to the Act on Bankruptcy ( https://www.government.is/publications/legislation/lex/2018/01/15/Act-on-Bankruptcy-etc.-No.-21-1991/ ). 4. Industrial Policies Iceland welcomes foreign direct investment. Iceland has, through the public-private agency Invest in Iceland, identified the following “key sectors” in Iceland: algae culture; data centers; life sciences; and tourism. Iceland “focuses on favorable environment for businesses in general, including low corporate tax, availability of land and efficiency in a European legislative framework.” Iceland offers a reimbursement scheme in the film industry. Authorities reimburse 25 percent of cost incurred during the production of television programs and films in Iceland. For more information visit ( www.invest.is ). The 2015 Act on Incentives for Initial Investments in Iceland implemented to “promote initial investment in commercial operations, the competitiveness of Iceland and regional development by specifying what incentives are permitted in respect to initial investments in Iceland and how they should be used.” For more information see the English translation of the act ( https://www.government.is/topics/business-and-industry/incentives-and-investment-agreements/ ). There is significant debate regarding the appropriate types and level of FDI in Iceland, particularly within the energy sector and with regard to job creation and the environmental impact associated with certain projects. Historically, foreign investment has been in energy-intensive industries, such as aluminum smelting, although investments in tourism, life sciences, and information technology have grown as a proportion of total FDI in recent years. Subsidiaries of foreign companies are able to participate in government-subsidized research and development programs, but only to cover R&D costs that are borne in Iceland. For further information see ( http://en.rannis.is ). For information on importing to Iceland and customs procedures, please visit the Iceland Revenue and Customs website ( https://www.skatturinn.is/english/companies/customs-matters/importing-to-iceland/ ). Iceland follows the EU General Data Protection Regulation and is a member of the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield arrangement for transatlantic data transfers. The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (DPA) monitors the implementation of Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and of the Act on Data Protection and the Processing of Personal Data no. 90/2018. DPA’s law-enforcement work includes “monitoring data controllers and ensuring that they take appropriate security measures, in accordance with law.” For more information see the Icelandic Data Protection Authority’s website ( https://www.personuvernd.is/information-in-english/ ). 5. Protection of Property Rights Only Icelandic citizens and foreign citizens that have permanent residency in Iceland can acquire the right to own or use real property in Iceland, including fishing and hunting rights, water rights, or other real property rights, whether by free assignation or enforcement measures, marriage, inheritance, or deed of transfer. However, special rules apply for citizens of the EEA. The Minister of Justice may grant exemption from these conditions based on application showing the need of ownership for business activities. The Minister’s permission is not necessary if leasing real property for less than three years or when the party involved enjoys rights in Iceland under the rules of the EEA. For more information, please see the Act on the Right of Ownership and Use of Real Property ( https://www.government.is/Publications/Legislation/Lex/?newsid=353f66b8-f153-11e7-9421-005056bc4d74 ). Property rights are generally enforced in Iceland. There is good access to mortgages and other financing to purchase real property in Iceland from commercial banks, pension funds and private lenders. Iceland adheres to key international agreements on property rights. Trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and industrial designs are all protected under Icelandic law. Iceland is a signatory of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and of the European Patent Convention (EPC). For further information see ( https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/running-business/intellectual-property/patents/iceland/index_en.htm ). Iceland is also a member of the European Patent Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and a party to most WIPO-administered agreements. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at ( http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ ). The Icelandic Intellectual Property Office’s (ISIPO) is a government agency under the auspices of the Minister of Industries and Innovation. The institution was established on July 1, 1991 and assumed responsibility for the patent and trademark department from the Ministry of Industries. In 2019, ISIPO, which used to be called the Icelandic Patent Office, took up its current name, the Icelandic Intellectual Property Office. ISIPO’s scope of operation is defined by Advertisement no. 187/1991 and Regulation no. 188/1991. ISIPO is responsible for “issues relating to patents, trademarks, design protection, municipal emblems, and other comparable rights as provided for by law, regulations, and international agreements on the protection of intellectual property rights in the field of industry.” For more information visit, the ISIPO webpage in English ( https://www.isipo.is/ ). Illegal downloading and distribution of films and TV shows has decreased in recent years due to widespread access to international streaming services, such as Netflix and Disney Plus. Purchasing cheap, counterfeit consumer goods on Chinese websites, namely AliEpxress.com is popular in Iceland, although that trend has declined somewhat due to increasing fees imposed by Iceland Post on incoming international deliveries. Customs seize counterfeit products if found and contact the owner of the intellectual property who then decides whether to press charges against the importer. If the owner of the intellectual property does not want to take legal actions, customs clears the items and send them to the importer. Iceland Revenue and Customs has on a few occasions seized counterfeit consumer goods that led to charges being pressed against the importer, including shipments containing counterfeit Nike shoes and Arco designer lamps in 2014. Iceland Revenue and Customs participated in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s campaign against counterfeit products in 2014 ( https://www.tollur.is/embaettid/frettir/frett/2014/03/13/Althjodlegt-atak-gegn-eftirlikingum/ ). Iceland is not listed in the USTR’s 2021 Special 301 Report, but the country is listed in the Notorious Markets for Piracy and Counterfeiting 2021 Report, as Iceland reportedly hosts servers for hosting provider FlokiNET. 6. Financial Sector Capital controls were lifted in March 2017 after more than eight years of restricting the free movement of capital. New foreign currency inflows fall under the Rules on Special Reserve Requirements for new Currency Inflows, no. 223/2019 which took effect on March 6, 2019, and replaced the older Rules no. 490/2016 on the same subject. The rules contain provisions on the implementation of special reserve requirements for new foreign currency inflows, including the special reserve base, holding period, special reserve ratio, settlement currency, and interest rates on deposit institutions’ capital flow accounts with the Central Bank of Iceland and Central Bank certificates of deposit. For more information see the Central Bank of Iceland’s website ( https://www.cb.is ). Foreign portfolio investment has increased significantly over the past few years in Iceland after being dormant in the years following the economic crash. U.S. investment funds have been particularly active on the Icelandic stock exchange. The Icelandic stock exchange operates under the name Nasdaq Iceland. Companies listed on Nasdaq Iceland are reported on its website ( http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/hlutabref/Skrad-fyrirtaeki/iceland ). The private sector has access to financing through the commercial banks and pensions funds. The IMF 2019 Article IV Consultation report states that “the de jure exchange rate arrangement is free floating, and the de facto exchange rate arrangement under the IMF classification system is floating. In the period from November 2018 to October 31, 2019, the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) intervened in the foreign exchange market on 14 of the 248 working days. The CBI publishes daily data on its foreign exchange intervention with a lag. Iceland has accepted the obligations under Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 and maintains no exchange restrictions subject to Fund jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 2(a). Iceland continues to maintain certain measures that constitute exchange restrictions imposed for security reasons based on UN Security Council Resolutions.” ( https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/12/19/Iceland-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-48891 ). The Central Bank of Iceland is an independent institution owned by the State and operates under the auspices of the Prime Minister. Its objective is to promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The bank also maintains international reserves and promotes a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation. The Icelandic banking sector is generally healthy. The Central Bank of Iceland has since the financial collapse of 2008 introduced stringent measures to ensure that the financial system remains “safe, stable, and effective.” For more information see the Central Bank webpage ( https://www.cb.is/financial-stability/ ). There are three commercial banks in Iceland, Landsbankinn, Islandsbanki, and Arion Bank. The Government of Iceland took over operations of the banks during the financial collapse in September and October 2008. Landsbankinn (formerly known as Landsbanki Islands) is still government-owned, while the Government of Iceland is in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki (formerly known as Glitnir). Arion Bank (formerly known as Kaupthing Bank) has been privatized and is listed on the Icelandic stock exchange Nasdaq Iceland. There is one investment bank in Iceland, Kvika, which is listed on Nasdaq Iceland. Icelandic pension funds offer loans and mortgages and are active investors in Icelandic companies. There are no foreign banks operating in Iceland. All companies have access to regular commercial banking services in Iceland. Establishing a bank account in Iceland requires a local personal identification number known as a “kennitala.” Foreign nationals should contact Registers Iceland for more information on how to register in Iceland ( https://www.skra.is/english/ ). The Government of Iceland has proposed establishing a sovereign wealth fund, called the National Fund of Iceland. The bill to establish the fund has not passed through Parliament. The stated purpose of the fund is “to serve as a sort of disaster relief reserve for the nation, when the Treasury suffers a financial blow in connection with severe, unforeseen shocks to the national economy, either due to a plunge in revenues or the cost of relief measures that the government has considered unavoidable to undertake.” 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Icelandic Government owns wholly or majority shares in 40 companies, including systematically important companies such as energy companies, the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RUV) and Iceland Post. Other notable SOEs are Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland), Isavia (public company that operates Keflavik International Airport), and ATVR (the only company allowed to sell alcohol to the general public). Here you can find a list of SOEs ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/rekstur-og-eignir-rikisins/felog-i-eigu-rikisins/ ). Total assets of SOEs in 2020 amounted to 5,735 billion ISK (approx. $44.3 billion) and SOEs employed around 5,100 people that same year. In terms of assets and equity, Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland) is the largest SOE in Iceland, and Isavia employs the most people. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, except in the energy production and distribution sector. Private enterprises have similar access to financing as SOEs through the banking system. As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. The Iceland Chamber of Commerce in Iceland, NASDAQ OMX Iceland and the Confederation of Icelandic Employers have issued guidelines that mirror the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Iceland is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). For SOEs operating within the private sector in a competitive environment, the general guideline from the Icelandic government is that all decisions of the board of the SOE should ensure a level playing field and spur competition in the market. In the midst of the banking crisis, the state, through the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME), took over Iceland’s three largest commercial banks, which collapsed in October 2008, and subsequently took over several savings banks to allow for uninterrupted banking services in the country. The government has started the privatization process of Islandsbanki, and currently owns 42.5 percent shares in the bank. The Bank Shares Management Company, established by the state in 2009, manages state-owned shares in financial companies. The government of Iceland has acquired stakes in many companies through its ownership of shares in the banks; however, it is the policy of the government not to interfere with internal or day-to-day management decisions of these companies. Instead, in 2009, the state established the Bank Shares Management Company to manage the state-owned shares in financial companies. The board of this entity, consisting of individuals appointed by the Minister of Finance, appoints a selection committee, which in turn chooses the State representative to sit on the boards of the various companies. While most energy producers are either owned by the state or municipalities, there is free competition in the energy market. That said, potential foreign investment in critical sectors like energy is likely to be met by demands for Icelandic ownership, either formally or from the public. For example, a Canadian company, Magma Energy, acquired a 95 percent stake in the energy production company HS Orka in 2010, but later sold a 33.4 percent stake to the Icelandic pension funds in the face of intense public pressure. Iceland’s universal healthcare system is mainly state-operated. However, few legal restrictions to private medical practice exist; private clinics are required to maintain an agreement regarding payment for services with the Icelandic state, a foreign state, or an insurance company. Icelandic authorities are currently in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki, one of Iceland’s three commercial banks. Authorities sold 35 percent shares in Islandsbanki in 2021, and 22.5 percent earlier this year. The government currently owns 42.5 percent in the bank. The government of Iceland currently owns 99.8 percent in Landsbankinn and has no immediate plans to privatize it. The government took ownership of the banks when the Icelandic banking system collapsed in 2008. Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Bjarni Benediktsson, has publicly declared his intentions to sell all government of Iceland shares in Islandsbanki, but wants the government to remain a large shareholder in Landsbankinn, with around 40 percent of shares. 8. Responsible Business Conduct As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Ministry for Culture and Business Affairs houses Iceland’s National Contact Point for the Guidelines, charged with promoting the due diligence approach of the Guidelines to the business community and to facilitate the resolution of any disputes arising in the context of the Guidelines ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/atvinnuvegir/vidskipti/almenn-vidskiptamal/ ). Business Iceland (formerly Promote Iceland), which is a public-private agency responsible for promoting Iceland’s export sectors abroad, has signed the United Nations’ Global Compact (GC) and raises awareness of corporate social responsibility in Iceland. Festa, a non-profit organization which promotes sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, has over 120 associated members, including some of Iceland’s largest companies, public organizations, universities, and municipalities ( www.samfelagsabyrgd.is/festa ). Gagnsaei, an NGO affiliated with Transparency International, is active in Iceland and is a voice against corruption ( www.transparency.is ). There is a general awareness of corporate social responsibility among producers, companies, and consumers. There was a high-profile case in 2018 and 2019 surrounding a private employment agency which has now been declared bankrupt, that allegedly mistreated migrant Romanian workers by failing to pay salaries and provide housing as per agreement. This case caused outrage in Iceland and many union and workers’ association leaders voiced their concerns in the media and stated that mistreatment of workers would not be tolerated. The Directorate of Labor fined the company in 2019 for failing to register workers adequately. As an OECD member state, Iceland adheres to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance recommendations to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral purchasing decisions and practices. The Icelandic economy does not have a mining industry, other than extracting rocks and gravel for construction purposes. In 2013, former Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson issued a joint statement with the other Nordic Prime Ministers to reaffirm their support to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Iceland’s 2018 Climate Acton Plan, which was updated in 2020, is designed to achieve national climate goals of making the country carbon neutral by 2040 and cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent by 2030 under the Paris Agreement. The MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index ranked Iceland first out of 76 economies in 2021. The MIT report stated that Iceland has been “a global leader in geothermal energy for decades” and has constructed the world’s largest direct air capture CO2 capture and storage plant. 9. Corruption Isolated cases of corruption have been known to occur but are not an obstacle to foreign investment in Iceland or a recognized issue of concern in the government. In 2021 Iceland ranked 13 out of 180 economies on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Iceland has signed the UN Convention against Corruption. Iceland is a member of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. The Council of Europe body Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) published its fifth evaluation report on Iceland on April 12, 2018. GRECO found that Iceland had no dedicated government-wide policy plan on anti-corruption and that its agency and institution-specific codes of conduct were not sufficiently detailed and were often implemented in an ad hoc manner. For more information, see the GRECO report ( https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/16807b8218 ). The Icelandic Parliament introduced a new law in 2020 on measures against conflict of interests for ministers, assistance to ministers, director generals at ministries, and ambassadors, concerning receiving gifts, additional job positions, and supervision of the aforementioned law. In the wake of the financial collapse in Iceland in 2008, a Code of Conduct for Staff in the Government Offices of Iceland was established in 2012, “with the purpose of promoting professional methods and of confidence in public administration.” The code of conduct addresses workplace relations and procedures; behavior and conduct; conflicts of interest and shared interests; communication with the media, public and surveillance bodies; and responsibility and monitoring for Government Offices staff. For more information see the Government of Iceland’s website ( https://www.government.is/ministries/prime-ministers-office/code-of-conduct-for-staff/ ). The code does not extend to family members of officials or political parties. Contact at the government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Ragna Bjarnadottir Director Ministry of Justice Solvholsgata 7, 101 Reykjavik, Iceland +3545459000 dmr@dmr.is Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Atli Thor Fanndal Managing Director Transparency International (Gagnsaei) Postholf 24, 121 Reykjavik, Iceland transparency@transparency.is 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence in Iceland is rare, and Iceland consistently ranks among the world’s safest countries. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator on Political Stability and Absence of Violence placed Iceland in the top 97th percentile rank of all countries worldwide in 2020 ( http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports ). In early 2014, frustration among voters regarding the then-governing Progressive Party-Independence Party coalition government’s withdrawal of Iceland’s accession bid to the European Union led to the largest protests since the financial collapse; these protests did not include violence. Non-violent protests led to a governmental reorganization and early elections following the 2016 “Panama Papers” scandal. A subsequent government, composed of the Independence Party, Bright Future, and the Reform Party, took office in early 2017 and collapsed within a year. The current coalition government, composed of the Independence Party, Progressive Party, and the Left-Green Movement, assumed power in November 2017 and began its second term November 28, 2021. There have been individual cases of politically motivated vandalism of foreign holdings in recent years, directed primarily at the aluminum industry. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The labor force in Iceland is highly skilled and educated. The labor force consisted of 208,900 people aged between 16 and 74 years old at the end of 2021 according to Statistics Iceland. Of them, 199,700 people were employed and 9,200 unemployed at the end of 2021. According to Statistics Iceland, the unemployment rate was 4.4 percent in December 2021, while the Directorate of Labor reported 4.9 percent unemployment for the same month. Foreign labor plays a large role in unskilled and semi-skilled sectors such as tourism and construction. In December 2021, 38,000 immigrants were employed in Iceland, according to Statistics Iceland. Women in Iceland are almost on par with men when it comes to labor participation, with 77.2 percent of women being active on the job market, compared to 79 percent of men, according to Statistics Iceland. The Icelandic population is highly educated, with 33.3 percent of 16-to-74-year old’s having tertiary/university education. Icelandic Labor Laws are taken seriously in Iceland, and there are no waivers to attract or retain investment. The labor unions and Directorate of Labor conduct spot inspections on worksites to monitor legal compliance. The labor market is highly unionized, with 91.9 percent of the workforce members of trade unions in 2020, according to Statistics Iceland. Icelandic labor unions are decentralized and not politically affiliated. Collective bargaining power, in both the public and the private sectors, rests with individual labor unions. The law does not establish a minimum wage, but the minimum wages negotiated in collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees in those occupations, including foreign workers, regardless of union membership. While the agreements can be either industry-wide, sector-wide, or in some cases firm-specific, the type of position defines the negotiated wage levels. The government has sometimes imposed mandatory mediation to avert or end strikes in key economic sectors such as healthcare or fisheries. According to collective bargaining agreements, the standard work week is 37.5 hours, or 7.5 hours a day. Employees have the right to take a 15-minute paid break within the standard workday. Lunch, either 30 or 60 minutes, is then added to the standard workday. The law requires that employers compensate work exceeding eight hours per day as overtime. Collective bargaining agreements determine the terms of overtime pay, but they do not vary significantly across unions. The law limits the total hours a worker may work, including overtime, to 48 hours a week on average during each four-month period. Typical holiday and shift-work rates are 40 percent above the standard shift rate and may be up to 45 percent more if total work hours exceed full-time employment. The law entitles workers to 11 hours of rest in each 24-hour period and one full day off each week. Under specially defined circumstances, employers may reduce the 11-hour rest period to no fewer than eight hours, but they must then compensate workers with corresponding rest time later. They may also postpone a worker’s day off, but the worker must receive the corresponding rest time within 14 days. Outside terminating an employee, employers are by law prohibited from making unilateral amendments to hiring contracts. Companies are mandated to report mass layoffs to the Directorate of Labor. Terminated employees retain the same rights to severance benefits regardless of whether they were part of a mass layoff or fired. For further information, see the Directorate of Labor website ( https://vinnumalastofnun.is/en ). 14. Contact for More Information Ester Halldorsdottir Economic and Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy Engjateigur 7 105 Reykjavik Iceland +354 595-2200 Reykjavikeconomic@state.gov India Executive Summary The Government of India continued to actively court foreign investment. In the wake of COVID-19, India enacted ambitious structural economic reforms that should help attract private and foreign direct investment (FDI). In February 2021, the Finance Minister announced plans to raise $2.4 billion though an ambitious privatization program that would dramatically reduce the government’s role in the economy. In March 2021, parliament further liberalized India’s insurance sector, increasing FDI limits to 74 percent from 49 percent, though still requiring a majority of the Board of Directors and management personnel to be Indian nationals. Parliament passed the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill on August 6, 2021, repealing a law adopted by the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh in 2012 that taxed companies retroactively. The Finance Minister also said the Indian government will refund disputed amounts from outstanding cases under the old law. While Prime Minister Modi’s government had pledged never to impose retroactive taxes, prior outstanding claims and litigation led to huge penalties for Cairn Energy and telecom operator Vodafone. Both Indian and U.S. business have long advocated for the formal repeal of the 2012 legislation to improve certainty over taxation policy and liabilities. India continued to increase and enhance implementation of the roughly $2 trillion in proposed infrastructure projects catalogued, for the first time, in the 2019-2024 National Infrastructure Pipeline. The government’s FY 2021-22 budget included a 35 percent increase in spending on infrastructure projects. In November 2021, Prime Minister Modi launched the “Gati Shakti” (“Speed Power”) initiative to overcome India’s siloed approach to infrastructure planning, which Indian officials argue has historically resulted in inefficacies, wasteful expenditures, and stalled projects. India’s infrastructure gaps are blamed for higher operational costs, especially for manufacturing, that hinder investment. Despite this progress, India remains a challenging place to do business. New protectionist measures, including strict enforcement and potential expansion of data localization measures, increased tariffs, sanitary and phytosanitary measures not based on science, and Indian-specific standards not aligned with international standards effectively closed off producers from global supply chains and restricted the expansion in bilateral trade and investment. The U.S. government continued to urge the Government of India to foster an attractive and reliable investment climate by reducing barriers to investment and minimizing bureaucratic hurdles for businesses. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank/ Amount Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 85 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/india Innovation Index 2021 46 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (Million. USD stock positions) 2020 $41,904 usdia-position-2020.xlsx (live.com) World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $1,920 https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf= n&zm=n&country=IND 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Changes in India’s foreign investment rules are notified in two different ways: (1) Press Notes issued by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) for most sectors, and (2) legislative action for insurance, pension funds, and state-owned enterprises in the coal sector. FDI proposals in sensitive sectors will, however, require the additional approval of the Home Ministry. The DPIIT, under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is the lead investment agency, responsible for the formulation of FDI policy and the facilitation of FDI inflows. It compiles all policies related to India’s FDI regime into a single document that is updated every year. This updated policy compilation can be accessed at: http://dipp.nic.in/foreign-direct–investment/foreign–direct–investment-policy. The DPIIT disseminates information about India’s investment climate and, through the Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA), plays an active role in resolving foreign investors’ project implementation problems. The DPIIT oftentimes consults with lead ministries and stakeholders. However, there have been specific incidences where some relevant stakeholders reported being left out of consultations. In most sectors, foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own businesses and engage in remunerative activities. However, there are sectors of the economy where the government continues to retain equity limits for foreign capital as well as management and control restrictions. For example, India caps FDI in the Insurance Sector at 74 percent and mandates that insurance companies retain “Indian management and control.” Similarly, India allows up to 100 percent FDI in domestic airlines but has yet to clarify governing substantial ownership and effective control (SOEC) rules. A list of investment caps is accessible in the DPIIT’s consolidated FDI circular at: https://dpiit.gov.in/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-direct-investment-policy . The Indian Government has continued to liberalize FDI policies across sectors. Notable changes during 2021 included: Increasing the FDI cap for the insurance sector to 74 percent from 49 percent, albeit while retaining an “Indian management and control” requirement. Increased the FDI cap for the pensions sector to 74 percent from 49 percent. The rider of “Indian management and control” is applicable in the pension sector. Eliminated the FDI cap in the telecom sector. 100 percent FDI allowed for insurance intermediaries. Eliminated the FDI cap for insurance intermediaries and state-run oil companies. Increased the FDI cap for defense manufacturing units to 74 percent from 49 percent and up to 100 percent if the investment is approved under the Government Route review process. Since the abolition of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) in 2017, FDI screening has been progressively liberalized and decentralized. All FDI into India must complete either an “Automatic Route” or “Government Route” review process. FDI in most sectors fall under the Automatic Route, which simply requires a foreign investor to notify India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and comply with relevant domestic laws and regulations for that sector. In contrast, investments in specified sensitive sectors – such as defense – require review under the Government Route to obtain the prior approval of the ministry with jurisdiction over the relevant sector along with the concurrence of the DPIIT. In 2020, India issued Press Note 3 requiring all proposed FDI by nonresident entities located in (or having “beneficial owners” in) countries that share a land border with India to obtain prior approval via the Government Route. This screening requirement applies regardless of the size of the proposed investment or relevant sector. The rule primarily impacted the People’s Republic of China, whose companies had more FDI in India, but other neighboring countries affected include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan. A. Third-party investment policy reviews https://www.oecd.org/economy/india-economic-snapshot/ https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp503_e.htm B. Civil society organization reviews of investment policy-related concerns https://www.ncaer.org/publication_details.php?pID=370 https://www.orfonline.org/research/jailed-for-doing-business/ The DPIIT is responsible for formulation and implementation of promotional and developmental measures for growth of the industrial sector. The DPIIT also is responsible for the overall industrial policy and facilitating and increasing FDI flows to the country. However, Invest India is the government’s lead investment promotion and facilitation agency and is managed in partnership with the DPIIT, state governments, and business chambers. Invest India works with investors through their investment lifecycle to provide support with market entry strategies, deep dive industry analysis, partner search, and policy advocacy as required. Businesses can register online through the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) website: http://www.mca.gov.in/ . To fast-track the regulatory approval process, particularly for major projects, the government created the digital multi-modal Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation (PRAGATI) initiative in 2015. The Prime Minister personally monitors the PRAGATI process, to ensure government entities meet project deadlines. As of September 2021, the Prime Minister had chaired 38 PRAGATI meetings with 297 projects, worth around $200 billion, approved and cleared. In 2014, the government also formed an inter-ministerial committee, led by the DPIIT, to track investment proposals requiring inter-ministerial approvals. Business and government sources report this committee meets informally on an ad hoc basis as they receive reports from companies and business chambers seeking assistance with stalled projects. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce’s India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), outbound investment from India has both increased and changed which countries and sectors it targets. During the last ten years, Overseas Investment Destination (OID) shifted away from resource-rich countries, such as Australia, UAE, and Sudan, toward countries providing higher tax benefits, such as Mauritius, Singapore, the British Virgin Islands, and the Netherlands. Indian firms invest overseas primarily through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to get direct access to newer and more extensive markets and better technologies and increasingly achieve a global reach. According to RBI data, outward investment from India in 2021 totaled around $29 billion compared with around $30 billion the previous year. The RBI’s recorded total of outward investment includes equity capital, loans, and issuance of guarantees. 3. Legal Regime Policies pertaining to foreign investments are framed by the DPIIT, and implementation is undertaken by lead federal ministries and sub-national counterparts. Some government policies are written in a way that can be discriminatory to foreign investors or favor domestic industry. For example, India bars foreign investors from engaging in multi-brand retail, which also limits foreign e-Commerce investors to a “market-place model.” On most occasions major rules are framed after thorough discussions by government authorities and require the approval of the cabinet and, in some cases, the Parliament as well. However, in some instances the rules have been enacted without any consultative process. The Indian Accounting Standards were issued under the supervision and control of the Accounting Standards Board, a committee under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), and has government, academic, and professional representatives. The Indian Accounting Standards are named and numbered in the same way as the corresponding International Financial Reporting Standards. The National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards recommends these standards to the MCA, which all listed companies must then adopt. These can be accessed at: https://www.mca.gov.in/content/mca/global/en/acts-rules/ebooks/accounting-standards.html India is a member of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an eight- member regional block in South Asia. India’s regulatory systems are aligned with SAARC’s economic agreements, visa regimes, and investment rules. Dispute resolution in India has been through tribunals, which are quasi-judicial bodies. India has been a member of the WTO since 1995, and generally notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade; however, at times there are delays in publishing the notifications. The Governments of India and the United States cooperate in areas such as standards, trade facilitation, competition, and antidumping practices. India adopted its legal system from English law and the basic principles of the Common Law as applied in the UK are largely prevalent in India. However, foreign companies need to adjust for Indian law when negotiating and drafting contracts in India to ensure adequate protection in case of breach of contract. The Indian judiciary provides for an integrated system of courts to administer both central and state laws. The judicial system includes the Supreme Court as the highest national court, as well as a High Court in each state or a group of states which covers a hierarchy of subordinate courts. Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that a decision declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Apart from courts, tribunals are also vested with judicial or quasi-judicial powers by special statutes to decide controversies or disputes relating to specified areas. Courts have maintained that the independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution, which provides the judiciary institutional independence from the executive and legislative branches. The government has a policy framework on FDI, which is updated every year and formally notified as the Consolidated FDI Policy ( https://dpiit.gov.in/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-direct-investment-policy ). The DPIIT issues policy pronouncements on FDI through the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular, Press Notes, and press releases that are also notified by the Ministry of Finance as amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999. These notifications take effect from the date of issuance of the Press Notes/Press Releases, unless specified otherwise therein. In case of any conflict, the relevant Notification under the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 will prevail. The payment of inward remittance and reporting requirements are stipulated under the Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 issued by the RBI. The government has introduced “Make in India” and “Self-Reliant India” programs that include investment policies designed to promote domestic manufacturing and attract foreign investment. The “Digital India” program aims to open new avenues for the growth of the information technology sector. The “Start-up India” program creates incentives to enable start-ups to become commercially viable and grow. The “Smart Cities” program creates new avenues for industrial technological investment opportunities in select urban areas. The central government has successfully established independent and effective regulators in telecommunications, banking, securities, insurance, and pensions. India’s antitrust body, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) reviews cases against cartelization and abuse of dominance and is a well-regarded regulator. The CCI’s investigations wing is required to seek the approval of the local chief metropolitan magistrate for any search and seizure operations. The CCI conducts capacity-building programs for government officials and businesses. Tax experts confirm that India does not have domestic expropriation laws in place. The Indian Parliament on August 6, 2021, repealed a 2012 law that authorized retroactive taxation. In first proposing the repeal on August 5, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman committed the government to refund the disputed amounts from outstanding cases under the old law. The Indian government has been divesting from state owned enterprises (SOEs) since 1991. In February 2021, the Finance Minister detailed an ambitious program to privatize roughly $24 billion in state owned enterprises as part of the FY 2021-22 (March 31-April 1) budget. India made resolving contract disputes and insolvency easier with the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016. The World Bank noted that the IBC introduced the option of insolvency resolution for commercial entities as an alternative to liquidation or other mechanisms of debt enforcement, reshaping the way insolvent companies can restore their financial well-being or are liquidated. The IBC created effective tools for creditors to successfully negotiate and receive payments. As a result, the overall recovery rate for creditors jumped from 26.5 to 71.6 cents on the dollar, and the time required for resolving insolvency also was reduced from 4.3 years to 1.6 years. India is now, by far, one of the best performers in South Asia in resolving insolvency and does better than the average for OECD high-income economies in terms of the recovery rate, time taken, and cost of proceedings. India enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in 1996, based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model to align its adjudication of commercial contract dispute resolution mechanisms with global standards. The government established the International Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR) as an autonomous organization under the Ministry of Law and Justice to promote the settlement of domestic and international disputes through alternate dispute resolution. The World Bank has also funded ICADR to conduct training for mediators in commercial dispute settlement. Judgments of foreign courts have been enforced under multilateral conventions, including the Geneva Convention. India is a signatory to the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). However, Indian firms are known to file lawsuits in domestic courts to delay paying an arbitral award. Several cases are currently pending, the oldest of which dates to 1983. In 2021, Amazon received an interim award against Future Retail from the Singapore International Arbitration Centre. However, Future Retail has refused to accept the findings and initiated litigation in Indian courts. India is not a member state to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague and the Indian Law Ministry agreed in 2007 to establish a regional PCA office in New Delhi, although this remains pending. The office would provide an arbitration forum to match the facilities offered at The Hague but at a lower cost. In November 2009, the Department of Revenue’s Central Board of Direct Taxes established eight dispute resolution panels across the country to settle the transfer-pricing tax disputes of domestic and foreign companies. In 2016 the government approved amendments that would allow Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions, and Commercial Appellate Divisions of the High Courts Act to establish specialized commercial divisions within domestic courts to settle long-pending commercial disputes. Since formal dispute resolution is expensive and time consuming, many businesses choose methods, including ADR, for resolving disputes. The most used ADRs are arbitration and mediation. India has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. In cases that involve constitutional or criminal law, traditional litigation remains necessary. The introduction and implementation of the IBC in 2016 overhauled of the previous framework for insolvency with much-needed reforms. The IBC created a uniform and comprehensive creditor-driven insolvency resolution process that encompasses all companies, partnerships, and individuals (other than financial firms). According to the World Bank, the time required for resolving insolvency was reduced significantly from 4.3 years to 1.6 years after implementation of the IBC. The law, however, does not provide for U.S. style Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions. In August 2016, the Indian Parliament passed amendments to the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, and the Debt Recovery Tribunals Act. These amendments targeted helping banks and financial institutions recover loans more effectively, encouraging the establishment of more asset reconstruction companies (ARCs), and revamping debt recovery tribunals. The Finance Minister announced in her February 2021 budget speech to Parliament plans to establish the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL), or “bad bank” to resolve large cases of corporate stress. In October 2021, the RBI approved the license to set up the NARCL. On May 10, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) issued a circular to introduce new environment, social, and governance (ESG) reporting requirements for the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalization. According to this circular, new disclosure will be made in the format of the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR), which is a notable departure from SEBI’s existing Business Responsibility Report and a significant step toward bringing sustainability reporting up to existing financial reporting standards. BRSR reporting will be voluntary for FY 2021-22 and mandatory from FY 2022-23 for the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalization. This is to provide companies subject to these requirements with sufficient time to adapt to the new requirements. 4. Industrial Policies The regulatory environment in terms of foreign investment has been eased to make it investor friendly. The measures taken by the government opened new sectors for foreign direct investment, increased the investment limit of existing sectors, and simplified other conditions of the FDI policy. The government also adopted production linked incentives to promote manufacturing in pharmaceuticals, automobiles, textiles, electronics, and other sectors. Details can be accessed at- https://www.investindia.gov.in/production-linked-incentives-schemes-india The government established several foreign trade zone initiatives to encourage export-oriented production. These include Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Export Processing Zones (EPZs), Software Technology Parks (STPs), and Export Oriented Units (EOUs). According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as of February 2022, 425 SEZ’s have been approved and 376 SEZs were operational with 5,604 operating units. The SEZs are treated as foreign territory, and businesses operating within the zones are not subject to customs regulations, FDI equity caps, or industrial licensing requirements and enjoy tax holidays and other tax breaks. Since 2018, the Indian government also announced guidelines for the establishment of the National Industrial and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZs), envisaged as integrated industrial townships to be managed by a special purpose vehicle and led by a government official. So far, three NIMZs have received “final approval” and 13 more have received “in-principal approval.” In addition, eight investment regions along the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DIMC) have also been established as NIMZs. EPZs are industrial parks with incentives for foreign investors in export-oriented businesses. STPs are special zones with similar incentives for software exports. EOUs are industrial companies, established anywhere in India, that export their entire production and are granted duty-free import of intermediate goods; income tax holidays; exemption from excise tax on capital goods, components, and raw materials; and a waiver on sales taxes. These initiatives are governed by separate rules and granted different benefits, details of which can be found at: http://www.sezindia.nic.in, https://www.stpi.in/ http://www.fisme.org.in/export_schemes/DOCS/B- 1/EXPORT%20ORIENTED%20UNIT%20SCHEME.pdf and http://www.makeinindia.com/home. The Indian government does issue guarantees to investments but only for strategic industries. The government has an ambitious target of installing 500 gigawatts of renewable energy (RE) by 2030 and has introduced several schemes and policies supporting clean energy deployment. State governments used to provide feed-in tariffs during the initial stages of RE development. However, with the RE sector becoming competitive, the scheme was discontinued in 2016. Most projects now are awarded through a Tariff Based Competitive Bidding Process . The Ministry of New & Renewable Energy (MNRE) provides ‘ Must Run ’ status to RE projects. MNRE offers Production Linked Incentives (PLI) under the National Program on High Efficiency Solar PV Modules. The PLI scheme was initially offered for just under $617 million and was oversubscribed. Under the FY 2022-23 budget, it was expanded by another $2.6 billion. The Ministry of Heavy Industry (MHI) launched the National Electric Mobility Mission to provide a roadmap for the faster adoption of electric vehicles. Can be accessed at https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/National%20Electric%20Mobility%20Mission%20Plan%202020.pdf . MHI also launched a PLI scheme National Program on Advance Chemistry Cell (ACC) Battery Storage to promote battery manufacturing. The Department of Science & Technology leads Carbon Capture Utilization & Storage (CCUS) efforts to enable near-zero CO2 emissions from power plants and carbon-intensive industries with the program limited to R&D and pilots. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) leads the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency and manages several programs promoting Energy Efficiency across sectors, including buildings, E-Mobility, fuel efficiency for heavy duty vehicles and passenger cars, demand side management, standards, and labelling and certification. The National Hydrogen Mission was launched in August 2021, with the aim to meeting Climate targets and making India a green hydrogen hub. Carbon Capture Utilization & Storage (CCUS) efforts to enable near-zero CO2 emissions from power plants and carbon-intensive industries with the program limited to R&D and pilots. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) leads the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency and manages several programs promoting Energy Efficiency across sectors, including buildings, E-Mobility, fuel efficiency for heavy duty vehicles and passenger cars, demand side management, standards, and labelling and certification. The National Hydrogen Mission was launched in August 2021, with the aim to meeting Climate targets and making India a green hydrogen hub. Preferential Market Access (PMA) for government procurement has created substantial challenges for foreign firms operating in India. The government and SOEs give a 20 percent price preference to vendors utilizing more than 50 percent local content. However, PMA for government procurement limits access to the most cost effective and advanced ICT products available. In December 2014, PMA guidelines were revised and reflect the following updates: Current guidelines emphasize that the promotion of domestic manufacturing is the objective of PMA, while the original premise focused on the linkages between equipment procurement and national security. Current guidelines on PMA implementation are limited to hardware procurement only. Former guidelines were applicable to both products and services. Current guidelines widen the pool of eligible PMA bidders, to include authorized distributors, sole selling agents, authorized dealers, or authorized supply houses of the domestic manufacturers of electronic products, in addition to OEMs, provided they comply with the following terms: The bidder shall furnish the authorization certificate by the domestic manufacturer for selling domestically manufactured electronic products. The bidder shall furnish the affidavit of self-certification issued by the domestic manufacturer to the procuring agency declaring that the electronic product is domestically manufactured in terms of the domestic value addition prescribed. It shall be the responsibility of the bidder to furnish other requisite documents required to be issued by the domestic manufacturer to the procuring agency as per the policy. The current guidelines establish a ceiling on fees linked with the compliance procedure. There would be a complaint fee of roughly $3,000, or one percent of the value of the domestically manufactured electronic product being procured, subject to a maximum of about $7,500, whichever is higher.In January 2017, the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) issued a draft notification under the PMA policy, stating a preference for domestically manufactured servers in government procurement. A current list of PMA guidelines, notified products, and tendering templates can be found on MeitY’s website: http://meity.gov.in/esdm/pma In April 2018, the RBI, announced, without prior stakeholder consultation, that all payment system providers must store their Indian transaction data only in India. The RBI mandate went into effect on October 15, 2018, despite repeated requests by industry and U.S. officials for a delay to allow for more consultations. In July 2019, the RBI, again without prior stakeholder consultation, retroactively expanded the scope of its 2018 data localization requirement to include banks, creating potential liabilities going back to late 2018. The RBI policy overwhelmingly and disproportionately has affected U.S. banks and investors, who depend on the free flow of data to both achieve economies of scale and to protect customers by providing global real-time monitoring and analysis of fraud trends and cybersecurity. In 2021, the RBI banned American Express, Diners Club, and Mastercard from issuing new cards for non-compliance with the data localization rule. In November 2021, the RBI deemed Diners Club compliant and permitted them to resume issuing new cards, but the ban on Mastercard and American Express continues. In addition to the RBI data localization directive for payments companies and banks, the government formally introduced its draft Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB) in December 2019 which has remained pending in Parliament. The PDPB would require “explicit consent” as a condition for the cross-border transfer of sensitive personal data, requiring users to fill out separate forms for each company that held their data. Additionally, Section 33 of the bill would require a copy of all “sensitive personal data” and “critical personal data” to be stored in India, potentially creating redundant local data storage. The localization of all “sensitive personal data” being processed in India could directly impact IT exports. In the current draft no clear criteria for the classification of “critical personal data” has been included. The PDPB also would grant wide authority for a newly created Data Protection Authority to define terms, develop regulations, or otherwise provide specifics on key aspects of the bill after it becomes a law. The implementation of a New Information Technology Rule through Intermediary Guidelines and a Digital Media Ethics Code added further uncertainty to how existing rules will interact with the PDPB and how non-personal data will be handled. 5. Protection of Property Rights In India, a registered sales deed does not confer title of land ownership and is merely a record of the sales transaction that only confers presumptive ownership and can still be disputed. Instead, the title is established through a chain of historical transfer documents that originate from the land’s original established owner. Accordingly, before purchasing land, buyers should examine all the documents that establish title from the original owner. Many owners, particularly in urban areas, do not have access to the necessary chain of documents. This increases uncertainty and risks in land transactions. Several cities, including Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai, have grown according to a master plan registered with the central government’s Ministry of Urban Development. Property rights are generally well-enforced in such places, and district magistrates – normally senior local government officials – notify land and property registrations. Banks and financial institutions provide mortgages and liens against such registered property. In other urban areas, and in areas where illegal settlements have been established, titling often remains unclear. The government launched the National Land Records Modernization Program (NLRMP) in 2008 to clarify land records and provide landholders with legal titles. The program requires the government to survey an area of approximately 2.16 million square miles, including over 430 million rural households, 55 million urban households, and 430 million land records. Initially scheduled for completion in 2016, the program is now scheduled to conclude in 2021. Although land title falls under the jurisdiction of state governments, both the Indian Parliament and state legislatures can make laws governing “acquisition and requisitioning of property.” Land acquisition in India is governed by the Land Acquisition Act (2013), which entered into force in 2014, and continues to be a complicated process due to the lack of an effective legal framework. Land sales require adequate compensation, resettlement of displaced citizens, and 70 percent approval from landowners. The displacement of poorer citizens is politically challenging for local governments. Foreign and domestic private entities are permitted to establish and own businesses in trading companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures, branch offices, project offices, and liaison offices, subject to certain sector-specific restrictions. The government does not permit FDI in real estate, other than company property used to conduct business and for the development of most types of new commercial and residential properties. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) can invest in initial public offerings (IPOs) of companies engaged in real estate. They can also participate in pre-IPO placements undertaken by real estate companies without regard to FDI restrictions. Businesses that intend to build facilities on land they own are also required to take the following steps: 1) register the land and seek land use permission if the industry is located outside an industrially zoned area; 2) obtain environmental site approval; 3) seek authorization for electricity and financing; and 4) obtain appropriate approvals for construction plans from the respective state and municipal authorities. Promoters must also obtain industry-specific environmental approvals in compliance with the Water and Air Pollution Control Acts. Petrochemical complexes, petroleum refineries, thermal power plants, bulk drug makers, and manufacturers of fertilizers, dyes, and paper, among others, must also obtain clearance from the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The Real Estate Act, 2016 aims to protect the rights and interests of consumers and promote uniformity and standardization of business practices and transactions in the real estate sector. Details are available at: http://mohua.gov.in/cms/TheRealEstateAct2016.php The Foreign Exchange Management Regulations and the Foreign Exchange Management Act set forth the rules that allow foreign entities to own immoveable property in India and convert foreign currencies for the purposes of investing in India. These regulations can be found at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Fema.aspx . Foreign investors operating under the Automatic Route are allowed the same rights as an Indian citizen for the purchase of immovable property in India in connection with an approved business activity. Traditional land use rights, including communal rights to forests, pastures, and agricultural land, are protected according to various laws, depending on the land category and community residing on it. Relevant legislation includes the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, the Tribal Rights Act, and the Tribal Land Act. India remained on the Priority Watch List in the USTR Office’s 2022 Special 301 Report due to concerns over weak intellectual property (IP) protection and enforcement. The 2022 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy includes physical and online marketplaces located in or connected to India. In the field of copyright, procedural hurdles, cumbersome policies, and ineffective enforcement continue to remain concerns. In February 2019, the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2019, which would criminalize illicit camcording of films, was tabled in the Parliament and remains pending. In June 2021, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting sought public comments on the Draft Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021. While the draft Bill proposes to enhance the penalties against piracy envisaged in the earlier 2019 bill, it also creates new concerns for the right holders by exempting all exceptions to copyright infringement covered by Section 52 of the India Copyright Act. The expansive granting of licenses under Chapter VI of the Indian Copyright Act and overly broad exceptions for certain uses have raised concerns regarding the strength of copyright protection and complicated the market for music licensing. In April 2021, India abolished the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and transferred its duties to the High Courts and Commercial Courts, creating uncertainties throughout the IP landscape, including raising concerns regarding the efficient adjudication of contentious IP matters. In addition, the abolishment left open how certain IP royalties will be set, collected, and distributed across the country. In August 2021, the DPIIT issued a notice requesting stakeholder comments on the recommendation of the July 2021 Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce (DRPSCC) Report to amend Section 31D of the Indian Copyright Act to extend statutory licensing to “internet or digital broadcasters.” The recommendation broadens the scope of statutory licensing to encompass not only radio and television broadcasting, but also online transmissions, despite a High Court ruling earlier in 2019 that held that statutory broadcast licensing does not include online transmissions. If implemented to permit statutory licensing for interactive transmissions, the DRPSCC Report’s recommendation would not only have severe implications for rights holders who make their content available online, but also raise serious concerns about India’s compliance with relevant international obligations. In the field of patents, the potential threat of compulsory licenses and patent revocations, and the narrow patentability criteria under the Indian Patents Act, burden companies across industry sectors. Patent applications continue to face expensive and time consuming pre- and post-grant oppositions and excessive reporting requirements. In October 2020, India issued a revised “Statement of Working of Patents” (Form 27), required annually by patentees. While some stakeholders have welcomed the revised version of Form 27, concerns remain as to whether the requirement and its associated penalties suppress innovation, and whether Indian authorities will treat as confidential the sensitive business information that parties are required to disclose on the form. India has made some progress on certain administrative decisions in past years, upholding patent rights, and developing specific tools and remedies to support the rights of a patent holder. Nonetheless, concerns remain over revocations and other challenges to patents, especially patents for agriculture, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical products. In addition to India’s application of its compulsory licensing law, the Indian Supreme Court in 2013 interpreted Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Law, as creating a “second tier of qualifying standards for patenting chemical substances and pharmaceuticals.” India currently lacks an effective system for protecting against unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed tests or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural products. Investors have raised concerns with respect to allegedly infringing pharmaceuticals being marketed without advance notice or adequate time or opportunity for parties to achieve early resolution of potential IP disputes. U.S. and Indian companies have advocated for eliminating gaps in India’s trade secrets regime, such as through the adoption of legislation that would specifically address the protection of trade secrets. While India’s National Intellectual Property Rights Policy called in 2016 for trade secrets to serve as an “important area of study for future policy development,” this work has not yet been prioritized. India issued a revised Manual of Patent Office Practice and Procedure in November 2019 that requires patent examiners to look to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Centralized Access to Search and Examination (CASE) system and Digital Access Service (DAS) to find prior art and other information filed by patent applicants in other jurisdictions. Other recent developments include India’s steps toward reducing delays and examination backlogs for patent and trademark applications. In addition, India actively promotes IP awareness and commercialization throughout India through the Cell for IPR Promotion and Management (CIPAM), a professional body under the aegis of the DPIIT, and through the Innovation Cell of the Ministry of Education. Following the IPAB’s abolition in July 2021, the Delhi High Court created an Intellectual Property Division (IPD) to deal with all matters related to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), including those previously covered by the IPAB. In July 2021, DRPSCC issued a report on “Review of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime in India” that is largely based on a premise that stronger protection and enforcement of IP would lead to better economic and social development in the country. The report makes many positive recommendations and emphasizes that India’s IP regime should comply with “International agreements, rules and norms” and be compatible with other nations and foreign entities. Some of the DRPSCC’s recommendations are problematic and raise serious concern from the perspective of U.S. innovators and creators, such as those relating to statutory licensing for “internet or digital broadcasters” under copyright law, and compulsory licensing under patent law. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: John Cabeca Intellectual Property Counselor for South Asia U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Foreign Commercial Service email: john.cabeca@trade.gov website: https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-attache-program tel: +91-11-2347-2000 For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Indian stocks experienced significant losses at the start of 2021, stemming from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. By midyear, markets began to recover, with India’s stock benchmarks reaching record highs and becoming among the top performers globally. Indian companies raised a combined $15.57 billion through 121 IPOs in 2021, the highest amount ever raised in a single calendar year compared with the previous high of $8.4 billion in 2017. Foreign investment inflows drove markets higher through February 2021. However, these investments began exiting the market when faced with the potential for faster-than-expected withdrawal of monetary stimulus and the Delta variant of COVID-19. Domestic institutional investors compensated outflows of foreign investment through significant investment in Indian stocks. Foreign investors’ net investment in 2021 was about $7 billion, significantly lower than the $14.5 billion in 2020 and $19 billion in 2019. Domestic investors put about $12.5 billion in 2021 into Indian domestic equity markets. Indian investors opened 27.4 million new stock trading accounts in 2021, up from 10.5 million accounts opened in 2020. The SEBI is considered one of the most progressive and well-run of India’s regulatory bodies. The SEBI regulates India’s securities markets, including enforcement activities and is India’s direct counterpart to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Board oversees seven exchanges: BSE Ltd. (formerly the Bombay Stock Exchange), the National Stock Exchange (NSE), the Metropolitan Stock Exchange, the Calcutta Stock Exchange, the Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX), the National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange Limited, and the Indian Commodity Exchange. Foreign venture capital investors (FVCIs) must register with the SEBI to invest in Indian firms. They can also set up domestic asset management companies to manage funds. All such investments are allowed under the automatic route, subject to SEBI and RBI regulations, as well as FDI policy. FVCIs can invest in many sectors, including software, information technology, pharmaceuticals and drugs, biotechnology, nanotechnology, biofuels, agriculture, and infrastructure. Companies incorporated outside India can raise capital in India’s capital markets through the issuance of Indian Depository Receipts (IDRs) based on SEBI guidelines. Standard Chartered Bank, a British bank was the only foreign entity to list in India but delisted in June 2020. Experts attribute the lack of interest in IDRs to initial entry barriers, lack of clarity on conversion of the IDRs holdings into overseas shares, lack of tax clarity, and the regulator’s failure to popularize the product. External commercial borrowing (ECB), or direct lending to Indian entities by foreign institutions, is allowed if it conforms to parameters such as minimum maturity; permitted and non-permitted end-uses; maximum all-in-cost ceiling as prescribed by the RBI; funds are used for outward FDI or for domestic investment in industry, infrastructure, hotels, hospitals, software, self-help groups or microfinance activities, or to buy shares in the disinvestment of public sector entities. The rules are published by the RBI: https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11510 According to RBI data, ECB by corporations and non-banking financial companies reached $38.8 billion in 2021. Companies have been increasingly tapping overseas markets for funds to take advantage of low interest rates in global markets. On December 8, 2021, the RBI announced a switch in calculation of interest rates for ECB and trade credits from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to alternative reference rates (ARRs). The RBI has taken several steps in the past few years to bring the activities of the offshore Indian rupee (INR) market in Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDF) onshore, with the goal of deepening domestic markets, enhancing downstream benefits, and obviating the need for an NDF market. FPIs with access to currency futures or the exchange-traded currency options market can hedge onshore currency risks in India and may directly trade in corporate bonds. The RBI allowed banks to freely offer foreign exchange quotes to non-resident Indians. The RBI has stated that trading on INR derivatives would be allowed and settled in foreign currencies in International Financial Services Centers (IFSCs). In June 2020, the RBI allowed foreign branches of Indian banks and branches located in IFSCs to participate in the NDF. With the INR trading volume in the offshore market higher than the onshore market, the RBI felt the need to limit the impact of the NDF market and curb volatility in the movement of the INR. In August 2021, the RBI released a working paper discussing the influence of offshore markets on onshore markets. The International Financial Services Centre at Gujarat International Financial Tech-City (GIFT City) is being developed to compete with global financial hubs. In January 2016, BSE Ltd. was the first exchange to start operations there. The NSE, domestic banks, and foreign banks have also started IFSC banking units in GIFT city. As part of its FY 2021-22 budget proposal, the government recommended establishing an international arbitration center in GIFT City to help facilitate faster resolution of commercial disputes, akin to the operation of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) or London Commercial Arbitration Centre (LCAC). The public sector remains predominant in the banking sector, with public sector banks (PSBs) accounting for about 66 percent of total banking sector assets. However, the share of public banks in total loans and advances has fallen sharply in the last five years (from 70.84 percent in FY 2015-16 to 58.68 percent in FY 2021-22), primarily driven by stressed balance sheets and non-performing loans. In recent years, several new licenses were granted to private financial entities, including two new universal bank licenses and 10 small finance bank licenses. The government announced plans in 2021 to privatize two PSBs. This followed Indian authorities consolidating 10 public sector banks into four in 2019, which reduced the total number of PSBs from 18 to 12. However, the government has yet to introduce the necessary legislation needed to privatize PSBs. Although most large PSBs are listed on exchanges, the government’s stakes in these banks often exceeds the 51 percent legal minimum. Aside from the large number of state-owned banks, directed lending and mandatory holdings of government paper are key facets of the banking sector. The RBI requires commercial banks and foreign banks with more than 20 branches to allocate 40 percent of their loans to priority sectors which include agriculture, small and medium enterprises, export-oriented companies, and social infrastructure. Additionally, all banks are required to invest 18 percent of their net demand and time liabilities in government securities. PSBs continue to face two significant hurdles: capital constraints and poor asset quality. As of September 2021, gross non-performing loans represented 6.9 percent of total loans in the banking system, with the PSBs having a larger share of 8.8 percent of their loan portfolio. The government announced its intention to set up the NARCL and India Debt Resolution Company Limited (IDRCL) to take over legacy stressed assets from bank balance sheets. With the IBC in place, banks are making progress in non-performing asset recognition and resolution. To address asset quality challenges faced by public sector banks, the government has injected $32 billion into public sector banks in recent years. The capitalization largely aimed to address the capital inadequacy of public sector banks and marginally provide for growth capital. Bank mergers and capital raising from the market, improved public sector banks’ total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 13.5 percent in September 2020 to 16.6 percent in September 2021. Women’s lack of sufficient access to finance remained a major impediment to women’s entrepreneurship and participation in the workforce. According to experts, women are more likely than men to lack financial awareness, confidence to approach a financial institution, or possess adequate collateral, often leaving them vulnerable to poor terms of finance. Despite legal protections against discrimination, some banks reportedly remained unwelcoming toward women as customers. International Finance Corporation (IFC) analysts have described Indian women-led Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) as a large but untapped market that has a total finance requirement of $29 billion (72 percent for working capital). However, 70 percent of this demand remained unmet, creating a shortfall of $20 billion. The government-affiliated think tank NITI-Aayog provides information on networking, mentorship, and financing to more than 25,000 members via its Women Entrepreneurship Platform (WEP), launched in March 2018. The government’s financial inclusion scheme Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) provides universal access to banking facilities with at least one basic banking account for every adult, financial literacy, access to credit, insurance, and pension. As of March 2, 2022, 249 million women comprised 55 percent of the program’s 448 million beneficiaries. In 2015, the government started the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency Ltd. (MUDRA), which supports the development of micro-enterprises. The initiative encourages women’s participation and offers collateral-free loans of around $15,000 to non-corporate, non-farm small and micro enterprises. As of October 29, 2021, 215 million loans have been extended to women borrowers. In FY 2016, the Indian government established the National Infrastructure Investment Fund (NIIF), India’s first sovereign wealth fund, to promote investments in the infrastructure sector. The government agreed to contribute $3 billion to the fund, with an additional $3 billion raised from the private sector primarily from foreign sovereign wealth funds, multilateral agencies, endowment funds, pension funds, insurers, and foreign central banks. Currently, the NIIF manages over $4.3 billion in assets through its funds: Master Fund, Fund of Funds, and Strategic Opportunities Fund. The NIIF Master Fund is focused on investing in core infrastructure sectors including transportation, energy, and urban infrastructure. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government owns or controls interests in key sectors with significant economic impact, including infrastructure, oil, gas, mining, and manufacturing. The Department of Public Enterprises ( http://dpe.gov.in ) controls and formulates all the policies pertaining to SOEs, and is headed by a minister to whom the senior management reports. The Comptroller and Auditor General audits the SOEs. The government has taken several steps to improve the performance of SOEs, also called Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs), including improvements to corporate governance. This was necessary as the government planned to disinvest its stake from these entities. According to the Public Enterprise Survey 2019-20, as of March 2020 there were 366 CPSEs, of which 256 are operational with a total turnover of $328 billion. The report revealed that 96 CPSEs were incurring losses and 14 units are under liquidation. Foreign investment is allowed in CPSEs in all sectors. The Master List of CPSEs can be accessed at http://www.bsepsu.com/list-cpse.asp . While the CPSEs face the same tax burden as the private sector, they receive streamlined licensing that private sector enterprises do not on issues such as procurement of land. The government has not generally privatized its assets but instead adopted a gradual disinvestment policy that dilutes government stakes in SOEs without sacrificing control. However as announced in the FY 2021-22 budget, the government has recommitted to the process of privatization of loss-making SOEs with an ambitious disinvestment target of $24 billion. In addition to completing the privatization of national carrier Air India in early 2022, the government has prioritized privatizing the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and reducing its shares in the state-owned Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). Details about the privatization program can be accessed at the Ministry of Finance site for Disinvestment ( https://dipam.gov.in/ ). FIIs can participate in these disinvestment programs. Earlier limits for foreign investors were 24 percent of the paid-up capital of the Indian company and 10 percent for non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin. The limit is 20 percent of the paid-up capital in the case of public sector banks. There is no bidding process. The shares of the SOEs being disinvested are sold in the open market. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Among Indian companies there is a general awareness of standards for responsible business conduct. The MCA administers the Companies Act of 2013 and is responsible for regulating the corporate sector in accordance with the law. The MCA is also responsible for protecting the interests of consumers by ensuring competitive markets. The Companies Act of 2013 also established the framework for India’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) laws, mandating that companies spend an average of two percent of their average net profit of the preceding three fiscal years. While the CSR obligations are mandated by law, non-government organizations (NGOs) in India also track CSR activities and provide recommendations in some cases for effective use of CSR funds. According to the MCA website, in FY 2020-21, 8,633 companies spent $2.72 billion on more than 25,000 CSR projects across India. The MCA released the National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct, 2018 (NGRBC) on March 13, 2019, to improve the 2011 National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental & Economic Responsibilities of Business. The NGRBC aligned with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights (UNGPs). India does not adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. There are provisions to promote responsible business conduct throughout the supply chain. India is neither a member of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), nor a member of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Government of India launched the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) on June 30, 2008, outlining eight “National Missions: on climate change. These include: National Solar Mission National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency National Mission on Sustainable Habitat National Water Mission National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Eco-system National Mission for a Green India National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change In addition, India has the Biological Diversity Act 2002 that focuses on the conservation of biological resources, managing its sustainable use, and enabling the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use and knowledge of biological resources with the local communities. The Act has a three-tier structure to regulate access to biological resources: The National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) The State Biodiversity Boards (SBBs) The Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs) (at local level) India does not yet have a system of ecosystem services, but the government is currently discussing within its interagency and with outside stakeholders the value of developing a strategy for ecosystem services. During the CoP 26 in Glasgow, Prime Minister Modi announced that India planned to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070. The government is now developing a strategy and a detailed plan to achieve that goal. The government has regulatory systems in place that include pollution standards, biodiversity off-sets through compensatory forestation, and a forest policy and wildlife management plans with numerous national parks and wildlife sanctuaries that protect forests and biodiversity. At CoP 26 Prime Minister Modi called for making LIFE – Lifestyle for Environment – a global movement that advances sustainable lifestyles as a part of addressing the climate crisis. While there is no sustainable public procurement law in India, the General Financial Rules (GFR) 2017 contain provisions that allow purchasing authorities to include environmental criteria when making procurements. Ministry of Finance procurement manuals also emphasize this ability. Various public sector entities and some government departments have started considering environmental and energy efficiency criteria in their procurement decisions. In addition, the government constituted a taskforce on sustainable public procurement in 2018 with the mandate to: Review international best practices in Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) Identify the current status of SPP in India across Government organizations Prepare a draft Sustainable Procurement Action Plan Recommend an initial set of product/service categories (along with their specifications) where SPP can be implemented However, the government has not yet developed a sustainable procurement action plan or policy mandating sustainable public procurement. 9. Corruption India is a signatory to the United Nation’s Conventions Against Corruption and is a member of the G20 Working Group against corruption. India, with a score of 40, ranked 86 among 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index. Corruption is addressed by the following laws: The Companies Act, 2013; the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; the Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973; the Indian Contract Act, 1872; and the Indian Penal Code of 1860. Anti- corruption laws amended since 2004 have granted additional powers to vigilance departments in government ministries at the central and state levels and elevated the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to be a statutory body. In addition, the Comptroller and Auditor General is charged with performing audits on public-private-partnership contracts in the infrastructure sector based on allegations of revenue loss to the exchequer. Other statutes approved by parliament to tackle corruption include: The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act of 2016 The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, enacted in 2017 The Whistleblower Protection Act, 2011 was passed in 2014 but has yet to be operationalized The Companies Act, 2013 established rules related to corruption in the private sector by mandating mechanisms for the protection of whistleblowers, industry codes of conduct, and the appointment of independent directors to company boards. However, the government has not established any monitoring mechanism, and it is unclear the extent to which these protections have been instituted. No legislation focuses particularly on the protection of NGOs working on corruption issues, though the Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011 may afford some protection once implemented. In 2013, Parliament enacted the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, which created a national anti- corruption ombudsman and required states to create state-level ombudsmen within one year of the law’s passage. A national ombudsman was appointed in March 2019. India is a signatory to the United Nations Conventions against Corruption and is a member of the G20 Working Group against Corruption. India is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Indian chapter of Transparency International was closed in 2019. Matt Ingeneri Economic Growth Unit Chief U.S. Embassy New Delhi Shantipath, Chanakyapuri New Delhi +91 11 2419 8000 ingeneripm@state.gov Mr. Suresh Patel Central Vigilance Commissioner Satarkta Bhavan , Block-A GPO Complex, INA New Delhi – 110 023 Ph: +91-11- 24651020 www.cvc.gov.in 10. Political and Security Environment India is a multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature. The president, elected by an electoral college composed of the state assemblies and parliament, is the head of state, and the prime minister is the head of government. National parliamentary elections are held every five years. Under the constitution, the country’s 28 states and eight union territories have a high degree of autonomy and have primary responsibility for law and order. Electors chose President Ram Nath Kovind in 2017 to serve a five-year term. Following the May 2019 national elections, Prime Minister Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) received a larger majority in the lower house of Parliament, or Lok Sabha, than it had won in the 2014 elections and returned Modi for a second term as prime minister. Observers considered the parliamentary elections, which included more than 600 million voters, to be free and fair, although there were reports of isolated instances of violence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Although there are more than 20 million unionized workers in India, unions still represent less than five percent of the total work force. Most of these unions are linked to political parties. Unions are typically strong in state-owned enterprises. A majority of the unionized work force can be found in the railroads, port and dock, banking, and insurance sectors. According to provisional figures from the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), over 672,000 workdays were lost to strikes and lockouts during 2021. Nonetheless, the International Labor Organization and International Monetary Fund both estimate India’s informal economy accounts for over 80 percent of overall employment. Labor unrest occurs throughout India, though the reasons and affected sectors vary widely. Most reported labor problems are the result of workplace disagreements over pay, working conditions, and union representation. To reduce the number and complexity of India’s previous 29 national labor statutes, address statutory contradictions, improve compliance, and improve labor rights protections by shifting businesses and workers into the formal economy, the parliament consolidated and reformed India’s national labor laws, beginning with passage of the Code on Wages in 2019. During 2020, the parliament passed the Industrial Relations Code; the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code; and the Code on Social Security. These laws’ reforms expanded minimum wage and social security coverage to informal sector workers in agriculture and the growing gig economy, raised the threshold for small and medium sized enterprise exemptions from 100 to 300 employees to foster growth of medium sized enterprises and move workers into the formal economy, expanded the authorized use of contract labor, and gave employers greater hiring and firing flexibility. Details of the laws can be accessed at https://labour.gov.in/labour-law-reforms . The new labor laws require adoption by India’s states for full implementation, which remains ongoing. The Maternity Benefits Act, 1961, as amended in 2017, mandates 26 weeks of paid maternity leave for women. The Act also mandates for all industrial establishments employing 50 or more workers to have a creche for babies to enable nursing mothers to feed the child up to four times in a day. The Child Labor Act, 1986 establishes a minimum age of 14 years for work and 18 years as the minimum age for hazardous work. The Bonded Labor Act, 1976 prohibits the use of bonded/forced labor. There are no reliable unemployment statistics for India due to the informal nature of most employment. During the COVID-19 pandemic experts claimed the unemployment rate spiraled as people in the informal sector lost their jobs. The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) reported that the average unemployment in October-December period of 2021 was around 7.54 percent. 14. Contact for More Information Matt Ingeneri Economic Growth Unit Chief U.S. Embassy New Delhi Shantipath, Chanakyapuri New Delhi +91 11 2419 8000 ingeneripm@state.gov Indonesia Executive Summary Indonesia’s 274 million population, USD 1 trillion economy, growing middle class, abundant natural resources, and stable economy are attractive features to U.S. investors; however, investing in Indonesia remains challenging. President Joko (“Jokowi”) Widodo, now in his second five-year term, has prioritized pandemic recovery, infrastructure investment, and human capital development. The government’s marquee reform effort — the 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Omnibus Law) — was temporarily suspended by a constitutional court ruling, but if fully implemented, is touted by business to improve competitiveness by lowering corporate taxes, reforming labor laws, and reducing bureaucratic and regulatory barriers. The United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Indonesia. In February 2021, Indonesia replaced its 2016 Negative Investment List, liberalizing nearly all sectors to foreign investment, except for seven “strategic” sectors reserved for central government oversight. In 2021, the government established the Risk-Based Online Single Submission System (OSS), to streamline the business license and import permit process. Indonesia established a sovereign wealth fund (Indonesian Investment Authority, i.e., INA) in 2021 that has a goal to attract foreign investment for government infrastructure projects in sectors such as transportation, oil and gas, health, tourism, and digital technologies. Yet, restrictive regulations, legal and regulatory uncertainty, economic nationalism, trade protectionism, and vested interests complicate the investment climate. Foreign investors may be expected to partner with Indonesian companies and to manufacture or purchase goods and services locally. Labor unions have protested new labor policies under the Omnibus Law that they note have weakened labor rights. Restrictions imposed on the authority of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) led to a significant decline in investigations and prosecutions. Investors cite corruption as an obstacle to pursuing opportunities in Indonesia. Other barriers include bureaucratic inefficiency, delays in land acquisition for infrastructure projects, weak enforcement of contracts, and delays in receiving refunds for advance corporate tax overpayments. Investors worry that new regulations are sometimes imprecise and lack stakeholder consultation. Companies report that the energy and mining sectors still face significant foreign investment barriers, and all sectors have a lack of adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement, and restrictions on cross border data flows. Nonetheless, Indonesia continues to attract significant foreign investment. According to the 2020 IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, Singapore, the United States, the Netherlands, Japan, and China were among the top foreign investment sources (latest available full-year data). Private consumption drives the Indonesian economy that is the largest in ASEAN, making it a promising destination for a wide range of companies, ranging from consumer products and financial services to digital start-ups and e-commerce. Indonesia has ambitious plans to expand access to renewable energy, build mining and mineral downstream industries, improve agriculture production, and enhance infrastructure, including building roads, ports, railways, and airports, as well as telecommunications and broadband networks. Indonesia continues to attract American digital technology companies, financial technology start-ups, franchises, health services producers and consumer product manufacturers. Indonesia launched the National Women’s Financial Inclusion Strategy in 2020, which aims to empower women through greater access to financial resources and digital skills and to increase financial and investor support for women-owned businesses. Table 1 Measure Year Index or Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions index 2021 96 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/idn Global Innovation Index 2021 87 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $18,715 M https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=2&step=1 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,870 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=ID 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Indonesia is an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) due to its relatively young demographics, strong domestic demand, stable political situation, abundant natural resources, and well-regarded macroeconomic policy. Indonesian government officials often state that they welcome increased FDI, aiming to create jobs, spur economic growth, and court foreign investors, notably focusing on infrastructure development, export-oriented manufacturing, mining refinery industries, and green investment. To further improve the investment climate, the government issued the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Law No. 1/2020) in October 2020 to amend dozens of prevailing laws deemed to hamper investment. It introduced a risk-based approach for business licensing, simplified environmental requirements and building certificates, tax reforms to ease doing business, more flexible labor regulations, and the establishment of the priority investment list. It also streamlined the business licensing process at the regional level. At the same time, investors cite concerns over restrictive technical regulations, policy inconsistency, bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of infrastructure, sanctity of contract issues, and corruption. The Ministry of Investment / Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) serves as an investment promotion agency, a regulatory body, and the agency in charge of approving planned investments in Indonesia. As such, it is the first point of contact for foreign investors, particularly in manufacturing, industrial, and non-financial services sectors. In August 2021, BKPM launched the Risk-Based Online Single Submission (OSS), an integrated online system that streamlines almost all business licensing and permitting processes (except in the oil and gas, and financial sectors). Under the OSS, businesses deemed lower risk will face fewer administrative requirements to obtain permits and licenses. The GOI abolished building permit requirements and relaxed environmental licenses, which the government deemed were major sources of corruption in the business licensing process. The OSS system intends to streamline permit issuance, but integrating overlapping authorities across ministries into one system, both at the national and subnational level, remains challenging. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation requires local governments to integrate their license systems into the OSS. The law allows the central government to take over local governments’ authority if local governments are not performing. The government has provided investment incentives particularly for “priority” sectors (please see the section on Industrial Policies). As part of the implementation of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, the Indonesian government enacted Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 to introduce a significant liberalization of foreign investment in Indonesia, repealing the 2016 Negative List of Investment (DNI). In contrast to the previous regulation, the new investment list sets a default principle that all business sectors are open for investment unless stipulated otherwise. It details the seven sectors that are closed to investment, explains that public services and defense are reserved for the central government, and outlines four categories of sectors that are open to investment: priority investment sectors that are eligible for incentives; sectors that are reserved for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and cooperatives or open to foreign investors who cooperate with them; sectors that are open with certain requirements (i.e., with caps on foreign ownership or special permit requirements); and sectors that are fully open for foreign investment. Although hundreds of sectors that were previously closed or subject to foreign ownership caps are in theory open to 100 percent foreign investment, in practice technical and sectoral regulations may stipulate different or conflicting requirements that still need to be resolved. In total, 245 business fields listed in the new Investment Priorities List, or DPI, are eligible for fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, notably pioneer industries, export-oriented manufacturing, capital intensive industries, national infrastructure projects, digital economy, labor-intensive industries, as well as research and development activities. Restrictions on foreign ownership in telecommunications and information technology (e.g., internet providers, fixed telecommunication providers, mobile network providers), construction services, oil and gas support services, electricity, distribution, plantations, and transportation were removed. Healthcare services including hospitals/clinics, wholesale of pharmaceutical raw materials, and finished drug manufacturing are fully open for foreign investment, which was previously capped in certain percentages. The regulation also reduced the number of business fields that are subject to certain requirements to only 46 sectors. Domestic sea transportation and postal services are allowed up to 49 percent of foreign ownership, while press, including magazines and newspapers, and broadcasting sectors are open up to 49 percent and 20 percent, respectively, but only for business expansion or capital increases. Small plantations, industry related to special cultural heritage, and low technology industries or industries with capital less than IDR10 billion (USD 700,000) are reserved for MSMEs and cooperatives. Foreign investors in partnership with MSMEs and cooperatives can invest in certain designated areas. The new investment list shortened the number of restricted sectors from 20 to 7 categories including cannabis, gambling, fishing of endangered species, coral extraction, alcohol, industries using ozone-depleting materials, and chemical weapons. In addition, while education investment is still subject to the Education Law, Government Regulation No. 40/2021 permits education and health investment as business activities in special economic zones. In 2016, Bank Indonesia (BI) issued Regulation No. 18/2016 on the implementation of payment transaction processing. The regulation governs all companies providing the following services: principal, issuer, acquirer, clearing, final settlement operator, and operator of funds transfer. The BI Regulation capped foreign ownership of payments companies at 20 percent, though it contained a grandfathering provision. BI’s Regulation No. 19/2017 on the National Payment Gateway (NPG) subsequently imposed a 20 percent foreign equity cap on all companies engaging in domestic debit switching transactions. Firms wishing to continue executing domestic debit transactions are obligated to sign partnership agreements with one of Indonesia’s four NPG switching companies. In December 2020, BI issued umbrella Regulation No. 22/23/2020 on the Payment System, which implements BI’s 2025 Payment System Blueprint and introduces a risk-based categorization and licensing system. The regulation entered into force on July 1, 2021. It allows 85 percent foreign ownership of non-bank payment services providers, although at least 51 percent of shares with voting rights must be owned by Indonesians, and foreign investors may only hold 49 percent of voting shares. The 20 percent foreign equity cap remains in place for payment system infrastructure operators who handle clearing and settlement services, and a grandfathering provision remains in effect for existing licensed payment companies. U.S. payment systems companies have stated that the new regulations could further limit access to Indonesia’s financial services market. Prior regulations required authorization, clearing, and settlement to be processed onshore. The new regulations add initiation of a payment as an onshore processing requirement. The regulations do not specify requirements by product. While the regulations provide for offshore processing if certain requirements are met, it is subject to BI approval. OJK Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2021, issued in August 2021, increased the foreign equity cap for commercial banks to 99 percent subject to OJK evaluation and approval, and foreign entities should meet requirements as follows: be committed to support the development of the Indonesian economy; obtain recommendations from the supervisory authority of the country of origin; and have a rating of at least 1 level above the lowest investment rating for bank financial institutions, 2 levels above the lowest investment rating for nonbank financial institutions, and 3 levels above the lowest investment rating for legal entities that are not financial institutions. This new regulation does not repeal the regulations listed in POJK 56 of 2016 article 2 and article 6 paragraph 1, stating that foreign entities may own shares of a bank representing more than 40 percent of the Bank’s capital subject to the approval of the Financial Services Authority (OJK). Foreigners may purchase equity in state-owned firms through initial public offerings and the secondary market. Capital investments in publicly listed companies through the stock exchange are generally not subject to the limitation of foreign ownership as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021. Government Regulation 14/2018 (Regulation 14) on foreign ownership in insurance companies set the maximum threshold for foreign equity ownership of an Indonesian insurance company to 80 percent but exempted insurance companies with existing foreign ownership levels that exceed 80 percent. Subsequently, the government issued Government Regulation 3/2020 to strengthen the grandfathering provisions of Regulation 14 by allowing foreign investors to inject capital and maintain their existing capital share, repealing the obligation under Regulation 14 for a local shareholder to make a corresponding 20 percent capital injection in the event of a capital increase. In June 2020, OJK issued Regulation 39/2020, which provides for the phased elimination of the domestic cession requirements for purchase of reinsurance from companies domiciled in a country with whom Indonesia has a bilateral agreement. The regulation also phased out the requirement for domestic reinsurance obligations for simple risks by the end of 2020, and for non-simple risks in 2022. Indonesia’s vast natural resources have attracted significant foreign investment and continue to offer significant prospects. However, some companies report that a variety of government regulations have made doing business in the resources sector increasingly difficult, and Indonesia now ranks 69th of 78 jurisdictions in the Fraser Institute’s 2020 Mining Policy Perception Index. In 2012, Indonesia banned the export of raw minerals, dramatically increased the divestment requirements for foreign mining companies, and required major mining companies to renegotiate their contracts of work with the government. The full export ban did not come into effect until January 2017, when the government also issued new regulations allowing exports of copper concentrate and other specified minerals, while imposing onerous requirements. Of note for foreign investors, provisions of the regulations require that to export mineral ores, companies with contracts of work must convert to mining business licenses – and be subject to prevailing regulations – and must commit to build smelters within the next five years. Also, foreign-owned mining companies must gradually divest 51 percent of shares to Indonesian interests over ten years, with the price of divested shares determined based on a “fair market value” determination that does not consider existing reserves. In January 2020, the government banned the export of nickel ore for all mining companies, foreign and domestic, in the hopes of encouraging construction of domestic nickel smelters. In March 2021, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources issued a Ministerial Decision to allow mining business licenses holders who have not reached smelter development targets to continue exporting raw mineral ores under certain conditions. The 2020 Mining Law returned the authority to issue mining licenses to the central government. Local governments only retain authority to issue small scale mining permits. In December 2020, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources issued Ministerial Decision No. 255.K/30/MEM/2020 that mandates coal mining companies fulfill 25 percent of its production for Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) and set the maximum price of coal for domestic power generation at $70/ton. In January 2022, the government of Indonesia banned exports of coal for all mining companies due to low DMO fulfillment, leading to the risk of power blackouts. The government has lifted the coal export ban and imposed stricter control to allow exports only for coal mining companies that have fulfilled DMO requirements. The latest World Trade Organization (WTO) Investment Policy Review of Indonesia was conducted in February 2021 and can be found on the WTO website: directdoc.aspx (wto.org) The last OECD Investment Policy Review of Indonesia, conducted in 2020, can be found on the OECD website: https://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-indonesia-2020-b56512da-en.htm The 2021 UNCTAD Report on ASEAN Investment can be found here: http://investasean.asean.org/files/upload/ASEAN%20Investment%20Report%202020-2021.pdf Business and Human Rights Resource Center’s Reports: Report on Human Rights Impact Assessment for Japanese Business Investmnt in Indonesia: Investigation Into Deforestation at An Indonesian Company: Global Witness country-specific reports can be accessed here: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/indonesia-palm-oil-traders-are-failing-land-and-environmental-defenders/ List of conflicts related to environmental and human rights involving companies investing in Indonesia can be seen on Environmental Justice can be accessed here: https: https://ejatlas.org/ In order to conduct business in Indonesia, foreign investors must be incorporated as a foreign-owned limited liability company (PMA) through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Once incorporated, a PMA must fulfill business licensing requirements through the OSS system. In February 2021, the Indonesian government issued Government Regulation No. 5/2021, introducing a risk-based approach and streamlined business licensing process for almost all sectors. The regulation classifies business activities into categories of low, medium, and high risk, which will further determine business licensing requirements for each investment. Low-risk business activities only require a business identity number (NIB) to start commercial and production activities. An NIB also serves as the import identification number, customs access identifier, halal guarantee statement (for low risk), and environmental management and monitoring capability statement letter (for low risk). Medium-risk sectors must obtain an NIB and a standard certification. Under the regulation, a standard certificate for medium-low risk is a self-declared statement that certain business standards were fulfilled, while a standard certificate for medium-high risk must be verified by the relevant government agency. High-risk sectors must apply for full business licenses, including an environmental impact assessment (AMDAL). A business license remains valid while the business operates in compliance with Indonesian laws and regulations. A grandfather clause applies to existing businesses that have obtained business licenses. Guidance on the business application process through the Risk-Based OSS can be found at https://oss.go.id/panduan. The OSS system is an online portal which allows foreign investors to apply for and track the status of licenses and other services online. Foreign investors are generally prohibited from investing in MSMEs in Indonesia, although Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 opened some opportunities for partnerships in farming, two- and three-wheeled vehicles, automotive spare parts, medical devices, ship repair, health laboratories, and jewelry/precious metals. According to Presidential Instruction 7/2019, the Ministry of Investment/BKPM is responsible for issuing “investment licenses” (the term used to encompass both NIB and other business licenses) that have been delegated from all relevant ministries and government institutions to foreign entities through the OSS system. BKPM has also been tasked to review policies deemed unfavorable for investors. While the OSS’s goal is to help streamline investment approvals, investments in the mining, oil and gas, and financial sectors still require licenses from related ministries and authorities. Certain tax and land permits, among others, typically must be obtained from local government authorities. Though Indonesian companies are only required to obtain one approval at the local level, businesses report that foreign companies must often seek additional approvals to establish a business. Government Regulation No. 6/2021 requires local governments to integrate their business licenses system into the Risk-Based OSS system and standardize services through a service-level agreement between the central and local governments. Indonesia’s outward investment is limited, as domestic investors tend to focus on the large domestic market. BKPM is responsible for promoting and facilitating outward investment, to include providing information about investment opportunities in other countries. BKPM also uses its investment and trade promotion centers abroad to match Indonesian companies with potential investment opportunities. The government neither restricts nor provides incentives for outward private sector investment. The Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) encourages Indonesian SOEs through the SOE Go Global Program to increase their investment abroad, aiming to improve Indonesia’s supply chain and establish demand for Indonesian exports in strategic markets. According to the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Indonesia recorded USD 4.5 billion outward direct investments in 2020, increasing 33.3 percent. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Indonesia currently has 26 bilateral investment agreements in force. In 2014, Indonesia began to abrogate its existing BITs by allowing the agreements to expire. However, Indonesia ratified a new BIT with Singapore in March 2021, marking the first investment treaty signed and entered into force after years of review. Indonesia reportedly developed a new model BIT which is currently reflected in the investment chapter of newly signed trade agreements. A detailed list of Indonesia’s investment agreements can be found at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/97/indonesia . Indonesia is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In November 2020, 10 ASEAN Member States and five additional countries (Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand) signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), representing around 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product and population. RCEP encompasses trade in goods, services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property rights, competition, dispute settlement, e-commerce, SMEs, and government procurement. Indonesia is actively engaged in bilateral FTA negotiations. Indonesia recently signed trade agreements with Australia, Chile, Mozambique, the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), and South Korea. Indonesia is currently negotiating Bilateral Trade Agreements with the European Union, United Arab Emirates, Canada, and other countries. The United States and Indonesia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) on July 16, 1996. This Agreement is the primary mechanism for discussions of trade and investment issues between the United States and Indonesia. The two countries also signed the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income in Jakarta on July 11, 1988. This was amended with a Protocol, signed on July 24, 1996. There is no double taxation of personal income. Indonesia is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Based Erosion and Profit Shifting. The government is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. 3. Legal Regime Indonesia continues to bring its legal, regulatory, and accounting systems into compliance with international norms and agreements, but foreign investors have indicated they still encounter challenges in comparison to domestic investors and have criticized the current regulatory system for its failure to establish clear and transparent rules for all actors. Certain laws and policies establish sectors that are either fully off-limits to foreign investors or are subject to substantive conditions. To improve the investment climate and create jobs, Indonesia overhauled more than 70 laws and thousands of regulations through the enactment of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. In November 2021, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled the Omnibus Law on Job Creation was conditionally unconstitutional due to its non-alignment with the standard formulation of laws and regulations, specifically that the law did not have the appropriate public participation during its formulation and deliberation process. The court ordered government officials to amend the procedural flaws in the law within two years and that no new implementing regulations for the Omnibus Law should be issued, although implementing regulations that had already been issued up to the date of the court ruling remain in force. U.S. businesses cite regulatory uncertainty and a lack of transparency as two significant factors hindering operations. U.S. companies note that regulatory consultation in Indonesia is inconsistent, despite the existence of Law No. 12/2011 on the Development of Laws and Regulations and implementation of Government Regulation No. 87/204, which states that the community is entitled to provide oral or written input into draft laws and regulations. The law also sets out procedures for revoking regulations and introduces requirements for academic studies as a basis for formulating laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the absence of a formal consultation mechanism has been reported to lead to different interpretations among policy makers of what is required. Laws and regulations are often vague and require substantial interpretation by the implementers, leading to business uncertainty and rent-seeking opportunities. Decentralization has introduced another layer of bureaucracy and red tape for firms to navigate. In 2016, the Jokowi administration repealed 3,143 regional bylaws that overlapped with other regulations and impeded the ease of doing business. However, a 2017 Constitutional Court ruling limited the Ministry of Home Affairs’ authority to revoke local regulations and allowed local governments to appeal the central government’s decision. The Ministry continues to play a consultative function in the regulation drafting stage, providing input to standardize regional bylaws with national laws. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation provided a legal framework to streamline regulations. It establishes the norms, standards, procedures, criteria (NSPK) and performance requirements in administering government affairs for both the central and local governments. Law No. 11/2020 aims to harmonize licensing requirements at the central and regional levels. Under that law and its implementing regulations, the central government has the authority to take over regional business licensing if local governments do not meet performance requirements. Local governments must also obtain recommendations from the Ministries of Home Affairs and Finance prior to implementing local tax regulations. In 2017, Presidential Instruction No. 7/2017 was enacted to improve coordination among ministries in the policy-making process. The regulation requires lead ministries to coordinate with their respective coordinating ministry before issuing a regulation. The regulation also requires ministries to conduct a regulatory impact analysis and provide an opportunity for public consultation. The presidential instruction did not address the frequent lack of coordination between the central and local governments. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation enhanced the predictability of trade policy by moving the authority to issue trade regulations from the ministry-level (Ministry of Trade regulation) to the cabinet-level (government regulation). Indonesia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2014 and the 2015 Paring Agreement in 2019 and issued Presidential Regulation 59/2017 on the implementation of the SDGs to support reforms in tackling issued related environment, social, and governance, and climate changes. The government made reforms to attract green investment, among others, through the issuance of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) has been actively promoting sustainable financing by developing a sustainable finance roadmap, establishing a task force for sustainable finance in financial sectors, and developing green bonds regulations. The Minister of Finance issued the first green sukuk (Islamic bonds) in February 2018. As an ASEAN member, Indonesia has successfully implemented regional initiatives, including the real-time movement of electronic import documents through the ASEAN Single Window, which reduces shipping costs, speeds customs clearance, and limits corruption opportunities. Indonesia has also ratified the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement and committed to ratify the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Notwithstanding the progress made in certain areas, the often-lengthy process of aligning national legislation has caused delays in implementation. The complexity of interagency coordination and/or a shortage of technical capacity are among the challenges being reported. Indonesia joined the WTO in 1995. Indonesia’s National Standards Body (BSN) is the primary government agency to notify draft regulations to the WTO concerning technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS); however, in practice, notification is inconsistent. In December 2017, Indonesia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Indonesia has met 88.7 percent of its commitments to the TFA provisions to date, including publication of information, consultations, advance rulings, detention and test procedures, goods clearance, import/export formalities, and goods transit. Indonesia is a Contracting Party to the Aircraft Protocol to the Convention of International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention). However, foreign investors bringing aircraft to Indonesia to serve the general aviation sector have faced difficulty utilizing Cape Town Convention provisions to recover aircraft leased to Indonesian companies. Foreign owners of leased aircraft that have become the subject of contractual lease disputes with Indonesian lessees have been unable to recover their aircraft in certain circumstances. Indonesia’s legal system is based on civil law. The court system consists of District Courts (primary courts of original jurisdiction), High Courts (courts of appeal), and the Supreme Court (the court of last resort). Indonesia also has a Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has the same legal standing as the Supreme Court, and its role is to review the constitutionality of legislation. Both the Supreme and Constitutional Courts have authority to conduct judicial review. Corruption continues to plague Indonesia’s judiciary, with graft investigations involving senior judges and court staff. Many businesses note that the judiciary is susceptible to influence from outside parties. Certain companies have claimed that the court system often does not provide the necessary recourse for resolving property and contractual disputes and that cases that would be adjudicated in civil courts in other jurisdictions sometimes result in criminal charges in Indonesia. Judges are not bound by precedent and many laws are open to various interpretations. A lack of clear land titles has plagued Indonesia for decades, although land acquisition law No. 2/2012 includes legal mechanisms designed to resolve some past land ownership issues. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation also created a land bank to facilitate land acquisition for priority investment projects. In January 2022, President Jokowi established a task force to formulate land use policy and conduct mapping of land use on mining, plantation, and forestry activities, and provide recommendations to the Ministry of Investment on revocation of land permits that are not being utilized. Government Regulation No. 27/2017 provided incentives for upstream energy development and regulates recoverable costs from production sharing contracts. Indonesia has also required mining companies to renegotiate their contracts of work to include higher royalties, more divestment to local partners, more local content, and domestic processing of mineral ore. Indonesia’s commercial code, grounded in colonial Dutch law, has been updated to include provisions on bankruptcy, intellectual property rights, incorporation and dissolution of businesses, banking, and capital markets. Application of the commercial code, including the bankruptcy provisions, remains uneven, in large part due to corruption and training deficits for judges and lawyers. FDI in Indonesia is regulated by Law No. 25/2007 (the Investment Law) which was amended by the Omnibus Law of Job Creation. Under the law, any form of FDI in Indonesia must be in the form of a limited liability company with minimum capital of IDR 10 billion (USD 700,000), excluding land and building and with the foreign investor holding shares in the company. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation allows foreign investors to invest below IDR 10 billion in technology-based startups in special economic zones. The Law also introduces several provisions to simplify business licensing requirements, reforms rigid labor laws, introduces tax reforms to support ease of doing business, and establishes the Indonesian Investment Authority (INA) to facilitate direct investment. In addition, the government repealed the 2016 Negative Investment List through the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021, introducing major reforms that removed restrictions on foreign ownership in hundreds of sectors that were previously closed or subject to foreign ownership caps. Several sectors remain closed to investment or are otherwise restricted. Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 contains a grandfather clause that clarifies that existing investments will not be affected unless treatment under the new regulation is more favorable or the investment has special rights under a bilateral agreement. The Indonesian government also expanded business activities in special economic zones to include education and health. (See section on limits on foreign control regarding the new list of investments.) The website of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) provides information on investment requirements and procedures: https://nswi.bkpm.go.id/guide. Indonesia mandates reporting obligations for all foreign investors through the OSS system as stipulated in BKPM Regulation No. 6/2020. (See section two for Indonesia’s procedures for licensing foreign investment.) The Indonesian Competition Authority (KPPU) implements and enforces the 1999 Indonesia Competition Law. The KPPU reviews agreements, business practices and mergers that may be deemed anti-competitive, advises the government on policies that may affect competition, and issues guidelines relating to the Competition Law. Strategic sectors such as food, finance, banking, energy, infrastructure, health, and education are the KPPU’s priorities. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation and its implementing regulation, Government Regulation No. 44/2021, removes criminal sanctions and the cap on administrative fines, which was set at a maximum of IDR 25 billion (USD 1.7 million) under the previous regulation. Appeals of KPPU decisions must be processed through the commercial court. Indonesia’s political leadership has long championed economic nationalism, particularly concerning mineral and oil and gas reserves. According to Law No. 25/2007 (the Investment Law), the Indonesian government is barred from nationalizing or expropriating an investor’s property rights, unless provided by law. If the Indonesian government nationalizes or expropriates an investors’ property rights, it must provide market value compensation. Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020 on Government Use of Patent and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (MLHR) Regulation No. 30/2019 on Compulsory Licenses (CL) enables patent right expropriation in cases deemed in the interest of national security or due to a national emergency. Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020 allows a GOI agency or Ministry to request expropriation, while MLHR Regulation No. 30/2019 allows an individual or private party to request a CL. GOI issued Presidential decrees number 100 and number 101 in November 2021 announcing government use of the Remdesivir and Favipiravir Patents to secure needed COVID-19 drugs supply. This decree will remain in effect for three years, extendable until the end of the global Covid-19 pandemic and requires the assigned company to compensate Remdesivir and Favirapir patent holders one percent of its net annual sales. 4. Industrial Policies Indonesia seeks to facilitate investment through fiscal incentives, non-fiscal incentives, and other benefits. Fiscal incentives are in the form of tax holidays, tax allowances, and exemptions of import duties for capital goods and raw materials for investment. Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 on investment establishes 245 priority fields that are eligible for tax and other incentives, such as facilitated licensing and land use, to encourage investment in those sectors. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation offers a variety of tax incentives, including eliminating income tax on dividends earned in Indonesia and on certain income, including dividends earned abroad, if they are invested in Indonesia. The Law also exempts dozens of goods and services from value added tax (VAT). The provisions in the Omnibus Law on Job Creation complement several regulations in Law No. 2/2020, which was issued earlier in 2020. Law No. 2 cut the corporate income tax rate, lowering it to 22 percent for 2020 and 2021, and to 20 percent for 2022. However, the Tax Harmonization Law No. 7/2021 reversed this tax cut, keeping corporate income tax for 2022 at 22 percent. In addition, a company can claim a further 3 percent reduction if it is publicly listed, with a total number of shares traded on an Indonesian stock exchange of at least 40 percent. A zero import duty for incompletely knocked down battery-based electronic vehicles came into effect on February 22, 2022 under MOF regulation No. 13/2022. This regulation aims to make Indonesia a production base and export hub of electric motor vehicles. The government is also reportedly preparing incentives to encourage the development of renewable energy and mining down streaming industries as part of the implementation Government Regulation 96/2021 concerning the Implementation of Mineral and Coal Mining Business Activities. However, there is no issued policy yet on these incentives. Investment incentives are outlined at https://www.investindonesia.go.id/cn/invest-with-us/faq . To cope with soaring demand and to improve domestic production of medical devices and supplies amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the government through BKPM Regulation No. 86/2020 streamlined licensing requirements for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The Ministry of Health also accelerated product registration and certification for medical devices and household health supplies. Moreover, the Ministry of Trade issued Regulation 28/2020 to relax import requirements for certain medical-related products. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued Regulation No. 92/2021 to accelerate the provision of fiscal facilities on the import of goods needed for the handling of COVID-19 such as oxygen, laboratory test kits and reagents, virus transfer, medicines, medical equipment and personal protective equipment and Regulation 188/2020 to provide exemptions of import duties and taxes on the import of COVID-19 vaccines. Indonesia’s Customs Authority also implemented a “rush handling policy” to speed up the vaccine import process. MOF Regulation 20/2021 and its amendments were issued to increase motor vehicle sales to support the post-pandemic economic recovery by reformulating the sales tax on luxury goods, specifically motor vehicles. Under Regulation 141/2021, MOF reformulated the sales tax for luxury motor vehicles based on efficiency levels and emissions levels, which aimed to reduce emissions from motor vehicles and to encourage the use of energy-efficient and environmentally friendly motor vehicles. Indonesia offers numerous incentives to foreign and domestic companies that operate in special economic and trade zones throughout Indonesia. The largest zone is the free trade zone (FTZ) island of Batam, Bintan, and Karimun, located just south of Singapore. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation and its implementing regulation, Government Regulation No. 41/2021 strengthened and unified the three islands (Batam, Bintan, and Karimun) into one integrated Free Trade Zone for the next 25 years to create an international logistics hub to support the industrial, trade, maritime, and tourism sectors. Investors in FTZs are exempted from import duty, income tax, VAT, and sales tax on imported capital goods, equipment, and raw materials. Fees are assessed on the portion of production destined for the domestic market which is “exported” to Indonesia, in which case fees are owed only on that portion. Foreign companies are allowed up to 100 percent ownership of companies in FTZs. Companies operating in FTZs may lend machinery and equipment to subcontractors located outside the zone for two years. Indonesia also has numerous Special Economic Zones (SEZs), regulated under Law No. 39/2009, Government Regulation No. 1/2020 on SEZ management, and Government Regulation No. 12/2020 on SEZ facilities. These benefits include reduction of corporate income taxes (depending on the size of the investment), luxury tax, customs duty and excise, and expedited or simplified administrative processes for import/export, expatriate employment, immigration, and licensing. Under the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, foreign technology start-up investments located within SEZs are exempt from the minimum investment threshold of IDR 10 billion (USD 700,000), excluding land and buildings. There are minimal export processing requirements within the SEZs. New business activities in the education and health sectors (for which licensing services remain under the central government’s authority) will be allocated by zones and determined by the administrator of the SEZ. The Law lifted limits of imported goods into SEZs but maintained restrictions on specific banned goods in accompanying laws and regulations. It also introduced new tax facilities and incentives for taxpayers in SEZs. As of March 2022, Indonesia has identified twelve SEZs in manufacturing and tourism centers that are operational and six under construction. Indonesian law also provides for several other types of zones that enjoy special tax and administrative benefits. Among these are Industrial Zones/Industrial Estates (Kawasan Industri), bonded stockpiling areas (Tempat Penimbunan Berikat), and Integrated Economic Development Zones (Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu). Indonesia is home to 135 industrial estates that host thousands of industrial and manufacturing companies. Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 105/2016 provides several different tax and customs accommodations available to companies operating out of an industrial estate, including corporate income tax reductions, tax allowances, VAT exemptions, and import duty exemptions depending on the type of industrial estate. Bonded stockpile areas include bonded warehouses, bonded zones, bonded exhibition spaces, duty free shops, bonded auction places, bonded recycling areas, and bonded logistics centers. Companies operating in these areas enjoy concessions in the form of exemption from certain import taxes, luxury goods taxes, and value-added taxes, based on a variety of criteria for each type of location. Most recently, bonded logistics centers (BLCs) were introduced to allow for larger stockpiles, longer temporary storage (up to three years), and a greater number of activities in a single area. The Ministry of Finance issued Regulation No. 28/2018, providing additional guidance on the types of BLCs and shortening approval for BLC applications. By October 2019, Indonesia had designated 106 BLCs in 159 locations, with plans to approve more in eastern Indonesia. In 2021, the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate General for Customs and Excise (DGCE) updated regulations (MOF Regulation No. 65/2021 and DGCE Regulation No. 9/2021) to streamline the licensing process for bonded zones. Together the two regulations are intended to reduce processing times and the number of licenses required to open a bonded zone. Shipments from FTZs and SEZs to other places in the Indonesia customs area are treated similarly to exports and are subject to taxes and duties. Bonded zones have a domestic sales quota of 50 percent of the initial realization amount on export, sales to other bonded zones, sales to free trade zones, and sales to other economic areas (unless otherwise authorized by the Indonesian government). Sales to other special economic regions are only allowed for further processing to become capital goods, and to companies with a license from the economic area organizer for the goods relevant to their business. Indonesia expects foreign investors to contribute to the training and development of Indonesian nationals, allowing the transfer of skills and technology required for their effective participation in the foreign companies’ management. Generally, a company can hire foreigners only for positions that the government has deemed open to non-Indonesians. Employers must have training programs aimed at replacing foreign workers with Indonesians. If a direct investment enterprise wants to employ foreigners, the enterprise should submit an Expatriate Placement Plan (RPTKA) to the Ministry of Manpower. Indonesia recently made significant changes to its foreign worker regulations. Government Regulation No. 34/2021, an implementing regulation of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, on the utilization of foreign workers stipulates specific documents required for the RPTKA and introduces different types of RPTKA for temporary works (e.g. film production, audits, quality control, inspection and installation of machinery), employment for work under six months, employment that does not require payment to the Foreign Worker Utilization Compensation Fund (DKPTKA), and employment in SEZs. Under the regulation, an RPTKA is not required for commissioners or executives. Foreigners working in technology-based startups are also exempted from the RPTKA requirement in the first three months. Expatriates can use an endorsed RPTKA to apply with the immigration office in their place of domicile for a Limited Stay Visa or Semi-Permanent Residence Visa (VITAS/VBS). Expatriates receive a Limited Stay Permit (KITAS) and a blue book, valid for up to two years and renewable for up to two extensions without leaving the country. While a technical recommendation from a relevant ministry is no longer required, ministries may still establish technical competencies or qualifications for certain jobs or prohibit the use of foreign workers for specific positions, by informing and obtaining approval from the Ministry of Manpower. Foreign workers who plan to work longer than six months in Indonesia must apply for employee social security and/or insurance. Government Regulation No. 34/2021 outlines the types of businesses that can employ foreign workers, sets requirements to obtain health insurance for expatriate employees, requires companies to appoint local “companion” employees for the transfer of technology and skill development, and requires employers to facilitate Indonesian language training for foreign workers. Any expatriate who holds a work and residence permit must contribute USD 1,200 per year to the DKPTKA for local manpower training at regional manpower offices. Ministry of Manpower Decree No. 228/2019 details the number of jobs open for foreign workers across 18 sectors, ranging from construction, transportation, education, telecommunications, and professionals. Foreign workers must obtain approval from the Manpower Minister or designated officials to apply for positions not listed in the decree. Some U.S. firms report difficulty in renewing KITASs (residency cards/IDs) for their foreign executives. Indonesia notified the WTO of its compliance with Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) on August 26, 1998. The 2007 Investment Law states that Indonesia shall provide the same treatment to both domestic and foreign investors originating from any country. Nevertheless, the government pursues policies to promote local manufacturing that could be inconsistent with TRIMS requirements, such as linking import approvals to investment pledges or requiring local content targets in some sectors. In 2019, Indonesia issued Government Regulation No. 71/2019 to replace Regulation No. 82/2012, further detailed in Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) Regulation No. 5/2020, which classifies electronic system operators (ESO) into two categories: public and private. Public ESOs are either a state institution or an institution assigned by a state institution but not a financial sector regulator or supervisory authority. Private ESOs are individuals, businesses and communities that operate electronic systems. Public ESOs must manage, process, and store their data in Indonesia, unless the storage technology is not available locally. Private ESOs have the option to choose where they will manage, process, and store their data. However, if private ESOs decide to process data outside of Indonesia, they must provide access to their systems and data for government supervision and law enforcement purposes. For private financial sector ESOs, Government Regulation 71/2019 provides that such firms are “further regulated” by Indonesia’s financial sector supervisory authorities regarding the private sector’s ESO systems, data processing, and data storage. MCIT Regulation No. 10/2021 requires private sector operator to register within six months period after the effective implementation of risk-based business licensing through the OSS system. The policy has not been implemented as MCIT is still waiting for an official statement from BKPM on the operational of the Risk-Based OSS system. MCIT also issued Regulation 13/2021 in October, requiring a minimum of 35 percent local content requirement (LCR) for 4G and 5G device distributed and used in Indonesia starting in mid-April 202, while previously it was set at 30 percent. Additionally, to implement Government Regulation 71/2019, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) issued Regulation No. 13/2020 that became effective March 31, 2020. It is an amendment to Regulation No. 38/2016, which allows banks to operate their electronic data processing systems and disaster recovery centers outside of Indonesia, provided that the system receives approval from OJK. OJK issued Regulation 4/2021, effective on March 9, 2021, which allows some non-bank financial institution data to be transferred and stored outside of Indonesia subject to OJK approval. Unless approved by OJK, data centers and disaster recovery centers must be in Indonesia. Certain core banking data and non-bank financial institution’s core systems must also be stored onshore/within Indonesia. OJK will evaluate whether offshore data arrangements could diminish its supervisory efficiency or negatively affect the bank’s performance, and if the data center complies with Indonesia’s laws and regulations. Data may be mirrored or placed in offshore systems, subject to OJK approval, such as for global integrated analysis, global risk management analysis with headquarters, and integrated anti-money laundering and terrorist financing analysis. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the predominant body of law governing land rights, recognizes the right of private ownership and provides varying degrees of land rights for Indonesian citizens, foreign nationals, Indonesian corporations, foreign corporations, and other legal entities. Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution states that all natural resources are owned by the government for the benefit of the people. This principle was augmented by the passage of Land Acquisition Law No. 2/2012, which was amended by the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Law No. 11/2020), that enshrined the concept of eminent domain and established mechanisms for fair market value compensation and appeals. The National Land Agency registers property under Government Regulation No. 18/2021, though the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) administers all “forest land.” The regulation introduced e-registration to cut bureaucracy and minimize land disputes. Registration is not conclusive evidence of ownership, but rather strong evidence of such. It allows foreigners domiciled in Indonesia to have housing property with land under a “right to use” status for a maximum of 30 years, with extensions available for up to 20 additional years, as well as a “right to own” status for apartments located in special economic zones, free trade zones, and industrial areas. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation aims to reduce uncertainty around the roles of the central and local governments, including around spatial planning and environmental and social impact assessments (AMDALs), by simplifying the licensing process through implementation of a risk-based approach. The Omnibus Law also created a land bank to facilitate land acquisition for priority investment projects. Indonesia remains on the priority watch list in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report due to the lack of adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement. Indonesia’s patent law continues to raise serious concerns, including patentability criteria and compulsory licensing. Indonesia is amending the Patent Law, in addition to the amendment made through the Omnibus Law and hopes for the amendment deliberation to start in 2022. Counterfeiting and piracy are pervasive, IP enforcement remains weak, and there are continued market access restrictions for IP-intensive industries. According to U.S. stakeholders, Indonesia’s failure to protect intellectual property and enforce IP rights laws has resulted in high levels of physical and online piracy. Local industry associations have reported large amounts of pirated films, music, and software in circulation in Indonesia in recent years, causing potentially billions of dollars in losses. Indonesian physical markets, such as Mangga Dua Market, and online markets Tokopedia and Bukalapak, were included in USTR’s Notorious Markets List in 2021. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation amended key articles in Patent Law No. 13/2016 and the Trademark and Geographical Indications Law No. 20/2016. While Patent Law amendments require the patent holder to exercise their patented invention locally within 36 months after the patent is granted, the new amendments provide flexibility to IP holders to meet local “working” requirements. The new law also revokes a provision requiring patent holders to support technology transfer, investment, and employment in local manufacturing as a condition of patent protection. The law reduces the processing time required for simple patent applications from 12 months to 6 months. In January 2020, Indonesia ratified the Marrakesh Treaty through Presidential Regulation No. 1/2020 to facilitate access to public works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print-disabled. Indonesia also ratified the Beijing Treaty on IPR protection for audiovisual performances to protect actors through Presidential Regulation No. 21/2020. Indonesia deposited its instrument of accession to the Madrid Protocol with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2017 and issued implementing regulations in 2018. Under the new rules, applicants desiring international mark protection under the Madrid Protocol must first register their application with DGIP and be Indonesian citizens, domiciled in Indonesia, or have clear industrial or commercial interests in Indonesia. Although the Trademark Law of 2016 expanded recognition of non-traditional marks, Indonesia still does not recognize certification marks. In response to stakeholder concerns over a lack of consistency in the treatment of internationally well-known trademarks, the Supreme Court issued Circular Letter 1/2017, which advised Indonesian judges to recognize cancellation claims for well-known international trademarks with no time limit stipulation. Ministry of Finance (MOF) Regulation No. 6/2019 grants the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DGCE) legal authority to hold shipments believed to contain imitation goods for up to two days, pending inspection. Under Regulation No. 6/2019, rights holders are notified by DGCE (through a recordation system) when an incoming shipment is suspected of containing infringing products. If the inspection reveals an infringement, the rights holder has four days to file a court injunction to request a shipment suspension. Rights holders are required to provide a refundable monetary guarantee of IDR 100 million (USD 6,600) when they file a claim with the court. If the court sides with the rights holder, then the guarantee money will be returned to the applicant. DGCE intercepted three suspected infringement product imports in 2020 by using this recordation system, as only 17 trademarks and two copyrights are registered in the recordation system. Despite business stakeholder concerns, the GOI retains a requirement that only companies with offices domiciled in Indonesia may use the recordation system. Trademark, Patent, and Copyright legislation require a rights-holder complaint for investigation. DGIP and BPOM investigators lack the authority to make arrests so must rely on police cooperation for any enforcement action. DGIP created an IP Enforcement Task Force in late 2021 to include DGIP, the Indonesian National Policy (INP) Criminal Investigation Agency, DGCE, MCIT, and BPOM. The Task Force is more focused on IP Enforcement and is promising but has not fully ramped up its efforts and more time is needed to evaluate its long-term effectiveness. Additional information regarding treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, can be found at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) country profile website: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . For a list of local lawyers, see: https://id.usembassy.gov/attorneys. 6. Financial Sector The Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) index has 766 listed companies as of December 2021 with a daily trading volume of USD 922.2 million and market capitalization of USD 571 billion (IDR 8,284 trillion). Over the past six years, there has been a 45.9 percent increase in the number listed companies, but the IDX is dominated by its top 50 listed companies, which represent 69.2 percent of the market cap. There were 54 initial public offerings in 2021 – three more than in 2020. During the fourth quarter of 2021, domestic entities conducted 75 percent of total IDX stock trades. Government treasury bonds are the most liquid bonds offered by Indonesia. Corporate bonds are less liquid due to less public knowledge of the product and the shallowness of the market. The government issues sukuk (Islamic treasury notes) as part of its effort to diversify Islamic debt instruments and increase their liquidity and issued the first in Southeast Asia Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) bond to fund projects that benefit communities and the environment. This SDG bond was issued in the global capital market, denominated in Euros, and listed in the Singapore and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges. Indonesia’s sovereign debt as of February 2022 was rated as BBB by Standard and Poor’s, BBB by Fitch Ratings and Baa2 by Moody’s. Foreigners held 19 percent of government bonds in January 2022 OJK began overseeing capital markets and non-banking institutions in 2013, replacing the Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Board. In 2014, OJK also assumed BI’s supervisory role over commercial banks. Foreigners have access to the Indonesian capital markets and are a major source of portfolio investment. Indonesia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Although there is some concern regarding the operations of the many small and medium sized family-owned banks, the banking system is generally considered sound, with banks enjoying some of the widest net interest margins in the region. As of December 2021, commercial banks had IDR 9,913.6 trillion (USD 683 billion) in total assets, with a capital adequacy ratio of 25.67 percent. Outstanding loans grew by 4.4 percent in 2021, a significant improvement from the 2,4 percent contraction in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Gross non-performing loans (NPL) in December 2021 decreased to 3 percent from 3.06 percent the previous year. NPL rates were partly mitigated through a loan restructuring program implemented by OJK as part of the COVID-19 recovery efforts. The Financial Services Authority (OJK) issued a regulation on credit restructuring in 2020 to support businesses hit by the pandemic and maintain financial stability, which was extended until March 2023 to prepare banks and debtors for a “soft landing” and give banks time to adequately provision for potential loan losses. The amount of credit restructured under this policy declined from IDR 830.5 trillion (USD 57.2 billion) in 2020 to IDR 693.6 trillion (USD 47.8 billion) in 2021. Most of the loans were restructured by extending the maturity, delaying payments, or reducing the interest rate, which provided borrowers with temporary liquidity relief. Loans at risk, a broader measure of potential troubled loans than the NPL ratio, decreased from 23.4 percent at the end of 2020 to 19.5 percent in December 2021. OJK Regulation No. 56/03/2016 limits bank ownership to no more than 40 percent by any single shareholder, applicable to foreign and domestic shareholders. This does not apply to foreign bank branches in Indonesia. Foreign banks may establish branches if the foreign bank is ranked among the top 200 global banks by assets. A special operating license is required from OJK to establish a foreign branch. The OJK granted an exception in 2015 for foreign banks buying two small banks and merging them. To establish a representative office, a foreign bank must be ranked in the top 300 global banks by assets. OJK regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2021, issued in August 2021, increased the foreign equity cap for commercial banks to 99 percent, subject to OJK evaluation and approval. On March 16, 2020, OJK issued Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020 on commercial bank consolidation. The regulation aimed to strengthen the structure and competitiveness of the national banking industry by increasing bank capital and encouraging consolidation of banks in Indonesia. This regulation increased minimum core capital requirements for commercial banks and Capital Equivalency Maintained Asset requirements for foreign banks with branch offices by least IDR 3 trillion (USD 209 million), by December 31, 2022. In 2015, OJK eased rules for foreigners to open a bank account in Indonesia. Foreigners can open a bank account with a balance between USD 2,000-50,000 with just their passport. For accounts greater than USD 50,000, foreigners must show a supporting document such as a reference letter from a bank in the foreigner’s country of origin, a local domicile address, a spousal identity document, copies of a contract for a local residence, and/or credit/debit statements. Growing digitalization of banking services, spurred on by innovative payment technologies in the financial technology (fintech) sector, complements the conventional banking sector. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending companies and e-payment services have grown rapidly over the past decade. Indonesian policymakers are hopeful that these fintech services can reach underserved or unbanked populations and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). In October 2021, OJK launched a Digital Banking transformation blueprint providing the agency’s policy vision for digital banking that consist of 5 elements: 1) data protection, transfer, and governance, 2) technology governance, architecture, emerging technology, 3) IT risk management, outsourcing, and cybersecurity, 4) platform sharing and cooperation of financial/non-financial institutions, and 5) institutional capacity, culture, leadership, and talent management. OJK Regulation 77/2016 on peer-to-peer (P2P) lending introduces various guidelines, obligations, and restrictions for P2P lending services, and the organization of P2P lending service providers. This regulation caps foreign ownership of P2P services at 85 percent and mandates data localization. Nonbank financial service suppliers may do business in Indonesia as a joint venture or be partially owned by foreign investors but cannot operate in Indonesia as a branch or subsidiary of a foreign entity. Indonesia issued a moratorium on October 2021 for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending licenses to combat illegal platforms. Under OJK Regulation 13/2018, financial technology companies must register with OJK and implement a regulatory sandbox to test new services and business models. As of December 2021, total fintech lending reached USD 20.4 billion in loan disbursements, with USD 2 billion outstanding, while payment transactions using e-money in 2021 grew by 49.06 percent y-o-y to USD 21.06 billion. The value of digital banking transactions increased by 45.6 percent y-o-y to USD 2.7 trillion. According to OJK data, only 39 percent of the population currently use digital banking, therefore significant growth potential remains. The government places no restrictions or time limitations on investment remittances. However, certain reporting requirements exist. Banks should adopt Know Your Customer (KYC) principles to carefully identify customers’ profile to match transactions. Indonesia does not engage in currency manipulation. As of 2015, Indonesia is no longer subject to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitoring process under its on-going global Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) compliance process. It continues to work with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to further strengthen its AML/CTF regime. In 2018, Indonesia was granted observer status by FATF, a necessary milestone toward becoming a full FATF member. The Indonesian Investment Authority (INA), also known as the sovereign wealth fund, was legally established by the 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation. INA’s supervisory board and board of directors were selected through competitive processes and announced in January and February 2021. The government initially capitalized INA with USD 2 billion through injections from the state budget and added another USD 4.04 billion from the state budget in October 2021. INA aims to attract foreign equity and invest that capital in long-term Indonesian assets to improve the value of the assets through enhanced management. According to Indonesian government officials, the fund will consist of a master portfolio with sector-specific sub-funds, such as infrastructure, oil and gas, health, tourism, and digital technologies. INA reportedly inked MoUs with several parties such as with Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ), APG Asset Management (APG), and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) on May 2021, to establish Indonesia’s first infrastructure investment platform; with state-owed energy/oil company Pertamina on May 19, to carry out investment cooperation in the energy sector; and with BP Jamsostek on May 24, to carry out investment activity cooperation. INA partnered with state-owned airport operator Angkasa Pura II to accelerate Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta airport expansion on October 28; partnered with Dubai Ports (DP) World on October 29 to invest USD 7.5 billion into Indonesian seaport facilities; and made an agreement with the Abu Dhabi growth fund (ADG) on November 25, to invest up to USD 10 billion in Indonesia. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Indonesia had 114 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 28 subsidiaries divided into 12 sectors, as of December 2019. By February 2022 that number had been reduced to 41 SOEs divided into 12 sectors mainly through consolidation or merger, although a small number of SOEs have also been liquidated due to ineffectiveness. As of December 2021, 28 were listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. Two SOEs plan IPOs in 2022, namely PT Pertamina Geothermal Energy and PT ASDP Indonesia Ferry (Persero). SOEs make up 55 percent of the economy. In 2017, Indonesia announced the creation of a mining holding company, PT Inalum. In 2020, three state owned sharia banks were merged. In January 2022, Minister of SOEs, Erick Thohir, stated that in total, nine SOE holding companies will be formed by 2024, including pharmaceutical, insurance, survey services, food industry, manufacturing industry, defense state-owned holdings, the media industry, port services, and transportation and tourism services holding. Several of this holding companies have already been formed, including pharmaceutical holding (Lead by PT Bio Farma, formed in early 2020), Indonesia battery holding (formed on March 26, 2021), Port Service Holding (a merger of PT Pelindo I to Pelindo IV, formed on October 1, 2021), Indonesia Financial Group (IFG) as an insurance holding formed in October 2020, Holding of SOE hotels (Wika as the lead of the holding, formed in December 2020), Ultra Micro Holding (BRI, Pegadaian and PNM, formed Sept 13, 2021), ID Food or Holding of food SOEs (lead by PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia, formed on January 7), Injourney as a tourism holding company (PT Aviasi Pariwisata Indonesia, formed on January 13), and Defend ID as the defense industry holding (with Len Industry as the lead of the holding, formed on March 2). Since his appointment by President Jokowi in November 2019, Minister of SOEs Erick Thohir has underscored the need to reform SOEs in line with President Jokowi’s second-term economic agenda. Thohir has noted the need to liquidate underperforming SOEs, ensure that SOEs improve their efficiency by focusing on core business operations, and introduce better corporate governance principles. Thohir has spoken publicly about his intent to push SOEs to undertake initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. He also encourages SOEs to increase outbound investment to support Indonesia’s supply chain in strategic markets, including through acquisition of cattle farms, phosphate mines, and salt mines. Information regarding SOEs can be found at the SOE Ministry website ( http://www.bumn.go.id/ ) (Indonesian language only). There are also an unknown number of SOEs owned by regional or local governments. SOEs are present in almost all sectors/industries including banking (finance), tourism (travel), agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, fishing, energy, and telecommunications (information and communications). Indonesia is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. However, many sectors report that SOEs receive strong preference for government projects. SOEs purchase some goods and services from the private sector and foreign firms. SOEs publish an annual report and are audited by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and external and internal auditors. While some state-owned enterprises have offered shares on the stock market, Indonesia does not have an active privatization program. The government capitalized Indonesia Investment Authority (INA) with USD 4 billion in state-owned assets to attract equity investments in those assets, which may eventually be sold to investors or listed on the stock market. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Indonesian businesses are required to undertake responsible business conduct (RBC) activities under Law No. 40/2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies. In addition, sectoral laws and regulations have further specific provisions on RBC. Indonesian companies tend to focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs offering community and economic development, and educational projects and programs. This is at least in part caused by the fact that such projects are often required as part of the environmental impact permits (AMDAL) of resource extraction companies, and those companies face domestic and international scrutiny of their operations. Because a large proportion of resource extraction activity occurs in remote and rural areas where government services are reported to be limited or absent, these companies face very high community expectations to provide such services themselves. Despite significant investments – especially by large multinational firms – in CSR projects, businesses have noted that there is limited general awareness of those projects, even among government regulators and officials. Yet, lack of regulations, oversight and enforcement measures deter stakeholders’ from more consistently adhering to environment, social, and governance standards (ESG). The government does not have an overarching strategy to encourage or enforce RBC but regulates each area through the relevant laws (environment, labor, corruption, etc.). Some companies report that these laws are not always enforced evenly. In 2017, the National Commission on Human Rights launched a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in Indonesia, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. OJK regulates corporate governance issues, but the regulations and enforcement are not yet up to international standards for shareholder protection. Indonesia does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the government is not known to have encouraged adherence to those guidelines. Many companies claim that the government does not encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas or any other supply chain management due diligence guidance. Indonesia is an active member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). As part of EITI requirement, payment made to governments in the extractive industries are disclosed through a system database managed by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) as it continues to improve data and information transparency. 9. Corruption President Jokowi was elected on a strong good-governance platform, but his performance on this remains inconsistent. Corruption remains a serious problem in the view of many, including some U.S. companies. The Indonesian government has issued detailed directions on combating corruption in targeted ministries and agencies, and the 2018 release of the updated and streamlined National Anti-Corruption Strategy mandates corruption prevention efforts across the government in three focus areas (licenses, state finances, and law enforcement reform). The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was established in 2002 as the lead government agency to investigate and prosecute corruption. KPK is one of the most trusted and respected institutions in Indonesia. The KPK has taken steps to encourage companies to establish effective internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of public officials. By law, the KPK is authorized to conduct investigations, file indictments, and prosecute corruption cases involving law enforcement officers, government executives, or other parties connected to corrupt acts committed by those entities; attracting the “attention and the dismay” of the general public; and/or involving a loss to the state of at least IDR 1 billion (approximately USD 66,000). The government began prosecuting companies that engage in public corruption under new corporate criminal liability guidance issued in a 2016 Supreme Court regulation, with the first conviction of a corporate entity in January 2019. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act, with possible fines ranging from USD 3,850 to USD 77,000 and imprisonment up to a maximum of 20 years to life, depending on the severity of the charge. Presidential decree No. 13/2018 issued in March 2018 clarifies the definition of beneficial ownership and outlines annual reporting requirements and sanctions for non-compliance. Indonesia’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2021 rose to 96 out of 180 countries surveyed, compared to 102 out of 180 countries in 2020. Indonesia’s score of public corruption in the country, according to Transparency International, rose to 38 in 2020 from 37 in 2020 (scale of 0/very corrupt to 100/very clean). Indonesia ranks below neighboring Timor Leste, Malaysia, and Brunei. Corruption reportedly remains pervasive despite laws to combat it. In September 2019, the Indonesia House of Representatives (DPR) passed Law No. 19/2019 on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) which revised the KPK’s original charter, reducing the Commission’s independence and limiting its ability to pursue corruption investigations without political interference. The current KPK Commissioner has stated that KPK’s main role will no longer be prosecution, but education and prevention. Although there have been some notable successful prosecutions including against members of the President’s cabinet, the 2019 changes to the KPK have led to a significant decline in investigations and prosecutions. Indonesia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in September 2006. However, Indonesia is not yet compliant with key components of the convention, including provisions on foreign bribery. Indonesia has not yet acceded to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention but attends meetings of the OECD Anti-Corruption Working Group. Several civil society organizations function as vocal and competent corruption watchdogs, including Transparency International Indonesia and Indonesia Corruption Watch. Resources to Report Corruption Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Commission) Jln. Kuningan Persada Kav 4, SetiabudiJakarta Selatan 12950 Email: informasi@kpk.go.id Indonesia Corruption Watch Jl. Kalibata Timur IV/D No. 6 Jakarta Selatan 12740 Tel: +6221.7901885 or +6221.7994015 Email: info@antikorupsi.org 10. Political and Security Environment As in other democracies, politically motivated demonstrations occasionally occur throughout Indonesia, but are not a major or ongoing concern for most foreign investors. Since the Bali bombings in 2002 that killed over 200 people, and other follow-on high-profile attacks on western targets Indonesian authorities have aggressively continued to pursue terrorist cells throughout the country, disrupting multiple aspirational plots. Despite these successes, violent extremist networks, terrorist cells, and lone wolf-style ISIS sympathizers have conducted small-scale attacks against law enforcement, government, and non-Muslim places of worship with little or no warning. Foreign investors in Papua face unique challenges. Indonesian security forces occasionally conduct operations against small armed separatist groups, including the Free Papua Movement, a group that is most active in the central highlands region. Low-intensity communal, tribal, and political conflict also exists in Papua and has caused deaths and injuries. Anti-government protests have resulted in deaths and injuries, and violence has been committed against employees and contractors of at least one large corporation there, including the death of a New Zealand citizen in an attack on March 30, 2020, as well as armed groups seizing aircraft and temporarily holding pilots and passenger’s hostage. Additionally, racially-motivated attacks against ethnic Papuans in East Java province led to violence in Papua and West Papua in late 2019, including riots in Wamena, Papua that left dozens dead and thousands more displaced. Continued attacks and counter attacks between security personnel and local armed groups have exacerbated the region’s issues with internally displaced persons. Travelers to Indonesia can visit the U.S. Department of State travel advisory website for the latest information and travel resources: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Indonesia.html. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Companies have reported that the labor market faces several structural barriers, including skills shortages and lagging productivity, restrictions on the use of contract workers, and complicated labor laws. Recent significant increases in the minimum wage for many provinces have made unskilled and semi-skilled labor more costly. In the bellwether Jakarta area, the Governor set the 2022 minimum wage to IDR 4,641,854 ($324.56), compared to the central government’s IDR 4,453,935 ($311.42), a move opposed by the Ministry of Manpower and private companies. Unions staged frequent, largely peaceful protests across Indonesia in 2021 demanding the government increase the minimum wage, decrease the price for basic needs, and stop companies from outsourcing and employing foreign workers. The 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation introduced labor reforms, intended to attract investors, boost economic growth and create jobs. The Law aims to make the labor market more flexible to encourage job creation and more formal sector employment, as over half of Indonesia’s workers are in the informal sector. Restrictions on the types of work that can be outsourced were lifted and a new working hours arrangement was established to accommodate jobs in the digital economy era. The Law abolished sectoral minimum wages and reformulated the calculation of minimum wage at the provincial and regency/city level based on economic growth or inflation variables. A new unemployment benefit is now officially part of the public safety net for workers, and severance pay requirements were reduced. The business community’s initial reactions to the law were cautiously optimistic, while labor unions, student groups, and religious organizations staged strikes and protests against the law’s labor reforms. Labor unions cite the loss of limits on temporary employment contracts and expansion of outsourcing flexibility as concerns. Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled November 2021 that the passing of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (No. 11/2020 ) was unconstitutional due to the opaqueness of the process by which the law was created and the fact that proposed revisions were not fully shared with the public. The court ordered lawmakers to revise the law within two years. The Omnibus Law, a key pillar for President Jokowi’s reform agenda intended to facilitate investment and create a friendlier business environment, has been the source of controversy among labor and environmental stakeholders, who assert that the law stripped away labor and environmental protections. Some green NGOs described the court’s decision as a “small win” for the environmental NGO community. Parts of the law already enacted via implementing regulations are still considered constitutionally valid during the two-year grace period set by the court though many of the law’s implementing regulations have not yet been released. The ruling stipulates that the government should not issue new regulations of a strategic nature related to the law until improvements are made to the current law. Until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment had remained steady at 4.38 percent. As of August 2021, Statistics Indonesia recorded that the unemployment rate jumped to 6.49 percent, or 9.1 million people, lower than the same period in 2020 which reached 7.07 percent or 9.77 million people. Meanwhile the number of workers who were furloughed or worked in shorter working hours due to COVID-19 was much higher. Employers note that the skills provided by the education system is lower than that of neighboring countries, and successive Labor Ministers have listed improved vocational training as a top priority. Labor contracts are relatively straightforward to negotiate but are subject to renegotiation, despite the existence of written agreements. Local courts often side with citizens in labor disputes, contracts notwithstanding. On the other hand, some foreign investors view Indonesia’s labor regulatory framework, respect for freedom of association, and the right to unionize as an advantage to investing in the country. Expert local human resources advice is essential for U.S. companies doing business in Indonesia, even those only opening representative offices. Labor unions are independent of the government; about 7.6 percent of the workforce is unionized. The law, with some restrictions, protects the rights of workers to join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Indonesia has ratified all eight of the core ILO conventions underpinning internationally accepted labor norms. The Ministry of Manpower maintains an inspectorate to monitor labor norms, but enforcement is stronger in the formal sector. A revised Social Security Law, which took effect in 2014, requires all formal sector workers to participate. Subject to a wage ceiling, employers must contribute an amount equal to 4 percent of workers’ salaries to this plan. In 2015, Indonesia established the Social Security Organizing Body of Employment (BPJS-Employment), a national agency to support workers in the event of work accident, death, retirement, or old age. Additional information on child labor, trafficking in persons, and human rights in Indonesia can be found online through the following references: Child Labor Report: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/indonesia . Trafficking in Persons Report: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/indonesia/ Human Rights Report: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/ 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $1,187 2020 $1,058 https://data.worldbank.org/ country/Indonesia Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $2,537.2 2020 $18,715 https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1#reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $461 https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1#reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1 Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 2.6% 2020 22.7% /World Investment Report 2021: Country-Fact-Sheets *Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), January 2022 There is a discrepancy between U.S. FDI recorded by BKPM and BEA due to differing methodologies. While BEA recorded transactions in balance of payments, BKPM relies on company realization reports. BKPM also excludes investments in oil and gas, non-bank financial institutions, and insurance. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment 2020 Outward Direct Investment 2020 Total Inward 240,507 100% Total Outward 88,847 100% Singapore 57,994 24.1% Singapore 31,240 35.2% United States 31,859 13.2% China (PR Mainland) 24,673 27.8% Netherlands 31,554 13.1% France 19,432 21.9% Japan 25,594 10.6% Cayman Islands 3,445 3.9% China (PR: Hong Kong) 13,577 5.6% British Virgin Islands 2,868 3.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, 2020 for inward and outward investment data. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets 2019 Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 22,957 100% All Countries 8,757 100% All Countries 14,200 100% Singapore 16,604 72.3% Singapore 8,06 92.1% Singapore 8,542 60.1% British Virgin Islands 2,210 9.6% India 450 5.1% British Virgin Islands 2,210 15.6% United States 950 4.1% Guernsey 81 0.9% United States 948 6.7% United Arab Emirates 599 2.6% China (PR Hong Kong) 59 0.6% United Arab Emirates 599 4.2% India 457 2.0% Japan 57 0.6% China (PR Hong Kong) 361 2.5% Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 2020. Sources of portfolio investment are not tax havens. The Bank of Indonesia published comparable data. 14. Contact for More Information Marc CookEconomic Section U.S. Embassy Jakarta +62-21-50831000 BusinessIndonesia@state.gov Iraq Executive Summary The effects of COVID-19 have begun to recede in Iraq, and vaccination rates are rising daily. The Iraqi economy is recovering and reverting to more normal conditions. However, the 2020 devaluation of the dinar and Russia’s war against Ukraine have exacerbated inflationary pressures, resulting in price increases, particularly on agricultural products. As of April 2022, the new government has not yet been formed and policies of the new government remain uncertain. Widespread protests in October 2019 caused the resignation of then-PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi and his government. After a lengthy period of government formation, the current government of PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi came to power in May 2020. Sporadic, sometimes violent, protests continue, especially in the country’s south. Iraq held national elections in October 2021, with the government formation process expected to continue into 2022. In October 2020, Iraq’s cabinet approved an economic reform agenda known as the “white paper,” which identified numerous reforms, legislative amendments, subsidy cuts, and e-government measures that are broadly in line with previous World Bank and IMF reform recommendations. The white paper acknowledged the scope of Iraq’s structural economic problems and aimed to place the country on a private sector-driven economic growth path. While Finance Minister Ali Allawi asserted that his ministry itself was able to implement 65 percent of the reforms, there was a lack of collaboration and buy-in from other ministries due to entrenched opposition from stakeholders who profit from Government of Iraq (GOI) opacity and inefficiency. Iraq did achieve one key white paper initiative, one-stop company registration, with the launch of its Online Single Window, which used the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) digital solutions platform. The security environment, including the threat of resurgent extremist groups, remains an investment impediment in many parts of the country. Other lingering effects of the fight against ISIS include major disruptions of key domestic and international trade routes and the negative impacts on respective economic infrastructure. Many militia groups that participated in the fight against ISIS remain deployed and are only under nominal government control. Militia groups have been implicated in a range of criminal and illicit activities in commercial sectors, including extortion. However, the security situation varies throughout the country and is generally less problematic in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). Investors in Iraq face challenges resolving issues with legitimate GOI entities, including procurement disputes, receiving timely payments, and winning public tenders. Difficulties with corruption, business registration, customs regulations, irregular and high tax liabilities, unclear visa and residency permit procedures, arbitrary application of regulations, lack of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, electricity shortages, and lack of access to financing remain common complaints for local and foreign companies operating in Iraq. Shifting and unevenly enforced regulations that often change with new government formation create additional burdens for investors. Despite these challenges, the Iraqi market offers potential for U.S. exporters. Iraq regularly imports rice, wheat, and other agricultural commodities, as well as machinery, consumer goods, and defense articles. While non-oil bilateral trade with the United States was $805.8 million in 2021, Iraq’s economy had an estimated GDP of $98 billion. Government contracts and tenders are the source of most commercial opportunities in Iraq in all sectors, including the significant oil and gas contracts, and have been financed almost entirely by oil revenues. Increasingly, the GOI has asked investors and suppliers to provide financing solutions and allow for deferred payments. Investors in the IKR face many of the same challenges as investors elsewhere in Iraq, but the IKR’s security and regulation environments are more stable. However, the region’s economy has struggled to recover from the 2014 ISIS offensive and ongoing disputes with the central government over revenue sharing. The GOI’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) February 15, 2022 decision declared the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 2007 oil and gas law to be unconstitutional. The oil contracts impacted by this decision are the KRG’s largest revenue source, providing economic stability when oil prices at present are rising. Local businesses welcome an American Chamber of Commerce presence in the IKR, hoping to improve KRG’s business process effectiveness and transparency. Water scarcity is a present danger and the salinization of water and soils, desertification, and the disappearance of arable land are existential environmental concerns connected to poor resource management and climate change. These challenges also represent economic opportunities in Iraq, which needs investments in green and renewable energy, modern irrigation systems, and the infrastructure to capture flared gas. The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) in 2012 and became effective the following year. The U.S. and Iraqi governments subsequently established the Trade and Finance Joint Coordination Committee and held the first TIFA meeting in Washington in March 2014. A second meeting was held in June 2019. Trade data resources in addition to Table 1 Key Business Metrics and Rankings include: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/irq https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IRQ#:~:text=Iraq%20had%20a%20total%20export,is%20222%2C434%2C137%2C055.84%20in%20current%20US%24. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 172 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita N/A N/A http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOI has publicly and repeatedly stated its desire to attract foreign investment as part of national plans to strengthen local industries and promote the “Made in Iraq” brand. The GOI has yet to follow through on reform process commitments made at the pre-COVID Kuwait International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in February 2018 to reform processes and regulations that hinder investment. Iraq claims that other countries have not followed through on their financial pledges either. Iraq administers foreign direct investments (FDI) under its National Investment Law (Investment Law, 2006), amended in December 2015. The Investment Law outlines improved investment terms for foreign investors, the purchase of land in Iraq for certain projects, and an investment license process. The purchase of land for commercial or residential development remains extremely difficult. Since 2015, Iraq has been a party to the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nations of Other States (ICSID). Foreign investors continue to encounter bureaucratic challenges, corruption, and a weak financial services sector, making it difficult to conclude and implement investment deals. State-owned banks in Iraq serve predominantly to settle financial payments, with the GOI’s vast public sector payroll dominating the small market for depositors. Privately-owned banks, until recently, served almost entirely as currency exchange businesses, except for a handful of mostly regionally owned private commercial banks. Iraq’s more than 60 private commercial banks compete for less than 20 percent of the market; Iraq is a cash-based economy, with many Iraqis distrusting private banks. Some privately owned banks have commercial lending programs, but Iraq’s lack of a credit monitoring system, insufficient legal guarantees for lenders, and limited correspondent connections to international banks hinder commercial lending. The financial sector in the IKR suffers from similar issues. Recently, the GOI has been exploring multi-year financing options to pay for large-scale development projects rather than relying on its previous practice of funding investments entirely from current annual budget outlays. However, even basic private bank-provided project finance models are virtually non-existent. According to Iraqi law, a foreign investor is entitled to make investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor, and the amount of foreign participation is not limited. However, Iraq’s Investment Law limits foreign direct and indirect ownership of most natural resources, particularly the extraction and processing of natural resources. It does allow foreign ownership of land to be used for residential projects and co-ownership of land to be used for industrial projects when an Iraqi partner is participating. Despite this legal equity between foreign and domestic investment, the GOI reserves the right to screen FDI. The screening process is vague, although it does not appear to have been used to block foreign investment. Still, bureaucratic barriers to FDI, such as a requirement to place a significant portion of the capital investment in an Iraqi bank prior to receiving a license, remain significant. The GOI established the National Investment Commission (NIC) in 2007, along with its provincial counterparts Provincial Investment Commissions (PICs), as provided under Investment Law 13 (2006). This cabinet-level organization provides policy recommendations to the Prime Minister and support to current and potential investors in Iraq. The NIC’s “One Stop Shop” https://investpromo.gov.iq/one-stop-shop/ is intended to guide investors through the investment process, though investors have reported challenges using NIC services. The IKR operates under a different investment law and its supporting regulations implemented in 2006. Under KRG’s law, foreign investors are entitled to incentives, including full property ownership, capital repatriation, and 10-year tax holidays. The KRG has an Investment Board to assist investors. An updated investment law, first drafted in 2010, has failed to pass the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament after numerous amendments. In 2020, the KRG Ministry of Planning (MOP) published a framework for creating public-private partnerships in the region but has not drafted legislation to codify it. Legislation to amend the investment law to broaden its reach to potential investors remains pending in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP). Iraqi law stipulates that 50 percent of a project’s workers must be Iraqi nationals to obtain an investment license (National Investment Regulation No. 2, 2009). Investors must prioritize hiring Iraqi citizens before hiring non-Iraqi workers. The GOI pressures foreign companies to hire local employees and has encouraged foreign companies to partner with local industries and purchase Iraqi-made products. The KRG permits full foreign ownership under its 2006 investment law. The GOI generally favors State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and state-controlled banks in competitions for government tenders and investment. This preference discriminates against both local and foreign investors. In the past three years, the GOI did not conduct any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). However, the GOI uses UNCTAD’s business registration platform for the Online Single Window program, launched in September 2021. The Online Single Window, at https://business.mot.gov.iq/, is an important step toward minimizing delays in business registration and reducing corruption, showing Iraq’s willingness to modify its processes to attract international investors. Foreign investors interested in establishing an office in Iraq or bidding on a public tender are required to register as foreign businesses with the Ministry of Trade’s (MOT) Companies Registration Department. The procedure costs and time to obtain a business license can be found at https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/108?l=en. Many international companies use a local agent to assist in this process due to its complexity. The GOI continues working with UNCTAD to streamline the business registration process and make it available online. Procedures to obtain investment licenses from the NIC can be found at: https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/60?l=en and https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/51/step/230?l=en®=0. The KRG offers business registration for companies seeking business only in the IKR; however, companies seeking business in both the IKR and greater Iraq must follow both GOI and KRG requirements. Business registration remains within the jurisdiction of IKR’s Chambers of Commerce. The KRG recently moved the authorities for brand name registration from the Chambers of Commerce to the Ministry of Trade, but this decision has not yet been implemented. Reforms to reduce bureaucracy and red tape to implement a “single window” for company registration remain unimplemented, though officials have expressed interest in learning from the GOI. Iraqi laws give the NIC and PICs authority to provide information, sign contracts, and facilitate registration for new foreign and domestic investors. The NIC offers investor facilitation services on transactions including work permit applications, visa approval letters, customs procedures, and business registration. Investors can request these services through the NIC website: http://investpromo.gov.iq/. The NIC does not exclude businesses from taking advantage of its services based on the number of employees or the size of the investment project. The NIC can also connect investors with the appropriate provincial investment council. These official investment commissions do struggle to operate amid unclear lines of authority, budget constraints, and the absence of regulations and standard operating procedures. Importantly, the investment commissions lack the authority to resolve investors’ bureaucratic obstacles with other Iraqi ministries. The Kurdistan Board of Investment (KBOI) manages an investment licensing process in the IKR that can take from three to six months and may involve more than one KRG ministry or entity, depending on the sector of investment. Due to oversaturated commercial and residential real estate markets, the KBOI has moved away from approving licenses in these sectors but may still grant them on a case-by-case basis. The KBOI has prioritized industrial tourism such as business conferences, and agricultural projects. Businesses reported some difficulties establishing local connections, obtaining qualified staff, and meeting import regulations. Some businesses reported that the KRG did not provide the promised support infrastructure such as water, electricity, or wastewater services, as required under the investment law framework. Additional information is available at the KBOI’s website: https://gov.krd/boi-en/. Iraq does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Iraq’s overall regulatory environment remains opaque, and the Investment Law does not establish a full legal framework governing investment. Corruption, unclear regulations, and bureaucratic bottlenecks are major challenges for companies that bid on public procurement contracts or seek to invest in major infrastructure projects. The KRG procurement reform measures, beginning in 2016, sought to address these problems, but with little result. Iraq’s commercial and civil laws generally fall short of international norms. The GOI’s rulemaking process, especially regarding commercial activity and investments, can be opaque and lends itself to arbitrary application. To illustrate, while ministries must publish regulations imposing duties on citizens or private businesses in the official government gazette, internal ministerial regulations have no corresponding requirement. This loophole allows officials to create internal requirements or procedures with little or no oversight, which can result in additional burdens for investors and businesses. Furthermore, the lack of regulatory coordination between GOI ministries and national and provincial authorities can result in conflicting regulations, which makes it difficult to accurately interpret the regulatory environment. In addition, accounting and legal procedures are opaque, inconsistent, and generally do not meet international standards. Draft bills, including investment laws, are not available for public comment. The promulgation of new regulations with little advance notice and requirements related to investment guarantees have also slowed projects. The GOI encourages private sector associations, but these associations are generally not influential, given Iraqi SOEs’ dominant role in the Iraqi economy. In the IKR, private sector associations have some influence and many, such as the contractors’ union, are very active in advocacy with the KRG. However, unions (or “syndicates”) often act as barriers to foreign entry into markets. Publicly available budgets do not include expenditures by ministry or revenues by source and type. The budget provided limited details regarding allocations to, and earnings from, SOEs. Financial statements for most SOEs were generally not publicly available. Limited information on debt obligations is available on the Central Bank and MOF websites. Iraq is not a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and is not a member of the WTO. Iraqi officials have, however, expressed some interest in WTO accession. Iraq has a civil law system, although Iraqi commercial jurisprudence is relatively underdeveloped. Over decades of war and sanctions, Iraqi courts did not keep up with developments in international commercial transactions. Corruption remains a significant problem because illegitimate gains are not consistently or successfully prosecuted. As trade with foreign parties increases, Iraqi courts have had to deal with rising numbers of complex commercial cases. Iraq is a signatory to the League of Arab States Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1987) and the Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation (1983). Iraq formally joined the ICSID Convention on December 17, 2015, and on February 18, 2017, Iraq joined the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) process agreement between investors and states. Additional information can be found in “A Legal Guide to Investment in Iraq:” http://cldp.doc.gov/programs/cldp-in-action/details/1551. The COR passed a Competition Law and a Consumer Protection Law in 2010. However, the Iraqi government has yet to form the Competition and Consumer Protection Commissions authorized by these laws. The COR has also amended Iraqi law several times to promote fair competition and “competitive capacities” in the local market (2010, 2015). The COR has also issued many recommendations regarding the amendments of investment licenses and improvements to the investment and businesses environment in Iraq. Resolution 245 issued in August 2019 announced investment opportunities provided through the NIC. Public and private corruption and the inordinately large role SOEs play in Iraq’s economy undermine the competitive landscape. The Iraqi constitution prohibits expropriation, unless done for the purpose of public benefit and in return for just compensation. The Constitution stipulates that expropriation may be regulated by law, but the COR has not drafted specific legislation regarding expropriation. Article 9 of the Investment Law guarantees non-seizure or nationalization of any investment project that the provisions of this law cover, except in cases with a final judicial judgment. The law prohibits expropriation of an investment project, except in cases of public benefit and with fair compensation. Iraq’s Commercial Court is charged with resolving expropriation cases. In recent years, there have not been any government actions or shifts in government policy that would indicate possible expropriations in the foreseeable future. In the IKR, the KBOI can impose fines and potentially confiscate land if it determines that investors are using land awarded under investment licenses for purposes other than those outlined in the license or if the projected was not started during the specified time limits. The IKR investment law (Article 17) outlines an investor’s arbitration rights, which fall under the civil court system, as the IKR lacks a commercial court system. Arbitration clauses should be written into local contracts in order to facilitate enforcement in the event of a dispute. Under Iraqi law, an Iraqi debtor may file for bankruptcy, and an Iraqi creditor may file for liquidation of the debtor. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The Iraqi Companies Law regulates the process for the liquidation of legal entities. Nevertheless, the mechanism for resolving insolvency remains opaque. In the IKR, there are no independent laws for resolving companies’ bankruptcies. Courts use the Iraqi commercial law 49 of 1970 (article 715-729) to settle bankruptcy claims, which can be cumbersome and costly. Iraq ranks 168 out of 190 countries in the category of Resolving Insolvency, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. 4. Industrial Policies The Iraqi Investment Law offers foreign investors several exemptions for qualified investments, including a 10-year exemption from taxes, exemptions from import duties for necessary equipment and materials throughout the period of project implementation, and exemption from taxes and fees for primary materials imported for commercial operations. The exemption increases to 15 years if Iraqi investors own more than 50 percent of the project. The law allows investors to repatriate capital brought into Iraq, along with proceeds. Foreign investors can trade in shares and securities listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange. Hotels, tourist institutions, hospitals, health institutions, schools, and colleges enjoy additional exemptions from duties and taxes for the import of furniture, tools, equipment, machinery, and means of transportation, but foreign companies that sell goods or services to any entity in Iraq may be subject to Iraqi taxes. Foreign and domestic companies may have tax-exempt profits if their project is with the GOI and the project is listed in the National Investment Plan, which the Ministry of Planning prepares annually. The GOI ministries overseeing investment projects provide updates for the list of investment contracts to the Ministry of Finance, including its tax commission, also known as the General Commission for Taxies (GCT). Foreign and domestic companies that have registered businesses to execute contracts outside the national investment plan do not receive tax exemptions. Companies have reported difficulties obtaining favorable tax treatment after deals are struck. However, in some cases, GOI entities have negotiated partial or short-term tax exemptions for companies as part of a project contract. Income tax language pertaining to oil projects is included in GOI petroleum contracts with the Ministry of Oil and applies to each consortium and its partners. The Council of Ministers (COM) ratified the contract language, which supersedes the Tax Code. Secondary contracts that a consortium issues are treated differently. The consortium is required to withhold seven percent from secondary contracts for remittance to the GOI. Companies pay a profit tax of 15 percent unless they operate in the oil sector, which has a 35 percent tax profit rate. The definition of “petroleum activities” is subject to interpretation. Any business or individual considering doing business in Iraq should obtain competent advice from a private accountant and attorney. Under the IKR’s investment law, foreign and national investors are treated equally and are eligible for the same benefits. Foreign investors may choose to invest in the IKR with or without local partners, and full repatriation of profits is allowed. While investors have the right to employ foreign employees in their projects, priority is given to awarding projects that employ a high share of local staff and involve significant knowledge transfer. The government is considering amending the existing law to require 75 percent of the employees of investment projects be local, but the amended investment laws have never passed the IKP. However, the KBOI considers local employment when deciding on project approvals or licensing. Additionally, the law allows an investor to transfer his investment totally or partially to another foreign investor with the approval of the KBOI. Free Trade Zones (FZs) are permitted under Iraqi law per the Free Zone Authority Law No. 3/1998, for industrial, commercial, and service projects. The Free Zone Commission in the Ministry of Finance administers the law but lacks a specific mandate to develop the FZs. Under the law, capital, profits, and investment income from projects in an FZ are exempt from all taxes and fees throughout the life of the project. Goods entering Iraq’s market from FZs are subject to normal import tariffs; no duty is levied on exports from FZs. Activities permitted in FZs include industrial activities such as assembly, installation, sorting, and refilling processes; storage, re-export, and trading operations; service and storage projects and transport of all kinds; banking, insurance, and reinsurance activities; and supplementary and auxiliary professional and service activities. Prohibited activities include weapons manufacture and environmentally polluting industries. Iraq currently has four FZs with tax exemptions and other incentives for the transportation, industrial, and logistics sectors. The largest is the Basrah/Khor al-Zubair FZ, comprising 18 square km and located southwest of Basrah at the Khor al-Zubair seaport. Operational since June 2004, it hosts a number of local and foreign companies. The Ninewa/Falafel Free Zone is located in the north. Plans to develop the FZ in Fallujah are ongoing. The Falafel and Fallujah zones are located in formerly ISIS-held areas, and the possibility of continued political instability makes further development in the near future unlikely. There is also an FZ in Baghdad. In May 2019, Iraq and Kuwait announced a new joint FZ project in Safwan port, pending approvals. More information can be found at the Ministry of Finance website: http://www.mof.gov.iq/pages/ar/FreeZonesInIraq.aspx. In the IKR, there are currently no FZs. The KRG has approved plans for zones in all IKR provinces. Iraqi labor law describes two categories of workers, which are local Iraqis and foreign workers whom the GOI and other Iraqi entities employ. The Investment Law stipulates the foreign workers may be hired for investment projects, after priority has been given to Iraqi workers. At least 50 percent of an investment project’s workers must be Iraqi nationals. International companies have noted that Iraq lacks skilled labor, and it can be a challenge to meet this requirement. Foreign investors are expected to help train Iraqi employees to increase their efficiency, skills, and capabilities. In the IKR, hiring locally is encouraged, but not mandated. Before applying for the residency permit required for legal employment, foreign workers must obtain a security clearance from the KRG MOI, a medical clearance which includes an HIV test, and a work permit from the KRG Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA). Some foreign companies have reported prolonged delays in obtaining necessary residency permits for foreign workers. In 2020, the KRG significantly increased its fees for foreign residency permits. The appointment of foreign nationals as managers of foreign-owned limited liability companies requires additional clearances. Residency permits are only one year in duration. In March 2021, Iraq’s MOI issued a new directive that would allow visitors from more than thirty countries, including the United States, to obtain visas on arrival at Iraq’s ports of entry, rather than having to do so prior to traveling to Iraq. In announcing the policy, the GOI said the move aimed to “encourage investment and support jobs.” Information indicates the visa-on-arrival will cost $75 and permit a single entry for a maximum two-month stay. The PM-led Committee for National Health and Safety rescinded on March 7 the requirement for inbound and outbound travelers to present a negative PCR test. Starting April 1, travelers must instead present vaccine certificates that indicate receipt of one dose of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine or two doses of other approved vaccines. Individuals who cannot receive the vaccine for medical reasons will still need to provide a negative PCR test result and a medical report approved by the Health Ministry. This new policy applies to Iraqi citizens and foreigners. U.S. citizens traveling to the IKR can obtain a visa upon arrival at the airport, valid for 30 days. This visa is not valid for travel in Iraq outside the IKR, as the GOI does not honor KRG-issued visas. U.S. citizens who plan to stay for longer than 30 days must extend their IKR visa or obtain a residency permit. The KRG does not require HIV tests if travel is shorter than 15 days. At the time of this report, KRG announced that from April 1 travelers older than 12 years old just need to have both shots of the Moderna or Pfizer vaccine, or one shot of the Johnson and Johnson vaccine. No PCR will be required for fully vaccinated people. If for medical reasons travelers could not get vaccinated, then a PCR (72 hours or less) will be required. Additional information can be found on the U.S. Department of State’s website: www.travel.state.gov. The GOI does not follow any forced localization policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in their goods and technology. There are no requirements for IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. The GOI strongly resists offering ownership or profit sharing with any potential foreign investor. The GOI prefers to structure foreign investments as contracts by which it agrees to pay for services or equipment at a price that a clause in the annual budget law guarantees, as opposed to a price based on profits or returns. The KRG, in contrast, has employed “build-own-operate” project structures and production sharing contracts in its management of the energy, oil, and gas sectors. 5. Protection of Property Rights Since 2009, Iraqi law has allowed foreigners to own land and the amended Investment Law expressly provides foreigners the right to own land for the purpose of developing residential real estate projects. It also allows foreign investors to own land for industrial projects if they have an Iraqi partner. Additionally, foreign investors are permitted to rent or lease land for up to 50 years, with an option to renew. The GOI approved implementing regulations in 2010 that allow investors to obtain land for residential housing projects free of charge on the condition that land value is excluded from the sales price. The land registration can be revoked if the domestic or foreign investor does not carry out the obligations of their agreement. For non-residential, commercial investment projects, including agriculture, services, tourism, commercial, and industrial projects without an Iraqi partner, foreign investors can lease government land. The terms and duration of these leases vary by project type and the result of negotiations between the parties. Land for non-residential projects will be leased free of initial down payment, and compensation will be either a percentage of pre-tax revenue or a specified percentage of the “rent allowance” for the land. These smaller percentages of the “rent allowance” rate, ranging from one percent to 25 percent, amount to significant rent reductions for leased land. In the IKR, foreign land ownership is allowed under Law Number 4 (2006). The KBOI initially awarded more than half of all investment licenses to housing projects, but that percentage has declined in favor of priority sector development areas of agriculture, industry, and tourism. Delays in the transfer of land title have sometimes slowed projects. Mortgages and liens exist in Iraq, and there is a national record system. However, mortgages are not common. Iraq ranks 121 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s “registering property” index of its 2020 Doing Business report. Legal systems that protect intellectual property (IP) rights in Iraq are inadequate and infringement is common. Counterfeit products are widespread in the Iraqi marketplace, including pharmaceutical drugs. According to a 2018 study (latest data available) by the Business Software Alliance on self-reported piracy, 85 percent of Iraq’s software was unlicensed in 2017, consistent with the levels found in each survey since 2009. New IP legislation is being drafted but it remains unclear when it will pass the Council of Ministers and the COR in 2022. The IKR has no independent IP protections and outsources all IP complaints to the GOI. The KRG is working with GOI to develop new laws. Responsibility for IP rights enforcement is spread across several ministries. The Ministry of Culture handles copyrights, and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) houses the trademarks office. The Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, an agency under the MOP, handles the patent registry and the industrial design registry. The MOP’s patent registry office has occasionally included Arab League Israel Boycott questionnaires in the patent registry application, which U.S. companies are not allowed to complete under U.S. law. IP infringement cases are primarily heard in commercial courts, although infrequently transferred to the criminal courts. A draft IP law, which would comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and consolidate all IP responsibilities into a single body, was stalled in the Shura Council but is now again under consideration. In 2018, the COM Secretariat reviewed IP forms and processes for simplification. As a result, the patent application is now based on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) standards. However, the application processes for all classes of IP protection favor domestic applicants through requirements for local Iraqi-national agents and optional, but advantageous, in-person review committee meetings. Iraq is a signatory to several international intellectual property conventions and to regional and bilateral arrangements, which include: 1) the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967 Act), ratified by Law No. 212 of 1975; 2) the WIPO Convention, ratified by Law No. 212 of 1975 (Iraq became a member of the WIPO in January 1976); 3) the Arab Agreement for the Protection of Copyrights, ratified by Law No. 41 of 1985; and 4) the Arab Intellectual Property Rights Treaty (Law No. 41 of 1985). GOI approved joining the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in March 2021, law no.15 has been issued on July 01, 2021, to be enforced on May 01, 2022. Iraq is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report, but two markets located in Iraq were listed in the 2020 and 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. The 2021 Notorious Markets List is available online at: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/february/ustr-releases-2021-review-notorious-markets-counterfeiting-and-piracy Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov A public list of local lawyers can be obtained by emailing BaghdadACS@state.gov. The American Chamber of Commerce in Iraq can be reached at: inquiries@amcham-iraq.org. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en. 6. Financial Sector Iraq remains one of the most under-banked countries in the Middle East. The Iraqi banking system includes around 70 private banks and seven state-owned banks. As of early 2022, 20 foreign banks have licensed branches in Iraq and several others have strategic investments in Iraqi banks. The three largest banks in Iraq are Rafidain Bank, Rasheed Bank, and the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), which account for roughly 85 percent of Iraq’s banking sector assets. Iraq’s economy remains primarily cash based, with many banks acting as little more than ATMs in a heavily U.S. dollarized economy. Rafidain and Rasheed offer standard banking products but primarily provide pension and government salary payments to individual Iraqis. Credit is difficult to obtain and expensive. Iraq ranked 186 out of 190 in terms of ease of getting credit in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. Although the lending volume of by privately-owned banks is growing, most privately-owned banks do more wire transfers and other fee-based exchange services. Businesses are largely self-financed or “between individuals” private transactions. State-owned banks mainly make financial transfers from the government to provincial authorities or individuals, rather than business loans. The CBI introduced a small and medium enterprise lending program in 2015, in which 47 private banks have reportedly participated. In early 2020, the CBI launched a real estate lending initiative and an Islamic finance consolidation program. The initiative received an enthusiastic response from private banks, as it increased their liquidity. The main purpose of the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) is to provide financial and related services to facilitate trade, particularly through letters of credit. Although CBI granted private banks permission to issue letters of credit below $50 million, TBI continues to process nearly all government letters of credit. Although banking sector reform was a priority of Iraq’s IMF Stand-By Arrangement, the GOI has had only incremental success reforming its two largest state-owned banks, Rafidain and Rasheed. Private banks are mostly active in currency exchanges and wire transfers. CBI is headquartered in Baghdad, with branches in Basrah and Erbil. CBI’s Erbil branch, and the IKR’s state-owned banking system, are now electronically linked to the CBI system. The CBI now has full supervisory authority over the financial sector in the IKR, including the banks and non-bank financial institutions. The Finance Action Task Force (FATF) recognized Iraqi’s anti-money laundering and counter finance terrorism progress towards best practice standards in June 2018, removing Iraq from FATF’s monitoring process. Iraq does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are active across all sectors in Iraq. GOI ministries currently own and operate over 192 SOEs, a legacy of the state planning system. The GOI’s continued support of unprofitable entities places a substantial fiscal burden on Iraq, as many SOEs are unproductive. These firms employ over half a million Iraqis, many of whom are underemployed. The degree to which SOEs compete with private companies varies by sector; SOEs face the most competition in the market for consumer goods. The GOI had expressed a commitment to reforming the SOEs and taking steps toward privatization as part of its previous international financing programs. Iraqi law permits SOEs to partner with foreign companies. When parent ministries wish to initiate a partnership for an SOE under their purview, they generally advertise the tender on their ministry’s website. Partnerships are negotiated on a case-by-case basis and require the respective minister’s approval. Iraq does not have a centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs. SOEs are required to seek their parent ministry’s approval for certain categories of financial decisions and operation expansions. However, in practice, SOEs defer to the parent ministry for most decisions. SOEs submit financial reports to their parent ministry’s audit departments and the Board of Supreme Audit. These reports are not published and sometimes exclude salary expenses. The Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), which oversees the largest number of Iraq’s SOEs, established the following requirements for partnerships: minimum duration of three years, the foreign company must register a company office in Iraq, and the foreign company must participate in the production of goods. Foreign companies have faced challenges in partnerships because the GOI has, at times, cut subsidies to SOEs after partnerships were formed and due to conflicts between the parent ministry and the GOI’s official policy. In addition, the MIM has often required that the foreign investor pay all SOE employees’ salaries regardless of whether they are working on the agreed project. GOI entities are required to give preferential treatment to SOEs, under multiple laws. A 2009 COM decision requires all Iraqi government agencies to procure goods from SOEs unless SOEs cannot fulfill the quality and quantity requirements of the tender. A Board of Supreme Audit decision requires government agencies to award SOEs tenders if their bids are no more than 10 percent higher than other bids. Furthermore, some GOI entities, including the MIM, have also issued their own internal regulations requiring tenders to select Iraqi SOEs, unless Iraqi SOEs state that they cannot fulfill the order. Sometimes a foreign firm must form a partnership with an Iraqi firm to fulfill SOE-promulgated tenders. Further, SOEs are exempt from the bid bond and performance bond requirements that private businesses are subject to. Iraq is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. SOEs do not adhere to OECD guidelines. Iraqi law supports a degree of autonomy in the selection process of an SOE’s board of directors. For example, it requires that a minister’s sole appointment to a board of directors receive the approval of an “opinion board.” Nevertheless, in practice, most board members have close personal and political connections to their parent ministry’s leadership. The GOI has repeatedly announced that it plans to reorganize failing SOEs across multiple sectors. Additionally, the GOI is eager to modernize Iraq’s financial and banking institutions. There are, however, no concrete timelines for these initiatives, and entrenched patronage networks tying SOEs to ministries remain a stumbling block. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The international oil companies active in Iraq are required to observe international best practices in corporate social responsibility (CSR) as part of their contracts with the GOI. Nevertheless, the GOI does not have policies in place to promote Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and raise awareness of environmental and social issues among investors. The concept of RBC is not widely recognized in Iraq. Investors are required to protect the environment and adhere to quality control systems. These include soil testing requirements on the land designated for the project as well as conducting an environmental impact study. In practice, the GOI lacks a mechanism to enforce environmental protection laws and implementation is limited. Iraq became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2009. The GOI established a 15-person committee to work on EITI, including several directors general within the Ministry of Oil (MOO), four representatives from NGOs, and oil company executives. The committee provided required reports through 2013. In November 2017, the EITI Board suspended Iraq’s membership for lack of progress. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Iraq officially ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021. It entered into force on December 1, 2021. Iraq pledged to voluntarily cut one to two percent in CO2-equivalent emissions from industry in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Iraq endorsed the Global Methane Pledge, but it has not committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Iraq enacted Protection and Improvement of the Environment law No. 27 of 2009. However, the law is lightly enforced and lacks regulatory incentives such as tax credits or biodiversity offsets to promote compliance. Public procurement and construction regulation do require environmental and pollution impacts. 9. Corruption Iraq ranked 157 out of 180 in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, a slight improvement from its ranking of 160 in 2020. Public corruption is a major obstacle to economic development and political stability. Corruption is pervasive in government procurement, in the awarding of licenses or concessions, dispute settlement, and customs imports and exports. While large-scale investment opportunities exist in Iraq, public and private corruption remain a significant impediment to conducting business. Foreign investors can expect to contend with corruption in many forms, at all levels. While the GOI is trying to reduce procurement corruption in sectors such as electricity, oil, and gas, credible reports of corruption in government procurement are widespread, with examples ranging from bribery and kickbacks to awards involving companies connected to political leaders. Investors may come under pressure to take on well-connected local partners to avoid systemic bureaucratic hurdles to doing business. Similarly, there are credible reports of corruption involving large-scale problems with government payrolls, ranging from “ghost” employees and salary skimming to nepotism and patronage in personnel decisions. Importing and exporting goods remains difficult, and bribery of or extortion by port officials is commonplace. Iraq ranked 181 out of 190 countries in the category of “Trading Across Borders” in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report. U.S. firms frequently identify corruption resulting from Iraq’s opaque business regulatory environment as a significant obstacle to FDI, particularly in government contracts and procurement, as well as performance requirements and performance bonds. U.S. companies are obligated to follow U.S. laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Several institutions have specific mandates to address corruption in Iraq. The Commission of Integrity (COI), initially established under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), is an independent government agency responsible for pursuing anti-corruption investigations, upholding the enforcement of laws, and preventing crime. The COI investigates government corruption allegations and refers completed cases to the Iraqi judiciary. After an unsuccessful Inspector General program, the GOI attempted several anti-corruption initiatives from 2004-2022. However, anti-corruption oversight remains with the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), established in 1927. BSA is an analogue to the U.S. government’s General Accountability Office. It is a financially and administratively independent body that derives its authority from Law 31 of 2011, the Law of the Board of Supreme Audit. It is charged with fiscal and regulatory oversight of all publicly funded bodies in Iraq and auditing all federal revenues, including any revenues received from the IKR. The Kurdistan Board of Supreme Audit is responsible for auditing regional revenues with IKP and GOI oversight. The IKP established a regional Commission of increasing its jurisdiction in 2014 to include other branches of the KRG and money laundering. In 2021, the IKP ordered the establishment of a Kurdistan Anti-Corruption Court. However, the KRG has not implemented the order, which falls to the Judicial Council. Iraq is a party but not a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention. Iraq is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. According to Iraqi law, any person or legal entity has the right to submit corruption-related complaints to the Commission for Integrity and the inspector general of a GOI ministry or body. Commission for Integrity Department of Complaints and Reports Mobile: 07901988559 Landline: 07600000030 Hotline@nazaha.iq 10. Political and Security Environment Iraqi security forces continue to carry out counter-terrorism operations against ISIS cells throughout the country. Terrorist attacks within the IKR occur less frequently than in other parts of Iraq, although the KRG, U.S. government facilities, and Western interests remain possible targets. In addition, Iran-aligned militias threaten U.S. citizens and companies throughout Iraq. Travelers should review the embassy’s official COVID-19 page, which is updated weekly, before traveling: https://iq.usembassy.gov/covid-19-information/. State Department guidance to U.S. businesses in Iraq advises the use of protective security details. Detailed security information is available on the U.S. Embassy website: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/. Some U.S. and third country businesspeople travel throughout much of Iraq; however, in general their movement is restricted with security advisors and protective security teams taken on most travels. Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil maintain an active branch of the Overseas Security Advisory Council. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Iraq continues to face high unemployment, a large informal sector, lack of satisfactory work standards, and unskilled labor force. Domestic and foreign investors often cite the lack of skilled Iraqi labor as one of the major impediments to investing in Iraq, as political instability and violence led many highly educated Iraqis to leave the country in recent years. More than 1.2 million Iraqis remained displaced due to conflict as of April, with most unable to find jobs or pursue livelihood activities to support their families. Foreign investors tend to rely on foreign workers, although at least 50 percent of an investment project’s workers must be Iraqi nationals. International companies have noted that it can be a challenge to meet this requirement. In the IKR, hiring locally is encouraged but not mandated. The Iraqi constitution states that citizens have the right to form and join unions and professional associations. Iraq is a party to both International Labor Organization conventions related to youth employment, including child labor. Iraqi labor laws also regulate working conditions and prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including by children. However, the GOI has not effectively monitored or enforced the law, which has resulted in unacceptable working conditions for many workers, including children. Iraqi’s labor law, revised in 2016, is more consistent with current international standards than previous laws and allows for collective bargaining, further limits child labor, and provides improved protections against discrimination at work. The law addresses sexual harassment at work and provides protection against it and enshrines the right to strike, which had been banned since 1987. The GOI no longer limits workers’ affiliation with more than one union or federation, and coverage has been expanded to include all workers not covered by Iraq’s civil service law. The IKR did not implement the new labor law and continues to operate under the 1987 statute. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) sets a minimum monthly wage for unskilled workers. The private sector sets wages by contract, and the GOI sets wages for those working in the public sector. The COM last approved changes to the public sector pay scale in January 2015, reducing the pay gap between low- and high-ranking employees. In addition, all employers must provide some level of transport, accommodation, and food allowances for each employee, but the law does not fix these allowance amounts. In December 2013, the GOI launched a Social Safety Net program to assist the unemployed and persons with disabilities in gaining access to financial aid and benefits from the government; as of April 2018, MOLSA’s Directorate of People with Disabilities and Special Needs reported the program covers approximately 4 million individuals. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The GOI collects and publishes limited statistics with which to compare international and U.S. investment data. The NIC and PICs granted 1067 licenses between 2008 and 2015 (latest statistics available) with a total potential value of $53.9 billion. In the IKR, the KBOI granted licenses to 166 projects from the period of January 2019 to March 2021, with a total potential value of $5.11 billion. This represented a capital increase of $1.98 billion (163 percent) compared to 2018. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $166.757 2020 $234,094 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2016 $5,911 2019 $1,928 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2016 3.5% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: http://cosit.gov.iq/en/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Embassy Baghdad Economic Section Al-Kindi Street, International Zone, Baghdad Office: +1-301-985-8841 x3013 USIraqTrade@state.gov https://iq.usembassy.gov/business/getting-started-iraq/ Ireland Executive Summary The COVID-19 crisis had a massive impact on Ireland’s economy and its effects will continue in 2022. The Irish government implemented varying degrees of lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from the onset in March 2020, including restrictions to close non-essential businesses and services for extended periods of time. Unemployment (including COVID-19 related temporary unemployment) peaked at 28.1 percent in April 2020. Ireland’s official unemployment rate remained around 5 percent (currently at 5.2 percent as of February 2022) due to the unprecedented pandemic related government assistance programs to businesses and workers furloughed due to COVID-19. Over the past two years, the government sustained a level of unprecedented deficit spending to combat the pandemic. Despite the prolonged difficulties caused by COVID-19, Ireland’s economy performed extremely well with GDP growth of 13.5 percent recorded in 2021 following growth of 5.9 percent in 2020. Most of this growth can be attributed to export focused industries (technology, pharmaceutical, and other large multinational companies headquartered in Ireland) while the domestic economy struggled with temporary business closures due to the restrictions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exasperated Ireland’s growing inflation concerns with fuel and gas price rises leading to price increases across all sectors, which could dampen consumer spending and confidence and could result in lower-than-expected growth for 2022. The Irish government actively promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) and has had considerable success in attracting investment, particularly from the United States. There are over 950 U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland operating primarily in the following sectors: chemicals, biosciences, pharmaceutical and medical devices; computer hardware and software; internet and digital media; electronics, and financial services. One of Ireland’s many attractive features as an FDI destination is its favorable 12.5 percent corporate tax (in place since 2003), the second lowest in the European Union (EU). Ireland signed the OECD Inclusive Framework Agreement, which institutes minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent when implemented. Firms routinely note that they come to Ireland primarily for the high quality and flexibility of the English-speaking workforce; the availability of a multilingual labor force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; and pro-business government policies and regulators. Additional positive features include a transparent judicial system; transportation links; proximity to the United States and Europe; and Ireland’s geographic location making it well placed in time zones to support investment in Asia and the Americas. Ireland benefits from its membership of the EU and a barrier-free access to a market of almost 500 million consumers. In addition, the clustering of existing successful industries has created an ecosystem attractive to new firms. The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the EU, or Brexit, on January 1, 2021, leaves Ireland as the only remaining English-speaking country in the EU and may make Ireland even more attractive as a destination for FDI. The Irish government treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. Ireland’s judicial system is transparent and upholds the sanctity of contracts, as well as laws affecting foreign investment. Conversely, Ireland’s ability to attract investment are often marred by relatively high labor and operating costs (such as for energy); skilled-labor shortages; licensing and permitting challenges (e.g., for zoning, rezoning, project permissions, etc.) Eurozone-risk; infrastructure in need of investment (such as in transportation, affordable housing, energy and broadband internet); high income tax rates; uncertainty in EU policies on some regulatory matters; and absolute price levels among the highest in Europe. New data centers must meet new requirements regarding location, energy consumption and energy storage as Ireland’s electricity system struggles to meet demand for energy. A formal national security screening process for foreign investment in line with the EU framework is expected to be in place by late 2022, though the original date was 2020 but delayed due to the pandemic. At present, investors looking to receive government grants or assistance through one of the four state agencies responsible for promoting foreign investment in Ireland are often required to meet certain employment and investment criteria. Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization. The government recognizes and enforces secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. Ireland is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to the International Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property. Several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in Ireland in the energy, broadcasting, and transportation sectors. All of Ireland’s SOEs are open to competition for market share. While Ireland has no bilateral investment treaties, the United States and Ireland have shared a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty since 1950 that provides for national treatment of U.S. investors. The two countries have also shared a Tax Treaty since 1998, supplemented in December 2012 with an agreement to improve international tax compliance and to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 19 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $390,274 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $65,620 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Irish government actively promotes FDI, a strategy that has fueled economic growth since the mid-1990s. The principal goal of Ireland’s investment promotion has been employment creation, especially in technology-intensive and high-skill industries. More recently, the government has focused on Ireland’s international competitiveness by encouraging foreign-owned companies to enhance research and development (R&D) activities and to deliver higher-value goods and services. U.S. companies are attracted to Ireland as an exporting sales and support platform to the EU market of almost 500 million consumers and other global markets. Ireland is a successful FDI destination for many reasons, including a currently low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent for all domestic and foreign firms (Ireland is party to the October 2021 OECD deal on a global minimum corporate tax that will set the tax rate to 15 percent); a well-educated, English-speaking workforce; the availability of a multilingual labor force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; and pro-business government policies and regulators. Ireland also benefits from a transparent judicial system; good transportation links; proximity to the United States and Europe, and the drawing power of existing companies operating successfully in Ireland (a so-called “clustering” effect). The stock of American FDI in Ireland stood at USD 390 billion in 2020, more than the U.S. total for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the so-called BRICS countries) combined. There are approximately 900 U.S. subsidiaries currently in Ireland employing roughly 190,000 people and supporting work for another 152,000. This figure represents a significant proportion of the 2.51 million people employed in Ireland. U.S. firms operate primarily in the following sectors: chemicals, biosciences, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, computer hardware and software, web and digital media; electronics, and financial services. U.S. investment has been particularly important to the growth and modernization of Irish industry over the past thirty years, providing new technology, export capabilities, management and manufacturing best practices, and employment opportunities. Ireland has more recently become an important R&D center for U.S. firms in Europe, and a magnet for U.S. internet and digital media investment. Industry leaders like Google, Amazon, eBay, PayPal, Meta (Facebook), Twitter, LinkedIn, Electronic Arts and cybersecurity firms like Tenable, Forcepoint, AT&T Cybersecurity, McAfee use Ireland as the hub or important part of their respective European, and sometimes Middle Eastern, African, and/or Indian operations. Factors that challenge Ireland’s ability to attract investment include relatively high labor and operating costs (such as for energy); sporadic skilled-labor shortages; the fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic; and sometimes-deficient infrastructure (such as in transportation, energy and broadband quality). Ireland also suffers from housing and high-quality office space shortages; and absolute price levels that are among the highest in Europe. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland has called for greater attention to a “skills gap” in the supply of Irish graduates to the high technology sector. It also has asserted that relatively high personal income tax rates can make attracting talent from abroad difficult. In 2013, Ireland became the first country in the Euro zone to exit a financial bailout program from the EU, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund (EU/ECB/IMF, or so-called Troika). Compliance with the terms of the Troika program came at a substantial economic cost with gross domestic product (GDP) stagnation and austerity measures, while dealing with high unemployment (which hit 15 percent). Strong economic progress followed through government-backed initiatives to attract investment and stimulate job creation and employment. Despite the prolonged difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Ireland’s economic performance continued to be the best in the Euro zone in 2021 with an estimated 13.5 percent growth, achieved on the back of strong exports from the food, pharmaceutical and med-tech sectors and other large multinational companies headquartered in Ireland. The domestic economy struggled with temporary business closures due to the restrictions. With Ireland’s official unemployment rate at 5.2 percent in February 2022, employers are expecting a tight labor market over the next year. Ireland’s sovereign debt remains attractive to investors exemplifying international confidence in Ireland’s economic progress. The UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit) in 2021, leaves Ireland as the only remaining English-speaking country in the bloc. The UK is now a non-EU member which shares a land border with Ireland. The December 2020 Brexit agreement dictates the future trading relationship between the UK and the EU and will likely affect Ireland’s future economic performance. The agreement allows for tariff-free Ireland to Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) trade but comes with increased customs procedures. Existing Ireland – Northern Ireland trade continues unimpeded (aka, the Northern Ireland Protocol). While some disruption has been noticed in the supply chain of retail and agricultural sectors (due to their traditional use of the UK “land-bridge” to move products to and from the EU), Irish companies have generally been able to find alternate routes (i.e., using ferries from Ireland directly to continental Europe), though this has raised costs in some sectors. The EU and UK are in ongoing discussions to ensure the Northern Ireland Protocol remains. With Brexit, Ireland has lost a close EU ally on policy matters, particularly free trade and business friendly open markets. Ireland continues to be heavily dependent on the UK as an export market and source especially for food products, and the full effect of Brexit may yet hit sectors such as food and agri-business with disruptions to supply chains and increased red-tape. Irish trade with its EU colleagues has already seen a dramatic switch to direct shipping rather than using Great Britain as a land-bridge for trucking products. Some UK-based firms (including U.S. firms) have moved headquarters or opened subsidiary offices in Ireland to facilitate ease of business with other EU countries. The Irish Department of Finance and the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) estimate Brexit will cut Ireland’s economic growth modestly in the near term, but such models are complicated with the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Six government departments and organizations have responsibility to promote investment into Ireland by foreign companies: The Industrial Development Authority of Ireland (IDA Ireland) has overall responsibility for promoting and facilitating FDI in Ireland. IDA Ireland is also responsible for attracting foreign financial and insurance firms to Dublin’s International Financial Services Center (IFSC). IDA Ireland maintains seven U.S. offices (in New York, NY; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Mountain View, CA; Irvine, CA; Atlanta, GA; and Austin, TX), as well as offices throughout Europe and Asia. Enterprise Ireland (EI) promotes joint ventures and strategic alliances between indigenous and foreign companies. The agency assists entrepreneurs establish in Ireland and assists foreign firms that wish to establish food and drink manufacturing operations in Ireland. EI has six existing offices in the United States (Austin, TX; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; New York, NY; San Francisco, CA; and Seattle, WA and has offices in Europe, South America, the Middle East, and Asia. Shannon Group (formerly the Shannon Free Airport Development Company) promotes FDI in the Shannon Free Zone (SFZ) and owns properties in the Shannon region as potential green-field investment sites. Since 2006, the responsibility for investment by Irish firms in the Shannon region has passed to Enterprise Ireland while IDA Ireland remains responsible for FDI in the region. Udaras na Gaeltachta (Udaras) has responsibility for economic development in those areas of Ireland where the predominant language is Irish. Udaras works with IDA Ireland to promote overseas investment in these regions. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has responsibility for economic messaging and supporting the country’s trade promotion agenda as well as diaspora engagement to attract investment. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) supports the creation of jobs by promoting the development of a competitive business environment where enterprises can operate with high standards and grow in sustainable markets. Irish law allows foreign corporations (registered under the Companies Act 2014 or previous legislation and known locally as a public limited company (plc)) to conduct business in Ireland. Any company incorporated abroad that establishes a branch in Ireland must file certain papers with the Companies Registration Office (CRO). A foreign corporation with a branch in Ireland has the same standing in Irish law for purposes of contracts, etc., as a domestic company incorporated in Ireland. Private businesses are not competitively disadvantaged to public enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. No barriers exist to participation by foreign entities in the purchase of state-owned Irish companies. Residents of Ireland may, however, be given priority in share allocations over all other investors. There are no recent examples of this, but Irish residents did receive priority in share allocations in the 1998-sale of the state-owned telecommunications company Eircom. The government privatized the national airline Aer Lingus through a stock market flotation in 2005 but chose to retain about a one-quarter stake. At that time, U.S. investors purchased shares in the sale. The International Airlines Group (IAG) purchased the government’s remaining stake in the airline in 2015, and subsequently took an overall controlling interest which it continues to hold. Citizens of countries other than Ireland and EU member states can acquire land for private residential or industrial purposes. In the past, all non-EU nationals needed written consent from the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine before acquiring an interest in land zoned for agricultural use but these limitations no longer exist. There are many equine stud farms and racing facilities owned by foreign nationals. No restrictions exist on the acquisition of urban land. Ireland does not yet have formal investment screening legislation in place. Draft legislation has been submitted to the Dail (Irish parliament) which is expected to be enacted during 2022. (The bill was partially delayed due to the government’s efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.) As a member of the EU, Ireland is required to implement any common EU investment screening regulations or directives such as the EU Framework. There were no third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. All firms must register with the Companies Registration Office (CRO) online at www.cro.ie . The CRO, as well as registering companies, can also register a business/trading name, a non-Ireland based foreign company (external company), or a limited partnership. Any firm or company registered under the Companies Act 2014 becomes a body corporate as and from the date mentioned in its certificate of incorporation. The CRO website permits online data submission. Firms must submit a signed paper copy of this online application to the CRO, unless the applicant company has already registered with www.revenue.ie (the website of Ireland’s tax collecting authority, the Office of the Revenue Commissioners). The Ireland pages in the following link gives the most up-to-date information: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/102/ireland Enterprise Ireland assists Irish firms in developing partnerships with foreign firms mainly to develop and grow indigenous firms. 3. Legal Regime Ireland’s judicial system is transparent and upholds the sanctity of contracts, as well as laws affecting foreign investment. These laws include: The Companies Act 2014 which contains the basic requirements for incorporation in Ireland; The 2004 Finance Act which introduced tax incentives to encourage firms to set up headquarters in Ireland and to conduct R&D; The Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies Control Act of 1978 which sets out rules governing mergers and takeovers by foreign, and domestic firms; The Competition (Amendment) Act of 1996 which amends and extends the Competition Act of 1991 and the Mergers and Takeovers (Control) Acts of 1978 and 1987, and sets out the rules governing competitive behavior; and, The Industrial Development Act (1993) which outlines the functions of IDA Ireland. The Companies Act (2014), with more than 1,400 sections and 17 Schedules, is the largest-ever Irish statute. The Act consolidated and reformed all Irish company law for the first time in over 50 years. In addition, numerous laws and regulations pertain to employment, social security, environment protection and taxation, with many of these keyed to EU regulations and directives. Ireland has been a member of the EU since 1973. As a member, it incorporates all EU legislation into national legislation and applies all EU regulatory standards and rules. Ireland is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and follows all WTO procedures Ireland’s legal system is common law. Courts are presided over by judges appointed by the President of Ireland (on the advice of the government). The Commercial Court is a designated court of the High Court which deals with commercial disagreements between businesses where the value of the claim is at least €1 ($1.2) million. The Commercial Court also oversees cases on intellectual property rights, including trademarks and trade secrets. Ireland treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. With only a few exceptions, no constraints prevent foreign individuals or entities from ownership or participation in private firms/corporations. The most significant of these exceptions is that, in common with other EU countries, Irish airlines must be at least 50 percent owned by EU residents to have full access to the single European aviation market. Citizens of countries other than Ireland and EU member states can acquire land for private residential or industrial purposes. In the past, one of Ireland’s many attractive features as an FDI destination was its low corporate tax rate. Since 2003, the headline corporate tax rate was 12.5 percent, one of the lowest in the EU. In 2014, the government announced firms would no longer be able to incorporate in Ireland without also being tax resident. Prior to this, firms could incorporate in Ireland and be tax resident elsewhere, making use of a tax avoidance arrangement colloquially known as the “Double Irish” to reduce tax liabilities. The Irish government is party to the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) negotiations and ratified the BEPS Multilateral Instrument in January 2019. The government implemented a Knowledge Development Box (KDB), effective 2016, which is consistent with OECD guidelines. The KDB allows for the application of a tax rate of 6.25 percent on profits arising to certain intellectual property assets that are the result of qualifying research and development activities carried out in Ireland. In October 2021, Ireland signed up to the OECD Inclusive Framework Agreement and will raise its corporate tax rate to 15 percent when implemented. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) is an independent statutory body with a dual mandate to enforce competition and consumer protection law in Ireland. The CPCC was established in 2014, following the amalgamation of the National Consumer Agency and the Competition Authority. The CPCC enforces Irish and EU competition law in Ireland. It has the power to conduct investigations and can take civil or criminal enforcement action if it finds evidence of breaches of competition law. The CPCC is given enforcement powers by the Competition Act of 2002, subsequently amended and extended by the Competition Act 2006. The Act introduced criminal liability for anti-competitive practices, increased corporate liability for violations, and outlined available defenses. Most tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws are compatible with EU regulations, and they do not adversely affect investment. The government publishes proposed drafts of laws and regulations to solicit public comment, including those by foreign firms and their representative trade associations. Bureaucratic procedures are transparent and reasonably efficient, in line with the general pro-business approach of the government. The Irish Takeover Panel Act of 1997 gives the ‘Irish Takeover Panel’ responsibility for monitoring and supervising takeovers and other relevant corporate transactions. The minority squeeze-out provisions in the legislation, allows a bidder who holds 80 percent of the shares of the target firm (or 90 percent for firms with securities on a regulated market) to compel the remaining minority shareholders to sell their shares. There are no reports that the Irish Takeover Panel Act has prevented foreign takeovers, and, in fact, there have been several high-profile foreign takeovers of Irish companies in the banking and telecommunications sectors in the past. Although not recent, Babcock & Brown (an Australian investment firm) acquired the former national telephone company, Eircom in 2006 which it subsequently sold to Singapore Technologies Telemedia in 2009. The EU Directive on Takeovers provides a framework of common principles for cross-border takeover bids, creates a level playing field for shareholders, and establishes disclosure obligations throughout the EU. Irish legislation fully implemented the directive in 2006, though the Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 had already incorporated many of its principles. Companies must notify the CCPC of mergers over a certain financial threshold for review as required by the Competition Act 2002, as amended (Competition Act). The government normally expropriates private property only for public purposes in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of international law. The government condemns private property in accordance with recognized principles of due process. The Irish courts provide a system of judicial review and appeal where there are disputes brought by owners of private property subject to a government action. There is no specific domestic body for handling investment disputes apart from the judicial system. The Irish Constitution, legislation, and common law form the basis for the Irish legal system. DETE has primary responsibility for drafting and enforcing company law. The judiciary is independent, and litigants are entitled to trial by jury in commercial disputes. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Ireland is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, meaning local courts must enforce international arbitration awards under appropriate circumstances. Some U.S. business representatives have occasionally called into question the transparency of Irish government tenders. According to some U.S. firms, lengthy procedural decisions often delay the procurement tender process. Unsuccessful bidders have expressed concerns over difficulties receiving information on the rationale behind the tender outcome. In addition, some successful bidders have experienced delays in finalizing contracts, commencing work on major projects, obtaining accurate project data, and receiving compensation for work completed, including through conciliation and arbitration processes. Some successful bidders have also subsequently found that the original tenders may not have accurately described conditions on the ground. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Ireland treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. Ireland’s legal system is common law and Ireland’s courts apply Irish and EU legislation. All disputes are dealt with judicially. In the past ten years, we are not aware of any investment disputes involving U.S. investors nor of any extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Ireland’s judicial court system is used to settle all investor disputes. Investment disputes involving U.S. or other foreign investors in Ireland are extremely rare. There were no known instances of SOE investment disputes in the past five years. The Companies Act 2014 is the most important body of law dealing with commercial and bankruptcy law, which Irish courts consistently apply. Irish company bankruptcy legislation gives creditors a strong degree of protection. 4. Industrial Policies Three Irish organizations – IDA Ireland (IDA), EI, and Udaras – have regulatory authority for administering grant aid to investors for capital equipment, land, buildings, training, and R&D. Foreign and domestic business enterprises seeking grant aid from these organizations must submit detailed investment proposals. These proposals typically include information on fixed assets (capital), labor, and technology/R&D components, and establish targets using criteria such as sales, profitability, exports, and employment. The submitted information is business confidential, and each investment proposal is subject to an economic appraisal before support is offered or denied. Ireland’s investment agencies and foreign investors jointly establish employment creation targets, which usually serve as the basis for performance requirements. The agencies only pay grant aid after the foreign investors have attained externally audited performance targets. Grant-aid agreements generally have a repayment term of five years after the date on which the last installment is paid. Parent companies of the investor generally must also guarantee repayment of the government grant if the grant-aided company closes before an agreed time period elapses, normally ten years after the grant was paid. There are no requirements foreign investors must procure locally or allow nationals to own shares. The EU Regional Aid Guidelines (RAGs) in place from 2022- 2027, govern the maximum grant-aid the Irish government can provide to firms/businesses which are graded based on the regional location. The differences in the various aid ceilings reflect the relative development status of business/infrastructure in regions outside the greater Dublin area. Investors are generally free, subject to planning permission, to choose the location of their investment, however IDA has actively encouraged investment in regions outside Dublin since the 1990s. Investment regionalization has been government policy since 2001. IDA set out its plan to secure 800 investments and generate 50,000 new jobs by 2025 in its Driving Recovery and Sustainable Growth 2021 – 2024 strategy. IDA’s goal is to locate over half of all new FDI investments outside the two main urban centers of Dublin and Cork. IDA has developed regional hubs to facilitate clusters of activity around the country. In the past IDA has supported construction of business parks in counties Galway and Louth, to encourage biotechnology sector activity in those counties. There are no restrictions on participation by foreign firms in government-financed and/or -subsidized R&D programs on a national basis. In fact, the government strongly encourages and incentivizes (via a partial tax break) foreign companies to conduct R&D as part of its national strategy to build a more knowledge-intensive, innovation-based economy. Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), the state science agency, has been responsible for administering Ireland’s R&D funding since 2000. Under its current strategy, SFI annually invests over USD 200 million in R&D activities. SFI targets leading researchers in Ireland and overseas to promote the development of biotechnology, information and communications technology; and energy. SFI has specific research centers of excellence – hubs that draw researchers from all of Ireland’s universities together for research on specific themes. The U.S.-Ireland Research and Development Partnership (UIRDP), launched in 2006, is a unique initiative involving funding agencies across three jurisdictions: the United States, Ireland, and Northern Ireland (NI). Under the program, a ‘single-proposal, single-review’ mechanism is facilitated by the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health in the United States, which accept submissions from tri-jurisdictional (U.S., Ireland, and NI) teams for existing funding programs. All proposals submitted under the auspices of UIRDP must have significant research involvement from researchers in all three jurisdictions. In 2015, the UIRDP program topics expanded to include agricultural research; and in 2019 cybersecurity research was also incorporated as a topic. A key aspect of government support is a tax credit on the cost of eligible research, development, and innovation (RDI) activity; and on buildings used for RDI activity. A tax credit of 25 percent is subject to certain conditions and is available for R&D activities carried out in a wide variety of science and technology areas such as software development, engineering, food and beverage production, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, financial services; agriculture and horticulture. Some U.S. firms have already used these tax credits to build and operate R&D facilities. The Irish government’s Knowledge Development Box (KDB), introduced in 2016, also offers a lower tax rate for certain R&D activities carried out in Ireland. The government established Shannon duty-free Processing Zone under legislation in 1957. Firms operating in the area were at the time entitled to taxation and duty-free benefits not available elsewhere in Ireland. Nowadays, all firms in Ireland are treated equally and the Shannon Free Zone (SFZ) as it is now called, continues to operate albeit without any additional tax benefits. All firms operating in the SFZ area have the same investment opportunities and tax incentives as indigenous Irish companies. More than 150 companies operate within the 254-hectare business park. U.S. companies are located in SFZ include: Benex (Becton Dickinson), Connor-Winfield, Digital River, Enterasys Networks, Extrude Hone, GE Capital Aviation Services, GE Money, Sensing, Genworth Financial, Intel, Illinois Tool Works, Kwik-Lok, Lawrence Laboratories (Bristol Myers Squibb), Le Bas International, Magellan Aviation Services, Maidenform, Melcut Cutting Tools (SGS Carbide Tools), Mentor Graphics, Phoenix American Financial Services, RSA Security, Shannon Engine Support (CFM International), SPS International/Hi-Life Tools (Precision Castparts Corp), Sykes Enterprises, Symantec, Travelsavers Corp, Viking Pump, Western Well Tool, Xerox, and Zimmer Biomet. The Shannon Group currently operates the SFZ, as well as Shannon Airport. Visa, residence, and work permit procedures for foreign investors are non-discriminatory and, for U.S. citizens (as investors or employees), generally liberal. No restrictions exist on the numbers of, and duration of employment for, foreign managers brought in to supervise foreign investment projects, though all work permits must be renewed annually. There are no discriminatory export policies or import policies affecting foreign investors. Data Storage The government does not force data-localization, nor does it require foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (e.g., backdoors into hardware and software, or encryption keys). There are no rules on maintaining minimum amounts of data storage in Ireland. Many U.S. firms already operate, and are planning for additional, data centers in Ireland. Future construction of new data centers may face additional planning restrictions particularly to access the power grid. In November 2021, Ireland’s energy regulator, the Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU), announced new requirements regarding location, energy consumption, and energy storage for future data centers connecting to the power grid. 5. Protection of Property Rights The government recognizes and enforces secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. The Department of Justice and Equality (DJE) administers a reliable system of recording such security interests through the Property Registration Authority (PRA) and Registry of Deeds. The PRA registers a person’s interest in property on a public register. All property buyers must since 2010 register their acquisition with the PRA. Ireland also operates a document registration system through the Registry of Deeds in which deeds (as distinct from titles) may be registered, priority obtained, and third parties placed on notice of the existence of documents of title. An efficient, non-discriminatory legal system is accessible to foreign investors to protect and facilitate acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Ireland is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Legislation enacted in 2000 brought Irish intellectual property rights (IPR) law into compliance with Ireland’s obligations under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. The legislation gave Ireland one of the most comprehensive legal frameworks for IPR protection in Europe. It also addressed several TRIPs inconsistencies in prior Irish copyright law that had concerned foreign investors, including the absence of a rental right for sound recordings, the lack of an anti-bootlegging provision, and low criminal penalties that failed to deter piracy. The legislation provides for stronger penalties on both the civil and criminal sides, but it does not include minimum mandatory sentencing for IPR violations. As part of this comprehensive legislation, revisions were also made to non-TRIPS conforming sections of Irish patent law. Specifically, the IPR legislation addressed two outstanding concerns of many foreign investors in the previous legislation: The compulsory licensing provisions of the previous 1992 Patent Law were inconsistent with the “working” requirement prohibition of TRIPs Articles 27.1 and the general compulsory licensing provisions of Article 31; and, Applications processed after December 20, 1991 did not previously conform to the non-discrimination requirement of TRIPs Article 27.1. The government continues to crack down on the sale of illegal cigarettes smuggled into the country by international and local organized criminal groups. High taxation on tobacco products makes illegal trade in counterfeit and untaxed cigarettes highly lucrative. Ireland became the first European country, and fourth globally, to enact legislation on plain packaging for tobacco products via The Public Health (Standardized Packaging of Tobacco) Act in 2015. In practice, all tobacco packaging is devoid of branding, and health warnings cover nearly the entire box with only the producer/product name otherwise visible. The legislation has been in force since September 2018. The Irish government has transcribed the 2012 EU Copyright and Related Rights Regulations into law. This legislation makes it possible for copyright holders to seek court injunctions against firms, such as internet service providers (ISPs) or social networks, whose systems host copyright-infringing material. Irish courts ensure any remedy provided will uphold the freedom of ISPs to conduct their business. The legislation ensures that the government cannot mandate any ISP to carry out monitoring of information. The legislation also ensures that measures implemented are “fair and proportionate” and not “unnecessarily complicated or costly.” The law also states that the Courts must respect the fundamental rights of ISP customers, including the customers’ right to protection of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information. The government enacted the Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Law Provisions Act in 2019. The legislation improves provision for copyright and other IPR protection in the digital era, and its enables rights holders to better enforce their IPR in the courts. Ireland implemented the EU’s 2019 Copyright in the Digital Single Market directive in November 2021. Ireland is not included on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about Ireland’s legislation and IP points of contact, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=IE 6. Financial Sector Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between Irish and foreign firms. In some instances, development authorities and commercial banks facilitate loan packages to foreign firms with favorable credit terms. All loans are offered on market terms. There was limited credit available, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), after the financial crisis of 2008. Bank balance sheets have since improved with lending levels increasing as the health of the economy improved. The government established the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (SBCI) to ensure SMEs had access to credit available at market terms. Irish legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms and provide a secure environment for portfolio investment. The current capital gains tax rate is 33 percent (since December 2012). Euronext, an EU-based grouping of stock exchange operators in 2018 acquired and operates the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE), now known as Euronext Dublin. The Irish banking sector, like many worldwide, came under intense pressure in 2007 and 2008 following the collapse of Ireland’s construction industry and the end of Ireland’s property boom. A number of Ireland’s financial lenders were severely under-capitalized and required government bailouts to survive. The government, fearing a flight of private investments, introduced temporary guarantees (still in operation) to personal depositors in 2008 to ensure that deposits remained in Ireland. Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), a bank heavily involved in construction and property lending, failed and was resolved by the government. The government subsequently took majority stakes in several other lenders, effectively nationalized two banks and acquired a significant proportion of a third. The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), established in 2009, acquired most of the property-related loan books of the Irish banks (including Anglo) at a fraction of their book value. The government, with its increased exposure to bank debts and a rising budget deficit, had difficulty in placing sovereign debt on international bond markets following the economic crash of 2008. Ireland sought and got assistance from the Troika (International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU and European Central Bank (ECB)) in November 2010. A rescue package of $110 (€85) billion, with $88 (€67.5) billion of this provided by the Troika, was agreed to cover government deficits and costs related to the bank recapitalizations. The government then took effective control of Allied Irish Bank (AIB), following a further recapitalization by the end of 2010. The government took into state control, and then resolved, two building societies, Irish Nationwide Building Society and Educational Building Society. The government helped re-capitalize Irish Life and Permanent (the banking portion of which was spun off and now operates under the name Permanent TSB) and the Bank of Ireland (BOI). Irish banks were forced to deleverage their non-core assets in line with Troika bailout program recommendations and were effectively limited to service domestic banking demand. BOI succeeded in remaining non-nationalized by realizing capital from the sale of non-essential portfolios and by imposing some targeted burden sharing with some of its bondholders. The government has been actively selling down its stake in BOI since 2021 and its holding has declined to below 6 percent. The government also signaled its to fully sell off its AIB shareholding by mid-2022. Soon after it exited the Troika program in 2013, Ireland re-entered sovereign debt markets. International financing rates continued to fall to record lows for Irish debt, and Ireland was able to fully repay all of its IMF loans by securing bond sales at less expensive rates. Ireland also paid off some bilateral loans extended to it by Denmark and Sweden ahead of schedule in 2017. Currently, Ireland is placing its sovereign debt at very low interest rates in line with other nations. Ireland’s retail banking sector rebounded from the crisis and is now healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The stock of non-performing loans on bank balance sheets remains high; and banks continue to divest themselves of these loans through bundle sales to investors. Ulster Bank, part of the UK-based NatWest Banking group and Ireland’s third largest retail bank, announced its withdrawal from retail banking in Ireland. KBC Bank also announced its withdrawal of services in Ireland in late 2022/early 2023. The move by the two banks is expected to create an unprecedented demand for new accounts with the remaining banks. The two banks are actively selling off portfolios of loan books and mortgages, but up to a million customers will need to find an alternative bank for daily business and credit card facilities. The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) is responsible for both central banking and financial regulation. The CBI is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), whose primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area. There are a large number of U.S. banks with operations in Ireland, many of whom are located in Dublin’s International Financial Services Center (IFSC) Dublin. The IFSC originally functioned somewhat like a business park for financial services firms. U.S. banks located in Ireland provide a range of financial services to clients in Europe and worldwide. These firms include State Street, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, and Northern Trust. The regulation of the international banks operating throughout Ireland falls under the jurisdiction of the CBI. Ireland is part of the Eurozone, and therefore does not have an independent monetary policy. The ECB formulates and implements monetary policy for the Eurozone and the CBI implements that policy at the national level. The Governor of the CBI is a member of the ECB’s Governing Council and has an equal say as other ECB governors in the formulation of Eurozone monetary and interest rate policy. The CBI also issues euro currency in Ireland, acts as manager of the official external reserves of gold and foreign currency, conducts research and analysis on economic and financial matters, oversees the domestic payment and settlement systems, and manages investment assets on behalf of the State. Foreign Exchange Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization. Foreign exchange is easily available at market rates. Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Remittance Policies There are no restrictions or significant reported delays in the conversion or repatriation of investment capital, earnings, interest, or royalties, nor are there any announced plans to change remittance policies. Likewise, there are no limitations on the import of capital into Ireland. The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) is the asset management bureau of the government. NTMA is responsible for day-to-day funding for government operations normally through the sale of sovereign debt worldwide. NTMA is also responsible for investing Irish government funds, such as the national pension funds, in financial instruments worldwide. Ireland suspended issuing sovereign debt upon entering the Troika bailout program in 2010 but has been successfully placing Irish debt since Ireland’s 2013 exit from the Troika program, The NTMA also has oversight of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), the agency established to take on, and dispose of, the property-related loan books of Ireland’s bailed-out banks. The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) established in 2014 has the statutory mandate to invest on a commercial basis to support economic activity and employment in Ireland. The dual objective mandate of the ISIF – investment return and economic impact – requires all its investments to generate returns as well as having a positive (i.e., job-creating) economic impact in Ireland. The ISIF has assisted some small and medium sized enterprises during Ireland’s economic revival. 8. Responsible Business Conduct A growing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Ireland is mainly driven by independent organizations and multinational corporations. According to “Business in the Community–Ireland,” an organization at the forefront of promoting CSR in Ireland, many of the participant firms believe CSR-oriented policies can play a major role in rebuilding Ireland’s corporate reputation. Companies advertise their participation in such programs as the Fairtrade Certification Mark. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland has also released its own report documenting the widespread CSR efforts of American affiliate firms in the country. The government promotes responsible business conduct in Ireland. Its national action plan “Towards Responsible Business – Ireland’s National Plan on Corporate Social Responsibility 2017- 2020″ aims to support businesses in Ireland to create sustainable jobs; embed responsible practices in the marketplace; embrace diversity and promote responsible workplaces; and encourage enterprises to consider their businesses’ impacts on the environment. It gives effect to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and sets out the Irish government’s commitments to promoting responsible business practice at home and overseas. DETE maintains a web page www.csrhub.ie for information on all aspects of CSR in Ireland. Ireland, as an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, established a National Contact Point (NCP) responsible for promoting CSR/RBC and facilitating mediation when complaints arise regarding a company not observing the Guidelines. Contact information for the NCP is: https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/What-We-Do/Trade-Investment/OECD-Guidelines-NCP/ Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues In November 2021, the government released its Climate Action Plan which detailed the actions required to achieve a 51 percent emissions reduction target by 2030 and a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050, as set out in the Climate Act 2021. The plan will be updated annually to ensure alignment with Ireland’s legally binding economy-wide carbon budgets and sectoral ceilings. The Climate Action Plan lays out sector specific targets to achieve these goals, with the largest reduction slated to come from the energy sector (62-81 percent reduction). Some of the actions outlined in the action plan to meet the energy decarbonization targets include a review of policy for large energy users, such as data centers, incentivizing demand side flexibility, and developing supportive policies for wind, solar, and micro generation. Security of energy supply continues to be an issue in Ireland which has been further complicated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ireland is highly dependent on imports of oil and natural gas. While renewable energy, mainly from onshore wind turbines, is growing, Ireland must still import gas, through interconnectors from the UK. Eirgrid, the national grid operator, said Ireland could face electricity shortages over the next five winters unless base load production (from gas or coal) is increased to ensure that intermittent supply from renewables is supplemented. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and the IDA have highlighted the importance of Ireland’s green credentials and climate improvement plans in attracting future investment from international financial services firms. The IDA said Ireland aims to be a global leader in the area of green or sustainable finance. Taoiseach Micheál Martin said sustainable finance remains “a top priority” within the government’s financial services agenda, and Ireland was “uniquely positioned” to benefit from significant global investment in fintech due to the country’s track record for foreign direct investment, entrepreneurial culture and existing number of international financial services firms. 9. Corruption Corruption is not a serious problem for foreign investors in Ireland. The principal Irish legislation relating to anti-bribery and corruption is the Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act of 2018. The Act consolidates all previous legislation for the prevention of corruption. The legislation makes it illegal for Irish public servants to accept bribes. The Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995, provides for the written annual disclosure of interests of people holding public office or employment. The law on corruption in Ireland gives effect in domestic law to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and other conventions concerning criminal corruption and corruption involving officials of the European Union and officials of EU member states. Irish legislation ensures there are strong penalties in place with prison terms of up to ten years and an ‘unlimited’ fine, for those found guilty of offenses under the Act, including convictions of bribery of foreign public officials by Irish nationals and companies that takes place outside of Ireland. Irish police (An Garda Siochana, or Garda) investigate all allegations of corruption. The Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for preparing files for prosecution, on detection of sufficient evidence of criminal activity. The government has, in the past, convicted a small number of public officials for corruption and/or bribery. In 1996, Ireland established the Criminal Asset Bureau (CAB), an independent body responsible for seizing illegally acquired assets. CAB has the powers to focus on the illegally acquired assets of criminals involved in organized crime by identifying criminally acquired assets of persons and taking the appropriate action to deny such people of these assets. Any CAB action is primarily taken through the application of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 legislation. Ireland is a member of the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN). UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Ireland signed the UN Convention on Corruption in December 2003 and ratified it in 2011. Ireland is also a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Resources to Report Corruption Government agency responsible for combating corruption: Department of Justice and Equality, Crime and Security Directorate 94 St. Stephen’s Green Dublin 2 Telephone: + 353 1 602-8202 E-mail: info@justice.ie Website: www.justice.ie Contact at Transparency International: John Devitt Chief Executive Transparency International Floor 2 69 Middle Abbey St Dublin 2 Telephone: +353 1 554 3938 E-mail: Admin@transparency.ie 10. Political and Security Environment There has been no significant spillover of violence from Northern Ireland since the ceasefires of 1994 and the signing and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998. The cessation of violence in Northern Ireland led to increased business investment and confidence in Northern Ireland which also benefited Ireland. The GFA designated funding to develop cross-border cooperation on R&D collaboration, create energy and transportation infrastructure linkages, and for participation in joint trade missions. No violence related to the situation in Northern Ireland has been specifically directed at U.S. citizens or firms located in Ireland. There have been some incidents of criminal terrorism and gangland violence attributed to cross-border groups believed to be involved in the black market. There is considerable Garda and Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) cooperation to stem any illegal activity. There have been no recent incidents involving politically motivated damage to foreign investment projects and/or installations in Ireland. There were some instances of damage to U.S. military assets transiting Shannon Airport in 2003 and later in 2011 by a small number of Irish citizens opposed to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2017, two anti-war activists defaced a U.S. aircraft with graffiti. The Garda arrested two peace protesters as they attempted to gain illegal access to Shannon airport runways in 2019. Other than these incidences of anti-military acts, there have been no acts against U.S. firms or private interests in Ireland. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Ireland’s population reached 5.01 million in April 2021 an increase of 34,000 on 2020 levels. Net migration in the year to April 2021 was 11,200 persons. The total number of persons employed at the end of 2020 was 2.28 million, but this increased to 2.51 million by the end of 2021 as COVID-19 restrictions relaxed and employers began hiring. Employment opportunities continue to attract inward migrations particularly for employees with language skills. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic brought with it three lockdowns of the economy (in April, October and December 2020) with maximum restrictions on movements and a sharp rise in the numbers receiving temporary government employment supports. Temporary government unemployment supports (pandemic unemployment payments) were put in place to keep employees linked to their employers to assist in a rapid return to operations following the lockdowns. The COVID-19 adjusted unemployment rate for Ireland stood at 27.0 percent (with an underlying unemployment rate of 7.2 percent) in February 2021. In the year since, most of those claiming temporary unemployment payments have returned to work and by February 2022 the traditional unemployment rate stood at 5.2 percent with the COVID-adjusted rate at 7.0 percent. The Central Bank of Ireland forecasts Ireland’s unemployment rate will average of 5.8 percent in 2022 before declining to 5.3 percent in 2023. Average hourly labor costs in Ireland increased by 2.0 percent in 2020. During 2021, average industrial earnings increased by 2.1 percent to 989 euro (USD 1,170) per week. The government mandated minimum wage rate was increased by 0.30 euro to 10.50 euro ($12.40) per hour from January 2022, with lower rates set for younger and less experienced workers. The government regulates the Irish labor force less than governments in most continental EU countries. The 2.633 million workforce has a high degree of flexibility, mobility, and education. There is relative gender balance in the workforce, with 1,328,100 males and 1,177,900 females employed in 2021. The gender balance reflects a societal change and government support that facilitated a surge in female employment from the mid-1980s. There are no restrictions on the hiring of non-national labor, and many firms, especially in the technology sector, hire young professionals with a diverse range of language and technology skills. Ireland, since the mid-1990’s, is an attractive destination for foreign investment due to the availability of a young, highly educated workforce. The removal of tuition fees for third level (university) education in 1995 resulted in a rapid increase of third-level qualified graduates. While tuition fees are paid by the government, students must still pay registration fees, currently capped at 3,000 euro ($ 3,600) per academic year. The availability of highly educated and qualified potential employees in Ireland is an attractive feature for employers looking to locate in the EU and has been a significant factor in attracting the already large number of multinational companies located in Ireland. Over 60 percent of new third-level students in Ireland undertake business, engineering, computer science, or science courses. The focus of government strategy has shifted to upgrading skills and increasing the number of workers in technology-intensive, high-value sectors to ensure the availability of an educated workforce. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic introduced mass teleworking to Ireland. The huge change in work practice came almost overnight and despite the immense change, workers and their employers seem to have adapted well. Key to Ireland’s teleworking success was the access to good broadband services. Adequate broadband is already available in most urban areas while the government’s national broadband plan to bring high speed broadband to all areas is still rolling out. It is likely that these plans may be accelerated to get earlier delivery of broadband services in more rural parts of the island. The government is expected to enact legislation giving rights to employees to seek remote working opportunities from their employers. The Irish system of industrial relations is voluntary. Employers and employees generally agree on pay levels and conditions of employment through collective bargaining. There are generally good industrial relationships and very few industrial disputes. There were just three labor disputes in 2021 down from seven in 2020. (Note: Pandemic measures are likely to have affected the number of disputes in 2020 and 2021. End note). A series of agreements between the government and public service labor unions in place since 2010 have in general reduced public service labor disputes. Employers typically resist trade union demands for mandatory trade/labor union recognition in the workplace. While the Irish Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to form associations and unions, Irish law also affirms the right of employers to withhold union recognition and to deal with employees on an individual basis. One quarter of all workers are unionized but there is much higher participation by public sector workers in unions. The government estimates up to 80 percent of workers in foreign-owned firms do not belong to unions. This may reflect more attractive pay, benefits, and conditions by these employers compared with domestic firms. DETE explicitly addressed the country’s collective bargaining rights through an amendment of existing legislation in the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015. 14. Contact for More Information Until August 2022: Peter Lee Economic Affairs Chief American Embassy, Dublin, Ireland Telephone: +353-1-630 6274 Email: dublinpeo@state.gov . From September 2022: Anood Taqui Economic Affairs Chief American Embassy, Dublin, Ireland Telephone: +353-1-630 6274 Email: dublinpeo@state.gov . Israel Executive Summary Israel has an entrepreneurial spirit and a creative, highly educated, skilled, and diverse workforce. It is a leader in innovation in a variety of sectors, and many Israeli start-ups find good partners in U.S. companies. Popularly known as “Start-Up Nation,” Israel invests heavily in education and scientific research. U.S. firms account for nearly two-thirds of the more than 300 research and development (R&D) centers established by multinational companies in Israel. Israel has 117 companies listed on the NASDAQ, the fourth most companies after the United States, Canada, and China. Israeli government agencies, led by the Israel Innovation Authority, fund incubators for early-stage technology start-ups, and Israel provides extensive support for new ideas and technologies while also seeking to develop traditional industries. Private venture capital funds have flourished in Israel in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic shook Israel’s economy, but successful pre-pandemic economic policy buffers – strong growth, low debt, a resilient tech sector among them – mean Israel entered the COVID-19 crisis with relatively low vulnerabilities, according to the International Monetary Fund’s Staff Report for the 2020 Article IV Consultation. The fundamentals of the Israeli economy remain strong, and Israel’s economy rebounded strongly post-pandemic with 8.1 percent GDP growth in 2021. With low inflation and fiscal deficits that have usually met targets pre-pandemic, most analysts consider Israeli government economic policies as generally sound and supportive of growth. Israel seeks to provide supportive conditions for companies looking to invest in Israel through laws that encourage capital and industrial R&D investment. Incentives and benefits include grants, reduced tax rates, tax exemptions, and other tax-related benefits. The U.S.-Israeli bilateral economic and commercial relationship is strong, anchored by two-way trade in goods and services that reached USD 45.1 billion in 2021, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and extensive commercial ties, particularly in high-tech and R&D. The total stock of Israeli foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States was USD 40.4 billion in 2020. Since the signing of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1985, the Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation, moving from a protected, low-end manufacturing and agriculture-led economy to one that is diverse, mostly open, and led by a cutting-edge high-tech sector. The Israeli government generally continues to take slow, deliberate actions to remove trade barriers and encourage capital investment, including foreign investment. The continued existence of trade barriers and monopolies, however, have contributed significantly to the high cost of living and the lack of competition in key sectors. The Israeli government maintains some protective trade policies. Israel has taken steps to meet its pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with planned investments in technologies and projects to slow the pace of climate change. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 36 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 15 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $40.4 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $42,600 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Israel is open to foreign investment and the government actively encourages and supports the inflow of foreign capital. The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s ‘Invest in Israel’ office serves as the government’s investment promotion agency facilitating foreign investment. ‘Invest in Israel’ offers a wide range of services including guidance on Israeli laws, regulations, taxes, incentives, and costs, and facilitation of business connections with peer companies and industry leaders for new investors. ‘Invest in Israel’ also organizes familiarization tours for potential investors and employs a team of advisors for each region of the world. The Israeli legal system protects the rights of both foreign and domestic entities to establish and own business enterprises, as well as the right to engage in remunerative activity. Private enterprises are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. As part of ongoing privatization efforts, the Israeli government encourages foreign investment in privatizing government-owned entities. Israel’s policies aim to equalize competition between private and public enterprises, although the existence of monopolies and oligopolies in several sectors, including communications infrastructure, food manufacturing and marketing, and some manufacturing segments, stifles competition. In the case of designated monopolies, defined as entities that supply more than 50 percent of the market, the government controls prices. Israel established a centralized investment screening (approval) mechanism for certain inbound foreign investments in October 2019. Investments in regulated industries (e.g., banking and insurance) require approval by the relevant regulator. Investments in certain sectors may require a government license. Other regulations may apply, usually on a national treatment basis. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its fifth and latest trade policy review of Israel in July 2018. In the past three years, the Israeli government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The OECD concluded an Economic Survey of Israel in 2020, which can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/israel-economic-snapshot/ The Israeli government is fairly open and receptive to companies wishing to register businesses in Israel. The business registration process in Israel is relatively clear and straightforward. Four procedures are required to register a standard private limited company and take 12 days to complete, on average, according to the Israeli Ministry of Finance. The foreign investor must obtain company registration documents through a recognized attorney with the Israeli Ministry of Justice and obtain a tax identification number for company taxation and for value added taxes from the Israeli Ministry of Finance. The cost to register a company averages around USD 1,000 depending on attorney and legal fees. The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s “Invest in Israel” website provides useful information for companies interested in starting a business or investing in Israel. The website is http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx . The Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute is an Israeli government agency operating independently, under the Ministry of Economy, that helps facilitate trade and business opportunities between Israeli and foreign companies. More information on their activities is available at https://www.export.gov.il/en . In general, there are no restrictions on Israeli investors seeking to invest abroad. However, investing abroad may be restricted on national security grounds or in certain countries or sectors where the Israeli government deems such investment is not in the national interest. 3. Legal Regime Israel promotes open governance and has joined the International Open Government Partnership. The government’s policy is to pursue the goals of transparency and active reporting to the public, public participation, and accountability. Israel’s regulatory system is transparent. Ministries and regulatory agencies give notice of proposed regulations to the public on a government web site: http://www.knesset.gov.il . The texts of proposed regulations are also published (in Hebrew) on this web site. The government requests comments from the public about proposed regulations. However, the government occasionally issues new or revised regulations without prior comment periods. Israel is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which covers most Israeli government entities and government-owned corporations. Most of the country’s open international public tenders are published in the local press. U.S. companies have won government tenders, notably in the energy and communications sectors. However, government-owned corporations make extensive use of selective tendering procedures. In addition, the lack of transparency in the public procurement process discourages U.S. companies from participating in major projects and disadvantages those that choose to compete. Enforcement of the public procurement laws and regulations is not consistent. Israel is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. ( http://unctad.org/en/pages/home.aspx ). Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures. The Israeli Securities Authority released a recommendation in April 2021 calling for all public companies to publish annual environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reports based on international standards. In May 2021, the Bank of Israel required banks to note in the annual reports the material environmental, social and governance aspects integrated into their targets, and to note concisely the main principles established by the banking corporation for promoting these issues. The Israeli Capital, Insurance, and Savings Authority, which regulates financial services in the insurance and pension funds industries, also required institutional investors to publish ESG reports. Israel is not a member of any major economic bloc but maintains strong economic relations with several such blocs. Israeli regulatory bodies in the Ministry of Economy (Standards Institute of Israel), Ministry of Health (Food Control Services), and the Ministry of Agriculture (Veterinary Services and the Plant Protection Service) often adopt standards developed by European standards organizations. Israel’s adoption of European standards rather than international may add costs for some U.S. exports to Israel. Israel became a member of the WTO in 1995. The Ministry of Economy and Industry’s Standardization Administration is responsible for notifying the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, and regularly does so. Israel has a written and consistently applied commercial law based on the British Companies Act of 1948, as amended. The judiciary is independent, but businesses complain about the length of time required to obtain judgments. The Supreme Court is an appellate court that also functions as the High Court of Justice. Israel does not employ a jury system. There are few restrictions on foreign investors, except in defense and other national security industries. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in Israel’s privatization program. Israeli courts exercise authority in cases within the jurisdiction of Israel. However, if an agreement between involved parties contains an exclusively foreign jurisdiction, the Israeli courts will generally decline to exercise their authority. Israel’s Ministry of Economy sponsors the web site “Invest in Israel” at www.investinisrael.gov.il The Investment Promotion Center of the Ministry of Economy seeks to encourage investment in Israel. The center stresses Israel’s high marks in innovation, entrepreneurship, and Israel’s creative, skilled, and ambitious workforce. The center also promotes Israel’s strong ties to the United States and Europe. Israel adopted its comprehensive competition law in 1988. Israel created the Israel Competition Authority (originally called the Israel Antitrust Authority) in 1994 to enforce the competition law. There have been no known expropriations of U.S.-owned businesses in Israel. Israeli law requires adequate payment, with interest from the day of expropriation until final payment, in cases of expropriation. Israel has established and well-regarded bankruptcy measures in place. Israeli Bankruptcy Law has several layers, some rooted in Common Law, when Palestine was under the British mandate in 1917-1948. Bankruptcy Law in Israel is based on the 1980 Bankruptcy Ordinance, the 1985 Bankruptcy Regulations, and the 2018 Law for Insolvency and Economic Recovery. 4. Industrial Policies The State of Israel encourages both local and foreign investment by offering a wide range of incentives and benefits to investors in industry, tourism, and real estate. The Law for Encouragement of Capital Investment and the Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Design include grants and tax benefits for potential investors. Israel’s Ministry of Economy places a priority on investments in hi-tech companies and R&D activities. The Ministry of Economy’s Small and Medium Business Agency offers special loan programs for Arab women. Israel also offers tax benefits for new immigrants and Israeli citizens returning from residing abroad, including exemption from capital gains taxes on the sale of assets located outside of Israel. Most investment incentives available to Israeli citizens are also available to foreign investors. Israel’s Encouragement of Capital Investments Law, 5719-1959, outlines Israel’s investment incentive programs. The Israel Investment Center (IIC) coordinates the country’s investment incentive programs. For complete information, potential investors should contact: Investment Promotion Center Ministry of Economy 5 Bank of Israel Street, Jerusalem 91036 Tel: +972-2-666-2607 Website: www.investinisrael.gov.il E-mail: investinisrael@economy.gov.il Israel Investment Center Ministry of Economy 5 Bank of Israel Street, Jerusalem 91036 490 http://economy.gov.il/English/About/Units/Pages/IsraelInvestmentCenter.aspx Tel: +972-2-666-2828 Fax: +972-2-666-2905 Israel has bilateral Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) Agreements with Egypt and Jordan. The QIZ initiative allows Egypt and Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain inputs from Israel (8 percent in the Israel-Jordan QIZ agreement, 10.5 percent in the Israel-Egypt QIZ agreement). Products manufactured in QIZs must comply with strict rules of origin. More information is available at the Israeli Ministry of Economy’s Foreign Trade Administration website: https://www.gov.il/en/departments/Units/foreign_trade Israel has one free trade zone, the Red Sea port city of Eilat. There are no universal performance requirements on investments, but “offset” requirements are often included in sales contracts with the government. There are no limits to private foreign ownership of Israeli firms. Israel’s visa and residency requirements are transparent. The Israeli government does not impose preferential policies on exports by foreign investors. 5. Protection of Property Rights Israel has a modern legal system based on British common law that provides effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Courts are independent. Israeli civil procedures provide that local courts may accept judgments of foreign courts. The Israeli judicial system recognizes and enforces secured interests in property. A reliable system of recording such secured interests exists. The Israeli Land Administration, which manages land in Israel on behalf of the government, registers property transactions. Registering or obtaining land rights is a cumbersome process. The Intellectual Property Law Division and the Israel Patent Office (ILPO), both within the Ministry of Justice, are the principal government authorities overseeing the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Israel. IPR protection in Israel has undergone many changes in recent decades as the Israeli economy has rapidly transformed into a knowledge-based economy. In recent years, Israel revised its IPR legal framework several times to comply with newly signed international treaties. Israel took stronger, more comprehensive steps towards protecting IPR, and the government acknowledges that IPR theft costs rights holders millions of dollars per year, reducing tax revenues and slowing economic growth. Israel was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report Watch List in 2014. Israel’s Knesset approved Amendment No. 5 to Israel’s Copyright Law of 2007 on January 1, 2019. The amendment aims to establish measures to combat copyright infringement on the internet while preserving the balance among copyright owners, internet users, and the free flow of information and free speech. The 2018 New Designs Law brought Israel into compliance with The Hague System for International Registration of Industrial designs. Nevertheless, the United States remains concerned with the limitations of Israel’s copyright legislation, particularly related to digital copyright matters, and with Israel’s interpretation of its commitment to protect data derived from pharmaceutical testing conducted in anticipation of the future marketing of biological products, also known as biologics. The United States continues to urge Israel to strengthen and improve its IPR enforcement regime. Israel lacks specialized courts, common in other countries with advanced IPR regimes. General civil or administrative courts in Israel typically adjudicate IPR cases. IPR theft, including trade secret misappropriation, can be common and relatively sophisticated in Israel. The European Commission “closely monitors” IP enforcement in Israel. The EC cites inadequate protection of innovative pharmaceutical products and end-user software piracy as the main issues with IPR enforcement in Israel. Israel is a member of the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Israeli government is supportive of foreign portfolio investment. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) is Israel’s only public stock exchange. Financial institutions in Israel allocate credit on market terms. Various credit instruments are available to the private sector and foreign investors can receive credit on the local market. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and conform to international norms, although the prevalence of inflation-adjusted accounting means there are differences from U.S. accounting principles. In the case of publicly traded firms where ownership is widely dispersed, the practice of “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to prevent mergers and acquisitions is common, but not directed at preventing foreign investment. Israeli law prevents foreign investment by individuals or businesses from “enemy states,” currently limited to Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. The Bank of Israel (BOI) is Israel’s central bank and regulates all banking activity and monetary policy. In general, Israel has a healthy banking system that offers most of the same services as the U.S. banking system. Fees for normal banking transactions are significantly higher in Israel than in the United States and some services do not meet U.S. standards. There are 12 commercial banks and four foreign banks operating in Israel, according to the BOI. Bank Leumi and Bank Hapoalim, the two largest banks, dominate Israel’s banking sector, collectively controlling nearly 60 percent of Israel’s credit market. The State of Israel holds 6 percent of Bank Leumi’s shares; all of Israel’s other banks are fully private. Israel passed legislation to establish the Israel Citizens’ Fund, a sovereign wealth fund managed by the BOI, in 2014. The law establishing the fund states that it will begin operating a month after the state’s tax revenues from natural gas exceed USD 307 million (1 billion NIS), which the Ministry of Finance expects will occur in late 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Israel established the Government Companies Authority (GCA) as an auxiliary unit of the Ministry of Finance following the passage of the 1975 Government Companies Law. It is the administrative agency for state-owned companies in charge of supervision, privatization, and implementation of structural changes. The Israeli state only provides support for commercial SOEs in exceptional cases. The GCA leads the recruitment process for SOE board members. Board appointments are subject to the approval of a committee, which confirms whether candidates meet the minimum board member criteria set forth by law. The GCA oversees some 100 commercial and noncommercial companies, government subsidiaries, and companies under mixed government-private ownership. Among these companies are some of the biggest and most complex in the Israeli economy, such as the Israel Electric Corporation, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Postal Company, Mekorot Israel National Water Company, Israel Natural Gas Lines, the Ashdod, Haifa, and Eilat Port Companies, Israel Railways, Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures and the Israel National Roads Company. The GCA does not publish a publicly available list of SOEs. Israel is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization. Israel’s inter-ministerial privatization committee approved plans in January 2020 to sell off the Port of Haifa, Israel’s largest shipping hub. The privatization process is underway now. The incoming owner will be required to invest approximately USD 280 million (1 billion NIS) in the port, including the cost of upgrading infrastructure and financing the layoff of an estimated 200 workers. The government of Israel has ongoing plans to fully privatize Israel Post, which currently has 20 percent of its shares publicly listed. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is awareness of responsible business conduct among enterprises and civil society in Israel. Israel adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Israel is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Israel’s National Contact Point sits in the Responsible Business Conduct unit in the OECD Department of the Foreign Trade Administration in the Ministry of Economy and Industry. An advisory committee, including representatives from the Ministries of Economy, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and the Environment, assist the National Contact Point. The National Contact Point also works in cooperation with the Manufacturer’s Association of Israel, workers’ organizations, and civil society to promote awareness of the guidelines. Israel is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. One Israeli company, RS Logistical Solutions Ltd, is a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Israel significantly strengthened greenhouse gas reduction targets during 2021 but does not yet have a national climate strategy, nor has it identified specific expectations for private sector contributions to reaching these targets. There are no binding policies to implement Prime Minister Bennett’s 2021 announcement that Israel will achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Public procurement policies are subject to environmental regulations and often require environmental impact assessments. The government does not explicitly consider environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, or climate resilience in awarding procurement contracts. 9. Corruption Bribery and other forms of corruption are illegal under several Israeli laws and Civil Service regulations. Israel is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Israel ranks 36 out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, dropping one place from its 2020 ranking. Several Israeli NGOs focus on public sector ethics in Israel and Transparency International has a local chapter. The Israeli National Police, state comptroller, Attorney General, and Accountant General are responsible for combating official corruption. These entities operate effectively and independently and are sufficiently resourced. NGOs that focus on anticorruption efforts operate freely without government interference. Ministry of Justice Office of the Director General 29 Salah a-Din Street Jerusalem +972 73-392 5665 mancal@justice.gov.il Transparency International Israel Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Management +972 3 640 9176 Shvil@TI-Israel.org 10. Political and Security Environment For the latest safety and security information regarding Israel and the current travel advisory level, see the Travel Advisory for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/israel-west-bank-and-gaza-travel-advisory.html). The security situation remains complex in Israel and the West Bank, and can change quickly depending on the political environment, recent events, and geographic location. Terrorist groups and lone-wolf terrorists continue plotting possible attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets, shopping malls, and government facilities. Hamas, a U.S. government-designated foreign terrorist organization, controls security in Gaza, making it particularly dangerous and volatile. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Central Bureau of Statistics data from February 2022 indicate there are 4.1 million people active in the Israeli labor force, with a 3.9 percent unemployment rate. According to OECD data from 2020, 47 percent of Israelis aged between 25 and 34 years have a tertiary education. Many university students specialize in fields with high industrial R&D potential, including engineering, computer science, mathematics, physical sciences, and medicine. According to the Investment Promotion Center, there are more than 145 scientists out of every 10,000 workers in Israel, one of the highest rates in the world. The rapid growth of Israel’s high-tech sector in the late 1990s increased the demand for workers with specialized skills. Tech sector executives report a significant shortage of qualified labor for the sector given its size and continuing growth. The national labor federation, the Histadrut, organizes about 17 percent of all Israeli workers. Collective bargaining negotiations in the public sector take place between the Histadrut and representatives of the Ministry of Finance. The number of strikes has declined significantly as the public sector has gotten smaller. However, strikes remain a common and viable negotiating tactic in difficult negotiations. Israel strictly observes the Friday afternoon to Saturday afternoon Jewish Sabbath and special permits must be obtained from the government authorizing Sabbath employment. At the age of 18, most Israelis are required to perform 2-3 years of national service in the military or in select civilian institutions. Until their mid-40s, many Israeli males are required to perform about a month of military reserve duty annually, during which time they receive compensation from national insurance companies. The size of Israel’s informal economy is estimated to be 20.8 percent which represents approximately $97 billion at GDP PPP levels, according to OECD estimates. Black market lending is common in Israel’s Arab neighborhoods with some “money change” shops servings as fronts for such illegal businesses. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, a national reform program aims to address the trend of large segments of the workforce in Israel working under temporary contracts that offer minimal job security, weak social protections, and dwindling economic security. 14. Contact for More Information Daniel Devries Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Jerusalem – Tel Aviv Branch Office DevriesDJ@state.gov Italy Executive Summary Italy’s successful vaccination campaign, an ambitious reform and investment plan funded and approved by the European Union, and Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s leadership which has boosted Italy’s role on the international stage, helped the Italian economy to grow a healthy 6.6 percent in 2021 – one of the fastest rates in Europe. Growth was underpinned by a robust 17 percent increase in investment. However, energy price spikes, supply chain disruptions, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine create uncertainty affecting consumer and business confidence. Italy now forecasts its economy, the euro area’s third largest, will grow by 3.1 percent (down from a 4.7 percent projected in September 2021). For 2023, the government projects GDP will grow 2.4 percent (down from the previous target of 2.8 percent). The public debt, proportionally the highest in the eurozone after Greece’s, is targeted at 147 percent of GDP in 2022, down from 2020’s 156 percent, and projected to decline to 145 percent in 2023. Italy’s National Resilience and Recovery Plan (NRRP) combines over €200 billion in investment to accelerate the digital and green transition coupled with wide-ranging reforms addressing the Italian economy’s longstanding drags on growth — namely its slow legal system, tax administration and bloated bureaucracy — while rebalancing policies to address gender, youth, and regional disparities. This combination of investment and reform, with some easing of fiscal constraints from Brussels, may reposition Italy, the eurozone’s second largest industrial base, as an engine for growth. In April 2022, the European Commission disbursed €21 billion in the first tranche of Next Generation EU funds pandemic aid to Italy after determining the Italian government successfully met the 51 objectives of its NRRP set out for 2021. Italy will have to achieve a further 45 milestones and targets by June 30, 2022, to receive the second tranche of funds worth €24.1 billion. Crucial for improving Italy’s investment climate and spurring growth is reform of Italy’s justice system, one of the slowest in Europe. According to the European Commission, the average Italian civil law case takes more than 500 days to resolve, versus an average of about 200 days in Germany, 300 in Spain and 450 in Greece. For U.S. investors, judicial reform and bureaucratic streamlining would minimize uncertainty and create a more favorable investment climate. Italy is and will remain an attractive destination for foreign investment, with one of the largest markets in the EU, a diversified economy, and a skilled workforce. Italy’s economy, the eighth largest in the world, is dominated by small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), which comprise 99.9 percent of Italian businesses. Italy’s relatively affluent domestic market, access to the European Common Market, proximity to emerging economies in North Africa and the Middle East, and assorted centers of excellence in scientific and information technology research, remain attractive to many investors. Italy is the eighth largest consumer market in the world, the seventh largest manufacturing producer, and boasts a diversified economy and skilled workforce. The clustering of industry, the infrastructure, and the quality of life are also among the top reasons international investors decide to start or expand a business in Italy. According to Italy’s Institute of Statistics, over 15,000 foreign multinationals employ one out of seven Italian residents. Foreign companies account for 18 percent of Italian GDP and 14 percent of investments. Exports of pharmaceutical products, furniture, industrial machinery and machine tools, electrical appliances, automobiles and auto parts, food and wine, as well as textiles/fashion are an important source of external revenue. The sectors that have attracted significant foreign investment include telecommunications, transportation, energy, and pharmaceuticals. The government remains open to foreign investment in shares of Italian companies and continues to make information available online to prospective investors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 42 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/ cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 29 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $31,093 https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $32,290 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Italy is an open economy and welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI). As an EU member state, Italy is bound by the EU’s treaties and laws. Under EU treaties with the United States, as well as OECD commitments, Italy is generally obliged to provide national treatment to U.S. investors established in Italy or in another EU member state. EU and Italian antitrust laws provide Italian authorities with the right to review mergers and acquisitions for market dominance. In addition, the Italian government may block mergers and acquisitions involving foreign firms under its investment screening authority (known as “Golden Power”) if the proposed transactions raise national security concerns. Enacted in 2012 and further implemented through decrees or follow-on legislation in 2015, 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2022, the Golden Power law allows the Government of Italy (GOI) to block foreign acquisition of companies operating in strategic sectors: defense/national security, energy, transportation, telecommunications including 5G and cloud computing, critical infrastructure, sensitive technology, and nuclear and space technology. Under the April 6, 2020, Liquidity Decree the Prime Minister’s Office issued, the government strengthened Italy’s investment screening authority to cover all sectors outlined in the EU’s March 2019 foreign direct investment screening directive. The decree also extends (and has been renewed until December 31, 2022) Golden Power review to certain transactions by EU-based investors and gives the government new authorities to investigate non-notified transactions. Embedded in a broader government decree issued on March 18, 2022, the latest revision of the Golden Power investment screening authority reflects the government’s effort to adapt to both rapid developments in technology and recent shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The proposed restructuring of the Golden Power mechanism revolves around three poles: the first enlarges Golden Power’s scope to capture emerging and critical technology, including cloud-based activities of strategic importance to the national defense and security system; the second proposes a requirement that companies submit to the Golden Power committee for approval annual procurement plans; and the third empowers a ten-expert committee to carry out investigations to monitor compliance, and also establishes strict penalties and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. The decree is in force for 60 days by which time it will need to be passed by the Italian parliament. The Italian Trade Agency (ITA) is responsible for foreign investment attraction as well as promoting foreign trade and Italian exports. ITA operates under the coordination of the Italian Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of April 2022, ITA operates through a network of 79 offices in 65 countries. ITA promotes foreign investment in Italy through Invest in Italy program: http://www.investinitaly.com/en/ . The Foreign Direct Investment Unit is the dedicated unit of ITA for facilitating the establishment and development of foreign companies in Italy. ITA supports foreign investors from location scouting to bureaucratic consulting to aftercare following the establishment of their business (e.g., visas, expansion projects, etc.). While not directly responsible for investment attraction, SACE, Italy’s export credit agency, has additional responsibility for guaranteeing certain domestic investments. Foreign investors – particularly in energy and infrastructure projects – may see SACE’s project guarantees and insurance as further incentive to invest in Italy. Additionally, Invitalia is the national agency for inward investment and economic development operating under the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. The agency focuses on strategic sectors for development and employment. Invitalia finances projects both large and small, targeting entrepreneurs with concrete development plans, especially in innovative and high-value-added sectors. For more information, see https://www.invitalia.it/eng . The Ministry of Economic Development ( https://www.mise.gov.it/index.php/en/ ) within its Directorate for Incentives to Businesses also has an office with some responsibilities relating to attraction of foreign investment. Italy’s main business association (Confindustria) also helps companies in Italy: https://www.confindustria.it/en . Under EU treaties and OECD obligations, Italy is generally obliged to provide national treatment to U.S. investors established in Italy or in another EU member state. EU and Italian antitrust laws provide national authorities with the right to review mergers and acquisitions over a certain financial threshold. The Italian government may block mergers and acquisitions involving foreign firms to protect the national strategic interest or in retaliation if the government of the country where the foreign firm is from applies discriminatory measures against Italian firms. Foreign investors in the defense and aircraft manufacturing sectors are more likely to encounter resistance from the many ministries involved in reviewing foreign acquisitions than are foreign investors in other sectors. Italy maintains a formal national security screening process for inbound foreign investment in the sectors of defense/national security, transportation, energy, telecommunications, critical infrastructure, sensitive technology, and nuclear and space technology through its “Golden Power” legislation. Italy expanded its Golden Power authority in March 2019 to include the purchase of goods and services related to the planning, realization, maintenance, and management of broadband communications networks using 5G technology. Under the April 6, 2020, Liquidity Decree the Prime Minister’s Office issued, the government strengthened Italy’s investment screening authority to cover all sectors outlined in the EU’s March 2019 foreign direct investment screening directive. The EU regulations cover: (1) critical infrastructure, physical or virtual, including energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defense, electoral or financial infrastructure, and sensitive facilities, as well as land and real estate; (2) critical technologies and dual use items, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, and nanotechnologies and biotechnologies; (3) supply of critical inputs, including food security, energy, and raw materials; (4) access to sensitive information; and (5) freedom of the media. The 2020 decree also extended (and has been renewed until December 31, 2022) Golden Power review to certain transactions by EU-based investors and gives the government new authorities to investigate non-notified transactions. Embedded in a broader government decree issued on March 18, 2022, the latest revision of the Golden Power investment screening authority reflects the government’s effort to adapt to both rapid developments in technology and recent shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The proposed restructuring of the Golden Power mechanism revolves around three poles: the first enlarges Golden Power’s scope to capture emerging and critical technology, including cloud-based activities of strategic importance to the national defense and security system; the second proposes a requirement that companies submit to the Golden Power committee for approval annual procurement plans; and the third empowers a ten-expert committee to carry out investigations to monitor compliance, and also establishes strict penalties and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. The decree is in force for 60 days by which time it will need to be passed by the Italian parliament. Italy has a business registration website, available in Italian and English, administered through the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce: http://www.registroimprese.it. The online business registration process is clear and complete, and available to foreign companies. Before registering a company online, applicants must obtain a certified e-mail address and digital signature, a process that may take up to five days. A notary is required to certify the documentation. The precise steps required for the registration process depend on the type of business being registered. The minimum capital requirement also varies by type of business. Generally, companies must obtain a value-added tax account number (partita IVA) from the Italian Revenue Agency; register with the social security agency (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale– INPS); verify adequate capital and insurance coverage with the Italian workers’ compensation agency (Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro – INAIL); and notify the regional office of the Ministry of Labor. According to the World Bank Doing Business Index 2020, Italy’s ranking decreased from 67 to 98 out of 190 countries in terms of the ease of starting a business; it takes seven procedures and 11 days to start a business in Italy. Additional licenses may be required, depending on the type of business to be conducted. Invitalia and the Italian Trade Agency’s Foreign Direct Investment Unit assist those wanting to set up a new business in Italy. Many Italian localities also have one-stop shops to serve as a single point of contact for, and provide advice to, potential investors on applying for necessary licenses and authorizations at both the local and national level. These services are available to all investors. Italy neither promotes, restricts, nor incentivizes outward investment, nor restricts domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Regulatory authority exists at the national, regional, and municipal level. All applicable regulations could be relevant for foreign investors. The GOI and individual ministries, as well as independent regulatory authorities, develop regulations at the national level. Regional and municipal authorities issue regulations at the sub-national level. Draft regulations may be posted for public comment, but there is generally no requirement to do so. Final national-level regulations generally are published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale (and only become effective upon publication). Regulatory agencies may publish summaries of received comments. In Italy private companies are not required to obtain an Environmental Product Declaration (EPD) – an internationally-recognized certificate on the environmental impact of their products or services – but an increasing number of companies apply and disclose it voluntarily. Eco-label licenses were first introduced to Italy in 1998. Since their inception, there has been a positive growth trend in both the number of labeled products and services and EU Eco-label licenses. According to a report issued by the European Commission, Italy ranked second in Europe for number of Eco-labeling licenses. Currently in Italy there are 351 EU Eco-label licenses involving 8,552 products. The product group with the largest number of licenses is “Tourist services” with 199 licenses followed by “Paper Fabric” with 36 licenses. No major regulatory reform affecting foreign investors was undertaken in 2021. Aggrieved parties may challenge regulations in court. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and are publicly available through banking channels such as the Bank of Italy (BOI). Italy is a member of the EU. EU directives are brought into force in Italy through implementing national legislation. In some areas, EU procedures require Member States to notify the European Commission (EC) before implementing national-level regulations. Italy on occasion has failed to notify the EC and/or the World Trade Organization (WTO) of draft regulations in a timely way. For example, in 2017 Italy adopted Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) measures for milk and milk products, rice, durum wheat, and tomato-based products. Italy’s Ministers of Agriculture and Economic Development publicly stated these measures would support the “Made in Italy” brand and make Italian products more competitive. Though the requirements were widely regarded as a Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT), Italy failed to notify the WTO in advance of implementing these regulations. Moreover, in March 2020, the Italian Ministers of Agriculture and Economic Development extended the validity of such COOL measures until December 31, 2021. Italy is a signatory to the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has implemented all developed-country obligations. Italian law is based on Roman law and on the French Napoleonic Code law. The Italian judicial system consists of a series of courts and a body of judges employed as civil servants. The system is unified; every court is part of the national network. Though notoriously slow, the Italian civil legal system meets the generally recognized principles of international law, with provisions for enforcing property and contractual rights. Italy has a written and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy law. Foreign investors in Italy can choose among different means of alternate dispute resolution (ADR), including legally binding arbitration, though use of ADR remains rare. The GOI in recent years has introduced justice reforms to reduce the backlog of civil cases and speed new cases to conclusion. These reforms also included a digitization of procedures, and a new emphasis on ADR. Judicial sector reform is a significant pillar of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Program. Regulations can be appealed in the court system. Italy is bound by EU laws on FDI. In 2020, Italy began implementing a digital services tax (DST), applicable to companies that meet the following two conditions: 1. €750 million in annual global revenues from any source, not just digital services; and, 2. €5.5 million in annual revenues from digital services delivered in Italy. Some U.S. technology companies fall under Italy’s DST, as do some Italian media firms. Taxes incurred for the calendar year are due in May of the following year. The government collected €233 million in digital services taxes incurred in 2020, well below the €702 billion estimate. The DST will expire with the full implementation of Pillar 1 of the corporate tax deal reached as part of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. In October 2021, the United States and Italy (along with France, Spain, Austria, and the UK) agreed that DST liabilities accrued by U.S. companies prior to implementation of the global tax deal will be creditable against future Pillar 1 taxes. The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. AGCM may examine transactions that restrict competition in Italy as well as in the broader EU market. As a member of the EU, Italy is also subject to interventions by the European Commission Competition Directorate (DG COMP). Companies can challenge AGCM decisions before the Lazio Regional Administrative Court. Regional Administrative Court decisions can be appealed to the Council of State. In August 2021, Italy’s antitrust authority opened an investigation into McDonald’s franchise agreements which require franchisees purchase supplies at fixed prices from the corporation. While the pending probe could result in considerable fines, it has not hampered the company’s planned expansion; at the end of 2021, McDonald’s announced its intent to open 200 new outlets in Italy over the next five years, a move that would create another 12,000 In November 2021, AGCM fined Amazon and Apple $225 million for alleged anti-competitive cooperation in the resale of Apple and Beats products. In December 2021 AGCM fined Amazon $1.3 billion for abuse of market dominance, in one of the biggest penalties imposed on a U.S. technology company in Europe. AGCM alleges Amazon grants benefits and higher site visibility to users (sellers) of Amazon’s warehouse and delivery service, thereby harming competitor delivery services. In addition to the fine, AGCM ordered Amazon “to grant sales benefits and visibility on Amazon.it to all third-party sellers which are able to comply with fair and non-discriminatory standards for the fulfillment of their orders.” AGCM alleges Amazon unfairly imposes stringent performance metrics on sellers not using Amazon delivery services, which can lead to account suspension. An Amazon spokesperson said, “The proposed fine and remedies are unjustified and disproportionate,” and added, “More than half of all annual sales on Amazon in Italy come from [small and medium businesses], and their success is at the heart of our business model.” The Italian Constitution permits expropriation of private property for “public purposes,” defined as essential services (including during national health emergencies) or measures indispensable for the national economy, with fair and timely compensation. Expropriations have been minimal in 2020. Italy’s bankruptcy regulations are somewhat analogous to U.S. Chapter 11 restructuring and allow firms and their creditors to reach a solution without declaring bankruptcy. In recent years, the judiciary’s role in bankruptcy proceedings has been reduced to simplify and expedite proceedings. In 2015, the Italian parliament passed a package of changes to the bankruptcy law, including measures to ease access to interim credit for bankrupt companies and to restructure debts. Additional changes were approved in 2017 (juridical liquidation, early warning, simplified process, arrangement with creditors, insolvency of affiliated companies as a group, and reorganization of indebtedness rules). The measures aim to reduce the number of bankruptcies, limit the impact on the local economy, and facilitate the settlement of corporate disputes outside of the court system. The reform follows on the 2015 reform of insolvency procedures. Finally, the conversion law of the NRRP includes elements aimed at resolving potential bankruptcies through preliminary agreements among creditors facilitated by exchanges of information and data with the use of telematic tools. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Index 2020, Italy ranks 21 out of 190 economies in the category of “Ease of Resolving Insolvency.” 4. Industrial Policies The GOI offers modest incentives to encourage private sector investment in targeted sectors and economically depressed regions, particularly in southern Italy. The incentives are available to eligible foreign investors as well. Incentives include grants, low-interest loans, and deductions and tax credits. Some incentive programs have a cost cap, which may prevent otherwise eligible companies from receiving the incentive benefits once the cap is reached. The GOI applies cost caps on a non-discriminatory basis, typically based on the order in which the applications were filed. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Italy provides an incentive for investments by SMEs in new machinery and capital equipment (“New Sabatini Law”), available to eligible companies regardless of nationality. This investment incentive provides financing, subject to an annual cost cap. Sector-specific investment incentives are also available in targeted sectors. The government has renewed “New Sabatini Law” benefits, extending them through 2027. The GOI allocated €23.8 billion in 2021-2023 for the private investment plan to transition to “Industry 4.0,” which aims to improve the Italian industrial sector’s competitiveness through a combination of policy measures, tax credits, and research and infrastructure funding. The 2022 budget also reformulated the rates of the tax credit of “Industry 4.0” for the purchase of new investment goods. The government also extended the incentives to the purchase of immaterial goods (software, system integration, platforms, and apps). In the 2021 budget, the GOI allocated €2 billion in tax incentives to spur bank mergers and attract a potential buyer for state-owned bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena. The 2022 budget extended these incentives through June 2022. In 2022, the GOI extended the “Transition 4.0” plan to 2025 to support the green transition. The plan extends tax credits for innovation and design (including to 2031 for R&D expenses) and lowers tax rates for capital investments. The GOI is also in the process of revising incentives and subsidies which it considers inefficient or out of alignment with decarbonization targets. The Italian tax system generally does not discriminate between foreign and domestic investors, though Italy’s digital services tax may impact certain U.S. companies. The corporate income tax (IRES) rate is 24 percent. In addition, companies may be subject to a regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) at a 3.9 percent rate. The World Bank estimates Italy’s total tax rate as a percent of commercial profits at 59.1 percent in 2019, higher than the OECD high-income average of 39.7 percent. Italy’s main free trade zone (FTZ) is in the northeastern city of Trieste. FTZs allow companies to import goods, transform them for re-export without paying import tariffs, and free of any customs restraints. There is an absolute exemption from duties on products coming from a third country and re-exported to a non-EU country. There is draft legislation proposing FTZs in Genoa and Naples. The government is restructuring the FTZ in place in Venice. In 2017, Laws 91 and 123 allowed for the creation of eight Special Economic Zones (SEZs) managed by port authorities in Italy’s less-developed south (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, and Puglia) and on the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. Investors will be able to access up to €50 million in tax breaks and take advantage of hiring incentives, reduced bureaucracy, and reimbursement of the IRAP regional business taxes. The program is funded annually (€250 million) through 2022. The 2021 budget law provided for a 50% reduction of income taxes for all business conducted in SEZs. In addition, the NRRP allocates €630 million for infrastructure investments to ensure development of intermodal transportation connections at SEZs and links to the EU’s Trans-European Networks (TEN-T). The NRRP has targeted another €1.2 billion from its reserves for projects in the main ports in the south. The SEZ in the Region of Campania was the first to become operational. The Naples SEZ encompasses over 54 million square meters of land in the ports of Naples, Salerno, and Castellamare di Stabia, as well as industrial areas and transport hubs in 37 cities and towns in Campania. Incentives must be approved by local government bodies in a procedure governed by the Port Authority of the Central Tyrrhenian Sea. The Region of Campania forecasts that the SEZ will create (or save) between 15,000 and 30,000 jobs. Any business can qualify for the fiscal and administrative benefits of the SEZ in Campania if at least 50% of the related investments are carried out within the borders of Campania’s SEZ. The port cities of Bari and Brindisi completed their SEZ approval procedures in late 2019, followed by the transshipment port of Gioia Tauro in Calabria. Other zones in the region include eastern Sicily (Augusta, Catania, and Siracusa), western Sicily (Palermo), Sardinia (Cagliari), SEZ Ionica (Taranto in Puglia and the region of Basilicata); and a shared SEZ between ports located in Abruzzo and Molise, which received local approval in 2020. With the 2020 budget, the government established that each SEZ is to be chaired by a government commissioner. Only two commissioners have been appointed to date- Rosanna Nisticò in Calabria (October 2020) and Gianpiero Marchesi in Taranto (December 2020). In addition to SEZs, Italian ports are focusing on Customs Free Zones whereby port operators can conduct commercial activities and take advantage of significant customs incentives. In mid-February 2021, the Port Authority of the Ionian Sea launched Taranto’s Customs Free Zone covering an area of approximately 163 hectares. In March 2021, the Port of Brindisi established a small 20-hectare Customs Free Zone. Currently, goods of foreign origin may be brought into Italy without payment of taxes or duties, if the material is to be used in the production or assembly of a product that will be exported. The free-trade zone law also allows a company of any nationality to employ workers of the same nationality under that country’s labor laws and social security systems. As a member of the EU, Italy does not follow forced localization policies in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. Italy does not have enforcement procedures for investment performance requirements. Italy does not require local data storage but companies transmitting customer or other business-related data within or outside of the EU must comply with relevant EU privacy regulations. In 2020, the GOI exercised its Golden Power authority in several 5G-equipment procurement cases. In some cases, the GOI authorized telecom operators to purchase equipment from certain foreign IT vendors if they could adhere to a set of “prescriptions.” One of these prescriptions includes access to the foreign IT vendors’ source code. 5. Protection of Property Rights According to the World Bank 2020 Doing Business Index, Italy ranks 26th worldwide out of 190 economies for the ease of registering property. Real property registration takes an average of 16 days, requires four procedures, and costs an average of 4.4 percent of the value of the property. Real property rights are enforced in Italian courts. Mortgages and judgment liens against property exist in Italy and the recording system is reliable. Although Italy does not publish official statistics on property with titling issues, the Embassy estimates that less than 10 percent of the land in Italy lacks clear title. Italian law includes provisions whereby peaceful and uninterrupted possession of real property for a period of 20 years can, under certain circumstances, allow the occupying party to take title to a property. Italy tracks and reports seizure of counterfeit goods, primarily through the Italian customs agency, Agenzia Dogane Monopoli (ADM). The Italian customs agency, Agenzia Dogane Monopoli (ADM), has an active enforcement posture at Italian ports and an excellent track record for interdicting counterfeit and substandard goods coming into Italy and the European Union. In 2020, ADM noted it confiscated almost 13 million fraudulent pieces nationwide (with a retail value of €1.64 billion (down 16.75% from 2019) – 98.3% of which reached Italy by ship. ADM also have the authority to monitor, inspect, and embargo intra-EU shipments that pass through Italian ports. During the COVID-19 pandemic, ADM detected an increased use of Adriatic ferries funneling counterfeit goods (mostly clothes and accessories from Bulgaria and Greece originating in China). For example, almost half of the counterfeit footwear (128,748 pieces) seized in trucks traversing in Adriatic ferries originated in China with upwards of three-fourths destined for the Italian market. Counterfeiting remains an issue, but it is in Italy’s interest to protect the “Made in Italy” branding and, accordingly, Italian law enforcement agencies are reportedly active in combatting this phenomenon. ADM also reported ongoing efforts to monitor and seize counterfeit personal protective equipment (PPE), medication, and unauthorized treatments for COVID-19. In 2020, ADM confiscated over 7.575 billion units valued at €3.10 billion. In addition to counterfeit masks and gloves, and substandard PPE, ADM enlisted private logistics operators to increase awareness of organized crime involvement in COVID-19 vaccine supply chains. USTR removed Italy from the Special 301 Watch List in 2014 after the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM) issued new regulation to combat digital copyright theft. The regulation created a process by which rights holders can report online infringements to AGCOM, which then blocks access to the domestic hosting infringing content. Italy is not listed in USTR’s Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy although USTR has identified several online and domains in Italy that have promoted access to unlicensed digital content. AGCOM’s authority is limited to blocking access to computer servers and web sites located in Italy. Many illegal services provide content through servers located outside Italy. In December 2021, the EU Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM) Directive came into force, essentially replacing the Italian Copyright Act. The Italian version is more lenient on sharing the digital search results (through via new original works research) of legally accessed materials databases and archival collections unless rights holders “opt out.’” The Italian law also recognizes the exception to copyright for cultural heritage preservation. For example, copies of works in any format or medium and cannot be limited via a contract if permanently held by cultural heritage institutions. The law also allows educational institutions to use sections of copyrighted materials without the copyright holder’s permission if used in secure online systems accessed only by students and educators. In July 2020 the UK International Brand Firm, which had registered the Supreme trademark in San Marino in November 2015 (and subsequently sold “legal fakes” in third countries using the “Supreme” trademark) transferred ownership of the trademark to Chapter 4 Supreme, the New York-based streetwear products maker in the United States. This was the result of a settlement following a complaint filed by Chapter 4 in San Marino, which had also led to the precautionary seizures of counterfeit goods in San Marino the year before. The Republic of San Marino is considering new legislation to improve trademark registration. The San Marino Trademark and Patent Office (USBM) publishes a bimonthly bulletin to advertise new trademark applications. Requests remain pending for four months, during which interested third parties can submit their observations to USBM. While the final decision rests with USBM, there is pending legislation that would grant third parties the possibility to submit their remarks and express their opposition to the registration of a trademark. In this case, the final decision would not rest with USBM, but rather a new entity (still undefined) likely composed of specialized experts and attorneys. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The GOI welcomes foreign portfolio investments, which are generally subject to the same reporting and disclosure requirements as domestic transactions. Financial resources flow relatively freely in Italian financial markets and capital is allocated mostly on market terms. Foreign participation in Italian capital markets is not restricted. In practice, many of Italy’s largest publicly traded companies have foreign owners among their primary shareholders. While foreign investors may obtain capital in local markets and have access to a variety of credit instruments, gaining access to equity capital is difficult. Italy has a relatively underdeveloped capital market and businesses have a long-standing preference for credit financing. The limited venture capital available is usually provided by established commercial banks and a handful of venture capital funds. In 2021 the Netherlands-based Euronext acquired Italy’s stock exchange, the Milan Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana), from the London Stock Exchange. Euronext’s primary data center is being transferred from London to Bergamo in northern Italy. Borsa Italiana is relatively small, with 407 listed companies and a market capitalization of 43 percent of GDP at the end of 2021, up from 37 percent at the end of 2020. Although the exchange remains primarily a source of capital for larger Italian firms, Borsa Italiana created “AIM Italia” in 2012 as an alternative exchange with streamlined filing and reporting requirements to encourage SMEs to seek equity financing. The GOI recognizes that Italian firms remain overly reliant on bank financing and has initiated some programs to encourage alternative forms of financing, including venture capital and corporate bonds. Financial experts have held that slow CONSOB (the Italian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission) processes and cultural biases against private equity have limited equity financing in Italy. The Italian Association of Private Equity, Venture Capital, and Private Debt (AIFI) estimates investment by venture capital and private equity funds in Italy increased by 142% in the first half of 2021 compared to the first half of 2020 (and by 81.5% over the first half of 2019) and totals around €4.5 billion – a low figure given the size of Italy’s economy. Italy’s financial markets are regulated by the Italian securities regulator CONSOB, Italy’s central bank (the Bank of Italy), and the Institute for the Supervision of Insurance (IVASS). CONSOB supervises and regulates Italy’s securities markets (e.g., the Milan Stock Exchange). As of January 2022, the European Central Bank directly supervised 13 of Italy’s largest banks and indirectly supervised less significant Italian banks through the Bank of Italy. IVASS supervises and regulates insurance companies. Liquidity in the primary markets is sufficient to enter and exit sizeable positions, though Italian capital markets are small by international standards. Liquidity may be limited for certain less-frequently traded investments (e.g., bonds traded on the secondary and OTC markets). Italian policies generally facilitate the flow of financial resources to markets. Dividends and royalties paid to non-Italians may be subject to a withholding tax, unless covered by a tax treaty. Dividends paid to permanent establishments of non-resident corporations in Italy are not subject to the withholding tax. Italy imposed a financial transactions tax (FTT, or Tobin Tax) beginning in 2013. Financial trading is taxed at 0.1 percent in regulated markets and 0.2 percent in unregulated markets. The FTT applies to daily balances rather than to each transaction. The FTT applies to trade in derivatives as well, with fees ranging from €0.025 to €200. High-frequency trading is also subject to a 0.02 percent tax on trades occurring every 0.5 seconds or faster (e.g., automated trading). The FTT does not apply to “market makers,” pension and small-cap funds, transactions involving donations or inheritances, purchases of derivatives to cover exchange/interest-rate/raw-materials (commodity market) risks, government and other bonds, or financial instruments for companies with a capitalization of less than €500 million. The FTT has been criticized for discouraging small savers from investing in publicly traded companies on the Milan stock market. There are no restrictions on foreigners engaging in portfolio investment in Italy. Financial services companies incorporated in another EU member state may offer investment services and products in Italy without establishing a local presence. Since April 2020, investors, Italian or foreign, acquiring a stake of more than one percent of a publicly traded Italian firm must inform CONSOB but do not need its approval. Earlier the limit was three percent for non-SMEs and five percent for SMEs. Any Italian or foreign investor seeking to acquire or increase its stake in an Italian bank equal to or greater than ten percent must receive prior authorization from the BOI. Acquisitions of holdings that would change the controlling interest of a banking group must be communicated to the BOI at least 30 days in advance of the closing of the transactions. Approval and advance authorization by the Italian Insurance Supervisory Authority are required for any significant acquisition in ownership, portfolio transfer, or merger of insurers or reinsurers. Regulators retain the discretion to reject proposed acquisitions on prudential grounds (e.g., insufficient capital in the merged entity). Italy has sought to curb widespread tax evasion by improving enforcement and changing attitudes. GOI actions include a public communications effort to reduce tolerance of tax evasion; increased and visible financial police controls on businesses (e.g., raids on businesses in vacation spots at peak holiday periods); and audits requiring individuals to document their income. Tax reforms implemented in 2015 institutionalized some OECD best practices to encourage taxpayer compliance, including by reducing the administrative burden for taxpayers through the increased use of technology such as e-filing, pre-completed tax returns, and automated screenings of tax returns for errors and omissions prior to a formal audit. The reforms also offer additional certainty for taxpayers through programs such as cooperative compliance and advance tax rulings (i.e., binding opinions on tax treatment of transactions in advance) for prospective investors. In July 2021, the Draghi-led government approved overarching guidelines of a general tax reform to simplify Italy’s tax system, which remains complex and has relatively high tax rates on labor income. The tax reform, however, which is part of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) must still be finalized and then implemented through a series of decrees. The GOI and the BOI have accepted and respect IMF obligations, including Article VIII. Despite isolated problems at individual Italian banks, the banking system remains sound and capital ratios exceed regulatory thresholds. However, Italian banks’ profit margins have suffered since 2011. The BOI said the profitability of Italian banks in 2020 declined significantly during the pandemic, with the annualized rate of return on equity (ROE) falling from 5.0 percent to 1.9 percent (net of extraordinary components). Government support measures for households and firms and the economy’s recovery in 2021 contributed to mitigating the effects of the pandemic on the quality banks’ assets. The capitalization of large banks (the ratio between common tier 1 equity and risk weighted assets) stood at 15.5 percent at the end of 2020, an increase of 150 basis points compared to the end of 2019. While the BOI has not yet released ROE data for 2021, major Italian banks reported significant improvements in their profitability compared to 2020. For example, even troubled Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) recorded a €310 million profit, its best result since 2015. While the financial crisis brought a pronounced worsening of the quality of banks’ assets, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total outstanding loans has decreased significantly since its height in November 2015, as banks continue to offload NPLs and unlikely-to-pay loans. As of December 2021, net NPLs decreased to €15.1 billion, the lowest since March 2009 and down from €20.9 billion in December 2020. ABI, the Italian banking association, reported the NPL ratio was 0.86% (net of provisions) in December 2021, compared to 1.21% in December 2020 and 4.89% in November 2015 when NPLs reached record level of €88.8 billion. The GOI has also taken steps to facilitate acquisitions of NPLs by outside investors. In 2016, the GOI created a €20 billion bank rescue fund to assist struggling Italian banks in need of liquidity or capital support. Italy’s fourth-largest bank, MPS, became the first bank to avail itself of this fund in January 2019. The government currently owns 64 percent of MPS but failed to exit the bank by the beginning of 2022, as agreed with EU authorities. The GOI also facilitated the sale of two struggling “Veneto banks” (Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca) to Intesa Sanpaolo in 2017. Italy’s Interbank Deposit Guarantee Fund (FITD) now owns 80 percent of Banca Carige after an industry-financed rescue in 2019. (Carige had been the smallest Italian bank under ECB supervision.) In February 2022, the board of Modena-based Bper bank approved a binding offer to acquire Carige for the symbolic price of €1 and a €530-million capital injection provided by FTID. The merger requires ECB approval and would create Italy’s fourth largest banking group with about €155 billion in assets. Government loan guarantees (to large companies via SACE, Italy’s export credit agency, and to SMEs via the Central Guarantee Fund, or Fondo Centrale di Garanzia) and repayment moratoriums also helped lead to an 8.5 percent increase in credit to firms in 2020, the fastest rate of growth since 2008. The guarantee on SMEs and large companies (though SACE) is set expire in June 2022, though it may be extended. The repayment moratorium expired in December 2021. Despite some banking-sector M&A activity in the past several years, the ECB, OECD, and Italian government continue to encourage additional consolidation to improve efficiency. In 2020, Italy had 59 (up from 55 in 2019) banking groups and 90 stand-alone banks (of which 39 were cooperative banks), as well as 81 subsidiaries of foreign banks. As of January 2022, there were 13 groups classified as “significant” under the EU’s Single Supervisory Mechanism. These systemically significant banks accounted for around 80 percent of banking groups’ total assets. The Italian banking sector remains overly concentrated on physical bank branches for delivering services, contributing to sector-wide inefficiency and low profitability. Electronic banking is available in Italy, but adoption remains below euro-zone averages. Cash remains widely used for transactions. The limit for cash transactions is €2000 but will be decreased to €1,000 beginning in 2023. Credit is allocated on market terms, with foreign investors eligible to receive credit in Italy. Credit in Italy remains largely bank driven. In practice, foreigners may encounter limited access to finance, as Italian banks may be reluctant to lend to prospective borrowers (even Italians) absent a preexisting relationship. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and BOI have indicated interest in blockchain technologies to transform the banking sector. Beginning in March 2021, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) implemented a Distributed Ledger Technology-based system across the Italian banking sector. The process aims to reconcile material (and not digitalized) products that are exchanged between banks, such as commercial paper or promissory notes. State-owned investment bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) launched a strategic wealth fund in 2011, now called CDP Equity (formerly Fondo Strategico Italiano – FSI). CDP Equity has €4.9 billion in invested capital and fourteen companies in its portfolio, holding both majority and minority participations. CDP Equity invests in companies of relevant national interest and on its website ( http://en.cdpequity.it/ ) provides information on its funding, investment policies, criteria, and procedures. CDP Equity is open to capital investments from outside institutional investors, including foreign investors. CDP Equity is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of expectations and standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) in Italy. Enforcement of civil society disputes with businesses is generally fair, though the slow pace of civil justice may delay individuals’ ability to seek effective redress for adverse business impacts. In addition, EU laws and standards on RBC apply in Italy. In the event Italian courts fail to protect an individual’s rights under EU law, it is possible to seek redress at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). CONSOB has enacted corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. Information on corporate governance standards is available at: https://www.consob.it/c/portal/layout?p_l_id=892052&p_v_l_s_g_id=0 As an OECD member, Italy supports and promotes the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“Guidelines”), which are recommendations by governments to multinational enterprises for conducting a risk-based due diligence approach to achieve responsible business conduct (RBC). The Guidelines provide voluntary principles and standards in a variety of areas including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, competition, consumer protection, taxation, and science and technology. (See OECD Guidelines: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/21/1903291.pdf ). The Italian National Contact Point (NCP) for the Guidelines is in the Ministry of Economic Development. The NCP promotes the Guidelines; disseminates related information; and encourages collaboration among national and international institutions, the business community, and civil society. The NCP also promotes Italy’s National Action Plan on Corporate Social Responsibility which is available online. See Italian NCP: http://pcnitalia.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/en /. Independent NGOs and unions operate freely in Italy. Additionally, Italy’s three largest trade union confederations actively promote and monitor RBC. They serve on the advisory body to Italy’s NCP for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Italy encourages adherence to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas and has provided operational guidelines for Italian businesses to assist them in supply chain due diligence. Italy is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs works internationally to promote the adoption of best practices. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Integrated National Plan for Energy and Climate (PNIEC) issued in 2020 outlined Italy’s strategy from 2021 to 2030 in relation to decarbonization, energy efficiency, self-consumption vs. distributed generation of renewable energy, and energy security. After the adoption of more ambitious targets by the EU in 2021 – reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050 – Italy must review its strategy. The GOI is preparing the Ecological Transition Plan (ETP) that is expected by June 2022. The ETP will reflect the EU “FIT for 55” plan, that is still under negotiation inside the EU. According to the National Recovery and Resilience Program (NRRP), Italy plans to eliminate the use of coal by 2025 and bring renewables’ share of final gross energy production to 72 percent by 2030 and 95-100 percent by 2050. The NRRP earmarked €59 billion (approximately $66 billion) to incentivize renewable energy sources between 2021 and 2026. After Italy’s ratification of the Convention for Biological Diversity in 2010, Italy adopted its first National Strategy for Biodiversity for 2010-2020. In December 2021, the Ministry for Ecological Transition (MET) launched the “National Strategy for Biodiversity towards 2030.” According to MET, “Italy will contribute to the international objective of ensuring that all ecosystems on the planet are restored, resilient and adequately protected by 2050.” Consultations with stakeholders are still underway. Italy’s Ecological Transition Plan is still under negotiation, so the GOI has not introduced any implementing policies yet. Lengthy bureaucratic procedures have delayed the permitting of new renewable energy plants, so Parliament is considering draft legislation aimed at simplifying the current public procurement code. The private sector must follow current EU regulations, since there is no specific Italian requirement. Companies included in the EU “cut and trade” Emission Trading System (ETS) include those in the power and heat generation sector, the energy-intensive industrial sectors, and the aviation sector which together account for around 41 percent of the EU’s total emissions. These companies buy or receive emissions allowances, which they can trade with one another as needed. At the end of each year, the regulated companies must surrender enough allowances to cover all their emissions. If a regulated entity reduces its emissions, it can keep the “saved” allowances to cover its future needs or sell them to another company that is short of allowances. The 2020 and 2021 tax laws included the “Green Bonus,” aimed at improving private gardens. The law allows for 36 percent of qualifying expenditures (capped at €5,000 per house unit) to be claimed against the tax bill in ten equal installments. Italy introduced the Ecobonus 65 percent scheme in 2012 to improve the energy efficiency of residential and non-residential units in Italy, as well as to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and natural gas. The scheme allows for 65 percent of the expenses to increase energy efficiency in buildings (e.g., new heating and boiler systems; building external coating; windows replacement, solar panels) to be reimbursed as tax credits in five equal annual installments. This tax credit applies to various buildings, including stores, offices, shops, hotels, and other hospitality buildings on top of residential units. The Superbonus 110 percent was introduced in 2020 and has been recently extended to December 2023. Qualifying seismic renovations and significant (at least two energy classes) energy efficiency improvements (such as insulation, solar panel installation, replacement of old-fashioned boilers and window fittings) allow for a tax credit amounting to 110 percent of the qualifying expenses. People can claim the subsidy by deducting it from their tax returns over a five-year period or use the tax credit to pay the construction firm. Construction firms may subtract the sum from their taxes or sell the credit to a bank, which is then reimbursed by the state. In 2019, Italy introduced another Ecobonus to increase the incentives for buying electric and hybrid vehicles. The Ecobonus is scaled according to CO2 emissions and vehicle classes. Italy’s public procurement system is bound by international obligations under both the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and the EU Public Procurement Directives. Italy has over 22,000 contracting agencies at the central and local level that are subject to EU Directives on public procurement. GOI Ministries are the main central contracting agencies. At the local level, principal contracting agencies include regions, provinces, municipalities, and entities controlled by the municipalities, including local healthcare authorities. In 2002, Italy approved the “Environmental Action Strategy for Sustainable Development in Italy,” which states that at least 30 percent of goods purchased must meet ecological requirements and 30-40 percent of the vehicle fleet for durable goods must be energy efficient. In 2017, in compliance with the European Green Public Procurement directive, Italy made the use of “Minimal Environmental Criteria” (MEC) for acquiring products and services by public administrations mandatory. Since 2017, MET has identified the MEC for 20 categories of products and services. According to Italian budget law for 2020, public administrations must reserve a 50 percent quota for the purchase or rental of electric, hybrid or hydrogen vehicles when renewing their fleet. 9. Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione (ANAC) Via Marco Minghetti, 10 – 00187 Roma Phone: +39 06 367231 Fax: +39 06 36723274 Email: protocollo@pec.anticorruzione.it Contact Info page: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/MenuServizio/Contatti ANAC’s whistleblowing web page is: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/Servizi/ServiziOnline/SegnalazioneWhistleblowing Transparency International Italia P.le Carlo Maciachini 11 20159 Milano – Italy T: +39 02 40093560 F: +39 02 406829 E: info@transparency.it General web site: www.transparency.it Corruption Specific: https://www.transparency.it/alac/ Corruption and organized crime continue to be significant impediments to investment and economic growth in parts of Italy, despite efforts by successive governments to reduce risks. Italian law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials. The government has usually implemented these laws effectively, but officials sometimes have engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. While anti-corruption laws and trials garner headlines, they have been only somewhat effective in stopping corruption. Since 2014, Italy has improved its overall rank and score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, rising to 42nd out of 180 countries for 2021 thanks to an improvement in its score from 53 to 56 out of 100. Italy has “reaped the rewards of anti-corruption reforms” but remains among the region’s low scorers according to Transparency International. Italy’s score is well below the EU average of 64 (although it has risen from 42 in 2012). Transparency International notes “legislative gaps need to be urgently filled for lobbying and beneficial ownership in Italy.” In December 2018 Italy’s Parliament passed an anti-corruption bill that introduced new provisions to combat corruption in the public sector and regulate campaign finance. The measures in the bill changed the statute of limitations for corruption-related crimes as well as other crimes and made it more difficult for people to “run out the clock” on their respective cases. In 2019 the government passed an anti-corruption measure, called “spazza-corrotti,” giving the same treatment for political parties and related foundations, strengthening the penalties for corruption crimes against public administration, and providing more tools for investigations. In December 2020, Italy’s Parliament passed a decree that created an Inter-Departmental Working Group to formulate a code of risk assessment measures in a continued effort to prevent corruption in the government. No significant anti-corruption legislation was passed by Parliament in 2021 due to a series of delays related to Italy’s COVID state of emergency. U.S. individuals and firms operating or investing in foreign markets should take the time to become familiar with the anticorruption laws of both the foreign country and the United States to comply with them and, where appropriate, U.S. individuals and firms should seek the advice of legal counsel. While the U.S. Embassy has not received specific complaints of corruption from U.S. companies operating in Italy in the past year, commercial and economic officers are familiar with high-profile cases that may affect U.S. companies. The Embassy has received requests for assistance from companies facing a lack of transparency and complicated bureaucracy, particularly in the sphere of government procurement and specifically in the aerospace industry and among digital economy companies. There have been no reports of government failure to protect NGOs that investigate corruption (e.g., Transparency International Italy). Italy has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence is not a threat to foreign investments in Italy. On rare occasion, extremist groups have made threats and deployed letter bombs, firebombs, and Molotov cocktails against Italian public buildings, private enterprises and individuals, and foreign diplomatic facilities. Though many of these groups have hostile views of the United States, they have not targeted U.S. property or citizens in recent years. Italy-specific travel information and advisories can be found at: www.travel.state.gov. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Unemployment continues to be a pressing issue in Italy, particularly among youth (ages 15-24). Italy has one of the EU’s highest youth unemployment rates at 25.3 percent (January 2022), while the overall unemployment rate was 8.9 percent in December 2021. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor force has been uneven and substantial. Job losses were concentrated among self-employed workers and those on fixed-term contracts, especially in the services sector, penalizing younger workers and women. The unemployment rate did not increase due to the government’s ban on layoffs and a program that provided paid furloughs, which allowed companies to temporarily reduce staff during the COVID-19 emergency – without adding them to the ranks of the unemployed. Despite these measures, Italy lost 456,000 jobs in 2020 but recuperated 540,000 jobs in 2021, while Italy’s inactive population (neither working nor seeking work actively) dropped 4.8 percent (corresponding to 653,000 people). Moreover, compared to February 2020, there are still 207,000 fewer jobs. Most new jobs in 2021 were in the services sector under temporary contracts (without unemployment insurance and social security benefits) and predominantly taken by young people and women. As of January 2022, only 50.3 percent of Italian women had jobs – the second lowest rate in the EU- compared to 68.1 percent for men. The data shows that the COVID pandemic impaired the already low levels of female participation in the labor force. The ratio of long-term unemployment (unemployment lasting over 12 months) as a share of overall unemployment continues to be among the highest of major European economies. Underemployment (employment that is not full-time or not commensurate with an employee’s skills and abilities) is also severe. Those underemployed usually find work in the service industry or other low-skilled professions in the large informal economy, which Italy’s statistics agency estimates comprises at least 12 percent of Italian GDP. According to the latest available data (released in October 2021), the informal economy accounted for 11.3 percent of GDP in 2019, with undeclared work estimated at approximately 3.6 million full-time equivalent units. The agricultural, services, and construction sectors stood out for high rates of undeclared work. However, there is anecdotal evidence of unpaid internships and trainee programs masking as de facto undeclared work in every industry as a precursor to securing a regular labor contract. Labor force productivity – a central weakness of the Italian economy – is below the EU average. Many Italian employers report an inability to find qualified candidates for highly skilled positions, demonstrating considerable skills disparities in the Italian labor market. The government has also reported difficulty finding qualified candidates to manage NRRP programs in the South. Well-educated Italians find more attractive career opportunities outside of Italy, with large numbers of Italians taking advantage of EU freedom of movement to work in other EU countries. There is no reliable measure of Italians working overseas, as many expatriate workers do not report their whereabouts to the Italian government. Skilled labor shortages are a particular problem in Italy’s industrialized north. Companies may bring in a non-EU employee after the government-run employment office has certified that no qualified, unemployed Italian is available to fill the position. However, the cumbersome and lengthy process is a deterrent to foreign firms seeking to comply with the law. Language barriers also prevent outsiders from competing for Italian positions. Work visas are subject to annual quotas, although intra-company transfers are exempt. Indefinite employment contracts signed before March 2015 are governed by the 2012 labor regulations, which allows firms to conduct layoffs and firings with lump-sum payments. Under the 2012 system, according to Article 18 of the workers’ statute of 1970, judges can order reinstatement of dismissed employees (with back pay) if they find the dismissal was a pretext for discriminatory or disciplinary dismissal. In practice, dismissed employees reserved the right to challenge their release indefinitely, often using the threat of protracted legal proceedings or an adverse court ruling to negotiate additional severance packages with employers. Indefinite employment contracts signed after March 2015 fall under rules established by the 2015 Jobs Act, a labor market reform package that contractually advanced employee protections that increased with tenure. During the first 36 months of employment, firms may dismiss employees for bona fide economic reasons. Under the 2015 Jobs Act regime, dismissed employees must appeal their dismissal within 60 days, and reinstatements are limited. Regardless of the reason for termination, a former employee is entitled to receive severance payments (TFR – trattamento di fine rapporto) equal to 7.4 percent of the employee’s annual gross compensation for each year worked. Other 2015 Jobs Act measures include universal unemployment and maternity benefits and a reduced number of official labor contract templates (from 42 to six). For example, Italy’s unemployment insurance (NASPI) provides up to six months of coverage for laid-off workers. The government also provides worker retraining and job placement assistance, but services vary by region. Implementation of robust national active labor market policies remains in progress. The NRRP includes provisions for unemployment benefit reform and new active labor policies that the government approved as part of the 2022 budget. In 2018 the government introduced the “Dignity Decree,” which rolled back some structural reforms to Italy’s labor market adopted as part of the 2015 Jobs Act. For example, the Dignity Decree extended incentives to hire people under 35 years of age, set limits on the renewal of short-term contracts (the government suspended the limit during the pandemic), and made it costlier for companies to fire workers. Italy offers residents other social safety net protections. In 2017 the government implemented an anti-poverty plan (Reddito di Inclusion, or “Inclusion Income”) to provide some financial relief and training to the indigent and those below a certain income threshold. In the 2019 budget, the government introduced the Citizenship Income (Reddito di Cittadinanza), which replaced and broadened the 2017 Inclusion Income program. The Citizenship Income program provides a basic income of €780 per month to eligible citizens and acts as an employment agency to some participants. The estimated annual cost of the program was approximately €6.5 billion, but the pandemic increased the number of potential beneficiaries. The program benefits around 1.3 million households (or 3.1 million individuals). In 2019 the government implemented an early retirement plan (Quota 100), which changed the pension law and permitted earlier retirement for eligible workers aged 62 or older with at least 38 years of employment. The benefit expired at the end of 2021, although the government proposed a less generous early retirement pilot program in the 2022 budget and is actively negotiating pension reform with unions. While the 2015 Jobs Act included a statutory minimum wage, the government has yet to implement the policy. With no national minimum wage, sector-wide collective bargaining determines prevailing wages. The government in 2016 established an agency for Job Training and Placement (ANPAL) to coordinate (with Italian regional governments) the implementation of many labor policies. ANPAL oversees the relocation allowance (Assegno di Ricollocazione), an initiative to provide unemployment benefits to workers willing to move to different regions, and a related special wage guarantee fund (Cassa Integrazione Straordinaria) that provides stipends for retraining. The Citizenship Income program and ANPAL appear to have failed in their goal of helping eligible workers find jobs. However, the Citizenship Income program seems to have played a role in reducing poverty before the pandemic and limiting its rise in 2020 during the economic crisis. In March 2021, the Ministry of Labor set up a committee to reform the Citizenship Income program. The 2022 budget provided extra funds to the program (€8.8 billion for 2022-2029) and implemented more stringent qualification criteria. Historical regional labor market disparities remain unchanged, with the southern third of the country posting a significantly higher unemployment rate than northern and central Italy. Despite these differences, internal migration within Italy remains modest and limited to highly educated workers that cannot find jobs in the South. At the same time, industry-wide national collective bargaining agreements set equal wages across the entire country. Italy is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and Italy does not waive existing labor laws to attract or retain investments. Collective labor agreements in different professions periodically fix the terms and conditions of employment. Italian unions fall into four major national confederations; the General Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions (CISL), the Italian Union of Labor (UIL), and the General Union of Labor (UGL). The first three organizations are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), while UGL is usually affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor (WCL). The confederations negotiate national-level collective bargaining agreements with employer associations that are binding on all employers in a sector or industry. Collective bargaining is widespread, occurring at the national level and used primarily by labor to secure compensation for inflation, cost-of-living adjustments and bonuses for increased productivity and profitability. Firm-level collective bargaining is limited, and the Italian Constitution provides that unions may reach collective agreements binding on all workers. There are no official estimates of the percentage of the economy covered by collective bargaining agreements. However, a 2019 estimate from the European Trade Union Institute estimated collective bargaining coverage was approximately 80 percent (for national-level bargaining), with less coverage for industry-level agreements and minimal coverage for company-level agreements. Collective agreements may last up to three years, although the current practice renews collective contracts annually. Collective bargaining establishes the minimum standards for employment, but employers retain the discretion to apply more favorable treatment to some employees covered by the agreement. Labor disputes are handled through the civil court system, though subject to specific procedures. Before entering the civil court system, parties must first attempt to resolve their disputes through conciliation (administered by the local office of the Ministry of Labor) and through specific union-agreed dispute resolution procedures. In cases of proposed mass layoffs or facility closures, the Ministry of Economic Development may convene a tripartite negotiation (Ministry, company, and union representatives) to reach a mutually acceptable agreement to avoid layoffs or closure. In recent years, U.S. companies have faced significant resistance from labor unions and politicians when attempting to right-size operations. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government banned most layoffs through 2021. The end of the ban did not generate any relevant impact on layoffs and employment, and the 2022 budget extended the prohibition to end-April 2022. There have been no recent strikes that posed investment risks. The Italian Constitution recognizes an employee’s right to strike. Strikes are permitted in practice but are typically short-term (e.g., one working day) to draw attention to specific areas of concern. In addition, workers (or former employees) commonly participate in demonstrations to show opposition to proposed job cuts or facility closings, but these demonstrations have not threatened investments. In addition, occasional strikes by employees of local transportation providers may limit citizens’ mobility. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Rome Economic Section Via Vittorio Veneto, 119 Tel. 39-06-4674-2867 RomeECON@state.gov Mailing Address: Unit 9500 Attn: Economic Section DPO, AE 09624 Email: RomeECON@state.gov Tel: +39 06 4674 2107 Jamaica Executive Summary The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) considers foreign direct investment (FDI) a key driver for economic growth and in recent years has undertaken macroeconomic reforms that have improved its investment climate. However, the reform program was stymied by measures implemented to contain the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. An early lockdown in the Spring of 2020 helped contain the number of Covid-19 cases but the impact on the economy was severe, with real GDP shrinking by 10 percent. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic on public health and the economy, the authorities suspended the fiscal rule for a year and swiftly implemented public health measures and a fiscal package to support jobs and protect the most vulnerable segments of the population. The downturn and the fiscal package resulted in a fiscal deficit of 3.1 percent of GDP in FY2020/21. The Jamaican economy contracted during fiscal year (FY) 2020/21, underpinned by a near collapse in tourism and travel and weaker disposable incomes. But unlike previous shocks, the country did not experience the usual bouts of macroeconomic instability, suggesting the past decade of economic and legislative reforms are beginning to bear fruit. The Jamaican economy is also recovering from the effects of the pandemic well ahead of regional peers, with economic growth of 7-9 percent projected for FY 2021/22. Robust construction activities, a strong rebound in tourist arrivals, and record remittances, both mostly from the United States, provided the impetus for growth. The expansion in economic activity spurred a rebound in employment, with the unemployment rate falling to a historic low of 7.1 percent. The economic recovery combined with strong fiscal management allowed the government to generate the primary surplus required to reverse the debt to GDP ratio, which is expected to return to the pre-pandemic levels. The economic turnaround also contributed to a general improvement in business and consumer confidence. Notwithstanding, inflation and inflationary expectations are beginning to threaten stability, forcing the central bank to tighten monetary policy. On March 09, 2022, Fitch Ratings Agency affirmed Jamaica’s Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at ‘B+’ and assigned a stable outlook. Fitch reported that Jamaica’s ‘B+’ rating was supported by a favorable business climate and government efforts to lower the debt to GDP ratio. The agency explained that the country remained susceptible to external shocks, low growth levels, high public debt and a debt composition that exposes the country to exchange rate fluctuations and interest rate hikes. “The Stable Outlook is supported by Fitch’s expectation that having been interrupted by the pandemic, a downward trend in public debt-to-GDP will be underpinned by political consensus to maintain a high primary surplus,” the agency continued. Jamaica received $366 million in FDI in 2020 (latest available data), a $299 million drop over the previous year. Despite the decline, data from the 2021 UNCTAD World Investment Report showed that Jamaica was the highest FDI destination in the English-Speaking Caribbean. China and Spain were the major drivers of FDI in 2020. Up to the onset of COVID-19, tourism, mining, and energy led investment inflows into the island. Though hard hit by the global pandemic, tourism and mining continued to drive foreign investment. Mineral and Chemicals investments also picked up in 2020. There is a significant host government commitment to mining, tourism, and airport development, which could resume when economic conditions improve. Business process outsourcing (BPO), including customer service and back-office support, continued to attract local and overseas investment. Investments in improved air, sea, and land transportation have reduced time and costs for transporting goods and have created opportunities in logistics. Jamaica’s high crime rate, corruption, and comparatively high taxes have stymied its investment prospects. The country’s Transparency International corruption perception ranking improved marginally from 74 (2019) to 69 (2020) out of 180 countries. Despite laws that prescribe criminal penalties for corrupt acts by officials, there were still reports of corruption at some ministries and agencies. Measures implemented to address crime continued into 2021, including the continuation of Zones of Special Operations in several high crime areas of the island. While these efforts resulted in lower rates of serious crime in the attendant zones, the measures did not significantly impact the overall murder rate, and Jamaica continues to have one of the highest homicide rates in the world. With energy prices a major component of the cost of doing business, the government has instituted a number of policies to address the structural impediment. In early 2020, the government published its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), outlining the country’s electricity roadmap for the next two decades. The plan, which has been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, projected 1,164 MW of new generation capacity at a cost of $7.3 billion, including fuel cost and the replacement of retired plants. Renewable sources are projected to generate 50 percent of electricity by 2037, with Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), introduced in 2016, providing the lion’s share of the other 50 percent. The increased investment in new generation is expected to increase efficiency and reduce the price of electricity to consumers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 29.6 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 145 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,670 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Jamaica (GoJ) is open to foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. The GOJ made significant structural changes to its economy, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance during the six-year period to 2019, resulting in an improved investment environment. Since 2013, Jamaica’s Parliament passed numerous pieces of legislation to improve the business environment and support economic growth through a simplified tax system and broadened tax base. The establishment of credit bureaus and a Collateral Registry under the Secured Interest in Personal Property (SIPP) legislation are improving access to credit. Jamaica made starting a business easier by consolidating forms and made electricity less expensive by reducing the cost of external connection works. The GOJ implemented an electronic platform for the payment of taxes and established a 90-day window for development approvals. The GOJ amended its public procurement regime with effect from April 2019, to include provisions for domestic margins of preference, affording preferential treatment to Jamaican suppliers in public contracts in some circumstances, and setting aside a portion of the government’s procurement budget for local micro, small, and medium enterprises. Notwithstanding, U.S. businesses are encouraged to participate in GOJ open procurements, many of which are published in media and via the government’s electronic procurement website: https://www.gojep.gov.jm/epps/home.do . Jamaica’s commitment to regulatory reform is an intentional effort to become a more attractive destination for foreign investment. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” report, Jamaica ranked 71 out of 190 economies, above average compared to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The country improved or held firm on all metrics assessed in the 2020 report, moving most significantly in the area registering property. The GoJ replaced the Ad Valorem Stamp Duty rate payable on the registration of collateral, such as property used to secure loan instruments, with a flat rate duty. Additionally, the transfer tax, payable on the change of ownership from one person to another, was also reduced during the year from five to two percent. Jamaica is ranked 80 out of 141 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index. Bureaucracy remains a major impediment, with the country continuing to underperform in the areas of trading across borders, paying taxes, and enforcing contracts. Jamaica’s trade and investment promotion agency, Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), is the GOJ agency responsible for promoting business opportunities to local and foreign investors. While JAMPRO does not institute general criteria for FDI, the institution targets specific sectors for investment and promotes Jamaican exports (see http://www.jamaicatradeandinvest.org/ ). JAMPRO and the Jamaica Business Development Corporation assist micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) primarily through business facilitation and capacity building. MSMEs tend to consist of less than 10 employees. Such fee-based services would be made available to foreign-owned MSMEs (see https://www.jbdc.net/ ). All private entities, foreign and domestic, are entitled to establish and own business enterprises, as well as to engage in all forms of remunerative activity subject to, inter alia, labor, registration, and environmental requirements. Jamaica does not impose limits on foreign ownership or control and local laws do not distinguish between local and foreign investors. There are no sector-specific restrictions that impede market access. A 2017 amendment to the Companies Act requires companies to disclose beneficial owners to the Companies Office of Jamaica (ORC). The law mandates that the company retain records of legal and beneficial owners for seven years. The GOJ proposed new legislation on the incorporation and operation of International Business Companies (IBC), which is designed to attract and facilitate a wide variety of international business activities to include: (1) holding companies providing asset protection for intellectual property rights, real property, and the shares of other companies; (2) serving as vehicles for licensing and franchising; (3) conducting international trade, and investment activities; (4) acting as special purpose vehicles in international financial transactions; and, (5) serving as the international headquarters for global companies. The U.S. government is not aware of any discrimination against foreign investors at the time of initial investment or after the investment is made. However, under the Companies Act, investors are required to either establish a local company or register a branch office of a foreign-owned enterprise. Branches of companies incorporated abroad must register with the Registrar of Companies if they intend to operate in Jamaica. There are no laws or regulations requiring firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Post is not aware of any formal screenings that exist for foreign investments. Incentives are available to local and foreign investors alike, including various levels of tax relief. Jamaica concluded a third-party trade policy review through the WTO in September 2017. The WTO Secretariat’s recommendations are listed here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp459_e.htm Jamaica has not undertaken any investment policy reviews within the last three years in conjunction with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The GOJ’s previous WTO review took place in 2017 and an OECD review took place in 2004. No domestic or foreign civil society organizations have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns within the past five years. Businesses can easily register using the “Super Form,” a single Business Registration Form for New Companies and Business Names. The ORC acts as a “one-stop-shop,” effectively reducing the registration time to between one and three days. Foreign companies can register using these forms, with or without the assistance of an attorney or notary. The “Super Form” can be accessed under Forms at the ORC’s website (https://www.orcjamaica.com). All that is needed is a device with access to the internet, an approved reserved name, proof of address (any recent document used to verify your current address such as a utility bill or driver’s license), and a valid ID (Driver’s License, Passport or Voters Id). The website gives detailed instructions throughout the process. While the GOJ does not actively promote an outward investment program, it does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Jamaica’s regulatory systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Proposed legislation is available for public review at japarliament.gov.jm, and submissions are generally invited from members of the public when there is a distinct policy shift or for sensitive changes. There is no law that requires the rulemaking body to solicit comments on proposed regulation and no timeframe for the length of a consultation period when it happens. Furthermore, the law does not require reporting on public consultations, but the government presents the consultations directly to interested stakeholders in one unified report. Laws in effect are available at japarliament.gov.jm or moj.gov.jm. Companies interested in doing business in a particular sector should seek guidance from the relevant regulator(s), including the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) for utilities, the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) for deposit taking institutions (DTIs) and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) for non-DTIs. Jamaica is compliant with established benchmarks for public disclosure of its budget, the establishment and functioning of an independent and supreme audit body, and the award of contracts for natural resource extraction. Additionally, Jamaica’s Public Debt Management Act (PDMA) of 2012 has codified a gradual reduction in its contingent liability or Government Guaranteed Loans (GGL). The PDMA targets a three percent GGL-to-GDP ratio by 2027. Jamaica has adopted IFRS Standards including the IFRS for SMEs Standard for all companies. Jamaica adopted IFRS Standards in 2000 by Resolution of the members of the ICAJ. The Jamaica Corporate Governance Code 2021 was officially launched on Friday, February 25, 2022. The Code remains the only tool of its kind to date in the Caribbean aimed at helping entities – public and private – to implement Corporate Governance best practices in keeping with international standards. The Code, which was prepared by the PSOJ Corporate Governance Committee through funding by IDB Invest is available for viewing and download here: https://www.psoj.org/corporate-governance-2/. The GOJ tends to adopt Commonwealth standards for its regulatory system, especially from Canada and the United Kingdom. In 2001, CARICOM member states established the Regional Organization for Standards and Quality (CROSQ) under Article 67 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. CROSQ is intended to harmonize regional standards to facilitate the smooth movement of goods in the common market. Jamaica is also a full member of the WTO and is required to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Jamaica has a common law legal system and court decisions are generally based on past judicial declarations. The Jamaican Constitution provides for an independent judiciary with a three-tier court structure. A party seeking to enforce ownership or contractual rights can file a claim in the Resident Magistrate or Supreme Court. Appeals on decisions made in these courts can be taken before the Court of Appeal and then to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), in its original jurisdiction, is the court of the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM), but Jamaica has not signed on to its appellate jurisdiction. Jamaica does not have a single written commercial or contractual law and case law is therefore supplemented by the following pieces of legislation: (1) Arbitration (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards) Act; (2) Companies Act; (3) Consumer Protection Act; (4) Fair Competition Act; (5) Investment Disputes Awards (Enforcement) Act; (6) Judgment (Foreign) (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; (7) Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act; (8) Loans (Equity Investment Bonds) Act; (9) Partnership (Limited) Act; (10) Registration of Business Names Act; (11) Sale of Goods Act; (12) Standards Act; and, (13) Trade Act. The commercial and civil divisions of the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear intellectual property claims. Jamaica enforces the judgments of foreign courts through: (1) The Judgment and Awards (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; (2) The Judgment (Foreign) (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; and (3) The Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act. Under these acts, judgments of foreign courts are accepted where there is a reciprocal enforcement of judgment treaty with the relevant foreign state. International arbitration is also accepted as a means for settling investment disputes between private parties. The Jamaican judicial system has a long tradition of being fair, but court cases can take years or even decades to resolve. A new Chief Justice appointed in 2018 has set aggressive benchmarks to streamline the delivery of judgments, bring greater levels of efficiency to court administration, and target throughput rates in line with international best practice. Efforts are currently underway to provide hearing date certainty and disposition of cases within 24 months, barring exceptional circumstances. The deployment of new courtrooms and the appointment of additional Appeal Court Judges are indicators of Jamaica’s commitment to justice reform. Challenges with dispute resolution usually reflect broader problems within the court system, including long delays and resource constraints. Subsequent enforcement of court decisions or arbitration awards is usually adequate, and the local court will recognize the enforcement of an international arbitration award. A specialized Commercial Court was established in 2001 to expedite the resolution of commercial cases. The rules do not make it mandatory for commercial cases to be filed in the Commercial Court and the Court is largely underutilized by litigants. Jamaica ranked 119 in the 2019 World Bank Doing Business Report on the metric of enforcement of contracts, scoring 64.8 in the length of time taken for enforcement, 43.6 for costs associated with litigation and 52.8 on the quality of judicial processes. There are no specific laws or regulations specifically related to foreign investment. Since foreign companies are treated similar to Jamaican companies when investing, the relevant sections of the applicable laws are applied equally. The Fair-Trading Commission (FTC), an agency of the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce, administers the Fair Competition Act (FCA). The major objective of the FCA is to foster competitive behavior and provide consumer protection. The Act proscribes the following anti-competitive practices: resale price maintenance; tied selling; price fixing; collusion and cartels; and bid rigging. The Act does not specifically prohibit mergers or acquisitions that could lead to the creation of a monopoly. The FTC is empowered to investigate breaches of the Act and businesses or individuals in breach can be taken to court if they fail to implement corrective measures outlined by the FTC. Expropriation is generally not an issue in Jamaica, although land may be expropriated for national development under the Land Acquisition Act, which provides for compensation on the basis of market value. The U.S. government is not aware of any current expropriation-related litigation between the Jamaican government and any private individual or company. However, the U.S. government assisted investors who had property expropriated during the 1970’s socialist regime, with a payment in one such case received in 2010. Jamaica enacted new insolvency legislation in 2014 that replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1880 and seeks to make the insolvency process more efficient. The Act prescribes the circumstances under which bankruptcy is committed; the procedure for filing a bankruptcy petition; and the procedures to be followed in the administration of the estates of bankrupts. The reform addresses bankruptcy; insolvency, receiverships; provisional supervision; and winding up proceedings. The law addresses corporate and individual insolvency and facilitates the rehabilitation of insolvent debtors, while removing the stigma formerly associated with either form of insolvency. Both insolvents and “looming insolvents” (persons who will become insolvent within twelve months of the filing of the proposal if corrective or preventative action is not taken) are addressed in the reforms. The Act contains a provision for debtors to make a proposal to their creditors for the restructuring of debts, subject to acceptance by the creditor. Creditors can also invoke bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor if the amount owed is not less than the prescribed threshold or if the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy. The filing of a proposal or notice of intention to file a proposal creates a temporary stay of proceedings. During this period, the creditor is precluded from enforcing claims against the debtor. The stay does not apply to secured creditors who take possession of secured assets before the proposal is filed; gives notice of intention to enforce against a security at least 10 days before the notice of intention or actual proposal is filed; or rejects the proposal. The 2014 legislation makes it a criminal offence if a bankrupt entity defaults on certain obligations set out in the legislation. Jamaica ranked 34 on Resolving Insolvency in the 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report. Bankruptcy proceedings take about a year to resolve, costing 18 percent of the estate value with an average recovery rate of 65 percent. The text of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act can be found at: http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/341_The%20Insolvency%20Act%202014%20No.14%20rotated.pdf 4. Industrial Policies The Fiscal Incentives (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 repeals most of the legacy incentive legislation and provides flexibility for new tax incentives only to be granted in relation to the bauxite sector, special economic zone activities, the relocation of corporate headquarters, and Junior Stock Exchange listings. The Act also outlines the arrangement for transitioning to the new regime. Continuing beneficiaries may elect to keep old incentives such as relief from income tax and customs duty as well as zero-rated General Consumption Tax (GCT) status for imports. Below are short descriptions of notable, recently enacted investment incentives. Omnibus legislation – Provides tax relief on customs duties, additional stamp duties, and corporate income tax. These benefits are granted under the following four areas: (1) The Fiscal Incentives Act: Targets small and medium size businesses and reduces the effective corporate income tax rate by applying: (a) an Employment Tax Credit (ETC) at a maximum value of 30 percent; and (b) a capital allowance applicable to a broadened definition of industrial buildings. (2) The Income Tax Relief (Large-Scale Projects and Pioneer Industries) Act: Targets large-scale projects and/or pioneering projects and provides for an improved and more attractive rate for the ETC. Projects will be designated either as large-scale or pioneer based on a decision by Parliament and subject to an Economic Impact Assessment. (3) Revised Customs Tariff: Provides for the duty-free importation of capital equipment and raw material for the productive sectors. (4) Revised Stamp Duty Act: Provides exemption from additional stamp duty on raw materials and non-consumer goods for the manufacturing sector. Urban Renewal Act: Companies that undertake development within Special Development Areas can benefit from Urban Renewal Bonds, a 33.3 percent investment tax credit, tax-free rental income, and the exemption from transfer tax and stamp duties on the ‘improved’ value of the property. Bauxite and Alumina Act: Under this Act, bauxite/alumina producers are allowed to import all productive inputs free of duties, Value Added Tax (VAT), and other port related taxes and charges. The Foreign Sales Corporation Act: This Act exempts income tax for five years for qualified income arising from foreign trade. U.S. law through the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) reinforces this incentive. Jamaica’s EX-IM Bank provides concessionary interest rate loans for trade financing, while the Development Bank of Jamaica offers reduced lending rates to the productive sectors. Special tax incentives exist for companies that register on the Junior Stock Exchange. Income Tax Act (Junior Stock Exchange): As of January 1, 2014, companies listed on the Junior Stock Exchange are not required to pay income tax during the first five years and 50 percent for the next five years. Special Economic Zone Act: In 2015, Jamaica passed legislation establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The SEZ Act repeals the Jamaica Free Zone Act, making way for: (1) the designation; promotion; development; operation; and management of Special Economic Zones; (2) the establishment of a SEZ Authority; and (3) the granting of benefits and other measures in order to attract domestic and foreign investments. Productive inputs relief (PIR): There is relief from customs duty and additional stamp duty on the importation of certain ‘productive inputs’ that are directly used in the ‘production of primary products’ or the ‘manufacture of goods’. In addition to the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, relief is also granted on certain products imported for use in the tourism, creative arts, and healthcare industries. As at March 2022 there were 164 entities operating in Jamaica’s Special Economic Zones (SEZ), occupying over 25 million square feet. Operations in Jamaica’s SEZs include business process outsourcing (BPO); warehousing and distribution; manufacturing; and assembly and production facilities. The Jamaica Special Economic Zone Authority (www.jseza.com) regulates, supervises, and promotes the Special Economic Zone (SEZ). SEZ operators benefit from a 12.5 percent corporate income tax rate (effective rate may be as low as 7.5 percent with the approval of additional tax credits); customs duty relief, General Consumption Tax (GCT) relief; employment tax credit; promotional tax credit on research and development; capital allowance; and a stamp duty payable of 50 percent. Developers receive these benefits plus relief from income tax on rental income and relief from transfer tax. There is a non-refundable one-time registration fee and renewable annual fee to enter the regime. Duty-free zones are primarily found in airports, hotels, and tourist centers and, as with special economic zone activities, do not discriminate on the basis of nationality. No performance requirements are generally imposed as a condition for investing in Jamaica, and government of Jamaica (GOJ) imposed conditions are not overly burdensome. The GOJ does not mandate local employment, although the use of foreign workers to fill semi-skilled and unskilled jobs is generally frowned upon, especially by trade unions. When requesting work permits for foreign workers, both local and foreign employers must describe efforts to recruit locally. The GOJ requires a description of efforts to recruit locally. The U.S. government has heard of delays in obtaining work permits for foreign workers as the GOJ does not readily have data available to determine if the requisite skills exist in Jamaica. The GOJ does not follow “forced localization,” requiring domestic content in goods or technology. There are no requirements to provide the GOJ access to surveillance of data and there are no restrictions on maintaining certain amounts of data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Private entities, whether foreign or domestic, generally have the right to freely establish, own, acquire, and dispose of business enterprises and may engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Property rights are guaranteed by the Jamaican Constitution. The Registration of Titles Act recognizes and provides for the enforcement of secured interests in property by way of mortgage. It also facilitates and protects the acquisition and disposition of all property rights, though working through Jamaica’s bureaucracy can result in significant delays. With less than half of land in Jamaica registered, it can take a long time for landowners to secure titles. Squatting is also a major challenge in Jamaica, with an estimated 20 percent of the population living as squatters. Three-quarters of these squatters reside on government lands. Under the Registration of Titles Act, a squatter can claim a property by adverse possession (without compensating the owner for the land) if a person can demonstrate that he or she has lived on government land for more than 60 years, or on private property for more than 12 years undisturbed (including without any payment to the landowner). There are no specific regulations regarding land lease or acquisition by foreign and/or non-resident investors. The country’s World Bank Doing Business Report ranking for ease of “registering property” was 85 in 2020, improving significantly due to the reduction in cost associated with transferring and registering collateral using property. Jamaica continued to outperform other Latin America and Caribbean countries in the time required to close a property transaction. Registration of Titles Act: http://moj.gov.jm/sites/default/files/laws/Registration%20of%20Titles.pdf Jamaica has one of the stronger intellectual property (IP) protection regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Intellectual Property Rights Index, although legislative and enforcement gaps still exist. Jamaica is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is a signatory of the Berne Convention. Jamaica and the United States have an Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty, which provide assurances to protect intellectual property. It is relatively easy to register IP, and the Jamaica Intellectual Property Office (JIPO) assists parties interested in registering IP and supports investors’ efforts to enforce their rights. Overall, protections across all types of IP are improving. Law enforcement efforts to combat counterfeit and pirated goods are improving on the ground but border enforcement remains a challenge. IP violations tend to be more in relation to physical goods, while electronic IP theft is less common. The country’s trademark and copyright regimes satisfy the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In January 2020, the country passed its long-awaited TRIPS compliant Patent and Designs Act and has been removed from the USTR Special 301 Watchlist. The Act came into force in February 2022. The Geographical Indications Act (GI) of 2004 is now fully in force and is TRIPS compliant, protecting products whose particular quality or reputation is attributable to its geographical origin. The Trademarks (Amendment) Act of 2021 went into force in March 2022, bringing into effect the Madrid Protocol. General law provides protection for trade secrets and protection against unfair competition is guaranteed under the Fair Competition Act. The Madrid Protocol allowing for international registration of a trademark on the basis of a single application takes effect on March 27, 2022. In the area of copyright protection, amendments to the Copyright Act passed in June 2015 fulfilled Jamaica’s obligations under the WIPO Internet Treaties and extended copyright protection term from 50 to 95 years. The Copyright Act complies with the TRIPS Agreement and adheres to the principles of the Berne Convention and covers works ranging from books and music to computer programs. Amendments in June 1999 explicitly provide copyright protection on compilations of works such as databases and make it an offense for a person to manufacture or trade in decoders of encrypted transmissions. It also gives persons in encrypted transmissions or in broadcasting or cable program services a right of action against persons who infringe upon their rights. The Jamaica Constabulary Force established a specialized intellectual property unit within its counter terrorism and organized crime branch (C-TOC) in 2015 to boost IP enforcement. The unit continued to work with the Contraband Enforcement Team of the Jamaica Customs Agency to seize and destroy counterfeit goods, while pursing criminal proceedings where possible. In 2021, over $60 million in counterfeit goods were destroyed by state agencies. The amount increased significantly due to the destruction of goods seized by Jamaica Customs in 2017. The most commonly counterfeited goods include shoes, alcohol, cigarettes, clothing, handbags, and pharmaceuticals. Jamaica’s border enforcement efforts are hampered by customs officers not having ex officio authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods. Rights holders must first be provided with visual samples of suspect merchandise to verify the item as counterfeit, submit a declaration indicating the differences between the fake and actual brands, and provide an authorization to seize the merchandise. Rights holders are responsible for paying the costs associated with storage and destruction of counterfeit goods, and in recent cases the cost started at $250,000. Presently the Commissioner of Customs may grant up to 10 days for a rights holder to produce the required evidence and commitments before releasing suspected counterfeit goods that are in transit. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Credit is available at market terms, and foreigners are allowed to borrow freely on the local market at market-determined rates of interest. A relatively effective regulatory system was established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Jamaica has had its own stock exchange, the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE), since 1969. The JSE was the top performing capital market indices in 2018 and was among the top five performers in 2019. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the central bank, regulate these activities. Jamaica adheres to IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. At the end of 2021 there were 11 deposit-taking institutions (DTIs) consisting of eight commercial banks, one merchant bank (Licensed under the Financial Institutions Act) and two building societies. The number of credit unions shrank from 47 at the end of 2009 to 25 at the end of 2021. Commercial banks held assets of approximately $14 billion at the end of 2021. Non-performing loans (NPL) of $200 million at end December 2020, were 3 percent of total loans. Five of the country’s eight commercial banks are foreign owned. After a financial sector crisis in the mid-1990s led to consolidations, the sector has remained largely stable. In October 2018, the GOJ took legislative steps to modernize and make the central bank operationally independent through the tabling of amendments to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act. The modernization program includes, inter alia, the institutionalization of the central bank independence, improved governance, and the transitioning of monetary policy towards inflation targeting. The modernization efforts continued in 2020 with the passage of the Bank of Jamaica Amendment Act to allow for, among other things: (1) full-fledged inflation targeting; (2) improved capitalization, governance, transparency, and accountability; (3) monetary policy decisions to be devolved to a monetary policy committee; and (4) the central bank Governor to account to Parliament. The Act will therefore remove the power of the government to give monetary policy direction to the central bank. These changes will move Jamaica’s financial governance framework closer in line with international standards. In May of 2020, the BOJ, as a part of their ongoing retail payments reform, ventured into the digital innovation that is fast becoming a feature of global central banks, central bank digital currency (CBDC). CBDC is a digital form of central bank issued currency and is therefore legal tender. It is not to be confused with cryptocurrency, which is privately issued and not backed by a central authority. CBDC is fully backed by the Central Bank, the sole issuer. The Bank of Jamaica will roll out the digital Jamaican dollar in 2022 after a successful pilot during 2021. Jamaica does not have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Jamaican SOEs are most prominent in the agriculture, mining, energy, and transport sectors of the economy. Of 149 public bodies, 54 are self-financing and are therefore considered SOEs as either limited liability entities established under the Companies Act of Jamaica or statutory bodies created by individual enabling legislation. SOEs generally do not receive preferential access to government contracts. SOEs must adhere to the provisions of the GOJ (Revised) Handbook of Public Sector Procurement Procedures and are expected to participate in a bidding process to provide goods and services to the government. SOEs also provide services to private sector firms. SOEs must report quarterly on all contracts above a prescribed limit to the Integrity Commission. Since 2002, SOEs have been subject to the same tax requirements as private enterprises and are required to purchase government-owned land and raw material and execute these transactions on similar terms as private entities. Jamaica’s Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act (PBMA) requires SOEs to prepare annual corporate plans and budgets, which must be debated and approved by Parliament. As part of the GOJ’s economic reform agenda, SOE performance is monitored against agreed targets and goals, with oversight provided by stakeholders including representatives of civil society. The GOJ prioritized divestment of SOEs, particularly the most inefficient, as part of its IMF reform commitments. Private firms compete with SOEs on fair terms and SOEs generally lack the same profitability motives as private enterprises, leading to the GOJ’s absorbing the debt of loss-making public sector enterprises. Jamaica’s public bodies report to their respective Board of Directors appointed by the responsible portfolio minister and while no general rules guide the allocation of SOE board positions, some entities allocate seats to specific stakeholders. In 2012, the GOJ approved a Corporate Governance Framework (CGF) under which persons appointed to boards should possess the skills and competencies required for the effective functioning of the entity. With some board members being selected on the basis of their political affiliation, the government is in the process of developing new board policy guidelines. The Jamaican court system, while slow, is respected for being fair and balanced and in many cases has ruled against the GOJ and its agents. As part of its economic reform program, the GOJ identified a number of public assets to be privatized from various sectors. Jamaica actively courts foreign investors as part of its divestment strategy. In certain instances, the government encourages local participation. Restrictions may be placed on certain assets due to national security considerations. Privatization can occur through sale, lease, or concession. Transactions are generally executed through public tenders, but the GOJ reserves the right to accept unsolicited proposals for projects deemed to be strategic. The Development Bank of Jamaica, which oversees the privatization program, is mandated to ensure that the process is fair and transparent. When some entities are being privatized, advertisements are placed locally and through international publications, such as the Financial Times, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, to attract foreign investors. Foreign investors won most of the privatization bids in the last decade. While the time taken to divest assets depends on state of readiness and complexity, on average transactions take between 18 and 24 months. The process involves pre-feasibility and due diligence assessments; feasibility studies; pre-qualification of bidders; and a public tender. In 2019 the GOJ divested two of its major assets through initial public offerings (IPOs): a 62-megawatt wind farm, which raised almost $40 million, and a toll highway, which raised almost $90 million. The GOJ is in planning to divest the Jamaica Mortgage Bank and its minority interest in the electricity provider, the Jamaica Public Service, through public offerings. In 2018, the GOJ signed a 25-year concession for the management and development of the Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston. Other large privatizations include the 2003 privatization of Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay and the 2015 privatization of the Kingston Container Terminal port facility. A list of current privatization transactions can be found at http://dbankjm.com/current-transactions/. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) among many Jamaican companies is a developing practice, with more established companies further along the scale. In 2013, the government provided additional financial incentives for corporations to support charity work through the Charities Act, under which corporations and individuals can claim a tax deduction on contributions made to registered charitable organizations. Some large publicly listed companies and multinational corporations in Jamaica maintain their own foundations that carry out social and community projects to support education, youth employment, and entrepreneurship. In 2018, the GOJ became party to the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Multilateral Convention, which updates the network of bilateral tax treaties and reduces opportunities for tax avoidance by multinational enterprises. GOJ also became signatory to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, effective March 1, 2019, having deposited instruments of ratification in November 2018. Recent years have seen increased disputes over bauxite mining rights in Jamaica’s Cockpit Country, an area inhabited by the semi-autonomous Maroon population. In January 2022, the Jamaican government granted a Jamaican-owned subsidiary of an international firm rights to mine on more than one thousand acres of previously protected land claimed by the Maroons despite protests by community representatives. 9. Corruption Jamaican law provides criminal penalties for corruption by public officials, however, there is at least circumstantial evidence that some officials engage in corrupt practice. There were also reports of government corruption in the last couple years and it remained a significant cause of public concern. Media and civil society organizations continued to criticize the government for being slow and at times reluctant to tackle corruption. Under the Corruption Prevention Act, public servants can be imprisoned for up to 10 years and fined as much as USD 100,000 if found guilty of engaging in acts of bribery, including bribes to foreign public officials. In 2017, Jamaica passed an Integrity Commission Act that consolidated three agencies with anti-corruption mandates into a single entity, the Integrity Commission, which now has limited prosecutorial powers. The three agencies are the precursor Integrity Commission, which received and monitored statutory declarations from parliamentarians; the Office of the Contractor General (OCG), which monitored government contracts; and the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, which received the financial filings of specified public servants. A key area of concern for corruption is in government procurement. However, successful prosecutions – particularly for high-level corruption – are rare. Three Ministers of government demitted office between 2018 and March 2022, in the wake of corruption allegations. Corruption, and its apparent linkages with organized crime, appear to be one of the root causes of Jamaica’s high crime rate and economic stagnation. In 2021, Transparency International gave Jamaica a score of 44 out of a possible 100 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 10. Political and Security Environment Crime poses a greater threat to foreign investment in Jamaica than political violence, as the country has not experienced any major political violence since the early 1980s. Violent crime, mostly attributed to gangs, is rooted in poverty, unemployment, social neglect, and transnational crime, including so-called “lottery-scamming”, and is a serious problem in Jamaica. Gang violence is highly concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods but can occur elsewhere. The Jamaica Constabulary Force recorded 1,463 murders in 2021, a per capita homicide rate of roughly 50 per 100,000, the highest homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2021. Jamaica also faces a significant problem with extortion in certain urban commercial areas and on large construction project sites. The security challenges increase the cost of doing business as companies spend on additional security measures. The U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory (of March 2022) assesses Jamaica at Level 3, indicating travelers should exercise increased caution. U.S. companies with personnel assigned to Jamaica are strongly advised to conduct security and cultural awareness training. Please refer to the Jamaica 2019 Crime and Safety Report from the Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) for additional information (https://www.osac.gov/Country/Jamaica/Detail). 11. Labor Policies and Practices Jamaica had an estimated labor force of 1.3 million as of October 2021 with an unemployment rate of 7.1 percent. Women make up 46.2 percent of the labor force and have an unemployment rate of 9 percent. Unemployment is highest within the 14-19 age cohort. Most Jamaicans are employed in services including the retail and tourism sectors, followed by construction, transportation, and communications. Since 1999, more Jamaicans have become trained in information technology and the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry currently employs more than 40,000 people. Data from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) show that the number of women securing employment is gradually increasing. According to STATIN’s October 2021 Labor Force Survey, of the 76,600 additional persons gaining jobs to expand the employed labor force by 6.6 per cent to 1,234,800, women accounted for 43,700. This out-turn represents 57 per cent of the overall additional jobs generated and pushed the number of gainfully employed females by 8.5 per cent up to 558,600. While the margin of increase for males was smaller, at 39,900 or 5.1 per cent, the overall number of men in jobs was significantly larger, at 676,200 (https://jis.gov.jm/government/ministries/). No law requires hiring locals, but foreign investors are expected to hire locals, especially for unskilled and lower skilled jobs. Under the Work Permit Act, a foreign national who wishes to work in Jamaica must first apply for a permit issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The law, which seeks to give first preference to Jamaicans, requires organizations planning to employ foreign nationals to prove that attempts were made to employ a Jamaican national. The security guard industry adopted the practice of employing workers on extended contracts to avoid some of the cost, including severance, associated with direct employment. Jamaica does not have a history of waiving labor laws to retain or attract investment and these laws tend to be uniform across the economy. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment to respond to market conditions, but there are severance payment requirements if a position is made redundant. Under the law, there is a distinction between a layoff and a redundancy. A layoff allows a temporary period without employment for up to four months. The Employment (Termination and Redundancy Payments) Act provides redundancy pay to employees who are let go with at least two years of continuous employment. There are no unemployment benefits in Jamaica, but low-income Jamaicans have the option of applying for social benefits under a conditional cash transfer program referred to as the Program for Advancement though Health and Education (PATH). The law provides for the rights of workers to form or join unions, to bargain collectively, and the freedom to strike. Trade union membership accounts for about 20 percent of the labor force, although the movement has weakened in recent years. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination, although it is not uncommon for private sector employers to lay off union workers and rehire them as contractors. Labor law entitles protections to all persons categorized as workers, although it denies contract workers coverage under certain statutory provisions, such as redundancy benefits. The law denies collective bargaining if no single union represents at least 40 percent of the workers in the unit. Unionization is limited in Jamaica’s free zones. Jamaica has an Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) to which the Minister of Labor and Social Security may refer disputes unsettled at the local level. Jamaica ratified most International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions and international labor rights are recognized within domestic law. Jamaica has ratified all key international conventions concerning child labor and established laws and regulations related to child labor, including in its worst forms. However, gaps still exist in Jamaica’s legal framework to adequately protect children from child labor. The GOJ is under-resourced for investigations on worker abuse as well as on occupational safety and health checks. Jamaica’s workplace policy incorporates all of the recommended practices of the ILO code of practice on HIV/AIDS but the legislation to regulate enforcement is yet to be ratified. In conjunction with the ILO and local stakeholders, the GOJ passed legislation guiding flexible working arrangements. The informal economy (encompassing pure tax evasion, the irregular economy and illegal activities) represents a large and growing share of the overall economy. This growing sector represents a diverse group of enterprises and workers, ranging from local peddlers to relatively sophisticated small entrepreneurs. Tax evaders reduce revenue the Jamaican tax system would otherwise receive. Tax evasion therefore contributes to lower levels of government services, higher taxes on the rest of the economy and larger government deficits. Irregular economic activity is the least virulent portion of the informal economy, and even has beneficial aspects. Irregular activity generates goods, services and jobs that might otherwise be unavailable. 14. Contact for More Information Joe James Economic/Commercial Officer kingstoncommercial@state.gov 142 Old Hope Road Kingston 6, Jamaica +1 876-702-6000 Japan Executive Summary Japan is the world’s third largest economy, the United States’ fourth largest trading partner, and, as of 2020, the top provider of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States. The Japanese government welcomes and solicits inward foreign investment and has set modest goals for increasing inbound FDI. Despite Japan’s wealth, high level of development, and general acceptance of foreign investment, however, inbound FDI stocks, as a share of GDP, are the lowest among the OECD countries. On the one hand, Japan’s legal and regulatory climate is highly supportive of investors. Courts are independent, but attorney-client privilege does not exist in civil, criminal, or administrative matters, with the exception of limited application in cartel anti-trust investigations. There is no right to have counsel present during criminal or administrative interviews. The country’s regulatory system is improving transparency and developing new regulations in line with international norms. Capital markets are fairly deep and broadly available to foreign investors. Japan maintains strong protections for intellectual property rights with generally robust enforcement. The country remains a large, wealthy, and sophisticated market with world-class corporations, research facilities, and technologies. Nearly all foreign exchange transactions, including transfers of profits, dividends, royalties, repatriation of capital, and repayment of principal, are freely permitted. The sectors that have historically attracted the largest foreign direct investment in Japan are electrical machinery, finance, and insurance. On the other, foreign investors in the Japanese market continue to face numerous challenges. A traditional aversion towards mergers and acquisitions within corporate Japan has inhibited foreign investment, and weak corporate governance, among other factors, has led to low returns on equity and cash hoarding among Japanese firms, although business practices are improving in both areas, at least among leading firms. Investors and business owners must also grapple with inflexible labor laws and a highly regimented system of labor recruitment and management that can significantly increase the cost and difficulty of managing human resources. The Japanese government has recognized many of these challenges and is pursuing initiatives to improve investment conditions. A revised national Climate Law, which the National Diet passed unanimously in May 2021 and enters into full effect on April 1, 2022, will codify Japan’s decarbonization commitments under the Paris Agreement. The new legislation amends the law in three areas: requiring Japan to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, bolstering mechanisms to support and expedite decarbonization at the subnational level, and requiring digitalization and transparency of emissions-related information published by the Government of Japan (GOJ). Levels of corruption in Japan are low, but deep relationships between firms and suppliers as well as between large business and the bureaucrats who regulate them may limit competition in certain sectors and inhibit the entry of foreign firms into local markets. Future improvement in Japan’s investment climate is contingent largely on the success of structural reforms to raise economic growth. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 13 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 131,643 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 40,360 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Direct inward investment into Japan by foreign investors has been open and free since the Diet amended the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) in 1998. In general, the only requirement for foreign investors making investments in Japan is to submit an ex post facto report to the relevant ministries. The Diet further amended FEFTA in 2019, updating Japan’s foreign investment review regime. The legislation became effective in May 2020 and lowered the ownership threshold for pre-approval notification to the government for foreign investors from ten percent to one percent in industries that could pose risks to Japanese national security. There are waivers for certain categories of investors. The Japanese government explicitly promotes inward FDI and has established formal programs to attract it. In 2013, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced its intention to double Japan’s inward FDI stock to JPY 35 trillion (USD 318 billion) by 2020 and reiterated that commitment in its revised Japan Revitalization Strategy issued in August 2016. At the end of 2020, Japan’s inward FDI stock was JPY 39.7 trillion (USD 386 billion), a 15.6 percent increase over the previous year, achieving the target. The previous administration set a target for inward FDI stocks to double to JPY 80 trillion ($672.3 billion with 1.0 USD = ¥119) by 2030, set out in the Basic Policies released in June 2021 by then-Prime Minister Suga. Achieving this goal would put Japan’s FDI stock as a percentage of GDP at around 20 percent of the OECD average. From time to time, the government’s “FDI Promotion Council,” composed of government ministers and private sector advisors, releases recommendations on improving Japan’s FDI environment. In a May 2018 report ( http://www.invest-japan.go.jp/documents/pdf/support_program_en.pdf ), the council decided to launch the Support Program for Regional Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, recommending that local governments formulate a plan to attract foreign companies to their regions. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) are the lead agencies responsible for assisting foreign firms wishing to invest in Japan. METI and JETRO have together created a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors, providing a single Tokyo location—with language assistance—where those seeking to establish a company in Japan can process the necessary paperwork (details are available at http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/ibsc/ ). Prefectural and city governments also have active programs to attract foreign investors, but they lack many of the financial tools U.S. states and municipalities use to attract investment. Foreign investors seeking a presence in the Japanese market or seeking to acquire a Japanese firm through corporate takeovers may face additional challenges, however, many of which relate more to prevailing business practices rather than to government regulations, although this varies by sector. Such challenges include an insular and consensual business culture that has traditionally resisted unsolicited mergers and acquisitions (M&A), especially when initiated by non-Japanese entities; a lack of multiple independent directors on many company boards (although board composition is changing); exclusive supplier networks and alliances between business groups that can restrict competition from foreign firms and domestic newcomers; cultural and linguistic challenges; and longstanding labor practices that tend to inhibit labor mobility. Business leaders have communicated to the U.S. Embassy that regulatory and governmental barriers are more likely to exist in mature, heavily regulated sectors than in new industries. Foreign and domestic private enterprises have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Japan has gradually eliminated most formal restrictions governing FDI. One remaining restriction limits foreign ownership in Japan’s former land-line monopoly telephone operator, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), to 33 percent. Japan’s Radio Law and separate Broadcasting Law also limit foreign investment in broadcasters to 20 percent, or 33 percent for broadcasters categorized as providers of broadcast infrastructure. Authorities count foreign ownership of Japanese companies invested in terrestrial broadcasters against these limits. The limits do not apply to communication satellite facility owners, program suppliers, or cable television operators. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, as amended, governs investment in sectors deemed to have national security or economic stability implications. If a foreign investor wants to acquire over one percent of the shares of a listed company in the sectors set out below, it must provide prior notification and obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance and the ministry that regulates the specific industry. Designated sectors include weapons manufacturers, nuclear power, agriculture, aerospace, forestry, petroleum, electric/gas/water utilities, telecommunications, and leather manufacturing. There are waivers for certain categories of investors. U.S. investors, relative to other foreign investors, are not disadvantaged or singled out by any ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its most recent review of Japan’s trade policies in July 2020 (available at directdoc.aspx (wto.org) ). The OECD released its biennial Japan economic survey results in December 2021 (available at http://www.oecd.org/japan/economic-survey-japan.htm ). The Japan External Trade Organization is Japan’s investment promotion and facilitation agency. JETRO operates six Invest Japan Business Support Centers (IBSCs) across Japan that provide consultation services on Japanese incorporation types, business registration, human resources, office establishment, and visa/residency issues. Through its website ( https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/ ), the organization provides English-language information on Japanese business registration, visas, taxes, recruiting, labor regulations, and trademark/design systems and procedures in Japan. While registration of corporate names and addresses can be completed online, most business registration procedures must be completed in person. In addition, corporate seals and articles of incorporation of newly established companies must be verified by a notary, although there are indications of change underway. Japan established a new Digital Agency in September 2021 to promote the digital provision of government services and digital transformation in the private sector. According to the 2020 World Bank “Doing Business” Report, it takes eleven days to establish a local limited liability company in Japan. JETRO reports that establishing a branch office of a foreign company requires one month, while setting up a subsidiary company takes two months. Although requirements vary according to the type of incorporation, a typical business must register with the Legal Affairs Bureau (Ministry of Justice), the Labor Standards Inspection Office (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare), the Japan Pension Service, the district Public Employment Security Office, and the district tax bureau. JETRO operates a one-stop business support center in Tokyo so that foreign companies can complete all necessary legal and administrative procedures at one location. In 2017, JETRO launched an online business registration system that allows businesses to register company documents but not immigration documentation. No laws exist to explicitly prevent discrimination against women and minorities regarding registering and establishing a business. Neither special assistance nor mechanisms exist to aid women or underrepresented minorities. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provides a variety of support for outward Japanese foreign direct investment. Most such support comes in the form of “overseas investment loans,” which can be provided to Japanese companies (investors), overseas Japanese affiliates (including joint ventures), and foreign governments in support of projects with Japanese content, typically infrastructure projects. JBIC often supports outward FDI projects to develop or secure overseas resources that are of strategic importance to Japan, for example, construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals to facilitate sales to Japan and third countries in Asia. (Note: Days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JBIC announced on March 3, 2022, that it would review the agreement it signed in November 2021 providing for a JPY 220 billion ($1.8 billion) in loans regarding LNG development in Russia.) More information on JBIC is available at https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/index.html . Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) supports outward investment by providing exporters and investors insurance that protects them against risks and uncertainty in foreign countries that is not covered by private-sector insurers. Together, JBIC and NEXI act as Japan’s export credit agency. Japan also employs specialized agencies and public-private partnerships to target outward investment in specific sectors. For example, the Fund Corporation for the Overseas Development of Japan’s Information and Communications Technology and Postal Services (JICT) supports overseas investment in global telecommunications, broadcasting, and postal businesses. Similarly, the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN) is a government-funded corporation to invest and participate in transport and urban development projects that involve Japanese companies. The fund specializes in overseas infrastructure investment projects such as high-speed rail, airports, and smart city projects with Japanese companies, banks, governments, and other institutions (e.g., JICA, JBIC, NEXI). Finally, the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) is a Japanese government entity administered by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy under METI. JOGMEC provides equity capital and liability guarantees to Japanese companies for oil and natural gas exploration and production projects. Japan places no restrictions on outbound investment, except under certain circumstances (e.g., with countries under international sanctions) that are listed in the appendix of the FEFTA. 3. Legal Regime Japan operates a highly centralized regulatory system in which national-level ministries and government organs play a dominant role. Regulators are generally sophisticated and there is little evidence of explicit discrimination against foreign firms. Most draft regulations and impact assessments are released for public comment before implementation and are accessible through a unified portal ( http://www.e-gov.go.jp/ ). Law, regulations, and administrative procedures are generally available online in Japanese along with regular publication in an official gazette. The Japanese government also actively maintains a body of unofficial English translations of some Japanese laws ( http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ ). Some members of the foreign business community in Japan continue to express concern that Japanese regulators do not seek sufficient formal input from industry stakeholders with adequate time for them to prepare, relying instead on formal and informal connections between regulators and domestic firms to arrive at regulatory decisions. This practice may have the effect of disadvantaging foreign firms that lack the benefit of deep relationships with local regulators. The United States has encouraged the Japanese government to improve public notice and comment procedures to ensure consistency and transparency in rule-making and to give fair consideration to comments received. The National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), contains a description of Japan’s regulatory regime as it affects foreign exporters and investors. The Japanese government encourages environmental, social, and governance disclosure (ESG) to assist investors. The Financial Services Agency is coordinating closely with the international community on harmonizing these standards in the G20 and the Financial Stability Board, among other multilateral groups, and is working to implement these best practices domestically. It is working with the Tokyo Stock Exchange to catalogue ESG bonds issued within the exchange. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government provides subsidies that aim to partially cover certification and consulting costs incurred by entities issuing green bonds. Combined with subsidies funded by the Ministry of the Environment, the additional burden incurred by issuing entities can be reduced by as much as 90 percent. The Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC), administered by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, plays a central role in maintaining Japan Industrial Standards (JIS). JISC aims to align JIS with international standards. According to JISC, as of March 31, 2021, 59 percent of Japan’s standards were harmonized with their international counterparts. Nonetheless, Japan maintains a large number of Japan-specific standards that can complicate efforts to introduce new products to the country. Japan is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of proposed regulations. Japan is primarily a civil law country based on codified law. The Constitution and the five major legal codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Commercial, Criminal, and Criminal Procedure) form the legal basis of the system. Japan has a fully independent judiciary and a consistently applied body of commercial law. An Intellectual Property High Court was established in 2005 to expedite trial proceedings in IP cases. Foreign judgments are recognized and enforced by Japanese courts under certain conditions. Major laws affecting foreign direct investment into Japan include the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, the 2005 Companies Act, and the 1948 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. The Japanese government actively encourages FDI into Japan and has sought over the past decades to ease legal and administrative burdens on foreign investors, including with major reforms to the Companies Act in 2005 and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in 2008. The Japanese government amended the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act in 2019. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) holds sole responsibility for enforcing Japanese competition and anti-trust law, although public prosecutors may file criminal charges related to a JFTC finding. In fiscal year 2020, the JFTC investigated 101 suspected Antimonopoly Act (AMA) violations and completed 91 investigations. During this same time period, the JFTC issued 15 cease and desist orders and issued a total of JPY 4.3 billion (USD 42 million) surcharge payment orders to four companies. In 2019, the Diet amended the AMA and granted the JFTC discretion to incentivize cooperation with investigations and adjust surcharges according to the nature and extent of the violation. The JFTC also reviews proposed “business combinations” (i.e., mergers, acquisitions, increased shareholdings, etc.) to ensure that transactions do not “substantially … restrain competition in any particular field of trade.” In December 2019, amended merger guidelines and policies entered into force to “deal with business combinations in the digital market.” Data enjoys consideration as a competitive asset under these new guidelines along with the network effects characteristic of digital businesses. The JFTC has expanded authority (but under no legal obligation) to review merger cases, including “Non-Notifiable Cases,” when the transaction value is more than JPY 40 billion (USD 370 million) and the merger is expected to affect domestic consumers. Further, the amended policies suggest that parties consult with the JFTC voluntarily when the transaction value exceeds JPY40 billion and when one or more of the following factors is met: (i) When an acquired company has an office in Japan and/or conducts research and development in Japan; (ii) When an acquired company conducts sales activities targeting domestic consumers, such as developing marketing materials (website, brochures, etc.) in the Japanese language; or (iii) When the total domestic sales of an acquired company exceed JPY100 million (USD 920,000) Since 1945, the Japanese government has not expropriated any enterprise, and the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments in Japan is highly unlikely. The World Bank 2020 “Doing Business” Report ranked Japan third worldwide for resolving insolvency. An insolvent company in Japan can face liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act or take one of four roads to reorganization: the Civil Rehabilitation Law; the Corporate Reorganization Law; corporate reorganization under the Commercial Code; or an out-of-court creditor agreement. The Civil Rehabilitation Law focuses on corporate restructuring in contrast to liquidation, provides stronger protection of debtor assets prior to the start of restructuring procedures, eases requirements for initiating restructuring procedures, simplifies and rationalizes procedures for the examination and determination of liabilities, and improves procedures for approval of rehabilitation plans. Out-of-court settlements in Japan tend to save time and expense but can lack transparency. In practice, because 100 percent creditor consensus is required for out-of-court settlements and courts can sanction a reorganization plan with only a majority of creditors’ approval, the last stage of an out-of-court settlement is often a request for a judicial seal of approval. There are three domestic credit reporting/credit monitoring agencies in Japan. They are not government-run. They are: Japan Credit Information Reference Center Corp. (JICC, https://www.jicc.co.jp/english/index.html ‘, member companies deal in consumer loans, finance, and credit); Credit Information Center (CIC, https://www.cic.co.jp/en/index.html , member companies deal in credit cards and credit); and Japan Bankers Association (JBA, https://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/pcic/ , member companies deal in banking and bank-issued credit cards). Credit card companies, such as Japan Credit Bureau (JCB), and large banks, such as Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), also maintain independent databases to monitor and assess credit. Per Japan’s Banking Act, data and scores from credit reports and credit monitoring databases must be used solely by financial institutions for financial lending purposes. This information is provided to credit card holders themselves through services provided by credit reporting/credit monitoring agencies. Increasingly, however, to get around the law, real estate companies partner with a “credit guarantee association” and encourage or effectively require tenants to use its services. According to a 2017 report from the Japan Property Management Association (JPMA), roughly 80 percent of renters in Japan used such a service. While financial institutions can share data to the databases and receive credit reports by joining the membership of a credit monitoring agency, the agencies themselves, as well as credit card companies and large banks, do not necessarily share data with each other. As such, consumer credit information is generally underutilized and vertically siloed. A government-operated database, the Juminhyo or the “citizen documentation database,” is used for voter registration; confirmation of eligibility for national health insurance, national social security, and child allowances; and checks and registrations related to scholarships, welfare protection, stamp seals (signatures), and immunizations. The database is strictly confidential, government-controlled, and not shared with third parties or private companies. For the credit rating of businesses, there are at least seven credit rating agencies (CRAs) in Japan, including Moody’s Japan, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Japan, Tokyo Shoko Research, and Teikoku Databank. See Section 9 for more information on business vetting in Japan. 4. Industrial Policies The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) maintains an English-language list of national and local investment incentives available to foreign investors on its website: https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/incentive_programs/ . Japan established a feed-in-tariff (FIT) system in 2012 to incentivize the diversification of its power supply. Under the FIT, approved renewable energy projects – including solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, geothermal, small-scale hydropower, and biomass – sell electricity to the transmission and distribution utilities at a fixed price for 20 years, and the utilities pass these costs on to end users through electricity rates. Solar PV has benefited most from the FIT scheme, with Japan now the world’s third largest solar market by installed capacity. Prices are set annually according to resource type and other conditions. Due to the cost of the FIT system – estimated at JPY 80.2 billion ($671 million) for 2022 – METI has reduced subsidy levels over time, particularly for solar PV projects. It has also taken other measures to control costs, such as introducing a capacity auction system for projects over a certain size. In line with recent revisions to Japan’s Renewable Energy Act, a new “feed-in-premium” (FIP) scheme will go into effect in April 2022 alongside the existing FIT scheme. Under the FIP, approved projects can receive a premium – based on the variable wholesale power market price – in addition to any revenue earned through market or bilateral transactions. FIP projects over a certain size must also participate in the existing auction system. The revised Renewable Energy Act also established a limit on the time period within which new FIT or FIP projects must commence operations before losing their access to grid interconnection. Further, the revised act requires that new commercial solar projects secure funds necessary for end-of-life decommissioning. These changes to Japan’s renewable energy support scheme, while necessary to address the growing economic costs of the existing FIT scheme, is forcing project developers to change their business models and sharpen their ability to predict revenues. We cannot yet estimate the impact these changes will have on the growth of Japan’s renewable energy market. Japan no longer has free-trade zones or free ports. Customs authorities allow the bonding of warehousing and processing facilities adjacent to ports on a case-by-case basis. The National Strategic Special Zones Advisory Council chaired by the Prime Minister has established a total of ten National Strategic Special Zones (NSSZ) to implement selected deregulation measures intended to attract new investment and boost regional growth. Under the NSSZ framework, designated regions request regulatory exceptions from the central government in support of specific strategic goals defined in each zone’s “master plan,” which focuses on a potential growth area such as labor, education, technology, agriculture, or healthcare. Foreign-owned businesses receive equal treatment in the NSSZs; some measures aim specifically to ease customs and immigration restrictions for foreign investors, such as the “Startup Visa” adopted by the Fukuoka NSSZ. The Japanese government has also sought to encourage investment in the Tohoku (northeast) region, which was devastated by the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear “triple disaster” of March 11, 2011. Areas affected by the disaster have been included in a “Special Zone for Reconstruction” that features eased regulatory burdens, tax incentives, and financial support to encourage heightened participation in the region’s economic recovery. The Diet approved a revision to add “advanced data technologies” as one of targeted growth areas for NSSZs in May 2020, which went into effect on September 1, 2020. The revision allowed regions to create “Super City National Strategic Zones,” on the condition that the zone will provide advanced services to its citizens through utilizing artificial intelligence (AI), big data or other data linkage platforms. The Cabinet Office website cited remote schooling/healthcare, cashless payment services, and one-stop administrative services as examples of such projects. Japan does not maintain performance requirements or requirements for local management participation or local control in joint ventures. Japan has no general restrictions on data storage. On January 1, 2020, the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement went into effect and specifically prohibits data localization measures that restrict where data can be stored and processed. These rules are extended to financial service suppliers, in circumstances where a financial regulator has the access to data needed to fulfill its regulatory and supervisory mandate. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in real property are recognized and enforced. Mortgages are a standard lien on real property and must be recorded to be enforceable. Japan has a reliable recording system. Property can be rented or leased but no sub-lease is legal without the owner’s consent. In the World Bank 2020 “Doing Business” Report, Japan ranks 43 out of 190 economies in the category of Ease of Registering Property. There are bureaucratic steps and fees associated with purchasing improved real property in Japan, even when it is already registered and has a clear title. The required documentation for property purchases can be burdensome. Additionally, it is common practice in Japan for property appraisal values to be lower than the actual sale value, increasing the down payment required of the purchaser, as the bank will provide financing only up to the appraisal value. Japan currently has no laws that ban or control land purchases by foreign nationals who live in the country. Foreign individuals and entities located outside of Japan also have the right to purchase property. On June 16, 2021, Japan’s Diet passed the Law to Investigate and Regulate Land Use around Important Facilities and Remote Border Islands, tightening oversight of land use near designated areas such as military defense facilities by allowing the Japanese government to collect personal information of individuals, both foreign nationals and Japanese citizens, to investigate their land usage. The law and its implementing guidelines may enter into effect as early as April 2022. The Japanese government is unsure of the titleholders to 4.1 million hectares of land in Japan, roughly 20 percent of all land. It estimated that by 2040 the amount of land without titleholders will increase to 7.2 million hectares. There are a number of reasons beyond the administrative difficulties of a title transfer as to why land lacks a clear title holder. They include: population decline, especially in rural areas; the difficulty of locating heirs, particularly if there are multiple heirs or if the deceased had no children; and the cost of reregistering land under a new name due to taxes. Virtually all the large banks, as well as some other private companies, offer loans to purchase property in Japan. Japan maintains a comprehensive and sophisticated intellectual property (IP) regime recognized as among the strongest in the world. In 2021, Japan ranked fifth out of 53 countries evaluated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the strength of IP environments. The government has operated a dedicated “Intellectual Property High Court” to adjudicate IP-related cases since 2005, providing judges with enhanced access to technical experts and the ability to specialize in intellectual property law. However, certain shortcomings remain, notably in the transparency and predictability of its system for pricing on-patent pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The discriminatory effect of healthcare reimbursement pricing measures implemented by the Japanese government continues to raise serious concerns about the ability of U.S. pharmaceutical and companies to have full and fair opportunity to use and profit from their IP in the Japanese market. More generally, the weak deterrent effect of Japan’s relatively modest penalties for IP infringement remains a cause for concern. On May 19, 2021, Japan’s National Diet amended the country’s Trademark Act, closing a loophole that had permitted unlimited importation of counterfeit goods delivered by mail to individuals who claimed the items were for personal use. Previously, only imports for business purposes were within the scope of the Trademark Act. Items claimed for personal use were exempted, and there was no restriction on the quantity of items imported for personal use, nor any limit on the number of times an individual could apply the personal use exemption. On May 26, 2021, Japan’s National Diet amended the country’s Copyright Act, a move that U.S. rights holders have flagged as potentially compromising intellectual property rights. The amendment went into effect on January 1, 2022. It stipulates that any license obtained to transmit content through traditional television broadcasting systems can be presumed to include a grant of rights to simulcast the content via other means, including Internet transmission. Lawmakers crafted the presumption of rights extension to overcome “difficulties” expressed by domestic broadcasters associated with obtaining rights from “non-professional” creators and licenses obtained via non-contract scenarios. U.S. stakeholders have expressed concern about the revision creating potential uncertainty for commercial licensing and the potential for unintended consequences without due consideration of global perspectives. In response, officials of Japan’s Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) stressed that business contracts, such as those under which major international content distributors operate, would not be affected, and the ACA does not foresee the amendment materially altering such existing business practices. U.S. Embassy Tokyo is aware of isolated claims of U.S. IP misappropriation by Japanese state-owned or affiliated entities and presumes, and given the vast volume of bilateral trade, that additional cases across public and private sectors may exist. That said, the Japanese government has taken several steps in recent years to improve protection of trade secrets. In July 2019 revisions to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA) went into effect. They classify the improper acquisition, disclosure, and use of specified protected data as an act of unfair competition and offer civil and criminal remedies to stakeholders. The revisions also extend the scope of unfair competition to include attempts to circumvent technological restriction measures. Japan has taken a leading role in promoting the expansion of IP rights in recent regional trade agreements, including: RCEP: The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership includes a comprehensive IP chapter, much of it repeating norms set out in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, but also offering unique protections for genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore. Japan-UK CEPA: The Japan-UK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed on October 23, 2020, and in force beginning January 1, 2021, contains an IP chapter including provisions on copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, regulatory test data exclusivity, new plant varieties, trade secrets, domain names, and enforcement. Japan-EU EPA: The Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which entered into force February 1, 2019, also includes a substantial IP chapter. CPTPP: As part of its 2018 accession to the CPTPP, Japan passed several substantive amendments to its Copyright Law, including measures that extended the term of copyright protection and strengthened technological protection rules. Japan’s Customs and Tariff Bureau publishes a yearly report on goods seizures, available online in English ( http://www.customs.go.jp/mizugiwa/chiteki/pages/g_001_e.htm ). Japan seized an estimated USD 118.3 million worth of IP-infringing goods in 2020, a decrease of 2.4 percent over 2019. In June 2020, the Customs and Tariff Bureau of the Ministry of Finance announced the “SMART Customs Initiative 2020,” which aims to utilize cutting-edge technologies such as AI to improve the sophistication and efficiency of its operations. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Japan maintains no formal restrictions on inward portfolio investment except for certain provisions covering national security. Foreign capital plays an important role in Japan’s financial markets, with foreign investors accounting for the majority of trading shares in the country’s stock market. Historically, many company managers and directors have resisted the actions of activist shareholders, especially foreign private equity funds, potentially limiting the attractiveness of Japan’s equity market to large-scale foreign portfolio investment, although there are signs of change. Some firms have taken steps to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights by foreign investors, including the use of electronic proxy voting. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) maintains an Electronic Voting Platform for Foreign and Institutional Investors. All holdings of TSE-listed stocks are required to transfer paper stock certificates into electronic form. The Japan Exchange Group (JPX) operates Japan’s two largest stock exchanges – in Tokyo and Osaka – with cash equity trading consolidated on the TSE since July 2013 and derivatives trading consolidated on the Osaka Exchange since March 2014. In January 2014, the TSE and Nikkei launched the JPX Nikkei 400 Index. The index puts a premium on company performance, particularly return on equity (ROE). Companies included are determined by such factors as three-year average returns on equity, three-year accumulated operating profits and market capitalization, along with others such as the number of external board members. Inclusion in the index has become an unofficial “seal of approval” in corporate Japan, and many companies have taken steps, including undertaking share buybacks, to improve their ROE. The Bank of Japan has purchased JPX-Nikkei 400 exchange traded funds (ETFs) as part of its monetary operations, and Japan’s massive Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has also invested in JPX-Nikkei 400 ETFs, putting an additional premium on membership in the index. The TSE and FSA revised the Corporate Governance Code in 2021 to reflect the realignment of TSE segmentations to be implemented in 2022. The revised guidelines require companies, to be listed in the “Prime Section,” a top-tier TSE section, to have more than one-third external directors. Japan does not restrict financial flows and accepts obligations under IMF Article VIII. Credit is available via multiple instruments, both public and private, although access by foreigners often depends upon visa status and the type of investment. Banking services are easily accessible throughout Japan; it is home to many of the world’s largest private commercial banks as well as an extensive network of regional and local banks. Most major international commercial banks are also present in Japan, and other quasi-governmental and non-governmental entities, such as the postal service and cooperative industry associations, also offer banking services. For example, the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations offers services through its bank (Norinchukin Bank) to members of the organization. Japan’s financial sector is generally acknowledged to be sound and resilient, with good capitalization and with a declining ratio of non-performing loans. While still healthy, most banks have experienced pressure on interest margins and profitability as a result of an extended period of low interest rates capped by the Bank of Japan’s introduction of a negative interest rate policy in 2016, especially some of the regional banks. The country’s three largest private commercial banks, often collectively referred to as the “megabanks,” are MUFG Bank (a banking subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group), Mizuho Bank (Mizuho Financial Group), and SMBC (Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group). Collectively, they hold assets reaching USD 6.0 trillion at September end of 2021. Japan’s second largest bank by assets – with more than USD 2.0 trillion – is Japan Post Bank, a financial subsidiary of the Japan Post Holdings(which holds 88.99 percent of the bank’s shares as of September 2021). Japan Post Bank offers services via 23,815 Japan Post office branches, at which Japan Post Bank services can be conducted, as well as Japan Post’s network of 31,901 ATMs nationwide, as of the end of March 2021. Many foreign banks operate in Japan offering both banking and other financial services. Like their domestic counterparts, foreign banks are regulated by the Japan Financial Services Agency (FSA). According to the IMF, there have been no observations of reduced or lost correspondent banking relationships in Japan. There are 518 correspondent financial institutions that have current accounts at the country’s central bank (including 123 main banks; 11 trust banks; 50 foreign banks; and 247 credit unions). Foreigners wishing to establish bank accounts must show a passport, visa, and foreigner residence card; temporary visitors may not open bank accounts in Japan. Other requirements (e.g., evidence of utility registration and payment, Japanese-style signature seal, etc.) may vary according to institution. Language may be a barrier to obtaining services at some institutions; foreigners who do not speak Japanese should research in advance which banks are more likely to offer bilingual services. Japanese regulators are encouraging “open banking” interactions between financial institutions and third-party developers of financial technology applications through application programming interfaces (“APIs”) when customers “opt-in” to share their information. As a result of the government having set a target to have 80 banks adopt API standards by 2020, more than 100 subject banks reportedly have done so. Many of the largest banks are participating in various proofs of concept using blockchain technology. While commercial banks have not yet formally adopted blockchain-powered systems for fund settlement, they are actively exploring options, and the largest banks have announced intentions to produce their own virtual currencies at some point. The Bank of Japan is researching blockchain and its applications for national accounts and established a “Fintech Center” to lead this effort. The main banking regulator, the Japan Financial Services Agency also encourages innovation with financial technologies, including sponsoring an annual conference on “fintech” in Japan. In April 2017, amendments to the Act on Settlements of Funds went into effect, permitting the use of virtual currencies as a form of payment in Japan, but virtual currency is still not considered legal tender (e.g., commercial vendors may opt to accept virtual currencies for transactional payments, though virtual currency cannot be used as payment for taxes owed to the government). The law also requires the registration of virtual currency exchange businesses. There are currently 30 registered virtual currency exchanges in Japan, as of January 2022. Japan does not operate a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Japan has privatized most former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Under the Postal Privatization Law, privatization of Japan Post group started in October 2007 by turning the public corporation into stock companies. The stock sale of the Japan Post Holdings Co. and its two financial subsidiaries, Japan Post Insurance (JPI) and Japan Post Bank (JPB), began in November 2015 with an IPO that sold 11 percent of available shares in each of the three entities. The postal service subsidiary, Japan Post Co., remains a wholly owned subsidiary of JPH. The Japanese government conducted additional public offerings of stock in September 2017 and October 2021, reducing the government ownership in the holding company to a little over one third. There were offerings in the insurance subsidiary in April 2019 and June 2021. JPH currently owns 88.99 percent of the banking subsidiary and 49.9 percent of the insurance subsidiary. Follow-on sales of shares in the two subsidiary companies will take place over time, but the government’s sale of JPH stocks in October 2021 is considered to be the last. The Postal Privatization Law requires the government to sell a majority share so that the government ownership would be “a little over one third” of all shares in JPH (which was completed in 2021), and JPH to sell all shares of JPB and JPI, as soon as possible. These offerings mark the final stage of Japan Post privatization begun under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) and respond to long-standing criticism from commercial banks and insurers—both foreign and Japanese—that their government-owned Japan Post rivals have an unfair advantage. While there has been significant progress since 2013 on private suppliers’ access to the postal insurance network, the U.S. government has continued to raise concerns about the preferential treatment given to Japan Post and some quasi-governmental entities compared to private sector competitors and the impact of these advantages on the ability of private companies to compete on a level playing field. A full description of U.S. government concerns regarding the insurance sector and efforts to address these concerns is available in the annual United States Trade Representative’s National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers report for Japan. In sectors previously dominated by state-owned enterprises but now privatized, such as transportation, telecommunications, and package delivery, U.S. businesses report that Japanese firms sometimes receive favorable treatment in the form of improved market access and government cooperation. Deregulation of Japan’s power sector took a step forward in April 2016 with the full liberalization of retail electricity supply, allowing all consumers to choose their electricity provider. This change has led to increased competition from, and rapid growth in the number of, new entrants; as of March 2022, there were almost 750 registered electricity retailers nationwide. While the generation and transmission of electricity remain mostly in the hands of the legacy power utilities, new electricity retailers reached a 21-percent market share of the total volume of electricity sold as of November 2021. Japan implemented the third phase of its power sector reforms in April 2020 by requiring vertically integrated regional monopolies to “legally unbundle” the electricity transmission and distribution portions of their businesses from the power generation and retailing portions. The transmission and distribution businesses retain ownership of, and operational control over, the power grid in their regional service territories. In addition, many of the former vertically integrated regional monopolies created electricity retailers to compete in the fully deregulated retail market. American energy companies have reported increased opportunities in this sector, but also report that the regional power utilities have advantages over new entrants with regard to understanding the regulatory regime, securing sufficient low-cost generation in the wholesale market, and accessing infrastructure. For example, while the wholesale market allows new retailers to buy electricity for sale to customers, legacy utilities, which control most of the generation, sell relatively little power into that market. This limits the supply and increases the cost of electricity that new retailers can sell to consumers. While the liquidity of the wholesale electricity market has increased in recent years, new entrants — including American companies — report that they have few other options for cost-effectively securing the electricity they need to meet their supply obligations. In addition, as the large power utilities still control transmission and distribution lines, new entrants in power generation are not able to compete due to limited access to power grids. More information on the power sector from the Japanese Government can be obtained at: http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/electricity_and_gas/electric/electricity_liberalization/what/ 8. Responsible Business Conduct Japanese corporate governance has often been criticized for failing to sufficiently prioritize shareholder interests and detect wrongdoing by company executives in a timely way, due in part to a lack of independent corporate directors and to cross-shareholding agreement among firms. Previous governments made corporate governance reform a core element of their economic agendas with the goal of reinvigorating Japan’s business sector through encouraging a stronger focus by management on earnings and shareholder value. PM Kishida has pledged that his administration will facilitate reforms further, with an added emphasis on additional stakeholders, such as labor and the environment. Progress has been made through efforts by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) to introduce non-binding reforms through changes to Japan’s Companies Act in 2014 and adoption of a Corporate Governance Code (CSR) in 2015. Together with the Stewardship Code for institutional investors launched by the FSA in 2014, these initiatives have encouraged companies to put cash stockpiles to better use by increasing investment, raising dividends, and taking on more risk to boost Japan’s growth. Positive results of these efforts are evidenced by rising shareholder returns, unwinding of cross-shareholdings, and increasing numbers of independent board members. According to a TSE survey conducted in December 2018, 85.3 percent of companies had a compliance rate of 90 percent out of the 66 principles of the new code. As of August 2021, 97 percent of TSE First Section-listed firms had at least two independent directors, according to an August 2021 TSE report. In December 2019, the Diet approved a revision of the Companies Act, which will enable companies to provide documents for shareholders’ meetings electronically. Listed companies will be obligated to have at least one outside director. The bill went into effect on March 1, 2021. Following Stewardship Code revision in March 2020, the TSE and FSA revised the Corporate Governance Code in spring of 2021 to reflect the realignment of the TSE segmentations, which will be implemented in 2022. The revised guidelines require companies, to be listed in the “Prime Section,” a top-tier TSE section, to have more than one-third external directors. As of October 2021, 72.8 percent had one-third external directors. The guidelines also urge listed companies to have more diversity in mid-level and managerial posts by hiring and training female and foreign workers. Awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) among both producers and consumers in Japan is high, and foreign and local enterprises generally follow accepted CSR principles. Business organizations also actively promote CSR. Japan encourages adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Changes to Japan’s Climate Law, enacted in May 2021 and taking full effect on April 1, 2022, codify Japan’s decarbonization commitments under the Paris Agreement. The revisions mark the first time that a specific reduction target was written into Japanese law. The new legislation amends the law in three areas: requiring Japan to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, bolstering mechanisms to support and expedite decarbonization at the subnational level, and requiring digitalization and transparency of emissions-related information published by the Government of Japan (GOJ). Diet approval of the revised law was unanimous. The government had previously been less forward leaning on implementing policy and taking legislative action on Japan’s near-term 2030 climate goals. The new climate law aims to address this by expediting decarbonization projects through simplified licensing and approvals from GOJ ministries. The Ministry of Environment also plans to submit additional amendments to the law in April that would provide JPY 20 billion (USD 174 million) in funding for private sector entities and another JPY 20 billion to subnational governments to accelerate decarbonization efforts. The 2021 revisions to the climate law also expand the standards for prefectural environmental policy and establish mechanisms to overcome local resistance and red tape for green project implementation. The law now calls for prefectural policies to specifically address renewable energy promotion, low-carbon products and operations, public transportation and greening of public spaces, and promotion of Japan’s “recycling-oriented society.” The changes also authorize ministries to establish standards for designating “promotion areas” for project development, following consultation with stakeholders and consideration of the “natural and societal conditions of each region.” In addition, municipalities must establish criteria for renewable energy promotion and work to identify local “promotion areas.” The new climate law streamlines and expedites approvals for decarbonization projects. Implementers, upon confirmation that a project aligns with municipal environmental plans, will benefit from consolidated and simplified licensing and approvals from GOJ ministries. 9. Corruption Japan’s penal code covers crimes of official corruption, and an individual convicted under these statutes is, depending on the nature of the crime, subject to prison sentences and possible fines. With respect to corporate officers who accept bribes, Japanese law also provides for company directors to be subject to fines and/or imprisonment, and some judgments have been rendered against company directors. The direct exchange of cash for favors from government officials in Japan is extremely rare. However, the web of close relationships between Japanese companies, politicians, government organizations, and universities has been criticized for fostering an inwardly “cooperative”—or insular—business climate that is conducive to the awarding of contracts, positions, etc. within a tight circle of local players. This phenomenon manifests itself most frequently and seriously in Japan through the rigging of bids on government public works projects. However, instances of bid rigging appear to have decreased over the past decade. Alleged bid rigging between construction companies was discovered on the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka maglev high-speed rail project in 2017, and the case was prosecuted in March 2018. Japan’s Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid-Rigging authorizes the Japan Fair Trade Commission to demand that central and local government commissioning agencies take corrective measures to prevent continued complicity of officials in bid rigging activities and to report such measures to the JFTC. The Act also contains provisions concerning disciplinary action against officials participating in bid rigging and compensation for overcharges when the officials caused damage to the government due to willful or grave negligence. Nevertheless, questions remain as to whether the Act’s disciplinary provisions are strong enough to ensure officials involved in illegal bid rigging are held accountable. Japan ratified the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, which bans bribing foreign government officials, in 1999. Japan detected only 46 allegations of foreign bribery, half of which the OECD brought to Japan’s attention, through 2019. For vetting potential local investment partners, companies may review credit reports on foreign companies available from many private-sector sources, including, in the United States, Dun & Bradstreet and Graydon International. Additionally, a company may inquire about the International Company Profile (ICP), which is a background report on a specific foreign company that is prepared by the U.S. Commercial Service at the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. Businesses or individuals may contact the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), with contact details at: http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/about_jftc/contact_us.html . 10. Political and Security Environment Political violence is rare in Japan. Acts of political violence involving U.S. business interests are virtually unknown. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Government of Japan has provided extensive and expanded employment subsidies to companies to encourage them to maintain employment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the pandemic, worker shortages remain in sectors such as information service, restaurants, and construction. The unemployment rate as of January 2022 was 2.8 percent. The fact that Japan’s unemployment rate has risen so slowly during the pandemic is likely due to the social contract between worker and employer in Japan, as well as the continued government subsidies that expanded substantially under the pandemic. Traditionally, Japanese workers have been classified as either regular or non-regular employees. Companies recruit regular employees directly from schools or universities and provide an employment contract with no fixed duration, effectively guaranteeing them lifetime employment. Non-regular employees are hired for a fixed period. Companies have increasingly relied on such non-regular workers to fill short-term labor requirements and to reduce labor costs. The pandemic has particularly hurt non-regular workers whose employment was concentrated in hard-hit service sectors such as tourism, hospitality, restaurants, and entertainment. Major employers and labor unions engage in collective bargaining in nearly every industry. Union members as of June 2021 made up 16.9 percent of employees (“koyo-sha”), down slightly compared to 2020 and in decline from 25 percent of the workforce in 1990. The government provides benefits for workers laid off for economic reasons through a national employment insurance program. Some National Strategic Special Zones allow for special employment of foreign workers in certain fields, but those and all other foreign workers are still subject to the same national labor laws and standards as Japanese workers. Japan has comprehensive labor dispute resolution mechanisms, including labor tribunals, mediation, and civil lawsuits. A Labor Standards Bureau oversees the enforcement of labor standards through a national network of Labor Bureaus and Labor Standards Inspection Offices. The number of foreign workers has been rising but slowed down slightly during the past year due to the pandemic. At just over 1.73 million as of October 2021, they still represent a small fraction of Japan’s 68.6-million-worker labor force. The Japanese government has made changes to labor and immigration laws to facilitate the entry of larger numbers of skilled foreign workers in selected sectors. A revision to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law in December 2018, implemented in April 2019, created the “Specified Skilled” worker program designed specifically for lower-skilled foreign workers. Prior to this change, Japan had never created a visa category for lower-skilled foreign workers, and this law created two. Category 1 grants five-year residency to low-skilled workers who pass skills exams and meet Japanese language criteria and permits them to work in 14 designated industries, such as agriculture or nursing care, identified by the Japanese government to be experiencing severe labor shortage. Category 2 is for skilled workers with more experience, granting them long-term residency and a path to long-term employment, but currently permitted only in a few designated industries, such as construction and shipbuilding. The Japanese government also operates the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). Originally intended as an international skills-transfer program for workers from developing countries, TITP is currently used to address immediate labor shortages in over 85 designated occupations, such as jobs in the construction, agriculture, fishery, and elderly nursing care industries. As noted previously, the 2018 Immigration Control Law revision enabled TITP beneficiaries with at least three years of experience to qualify to apply for the Category 1 status of the Specified Skilled worker program without any exams. To address the labor shortage resulting from population decline and a rapidly aging society, Japan’s government has pursued measures to increase participation and retention of older workers and women in the labor force. A law that entered into force in April 2013 requires companies to introduce employment systems allowing employees reaching retirement age (generally set at 60) to continue working until age 65. The law was revised again in March 2020 and entered into force in April 2021, asking companies to “make efforts” to secure employment for workers between 65 and 70. Since 2013, the government has committed to increasing women’s economic participation. The Women’s Empowerment Law passed in 2015 requires large companies to disclose statistics about the hiring and promotion of women and to adopt action plans to improve the numbers. The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, had a disproportionately negative effect on women in Japan. Women were more likely than men to occupy non-regular positions, work in industries hardest hit by the downturn, and face greater pressure to prioritize family over work. As a result, women have experienced reductions in working hours, departure from the labor force, or furloughs in greater numbers than men, erasing part of the rise in their workforce participation through 2019. The Government of Japan has acknowledged this impact on women’s economic participation and convened a study group in September 2020 to consider solutions. Its final report, issued on April 28, 2021, urged that changes be made to systems and practices which persist in Japanese society, such as gender-based roles. The report also noted the importance of gender segregated data to be taken at the national and local government level, to help create effective measures. In May 2019, a package law that revised the Women’s Empowerment Law, expanded the reporting requirements to SMEs that employ at least 101 persons (starting in April 2022) and increasing the number of disclosure items for larger companies (from June 2020). The package law also included several labor law revisions requiring companies to take preventive measures for power and sexual harassment in the workplace. In June 2018, the Diet passed the Workstyle Reform package. The three key provisions are: (1) the “white collar exemption,” which eliminates overtime for a small number of highly paid professionals; (2) a formal overtime cap of 100 hours/month or 720 hours/year, with imprisonment and/or fines for violators; and (3) new “equal-pay-for-equal-work” principles to reduce gaps between regular and non-regular employees. Japan has ratified 49 International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions (including six of the eight fundamental conventions). As part of its agreement in principle on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Japan agreed to adopt the fundamental labor rights stated in the ILO Declaration including freedom of association and the recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced labor and employment discrimination, and the abolition of child labor. The CPTPP entered into force on December 30, 2018. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $5,039,813 2020 $5,057,759 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $62,930 2020 $131,643 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $563,367 2020 $647,718 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 7.37% 2020 4.9% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: *2020 Nominal GDP data from Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government. February, 2022. (Note: uses exchange rate of 106.78 Yen to 1 U.S. Dollar and Calendar Year Average Data) The discrepancy between Japan’s accounting of U.S. FDI into Japan and U.S. accounting of that FDI can be attributed to methodological differences, specifically with regard to indirect investors, profits generated from reinvested earnings, and differing standards for which companies must report FDI. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (IMF CDIS, 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 232,313 100% Total Outward 1,837,075 100% United States 62,748 27% United States 561,736 31% Singapore 35,629 15% China 138,566 8% France 30,774 13% Netherlands 134,492 7% Netherlands 20,886 9% United Kingdom 131,675 7% United Kingdom 14,466 6% Singapore 92,886 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets (IMF CPIS, 2020 end) Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 5,073,686 100% All Countries 2,078,430 100% All Countries 2,995,256 100% United States 2,072,497 41% Cayman Islands 777,816 37 United States 1,325,961 44% Cayman Islands 990,422 20% United States 746,535 36% France 263,330 9% France 300,213 6% Luxembourg 103,926 5% Cayman Islands 212,605 7% Australia 189,649 4% Ireland 59,243 3% Australia 163,873 5% United Kingdom 185,243 4% United Kingdom 39,338 2% United Kingdom 145,905 5% 14. Contact for More Information Pam Pontius Economic Section U.S. Embassy Tokyo 1-10-5 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8420 Japan+81 03-3224-5035 pontiuspr@state.gov Jordan Executive Summary Since King Abdullah II’s 1999 ascension to the throne, Jordan has taken steps to encourage foreign investment and to develop an outward-oriented, market-based, and globally competitive economy. Jordan is also uniquely poised as a platform to host investments focused on the reconstruction of Iraq and other projects in regional markets. Jordan is committed to investment promotion as a key driver of economic growth and job creation, though in practice these policies are implemented unevenly. Traditionally, foreign investment has been concentrated in the energy (from both conventional sources and renewables), tourism, real estate, manufacturing, and services sectors. The Government of Jordan offers a range of incentives to potential investors and has undertaken measures to review and enhance the economic, financial, and legal framework governing the investment process. However, despite improvement on doing business indicators, operating in Jordan is more difficult than elsewhere in the region. U.S. investors specifically cite instability in the tax regime and incentive packages as a key challenge, as well as public-private interface issues including the government’s inconsistent interpretation of its policies and regulations. Jordan’s economic growth has been limited for over a decade by exogenous shocks, including the global financial crisis, energy disruptions during the 2011 Arab Spring, the 2015 closure of Jordans borders with Iraq and Syria, and the Syrian civil war. Although the borders with Iraq fully and Syria partially reopened in 2017 and 2018 respectively, cross-border movements have not recovered to previous levels. After a 1.6 percent GDP contraction in 2020 due to the pandemic, Jordan achieved 2.2 percent real GDP growth in 2021. IMF projections estimate growth will reach 2.7 percent in 2022. In recent years, the government has run large annual budget deficits and reducing the financing gap with loans, foreign grants, and savings. In March 2020, the IMF board approved a $1.3 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program focused on fiscal consolidation, increased revenue collection, targeted social spending, economic growth, and job creation. The IMF also released additional credit from a Rapid Financing Instrument to help Jordan meet its fiscal obligations during the pandemic. In January 2022, Jordan and the IMF completed its third review of the EFF program. In October 2021, Jordan established a dedicated Ministry of Investment, which has absorbed the duties of the Jordan Investment Commission and the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Unit. The Minister of Investment is charged with all issues related to local and foreign investors and setting policies to stimulate investment and enhance competitiveness. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) dropped slightly by 1.5 percent to JD 509.8 million ($720 million) in 2020 compared to 2019. FDI inflow reached JD 269.4 million ($380 million) during the first three quarters of 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 81 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $ 156 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 USD 4,310 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Jordan is largely open to foreign investment, and the government is committed to supporting foreign investment. Foreign and local investors are treated equally under the law. In October 2021, a new, dedicated Ministry of Investment absorbed the responsibilities of the Jordan Investment Commission (JIC) and is now responsible for implementing the 2014 Investment Law and promoting new and existing investment in Jordan. The Ministry is the focal point for investors and can expedite government services and investment incentives. The Ministry supervises and approves investment-related matters within guidelines set by the Investment Council and approved by the government. The Investment Council, comprised of the Prime Minister, ministers with economic portfolios, and representatives from the private sector, oversees the management and development of national investment policy and propose legislative and economic reforms to facilitate investment. The Ministry of Investment oversees an “Investment Window” to provide information and technical assistance to investors, with a mandate to simplify registration and licensing procedures for investment projects that benefit from the Investment Law. The Ministry will continue offering the same services that were initiated by The Jordan Investment Commission, including the “Follow-Up and After Care” department established in 2018 and the investor grievance mechanism introduced in 2019 to address investor complaints, with the aim to resolve legal disputes outside of the formal court system. In 2018, the government issued the “Code of Governance Practices of Policies and Legislative Instruments in Government Departments for the Year 2018.” It aims to increase legislative predictability and stability to ensure the confidence of citizens and the business sector. The government developed and adopted guidelines for a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), to be implemented across all government entities. Investment and property laws allow U.S. entities to establish businesses in many, but not all, sectors. Foreign companies may open regional and branch offices; branch offices may carry out full business activities; and regional offices may serve as liaisons between head offices and Jordanian or regional clients. The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply’s Companies Control Department implements the government’s policy on the establishment of regional and branch offices. Under the U.S.-Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. investors are granted several exceptions and are accorded the same treatment as Jordanian nationals, allowing U.S. investors to maintain 100 percent ownership in some restricted businesses. In some sectors, including aerospace and defense, travel and tourism, transportation, and media and entertainment, there are limits to U.S. ownership and/or requirements for key positions to be filled by Jordanian nationals, among other restrictions. The most up-to-date listing of limitations on U.S. investments is available in the FTA Annex 3.1 and may be found at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta/final-text Foreign nationals and firms are permitted to own or lease property in Jordan for investment purposes and are allowed one residence for personal use, provided that their home country permits reciprocal property ownership rights for Jordanians. Depending on the size and location of the property, the Land and Survey Department, the Ministry of Finance, and/or the Cabinet may need to approve foreign ownership of land and property, which must then be developed within five years of the date of approval. In 2020, the government amended its bylaw governing foreign ownership, expanding ownership percentage in some economic activities, while maintaining the following restrictions: Foreigners are prohibited from wholly or partially owning investigation and security services, stone quarrying operations for construction purposes, customs clearance services, and bakeries of all kinds; and are prohibited from trading in weapons and fireworks. The Cabinet, however, may approve foreign ownership of projects in these sectors upon the recommendation of the Investment Council. To qualify for the exemption, projects must be categorized as being highly valuable to the national economy. Investors are limited to 50 percent ownership in certain businesses and services, including retail and wholesale trading, engineering consultancy services, exchange houses apart from banks and financial services companies, maritime, air, and land transportation services, and related services. Foreign firms may not import goods without appointing an agent registered in Jordan; the agent may be a branch office or a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign firm. The agent’s connection to the foreign company must be direct, without a sub-agent or intermediary. The bylaw authorizes the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister to grant a higher percentage ownership to non-Jordanian investors in any investment based on a certain criterion. The Commercial Agents and Intermediaries Law No. 28/2001 governs contractual agreements between foreign firms and commercial agents. Private foreign entities, whether licensed under sole foreign ownership or as a joint venture, compete on an equal basis with local companies. For national security purposes, foreign investors must undergo security screening through the Ministry of Interior, which can be finalized through the Commission’s “Investment Window” located at the Investment Commission or online https://www.jic.gov.jo/en/home-new/. Jordan has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 2000. The WTO conducted Jordan’s second Trade Policy Review in November 2015. In 2012, the United States and Jordan agreed to Statements of Principles for International Investment and for Information and Communication Technology Services, and a Trade and Investment Partnership Bilateral Action Plan, each of which is designed to increase transparency, openness, and governmental and private sector cooperation. All current treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Jordan may be found here: https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force/ As a follow-up to OECD’s Investment Policy Review of Jordan and Jordan’s adherence to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 2013, the MENA-OECD competitiveness program issued a report in 2018 entitled “Enhancing the legal framework for sustainable investment: Lessons from Jordan” (http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/Enhancing-the-Legal-Framework-forSustainable-Investment-Lessons-from-Jorden.pdf). The Jordan Strategy Forum (JSF), a leading think tank on economic development, regularly publishes an Investor Confidence Index and Investor Confidence Survey (in Arabic) on its website ( http://www.jsf.org ). JSF has published a policy paper on how to increase FDI inflows into Jordan: http://jsf.org/sites/default/files/Opportunities%20to%20Attract%20Foreign%20Direct%20Investment.pdf . Businesses in Jordan need to register with the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply, Companies Control Department, or the Chambers of Commerce or Industry depending on the type of business they conduct. Registration is required to open a bank account, obtain a tax identification number and obtain a VAT number. New businesses also need to obtain a vocational license from the municipality, receive a health inspection, and register with the SSC. In February 2022, the Parliament endorsed a new law for licensing professions within the jurisdiction of the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) to create a registration fast-track. More than 383 economic activities will be eligible to obtain their licenses within one day, or maximum seven days if the business is considered high-risk. The law also extended the validity of licenses from one to five years. The Ministry of Investment (which has absorbed the responsibilities of the Jordan Investment Commission) maintains an “Investment Window” which serves as a comprehensive investment center for investors. The Investment Window offers technical advice and complete registration and licensing services for investments inside and outside of development zones. Investors can register their businesses in one day if all documents are provided. Approvals for exemptions granted under the investment law can be approved and obtained in one week. Jordan has also adopted a single security approval for new investors. The new approval covers registering and licensing the company, obtaining driving licenses for investors, possessing immovable property for the establishment of investment projects in the industrial and developing zones, in addition to granting residence permits to non-Jordanian investors and their family members. The commission has published a number of online guides, including the investor guide ( Investor Guide – Moin ). In 2018, the Companies Control Department has developed and launched a portal for online registration: http://www.ccd.gov.jo /. Foreign investors can access it to register new companies. However, e-signatures have not been implemented, so investors must sign documents using notary services in their countries. In November 2019, under the Jordan Investment Commission (JIC), the government introduced several new online services including the issuance and renewal investor IDs, issuance and renewal of IDs for investors’ family members, registration of institutions in development zones, first-time registration of individual institutions, changing the method of use, registration and renewal of subscriptions to the Amman Chamber of Commerce (ACC), amendments to subscriptions to the ACC, and issuance of environmental permits. The introduction of these electronic services reduced the time needed to grant or renew the investor identification card (required to facilitate various transactions) to one day. ( home new – Moin ). In December 2020, the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) digitized thirteen of its licensing related services, including vocational licensing and renewal. In 2018, Jordan launched a National Single Window (NSW) for customs clearance. In 2020, all export and import custom declarations became electronic. In January 2022, the government adopted a simplified import tariff structure and reduced tariff rates. The Ministry of Finance reduced tariff brackets from eleven levels of taxation to four, ranging from zero to 25 percent. The maximum tariff rate (previously 40 percent) was reduced to 25 percent and will be reduced to 15 percent by 2023 ( https://services.customs.gov.jo/JCcits/sections.aspx ). The Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship continues to encourage the use of e-services and expand the number of government transactions that can be completed online. As of March 2021, 413 e-services are available including services provided by the Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Investment, Tax Department, Ministry of Trade, and Jordan Customs. Jordan does not have a mechanism to specifically incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict it. 3. Legal Regime Legal, regulatory, and accounting policies, applicable to both domestic and foreign investors, are transparent. The Jordanian Companies Law stipulates that all registered companies should maintain sound accounting records and present annual audited financial statements in accordance with internationally recognized accounting and auditing principles. According to the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) Law and Directives of disclosures, auditing, and accounting standards (1/1998), all entities subject to JSC’s supervision are required to apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2018, the government issued the “Code of Governance Practices of Policies and Legislative Instruments in Government Departments” to increase legislative predictability and the stability of legislative environment. Currently, the government is updating its Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) guidelines. Furthermore, it is working to establish a unified public consultation portal to ensure all government entities conduct consultations on all their regulations. In 2020, the Council of Ministers issued a “Legislation Data Memorandum,” which all government entities submitting new regulations are required to fill out. The memorandum provides information on the type and details of consultations conducted with the public and private sector. Laws and regulations are also published on the website of the Legislative and Opinion Bureau for public comment, in addition to executive branch consultations with the legislative branch and key stakeholders. The government is gradually implementing policies to improve competition and foster transparency in implementation. These reforms aim to change an existing system influenced inthe past by family affiliations, business ties, and other entrenched interests. The draft comprehensive business law, currently with the Legislative and Opinion Bureau undergoing an RIA, includes updates that will touch on anti-competitive practices, Investors’ rights, contract enforcement, insolvency, etc. All investments, including public sector projects, are required to conduct an environmental and social impact studies, before receiving final approval. Jordan is committed to its fiscal transparency policy; the Ministry of Finance publishes a monthly “General Government Finance Bulletin” and that includes detailed information on government’s debt obligations. ( arbic_pdf_december2-2021.pdf (mof.gov.jo) ) Jordan recognizes and accepts most U.S. standards and specifications. However, Jordan has occasionally required additional product standards for imports. Some of these measures have been viewed as barriers to trade, such as a 2014 restriction imposed on packaging sizes for poultry available for retail resale. As a member country of the WTO, Jordan is obliged to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Jordan is a signatory of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Jordan had implemented 88.7 percent of its commitments. Jordan submitted its notifications for Category A before the agreement came into force, is currently in the final review for categories B and C and must report completion by December 2022. Jordan has a mixed legal system based on civil law, sharia law (Islamic law), and customary law. The Constitution establishes the judiciary as one of three separate and independent branches of government. Jordanian commercial laws do not make a distinction between Jordanian and non-Jordanian investors. However, plaintiffs have complained about judicial backlogs and subsequent delays in legal proceedings. In 2018, Jordan has introduced economic judicial chambers. Jointly the Judicial Council in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice established a unit at the Amman First Instance Court and Amman Magistrate Court that includes judges who are solely dedicated to commercial cases specialized in hearing commercial cases exclusively, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Formation of the amended Courts No. 30 of 2017. These chambers specialize in the adjudication of certain commercial and investment disputes mentioned in Article 4 of the Courts Formation Law. Jordan’s Investment Law governs local and foreign investment. The law consolidated three entities – the Jordan Investment Board, the Jordanian Development Zones Commission, and the Free Zones Corporation – into the Jordan Investment Commission, which was absorbed by the Ministry of Investment in 2021. The law incorporates a statement of investors’ rights and a legal framework for a single Investment Window. The Ministry published services and licensing guides outlining processes and fees, in addition to other guides on its website ( Publications – Moin ). In 2019, it passed amendments to the Foreign Investors bylaw which allowed larger foreign ownership in previously restricted sectors. In 2018, Jordan passed the Insolvency Law, Movable Assets and Secured Lending Law and Bylaw, the Venture Capital Bylaw, and the Income Tax Law, along with bylaws to ensure proper implementation. The government has worked to train and certify insolvency practitioners. To date, no company has successfully used the insolvency law to re-structure operations and obligations. In October 2019, Jordan published an amended Social Security Law stipulating temporary changes to the social security contributions of newly registered entities that meet specific conditions, with an aim to support new companies and startups. The government also issued the Investor Grievance Bylaw and established a special unit to follow up on investors’ cases. As of 2019, new investors are offered 10-year “incentive stability guarantees.” Since 2020, the Government of Jordan has a Public Private Partnership (PPP) Unit to identify and study investment opportunities. The PPP Unit falls under the Ministry of Investment and has received technical assistance from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other donors. In 2021, the Parliament approved further amendments to the Companies Law, to allow virtual General Assembly and Board of Directors meetings. The amendments also stipulated companies must keep a record that includes information about the beneficial owner of shares and further obliged companies to disclose to the Companies Control Department the actual beneficiary, in support on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law. There is no systematic or legal discrimination against foreign participation with respect to ownership and participation in Jordan’s major economic sectors other than the restrictions outlined in the governing regulations. In fact, many Jordanian businesses actively seek engagement with foreign partners to increase their competitiveness and access to international markets. The government’s efforts have made Jordan’s official investment climate welcoming; however, U.S. investors have reported hidden costs, bureaucratic red tape, vague regulations, and unclear or conflicting jurisdictions. Most economic regulations are available on the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supply website ( https://www.mit.gov.jo/Default/AR ). All regulations are published in the Legislative and Opinion Bureau ( http://www.lob.jo/ ). Parliament passed amendments to Competition Law No. 33/2004 in 2011 to strengthen the local economic environment and attract foreign investment by providing incentives to improve market competitiveness, protect small and medium enterprises from restrictive anticompetitive practices, and give consumers access to high quality products at competitive prices. The Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply conducts market research, examines complaints, and reports violators to the judicial system. The investor grievance unit established in 2019 at the Ministry of Investment can also investigate unfair competition cases filed by investors. Article 11 of the Jordanian Constitution stipulates those expropriations are prohibited unless specifically deemed to be in the public interest. In cases of expropriation, the law mandates provision of fair compensation to the investor in convertible currency. The Commercial Code, Civil Code, and Companies Law collectively govern bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. In December 2017, the cabinet endorsed a bankruptcy bylaw which stipulates procedures for optional and compulsory liquidation, along with the mechanism, liquidation plan, and required documentation and reporting. In 2018, Parliament passed the Insolvency Law, which allows individuals and companies to offset their financial position through a debt management plan. The law was designed to help the insolvent entity continue its economic activity, rather than directly resorting to bankruptcy. The law regulates insolvency proceedings for foreign organizations according to international conventions ratified by Jordan. As of 2022, judges had dismissed almost all petitions for insolvency on technical grounds and no company has yet used the insolvency law successfully. Defaulting on loans or issuing checks without adequate available balances is a crime in Jordan and may subject the offender to imprisonment under Jordan’s penal system. While Jordan is reexamining these laws, prison terms for debtors remains a legal practice in Jordan. Investors should conduct thorough due diligence on potential partners and avail themselves of local legal counsel to understand best business practices in Jordan and conform with local laws. The U.S. Commercial Service Office of the Embassy of the United States in Amman can assist American businesses in these endeavors. 4. Industrial Policies Under Investment Law No. 30/2014, the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Investment Council, may offer investment incentives in accordance with the law and governing regulations for projects outside the Development and Free Zones. The Investment Council and Investment Commission can also offer certain exemptions for projects in the following sectors: Agriculture and livestock Hospitals and specialized medical centers Hotel and touristic facilities Tourism-related entertainment and recreation Contact and communication centers Scientific research centers and medical laboratories Technical and media production Such incentives include customs exemptions, refunding of the general tax for production inputs, and no sales tax. The Ministry of Investment can provide investors with further information on these exemptions ( home new – Moin). Automatic exemptions are also granted for specific services whether purchased locally or imported. The Income and Sales Tax Department will refund the general tax levied within 30 days from submitting a written request in accordance with the terms and conditions determined by the Regulations Governing Investment Incentives (Number 33 of 2015). A number of non-automatic exemptions are granted for production requirements and fixed assets used in industrial or handicrafts activities. Such exemptions are subject to administrative procedures and approvals obtained from the Ministry of Investment Technical Committee and are governed by the previously referenced regulation. Article 8-A of the 2014 Investment Law allows the cabinet to grant additional advantages, exemptions, or incentives to any economic activities. Under this article, the cabinet granted additional incentives to the ICT, tourism, and transport sectors in 2016, as published in the Official Gazette. As the government implements reforms under the IMF Extended Fund Facility program and its own pro-growth reform agenda, several U.S. investors have reported the government has sought to reduce or eliminate incentives, guarantees, and/or tax exemptions previously expected. Bylaw number 13 for year 2015 regulates the incentives granted to renewable energy and energy efficiency equipment and projects. The Bylaw exempted those items from customs duties and imposed a General Sales Tax (GST) at a rate of zero percent. However, the Ministry of Energy has stalled all renewable energy projects of more than 1 MW capacity. Jordanian law and regulation promote and incentivizes water efficiency, waste management, and green building in commercial property development. For example, since 2015 the Jordan National Building Codes have required energy efficient practices in new construction. Starting April 1, 2022, the Government will implement a new electricity tariff structure, which will reduce production costs for several vital economic sectors including health, tourism, commercial, agricultural, and industrial sectors. The country is divided into three development areas: Zones A, B, and C. Investments in Zone C, the least developed areas of Jordan, receive the highest level of incentives while those in Zone A receive the lowest level. All agricultural, maritime, transport and railway investments are classified as Zone C, irrespective of location. Hotel and tourism-related projects along the Dead Sea, leisure and recreational compounds, and convention and exhibition centers receive Zone A designations. Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) are zoned according to their geographical location unless granted an exemption. The three-zone classification scheme does not apply to nature reserves and environmental protection areas. Jordan’s Investment Law No. 30 of 2014 merged the Development and Free Zones Commission (DFZC) into the newly formed Jordan Investment Commission (now absorbed by the Ministry of Investment), thus it became the main governmental body responsible for creating, regulating, and monitoring Jordan’s free trade zones, industrial estates, and development zones. The development areas are the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTDA) in Mafraq, the Ma’an Development Area, the Irbid Development Area (IDA), the Dead Sea Development Zone, the Jabal Ajloun Development Zone, and the King Hussein Business Park Development Zone. The Investment Law assigns the Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation (JIEC) and the Development and Free Zones Corporation (DFZC) as main developers of industrial estates and development and free zones, under the supervision of the investment commission. The government has also created nine industrial estates in Amman, Irbid, Karak, Mafraq, Madaba , Tafileh, Salt, and Aqaba, in addition to several privately-run industrial parks, including al-Mushatta, al-Tajamouat, al-Dulayl, Cyber City, al-Qastal, Jordan Gateway, and al-Hallabat. These estates provide basic infrastructure for a wide variety of manufacturing activities, reducing the cost of utilities and providing cost-effective land and buildings. Investors in the estates continue to receive incentives until their contracts expire, and receive various additional exemptions, such as a two-year exemption on income and social services taxes, complete exemptions from building and land taxes, and exemptions or reductions on most municipalities’ fees. Besides the six public free zones in Zarqa, Sahab, Karak, Karama, Mowaqaar, and Queen Alia Airport, Jordan has over 37 designated free zones administered by private companies under the DFZC’s supervision. The free zones are outside of the jurisdiction of Jordan Customs and provide a duty and tax-free environment for the storage of goods transiting Jordan. Jordan launched a solar park in Ma’an development zone and announced plans to establish two new industrial parks in Zarqa and Jerash. Under the Investment Law, establishments operating within development zones are subject to a unified tax rate of 5 percent. However, Income Tax Law No. 38 of 2018 modified the tax rates applicable to entities operating in the Development Zones depending on the source of the income; industrial activities with a local value-added of at least 30 percent are subject to 5 percent income tax rate, while other projects and activities are subject to 10 percent. The Investment Law also grants entities registered in the free zones a tax exemption on any activity conducted within the borders of the free zones, the export of goods and services outside the Kingdom, and associated transit trade. Profits earned on activities pertaining to the sale, disposal, or importation of goods and services within the borders of the free zones are subject to tax based on the normal income tax rates applicable to each entity, depending on its status (corporation or individual). The Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZA) is an independent economic zone not governed by the Investment Commission or the articles in the Investment Law governing investments in free zones or development zones. It offers special tax exemptions, a flat five percent income tax, and facilitates customs handling at Aqaba Port. In recent years, ASEZA has attracted projects, mainly in hotel and property development sectors, valued at over $8 billion. The government continues to implement development projects aimed at attracting commerce and tourism through the Port of Aqaba. The Aqaba New Port project became operational in 2018 and reached design capacity in 2019. The new port, 20 kilometers south of the previous port, added four new terminals and expanded general ship berthing and marine services, in addition to adding dedicated terminals for grain silos, liquefied natural gas, phosphates, and propane. Investors, foreign or domestic, face specific requirements in trade, services, and industrial projects in free zones. Industrial projects must be related to one of the following industries: New industries that depend on advanced technology; Industries that require locally available raw material and/or locally manufactured parts; Industries that complement domestic industries; Industries that enhance labor skills and promote technical know-how; or, Industries that provide consumer goods and that contribute to reducing market dependency on imported goods. In 2021, the government passed tax legislation to address gaps and loopholes to prevent tax leakages and ensure transparency and fairness; This included legislation on economic substance and transfer pricing and brought ASEZA under the national control for tax and customs administration. For further details, please visit: Jordan Ministry of Investment ( home new – Moin ) Jordan Industrial Estate Corporation (http://www.jiec.com ) Aqaba Special Economic Zone (Home Page – Aseza) Jordan does not follow “forced localization.” However, some of the incentives are being tied to deployment of local content at certain percentages. Jordan does not have requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. In 2020, the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship submitted a draft for the personal Data Protection Law, which supports Jordan’s digitization efforts. The Council of Ministers approved the law and sent it to the Legislative and Opinion Bureau for review, as of March 2022, the draft law is with the Lower House for review. Jordan does not have a modern data protection law. The Criminal Law, Cybercrime Law, and Telecommunication Law offer partial protection of personal data. 5. Protection of Property Rights The legal system reliably facilitates and protects the acquisition and disposition of property rights. Foreign ownership of land and assets is governed by the Leasing of Immovable Assets and Their Sale to Non-Jordanian and Judicial Persons Law No. 47/2006. Under Article 3 of the law, if the buyer’s country of residence has a reciprocal relationship with Jordan, foreign nationals are afforded the right of ownership of property within urban borders in Jordan for residential purposes. According to the law, foreign nationals may rent immovable assets for business or accommodation purposes, provided that the plot of land does not exceed 10 acres and the lease is for no more than three years in duration. Interest in real property is recognized and enforced once recorded in a legal registry. Jordan approved an investment program that grants citizenship or permanent residency of non-Jordanians in February 2018. This program includes permanent residency for non-Jordanians who purchase properties worth a minimum of JOD 200,000 ($282,100) and hold the properties for 10 years. A new Property law passed in 2019 consolidated 13 laws governing property ownership in one legislation and addressed issues such as zoning and the facilitation of ownership and leases for foreign investors. All land plots in Jordan are titled and registered with the Jordanian Land and Survey Department; any land not titled as private property is considered government property. Jordan has a fairly strong legal structure to protect intellectual property rights (IPR), having passed several laws in compliance with its international commitments. Laws consistent with Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) now protect trade secrets, plant varieties, and semiconductor chip designs. Jordan’s record on IPR enforcement has improved in recent years, but more effective enforcement mechanisms and legal procedures are still needed to address the cases of infringement and theft that persist. Copyrights are registered with the Ministry of Culture’s National Library Department, and patents and trademarks are registered with the Registrar of Patents and Trademarks at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Registration of patents and trademarks can be done electronically at https://ippd-eservice.mit.gov.jo/ . Jordan ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Madrid Protocol in 2007. Jordan is a signatory to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties on both copyrights and on performances and phonograms, and it has been developing updated laws for copyrights, trademark standards, and customs regulations to meet international standards. Jordanian firms may seek joint ventures and licensing agreements with multinational partners. In 2021, the Industrial Property Protection Directorate, in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organization, completed institutional intellectual property policies for Jordanian universities and research institutions where 11 Jordanian universities benefited from this technical support. Despite improvements in enforcement generally, infringements persist, especially copyright violations of electronic media. In particular, a significant amount of pirated videos, software, and television content remains in the marketplace. During 2021, the National Library referred 23 cases of copyright violations to the judiciary. In October 2021, the government enacted a bylaw on Border Measures to Protect Intellectual Property Rights to stipulate the procedures to be followed by customs officials at the border to ensure the protection of IPR. The bylaw allows the right holder of a good to request the competent court to stop clearance procedures and prevent the release of suspected counterfeits. Jordan was not included in the 2021 Special 301 report. One online market in Jordan was included in the 2021 Notorious Markets Report for streaming pirated television content. Mr. Peter Mehravari Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi Tel: +965 97589223 Email: Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points off contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are three key capital market institutions: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depository Center (SDC). The ASE launched an Internet Trading Service in 2010, providing an opportunity for investors to engage in securities trading independent of geographic location. Jordan’s stock market is one of the most open among its regional competitors, with no cap on foreign ownership. As of end of February 2022, non-Jordanian ownership in companies listed on the ASE represented 48.3 percent of the total market value. The foreign ownership includes governments, institutional investors, and individuals. Non-Jordanian ownership in the financial sector was 52.2 percent, 21.5 percent in the services sector and 53.7 percent in the industrial sector. Despite recent reforms and technological advances, the ASE suffers from intermittent liquidity problems and low trading activity. No new listings have been added since 2008. Market capitalization at end of 2021 reached $21.8 billion, up by almost 20 percent from 2020 levels. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms. The private sector has access to a limited variety of credit instruments relative to countries with more developed capital markets. Jordan has 24 banks, including commercial banks, Islamic banks, and foreign bank branches. Jordan does not distinguish between investment banks and commercial banks. Concentration in the banking sector has decreased over the past decade, the assets of the largest five banks accounted for 50.3 percent of licensed banks’ total assets at the end of 2020. The banking system is capably supervised by the CBJ, which publishes an annual Financial Stability Report. JFSR2020 Final 28-11-2021.pdf (cbj.gov.jo) Banks continue to be profitable and well-capitalized with deposits being the primary funding base. Liquidity and capital adequacy indicators remain strong largely due to the banks’ conservative and risk averse approach, and due to strict regulations on lending, particularly mortgage lending. The non-performing loan ratio reached 5.45 percent at the end of 2020. The rate of non-performing loans is expected to increase in 2022 as the CBJ rescinded in December 2021 measures to defer loan payments for pandemic-affected businesses. Jordan has historically had low banking penetration, which the CBJ has worked to improve through its 2018 Financial Inclusion Strategy. As of end of 2020, 50 percent of people and 29 percent of women in Jordan above the age of 15 had bank accounts. Banking Law No. 28 of 2000 does not discriminate between local and foreign banks, however capital requirements differ. The minimum capital requirements for foreign banks are JD 50 million ($70.6 million), and JD 100 million ($141 million) for local banks, although the CBJ has the authority to amend and increase the minimum capital requirement. The law also protects depositors’ interests, diminishes money market risk, guards against the concentration of lending, and includes articles on electronic banking practices and anti-money laundering. The CBJ set up an independent Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) in 2000 that insures deposits up to JOD 50,000 ($71,000). The DIC also acts as the liquidator of banks as directed by the CBJ. Foreigners are allowed to open bank accounts with a valid passport and a Jordanian residence permit. In January 2017, the CBJ established the Jordan Payments and Clearing Company, with an aim to establish and develop digital retail and micro payments along with the investment in innovative technology and digital financial services. The CBJ actively supports technology and is running JoMoPay, a mobile payment system and provides regulatory support to a privately-operated electronic bill payment service eFAWATEER.com. In October 2021, The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) started a process soliciting comments from local banks over the potential introduction and licensing of digital banks, which aims to automate all front-end, back-end and middle-end operations. The CBJ is also exploring the possibility of launching the central bank digital currency (CBDC) would be linked to the Jordanian dinar and have legal standing. Full adoption and implementation could take five years. Jordan does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Jordan has twenty-two SOEs of different sizes and mandates that are fully owned by the government. Wholly-owned SOEs employ around 11,000 people and have assets exceeding $8 billion. The government has more than 50 percent ownership in six companies, employing around 4,000 individuals, with total assets of $1.3 billion. Most SOEs are small in terms of operations, assets, number of employees, and income. The largest SOEs are: National Electrical Power Company (NEPCO), Samra Electric Power Company, the Yarmouk Water Company, and Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC). On average, since 2010, the private sector has maintained its share in the Jordanian economy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proportion remains around the 84% to 86% of GDP. SOEs in Jordan exercise delegated governmental powers and operate in fields not yet open for private investment, such as managing the transmission and distribution of electrical power and water. Other SOE activities include logistics, mining, storage and inventory management of strategic products, and some economic development activities such as Aqaba Port Company, Jordan National Petroleum Company, and Jordan Silos and Supply General Company. The government supports these companies as necessary, for example, the government has issued and guaranteed Treasury bonds for NEPCO since 2011 to ensure continuous power supply for the country. SOEs generally compete on equal terms with private enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. The law does not provide preferential treatment to SOEs, and they are held accountable by their Board of Directors, typically chaired by the sector-relevant Minister and the Audit Bureau. Jordan is not a party to the World Trade Agreement (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement. In year 2012, Jordan completed a multi-year privatization program, in the telecom, energy, and transportation sectors. There government has no further plans for additional privatizations. In year 2020, Jordan adopted a new Public Private Partnership Law (PPP) to support the government’s commitment to broadening the utilization of public-private sector partnerships (PPPs) and encouraging the private sector to play a larger role in the economy. The law does not limit PPPs to certain sectors or nationalities. A PPP unit housed at the Ministry of Investment supports the government in identifying and prioritizing projects, provides funding resources to cover pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and oversees tendering processes. The PPP unit interacts with private sector and potential investors through promotional activities, market sounding exercises, and to discuss proposals. Communication during the bidding phase is strictly governed by the PPPs bylaw in line with international best practices. Once a contract is awarded, line ministries or entities will take over as main POCs for projects and their implementation. The PPP Higher Council will handle investors’ grievances throughout the project’s lifecycle. The unit has already identified a list of potential PPP projects in several sectors: water, energy, transport, tourism, education, health, environment, and ICT. PPPs related regulations and current investment opportunities are listed on the Ministry of Investment website (In Arabic) مشاريع الشراكة بين القطاع العام و الخاص – وزارة الاستثمار الاردنية (moin.gov.jo) 8. Responsible Business Conduct Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/); Trafficking in Persons Report (https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/); Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities (https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/) and; North Korea Sanctions & Enforcement Actions Advisory (https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_supplychain_advisory_07232018.pdf ). There is general awareness of responsible business conduct among both manufacturers and consumers in Jordan, with many of the large local and multinational companies voluntarily developing and adopting corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. CSR efforts predominantly focus on improving infrastructure in adjoining communities or providing better access to educational opportunities. The amended Companies Law of 2018 regulates the work of companies by applying the rules of corporate governance and enhancing the monitoring authorities of shareholders at public liability companies. All investors are required to conduct environmental and social impact studies. The government, enterprises, and NGOs are taking initiatives to promote responsible business conduct principles into their practices. The authorities developed a Corporate Governance Code based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and ratified human rights conventions, but further steps are needed to guarantee respect for human rights by enterprises. Jordan Labor Watch is a non-governmental organization which contributes to improving working conditions in accordance with international labor standards. It produces reports covering labor issues and uncovers workplace violations and abuses. The program provides a comprehensive database covering indicators related to the labor market, trade unions, labor organizations, and laws and regulations governing performance. Furthermore, Jordan Labor Watch strives to present alternative policies that tackle challenges facing the Arabian and Jordanian labor market. The American Chamber of Commerce in Jordan published in 2016 a framework code of conduct for the private sector, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) approved and embedded as part of the governance chapter in the amended Companies Law. The Customs Department released and revised a Golden List Program, which encourages good corporate citizenship amongst trading companies and international best practice for trade across borders. The government issues a monthly financial bulletin highlighting all revenues, including taxes and royalties paid by extractive industries. Jordan initiated discussions with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), but it has not joined. Jordan is a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies since 2009. Jordan is drafting a Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) Action Plan in five key sectors: energy, transport, agriculture, water, and health. The NDC Action Plan seeks to scale up renewables and energy efficiency measures; adapt the water, agricultural, and health sectors to climate change impacts; and strengthen the resilience of disadvantaged groups and vulnerable ecosystems. Jordan has raised its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target included in its revised NDCs to 31 percent compared to the baseline scenario. The reduction target is divided into conditional and unconditional a as follows: conditional target: 26 percent, unconditional target: 5 percent. The new GHG emission reduction target is based on a combination of national policies, programs, and actions as well as international support and finance. The adaptation vision and objective of the updated NDC is directly linked to the recently launched National Adaptation Plan (NAP). This updated NDC aims at driving Jordan’s post COVID-19 recovery process into a lower carbon and more climate resilient development pathway steered by national green growth priorities while fully committing to the provisions of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and paving the way for a future Climate Change Long Term Strategy (LTS). The total estimated cost of the proposed mitigation actions listed in the updated NDC submission is $7.54 billion To support its targets, the Ministry of Environment has also identified pilot cross-sector interventions to implement mitigation actions in the energy and water sectors with Energy Efficiency (EE) and Renewable Energy (RE). The interventions aimed at fulfilling three components: A national Monitoring, Reporting and Verification MRV system and registry for climate mitigation measures, designing a platform for private sector financing in EE and RE, and exploring the potential for market-based instruments for climate mitigation measures. The Ministry of Environment adopted two by-laws in 2005 to protect biodiversity. Article 4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulation No. 37 of 2005 ensures any project will need to assess its impact on the environment including biodiversity. Regulation No. 29 of 2005 on natural protected areas and national parks gave the authority of creating protected areas to a Technical Committee led by the Ministry of Environment, and management authority to the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN), a unique model for the region and globally. Since that time, RSCN has gone on to establish seven protected areas throughout Jordan, covering over 1200 square kilometers. All agricultural, industrial, commercial, housing, and tourism projects, including public sector projects, are required to obtain environmental approval from the Ministry of Environment (Article 4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulation No. 37 of 2005). The process begins with a screening phase led by the Ministry of Environment and an initial EIA, to determine whether the project has a significant impact on the environment. Depending on the result, the Ministry of Environment may require a comprehensive EIA. In 2020 Jordan established its first Marine Protected Area in the Gulf of Aqaba, governed and managed by the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority under its laws and regulations. That same year new provisions were added to the Agricultural Law of 13 of 2015 updating the fishing regulations, including an annex with endangered marine species. Jordanian law and regulation promote and incentivizes water efficiency, waste management, and green building in commercial property development. For example, since 2015 the Jordan National Building Codes have required energy efficient practices in new construction. 9. Corruption Courts convicted a former Minister of Public Works and Housing, Customs Director General, and several local elected officials for corruption in separate trials during 2021. In September 2021, the State Security Court issued verdicts in a case related to the illegal production and smuggling of tobacco. A three-judge panel convicted 23 defendants and sentenced the chief suspect to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judges also acquitted four defendants and dismissed charges on two defendants who died during the trial. The verdict was subject to appeal at the Court of Cassation. The State Security Court also imposed fines of JD 179 million ($252 million) on multiple defendants in the case, requiring additional hearings. Jordan was the first Middle Eastern country to sign and ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005. In 2006, Jordan issued a code of conduct for the public sector, enacted an Illicit Gains Law, and Anti-Corruption Law. Jordanian law defines corruption as any act that violates official duties, all acts related to favoritism and nepotism that could deprive others from their legitimate rights, economic crimes, and misuse of power. The Illicit Gains Law requires designated officials, their spouses, and minor children to file financial disclosures with the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (IACC). Designated officials include the prime minister, cabinet members, members of parliament, senior government officials, as well as municipal-level council members and executives. In 2019, Parliament amended the IACC Law granting the IACC more authority to access asset disclosure filings of officials exhibiting unexplained wealth. The amendment empowers the commission to request asset seizures, international travel bans, and suspension of officials under investigation for corruption. The amendment also increases the IACC’s administrative autonomy by enabling the commission to update its own regulations and protecting IACC board members and the chairperson from arbitrary dismissal. In 2018, the government issued the Code of Governance Practices of Policies and Legislative Instruments in Government Departments, to improve the predictability of legal and regulatory framework governing the business environment. A new Audit Bureau Law was enacted in 2018 to strengthen audit performance, capacity and independence in line with International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) standards. Other related laws include the Penal/Criminal Code, Anti-Money Laundering Law, Right to Access Information Law, and the Economic Crimes Law. Jordan is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. H.E. Mohannad Hijazi Chairman Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) P.O. Box 5000, Amman, 11953, Jordan +962 6 550 3150 Abeer Mdanat Executive Director Rasheed Coalition P.O. Box 582662, Amman, 111585, Jordan +962 6 585 2528 amdanat@rasheedti.org 10. Political and Security Environment The threat of terrorism remains high in Jordan. Transnational and indigenous terrorist groups have demonstrated the capability to plan and implement attacks in Jordan. Violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, including the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), and al-Qa’ida, directly or indirectly have conducted or supported attacks in Jordan and continue to plot against local security forces, U.S. and Western interests and “soft” targets, such as high-profile public events, hotels, places of worship, restaurants, schools, and malls. Jordan’s prominent role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and its shared borders with Iraq and Syria increase the potential for future terrorist incidents. Demonstrations occur frequently. They may take place in response to political or economic issues, on politically significant holidays, and during international events. In general, demonstrations remain peaceful. However, some have turned violent, even when intended to be peaceful, leading security officials to intervene. Jordan remained a committed partner on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism in 2021. As a regional leader in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Jordan played an important role in Coalition successes in degrading the terrorist group’s territorial control and operational reach. Although Jordan experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in 2021 compared to previous years partially due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, the country faced a continued threat from terror groups. While the Jordanian security forces thwarted plots and apprehended suspected terrorists, the threat of domestic radicalization, especially online, persisted. Visitors should consult current State Department public announcements at www.travel.state.gov before traveling to Jordan. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to Jordan’s Department of Statistics, in 2021 the total number of employed persons over the age of 15 was approximately 1.3 million, and the total number of unemployed persons was 425,000, suggesting a total workforce of approximately 1.7 million. Jordan does not officially publish a labor participation rate but given a population of 5.1 million persons above the age of 15, the implied labor participation rate is 33 percent. Jordan’s unemployment rate as of September 30, 2021, was 23.2 percent. Women and youth are underrepresented in Jordan’s labor market. In 2021, the unemployment rate for women was 30.8 percent, and the labor participation rate for women was 14.5 percent. At the same time, the unemployment rate for youth (15-25 years) was 48.5 percent, and the labor participation rate was 34.4 percent. Jordan does not officially track the nationality of its workforce. However, 31 percent of Jordan’s total population are not Jordanian nationals (either refugees or non-Jordanian workers) and non-Jordanian workers play a significant role in Jordan’s economy, including the informal economy. Jordan’s workforce (employed and unemployed) is largely well educated, with nearly 40 percent holding a bachelor’s degree or higher, and literacy rates approaching 100 percent. However, educational attainment rates among the population at large are significantly lower, especially among the older population. Informal labor plays a significant part in Jordan’s economy. Official statistics are unavailable; however, experts estimate that informal labor may account for as much as 41 percent of Jordan’s actual workforce and 15 percent of GDP. There have been few analyses on the interaction between the informal and formal sectors of the economy. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the agriculture sector and the domestic sector rely heavily on informal employment. In January 2021, agriculture sector employers protested attempts to regularize employment in that sector, complaining regularized employment arrangements would erode their competitiveness. The COVID-19 pandemic shed light on conditions faced by workers in the informal economy, who do not have access to social welfare protection or medical insurance or may suffer from poor working environment, unfair pay, and harassment. In response to these concerns, the Government of Jordan established a complementary welfare support system in 2021 to support vulnerable workers. According to Jordan’s Civil Service Bureau, the labor market needs certain medical specialists (such as respiratory therapists), engineers, and cybersecurity specialists. Jordan has a surplus of people educated in the humanities and social sciences. Many professions and types of positions may be filled only by Jordanians, e.g. administrative professions such as data entry, secretarial tasks and wholesale/retail business. In addition, each sector has a designated minimum percentage of Jordanian employees. The Minister of Labor has the authority to grant exceptions to these policies. The Jordanian Labor Law restricts layoffs under most circumstances by requiring prior notice to the Ministry of Labor and a guarantee of payment of benefits and severance payments to which the severed employee is entitled. However, termination without prior notice is allowed under certain conditions. Companies may obtain permission from the Ministry of Labor (MOL) to reduce their staff as a result of business restructuring. The social security system provides up to six months of unemployment benefits for formally registered workers. Local labor requirements in economic development zones and free trade zones vary based on the type of economic activity. For example, employers in qualified industrial zones are restricted in their ability to transfer employees to other sectors and have certain obligations to repatriate foreign workers at the end of their contract terms. Collective bargaining in Jordan is rare, and labor unions are generally weak. Labor unions serve primarily as intermediaries between workers and the MOL and may engage in collective bargaining on behalf of workers. The 17 recognized unions are all members of the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions. Estimates put union membership at less than 10 percent of the labor force. In 2021, labor unions representing workers in garment, food, petrochemical, and oil industries signed forty Collective Bargaining Agreements. Articles 120, 121, and 122 of the Jordanian law set forth a mechanism for collective labor dispute resolution beginning with labor inspector mediation. If mediation fails, the Minister of Labor reviews the case, followed by the Conciliation Council, then finally by the Labor Court under the Magistrate and Penalty Court to resolve the case within seven days. There were two strikes in 2021, at Jordanian Cement Factories Company and Aqaba Container Terminal Company. The government’s role has been to keep communications open between workers and management. Neither posed a serious investment risk. The International Labor Organization has produced a legal analysis showing the extent to which Jordanian legislation is compatible with Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment in the workplace with the aim of establishing a legislative framework conducive to creating a workplace free of these two phenomena. To date, the Government of Jordan has not addressed the issues raised in this analysis, such as defining, comprehensively prohibiting, and/or addressing workplace violence and harassment. 14. Contact for More Information Shaden Al-Majali Senior Economic Specialist +962 6 590 6317 Majalisa@state.gov Kazakhstan Executive Summary Kazakhstan has made significant progress towards creating a market economy since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It has attracted significant foreign investment to develop its abundant mineral, petroleum, and natural gas resources. As of October 2021, the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $170 billion, including $40.4 billion from the U.S., according to official central bank statistics. Publicly available information indicates that U.S. investments in the hydrocarbons sector alone far exceed this official statistic. While Kazakhstan’s vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves remain the backbone of the economy, the government continues to make incremental progress toward diversification into other sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic gave impetus to efforts by the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) to remove bureaucratic barriers to trade and investment. The GOK maintains an active dialogue with foreign investors through the President’s Foreign Investors Council and the Prime Minister’s Council for Improvement of the Investment Climate. Kazakhstan is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Widespread civil unrest in January raised concerns about the country’s political and economic stability. President Tokayev has since assured foreign investors that the GOK will ensure a stable investment climate and meet its commitments to investors. He also pledged to reduce the outsized role of monopolies and oligopolies in the economy. President Tokayev announced political and economic reforms in March that may bring positive changes to the country’s investment climate by increasing privatization and combatting corruption. Given Kazakhstan’s long border and extensive economic ties with Russia, Russian aggression against Ukraine and ensuing sanctions against Russia affect Kazakhstan’s investment climate. Some investors will likely be deterred from investing in Kazakhstan, while others may find Kazakhstan an attractive alternative to doing business in Russia. The GOK has expressed a commitment to complying with the western sanctions against Russia and has invited western investors to relocate from Russia to Kazakhstan. Despite President Tokayev’s assurances, concerns remain that some of the underlying economic causes of the January unrest remain unaddressed and sanctions on Russia may exacerbate existing structural weaknesses to cause high inflation, currency devaluation, and logistical impediments to imports and exports. Despite institutional and legal reforms, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, arbitrary law enforcement, and limited access to a skilled workforce in certain regions continue to present challenges. The government’s tendency to increase its regulatory role in relations with investors, to favor an import-substitution policy, to limit the use of foreign labor, and to intervene in companies’ operations continues to concern foreign investors. Foreign firms cite the need for better rule of law, deeper investment in human capital, improved transport and logistics infrastructure, a more open and flexible trade policy, a more favorable work-permit regime, and a more customer-friendly and consistent tax administration. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 79 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $8,710 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kazakhstan has attracted significant FDI since independence. As of October 1, 2021, FDI totaled $170 billion, primarily in the oil and gas sector. International financial institutions consider Kazakhstan to be a relatively attractive destination for their operations, and some international firms have established regional headquarters in the country. Kazakhstan adheres to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, meaning it is committed to certain investment standards. In April 2019, the Prime Minister created the Coordination Council for Attracting Foreign Investment. The Prime Minister acts as the Chair and Investment Ombudsman. The Investment Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its subsidiary, KazakhInvest, handle investment climate policy issues and work with potential and current investors, while the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Trade and Integration work with international organizations like the OECD, WTO, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Each regional government designates a representative to work with investors. The GOK established the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC), modelled on the Dubai International Financial Center. It offers foreign investors an alternative jurisdiction for operations, with tax holidays, flexible labor rules, a Common Law-based legal system, and flexibility to carry out transactions in any currency. The GOK recommends that foreign investors use AIFC for contracts with Kazakhstani businesses. By law, foreign and domestic private firms may establish and own business enterprises. While no sectors are completely closed to foreign investors, restrictions on foreign ownership exist, including a 20 percent ceiling on foreign ownership of media outlets, a 49 percent limit on domestic and international air transportation services, and a 49 percent limit on telecom services. Kazakhstan formally removed the limits on foreign ownership of telecom companies, except for the country’s main telecom operator, KazakhTeleCom. Still, foreign investors must obtain a government waiver to acquire more than 49 percent of shares in a telecom company. There are no constraints on the participation of foreign capital in the banking and insurance sectors. However, law limits the participation of offshore companies in banks and insurance companies and prohibits foreign ownership of pension funds and agricultural land. Foreign citizens and companies are restricted from participating in private security businesses. Kazakhstan does not have a screening system in place and does not have legislation specifically focused on the national security implications of FDI akin to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). Kazakhstan’s central bank (the National Bank of Kazakhstan) collects standard statistics on FDI and other forms of investments, but mostly for macroeconomic purposes. Foreign companies remain concerned about the risk of preferences for domestic companies and mechanisms for government intervention in foreign companies’ operations, particularly in procurement. The Front Office for Investors assists with investors’ challenges and brings them to the Prime Minister’s Council. The OECD Investment Committee presented its second Investment Policy Review in June 2017, available at: https://www.oecd.org/countries/kazakhstan/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-kazakhstan-2017-9789264269606-en.htm The OECD review recommended Kazakhstan undertake corporate governance reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), implement a more efficient tax system, further liberalize its trade policy, and introduce responsible business conduct principles and standards. Kazakhstan has taken steps to simplify procedures for starting and operating businesses. Most procedures can now be done online. For example, online registration of any business is possible through the unified government website https://egov.kz/cms/en/services/business_registration/pass042com_mu . Non-residents must have a business immigrant visa and submit electronic copies of their IDs, as well as any certification of their companies from their country of origin. Documents must be translated and notarized. Investors may learn more about these services here: https://invest.gov.kz/invest-guide/business-starting/ A foreign-owned company registered in Kazakhstan is considered a domestic company for purposes of currency regulation. Residents may open bank accounts in foreign currency in Kazakhstani banks. In 2021, the GOK introduced a special three percent retail tax for 114 types of small and medium-sized businesses that have been affected the most by the pandemic, available for two years. The GOK also introduced an investment tax credit allowing entrepreneurs to defer taxes for up to three years. In 2020, the government approved new measures aimed to attract FDI. For example, the government introduced a new type of investment agreement (see details in Section 4). In January, Kazakhstan re-instituted visa-free travel for citizens of 54 countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. The AIFC offers legal arrangements not normally available under Kazakhstani law, including trusts. AIFC residents have access to simplified procedures for obtaining investor visas. Foreign investors often complain about problems with finalizing contracts and licensing. Tax errors still have not been decriminalized. The controversial taxation of dividends of non-residents came into force in January 2021. The government neither incentivizes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime National legislation is enacted by the Parliament and President. The government, ministries, and local executive administrations issue regulations and executive acts in compliance with national laws. Publicly listed companies adhere to international financial reporting standards, but accounting and valuation practices are not always consistent with international best practices. The government does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data. Companies listed on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) and Astana International Exchange (AIX), must, however, disclose information on ESG. All laws and decrees of the President and the government are available in Kazakh and Russian on the websites of the Ministry of Justice: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus and http://zan.gov.kz/en/ . The government consults on some draft legislation with experts and the business community; draft bills are available for public comment at https://legalacts.egov.kz under the Open Government section. The process of public comments seems overregulated. Publication occurs without broad notifications, some bills are excluded from public comment, and those who want to participate must register in advance. The legal and regulatory process is opaque. Implementation and interpretation of commercial legislation sometimes creates confusion. In 2016, the Ministry of Health and Social Development introduced new rules on attracting foreign labor, some of which created significant barriers for foreign investors. After active intervention through the Prime Minister’s Council, the government canceled the most onerous requirements. Decrees and legislative changes frequently do not “grandfather in” existing investments. Penalties are often assessed for periods prior to the change in policy. The new OECD-compliant Environmental Code (Eco Code) mandates that local authorities spend 100 percent of environmental payments on environmental remediation. Public financial reporting, including debt obligations, are published by the National Bank of Kazakhstan at https://nationalbank.kz/en/news/vneshniy-dolg and, in a very limited scope, by the Ministry of Finance on its site: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/minfin/press/article/details/17399?directionId=261&lang=ru . The Civil Code establishes commercial and contract law principles. The judicial system is officially independent of the executive branch, although the government interferes in judiciary matters. Freedom House’s 2021 Nations in Transit report gave Kazakhstan a very low score (1.25 out of seven) in the Judicial Framework and Independence category, implying that the executive branch effectively dominates the judicial branch. Allegations of pervasive corruption of the courts and the influence of the ruling elite results in low public expectations and trust in the justice system. Parties to commercial contracts, including foreign investors, can seek dispute settlement in Kazakhstan’s courts or international arbitration, and courts nominally enforce arbitration clauses in contracts. However, the Post is aware of at least one case when the government is alleged to have refused to honor a fully litigated international arbitral decision. The AIFC has its own arbitration center and court based on British Common Law and is independent of the judiciary. The government advises foreign investors to use the capacities of the AIFC arbitration center and the AIFC court more actively. Laws provide for non-expropriation, currency convertibility, guarantees of legal stability, transparent government procurement, and incentives for priority sectors. The Entrepreneurial Code outlines basic principles of doing business, the government’s relations with entrepreneurs, and codifies non-discrimination for foreign investors. The code contains incentives and preferences for government-determined priority sectors. A law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control expands the statistical monitoring of transactions in foreign currency and facilitated the process of de-dollarization. The law treats branches of foreign companies in Kazakhstan as residents and enables the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) to enhance control over cross-border transactions. The Entrepreneurial Code regulates competition-related issues such as cartel agreements and unfair competition. The Agency for Protection and Development of Competition is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Regulation of natural monopolies remains with the Ministry of National Economy. The bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Kazakhstan requires the government to provide compensation in the event of expropriation. The Entrepreneurial Code allows the state to nationalize property in emergency cases but fails to provide clear criteria for expropriation or to require prompt and adequate compensation at fair market value. The Mission is aware of cases where owners of flourishing and developed businesses have been forced to sell their businesses to companies affiliated with high-ranking and powerful individuals. In 2021, the government amended the Criminal Code and enhanced punishment for raiding by increasing the possible sentence to a range of five to eight years. One hydrocarbons company claims expropriation. The case went to international arbitration and the legal process continues without resolution. Bankruptcy Law protects the rights of creditors during insolvency proceedings. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, unless the court determines the bankruptcy was premeditated, or rehabilitation measures are wrongful. The law eases bureaucratic requirements for bankruptcy filings, gives creditors a greater say in continuing operations, introduces a time limit for adopting rehabilitation or reorganization plans, and adds court supervision requirements. 4. Industrial Policies The Entrepreneurial Code and Tax Code incentivize foreign and domestic investment in priority sectors, which include agriculture, metallurgy, extraction of metallic ores, chemical and petrochemical industries, textile and pharmaceutical industries, food production, machine manufacturing, waste recycling, and renewable energy. Firms in priority sectors receive tax and customs duty waivers, in-kind grants, investment credits, and simplified work permits. Model investment contracts are prepared and signed for investment priority projects by the Investment Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KazakhInvest. Details on their requirements are available here: https://invest.gov.kz/doing-business-here/regulated-sectors/ . In January 2021, the government added investment agreements to the Entrepreneurial Code. Such projects exceed $50 million in industries selected by the government. Only Kazakhstan companies or residents of the AIFC are eligible. Under this agreement, the government provides incentives and a stabile legal regime for 25 years. A U.S. investor signed the first investment agreement of this type in January 2021. The government will establish a special economic zone with tax and customs preferences. The government offers incentives for clean energy investments by facilitating the sale of electricity generated by renewable energy sources (RES). The Financial Settlement Center of Kazakhstan’s Electric Grid Operating Company guarantees purchases of electricity produced from RES and connects RES to the grid on a priority basis. The Law on Special Economic Zones allows foreign companies to establish enterprises in special economic zones (SEZs), simplifies permit procedures for foreign labor, and establishes a special customs zone regime not governed by EAEU rules. Kazakhstan has thirteen SEZs. Kazakhstan altered its local content requirements to meet WTO accession requirements. Subsoil use contracts concluded after January 1, 2015, no longer contain local content requirements, and any local content requirements in contracts signed before 2015 phased out on January 1, 2021. The GOK established a fund for the development of local content. The fund invests in technology, IT, assembly of oil and gas equipment, and environmental projects. In 2021, Kazakhstan introduced a scoring system for localization to stimulate local assembly of vehicles and agricultural equipment. Foreign investors may participate in government and quasi-government procurement tenders, if they have established production facilities in Kazakhstan and are recognized as a pre-qualified bidder. The product must be made in Kazakhstan and be on the register of trusted producers. The pandemic has amplified the import substitution trend. The GOK introduced significant recycling fees on imported combines and tractors. The government contends that the fee is applied to foreign and domestically produced vehicles, combines and tractors; however, it subsidizes the fee for domestic producers. Foreign companies consider this to be coercion to localize production. The government announced a 50-percent decrease in the recycling fee rate after President Tokayev publicly criticized the fee, but this change has not yet come into force. Cross-border transmission of data is possible if countries receiving this data provide data protection. The National Security Committee and the Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations and Aerospace Industry supervise data protection and data storage in Kazakhstan. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property (fixed and non-fixed) are recognized under the Civil Code and the Land Code. Agricultural land and certain other natural resources may only be owned or leased by Kazakhstani citizens. In May 2021, President Tokayev signed into law amendments which prohibit foreigners, persons without citizenship, foreign legal entities and legal entities with foreign participation, international organizations, scientific centers with foreign participation, and repatriated Kazakhs from owning or leasing agricultural lands. The legal structure for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is relatively strong; however, enforcement needs further improvement. Kazakhstan is not currently included in the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report. To facilitate its accession to the WTO and attract foreign investment, Kazakhstan continues to improve its legal regime for protecting IPR. The Civil Code and various laws protect U.S. IPR. Kazakhstan has ratified 18 of the 24 treaties endorsed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?country_id=97C The Criminal Code sets out punishments for violations of copyright, rights for inventions, useful models, industrial patterns, selected inventions, and integrated circuit topographies. The law authorizes the government to target internet piracy and shut down websites unlawfully sharing copyrighted material, provided that the rights holders had registered their copyrighted material with the IPR Department at the Ministry of Justice. Despite these efforts, the use of pirated software remains high. Kazakhstan amended its legislation to comply with OECD IPR standards. The law set up a more convenient, one-tier system of IPR registration and provided rights holders the opportunity for pre-trial dispute settlement through the Appeals Council at the Ministry of Justice. Authorities conduct nationwide campaigns called “Hi-Tech” and “Anti-Fraud” that are aimed at detecting and ceasing IPR infringements and increasing public awareness about IP issues. In 2021, these campaigns resulted in the seizing of 3,500 units of counterfeit goods and closing access to 40 foreign websites selling pirated software. In 2021, the Agency for Financial Monitoring filed 11 criminal cases for IPR violations worth more than $4.2 million. Foreign companies complain of inadequate IPR protection. Judges, customs officials, and police officers lack IPR expertise, which exacerbates weak IPR enforcement. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=KZ . 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain underdeveloped and illiquid, with small equity and debt markets dominated by SOEs and lacking in retail investors. Most domestic borrowers obtain credit from Kazakhstani banks, although foreign investors often find interest rates and collateral requirements onerous, and it is often cheaper and easier for foreign investors to use retained earnings or borrow from their home country. The government actively seeks to attract portfolio investment. Foreign clients may only trade via local brokerage companies or after registering at KASE or at the AIFC. KASE, with 233 listed companies, trades a variety of instruments, including equities and funds, corporate bonds, sovereign debt, international development institutions’ debt, foreign currencies, repurchase agreements (REPO), and derivatives. KASE launched a new global platform on November 15, which currently trades over 40 U.S. securities listed on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange. The AIFC has its own stock exchange (AIX), that has partnered with the Shanghai Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Goldman Sachs International, the Silk Road Fund, and others. AIX currently has 134 listings in its Official List, including 99 traded on its platform. Kazakhstan is bound by Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement which prohibits government restrictions on currency conversions or the repatriation of investment profits. Money transfers associated with foreign investments are unrestricted; however, Kazakhstan’s currency legislation requires that a currency contract must be presented to the servicing bank if the transfer exceeds $10,000. Money transfers over $50,000 require the servicing bank to notify the transaction to the authorities. President Tokayev signed a decree banning the export of foreign currency cash exceeding $10,000 or its equivalent starting March 14. Kazakhstan had 22 commercial banks as of January 1. The five largest banks (Halyk, Sberbank-Kazakhstan, Kaspi, Otbasy, and First Heartland Jusan) held assets of approximately $57.6 billion, accounting for 66.1 percent of the total banking sector. The banking system has been impaired by legacy non-performing loans, poor risk management, weak corporate governance practices, and significant related-party exposures. The GOK has undertaken measures to strengthen the sector, including capital injections, enhanced oversight, and expanded regulatory authorities. As of January, the ratio of non-performing loans to banking assets was 3.4 percent, down from 8.6 percent in April 2019, while the number of commercial banks decreased to 22 from 28 in April 2019 as a result of mergers and liquidation of financially struggling entities. The United States and other countries have imposed sanctions on multiple Russian financial institutions, some of which have subsidiaries in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has a central bank system led by the NBK and the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market (ARDFM). ARDFM is the main financial regulator overseeing banks, insurance companies, the stock market, microcredit organizations, debt collection agencies, and credit bureaus, while the NBK performs core central bank functions, as well as management of the country’s sovereign wealth fund and pension system assets. The NBK and ARDFM are committed to the incremental introduction of the Basel III regulatory standard. Kazakhstan allows foreign banks to operate in the country via branches. Foreigners may open bank accounts in local banks if they have a local tax registration number. The National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan was established to support the country’s social and economic development, as well as to reduce the country’s dependence on the oil sector and external shocks. The National Fund’s assets are generated from direct taxes and other payments from oil companies, public property privatization, sale of public farmlands, and investment income. As of January 1, the National Fund’s assets were $55.3 billion or around 30 percent of GDP. The government receives regular transfers from the National Fund for general state budget support, as well as special purpose transfers ordered by the President. The National Fund is required to retain a minimum balance of no less than 30 percent of GDP. Kazakhstan is not a member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises According to the National Statistical Bureau, as of January 1, there are 25,201 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 617 enterprises where the state has some stake, including all types of enterprises, from small veterinary inspection offices, kindergartens, and regional hospitals, to airlines, mining companies, and the national oil and gas company. A full list of SOEs is available at: https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/en/gr-search/search-objects . SOEs play a leading role in the country’s economy. According to the 2017 OECD Investment Policy Review, SOE assets amount to $48-64 billion, approximately 30-40 percent of GDP; net income was approximately $2 billion. In January, President Tokayev enabled the Agency for Development and Protection of Competition to endorse the creation of new state-owned enterprises and to review enlargement of existing ones. Parastatal companies benefit from greater access to subsidies and other government support. The National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna (SK) is the largest national holding company, managing key SOEs in the oil and gas, energy, mining, transportation, and communication sectors. The IMF reports that, as of 2019, SK held assets equivalent to 38 percent of GDP and generated revenues of 15 percent of GDP, which was equivalent to three-quarters of total government revenue. In 2020, SK reported $54 billion in assets and $1.4 billion in consolidated net profit. Political influence continues to dominate SK. SK has special rights to conclude large transactions among members of its holdings without public notification, a pre-emptive right to buy strategic facilities and assets and is exempt from government procurement procedures. More information is available at http://sk.kz/. Two other major SOEs are the national managing holding company Baiterek and national information holding company Zerde. More information about both companies is available on their web-sites: https://www.baiterek.gov.kz/en and http://zerde.gov.kz/. Officially, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions. In some cases, SOEs enjoy better access to natural resources, credit, and licenses than private entities. The government enacted a new comprehensive privatization program in 2020. More information is available at: https://privatization.gosreestr.kz/ . As of March 31, the government has sold 938 organizations for $1.7 billion out of 1,747 organizations subject to privatization. The government sells small, state owned and municipal enterprises through electronic auctions. Foreign investors may participate in privatization projects. However, they may experience challenges in navigating the process. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Entrepreneurs, the government, and non-governmental organizations are aware of the expectations of responsible business conduct (RBC). Kazakhstan continues to make steady progress toward meeting the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the government promotes the concept of RBC. The OECD National Contact Point is the Ministry of National Economy. The Entrepreneurial Code has a section on social responsibility, which is defined as a voluntary contribution for the development of social, environmental, and other spheres. This creates conditions for RBC but cannot force entrepreneurs to take socially responsible actions. The code considers charitable contributions as a form of social responsibility and envisions tax preferences for entrepreneurs engaged in charitable activities. The government encourages companies to donate to the Khalkyna (To the People of Kazakhstan Fund). The government signed on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007. Kazakhstan produces EITI reports that disclose revenues from the extraction of its natural resources. Companies disclose what they have paid in taxes and other payments, and the government discloses what it has received; these two sets of figures are then compared and reconciled. In 2019, the EITI Board reported that Kazakhstan had made considerable improvements since 2017 by providing additional information on local content, social investment, and transportation of oil, gas, and minerals. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Eco Code includes a chapter on adaptation to climate change that focuses on the priority areas of agriculture, water management, forestry, and civil protection. Kazakhstan 2050 encourages an accelerated transition to a low-carbon economy, sets a target for the share of RES in total power mix to reach 50 percent by 2050, and promotes water-saving technologies. The Concept for Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector until 2030 aims to develop regulations and incentives to promote sustainable and renewable energy, adapt to climate change and address the challenges associated with reducing carbon dependency. The Ministry of Ecology, Geology, and Natural Resources (MEGNR) Strategic Plan 2020-2024 stipulates a regulatory approach to enable the transition to a low-carbon economy along with a decrease in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Kazakhstan’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) includes an unconditional, economy-wide target of 15 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 and a conditional 25 percent reduction by 2030. GOK has pollution standards for soil, water, air, and radiation. The Eco Code introduced a ten-year exemption from environmental payments for businesses committed to implementing best available technologies (BAT), with a perpetual exemption if they reached their target emission reductions. For those who did not introduce BAT, environmental payments will double in 2025, increase four-fold in 2028, and eight-fold in 2031. 9. Corruption Kazakhstan’s rating in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index is 37/100, where 100 is very clean and 0 is highly corrupt. According to Transparency International, the January civil unrest underscored the dangers of ignoring corruption. The Anti-Corruption Agency has focused on sectors like agriculture and healthcare, leaving out the largest industries. President Tokayev announced in January that the government would do more to combat corruption. Within months, several investigations began against wealthy and powerful individuals, including relatives of First President Nazarbayev. According to the State Department’s Human Rights Report, the government selectively prosecuted officials who committed abuses, especially in high-profile corruption cases. Nonetheless, corruption remained widespread, and impunity existed for many in positions of authority as well as for those connected to law enforcement entities. The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Corruption was widespread in the executive branch, law enforcement agencies, local government administrations, the education system, and the judiciary, according to human rights NGOs. Journalists and advocates for fiscal transparency report frequent harassment and administrative pressure. The Criminal Code imposes criminal liability and punishment for corruption, forbids suspended sentences for corruption-related crimes, and provides for lifelong bans on employment in the civil service with mandatory forfeiture of title, rank, grade, and state awards for those convicted of corruption-related crimes. The Law on Public Service mandates public servants adhere to rule of law principles including anti-corruption and professionalism of civil service. However, the Law on the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan—Leader of the Nation establishes blanket immunity for First President Nursultan Nazarbayev and members of his household from arrest, detention, search, or interrogation. Kazakhstan’s Anti-Corruption Agency prepares an annual report on countering corruption. Kazakhstan ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. It participates in the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network, the International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies, and the International Counter-Corruption Council of CIS member-states. Kazakhstan is a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Corruption continues to be observed in nearly all sectors, including extractive industries, infrastructure projects, state procurements, and banking. The International Finance Corporation’s Enterprise Survey for Kazakhstan, conducted in 2019 with over 1,400 small, medium, and large enterprises, found that 12 percent of respondents had experienced at least one bribe payment request across six different transactions including paying taxes, obtaining permits or licenses, and obtaining utility connections. Contact at the government agency responsible for combating corruption: Olzhas Bektenov Chairman Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 37 Seyfullin Street, Nur-Sultan +7 (7172) 909002 kense@antikor.gov.kz Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Aidar Yegeubayev Chairman of the Board of Governors Transparency Kazakhstan Foundation Rahat Palace Business Centre, Satbayev koshesy 29/6, 10th Floor, Office 105, A15P5A0, Almaty, Kazakhstan +7(707) 711 4949 transparencykazakhstan@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment During violent civil unrest in January, at least 237 individuals were killed and there were many instances of theft, looting, and arson. More than 1,000 government and commercial buildings were damaged in Almaty and several other cities and rioters briefly seized Almaty International Airport. President Tokayev stated that the initial economic damages were estimated at $2-3 billion. After restoring order, President Tokayev assured foreign investors that the GOK would ensure a stable investment climate. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The OECD Skills Strategy project showed in 2021 that the country is improving rapidly in the use of skills at work, particularly digital skills. However, the skills of youth remain substantially below the OECD average. Adults also possess comparatively weak foundational and problem-solving skills, as the culture of adult learning is under-developed. The State Program of Education and Science Development 2020-2025 seeks to reduce the gap in educational achievement between urban and rural schools and to improve lifelong learning. Many large investors rely on foreign workers to fill the void. The government regulates foreign labor; foreign workers must obtain work permits. The GOK has made it a priority to ensure that Kazakhstani citizens are well represented in foreign enterprise workforces. The government is particularly keen to see Kazakhstanis hired into the managerial and executive ranks of foreign enterprises. Kazakhstan joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1993 and has ratified 24 out of 189 ILO conventions. The Constitution and Labor Code guarantee basic workers’ rights, including occupational safety and health, the right to organize, and the right to strike. On May 4, 2020, the government enacted amendments to labor-related laws, including the trade union law, to bring them closer to compliance with ILO standards. The three independent labor unions – the Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (FTUK), Commonwealth of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan Amanat, and Kazakhstan Confederation of Labor (KCL) – had over three million members, or 40 percent of the workforce, as of March 1, 2020. According to the FTUK, as of January 2021, 1.5 million workers, or 90.2 percent of FTUK members, labored with collective bargaining agreements in 2020. The number of collective agreements countrywide increased 19.1 percent from 120,200 in 2019 to 143,571 in 2020, the latest data available. The Labor Code describes a mechanism for resolution of individual labor disputes via direct negotiations with an employer, mediation commission, and court. It identifies a mechanism for resolution of collective labor disputes via direct negotiations with an employer, mediation commission, labor arbitration, and the court. Workers’ right to strike are limited. Courts have the power to declare a strike illegal at the request of an employer or the Prosecutor General’s Office. Employers may fire striking workers after a court declares a strike illegal. Please see additional details at the Human Rights Report at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kazakhstan/. Complaints about low wages, poor social benefits, and substandard working conditions resulted in over 363 strikes and labor disputes in 2021 and dozens in the first three months of 2020. Workers typically ended strikes after the companies’ management agreed to a partial increase of wages and bonuses. The average salary for men was 21.7 percent higher than that for women in 2021. The official unemployment rate is 4.9 percent, or around 450,000 unemployed people out of 9.2 million working-age Kazakhstanis. In March, KPMG estimated that the real unemployment rate was 10 percent in 2019, 12 percent in 2020, and may increase to 20 percent in 2022. The GOK reported in 2020 that 1.22 million citizens (or about 13.5 percent) of the country’s workforce worked in the informal economy. Informal workers were concentrated in the retail trade, transport services, agriculture, real estate, beauty and hair dressing salons, and laundry and dry-cleaning businesses. Small entrepreneurs and their employees for the most part worked without health, social, or pension benefits, and did not pay into the social security system. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Nur-Sultan Economic Section 3, Qoshkarbayev Str., Nur-Sultan +7 7172 70 21 00 InvestmentClimateKZ@state.gov Country/Economy resources: American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Kazakhstan www.amcham.kz Kenya Executive Summary Kenya has a positive investment climate that has made it attractive to international firms seeking a location for regional or pan-African operations. The novel coronavirus pandemic has negatively affected the short-term economic outlook, but the country remains resilient in addressing the health and economic challenges. In July 2020 the U.S. and Kenya launched negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, the first in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this progress, U.S. businesses operating in Kenya still face aggressive tax collection attempts, burdensome bureaucratic processes, and significant delays in receiving necessary business licenses. Corruption remains pervasive and Transparency International ranked Kenya 128 out of 180 countries in its 2021 Global Corruption Perception Index – reflecting modest progress over the last decade but still well below the global average. Kenya has strong telecommunications infrastructure and a robust financial sector and is a developed logistics hub with extensive aviation connections throughout Africa, Europe, and Asia. In 2018, Kenya Airways initiated direct flights to New York City in the United States. Mombasa Port is the gateway for East Africa’s trade. Kenya’s membership in the East African Community (EAC), the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and other regional trade blocs provides it with preferential trade access to growing regional markets. In 2017 and 2018 Kenya instituted broad reforms to improve its business environment, including passing the Tax Laws Amendment (2018) and the Finance Act (2018), which established new procedures and provisions related to taxes, eased the payment of taxes through the iTax platform, simplified registration procedures for small businesses, reduced the cost of construction permits, and established a “one-stop” border post system to expedite the movement of goods across borders. However, the Finance Act (2019) introduced taxes to non-resident ship owners, and the Finance Act (2020) enacted a Digital Service Tax (DST). The DST, which went into effect in January 2021, imposes a 1.5 percent tax on any transaction that occurs in Kenya through a “digital marketplace.” The oscillation between business reforms and conflicting taxation policies has raised uncertainty over the Government of Kenya’s (GOK) long-term plans for improving the investment climate. Kenya’s macroeconomic fundamentals remain among the strongest in Africa, averaging five to six percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth since 2015 (excepting 2020due to the negative economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic), five percent inflation since 2015, improving infrastructure, and strong consumer demand from a growing middle class. There is relative political stability and President Uhuru Kenyatta has remained focused on his “Big Four” development agenda, seeking to provide universal healthcare coverage, establish national food and nutrition security, build 500,000 affordable new homes, and increase employment by growing the manufacturing sector. Kenya is a regional leader in clean energy development with more than 90 percent of its on-grid electricity coming from renewable sources. Through its 2020, second Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement targets, Kenya has prioritized low-carbon resilient investments to reduce its already low greenhouse gas emissions a further 32 percent by 2030. Kenya has established policies and a regulatory environment to spearhead green investments, enabling its first private-sector-issued green bond floated in 2019 to finance the construction of sustainable housing projects. American companies continue to show strong interest to establish or expand their business presence and engagement in Kenya. Sectors offering the most opportunities for investors include: agro-processing, financial services, energy, extractives, transportation, infrastructure, retail, restaurants, technology, health care, and mobile banking. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 85 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $339 http://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $11,067.86 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kenya has enjoyed a steadily improving environment for FDI. Foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in Kenya generally receive the same treatment as local investors, and multinational companies make up a large percentage of Kenya’s industrial sector. The government’s export promotion programs do not distinguish between goods produced by local or foreign-owned firms. The primary regulations governing FDI are found in the Investment Promotion Act (2004). Other important documents that provide the legal framework for FDI include the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the Companies Ordinance, the Private Public Partnership Act (2013), the Foreign Investment Protection Act (1990), and the Companies Act (2015). GOK membership in the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides an opportunity to insure FDI against non-commercial risk. In November 2019, the Kenya Investment Authority (KenInvest), the country’s official investment promotion agency, launched the Kenya Investment Policy (KIP) and the County Investment Handbook (CIH) (http://www.invest.go.ke/publications/) which aim to increase inflow of FDI in the country. The KIP intends to guide laws being drafted to promote and facilitate investments in Kenya. KenInvest’s (http://www.invest.go.ke/) mandate is to promote and facilitate investment by helping investors understand and navigate local Kenya’s bureaucracy and regulations. KenInvest helps investors obtain necessary licenses and developed eRegulations, an online database, to provide businesses with user-friendly access to Kenya’s investment-related regulations and procedures (https://eregulations.invest.go.ke/?l=en). KenInvest prioritizes investment retention and maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors. All proposed legislation must pass through a period of public consultation, which includes an opportunity for investors to offer feedback. Private sector representatives can serve as board members on Kenya’s state-owned enterprises. Since 2013, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the country’s primary alliance of private sector business associations, has had bi-annual round table meetings with President Kenyatta and his cabinet. President Kenyatta also chairs a cabinet-level committee focused on improving the business environment. The American Chamber of Commerce has also increasingly engaged the GOK on issues regarding Kenya’s business environment. The government provides the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. To encourage foreign investment, in 2015, the GOK repealed regulations that imposed a 75 percent foreign ownership limit for firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange, allowing such firms to be 100 percent foreign owned. However, also in 2015, the government established regulations requiring Kenyan ownership of at least 15 percent of the share capital of derivative exchanges, through which derivatives, such as options and futures, can be traded. Kenya’s National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) policy guidelines, published in August 2020, adjusted the requirement for Kenyan ownership in foreign ICT companies from 20 to 30 percent, and broadened its applicability within the telecommunications, postal, courier, and broadcasting industries. Affected companies have 3 years to comply with the new requirement. The Mining Act (2016) reserves mineral acquisition rights to companies registered and established in Kenya, whether local or foreign owned. Mineral dealership licenses are only issued to Kenyan citizens or to corporations where at least 60 percent shareholding is held by Kenyan citizens. The Private Security Regulations Act (2016) restricts foreign participation in the private security sector by requiring at least 25 percent Kenyan ownership of private security firms. The National Construction Authority Act (2011) and the 2014 National Construction Authority regulations impose local content restrictions on “foreign contractors,” defined as companies incorporated outside Kenya or with more than 50 percent ownership by non-Kenyan citizens. The definition excludes companies owned by foreigners but incorporated in Kenya. The act requires foreign contractors enter subcontracts or joint ventures assuring that at least 30 percent of the contract work is done by local firms and locally unavailable skills transferred to a local person. The Kenya Insurance Act (2010) limits foreign capital investment in insurance companies to two-thirds, with no single person holding more than a 25 percent ownership share. In 2019, the World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review for the East Africa Community (EAC), of which Kenya is a member (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp484_e.htm). In 2011, the GOK established KenTrade to address trading partners’ concerns regarding the complexity of trade regulations and procedures. KenTrade’s mandate is to facilitate cross-border trade and to implement the National Electronic Single Window System. In 2017, KenTrade launched InfoTrade Kenya (infotrade.gov.ke), which provides a host of investment products and services to prospective investors. The site documents the process of exporting and importing by product, by steps, by paperwork, and by individuals, including contact information for officials responsible for relevant permits or approvals. In February 2019, Kenya implemented a new Integrated Customs Management System (iCMS) that includes automated valuation benchmarking, release of green-channel cargo, importer validation and declaration, and linkage with iTax. The iCMS enables customs officers to efficiently manage revenue and security related risks for imports, exports and goods on transit and transshipment. The Movable Property Security Rights Bill (2017) enhanced the ability of individuals to secure financing through movable assets, including using intellectual property rights as collateral. The Nairobi International Financial Centre (NIFC) Act (2017) seeks to provide a legal framework to facilitate and support the development of an efficient and competitive financial services sector in Kenya. The act created the Nairobi International Financial Centre Authority to establish and maintain an efficient financial services sector to attract and retain FID. The Kenya Trade Remedies Act (2017) provides the legal and institutional framework for Kenya’s application of trade remedies consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) law, which requires a domestic institution to receive complaints and undertake investigations in line with WTO Agreements. To date, however, Kenya has implemented only 7.5 percent of its commitments under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which it ratified in 2015. In 2020, Kenya launched the Kenya Trade Remedies Agency to investigate and enforce anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and trade safeguards, to protect domestic industries from unfair trade practices. The Companies (Amendment) Act (2017) clarified ambiguities in the original act and ensures compliance with global trends and best practices. The act amended provisions on the extent of directors’ liabilities and disclosures and strengthens investor protections. The amendment eliminated the requirements for small enterprises to hire secretaries, have lawyers register their firms, and to hold annual general meetings, reducing regulatory compliance and operational costs. The Business Registration Services (BRS) Act (2015) established the Business Registration Service, a state corporation, to ensure effective administration of laws related to the incorporation, registration, operation, and management, of companies, partnerships, and firms. The BRS also devolves certain business registration services to county governments, such as registration of business names and promoting local business ideas/legal entities- reducing registration costs. The Companies Act (2015) covers the registration and management of both public and private corporations. In 2014, the GOK established a Business Environment Delivery Unit to address investors’ concerns. The unit focuses on reducing the bureaucratic steps required to establish and do business. Its website (http://www.businesslicense.or.ke/) offers online business registration and provides detailed information regarding business licenses and permits, including requirements, fees, application forms, and contact details for the respective regulatory agencies. In 2013, the GOK initiated the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities program, requiring all public procurement entities to set aside a minimum of 30 percent of their annual procurement spending facilitate the participation of youth, women, and persons with disabilities (https://agpo.go.ke/). Kenya’s iGuide, an investment guide to Kenya (http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/kenya/about#, developed by UNCTAD and the International Chamber of Commerce, provides investors with up-to-date information on business costs, licensing requirements, opportunities, and conditions in developing countries. Kenya is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The GOK does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Despite this, Kenya is evolving into an outward investor in tourism, manufacturing, retail, finance, education, and media. Kenya’s outward investment has primarily been in the EAC, due to the preferential access afforded to member countries, and in a select few central African countries. The EAC allows free movement of capital among its six member states – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 3. Legal Regime Kenya’s regulatory system is relatively transparent and continues to improve. Proposed laws and regulations pertaining to business and investment are published in draft form for public input and stakeholder deliberation before their passage into law (http://www.kenyalaw.org/; http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/house-business/bills-tracker). Kenya’s business registration and licensing systems are fully digitized and transparent while computerization of other government processes, aimed at increasing transparency and efficiency, and reducing corruption, is ongoing. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution requires government to incorporate public participation before officials and agencies make certain decisions. The draft Public Participation Bill (2019) aims to provide the general framework for such public participation. The Ministry of Devolution has produced a guide for counties on how to carry out public participation; many counties have enacted their own laws on public participation. The Environmental Management and Coordination Act (1999) incorporates the principles of sustainable development, including public participation in environmental management. The Public Finance Management Act mandates public participation in the budget cycle. The Land Act, Water Act, and Fair Administrative Action Act (2015) also include provisions providing for public participation in agency actions. Kenya also has regulations to promote inclusion and fair competition when applying for tenders. Executive Order No. 2 of 2018 emphasizes publication of all procurement information including tender notices, contracts awarded, name of suppliers and their directors. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority publishes this information on the Public Procurement Information Portal, enhancing transparency and accountability (https://www.tenders.go.ke/website). However, the directive is yet to be fully implemented as not all state agencies provide their tender details to the portal. Many GOK laws grant significant discretionary and approval powers to government agency administrators, which can create uncertainty among investors. While some government agencies have amended laws or published clear guidelines for decision-making criteria, others have lagged in making their transactions transparent. Work permit processing remains a problem, with overlapping and sometimes contradictory regulations. American companies have complained about delays and non-issuance of permits that appear compliant with known regulations. Kenya is a member of the EAC, and generally applies EAC policies to trade and investment. Kenya operates under the EAC Custom Union Act (2004) and decisions regarding tariffs on imports from non-EAC countries are made by the EAC Secretariat. The U.S. government engages with Kenya on trade and investment issues bilaterally and through the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership. Kenya also is a member of COMESA and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). According to the Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2019, Kenya is the second most integrated country in Africa and a leader in regional integration policies within the EAC and COMESA regional blocs, with strong performance on regional infrastructure, productive integration, free movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration. The GOK maintains a Department of EAC Integration under the Ministry of East Africa and Regional Development. Kenya generally adheres to international regulatory standards. It is a member of the WTO and provides notification of draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Kenya maintains a TBT National Enquiry Point at http://notifyke.kebs.org. Additional information on Kenya’s WTO participation can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/kenya_e.htm. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Publicly listed companies adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that have been developed and issued in the public interest by the International Accounting Standards Board. The board is an independent, non-profit organization that is the standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation. Kenya is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Kenya’s legal system is based on English Common Law, and its constitution establishes an independent judiciary with a Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court, High Court, and Environment and Land Court. Subordinate courts include: Magistrates, Kadhis (Muslim succession and inheritance), Courts Martial, the Employment and Labor Relations Court, and the Milimani Commercial Courts – the latter two have jurisdiction over economic and commercial matters. In 2016, Kenya’s judiciary instituted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Courts, focused on corruption and economic crimes. There is no systematic executive or other interference in the court system that affects foreign investors, however, the courts often face allegations of corruption, as well as political manipulation, in the form of insufficient budget allocations by the executive branch, which significantly impact the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Delayed confirmation of judges nominated by the Judicial Service Commission has in the past resulted in an understaffed judiciary and prolonged delays in cases coming to trial and receiving judgments. The COVID-19 pandemic has also increased case backlogs, as courts reduced operations and turned to virtual hearings, particularly for non-urgent cases. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (2012) provides for the enforcement of judgments given in other countries that accord reciprocal treatment to judgments given in Kenya. Kenya has entered into reciprocal enforcement agreements with Australia, the United Kingdom, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Seychelles. Outside of such an agreement, a foreign judgment is not enforceable in Kenyan courts except by filing a suit on the judgment. Foreign advocates may practice as an advocate in Kenya for the purposes of a specified suit or matter if appointed to do so by the Attorney General. However, foreign advocates are not permitted to practice in Kenya unless they have paid to the Registrar of the High Court of Kenya the prescribed admission fee. Additionally, they are not permitted to practice unless a Kenyan advocate instructs and accompanies them to court. The regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The 2018 amendment to the Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA) Act expanded its scope to include protection of intellectual property rights, including those not registered in Kenya. The amended law empowered ACA inspectors to investigate and seize monetary gains from counterfeit goods. The 2019 amendment to the 2001 Copyright Act (established when the country had less than one percent internet penetration), formed the independent Copyright Tribunal, ratified the Marrakesh Treaty, recognized artificial intelligence generated works, established protections for internet service providers related to digital advertising, developed a register of copyrighted works by Kenya Copyright Board (KECOBO), and protected digital rights through procedures for take down notices. The Competition Act of 2010 created the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK). The law was amended in 2019 to clarify the law with regard to abuse of buyer power and empower the CAK to investigate alleged abuses of buyer power. The competition law prohibits restrictive trade practices, abuse of dominant position, and abuse of buyer power, and it grants the CAK the authority to review mergers and acquisitions and investigate and take action against unwarranted concentrations of economic power. All mergers and acquisitions require the CAK’s authorization before they are finalized. The CAK also investigates and enforces consumer-protection related issues. In 2014, the CAK established a KES one million (approximately USD 10,000) filing fee for mergers and acquisitions valued between one and KES 50 billion (up to approximately USD 500 million). The CAK charges KES two million (approximately USD 20,000) for larger transactions. Company acquisitions are possible if the share buy-out is more than 90 percent, although such transactions seldom occur in practice. The constitution guarantees protection from expropriation, except in cases of eminent domain or security concerns, and all cases are subject to the payment of prompt and fair compensation. The Land Acquisition Act (2010) governs due process and compensation related to eminent domain land acquisitions; however, land rights remain contentious and resolving land disputes is often a lengthy process. However, there are cases where government measures could be deemed indirect expropriation that may impact foreign investment. Some companies reported instances whereby foreign investors faced uncertainty regarding lease renewals because county governments were attempting to confiscate some or all of the project property. The Insolvency Act (2015) modernized the legal framework for bankruptcies. Its provisions generally correspond to those of the United Nations’ Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency. The act promotes fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies to protect the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor. The act repeals the Bankruptcy Act (2012) and updates the legal structure relating to insolvency of natural persons, incorporated, and unincorporated bodies. Section 720 of the Insolvency Act (2015) grants the force of law in Kenya to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law model law on cross border insolvency. Creditors’ rights are comparable to those in other common law countries, and monetary judgments are typically made in KES. The Insolvency Act (2015) increased the rights of borrowers and prioritizes the revival of distressed firms. The law states that a debtor will automatically be discharged from debt after three years. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Kenya. 4. Industrial Policies Kenya provides both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to foreign investors (http://www.invest.go.ke/starting-a-business-in-kenya/investment-incentives/). The minimum foreign investment to qualify for GOK investment incentives is USD 100,000. Investment Certificate benefits, including entry permits for expatriates, are outlined in the Investment Promotion Act (2004). Investment incentives are revised annually through the government’s budget policy statement and the Finance Act based on government’s strategic priorities at a given time. The government allows all locally-financed materials and equipment for use in construction or refurbishment of tourist hotels to be zero-rated for purposes of VAT calculation – excluding motor vehicles and goods for regular repair and maintenance. The National Treasury principal secretary, however, must approve such purchases. In a measure to boost the tourism industry, one-week employee vacations paid by employers are a tax-deductible expense. In 2018, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) exempted from VAT certain facilities and machinery used in the manufacturing of goods under Section 84 of the East African Community Common External Tariff Handbook. VAT refund claims must be submitted within 12 months of purchase. The Finance Act (2014) amended the Income Tax Act (1974) to reintroduce capital gains tax on transfer of property. Under this provision, gains derived from the sale or transfer of property by an individual or company are subject to a five percent tax. Capital gains on the sale or transfer of property related to the oil and gas industry are subject to a 37.5 percent tax. The Finance Act (2014) also reintroduced the withholding VAT system by government ministries, departments, and agencies. The system excludes the Railway Development Levy (RDL) imports for persons, goods, and projects; the implementation of an official aid-funded project; diplomatic missions and institutions or organizations gazetted under the Privileges and Immunities Act (2014). Kenya’s Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) offer special incentives for firms operating within their boundaries. By the end of 2019, Kenya had 74 EPZs, with 137 companies and 60,383 workers contributing KES 77.1 billion (about USD 713 million) to the Kenyan economy. Companies operating within an EPZ benefit from the following tax benefits: a 10-year corporate-tax holiday and a 25 percent tax thereafter; a 10-year withholding tax holiday; stamp duty exemption; 100 percent tax deduction on initial investment applied over 20 years; and VAT exemption on industrial inputs. About 54 percent of EPZ products are exported to the United States under AGOA. The majority of the exports are textiles – Kenya’s third largest export behind tea and horticulture – and more recently handicrafts. Eighty percent of Kenya’s textiles and apparel originate from EPZ-based firms. Approximately 50 percent of the companies operating in the EPZs are fully-owned by foreigners – mainly from India – while the rest are locally owned or joint ventures with foreigners. While EPZs aim to encourage production for export, Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are designed to boost local economies by offering benefits for goods that are consumed domestically and for export. SEZs allow for a wider range of commercial ventures, including primary activities such as farming, fishing, and forestry. The 2016 Special Economic Zones Regulations state that the Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZA) maintain an open investment environment to facilitate and encourage business by establishing simple, flexible, and transparent procedures for investor registration. The 2019 draft regulations include customs duty exemptions for goods and services in the SEZs and no trade related restrictions on the importation of goods and services into the SEZs. The rules also empower county governments to set aside public land to establish industrial zones. Companies operating in the SEZs receive the following benefits: all SEZ produced goods and services are exempted from VAT; the corporate tax rate for enterprises, developers, and operators reduced from 30 percent to 10 percent for the first 10 years and 15 percent for the next 10 years; exemption from taxes and duties payable under the Customs and Excise Act (2014), the Income Tax Act (1974), the EAC Customs Management Act (2004), and stamp duty; and exemption from county-level advertisement and license fees. There are currently SEZs in Mombasa (2,000 sq. km), Lamu (700 sq. km), Kisumu (700 sq. km), Naivasha (1,000 acres), Machakos (100 acres) and private developments designated as SEZs include Tatu City (5,000 acres) and Northlands (11,576 acres) in Kiambu. The Third Medium Term Plan of Kenya’s Vision 2030 economic development agenda calls for a feasibility study for an SEZ at Dongo Kundu in Mombasa, and the GOK is also considering establishing an SEZ near the Olkaria geothermal power plant. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (2015) offers preferences to firms owned by Kenyan citizens and to products manufactured or mined in Kenya. The “Buy Kenya, Build Kenya” policy mandates that 40 percent of the value of each GOK procurement be sourced locally. Tenders funded entirely by the government, with a value of less than KES 50 million (approximately USD 500,000), are reserved for Kenyan firms and goods. If the procuring entity seeks to contract with non-Kenyan firms or procure foreign goods, the act requires a report detailing evidence of an inability to procure locally. The act also calls for at least 30 percent of government procurement contracts to go to firms owned by women, youth, and persons with disabilities. The act further reserves 20 percent of county procurement tenders to residents of that county. The Finance Act (2017) amends the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal (PPAD) Act (2015) to introduce Specially Permitted Procurement as an alternative method of acquiring public goods and services. The new method permits state agencies to bypass existing public procurement laws under specific circumstances. Procuring entities are allowed to use this method where market conditions or behavior do not allow effective application of the 10 methods outlined in the Public Procurement and Disposal Act. The act gives the National Treasury Cabinet Secretary the authority to prescribe the procedure for carrying out specially permitted procurement. The 2020 PPAD regulations exempt government to government (G2G Exemption) procurements from PPAD Act requirements. G2G Exemption procurements must: provide a plan for local technology transfer; reserve 50 percent of the positions for Kenyans; and locally source 40 percent of inputs. The Data Protection Act (DPA) (2019) restricts the transfer of data in and out of Kenya without consent from the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) and the data owner, functionally requiring data localization. Entities seeking to transfer data out of Kenya must demonstrate to the DPC that the destination for the data has sufficient security and protection measures in place. The 2019 DPA gives discretion to the Ministry of Information Communication Technology Cabinet Secretary to prescribe localization requirements for data centers or servers, including strategic interests, protection of government revenue, and “certain nature of strategic processing.” The DPA authorizes the DPC to investigate data breaches and issue administrative fines of up to USD 50,000 and/or imprisonment of up to 10 years, depending on the severity of the breach. 5. Protection of Property Rights The constitution prohibits foreigners or foreign owned firms from owning freehold interest in land in Kenya. However, unless classified as agricultural, there are no restrictions on foreign-owned companies leasing land or real estate. The cumbersome and opaque process to acquire land raises concerns about security of title, particularly given past abuses related to the distribution and redistribution of public land. The Land (Extension and Renewal of Leases) Regulations (2017) prohibited automatic lease renewals and tied renewals to the economic output of the land, requiring renewals to be beneficial to the economy. If legally purchased property remains unoccupied, the property ownership can revert to other occupiers, including squatters. The constitution, and subsequent land legislation, created the National Land Commission (NLC), an independent government body mandated to review historical land injustices and provide oversight of government land policy and management. The creation of the NLC also introduced coordination and jurisdictional confusion between the NLC and the Ministry of Lands. In 2015, President Kenyatta commissioned the National Titling Center and promised to significantly increase the number of title deeds. From 2013 to 2018, an additional 4.5 million title deeds have been issued, however 70 percent of land in Kenya remains untitled. Due to corruption at the NLC, land grabbing, enabled by the issuance of multiple title registrations, remains prevalent. Ownership of property legally purchased but unoccupied can revert to other parties. Mortgages and liens exist in Kenya, but the recording system is unreliable – Kenya has only about 27,993 recorded mortgages as of 2019 in a country of 47.6 million people – and there are complaints that property rights and interests are seldom enforced. The legal infrastructure around land ownership and registration has changed in recent years, and land issues have delayed several major infrastructure projects. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution required all existing land leases to convert from 999 years to 99 years, giving the state the power to review leasehold land at the expiry of the 99 years, deny lease renewal, or confiscate the land if it determines the land had not been used productively. In 2010, the constitution also converted foreign-owned freehold interests into 99-year leases at a nominal “peppercorn rate” sufficient to satisfy the requirements for the creation of a legal contract. However, the implementation of this amendment remains somewhat ambiguous. In July 2020, the Ministry of Lands and Physical planning released draft electronic land registration regulations to guide land transactions. The major intellectual property enforcement issues in Kenya related to counterfeit products are corruption, lack of enforcement of penalties, insufficient investigations and seizures of counterfeit goods, limited cooperation between the private sector and law enforcement agencies, and reluctance of brand owners to file complaints with the Anti-Counterfeit Agency (ACA). The prevalence of “gray market” products – genuine products that enter the country illegally without paying import duties – also presents a challenge, especially in the mobile phone and computer sectors. Copyright piracy and the use of unlicensed software are also common. Kenya’s score in the 2021 International Property Rights Index, which assesses intellectual and physical property rights, decreased marginally from 5.0 in 2020 to 4.98 in 2021, though its relative ranking improved, rising from 10 to 8 of 28 countries in Africa, and from 86 to 85 of 129 globally. The Presidential Task Force on Parastatal Reforms (2013) proposed that the three intellectual property agencies – the Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI), the KECOBO and the Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA) – be merged into one government-owned entity, the Intellectual Property Office of Kenya. A task force on the merger, comprising staff from KIPI, ACA, KECOBO, and the Ministry of Industrialization, Trade and Enterprise Development is drafting the instruments of the merger, including consolidating intellectual property laws, and updating the legal framework and processes. To combat the import of counterfeits, the Ministry of Industrialization and the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) decreed in 2009 that all locally manufactured goods must have a KEBS import standardization mark (ISM). Several categories of imported goods, specifically food products, electronics, and medicines, must have an ISM. Under this program, U.S. consumer-ready products may enter Kenya without altering the U.S. label but must also have an ISM. Once the product qualifies for Confirmation of Conformity, KEBS issues the ISMs for free. KEBS and the Anti-Counterfeit Agency conduct random seizures of counterfeit imports, but do not maintain a clear database of their seizures. Kenya is not included on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Though relatively small by Western standards, Kenya’s capital markets are the deepest and most sophisticated in East Africa. The 2021 Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging and Frontier Markets Index, which assesses equity opportunity in 27 emerging economies, ranked the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) as the best performing exchange in sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade. The NSE operates under the jurisdiction of the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya. It is a full member of the World Federation of Exchanges, a founding member of the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) and the East African Securities Exchanges Association (EASEA). The NSE is a member of the Association of Futures Markets and is a partner exchange in the United Nations-led Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative. Reflecting international confidence in the NSE, it has always had significant foreign investor participation. In July 2019, the NSE launched a derivatives market that facilitates trading in future contracts on the Kenyan market. The bond market is underdeveloped and dominated by trading in government debt securities. The government’s domestic debt market, however, is deep and liquid. Long-term corporate bond issuances are uncommon, limiting long-term investment capital. In November 2019, Kenya repealed the interest rate capping law passed in 2016, which had slowed private sector credit growth. There are no restrictions on foreign investors seeking credit in the domestic financial market. Kenya’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems generally align with international norms. In 2017, the Kenya National Treasury launched the world’s first mobile phone-based retail government bond, locally dubbed M-Akiba. M-Akiba has generated over 500,000 accounts for the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation, and The National Treasury has made initial dividend payments to bond holders. The African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA) 2014-2019 report on venture capital performance in Africa ranked Kenya as having the second most developed venture capitalist ecosystem in sub-Saharan Africa. The report also noted that over 20 percent of the venture capital deals in Kenya, from 2014-2019, were initiated by companies headquartered outside Africa. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) is working with regulators in EAC member states through the Capital Market Development Committee (CMDC) and East African Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA) on a regional integration initiative and has successfully introduced cross-listing of equity shares. The combined use of both the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) and an automated trading system has aligned the Kenyan securities market with globally accepted standards. Kenya is a full (ordinary) member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Money and Banking System. Kenya has accepted the International Monetary Fund’s Article VIII obligation and does not provide restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. In 2021, the Kenyan banking sector included 42 commercial banks, one mortgage finance company, 14 microfinance banks, nine representative offices of foreign banks, eight non-operating bank holdings, 69 foreign exchange bureaus, 19 money remittance providers, and three credit reference bureaus, which are licensed and regulated by the CBK. Fifteen of Kenya’s commercial banks are foreign owned. Major international banks operating in Kenya include Citibank, Absa Bank (formerly Barclays Bank Africa), Bank of India, Standard Bank, and Standard Chartered. The 12 commercial banks listed banks on the Nairobi Securities Exchange owned 89 percent of the country’s banking assets in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected Kenya’s banking sector. According to the CBK, in 2020, 32 out of 41 commercial banks restructured loans to accommodate affected borrowers. Non-performing loans (NPLs) reached 14.6 percent by the end of 2021 – a three percent year-on-year increase. In March 2017, following the collapse of Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank, the CBK lifted its 2015 moratorium on licensing new banks. The CBK’s decision to restart licensing signaled a return of stability in the Kenyan banking sector. In 2018, Societé Generale (France) also set up a representative office in Nairobi. Foreign banks can apply for license to set up operations in Kenya and are guided by the CBK’s 2013 Prudential Guidelines. In November 2019, the GOK repealed the interest rate capping law through an amendment to the Banking Act. This amendment has enabled financial institutions to use market-based pricing for their credit products. While this change has slightly increased the cost of borrowing for some clients, it effectively ensures the private sector uninterrupted access to credit. The percentage of Kenya’s total population with access to financial services through conventional or mobile banking platforms is approximately 80 percent. According to the World Bank, M-Pesa, Kenya’s largest mobile banking platform, processes more transactions within Kenya each year than Western Union does globally. The 2017 National ICT Masterplan envisages the sector contributing at least 10 percent of GDP, up from 4.7 percent in 2015. Several mobile money platforms have achieved international interoperability, allowing the Kenyan diaspora to conduct financial transactions in Kenya from abroad. In 2019, the National Treasury published the Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund policy and the draft Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill (2019), both of which remain pending. The fund would receive income from any future privatization proceeds, dividends from state corporations, oil and gas, and minerals revenues due to the national government, revenue from other natural resources, and funds from any other source. The Kenya Information and Communications Act (2009) provides for the establishment of a Universal Service Fund (USF). The purpose of the USF is to fund national projects that have significant impact on the availability and accessibility of ICT services in rural, remote, and poor urban areas. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In 2013, the Presidential Task Force on Parastatal Reforms (PTFPR) published a list of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and recommended proposals to reduce the number of State Corporations from 262 to 187 to eliminate redundant functions between parastatals; close or dispose of non-performing organizations; consolidate functions wherever possible; and reduce the workforce — however, progress is slow (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BytnSZLruS3GQmxHc1VtZkhVVW8/edit). SOEs’ boards are independently appointed and published in Kenya Gazette notices by the Cabinet Secretary of the ministry responsible for the respective SOE. The State Corporations Act (2015) mandated the State Corporations Advisory Committee to advise the GOK on matters related to SOEs. Despite being public entities, only SOEs listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange publish their financial positions, as required by Capital Markets Authority guidelines. SOEs’ corporate governance is guided by the constitution’s chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity, the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) (L&I) and the Public Officer Ethics Act (2003), which establish integrity and ethics requirements governing the conduct of public officials. In general, competitive equality is the standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises. Certain parastatals, however, have enjoyed preferential access to markets. Examples include Kenya Reinsurance, which enjoys a guaranteed market share; Kenya Seed Company, which has fewer marketing barriers than its foreign competitors; and the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), which benefits from retail market outlets developed with government funds. Some state corporations have also benefited from easier access to government guarantees, subsidies, or credit at favorable interest rates. In addition, “partial listings” on the Nairobi Securities Exchange offer parastatals the benefit of accessing equity financing and GOK loans (or guarantees) without being completely privatized. In August 2020, the executive reorganized the management of SOEs in the cargo transportation sector and mandated the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) to oversee rail, pipeline and port operations through a holding company called Kenya Transport and Logistics Network (KTLN). ICDC assumes a coordinating role over the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), and Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC). KTLN focuses on lowering the cost of doing business in the country through the provision of cost effective and efficient transportation and logistics infrastructure. SOE procurement from the private sector is guided by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (2015) and the published Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations (2020) which introduced exemptions from the Act for procurement on bilateral or multilateral basis, commonly referred to as government-to-government procurement; introduced E-procurement procedures; and preferences and reservations, which gives preferences to the “Buy Kenya Build Kenya” strategy (http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2020/LN69_2020.pdf). Kenya is neither party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor an Observer Government. The Privatization Act (2003) establishes the Privatization Commission (PC) that is mandated to formulate, manage, and implement Kenya’s Privatization Program. GOK has been committed to implementing a comprehensive public enterprises reform program to increase private sector participation in the economy. The privatization commission (https://www.pc.go.ke/) is fully constituted with a board responsible for the privatization program. The PC has 26 approved privatization programs (https://www.pc.go.ke/sites/default/files/2019-06/APPROVED%20PRIVATIZATION%20PROGRAMME.pdf ). In 2020, the GOK began the process of privatizing some state-owned sugar firms through a public bidding process, including foreign investors. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Environmental Management and Coordination Act (1999) establishes a legal and institutional framework for responsible environment management, while the Factories Act (1951) safeguards labor rights in industries. The Mining Act (2016) directs holders of mineral rights to develop comprehensive community development agreements that ensure socially responsible investment and resource extraction and establish preferential hiring standards for residents of nearby communities. The legal system, however, has remained slow to prosecute violations of these policies. The GOK is not a signatory to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, and it is not yet an Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) implementing country or a Voluntary Principles Initiative signatory. Nonetheless, good examples of corporate social responsibility (CSR) abound as major foreign enterprises drive CSR efforts by applying international standards relating to human rights, business ethics, environmental policies, community development, and corporate governance. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Kenya has a 2010 Kenya National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) that focuses on integrating adaptation and mitigation measures in all government planning, budgeting, and development objectives, and a collaborative and joint action with all stakeholders. The NCCRS also proposes Kenya’s participation in carbon markets including the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism carbon offset scheme. In 2020, Kenya submitted its second Nationally Determined Contribution committing to reduce its already low total greenhouse gas emissions an additional 32 percent by 2030. Kenya develops five-year periodic National Climate Change Action Plans (NCCAP). The current NCCAP (2018-2022) seeks to further sustainable development and create an environment to pursue low-carbon climate resilient development. In 2016, Kenya published its Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan (2016-2030) which prioritizes investments and development pathways with higher green growth, cleaner environment, and higher productivity. Kenya’s 2018 National Climate Finance Policy supports a Green Climate Fund and the tracking of climate related activities in the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) through budget coding and tagging. Kenyan government strategies involve a multi-stakeholder approach to climate change response. This includes the national government, county government, non-governmental organizations, and private sector. The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) assesses all projects for compliance with set environmental and sustainability standards. Projects cannot commence until meeting set criteria for environmental impact assessment and being cleared by NEMA. Kenya’s climate policies are ranked favorably in global climate related indices, including: ClimateScope, the Green Growth Index, and The Green Future Index. The rankings measure the degree to which economies are pivoting toward clean energy, industry, agriculture, and society through investment in renewables, innovation and green finance, which market is the most attractive for energy transition investment, and performance in achieving sustainability targets including the UN Sustainable Development Goals. (https://global-climatescope.org/results/, https://greengrowthindex.gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Green-Growth-Index.pdf, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/25/1016648/green-future-index/) 9. Corruption Corruption is pervasive and entrenched in Kenya and international corruption rankings reflect its modest progress over the last decade. The Transparency International (TI) 2021 Global Corruption Perception Index ranked Kenya 128 out of 180 countries, its second-best ranking, and a marked improvement from its 2011 rank of 145 out of 176. Kenya’s score of 30, however, remained below the global average of 43 and below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 33. TI cited lack of political will, limited progress in prosecuting corruption cases, and the slow pace of reform in key sectors as the primary drivers of Kenya’s relatively low ranking. Corruption has been an impediment to FDI, with local media reporting allegations of high-level corruption related to health, energy, ICT, and infrastructure contracts. Numerous reports have alleged that corruption influenced the outcome of government tenders, and some U.S. firms assert that compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act significantly undermines their chances of winning public procurements. In 2018, President Kenyatta began a public campaign against corruption. While GOK agencies mandated to fight corruption have been inconsistent in coordinating activities, particularly regarding cases against senior officials, cabinet, and other senior-level arrests in 2019 and 2020 suggested a renewed commitment by the GOK to fight corruption. In 2020, the judiciary convicted a member of parliament to 67 years in jail or a fine of KES 707 million (approximately USD 7 million) for defrauding the government of KES 297 million (approximately USD 2.9 million). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), in 2019, secured 44 corruption-related convictions, the highest number of convictions in a single year in Kenya’s history. The EACC also recovered assets totaling more than USD 28 million in 2019 – more than the previous five years combined. Despite these efforts, much work remains to battle corruption in Kenya. Relevant legislation and regulations include the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003), the Public Officers Ethics Act (2003), the Code of Ethics Act for Public Servants (2004), the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (2010), the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012), and the Bribery Act (2016). The Access to Information Act (2016) also provides mechanisms through which private citizens can obtain information on government activities; however, government agencies’ compliance with this act remains inconsistent. The EACC monitors and enforces compliance with the above legislation. The Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) requires public officers to register potential conflicts of interest with the relevant commissions. The law identifies interests that public officials must register, including directorships in public or private companies, remunerated employment, securities holdings, and contracts for supply of goods or services, among others. The law requires candidates seeking appointment to non-elective public offices to declare their wealth, political affiliations, and relationships with other senior public officers. This requirement is in addition to background screening on education, tax compliance, leadership, and integrity. The law requires that all public officials, and their spouses and dependent children under age 18, declare their income, assets, and liabilities every two years. Information contained in these declarations is not publicly available, and requests to obtain and publish this information must be approved by the relevant commission. Any person who publishes or makes public information contained in a public officer’s declarations without permission may be subject to fine or imprisonment. The Access to Information Act (2016) requires government entities, and private entities doing business with the government, to proactively disclose certain information, such as government contracts, and comply with citizens’ requests for government information. The act also provides a mechanism to request a review of the government’s failure to disclose requested information, along with penalties for failures to disclose. The act exempts certain information from disclosure on grounds of national security. However, the GOK has yet to issue the act’s implementing regulations and compliance remains inconsistent. The private sector-supported Bribery Act (2016) stiffened penalties for corruption in public tendering and requires private firms participating in such tenders to sign a code of ethics and develop measures to prevent bribery. Both the constitution and the Access to Information Act (2016) provide protections to NGOs, investigative journalism, and individuals involved in investigating corruption. The Witness Protection Act (2006) establishes protections for witnesses in criminal cases and created an independent Witness Protection Agency. A draft Whistleblowers Protection Bill has been stalled in Parliament since 2016. President Kenyatta directed government ministries, departments, and agencies to publish all information related to government procurement to enhance transparency and combat corruption. While compliance is improving, it is not yet universal. The information is published online (https://tenders.go.ke/website/contracts/Index). Kenya is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and in 2016 published the results of a peer review process on UNCAC compliance: (https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2015_09_28_Kenya_Final_Country_Report.pdf). Kenya is also a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery, and a member of the Open Government Partnership. Kenya is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Kenya is also a signatory to the East African Community’s Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Rev. Eliud Wabukala (Ret.) Chairperson and Commissioner Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission P.O. Box 61130 00200 Nairobi, Kenya Phones: +254 (0)20-271-7318, (0)20-310-722, (0)729-888-881/2/3 Report corruption online: https://eacc.go.ke/default/report-corruption/ Contact at “watchdog” organization: Sheila Masinde Executive Director Transparency International Kenya Phone: +254 (0)722-296-589 Report corruption online: https://www.tikenya.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment Kenya’s 2017 national election was marred by violence, which claimed the lives of nearly 100 Kenyans, a contentious political atmosphere, which pitted the ruling Jubilee Party against the opposition National Super Alliance (NASA), as well as political interference and attacks on key institutions by both sides. In November 2017, the Kenyan Supreme Court unanimously upheld the October 2017 repeat presidential election results and President Uhuru Kenyatta’s win in an election boycotted by NASA leader Raila Odinga. In March 2018, President Kenyatta and Odinga publicly shook hands and pledged to work together to heal the political, social, and economic divides highlighted by the election. The GOK, civil society actors, private sector, and religious leaders are implementing a number of initiatives to promote peace in advance of the next national election in August 2022. The United States’ Travel Advisory for Kenya advises U.S. citizens to exercise increased caution due to the threat of crime and terrorism, and not to travel to counties bordering Somalia and to certain coastal areas due to terrorism. Due to the high risk of crime, it is common for private businesses and residences to have 24-hour guard services and well-fortified property perimeters. Instability in Somalia has heightened concerns of terrorist attacks, leading businesses and public institutions nationwide to increase their security measures. Tensions flare occasionally within and between ethnic communities in Kenya. Regional conflict, most notably in Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan, sometimes have spill-over effects in Kenya. There could be an increase in refugees entering Kenya due to drought and instability in neighboring countries, adding to the already large refugee population in the country. Kenya and its neighbors are working together to mitigate threats of terrorism and insecurity through African-led initiatives such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF). Despite attacks against Kenyan forces in Kenya and Somalia, the Government of Kenya has maintained its commitment to promoting peace and stability in Somalia. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In 2021, Kenya’s employed labor force was recorded at 17.4 million. Kenya’s informal economy is estimated to employ about 80 percent of the work force and to contribute 34 percent to Kenya’s gross domestic product. Informal enterprises are mainly run by women, have low levels of innovation, lack social security coverage, job security, and low levels of unionization. Kenya’s constitution mandates that no gender hold more than two-thirds of any positions in all elective or appointive bodies. Gender balance and regional inclusivity are key facets of public appointments. The Government of Kenya has not, however, ensured regional inclusivity in its appointments and public service human capital reports show dominant regional communities in appointments. The gender mandate is not mandatory for private sector companies. The private sector, however, has been instrumental in advancing gender balance in its work force composition. NSE-listed companies have 36 percent female board representations. The Government of Kenya mandates local employment in the category of unskilled labor. The Kenyan government regularly issues permit for key senior managers and personnel with special skills not available locally. For other skilled labor, any enterprise, whether local or foreign, may recruit from outside if the required skills are not available in Kenya. However, firms seeking to hire expatriates must demonstrate that they conducted an exhaustive search to find persons with the requisite skills in Kenya and were unable to find any such persons. The Ministry of EAC and Regional Development, however, has noted plans to replace this requirement with an official inventory of skills that are not available in Kenya. A work permit can cost up to KES 400,000 (approximately USD 4,000). Kenya has one of the highest literacy rates in the region at 90 percent. Investors have access to a large pool of highly qualified professionals in diverse sectors from a working population of over 47.5 percent out of a population of 47.6 million people. Expatriates are permitted to work in Kenya provided they have a work (entry) permit issued under the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (2011). In December 2018, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Cabinet Secretary issued a directive requiring foreign nationals to apply for their work permits prior to entering Kenya and to confirm that the skill they will provide is unavailable in Kenyan via the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection’s Kenya Labor Market Information System (KLMIS). KLMIS provides information regarding demand, supply, and skills available in Kenya’s labor market (https://www.labourmarket.go.ke/labour/supply/). Work permits are usually granted to foreign enterprises approved to operate in Kenya as long as the applicants are key personnel. In 2015, the Directorate of Immigration Services (DIS) expanded the list of requirements to qualify for work permits and special passes. Issuance of a work permit now requires an assured income of at least USD 24,000 annually or documented proof of capital of a minimum of USD 100,000 for investors. Exemptions are available, however, for firms in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, or consulting sectors with a special permit. International companies have complained that the visa and work permit approval process is slow, and some officials request bribes to speed the process. Since 2018, the DIS has more stringently applied regulations regarding the issuance of work permits. As a result, delayed or rejected work permit applications have become one of the most significant challenges for foreign companies in Kenya. A company holding an investment certificate granted by registering with KenInvest and passing health, safety, and environmental inspections becomes automatically eligible for three class D work (entry) permits for management or technical staff and three class G, I, or J work permits for owners, shareholders, or partners. More information on permit classes can be found at https://kenya.eregulations.org/menu/61?l=en. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), in 2019, the formal sector, excluding agriculture, employed 18.1 million people, with nominal average earnings of KES 778,248 (USD 7,780) per person per annum. Kenya has the highest rate of youth joblessness in East Africa. According to the 2019 census data, 5,341,182 or 38.9 percent of the 13,777,600 youths eligible to work are jobless. Employment in Kenya’s formal sector was 2.9 million in 2019 up from 2.8 million in 2018. The government is the largest employer in the formal sector, with an estimated 865,200 government workers in 2019. In the private sector, agriculture, forestry, and fishing employed 296,700 workers while manufacturing employed 329,000 workers. However, Kenya’s large informal sector – consisting of approximately 80 percent of the labor force – makes accurate labor reporting difficult. The GOK has instituted different programs to link and create employment opportunities for the youth, published weekly in GOK’s “MyGov” newspaper insert. Other measures include the establishment of the National Employment Authority which hosts the National Employment Authority Integrated Management System website that provides public employment service by listing vacancies ( https://neaims.go.ke/). The Kenya Labour Market Information System (KLMIS) portal (https://www.labourmarket.go.ke/), run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection in collaboration with the labor stakeholders, is a one-stop shop for labor information in the country. The site seeks to help address the challenge of inadequate supply of crucial employment statistics in Kenya by providing an interactive platform for prospective employers and job seekers. Both local and foreign employers are required to register with National Industrial Training Authority (NITA) within 30 days of operating. There are no known material compliance gaps in either law or practice with international labor standards that would be expected to pose a reputational risk to investors. The International Labor Organization has not identified any material gaps in Kenya’s labor law or practice with international labor standards. Kenya’s labor laws comply, for the most part, with internationally recognized standards and conventions, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection is currently reviewing and ensuring that Kenya’s labor laws are consistent with the constitution. The Labor Relations Act (2007) provides that workers, including those in export processing zones, are free to form and join unions of their choice. Collective bargaining is common in the formal sector but there is no data on the percentage of the economy covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBA). However, in 2019 263 CBAs were registered in the labor relations court with the Wholesale and Retail trade sector recording the most, at 88. The law permits workers in collective bargaining disputes to strike but requires the exhaustion of formal conciliation procedures and seven days’ notice to both the government and the employer. Anti-union discrimination is prohibited, and the government does not have a history of retaliating against striking workers. The law provides for equal pay for equal work. Regulation of wages is part of the Labor Institutions Act (2014), and the government has established basic minimum wages by occupation and location. The GOK has a growing trade relationship with the United States under the AGOA framework which requires compliance with labor standards. The Ministry of Labor is reviewing its labor laws to align with international standards as labor is also a chapter in the Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the U.S. In 2019, the government continued efforts with dozens of partner agencies to implement a range of programs for the elimination of child and forced labor. However, low salaries, insufficient resources, and attrition from retirement of labor inspectors are significant challenges to effective enforcement. Employers in all sectors routinely bribe labor inspectors to prevent them from reporting infractions, especially regarding child labor violations. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $96.01 billion 2019 $101.01 billion https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD?locations=KE Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $353 M BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_ multinational_companies_comprehensive_data.htm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $-16 M BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_ multinational_companies_comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 1.2% 2020 0.1% https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2021 *Host Country Statistical Source: Central Bank of Kenya, Foreign Investment Survey 2020 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Economic Section U.N. Avenue, Nairobi, Kenya +254 (0)20 363 6050 Kosovo Executive Summary Already one of Europe’s poorest countries, Kosovo was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic but recovered quickly. Although economic growth estimates for 2021 differ significantly between the Central Bank of Kosovo’s 9.9 percent estimate and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 7.5 percent estimate, both point to a robust economic recovery and faster growth rates than initially forecast. A large inflow of remittances and diaspora tourism combined with increased exports contributed to this growth. Although many international financial institutions remain cautious in forecasting economic growth for 2022 given the unpredictability of the pandemic and global supply chain shocks, most expect Kosovo’s GDP to grow between 3.8 and 4 percent. The pandemic has not led to permanent changes in Kosovo’s investment policies. The government enacted several relief measures that are all temporary and focused on maintaining employment levels and helping businesses preserve liquidity. As such, Kosovo’s COVID-19 relief measures did not significantly affect its broader investment policy environment. Kosovo has potential to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), but that potential is constrained by its failure to address several serious structural issues, including limited regional and global economic integration; political interference in the economy; corruption; an unreliable energy supply; a large informal sector; difficulty establishing property rights; and tenuous rule of law, including a glaring lack of contract enforcement. The country’s ability to sustain growth relies significantly on international financial support and remittances. Its ongoing dispute with Serbia and lack of formal recognition by many countries and international organizations, including the lack of membership in the United Nations, also create obstacles to doing business. Increased energy prices throughout Europe, particularly in the last quarter of 2021 through the first quarter of 2022 exposed Kosovo’s vulnerability to energy price shocks and its serious issues with energy reliability. By January 2022, the Kosovo government had to subsidize the energy sector in the amount of €90 million (about 1.3 percent of GDP) and increase energy tariffs to cover the cost of increased energy imports. Kosovo also faced blackouts due to maintenance issues at its two dilapidated coal-fired power plants. The Energy Regulatory Office in February 2022 instituted block tariffs for residential consumers but did not change electricity prices for businesses. In 2021, the net flow of FDI in Kosovo was estimated at $466 million, a significant increase over the 2020 amount of $382 million. Real estate and leasing activities are the largest beneficiaries of FDI, followed by financial services and energy. The food, IT, infrastructure, and energy sectors are growing and are likely to attract new FDI. One key sector of the economy that has sustained strong growth is the wood processing sector. Companies producing kitchens, baths, doors, upholstered furniture, and combined wood, metal and glass have seen increased investment since 2017. The sector is maturing and receiving support in business development services and access to finance. Kosovo is also addressing its energy security by increasing its renewable energy capacity and facilitating more bankable renewable projects. Kosovo has also rapidly increased the exports of bedding, mattresses, and cushions, but this development has mainly been concentrated within a few companies. Kosovo’s laws and regulations are consistent with international benchmarks for supporting and protecting investment, though justice sector enforcement remains weak. Kosovo has a flat corporate income tax of 10 percent. In 2016, the government partnered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international donors to launch the Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund, which improves access to credit. With USAID assistance, Kosovo passed legislation to establish a Commercial Court, which aims to handle business disputes fairly, efficiently, and predictably and is expected to improve the business enabling environment by reducing opportunities for corruption and building investor and private sector trust in the judiciary. Property rights and interests are enforced, but legal system weaknesses and difficulties associated with establishing title to real estate, in part due to competing claims arising from the history of conflict with Serbia, make enforcement difficult. Kosovo has a legal framework for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), but enforcement remains weak, largely due to a lack of resources. While IPR theft occurs in Kosovo, there is insufficient data on how widespread the issue is. The issue does not get attention in the media, and the U.S. Embassy in Pristina has not had significant complaints of IPR theft in Kosovo from U.S. companies. Anecdotally, the IPR theft that occurs tends to be mostly in lower-value items that likely do not garner significant attention. All legal, regulatory, and accounting systems in Kosovo are modeled on EU standards and international best practices. All large companies are required to comply with international accounting standards. Investors should note that despite regulatory requirements for public consultation and the establishment of an online platform for public comments ( http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net ), some business groups complain that regulations are passed with little substantive discussion or stakeholder input. In Kosovo’s recent history, the political environment has been characterized by short electoral cycles and prolonged periods of caretaker governments. However, the current governing coalition has an overwhelming majority, and all indications point to the likelihood that it will remain in place for much, if not all, of its four-year term. In addition, there have been few substantive changes in legislation and regulations on foreign investment and the general business environment despite previously short electoral cycles. To date, the U.S. Embassy in Pristina is not aware of any damage to commercial projects or installations. The government, which took office March 2021, ran on an anti-corruption platform and has a strong electoral mandate to enact positive change. The public consistently ranks Kosovo’s high unemployment rate (officially 25.9 percent in 2021) as among its greatest concerns. Unemployment levels for first-time job seekers and women are considerably higher than the official rate. Many experts cite a skills gap and high reservation wage as significant contributing factors. Despite the challenges, Kosovo has attracted a number of significant investors, including several international firms and U.S. franchises. Some investors are attracted by Kosovo’s relatively young population, low labor costs, relative proximity to the EU market, and natural resources. Global supply disruptions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic have sparked greater interest recently from some businesses to utilize Kosovo as a base for near-shoring production destined for the EU market. Kosovo does provide preferential access for products to enter the EU market through a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 283 Million http://data.imf.org/CDIS World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kosovo welcomes FDI. Kosovo’s laws do not discriminate against foreign investors. The current government (as the government before) – including the Prime Minister’s Office; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade; and the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers – recognizes the importance of FDI to the expansion of the private sector. The mission of the Kosovo Investment Enterprise and Support Agency (KIESA) is to promote and support foreign investments. The agency is tasked with offering a menu of services, including assistance and advice on starting a business in Kosovo, assistance with applying for a site in a special economic zone or as a business incubator, facilitation of meetings with different state institutions, and participation in business-to-business meetings and conferences. In practice, however, many foreign and local companies have complained that KIESA has extremely weak capacity to provide the services under its mandate and must be strengthened. Foreign chambers of commerce – including the American, German, and European – participate in dialogue platforms with the government, although overall communication between the government and the private sector has slightly deteriorated recently. The laws and regulations on establishing and owning business enterprises and engaging in all forms of remunerative activity apply equally to foreign and domestic private entities. Kosovo legislation does not interfere with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or sale of interests in enterprises by private entities. Under Kosovo law, foreign firms and local businesses operating in Kosovo are treated equally. Kosovo does not have an investment screening mechanism, though the U.S. government is actively working with Kosovo on the best practices for developing and implementing such a mechanism. There have been no reports of restrictions from U.S. investors. There are no licensing restrictions particular to foreign investors and no requirement for domestic partners for joint ventures. Kosovo is not a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), so there are no Kosovo-specific investment policy reviews from these organizations. However, Kosovo was profiled as part of the OECD’s report on “Competitiveness in Southeast Europe 2021: A Policy Outlook,” in which Kosovo received an overall score of 2.0 in the area of investment policy and promotion (versus an average of 3.0 across the Western Balkans 6 countries). In February 2017, the Pristina think tank, Group for Legal and Political Studies, published the report, “ How ‘friendly’ is Kosovo for Foreign Direct Investments: A Policy Review of Gaps from a Regional Market Perspective .” The government has taken steps to remove barriers to facilitate businesses’ operations and improve related government services. With USAID’s assistance, the Government of Kosovo continued a series of business climate reforms that have contributed to Kosovo’s improved ranking in the World Bank Doing Business Index over the years. Per the amended Law on Support to Small and Medium Enterprises, KIESA supports both domestic and foreign-owned micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), without any specific eligibility criteria. Such services include voucher programs for training and advisory services, investment facilitation, assistance to women and young business owners, and the provision of business space with complete infrastructure at industrial parks, at minimal cost. The Kosovo Business Registration Agency (KBRA), part of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade, registers all new businesses, business closures, and business modifications. The KBRA website is available in English and can be accessed at arbk.rks-gov.net . As of March 2022, some steps in the registration process can be completed online. Successful registrants will receive a business-registration certificate and a VAT number. New businesses must register employees for tax and pension programs with the Tax Administration under the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers. Business registration generally takes one day for an individual business and up to three days for a limited liability company or a joint stock company. A notary is not required when opening a new business unless the business registration also involves a transfer of real property. Kosovo does not promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. There are no restrictions on investments abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Law on Public Procurement delegates procurement authority to budgetary units (i.e., ministries, municipalities, and independent agencies) except when the government specifically authorizes the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers’ Central Procurement Agency to procure goods and/or services on its behalf. All tenders are advertised in Albanian and Serbian, and for most important projects, also in English. The Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) oversees and supervises all public procurement and ensures that the Law on Public Procurement is fully implemented. As of March 2022, an e-procurement platform is fully operational; all procurements are handled through it, which has greatly enhanced transparency. The PPRC publishes contract award information on its website ( https://e-prokurimi.rks-gov.net/Home/ClanakItemNew.aspx?id=327 ). The National Audit Office conducts annual procurement audits of all Kosovo ministries, municipal authorities, and agencies that receive funds from the Kosovo consolidated budget. The Procurement Review Body (PRB), an independent administrative body, is responsible for handling appeals related to government procurement. The PRB’s Board, its highest decision-making body, has been unable to process appeals at the highest level, due to board vacancies that have gone unfilled by the Government of Kosovo (GoK) for more than a year. The Kosovo Assembly is responsible for rule-making and regulatory actions, while government ministries and agencies draft and authorize secondary legislation (i.e., implementing regulations). Municipal assemblies and mayors have regulatory authority at the local level, which rarely extends to the broader issues of investment climate. The Government of Kosovo is working to align all legal, regulatory, and accounting systems in Kosovo with EU standards and international best practices. Publicly listed companies are required to comply with international accounting standards. The government requires Environmental and Social Impact Assessment studies for many projects, especially those with a large environmental or social footprint, such as in the energy and mining sectors. The Assembly publishes draft laws on its website ( http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/shq/projektligjet-dhe-ligjet/ ). The relevant committees also hold public hearings on proposed laws, including investment laws. The 2016 regulation on the Minimum Standards for Public Consultation Process clarifies the standards, principles, and procedures for consultations during the drafting of legislation. Kosovo has developed an online platform for public comments ( http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net/ ) and publishes all laws and most rules and regulations in the Official Kosovo Gazette ( https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ ) and on the Kosovo Assembly’s website. The Government of Kosovo is currently working to annul, amend, and update all secondary legislation that is outdated or that might otherwise contradict primary legislation. The Government of Kosovo is also working on publishing all secondary legislation in the Official Gazette and relevant ministerial websites. The Law on Public Financial Management and Accountability requires a detailed impact assessment of any budgetary implications before new regulations can be implemented. The Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers regularly publishes detailed reports on Kosovo’s public finances and debt obligations. Despite the regulatory requirements, some businesses and business associations complain that regulations are still passed with little substantive discussion or stakeholder input. Kosovo is represented in CEFTA by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and is pursuing EU integration. Through its Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, Kosovo is working to harmonize its laws and regulations with EU standards. Kosovo is not a member of the WTO. Kosovo is a signatory to the July 2017 Multi-Annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six and its subsequent Common Regional Market Action Plan . This action plan aims to increase regional integration in the fields of trade, investment policy, labor force mobility, and digitalization. In 2016, the Kosovo Assembly amended the constitution to enhance the independence of the judiciary in line with EU requirements. Despite significant reforms and improvements in court efficiency, backlog, and sentencing procedures, the judiciary lacks sufficient subject-matter expertise to effectively handle complex economic issues. While complainants have the right to challenge court decisions, regulations, and enforcement actions in the regular court system, as well as the constitutional court, many analysts view Kosovo’s courts as politically influenced by the executive branch, with special treatment or “selective justice” for high-profile, well-connected individuals. While Kosovo court conviction rates generally match regional averages, the rate falls considerably when filtered for high-profile corruption cases. In January 2022, the Kosovo Assembly unanimously adopted the Law on the Commercial Court, which establishes a special court for handling business disputes fairly, efficiently, and predictably. The Commercial Court aims to improve the business enabling environment by reducing opportunities for corruption and building investor and private sector trust in the judiciary. USAID supported the Kosovo Ministry of Justice in developing the law through an inclusive and participatory process with the judiciary, commercial law experts, practitioners, academics, businesses, and civil society representatives. The Kosovo Judicial Council, with the help of USAID, developed and is implementing an Action Plan for operationalizing the Commercial Court, including by developing regulations on internal organization, case transfer, and recruitment of key personnel. Significant legislation overhauling the 2004 Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 2018, brought Kosovo’s Criminal Law in compliance with the EU Convention on Human Rights, updating definitions and best practices. The Criminal Code contains penalties for tax evasion, bankruptcy, fraud, intellectual property rights offenses, antitrust, securities fraud, money laundering, and corruption. The Special Department of the Special Prosecutor of the Republic of Kosovo handles high-level cases of corruption, organized crime, terrorism, etc. Kosovo’s civil legal system provides for property and contract enforcement. The Department for Economic Affairs within the Basic Court of Pristina has jurisdiction over economic disputes between both legal and natural persons, including reorganization, bankruptcy, and liquidation of economic persons; disputes regarding impingement of competition; and protection of property rights and intellectual property rights across the entire territory of Kosovo. A similar department within the Court of Appeals holds jurisdiction over “disputes between domestic and foreign economic persons in their commercial affairs” and addresses all appeals coming from the Pristina Basic Court’s Department for Economic Affairs. Commercial cases can take anywhere from six months to several years to resolve. The upcoming Commercial Court, expected to open in 2022, will supplant the responsibilities of the Economic Departments of the Pristina Basic Court and the Court of Appeals in handling commercial cases and the Administrative Department of the Pristina Basic Court in handling commercial-related administrative cases. The Law on Enforcement Procedures permits claimants to utilize bailiffs licensed by the Ministry of Justice to execute court-ordered judgments. In addition, the Laws on Arbitration and Mediation have helped to address impediments to alternative dispute resolution and to enforcing arbitral awards. Foreign firms operating in Kosovo are entitled to the same privileges and treatment as local businesses. Kosovo’s commercial laws are available to the public in English, as well as Kosovo’s official languages (Albanian and Serbian) on the Kosovo Assembly’s website ( http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/shq/projektligjet-dhe-ligjet/ ) and on the Official Gazette website ( http://gzk.rks-gov.net/default.aspx ). Laws of particular relevance include: The Law on Foreign Investment: provides a set of fundamental rights and guarantees to ensure protection and fair treatment in strict accordance with accepted international standards and practices. The Law on Business Organizations: regulates the registration and closure of a company and the rights and obligations of shareholders, authorized representatives, and others included in the business management structure. The Law on Late Payments in Commercial Transactions: discourages late payments and regulates the calculation of interest on late payments. The Law on Bankruptcy: regulates all matters related to the insolvency of business organizations; the provisions for the protection, liquidation, and distribution of the assets of a bankrupt debtor to its creditors; and the reorganization and discharge of debt for qualified business organizations. The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing: enabled Kosovo to join Egmont Group, an inter-governmental network of 152 Financial Intelligence Units whose members exchange expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Credit Guarantee Fund Law: increased access to finance for all MSMEss in Kosovo in an effort to increase employment, boost local production, and improve the trade balance. The Law on Foreign Trade, and the Law on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures: provides a set of principles and rules on trade, as well as provisions for government interventions in cases of dumping and countervailing measures. There are two main laws that regulate transactions for competition-related concerns: The Law on Protection of Competition and the Law on Antidumping and Countervailing Measures. The Competition Authority is responsible for implementing the Law on Protection of Competition, but generally lacks the human resources to conduct thorough investigations. The Authority has lacked a decision-making body since May 2021. The Trade Department of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade is responsible for the implementation of the Law on Antidumping and Countervailing Measures. In September 2018, Kosovo’s Assembly approved the Law on Safeguard Measures on Imports, which allows the trade minister to impose a provisional safeguard measure for up to 200 days. Articles seven and eight of the Foreign Investment Law limit expropriation to cases with a clear public interest and protect foreign investments from unreasonable expropriation, guaranteeing due process and timely compensation payment based on fair-market prices. The Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property permits government or municipal expropriation of private property when such action is in the public interest; articles five through thirteen of the Law define expropriation procedures. An eminent domain clause limits legal recourse in cases arising from the expropriation and sale of property through the privatization of state-owned enterprises. There is no history of expropriation other than uncontroversial, undisputed expropriations for work in the public interest, such as roadway construction. 4. Industrial Policies Kosovo has established a flat corporate income tax of ten percent. To encourage investment, the government can grant certain VAT-related privileges, such as a six-month VAT deferment upon presentation of a bank guarantee for companies importing capital goods. Suppliers may export goods and services without being required to collect VAT from foreign buyers. Suppliers may claim credit for taxes on inputs by offsetting those taxes against gross VAT liabilities or claiming a refund. The government can issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects but has not yet done so. Kosovo does not have legislation that incentivizes businesses owned by underrepresented investors. The Customs agency has enacted an administrative instruction that reduces the number of documents required for export and import. Only two documents are needed to export (a commercial invoice and a customs export declaration) and only three are now required to import (a commercial invoice, a customs import declaration, and a certificate of origin). Kosovo has previously offered feed-in tariffs for a quota of renewable energy projects, which has been fulfilled. Kosovo currently does not offer any incentives for renewable energy investments, but it is working on its energy strategy which will define its energy future and subsequent policies. The Kosovo Customs and Excise Code is compliant with EU and World Customs Organization standards, and addresses topics such as bonded warehouses, inward and outward processing, transit of goods, and free-trade zones. In addition to imported goods, some domestically produced goods from designated industries can be stored in bonded warehouses when these goods meet export criteria. Foreign firms are permitted to import production inputs for the manufacture of export goods without paying taxes or customs duties. The Customs Code permits the establishment of zones for manufacturing and export purposes, and the Law on Economic Zones regulates their establishment. In 2014, Kosovo established three economic zones in the municipalities of Mitrovica/e, Gjakovë/Djakovica, and Prizren. Currently only the economic zone of Mitrovica/e has completed the legal and administrative procedures for building infrastructure, but the zone remains to be established and operationalized. Three business parks and one business incubator are operational. Kosovo does not specify performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investments in Kosovo. There are no onerous requirements that would inhibit the mobility of foreign investors or their staff. There are no conditions on permissions to invest, and the government does not mandate local employment. Investment incentives apply uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors, on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the tender, Kosovo may require foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. Kosovo does not yet have standard rules on data transmission or storage. The Agency for Information Society is responsible for the storage of data for the central government, and other institutions store their respective data as well. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are enforced, but weaknesses in the legal system and difficulties related to establishing title to real estate, in part due to competing claims arising from the history of conflict with Serbia, can make enforcement difficult. Minority communitiesin particular, are frequently unable to fully exercise their property rights. The country’s legal and regulatory framework is complex, but generally, Kosovo’s de jure property-related laws are well structured and provide for security and transferability of rights. In 2018, Kosovo adopted a new Law on the Treatment of Constructions without Permit under which all buildings constructed without a permit prior to 2018 are subject to legalization and formalization through registration in the Cadaster and Immovable Property Rights Registry, thereby protecting individual property rights and unlocking this capital for circulation in the formal economy and bringing all real property into the property tax system. The jurisdictions of government ministries, municipal authorities, and independent agencies often overlap, and the court system is backlogged with property-related cases. Mortgages and liens are available, but the range of financial products is limited. Mortgage agreements must be registered in cadastral records by the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, while pledge agreements must be registered with the pledge registry, which is a centralized registry office in the Business Registration Agency. The Kosovo Property Comparison and Verification Agency (KPCVA) is responsible for receiving, registering, and resolving property claims on private immovable property, including agricultural and commercial property related to the 1998-1999 conflict and post-conflict period. Decisions of the Kosovo Property Claims Commission within the KPCVA are subject to a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The KPCVA has received 42,749 total claims, the vast majority of which relate to agricultural property. The KPCVA holds the mandate for implementing decisions of the Housing and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) that are pending enforcement. Resolution of residential, agricultural, and commercial property claims remains a serious and contentious issue in Kosovo and limits the development of the formal property market needed for more stable economic growth. Many property records were destroyed or removed to Serbia by the Serbian government during the 1998-1999 conflict, which can make determining rightful ownership difficult. The country is in the process of rebuilding the property registry and an EU-facilitated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue includes a component focused on comparing the cadastral records with the records taken by Serbia and resolving any gaps, predicated on Serbia returning the cadastral records to Kosovo. The KPCVA is charged with carrying out the task of property comparison and verification. In February 2022, the Kosovo Assembly approved the Law on Property Rights of Foreign Citizens in the Republic of Kosovo, which establishes the principle of reciprocity and restricts ownership rights of a foreign national only in cases where the origin country of those foreign nationals restricts ownership rights to Kosovo nationals. In early 2017, Kosovo launched the national strategy on land and property rights reform, which includes a provision to clarify and codify regulations regarding property ownership by foreign and/or non-resident investors. Per Article 40 in the Law on Property and Other Real Rights, a proprietary possessor acquires ownership of immovable property after ten years of uninterrupted and uncontested possession. Registration of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Kosovo conforms with regional and international practices. The trademark registration process takes approximately nine months, while patent approval takes about 18 months. Public awareness of the importance of IPR is low. Evidence suggests there is little domestic production of counterfeit goods in Kosovo, but the importation of counterfeit goods, especially apparel, is a concern. The government tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. The Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade established the Industrial Property Rights Office (IPO) in 2007, which is tasked with IPR protection. Kosovo’s IPR laws were amended in 2015 to align with EU standards and strengthen legal remedies for right holders. Kosovo’s Law on Patents, Law on Trademarks, Law on Industrial Design, and Law on Geographical Indices, together with the relevant Criminal Code and Customs provisions, provide for strong protection of IPR and comply with related international conventions, even though Kosovo is not party to the associated international organizations. Examples of these conventions include the Paris Convention, the Budapest Treaty, the Madrid Protocol, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In 2018, the Assembly approved the Law on Customs Measures for Protection of Intellectual Property Rights to harmonize Kosovo law with EU regulations. To enhance IPR enforcement and increase interagency coordination, the government has adopted an IPR strategy and established the National Intellectual Property Council and a Task Force Against Piracy. The Council and the Task Force have similar structures and are comprised of the IPO, the Copyright Office, Customs, Kosovo Police Departments for Economic Crime and Corruption and Cyber Crimes, the Market Inspectorate, and the Ministry of Justice. The Council also includes the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, judicial courts, and other government and non-governmental institutions. Kosovo is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. Kosovo is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and there is no WIPO country profile for Kosovo. 6. Financial Sector Kosovo has an open-market economy, and the market determines interest rates. Individual banks conduct risk analysis and determine credit allocation. Foreign and domestic investors can get credit on the local market. Access to credit for the private sector and financial products are limited but gradually improving. The country generally has a positive attitude towards foreign portfolio investment. Kosovo does not have a stock exchange. The regulatory system conforms with EU directives and international standards. There are no restrictions beyond normal regulatory requirements related to capital sourcing, fit, and properness of the investors. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) has taken all required measures to improve policies for the free flow of financial resources. Requirements under the SAA with the EU oblige the free flow of capital. The government respects the IMF’s Article VIII conditions on the flow of capital. In early 2006, Kosovo created a credit registry managed by the Central Bank of Kosovo. It serves as a database for customers’ credit history and aims to help commercial banks and non-banking institutions assess customers’ credit worthiness. Banks and non-banking institutions are required to report to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, but only authorized banking and non-banking institution personnel can access it. In addition to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade offers a Pledge Registry Sector, a mechanism that records data for collateral pledges. Kosovo has 11 commercial banks (of which nine are foreign) and 30 micro-finance institutions (of which 13 are foreign). The official currency of Kosovo is the Euro, although the country is not a member of the Eurozone. In the absence of an independent monetary policy, prices are highly responsive to market trends in the larger Eurozone. Kosovo’s private banking sector remains stable, well capitalized, and profitable despite the COVID-19 pandemic’s negative economic shock to the economy. Difficult economic conditions, weak contract enforcement, and a risk-averse posture have traditionally limited banks’ lending activities. However, financial services and bank lending have steadily improved over the years, albeit from a low baseline. In March 2022, the rate of non-performing loans was 2.3 percent, which stands slightly lower than the pre-pandemic February 2020 rate of 2.5 percent. The concentration of the three largest banks’ assets have decreased slightly to 53 percent in March 2022 compared to 56.2 percent in March 2021. The assets of the entire banking sector total 5.9 billion euros; foreign-owned banks have 85.6 percent of the market share. Relatively little lending is directed toward long-term investment activities, although this trend has been changing slowly. Interest rates have dropped significantly in the past decade, from an average of about 12.7 percent in 2012 to an average of 5.7 percent in March 2022. Slower lending is notable in the northern part of Kosovo due to a weak judiciary, informal business activities, and fewer qualified borrowers. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) is an independent government body responsible for fostering the development of competitive, sound, and transparent practices in the banking and financial sectors. It supervises and regulates Kosovo’s banking sector, insurance industry, pension funds, and micro-finance institutions. The CBK also performs other standard central bank tasks, including cash management, transfers, clearing, management of funds deposited by the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers and other public institutions, collection of financial data, and management of a credit register. Although the financial sector remains stable, a prolonged period without a governing board and allegations of mismanagement have caused concern over CBK’s institutional development. Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same licensing requirements and regulations as local banks. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years and no such relationship is currently in jeopardy. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts; they can do so upon submission of valid identification documentation. Kosovo is a signatory country to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), aimed at addressing tax evasion by U.S. citizens or permanent residents with foreign bank accounts. For more information, visit the FATCA website: https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA . Kosovo does not have any sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kosovo has 63 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 44 of which are municipality managed. These enterprises are typically utilities, such as water treatment and supply, waste management, energy generation and transmission, but also include SOEs involved in telecommunications, mining, and transportation. SOEs are generally governed by government-appointed boards. The Ministry of Economy monitors SOE operations with a light hand. Private companies can compete with SOEs in terms of market share and other incentives in relevant sectors. State-owned enterprises are subject to the same tax laws as private companies. There are no state-owned banks, development banks, or sovereign funds in Kosovo. The majority of Kosovo’s SOEs are either regulated or operate in the free market but incur losses and depend on government subsidies for their survival. SOEs do not receive a larger percentage of government contracts in sectors that are open to foreign competition. However, the government interprets procurement law in a way that considers SOEs to be public authorities and prevents contracting authorities from procuring goods from other sources if SOEs offer such goods and/or services. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private sector, including international firms. The privatization process has essentially slowed to a halt. Kosovo had been progressively privatizing SOE assets since the early 2000s, but there are few assets left to privatize, and the current governing coalition has traditionally opposed the privatization process. The Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK), an independent agency, is still responsible for the disposition of Kosovo’s SOE assets. The Government of Kosovo is currently working on a concept note for the establishment of a Sovereign Fund. As currently written, the Kosovo Government plans to transfer some of the most valuable assets currently under PAK authority to the Sovereign Fund. For those assets put on sale, the privatization process is open to foreign investors. PAK provides a live feed of bidding day procedures on its website ( http://www.pak-ks.org/ ). The website also includes bidding information, the results of sales, and other information. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Spurred in large part by the growing number of foreign investors, the topic of responsible business conduct (RBC) has begun to surface in public discussions. The American Chamber of Commerce, Kosovo Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Network, and other entities engaged in RBC are able to advocate and monitor freely. The government does not actively promote or encourage RBC and does not factor RBC principles into procurement decisions. In most cases, tenders are awarded to the economic operator with the lowest price offer and highest technical score. There have not been any major cases of negative corporate impact on human rights in Kosovo. There are occasional complaints and media reports that the health of citizens in the area near the power plant in Obiliq/Obilič is endangered due to high levels of lignite coal pollution. As a result of those concerns, the Kosovo Assembly approved a 2016 Law on Environmentally Endangered Zone of Obiliq/Obilič and its Surroundings, which mandates a return of 20 percent of royalties collected in the area to the municipality. However, many provisions of that law remain unimplemented. There have been reports and allegations of child and forced labor in Kosovo, but they are relatively uncommon and typically engaged in the informal economy or family-run agricultural businesses. Companies are not required to make a public disclosure of policies, procedures, or practices unless registered as a joint stock company, in which case there are added disclosure responsibilities related to financial reporting and auditing. Implementation of the Law on Consumer Protection is limited. The government has not undertaken any significant action to raise awareness of consumer rights. The government does not promote the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. Kosovo does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). There are no domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments for projects related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Kosovo is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. 9. Corruption Opinion polls attest to the public perception that corruption is widespread in public procurement and local and international businesses regularly cite corruption, especially in the form of political interference, as one of Kosovo’s largest obstacles to attracting investment. Kosovo has enacted strong legislation to combat corruption, but the government has thus far been unsuccessful in efforts to investigate, prosecute, jail, and confiscate the assets of corrupt individuals. The government has enacted other measures to address corruption, including a requirement to conduct all public procurement electronically and to publish the names of contract winners. The Anti-Corruption Agency and the Office of Auditor General are the government agencies mandated to fight corruption. The Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest and Discharge in Public Function as well as the Law on Declaration, Origin, and Control of Property of Public Officials are intended to combat nepotism. They require senior public officials and their family members to disclose their property and its origins. The Criminal Code also punishes bribery and corruption. The U.S. Embassy in Pristina is unaware of any government activity to encourage private companies to establish internal codes of conduct, or off local industry or non-profit groups that offer services for vetting potential local investment partners. In 2016, the Kosovo Assembly approved amendments to the Law on Anti-Money Laundering. The EU-compliant law supported Kosovo’s membership in the Egmont Group, a network of 152 Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) where the members exchange expertise to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Money laundering is believed to be most common in the real estate and construction sectors. Kosovo’s FIU is an independent governmental agency that leads Kosovo’s efforts to investigate economic crimes. U.S. companies operating in Kosovo must adhere to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) requirements. Kosovo participated in 2013 as an observer member in the anti-corruption conference organized by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and has attended several international conferences on anti-corruption with the support of the Council of Europe and UNDP. Kosovo’s laws protect NGOs that investigate corruption. Yll Buleshkaj Director, Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency Nazim Gafurri Street, No. 31, Pristina, Kosovo +383 38 518 933 Email: yll.buleshkaj@rks-gov.net Naim Qelaj Ombudsman Rr. “MIGJENI”, nr. 21, Pristina, Kosovo +383 38 223 782 Email: info.oik@oik-rks.org Ismet Kryeziu Executive Director, Kosovo Democratic Institute/Transparency International Bajram Kelmendi Street, n/45, Pristina, Kosovo +381 38 248 038 Email: info@kdi-kosova.org Jeta Xharra Executive Director Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Kosovo, and Editor of Kallxo.com Menza e studenteve, kati i pare, 10000 Pristina, Kosovo +383 38 22 44 98 Email: info@kallxo.com 10. Political and Security Environment In recent history, the political environment has been characterized by short electoral cycles and prolonged periods of caretaker governments. Despite the political instability, there have not been substantial legislative and regulative changes, especially regarding investments and business environment. There have been no reports of any damage to commercial projects or installations. Kosovo held national assembly elections on February 14, 2021, after the Constitutional Court ruled in December 2020 that a convicted Member of Parliament’s (MP) decisive 61st vote to form the government was not valid. For the first time in the last 20 years, the elections produced an overwhelmingly clear victor, the Levizja Vetevendosje (“Self-Determination Movement”) led by Albin Kurti, which formed a government in March 2021 with the help of only a few minority MPs. This was unusual as Kosovo’s proportional electoral system typically favors coalitions and partnerships. The new government has restored perceptions of political stability and is likely to provide a break from Kosovo’s short electoral cycles. The current administration’s electoral victory centered mainly on anti-corruption promises. While the administration has produced some results in fighting corruption, balancing the budget, and reforming the public administration, it has been relatively slow in introducing new laws and regulations as well as drafting strategies that would guide economic policymaking. Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations and regional neighbors Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the countries that do not recognize its statehood. In November 2018, Kosovo imposed a 100 percent tariff on all goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but in April 2020 dropped the 100 percent tariff in favor of “reciprocal measures.” The previous administration dropped these “reciprocal measures” temporarily in June 2020 to give way for negotiations on “economic normalization” with Serbia. Despite a White House-brokered set of commitments signed on September 4, 2020, in Washington, DC, by Kosovo’s then-Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, there are numerous issues remaining that might lead to trade and investment barriers between the two countries. In addition, the lack of recognition also exposes Kosovo to subtle technical difficulties in carrying on day-to-day business activities. For example, Kosovo is not listed in the ISO 3166 list of countries, which results in numerous companies and services not listing Kosovo in the drop-down menu of countries and forces businesses in Kosovo to either register and divert their business through a third country or renders them unable to use such services. Due to Kosovo’s lack of Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD), it is more difficult to track cyberattacks. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the Kosovo Statistical Agency, almost two thirds of Kosovo’s population of 1.8 million is of working age (15-64). The official unemployment rate is 25.8 percent. Youth unemployment is estimated at 48.6 percent. There are no reliable statistics on Kosovo’s informal economy, but a 2017 EU-commissioned report estimated the informal and black market at 32 percent of GDP. Informal businesses dominate in the agriculture, construction, and retail sectors. Because of pervasive informality and the slow pace of courts, informal and verbal agreements often carry more significance than formal agreements and contracts. Private-sector employers make a practice of not providing contracts to their employees and paying them in cash. In the public sector, employers sometime hire employees as contract workers and enroll them in the regular payroll when the budget for salaries becomes available. Kosovo’s Labor Law requires employers to observe employee protections, including a 40-hour work week, payment of overtime, adherence to occupational health and safety standards, respect for annual leave benefits, and up to a year of maternity leave (six months of employer paid leave at a reduced rate, followed by three months of government paid leave and three months of unpaid leave). The Labor Law distinguishes between layoffs and firings, and mandates severance pay only for laid off workers (when at least 10 percent of employees are dismissed collectively). The law also establishes a monthly minimum wage, which the government set in 2011 at €130 ($146) for employees under 35 and €170 ($191) for those over 35 years of age. Kosovo has no unemployment insurance or any other safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. It is estimated that about one third of employees are employed in the public sector and SOEs. Although the country’s average monthly salary amounts to nearly €416 ($457) in take-home pay, there are stark differences between the private sector average of €342 ($376), the public administration average of €552 ($607), and the SOE average of €680 ($748). The Labor Law has no nationality requirement and is not waived for investment purposes. There are no additional or different labor laws for special economic zones or free zones. Labor unions are independent by law, but in practice, many of them are closely associated with political parties. The government, labor unions, and private sector representatives signed a collective bargaining agreement in 2014, which has been partially implemented. Kosovo’s Statistical Agency and the Ministry of Economy do not collect specific data on implementation. Public-sector employees – including doctors, teachers, and judges – sporadically go on strike to demand implementation of the entire agreement, better working conditions, or higher wages. In January 2019, education and health workers went on a month-long strike demanding higher wages, only stopping the strike after the Kosovo Assembly approve the Law on Wages, which granted some of their demands. Strikes and protests in the private sector are almost nonexistent. Local courts formally adjudicate labor disputes. The Ministry of Finance, Labor, and Transfers established a compliance office with the authority to inspect employer adherence to labor laws. The International Labor Organization office in the country is project-focused and does not serve as a government advisor on labor legislation or international labor standards. The government plans to reform inspectorates, labor inspectorate included, and has already increased the labor inspectorate’s number of inspectors from 38 to 90. The Inspectorate issues fines and penalties depending on the extent of the violation of labor legislation. The Labor Inspectorate and the judicial system investigate and prosecute labor practice violations. Municipal social work centers at the Ministry of Finance, Labor, and Transfers investigate and report on child labor issues, while the Labor Inspectorate inspects violations of child labor practices for children aged 15-18 years. Kosovo’s education system has been criticized for not sufficiently linking its curriculum to the needs of Kosovo’s business community. Kosovo’s large, young labor force often remains idle due to mismatches between applicant skills and employer needs. 14. Contact for More Information Dren Pozhegu Senior Economic Advisor U.S. Embassy Pristina Rr. 4 Korriku Nr.25 Pristina, Kosovo +383 38 5959 3183 PozheguDM@state.gov Kuwait Executive Summary The Government of Kuwait launched an ambitious development plan in 2018 known as ‘Vision 2035’ which aims to transform country into an international trade hub and diversify its oil-centric economy. The goal is to increase private sector participation in Kuwait’s economy by creating a more investor-friendly environment as well as to invest in the nation’s economic infrastructure via the construction of new airports, ports, roads, industrial areas, residential developments, hospitals, a railroad, and a metro rail. The Northern Gateway initiative, which encompasses the Five Islands or New Kuwait projects, envisions public and private sector investment in the establishment of an international economic zone that could exceed USD 400 billion over several decades. With one of the world’s largest sovereign funds with more than USD 670 billion in assets as of March 2021, minimal taxes, and low-cost labor, Kuwait provides a great opportunity for investment. However, bureaucratic red tape and the frequent changing of the government has stalled the progress of many initiatives. Several public-private partnerships are in the pipeline in the power, water management, and renewable energy sectors. Two billion-dollar hospitals were completed in the last two years. These institutions need foreign investment to operate and train hospital staff, as well as to deliver world-class equipment and IT infrastructure. With a view to attracting foreign investment, the government passed a foreign direct investment law in 2013 that permits up to 100 percent foreign ownership of a business if approved by the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority (KDIPA). All other foreign businesses must abide by existing law that mandates that Kuwaitis, or other GCC nationals, own at least 51 percent of any enterprise. In approving applications from foreign investors seeking 100 percent ownership, KDIPA prioritizes local job creation, the provision of training and education to Kuwaiti citizens, technology transfer, diversification of national income sources, contribution to exports, support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the utilization of Kuwaiti products and services. KDIPA has sponsored 37 foreign firms, including six U.S. companies. KDIPA also provides certain investment incentives like tax benefits, customs duties relief, and permission to recruit foreign employees. Kuwait has also made great strides in protecting intellectual property. Kuwait’s 2019 Copyright Law addressed serious concerns about Kuwait’s intellectual property protection regime. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) moved Kuwait from the Priority Watch List to the Watch List in its 2020 Special 301 Report because of the new copyright legislation and an increase in intellectual property enforcement actions. The Special 301 Report identifies countries that are trading partners, but which do not adequately or effectively protect and enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Kuwait has continued to increase enforcement actions in 2021. Kuwait is a country of 1.4 million citizens and 3.3 million expatriates. It possesses six percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and is a major oil exporter. The economy is heavily dependent upon oil production and related industries, which are almost wholly owned and operated by the government. The energy sector accounts for more than half of GDP and close to 90 percent of government revenue. The fall in oil prices after OPEC+ failed to agree on production targets in 2019 and the reduction in global demand for oil upon the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 greatly exacerbated Kuwait’s fiscal deficit. However, the rapid increases in the price of oil since spring 2021 has allowed Kuwait to significantly reduce its deficit from KD 5.4 billion (USD 17.7 billion) in March 2021 to KD 406.4 million (USD 1.3 billion ) as of January 2022. However, reduced stress on the country’s finances has dampened support for economic and business reforms that Kuwait needs to become the investment hub envisioned in New Kuwait Vision 2035. Kuwait’s ability to implement these changes will determine whether the current financial windfall will result in an economically sustainable future. As it develops the private sector to reduce the country’s dependence on oil, the government faces two central challenges. It must improve the business climate to enable the private sector and must prepare its citizens to work in the private sector. Political tension between the government and the elected National Assembly, a slow and overly complicated bureaucracy, inconsistent legal practices, and restrictive economic policies contribute to a challenging business environment for outside investors. More than 85 percent of all Kuwaitis with jobs work in the public sector, where they receive generous salaries and benefits. This makes public sector jobs largely preferable to careers in the private sector. Convincing young Kuwaitis that their future is in the private sector will require changing social attitudes and raising the level of local education so that Kuwaiti businesses can compete internationally in sectors other than fossil fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 72 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 540 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD amount 36,290 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime Kuwait does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published akin to the Federal Register in the United States. The regulatory system does not require that regulations be made available for public comment. The government frequently passes draft regulations to interested parties in the private sector, such as the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the Bankers Association, for comment. Kuwait does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. However, ESG concepts are increasingly gaining traction in Kuwait with the Kuwait Investment Authority’s January 2022 announcement that it intended to make its investment portfolio ESG compliant. The State Audit Bureau reviews government contracts and audits contract performance but does not publicly share the results. Kuwait does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), nor does it incorporate domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to other governments related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or mineral deposits. However, the Kuwait economy is almost wholly dependent upon oil, the extraction of which is deemed a responsibility of the government and is subject to close National Assembly oversight. Kuwait joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963 and became a founding member of the WTO in 1995. However, Kuwait is not a signatory to every WTO plurilateral agreement, such as the Agreement on Government Procurement. In April 2018, Kuwait deposited its Trade Facilitation Agreement instrument of ratification with the WTO after Kuwait’s National Assembly approved the agreement the previous month. Kuwait has been part of the GCC since its formation in 1981. The GCC launched a common market in 2008 and a customs union in 2015. The GCC continues to forge agreements on regional standards and coordinate trade and investment policies. American standards and internationally recognized standards are typically accepted. For more information regarding GCC standards and policies, please refer to the following GCC website: http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx Kuwait has a developed civil legal system, based in part on Egyptian and French law and influenced by Islamic law. Having evolved in a historically active trading nation, the court system in Kuwait is familiar with international commercial law. Kuwait’s judiciary includes specialized courts, including a commercial court to adjudicate commercial law. Residents that are not Kuwaiti citizens involved in legal disputes with citizens have frequently alleged the courts show bias in favor of Kuwaiti citizens. Holders of legal residence have been detained and deported without recourse to the courts. Persons charged with criminal offenses, placed under investigation, or involved in unresolved financial disputes with local business partners have, in some cases, been subjected to travel bans. Travel bans are meant to prevent an individual from leaving Kuwait until a legal matter is resolved or a debt settled. Travel bans may remain in place for a substantial period while the case is investigated, resolved, and/or prosecuted. Failure to repay a debt can result in a prison term ranging from months to years, depending upon the amount owed. U.S. firms are advised to consult with a Kuwaiti law firm or the local office of a foreign law firm before executing contracts with local parties. Fees for legal representation can be very high. Contracts between local and foreign parties serve as the basis for resolving any future commercial disputes. The process of resolving disputes in the Kuwaiti legal system can be subject to lengthy delays, sometimes years, depending on the complexity of the issue and the parties involved. During these delays, U.S. citizens can be deprived of income streams related to their business venture and be forced to surrender assets and ownership rights before being allowed to depart the country. To diversify the economy by attracting foreign investment and grow private sector employment, Kuwait passed a new foreign direct investment law in 2013 permitting up to 100 percent foreign ownership of a business – if approved by KDIPA. Without KDIPA approval, all businesses incorporated in Kuwait must be 51 percent-owned by Kuwaiti or GCC citizens and seek licensing through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In reviewing applications from foreign investors, KDIPA places emphasis on creating jobs and the provision of training and education opportunities for Kuwaiti citizens, technology transfer, diversification of national income sources, increasing exports, support for local small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the utilization of Kuwaiti products and services. In addition to assistance in navigating the bureaucracy, available investment incentives through KDIPA include tax benefits, customs duties relief, and permission to recruit required foreign labor. Government control of land limits its availability for development. In 2019, a set of criteria was introduced to assess applications and grant licenses to foreign investors. Decision No. 329 of 2019 enacted five main criteria for assessing licensing and granting incentives. The criteria covered the following: (i) transfer and settlement of technology, including tangible and intangible technological innovation and the enablement of knowledge creation; (ii) human capital, stressing job creation for nationals and employee development programs; (iii) market development; (iv) economic diversification; and (v) sustainable development in the areas of corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability. Decisions on licenses and the granting of incentives are based on a “Points Scoring Mechanism” (PMS). Other recent legal measures to facilitate foreign direct investment and economic growth include Law No. 116 of 2014 regarding public-private partnerships (PPP) and a new Companies Law No. 1 of 2016. The PPP law created the Kuwait Authority for Partnership Projects ( www.kapp.gov.kw ). Kuwait’s open economy has generally promoted a competitive market. In 2007, the government enacted the Protection of Competition Law No. 10 and by-laws in 2012 that facilitated the establishment of a Competition Protection Authority to safeguard free commerce, ban monopolies, investigate complaints, and supervise mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Protection Authority presented a restructuring plan with the assistance of the World Bank to the Cabinet in 2018, which is still under review. In some previous years, U.S. investors have alleged instances of discrimination. The Commercial Agency Law No. 13 of 2016 removed exclusivity, enabling foreign firms to have multiple agents to market their products. In 2016, the National Assembly passed a new Public Tenders Law No. 49. All bids on government-funded infrastructure projects (excluding military, security, and some oil sector tenders) in excess of KD 75,000 (USD 250,000) must be submitted to the Central Agency for Public Tenders. The law requires that foreign contractors bidding on government contracts purchase at least 30 percent of their inputs locally and award at least 30 percent of the work to local contractors, where available. The law favors local sourcing by mandating a 15 percent price preference for locally- and GCC-produced items, however this provision may be waived on a case-by-case basis. Kuwait has had no recent cases of expropriation or nationalization involving foreign investments. The 2013 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Law guarantees investors against expropriation or nationalization, except for public benefit as prescribed by law. In such cases, investors should be compensated for the real value of their holdings at the time of expropriation. The last nationalization occurred in 1974. Kuwait worked with the World Bank to draft bankruptcy legislation designed to assist businesses to recover from financial difficulties as an alternative to liquidation. The Council of Ministers approved new legislation to support competition and create bankruptcy protections and sent it to the National Assembly. On September 29, 2020, Kuwait’s National Assembly passed the long-awaited law. The new law restructures the legal framework for bankruptcy to focus on rehabilitating troubled companies rather than liquidation. The new law removes these penalties for good faith debtors and creates new mechanisms to allow debtors to avoid liquidation, including a preventive settlement procedure and a restructuring procedure. 4. Industrial Policies Incentives under the 2013 FDI Law include tax benefits (15 percent corporate tax on foreign firms may be waived for up to 10 years), customs duties relief, land and real estate allocations, and permissions to recruit required foreign labor. Kuwait does not offer incentives for businesses owned by demographically underrepresented investors. Other tax benefits exist. For example, entities incorporated in the GCC that are 100 percent owned by GCC nationals are exempt from paying a tax on corporate profits. Capital gains arising from trading in securities listed on Kuwait’s stock market are exempt from tax. Foreign principals selling goods through Kuwaiti distributors are not subject to tax. Kuwait does not have personal income, property, inheritance, or sales taxes. Kuwait, alongside its GCC neighbors, agreed in 2016 to implement a 5 percent value added tax on consumption. In 2019, Kuwait announced that it would delay implementation until 2021. As of March 2022, the VAT has not been implemented nor is it being seriously discussed in the National Assembly or government. Kuwait does not offer any incentives for clean energy investment. Conversely, heavily subsidized utilities like electricity and desalinated water incentivize unmitigated use of emissions intense resources. The Kuwait Free Trade Zone was established at Shuwaikh port in 1999. The Council of Ministers approved legislation that would establish a new Free Trade Zone area as part of Kuwait’s Northern Gateway megaproject. The legislation is pending in the National Assembly. Many restrictions normally faced by foreign firms, as well as corporate taxes, would not apply within the free trade zone. KDIPA is developing three Economic Zones (Abdali, Al-Na’ayem and Al-Wafra) that were authorized by Law No. 116 of 2013. The government requires foreign firms to hire a percentage of Kuwaitis that varies according to sector. The percentages are as follows: banking: 75 percent communications: 65 percent investment and finance: 40 percent petrochemicals and refining industries: 30 percent insurance: 22 percent real estate: 20 percent air transportation, foreign exchange, cooperatives: 15 percent manufacturing and agriculture: 3 percent Employers must obtain a no-objection certificate for a work permit for foreign employees from the Public Authority for Manpower (PAM) prior to the employee’s arrival in the country. Obtaining a no-objection certificate requires submission of the employee’s criminal history and a completion of a health screening through a Kuwaiti Embassy or Consulate. Upon arrival, the employee must obtain a work permit from PAM and complete health and security screenings before receiving final status as a resident foreign worker from the Ministry of Interior. Kuwait requires that foreign companies store data locally, although an upcoming data privacy law may permit for some external data storage. Kuwait has strict laws governing the use and transmission of data on Kuwaiti citizens. Foreign investors are subject to a 30 percent local content requirement on construction projects and when manufacturing goods locally. Each company may determine whether and how it chooses to store data. Most governmental agencies follow International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certificate standards, which mandate the storage of data for five years. Banks and other financial institutions are required by the Anti-Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism Law 106 of 2013 to maintain transactions data for five years. Contractors are subject to performance and completion bonds. 5. Protection of Property Rights Non-GCC citizens may own properties only under special conditions that require Cabinet approval. Kuwait was removed from USTR’s Special 301 Watch List in 2022 for making continued and significant progress on concerns that stakeholders identified with IP enforcement and transparency. Kuwait acceded to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995 and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Cooperation Treaty in 2016. The government enacted the GCC Trademark Law in 2015. In 2019, Kuwait passed the Copyright and Related Rights Law and related Implementing Regulations. In 2021, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Copyright Office each created online portals for streamlining the submission of trademark and copyright violation reports, respectively. Right holders continue to raise concerns regarding the lack of transparency of administrative and criminal enforcement proceedings. The government did not prioritize the prosecution of criminal behavior in such cases nor reduce the undue delays in the judicial process. Kuwait does not publicly report statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods, but IPR authorities have increased public outreach and awareness building over the past year. The following descriptions characterize the protection of IPR in Kuwait: Legal Structure: strong; Kuwait’s 2019 Copyright Law addressed serious concerns about Kuwait’s intellectual property protection regime. IPR legislation is adequate. Enforcement: medium; The Kuwait Ministry of Commerce and Industry has made significant progress over the past year in improving enforcement of IPR laws. The Ministry reported that it cited 327 shops in 2021 for selling counterfeits and ordered the closure of 80 of these violating businesses. The Ministry is improving its collaboration with Kuwait’s judicial authorities to increase successful prosecution of IP violations. Infringement on rights: common; Counterfeit items are widely available and often sold in plain sight. However, increased and improved enforcement of IPR laws is having a visible impact on businesses’ ability to market counterfeit goods. Theft: uncommon; intellectual property theft is rare, principally because Kuwait’s technology, manufacturing, and research sectors are relatively small. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. Mr. Peter Mehravari Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi Tel: +965 97589223 Email: Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov Embassy list of local lawyers: https://kw.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ 6. Financial Sector Foreign financial investment firms operating in Kuwait characterize the government’s attitude toward foreign portfolio investment as welcoming. An effective regulatory system exists to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies and infrastructure facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the capital market. Government bodies comply with guidelines outlined by IMF Article VIII and refrain from restricting payments and transfers on current international transactions. In November 2015, the Capital Markets Authority issued a regulation covering portfolio management, but it does not apply to foreign investors. The privatized stock exchange, named the Boursa, currently lists 166 companies. In February 2019, a consortium led by Kuwait National Investment Company that included the Athens Stock Exchange won a tender to acquire 44 percent of the Kuwaiti Boursa. In December 2019, the Capital Markets Authority sold its 50 percent stake in the Kuwaiti Boursa as part of an Initial Public Offering. The offering was oversubscribed by more than 8.5 times. Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security owns the remaining six percent of shares. The Boursa is the only stock exchange owned by the private sector in the Middle East. FTSE Russell upgraded the status of the Boursa to Secondary Emerging Market in 2017. On December 1, 2020, Boursa Kuwait completed the Kuwaiti capital market’s inclusion into the MSCI Emerging Markets Indexes with the successful implementation of the first tranche of index inclusion. While the debt market is not well developed, local banks have the capacity to meet domestic demand. Credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors can obtain local credit on terms that correspond to collateral provided and intended use of financing. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Central Bank restricts commercial banks’ use of structured and complex derivatives but permits routine hedging and trading for non-speculative purposes. In March 2017, the government issued USD 8 billion in five- and ten-year notes but was unable to secure approval from the National Assembly for issuance of 30-year notes. The Central Bank of Kuwait reported that banking sector assets totaled USD 251 billion in September 2021, an increase by 0.6 percent. Twenty-two banks operate in Kuwait: five conventional local banks, five Islamic banks, 11 foreign banks, and one specialized bank. Conventional banks include National Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Gulf Bank, Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait, and Burgan Bank. Sharia-compliant banks include Kuwait Finance House, which is the second largest bank in Kuwait, Boubyan Bank, Kuwait International Bank, Al-Ahli United Bank, and Warba Bank. Foreign banks include BNP Paribas, HSBC, Citibank, Qatar National Bank, Doha Bank, Dubai-based Mashreq Bank, the Bank of Muscat, Riyadh-based Al Rajhi Bank (the largest Sharia-compliant bank in the world), the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (BBK), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Union National Bank. The government-owned Industrial Bank of Kuwait provides medium- and long-term financing to industrial companies and Kuwaiti citizens through customized financing packages. In December 2018, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry began permitting more than 49 percent foreign ownership in local banks with the approval of the Central Bank of Kuwait. Following the global financial crisis in 2008 when large losses reduced confidence in the local banking sector, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly passed legislation to guarantee deposits at local banks to rebuild confidence. Foreign banks can offer retail services. In 2013, the Central Bank announced that foreign banks could open multiple branches on a case-by-case basis. In 2017, the Al-Rajhi Bank opened its second branch. Qatar National Bank received CBK’s approval in 2014 and opened its second branch in 2018. Kuwaiti law restricts foreign banks from offering investment banking services. Foreign banks are subject to a maximum credit concentration equivalent to less than half the limit of the largest local bank and are prohibited from directing clients to borrow from external branches of their bank. Foreign banks may also open representative offices. The Central Bank of Kuwait announced initial guidelines for digital banking in early 2022. Concurrently, they opened applications for licensing for digital banking and will remain open until June 30, 2022. It is expected many of the existing large banks will apply for a digital license—further crowding the sector. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) manages the Kuwait General Reserve Fund and the Kuwait Fund for Future Generations. By law, ten percent of oil revenues can be deposited each annually into the Fund for Future Generations in year of budget surplus. Despite rising oil prices, a surplus has not been formally announced and thus the ten percent policy has not been reinstated as of March 2022. KIA management reports to a Board of Directors appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Finance chairs the board; other members include the Minister of Oil, the Central Bank Governor, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, and five representatives from Kuwait’s private sector (three of whom must not hold any other public office). An internal audit office reports directly to the Board of Directors and an external auditor. This information is provided to the State Audit Bureau, which audits KIA continuously and reports annually to the National Assembly. The 1982 law establishing the KIA prohibits the public disclosure of the size of sovereign wealth holdings and asset allocations. KIA conducts closed-door presentations for the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly on the full details of all funds under its management, including its strategic asset allocation, benchmarks, and rates of return. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimated that KIA manages one of the world’s largest sovereign funds with more than USD 670 billion in assets as of March 2021. Economic stress and budget deficits since 2016 due to diminishing oil revenues and, as of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to the near depletion of the General Reserve Fund. Authorization to issue debt has stalled in the National Assembly. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The energy sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as law precludes private participation in most sector activities. Outside the energy sector, Kuwait has few fully SOEs. One notable exception is Kuwait Airways. No published list of SOEs exists. The government owns shares in various Kuwaiti companies through the Fund for Future Generations managed by the KIA or the Social Security Fund managed by Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security. SOEs are permitted to control their own budgets. The National Assembly has passed several privatization laws since 2008. The Supreme Council for Privatization was established under a Privatization Law to increase the role of the private sector in Kuwait’s national economy. The council is chaired by the prime minister and consists of five ministers and three experts from different sectors. The Privatization Law was developed to address all the major issues related to privatization, especially the processes of transferring public projects into joint stock companies, protecting the rights of national manpower, and controlling prices and the controls which govern revenues arising from the privatization process. The Supreme Council and then the Council of Ministers must approve any privatization initiative. Kuwaiti employees have the right to retain their jobs in a privatized company for at least five years with the same salary and benefits. Privatized shares of any public company must be offered as follows: 40 percent of shares reserved for Kuwaiti citizens; 20 percent of shares retained by the government; five percent of shares distributed to Kuwaiti employees, both former and current; and the remaining 35 percent of shares sold at auction to a local or foreign investor. Telecommunications is the largest service sector in Kuwait. The Ministry of Communications owns and operates landlines and owns a fiber optic network. Internet providers may access both landlines and fiber optic networks. Three private mobile telephone companies provide cellular telephone and data services to the country. The government owns a significant minority interest in each, but foreign companies own majority interests in two of them. In 2014, the National Assembly passed legislation creating the independent Communication and Information Technology Regulatory Authority (CITRA), in part to prepare for the liberalization of mobile communications and Internet markets. Officially opened in 2016, CITRA serves as the primary national telecom regulator and cybersecurity agency. In March 2022, Kuwait announced the creation of a cybersecurity center that will eventually assume CITRA’s cybersecurity role, although details have not yet been finalized. CITRA also has a mandate to attract high-tech investment. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Kuwaitis have a general awareness of expectations for responsible business conduct, including environmental, social, and governance issues. One aspect of responsible business conduct in Kuwait is contributions to local charities and causes. Kuwaiti labor law is generally adequate in its protection of workers, although actual implementation of the law varies. Labor rights violations are generally more common in the domestic worker sphere than in the business community, although violations are common in low wage sectors with high expatriate populations. Economic stress following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 led to an increase in illegally forced “resignations” or illegal salary cuts as businesses sought to relieve themselves of financial obligations. The Kuwait Environmental Public Authority has been active in enforcing compliance and addressing environmental violations, since the passage of the Environmental Protection Law of 2014. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Kuwait is developing its national climate strategy. Although it has not committed to reaching net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, the New Kuwait Vision 2035 plan does incorporate a focus on environmentally sustainable economic diversification, renewable energy, and environmental conservation. Kuwait does not offer regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, or other desirable ecological benefits nor do public procurement policies explicitly include environmental considerations. Kuwait is increasing its focus on the creation of protected areas and ecosystem management plans and hopes to eventually set 18 percent of its surface area aside as protected space. 9. Corruption In recent years, Kuwaiti authorities have increased their focus on combatting corruption and several investigations and trials involving current or former government officials accused of malfeasance are active. Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Kuwait 73 out of 180 countries, an improvement from 78 in 2020. Kuwait ranked behind all other GCC countries except for Bahrain. According to Transparency International, Kuwait’s numeric score is 43 out of 100. The often-lengthy procurement process in Kuwait occasionally results in accusations of attempted bribery or the offering of other inducements by bidders. In 1996, the government passed Law No. 25, which required all companies securing contracts with the government valued at KD 100,000 (USD 330,000) or more to report all payments made to Kuwaiti agents or advisors while securing the contract. The law similarly requires entities and individuals to report any payments they received as compensation for securing government contracts. Kuwait signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2007. In 2016, the National Assembly passed legislation to establish the Anti-Corruption Authority, also known as Nazaha (integrity). The legislation was passed to comply with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Nazaha has sent several cases to the Public Prosecution Office for failure to comply with financial disclosure requirements. Contact information for the government agency responsible for combating corruption is as follows: Mr. Abdul Aziz Abdul Latif Al Ibrahim President Kuwait Anti-Corruption Authority (Nazaha) Shamiya, Block 2, Opposite Wahran Park, Kuwait City, Kuwait Tel: +965 2464-0200/118 Email: contact@nazaha.gov.kw 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. Embassy occasionally receives threat information indicating possible targeting of official and private U.S. citizens for terrorist attacks. Soft targets are vulnerable to terrorist attack, although many have improved their perimeters and internal security. There have been no terror incidents in Kuwait since 2016. There have been no attacks targeting businesses or infrastructure. Since late 2013, Kuwait has seen no large-scale, politically motivated demonstrations, although it experienced some small-scale protests against COVID-19 restrictions over the winter of 2020-2021. U.S. citizens are encouraged to enroll in the U.S. Department of State’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) for up-to-date information from the Embassy. The Department of State shares credible threat information through its Consular Information Program, including Travel Advisories, Alerts, and Country Information for Kuwait, available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel.html or the Embassy’s website: https://kw.usembassy.gov/. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Kuwait has a diverse labor force. According to the Central Statistical Bureau (CSB), as of September 30, 2021, approximately 1,479,454 million expatriate workers account for 77.7 percent of Kuwait’s workforce. According to the Kuwaiti government’s statistics, the number of foreign workers in the private sector fell by over 280,000 over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many expatriate workers are low-paid laborers from other Middle Eastern countries, South Asia, and the Philippines working in Kuwait under a legally established “sponsorship” system. Under the kafala system, a migrant worker’s immigration status is legally bound to an individual employer or sponsor for their contract period. The migrant worker cannot enter the country or transfer employment for any reason without first obtaining explicit written permission from their sponsor. This situates the migrant worker as almost entirely dependent upon their sponsor for their livelihood and residency. Abuse of the sponsorship, or “kafala” system is widespread. Sponsors sometimes confiscate workers’ passports despite legislation declaring this practice illegal. Workers who fled abusive employers had difficulty retrieving their passports, and authorities deported them in almost all cases. The law does not explicitly prohibit private sector workers from paying recruitment fees. For domestic workers, employers are required to pay recruitment agency fees, which cannot be deducted from the worker’s remuneration. White-collar workers from around the world occupy highly-skilled positions in Kuwait, while many middle management positions are occupied by Egyptian, Lebanese, and South Asian nationals. Kuwaiti nationals occupy most of the top management positions in the private and public sectors. Generally, unemployment among Kuwaitis is quite low, but new labor entrants are reluctant to enter the private sector. According to the Public Authority for Manpower, approximately 73,000 Kuwaiti citizens worked in the private sector as of September 2021. The International Monetary Fund has stressed that limiting public sector employment growth should be part of broader public sector reforms and accompanied by efforts to boost private sector job and entrepreneurship opportunities for Kuwaiti youth. Since 1991, the government has adopted inconsistent policies intended to limit growth of the resident expatriate population. This population has continued to increase steadily however. Lower-paid, unskilled workers often suffer unfavorable working conditions. The government has an electronic labor tracking system to allow companies only enough work permits to be issued for pre-verified positions. The tracking system is designed to protect workers, following years of visa fraud whereby Kuwaiti sponsors created ghost positions and sold the visas for personal profit. Workers brought to Kuwait under such fraudulent schemes found themselves unemployed, forced to seek illegal work, vulnerable to exploitative work conditions, and eventual arrest and deportation. Unskilled foreign workers are restricted from transferring from one sponsor to another within the private sector for a minimum of two years, but college graduates may transfer after one year. However, the quota system has impacted ability of domestic and foreign firms, delaying their ability to bring in new expatriate workers. Kuwaiti workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, but Kuwaiti law restricts the right of freedom of association to only one union per occupational trade. The law permits only one federation, the Kuwait Trade Union Federation, which comprises 15 of the 47 licensed unions. Foreign workers are permitted by law to join unions only as non-voting members after five years of work in a specific sector. Private sector workers have the right to strike; however, negotiation and arbitration are compulsory in the case of disputes. Public sector workers do not have the legal right to strike, though groups of public sector workers threatened to strike on occasion during the past few years. Kuwaiti labor law prohibits anti-union discrimination. Kuwaiti labor laws establish work conditions in the public and private sectors, except for the oil sector. Kuwaiti law prohibits forced labor. Workers in industrial and dangerous jobs must be at least 18 years old; youth under the age of 18 can work part-time in some non-industrial positions. A multi-tiered labor market ensures higher wages for Kuwaiti employees. The minimum monthly salary for the private sector is approximately 75 dinars (USD 250) whereas the approximate lowest monthly salary for Kuwaitis in the public sector is 600 dinars (USD 2,000). Domestic workers earn a minimum monthly salary of approximately 60 dinars (USD 200). Kuwaitis, whether employed in the private or public sector, receive substantial government payments and benefits on top of their base salaries. The amended labor law of 2010 did not change the previous workweek maximum from 48 hours but extended annual leave to 30 days after six months of employment. Labor laws are not consistently enforced and disputes over the payment of salaries and contract switching are common, especially among unskilled workers. A specific set of laws and regulations cover domestic (household) workers. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Committee of Experts has longstanding criticisms concerning discrepancies between the Kuwaiti Labor Code and ILO Conventions 1, 30, and 87 regarding work hours and freedom of association. The ILO has criticized the prohibition on more than one trade union for a given field; the requirement that a new union have at least 100 workers, of whom 15 must be citizens; the regulation that workers must reside in Kuwait for five years before joining a trade union; the denial of foreign workers’ right to vote and serve in trade union leadership positions for; the prohibition against trade unions engaging in political or religious activity; and the reversion of trade union assets to the Public Authority for Manpower in the event of dissolution. While Kuwaiti public sector union leaders and workers faced no government repercussions for their roles in union or strike activities, companies directly threatened migrant workers calling for strikes with termination and deportation. Law No. 91 of 2013 for Combating Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants defines human trafficking in Kuwait and the penalties for trafficking in persons. Forced labor conditions for migrant workers included nonpayment of wages, long working hours, deprivation of food, threats, physical and sexual abuse, and restrictions on movement, such as withholding passports or confinement to the workplace. During recent years, the Government of Kuwait has taken several measures to address human trafficking and to improve protections for workers. In September 2020, the Public Authority for Manpower, the Supreme Council for Planning and Development, the United Nations Development Program and the International Organization for Migration launched the Tamkeen initiative to implement the International Recruitment Integrity System to promote ethical recruitment of migrant workers. As of November 2021, the Public Authority for Manpower completed the first phase of the Tamkeen initiative, which included training for its own staff and recruitment agencies. In October 2021. the Anti-Trafficking Department of the Ministry of Interior established a 24/7 hotline in Arabic and English to receive reports of human trafficking, but there are reports it did not operate at all times. Since 2007, labor laws have banned women from working between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., except for sectors approved by the Public Authority for Manpower such as nursing. The law also banned women from working in jobs that are judged to be hazardous, rough, and damaging to health, as well as in positions that the government deems “immoral or abuse women’s femininity,” or in businesses that exclusively serve men. The Supreme Council for Planning and Development reported that women make up 56 percent of the labor market in the public sector and 11 percent in the private sector. The Director General of the Public Authority for Manpower issued an administrative decision in March 2022 annulling a previous 2021 decision that banned the renewal of work and residency permits for expatriates who reached the age of 60 and held only a high school certificate. Kuwait’s Public Authority for Manpower assists all residents of Kuwait with private sector employment and labor disputes. The Public Authority for Manpower’s labor and occupational safety inspectors routinely monitored private firms for labor law compliance. Noncompliant employers faced fines or a forced suspension of their company operations. Offices assist residents according to the location of the employer and are open Sunday through Thursday, 8:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. Some expatriate residents have reported that the offices were unable to provide any assistance. It is recommended that residents seeking assistance be accompanied by an Arabic speaker. Following is information on Public Authority for Manpower offices: Capital Business Administration: Sharq, Mohammad al-Haqan Street Tel: +965 2246-6830 and 2246-6831 Hawalli Business Administration: Hawalli Tunis Street, opposite Ahli Bank of Kuwait Tel: +965 266-0229 and 2266-0228 Al-Farwaniya Business Administration: Dajeej Adjacent to General Department of Criminal Evidence Tel: +965 2431-9555 Al-Jahra Business Administration: Saad al-Abdullah (Amgarah) Street 1, Block 10 Tel +965 9494-5446 Al-Ahmadi Business Administration: Al Ahmadi Next to Kuwait Oil Company Block 1, Street 20 Tel: +965 2398-2059 Mubarak Al-Kabeer Business Administration: Mubarak Al-Kabeer Co-op #4, beside National Bank of Kuwait and Kuwait Finance House Tel: +965 2543-8595 The Public Authority for Manpower offers Arabic and English responses via their Twitter handle: @manpower_KWT, or Instagram account: pr.manpower. The Authority attempts to answer inquiries within one business day. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics According to the 2020 World Investment Report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Kuwait attracted a foreign direct investment inflow of USD 104 million in 2019, while divesting USD 2.5 billion of overseas investment. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019 U.S. direct investment in Kuwait was USD 398 million, down from USD 499 million in 2018. Kuwait’s FDI stock position in the United States totaled USD 1.26 billion in 2019. Kuwaiti direct investment in the United States is largely in real estate, stocks, and logistics. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $136.197 billion http://www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $398 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2018 $1,256 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 $398 million 2019-2020 -5.1% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Host country source: https://www.cbk.gov.kw/en/statistics-and-publication/publications/quarterly-statistical-bulletin Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward Amount 100% Total Outward Amount 100% Qatar 3,288 X% Cayman Islands 4,451 X% Saudi Arabia 908 X% Bahrain 3.728 X% United Arab Emirates 848 X% Saudi Arabia 3,401 X% Bahrain 746 X% Iraq 3,126 X% Oman 440 X% Turkey 2,932 X% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section U.S. Embassy Kuwait P.O. Box 77 Safat 13001 Kuwait +965 2259 1001 KuwaitDirectLine@state.gov Kyrgyz Republic Executive Summary The Kyrgyz Republic remains a frontier market oriented towards higher-risk investors, but the government under President Sadyr Japarov has expressed its desire to attract greater, more diversified foreign direct investment (FDI) and to develop a green economy to contribute to sustainable economic growth. In 2021, the President traveled extensively to seek investment partners in different regions, and government officials attended several trade and investment expositions in the region and beyond. While the official attitude toward FDI is positive and by law there are no limits on foreign ownership or control, in practice foreign investors may be subject to greater scrutiny than domestic investors, and the country’s capacity to provide a sound enabling environment for investment still faces many challenges. The legal framework for foreign investment mostly corresponds to international standards, but enforcement of these laws and private property rights is weak, and criminal investigations of commercial disputes is not uncommon. Mining has historically been the industry that attracted the most FDI to the Kyrgyz Republic but a dispute with its largest foreign investor may have damaged investor appetite for this sector. In May 2021, the Kyrgyz government raided the offices of Kumtor Gold Company, a local subsidiary of Canadian mining company Centerra Gold, and fined the Canadian firm $3 billion for alleged environmental damages caused by running the Kumtor gold mine. The national government subsequently took over the mine and pursued Centerra Gold for corruption, criminal violations, and environmental damage in national and international courts. In September 2021, the London Bullion Market Association suspended Kyrgyzaltyn, the state gold refiner, from its Good Delivery List over issues concerning delivery and the potential for fraud, while the sale of Kyrgyz gold still suffers transparency issues. With the creation of the “Heritage of the Great Nomads” national holding company, the government has also signaled it intends to play a greater role in the development of the mining and precious metals industries. In April 2022, the Kyrgyz government and Centerra reached a conditional agreement by which the Kyrgyz government will take full control of the mine and give up its 26 percent stake in Centerra. Still, other growing industries have attracted both domestic and foreign investor interest, including textiles, agriculture, education, franchising, and IT. Green investment is another promising area for potential investors as the Kyrgyz government increased its commitment to fighting climate change and sustainable development. In 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic joined the Global Methane Pledge and unveiled revised Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which also opened many opportunities for foreign firms seeking to invest in industries such as hydropower, energy efficiency, and methane abatement. Additional challenges to an enabling investment climate include a weak judiciary, lack of incentives for foreign investors, and a banking system highly dependent on the Russian financial system. The local currency, the Kyrgyz som, quickly depreciated against the U.S. dollar after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, making not only imports more expensive but contributing to a drop in value of remittances that Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia send home, which annually comprise roughly 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP. *Some information in the report may be subject to change upon date of publication and will be updated in the 2022 ICS. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 98 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,160 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Kyrgyz Republic is actively seeking FDI, and the government publicly recognizes that it is an important component of economic development. While the government has implemented laws to attract foreign investment, a move to nationalize the country’s largest gold mine, the use of criminal investigations in commercial disputes, onerous bureaucracy, and an inability to protect investors’ assets continue to deter foreign investors. In particular, government activities, including demands for renegotiation of operating contracts, invasive and time-consuming audits, levies of large retroactive fines, and disputes over licenses, pose significant impediments to attracting foreign investment. Still, net FDI inflows in 2021 recovered somewhat, increasing 30 percent compared to 2020 levels, but remained 65 percent lower than 2019 levels. Since 1993, the United States has had a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Kyrgyz Republic that encourages and offers reciprocal protection of investment. The newly restructured Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment (KADI, formerly IPPA), under the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, serves as a vehicle for ongoing dialogue with foreign investors and advocates for investing in the Kyrgyz Republic. The agency participates in the development and implementation of measures to attract and stimulate investment activity. Its mandate is to coordinate with state bodies, local municipalities, business entities, and non-state actors to promote investment and support investors in the Kyrgyz Republic, including private investment and public-private partnerships, as well as assist local exporters to promote Kyrgyz goods to external markets, and develop Free Economic Zones (FEZ). The KADI has investor support programs to help guide investors through the registration process and conducts outreach aimed at helping create an environment conducive to foreign investment. The KADI often coordinates with international donor organizations on hosting round- tables discussions, exchanges, and capacity building workshops in the field of economic development. The Institute of the Business Ombudsman was created in January 2019 as an independent non-state body, funded by external donor sources, to protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of business entities, both local and foreign. In August 2019, the Supervisory Board of the Institute of the Business Ombudsman appointed former UK Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Robin Ord-Smith, as Business Ombudsman. The Institute of Business Ombudsman has concluded memorandums of cooperation with leading international business associations, including the American Chamber of Commerce in the Kyrgyz Republic (AmCham), International Business Council (IBC), and the Chamber of Commerce of Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (CCI). In 2020, the Business Ombudsman recommended that business reform, protection and support of local entrepreneurs and protecting private property rights are key conditions for attracting direct investment. The government has established several committees and councils to coordinate cooperation between the business associations and government bodies. Since 2017, the Business and Entrepreneurship Development Council under the Speaker of the Parliament regularly convenes MPs, business community representatives from various sectors of the economy to discuss measures to improve the investment, promotion of entrepreneurship, and legislation to facilitate doing business in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Committee on Development of Industry and Entrepreneurship under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic serves as a platform for entrepreneurs to turn to in case if their grievances are not addressed by the government. The presidential decree to establish the Committee under the National Council on Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic was signed on December 24, 2019, with the amendment to designate to the Vice-Prime-Minister for economic development, the Business Ombudsman and heads of business associations. The committee includes platforms to raise investment climate and other business concerns to the offices of the President, Parliament, and Prime Minister (Note: the position of Prime Minister was abolished in the 2021 constitution. End Note). The Kyrgyz government also interacts with the business community via a number of local associations that serve as a voice for entrepreneurs and corporations, including AmCham, IBC, and the National Alliance of Business Associations of the Kyrgyz Republic (http://caa.kg/ru/ru-naba/). The Ministry of Economy and Commerce, Parliamentary Business and Entrepreneurship Development Council, and other government bodies often seek the opinion of these associations during the formulation of policy. While there are still no official limits on foreign control, a large investor in a politically sensitive industry may find that the government imposes investor-specific requirements such as a high percentage of local workforce employment or a minimum number of local seats on a board of directors. Foreigners have the right to establish and own businesses, and there have been no allegations of market access restrictions from U.S. investors since 2016. By law, the Kyrgyz Republic guarantees equal treatment to investors and places no limit on foreign ownership or control. In the last two years, there were no known cases of sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to foreign ownership and control, but the government has intervened in the ownership of politically sensitive industries like mining. Amendments to the “Law on Mass Media” to limit foreign ownership of television (excluding radio and print media) broadcasters to 35 percententered into force in June 2017. Post is unaware of any formal investment screening processes in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2016, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, released a report on the Kyrgyz investment climate in January 2016. The report is available at: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/259411467997285741/investment-climate-in-kyrgyz-republic-views-of-foreign-investors-results-of-the-survey-of-foreign-investors-operating-and-non-operating. The Investment Policy Review (IPR) of The Kyrgyz Republic for 2016 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is available at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1436. Starting a business in the Kyrgyz Republic has become easier following the elimination of the minimum capital requirement for business registration, abolition of certain registration fees, and decreases in registration times. The Kyrgyz Republic does not have a business registration website. Registration of legal entities, branches, or representative offices in the Kyrgyz Republic is based on “registration by notification” and the “one stop-shop” practice. State registration of a legal entity is completed within three business days from the date of filing the necessary documents for a specified fee. To stimulate the inflow of direct investment, Parliament passed the law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Kyrgyz Republic on Investment Support” in December 2020. This law provides for the following rules relating to investment issues: The concept of “investment lots” is introduced, which provides investors with a package of services with the objective of helping the investor start their project; Local authorities have the authority to execute land transfers; Reduction of the investment threshold from $50 to $10 million USD for any investor that wants to negotiate an investment agreement directly with the Kyrgyz government; The Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment has the right to issue an application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an investor visa for individuals who have invested more than 10 million soms (c. $95,000); and, Changes to public-private partnership (PPP) legislation aimed at simplifying procedure and attracting greater investment. Post is not aware of host government efforts to promote outward investment from the Kyrgyz Republic, nor of any instances in which the government sought to restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The legal and regulatory system of the Kyrgyz Republic remains underdeveloped, and implementation regulations and court orders relating to commercial transactions remain inconsistent with international practices. Heavy bureaucracy, lack of accessibility among decision-makers responsible for investment promotion, and frequent changes in leadership due to political instability all undermine investor confidence. Moreover, there is a significant capacity gap between the capital (Bishkek) and regional municipalities, particularly in remote, rural areas, in terms of institutional legal expertise and local officials and local law enforcement capacity, which hinders the conduct of business especially in the regions of Kyrgyzstan. There have been no known cases of U.S. investors facing discrimination. Rule-making authority is vested in the Kyrgyz Parliament – the Jogorku Kenesh – which has established committees that oversee legislation and regulations affecting several areas of the economy, including: the Committee on Budget, Economic, and Fiscal Policy; the Committee for Fuel and Energy Complex, Subsoil Use and Industrial Policy; the Committee for Transport, Communications, Architecture and Construction; and the Committee on Agrarian Policy, Water Resources, Ecology and Regional Development. The Office of the Prosecutor General is the supreme legal and regulatory enforcement body in the Kyrgyz Republic. The State Service on Financial Market Regulation and Supervision (Financial Supervision) and the State Service on Financial Intelligence (Financial Intelligence) have played important regulatory roles. Accounting procedures tend to adhere to internationally recognized accounting rules, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and audits are conducted regularly, often in compliance with agreements with international financial institutions (IFIs). Audit results of state organizations tend to be publicly available, unlike those of private organizations. There have been lapses in the public consultation process, and significant reductions in transparency of Parliamentary committee meetings and failure to circulate draft bills for public review, including the 2022 budget and the new tax code. Draft bills or regulations must be posted on either Parliament’s website or the site of the Ministry that drafted the bill for public comment for 30 days prior to consideration by Parliament and its committees. Parliament is required by regulation to hold public hearings on draft legislation and has historically been open to the participation of representatives of civil society organizations and the business community in relevant hearings when held. Still, in 2021 many business associations complained of lack of transparency in the passing of business-related legislation and insufficient consultation with the private sector. The Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment (KADI) assists investors with regulatory compliance. However, the efficacy of this office in assisting firms with setting up shop is limited since official bureaucratic procedures comprise only some of the hurdles to opening a business. Government investment councils exist to further regulatory improvements for the business climate. Since the creation of the Anticorruption Business Council under the Office of the President in 2021, it is unclear under what authority the preexisting Investment Council will fall (the President’s Office or a ministry). Contradictory government decrees often create bureaucratic paralysis or opportunities for bribe solicitation in order to complete normal bureaucratic functions. As often in the Kyrgyz Republic, the legal and regulatory framework is largely sound, but implementation and enforcement are weak. Throughout 2021, the government structure underwent “optimization,” which resulted in the significant downsizing of ministries and the dissolution and re-organization of several independent state regulatory bodies. The Ministries of Economy and Finance were merged, only to be unmerged later in the year, and the Department of Geology and Subsoil Use became a part of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology and Technical Supervision (MRNETS), formerly the State Committee for Ecology and Climate. MRNETS now oversees mining licensing. The State Committee of Information and Communications Technology, responsible for implementation of the Digital Transformation Strategy 2019-2023, became the Ministry of Digital Development. The government also eliminated the State Service of Combating Economic Crimes (Financial Police) and transferred its authority to investigate economic crimes to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The State Inspectorate on Ecological and Technical Safety was dissolved, and transferred to the Ministry of Labor, Social Development, and Migration. This move also shifted labor inspection authority to the labor ministry. In August 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic acceded to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus. The Kyrgyz Republic continues to harmonize its laws to comply with regulations set by the Eurasian Economic Commission, the executive body of the EAEU. And while Kyrgyz exports to the EAEU steadily increased from $410 million to $642 million in 2019, the Kyrgyz Republic has not fully realized increased bilateral trade with EAEU member countries. Traders cite unilaterally imposed trade barriers restricting the flow of Kyrgyz exports and numerous Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have criticized non-tariff measures that emerged after the country’s accession to the Union, preventing local exporters from fully accessing the wider EAEU market. In addition, Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have experienced issues exporting their goods through Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, which is the only EAEU land export route available. Kyrgyz truck drivers report more onerous technical requirements and inspections for their trucks to cross the border, while Kazakh authorities explain these checks are motivated by a desire to curb the smuggling of Chinese goods through the Kyrgyz Republic to the EAEU. The United States and other international partners provided substantial technical assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic in support of its accession to the WTO in 1998, and the country’s regulatory system reflects many international norms and best practices. The Law on the Fundamentals of Technical Regulation in the Kyrgyz Republic, which provides for standardization principles under the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, entered into force in 2004. To Post’s knowledge, the Kyrgyz government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The government’s self-stated principles of the reformed legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic are “ideological and political pluralism, a socially oriented market economy, and the expansion of individual rights and freedoms.” Major barriers to foreign investment stem largely from a lack of adequate implementation rather than gaps in existing laws. The judicial system is technically independent, but political interference and corruption regularly besmirch its reputation and undermine its effectiveness. Resolution of investment disputes within the Kyrgyz Republic depends on several factors, including who the parties are and the amount of investment. The weak Kyrgyz judicial system often fails to act as an independent arbiter in the resolution of disputes. Since most disputes are lodged by foreign investors against the Kyrgyz Government, local courts often serve as an executor of the authorities’ political agenda. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed and are adjudicated in the national court system. International Court of Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (ICA).and the Central Asian Alternative Dispute Resolution Center provide mediation services for public-private disputes, which remain a protracted and often impartial process in the Kyrgyz Republic. In a move to improve the investment climate, the new tax code created arbitration courts where tax disputes with the government can be resolved, rather than in a trial court. Previously, almost 90 percent of tax cases were decided in favor of the state under the trial court system. The hope of the arbitration court system is that it will be more independent and allow for disputes to be resolved faster. The Kyrgyz Republic’s main legal framework for FDI remains the “2003 Law on Investments,” which reflects multiple amendments up until September 2021. One notable amendment lowers the investment threshold for direct negotiations between the investor and the Kyrgyz government (now $10 million compared to $50 million previously). This law contains an important article that is often interpreted differently by foreign investors and the Kyrgyz Republic, and the government has sought to amend it to limit direct access of foreign investors to international arbitration. While foreign investors claim Article 18 contains the Kyrgyz Republic’s consent to arbitration under either the ICSID Convention or UNCITRAL rules, the government argues each side must first seek consent of the other to bring the dispute to arbitration (see Penwell Business vs. Kyrgyz Republic). In 2022 Parliament introduced a bill amending the language of Article 18 to require the investor to receive consent of the Kyrgyz Republic for any dispute to go to arbitration, which may negatively impact foreign investor rights. Post continues to monitor the issue. The justice system in the Kyrgyz Republic is inefficient and lacks independence, and cases can take years to be resolved. The Kyrgyz Republic does not have a business registration website. KADI maintains the country’s main website for investment queries, https://invest.gov.kg/. The State Agency for Anti-Monopoly Regulation of the Kyrgyz Republic conducts unified state antitrust price regulation in the economy. The main tasks of the State Agency are to develop and protect competition, to control compliance with legislation in the field of anti-trust, price regulation, to protect the legal rights of consumers against manifestations of monopoly and unfair competition, to ensure observance of legislation on advertising. To Post’s knowledge, there have been no developments in any significant competition cases over the past year. The Kyrgyz Republic has a written law governing bankruptcy procedures of legal persons and insolvent physical persons (Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Bankruptcy” September 22, 1997 with multiple amendments in December 30, 1998, July 1999, September 2000, June 2002, March and August 2005, January and July 2006, June 2007, July 2009, April 2015, June, July and December 2016, May 2017, and December 31, 2019), which covers industrial enterprises and banks, irrespective of the type of ownership, commercial companies, private entrepreneurs, or foreign commercial entities. Bankruptcy proceedings are conducted by the court of arbitration competent for the district in which enterprise is located. The procedure of liquidation can be carried out without the involvement of the judicial bodies if all creditors agree on out-of-court proceedings. Chapter 10 of the law on bankruptcy provides for the possibility of an amicable or peaceful settlement between the enterprise and its creditors, which can be made at any stage of the liquidation process. 4. Industrial Policies The Kyrgyz Government has reduced the tax burden on repatriation of profits by foreign investors to conform to the tax rate for domestic investors. The Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the Kyrgyz National Investments Agency (KNIA) often express the government’s willingness to discuss potential incentives, including access to land, with specific foreign investors. To attract investment in the IT sector, the Kyrgyz government has created a “zero-tax zone” at the High Technology Park of the Kyrgyz Republic, which waives tax burden for companies in which 80 percent of total products and services are exported. The 2022 Tax Code provides some tax breaks for certain industries including agriculture, textiles, jewelry, aviation, and export-oriented production. Incentives for clean energy investments are mostly tax breaks, such as VAT exemption for e-vehicles, though they are subject to the EAEU 15% import duty. (Consumers must still pay 12% VAT when they purchase an e-vehicle). The government has expressed a desire to attract investment to develop domestic hydropower production, but hurdles remain. For example, while the government offers a feed-in tariff with a co-efficient of 1.3 for companies that produce renewable electricity, the government will only sign the agreement to purchase this electricity once the renewable energy infrastructure (such as a hydropower plant) has been built. The lack of a purchase agreement prior to construction has led to little investment appetite beyond a handful of domestic investors. Other outstanding issues involve contradictions in legislation that involve water and land regulation that would affect any new hydropower plant project. There are five Free Economic Zones (FEZs) in the Kyrgyz Republic: Bishkek, Naryn, Karakol (Issyk-Kul province), Leylek (Batken province) and Maimak (Talas province). Each is situated to make use of transportation infrastructure and/or customs posts along the Kyrgyz borders. Government incentives for investment in the zones include exemption from several taxes, duties and payments, simplified customs procedures, and direct access to utility suppliers. The production and sale of petroleum, liquor, and tobacco products in FEZs are banned. Additional information on FEZs can be found at https://invest.gov.kg/free-economic-zones/. While there are no formal legal requirements for local employment, most major international investors are subject to tremendous public pressure to support threshold local employment, particularly in the mining and construction sectors. New investors may find local employment quotas included in potential investment agreements, mandating numbers for boards of directors, senior management, and/or other employees. The Kyrgyz government currently does not have any “forced localization” policies but in 2021 officials, including President Japarov, began to discuss introducing legal localization requirements. There are no known government/authority-imposed conditions on permission to invest. The U.S.-Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty ensures that investments are guaranteed freedom from performance requirements, including requirements to use local products or to exports local goods. Foreign investors may freely transmit customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory upon their own need as long as it does not contradict with local law on investments. There are no known instances of requiring foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There is no legislation on maintaining data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Inviolability of property rights is written in the Kyrgyz Constitution and the Civil Code. Mortgages and liens are common in the Kyrgyz Republic and operate according to relevant legislation. The State Registration Service is the major operator of a recording system (database) on property under mortgage/lien commitments. When providing mortgages, local banks must request a reference from the State Registration Service that confirms the property is not under lien. However, several have questioned the reliability of the recording system, and the Service itself is frequently subject to allegations of corruption. There are a number of legal restrictions on the right of foreign persons to own land in the Kyrgyz Republic. The land rights of foreign persons are limited to the following: Foreign persons may not own or use agricultural land. Foreign persons may not own or use any land except residential land, which has been foreclosed under a mortgage loan agreement in accordance with Kyrgyz Pledge Law. Foreclosed agricultural land may belong to foreign banks and specialized financial institutions but only for the period of two years (http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/386). Foreign persons may use non-residential land transferred thereto by way of universal succession, except agricultural and mining use land, subject to permission of the Kyrgyz Government, for the period of up to 50 years. Foreign persons who have acquired ownership of land by way of universal succession (inheritance, reorganization) must transfer such land to a Kyrgyz national or legal entity within one year from the date of acquiring such ownership. All land related issues are covered by the Land Code. The Land Code provides a description of all land types and how each type is transferred, sold, or leased. The Land Code states that all land either belongs to the state, municipality, or private owner. Article 7 describes the duration of ownership for each land type. The Government sells “untitled” territories through open bidding only if the land plot does not have a direct licensed owner. The Land Code is currently being revised by a special Commission that consists of 13 government bodies. The Kyrgyz Republic has robust legislation protecting intellectual property (IP) and the country is a signatory to several IP related international treaties; enforcement remains problematic. The State Service for Intellectual Property and Innovation under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic (“Kyrgyzpatent”) is the authorized body of the Executive Branch that issues documents to certify intellectual property. Kyrgyzpatent establishes the Appeal Council that is the primary body to hear intellectual property related disputes. The judicial system remains underdeveloped and lacks independence and the appeals process can be lengthy. The Kyrgyz Republic is obligated to protect intellectual property rights as a member of the WTO. The Kyrgyz Republic acceded to both the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty in 2002. The Kyrgyz Republic was not included in the 2022 Special 301 report but was listed on the 2021 U.S. Trade Representative’s Notorious Markets report, due to the availability of counterfeit goods sold at the massive Dordoi bazaar – Central Asia’s largest market. Counterfeit goods imported from China are also re-exported to Russia and Kazakhstan. No specific action has been taken against Dordoi market. The Kyrgyz Republic did not pass any new IPR related laws or regulations in 2021. IPR-related codes, laws and regulations of the Kyrgyz Republic are listed on Kyrgyzpatent’s website. The few pending IPR bills listed on the Parliament’s website are mainly aimed to make minor changes into the existing governmental IPR-related decrees (http://patent.kg/ru/sample-page-5-4/sample-page-2-2-3/). Criminal liability for violation of IPR is listed in the Criminal Code. Unfortunately, enforcement is lax and according to sources, there have been no successful prosecution for IPR violations in the history of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic is not known as a major producer of counterfeit goods but sale/re-export of imported counterfeit goods remains prevalent. The State Customs Service regularly publishes alerts and notifications on the recent seizure of counterfeit goods on its official website. There is no central database of official statistics on the seizure of counterfeit goods to date. KADI has dedicated a segment of its website to IPR. 6. Financial Sector The Kyrgyz government is generally open toward foreign portfolio investment, though experts from international financial institutions (IFIs) have noted that capital markets in the Kyrgyz Republic remain underdeveloped. The economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is primarily cash-based, although non-cash consumer transactions, such as debit cards and transaction machines, are increasing every year. The number of bank payment cards in use increased by 2 times and e-wallets 3 times in the last five years. In January 2022, Moody’s downgraded the Kyrgyz Republic’s sovereign credit rating to B3, and dropped its outlook from stable to negative, citing weak institutions and governance. The government debt market is small and limited to short maturities, though Kyrgyz bonds are available for foreign ownership. Broadly, credit is allocated on market terms, but experts have noted that the subsidized credit from the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund subsidized has led to market distortions. Bank loans remain the primary source of private sector credit, and local portfolio investors often highlight the need to develop additional financial instruments in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are two stock exchanges in the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyz Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange of the Kyrgyz Republic), but all transactions are conducted through the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange. In 2021, the total value of transactions amounted to 9.7 billion Kyrgyz som (approximately USD 115 million). The small market lacks sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Since 1995, the Kyrgyz Republic has accepted IMF Article VIII obligations. Foreign investors are able to acquire loans on the local market if the business is operating on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and collateral meets the requirements of local banks. The average interest rate for loans in USD is 7-15 percent. USAID has assisted small and medium enterprises (SME) through locally registered private equity funds to develop equity and mezzanine financing, which have invested $14.3 million into local SMEs in the past 2 years. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) is a nominally independent body whose mandate is to achieve and maintain price stability through monetary policy. The Bank is also tasked with maintaining the safety and reliability of the banking and payment systems. The NBKR licenses, regulates, and supervises credit institutions. The penetration level of the banking sector is 49.9 percent According to the IMF, the Kyrgyz banking system at present remains well capitalized with still sizeable, non-performing loans (NPLs). NPLs increased from 10.5 percent to 11.1 percent in 2021. Net capital adequacy ratio decreased from 24.9 percent to 22.2 percent in 2021. Total assets in the Kyrgyz banking system in 2021 equaled approximately USD 4.2 billion. As of February 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic’s three largest banks by total assets were Optima Bank (approximately USD 846 million), Aiyl Bank (approximately USD 476 million), and Kyrgyz Investment and Credit Bank (KICB; approximately USD 475 million). There are currently 23 commercial banks in the Kyrgyz Republic, with 312 operating branches throughout the country; the five largest banks comprise more than 50 percent of the total market. No U.S. bank operates in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kyrgyz banks do not maintain correspondent accounts from U.S. financial institutions, following widespread de-risking in 2018. There are ten foreign banks operating in the Kyrgyz Republic: Demir Bank, National Bank of Pakistan, Halyk Bank, Optima Bank, Finca Bank, Bai-Tushum Bank, Amanbank, Kyrgyz-Swiss Bank, Chang An Bank, and Kompanion Bank are entirely foreign held. Other banks are partially foreign held, including KICB and BTA Bank. KICB has multinational organizations as shareholders including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Economic Finance Corporation, the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, and others. The micro-finance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is robust, representing nearly 10 percent the market size of the banking sector. Trade accounted for 28 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking sector, followed by agriculture (18 percent) and consumer loans (12 percent). The microfinance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is rapidly growing, with total assets of microfinance companies growing by 17 percent in 2021 compared to 2020. The three largest microfinance companies (Bai-Tushum, FINCA, and Kompanion) have transformed into banks with full banking licenses. The Kyrgyz Republic has no official Sovereign Wealth Fund, though previously an informal sovereign fund originated from proceeds of the Kumtor gold mine and was comprised of shares in the parent company of the gold mine operator, Centerra Gold. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are approximately 94 SOEs in the Kyrgyz Republic that play a significant role in the local economy. According to 2021 data, 65 of the 94 SOEs were not profitable. Still, SOE income managed to double only for the first nine months of 2021 to $76.4 million dollars. The State Property Management Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic (www.fgi.gov/kg) is the public executive authority representing the interests of the state. The purpose of the Fund is to ensure the efficiency of the use, management, and privatization of state property. Information on allocations to and earnings from SOEs is included in budget execution reports and is published (in Russian) by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (www.minfin.kg). Information on SOE assets, earnings, profitability, working capital, and other financial indicators is available on the State Property Management Fund’s website (http://finance.page.kg/index.php?act=svod_profit), though the website is not actively maintained. The State Property Management Fund also reviews the budgets for the largest SOEs, while the Accounting Chamber reviews the accounts of all SOEs and publishes audit reports on their website (www.esep.kg). The Kyrgyz Republic does not fully adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Cronyism and corruption within SOEs are a major obstacle to the Kyrgyz Republic’s economic development. The Heritage Foundation’s 2017 Index of Economic Freedom report noted, elected officials appoint company board members based on political loyalty rather than professional skills and corporate governance knowledge. Positions on boards of directors are frequently used as rewards for political support, and the dynamic has reinforced the patronage system and resulted in poor economic performance and public service delivery. As of February 2021, the presidential decree on “State Personnel Hiring Policy” authorizes the State Personnel Service to direct all state agencies and SOEs to verify the qualifications of all candidates, including education and professional experience, as the basis for personnel appointments. The government has attempted to improve transparency on contracts and bidding processes. Due to widespread corruption, there are common complaints that only individual government officials have access to government contracts and bidding processes. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private firms and usually place the calls for bids either on their websites or in public newspapers, as required. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs and are subject to the same tax burden. In some cases, SOEs have preferential access to land and raw materials. The Kyrgyz government periodically auctions rights to subsoil usage and broadcasts tender announcements, including disseminating information to diplomatic missions, in order to attract foreign investors. There are no restrictions on foreign investors participating in privatization programs. The privatization process is not well defined and is subject to change. There is ongoing deliberation on the privatization of other state-owned assets, such as the postal service and the capital’s international airport, but lack of interest by private partners has stalled any potential moves. The Kyrgyz government is no longer actively pursuing sale of its 100 percent stake in Megacom, the country’s largest telecommunications company. In December 2021 the Ministry of Finance announced plans to fully or partially sell 25 SOEs in 2022, including the Eurasian Savings Bank and Bakai Bank, among others. Foreign investors – both companies and individuals – are generally able to participate in public auctions of state-owned properties unless specifically prohibited in the terms and conditions. There are, however, some land legislation restrictions concerning the property rights of foreigners. Information about terms and conditions of SOE sales are posted on the State Property Management Fund’s website (www.fgi.gov.kg). 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Kyrgyz Government does not factor responsibility business conduct (RBC) policies or practices into its procurement decisions. Historically, the mining sector has been a lightning rod for public controversy concerning RBC violations. In the recent past, local residents have staged rallies to protest against small gold mining operations owned and operated by Chinese and other foreign-owned mining companies based on claims of their detrimental impact on the environment, and in 2021, the Kyrgyz government sued Centerra Gold in international court for alleged environmental violations. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is not a fully developed concept or practice. Most companies have not yet developed the capacity to coordinate with civil society on this level. The companies that generally demonstrate CSR are large, foreign-owned companies that participate in or lead industry-strengthening training sessions, work with local universities to develop internship programs and donate to national development projects. Many new large investors, particularly in natural resource extraction, find that there is a requirement to establish a sizeable “social development fund” as a prerequisite for doing business in the Kyrgyz Republic. Charitable donations are not tax deductible. The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The online license register of the State Committee on Industry, Energy, and Subsoil Use keeps track of the number of active extractive licenses, and EITI covers more than 95 percent of mining revenues in the Kyrgyz Republic. After being suspended by the EITI in 2017, the EITI Board in September 2020, reinstated the Kyrgyz Republic citing meaningful progress in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard. Child labor is still used in the country especially in the country’s sizeable shadow economy which includes agriculture, bazaars (transportation of goods, shoes cleaning, sales of beverages and food, etc.), service sector and construction. In 2020, the Kyrgyz Republic made minimal advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, though the government lifted a regressive moratorium on business inspections on January 1, 2022. The government passed a policy package that established a National Referral Mechanism for victims of human trafficking and drafted a new National Action Plan for 2020–2024 on the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor. There are approximately 50 private security companies in Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic is not currently a member of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and is not a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers, nor a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The government of the Kyrgyz Republic unveiled revised, more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) at COP26 in November 2021, including a goal to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 17 percent by 2025 under the business-as-usual scenario, and by 37 percent subject to international support (financial assistance). Climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts will focus on the three sectors that produce the most GHG emissions: energy, agriculture, and forestry and other types of land use. The Kyrgyz Republic has abundant water resources that the government plans to develop sustainably to increase the share of hydropower in its energy mix. Other plans include increased carbon flow from populated areas towards forests by creation of new forest plantations and expansion of the areas with perennial forests, and expansion of areas cultivated under organic land farming. The Kyrgyz Republic joined the Global Methane Pledge in 2021. And while the government has committed to reaching net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, it has not announced or debuted any policy measures to achieve this goal. Post is unaware of any public procurement policies that include environmental and green growth considerations. Most regulatory incentives to encourage clean energy development and climate-friendly business practices involve tax breaks and credits. For a full discussion, see Investment Incentives under the Industrial Policies section. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a serious problem at all levels of Kyrgyz society and in all sectors of the economy. All companies are recommended to establish internal codes of conduct, above all, to prohibit the bribery of public officials. There are laws criminalizing the giving and accepting of bribes, establishing penalties ranging from a small administrative fine to a prison sentence. However, the government’s enforcement of anti-corruption legislation has been notoriously uneven and often politically motivated. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, the Kyrgyz Republic ranked 144 out of 180 countries with a score of 27 out of 100 – a lower ranking than 2020 (124) and below the global average score of 43. Kyrgyz politicians and citizens alike are aware of the systemic corruption, but the problem has been difficult to fight. Moreover, many in the Kyrgyz Republic view paying of bribes as the most efficient way to receive government assistance and many, albeit indirectly, gain benefits from corrupt practices. The Kyrgyz Republic is a signatory of the UN Anticorruption Convention but is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Since 2020, the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) has arrested and detained dozens of public figures including former ministers and current and former members of parliament on suspicion of corruption, most of whom were released after paying a fine. In 2021, the government launched an extensive corruption investigation against former government officials involved in past deals with Centerra Gold related to the Kumtor gold mine. The investigation is ongoing. In recent years, including in 2022, anti-corruption campaigners and Kyrgyz journalists involved in investigating corruption have been subject to intimidation and physical assault, as well as detention on unrelated charges. Such incidents are rarely investigated thoroughly by law enforcement. In October 2020, the government instituted a policy of “economic amnesty” for corruption, if the perpetrator returns stolen assets. The legality of such amnesty has been disputed by international experts, and a number of high-profile arrests have resulted in swift release following payment of fines. The government is still considering legislation to legalize illicit assets: a working group is currently developing draft laws that would allow individuals to avoid criminal liability for any assets they declare to the government, order the destruction of any financial disclosure statements filed in the past, and end publication of future financial disclosure statements. President Japarov established the Anti-Corruption Business Council by decree in July 2021, to develop a strategy and action plan to institute government-wide policies to combat systemic corruption (still in draft form as of March 18, 2021). The President is the Chair of the Council and Nuripa Mukanova is the Secretary General. Its membership is comprised of government officials, business associations, representatives from the diplomatic community, NGOs, and development partners. U.S. companies seeking to do business in the Kyrgyz Republic, regardless of their size, should assess the business climate in the relevant sector in which they will be operating or investing, and conduct due diligence to ensure full compliance with measures to prevent and detect corruption, including bribery. U.S. individuals and firms operating or investing in foreign markets should take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption laws of both the Kyrgyz Republic and the United States in order to properly comply with them, and where appropriate, should seek the advice of legal counsel. The Kyrgyz Republic ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in September 2005. The Kyrgyz Republic is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. Anti-Corruption Business Council Adskyrgyzstan@gmail.com info@adc.kginfo@adc.kg www.adc.kg 10. Political and Security Environment A history of political upheaval and violent clashes with neighboring Tajikistan over disputed territory in 2021 and early 2022, perpetuate an unstable political and security landscape that negatively impacts the investment environment. Both Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit dropped their ratings of the Kyrgyz Republic’s democracy in 2021, citing the now-annulled October 2020 parliamentary elections and the subsequent concentration of power within the presidency. After protests over highly flawed parliamentary elections led to the resignation of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov, Sadyr Japarov, an opposition figure imprisoned since 2017, took office amid political tumult, and was subsequently elected president in January 2021. Japarov introduced a new constitution, approved by referendum in April 2021, that has transitioned the country to a presidential system, consolidated power in the executive branch, and weakened the power of parliament. Since independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has had 5 presidents and 26 different prime ministers, and the tradition of frequent turnover in the cabinet of ministers continues today, with many ministries also reorganized in 2021. The security environment remains unpredictable across the country. In the days following the October 2020 tumult, political instability spilled over into the commercial sector in Bishkek; following the election protests, local marauders looted and raided the offices and facilities of multiple foreign-joint venture mining enterprises. Foreign-owned extractive resources companies were targeted by local communities in 2018 and 2019, after relative calm in 2015 and 2016. Fighting between Kyrgyz and Tajik border forces broke out in April 2021 in the southwestern Batken region, leading to dozens of casualties and the forced temporary evacuation of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens. Water resources and the border demarcation remain disputed in these areas, along with disputed demarcation along portions of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, although the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments reportedly reached overall agreement on border issues in 2021.Violence in these border areas has continued to flare up between border guards, sometimes involving civilians. Foreign-affiliated companies have been subject to local protests, at times resulting in vandalism and violence. In 2019, the majority Chinese company Zhong Ji Mining suspended operations at the Solton-Sary gold mine following violent clashes with hundreds of local residents who blamed the company for environmental degradation. In December 2019, hundreds of protestors demanded local authorities of the Naryn Free Economic Trade Zone to cancel the land lease of a Chinese-Kyrgyz enterprise, resulting in the suspension of a major customs and trade logistics complex. Local populations tend to view Chinese investment projects with more scrutiny, due to perceptions that these companies’ activities degrade the environment, such as water sources. Supporters of extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Qaeda, and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) remain active in Central Asia. These groups have expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and could potentially target U.S.-affiliated organizations and business interests. In August 2016, a suicide bomber, reportedly affiliated with ETIM and trained in Syria, detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device inside the Chinese Embassy compound in Bishkek, located less than 200 yards from the U.S. Embassy. The attack reportedly killed the perpetrator and injured four others, in addition to causing extensive damage. The United States has cooperated with the Kyrgyz Government to improve border and internal security and efforts to return Kyrgyz citizens from conflicts in Iraq and Syria are ongoing. 11. Labor Policies and Practices There is significant competition for skilled and educated individuals in the Kyrgyz labor market as many qualified Kyrgyz citizens find more lucrative job opportunities abroad, and the nation’s education system has largely failed to keep pace with advancing educational needs within many sectors. International organizations are generally able to employ competent staff, often bilingual in English or other languages. Youth are increasingly interested in acquiring coding and programming skills for jobs in the technology sector, and the IT industry in the Kyrgyz Republic is small but growing rapidly with an international client base. There are two unemployment rates published by the government: the official unemployment rate (of individuals officially registered with the government for social security benefits), is 3 percent, while the unemployment rated based on a national survey of households (including those not registered for social security) is 6 percent. In addition, some experts estimate true unemployment exceeds both of these figures. The women’s labor force participation rate is 39 percent. Approximately 1 million Kyrgyz citizens work abroad because of limited opportunities in the Kyrgyz Republic, with roughly 90 percent of Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia. The large Kyrgyz informal economy comprises an estimated 40-70 percent of the country’s GDP and employs a large number of workers including women and children. Employers in the informal sector generally perceive the formal economy as rife with red tape, corruption, and high taxes and pension contribution obligations, and remain reluctant to leave the “shadow” economy. The new tax code aims to tackle the informal economy using several mechanisms including requiring all businesses to operate with digital cash registers to capture accurate revenue and tax liability. There are no government policies that require hiring Kyrgyz nationals, though it is often added as a condition for investment, particularly in the mining sector. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting to a fluctuating market, including the hiring and firing of workers without cause. Many private companies use temporary or contract workers. The Labor Code does not provide any special conditions in order to attract investment. Labor unions are independent and are not subject to state bodies, employers, political parties, or other unions. In practice, labor unions have been inactive on advocating and enforcing the protection of workers’ rights. Workers have the right to form and join trade unions. The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, organize, and bargain collectively. Workers may strike, but the requirement to receive formal approval has made striking difficult and complicated. The law prohibits government employees from striking, but the prohibition does not apply to teachers or medical professionals. The law does not prohibit retaliation against striking workers. Labor disputes are settled by a Commission for Labor Disputes (established within all organizations with 10 or more employees), by the authorized state body, or by courts of the Kyrgyz Republic. The employee has the right to choose one of these bodies to settle the dispute. In 2021, Parliament repeatedly approved a controversial bill that would have required all trade unions to be affiliated with the government sanctioned Federation of Trade Union, but the President vetoed the proposed law each time. Had it passed, the bill would have violated the principle of “freedom of association” enshrined in international labor rights, and the principle of independence of trade union organizations. Safety and health conditions in factories are generally poor and weakly enforced by the government. Workers in the informal economy have neither legal protection nor mandated safety standards. The law establishes occupational health and safety standards, and the Ministry of Labor, Social Development, and Migration is responsible for protecting workers and carrying out inspections in the event that worker safety and well-being is compromised. The three-year moratorium on business inspections expired January 1, 2022. The Labor Code of the country complies with all required international laws and treaties, but gaps remain in protecting the rights of individuals employed by private companies. Many employees are hired based on basic or even oral agreements and lack knowledge of their rights. In January 2017, amendments to the Labor Code of the Kyrgyz Republic entered into force that strengthened labor rights and protections for people under the age of 18 and in 2020 the government adopted a revised list of hazardous work prohibited for children under age 18. However, child labor laws are not uniformly enforced. The U.S. Embassy is unaware of the Kyrgyz government’s efforts to implement OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas or OECD or UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $7.240 2020 $7,736 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kyrgyzrepublic Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $6.4 2020 $29 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1.7 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 -4.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html *Source for Host Country Data: National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic: http://www.stat.kg; http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/2315/; http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/4428/; http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/investicii/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $5,412 100% Total Outward $897 100% Canada $1,683 31% Canada $878 98% China $1,037 19% China $15 2% Russian Federation $968 17% Tajikistan $2 0.2% United Kingdom $380 7% Germany $1 0.1% Kazakhstan $241 4% United Kingdom $0 0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Host country data differs from IMF data due to differing methodologies. According to host country data, total inward FDI in 2020 amounted to 537.4 million USD. In 2020 the incoming FDI from Canada was 154 million USD and from China is 136 million USD, according to the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee. The total outward FDI was 939 million USD, according to the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee; however, outward FDI to Canada reached 6 million USD and to China 592 million USD according to National Statistical Committee in 2020. 14. Contact for More Information Natalia Sitnikov Economic Officer U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic 171 Prospekt Mira Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic 720016 +996-312-597-000 Laos Executive Summary Laos, officially the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), is a rapidly growing developing economy at the heart of Southeast Asia, bordered by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Laos’ economic growth over the last decade, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, averaged just below eight percent, placing Laos amongst the fastest growing economies in the world. Over the last 30 years, Laos has made slow but steady progress in implementing reforms and building the institutions necessary for a market economy, culminating in accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 2013. The Lao government’s commitment to WTO accession and the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 led to major reforms of economic policies and regulations with the aim to improve Laos’ business and investment environment. Nonetheless, within ASEAN, Laos ranks only ahead of Burma in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business’ rankings. The Lao government is increasingly tying its economic fortunes to the economic integration of ASEAN and export-led development and is prioritizing the digital economy, logistics, green growth, and more sustainable development. Prior to Laos’ second COVID lockdown in September 2021, the World Bank predicted that Laos’ economic growth rate would increase from 0.5 percent in 2020 to 3.6 percent in 2021 on the prediction that Laos would soon open its borders. However, limited fiscal and foreign currency buffers have posed a challenge to the government’s ability to mitigate the economic impacts of COVID-19. Overall, the pandemic has resulted in an intensification of the country’s macroeconomic vulnerabilities. When compared to other countries in the region, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Laos have been relatively stable and driven by the construction of infrastructure and power projects. In 2022, if the pandemic is brought under control and the government effectively implements fiscal support measures, international and Lao economists project GDP growth will reach four percent. The exploitation of natural resources and the development of hydropower has driven rapid economic growth over the last decade, with both sectors largely led by foreign investors. However, because growth opportunities in these industries are finite and employ few people, the Lao government has recently begun prioritizing and expanding the development of high-value agriculture, light manufacturing, and tourism, while continuing to develop energy resources and related electrical transmission capacity for export to neighboring countries. The Lao government hopes to leverage its lengthy land borders with Burma, China, Thailand, and Vietnam to transform Laos from “land-locked” to “land-linked,” thereby further integrating the Lao economy with the larger economies of its neighbors. The government hopes to increase exports of agriculture, manufactured goods, and electricity to its more industrialized neighbors, and sees significant growth opportunities resulting from the Laos-China Railway, which connects Kunming in Yunnan Province, China with Laos’ capital city Vientiane. Some businesses and international investors are beginning to use Laos as a low-cost export base to sell goods within the region and to the United States and Europe. The emergence of light manufacturing has begun to help Laos integrate into regional supply chains, and improving infrastructure should facilitate this process, making Laos a legitimate locale for regional manufacturers seeking to diversify from existing production bases in Thailand, Vietnam, and China. New Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Vientiane and Savannakhet have attracted major manufacturers from Europe, North America, and Japan. Chinese and Thai interests also have plans for new SEZ projects. Economic progress and trade expansion in Laos remain hampered by a shortage of workers with technical skills, weak education and health care systems, and poor—although improving—transportation infrastructure. Institutions, especially in the justice sector, remain highly underdeveloped and regulatory capacity is low. Despite recent efforts and some improvements, corruption is rampant and is a major obstacle for foreign investors. Corruption, policy and regulatory ambiguity, and the uneven application of laws remain disincentives to further foreign investment in the country. The Lao government is making efforts to improve the business environment. Its 8thfive-year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) (2016-2020) directed the government to formulate “policies that would attract investments” and to “begin to implement public investment and investment promotion laws.” The former prime minister, now president, has stated his goal was to see Laos improve its World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking (Laos is currently ranked #154). In February 2018 and January 2020, the Office of the Prime Minister issued orders laying out specific steps ministries were to take to improve the business environment. These efforts made an impact. For example, due to streamlining of application processes, it now takes to less than 17 days to obtain a business license, compared to 174 days a few years ago. In 2021, the former prime minister assumed the presidency of a new administration with a stated focus on economic issues. This continuity provides a foundation to build on Laos’ previous National Socio-Economic Development Plan. Laos’ new development plan, the 9th NSEDP (2021-2025), will be published later this year with a focus on graduating Laos from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026 and become an upper-middle income country. One of the government’s priorities is to diversify the economy and improve the investment climate encouraging both domestic and foreign investment to accelerate economic growth. The government is focused on a post-COVID economic recovery through policies to achieve macro-economic stability, connectivity through improved infrastructure, and green, sustainable growth initiatives. Sectors such as agriculture, natural resource development, and tourism are emphasized in the draft 9th NSEDP plan. Further development of investment-related policies and other regulations can be expected from the new government. The current administration remains active in firing or disciplining corrupt officials, with the government and National Assembly in 2019 disciplining hundreds of officials for corruption-related offenses. Despite these efforts, Laos’ Ease of Doing Business ranking fell from 139 in 2016 to154 in 2020. The multiple ministries, laws, and regulations affecting foreign investment in Laos creates confusion, and requires potential investors to engage either local partners or law firms to navigate a confusing and cumbersome bureaucracy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 117 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 2,520 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Lao government officially welcomes both domestic and foreign investment as it seeks to keep growth rates high and graduate from Least Developed Country status by 2026. The pace of foreign investment has increased over the last several years. According to Lao government statistics, mining and hydropower account for 95.7 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and agriculture accounted for only 2 percent of FDI in 2019. China, Thailand, France, Vietnam, and Japan are the largest sources of foreign investment, with China accounting for a significant share of all FDI in Laos. The government’s Investment Promotion Department encourages investment through its website www.investlaos.gov.la , and the government is attempting to improve the business environment by facilitating a constructive dialogue annually with the private sector and foreign business chambers through the Lao Business Forum, which is managed by the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry LNCCI). The 2009 Law on Investment Promotion was amended in November 2016, with 32 new articles introduced and 59 existing articles revised. Notably, the new law, an English version of which can be found at www.investlaos.gov.la , clarifies investment incentives, transfers responsibility for SEZs from the Prime Minister’s office to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), and removes strict registered capital requirements for opening a business, deferring instead to the relevant ministry. Foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or that have a negative impact on the natural environment. In December 2021, Laos amended the value-added tax (VAT) law following Presidential Decree no. 231/P, which reduced the VAT rate from 10 to 7 percent as part of the government’s effort towards economic recovery. Also, the decree aims to provide a mechanism to facilitate investment towards activities that enable production and export. More importantly, the amended law indicates that more activities are exempted from VAT, while other mineral and electricity-related activities are subject to a specific basis for VAT calculation. Nevertheless, even in cases where full foreign ownership is permitted, many foreign companies seek a local partner. Companies involved in large FDI projects, especially in mining and hydropower, often either find it advantageous or are required to give the government partial ownership. Foreign investors are typically required to go through several procedural steps prior to commencing operations. Many foreign business owners and potential investors claim the process is overly complex and regulations are erratically applied, particularly to foreigner investors. Investors also express confusion about the roles of different ministries, as multiple ministries become involved in the approval process. In the case of general investment licenses (as opposed to concessionary licenses, which are issued by MPI, foreign investors are required to obtain multiple permits, including an annual business registration from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), a tax registration from the Ministry of Finance, a business logo registration from the Ministry of Public Security, permits from each line ministry related to the investment (i.e., MOIC for manufacturing, and Ministry of Energy and Mines for power sector development), appropriate permits from local authorities, and an import-export license, if applicable. Obtaining the necessary permits can be challenging and time consuming, especially in areas outside the capital. There are several possible vehicles for foreign investment. Foreign partners in a joint venture must contribute at least 30 percent of the company’s registered capital. Wholly foreign-owned companies may be entirely new or a branch of an existing foreign enterprise. Equity in medium and large-sized SOEs can be obtained through a joint venture with the Lao government. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, however the trend of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) shows an increase in recent years, mainly driven by large infrastructure projects. Total FDI in Laos increased from $5.7 billion in 2016 to $10 billion in 2019. As discussed above, even though foreigners may invest in most sectors or businesses (subject to previously noted exceptions), many foreign companies seek a local partner to navigate byzantine official and unofficial processes. Companies involved in large FDI projects, especially in mining and hydropower, often either find it advantageous or are required to give the government partial ownership. The OECD released its most recent investment policy review of Laos on July 11, 2017. More details can be found at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-lao-pdr-2017-9789264276055-en.htm Laos does not have a central business registration website yet, but the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) has improved its online enterprise registration site, http://www.erm.gov.la , to accelerate the registration process. Due to the government’s effort in supporting the ease of doing business, investors recently reported needing less than 17 days to attain an Enterprise Registration Certificate for general business activities, compared to 174 days in the past. Nonetheless, the timeline and process for controlled and concession activities (see https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/Legal_1571216364.pdf for a list) can vary considerably, as it requires the engagement of different government agencies to issue an operating license. As a result, many investors and even locals often hire consultancies or law firms to shepherd the labor-intensive registration process. The Lao government has attempted to streamline business registration using a one-stop shop model. Registration for general business activities can be done at the Department of Enterprise Registration and Management offices, MOIC(see http://www.erm.gov.la for more details), while the service for activities requiring a government concession is through the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). For investment in special economic zones (SEZ), one-stop registration is run through the MPI or in special one-stop service offices within the SEZs themselves (under the authority of the MPI). To promote and facilitate domestic and foreign investment, the Prime Minister’s Office issued Order 02 and Order 03 in 2018 and 2019 respectively to reform the ease of doing business and improve services on investment and operational licenses. This includes the improvement of the One Stop Service system and conducting business implementation associated with transparency in a uniform and timely manner. The government also encouraged the participation of both domestic and foreign investors to develop infrastructure and public services delivery projects by issuing a public-private partnership (PPP) decree in 2020 aiming to boost economic growth. So far, business owners give the one-stop shop concept mixed reviews. Many acknowledge that it is an improvement but describe it as an incomplete reform with several additional steps that must still be taken outside of the single stop. Businesses also complain that there are often different registration requirements at the central and provincial levels. The Lao government does not actively promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Regulations in Laos can be vague and conflicting, a subject that the private sector raises regularly with the government, including through official fora such as the Lao Business Forum. The 2013 Law on Making Legislation mandated that all laws be available online at the official gazette website, www.laoofficialgazette.gov.la . Draft bills are also available for public comment through the official gazette website, although not all bills are posted for comment or in the official gazette, and the provinces seldom post their local legislation. Although the situation continues to improve, the realities of doing business in Laos can fail to correspond with existing legislation and regulation. Implementation and enforcement often do not strictly follow the letter of the law, and vague or contradictory clauses in laws and regulations provide for widely varying interpretations. Regulations at the national and provincial levels can often diverge, overlap, or contradict one another. Many local firms still complain about informal or gray competition from firms that offer lower costs by flaunting formal registration requirements and operating outside of government regulatory structures. The nascent legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not particularly conducive to a transparent, competitive business environment. International accounting norms apply, and major international firms are present in the market, though understanding and adherence to these norms is limited to a small section of the business community. Eleven companies are listed on the Lao stock exchange. Regulations dictate that companies listed on the exchange must be held to accounting standards, but the government’s capacity to enforce those standards is low. The government now publicly releases the enacted budget, which includes the total amount of domestic and external debt obligations for the whole country. Laos is a member of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and is seeking to implement all AEC-agreed standards domestically. However, the local capacity to develop regulatory standards is weak, while enforcement of technical regulations is weaker still. The Lao government has been diligent at notifying draft technical regulations – such as its new law on standards – to the WTO committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Laos currently has a poorly developed legal sector. The government adopted the Legal Sector Master Plan with an aim to become a rule of law state by 2020.The plan is now complete however rule of law in Laos is still in its infancy. To improve the country’s legal system, the government will continue to work with many development partners on comprehensive legal sector reform. From 1975 to 1991, Laos did not have a constitution, and government decrees issued by various ministries and officials only exacerbated the country’s poor legal framework. While there have been dramatic improvements in the legal system over the last decade, Laos has relatively few lawyers, many judges lack formal training and experience, and laws often remain vague and subject to broad interpretation. The existing system incorporates some major elements of the French civil law system, but is also influenced by the legal systems of the former Soviet Union and regional neighbors’ systems. Court decisions are neither widely published, nor do they necessarily affect future decisions. Despite being bureaucratically independent of the government cabinet, the Lao judiciary is still subject to government and political interference. Contract law in Laos is lacking in many areas important to trade and commerce. The law provides for the sanctity of contracts, but in practice, contracts are subject to political interference and patronage. Businesses report that contracts can be voided if they are found to be disadvantageous to one party, or if they conflict with state or public interests. Foreign businessmen describe contracts in Laos as being “a framework for negotiation” rather than a binding agreement, and even when faced with a judgment, enforcement is weak and subject to the influence of corruption. Although a commercial court system exists, most judges adjudicating commercial disputes have little training in commercial law. Those considering doing business in Laos are strongly urged to contact a reputable law firm for additional advice on contracts. One positive development from 2019 is that under the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), Laos became the 92nd State Party to join the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. As discussed above, the 2009 Law on Investment promotion was amended in November 2016. The new law provides more transparency regarding regulations and procedures and provides greater detail about what specific responsibilities fall under the Ministry of Planning and Investment. The 2016 Law on Investment Promotion introduced uniform business registration requirements and tax incentives that apply equally to foreign and domestic investors. As noted above, foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or to have a negative impact on the natural environment. Aside from these sectors, there are no statutory limits on foreign ownership or control of commercial enterprises. For reasons discussed above, despite changes in the law, many companies continue to seek a local partner. Most laws of interest to investors are featured on the Lao Trade Portal website, http://www.laotradeportal.gov.la , with many laws and regulations translated into English, or the Lao Official Gazette, http://laoofficialgazette.gov.la , or the official website of the Investment Promotion Department (MPI), www.investlaos.gov.la , or the newly created “Lao Law” App. In sum, neither the government’s investment bureaucracy nor the commercial court system is well developed, although the former is improving and reforming. Investors have experienced government practices that deviate significantly from publicly available laws and regulations. Some investors decry the courts’ limited ability to handle commercial disputes and vulnerability to corruption. The Lao government has repeatedly underscored its commitment to increasing predictability in the investment environment, but in practice, with some exceptions in the creation and operation of SEZs, and investments by larger companies, foreign investors describe inconsistent application of laws and regulations. There have been no updates since 2017. A new competition law was approved in 2015 that applies to both foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The law was drafted with the assistance of the German government and other donors. The competition law was one of the Lao government’s policy efforts to implement the ASEAN Economic Community, or AEC, before 2016. The law established two new government entities, the Business Competition Control (BCC) Commission and the BCC Secretariat. The BCC Commission is the senior body, and its membership is decided by the Prime Minister with the advice of the Minister of Industry and Commerce (MOIC). According to the legislation, it should include senior officials from multiple ministries as well as businesspeople, economists, and lawyers. The BCC Commission can draft regulations, approve mergers, levy penalties, and provide overall guidance on government competition policy and regulation. The BCC Secretariat, a lower-level institution equivalent to a MOIC department or division, can hear complaints, conduct investigations, and conduct research and reporting at the request of the Commission. According to law, foreign assets and investments in Laos are protected against seizure, confiscation, or nationalization except when deemed necessary for a public purpose. Public purpose can be broadly defined, however, and land grabs are feared by Lao nationals and expatriates alike. In the event of a government expropriation, the Lao government is supposed to provide fair market compensation. Nevertheless, a business relying on a specific parcel of land may lose its investment license if the land is in dispute. Revocation of an investment license cannot be appealed to an independent body, and companies whose licenses are revoked must quickly liquidate their assets. Small landholdings, land with unclear title, or land on which taxes have not been paid are at particular risk of expropriation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention The Decree on the Establishment of Private Economic Dispute Resolution as specified under Article 4 of the Law on Economic Dispute Resolution No.51/NA, (2018) provides for private arbitration bodies in Lao PDR. However, the regulatory framework to enable the private sector to establish an alternative channel for business arbitration is still under development with assistance from international donors such as USAID. Laos is not a member state to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). It is, however, a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement According to the Law on Investment Promotion, resolution of a dispute resolution should proceed through the following process: mediation, administrative dispute resolution, dispute resolution by the Committee for Economic Dispute Resolution, and finally, litigation. However, due to the underdeveloped state of the Lao legal system, foreign investors are generally advised to seek arbitration outside of the country. There are few publicly available records on international investment disputes. According to the 2016 investment promotion law, Article 96 on Dispute Resolution by the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution in the Lao PDR or international organization to which Lao PDR is a party states: “When there is an investment-related dispute, either party thereto shall have the rights to request the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution for resolution within the Lao PDR or abroad as agreed by the parties of the dispute. The Lao PDR recognizes and enforces the award of foreign or international arbitration subject to certification by the people’s court of Lao PDR.” However, in practice, the Embassy is not aware of this new article being successfully exercised by a foreign investor. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Beyond those listed above, there are no formal Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms provided in Lao law but based on the amended Investment Promotion Law and the law on Investment Resolution dated June 22, 2018, both parties can decide if they would like to have arbitration in Laos or abroad as mentioned in the contract. There is no known history of Laos enforcing foreign commercial arbitral decisions. The 1994 bankruptcy law permits either the business or creditor the right to petition the court for a bankruptcy judgment and allows businesses the right to request mediation. The law also authorizes liquidation of assets based upon the request of a debtor or creditor. However, there is no record of a foreign-owned enterprise, whether as debtor or as creditor, petitioning the courts for a bankruptcy judgment. According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, Laos remains at the very bottom of the global rankings for ease of resolving insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies Laos offers a range of investment incentives depending on the investment vehicle, with particular focus on government concessions and special economic zones. Many of these incentives can be found at www.investlaos.gov.la and are generally governed by the Investment Promotion Law. The new Foreign Investment Law allows for the establishment of special economic zones and specific economic zones (both referred to as SEZs). Special economic zones are intended to support development of new infrastructure and commercial facilities and include incentives for investment. Specific economic zones are intended for the development of existing infrastructure and facilities and provide a lower level of incentives and support than special economic zones. Laos has announced plans to construct as many as 40 special and specific zones, but as of 2020, it has only established 12. Some, such as Savan Seno SEZ in Savannakhet and the Vientiane Industry and Trade Area SEZ, or VITA Park, in Vientiane, have successfully attracted foreign investors. Others are accused of harboring illegal activities, such as the Golden Triangle SEZ in Bokeo province that houses the Kings Roman Casino. The Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control in early 2018 designated the Kings Roman Casino and its owners a Transnational Criminal Organization for engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking. More Chinese-invested SEZs are expected to open in the coming years, especially along the Laos-China Railway line. Thai companies are also exploring new SEZ-style industrial parks in Laos. Generally, the Lao government places a high priority on trade facilitation measures in international fora, particularly as Laos relies upon trade moving across its neighboring countries in order to reach seaports. Since 2012, customs management has been modernized through the implementation of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) system assisted by the United Nations and the World Bank to operate customs declarations and border inspections across international check points, including airports and SEZs. The government has also developed a National Single Window to facilitate requests and issue permits for the import, export, and transit of all goods. These approaches reduced the use of paperwork and time involving customs’ clearance from two days in the past to less than eight hours in 2020. With assistance from Japan, the Lao government instituted a new system for electronic collection of customs fees at several major border crossings in 2016, which is a significant improvement, and in early 2019 the Department of Customs introduced electronic customs payments at the Lao – Thai Friendship Bridge. On several border crossings with Vietnam, Lao and Vietnamese officials jointly conduct inspections to facilitate movement of goods. On top of these actions, the government published a new version of the Tax Law (No. 81/NA) in late 2020 focusing on trade facilitation rather than revenue collection by eliminating required approvals by some agencies in the approval process. Nonetheless, Laos has struggled to harmonize its own internal processes. For example, customs practices vary widely at different ports of entry. Laos does not have performance requirements. Requirements relating to foreign hiring are governed by the 2014 Labor Law, but in practice, large investors have been able to extract additional government concessions on use of foreign labor. Some foreign-owned businesses have criticized labor regulations for strict requirements that foreign employees not travel abroad during the first months of their Lao residency. Laos does not currently have enacted laws or regulations on domestic data storage or localization requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights In 2020, the government published the revised Law on Land, which is available at https://www.laoofficialgazette.gov.la/index.php?r=site/index . While restriction on the ownership rights of foreigners towards land remains unchanged, the revised law allows immovable properties to be owned and invested in by foreign nationals. This significant change in the regulatory framework is expected to accelerate development of the Lao PDR’s real estate sector. Laos hopes for an inflow of investment and foreigners as a result of the Lao-China railway which opened in December 2021. Apart from the Land Law, Article 16 of the 2016 Law on Investment Promotion allows investors to obtain land for use through long-term leases or as concessions and allows for the ownership of leases, the right to transfer leases, and to improve leasehold interests. Government approval is not required to transfer property interests, but the transfer must be registered, and a registration fee paid. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Laos ranked 88th out of 190 countries in terms of registering property in 2020. Under existing law, a creditor may enforce security rights against a debtor and the concept of a mortgage does exist. The Lao government is currently engaged in a land parceling and titling project, but it remains difficult to determine if a piece of property is encumbered in Laos. Enforcement of mortgages is complicated by the legal protection given mortgagees against forfeiture of their sole place of residence. Laos provides for secured interests in moveable and non-moveable property under the 2005 Law on Secured Transactions and a 2011 implementing decree from the Prime Minister’s office. In 2013, the State Assets Management Authority at the Ministry of Finance launched a new Secured Transaction Registry (STR), intended to expand access to credit for individuals and smaller firms. The STR allows for registration of movable assets such as vehicles and equipment so that they may be easily verified by financial institutions and used as collateral for loans. Outside of urban areas, land rights can be even more complex. Titles and ownership are not clear, and some areas practice communal titling. Intellectual property protection in Laos is weak, but steadily improving. The USAID-funded Lao PDR-U.S. International and ASEAN Integration (USAID LUNA II) project assisted the Lao government’s efforts to increase its capacity for IPR protection and to progress on the IPR-related commitments undertaken as a part of Laos’ 2013 WTO accession package. USAID LUNA II worked with the Ministry of Science and Technology’s Department of Intellectual Property to establish an online portal that provides detailed information regarding the registration of copyrights, trademarks, Geographic Indicators, and Plant Varieties at https://dip.gov.la . Interested individuals can use the portal to complete the application forms online. The portal officially launched in February 2019. Additionally, the USAID LUNA II project provided technical support to the Lao government in amending the Law on Intellectual Property. The government announced the dissolution of the Ministry of Science and Technology in February 2021. Consequently, the MOIC is now responsible for the issuance of patents, copyrights, and trademarks. There is insufficient understanding of the copyright principles among the general public. The MOIC has recently assigned administrative duties to relevant agencies attempting to ensure intellectual property rights are respected by individuals and businesses. Laos is a member of the ASEAN Common Filing System on patents but lacks qualified patent examiners. The bilateral Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) agreement between Thailand and Laos dictates that a patent issued in Thailand also be recognized in Laos. Laos is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention and the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property but has not yet joined the Berne Convention on Copyrights. In 2011 the National Assembly passed a comprehensive revision of the Law on Intellectual Property which brings it into compliance with WIPO and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Standards (TRIPS). Amendments to the 2011 Law on Intellectual Property were made public in May 2018. Laos is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets report. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Laos does not have a well-developed capital market, although government policies increasingly support the formation of capital and free flow of financial resources. The Lao Securities Exchange (LSX) began operations in 2011 with two stocks listed, both state-owned – the Banque Pour l’CommerceExterieur (BCEL), and the power generation arm of the electrical utility, Electricite du Laos – Generation (EDL-Gen). In 2012, the Lao government increased the proportion of shares that foreigners can hold on the LSX from 10 to 20 percent. As of March 2021, there are eleven companies listed on the LSX: BCEL, EDL-Gen, Petroleum Trading Laos (fuel stations), Lao World (property development and management), Souvanny Home Center (home goods retail), Phousy Construction and Development (Construction and real estate development), Lao Cement (LCC), Mahathuen Leasing (leasing), Lao Agrotech (palm oil plantation and extraction factory), Vientiane Center (property development and management), and Lao ASEAN Leasing (LALCO) (financing and leasing). News and information about the LSX are available at http://www.lsx.com.la/ . Businesses report that they are often unable to exchange kip into foreign currencies through central or local banks, particularly at times when the kip is depreciating against international currencies. Analysts suggest that concerns about dollar reserves may have led to temporary problems in the convertibility of the national currency. Private banks allege that the Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) withholds dollar reserves. The Bank of Lao PDR alleges that private banks already hold sizable reserves and have been reluctant to give foreign exchange to their customers to maintain unreasonably high reserves. Lao and foreign companies alike, and especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), note the lack of long-term credit in the domestic market. Loans repayable over more than five years are very rare, and the choice of credit instruments in the local market is limited. The Credit Information Bureau, developed to help inject more credit into markets, still has very little information and has not yet succeeded in mitigating lender concerns about risk. The banking system is under the supervision of the Bank of Lao PDR, the nation’s central bank, and includes 42 banks, most of them commercial. Private foreign banks can establish branches in all provinces of Laos. ATMs have become ubiquitous in urban centers. Technical assistance to Laos’ financial sector has led to some reforms and significant improvements to Laos’ regulatory regime on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, but overall capacity within the financial governance structure remains poor. The banking system is dominated by large, government-owned banks. The health of the banking sector is difficult to determine given the lack of reliable data, though banks are widely believed to be poorly regulated and there is broad concern about bad debts and non-performing loans that have yet to be fully reconciled by the state-run banks. The IMF and others have encouraged the Bank of Lao PDR to facilitate recapitalization of state-owned banks to improve the resilience of the sector. Several banks operate digital payment services, which has facilitated domestic transactions, but also introduced new digital crime risks. While publicly available data is difficult to find, non-performing loans are widely believed to be a major concern in the financial sector, fueled in part by years of rapid growth in private lending. The government’s fiscal difficulties in 2013 and 2014 led to non-payment on government infrastructure projects. The construction companies implementing the projects in turn could not pay back loans for capital used in construction. Many analysts believe the full effects of the government’s fiscal difficulties have not yet worked their way through the economy. In 2021, Laos’ fiscal deficit was estimated to decrease by 4.7 percent as a result of lower spending and improved revenue collection. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt were estimated to reach 72 percent of GDP which adds to concerns about Laos’ fiscal outlook and macroeconomic stability.In 2018 Laos passed a new law on Public Debt Management aimed at reducing Laos’ debt-to-GDP ratio but most economic analysts anticipate Laos’s debt-to-GDP ratio will likely increase as the country navigates an economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Foreign Exchange There are no published, formal restrictions on foreign exchange conversion, though restrictions have previously been reported, and because the market for Lao kip is relatively small, the currency is rarely convertible outside the immediate region. Laos persistently maintains low levels of foreign reserves, which are estimated to cover approximately two months’ worth of total imports. The reserve buffer is expected to remain relatively low due to structurally weak export growth in the non-resource sector and to debt service payments. The decline in reserves was due to a drawdown of government deposits primarily for external debt service payments, some intervention in the foreign exchange market to manage the volatility of the currency and financing the continuing current account deficit. The Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) occasionally imposes daily limits on converting funds from the Lao kip into U.S. dollars and Thai baht or restricts the sectors able to convert Lao kip into dollars. This can sometimes result in difficulties obtaining foreign exchange in Laos. The BOL issued Notice no.758/MPD in July 2021 to mandate independent exchange bureaus to link with commercial banks in response to the Lao kip’s depreciation against foreign currencies. Such effort reduces the gap between official and gray-market currency rates. However, the Lao kip rapidly depreciated in early 2022 reaching new lows against the dollar and Thai baht. To facilitate business transactions, foreign investors generally open commercial bank accounts in both local and foreign convertible currency at domestic and foreign banks in Laos. The Enterprise Accounting Law places no limitations on foreign investors transferring after-tax profits, income from technology transfer, initial capital, interest, wages and salaries, or other remittances to the company’s home country or third countries if they request approval from the Lao government. Foreign enterprises must report on their performance annually and submit annual financial statements to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). According to a recent report from Laos’ National Institute for Socio-Economic Research (NSER), the increasing demand for USD and Thai baht for the import of capital equipment for projects and consumer goods, coupled with growing demand for foreign currency to pay off foreign debts has resulted in a continued depreciation of the exchange rate in 2022. The official nominal kip/U.S. dollar reference rate depreciated by 13.84 percent year-on-year in February 2022, while the kip/baht exchange rate depreciated by 5.62 percent. Remittance Policies There have been no recent changes to remittance law or policy in Laos. Formally, all remittances abroad, transfers into Laos, foreign loans, and payments not denominated in Lao kip must be approved by the BOL. In practice, many remittances are understood to flow into Laos informally, and relatively easily, from a sizeable Lao workforce based in Thailand. Remittance-related rules can be vague and official practice is reportedly inconsistent. There are no known sovereign wealth funds in Laos. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is low general awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). There is no systematic government or NGO monitoring of RBC. RBC is not generally included in the government’s investment policy formulations. No concerns regarding human rights and their relation to RBC have been reported so far, however there are ongoing concerns about various forms of trafficking in some of Laos’ Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Department of Commerce Country Commercial Guide for Laos 9. Corruption Corruption is a serious problem in Laos that affects all levels of the economy. The Lao government has developed several anti-corruption laws, but enforcement remains weak. When he assumed office in early 2016, then Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith focused on government anti-corruption efforts. Lao media and the National Assembly now regularly report on corruption challenges and the sacking or disciplining of corrupt officials. In September 2009, Laos ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In March 2021, Thongloun was named President of the Lao PDR. He and newly appointed Prime Minister PhankhamViphavanh indicated they will continue to prioritize good governance in their new administration. Laos is ranked 128th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), advancing six spots since 2020. Domestic and international firms have repeatedly identified corruption as a problem in the business environment and a major detractor for international firms exploring investment or business activities in the local market. The Lao State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA), an independent, ministry-level body, oversees analyzing corruption at the national level and serves as a central office for gathering evidence of suspected corruption. Additionally, each ministry and province has a SIAA office independent from the organization in which it is housed. These SIAA offices feed into the SIAA’s central system. According to Lao law, both giving and accepting bribes are criminal acts punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. Nonetheless, foreign businesses frequently cite corruption as an obstacle to operating in Laos. Often characterized as a fee for urgent service, officials commonly accept bribes for the purpose of approving or expediting applications. Laos is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. In 2014, an asset declaration regime entered into force for government officials, which required them to declare income, assets, and debts for themselves and their family members; this was further strengthened in 2017 and 2018. Officials are now required to file a declaration on any assets valued over $2,500, including land, structures, vehicles, and equipment, as well as cash, gold, and financial instruments. These declarations are reportedly held privately and securely by the government. If a corruption complaint is made against an official, the SIAA can compare the sealed declaration with the official’s current wealth. Whether this program has worked or is working remains unclear. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: Mr. ViengkeoPhonasa Director General AntiCorruption Department, State Inspection and AntiCorruption Authority Sivilay Village, Xaythany District, Vientiane Capital, 13th South Road Tel: office: 021 715032; Fax: 021 715006; cell: 020 2222 5432 10. Political and Security Environment Laos is generally a peaceful and politically stable country. In 2021, Laos once again had an orderly change of administration under its one-party system. The risk of political violence directed at foreign enterprises or businesspersons is low. There has been little-to-no political violence in the last decade, and Laos’ political stability is an attractive feature for foreign investors. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Despite Laos’ young population, the median age is 24 years old, the labor market remains tight with employers reporting shortages of labor at all levels, especially skilled labor, reflecting the relatively low level of educational attainment within Laos. The government enacted a new labor law in late 2014 that established many new protections for workers. It also contained provisions aimed at increasing the skills of the Lao labor force and established stricter provisions on the hiring of foreign workers. The new law also authorized independent worker’s groups to elect their own leaders and to represent their interests and engage in collective bargaining on their behalf. The Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), which is associated with the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, is the primary representative of labor and represents workers in tripartite processes. Laos’ National Assembly passed a new Trade Union Law in November 2017 but the impact of the new law on the labor market and foreign investors has yet to be determined. No official English translations of the final Trade Union Law are publicly available. Child labor is outlawed except under very strict, limited conditions that ensure no interference with the child’s education or physical wellbeing. The 2014 law outlaws several forms of employment discrimination and provides standards for work hours. The minimum wage is set by separate regulation, and in recent years has seen annual increases after a tripartite negotiation among LFTU, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The 2014 law also established occupational health and safety standards, but inspections remain inconsistent. An International Labor Organization project undertaken in 2015 and 2016 trained labor inspectors in basic practices, with particular focus on the garment industry. Foreign investors using a concession as an investment vehicle are reportedly able to negotiate the percentage of foreign labor to be used in the investment. However, labor standards such as minimum wage and health and safety standards should apply uniformly regardless of the investment vehicle or use of a special economic zone. In 2018, the minimum wage was approximately $130 per month. The new labor law authorizes strikes if several steps of dispute resolution fail; however, there is no record of strikes occurring in Laos. A cultural distaste for open confrontation and the general shortage of labor continue to make strikes highly unlikely. Employment contracts are required under the labor law but are rarely used in practice. In February 2018, the government promulgated a new decree on labor dispute resolution. Collective bargaining is typically undertaken by representatives of the LFTU, though the 2014 labor law also provides the elected representative of independent worker’s groups the ability to negotiate their own collective bargaining agreements with employers. Basic and subsistence agriculture, informal businesses, and small family businesses make up the vast majority of employment, thus collective bargaining is relatively rare in the overall economy and unfamiliar to many. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $14,753 2019 $18,174 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2021 5% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Souliyakhom Thammavong Commercial and Economic Assistant U.S. Embassy, Vientiane +856 21 487000 ThammavongS@state.gov Latvia Executive Summary Located in the Baltic region of northeastern Europe, Latvia is a member of the EU, Eurozone, NATO, OECD, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Latvian government recognizes that, as a small country, it must attract foreign investment to foster economic growth, and thus has pursued liberal economic policies and developed infrastructure to position itself as a transportation and logistics hub. As a member of the European Union, Latvia applies EU laws and regulations, and, according to current legislation, foreign investors possess the same rights and obligations as local investors (with certain exceptions). Any foreign investor is entitled to establish and own a company in Latvia and apply for a temporary residence permit. Latvia provides several advantages to potential investors, including: Regional hub: Latvia is a transportation and logistics hub between West and East, providing strategic access to both the EU market and to Russia and Central Asia. Latvia’s three ice-free ports are connected to the country’s rail and road networks and to the largest international airport in the Baltic region (Riga International Airport). Latvia’s road network is connected to both European and Central Asian road networks. Railroads connect Latvia with the other Baltic States, Russia, and Belarus, with further connections extending into Central Asia and China. Workforce: Latvia’s workforce is highly educated and multilingual, and its culture promotes hard work and dependability. Labor costs in Latvia are the fifth lowest in the EU. Competitive tax system: Latvia ranked second in the OECD’s 2021 International Tax Competitiveness Index Rankings. To further boost its competitiveness, the Latvian government has abolished taxes on reinvested profits and has established special incentives for foreign and domestic investment. There are five special economic zones (SEZs) in Latvia: Riga Free Port, Ventspils Free Port, Liepaja Special Economic Zone, Rezekne Special Economic Zone, and Latgale Special Economic Zone, which provide various tax benefits for investors. The Latgale Special Economic Zone covers a large part of Latgale, which is the most economically challenged region in Latvia, bordering Russia and Belarus. Despite the continued COVID-19 pandemic, Latvia’s GDP increased by 4.8 percent in 2021, rebounding from the 3.6 percent contraction in 2020. According to the government, growth in manufacturing and services sectors contributed to the economic growth. The most competitive sectors in Latvia remain woodworking, metalworking, transportation, IT, green tech, healthcare, life science, food processing, and finance. Recent reports suggest that some of the most significant challenges investors encounter in Latvia are a shortage of available workforce, demography, quality of education, and a significant shadow economy. Latvia has made significant progress combatting money laundering since its non-resident banking sector first came under increased regulatory scrutiny in 2018 because of inadequate compliance with international AML standards. In late 2019 and early 2020, MONEYVAL and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) concluded that Latvia had developed and implemented strong enough reforms for combating financial crimes to avoid inclusion on FATF’s so-called “grey list.” The Government of Latvia continues work to restore confidence in its financial institutions and has passed several pieces of additional reform legislation. Latvia also became the first member state under the MONEYVAL review to successfully implement all 40 FATF recommendations. Some investors note a perceived lack of fairness and transparency with Latvian public procurements. Several companies, including foreign companies, have complained that bidding requirements are sometimes written with the assistance of potential contractors or couched in terms that exclude all but “preferred” contractors. The chart below shows Latvia’s ranking on several prominent international measures of interest to potential investors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 36 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 38 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 219 EUR* https://statdb.bank.lv/lb/Data/128/128 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 17,880 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD *These figures significantly underestimate the value of U.S. investment in Latvia due to the fact that these do not account for investments by U.S. firms through their European subsidiaries. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Latvian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) and works with investors to improve the country’s business climate. Latvia has a dedicated investment promotion agency – Latvian Investment and Development Agency – to provide a full scope of investment services to prospective investors: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en . As of April 2022, the agency has two dedicated representatives based in the United States (San Francisco, CA and Boston, MA). The Latvian government meets annually with the Foreign Investors Council in Latvia (FICIL), which represents large foreign companies and chambers of commerce, to improve the business environment and encourage foreign investment. The Prime Minister chairs the Coordination Council for Large and Strategically Important Investment Projects. In January 2021, FICIL published its Sentiment Index 2020 – a survey of current foreign investors’ assessments about the investment climate in Latvia. It is available at: https://www.ficil.lv/sentiment-index/ . Latvian legislation, on the basis of national security concerns, requires governmental approval prior to transfers of significant ownership interests in the energy, telecommunications, and media sectors. The government is considering expanding this list of sectors. Detailed information is available here: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/118/latvia. With these limited exceptions, physical and legal persons who are citizens of Latvia or of other EU countries may freely purchase real property. In general, physical and legal persons who are citizens of non-EU countries (third-country nationals) may also freely purchase developed real property. However, third-country nationals may not directly purchase certain types of agricultural, forest, and undeveloped land. Such persons may acquire ownership interest in such land through a company registered in the Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia, provided that more than 50 percent of the company is owned by: (a) Latvian citizens and/or Latvian governmental entities; and/or (b) physical or legal persons from countries with which Latvia signed and ratified an international agreement on the promotion and protection of investments on or before December 31, 1996; or for agreements concluded after this date, so long as such agreements provide for reciprocal rights to land acquisition. The United States and Latvia have such an agreement (a bilateral investment treaty in force since 1996). In addition, foreign investors can lease land without restriction for up to 99 years. The Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas allows EU citizens to purchase Latvia’s agricultural land and forests. Other restrictions apply (to both Latvian citizens and foreigners) regarding the acquisition of land in Latvia’s border areas, Baltic Sea and Gulf of Riga dune areas, and other protected areas. In May 2017, the President of Latvia promulgated amendments to the Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas to simplify and clarify the process for local farmers to purchase land. The law, however, also prohibits foreigners who do not have a working knowledge of the Latvian language from purchasing agricultural land. On June 11, 2020 the Court of Justice of the EU found that the law violated European law, but the Latvian government has yet to amend the law. The Latvian constitution guarantees the right to private ownership. Both domestic and foreign private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of commercial activity, except those expressly prohibited by law. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published the latest Latvia Economic Snapshot in March 2022 ( http://www.oecd.org/economy/latvia-economic-snapshot/ ). Although there have been no trade policy reviews specifically involving Latvia, the WTO completed its latest review of the European Union in February 2020. ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp495_e.htm ). Additionally, in October 2017, the World Bank published a review of Latvia’s tax system ( http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/587291508511990249/Latvia-tax-review ). A new business can be registered in Latvia in one day. The Latvian Investment and Development Agency has prepared a guide on starting a business in Latvia: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/business-guide/operating-environment. The official website of the Latvian Commercial Register provides detailed information in English on business registration process in Latvia: https://www.ur.gov.lv/en/ . Latvia has implemented special legislation to encourage startup ventures through favorable tax treatment. For more information, please see here: http://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/start-up-ecosystem and here: https://labsoflatvia.com/en/resources . Using the European Commission definitions of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), Latvia has established a special tax regime for microenterprises. This special tax regime is available to foreign nationals. Changes introduced as of January 2022, including an increased microenterprise tax rate, now make the tax regime less attractive for most small companies. For additional details on the microenterprise tax regime, see: https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/micro-enterprise-tax Latvia joined other OECD countries in July 2021 in agreeing to a new framework for global tax reform and a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent for multinational enterprises with annual revenue exceeding $868 million. Further detailed technical guidance can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-releases-detailed-technical-guidance-on-the-pillar-two-model-rules-for-15-percent-global-minimum-tax.htm The Latvian government does not incentivize outward investment nor restrict Latvians from investing overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Latvian government has amended its laws and regulatory procedures to bring Latvia’s legislation in compliance with the EU and WTO GPA requirements. The Latvian government has developed a good working relationship with the foreign business community (through FICIL) to streamline various bureaucratic procedures and to address legal and regulatory issues as they arise. Additional information on the regulatory system in Latvia is available here: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/latvia. The public finance and debt obligations process is transparent. Detailed information on the national budget process is available on the Latvian Ministry of Finance’s website: https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/s/budget/ . As an EU member, Latvia has incorporated European norms and standards into its regulatory system. As an EU member, Latvia is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. As a WTO member, Latvia has the duty to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Latvia has a three-tier court system comprising district (city) courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court reviews the compatibility of decrees and acts of the President of the Republic, the government, and local authorities with the constitution and the law. Unless otherwise stipulated by law, district courts are the courts of first instance in all civil, criminal, and administrative cases. Regional courts have appellate jurisdiction over district court cases and original jurisdiction for certain cases specified in the Civil Code, such as cases on the protection of patent rights, trademarks, and geographic indicators, as well as cases on the insolvency and liquidation of credit institutions. The Supreme Court is the highest-level court in Latvia and – depending on the origin of the case – has either de novo review of both factual and legal findings or, in instances where it is the second appellate court reviewing a case, cassation review of only legal findings. In March 2021, Latvia established a specialized Economic Court to handle cases of corruption, economic crimes, and complex commercial disputes. City and regional courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice (https://www.tm.gov.lv/en ), while the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court are independent. Observers have voiced concerns about the length of criminal and civil cases in Latvia, and the nature and opacity of judicial rulings have led some investors to question the fairness and impartiality of some judges. These concerns are not specific to foreign or local investors, however, and the court system is generally viewed as applying the law equally to the interests of foreign and local investors. Although the Ministry of Justice has enacted reforms designed to reduce the backlog of cases in the lower courts, improvements in the judicial system are still needed to accelerate the adjudication of cases, to strengthen the enforcement of court decisions, and to upgrade professional standards. The Economic Court’s creation was part of an effort by the government to accelerate and improve adjudication of commercial cases and financial crimes. Incoming foreign investment in Latvia is regulated by the Commercial Law. The Latvian Investment and Development Agency’s website is a helpful resource for navigating the rules and procedures governing foreign investment. (http://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/investor-business-guide/operating-environment ). Competition-related concerns are supervised by the Competition Council. Council’s decisions can be appealed to a court in Latvia. More information can be accessed at: http://www.kp.gov.lv/en. In July 2021, the Competition Council imposed about $18 million in fines on 10 construction companies for entering into long-term prohibited agreements related to participation in public and private procurement in Latvia. This was one of the all-time largest cartel cases in Latvia. More detailed information about the so-called “construction company cartel” case is available here: https://www.kp.gov.lv/en/article/competition-council-fines-10-construction-companies-participating-cartel . Cases of arbitrary expropriation of private property by the Government of Latvia are extremely rare. Expropriation of foreign investment is possible in a very limited number of cases specified in the Law on the Alienation of Immovable Property Necessary for Public Needs: (https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/220517-law-on-the-alienation-of-immovable-property-necessary-for-public-needs ). If the owner of the property claimed by the government deems the compensation inadequate, he or she may challenge the government’s decision in a Latvian court. There are two laws governing bankruptcy procedure: the Law on Insolvency and the Law on Credit Institutions (regulating bankruptcy procedures for banks and other financial sector companies). The business community has expressed concerns over inefficiency and allegations of corruption in Latvia’s insolvency administration system. One way Latvia has addressed the issue was partnering with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the September 2019 launch a project entitled “Support for Debt Restructuring in Latvia.” More information is available here: https://www.ebrd.com/news/2019/support-for-debt-restructuring-in-latvia-project-launched.html. 4. Industrial Policies Latvia does not offer tax incentives. The Cross-Sectoral Coordination Center of Latvia is the main agency in charge of National Development Planning. In accordance with the Law on the Development Planning System (https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=175748 ), national development planning documents are prepared for a long-term (up to 25 years), medium-term (up to seven years) and short-term (up to three years). More information available here: https://www.pkc.gov.lv/en/national-development-planning. In addition, Latvia has identified the following sectors as having the highest potential for new investment: woodworking, metalworking and mechanical engineering, transport and storage, information technology (including global business services), green technology, health care, life sciences, and food processing. The information is disseminated to the general public and potential investors via the Latvian Investment and Development Agency’s official website ( http://liaa.gov.lv/invest-latvia/sectors-and-industries ), and through its representative offices ( LIAA representative offices abroad | Latvijas Investīciju un attīstības aģentūra ). Because the Latvian government extends national treatment to foreign investors, most investment incentives and requirements apply equally to local and foreign businesses. Latvia has three special economic zones and two free ports in which companies benefit from various tax rebates (real estate, dividend, and corporate income) and do not pay VAT. The full list of investment incentives is available here: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/business-guide/business-incentives . Latvia does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Latvia has the third highest share of renewables in total energy consumption (42.1 percent) within the European Union only behind Sweden and Finland. In Latvia, renewable electricity generation is promoted through a support system based on feed-in tariffs, but the current support mechanism is being revised due to concerns of lack of transparency and abuse of the system. Latvia’s National Climate and Energy Action Plan 2021-2030 is available here: https://www.em.gov.lv/en/national-energy-and-climate-plan-2021-2030 . There are five free trade areas in Latvia. Free ports have been established in Riga and Ventspils. Special economic zones (SEZ) have been created in Liepaja, a port city in western Latvia; Rezekne, a city in eastern Latvia; and an additional SEZ in Latgale, the poorest region in Latvia, which borders Russia and Belarus. Somewhat different rules apply to each of the five zones. In general, the two free ports provide exemptions from indirect taxes, including customs duties, VAT, and excise tax. The SEZs offer additional incentives, such as an 80-100 percent reduction of corporate income taxes and real estate taxes. To qualify for tax relief and other benefits, companies must receive permits and sign agreements with the appropriate authorities: the Riga and the Ventspils Port Authorities, for the respective free ports; the Liepaja SEZ Administration; the Rezekne SEZ Administration; or the Latgale SEZ Administration. The SEZs are expected to be in place until 2035. Except for specific requirements for investors acquiring former state enterprises through the privatization process, there are no performance requirements for a foreign investor to establish, maintain, or expand an investment in Latvia. In the privatization process, performance requirements for investors, both foreign and domestic, are determined on a case-by-case basis. Under Latvian Immigration Law, foreign citizens can enter and reside in Latvia for temporary business activities for up to three months in a six-month period. For longer periods of time, foreigners are required to obtain residence and work permits. The Latvian Investment and Development Agency has created a guide to help third-country nationals interested in working in Latvia obtain work permits: https://investinlatvia.org/assets/upload/Relocation%20Guide-web.pdf . A third-country national may obtain a five-year temporary residence permit if he or she has made certain minimum equity investments in a Latvian company, certain subordinated investments in a Latvian credit institution, or purchased real estate for certain designated sums, subject to limitations in each case. More information is available here: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/business-guide/operating-environment . Latvia’s Law on Personal Data Processing, implementing the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, entered into force in July 2018. Full text of the Law available here: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/300099-personal-data-processing-law. More information is available here: https://www.dvi.gov.lv/en/. 5. Protection of Property Rights Latvia recognizes the full spectrum of property rights, including mortgages and liens. Latvia does not have significant problems with unclear legal titles. More information: http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Latvia/Buying-Guide . To harmonize its legislation with EU and WTO requirements, Latvia has established a legal framework for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), including legislation to protect copyrights, trademarks, and patents. The Law on Copyrights strengthens the protection of software copyrights and neighboring rights. Foreign owners may seek redress for violation of their IPR through the appellation council at the Latvian Patent Office, as well as through private litigation. In copyright violation cases, aggrieved parties can request that the use of the pirated works be prohibited, pirated copies be destroyed, and that violators compensate them for losses (including lost profits). The criminal law stipulates penalties for copyright violations. The United States has signed a Trade and Intellectual Property Rights Agreement with Latvia. Latvia is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and the Geneva Phonograms Convention. In addition, the Latvian government has amended all relevant laws and regulations to comply with the requirements of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to which Latvia acceded by joining the WTO. The business community has occasionally raised concerns regarding the enforcement of IPR in Latvia. Digital piracy is still a concern in Latvia, as it is in much of Eastern and Central Europe. Latvian law enforcement authorities have the authority to investigate IPR infringement cases. The Government of Latvia is working to tackle online/digital piracy, and has drafted respective policy guidelines: https://www.iem.gov.lv/en/article/tackle-copyright-infringements-digital-environment-more-effectively . Every year, the European Commission publishes a report describing the customs detentions of articles suspected of infringing IPR. These statistics are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/customs-controls/counterfeit-piracy-other-ipr-violations/ipr-infringements-facts-figures_en . Latvia is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report or included in the Notorious Market List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Clare Zimmerman Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy Riga, Latvia +371 67107000 ZimmermanCN@state.gov List of Attorneys in Latvia, compiled by the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Riga: https://lv.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ American Chamber of Commerce of Latvia: http://www.amcham.lv/en/home Contact at Copyright Offices Ms. Ilona Petersone Director of Copyright Division, Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Latvia +371 6733-0240 Ilona.Petersone@km.gov.lv Contact at Industrial Property Offices Mr. Agris Batalauskis Director of the Patent Office of the Republic of Latvia +371 670 99 600 valde@lrpv.lv 6. Financial Sector Latvian government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. Local bank loans are available to foreign investors. The NASDAQ/OMX Riga Stock Exchange (RSE) (www.nasdaqomxbaltic.com ) operates in Latvia, and the securities market is based on the continental European model. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have agreed to create a pan-Baltic capital market by creating a single index classification for the entire Baltic region. Latvia is currently rated by various index providers as a frontier market due to its small size and limited liquidity. https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/article/latvia-passes-ebrd-supported-covered-bond-law Latvia’s retail banking sector, which is composed primarily of Scandinavian retail banks, generally maintains a positive reputation. Latvian banks servicing non-resident clients, however, have come under increased scrutiny for inadequate compliance with anti-money laundering standards. In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) identified Latvia’s third-largest bank as a “foreign bank of primary money laundering concern” and issued a proposed rule prohibiting U.S. banks from doing business with or on behalf of the bank. The Latvian bank regulator has also levied fines against several non-resident banks for AML violations in recent years. Latvia is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. On August 23, 2018, MONEYVAL issued a report finding that Latvia’s AML regime was in substantial compliance with only one out of eleven assessment categories, was in moderate compliance with eight areas, but in low compliance with two areas. In late 2019 and early 2020, MONEYVAL and the FATF concluded that Latvia has developed and implemented strong enough reforms for combating financial crimes to avoid increased monitoring via the so-called “grey list.” With this decision, Latvia became the first member state under the MONEYVAL review to successfully implement all 40 FATF recommendations. The most recent MONEYVAL report can be found at: https://rm.coe.int/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing-measures-latvia-/16809988c1 . According to Latvian banking regulators, Latvia’s regulatory framework for commercial banking incorporates all principal requirements of EU directives, including a unified capital and financial markets regulator. Existing banking legislation includes provisions on accounting and financial statements (including adherence to international accounting), minimum initial capital requirements, capital adequacy requirements, large exposures, restrictions on insider lending, open foreign exchange positions, and loan-loss provisions. An Anti-Money Laundering Law and Deposit Guarantee Law have been adopted. An independent Financial Intelligence unit (FIU) operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Some of the banking regulations, such as capital adequacy and loan-loss provisions, reportedly exceed EU requirements. According to the Finance Latvia Association, total assets of the country’s banks at the end of 2021 stood at 25.34 billion euros. More information is available at: https://www.financelatvia.eu/en/industry-data/ . Securities markets are regulated by the Law on the Consolidated Capital Markets Regulator, the Law on the Financial Instrument Market, and several other laws and regulations. Latvia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the energy and mining, aerospace and defense, services, information and communication, automotive and ground transportation, and forestry sectors. Private enterprises may compete with public enterprises on the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. The Latvian government has implemented the requirements of the EU’s Third Energy Package with respect to the electricity sector, including opening the electricity market to private power producers and allowing them to compete on an equal footing with Latvenergo, the state-owned power company. The country’s natural gas market has also been liberalized, creating competition among privately owned gas suppliers. Latvia, as an EU member, is a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the World Trade Organization, and SOEs are covered under the agreement. In 2015, the OECD published a review of the corporate governance of Latvia’s SOE and found that Latvia’s SOE sector relative to the size of the national economy was larger than the OECD average. The full report is available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecd-review-corporate-governance-soe-latvia.htm . Senior managers of major SOEs in Latvia report to independent boards of directors, which in turn report to line ministries. SOEs operate under the Law on Public Persons Enterprises and Capital Shares Governance. The law also establishes an entity that coordinates state enterprise ownership and requires annual aggregate reporting. Detailed information on Latvian SOEs is available here: http://www.valstskapitals.gov.lv/en/ . For additional information please see here: http://www.oecd.org/latvia/corporate-governance-in-latvia-9789264268180-en.htm . The Law on Privatization of State and Municipal Property governs the privatization process in Latvia. State joint stock company “Possessor” (https://www.possessor.gov.lv/ ) uses a case-by-case approach to determine the method of privatization for each state enterprise. The three allowable methods are: public offering, auction for selected bidders, and international tender. For some of the largest privatized companies, a percentage of shares may be sold publicly on the NASDAQ OMX Riga Stock Exchange. The government may maintain shares in companies deemed important to the state’s strategic interests. Privatization of small and medium-sized state enterprises is considered to be largely complete. Latvian law designates six State Joint Stock Companies that cannot be privatized: Latvenergo (Energy and Mining), Latvijas Pasts (Postal Services), Riga International Airport, Latvijas Dzelzcels (Automotive and Ground Transportation), Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (Aerospace and Defense), and Latvijas Valsts Mezi (Forestry). Other large companies in which the Latvian government holds a controlling interest include airBaltic (Travel), TET (Information and Communication), Latvian Mobile Telephone (Information and Communication), and Conexus Baltic Grid (Energy). Due to the pandemic, the government invested EUR 250 million into airBaltic equity, thus increasing its stake in the airline to 96.14%. The airline plans to return the investment to the state, via an initial public offering, potentially in 2023-2024. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of and implementation of due diligence principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR)/Responsible Business Conduct is developing among producers and consumers. Two of the most active promoters of CSR are the American Chamber of Commerce in Latvia and the Employers’ Confederation of Latvia. The Latvian Ministry of Welfare also promotes CSR. Several other initiatives promote CSR, such as the Institute for Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility (https://www.incsr.eu/ ), the Corporate Social Responsibility Platform ( http://www.ksalatvija.lv/en ), and the Human Development Award (http://www.cilvekaizaugsme.lv/home/ ). Latvia adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Latvia’s national point of contact for the guidelines can be found here: https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/economic-affairs/oecd/latvian-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises . Latvia also promotes the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. Latvia has adopted a strategy achieving climate neutrality by 2050, which is available here: https://unfccc.int/documents/267179 . In addition, Latvia’s National Climate and Energy Action Plan 2021-2030 is available here: https://www.em.gov.lv/en/national-energy-and-climate-plan-2021-2030 . 9. Corruption Latvian law enforcement institutions, foreign business representatives, and non-governmental organizations have identified corruption and the perception of corruption as persistent problems in Latvia. According to the 2021 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Latvia ranks 36th out of 180 countries (in order from the lowest perceived level of public sector corruption to the highest). To strengthen its anti-corruption programs, the Latvian government has adopted several laws and regulations, including the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism and Proliferation Financing and the Law on Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Work of Public Officials. The Conflicts of Interest Law imposes restrictions and requirements on public officials and their relatives. Several provisions of the law deal with the previously widespread practice of holding several positions simultaneously, often in both the public and private sector. The law includes a comprehensive list of state and municipal jobs that cannot be combined with additional employment. Moreover, the law expanded the scope of the term state official to include members of boards and councils of companies with state or municipal capital exceeding 50 percent. Additionally, Latvia is a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (FRECO). In line with OECD and GRECO recommendations, the government is working to strengthen anti-corruption policy and enforcement while improving the functioning of the independent Corruption Prevention and Combatting Bureau (KNAB). Under Latvian law, it is a crime to offer, accept, or facilitate a bribe. Although the law stipulates heavy penalties for bribery, a limited number of government officials have been prosecuted and convicted of corruption to date. The law also provides the possibility of withdrawing charges against a person giving a bribe in cases where the bribe has been extorted or in cases where the person voluntarily reports these incidents and actively assists the investigation. In addition, the Latvian government has adopted a whistleblower law that requires all government agencies and large companies to establish protocols to accept whistleblower disclosures and protect whistleblowers from reprisals. KNAB is the institution with primary responsibility for preventing and combating corruption and carrying out enforcement activities in response to suspected or alleged corruption. It is subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers and supervised by the Prime Minister. KNAB has also established a Public Consultative Council to help increase public participation in implementing its anti-corruption policies, increasing public awareness, and strengthening connections between the agency and the public. More information is available at: https://www.knab.gov.lv/en/knab/consultative/public/ . The Prosecutor General’s Office also plays an important role in fighting corruption. There is a perceived lack of fairness and transparency in the public procurement process in Latvia. Several companies, including foreign companies, have complained that bidding requirements are sometimes written with the assistance of potential contractors or couched in terms that exclude all but preferred contractors. A Cabinet of Ministers regulation provides for public access to government information, and the government generally provided citizens such access. There have been no reports the government has denied noncitizens or foreign media access to government information. Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption: Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau Citadeles iela 1, Riga, LV 1010, Latvia +371 67356161 knab@knab.gov.lv Contact at “watchdog” organization: Delna (Latvian affiliate of Transparency International) Citadeles iela 8, Riga, LV-1010 +371 67285585 ti@delna.lv 10. Political and Security Environment There have been no reports of political violence or politically motivated damage to foreign investors’ projects or installations. The likelihood of widespread civil disturbances is very low. While Latvia has experienced peaceful demonstrations related to political issues, there have been few incidents when these have devolved into crimes against property, such as breaking shop windows or damaging parked cars. U.S. citizens are cautioned to avoid any large public demonstrations since even peaceful demonstrations can turn confrontational. The Embassy provides periodic notices to U.S. citizens in Latvia, which can be found on the Embassy’s web site: https://lv.usembassy.gov/. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The official rate of registered unemployment in January 2022, according to Eurostat, was 7.3 percent (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics ). The Latvian State Employment Agency reported 6.9 percent unemployment at the end of January 2022. Unemployment is significantly higher in rural areas. A high percentage of the workforce has completed at least secondary or vocational education. Foreign managers praise the high degree of language skills, especially Russian and English, among Latvian workers. However, foreign managers have reported a shortage of mid- and senior-level managers with “Western” management skills. Companies must keep wages above the legally specified minimum of EUR 500 per month, as of January 2021. Union influence on the wage setting process is limited. Trade unions do not have significant influence on the labor market. Additional information on trade unions in Latvia is available here: http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Latvia . One challenge employers have faced since Latvia joined the EU is that many skilled employees can find better employment opportunities in other EU countries. Unofficial statistics suggest that more than 240,000 people have moved from Latvia to other EU countries since May 1, 2004. Despite the fact that the macroeconomic situation has stabilized, skilled and unskilled workers continue to emigrate. The government is implementing a strategy to entice people who have left Latvia to return. According to several reports, there is a significant shortage of workers in manufacturing, wholesale and retail, transport and storage, and ICT sectors. The largest share of registered unemployment is comprised of persons with only primary or secondary education who do not possess specialized skills. To address this problem, the Latvian government has approved a list of highly skilled professions that employers may use to recruit professionals abroad to work in Latvia: https://www.em.gov.lv/en/news/18513-the-government-supports-the-application-of-simplified-conditions-for-the-attraction-of-highly-qualified-foreign-professionals . The Labor Law addresses discrimination issues, provides detailed provisions on the rights and obligations of employees’ representatives, and created the Conciliation Commission, a mechanism that can be used in the workplace to resolve labor disputes before going to arbitration. Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace can also submit a complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman and the State Labor Inspectorate. Full-time employees in Latvia work 40 hours a week. Normally, there are five working days per week, but employers may schedule a sixth workday without offering premium pay. Employees are entitled to four calendar weeks of annual paid vacation per year. Employers are prohibited from entering into an employment contract with a foreign individual who does not have a valid work permit. Latvia is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has ratified all eight ILO Core Conventions. Latvia’s shadow economy – largely driven by undeclared wages and business earnings – continues to be a major challenge. The annual Stockholm School of Economics Riga “Shadow Economy Index” shows that in 2020 the shadow economy grew by 1.6 percentage points and reached 25.5 percent of GDP. The detailed report is available here: https://www.sseriga.edu/shadow-economy-index-baltic-countries . 14. Contact for More Information Clare Zimmerman Economic Officer Samnera Velsa iela 1, Riga, Latvia, LV1510 +371 6710 7000 RigaCommerce@state.gov Lebanon Executive Summary Lebanon’s deep economic depression since the end of 2019 is the result of an import-dependent economy out of hard currency and decades of financial mismanagement, including a state-sponsored “Ponzi” scheme that offered high interest rates to attract financial inflows. The August 2020 Port of Beirut explosion and the COVID-19 pandemic further hampered economic growth. A June 2021 World Bank report estimated that Lebanon’s depression is likely to rank among top three most severe economic crises since the 1850s. The World Bank estimated Lebanon’s real GDP fell 10.5 percent in 2021 after a 21.4 percent contraction in 2020. Lebanon’s currency, the Lebanese pound (LBP), has lost more than 90 percent of its value since 2019. As a result, inflation in an import-dependent economy reached 240 percent as of December 2021. Lebanon’s Central Bank is intervening in the foreign exchange market to stem the local currency’s fall at the expense of the country’s limited foreign currency reserves. Lebanon’s banks accumulated around $70 billion in USD losses and are USD insolvent. More than half the country’s population is considered poor, and up to 50 percent are unemployed. On March 7, 2020, Lebanon announced it would default on and restructure its nearly $31 billion dollar-denominated debt, the first such default in Lebanon’s history. Lebanon has not yet entered into negotiations with bondholders and is unable to borrow on international capital markets, reducing the country’s ability to import key commodities and invest in infrastructure. International correspondent banks likely place increased levels of due diligence on domestic banks because of the incomplete implementation of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. Correspondent banks have also introduced onerous requirements on their Lebanese counterparts because of increasing country risk. PM Najib Mikati formed a government in September 2021, after a 13-month political vacuum, and his Cabinet resumed talks with the IMF on a potential loan in January 2022. While the Mikati government has drafted a plan to address the $69 billion in financial sector losses, the IMF is looking for the government to develop a more comprehensive social, economic, and financial reform program to stabilize the economy and lay the foundation for future growth. The IMF will likely require deep fiscal reforms to make Lebanon’s debt – which reached 194 percent of GDP in 2021 – more sustainable, including restructuring the financial sector, reforming state-owned enterprises, particularly the energy sector, strengthening governance and anti-corruption efforts, and unifying the country’s system of multiple currencies. Absent holistic economic reforms, preferably as part of an IMF program, analysts assess that Lebanon’s near- and medium-term economic future is bleak, imperiling Lebanon’s potential as a destination for foreign investment. Much depends on how Lebanon implements overdue economic and governance reforms and attracts international assistance and foreign investment. If the country can implement necessary reforms, attract foreign capital, stabilize the exchange rate, and recapitalize its financial sector, then opportunities remain for U.S. companies. Lebanon still has the legal underpinnings of a free-market economy, a highly educated labor force, and limited restrictions on investors. The most alluring sector is the energy sector, particularly for power production, renewable energies, and oil and gas exploration, though challenges remain with corruption and a lack of transparency. Information and communication technology, healthcare, safety and security, waste management, and franchising have historically attracted U.S. investments. However, corruption and a lack of transparency have continued to cause frustration among local and foreign businesses. Other concerns include over-regulation, arbitrary licensing, outdated legislation, ineffectual courts, high taxes and fees, poor economic infrastructure, and a fragmented and opaque tendering and procurement processes. Social unrest driven by a decline in public services and growing food insecurity may further hamper the investment climate. If Lebanon is able to reform its business environment, it may once again attract foreign investment. Lebanon’s economic crisis is likely to be long and painful, however, and recovery can only be accelerated through quick but careful implementation of reforms. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 154 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 82 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $4347 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,370 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Lebanon is open to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) is the national authority responsible for promoting local and foreign investment in Lebanon covering eight priority sectors: industry, media, technology, telecommunications, tourism, agriculture, and agroindustry. IDAL has the authority to award licenses and permits for new investment in specific sectors. It also grants special incentives and tax exemptions for projects implemented by local and foreign investors based on an investment’s geographic location, sector, and number of jobs created (Investment Law No. 360). IDAL publishes its investment incentives online by sector at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/sectors_in_focus . IDAL seeks to facilitate international and local partnerships through joint ventures, equity participation, acquisition, and other mechanisms. Moreover, it provides business intelligence, market studies, and legal and administrative advice to potential investors. In February 2018, IDAL established the Business Support Unit (BSU), which provides free legal, accounting, and financial advice to startups across sectors. IDAL is mandated by law to attract, facilitate, and retain investment in Lebanon. IDAL has proposed draft decrees to facilitate investment and boost its “One-Stop-Shop,” but these remain pending in the Prime Minister’s office. In 2020, IDAL set up a business matchmaking platform to connect Lebanese companies seeking capital with a network of local and foreign investors to help them grow and expand. IDAL is involved in providing after-care services to local and foreign investors alike. Foreign private entities may establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises and may engage in all types of remunerative activities. Lebanese law allows the establishment of joint-stock corporations, limited liability, and offshore and holding companies. According to UNCTAD’s latest investment policy review of Lebanon, the country allows only Lebanese nationals to obtain licenses to manufacture and trade products related to defense and weapons (Legislative Decree 137 of 12 June 1959, Weapons and Ammunition Law). Only Lebanese nationals can own political newspapers and all broadcast media (Press Law of 14 September 1962, Broadcast Law 382 of 4 November 1994). A series of regulatory requirements also effectively restrict FDI in other instances: Two sectors, fixed line telephony and energy transmission, are closed to domestic and foreign investors as they are currently operated by state-owned enterprises, which have a de facto monopoly. Only Lebanese nationals are permitted to practice law. Legislative Decree No. 35 (August 5, 1967), under the Lebanese Commercial Code, permits foreigners to own and manage 100 percent of limited liability companies (LLC or Société à Responsabilité Limitée – SARL), except if the company engages in certain commercial activities such as exclusive commercial representation. In these cases, Lebanese citizens must hold a majority of capital, and the manager must be Lebanese (Legislative Decree No. 34 dated August 5, 1967). An amendment introduced in 2019 allowed the formation of LLCs by only one person. Legislative Decree No. 304 of the Commercial Code (December 24, 1942) governs joint-stock corporations (Société Anonyme Libanaise – SAL) and was amended by Law No. 126 on March 29, 2019. Limitations related to foreign participation stipulate that: 1) one-third of the board of directors should be Lebanese (Article 144 amended); 2) board members can be either shareholders or non-shareholders (Article 147 amended); 3) one-third of capital shares should be held by Lebanese for companies that provide public utility services (Article 78); and 4) capital shares and management in cases of exclusive commercial representation are limited (Legislative Decree No. 34 dated August 5, 1967). Banking, insurance, and cargo, which can only operate as joint-stock corporations (JSCs), are required to have a Lebanese majority on the board, which makes them, in practice, restricted for FDI. Holding and offshore companies are structured as JCSs and governed by Legislative Decree No. 45 (on holdings) and Legislative Decree No. 46 (on offshore companies), both dated June 24, 1983. The law on offshore companies was amended by Law No. 85, dated October 18, 2018, whereby all board members may be non-Lebanese (Article 2, para 4) and the company may be formed by one person (Article 1 in the amendment of the Commercial Code). A foreign non-resident chairman/general manager of a holding or an offshore company is exempt from the obligation of holding work and residency permits. Law No. 772, dated November 2006, exempts holding companies from the obligation to have two Lebanese persons or legal entities on their board of directors. All offshore companies must register with the Beirut Commercial Registry. The law does not permit offshore banking, trust, and insurance companies to operate in Lebanon. There are size and quota limits that effectively curb foreign ownership of real estate as well. Law No. 296, dated April 3, 2001, amended the 1969 Law No. 11614 that governs acquisition of property by foreigners. The 2001 law eased legal limits on foreign ownership of property to encourage investment in Lebanon, especially in industry and tourism, abolished discrimination for property ownership between Arab and non-Arab nationals and set real estate registration fees at approximately six percent for both Lebanese and foreign investors. The law permits foreigners to acquire up to 3,000 square meters (around 32,000 square feet) of real estate without a permit but requires cabinet approval for acquisitions exceeding this threshold. The cumulative real estate acquisition by foreigners may not exceed three percent of total land in any district. Cumulative real estate acquisition by foreigners in the Beirut region may not exceed ten percent of the total land area. The law prohibits individuals not holding an internationally recognized nationality from acquiring property in Lebanon. In practice, this restriction attempts to prevent Palestinian refugees who are long-term residents in Lebanon from owning property. The Lebanese Government does not review FDI transactions for national security considerations. Lebanon is not a member of either the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in collaboration with IDAL, published a comprehensive Investment Policy Review for Lebanon in December 2018, which it officially launched in Beirut in March 2019. The report provides a thorough assessment of Lebanon’s business environment, with concrete short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations to revitalize Lebanon’s investment climate. These include creating an FDI promotion strategy and passing or amending legislation, rules, and regulations in the taxation, labor, competition, and governance regimes towards a more conducive business environment. The full report is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d11_en.pdf In March 2022, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Arabnet published Braving the Storm: Safeguarding the Lebanese Innovation Economy. The report notes that the country’s economic crisis has severely affected the Lebanese innovation ecosystem, much like the wider economy. Between 2017 and 2021, yearly total investments in local startups shrunk by more than 70 percent, from $54 million to $16 million. The number of startup investment deals dropped from 56 to 12, which puts Lebanon in 14th place when it comes to the number of investments among 18 MENA countries, from 2nd place in 2017. The resulting toxic environment has also led several startups to relocate outside of Lebanon, with an estimated 55 percent of companies have moved either their entire or part of their business abroad. Lebanon does not have a business registration website; rather, IDAL provides an information portal about doing businesses in Lebanon and outlines requirements at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/doing_business . According to UNCTAD, company establishment is cumbersome and costly in Lebanon. It takes, on average, more than 15 days to establish an LLC with 15 employees or more in Beirut. Companies must typically register with one of five trade registers (Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, North and South), overseen by a magistrate, that operate in the country and are closest to the company’s location. LLCs and JSCs must also retain the services of a lawyer and one auditor on a yearly basis, pay registration fees at the Ministries of Finance and Justice, and register employees at the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Foreign companies seeking to establish branches in Lebanon must additionally register at the Ministry of Economy. Online establishment is not available for companies wishing to incorporate in Lebanon, and information on establishment is scattered. Foreign branches and representative offices can be partly registered online, but heavy administrative requirements remain. All foreign documents must be certified by the trade register in the company’s country of incorporation and legalized by the Lebanese embassy or consulate there and translated into Arabic. Lebanon neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, informal capital controls imposed by the Lebanese financial sector since October 2019 prevent nearly all external transfers. Banks do allow outward transfers of money from so-called “fresh dollar” accounts, which include foreign currency inflows that occurred after October 2019. 3. Legal Regime Private firms should exercise caution when bidding on public projects. Lebanese Government agencies often sole-source contracts, undertaking direct contracting processes that operate according to differing standards and without a formal competitive solicitation. Public institutions evade regulations that promote full and open competition by splitting contract requirements into smaller solicitations whose values do not exceed government agency procurement limits. Parliament passed a modern public procurement law consistent with international standards in June 2021, updating Lebanon’s public procurement system for the first time since the 1960s. The Public Procurement Management Administration (PPMA), known as the “Tender Board,” technically has the authority to review terms of reference and evaluate bids for government contracts. The Tender Board is generally transparent, but corruption often arises within the scope of the tenders and the ministries that issue them. The new law would create a new public procurement oversight agency and require public tenders to be published online. The law’s success, however, depends on implementation. The Central Inspection Board (CIB), an oversight body within the Office of the Prime Minister, oversees government administrative processes, and the Court of Audit has oversight over public expenditures. The Social Security Fund and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, public entities that manage large funding flows, remain outside the CIB jurisdiction. Excessive regulation hampers procedures for business entry, operation, and exit. However, the process does not discriminate against foreign investors. International companies face an unpredictable and opaque operating environment and often encounter unanticipated obstacles or costs late in the process. Trademark registration, economic and trade indicators, and market surveillance reports are available online at: http://www.economy.gov.lb . However, some procedures, including those related to branch offices or representative offices of foreign companies, or to protecting intellectual property rights, still require the right-holder to visit the ministry in person to finalize and pay required dues. All legislation, government decrees, decisions, and official announcements are published in the Official Gazette. The government does not publish proposed draft laws and regulations for public comment, but a parliamentary commission may invite private sector stakeholders to comment on legislation. Telecom Law No. 431 requires the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) to issue regulations in draft for public consultation to promote transparency and enable the general public to shape future regulations. The TRA has not introduced new regulations since the term of its executive board expired in February 2012. Publicly listed companies adhere to international accounting standards. In general, legal, regulatory, and accounting systems for Lebanese businesses in the formal sector accord with international norms. Lebanon passed the Access to Information Law in January 2017 to promote transparency in the public sector. The law permits anyone, including foreigners, to request information from government agencies. A Whistleblower Protection law also passed in October 2018. While the Whistleblower law is in force, the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Commission to oversee the law’s implementation was only approved by Parliament in April 2020 and its members were appointed in January 2022. In January 2017, Lebanon announced its intent to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), a global standard to promote transparency of the extractive sector, though Lebanon has not yet joined. In September 2018, Parliament adopted the Transparency in Oil and Gas Law to facilitate the EITI accession process. To complete Lebanon’s candidacy, the Minister of Energy and Water announced that Lebanon would form a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG), with representatives from government, private firms operating in Lebanon, and civil society. In March 2019, the Minister of Energy and Water invited civil society to choose independently its representative to the MSG, as per the EITI’s requirements. EITI membership will require annual data disclosures on licenses, contracts, beneficial ownership, payments, revenues, and production. Lebanon’s public finances are not transparent; budget documents did not present a full picture of Lebanon’s expenditures and revenue streams, and Lebanon has not published an end-of-year report. Details regarding allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises were limited. The information in the budget was not considered reliable or reasonably accurate and did not correspond to actual revenues and expenditures. Lebanon’s supreme audit institution did not make its audit reports publicly available. While Lebanon’s debt obligations are transparent, some analysts have questioned the Central Bank’s reported foreign currency position. The Lebanese government hired three private auditors to audit its Central Bank in September 2020. The audits, including one forensic audit, have reportedly stalled. Lebanon does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Lebanon is not part of any regional economic block. It adopts a variety of standards based on the type of product and product destination. Lebanon is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but has held observer status since 1999. Lebanon does have a WTO/TBT (technical barriers to trade) Enquiry Point that handles enquiries from WTO Member States and other interested parties. Lebanon has a civil (roman and codified law) legal system inspired by the French civil procedure code (three degrees of jurisdictions: First Instance, Appeal, and Supreme Court). Ownership of property is enforced by registering the deed in the Property Registry. Lebanon has a written commercial law and contractual law. Lebanon has commercial, civil, and penal courts, but no specialized courts to hear intellectual property (IP) claims. Civil and/or penal courts adjudicate IP claims. Lebanon has an administrative court, the State Council, which handles all disputes involving the state. Lebanon has a labor court in seven out of its nine governorates to hear claims of unfair labor practices. Local courts accept investment agreements subject to foreign jurisdictions if they do not contravene Lebanese law. Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the Exequatur obtained. Weak judicial capacity (i.e., shortage of judges, inadequate support structures, administrative delays) results in delays in the handling of cases. The Lebanese Constitution guarantees the judicial system’s independence. However, politicians and powerful lobbying groups often interfere in the court system. Lebanon’s Parliament has discussed a draft law on the independence of the judiciary, but as of March 2022, it remains with Parliament’s Administration and Justice Committee. A foreigner may establish a business under the same conditions as a Lebanese national and must register the business in the Commercial Registry. Foreign investors who do not manage their business from Lebanon need not apply for a work permit. However, foreign investors who own and manage their businesses within Lebanon must apply for an employer work permit and a residency permit. Employer work permits stipulate that a foreign investor’s capital contribution cannot be less than $67,000. The investor must also hire three Lebanese employees and register them in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) within the first six months of employment. Companies established in Lebanon must abide by the Lebanese Commercial Code and are required to retain the services of a lawyer to serve as a corporate agent. Local courts are responsible for enforcing contracts. There are no sector-specific laws on acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers, except for bank mergers. Lebanese law does not differentiate between local and foreign investors, except in land acquisition (see Real Property section). Foreign investors can generally establish a Lebanese company, participate in a joint venture, or establish a local branch or subsidiary of their company without difficulty. Specific requirements apply for holding and offshore companies, real estate, insurance, media (television and newspapers), and banking. Lebanese law allows the establishment of joint-stock corporations, limited liability, offshore, and holding companies. However, offshore and holding companies must be joint-stock corporations (Société Anonyme Libanaise – SAL). The Lebanese Commercial Code governs these entities. IDAL’s website (http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/ ) provides investors information on investment legislation, regulations, and starting a business. IDAL’s proposed changes to investment-related laws and regulations, including amending requirements for IT companies to benefit from IDAL incentives, are pending government approval. IDAL has finalized a detailed Information and Communications Technology (ICT) plan aimed at expanding facilities, developing incentives, and facilitating investments in the ICT sector; it awaits Cabinet’s approval. IDAL intends to focus its investment promotion strategy on attracting high value-added innovative investments related to all of the sectors under its mandate. Lebanon’s Parliament passed a new law on competition in February 2022. The law will nullify exclusive licenses granted to local companies in certain sectors and create a National Competition Commission to regulate competition. The law’s success in curtailing Lebanon’s many monopolies and attracting foreign investment depends, however, on its implementation. Local courts review claims on competition-related issues under various laws. Land expropriation in Lebanon is relatively rare. The Law on Expropriation (Law No. 58, dated May 29, 1991, Article 1) and Article 15 of the Constitution specify that expropriation must be for a public purpose and calls for fair and adequate compensation. The government pays compensation at the time of expropriation, but the rate is often perceived as below fair market value. The government does not discriminate against foreign investors, companies, or their representatives on expropriations. The government established three real estate companies in the mid-1990s to encourage reconstruction and development in Greater Beirut following the Lebanese Civil War: 1) private corporation Solidere for the development and reconstruction of Beirut’s downtown commercial district, 2) private corporation Linord, for northern Beirut, and 3) public institution Elyssar for the southwest suburbs of Beirut. Linord has been dormant for years, and Elyssar’s projects have stalled since 2007. The government granted these three companies the authority to expropriate certain lands for development under the Law on Expropriation. Landowners and squatters have challenged the land seizures in court. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Lebanon is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). Lebanon ratified the 1958 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) in 2007. Lebanese law conforms to both conventions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The government accepts international arbitration related to investment disputes. In cases involving concessions or public projects, the government does not accept binding international arbitration unless the contract includes an arbitration clause that was obtained through prior approval by Cabinet decree. However, there is an exception for investors from countries that have a signed and ratified investment protection agreement with Lebanon that provides for international arbitration in the case of disputes. In the past, the government has faced challenges related to previously awarded contracts and resorted to international arbitration for resolution. To post’s knowledge, there are no known new cases. In 2010, the government settled a dispute with a China-based contracting company working to expand the northern port of Tripoli. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts International arbitration is accepted as a means to settle investment disputes between private parties. The Lebanese Centre for Arbitration was created in 1995 by local economic organizations, including the Lebanese chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture. The Centre resolves domestic and international conflicts related to trade and investment. Its statutes are similar to those of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, and its conciliation and arbitration rules are modeled on those of the Paris ICC. Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the exequatur obtained. Lebanon does not have a Bankruptcy Law. However, the Commercial Code (Book No. 5, Articles 459-668) and the Penal Code govern insolvency and bankruptcy. Workers may resort to the Labor Court and the National Social Security Fund to recover pay and benefits from local and foreign firms that go bankrupt. The law criminalizes fraudulent bankruptcy. 4. Industrial Policies Lebanon’s Investment Law No. 360 encourages investment in information technology, telecom, media, tourism, industry, agriculture, and agro-industry. The law divides the country into three investment zones, with different incentives in each zone. These include facilitating permits for foreign labor and tax benefits, which range from a five-year, 50 percent reduction on income and dividend distribution taxes to a total exemption of these taxes for 10 years, starting from the date of operation (tied to the issuance of the first invoice). Companies that list 40 percent of their shares on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) are exempt from income tax for two years. The law also introduces tailored incentives through package deals for large investment projects, regardless of the project’s location. These may include tax exemptions for up to 10 years, reductions on construction and work permit fees, and a total exemption on land registration fees. IDAL exempts joint-stock companies that benefit from package deal incentives from the obligation to have a majority of a board of directors be Lebanese nationals (Law No. 771, dated November 2006). Investors who seek to benefit from work permit incentives under package deals must hire two Lebanese for every foreigner and register them with the NSSF. In 2019, Parliament approved amendments to Investment Law 360 that would expand incentives to existing projects and grant additional incentives to ICT and telecom projects; however, implementation decrees await Cabinet’s approval. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Other laws and legislative decrees provide tax incentives and exemptions depending on the type of investment and its geographical location. Industrial investments in rural areas benefit from tax exemptions of six or 10 years, depending on specific criteria (Law No. 27, dated July 19, 1980, Law No. 282, dated December 30, 1993, and Decree No. 127, dated September 16, 1983). Exemptions are also available for investments in South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and the Bekaa Valley (Decree No. 3361, dated July 2, 2000). For example, new industrial establishments manufacturing new products benefit from a 10-year income tax exemption. Factories currently based on the coast, which relocate to rural areas or areas in South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, or the Bekaa Valley benefit from a six-year income tax exemption. Parliament enacted a law in April 2014 to reduce income tax on industrial exports by 50 percent. More information can be found on IDAL’s website at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/doing_business/investment_incentives . Domestic and foreign investors may benefit from Central Bank subsidies for the import of industrial raw materials (Intermediate Circular No. 556 dated May 2020). In addition, the Central Bank has made preparations to launch “The Oxygen Fund” to support the import of raw materials to Lebanese industries and provided $175 million to this fund.. Analysts question whether such efforts, absent external assistance, will be enough. The government grants customs exemptions to industrial warehouses for export purposes. Companies located in the Beirut Port or the Tripoli Port Free Zone benefit from customs exemptions and are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT) for export purposes. They are also not required to register their employees with the NSSF, if they provide equal or better benefits. As part of its mandate, IDAL promotes and supports Lebanese exports, especially in the agriculture, agro-industry, and industry sectors, by providing assistance on export requirements and studies on potential new markets, supporting exporter participation in international fairs and exhibitions, as well as subsidizing export transportation costs. Lebanon does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Lebanese firms. Lebanon has one duty-free zone at Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport and two free trade zones, the Beirut Port and the Tripoli Port. The WTO-compatible Customs Law issued by Decree No. 4461 fosters the development of free zones (Articles 242-261 cover free trade zones and Articles 262-266 cover duty free zones) and is available online at www.customs.gov.lb . The government enacted Law No. 18, dated September 5, 2008, that established the Tripoli Special Economic Zone (TSEZ) to attract investment in trade, industry, services, storage, and other services, as well as to grant investors tax exemptions and offer other incentives such as relaxed allowances for foreign labor and unrestricted currency conversion. On April 9, 2015, the Cabinet appointed a TSEZ Authority to regulate the zone, and according to the TSEZ Authority, it received from the International Finance Corporation a policy note for the licensing regime and the regulatory framework. The TSEZ Authority is developing its licensing regime to grant licenses for logistics and industrial activities, and has completed the strategic environmental impact assessment and detailed design for all infrastructure. The master plan for the industrial and logistics site next to Tripoli Port is complete and awaits Cabinet approval. On March 29, 2018, the Cabinet approved expanding the geographical area of the TSEZ to include an additional 75,000 square meters of the Rachid Karami Fair in Tripoli and to establish a knowledge-innovation center. The Authority has completed the architectural concept for the Rachid Karami zone for knowledge and innovation center and will start with the Master Plan this year. The Authority expects the TSEZ will begin logistics activities in early 2022. Registration with a chamber of commerce is required to import and handle a limited number of products that are subject to control requirements for safety reasons. Products with such special import requirements constitute less than one percent of total tradable goods. Registration with a chamber of commerce is required to ensure that established facilities meet safety, handling, and storage requirements. Lebanon does not follow any forced localization policy and does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. Lebanon’s Central Bank requires all banks to keep data backups in Lebanon, while service providers are required to do the same. 5. Protection of Property Rights The right to private ownership is respected in Lebanon. The concept of a mortgage exists and secured interests in property, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced. Such security interests must be recorded in the Commercial Registry and the Real Estate Registry. The Real Estate Law governs acquisition and disposition of all property rights by Lebanese nationals, while Law No. 296, dated April 3, 2001, governs real estate acquisition by non-Lebanese. Over twenty percent of land, mostly in rural and remote areas, does not have clear title. The government is undertaking efforts to identify property owners and register land titles. While Lebanon is not a WTO member, its intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation is generally compliant with Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) standards. IPR enforcement is weak. The Ministry of Economy and Trade’s (MOET) Intellectual Property Protection Office (IPPO) has led efforts to improve the IPR regime but suffers from limited financial and human resources, and insufficient political support. Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Customs play roles in enforcement. The understanding of IPR within the Lebanese judiciary has improved somewhat in recent years but gaps remain with regards to the negative economic impact that IPR violations have on the economy. The MOET’s new draft laws and amendments to existing laws (as well as key IPR treaties) aimed at improving the IPR environment, notably for industrial design, trademark, geographical indications, as well as amendments to the copyright law, await approval from both Lebanon’s Cabinet and Parliament. During the past year, Lebanon did not enact any new IP related laws or legislation. Lebanon does not track nor report on seizures of counterfeit goods. Existing IPR laws cover copyright, patent, trademarks, and geographical elements. Lebanon’s 1999 Copyright Law largely complies with WTO regulations and needs only minor amendments to become fully compatible. Copyright registration in Lebanon is not mandatory, and copyright protection is granted without the need for registration. The MOET launched an online registration service in January 2013 for trademarks on https://portal.economy.gov.lb/ . This service simplified the registration process and registrations of trademarks now take place online. Due to the complexity of copyrights and patents, registration is still accepted in person at the MOET, and payment must also take place in person. The switch from a deposit system to an objection system for trademarks also remains stalled due to the need for parliamentary approval. However, the MOET noted that it implements the objection system in practice. Lebanon was removed from the Special 301 Watch List in 2022 as rights holders did not raised significant concerns about IP protection or enforcement during the review process. Mr. Peter MehravariIntellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North AfricaU.S. Embassy Abu DhabiTel: +965 97589223Email: Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are no restrictions on portfolio investment, and foreign investors may invest in Lebanese equities and fixed income certificates. While legally Lebanon is a free-market economy and does not restrict the movement of capital into or out of the country, the country’s banks have imposed informal capital controls on dollar withdrawals and financial outflows from Lebanon since October 2019. There are de facto restrictions on outbound payments and transfers for current international transactions, but these have yet to be codified into law. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law. Lebanon’s stock market is the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). Currently, the BSE lists six commercial banks, four companies including Solidere – one of the largest publicly held companies in the region – and eight sovereign Eurobond issues. However, the BSE suffers from a lack of liquidity and low trading volumes in the absence of significant institutional and foreign investors. It had an annual trading volume of only 3.3 percent of market capitalization in 2021. Weak market turnover discourages investors from committing funds to the market and discourages issuers from seeking listings on the BSE. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates Lebanon’s capital markets. The Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank oversees the CMA. Politicization of the CMA’s board and frequent vacancies have distracted the CMA from encouraging the development of Lebanon’s capital markets. The Capital Markets Law calls for the corporatization and subsequent privatization of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) within a two-year period from the date that the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is appointed. The Cabinet appointed the CMA in June 2012, and in September 2017 issued a decree to corporatize the BSE. The corporatization has yet to occur. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors may obtain credit facilities on the local market. However, as Lebanon entered its economic crisis in the fall of 2019 and defaulted on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020, local and international credit is virtually nonexistent. Banks have substantially reduced retail loans, such as housing, consumer, or personal loans, as well as have reduced heavily international limits of credit and debit cards, and maintains commercial loans mainly to agriculture, industrial and trade sectors for SMEs and large corporates. The Lebanese banking sector covers the entire country with 959 operating commercial and investment bank branches as of September 2021. There are 5,214 residents per branch in Lebanon (assuming five million inhabitants), which compares favorably to regional and emerging markets. According to World Bank Development indicators, there are 493 depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, 177 borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 37 ATMs per 100,000 adults. The total domestic assets of Lebanon’s fifteen largest commercial banks reached approximately US$ 150 billion as of the end of 2021 (about 85.3 percent of total banking assets), according to Central Bank data. Lebanon’s banks are insolvent. The government announced in February 2022 that it estimated banks accumulated $69 billion in losses and suggested a plan for distributing those losses, primarily through converting USD deposits into local currency. Banks are no longer serving their core functions: making productive loans or allowing those with dollar deposits to withdraw them. Clients cannot transfer money deposited prior to October 2019 overseas. Lebanon has yet to adopt formal capital controls legislation, but most economic analysts believe such a law is necessary to preserve what limited foreign currency is left in the country, provide a legal framework for banks to limit withdrawals, and provide a level playing field to all Lebanese. At the behest of the Central Bank, in April 2020, banks began providing LBP at rates higher than the official pegged rate to customers with dollar-denominated accounts, but less than 60 percent of the market value of USD banknotes. In December 2021, the Central Bank announced new measures to stabilize the local currency, including allowing banks to provide USD banknotes to clients sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves. Banks are acting as de facto foreign exchange houses, providing clients with scarce USD banknotes in exchange for LBP at rates slightly below the actual market rate. This intervention has stemmed the local currency’s fall, but most analysts believe it is only a temporary solution. Lebanon relied on dollar inflows from abroad to finance imports and public spending and to maintain the LBP-to-USD peg, in place since 1997. Those dollars were deposited in Lebanese banks, which in turn lent them to the state in the form of deposits at the Central Bank or Lebanese debt instruments. Nearly 70 percent of bank assets are tied to the sovereign in those two forms. In 2019, as dollar inflows dried up and banking sector assets were tied to long-term deposits at the Central Bank and illiquid debt instruments, banks had trouble meeting their dollar obligations to clients, planting the seeds of the current crisis. Lebanon’s default on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020 – Lebanese banks at the time held $12.7 billion in Lebanon’s dollar bonds – further eroded the balance sheets of Lebanese banks. Financial experts estimated that 40 percent of loans from Lebanese banks were non-performing in December 2020. Bankers reported that correspondent banks overseas have stopped providing them with lines of credits – or only provide facilities with onerous conditions because of increasing country risk– further hampering bank efficacy in Lebanon. Correspondent banks remain but likely place high levels of due diligence on banks because of the incomplete implementation of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The government’s February 2022 draft financial sector recovery plan hinted at the conversion of dollar denominated deposits into local currency and a potential “haircut” on dollar deposits, in which wealthy account holders could lose some of their deposits to help recapitalize banks after shareholders “bail-in” (convert their deposits into bank shares) their financial institutions. The government has not implemented that plan, however. Lebanon’s Central Bank was established in 1963. Lebanon’s Central Bank imposes strict compliance with regulations on banks and financial institutions, and commercial banks, in turn, maintain strict compliance regimes. However, the United States designated Jammal Trust Bank in August 2019 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its role in financing Foreign Terrorist Organization Hizballah. Foreign banks and branches need the Central Bank’s approval to establish operations in Lebanon. Moreover, any shareholder with more than five percent of a bank’s share capital must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to acquire additional shares in that bank and must inform the Central Bank when selling shares. In addition, any shareholder needs to obtain prior approval from the Central Bank if he/she wants to become a board member. The use of cryptocurrencies is prohibited in Lebanon by the Central Bank. The Central Bank announced that it is developing a digital currency that it plans to issue for domestic use only. There are no legal restrictions in Lebanon on a foreigner or non-resident’s ability to open a bank account in local or foreign currency, provided they abide by Lebanese compliance rules and regulations. Currently, however, most banks are not taking on new clients or new accounts. Banks claim they have stringent inquiry mechanisms to ensure compliance with international and domestic regulations and implement Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance laws. Banks inform customers of Know-Your-Customer requirements and ask them about the purpose of opening new accounts and about the sources of funds to be deposited. Lebanese banks note they are compliant with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Lebanon adopted the OECD Common Reporting Standards since January 1, 2018. Foreign Exchange Commercial banks in late 2019 introduced informal capital controls on Lebanese depositors to stem the outflow of foreign currency; these controls have persisted today, and banks have barred virtually all overseas transfers. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law. In April 2020, Lebanon’s Central Bank required money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram to disburse inbound transfers in local currency, the Central Bank later allowed them to disburse in U.S. dollars in August 2020, ostensibly to attract remittance inflows. In February 2022, the Central Bank allowed money transfer organizations to sell USD at an exchange rate close to the market rate. As of March 2022, Lebanon had several different exchange rates in use: the official, pegged rate; the actual market rate; the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” rate; and the rate used by money transfer organizations to convert incoming remittances. Since 1997, the LBP has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 1,507.5 LBP/1 USD. However, as Lebanese continue to demand scarce dollars in the Lebanese financial system, the currency depreciated on the market, the only source of USD banknotes for most Lebanese. The actual market rate reached a peak of 33,000 LBP/USD in January 2022; as of March 2022, the rate was closer to 23,000 LBP/USD. In December 2021, Lebanon’s Central Bank announced banks could convert LBP into USD – sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves – using the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” platform. This intervention stabilized the local currency temporarily; the “Sayrafa rate” and market rate tracked closely for most of February and March 2022 at 20,000 LBP/USD. However, the Sayrafa platform could not satiate local demand for USD banknotes, and the market rate once again increased from the Sayrafa rate. Money transfer organizations such as Western Union or Money Gram can also convert incoming USD to LBP using a separate rate that is usually higher than the Sayrafa rate but below the market rate. While capital controls curtailed the ability of those holding dollar-denominated bank accounts in Lebanon to withdraw or transfer their currencies overseas, those in Lebanon with access to “fresh dollars” (i.e., new dollar bills from abroad or not within the local financial system) were able to access, withdraw, and transfer overseas dollars. For the vast majority of Lebanese and businesses in Lebanon, remitting any money overseas, including investment returns, remained nearly impossible. Most economists believe capital controls must continue for the foreseeable future to prevent a bank run and preserve the limited foreign currency remaining in Lebanon, although they prefer formal and legal capital controls passed by Lebanon’s Parliament. Lebanon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Lebanon’s Offshore Petroleum Resource Law states that proceeds generated from oil and gas exploration must be deposited in a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Creating the fund requires a separate law, which the government has yet to adopt. Lebanon currently receives no proceeds from natural resources that could flow into a sovereign wealth fund. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Lebanese firms are aware of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC), including on environmental, social, and governance issues. This is true for the banking sector as well as companies in industry, which are slowly creating sustainable supply chains or pursuing social initiatives to appeal to consumers. The Lebanese Standards Institution (LIBNOR), part of the Ministry of Industry, strives to expand the use of the ISO 26000 standard on Social Responsibility (SR) in Lebanon, one of the eight pilot countries in the Middle East. However, laws related to human and labor rights, consumer protection, and environment protections are unevenly enforced. On December 30, Parliament passed Law No. 205 criminalizing sexual harassment in the workplace. The Central Bank of Lebanon works with banks to direct their financial resources towards projects that improve society and the environment. This includes issuing circulars to create favorable environmental and educational loans, encourage entrepreneurship through private equity investments, and facilitate improved governance through customer protection. Lebanon’s economic crisis, however, has frozen project and corporate lending. In 2015, the banking sector started to implement Central Bank Circular No. 134, requiring banks to apply measures to ensure transparent and fair dealings with their customers, a reflection of the CSR principles of corporate governance and consumer protection. The Central Bank also established the Institute for Finance and Governance (IFG). Some Lebanese banks attempt to align their business plans and CSR policy with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Several banks issue their own annual CSR reports. The government does not require or encourage private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. However, several companies have adopted a Code of Ethics and corporate governance codes, including the business association ‘Rassemblement de Dirigeants et Chefs d’Entreprises Libanais’ (RDCL, or the Group of Lebanese Business Owners) Code of Business Ethics, and the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance (CG), which is under the auspices of the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA). However, these codes are strictly voluntary and the government provides no incentives or enforcement for their adoption. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Lebanon does not have a national climate strategy. It also does not have a net zero greenhouse gas emission goal for 2050, nor does it have a long-term climate strategy for reaching net zero emissions. However, Lebanon submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) in March 2021. Lebanon’s new NDC increased the country’s commitments on climate change and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to the 1.5-degree goal of the Paris Agreement. Specifically, Lebanon committed to unconditionally increasing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target relative to the business-as-usual scenario from 15 percent (2015) to 20 percent (2020). In addition, Lebanon committed to conditionally increasing its GHG emission reduction target relative to the business-as-usual scenario from 30 percent to 31 percent Lebanon committed to unconditionally generating 18 percent of its power demand and 11 percent of its heat demand from renewable energy sources in 2030, compared to its 15 percent combined commitment made in 2015. Moreover, Lebanon conditionally committed to generating 30 percent of its power demand and 16.5 percent of its heat demand from renewable energy sources in 2030, compared to a combined 20 percent in 2015. In April 2019, the Cabinet adopted an electricity reform plan that committed to 30 percent renewable energy for Lebanon’s power generation as well as 840 MW of solar and 600 MW of wind power. Lebanon’s power generation sector is its largest polluter, with nearly all electricity generation sourced from heavy fuel oil and diesel. The Ministry of Energy and Water is seeking to import natural gas from Egypt and to allow for renewable energy power generation. Should Lebanon reform its electricity sector and once again regain access to international capital markets, Lebanon has a significant opportunity to increase its power generation via renewable sources. A broader chorus of civil society activists and donors believe it will be cheaper for Lebanon to invest in renewable power generation as a solution for its electricity deficit as an alternative to capital intensive fossil fuel power plants. 9. Corruption U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI, including in government procurement, award of contracts, dispute resolution, customs, and taxation. A key demand of the anti-government protest movement that led to resignation of the previous government in October 2019 was stricter anti-corruption measures. Corruption is reportedly more pervasive in government contracts (primarily in procurement and public works), taxation, and real estate registration, than in private sector transactions. Lebanese law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but they are not implemented effectively. For instance, Lebanon does not effectively enforce its Illicit Wealth Law. The Illicit Wealth Law applies to all state employees, government and senior officials, and municipality members and extends to family members. The law does not extend to political parties. The legislation has articles to counter conflict-of interest in awarding contracts and government procurement, but they are not enforced. An amendment to this law from October 2020 obliges the declaration of wealth every three years. The Access to Information Law is not effectively implemented. In April 2020, Parliament approved several laws seen as key to anti-corruption efforts: an anti-corruption law targeting public sector employee and creating a National Committee to Combat Corruption, and a law to lift immunity of (low-level) public service employees. Implementations of these laws will be critical to their success. In January 2022, the government appointed six commissioners to the National Anti-Corruption Commission. In May 2020, the government approved its National Anti-Corruption Strategy, while Parliament approved a law allowing the committee and Lebanon’s Financial Intelligence Unit to lift bank secrecy for top government officials. It also approved a law changing appointments of top civil servants to a merit-based system. In December 2020, Parliament approved lifting bank secrecy for one year for all those who have dealt with the public sector. Parliament extended this law for an additional year in February 2022. Parliament also passed a landmark public procurement law in June 2021, which will create a new public procurement authority and publish public tenders online. However, implementation remains key to determining how these laws will combat entrenched corruption. Lebanon ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in April 2009. Lebanon is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. As for civil society, the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) is a key advocate for stronger anti-corruption enforcement. The LTA also established the Lebanese Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (LALAC) to inform citizens of their rights and to encourage victims and witnesses to take action against cases of corruption. LALAC operates a hotline for victims and witnesses to report cases of corruption and receive free legal advice and assistance with their case. The program is currently funded by Transparency International (TI) and the German Foreign Office. LTA also conducted several workshops targeting municipalities, public servants, investigative journalists, and civil society groups promoting access to information right in Lebanon. Resources to Report Corruption Lebanese Transparency Association Sami El Solh Avenue, Kaloot Bldg, 9th Floor Badaro, Beirut P.O. Box 50-552, Lebanon Tel/Fax: +961-1-388113/4/5 Cell: 70-035777 Email: info@transparency-lebanon.org 10. Political and Security Environment Sustained anti-government protests began on October 17, 2019 and led to the resignation of the government on October 29. The protests continued for months, with demonstrators demanding an end to corruption, poor governance, and economic stagnation. A new government, which drew support from Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Hizballah, did not form until January 21, 2020. This government resigned on August 10, 2020, in the wake of protests after an August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut killed more than 200 people. Lebanese political leaders took 13 months to form a new government on September 2021. That government will have to resign after scheduled elections on May 15, and it is therefore trying to pursue negotiations with the IMF to secure an economic recovery program. Public demonstrations have continued since October 2019, albeit with lesser frequency. Some protests have turned violent and targeted property, particularly banks and public institutions. Lebanon’s declining economic situation has resulted in more than half of the population falling below the poverty line, according to the World Bank. Hizballah continued fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, while some Lebanese Sunnis reportedly lent support to the Syrian opposition. Lebanon continues to host more refugees per capita than any other country in the world. The refugee presence led to increased social tensions and competition for low-skill jobs, and strained infrastructure and provision of public services. The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Beirut sufficiently serious enough to require all official personnel to live and work under security restrictions. These limitations occasionally prevent the movement of U.S. Embassy officials and the provision of consular services in certain areas of the country. U.S. citizen visitors are encouraged to contact the Embassy’s Consular Section for the most recent safety and security information concerning travel to Lebanon. More information may be found at https://lb.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The 1946 Labor Law provides for written and oral contracts and specifies a maximum workweek of 48 hours (with several exceptions, notably agricultural and domestic workers, who are not covered under the Labor Law). The legal minimum wage was raised in 2012 to 675,000 LBP ($30) per month. Lebanon is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and signatory to all its fundamental conventions except on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. The Ministry of Labor issues an annual list of jobs restricted to only Lebanese. The Lebanese Industrialists Association, in coordination with the Ministry of Industry, started issuing a list of job vacancies in the industry sector. Local unskilled labor is in short supply. Arab (mainly Syrian, Egyptian, and Palestinian), Asian, and African laborers are hired to work in construction, agriculture, industry, low-end tourism, and households, although Lebanon’s economic crisis has dampened construction and tourism. The law provides for the right of private sector workers to form and join trade unions, strike, and bargain collectively, although the law places several restrictions on these rights. It provides protection against anti-union discrimination, but enforcement is weak and anecdotal evidence suggests anti-union discrimination was widespread. Lebanon has a government-recognized General Labor Confederation (CGTL), whose membership is limited exclusively to Lebanese workers. The CGTL’s activities are mainly limited to demanding cost-of-living increases and other social benefits for workers. The general labor-management relationship remains difficult and the Labor Law is not always properly enforced. Strikes and demonstrations are not uncommon and are usually aimed at pressuring the government for better employment conditions. The law requires businesses to adhere to safety standards, but enforcement is weak. Lebanon’s labor force (defined locally as aged 15 and above) is estimated at 2.4 million in 2019, including foreign residents but excluding the seasonal work force, according to the World Bank. The World Bank estimated Lebanon’s total population, including refugees, at 6.86 million as of 2019. There are no official statistics on unemployment. As of March 2021, analysts have cited numbers from 30 to 50 percent unemployment, with numbers expected to increase as Lebanon’s economy contracts. The informal economy is very large in Lebanon and is only expanding as unemployment increases and most cash-based transactions bypass the insolvent financial sector. In previous years, Lebanon’s informal economy amounted to 30 percent of GDP; in 2021, several economists put the number closer to 50 percent of GDP. Government subsidies of wheat, fuel, and medicine from October 2019 to the end of 2021 fueled informal but highly profitable smuggling to Syria, which had liberalized much of its wheat and fuel markets. Smugglers also carry other profitable goods across the Lebanese-Syrian border, including captagon, an amphetamine often bound for Gulf Arab countries. In 1981, Lebanon and the United States signed an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement, which become operational in 1996. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is currently active in Lebanon in insurance, financing, and investment. To date, DFC has provided more than $300 million in credit line guarantees for transactions in Lebanon. The Lebanese government’s National Investments Guarantee Corporation (NIGC) continues to insure new investments against political risks, riots, losses due to non-convertibility of currencies, and transfer of profits. Lebanon has been a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World Bank, since 1994. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 NA 2020 $3,174 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $347 2019 $354 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1 2020 $4 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 5.2% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ * Source for Host Country Data: The Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) has not yet released official 2020 GDP figures. Lebanon’s Central Bank compiled FDI statistics without geographical breakdown, thus the inward/outward FDI positions from/to the United States are “partial figures” derived from the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). The CDIS includes banking, financial, and insurance sectors. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $2,611 100% Total Outward $4,622 100% Luxembourg 10,839 33.7% France $837 18.1% United Arab Emirates $307 11.7% Egypt $732 15.8% France $212 8.1% Turkey $374 8.1% Jordan $144 5.5% Jordan $372 8% Libya $143 5.5% Cyprus $316 6.8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: BdL; IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey-CDIS, December 2020. Neil Gundavda Economic and Commercial Officer +961 76 514 942 U.S. Embassy Beirut GundavdaN@state.gov Lesotho Executive Summary The Kingdom of Lesotho is a country open to and eagerly seeking foreign direct investment (FDI). Government, business, labor, and civil society leaders all strongly agree that attracting FDI is vital to Lesotho’s future. In 2021 the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (GOKL) undertook many promising initiatives to make doing business in Lesotho easier. However, in 2020 GOKL took or proposed measures that concerned foreign entrepreneurs and investors. These included measures that treat foreign-owned businesses differently than in the past and which suggest to some foreign observers a turn towards economic nationalism. Among the important reforms undertaken in 2020, GOKL introduced new e-licensing and e-registration platforms that promise to greatly reduce the time for business creation and licensing. New protocols for customs procedures promise to streamline importing and exporting. And at the highest levels GOKL has announced that to help Lesotho recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, GOKL will focus on making Lesotho an attractive destination for FDI. While GOKL clearly recognizes the importance of FDI and has continued to enact policies to make foreign investment easier, 2020 also saw the rollout of rules intended to protect local entrepreneurs from foreign competition in designated sectors. In recent years, many migrants from Asia and other parts of Africa have started businesses in these designated sectors and the current government has announced aggressive measures to reverse this trend. These sectors—such as small retail food sales and basic auto repair—are dominated by local small and micro enterprises but some do have participation by medium-sized foreign-owned firms. Although these regulations will have a negative effect on some foreign investors, they will have low impact on overall FDI because most businesses in the designated sectors are relatively small. However, the government has also enacted other regulations, such as requiring foreign investors to renew their business licenses yearly instead of every three years, a condition that many foreign investors describe as onerous to the point of impossibility given the bureaucratic challenges. Moreover, recent policy debates within the government around proposals to mandate a minimum percentage of local ownership enterprises earmarked for the locals have caused real concern. In February, the government implemented the regulations in the used car motor dealership sector causing barriers to entry for investors. Uncertainty concerning the execution of the regulations in other sectors remains. Lesotho’s economy and FDI were badly affected by COVID-19 in 2021, with several foreign-owned textile factories closing or cutting back on operations due to the global downtrend in demand. The government introduced measures to reduce the impact of COVID-19 on the private sector. Other challenges included corruption; while not pervasive, corruption is a problem with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranking Lesotho as 83rd out of 180 countries. Foreign investors are requested to adhere to international labor standards, however, there were reported instances of Gender Based Violence and Harassment (GBVH) in some textiles factories. The government, in collaboration with the stakeholders, is working to address GBV. Despite these challenges, GOKL is refining the services it offers foreign investors, and Lesotho retains advantages such as ready access to the South African and regional markets as well as lower labor, electricity, and communications costs than neighboring countries. Lesotho also has a government that remains focused on providing jobs to its citizens, and which has publicly proclaimed its eagerness to work with foreign investors—especially those ready to partner with locals. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2015 118 of 141 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $3 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 $11,067 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Lesotho (GOKL) is generally open to FDI and successive governments have tried to attract FDI as a key component of national development. However, recent years have seen increasing critiques in Lesotho’s press and politics of foreign investors who repatriate their profits rather than reinvesting in Lesotho. This has resulted in a series of populist polices and policy proposals intended to protect opportunities for local investors and entrepreneurs, but which may inadvertently dampen Lesotho’s attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment. Lesotho follows World Trade Organization (WTO) laws and regulations, but local law makes some distinctions between local and foreign investors in some industries (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment”). Lesotho’s investment promotion agency, the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), is responsible for the initiation, facilitation, and promotion of Lesotho as an attractive investment destination. LNDC also undertakes investment project appraisals, provides pre-investment and after-care services, risk management, trade and investment research, and strategic planning. It also ensures investors’ compliance with the country’s legal frameworks. Through LNDC, the government actively encourages investment in manufacturing, mining, and agriculture sectors. LNDC also implements the country’s industrial development policies. LNDC provides the support services described above to foreign investors and regularly publishes information on investment opportunities and the services it offers to foreign investors. Furthermore, LNCDC offers incentives such as long-term loans, tax incentives, factory space at discounted rental rates, assistance with work permits and licenses, and logistical support for relocation. LNDC maintains an ongoing dialogue with foreign and domestic investors by attending annual trade and investment forums both locally and internationally. In August 2020 to March 2021, the government launched the LNDC COVID-19 Partial Guarantee Scheme. To date, USD 2.1 million were approved to assist businesses to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19. For, more information on LNDC, please visit: http://www.lndc.org.ls . Lesotho is open to foreign investment and there are no economy-wide restrictions applied to foreign ownership and control. However, GOKL has passed laws and regulations intended to limit foreign ownership to large scale businesses in complex sectors while reserving small scale businesses in designated sectors exclusively for the indigenous citizens of Lesotho (“Basotho”). The Trading Enterprises Regulations of 2011 (TER 2011) and the Business Licensing and Registration Regulations of 2020 (BLRR 2020) reserve certain businesses for Basotho and limit foreign investors to operating these businesses as minority shareholders with a maximum of 49 percent shareholding. The reserved 47 businesses include acting as an agent of a foreign firm, barber, butcher, snack-bar operator, domestic fuel dealer, dairy shop proprietor, general café or dealer, greengrocer, broker, mini supermarket (floor area < 250m2), and hair and beauty salon. Most businesses affected by these regulations are micro or small enterprises, but some mid-sized foreign owned firms will be affected. In 2021, the government amended the BLRR 2020 to allow foreign investors to continue to operate in the used motor dealership sector following a low number of Lesotho citizens willing to venture into the sector which requires high capital. The Business Licensing and Registration Act 2019 (BLRA 2019) requires foreign investors to provide a capital of $123,152 or provide proof of investment of $123,152 during registration or renewal of their traders’ licenses or to have deposited $123,152 with a local institution. However, the Central Bank of Lesotho Act of 2000 stipulates a foreign investment minimum threshold of $250,000. While pleased that the new law indicates a reduction in the minimum sum that they must invest, many foreign investors are concerned that this discrepancy was not clarified in the BLRA 2019 legislation. BLRA 2019 requires foreign investors to renew their business identification card annually while locals are only required to renew their business identification cards after three years. Some foreign entrepreneurs operating in Lesotho have complained that the process of renewing their business identification cards annually is extremely onerous. BLRA 2019 also requires foreign investors to transfer technology and business expertise to local investors. Many foreign entrepreneurs operating in Lesotho complain that this requirement is poorly articulated and arbitrarily enforced. The Mines and Minerals Act No.4 of 2005 restricts mineral permits for small-scale mining operations on less than 100m2 to local ownership. Diamond mining, regardless of the size of the operation, is subject to the large-scale mines licensing regime, which has no restrictions on foreign ownership; however, GOKL reserves the right to acquire at least 20-35 percent ownership in any large-scale mine. By law, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is instructed to screen foreign investments in a routine, nondiscriminatory manner to ensure consistency with national interests. Cabinet approved Lesotho’s investment policy and it became law in early 2016. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development assisted with the development of the policy. (UNCTAD) http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=503 The government has undertaken investment policy reviews in 2020 with the assistance of UNCTAD. In 2016, the government launched a “One Stop Business Facilitation Centre” (OBFC), to make it easier to do business and facilitate FDI. OBFC places all services required for the issuance of licenses, permits, and imports and exports clearances under one roof. The portal provides transparency and predictability to trade transactions and reduces the time and cost of trading across borders. The OBFC web site is http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php . The process of company registration includes: a work permit application with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, a visa application and resident permit with the Ministry of Home Affairs, a trader’s license with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, tax clearance with Lesotho Revenue Authority, a police clearance with the Ministry of Police and Public Safety, the Certificate of Occupancy with Maseru City Council and a medical clearance with the Ministry of Health. In November 2020, the OBFC held a twin launch of e-Regulations and e-Licensing. The e-Regulations provides a clear step by step process to register a business. This also stipulates requirements, costs, time and contact details for registering a business. The e-Licensing allows foreign investors to apply online for obtaining a business license. This initiative has reduced instances of fraud and manipulation. It takes a maximum of 3 days to issue both industrial and traders licenses. For more information on e -licenses, please visit: www.Lesotho.elicenses.org . For more information on e-regulations please visit: http://www.lesotho.eregulations.org . Lesotho provides incentives to investors who export outside the country. Export manufacturers obtain a full rebate of customs duty paid on their inputs imported to produce for markets outside Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. The government facilitates quality standard processes and export permits for outward investment. For AGOA exports, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, LNDC, and Lesotho Revenue Authority provide support including on export requirements. Other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development Southern Africa Trade Hub provide capacity to the government for the implementation of AGOA. The government has assigned Lesotho Standards Authority to assist investors who export to the Republic of South Africa (RSA). 3. Legal Regime Regulatory enforcement is generally weak and has moderate impact by hindering competition and distorting business and investment practices. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The accounting systems for companies are regulated by the Companies Act of 2011 and Financial Institutions of 2012. International Financial Reporting System (IFRS) is the current financial system used by companies. Rule-making and regulatory mechanisms exist at the local, national, and supra-national levels although the most relevant for foreign investors is the national level. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by the private sector or non-governmental organizations. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in consortia or organizations that set industry standards. Lesotho has a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. However, the website is poorly maintained and rarely updated — https://lesotholii.org/ The government printing office also publishes government gazettes which can be purchased by the public. Businesses in Lesotho are regulated by the Companies Act of 2011. The issuance of traders’ licenses is governed by the Trading Enterprises Order of 1993, as amended in 1996, and the Trading Enterprises Regulations of 1999, as amended in 2011, as well as the Business Licensing and Registration Act of 2019. Trading licenses are required for a wide range of services; some enterprises can require up to four licenses for one location. Manufacturing licenses are covered by the Industrial Licensing Act of 1969 and the Pioneer Industries Encouragement Act of 1969. For most manufacturing license applications, environmental certificates issued by the National Environmental Secretariat (NES) are sufficient. Where manufacturing activities are assumed to have actual or potential environmental impacts, however, an Environmental Impact Assessment is required, which must be approved by the NES. The introduction of the OBFC improved the industrial and trading license system. The OBFC has also streamlined other bureaucratic procedures, including those for licenses and permits. The GOKL modernized the regulatory framework for utilities through the establishment of the independent Lesotho Communications Authority (LCA), which regulates the telecommunications sector, and the Lesotho Electricity and Water Authority (LEWA), which regulates the energy and water sectors. The two authorities set the conditions for entry of new competitive operators. The LEWA allows both the Lesotho Electricity Company and the Water and Sewerage Company to maintain monopolies in their respective sectors. The Mines and Minerals Act of 2005, the Precious Stones Order (1970), and the Mine Safety Act (1981) provide a regulatory framework for the mining industry. The Commissioner of Mines in the Ministry of Mines, supported by the Mining Board, is authorized to issue mineral rights to both foreigners and local investors. On approval, it takes about a month for both prospecting and mining licenses to be issued. Under the Financial Institutions Act of 2012 the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) regulates financial services. Tourism enterprises are required to secure licenses under the Accommodation, Catering and Tourism Enterprise Act of 1997. The Act provides for a Tourism Licensing Board that issues and renews licenses for camp sites, hotels, lodges, restaurants, self-catering establishments, bed and breakfasts, youth hostels, resorts, motels, catering, and guest houses. Applicants for any of the above licenses must apply to the Board three months before its next meeting. Several government departments, specifically the Ministries of Health and Tourism, the police and, when the property is in Maseru, the Maseru City Council, must inspect properties and submit inspection reports to the Board on prescribed forms. Licenses are granted for one year and can be renewed. Parliamentary committees may, but are not required to, publish proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Parliament may also hold public gatherings to explain the contents of the proposed laws, and these provide opportunities for comment on proposed laws and regulations. The committees generally hold such consultations for laws that are perceived to be sensitive, such as: The Land Act, the Penal Code, and the Children’s Welfare and Protection Act. Regulations are developed to enforce the law, to implement objectives of legal frameworks, and to ensure compliance. The following steps are followed when regulations are developed: The initiating ministry or agency writes a cabinet memo reflecting objectives and benefits of the regulations. The cabinet memo is then widely circulated to relevant stakeholders to reflect how the regulations will impact them and to seek concurrence. The initiating agency then makes a cabinet presentation to seek cabinet approval to draft the regulations. The initiating agency drafts regulations and holds meetings with relevant stakeholders to obtain their input. The initiating ministry or agency holds workshops with relevant stakeholders to validate regulations. Draft regulations are submitted to the Attorney General for certification. A Parliamentary presentation is held and updates to the draft are made. A presentation to the Senate is held and updates of the regulations are made. Parliament tables the regulations, and a provision of royal ascent is made by His Majesty King Letsie III. The regulations are published, and the public is given a period of 14 days to review the regulations after which their comments are incorporated, and the regulations are finalized and gazetted. The last step is to sensitize the public on the new regulations. Information on debt obligations is publicly available, including online. The government produces an Annual Public Debt Bulletin, which covers debt management operations, debt portfolio, debt service, and loan guarantees. The government also publishes a Medium-Term Debt Strategy paper. More information is available at: www.finance.gov.ls/ Lesotho is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU strives to promote integration of Member States into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment. SADC aspires to deepen regional integration and sustainable development. Lesotho’s products enjoy duty free access to SADC countries, which has a total population of 277 million. For more information about SADC, visit: www.sadc.int In January 2021, the GOKL ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The main objective of the AfCTA is to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspersons and investments. The agreement has been signed by 54 out 55 countries. To date, 35 countries have ratified the agreement. The agreement would provide a market access of over 1 billion people to Lesotho’s products with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated at $3.4 trillion. Lesotho is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Lesotho’s regulatory systems are independent and not intertwined with regional regulations. In cases where there are gaps with national regulations, the country uses regional regulations to close them. The government does not reference or incorporate U.S. or another country’s regulatory systems. The government notifies all agreements of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). More information is located at: https://www.tfadatabase.org/members/lesotho The legal system in Lesotho is based on Roman–Dutch Law and English Common Law, combined with precolonial Customary Law. The judicial system is made up of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, subordinate courts, and the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). There is no trial by jury, instead, judges make rulings alone. There are magistrates’ courts in each of the 10 districts, and more than 70 central and local courts. With U.S. support, a Commercial Court was established in 2010 to improve the country’s capacity in resolving commercial cases though backlogs continue to delay processing times. Foreign investors have equal treatment before the courts in disputes with national parties or the government. The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment enables investors to refer a dispute with the State to international arbitration if domestic remedies have been exhausted. Lesotho is a signatory of the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) and also accepts ad hoc arbitration. Lesotho is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the Arbitration International Investment Disputes Act of 1974 commits Lesotho to accept binding international arbitration of investment disputes. Lesotho does not have any investment laws. The overarching FDI policy is the 2015 National Investment Policy of Lesotho, produced with the assistance of UNCTAD. The Companies Act of 2011 and the Financial Institutions Act of 2012, are the principal laws that regulate incoming foreign investment through acquisitions, mergers, takeovers, purchases of securities and other financial contracts and greenfield investments. The investment treaties also govern conduct toward the entry of foreign investment. In 2021 there were no major cases relating to foreign investment and the 2021 judgments are available at: https://lesotholii.org/courtnames/high-court/202 The OBFC hosts the Lesotho Trade Information Portal, a single online authoritative source of all laws, regulations, and procedures for importing and exporting. The OBFC web site is:HYPERLINK hError! Hyperlink reference not valid. http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php. The OBFC portal provides information on company registration and export and import regulations as well as information and links to key laws and 23 ministries. The government has produced but not yet passed a draft competition bill to improve the regulation of investments. Its goal is to “provide the legal basis for undistorted competition and thus contribute to transparency and predictability in domestic markets.” The are no agencies established to review transactions for competition-related concerns. However, various government sectors deal with competition-related issues through use of available institutional guidelines and procedures. These include the Commercial Court, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Small Business. The government is also in the process of drafting a consumer protection bill. The constitution provides that the acquisition of private property by the state can only occur for specified public purposes. The processes that are followed during expropriation follow the Land Act of 2010. These include consultations between government/authority and claimant, consultation with the chief, demarcation and survey of the area, publishing a gazette for public notification and information and provision of compensation equal to fair market value of the property. In cases of expropriation where claimants allege a lack of due process, the affected persons may appeal to the High Court as to whether the action is legal and compensation is adequate. The constitution is silent on whether compensation may be paid abroad in the case of a non-resident; such an additional provision would usually be contained in a foreign investment law. The government has no history of discriminating against U.S. or other foreign investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation. The only local ownership law is the Trading Enterprises Act. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Lesotho is a member of the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. There is no specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The government is a signatory to a treaty in which binding international arbitration of investment disputes is recognized. Lesotho has no Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. The government has little history of investment disputes involving U.S. or other foreign investors or contractors in Lesotho. Foreign investors have full and equal recourse to the Lesotho courts for commercial and labor disputes. Courts are regarded as fair and impartial in cases involving foreign investors. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Lesotho readily accepts binding international arbitration of investment disputes. Lesotho has entered into a number of bilateral investment agreements that provide for international arbitration. However, Lesotho does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. The government stands ready to accept and enforce foreign arbitral awards and judgements if they meet the requirements of domestic law (there have been no such awards to date). The Companies Act is the principal commercial and bankruptcy law in Lesotho. According to the law, creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts of a bankrupt company have a right to nominate a person to be a liquidator, however, if there are any disagreements, the person nominated by the creditors shall be the liquidator. All claims against a bankrupt company shall be proved at a meeting of creditors and equity shareholders. If the claim is rejected by the liquidator, the claimant may apply to the court by motion to set aside the rejection. Creditors who will act as witnesses are entitled to witness fees. In a bankruptcy, workers are paid first, then creditors, equity shareholders and holders of other financial contracts are paid. Monetary judgments are usually made in the local currency. 4. Industrial Policies There are tax, factory space, and financial incentives available to manufacturing companies establishing themselves in Lesotho, such as: No withholding tax on dividends distributed by manufacturing firms to local or foreign shareholders, unimpeded access to foreign exchange, export finance facility, and long-term loans. These incentives are applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. For more information, see http://www.lndc.org.ls The incentives are specified in government administrative policies and regulations. Lesotho does not have any free or foreign trade zones. Lesotho drafted a Free Trade Policy which was presented to Parliament. Labor-intensive textile manufacturing companies that export beyond the SACU market including those who export under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) enjoy the benefits of free trade zones since they can import raw materials then export finished products duty and tax free. The government imposes mandates for local employment with an exception on shareholders and investors. Requirements for visas and residence permits are not intentionally discriminatory; however, procedures are lengthy and not integrated. For executive positions, work permits to foreign nationals are generally issued and renewed without significant delay. For technical positions, firms have to provide justification based on local skill shortage. The procedures for obtaining technical permits are transparent but foreign investors complain about excessive fees charged and long delays in processing. Work permits for the manufacturing sector are issued at the OBFC, while all other sectors need to lodge their applications with the office of the Labor Commissioner. The maximum period provided for a work permit is one year. The Ministry of Labor and Employment with the financial support of the U.S. government and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is conducting research to improve the effectiveness of the work permit system. For more information on the requirements for visas, residence permits and work permits, please visit: http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php The GOKL does not follow a policy of “forced localization” designed to force foreign investors to increase investment and/or employment in the local economy. The government does not force foreign investors to establish and maintain data storage within Lesotho; however, foreign investors are required to keep records of local sales and employees’ remuneration locally for tax purposes. The country drafted a localization program to guide businesses in adhering to domestic conduct. The country introduced the training incentive program which applies for both local and foreign investors. Training costs are allowable at 125 percent for tax purposes. 5. Protection of Property Rights The right to private property is protected under the law. Property rights and interests are enforced, and owners of property enjoy protection under the Lesotho Constitution of 1993. All foreign and domestic private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Under the Land Act of 2010, foreign nationals are permitted to buy and hold land provided they have a local partner with at least 20 percent ownership. Foreign Investors are eligible to hold rights under sublease agreements, which should not exceed duration of parent land leases being 90 years for residential leases, 60 years for commercial leases and 30 years for petroleum products respectively (section 32 of the Land Act). Secured interests in property, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced under the Land Act of 2010. The concept of a mortgage exists; and mortgages are protected under the Deeds Registry Act of 1967. Secured interests, including mortgages, are recorded and filed by the Deeds Registry. Land titles (leases) as well as secondary land transactions can be enforced in the Land Courts, Magistrate Courts, and the High Court. For more information, please visit www.laa.org.ls Through the support of the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, the government of Lesotho significantly improved the process of registering land titles, peaking at 88 under the “Registering Property” index of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report in 2014. The Land Administration Authority (LAA) has commenced preparations to implement a digital platform whereby, customers would be able to apply for land leases and register deeds online. This new system would help issue leases within three weeks as opposed to a period of over 12 months current turn around. The initiative is expected to improve Lesotho’s investment environment. Legal structures to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) in Lesotho are relatively strong. Investors complain that enforcement is somewhat weak, but infringements and theft are not common. Lesotho respects international IPR laws and is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as well as the African Intellectual Property Organization. Protection of IPR is regulated by the Industrial Property Order of 1989 and the Copyright Act of 1989, which conform to the standards set out in the Paris and Berne Conventions, respectively. The laws protect patents, industrial designs, trademarks, and grants of copyright, but they do not protect trade secrets or semiconductor chip lay-out design. The Law Office is responsible for enforcement of the Industrial Property Order, while the Ministry of Tourism, Sports and Culture is responsible for enforcement of copyright (reflecting the law’s focus on protection of artistic works). Two bills with IP related regulations are yet to be passed in Lesotho Parliament. The Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology in liaison with the Lesotho Communications Authority (LCA) have finalized the drafting of the Computer Crime and Cyber Security bill and the Electronic Transactions and Commerce bill. If enacted, the bills will improve the protection of IPR by addressing cyber-crime and protecting electronic transactions. Lesotho is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Through the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), the GOKL promotes the development of financial markets in Lesotho. Lesotho’s capital market is relatively underdeveloped, with no secondary market for capital market transactions. The Maseru Securities Market launched in 2016 under the wing of the CBL listed the first company on its stock exchange. The trading of government bonds; corporate bonds and company shares is strictly electronic— there is no physical building. For now, bond trading is operated by the Central Bank of Lesotho. For the 2021/22 fiscal year, the government financed a fiscal deficit of approximately USD 326 million through external borrowing. The government accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII in 1997 and has removed restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has put a limit of USD 81,632 for international transactions. Foreign participation in government securities is allowed as long as foreign investors can open accounts with local banks through which funds can be collected. Lesotho is part of the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The current account has been fully liberalized for all inward and outward cross-border transactions. Transactions, however, over USD 272,108 for individuals and USD 34.0 million for businesses still need approval from the Central Bank. A Central Bank Report reflected that private sector credit from the banking sector increased by 0.7 percent in November 2020 while a decline of 0.02 percent was registered in December 2020. On a year-to-year basis, credit rose by 0.01 percent. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market. Interest rates are quite high by global standards. LNDC does not provide credit to foreign investors but can acquire equity in foreign companies investing in strategic economic sectors. The private sector has access to a limited number of credit instruments, such as credit cards, loans, overdrafts, checks, and letters of credit. In January 2016, Lesotho’s first credit bureau was launched and has been functional. In July 2020, the parliament passed the Secured Interest in Movable Property Act to allow movable property to be considered as collateral in requesting for credit from commercial banks. Lesotho has a central bank and four commercial banks, including subsidiaries of South African banks (subject to measures and regulations under the Institutions Act of 2012) and the government-owned Lesotho Post Bank. Commercial banks in Lesotho are well-capitalized, liquid, and compliant with international banking standards; however, interest rates are high by global standards. Three South African banks account for almost 92.5 percent of the country’s banking assets, which totaled over M21.6 billion (USD 1.5billion) by December 2021. The share of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans was approximately 4 percent in December 2021. Foreigners are allowed to establish a bank account and may hold foreign currency accounts in local banks; however, they are required to provide a residence permit as a precondition for opening a bank account to comply with the “know your customer” requirements. The country did not lose correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Currently there are no banking relationships in jeopardy. Foreign Exchange The Lesotho loti is pegged to the South African rand. The currency fluctuates according to market forces. There are restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment into a freely usable currency and at a legal market-clearing rate. Funds can only be converted into the world’s widely recognized currencies such as the U.S. dollar, British Pound, and the Euro. Incoming funds can be converted into the local currency if the investor does not have the Customer Foreign Currency (CFC) account. If the investor has a CFC account, such funds can remain foreign in that account without any obligation to convert to Maloti. Remittance Policies According to the CBL, there are no plans to change remittance policies. The current average delay period for remitting investment returns such as dividends, return of capital, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees through normal legal channels is 30 days, provided the investor has submitted all the necessary documentation related to the remittance. There has never been a case of blockage of such transfers, and shortages of forex that could lead to blockage are unlikely given that the CBL maintains net international reserves at a target of 4.3 months of import cover. Payments of royalties should seek approval from the Central Bank. Export proceeds should be repatriated into the country within the period of six months (180 days). There is no sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Lesotho. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In Lesotho, responsible business conduct (RBC) is understood as technical business culture which adheres to environmental, social and governance principles that improve the ease of doing business, levels the playing field and manages risk to attract and keep investors. There is a general awareness of RBC and corporate social responsibility among both producers and consumers. The government maintains and enforces domestic laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protections, and environmental protections. Labor laws and regulations are rarely waived in order to attract investment, and the government does not compromise on environmental laws. The Government of Lesotho through the LNDC (which is the Government of Lesotho’s Investment Promotion Agency) subscribes and implements globally accepted due diligence standards as prescribed by the OECD as well as UNCTAD. The government through the assistance of UNCTAD reviewed Lesotho Investment Policy of 2003 and has developed the Investment Policy of 2016. Foreign and local enterprises tend to follow generally accepted corporate social responsibility principles such as those contained in OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Firms that pursue CSR are viewed favorably by society, but CSR does not necessarily provide any advantages in dealing with the government. The country has limited tools to protect human rights, labor rights, consumer rights and the environment. The Labor Court has been established to address labor issues. The Consumer Protection Unit is established under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, the offices of this unit are only available in one district. The country is yet to establish Human Rights Commission and the Tribunal on Environment matters. The Lesotho Companies Act of 2011 provides for standard and adaptable requirements for incorporation, organization, operation, and liquidation of companies to encourage efficient and responsible management of companies to protect shareholders and other key stakeholders. Furthermore, the government has assisted the Lesotho Institute of Directors (IoD) in the development of the Mohlomi Corporate Governance Code sponsored by the African Development Bank (ADB). The code was launched in September 2021. This code will provide universal best practices guidance for good corporate governance for Lesotho. The IoD promotes and monitors responsible business conduct. The local NGO, the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC), also monitors and advocates for responsible business conduct. Although Lesotho has an extractive/mining industry, it does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), since it does not extract/produce any of the minerals supported through the initiative. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues The Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (GOKL) has a climate Change Strategy. In 2018, the governemnt prepared the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) which sets a 35 % reduction target in Green House Gases (GHG) emission by 2030. The private sector is expected to reduce net GHG emissions by 10% by 2030. The GOKL developed its National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 2017-2027 to preserve biodiversity. Lesotho’s procurement policies do not include environmental or green growth considerations. 9. Corruption Lesotho’s Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) is mandated to prevent and to combat corruption. The country has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption of public officials. Parliament passed anticorruption legislation in 1999 that provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The DCEO is the primary anticorruption organ and investigates corruption complaints against public sector officials. The Amendment of Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006 enacted the first financial disclosure laws for public officials. On February 5, 2016, the government issued regulations to initiate implementation of the financial disclosure laws for public officials who must file their declarations annually by April 30. The law may also be applied to private citizens if deemed necessary by the DCEO. The law prohibits direct or indirect bribery of public officials, including payments to family members of officials and political parties. On June 25, 2020, the parliament passed the amendment on Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006, which will allow the DCEO to investigate money laundering issues beyond national boundaries. This amendment provides the DCEO with the power to work together with similar institutions from other countries in combating corruption. The Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act of 2008 (amended in 2017) and Public Financial Management and Accountability Act of 2011 serve as additional anti-corruption laws. The Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act (section 14 (1)) and Public Procurement Regulations of 2007 have provisions that address conflicts-of-interest in awarding government procurement contracts. Section 6 (g) (h) (i) of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 1999 encourages private companies to develop internal controls to prevent corruption. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, awarding licenses, and customs fraud. While the GOKL has made significant efforts to implement its laws, many officials continue to engage in corruption with impunity. The DCEO claims it cannot effectively undertake its mission because it lacks adequate resources. The country does not have instruments to protect NGOs investigating corruption. Corruption is pervasive in government procurement, provision of licenses, work permits, and residence permits. The 2020 Afrobarometer survey reflected increasing perceptions of government official corruption from 28% in 2017 to 46% in 2020. The study also showed increasing perception of members of parliament corruption increasing from 22% in 2017 to 45% in 2020. To prevent corruption and economic offences, the DCEO encourages companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Many companies have effective internal controls, ethics, and programs to detect and prevent bribery. No U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Lesotho. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act under the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006, the penalty for which is a minimum of 10,000 maloti (USD 667) or 10 years imprisonment. Local companies cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from taxes. UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Lesotho acceded to the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005, but it is not yet a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Lesotho acceded to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2003. The country is also a member of the Southern African Development Community Protocol against corruption, the Southern African Forum against corruption, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Contacts at government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Sefako Seema Prosecutor DCEO or Mamello Mafelesi Prosecutor DCEO P.O. Box 16060, Maseru 100 Lesotho +266 2231-3713 info@dceo.org.ls 10. Political and Security Environment Since 2012, Lesotho has been governed through coalition governments which did not last beyond three years resulting in snap elections. In April 2020, the National Assembly passed the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution which curtailed the Prime Minister’s power to call snap elections. (Note: The constitution states that elections should be held every five years and the next elections are scheduled for October 2022. End Note.) The impulsion of the main political party in the current coalition has left the National Assembly increasingly polarized, and the political environment is very unpredictable. On May 14, 2021, textiles factory workers country-wide engaged on a massive violent protest which claimed two lives. They blocked roads and vandalized the buildings to put pressure on the government to publish 2020 and 2021 gazettes. The workers requested wages to be increased by 20 percent while employers offered to provide an increase between 3 and 5 percent. On June 7, the workers ended their three weeks protest following Lesotho Textile Exporter’s Association (LTEA) letter of June 4 to the trade unions which warned workers would be dismissed for participating in an illegal protest. On June 16, the government published a gazette on minimum wage increase reflecting 14 percent increment for the textiles workers and 9 percent for other private sector workers for the 2021/22 financial year. The increment was implemented with effect on July 1. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Lesotho’s 2019 Labor Force Survey reflected official unemployment rate as 22.5 percent and youth unemployment at 29.1 percent. The report reflected the formal sector represented 41.1 percent of the of the total employment while the informal sector and household sector represented 40.5 percent and 18.4 percent, respectively. Males constituted 52.8 percent of those employed while females constituted 47.2 percent. About 77.3 percent of international migrant workers were females working in elementary occupations. The report reflected most international migrants were from South Africa, followed by Zimbabwe and China. Lesotho has embarked on its first Critical Skills Assessment survey to determine skills surplus and shortage. The results of the survey will be released in June. The data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment reflected engineers, doctors, and academia represented scarce skills while lawyers, teachers, nurses, and business administrators are considered to be surplus skills. The IMF estimated the informal economy comprises of 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Informal sector constitutes companies that are not registered and do not pay taxes. The informal economy is characterized by labor standards deficits. There are no employment contracts or formal relationships. The government has not enforced the formal registration of these businesses. Collective bargaining is not yet a commonly practiced phenomenon. In the private sector, there are very few trade unions and even where they exist the law does not require that collective bargaining agreements should be registered. The majority of active unions are in the textile and manufacturing sector however, they do not have the capacity to bargain with employers. To address this shortfall, the Ministry has included legal provisions relating to the establishment of bargaining councils in the Labor Code Draft Bill section 135. During the reporting period the textiles factory workers and nurses embarked on strikes. Issues of gender-based violence and harassment (GBVH) were reported in one textile factory. The Ministry of Labor together with social partners have decided to ratify the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 190 on gender-based violence and harassment as a first step towards ensuring that frameworks are reviewed to adequately address GBV in the workplace. The International Labor Organization has identified gaps in the following international labor standards: ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87: the ILO requested the Public Service Act to be amended to ensure public officers can establish and join federations and confederations and affiliate with international organizations. ILO Convention on Minimum Age No. 132 requires member states to set completion of free and compulsory primary education at 15 years in line with the minimum age into employment to close the gap between minimum age of employment and completion of primary education. In Lesotho, the completion of primary education is at 13 years of age. The Labor Code Order of 1992 and the Constitution of 1993 require hiring of citizens; however, non-citizens can be hired with a work permit. The Labor Code No. 24 of 1992 Section 79 (2) only puts a restriction on employees who have been fairly dismissed for misconduct that they are not entitled to claim for payment of severance upon termination of their contract of employment. Furthermore, the Labor Code (Code of Good Practice) Notice, 2003 provides for fair dismissals and grounds that may warrant for dismissals and layoffs. In Lesotho there are currently no economic zones; however, the law permits waivers in order to attract investment. The law provides for freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. The country has various labor dispute resolution mechanisms in place. This includes both formal and informal mechanisms. LNDC is one key institution that deals with labor disputes. For example, LNDC intervenes in strikes and tries to reconcile workers and employers. When this informal process fails, the more formal process of the Directorate of Dispute Prevention & Resolution (DDPR) can be engaged which can consist of conciliation and arbitration. The Labor Code Amendment Act of 2000 established the DDPR, which serves as a semi-autonomous labor tribunal independent of the government, political parties, trade unions, and employers and employer organizations. The Labor Court and the Labor Court of Appeal are the key judiciary entities dealing with labor disputes. The Labor Court reviews the decisions of the DDPR while the Labor Appeal Court reviews the decisions of the Labor Court. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $2,486 2020 $1,880 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $1,430 2020 $3 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2018 32.7 2020 19.9 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Lesotho Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Erika Lewis Political & Economic Affairs Chief 254 Kingsway Avenue Maseru, Lesotho Tel: +266 2231-2666 Fax: +266 22310116 MaseruCommercial@state.gov Liberia Executive Summary Liberia offers opportunities for investment, especially in natural resources such as mining, agriculture, fishing, and forestry, but also in more specialized sectors such as energy, telecommunications, tourism, and financial services. The economy, which was severely damaged by more than a decade of civil wars that ended in 2003, has been slowly recovering, but Liberia has yet to attain pre-war levels of development. Liberia’s largely commodities-based economy relies heavily on imports even for most basic needs like fuel, clothing, and rice – Liberia’s most important staple food. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted many sectors of the economy, which contracted in 2019 and 2020. However, the World Bank and IMF expect per capita GDP to return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2023. Growth will be driven mainly by the mining sector, although structural reforms are also expected to increase activity in agriculture and construction. Low human development indicators, expensive and unreliable electricity, poor roads, a lack of reliable internet access (especially outside urban areas), and pervasive government corruption constrain investment and development. Most of Liberia lacks reliable power, although efforts to expand access to the electricity grid are ongoing through an extension from the Mount Coffee Hydropower Plant, connection to the West Africa Power Pool, and other internationally supported energy projects. Public perception of corruption in the public sector is high, as indicated by Liberia’s poor showing in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, where Liberia ranked 136 out of 180 countries. Low public trust in the banking sector and seasonal currency shortages result in most cash being held outside of banks. To remedy this, the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) in 2021 initiated a plan to print and circulate additional currency. The new printing and minting will provide 48 billion Liberian dollars through 2024. The CBL and commercial banks have also successfully pushed the adoption of mobile money, which Liberians access through their mobile phones to make everyday purchases and pay bills. However, the government has yet to activate the “national switch,” meaning banking instruments like ATMs and mobile money accounts remain unintegrated and are not interoperable. The government-backed Business Climate Working Group (BCWG) works with public and private sector stakeholders to explore how to create a friendlier business environment. International donors also work with the government to improve the investment climate, which ranks toward the global bottom by most global measures. Despite these numerous challenges, Liberia is rich in natural resources. It has large expanses of potentially productive agricultural land and abundant rainfall to sustain agribusinesses. Its rich mineral resources offer significant potential to investors in extractive industries. Several large international concessionaires have invested successfully in agriculture and mining, though negotiating these agreements with the government often proves to be a lengthy and byzantine struggle. The fishing industry, long dormant compared to pre-war levels, is making improvements that should make it more attractive for investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Liberia ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -$94 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $570 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Liberia describes the country as “open for business” and supports programs and initiatives to foster commerce, including an ad hoc Business Climate Working Group (BCWG) to improve the investment climate. During Liberia’s National Judicial Conference in June 2021, President George Weah called on the Judiciary to partner with agencies on reforms to improve the investment climate. The BCWG, chaired by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, collaborates with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry , Liberia Business Registry (LBR) , National Investment Commission (NIC) , and Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) . The National Investment Commission (NIC) is Liberia’s investment promotion agency. It develops investment strategies, policies, and programs to attract foreign investment and negotiates investment contracts and concessions. The NIC oversees the implementation of Liberia’s 2010 Investment Act and chairs an ad hoc Inter-Ministerial Concession Committee (IMCC). In 2021, the NIC became a member of the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) See link ( https://waipa.org/members/ ). It also participates in the African Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) Forum. In practice, however, the government does much to discourage investors and investment. Some business leaders report it is difficult even to meet with government representatives to discuss new investment or policies damaging to the business climate. A weak legal and regulatory framework, lack of transparency in contract awards, and widespread corruption inhibit foreign direct investment. Investors are often treated as opportunities for graft, and government decisions affecting the business sector are driven more by political cronyism than investment climate considerations. Many businesses find it easy to operate illegally if the right political interests are being paid, whereas those that try to follow the rules receive little if any assistance from government agencies. The Investment Act restricts market access for foreign investors, including U.S. investors, in certain economic sectors or industries. See “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Foreign Ownership and Establishment” below for more detail. Foreign and domestic private entities may own and establish business enterprises in many sectors. The Liberian constitution restricts land ownership to citizens, but non-Liberians may hold long-term leases to land. Examples are rubber, oil palm, and logging concessions that cover a quarter of Liberia’s total land mass. See Real Property, below, for further details. The National Investment Commission is the oversight agency to screen and monitor investments. The Investment Act and Revenue Code mandate that only Liberian citizens may operate businesses in the following sectors and industries, but it is not clear to what degree this mandate is enforced: Supply of sand Block making Peddling Travel agencies Retail sale of rice and cement Ice making and sale of ice Tire repair shops Auto repair shops with an investment of less than USD 550,000 Shoe repair shops Retail sale of timber and planks Operation of gas stations Video clubs Operation of taxis Importation or sale of second-hand or used clothing Distribution in Liberia of locally manufactured products Importation and sale of used cars (except authorized dealerships, which may deal in certified used vehicles of their make) The Investment Act also sets minimum capital investment thresholds for foreign investors in other business activities, industries, and enterprises. (See Section 16 of the Act: http://www.moci.gov.lr/doc/TheInvestmentActof2010(1).pdf .) For enterprises owned exclusively by non-Liberians, the Act requires at least USD 500,000 in investment capital. For foreign investors partnering with Liberians, the Act requires at least USD 300,000 in total capital investment and at least 25 percent aggregate Liberian ownership. All businesses must register with the Liberia Business Registry (LBR) to conduct business or provide services in Liberia. Investment contracts, such as concessions, are reviewed by the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee (IMCC). Concessions are ratified by the national legislature and approved by the president. Businesses register with the Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) for taxes and the National Social Security and Welfare Corporation (NASSCORP) for social security. It is possible for foreign companies to obtain investment incentives through the National Investment Commission. In 2021, two companies, Mano Manufacturing Company and Jetty Rubber LLC, received long-term investment incentives, according to NIC’s 2021 Annual Report. Foreign companies must use local counsel when establishing a subsidiary. If the subsidiary will engage in manufacturing and international trade, it must obtain a trade license from the LBR. For more information about investment laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other treaties with investment provisions, see: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/121/liberia . Liberia is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and a party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. The government neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment but it does not restrict Liberian citizens from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Companies are required to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) consistent with international norms. In many instances, however, authorities do not consistently enforce or apply national laws and international standards. Furthermore, no systematic oversight or enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure government authorities correctly follow administrative rules. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are often not transparent. The government does not require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high-and low-quality investments. Liberia passed a Freedom of Information Law in 2010 requiring government agencies to appoint a public information officer and make records available to the public, but access to government records is often difficult or impossible. Some government ministries and agencies have overlapping responsibilities, resulting in inconsistent application of laws. Government agencies are not legally required to disclose regulations before or after enactment and there is no requirement for public comment, although finalized regulations are often published. No central clearinghouse exists to access proposed regulations. Government finances, including revenues and debt obligations, are partially captured in national budgets, but are not fully transparent. Some budget documents are accessible online. For more information on regulatory transparency, see: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/liberia . Liberia is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mano River Union (MRU) . The Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) is standardizing the country’s customs and tariff systems and harmonizing its tax regime with the ECOWAS Common External Tariff . Liberia is a member of the World Trade Organization. Liberia’s legal system uses common law alongside local customary law. The common law-based court system operates in parallel with local customary law, which incorporates unwritten, indigenous practices, culture, and traditions. Adjudication under these dual systems often results in conflicting decisions between entities based in Monrovia and communities outside of Monrovia, as well as within communities. The Commercial Court hears commercial and contractual issues, including debt disputes of USD 15,000 and above. In theory, the Commercial Court presides over all financial, contractual, and commercial disputes, serving as an additional avenue to expedite commercial and contractual cases. Under the Liberian constitution, the judicial branch is independent from the executive, but reports regularly indicate that the executive branch frequently interferes in both judicial and legislative matters. Cases can be subject to extensive delays and procedural and other errors, and investors have questioned the fairness and reliability of judicial decisions. There are widespread reports that court officials solicit bribes to act on cases. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and appeals are adjudicated in the Supreme Court . The high volume of appeals is a significant burden on the court’s five judges and often results in long delays. Laws guiding foreign investment include the Investment Act of 2010 , the Revenue Code , the Public Procurement and Concessions Act , and the National Competitive Bidding Regulation . No major laws or judicial decisions pertaining to foreign direct investment have come out in the past year. The government does not maintain a “one-stop-shop” website for investment laws, rules, procedures, or reporting requirements. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) reviews domestic and international trade transactions for competition-related concerns. If the MOCI cannot resolve the issue or it requires investigation, it may be referred to the Department of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The MOJ refers potential violations of civil or criminal law to the court system, including the Commercial Court. There were no significant competition cases during the review period. Liberia does not have anti-trust laws. The Liberian Constitution permits the government to expropriate property for “national security issues or where the public health and safety are endangered, or for any other public purposes.” The government must pay just compensation and landowners may challenge the expropriation in court. When property taken for a purpose is no longer used for that purpose, the former owner has the right of first refusal to reacquire the property. The 2010 Investment Act further defines the circumstances under which the government can legally expropriate property and includes protections for foreign enterprises against expropriation or nationalization. Liberia is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Convention. 4. Industrial Policies The government provides tax deductions for equipment, machinery, cost of buildings and fixtures used in manufacturing. It also provides exemptions on import duties and goods and services taxes as investment incentives for the following sectors: Tourism Manufacturing Energy Hospitals and Medical Housing Transportation Information Technology Banking Agriculture and Agro-processing (fisheries, poultry, aquaculture, food processing) Investments in economically deprived regions qualify for additional incentives of up to 12.5 percent. Additional investment incentives are available if an investment creates more than 100 direct jobs, or if an investment uses at least 60 percent local materials to manufacture finished products. The government does not issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. In 2019, the government established a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Steering Committee, “to create, drive, guide, enhance, coordinate, and manage single, multiple and mixed-use (SEZs) in Liberia.” The government identified the port city of Buchanan in Grand Bassa County for the first special economic zone, now known as the Buchanan Special Economic Zone. In 2021, the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced it would fund a Special Agro-Industrial Processing Zone (SAPZ) Project in the Buchanan Special Economic Zone. Liberia has no performance or data localization requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Liberian law protects property rights and interests, but with weak enforcement mechanisms. “Long term” mortgages or construction loans of up to 10 years are only available through the Liberia Bank for Development and Investment. Only Liberians may own land, with the limited exception provided in Article 22(c) of the Constitution that non-citizen missionary, educational, and other benevolent institutions shall have the right to own property, if that property is used for the purposes for which acquired. Property no longer so used reverts to the Government of Liberia. Other foreigners and non-resident investors may acquire land on leases, which ordinarily run for 25 to 50 years. Liberian law provides for no official waiver mechanisms for limitations on foreign land ownership. The Liberia Land Authority (LLA) , a one-stop-shop for all land-related matters, is working with international partners, including USAID, to implement strategic and targeted programs aimed at resolving critical land issues. Although the LLA encourages property owners to identify and register land titles, it does not have systemic enforcement programs. The LLA estimates that less than 25 percent of the country’s total land is formally registered. Conflicting land ownership records are common. Investors sometimes experience costly and complex land dispute issues, even after concluding agreements with the government. The Land Rights Act, enacted in 2018, was designed to resolve historical land disputes that have caused conflict and communal strife in the past. The Act defines four categories of land ownership as follows: Public land, which is owned, but currently not used by the government Government land, which is used by government agencies (for office buildings or other purposes) Customary land, on which the livelihoods of most rural communities depend Private land owned by private citizens. Public awareness of the Land Rights Act is growing, but still limited. See Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment, above, for further information, including implementation of the Land Rights Act. See, also: https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/liberia#DB_rp . Foreign companies seeking to lease land may lease privately or publicly held land. Frequently, foreign companies seeking to acquire land leases do so through direct negotiations with landlords or owners. Liberia has a weak legal structure and regulatory environment for enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The Liberia Intellectual Property Act covers domain names, traditional knowledge, transfer of technology, patents, and copyrights. The Liberia Intellectual Property Office (LIPO) operates as a semi-autonomous agency under the oversight of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. LIPO, however, lacks the technical and financial capacity to address infringements of intellectual property rights. The Copyright Society of Liberia (COSOL) collaborates with the MOCI and LIPO to develop legal and international frameworks to guide the collection and distribution of royalties. In February 2021, LIPO and COSOL rolled out nationwide public awareness and inspection campaigns to remove pirated copyright materials from the Liberian market. In October 2021, during a meeting of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the government recommitted to global efforts to protect and promote intellectual property rights. There is no system to track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods. The government rarely prosecutes intellectual property violations. Many Liberians are unfamiliar with intellectual property rights, and intellectual property infringement is common, including unauthorized duplication of movies, music, and books. Counterfeit drugs, apparel, cosmetics, mobile phones, computer software, and hardware are sold openly. Liberia is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and local IPR points of contact, see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The government welcomes foreign investment, but Liberia’s capital market is highly underdeveloped. Private investors have limited credit and investment options. The country does not have a domestic stock market and does not have an effective system to encourage portfolio investments. In 2019, Liberia committed to non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions consistent with its obligations under IMF Article VIII , and the country does not restrict international payments and transfers. Commercial credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Many foreign investors prefer to obtain credit from foreign banks. The country’s financial sector regulatory authority is the Central Bank of Liberia . Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Liberia subject to the CBL’s regulations. There are 10 commercial banks. Most are foreign-owned with branch outlets in the country. Non-bank financial institutions also provide diverse financial services. These include a development finance company, a deposit-taking microfinance institution, numerous non-deposit-taking microfinance institutions, rural community finance institutions, money remittance entities, foreign exchange bureaus, credit unions, and village savings and loans associations. However, chronic liquidity shortages, especially of Liberian dollars in recent years, have undermined confidence in banks. The CBL’s 2021 third-quarter report described the banking industry as “relatively stable” based on indicators such as total assets, deposits, loans, and total capital. As of November 2021, the capital adequacy ratio of 27.47 was well above the 10% regulatory minimum, and the liquidity ratio was 44.17, above the 15% regulatory minimum. Although the banking sector is sufficiently capitalized, it is not well positioned to withstand shocks. The sector’s primary weaknesses include a high number of non-performing loans (21% in November 2021), low profitability due to high operating expenses, periodic cash shortages for depositors, low public confidence, and inadequate policing and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The Government of Liberia does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or similar entity. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Liberia has approximately 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are governed by boards of directors and management teams overseen by government ministries. All are wholly government-owned and semi-autonomous. The president of Liberia appoints board members and directors or managers to govern and run SOEs. The Public Financial Management (PFM) Act defines the requirements for SOEs. SOEs employ more than 10,000 people in sea and airport services, electricity supply, oil and gas, water and sewage, agriculture, forestry, maritime, petroleum importation and storage, and information and communication technology services. Not all SOEs are profitable, and some citizens and advocacy groups have called for SOEs to be dissolved or privatized. Liberia does not have a clearly defined corporate code for SOEs. Reportedly, high-level officials, including some who sit on SOE boards, influence government-owned enterprises to conduct business in ways not consistent with standard corporate governance. Not all SOEs pay taxes, or do so transparently, and SOE revenue is not always transparently reported or adequately reflected in national budgets. In 2016 Liberia’s Ministry of Education initiated a school privatization program that, as of the 2021-22 school year, had privatized 525 schools. Operation of the schools was outsourced to domestic and foreign for-profit and nonprofit education providers and NGOs. There have been numerous calls from political leaders and government officials to privatize government-owned enterprises, including the Liberia Electricity Corporation, the Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, and Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, but the government does not have an official privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Liberian authorities have not clearly defined responsible business conduct (RBC). The Liberian Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, includes RBC requirements in policies such as the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Strategy (2020-2030), the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2018), and the National Adaptation Plan (2020-2030). Foreign companies are encouraged, but not required, to publicly disclose their policies, procedures, and practices to highlight their RBC practices. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and workers organizations/unions promote or monitor foreign company RBC policies and practices. However, NGOs and CSOs monitoring or advocating for RBC do not conduct their activities in a structured and coordinated manner, nor do they tend to monitor locally owned companies. Most Liberians are generally unaware of RBC standards. Generally, the government expects foreign investors to offer social services to local communities and contribute to a government-controlled social development fund for the area in which the enterprise conducts its business. Some communities complain that these contributions to social development funds do not reach them. The government frequently includes clauses in concession agreements that oblige investors to provide social services such as educational facilities, health care, and other services which other governments typically provide. Foreign investors have reported that some local communities expect benefits in addition to those outlined in formal concession agreements. Liberia is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The National Bureau of Concessions monitors and evaluates concession company compliance with concession agreements, but it does not design policies to promote and encourage RBC. Some NGOs report that several concessions have violated human or labor rights, including child labor and environmental pollution. Liberia has several private security companies, but the country is not a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private and Security Companies. Private security companies are regulated by the Ministry of Justice, and they perform a range of tasks such as providing security or surveillance to large businesses, international organizations, diplomatic missions, and some private homes. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Liberia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In 2018, Liberia ratified the Paris Agreement and adopted the Liberia National Policy and Response Strategy on Climate Change. Liberia released its revised Nationally Determined Contribution in 2021, when it committed to reducing economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 64 percent below business-as-usual levels by 2030. The revised NDC targets nine sectors: Agriculture, Forests, Coastal zones, Fisheries, Health, Transport, Industry, Energy, and Waste. Liberia’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains a director of climate finance instruments eligible for Liberia that can be used for public or private sector projects. Liberia has been working with national and international development partners since 2008 to reform its forestry sector and is currently implementing Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) readiness activities, which include a National Forest Inventory, and institutionalizing its National Forest Monitoring System. In 2019, Liberia set up its Safeguard Information System , a free public web-based platform hosted by the EPA to provide information on how social and environmental safeguards are being addressed. However, the site does not appear to be updated regularly. 9. Corruption Liberia has laws against economic sabotage, mismanagement of funds, bribery, and other corruption-related acts, including conflicts of interest. However, Liberia suffers from corruption in both the public and private sectors. The government does not implement its laws effectively and consistently, and there have been numerous reports of corruption by public officials, including some in positions of responsibility for fighting corrupt practices. On December 9, 2021, the United States Treasury Department sanctioned Nimba County Senator Prince Yormie Johnson under the Global Magnitsky Act for personally enriching himself through pay-for-play funding schemes with government ministries and organizations. In 2021, Liberia ranked 136 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index . See http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview . The Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) currently cannot directly prosecute corruption cases without first referring cases to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) for prosecution. If the MOJ does not prosecute within 90 days, the LACC may then take those cases to court, although it has not exercised this right to date. The LACC continues to seek public support for the establishment of a specialized court to exclusively try corruption cases. In October 2021 the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), launched “The Anti-Corruption Innovation Initiative Project.” LACC will hire at least 15 officers around the country who will report on corruption to the LACC. LACC is also developing a national digital platform for the public to report corruption. Foreign investors generally report that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, contract and concession awards, customs and taxation systems, regulatory systems, performance requirements, and government payments systems. Multinational firms often report paying fees not stipulated in investment agreements. Private companies do not have generally agreed and structured internal controls, ethics, or compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of public officials. No laws explicitly protect NGOs that investigate corruption. Liberia is signatory to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), but Liberia’s association with these conventions has done little to reduce rampant government corruption. Contact at government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Baba Borkai, Chief Investigator Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), Monrovia, http://lacc.gov.lr/ bborkai@lacc.gov.lr Tel: (+231) 777-313131 Email: bborkai@lacc.gov.lr Contact at a “watchdog” organization (local or nongovernmental organization operating in Liberia that monitors corruption): Anderson Miamen, Executive Director Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL) Tel: (+231) 886-818855 Email: admiamen@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment President Weah’s inauguration in January 2018 marked the first peaceful transfer of power in Liberia from one democratically elected president to another since 1944. International and domestic observers have said midterm senatorial and special elections since then have been largely peaceful, although there were reported instances of vote tempering, election violence, intimidation, and harassment of female candidates. Liberia’s relatively free media landscape has led to vigorous pursuit of civil liberties, resulting in active, often acrimonious political debates, and organized, non-violent demonstrations. Liberia adopted a press freedom law in 2019, but there have been reports and instances of violence and harassment against the media and journalists. Numerous radio stations and newspapers distribute news throughout the country. The government has identified land disputes and high rates of youth and urban unemployment as potential threats to security, peace, and political stability. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a peacekeeping force, withdrew from Liberia in March 2018 and turned over responsibility for security to the government. Protests and demonstrations may occur with little warning. The Armed Forces of Liberia and law enforcement agencies, including the Liberia National Police (LNP) , Liberia Immigration Service (LIS) , and Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA) , maintain security in the country. There are also many private security firms. Most security personnel are in the capital city Monrovia and other urban areas. The effectiveness of soldiers and police is limited by lack of money and poor infrastructure. 11. Labor Policies and Practices With a literacy rate of just under 50 percent, much of the Liberian labor force is unskilled. Most Liberians, particularly those in rural areas, lack basic vocational or computer skills. Liberia has no reliable data on labor force statistics, such as unemployment rates. Government workers comprise the majority of formally employed Liberians. An estimated four out of five Liberian workers engage in “vulnerable” or “informal” employment. Many work in difficult and dangerous conditions that undermine their basic rights. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) largely attributes high levels of vulnerable and informal employment to the private sector’s inability to create employment. There is an acute shortage of specialized labor skills, particularly in medicine, information and communication technology, and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Migrant workers are employed throughout the country, particularly in service industries, artisanal diamond and gold mining, timber, and fisheries. The predominantly female workers who sell in markets and on the streets face significant challenges, including a lack of access to credit and banking services, limited financial literacy and business training, few social protections or childcare options, harassment from citizens and local authorities, and poor sanitation within marketplaces. Through the Bureau of Small Business Administration (SBA) at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, businesses owned by female informal workers are being formalized using a “one-stop shop” registration mechanism. Development partners are also designing programs aimed at empowering women businesses and entrepreneurs. Liberia’s labor law, the 2015 Decent Work Act, gives preference to employing Liberian citizens, and most investment contracts require companies to employ a defined percentage of Liberians, including in top management positions. In 2021, the Ministry of Labor issued an order that restricts certain employment opportunities in commercial business establishments with branches in Monrovia and other parts of the country to Liberians. The order was the result of a memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Labor and the Liberia Chamber of Commerce calling for the creation of five hundred jobs for new college and university graduates. Foreign companies often report difficulty finding local skilled labor. Child labor is a problem, particularly in extractive industries. The Decent Work Act guarantees freedom of association and gives employees the right to establish labor unions. Employees can become members of organizations of their own choosing without prior authorization. Workers, except for civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises, are covered by the Act. The Act allows workers’ unions to conduct activities without interference by employers. It also prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of membership in or affiliation with a labor organization. Unions are independent from the government and political parties. Employees, through their associations or unions, often demand and sometimes strike for better compensation. When company ownership changes, workers sometimes seek payment of obligations owed by previous owners or employers. The Decent Work Act provides that labor organizations, including trade or employees’ associations, have the right to draw up constitutions and rules regarding electing representatives, organizing activities, and formulating programs. There were no major labor union-related negotiations affecting workers or the labor market during 2021. While the law prohibits anti-union discrimination and provides for the reinstatement of workers dismissed because of union activities, it allows for dismissal without cause provided the company pays statutory severance packages. The Decent Work Act sets out fundamental rights of workers and contains provisions on employment and termination of employment, minimum conditions of work, occupational safety and health, workers’ compensation, industrial relations, and employment agencies. It also provides for periodic reviews of the labor market as well as adjustments in wages as the labor conditions dictate. The government does not waive labor laws to attract or retain investment, but the National Investment Commissions (NIC) provides investment incentives based on economic sectors and geographic areas (see Investment Incentives in section 4 above). The MOL does not have an adequate or effective inspection system to identify and remedy labor violations and hold violators accountable. It lacks the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute unfair labor practices, such as harassment or dismissal of union members or instances of forced labor, child labor, and human trafficking. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Commercial Service Contact Information Email: Monrovia-Commerce@state.gov Phone: (+231) 77-677-7000 Libya Executive Summary Libya presents a challenging investment climate. Reconstruction needs, severely underserved consumer demand, and abundant natural resources provide many opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, and the Government of National Unity (GNU), which took office in March 2021, has expressed a strong desire to receive greater foreign investment and partner with foreign companies. Nonetheless, the country’s prospects for foreign investment continue to be hampered by security risks posed by the presence of non-state militias, foreign mercenaries, and extremist and terrorist groups, and opaque bureaucracy, onerous regulations, and widespread rent-seeking activity in public administration. The Libyan government has a long history of not honoring contracts and payments, and several U.S. firms continue to be owed back payments for work done before and after the 2011 revolution. The sectors that have historically attracted the most significant investment into Libya are oil and gas, electricity, and infrastructure. Following years of civil conflict, Libya’s warring parties signed a ceasefire in October 2020 that paved the way for a United Nations-facilitated political process that resulted in the country’s first unified national government since 2014. The GNU is an interim government charged with leading the country toward national elections that were scheduled for December 2021, but ultimately postponed. Since the postponement of elections Libya has entered a new period of political uncertainty that has slowed down any attempts to improve the business climate. Libya holds Africa’s largest (and the world’s ninth largest) proven oil reserves and Africa’s fifth largest gas reserves. Most government revenues derive from the sale of crude oil. Libya’s oil production has been making a gradual recovery from repeated attacks on oil infrastructure by ISIS-Libya and other armed groups in 2016 and a nine-month forced shutdown in 2020 due to the civil conflict. Production has reached 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) as of March 2022. Technocrats heading the NOC, an independent, apolitical institution, continue to lay the groundwork for the long-term development and stabilization of the energy sector. The Ministry of Oil and Gas has attempted to exert political control over the NOC, at times complicating matters for companies working in the sector. The Privatization and Investment Board (PIB), supervised by the Ministry of Economy, is the primary governmental body for encouraging private foreign investment in Libya.The Investment Law of 2010 provides the primary legal framework for foreign investment promotion. Passed prior to the 2011 revolution that toppled the Qadhafi regime, the law lifted many FDI restrictions and provided a series of incentives to encourage private investment. No significant laws related to investment have been passed since the revolution. No pandemic- or green-related measures have been instituted that can affect the investment climate. Perceived corruption is deeply embedded in Libya and is widespread at all levels of public administration. The lack of transparency or accountability mechanisms in the management of oil reserves and revenues, the issuance of government contracts, and the enforcement of often ambiguous regulations continue to provide government officials with substantial opportunities for rent-seeking activities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 172 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (USD Millions, historical stock positions) 2020 341 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (in USD PPP) 2020 11,250 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Libyan government’s efforts to attract FDI, primarily through the PIB and NOC, are relatively recent. Until the 1990s, FDI was only permitted in the oil sector through sovereign contracts to which the state was a party. A number of foreign investment laws were passed in subsequent years to encourage and regulate FDI, culminating in “Law No. 9 of the year 1378 PD (2010) Regarding Investment Promotion” (known as the 2010 Investment Law). Though promulgated prior to Libya’s 2011 revolution, the law remains in effect. This new law lifted many FDI restrictions and provided a series of incentives to qualifying investments, such as tax and customs exemptions on equipment, a five-year income tax exemption, a tax exemption on reinvested profits and exemptions on production tax expert fees for goods produced for export markets. It also allowed for investors to transfer net profits overseas, defer losses to future years, import necessary goods, and hire foreign labor if local labor was unavailable. Foreign workers may acquire residency permits and entry reentry visas for five years and transfer earnings overseas. The law regulates the establishment of foreign-owned companies and the setting up of branches in representative offices. Branches are allowed to be opened in a large number of sectors, including: construction for contracts over LYD 50 million; electricity works; oil exploration; drilling and installation projects; telecommunications construction and installation; industry; surveying and planning; installation and maintenance of medical machines and equipment; and hospital management. However, the investment law restricts full foreign ownership of investment projects to projects worth over LYD 5 million, except in the case of limited liability companies, and requires 30 percent of workers to be Libyan nationals and to receive training. Foreign investors are prevented from owning land or property in Libya and are allowed only the temporary leasing of real estate. Investment in “strategic industries” – in particular, Libya’s upstream oil and gas sector, which is controlled by the NOC – requires a foreign entity to enter into a joint venture with a Libyan firm that will retain a majority stake in the enterprise. It is not clearly defined which industries other than upstream oil and gas may be considered strategic. The most important investment promotion institution Libya is the PIB, established in 2009 to assume responsibility for the Libyan privatization program and oversee and regulate FDI activities. The PIB’s screening process for incoming FDI to Libya is not clearly defined; the bidding criteria and process for investment are not published or transparent, and it is therefore not clear whether foreign investors have faced discrimination. The PIB states that it reviews bids or proposals for general consistency with Libya’s national security, sovereignty, and economic interest. The Minister of Economy must give final approval to all FDI projects, at the recommendation of the PIB. There is no information available on the timeline of the approval process or any potential outcomes of the process other than an affirmative or negative decision by the PIB or Minister of Economy. The PIB maintains that it keeps all company information confidential. U.S. firms have repeatedly expressed frustration about the slow pace by which the Libyan government makes business-related decisions. Despite these complaints, some U.S. firms have successfully invested in Libya, particularly in the country’s oil and gas sector. The ownership of real estate in Libya is restricted to Libyan nationals and wholly-owned Libyan companies. The 2010 Investment Law permits the ownership of real estate in Libya by locally established project vehicles of foreign investors. However, such ownership is limited to leasehold ownership only. Foreign investors are allowed lease property from public holdings and private Libyan citizens, according to Article 17 of the 2010 Investment Law. There is considerable ambiguity in both the public and private rental markets; many aspects of these arrangements are left to local officials. Libya has not undergone any recent investment policy reviews by the OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, or any other international body. Civil society groups have not expressed nor provided any useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. However, in July 2021, the UN-sponsored audit of the CBL was released to the stakeholders; the audit did include a number of top-level recommendations such as. Please refer to Section 6: Financial Sector – Money and Banking System for more details. Moreover, the Libya Investment Authority is currently being audited by an international accounting firm. Business registration procedures in Libya are lengthy and complex. The Ministry of Economy is the main institution for processing business registration requirements. The Libyan government does not maintain an online information portal on regulations for new business registration or online registration functionality for registering a new business. There are multiple corporate structures based on the type of business undertaken (e.g. limited liability, joint venture, branch office) and each has specific registration requirements. Some requirements apply to all businesses, including: obtaining a Commercial Register certificate, registering with the Chamber of Commerce and the tax and labor departments, and obtaining a working license. If a company will be importing items, a statistical code will be required. If the company will be obtaining letters of credit in Libya, a Central Bank code will be required. A specialized agent must complete these tasks on behalf of the registering company. For the simplest corporate structure (limited liability with no Central Bank code) the process can take two to three months if the registration agent is familiar with the procedures. Libya is a member of the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit, which provides investment and export credit insurance for entities in member states. FDI outflows in 2020 were USD 205 million, compared to USD 2.7 billion in 2010. The Libyan government does not formally promote or incentivize outward investment. Stress in the banking sector has reduced liquidity, and this has negatively affected the ability of Libyan citizens to acquire the hard currency to invest abroad. The advent of a unified exchange rate in January 2021 has, however, facilitated international flow to a certain degree. 3. Legal Regime The Libyan regulatory system lacks transparency, and there is a general lack of clarity regarding the function and responsibilities of Libyan government institutions. Transparency International placed Libya 172 out of 180 countries (“1” indicates least corrupt) in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, and Libya ranked 186 out of 190 on the most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Index. Libya’s bureaucracy is one of the most opaque and amorphous in the Middle East region; its legal and policy frameworks are similarly difficult to navigate. The issuance of licenses and permits is often delayed for significant periods for unspecified reasons, and the adjudication of these applications is most often done in a subjective and non-transparent fashion. This has created an environment ripe for graft and rent-seeking behavior. Neither ministries nor regulatory agencies publish the text or summary of proposed regulations before their enactment. Accurate, current information about key commercial regulations is difficult to obtain. These factors serve as a deterrent to foreign investment. Libya does not promote or require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance information in order to promote transparency. Libya scores zero out of five (with five being the best) in the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance. Libya is not a member of the WTO. The WTO received Libya’s application on June 10, 2004. The General Council established a Working Party on July 27, 2004, but no formal progress on Libya’s application has been made. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration currently functions as the interim constitution. It states Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source of legislation. The Libyan civil code begins with a preliminary title containing general dispositions regarding law, sources of law, application of the law, and general dispositions regarding the legal definition of persons as well as the classification of things and property. Thereafter, the code is divided into two parts and four books. The first part addresses obligations or personal rights and contains similarly named subdivisions: Book I (Obligations in General) and Book II (Specific Contracts). The second part of both codes is entitled “Real Rights” and contains Books III (Principal Real Rights) and Book IV (Accessory Real Rights). In the absence of a legal provision, the Libyan civil code requires courts to adjudicate matters “in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.” In the absence of an Islamic rule on a particular matter, the Libyan civil code requires courts to look to “prevailing custom,” and in the absence of any custom, “to the principles of natural law and the rules of equity.” Article 89 of the Libyan Civil Code states that “a contract is created, subject to any special formalities that may be required by law for its conclusion, from the moment that two persons have exchanged concordant intentions.” The Libyan court system consists of three levels: the courts of first instance; the courts of appeals; and the Supreme Court, which is the final appellate level. Libya’s justice system has remained weak throughout the post-revolutionary period, and enforcement of laws remains a challenge for the government. Laws and regulations on investment and property ownership allow domestic and foreign entities to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. Investment law and commercial law differ in their foreign ownership restrictions for business enterprises. Article 7 of the 2010 Investment Law specifies, in general accordance with standard international practice, conditions a project must fulfill in part or in full in order to qualify as an investment rather than a commercial vehicle. Investment projects that meet the conditions set out in the 2010 Investment Law enjoy a number of benefits, such as relief from income taxes for a set number of years. Further, a foreign investor may wholly own the enterprise if the foreign investment exceeds LYD 5 million. This is reduced to LYD 2 million if a Libyan partner holds at least half of the investment. For investment projects that do not meet the conditions set out in the 2010 Investment Law, these benefits do not apply and Libya’s Commercial Code stipulates no more than 49 percent foreign ownership unless the enterprise is a branch of a foreign company, which the foreign company can then fully own. Chapter 11 of the Libyan Commercial Code deals with the issue of competition and prohibits market abuse. The Commercial Code provides for the establishment of a Competition Committee to be responsible for reviewing complaints and investigating them and, in cases where the law has been violated, referring the cases to public prosecution. There is not an active Competition Committee at the moment, and since these issues are regulated by law and considered violations, interested/damaged parties can pursue legal action directly. Article 23 of the 2010 Investment Law provides an express guarantee against the nationalization, expropriation, forcible seizure, confiscation, imposition of receivership, freeze or subjection of procedures of similar effect, except by virtue of a law or court ruling and fair and equitable indemnity, and provides such procedures be applied indiscriminately. Article 43 of executive regulation No. 449 of 2010 implementing the law reinforces those provisions. The Libyan government’s history of state expropriation of private property, including the assets of foreign companies, most prevalent during the 1980s, had already been in decline before the law’s passage. There have been no reports of nationalizations or expropriations under the current investment law. Libya does not have a separate bankruptcy law, but bankruptcy issues are covered under articles 1012 and 1013 of the 2010 Commercial Code. According to this legislation, bankruptcy proceeds in two phases. The first is preventative reconciliation, during which the debtor attempts to rectify the financial situation of the business through an agreement with creditors under court supervision. The second phase commences in the event of the agreement’s failure, whereby the court intercedes to protect the rights of the creditors through liquidation. Libya is tied for last for ease of resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s most recent ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. 4. Industrial Policies Investments set up according to the 2010 Investment Law benefit from the following incentives: tax and customs exemptions on equipment, a five-year income tax exemption, a tax exemption on reinvested profits and exemptions on production tax expert fees for goods produced for export markets. It also allowed for investors to transfer net profits overseas, defer losses to future years, import necessary goods, and hire foreign labor if local labor is unavailable. The government does not offer any additional investment incentives. Libyan Law Number 215 of 2006 established the Zuwara Free Trade Zone (ZFTZ), and Law Number 495 of 2000 (amended by Law Number 32 of 2006) created the Misrata Free Trade Zone (MFTZ). Both the ZFTZ and the MFTZ are overseen by the Libya Free Trade Zone Board, created by Law Number 168 of 2006. By law, the ZFTZ and MFTZ are financially and administratively independent, and are free to legislate “within the boundaries of Libyan law.” Foreign companies can apply for a license to operate in the free FTZs and enjoy the same benefits as Libyan companies. The host government does not follow forced localization. The 2010 Investment Law mandates that 30 percent of a foreign-owned company’s workforce consist of Libyans. Exemptions are available if the required skills for a position are not available on the local labor market. U.S. citizens traveling to Libya on business visas require an invitation from/sponsorship by a company operating in Libya. Obtaining a Libyan business visa regularly requires several weeks or months. There is anecdotal evidence of enhanced vetting of U.S. citizen visa requests by Libyan authorities. Libyan Embassies in third countries have followed varying rules and procedures regarding the issuance of visas, but all visa applications require approval by the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Libyan law prohibits using a tourist visa to travel to Libya for business purposes. The Government of Libya does not allow persons with passports bearing an Israeli visa or entry/exit stamps from Israel to enter Libya. Further information can be found in the Consular Information Sheet for Libya at the State Department website travel.state.gov. The 2010 Investment Law grants investors the right to a residence permit for a period of five years, subject to renewal if the project continues. 5. Protection of Property Rights Libyan property rights are complicated by past government policy actions and a weak regulatory environment. The Libyan government eliminated all private property rights in March 1978 and eliminated most private businesses later in the same year. The renting of property was illegal, and ownership of property was limited to a single dwelling per family, with all other properties being redistributed. Reduced rate “mortgages” were paid directly to the Libyan government, but many Libyans were exempted from these payments based on family income. This process, and destruction of official documents that followed several years later, has served to greatly complicate any subsequent effort to prove clear title to property throughout Libya. Post-revolutionary governments have made little progress on improving the situation. As a consequence of the ambiguity of property ownership, banks are reluctant to take property as collateral for loans until property disputes are resolved. Libya is tied for last place for ease of registering property in most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. Article 1286 of the 2010 Commercial Code covers a set of rules which seek to protect intellectual innovations and the non-material aspects of industrial and commercial projects. It prohibits infringement of trademarks and transgression on registered trade names and logos; bans all acts of forgery, trademark or local counterfeiting, and all forms of intellectual property violations; and outlines the nature of financial and criminal procedures against those violations. The law provides for enforcement of the rules regulating registered industrial designs and models as well as information systems. Some additional laws providing protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) have been passed, such as Law No. 7 of 1984 and Law No. 8 of 1959 on patents, commercial designs, and models. The trademark office in the Ministry of Economy is responsible for enforcing the law of consumer and intellectual property protection, but trademark violations are widespread, especially in the retail sector, and enforcement generally requires a specific legal claim. U.S. brands remain vulnerable to such activity. While Libya is in the process of applying for entry to the WTO, it is not currently a member, and thus is not a party to TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). The IMF has asked Libya to bring its IPR regime in line with international best practice. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The Libyan government passed a law in 2007 to establish a stock market, primarily to support privatization of SMEs, but it is not well-capitalized, has few listings, and does not have a high volume of trading. Capital markets in Libya are underdeveloped, and the absence of a venture capital industry limits opportunities for SMEs with growth potential and innovative start-ups to access risk financing for their ventures. Libya has been attempting to modernize its banking sector since before the revolution, including through a privatization program that has opened state-owned banks to private shareholders. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) owns the Libyan Foreign Bank, which operates as an offshore bank, with responsibility for satisfying Libya’s international banking needs (apart from foreign investment). The banking system is governed by Law No. 1 of 2005, as amended by Law No. 46 of 2012 on Islamic banking. In accordance with that amendment, Law No. 1 of 2013 prohibits interest in all civil and commercial transactions. The banking modernization program has also been seeking, among other components, to establish electronic payment systems and expand private foreign exchange facilities. The CBL is responsible for the receipt of all of Libya’s oil revenues, prints Libyan dinars, and controls the country’s foreign exchange reserves. After being effectively divided since 2014 between its eastern and western branches as a result of the civil conflict, the CBL officially began the process of reunification in January 2022. Based on UN-sponsored audit report conducted by an international accounting firm and completed in July 2021, the CBL is seven work streams to incorporate top-level recommendations such as: strengthen financial accountability and transparency, assess process for letters of credit, adopt widely accepted accounting standards for financial reporting, establish effective governance and internal controls, reconcile the two branches’ balance sheets, unify the ledger system of the two branches, and unify organizational structure, operations, resource needs, and plans. The CBL has put in place seven work streams aimed at incorporating these recommendations. The CBL in Tripoli controls access to all foreign currency in Libya, and it provides Libyans access to hard currency by issuing letters of credit (LCs). Access to LCs in Libya has historically been an issue, but in January 2021, the CBL set a single, unified foreign exchange rate (described in the next section). This has increased importers’ access to hard currency at stable levels. The availability of financing on the local market is weak. Libyan banks can only offer limited financial products, loans are often made on the basis of personal connections (rather than business plans), and public bank managers lack clear incentives to expand their portfolios. Lack of financing acts as a brake on Libya’s development, hampering both the completion of existing projects and the start of new ones. This has been particularly damaging in the housing sector, where small-scale projects often languish for lack of steady funding streams. Libya tied for last on the ease of getting credit in most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. Libya boasts 19 commercial banks, the largest of which are majority-owned by the CBL, and four specialized banks. The six largest banks hold 90 percent of the system’s assets and loans, whereas it is estimated that 30 percent of all cash in Libya is not within the formal banking system. In total, the banking system employs 20,000 persons. Libya maintains a sovereign wealth fund called the Libya Investment Authority (LIA). UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) froze many of the LIA’s assets outside Libya. The freeze on the LIA’s assets is intended to preserve Libya’s assets through its post-revolutionary transition for the benefit of all Libyans. An evaluation of the LIA’s assets in 2019 put their value at USD 69 billion. The international community and private consultancies continue to provide technical assistance to the LIA to help it improve its governance, including adherence to the Santiago Principles, a set of 24 widely accepted best practices for the operation of sovereign wealth funds: the LIA is now compliant with 17 of the 24 best practices. The LIA is also currently undergoing an audit by an international auditing firm. The LIA comes under sporadic political pressure to make administrative and human resources changes to favor certain political actors. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Libyan state is responsible for approximately 85 percent of economic activity in the country. On the periphery of the governmental apparatus, state-owned enterprises (SOE) dominate economic life. The largest are the National Oil Company (NOC), the Libyan Post, Telecommunication, and Information Technology Company (LPTIC), and the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL). The state is also involved in the following sectors: commercial banks, cement, transportation, airlines, construction, and oil and gas. The PIB is responsible for matters related to privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). All enterprises in Libya were previously state-owned. Except for the upstream oil and gas sector, no state-owned enterprise is considered to be efficient. The state is deeply involved in utilities, oil and gas, agriculture, construction, real estate development and manufacturing, and the corporate economy. Libya has gone through three previous phases of privatization, the latest between 2003 and 2008 during which 360 SOEs ranging from small to large in various sectors were either fully or partially privatized or brought in private partners through public-private partnerships. However, restrictions to individual shares and foreign ownership – individual investors’ share of the capital was restricted to 15 percent and local ownership had to be 30 percent – limited interest in the privatization program. Accusations of fraud further discouraged investments. Nonetheless, the food industry, healthcare, construction materials, downstream oil and gas, and education sectors are now partially or fully privatized. Fragile governments and lack of security since 2011 have impeded implementation of further privatization programs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is not a general awareness of, expectation of, or standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) in Libya, nor of businesses’ obligation to proactively conduct due diligence to ensure they are doing no harm (including with regards to environmental, social, and governance issues). The Libyan government has not taken measures to define or encourage RBC, such as promoting the OECD or UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or establishing a national contact point or ombudsman for stakeholders to get information or raise concerns about RBC. As far as domestic laws exist in relation to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts, the capacity of the government to enforce these laws is very limited. Libya is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Libya does not have a well-defined national climate strategy. The government has not yet introduced any meaningful policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Moreover, Libya has not yet announced its Nationally Determined Contribution to the UN relevant authority. Libya scores in the bottom three of 148 countries as to efficient and sustainable resource use according to the Global Green Growth Institute. Although Libya is a signatory to the Paris Climate Accords, it has not yet ratified the accord. Libya also signed the Global Methane Pledge during the COP26 in the United Kingdom. Libya recently reactivated the Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (REAL), which has communicated its plan to include renewable energy sources to contribute 22 percent of power generation by 2030; renewable energy sources currently contribute zero percent of power generation. 9. Corruption Foreign firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI; corruption is pervasive in virtually all sectors of the economy, especially in government procurement. Officials frequently engage with impunity in corrupt practices such as graft, bribery, nepotism, money laundering, human smuggling, and other criminal activities. Although Libyan law provides some criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government does not enforce the law effectively. Internal conflict and the weakness of public institutions further undermine enforcement. No financial disclosure laws, regulations, or codes of conduct require income and asset disclosure by appointed or elected officials. The Libyan Audit Bureau, the highest financial regulatory authority in the country, has made minimal efforts to improve transparency. The Audit Bureau has investigated mismanagement at the General Electricity Company of Libya that had lowered production and led to acute power cuts. Other economic institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank published some economic data during the year. Libya has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. It is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Akram Bannur General Secretary National Anti-Corruption Commission of Libya +218 91 335 8583 Bannurakram@outlook.com Contact at a “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International): Ibrahim Ali Chairman Libyan Transparency International +218916344442 info@transparency-libya.org 10. Political and Security Environment There is a significant recent history of politically-motivated damage and seizure by force of economic infrastructure and installations, particularly in the oil and gas industry. Most recently, forces allied with Libyan National Army Commander Haftar forced the near-total shutdown of Libya’s energy sector in January 2020, which was eventually lifted in September 2020. The October 2020 ceasefire and the peaceful transfer of power in March 2021 to a unity government has markedly reduced the civil disturbances that had been a daily occurrence. However, militias also shut down Libya’s largest oil field in December 2021. Moreover, due to the postponement of elections (scheduled for December 2021), the political scene is further complicated by questions regarding the tenure of the current interim prime minister, as the House of Representatives nominated a new interim prime minister in February 2022, who to date has not been able to take power. As a result of this instability, rival armed groups have continued to jockey for control over the country’s political institutions and economic resources, which means that insecurity and instability remains a cause for concern. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Libya’s labor market is characterized by a dominant public sector that employs 85 percent of the active labor force in the Libyan economy, according to the World Bank. Just four percent of the labor force works for private firms. The Libyan labor market has many skilled workers with high levels of education, but high public sector wages and benefits result in outsized expectations among job seekers, particularly among the highly-skilled. The World Bank has estimated Libya’s unemployment rate to be around 20 percent, and youth unemployment to be around 50 percent – numbers that, given the already bloated public sector, indicate a lack of private sector jobs for skilled and unskilled Libyans. The World Bank also noted significant “mismatches” between the skills Libyan degree holders possess and those demanded by foreign and domestic employers in Libya. The 2010 Investment Law permits investors to hire foreign workers when national substitutes are not available. The law does not provide the right for workers to form and join independent unions. Formal sector workers are automatically members of the General Trade Union Federation of Workers but can opt out on request. Foreign workers are not permitted to organize. Workers are permitted to bargain collectively, but the law stipulates that cooperative agreements must conform to the “national economic interest,” thus significantly limiting collective bargaining. The government has the right to set and cut salaries without consulting workers. According to Freedom House, some trade unions formed after the 2011 revolution, but they remain in their infancy, and collective-bargaining activity was severely limited due to the ongoing hostilities and weak rule of law. There is no data available about the prevalence of collective bargaining, or about the effectiveness of labor dispute or arbitration services. Workers may call strikes only after exhausting all conciliation and arbitration procedures. Over the past year, employees organized spontaneous strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins in a number of workplaces. The government or one of the parties has the right to demand compulsory arbitration, though state penalties for noncompliance were not sufficient to deter violations. The law does not criminalize all forms of forced or compulsory labor. Article 425 of the penal code criminalized slavery and prescribed penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment. Article 426 criminalized the buying and selling of slaves and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. However, other forms of forced labor were not criminalized. The government did not effectively enforce these laws, and the resources, inspections, and penalties for violations were not commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes such as kidnapping. There have been numerous anecdotal reports of migrants and IDPs being subjected to forced labor by human traffickers. The informal economy, largely composed of migrants, is concentrated in the agricultural, construction, and domestic help sectors. Private employers have sometimes used detained migrants from prisons and detention centers as forced labor on farms or construction sites; when the work was completed or the employers no longer required the migrants’ labor, employers returned them to detention facilities. The law prohibits children younger than 18 from being employed except in a form of apprenticeship. It was unclear whether child labor occurred, and no information was available concerning whether the law limits working hours or sets occupational health and safety restrictions for children. It was not clear whether the government had the capacity to enforce compulsory or child labor laws, nor was it clear whether non-enforcement of these laws posed a commercial risk to investors. 14. Contact for More Information Pedro Campo-Boué Economic and Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy to Libya, Libya External Office Tunis, Tunisia +216 58 539 035 Campo-BouePG@state.gov Lithuania Executive Summary Lithuania is strategically situated at the crossroads of Europe and Eurasia. It offers investors a diversified economy, EU rules and norms, a well-educated multilingual workforce, advanced IT infrastructure and a stable democratic government. The Lithuanian economy has been growing steadily since the 2009 economic crisis but contracted in 2020 due to economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it recovered relatively rapidly in 2021, reaching 5.1 percent GDP growth thanks to budget surpluses and accumulated financial reserves prior to the crisis, as well as a well-diversified economy. The country joined the Eurozone in January 2015 and completed the accession process for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018. Lithuania’s income levels are lower than in most of the EU. Based on the average net monthly wage, Lithuania is 23rd of 27 EU member states. According to Bank of Lithuania statistics, at the end of 2021, the United States was Lithuania’s 15th largest investor, with cumulative investments totaling $366 million (1.3 percent of total FDI). The new government elected at the end of 2020 has continued prior governments’ efforts to improve the business climate and lower barriers to investment. In 2013, the government passed legislation which streamlined land-use planning, saving investors both time and money. In July 2017, the government introduced the new Labor Code which is believed to better balance the interests of both employees and employers, and in 2020 it introduced a law on exemption of profit tax for the period of up to 20 years for large and significant investment to the country. The government provides equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors and sets few limitations on their activities. Foreign investors have the right to repatriate or reinvest profits without restriction and can bring disputes to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Lithuania offers special incentives, such as tax concessions, to both small companies and strategic investors. Incentives are also available in seven Special Economic Zones located throughout the country. U.S. executives report some burdensome procedures to obtain business and residence permits, and limited instances of low-level corruption in government. Transportation barriers, especially insufficient direct air links with some European cities, remain a hindrance to investment, as does the lack of transparency in government procurement. Lithuania offers many investment opportunities in most of its economy sectors. The sectors which to date attracted most investment include Information and Communication Technology, Biotech, Metal Processing, Machinery and Electrical Equipment, Plastics, Furniture, Wood Processing and Paper Industry, Textiles and Clothing. Lithuania also offers opportunities for investment in the growing sectors of Real Estate and Construction, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), Shared Services, Financial Technologies, Biotech and Lasers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 34 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 39 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $182 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 19,620 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Lithuania’s laws ensure equal protection for both foreign and domestic investors. No special permit is required from government authorities to invest foreign capital in Lithuania. State institutions have no right to interfere with the legal possession of foreign investors’ property. In the event of justified expropriation, investors are entitled to compensation equivalent to the market value of the property expropriated. The law obligates state institutions and officials to keep commercial secrets confidential and requires compensation for any loss or damage caused by illegal disclosure. As a member of European Union, Lithuania is subject to WTO investment requirements. Invest Lithuania is the government’s principal institution dedicated to attracting foreign investment. It serves as a one-stop-shop to: provide information on business costs, labor, tax and legal considerations, and other business concerns; facilitate the set up and launch of a company; provide help in accessing government financial support; and advocate on behalf of investors for more business friendly laws. In addition to its offices in Vilnius and major Lithuanian cities, Invest Lithuania has representative offices in Germany and the United Kingdom. The government is also expanding its network of commercial representatives, with an attaché appointed to serve at the Consulate General in Los Angeles in 2021 and new postings planned for in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Every year the government holds a conference with foreign investors to discuss their concerns and ways to improve investment climate in Lithuania. Foreign investors have the right to repatriate profits, income, or dividends, in cash or otherwise, or to reinvest the same without any limitation, after paying taxes. The law establishes no limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign investors have free access to all sectors of the economy with some limited exceptions: The Law on Investment prohibits investment of foreign capital in sectors related to the security and defense of the State. The Law on Investment also requires government permission and licensing for commercial activities that may pose risks to human life, health, or the environment, including the manufacturing of, or trade in, weapons. As of 2014, foreign citizens are allowed to buy agricultural or forest land. The Law on Investment specifically permits the following forms of investment in Lithuania: establishment of an enterprise or acquisition of a part, or the whole, of the authorized capital of an operating enterprise registered in Lithuania; acquisition of securities of any type; creation, acquisition, and increase in the value of long-term assets; lending of funds or other assets to business entities in which the investor owns a stake, allowing control or considerable influence over the company; and performance of concession or leasing agreements. Foreign entities are allowed to establish branches or representative offices. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign investors can contribute capital in the form of money, assets, or intellectual or industrial property rights. The State Property Bank screens the performance record and size of companies bidding on state or municipal property and has halted privatizations when it determined that the bidders were not suitable, i.e., for criminal or other reasons. The Lithuanian parliament most recently updated its 2002 law on the Protection of Objects Important to National Security in 2018. The law is aimed at enforcing additional safeguards to avoid threats related to investments into companies of strategic national importance, thus requiring a special government commission to screen investments in identified strategic sectors. http://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/economic-survey-lithuania.htm The process of company registration in Lithuania involves the following steps that can be accomplished online at http://www.registrucentras.lt/en/ : Check and reserve the name of the company (limited liability company). It takes about one day and costs approximately $18. Register at the Company Register, including registration with State Tax Inspectorate (the Lithuanian Revenue Authority) for corporate tax, VAT, and State Social Insurance Fund Board (SODRA). It takes one day and costs approximately $64. Complete VAT registration. It takes three days to complete at no charge. The Lithuanian government neither incentivizes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The regulatory system remains a challenge for some investors. Local business leaders report that bureaucratic procedures often are not user-friendly and that the interpretation of regulations is inconsistent and unclear. Businesses and private individuals complain of low-level, but non-systemic corruption, including in the process of awarding government contracts and the granting of licenses and permits. Businesses also note that they would like to have more opportunity to consult with lawmakers regarding new legislation and that new legislation sometimes appears with little advance notice. Public procurement is overseen by the national procurement supervising authority and has a strong reporting system to monitor its activities, making it largely transparent. Nevertheless, problems persist in practice, as some bids are released with technical irregularities and many winning vendors are selected based primarily on price over the quality of the product. However, the government continues to improve transparency. A new anti-corruption law came into effect in 2022 which codified the responsibilities of public institutions to enforce stricter standards of openness and transparency and established a network of trained anti-corruption officials. For example, the parliament’s website contains all draft legislation, and public tenders must be published electronically in a central database. Ministries also post draft laws under consideration. In March 2014, Transparency International released a report recommending new laws aimed at protecting whistle-blowers, encouraging lobbying transparency, preventing and controlling conflicts of interest, and increasing transparency in political party funding. Some of the recommendations have already been addressed by introducing a whistleblower protection law and a new law on lobbying in 2017. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report ranked Lithuania 11th out of 190 in 2020. Lithuania scored especially high in the categories of Registering Property (4th), Enforcing contracts (7th) Dealing with Construction Permits (10th) and Starting a Business (34th). It did less well in the categories of Resolving Insolvency (89th) and Getting Credit (48th). Since May 1, 2004, in accordance with its European Union membership, Lithuania has applied European Union trade policies, such as antidumping or anti-subsidy measures. The European Union import regime applies to Lithuania. The country is a member of the WTO and it notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Lithuanian legal system stems from the legal traditions of continental Europe and complies with the EU’s acquis communautaire. New laws enter into force upon promulgation by the President (or in some cases the Speaker of the parliament) and publication in the official gazette, Valstybes Zinios (State News). Several possibilities exist for commercial dispute resolution. Parties can settle disputes in local courts or in the increasingly popular independent, i.e., non-governmental, Commercial Court of Arbitration. Lithuania also recognizes arbitration judgments by foreign courts. Domestic courts generally operate independently of government influence. Lithuania’s EU membership has given foreign firms the additional right to appeal adverse court rulings to the European Court of Justice. The Lithuanian court system consists of courts of general jurisdiction that deal with civil and criminal matters, and includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, District Courts, and local courts. In 1999, Lithuania established a system of administrative courts to adjudicate administrative cases, which generally involve disputes between government regulatory agencies and individuals or organizations. The administrative court system consists of the High Administrative Court and District Administrative Courts. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania is a separate, independent judicial body that determines whether laws and legal acts adopted by the parliament, president, and the government violate the Constitution. Lithuanian law provides that foreign entities may establish branches or representative offices, and there are no limits on foreign ownership or control. A foreigner may hold a majority interest in a local company in Lithuania. However, there are some areas of the economy where investment is limited, such as in sectors related to national security and defense of the State, and licensing is necessary for activities related to human life and health, or which are deemed potentially risky. The national investment promotion agency Invest Lithuania provides a detailed overview of the relevant laws and regulations on foreign investment. http://www.investlithuania.com There is a domestic Competition Council, which is responsible for the prevention of competition law violations. For more information: https://kt.gov.lt/en/ Lithuanian law permits expropriation on the basis of public need, but requires compensation at fair market value in a convertible currency. The law requires payment of compensation within three months of the date of expropriation in the currency the foreign investor requests. The compensation must include interest calculated from the date of publication of the notice of expropriation until the payment of compensation. The recipient may transfer this compensation abroad without any restrictions. There have been no cases of expropriation of private property by the Lithuanian government since 1991. There is an ongoing process to restitute property expropriated during World War II and the Soviet occupation. While the Lithuanian government passed a law in 2011 providing for the restitution of communal property, it has not passed legislation to address the restitution of private and heirless property seized during the Holocaust. Lithuania passed the current Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 2001. This law applies to all enterprises, public establishments, commercial banks, and other credit institutions registered in Lithuania. The law provides a mechanism to override the provisions of other laws regulating enterprise activities, assuring protection of creditors’ rights, recovery of debts, and payment of taxes and other mandatory contributions to the State. This law establishes the following order of creditors’ claims: claims by creditors that are secured by a mortgage/pledge of debtor; claims related to employment; tax, social insurance, and state medical insurance claims; claims arising from loans guaranteed or issued on behalf of the Republic of Lithuania or its government; and other claims. Bankruptcy can be criminalized in cases of intentional bankruptcy. The Law on the Bankruptcy of Natural Persons was introduced in Lithuania in 2013. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey ranks Lithuania 89th in the category of “resolving insolvency”. 4. Industrial Policies The Lithuanian government taxes corporate income and capital gains at 15 percent and the personal income tax rate is 20 percent. The value added tax is 21 percent, and the annual real estate tax ranges from 0.3 to three percent, depending on the market value of a property. For more details, please visit https://investlithuania.com/investor-guide/running-your-business/ Lithuanian municipalities provide special incentives to investors who create jobs or invest in infrastructure. Municipalities may tie designation criteria to additional factors, such as the number of jobs created or environmental benefits. Strategic investors’ benefits could include favorable tax incentives for up to ten years. Municipalities may grant special incentives to induce investments in municipal infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. Lithuania has seven Free Economic Zones (FEZs) located near the cities of Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Kedainiai, Panevėžys, Akmenė, and Marijampolė. The FEZs in Kaunas and Klaipėda have attracted the most business; there are about one hundred companies from 18 countries operating in the Klaipėda FEZ, and 38 in the Kaunas FEZ. Companies operating in FEZs must follow the same accounting and reporting rules as companies operating in the rest of the country. Companies that invest or are operating within the zones enjoy: six years’ exemption from corporate income tax and a 50 percent reduction during the exemption from real estate tax; no tax on foreign company dividends. In January 2017, the parliament passed legislation providing for a Startup Visa, designed for non-EU entrepreneurs wishing to start or expand information technology, biotech, nanotech, mechatronics, electronics, or laser technology businesses. For more information on the new Startup Visa, visit: https://startupvisalithuania.com/Lithuania also participates in the EU BlueCard program, which simplifies the residency and work permit application process for highly-skilled non-EU citizens. Once secured, the BlueCard is valid for up to three years and can be extended for an additional three years. BlueCard holders are also eligible to apply for permanent residency after five years. For more information on the BlueCard program, visit: http://www.eubluecard.lt/ . Nevertheless, foreign investors that do not qualify for these programs, including U.S. citizens, may face difficulties obtaining and renewing residency permits. U.S. citizens can stay in Lithuania no more than 90 days without a visa (and no more than 90 days in any six-month period). Those who stay longer face fines and deportation. However, foreigners may only submit residency permit applications after they arrive in Lithuania. Therefore, the Embassy recommends applicants work with Lithuanian embassies and consulates to review documentation required for a permit well in advance of their first visit to Lithuania. For more information on the various types of visas and their requirements, visit: https://www.migracija.lt/en/search?q=visas Lithuania provides special incentives to strategic investors. The criteria by which the national government or a municipality designates a strategic investor vary from project to project. In general, the national government requires that a strategic investor initially invests $50 million or more. Municipalities may tie the designation criteria to additional or other factors, such as the number of jobs created and the environmental benefits that accrue. Strategic investors’ rewards include special business conditions, such as favorable tax incentives for up to ten years. Significant tax incentives apply to foreign investments made before 1997. Municipalities may grant special incentives to induce investments in municipal infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. The Lithuanian government does not follow “forced Localization” policy and foreign investors can use domestic and foreign content in goods or technology alike. As a member of the European Union, Lithuania follows the General Data Protection Regulation. Enforcement is carried out by the State Data Protection Inspectorate. Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to the encryption. 5. Protection of Property Rights Lithuanian law protects foreign investments and the rights of investors in several ways: The Constitution and the Law on Foreign Capital Investment protect all forms of private International agreements, such as the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, offer protection. Bilateral agreements with the United States and other western countries on the mutual The Law on Capital Investment in Lithuania and other acts regulate customs duties, taxes, and relationships with financial and inspection authorities. This law also establishes dispute settlement procedures. In the event of justified expropriation, applicable law entitles investors to compensation Foreign investors may defend their rights under the Washington Convention of 1965 by State institutions and officials are obligated to keep commercial secrets confidential and must pay compensation for any loss or damage caused by illegal disclosure. Lithuania legalized the possibility of hiring private bailiffs to enforce court judgments in 2003. Lithuania’s commercial laws conform to EU requirements, and include the principles of the free establishment of companies, protection of shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, free access to information, and registration procedures. Relevant laws include: the Company Law and Law on Partnerships (2004), the Law on Personal Enterprises (2004), the Law on Investments (1999), the Law on Bankruptcy of Enterprises (2001), and the Law on Restructuring of Enterprises (2001). The Civil Code of 2000 governs commercial guarantees and security instruments. It provides for the following types of guarantee and security instruments to secure fulfillment of contractual obligations: forfeiture, surety, guarantee, earnest money, pledge, and mortgage. Lithuania has significantly improved its intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in recent years, and members of the innovation community report that IPR infringement and theft is infrequent. Lithuania joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2002 and is party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Lithuania joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and so is party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Following EU accession, Lithuania extended protection to member states’ trademarks and designs. Lithuania brought its national law protecting biological inventions into compliance with EU Directive 98/44 in June 2005. In 2008, Lithuania was removed from USTR’s Special 301 Watch List and is not currently included in the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . The State Patent Bureau provides a list of patent attorneys at the following link: https://vpb.lrv.lt/en/ 6. Financial Sector Government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. In 1994, Lithuania accepted the requirements of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund to liberalize all current payments and to establish non-discriminatory currency agreements. Lithuania ensures the free movement of capital and does not plan to impose any restrictions. The government imposes no restrictions on credits related to commercial transactions or the provision of services, or on financial loans and credits. Non-residents may open accounts with commercial banks. The banking system is stable, well-regulated, and conforms to EU standards. Currently there are 12 commercial banks holding a license from the Bank of Lithuania, six foreign bank branches, two foreign bank representative offices, the Central Credit Union of Lithuania and 65 credit unions. Two hundred-eighty EU banks provide cross-border services in Lithuania without a branch operating in the country, and three financial institutions controlled by EU licensed foreign banks provide services without a branch. Nearly all foreign banks are headquartered in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. By the end of 2021 the total assets of major Lithuanian banks were $45.4 billion: Swedbank – 37.7% (www.swedbank.lt ) SEB – 26.7% (www.seb.lt ) Luminor 20.8% (www.luminor.lt ) Siauliu Bankas – 9.1% (www.sb.lt ) Other smaller banks: Citadele ( www.citadele.lt ) Siaulius Bankas (www.sb.lt ) Medicinos Bankas (www.medbank.lt ) Finasta (http://finasta.com/lit/lt ) Revolut ( www.revolut.com ) European Merchants Bank ( www.europeanmerchantbank.com ) Mano Bankas (www.mano.bank ) Effective January 1, 2015, all of the banks are controlled by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Lithuania. There is no restriction on portfolio investment. The right of ownership to shares acquired through automatically matched trades is transferred on the third working day following the conclusion of the transaction. The Vilnius Stock Exchange is part of the OMX group of exchanges and offers access to 80 percent of all securities trading in the Nordic and Baltic marketplace. OMX is owned by the U.S. firm NASDAQ and the Dubai Bourse. The supervisory service at the Bank of Lithuania oversees commercial banks and credit unions, securities market, and insurance companies. Lithuanian law does not regulate hostile takeovers. Like much of the rest of the world, rising inflation driven by high global energy prices is a concern in Lithuania. Lithuania experienced 12.4% year-over-year inflation in January 2022, the highest in the EU. Lithuania does not maintain any Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises At the beginning of 2021, the Lithuanian government was majority or full owner of 46 enterprises. Throughout 2017, the government consolidated many duplicative state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in response to OECD recommendations reducing the number of its companies from 130. The SOE sector is valued at approximately $5.8 billion and employs just over 42,000 people. The greatest number of SOEs by value are found in the electricity and gas sector (38%), followed by transportation (36%) and extractive industries including fishing, farming, and mining (21%). The transportation sector (which in Lithuania’s definition includes the postal service) accounts for over half of all SOE employment, followed by the electricity and gas sectors, which accounts for about one fifth. The largest SOE employers are Lithuanian Railways, Ignitis Group, and Lithuanian Post, which collectively employ over 23,000 people. A list of SOEs is available at the Governance Coordination Center site: https://vkc.sipa.lt/apie-imones/vvi-sarasas/ In response to OECD recommendations issued during Lithuania’s accession process, the government passed several laws to reform SOE governance, addressing such issues as the hiring, firing, and oversight of top management, the introduction of independent board members to professionalize and depoliticize SOE boards and strengthen independent and pragmatic decision making, and a requirement for SOE CEOs to certify financial statements. The government has privatized most state enterprises and property, with foreign investors purchasing the majority of state assets privatized since 1990. These include companies in the banking and transportation sectors. Some foreign companies have complained about a lack of transparency or discrimination in certain privatization transactions. Major assets still under government control include the railway company (Lietuvos Gelezinkeliai), Lithuania’s three international airports (Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda), Lithuanian post (Lietuvos Pastas), as well as energy companies controlled by Ignitis Group holding company. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Although Lithuania has a strong private sector, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is still relatively new in Lithuania. However, over the past few years many companies, especially those in Vilnius, have developed more robust CSR programs. There are an increasing number of private-public partnerships and social projects where the private sector is involved in supporting volunteerism, environmental restoration, and scholarships. Furthermore, successful participation in the European Union market requires higher standards of CSR. Foreign investors in Lithuania have played a very important role in promoting CSR. In 2009, the government developed and approved a National Corporate Social Responsibility Development Program aimed at promoting CSR. Also, in the past few years there has been growing interest from both government and NGOs in promoting CSR values by organizing competitions and awards ceremonies such as the Social and Labor Ministry’s annual Socially Responsible Business Awards Ceremony, Confederation of Industrialists’ Awards, and others. Also, after Lithuania acceded to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2017, more business organizations and the legal community have started to promote the importance of companies adopting anti-bribery compliance programs. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Implementation of Lithuania’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) for 2021-2030 will require approximately EUR 14 billion. Most of the funds, around EUR 10.8 billion, will be used to implement the national energy independence objectives and Lithuania’s EU commitments on mitigating the impact on climate change. The NECP provides for the construction of resilient road surfaces, more resilient electricity infrastructure, and rainwater management. It subsidizes agricultural insurance and organic and climate-resilient farming. The NECP also includes measures on public health, management of extreme weather events, forestry, ecosystems, and biodiversity. Most of these funds will come from the EU and the national budget. Lithuania together with Denmark, Estonia, Spain, and Portugal, is among the five countries in the EU with the most ambitious renewable energy targets for 2030. By building interconnections with the Western European electricity system, converting district heating systems to the use of biofuels, approving additional auctions for the production of solar and wind electricity, and by promoting prosumer (consumers who both produce and consume electricity) policies, Lithuania projects that 45% of its electricity will come from renewable energy sources by 2030. Conservation is also an element of Lithuania’s efforts to reduce emissions. Lithuania aims to reduce its energy consumption by one-fifth by 2030 through a combination of renovating public and residential buildings, promoting energy efficiency in industry and services, and promoting sustainable mobility. These efforts will also contribute to Lithuania’s national security objective of reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. By 2030, the government projects that 70% of rail freight will be transported by electric trains and 14% of passenger cars will be electric. This will lead to a drop in Lithuania’s total fuel consumption by 24% and reduce the country’s dependency on imported fuel. The government also projects that the use of cleaner technologies by Lithuanian industry and reductions in the use of mineral fertilizers will lead to an 8 hectare per year increase in forest growth. The government also plans to improve efficiency in agricultural production and hopes to bring down the use of energy and production resources in agriculture by 20% by 2030. According to the NECP, the implementation of all the planned measures by 2030 will reduce GHG emissions by: 8.1% in the transport sector, 9.1% in agriculture, 9.8% in industry, and 52.4% in the waste sector. 9. Corruption A 2019 Eurobarometer study on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU shows that corruption is becoming less of an obstacle for business in Lithuania. Only 15 percent of business executives identified corruption as a problem in Lithuania, twice fewer than in 2015. Out of 27 EU countries, Lithuania was ranked seventh for corruption being the least pressing issue in business. Additionally, the Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2019 survey initiated by the Special Investigations Service (STT) – Lithuania’s anti-corruption law enforcement agency – also showed the positive anti-corruption trends in business environment over the past decades. However, nepotism and cronyism – hiring relatives and friends – are still the most prevalent forms of corruption that hinder business development. More than 50 governmental institutions regulate commerce in one way or another, creating opportunities for corrupt practices. Large foreign investors report few problems with corruption. On the contrary, most large investors report that high-level officials are often very helpful in solving problems fairly. In general, foreign investors say that corruption is not a significant obstacle to doing business in Lithuania and describe most of the bureaucrats they deal with in Lithuania as reasonable and fair. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) perceive themselves as more vulnerable to petty bureaucrats and commonly complain about extortion. SMEs often complain that excessive red tape virtually requires the payment of “grease money” to obtain permits promptly. Business owners maintain that some government officials, on the other hand, view SMEs as likely tax-cheats and smugglers, and treat the owners and managers accordingly. Paying or accepting a bribe is a criminal act. Lithuania established in 1997 the Special Investigation Service (Specialiujų Tyrimų Tarnyba) specifically to fight public sector corruption. The agency investigates approximately 100 cases of alleged corruption every year. The STT has a strong track record in investigating and prosecuting corruption cases, but has identified corruption prevention as an area for improvement, which Lithuania’s new anti-corruption law that entered into effect in 2022 aims to address. The law codifies the responsibilities of public institutions to enforce stricter standards of openness and transparency. The law also establishes a network of trained anti-corruption officials throughout all levels and areas of government, implements stricter personnel screening procedures, and standardizes metrics to measure anti-corruption performance. Transparency International (TI)has a national chapter in Lithuania. TI ranked Lithuania 34th out of 180 in its 2021 Perceptions of Corruption Index with a score of 61 out of 100 (TI considers countries with a score below 50 to have serious problems with corruption.). Medical personnel and local government officials, among others, were cited by TI as prone to corruption. Lithuania ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2006 and acceded to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2017. Resources to Report Corruption Special Investigation Service Jakšto g. 6, 01105 Vilnius, Lithuania Tel: 370-5266333 Fax: 370-70663307 Email: pranesk@stt.lt Sergejus Muravjovas, Executive Director Transparency International Didžioji st. 5, LT–01128, Vilnius, Lithuania Tel: 370 5 212 69 51 info@transparency.lt | skype: ti_lithuania 10. Political and Security Environment Since its independence in 1991, Lithuania has not witnessed any incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects and/or installations. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Lithuanian labor is relatively inexpensive compared to Western Europe. However, employment regulations are often stricter than those in other EU countries, according to some foreign investors. By law, white-collar workers have a 40-hour workweek. Blue-collar workers have a 48-hour workweek with premium pay for overtime. Maternity leave in Lithuania is granted for up to 126 days, and the government compensates 100 percent of the mother’s salary. A father is also allowed to take paternity leave for one month. His salary is compensated 100 percent as well. Sick leave in Lithuania is granted up to 14 days at any one time and no more than 90 days a year. For the first two days, the salary compensation is 80 – 100 percent, paid by the employer, with the rest of the days being compensated by SODRA (Lithuanian Social Security body) at 80 percent of salary. Lithuania is a member of International Labor Organization (ILO) and has ratified its core conventions. The government adjusts the monthly minimum wage periodically. Since January 2022, Lithuania’s minimum monthly wage is $817. The average monthly wage is $1,880. The ability of Lithuanians to work legally in EU countries generated a sizable outflow of labor, causing a domestic shortage of skilled construction workers, truck drivers, shop assistants, medical nurses, and medical specialists. In March, 2021 unemployment rate stood at 6.7 percent. Lithuania’s management-labor relations are good. Labor unions are not considered overly influential in Lithuania, according to some foreign investors. More than half of workers at Lithuanian fertilizer firm Achema went on strike in February 2022 in the first major strike since 1991. The primary dispute was over the signing of a collective bargaining agreement with management on wages and other conditions. . Lithuania has one of the best-educated workforces in Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania ranks fourth among the EU states in terms of population with higher education and first in the Baltic States. Lithuania is one of the five EU members with the highest percentage of people speaking at least one foreign language. Ninety percent of Lithuanians can speak at least one other language – usually English, Polish, and/or Russian – apart from their mother tongue. Major Lithuanian companies specializing in IT, biotechnology, and laser technology cooperate closely with the leading Lithuanian technological universities, which provide companies with R&D services and offer students specialized on-the-job training programs. This way companies are able to attract a large number of qualified specialists for both local and international projects. Some technology companies, however, have noted challenges in finding highly- skilled workers with advanced technical degrees. In 2017, the parliament passed a new Labor Code. These changes aim to encourage foreign investment and job creation by simplifying some employment conditions and clarifying other requirements. The new law decreases the advanced notice required when employers terminate an employment contract, and adds new contract options for employers, such as project-based contracts and job-sharing contracts. The law also clarifies previous informal practices by requiring non-union employers to form works councils to represent employee interests and requiring employers to establish and publicize standard company compensation policies. 14. Contact for more Information Jonas Vasilevicius, Commercial Specialist Tel: 370-5 2665671 VasileviciusJ@state.gov U.S. Embassy Vilnius Akmenu str. 6 Vilnius, Lithuania Luxembourg Executive Summary Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population (634,700), Luxembourg is the second-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita basis. Since 2002, the Luxembourg Government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The Government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information, and communications technology (ICT), health technologies including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and most recently, space technology and financial services technologies. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the health-tech sector has become a priority sector to attract to Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s economy proved resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic, as 2020 GDP only contracted by 1.3 percent. Luxembourg’s economy rebounded strongly in 2021 with a growth rate of 6.9 percent. Luxembourg fared better than the EU growth rate of 5 percent. This rebound is due to a well-performing financial sector which managed to quickly revert to telework and only suffered limited effects of the pandemic. The Government of Luxembourg also provided a major economic stimulus package of 11 billion euros ($13 billion), equivalent to 18.5 percent of Luxembourg GDP, which helped stabilize the economy. This package includes direct subsidies and compensatory payments to companies, state-guaranteed loans, deferral of taxes, and social security contributions. The Government of Luxembourg borrowed a total of 5 billion euros ($6 billion) at negative interest rates due to the Grand Duchy’s Triple A credit rating. Unemployment decreased 6.3 to 5.2 percent in 2021 and went back to pre-pandemic levels. This rapid job market recovery was supported by the government’s part-time employment reimbursement scheme, which allows workers to go on extended leave while receiving 80 percent of their salary and keeping their job. This measure cost the State of Luxembourg 1.3 billion euros in 2020 and 216 million euros in 2021. The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a major downside risk for the Luxembourg economy, with rising energy prices and a general spike in inflation stifling growth in 2022. The forecast 3.5 percent growth rate for 2022 might be out of reach. Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse thanks to the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second largest investment fund asset domicile, after only the United States, with over $6 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions. Luxembourg has committed to the EU target of 55 percent Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions reductions by 2030 and net-zero emission by 2050, and has also set itself a national target of 25 percent renewable energy and 35-40 percent energy efficiency improvement by 2030. Luxembourg is consistently ranked as one of the world’s most open and transparent economies and has no restrictions on foreign ownership. It is also consistently ranked as one of the world’s most competitive and least-corrupt economies. Over the past decade, Luxembourg has adopted major fiscal reforms to counter money-laundering, terrorist-financing, and tax evasion. The Government of Luxembourg actively supports the development of new sectors to diversify the country’s economy, given the dominance of the financial sector. Target sectors include space, logistics, and information technology, including financial technology and biomedicine. Luxembourg launched its SpaceResources.lu initiative in 2016, and, in 2017, announced a fund offering financial support for the space resources industry. More than 50 companies dedicated to space initiatives are now active in Luxembourg. Luxembourg added an additional space fund in early 2020 to further bolster its status as a space startup nation. Luxembourg has positioned itself as “the gateway to Europe” to establish European company headquarters operations by virtue of its central European location and advanced road, railway, and air connectivity. Due to uncertainties related to Brexit, 50 insurers, asset managers and banking institutions have decided to re-locate their EU headquarters to Luxembourg or transfer a significant part of their activity to the country. Luxembourg is actively seeking logistics companies to expand the new logistics hub at Luxembourg Airport, home to Cargolux, Europe’s largest all cargo airline. Inaugurated in 2017, the Luxembourg Intermodal Terminal (LIT) is ideally positioned as an international hub for the consolidation of multimodal transport flows across Europe and beyond. Luxembourg is also seeking ICT companies to use the existing high-security, state-of-the-art datacenters, affording high-speed internet connectivity to major international data hubs. Luxembourg has set up a high-performance computer which will be part of the EU’s high-performance computer network called EURO HPC Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 9 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 23 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 759,400 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 80,860 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Luxembourg offers a public policy framework and political stability, which remain highly attractive for foreign investors, particularly for U.S. investors, given the focus on growth sectors and the historically strong bilateral relationship between the two countries. The government has increased its outreach toward companies looking to expand in Europe. Luxembourg is in the process of implementing the EU standards for the screening of foreign investment but missed the Fall 2020 implementation deadline. In 2017, Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade, Etienne Schneider, unveiled a strategy to promote economic growth focusing on attracting FDI and supporting companies’ moving into other markets. The Luxembourg “Let’s Make It Happen” campaign, developed by the state Trade and Investment Board, focuses on five key objectives: Improving Luxembourg-based companies’ access to international markets Attracting FDI in a “targeted, service-oriented” way Strengthening the country’s international “economic-promotion network” Improving Luxembourg’s image as a “smart location” for high-performance business and industry Ensuring the coherence of economic promotion efforts There is no overall economic or industrial strategy that has discriminatory effects on foreign investors, either at a market-access or post-establishment phase of investment. Luxembourg strives to attract and retain foreign investors with its unique model of “easy access to decision makers” and its known ability to “act swiftly.” The Trade and Investment Board has taken the lead in investment promotion and includes representatives from the ministries of Economy, Higher Education and Research, Finance, Foreign and European Affairs, and State. Public-private trade associations such as FEDIL (Business Federation of Luxembourg, the main employers’ trade association), the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Skilled Trades and Crafts, as well as Luxinnovation, are also represented. The Board is working in cooperation with Luxembourg embassies and trade and investment offices worldwide, as well as economic and commercial attachés, honorary consuls, and foreign trade advisers, to attract FDI and retain investors. In 2016, the Ministry of the Economy expanded the role of Luxinnovation to incorporate promotion of Luxembourg abroad and to attract FDI into the country. Luxinnovation is a public private partnership agency that carries out business intelligence to target relevant investors and regions and also provides a soft-landing service for investors as they arrive in Luxembourg. The Covid-19 pandemic has led investor outreach efforts to be carried out virtually, and travel restrictions have led investors to prefer virtual meetings before traveling to the country. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership/control or sector-specific restrictions. General screening of foreign investment exists in line with that of domestic investment. There are no major sectors/matters in Luxembourg in which foreign investors are denied national (domestic) treatment. Luxembourg is in the process of implementing the EU rules for investment screening, to be adopted by Parliament in the Summer of 2022. By implementing these rules, Luxembourg will adopt a formal investment screening process to replace the previous ad-hoc and case by case screening, which lacks transparency. Luxembourg is included in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of the EU/EC; see the TPR gateway for explanations and background. In terms of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation, Luxembourg’s business facilitation efforts are aligned with most of the recommended action points. Over the past decade, Luxembourg has been furthering accessibility and transparency in investment policies and regulations, as well as procedures relevant to investors. Luxembourg ranks 76th in the World Bank’s starting a business ranking, indicating it takes 16.5 days to set up a business in the country. The Government has improved the efficiency of investment administrative procedures, notably in the context of the overall “Digitization” movement to offer a multitude of government services online or electronically. This has led to the time it takes to start a business being reduced by 2-3 months. The Government provides a website in multiple languages, including English, that explains the business registration process: http://www.guichet.public.lu/en . A new business must register with the Registry of Commerce (Registre du Commerce: http://www.lbr.lu.) Foreign companies can use the site (after translating from the original French language), but it is best to consult with a local lawyer or fiduciary to complete the overall process. It is necessary to engage a notary to submit the company’s by-laws for registration. In 2017, the Government reduced the required minimum capitalization of a new company from 12,500 euro to just 1 euro (symbolic), to encourage start-up creation. Between January 2017 and January 2018, over 680 such simplified limited liability companies (Société à responsabilité limitée simplifiée SARL-S) have registered. According to the Luxembourgish Chamber of Commerce, one client out of three has requested information on SARL-S. After receiving a certificate from the Registry of Commerce, companies are required by law to register with and pay annual dues to the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, as well as the Social Security Administration, the Tax Administration (Administration des Contributions Directes) and the Value-Added-Tax Authority (TVA = taxe à la valeur ajoutée). The company will receive an official registration number reflecting the date of inception of the entity, and this number will be used in all business transactions and correspondence with administrative authorities. The House of Entrepreneurship (HOA), opened in 2016 within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, also provides guidance on the entire registration and creation process of a business. HOA receives over 10,000 enquiries per year by entrepreneurs interested in setting up a business in the country. The organization plays a key role during the COVID-19 pandemic, as it serves as a point of contact and information for businesses looking to apply for Government aid. The Ministry of Economy continues to support networks and associations acting in favor of female entrepreneurship. The Law of December 15, 2016 incorporated the principle of equal salaries in the Grand Duchy’s legislation, which makes illegal any difference in the salaries paid to men and women carrying out the same task or work of equal value. As a result, Luxembourg had the lowest gender pay gap in the EU in 2021. In general, the instruments that are most effective are outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy but are critical. For example, there has been an increase in the number of childcare centers close to business districts which helps dual career families. The same government services website listed above, http://www.guichet.public.lu/en , includes an “International Trade” tab which provides guidance on outward investment by Luxembourgish companies on various topics, including intra-EU trade and services; import, export, and transit; licensing; and transport. The Luxembourg Government promotes outward investment via the Trade and Investment Board, which functions as a promotion entity for both inward and outward investment. The “Let’s Make It Happen” initiative, among its many missions, is working to facilitate access to international markets for Luxembourgish companies and to strengthen Luxembourg’s international economic promotion network. Luxembourg does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Luxembourg also has a public export credit agency, the Office du Ducroire to help companies engage in export and outward investment through funding and export insurance. In 2020, the Office du Ducroire has insured over 970 million dollars of new transactions and has paid over 1 million dollars of financial support for exports. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Luxembourg uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish clear ground rules on a non-discriminatory basis. The legal system is quite welcoming with respect to FDI, and legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. With the exception of the mandatory membership in the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, there are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. In addition to the Government, the Luxembourg Institute of Regulation, a public agency, proposes regulatory policies. As confirmed by the World Bank report on Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, the Luxembourg Government develops anticipated and publishes forward looking regulatory plans – a public list of anticipated regulatory changes and proposals intended to be adopted and implemented. These plans are available to the public, as the texts of proposed legislation are published before Parliamentary debate and voting. In addition, plans and proposed legislation is subject to review by the State Council and the Grand Duke. Draft texts are published on a unified website where all proposed regulations are published and directly distributed to interested stakeholders. While the ministries do not have a legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment, the entire text of the proposed draft law is published. ( www.legilux.lu ) In addition, the Government solicits comments on proposed laws and regulations from the public. The comments are received on the same website (www.legilux.lu), through public meetings, and through targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations. Publicly listed companies adhere to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and their accounts must be audited accordingly by an officially accredited auditor. The Government does not mandate, but strongly encourages companies to disclose information on their environmental, social and governance (ESG) targets. There are multiple ESG labels, international and domestic that are enjoying a strong uptick. Luxembourg has also created an ESG label for investment products called LuxFlag and is home to the first and largest ESG bond exchange in the world, the Luxembourg Green Exchange (LGX). The law requires that the rulemaking body solicit comments on proposed regulations. The consultation period is typically three months, and the Government reports on the results of the consultation in the form of a consolidated response on the same website. The official journal Mémorial publishes the final text of laws, both online and in print. Proposed legislation also includes a factsheet on the impact on public finances. The Luxembourg Government is transparent with its public finances and debt obligations through the annual budget procedure that requires Parliamentary approval. The Government also communicates on issuances of new State borrowing. Luxembourg is a member state of the EU and routinely transposes EU directives and regulations into domestic law. Luxembourg has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Luxembourg ratified the TFA on October 5, 2015 and has an implementation rate of 100 percent. Luxembourg is a parliamentary representative democracy headed by a constitutional monarch . The Constitution of 1868 provides for a flexible separation of powers between the executive and the parliament, with the judiciary watching over proper application of laws. The Grand Duchy has a written commercial/contractual law. Magistrates’ courts deal with cases of lesser importance in civil and commercial matters and under the urgent procedure in the field of law enforcement. The district courts , of which there are three, adjudicate civil and commercial matters for all cases not specifically attributed by law to any other court. The current judicial process is considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, albeit notably slow (The judicial sector observes all public-school holiday periods). Regulation and enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). As previously mentioned, the website for doing business is: www.guichet.public.lu, and the new one-stop-shop for setting up a business is the House of Entrepreneurship within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce ( www.houseofentrepreneurship.lu ). The Competition Inspectorate, a department within the Ministry of the Economy, oversees investigating competition cases. The laws governing expropriation of property are quite complex, and the process can be arduous and lengthy, depending on the property. The Ministry of the Interior, along with the Ministry of Justice, sets forth the specific regulations according to each type of case. There have been no known expropriations in the recent past or policy shifts which would indicate such actions soon. There are no tendencies by the Luxembourg Government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation. Instances of indirect expropriation or governmental action tantamount to expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes, that might warrant special investigation, are non-existent. Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). Judgments of foreign courts are accepted and enforced by the local courts, and Luxembourg does have a written and consistently applied bankruptcy law, which is based on European Union-wide legislation. Monetary settlements are usually made in local currency (euro). Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The bankruptcy law is currently under review and the updated law is expected to be adopted by the end of 2022. At the end of 2021, the Luxembourg banking sector comprised 125 credit institutions from 26 different countries. Under Luxembourg law, two types of licenses are possible for the credit institutions: the Universal Banking License, and the Mortgage Bonds Banking License. The Ministry of Finance grants credit institutions operating out of the Grand Duchy an operating license. Since the entry into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on November 4, 2014, credit institutions are subjected to the control of the European Central Bank, either directly or indirectly through Luxembourg’s financial sector supervisory authority, the CSSF. The supervision by the ECB/CSSF extends equally to activities performed by these undertakings in another Member State of the EU, whether by means of the establishment of a branch or by free provision of services. 4. Industrial Policies Luxembourg is considered to be a very attractive tax location for conducting business: low effective corporate tax rates of 18 percent (with an adjusted rate of 15 percent for entities with annual taxable income less than 25,000 euro); the lowest VAT (value-added tax) rate in Europe (at 17 percent); and a variety of tax incentives, including investment tax credits, new business tax credit, subsidies for film productions, venture capital investment certificates, small business incentives, regional and national incentives, research and development incentives, and environmental incentives. The investment incentives are provided within the limitations of the EU rules on State aid, which were relaxed by the EU because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Luxembourg has taken full advantage by raising the aid ceiling for investment aid for projects focusing on digitization, sustainability, and the circular economy. Until recently, the European Court of Justice has been increasingly stringent on individual tax treatment, including a ruling specific to Luxembourg and its tax treatment of Apple. During 2020, the ECJ deemed to relax its approach in a case involving Amazon, ruling in the company’s favor. The full impact of these decisions and their impact on judicial review of these arrangements has yet to be fully determined. U.S. and foreign firms can participate in government/authority-financed and subsidized research and development programs. The Government offers discounts on electricity rates, tax credits as well as subsidies for companies investing into energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions. These investments need to be externally audited to qualify for government aid. The Government also promotes low-carbon transport through the roll-out of charging stations for electric vehicles. The measures regarding energy efficiency have proven very popular with energy intensive companies, which have benefited from millions of dollars of price advantages over the years on their electricity and gas rates, as a counterpart to establishing an energy efficiency performance program with dedicated measures. The de-carbonatization aid measures are a recent tool that is being rolled out and whose effects will be seen in the coming years. Luxembourg opened a free-trade zone called Le Freeport in 2014, which was built and integrated into the cargo logistics center at Luxembourg Airport. This zone, modeled after other successful customs warehousing in premier trade regions such as Geneva and Singapore, allows the warehousing and handling of high-value merchandise (art, cars, wines) in a secure location free of fiscal obligations (no Value-Added-Tax (VAT) or import duties to be paid as long as the goods remain on the premises). Taxation only occurs when the articles leave the zone as imports into the country of consumption (or if a bottle of wine is opened at Le Freeport, it is also subject to taxation). Data storage has been greatly enhanced via new state-of-the-art data centers, built by the government as part of the long-term massive ICT infrastructure development plan which includes replacing old transmission lines with fiber-optic cable across the country. The data centers have served to optimize international connectivity to large hubs such as Paris, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt, and have attracted major ICT and e-commerce players, such as Amazon and PayPal, which located their EU headquarters in Luxembourg. The centers are rated at the highest security level for data storage. Enforcement on the respect of data storage rules, such as the EU GDPR, rests with the Luxembourg data protection regulator CNPD. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property in Luxembourg, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced through intellectual property rights (IPR) and community laws. The legal system that protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights, such as land and buildings, is based on a land register, called cadastre in French, where each parcel of property is documented in terms of ownership and duration. There is adherence to key international agreements on iIPR, as well as adequate protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Luxembourg law allows the securitization of many types of assets, risks, revenues, and activities. It makes securitization accessible to all types of investors (institutional or individual), which means that securitization can easily facilitate the financing of a company or the management of personal or family wealth. An extremely wide range of assets can be securitized: securities, loans, subordinated or non-subordinated bonds, risks linked to debt (commercial and other), moveable and immovable property (whether tangible or not). Under Luxembourg law, a securitization vehicle can be constituted either as a company or a fund. Securitization companies can benefit from EU directives and double tax treaties. Securitization organizations that continually issue transferable assets for the public must be approved and supervised by the financial sector supervisory authority, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). Trademarks, designs, patents, and copyrights are the principal forms of intellectual property rights (IPR) available to companies and individuals. Luxembourg has been proactive in developing its IPR standards and participates in all the major IPR treaties and conventions, including: Berne Convention Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Paris Convention Patent Law Treaty (PLT) Madrid Agreement and Protocol The country is a signatory of the European Patent Convention, created by the European Patent Office (EPO), and a member state of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Adequate steps have also been taken to implement and enforce the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The regulation stipulating the measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, re-export, or entry for the suspension of counterfeit and pirated goods states that the competent authority to receive applications must be a customs authority. In Luxembourg, this is the Litigation and Research Department (Division des Contentieux et Recherches) of the Directorate of Customs and Excise (Direction des Douanes et Accises). Customs officers have every right to seize (but not necessarily destroy) goods. Most cases are related to customs declaration abuses by the owner (importing products above the maximum allowable amount for tax-free treatment within the EU), and not counterfeit goods. The merits of a counterfeit goods case are decided by judicial proceedings; thus, the ordinary law courts are responsible for deciding whether there are grounds for a case. A few provisions within the agreement deal with different IPR and allow for the possibility of confiscating, or even destroying, counterfeit goods and the tools or implements used for their production. The Luxembourg customs authorities may impose measures for a period of six months, which may be renewed at the request of the rights holder. The customs office tracks the seizures of counterfeit goods, notably at Luxembourg Airport, but this is a small part of customs work. There are no public statistics on such seizures. The main rules of civil procedure are contained in the Luxembourg Code of Civil Procedure and in the Administration of Justice Act. In the absence of specific rules concerning material and local jurisdiction for certain IPR, ordinary law applies. In an effort to become the prime location for Europe’s knowledge-based and digital economy, Luxembourg implemented a new IPR tax regime in 2008, providing for a very competitive tax rate (first 8%, then down to 3%) applicable to a broad range of IPR income generated by taxpayers. However, due to pressure from the EU Commission in Brussels to disallow specific member state fiscal advantages, the IPR fiscal regime in Luxembourg was no longer offered as of 2016, and assets are now subject to the standard VAT rate of 17%. In March 2018, the Luxembourg Government voted to approve the legislative measures necessary to bring Luxembourg’s new IPR regime into force with effect from January 1, 2018. The new regime is fully consistent with all recommendations made by the OECD’s Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, including those set out in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project Action 5 Final Report published in October 2015. Under the new regime, eligible net income from qualifying IPR assets benefits from an 80% exemption from income taxes. Consequently, a corporate taxpayer based in Luxembourg City with eligible net income was taxed on such income at an overall (i.e., corporate income taxes plus municipal business tax) effective tax rate of 5.202% in the 2018 tax year. IPR assets qualifying for the new regime also benefit from a full exemption from Luxembourg’s net wealth tax. Luxembourg is not included in the USTR’s 2021 Special 301 Report or 2020 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Luxembourg government policies, which reflect the European Union’s free movement of capital framework, facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the product and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market, thanks to the sophisticated and extremely developed international financial sector, depending on the banks’ individual lending policies. Since the financial crisis and tighter regulation through EU central banking authority and stability mechanisms, banks had become more selective in their lending practices pre-COVID. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, including those issued by the National Public Investment Agency (SNCI), and there is an effective regulatory system established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Luxembourg continues to be recognized as a model of fighting money-laundering activities within its banking system through the enactment of strict regulations and monitoring of fund sources. Indeed, the number of enforcements reflects the degree to which the government remains committed to fighting money-laundering. The country has its own stock market, a sub-set of which was rebranded in 2016 as a “green exchange” (LGX) to promote securities (primarily bonds in Luxembourg) reflecting ecologically sound investments. To this day, LGX has become the largest ESG and Green Bond market in the world. Luxembourg’s banking system is sound and strong, having been shored up following the global financial crisis by emergency investments by the Government of Luxembourg in BGL BNP Paribas (formerly Banque Generale du Luxembourg and then Fortis) and in Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (BIL), formerly Dexia, in 2008. At the end of 2021, 125 credit institutions were operating, with total assets under management by private banking of EUR 508 billion during the first quarter of 2022 (USD 560 bn), and approximately 26,000 employees. Luxembourg has a central bank, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg. Foreign banks can establish operations, subject to the same regulations as Luxembourgish banks. Due to the U.S. FATCA law, local retail bank Raiffeisen bank still refuses U.S. citizens as clients. However, two banks have offered to serve U.S. citizen customers: BIL and the State Bank and Savings Bank (Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat). On February 21, 2018, the Luxembourg House of Financial Technology (LHoFT) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European FinTech platform, B-Hive, based in Brussels, and the Dutch Blockchain Coalition, that will favor collaboration in the field of distributed ledger technology, otherwise known as blockchain. The MoU confirms mutual interest and defines the fields of collaboration, among other things, on how blockchain technology can benefit society and business in general or on how they can help define international and/or European standards for distributed ledger technology. The Ministry of Finance is tracking developments very closely in the field of virtual currencies and has said it will adapt its legislation in accordance with the results of ongoing European and international studies. Luxembourg places virtual currencies under the legal regime of payment companies. The CSSF continues close supervision and oversight of virtual currencies. Luxembourg created a sovereign wealth fund in 2014. The fund is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and operates with 234 million euros of assets. Until the fund reaches 250 million euros of assets, it operates a conservative investment policy, with a portfolio of 57% of bonds, 40% of stocks and 3% of liquidities. The sovereign wealth fund only invests outside of Luxembourg and is audited by an independent audit company. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The most prominent state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Luxembourg is POST (formerly P&T, postal and telecommunications), whose sole shareholder is the government of Luxembourg and whose board of directors is composed of civil servants. POST responded to the competition created by new players in the market (Orange, Proximus) by transforming itself from a passive utility company into a commercial enterprise, recruiting from the corporate sector, and improving consumer products and services. POST also publishes an annual report and communicates in a similar manner to a private company. Another sector in which SOEs have been very active is the energy sector (electric and gas utilities), which is now liberalized as well. Anyone can become a provider or distributor (via networks) of electricity and gas. The former state electricity utility, Cegedel, was absorbed into a private company, Encevo, along with a nearby German utility and the former state gas utility, with an independent board of directors. Creos, the new distribution network for energy, is jointly held by the government and private shareholders. Finally, an important market which appears to have barriers to entry is freight air transport, due to the dominance of the majority state-owned Cargolux. It is the largest consumer of U.S. exports to Luxembourg in terms of value, owing to their all-Boeing fleet of 30 747-freighter aircraft (including 14 of the new-generation 747-8F, of which Cargolux was a launch customer). It received a capital increase from the Luxembourg government in return for a larger share ownership of the company. China has invested in Cargolux, with a Chinese regional fund currently holding approximately one-third of the shares. Cargolux has aggressively expanded in China. Private enterprises can compete with public enterprises in Luxembourg under the same terms and conditions in all respects. All markets are now open or have been liberalized via EU directives to encourage market competition over monopolistic entities. There is a national regulator (National Institute of Regulation), which sets forth regulations and standards for economic sectors, mostly derived from EU directives transposed into local law. While markets continue to open, the government has maintained a large enough stake in critical sectors such as energy, to ensure national security. Luxembourg is an OECD member with established practices consistent with OECD guidelines as far as SOEs are concerned. There is no centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs. In general, if the government has a share in an enterprise, they will receive board of directors’ seats on a comparable basis to other shareholders and in proportion to their share, with no formal management reporting directly to a line minister. The court processes are transparent and non-discriminatory. Foreign investors can participate equally in ongoing privatization programs, and the bidding process is transparent with no barriers erected against foreign investors at the time of the initial investment or after the investment is made. Moreover, there are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. There are no other practices by private firms to force local ownership or restrict foreign investment, participation in, or control of domestic enterprises. There has been no evidence to suggest that potential conflicts of interest exist. Government officials sitting on boards of directors do not appear to have impacted freedom of investment in the private sector. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a heightened awareness of responsible business conduct in Luxembourg, whether it is in the corporate sector or among the consuming public. In financial matters, a desire to avoid inclusion on the OECD’s tax haven grey list has driven a push for greater transparency. While Luxembourg has always taken a lead role in ecological matters, including stringent trash sorting and mandatory recycling procedures, the global discussion on climate change, pushed to the forefront by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (COP 21) and pressure from the EU in terms of concrete goals and directives, has made green finance a high priority. In 2016, Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LuxSE) created the Luxembourg Green Exchange (LGX), the world’s first stock exchange to deal with securities related to climate change. It currently lists over $320 billion of green bonds. LGX is a dedicated platform for issuers and investors focused on green instruments. With over 750 securities denominated in 32 countries, this represents a 50% global market share for green bonds. In its offer, LuxSE helps issuers market their green securities by generating awareness for their green projects. There have been no controversial instances of corporate impact on human rights in Luxembourg.There are also independent NGOs, worker organizations/unions, and business trade associations promoting and monitoring RBC. These organizations can do their work freely and often directly integrated into the review, oversight, and supervisory process. There are no systemic labor or human rights concerns relating to RBC, with the government encouraging companies to respect human rights and pleading for a duty-of-care principle at the international level. In June 2018, the government adopted the country’s first National Action Plan to Implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, an initiative welcomed by civil society actors for educating the private sector on its responsibilities but criticized for failing to introduce a binding legal framework. In Luxembourg, there have been very few cases of labor exploitation and labor trafficking, with many of them occurring in the catering and construction sectors. Given the high bar of evidence for trafficking crimes and the fact that many victims travel to Luxembourg by their own means, perpetrators were often sentenced for the employment and/or exploitation of illegal workers and benefited from a suspended sentence if first-time offenders. Luxembourg signed the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in 2013. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Luxembourg has fully committed to the EU target of 55 percent Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions reductions by 2030 and net-zero emission by 2050, and has also set itself a national target of 25 percent renewable energy and 35-40 percent energy efficiency improvement by 2030. The GoL also established in 2021 specific sectoral targets to contribute to the overall objective for five specific sectors. They are transport, industry, agriculture, buildings and waste disposal. Luxembourg has not only implemented EU directives concerning emissions reduction, but also set forth major new energy policies to promote clean energies and energy conservation in consumer households. In 2010, the energy pass became compulsory for existing dwellings (houses and residences) that change owners or tenants and for accommodations that undergo substantial installation transformation ( www.myenergy.lu ). Starting in 2017, the government offered subsidies for zero-emissions vehicles as part of the tax reform. Starting in 2018, the government offered subsidies for hybrid plug-in electric vehicles (PHEV) owned by private customers, and zero emission (100 percent electric) vehicles owned by companies, as part of the tax reform. The government also adopted measures to make all public transportation free. In the context of the COVID-19 stimulus package, the Government increased these support measures in 2020 and introduced new incentives for low energy buildings. Since 2020, the GoL is also moving away from a tax income stream that consists of selling fuels at lower prices than its neighboring countries and introduced a CO2 tax to close the gap. In 2021, the Government has also overhauled the taxation of company cars to privilege the use of electric or hybrid vehicles. Companies have to adhere to strict pollution standards and provide biodiversity offsets when requesting planning and operation permits for industrial facilities. Public procurement rules also take into account environmental and green growth considerations, both at national and local levels. 9. Corruption Regulations are enforced by the strong but flexible Financial Sector Surveillance Commission (CSSF, which is equivalent to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Luxembourg. There are no known areas or sectors where corruption is pervasive, whether in Government procurement, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory system, or taxation. Giving or accepting a bribe, including between a local company and a public official, is a criminal act subject to the penal code. Recently, a mayor was implicated in abusing his office for personal purposes. Senior Government officials take anti-corruption efforts seriously. International, regional, or local nongovernmental watchdog organizations do not operate in the country, given the low risk. Luxembourg has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption effectively, and they are enforced impartially with no disproportionate attention to foreign investors or any other group. The country ranks very favorably on the World Bank’s corruption index. Luxembourg has made anti-money laundering and suppression of terrorism financing a priority, given its status as a leading world financial center. The government has taken the lead in freezing bank accounts suspected to be connected to terrorist networks, and since 2004 extended the law against money-laundering and terrorist financing to additional professional groups (including auditors, accountants, attorneys, and notaries). On February 14, 2018, a new law implementing a substantial part of the fourth anti-money laundering (AML) directive was published in the Official Journal of Luxembourg. The law entered into force on February 18, 2018. Local police, responsible for combating corruption, also work closely with neighboring countries’ law enforcement officials, as well as with Interpol and Europol. Luxembourg signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention (signed December 2003 and ratified in November 2007). Luxembourg is a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption are: Director of Criminal and Judicial Affairs Ministry of Justice 13 rue Erasme L-1468 Luxembourg Telephone: +352 247 84537 info@mj.etat.lu Contact at “watchdog” organization: D. Goedert Section Chief Financial Sector Surveillance Commission (CSSF) 283, route d’Arlon L-1150 Luxembourg +352 26 251 2217 compta@cssf.lu / audit@cssf.lu 10. Political and Security Environment Luxembourg has consistently ranked among the most politically stable and overall safest countries in the world. There have been no recent serious incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations. The environment is not growing more politicized such that civil disturbances would be likely. Of note: many of the demonstrations which do occur in Luxembourg are not aimed at the Grand Duchy, but rather at the EU offices located within Luxembourg (for example, the European Court of Justice and periodic European ministerial meetings). There are no known nascent insurrections, belligerent neighbors, or other politically motivated activities. The introduction of COVID-19 restrictions, especially regarding unvaccinated individuals, have led to disruptive protests in the city with isolated incidents of violence, which were dealt with by the Police. These incidents ran counter to the Luxembourg’s track record of peaceful and orderly protest. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Luxembourg boasts a very stable, diverse, multilingual, and qualified labor market, benefiting from the approximately 213,000 industrial and service employees (known as “cross-border” workers) who come to work in Luxembourg on a daily basis from neighboring Belgium, France, and Germany. Foreign (non-Luxembourger) workers are treated by Luxembourg the same as nationals, including free COVID testing. Work permit constraints have been somewhat relaxed for non-EU applicants (including Americans), particularly for qualified persons for skilled positions. Foreign investors often cite Luxembourg’s labor relations as a primary reason for locating in the Grand Duchy. Unemployment in Luxembourg has decreased from 6.3 to 5.2 percent and came back to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Most industrial workers are organized by unions, linked to one of the major political parties. Luxembourg is proud of the system of representatives of business, unions, and Government participating in a tripartite process in the conduct of major labor negotiations, which serves to avoid strikes, common in neighboring France and Germany. Luxembourg has a strong trade relationship with the United States. Every employee working in Luxembourg, whether a resident, European, or a third-country national, is subject to the provisions of labor law. Most active laws and regulations regarding work and employment in Luxembourg are incorporated in the Labor Code. The Inspectorate of Labor and Mines has responsibility for working conditions and protection of workers in the exercise of their professional activity (apart from civil servants). Collective bargaining agreements are common in the public and private sectors. The country has a labor dispute resolution mechanism in place called office de la conciliation (conciliation office). 14. Contact for More Information Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Luxembourg 22 Boulevard Emmanuel Servais L-2535 Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG +352-46-01-23-53 luxembourgpolecon@state.gov Macau Executive Summary Macau became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on December 20, 1999. Macau’s status since reverting to Chinese sovereignty is defined in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration (1987) and the Basic Law (the SAR’s de facto constitution). Under the concept of “one country, two systems” articulated in these documents, Macau enjoys a high degree of autonomy in economic matters, and its economic system is to remain unchanged for 50 years following the 1999 reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Macau, a separate customs territory, describes itself as a liberal economy and a free port. Tourism is the basis of the Macau economy. The Government of Macau (GOM) maintains a transparent, non-discriminatory, and free-market economy. The GOM is committed to maintaining an investor-friendly environment. In 2002, the GOM ended a long-standing gaming monopoly, awarding two gaming concessions and one sub-concession to consortia with U.S. interests. This opening encouraged substantial U.S. investment in casinos and hotels and has spurred rapid economic growth in the tourism, gaming, and entertainment sector, in which the gaming industry constitutes the most important pillar of Macau’s economy. In 2021, gaming taxes accounted for 67 percent of $6 billion total tax revenue collected. Macau is today the biggest gaming center in the world, having far surpassed Las Vegas in gambling revenue. However, Macau has been hit worse by the pandemic than Las Vegas due to inbound travel restrictions mandated by the GOM since January 2020, which drastically reduced the number of travelers from mainland China, who account for about 70 percent of all tourists entering Macau. Although the individual visa scheme that allows for mainland visitors to come to Macau resumed in August 2020, visa processing for tour groups, which have been the main source of tourists for years, is still on hold and its reactivation hinges on Beijing’s revising its rigid Zero-COVID policies. Macau recorded $10.82 billion in full-year casino gross gaming revenue in 2021, a 44 percent increase compared to 2020 figures, but still down 79 percent compared to the 2019 pre-pandemic numbers. U.S. investment over the past decade is estimated to exceed $24 billion. In addition to gaming, Macau aspires to position itself as a regional center for incentive travel, conventions, and tourism, though to date it has experienced limited success in diversifying its economy. In 2007, business leaders founded the American Chamber of Commerce of Macau. Macau also seeks to become a “commercial and trade cooperation service platform” between mainland China and Portuguese-speaking countries. The GOM has various policies to promote these efforts and to create business opportunities for domestic and foreign investors. Many infrastructure projects are currently underway, such as new casinos, hotels, subways, airport expansion, and the Macau-Taipa 4th vehicle harbor crossing that started construction in August 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 N/A of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $2,530 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $75,690 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Joint Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Portuguese Republic on the question of Macau was signed in March 1987, which established the constitutional principle of “One Country, Two Systems.”. The “One Country, Two Systems” principle guarantees that the rights related to autonomy, its capitalist system, its legal regime, and the liberal society enjoyed by Macau would remain unchanged until at least 2049. Drafted based on the Joint Declaration, Macau’s Basic Law came into effect in December 1999 and laid out the basic principles of Macau’s governance under Chinese sovereignty. The Basic Law also guaranteed that “One Country, Two Systems” would remain essentially unchanged in Macau until at least 2049. Macau has separate membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) from that of mainland China. According to the 2018 Index of Economic Freedom released by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation, Macau ranked 34th among 180 worldwide economies and ranked the 9th in the Asia Pacific region. However, Macau was excluded from the 2021 Index published in March 2021. The Heritage Foundation explained the decision to exclude Macau by saying that developments over the past few years have demonstrated unambiguously that those policies offering economic freedom to Macau are ultimately controlled from Beijing. There are no restrictions placed on foreign investment in Macau as there are no special rules governing foreign investment. Both overseas and domestic firms register under, and are subject to, the same regulations on business, such as the Commercial Code (Decree 40/99/M). Macau is heavily dependent on the gaming sector and tourism. The GOM aims to diversify Macau’s economy by attracting foreign investment and is committed to maintaining an investor-friendly environment. Corporate taxes are low, with a tax rate of 12 percent for companies whose net profits exceed MOP 600,000 (USD 75,000). Companies whose net profits are less than USD 75,000 are exempt from tax. The top personal tax rate is 12 percent and the first MOP 144,000 (USD 18,000) of an individual’s taxable income is exempt from personal tax. The tax rate of casino concessionaries is 35 percent on gross gaming revenue, plus a four percent contribution to a combined culture, infrastructure, tourism, and a social security fund. Macau is attempting to position itself as a regional center for incentive travel, conventions, and tourism. The concessions of all six of Macau’s gambling concessionaires and sub-concessionaires are now set to be extended for a period of six months from the original date of expiration to December 31, 2022, as the ongoing legislative review of the gaming law is taking longer than expected. The Legislative Assembly of Macau is currently reviewing and proposing amendments to the draft bill on the amendment to the gaming law ahead of the re-tendering of concessions. A fresh public tender process with up to six winning bidders granted ten-year concessions will follow once the bill is passed. The Macau Trade and Investment Promotion Institute (IPIM) is the GOM agency responsible for promoting trade and investment activities. IPIM provides one-stop services, including notary servicesfor business registration, and it applies legal and administrative procedures to all local and foreign individuals or organizations interested in setting up a company in Macau. Macau maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors through various business networks and platforms, such as the IPIM, the Macau Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce Macau, and the Macau Association of Banks. Macau participates in the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, a liaison platform that strengthens economic and commercial cooperation among Lusophone nations. The Forum hosts a ministerial-level conference in Macau on a triennial basis to gather businesspeople and government officials from the participating countries as well as representatives from international trade organizations and trade promotion entities.. Foreign firms and individuals are free to establish companies, branches, and representative offices without discrimination or undue regulation in Macau. There are no restrictions on the ownership of such establishments. Company directors are not required to be citizens of, or resident in, Macau, except for the following three professional services which impose residency requirements: Education: An individual applying to establish a school must have a Certificate of Identity or have the right to reside in Macau. The principal of a school must be a Macau resident. Newspapers and magazines: Applicants must first apply for business registration and register with the Government Information Bureau as an organization or an individual. The publisher of a newspaper or magazine must be a Macau resident or have the right to reside in Macau. Legal services: Lawyers from foreign jurisdictions who seek to practice Macau law must first obtain residency in Macau. Foreign lawyers must also pass an examination before they can register with the Lawyers’ Association, a self-regulatory body. The examination is given in Chinese or Portuguese. After passing the examination, foreign lawyers are required to serve an 18-month uninterrupted internship before they can practice law in Macau. Macau last conducted the WTO Trade Policy Review in November 2020. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s402_e.pdf The IPIM helps foreign investors in registering a company and liaising with the involved agencies for entry into the Macau market. The business registration process typically takes less than 10 working days. Company registration procedures can be found here: http://www.ipim.gov.mo/en/services/one-stop-service/handle-company-registration-procedures/ Macau does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. In 2020, the latest available data, outward direct investment flows of Macau enterprises increased by 34.6 percent year-on-year to MOP 9.44 billion while the stock of outward direct investment increased 21.6 percent year-on-year to MOP 69.89 billion. Hong Kong and mainland China remained the top two destinations. 3. Legal Regime The GOM typically conducts a two-month public consultation when amending or making legislation, including investment laws, and will prepare a draft bill based on the results of the public consultation. The lawmakers then discuss the draft bill before putting it to a final vote. All of the processes are transparent and consistent with international norms. Public comments received by the GOM are not made available online to the public. The draft bills are made available at the Legislative Assembly’s website (http://www.al.gov.mo/zh/), while this website http://www.io.gov.mo/ links to the GOM’s Printing Bureau, which publishes laws, rules, and procedures. Macau’s anti-corruption agency, the Commission Against Corruption (known by its Portuguese acronym CCAC), carries out ombudsman functions to safeguard rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of individuals and to ensure the impartiality and efficiency of public administration. Macau’s law on the budgetary framework (Decree 15/2017) aims to reinforce monitoring of public finances and to enhance transparency in the preparation and execution of the fiscal budget. Macau does not owe debt to any countries. The public can retrieve up-to-date data on public finance from the Financial Services Bureau website https://www.dsf.gov.mo/financialReport/?lang=en at all times. Macau is a member of the WTO since 1995 and adopts international norms. The GOM notified all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Macau, as a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), has achieved a 100 percent rate of implementation commitments. Under “one country, two systems”, Macau maintains Continental European law as the foundation of its legal system, which is based on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Macau has written commercial law and contract law. The Commercial Code is a comprehensive source of commercial law, while the Civil Code serves as a fundamental source of contractual law. Courts in Macau include the Court of Final Appeal, Intermediate Courts, and Primary Courts. There is also an Administrative Court, which has jurisdiction over administrative and tax cases. These provide an effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Currently, the Court of Final Appeal has three judges; the Intermediate Courts have nine judges; and the Primary Courts have 33 judges. The Public Prosecutions Office has 36 prosecutors. Macau passed a National Security Law in 2009 that prohibits and punishes crimes against national security, including treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and collusion with foreign political organizations. Preparatory acts leading to any of these crimes may also constitute a criminal offense. Macau’s courts still have jurisdiction over all local cases except those related to defense and foreign affairs. The 2009 National Security Law did not affect this jurisdiction. Macau’s legal system is based on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Foreign and domestic companies register under the same rules and are subject to the same set of commercial and bankruptcy laws (Decree 40/99/M). Macau has no agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns, nor does it have a competition law. The Commercial Code (Law No. 16/2009) contains basic elements of a competition policy for commercial practices that can distort the proper functioning of markets. In response to public outcries of price-fixing schemes in the Macau oil and food retail industries, in March 2019, the GOM commissioned Macau University of Science and Technology to conduct research on how to optimize market institutions to help foster healthy private sector competition. The research results were released to the public in May 2020. Based on this research, the GOM claimed that a legislative solution such as an anti-monopoly or anti-trust law would not necessarily bring about lower prices. Rather, the GOM appointed the Macau Consumer Council to monitor the local market prices and determine when the need for new legislation on market competition is warranted. Speaking at a Legislative Assembly plenary meeting on consumer rights protection law in June 2021, the Secretary for Economy and Finance revealed that the authorities still do not have a specific timetable for enacting competition and antitrust laws, explaining that Macau is a civilized society, and legislation is always the last resort to promote ethical conduct and integrity. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any direct or indirect actions to expropriate. Legal expropriations of private property may occur if it is in the public interest. In such cases, the GOM will exchange the private property with an equivalent public property based on the fair market value and conditions of the former. The exchange of property is in accordance with established principles of international law. There is no remunerative compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Both the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) apply to Macau. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Decree 55/98/M) provides for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The U.S. Consulate General is aware of one previous investment dispute involving U.S. or other foreign investors or contractors and the GOM. In March 2010, a low-cost airline carrier was reportedly forced to cancel flight services because of a credit dispute with its fuel provider, triggering events which led to the airline’s de-licensing. Macau courts declared the airline bankrupt in September 2010. The airline’s major shareholder, a U.S. private investment company, filed a case in the Macau courts seeking a judgment as to whether a GOM administrative act led to the airline’s demise. The Court of Second Instance held hearings in May and June 2012. In November 2013, the Court of Second Instance rejected the appeal. Private investment disputes are normally handled in the courts or via private negotiation. Alternatively, disputes may be referred to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center or the World Trade Center Macau Arbitration Center. The Arrangement for Mutual Service of Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Cases between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region came into effect in August 2020, significantly accelerating the service of such judicial documents between the two regions. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Macau has an arbitration law (Decree 55/98/M), which adopts the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law for international commercial arbitration. The GOM accepts international arbitration of investment disputes between itself and investors. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The GOM in May 2020 enacted the New Arbitration Law, which unifies the laws governing domestic and international arbitration in Macau. This arbitration reform incorporated best international practices with effective dispute resolution techniques for investment disputes, including the introduction of emergency arbitrator mechanism, limitation on rights of appeal, procedure for courts assistance in taking of evidence, recognition and enforcement of interim measures, and publication of arbitral awards. Macau established the World Trade Center Macau Arbitration Center in June 1998. The objective of the Center is to promote the resolution of disputes through arbitration and conciliation, providing the disputing parties with alternative resolutions other than judicial litigation. Foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters may be enforced in Macau. The enforcement of foreign judgments is stipulated in Articles 1199 and 1200 of the Civil Procedure Code. A foreign court decision will be recognized and enforced in Macau if it qualifies as a final decision supported by authentic documentation and that its enforcement will not breach Macau’s public policy. Commercial and bankruptcy laws are written under the Macau Commercial Code, the Civil Procedure Code, and the Penal Code. Bankruptcy proceedings can be invoked by an application from the bankrupt business, by petition of the creditor, or by the Public Prosecutor. There are four methods used to prevent the occurrence of bankruptcy: the creditors meeting, the audit of the company’s assets, the amicable settlement, and the creditor agreement. According to Articles 615-618 of the Civil Code and Article 351-353 of the Civil Procedure Code, a creditor who has a justified fear of losing the guarantee of his credits may request seizure of the assets of the debtor. Bankruptcy offenses are subject to criminal liability. In October 2020, Macau Post and Telecommunications Bureau announced the establishment of a credit information system, allowing banks to inquire about the credit status of lenders when approving individual customer credit applications, while mandating those who want to borrow money from banks to apply for a personal credit report from the new system for the bank’s assessment. The new system is expected to enter service as soon as the second quarter of 2022. 4. Industrial Policies To attract foreign investment, the GOM offers investment incentives to investors on a national treatment basis. These incentives are contained in Decrees 23/98/M and 49/85/M and are provided so long as companies can prove they are doing one of the following: promoting economic diversification, contributing to the promotion of exports to new unrestricted markets, promoting added value within their activity’s value chain, or contributing to technical modernization. There is no requirement that Macau residents own shares. These incentives are categorized as fiscal incentives, financial incentives, and export diversification incentives. Fiscal incentives include full or partial exemption from profit/corporate tax, industrial tax, property tax, stamp duty for transfer of properties, and consumption tax. The tax incentives are consistent with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as they are neither export subsidies nor import substitution subsidies as defined in the WTO Agreement. In 2019, the GOM put forward an enhanced tax deduction for research and development (R&D) expenditure incurred for innovation and technology projects by companies whose registered capital reached USD 125,000, or whose average taxable profits reached USD 62,500 per year in three consecutive years. The tax deduction amounts to 300 percent for the first USD 375,000 of qualifying R&D expenditure and 200 percent for the remaining amount, subject to a limit of USD 1.9 million in total). In addition, income received from Portuguese speaking countries is exempt from the corporate tax, provided such income has been subject to tax in its place of origin. Two new laws to encourage financial leasing activities in Macau became effective in April 2019. Under the new regime, the minimum capital requirement of a financial leasing company is reduced from USD 3.75 million to USD 1.25 million. In addition, the acquisition by the financial leasing company of a property exclusively for its sole use has an exemption of up to USD 62,500 from a stamp duty. An approved financial leasing company can also be exempted from stamp duty for registration of initial and additional capital, interest and commission, and financial contracts. Financial incentives include government-funded interest subsidies. Export diversification incentives include subsidies given to companies and trade associations attending trade promotion activities organized by IPIM. Only companies registered with the Economic and Technological Development Bureau (ETDB) may receive subsidies for costs such as space rental or audio-visual material production. Macau also provides other subsidies for the installation of anti-pollution equipment. Macau is a free port; however, there are four types of dutiable commodities: liquors, tobacco, vehicles, and petrol (gasoline). Licenses must be obtained from the ETDB prior to importation of these commodities. In order to promote the MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions, and exhibitions) and logistics industries in Macau, the GOM has accepted the ATA Carnet (Admission Temporaire/Temporary Admission), an international customs document providing an efficient method for the temporary import and re-export of goods that eases the way for foreign exhibitions and businesses. The latest CEPA addition established principles of trade facilitation, including simplifying customs procedures, enhancing transparency, and strengthening cooperation. Macau does not follow a forced localization policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. The Macau government adopts stringent foreign labor policies, however, mandating that Macau residents receive priority in the hiring process so that their opportunities for work are not compromised by the importation of foreign workers. Non-residents are approved to work in Macau only when employers are unable to find suitable candidates in the local labor market. Employers who want to hire foreign labor must request a prior authorization from the Macau Labor Affairs Bureau and attest that the manpower provided by the non-resident workers is, according to the law, supplemental, provisional, secondary, and sustainable. Critics of the Macau labor policies say the asymmetrical legal provisions in the hiring process between Macau residents and non-resident undermine the labor rights of the foreign worker on a practical level. Applications for employing foreign workers are processed by the Macau Labor Affairs Bureau. There are no requirements by the GOM for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (i.e., backdoors into hardware and software or turning over keys for encryption). According to the Personal Data Protection Act (Decree 8/2005), if there is transfer of personal data to a destination outside Macau, the opinion of the Office for Personal Data Protection — the regulatory authority responsible for supervising and enforcing the Act — must be sought to confirm if the destination ensures an adequate level of protection. In December 2019, Macau’s Cybersecurity Law came into force. Under this law, public and private network operators in certain industries must meet obligations, including providing real-time access to select network data to Macau authorities, with the stated aim of protecting the information network and computer systems. For example, network operators must register and verify the identity of users before providing telecommunication services. The new law creates new investment and operational costs for affected businesses and has raised some privacy and surveillance concerns. In December 2021, the Legislative Assembly passed a new wiretapping bill stipulating duties of conservation of data for telecommunications operators, in which they must keep the communication records, except the content of communications, produced by the use of their services for one year. During the retention period, telecommunications operators must guarantee the security and confidentiality of relevant data. 5. Protection of Property Rights Private ownership of property is enshrined in the Basic Law. There are no restrictions on foreign property ownership. Macau has a sound banking mortgage system, which is under the supervision of the Macau Monetary Authority (MMA). There are only a small number of freehold property interests in the older part of Macau. According to the Cartography and Cadaster Bureau, 21 percent of land parcels in Macau do not have clear title, for unknown reasons. Industry observers commented that no one knows whether these land parcels will be privately or publicly owned in the future. The Land Law (Decree 10/2013) stipulates that provisional land concessions cannot be renewed upon their expiration if their leaseholders fail to finish developing the respective plots of land within a maximum concession period of 25 years. The leaseholders will not only be prohibited from renewing the undeveloped concessions – regardless of who or what caused the non-development – but also have no right to be indemnified or compensated. Macau is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Macau is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report. Macau has acceded to the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Patents and trademarks are registered under Decree 97/99/M. Macau’s copyright laws are compatible with the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and government offices are required to use only licensed software. The GOM devotes considerable attention to intellectual property rights enforcement and coordinates with copyright holders. Source Identification Codes are stamped on all optical discs produced in Macau. The ETDB uses an expedited prosecution arrangement to speed up punishment of accused retailers of pirated products. The copyright protection law has been extended to cover online privacy. Copyright infringement for trade or business purposes is subject to a fine or maximum imprisonment of four years. Macau Customs maintains an enforcement department to investigate incidents of intellectual property (IP) theft. Macau Customs works closely with mainland Chinese authorities, foreign customs agencies, and the World Customs Organization to share best practices to address criminal organizations engaging in IP theft. In 2021, Macau Customs seized a total of 6,369 pieces of counterfeit goods, including 4,549 garments, 496 watches, and 721 containers of illicit alcohol. In 2021, the ETDB filed a total of 14,743 applications for trademark registrations. 6. Financial Sector Macau allows free flows of financial resources. Foreign investors can obtain credit in the local financial market. The GOM is stepping up its efforts to develop finance leasing businesses and exploring opportunities to establish a system for trade credit insurance to take a greater role in promoting cooperation between companies from Portuguese-speaking countries. Since 2010, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has provided cross-border settlement of funds for Macau residents and institutions involved in transactions for RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong. Macau residents and institutions can purchase or sell, through Macau RMB participating banks, RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong and Macau. The Macau RMB Real Time Gross Settlements (RMB RTGS) System came into operation in March 2016 to provide real-time settlement services for RMB remittances and interbank transfer of RMB funds. The RMB RTGS System is intended to improve risk management and clearing efficiency of RMB funds and foster Macau’s development into an RMB clearing platform for trade settlement between China and Portuguese-speaking countries. In December 2019, the PBoC canceled an existing quota of RMB 20,000 (USD 3,057) exchanged in Macau for each individual transaction. Macau has no stock market, but Macau companies can seek a listing in Hong Kong’s stock market. Macau and Hong Kong financial regulatory authorities cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Under the Macau Insurance Ordinance, the MMA authorizes and monitors insurance companies. There are 12 life insurance companies and 13 non-life insurance companies in Macau. In 2021, total net profit from insurance services including life insurance and general insurance amounted to MOP 22.3 billion (USD 2.8 billion). USD. In October 2018, the Legislative Assembly took steps to tackle cross-border tax evasion. Offshore institutions in Macau and their tax benefits, including credit institutions, insurers, underwriters, and offshore trust management companies, were thoroughly abolished starting from January 1, 2021. Decree 9/2012, in effect since October 2012, stipulates that banks must compensate depositors up to a maximum of MOP 500,000 (USD 62,500) in case of a bank failure. To finance the deposit protection scheme, the GOM has injected MOP 150 million (USD 18.75 million) into the deposit protection fund in 2013, with banks paying an annual contribution of 0.05 percent of the amount of protected deposits held. The deposit protection fund had MOP 486 million (USD 60.75 million) available by the end of 2018, according to the MMA. The MMA functions as a de facto central bank. It is responsible for maintaining the stability of Macau’s financial system and for managing its currency reserves and foreign assets. At present, there are thirty-one financial institutions in Macau, including 12 local banks and 19 branches of banks incorporated outside Macau. There is also a finance company with restrictive banking activities, two financial leasing companies and a non-bank credit institution dedicated to the issuance and management of electronic money stored value card services. In addition, there are 11 moneychangers, two cash remittance companies, two financial intermediaries, six exchange counters, two payment service institutions, and two other financial institutions (one is a representative office). The Bank of China (Macau) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are the two largest banks in Macau, with total assets of USD 79.8 billion and USD 33.9 billion, respectively. Total deposits amounted to USD 83.5 billion by the end of 2021. As of December 2021, total international assets of banks in Macau increased to MOP 2,311.4 billion (USD 287.8 billion). In the third quarter of 2021, banks in Macau maintained a capital adequacy ratio of 14.9 percent, well above the minimum eight percent recommended by the Bank for International Settlements. Accounting systems in Macau are consistent with international norms. The MMA prohibits the city’s financial institutions, banks, and payment services from providing services to businesses issuing virtual currencies or tokens. In December 2020, the MMA said it is communicating with the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) about the feasibility of issuing digital currency in Macau. In a Legislative Assembly plenary meeting in April 2021, Chief Executive Ho Iat-seng continued to reiterate that the GOM is closely following the trend of digital currency development around the world and maintains close communication with the PBoC regarding the implementation of the digital renminbi in Macau. However, no specific timetable or update was given since his remarks in 2021. Foreign Exchange Profits and other funds associated with an investment, including investment capital, earnings, loan repayments, lease payments, and capital gains, can be freely converted and remitted. The domestic currency, Macau Official Pataca (MOP), is pegged to the Hong Kong Dollar at 1.03 and indirectly to the U.S. Dollar at an exchange rate of approximately MOP 7.99 = USD 1. The MMA is committed to exchange rate stability through maintenance of the peg to the Hong Kong Dollar. Although Macau imposes no restrictions on capital flows or foreign exchange operations, exporters are required to convert 40 percent of foreign currency earnings into MOP. This legal requirement does not apply to tourism services. There are no recent changes to or plans to change investment remittance policies. Macau does not restrict the remittance of profits and dividends derived from investment, nor does it require reporting on cross-border remittances. Foreign investors can bring capital into Macau and remit it freely. A Memorandum of Understanding on anti-money laundering (AML) actions between MMA and PBoC, increased information exchanges between the two parties, as well as cooperation on onsite inspections of casino operations. Furthermore, Macau’s terrorist asset-freezing law, which is based on United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, requires travelers entering or leaving with cash or other negotiable monetary instruments valued at MOP 120,000 (USD 15,000) or more to sign a declaration form and submit it to the Macau Customs Service. In December 2019, the PBoC increased a daily limit set on the amount of RMB-denominated funds sent by Macau residents to personal accounts held in mainland China from RMB 50,000 (USD 6,250) to RMB 80,000 (USD 10,000). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested in July 2014 that the GOM invest its large fiscal reserves through a fund modeled on sovereign wealth funds to protect the city’s economy from economic downturns. In November 2015, the GOM decided to establish such a fund, called the MSAR Investment and Development Fund (MIDF), through a substantial allocation from the city’s ample fiscal reserves. However, the GOM in 2019 withdrew a draft bill that proposed the use of USD 7.7 billion to seed the MIDF over public concerns about the government’s supervisory capability. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The six gaming concessionaires that dominate Macau’s economy pay four percent of gross gaming revenues to the government to fund cultural and social programs in the SAR. Several operators also directly fund gaming addiction rehabilitation programs. Some government-affiliated entities maintain active corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. For example, Companhia de Electricidade de Macau, an electric utility, provides educational programs and repair services free-of-charge to underprivileged residents. The GOM did not put any restrictions on the qualifications of the potential bidders in the 2002 public tender of gaming concession. Twenty-one companies, including those holding capital in Macau, Hong Kong, the U.S., Malaysia, Australia, United Kingdom, and Taiwan, submitted bidding papers, but the government eventually granted concessions to only three bidders: SJM, Wynn Macau, and Galaxy Entertainment Group. Subsequently, another three casino operators, Sands China, MGM China Holdings, and Melco Resorts and Entertainment Ltd, were allowed into the market via sub-concessions spun off from the three original concessionaires selected in the 2002 public tender. As all six gaming concessions and sub-concessionaires will expire by June 2022, the GOM is now revising the city’s gaming laws and plans to complete the task by the fourth quarter of 2021, before submitting a finalized draft bill to the Legislative Assembly. One of the nine factors that the GOM will consider for the renewal of the gaming licenses is the casino operator’s CSR (corporate social responsibility) performance. Unlike 2002, the GOM will likely require potential casino operators to increase their organization’s CSR efforts in Macau and to do more to facilitate Macau’s economic diversification. In November 2019, the Business Awards of Macau presented the Gold Award to Galaxy Entertainment Group for its CSR initiatives. Macau is not a member of the OECD, and hence, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are not applicable to Macau companies. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain 9. Corruption Mainland China extended in February 2006 the United Nations Convention Against Corruption to Macau. Macau has laws to combat corruption by public officials and the private sector. Anti-corruption laws are applied in a non-discriminatory manner and effectively enforced. One provision stipulates that anyone who offers a bribe to foreign public officials (including officials from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and officials of public international organizations in exchange for a trade deal could receive a jail term of up to three years or fines. The CCAC is a member of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities and a member of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific. The CCAC’s guidelines on prevention and repression of corruption in the private sector and a booklet Corruption Prevention Tips for Private Companies provide rules of conduct that private companies must observe. In January 2019, the GOM completed a public consultation on public procurement to create a legal framework through which the GOM will seek to promote an efficient and transparent regime. Resources to Report Corruption CHAN Tsz King, CommissionerCommission Against Corruption105, Avenida Xian Xing Hai, 17/F, Centro Golden Dragon, Macau+853- 2832-6300 ccac@ccac.org.mo 10. Political and Security Environment Macau is politically stable. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any incidents in recent years involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations. Macau enacted its own National Security Law (NSL) in 2009. While human rights groups raised concerns at the time that the NSL’s “vague and broad provisions” would erode freedom of association and expression in Macau, the passage of the Macau NSL was not as controversial as the one in Hong Kong, and no one has been charged under the Macau NSL since its enactment in 2009. In 2021, Macau election authorities for the first time in the history of the SAR disqualified 21 pro-democracy candidates from running in its Legislative Assembly election. Macau’s pro-democracy politicians, which traditionally occupied a small minority in its legislature, were disqualified for disloyalty to the Macau SAR and PRC government. The absence of pro-democracy candidates on the ballot caused voter turnout to reach its lowest level in more than twenty years. Macau continues to enforce restrictions of admission and travel controls due to COVID-19 related concerns, including compulsory COVID testing and self-quarantine upon arrival. As of March 16, 2021, foreign nationals from areas outside mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are still prohibited from entering Macau, though exceptions are in place for some foreigners related to Macau residents, students, and essential workers, or for select business or academic reasons. Foreign nationals entering from mainland China will need to have been physically present in mainland China for 21 consecutive days before entering Macau. The Macau government did not provide a timeline for re-opening the borders for foreign nationals apart from those from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since January 2020, U.S. citizens living in Macau have been unable to obtain in-person consular services due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions mandated by the Macau government. Mail-in services can be an acceptable alternative in certain situations but cannot replace services that require a personal appearance before a consular officer such as the issuance of citizenship documents for children born in Macau and renewals of minor/first-time adult passports. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Macau’s unemployment rate stood at 3.1 percent for the entire population in December 2021. Foreign businesses cite a constant shortage of skilled workers – a result of the past decade’s boom in entertainment facilities – as a top constraint on their operations and future expansion. The government is studying proposals to resolve the human resources problem. For example, Macau has labor importation schemes for unskilled and skilled workers who cannot be recruited locally. However, both local and foreign casino operators in Macau are required by law to employ only Macau residents as croupiers. Taxi and bus drivers must also be local residents. There is no such restriction imposed on any other sector of the economy. Macau does not have any policies that waive labor laws to attract or retain investment. The rights for workers to form trade unions and to strike are both enshrined in the Basic Law, but there are no laws in Macau that specifically deal with those rights. The law does not provide that workers can collectively bargain, and while workers have the right to strike, there is no specific protection in the law from retribution if workers exercise this right. Labor unions are independent of the government and employers, by law and in practice. According to the Labor Relations Law, a female worker cannot be dismissed, except with just cause (e.g., willful disobedience to orders given by superiors, or violation of regulations on occupational hygiene and safety), during her pregnancy or within three months of giving birth. In May 2020, the GOM amended the Labor Relations Law specifically to extend the minimum paid maternity leave period and introduce employer-paid paternity leave. Under the new amendment, female employees are entitled to at least 70 days of maternity leave while fathers are entitled to five working days of employer-paid paternity leave. In practice, either the employer or the employee may rescind the labor contract with or without just cause. In general, any circumstance that makes it impossible to continue the labor relation can constitute just cause for rescission of the contract. If the employer terminates the contract with the worker without just cause, the employer must pay the employee severance pay. In the event of dismissal, with or without just cause, employees are entitled to compensation depending on the length of the employment relationship. In addition, Macau’s social security system, which is regulated by Decree 84/89/M, provides local workers with economic aid when they are elderly, unemployed, or sick. Workers who believe they were dismissed unlawfully can bring a case to court or lodge a complaint with the Labor Affairs Bureau. Even without formal collective bargaining rights, companies often negotiate with unions, although the government may act as an intermediary. There is no indication that past disputes or appeals were subject to lengthy delays. The Labor Relations Law does not contain provisions regarding collective bargaining, which is not common at the company or industry level. The GOM has put measures in place to replace some foreign workers with Macau residents. Macau has a law imposing criminal penalties for employers of illegal migrants and preventing foreign workers from changing employers in Macau. The government has used the proceeds of a tax on the import of temporary workers for retraining local unemployed people. Effective November 1, 2020, Macau employees are protected by the universal minimum wage law which stipulates that the monthly salary of Macau employees must be at least MOP 6,656 (USD 832), with a minimum hourly wage of MOP 32 (USD 4). Special note on COVID-19: In May 2020, Macau imposed additional COVID entry restrictions to Blue Card holders (foreign workers holding non-resident work permits), effectively barring them from returning to Macau even if their Blue Card is still valid. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $24,300 2020 $25,586 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MO Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $398 2019 $2,530 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2017 $17 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 80% 2019 71.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report *Source for Host Country Data: Macau Statistics and Census Service Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 37,012 100% Total Outward 8,557 100% China, P.R: Hong Kong 10,190 28% China, P.R: Mainland 7,480 87% Cayman Island 8,720 24% China, P.R: Hong Kong 1,263 15% China, P.R: Mainland 7,341 20% Vietnam 56 1% British Virgin Islands 5,913 16% United States 2,094 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 134,753 100% All Countries 46,333 100% All Countries 88,420 100% China, P.R: Mainland 51,181 38% China, P.R: Mainland 16,612 36% China, P.R: Mainland 34,569 39% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 16,327 12% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 8,218 18% British Virgin Islands 10,039 11% United States 14,743 11% Cayman Islands 6,178 13% United States 8,965 10% Cayman Islands 12,119 9% United States 5,777 12% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 8,109 9% British Virgin Islands 10,051 7% Luxembourg 2,964 6% Cayman Islands 5,941 7% 14. Contact for More Information: Timothy J, Giangarlo , Consul, Economic Affairs U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong and Macau 26 Garden Road, Central Malawi Executive Summary Malawi’s economy was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Gross domestic product growth slowed to 0.9 percent in 2020, but rebounded slightly in 2021, expanding by 2.2 percent. The government forecasts this trend will continue and forecasts growth of 4.5 percent by 2023. Macroeconomic and fiscal challenges remain, however. The government’s heavy debt burden and persistent fiscal deficits are likely to restrain economic expansion that outpaces population growth. Inflation was 9 percent in 2021, driven largely by currency devaluation and price increases for imported goods, primarily fuel, fertilizers, and food. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and is particularly vulnerable to climate related shocks. The Government of Malawi is eager to attract foreign direct investment. Investment opportunities exist in agricultural, mining, health, transportation, information technology, and energy sectors. Transportation is a potential growth sector as the government works to improve the road network and rehabilitate railway lines connecting Malawi to Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. Public-private partnership opportunities are likely to open in aviation and road networks. Corruption remains a major problem at all levels of the public and private sectors. There is a scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled labor. Political risk in Malawi is manageable and tribal, religious, regional, ethnic, or racial tensions are minimal. The Malawi Investment and Trade Center assists investors and businesses by providing insight and local knowledge to help navigate the myriad regulations, processes, and procedures required to operate a business. Malawi’s legal system is generally unbiased but is notoriously slow. Investors have the right to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Parliament is scheduled to review existing land laws in early 2022. If passed, the reforms may negatively affect foreign ownership and investment in land-based enterprises. Scarcity of foreign exchange (forex) remains a challenge and negatively affects investors. The government aims to maintain a three-month supply of forex, but often falls short of that goal. Forex rationing has led to several months wait for business to remit foreign investment funds. Despite the long wait times, there are currently no restrictions on remittance of foreign investment funds if the capital and loans initially came from foreign sources and were registered with the Reserve Bank of Malawi. Malawi is a land-locked country and the road network connecting to ports in neighboring countries is limited. Investment in infrastructure overall has been limited. Formal and informal trade boundaries may restrict imports and exports, and import tariffs tend to be high. Malawi is one of the least electrified countries in the world; approximately eleven percent of the country has access to regular electricity and internet is unreliable, and expensive. The government is committed to addressing climate change through climate smart policies and programs. The Environmental Management Act provides details on environmental requirements for investors and ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). Climate change issues are integrated across the public service and national development plans. However, limited resources and issues related to poverty impede the government’s ability to implement climate adaptation and resilience programs and initiatives. Malawi’s borders are open to local and international travelers, but all travelers are required to present negative COVID-19 test results and certificate of COVID-19 vaccination. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 107 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 188 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 580 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Malawi is open to foreign and domestic investment. Foreign investors may invest in most sectors of the economy and may access government investment incentives. There are no restrictions on ownership, size of investment, source of funds, investment sector, or whether the products are destined for export or for domestic markets. An investor can disinvest 100%, make international payments, and cannot be forced into local partnerships. The Malawi Stock Exchange limits an individual foreign investor to 10% of any company’s initial public offering (IPO) and limits foreign investment to 49% of total shares in the company. The Cabinet Committee on Public Private Partnership was established in 2020 to boost private sector growth. The government utilizes the Malawi Investment and Trade Center ( MITC ), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Malawi Revenue Authority, Reserve Bank of Malawi, and the Public Private Partnership Commission to interface with foreign investors. The Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry ( MCCCI ) represents all sectors of the economy and has successfully lobbied the government on various private sector issues in the past. The Malawi Investment Forum serves as a platform for marketing the country, fostering partnerships, and bringing in foreign direct investment. The government does not impose restrictions on the ownership or location of investments. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors of the economy except those that are deemed to pose a danger to health, the environment, or national security. There are no restrictions on funding sources, destinations, or final product. All companies are required to have at least two Malawian residents as directors, and there are limitations on foreign ownership of land. The 2022 session of Parliament is expected to review the current Land Act of 2016. The act states that neither Malawians nor foreigners can acquire freehold land. Foreigners can secure lease-hold land for up to 50 years and may renew the leasehold in most instances. Foreigners can only secure private land when no Malawian citizen has made an equal offer for the same land. The 2022 land act reform is expected to place additional restrictions on ownership and land acquisition by foreigners. Malawian nationals receive preferential treatment during the privatization of government assets; this can include discounted share prices and subsidized credit. The 2017 amendment to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act calls for “the prioritization of all bids submitted to give 60% preference to indigenous black Malawians.” In 2020, the government drafted Indigenous Black Malawian (IBM) Preference regulations. These were approved by Parliament but failed to be gazetted due to pressure from non-indigenous populations. There is a high likelihood that the regulations will be gazetted in 2022. The Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Participation Order restricts government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to allocate procurements below certain thresholds to MSMEs ( PPDA Legal Instruments ). Prior to establishing or conducting business in Malawi, all foreign investors are required to obtain an investment certificate from MITC . As part of the certification process, investors must register with the Registrar General’s office and RBM and have a minimum of $50,000 to invest ( MITC Investment Procedures ). MITC announced plans to revise the threshold for capital requirements in 2019 but provided no concrete timeline for completion. The proposed thresholds will differ by sectors and may go as high as $500,000, if implemented. Registration of borrowed invested funds allows investors to externalize profits to pay back loans contracted abroad and repatriate funds when disinvesting. ( MITC Malawi ). The last Trade Policy Review of Malawi was conducted by the WTO in April 2016. The full report is available at WTO TPR . The OECD and UNCTAD have not conducted investment policy reviews for Malawi. There are no recent policy recommendations by civil society organizations based on reviews of investment policy related concerns. The MITC offers business facilitation services to any foreign or domestic investor through their One Stop Center. The center houses representatives from Registrar General , Malawi Revenue Authority , Department of Immigration , and Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. Information can also be found on MITC’s main website, the iGuides , and its online trade portal www.trade.mitc.mw ; and http://www.malawitradeportal.gov.mw/ . To operate in Malawi, a business must register with the Registrar General, the Malawi Revenue Authority and the Ministry or regulatory body overseeing their particular sector. Businesses can register online through the Registrar General; however, the online process can be cumbersome and inefficient due to technical constraints. Registering in person is preferred and generally less time consuming. Businesses must also obtain business licenses from the city assembly, register the worksite with the Ministry of Labor, and allow health officials to carry out periodic inspections of the company premises ( https://mitc.mw/invest/index.php ). Malawi does not incentivize or promote outward investment. The Pension Act of 2010 and accompanying regulations prohibit domestic investors from investing pension funds or umbrella funds in foreign schemes. There are no other prohibitions on domestic investors investing abroad. MITC is responsible for the promotion and facilitation of trade and investment. MITC offers services to both local and foreign investors, for both inward and outward facing investments. In practice, most MITC services are for domestic investing and business development. 3. Legal Regime The government continues to work on policy reforms to support business development and investment. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are partially transparent and consistent with international norms. Almost all proposed laws, regulations, and policies (including investment laws) are subject to public consultation before submission to the Cabinet, Parliament, or Ministry of Justice. However, public consultation notices are often posted late, resulting in a situation in which only insiders are aware of and able to participate in the consultation process. Enforcement of laws and regulations varies by location and sector and is limited by government resources and capacity. All regulations follow the same approximate process. The relevant government MDA develops technical regulations and forward them to Ministry of Justice for review and gazetting. All regulations are set at the national level with input from relevant stakeholders. Regulations and enforcement actions are legally reviewable in the national court system. The Ministry of Justice provides oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure MDAs follow administrative processes for developing and implementing regulations. Private individuals may raise issue with the appropriate MDA, Parliament, or Ombudsman if they feel the aforementioned procedures were not followed. There are no specific regulatory guidelines for reviewing regulations or conducting impact assessments, including scientific or data-driven assessments. There are no specific criteria for determining which proposed regulations are subject to an impact assessment nor is there a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other MDAs. The government uses a mix of fiscal, financial, and regulatory instruments to administer business and economic policies across multiple MDAs. Taxation policy is overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Treasury Department. The Malawi Revenue Authority is responsible for implementation of all tax policies. The Reserve Bank of Malawi administers monetary policy, exchange rate policy, as well as exchange controls to allow free flow of capital and earnings, and repatriation of dividends, profits, and royalties. The Immigration department administers the Employment of Expatriates Policy, Temporary Employment Permits (TEPs), and business residence permit. The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development is responsible for land policy administration. The Malawi Bureau of Standards is responsible for metrology, standardization, and quality assurance. The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority administers the communications act. The MITC is responsible for approving business plans and providing investment certificates. The National Construction Industry Council, Malawi Law Society, Malawi Accountants Board, Medical Council of Malawi, and the Employers Consultative Association of Malawi have sectoral rule-making authority, similar to regulatory power. Among the rules established by these associations is the required use of local labor, local contractors, or other means to achieve localization or skills transfer to Malawians. The sector-specific rule-making process is not transparent and can be confusing for firms that are new to the Malawi market. More information on the rule making process can be found at: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/comparedata/consultation . The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Malawi (ICAM) adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a common global language in 2001. The Companies Act stipulates that all companies must use IFRS or IFRS accounting standards for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). All public interest entities are required to use full IFRS standards. The government encourages, but does not require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. The Environmental Management Act provides the authority to the relevant ministry to require environmental and social impact assessment of projects prior to implementation which may significantly impact timelines and limit the use of an environment or natural resources. The government does not maintain a public, central repository for technical regulations. Copies of Acts and Laws are available at the National Library and High Court libraries. Copies of recent laws can be purchased from the government printing office. A limited number of laws are also available online at https://malawilii.org/ . The relevant MDAs manage and publish their respective regulations in the Malawi Government Gazette. MDAs do not generally post their regulations or laws on their websites but have been known to provide them upon request. Recently implemented policy reforms: (2020) Commodity exchange guidelines, the Cannabis Act of 2020, Export Processing Zone (EPZ) regulations: 20% allowance for local sales by an export enterprise under EPZ. Electronic Permit System launched by the Immigration Department. (2021) Control of Goods Act (COGA) Export Mandates: all grains, legume, and oil seed export transactions must take place through licensed commodity exchange. E-Passport System launched by the Immigration Department. Transparency of public finances and debt is inconsistent. Publicly available draft budget documents detail Malawi’s proposed or estimated revenue, and includes natural resources revenues, off-budget donor support, and detailed expenditure lines. The final, approved government budget only provides ministry level expenditure data, line items are generally not disclosed. Actual revenue and expenditures are included in the end of year financial statements. Information about government debt obligations is available in the financial statement and annual debt report. These documents are available at Ministry of Finance . Financial information and contingent liabilities on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are generally unknown to the public. SOE data is not transparent nor made public. The IMF currently considers Malawi’s debt to be unsustainable. Additional information on Malawi’s debt can be found in the IMF’s publicly available reports. Malawi is a member of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), COMESA Customs Union, and the SADC Free Trade Area. The government develops all new regulations roughly in line with the regulatory policy provisions set out by AfCFTA, COMESA, and SADC but national regulations take precedence if there is a conflict. As a member of AfCFTA, SADC, and COMESA, Malawi is bound by their respective norms and standards. Details on the respective standards can be found at each organization’s website: SADC- SADC Standards-quality-infrastructure ; COMESA- http://www.comesacompetition.org/ ; and AfCFTA- https://au.int/en/cfta . There are no records of Malawi providing notification on draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Malawi submitted a statement on implementation and administration of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in 2007 and signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) on July 12, 2017. Malawi has made progress on implementing the TFA provisions through the launch of a trade information portal at https://www.malawitradeportal.gov.mw/ . As of February 2022, Malawi has implemented 63% of the TFA Commitments . Malawi’s legal system is based on English Common Law. The judiciary consists of local courts and a local appeals court in every district. The higher tiers consist of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the Magistrates’ Courts. Judges of the High Court are appointed by the President and posted to one of five divisions on the high court: civil, commercial, criminal, family and probate, or revenue. The High Court has judicial authority over all civil and criminal cases. The High Court hears appeals from the Magistrates’ Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Blantyre hears appeals arising from the High Court. Magistrates’ Courts are located throughout the country. At the end of 2021, there were 36 seated High Court judges and 11 vacancies, and seven Supreme Court judges and six vacancies. The Commercial Division of the High Court deals exclusively with commercial or business disputes; the Revenue Division deals with any revenue or tax related matter. The Industrial Relations Court handles labor disputes and issues relating to employment. The Child Justice Court handles matters affecting children but falls under the High Court. More information on the judicial system can be found at the Judiciary website. The government does not have written commercial or contractual laws but instead relies on legislation that governs commercial transactions. The Sale of Goods Act, Companies Act, Employment Act, Hire Purchase Act, Insolvency Act, Control of Goods Act, Labor Relations Act, Business Licensing Act, Taxation Act, Consumer Protection Act, Copyright Act, and Patents Act, serve as the commercial and contractual framework. Mediation is often used to facilitate agreements prior to court proceedings. Enforcement of judgments can be extremely slow. Foreign and domestic investors have access to Malawi’s legal system, which is generally unbiased but notoriously slow. The legal process is slowed by heavy caseloads, staffing limitations, and inadequate funding. Court injunctions contribute significantly to backlogs and delays. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. In the financial sector, regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through the Financial Services Appeals Committee and investors are free to seek judicial review through the High Court’s Commercial Division. The legal system supports local and foreign investments. The MITC operates a One Stop Center to assist any investor to navigate relevant government regulations and procedures. MITC and MCCCI both offer websites with relevant information on doing business in Malawi. The government established the Competition and Fair-Trading Commission ( CFTC ) in 2005 to promote fair and transparent business procedures. The CFTC is responsible for regulation, monitoring, and prevention of activities likely to negatively impact competition or fair trade in Malawi. CFTC decisions may be appealed at the Commercial Court level. COMESA Competition Commission is responsible for mergers and acquisitions across the COMESA block. It promotes and encourages competition by identifying and preventing restrictive business practices that may impede efficient market operations in COMESA. According to Malawi’s constitution, Section 44, expropriation of property is only permitted when done for public utility and with adequate notification and compensation. Land is generally only expropriated for government development projects, such as road construction. Affected individuals may obtain an independent assessment of the land value and have the right to appeal in court. The Land Acquisition Act of 2016 is currently under review and changes are expected. The reforms will likely impact land expropriation costs. Commercial courts govern all bankruptcies under the provision of the consolidated Insolvency Act of 2016 . The Act encourages the use of receivership or reorganization as an alternative to bankruptcy. Secured creditors are given priority over other creditors. Monetary judgments are usually made in the investor’s currency. Cross-border provisions of the Insolvency Act are modeled after UN Commission on International Trade Law models. 4. Industrial Policies The government offers tax and non-tax incentives in various sectors. Incentives vary by year and are available to both domestic and foreign investors. In recent years, the government has offered incentives in manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. The current list of investment incentives can be found on the MITC and Malawi Revenue Authority websites. Firms must negotiate to establish their eligibility with the relevant government entity. Long delays in accessing incentives and accrued benefits are not uncommon. The government occasionally issues guarantees and joint financing on foreign direct investment projects of national importance. To support clean energy investment, government recently removed import duty, import excise and value added tax (VAT) on most imported renewable energy products. Regulations to enable export processing zones (EPZs) were established in 1995. The original program was limited to companies strictly engaged in manufacturing for export. In 2020, the EPZ program was amended to allow export processing firms to sell up to 20 percent of their product on the local market. As of 2022, there are 13 companies operating under the auspices of the EPZ, 11 of the companies in the program are foreign owned, though the law does not discriminate on ownership. The government began the process to establish Special Economic Zones (SEZ), in 2021. The SEZs will have broader coverage than EPZs and include a mix of commercial activities and services. Malawi does not follow “forced localization” or use geographic requirements for goods or financing, nor set performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. There is an ongoing local campaign to “Buy Malawi” to encourage the purchase of locally produced goods. Legal restrictions on foreign investment are based on environmental, health, biosafety, and national security concerns. The primary sectors subject to restrictions are firearms and ammunition, chemical and biological weapons, explosives, and manufacturing involving hazardous waste treatment/disposal or radioactive material. All business ventures in Malawi must navigate complex and often confusing bureaucratic processes. Minimum requirements include, business license, tax registration number, temporary employment permit, business residency permits, and land use permits. Depending on the sector additional licensing or permits may also be required. These procedures are time consuming and may constitute an impediment to investment. Currently there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption to prevent free transmission of customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory, or a mandate for local data storage within the country. The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority ( MACRA ) and the Ministry of Information and Digitization are responsible for IT issues. The Ministry of Information and Digitization is drafting a data protection bill, it is expected to be tabled in parliament sometime in 2022. 5. Protection of Property Rights The government utilizes various laws and regulations to govern the acquisition, disposition, recording, and protection of all physical property rights. The land ownership registry is centralized, and record keeping is inefficient and often inaccurate. Efforts are underway to computerize and decentralize recordkeeping. Financing options in the housing sector are extremely limited. Most households finance their homes through savings or non-mortgage credit. Mortgage availability is inefficient to meet demand and interest rates generally start at 18 percent and go up. The Land Act of 2016 converted customary land tenure to leasehold title to enable those currently using that land to have legal rights to it. The 2016 law prohibits freehold title; renewable lease terms for Malawians is up to 99 years and up to 50 years for foreigners. The Act prohibits the issuance of new freehold titles but grandfathered in existing land titles. The Office of Commissioner of Lands administers and manages land issues, grants, leases, and other dispositions. There is no reliable data on the proportion of land without clear titles, but it is likely much higher than 10%. Under the 2016 Act, land may be repossessed by the government if it lays idle for more than two years after it is registered to an individual or entity. No land has been repossessed from a developer the recent past. The 2022 session of Parliament is expected to review proposed changes to the 2016 Act. If passed, the reforms may negatively affect foreign ownership of land and investments in land-based enterprises while increasing ministerial powers to determine land uses. Malawi recognizes the importance of intellectual property protection but lacks enforcement capacity. The Registrar General administers the Patent and Trademarks Act, which protects industrial intellectual property rights (IPR) in Malawi. The Registrar General maintains a public registry of patents and patent licenses. Patents must be registered. Trademarks are registered publicly following advertisement and a period of no objection. Enforcement of IPR is inadequate. General awareness of importance of protecting intellectual property in all forms has improved. The Copyright Society of Malawi (COSOMA) administers the Copyright Act of 2016, which protects copyrights and “neighboring” rights in Malawi. The government approved copyright regulations and levies on storage devices in 2018. COSOMA and the Malawi Revenue Authority introduced a five percent levy on all media storage devices to be used to compensate rights holders. The Trademarks Act of 2018 and National Intellectual Property Policy of 2019 acknowledge the challenges to intellectual property rights in Malawi and provide a framework to foster the generation and protection of intellectual property rights. Enforcement officials routinely seize counterfeit goods, but there is no systematic approach to track and report on seizures, so statistics are not available. Malawi is not listed on USTR’s Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact for local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The Malawi Stock Exchange ( MSE ) is open to foreign portfolio investment. As of February 2022, the MSE hosts 16 listed companies with a total market capitalization of $3.01 million. The demand and supply of shares for listed companies is limited. The stock exchange is licensed under the Financial Services Act 2010 and operates under the Securities Act 2010 and the Companies Act 2013. Other governing regulations are the Capital Market Development Act 1990, and Capital Market Development Regulations 1992 as amended in 2013. There are no restrictions on foreign investors buying or selling shares listed on the MSE. Trading can be done by the stockholder or through one of four registered brokers. A secondary market offers government securities and is also open to local and foreign investors. Malawi respects the obligations under IMF article VIII. There are no restrictions on making payments or transfers for international transactions and no discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices undertaken without IMF approval. Credit is generally allocated on market terms though the cost of credit is generally high. Foreign investors may utilize domestic credit, but any proceeds from investments made using local resources are not remittable. According to a World Bank Report , only 40 percent of the adult population in Malawi use financial services. Access to and the cost of credit remains one of the biggest challenges for businesses and particularly SMEs. The minimum lending rate in February 2022 was 12 percent with a maximum rate of 24 percent. Mobile banking technology has the potential to increase access to local banking but is very nascent and its implementation is limited by access to reliable electricity and IT infrastructure. Official central bank reports do indicate an increase in electronic transactions over the last 24 months, but mobile banking is still not widely used. The banking sector is generally sound. The sector is overseen and regulated by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM). As of February 2022, there are eight full-service commercial banks with 106 branches across the country. The banking sector remained profitable and stable with adequate liquidity and capital positions throughout 2021. Prudential regulations have limited net forex exposure and non-performing loan rates hovers around 6-7 percent and spreads remain high. The sector is highly concentrated and heavily invested in domestic government debt, which is a systemic risk. Total assets as of December 2021 were $3.5 billion. The National Bank of Malawi and Standard Bank Malawi account for 46 percent of total assets. Equity capital of the two banks is approximately 61 percent and total loans 53 percent of total banking sector. The Banking Act provides a supervisory mandate to the RBM. The RBM has supervisory authority over all financial institutions and is responsible for ensuring the efficiency, reliability, and integrity of the financial system. There are no additional restrictions placed on foreign banks in Malawi. As of February 2022, four of the eight banks are foreign owned. The RBM and the major commercial banks maintain correspondent banking relationships with other central banks and major banks in foreign countries. To open a bank account locally, a foreigner must first present a temporary employment permit or business residency permit. Malawi does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund or similar entity. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Malawi has 71 public enterprises, 20 of which are SOEs. A full list of the SOEs is available by request from the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), but the government does not publish the list in the media or online except in conjunction with the announcement of board members of public enterprises. The government has bailed out several SOEs when they incurred heavy losses. SOE finance and operations data is opaque and not available to the public. Malawi’s SOEs are not required to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Corporate governance for the various SOEs is mandated by the law that established the entity. All public enterprises report to their sector-related line ministry, to the Department of Statutory Corporations in the OPC, and have a Chairperson and Board of Directors. The President appoints the board of directors, usually politicians, religious & traditional leaders, and professionals. Boards also include senior government officials as ex-officio/non-voting members. The participation of members as ex-officio/non-voting members, and of politicians as directors, creates a perceived and/or real conflict of interest. Public and private enterprises are subject to the same terms and conditions, and must compete for access to markets, credit, and business opportunities. Public enterprises are given special preference by the government in the case of public projects. Personal relationships play a significant role in influencing business decision-making. Public enterprises in agriculture, education, and health sectors spend more on research and development than the private sector. Local firms tend to be capital-constrained and highly skilled labor is scarce. There is not a strong tradition of private sector-led research and development in Malawi. There are no immediate plans for privatization of government resources or services. It is unclear how impacts from the proposed Lands Amendment will impact the ability of foreign investors to participate in the privatization sales. Under the current Land Law, if privatization were to take place, any foreign or domestic investor would be allowed to participate, and the government is permitted to offer domestic investors a discount on shares. Business and investment efforts are focused on public-private partnerships and attracting strategic investors rather than outright privatization. These are handled by the Public Private Partnership Commission . 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate entities in Malawi have a well-developed sense of responsible business conduct (RBC) and incorporate corporate social responsibility (CSR) into their business practices. Corporate entities make a point to publicize their CSR activities in the local media. There are no established laws or regulations governing RBC or CSR. As a candidate to the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the government is promoting RBC in the mining sector. There are a variety of laws and regulations to protect the environment and on waste disposal for producers and consumers. All foreign and domestic enterprises are expected to adhere to the national and local laws and regulations regarding employment and compensation, the work environment, industrial safety, age limits, and minimum wages. However, there is a lack of resources for meaningful enforcement of laws and regulations and no comprehensive reporting mechanism to track violations. There is no history of any laws or regulations being waived to attract investment, nor of the government factoring in RBC practices into its procurement decisions. There are no verified reports of high profile or controversial instances of any private sector entity impacting human rights or related resolutions. In the recent past, the media reported on complaints by indigenous communities against government MDAs related to land or natural resource allocations. Most land allocation complaints are related to development projects and are decided by the courts or in mediation. There is a general lack of government enforcement and reporting on human rights, labor rights, environment protections because of budget and capacity constraints. The private sector is required to adhere to international accounting standards. Executive compensation requirements are not defined. The law requires all Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE) listed companies to publish their annual audited accounts in local newspapers. Listed companies are also required to publicly declare profits, dividends, planned takeovers, major portfolio investments, and all relevant information for shareholders to make informed decisions. The Institute for Policy Interaction (IPI), the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), the Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy, Institute for Sustainable Development, Consumers Association of Malawi, Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), and Natural Resources Justice Network are civil society organizations that monitor and advocate freely for CSR and RBC in Malawi. Malawi does not adhere to OECD Guidelines for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. There are no domestic requirements for due diligence by companies engaged in the supply chain of minerals that may originate from conflict-affected areas. The EITI Board approved Malawi as a candidate country in 2015. Malawi’s Validation was completed in 2018, and the EITI Board concluded that Malawi has made meaningful progress overall in implementing the EITI Standards. The Board determined Malawi must carry out corrective actions regarding the findings of the initial assessment. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the final assessment has been delayed until sometime in 2022. Failure to achieve meaningful progress on the second validation will result in suspension in accordance with the EITI Standard. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Malawi is vulnerable to climate change impacts due to deep-rooted poverty, over-dependence on rainfed agriculture, overexploitation of natural resources, and rapid population growth. The government offers incentives in several sectors as part of an overall effort to address climate resilience and adaptation. The Environmental Management Act provides details on adherence to environmental requirements for MDAs and general business investors, including foreigners. Climate related issues are integrated throughout public service and national development plans, adherence and enforcement suffer from a lack of funding and capacity. The government submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2015, which provides strategic goals and objectives for Malawi through 2040 and updated the document in 2021. The update includes an unconditional target of six percent carbon emission reductions and a combined conditional and unconditional reduction of 51 percent carbon emission reductions by 2040—contingent upon additional external support and full NDC implementation. The Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Climate Change is the secretariat of all climate change related issues in the country. Several documents and strategies govern the country’s climate adaption and mitigation activities. The Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), National Climate Change Response Framework (NCCRF), and National Adaptation Plan (NAP) provide details on the government’s commitment to addressing climate change. The 2016 National Climate Change Management Policy (NCCMP) provides an overview of the country’s climate change intervention priorities. The National REDD+ Strategy, National Charcoal Strategy, and National Forest Landscape Restoration Strategy provide guidelines and strategies to manage emissions from forestry and land-use sectors. National strategies, Malawi 2063, Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, the National Meteorological policy, the National Climate Change Investment Plan, the National Climate Change Resilience Strategy, and the Malawi Strategy on Climate Change Learning provide long term development and growth strategies. Despite these well-articulated documents, implementation is stymied by budget and resource constraints. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a major challenge for firms operating in Malawi. Corruption, fraud, bribery of public officials, illicit payments, misuse of funds, and conflicts of interest are not uncommon. A number of high-profile government scandals have occurred during all recent presidential administrations. President Lazarus Chakwera dissolved his cabinet in January 2022 over a corruption scandal. Corruption in all forms is illegal in Malawi. However, enforcement is insufficient and slow. The Corrupt Practices Act established the independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) which works with other anti-corruption bureaus in the region but is consistently under-staffed and under-resourced. The Act widened the definition of corruption to include offences for abuse of office and possession of unexplained wealth. The Act also provides protection for whistleblowers. The ACB encourages private sector companies and institutions to develop and implement corruption prevention policies as a way of mainstreaming anti-corruption initiatives into their operations. The business sector may join forces to collectively engage in the fight against corruption, but no formal mechanism currently exists. Some companies employ their own fraud controls, but to date fraud identified through internal controls has failed to result in any high-level prosecutions. Malawian law requires all public officials from all levels of government to declare their assets and business interests. However, access to view or obtaining copies of the declarations is difficult at best. However, the law does not extend to family members. The Political Parties Act requires all political parties to disclose source of funds. If corruption evidence implicates family members or members of a political party the ACB has the power to build a case against accomplices and bring them to court. All public officials are required to disclose any conflict of interest and to recuse themselves from any deliberation or decision-making process in relation to the conflict. However, there is no clear definition of what constitutes conflict of interest. Despite have the legal framework in place, in practice the requirements for public asset declarations, political party financial reporting, and conflict of interest disclosures are rarely enforced, and noncompliance is high. Malawi is party to the UN Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. According to Malawi law, citizens have a right to form NGOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance and these NGOs are free to accept funding from any domestic or foreign sources. Malawi’s civil society and the media play an important and visible role in fighting corruption, investigating, and uncovering cases of corruption. Specific firms with U.S. affiliations have noted irregularities in tender processes and mining licensing but have nonetheless continued to pursue business opportunities. Although some progress has been made, corruption remains a major obstacle to businesses in Malawi. Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Mulanje House, P.O Box 2437, Lilongwe, Malawi Tel: +(265) 1 770 166 / +265 (0) 888 208 963 E-mail: reportcentre-ll@acbmw.org Website: https://acbmw.org/ National Coordinator The Integrity Platform Area 47, Sector 5, Private Bag 382, Lilongwe, Malawi Telephone: +265 1 775 786/691 Email: info@integrityplatformmw.org Website: www.integrityplatformmw.org The Chairperson National Anti-Corruption Alliance (NACA) Phone Numbers: 0881 02 22 12 and 099 86 57 18 Email Address: mosesmkandawire@yahoo.co.uk 10. Political and Security Environment Malawi continues to enjoy a stable and democratic government. Since the end of one-party rule in 1994, the country has had 7 peaceful presidential and 6 parliamentary elections. In 2020, Malawians voted for a new government in a court sanctioned presidential re-run ousting the then ruling party. Although political divisions exist, Malawi has no significant tribal, religious, regional, ethnic, or racial tensions that might lead to widespread violence. Incidents of labor unrest occasionally occur but are usually non-violent. Despite instances of political uncertainty there are no nascent insurrections or politically motivated activities of major concern to investors. Democratic processes in Malawi are well established, and destabilizing unrest is unlikely. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Most working-age individuals in Malawi live in rural areas and are involved in the informal sector and subsistence agriculture. The informal economy covers 89 percent of the labor force. Informal employment is primarily small-scale, minimally capitalized, and relies on household members for labor. Across all age groups, more males are employed than females. Informal employment is usually easier to get, is less stable, and usually pays far less than minimum wage. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly and adversely affected the informal sector. Child labor remains a problem. A 2015 Child Labor Survey found 38% of children aged 5-17 are active in child labor. In November 2019, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency issued a Withhold Release Order against tobacco from Malawi due to child and forced labor concerns. As of February 2022, three companies were granted waivers enabling them to export tobacco to the U.S. Due to capital requirements, all foreign investors are categorized in the formal sector. Labor laws cut across all sectors and the courts may get involved in any labor dispute. Skilled and semi-skilled labor is scarce and skilled employment opportunities are extremely limited. Despite the Gender Equality Act in 2013, discrimination against women is pervasive, and women still have lower literacy and education levels and less access to employment opportunities. Occupational categories with skills shortages include accountants, economists, engineers, lawyers, IT, and medical/health personnel. Malawi has six public universities that provide bachelor’s, and master’s degrees in several fields including accountancy, economics, engineering, medicine, education, agriculture, and administration. In response to a need for skilled tradesmen, the government is expanding its network of vocational schools. The University of Malawi and the privately owned Catholic University are accredited to offer law degrees. There are few PhD programs that usually enroll few candidates. Employment, immigration laws, and regulations require that any local or foreign investor prioritize hiring of nationals except in cases where the needed skills are not available locally. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions so long as such adjustments comply with employment laws and regulations. There are also no social safety net programs for workers laid off due to economic reasons nor are employers required to have employment insurance for their employees. There are no provisions for labor laws to be waived to attract or retain investment in Malawi nor are there additional or different labor law provisions in Export Processing and Special Economic zones for purpose of promoting exports. Aside from military or police personnel, all workers are legally permitted to form and join trade unions without previous authorization or excessive requirements. Unions must register with Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers’ Organizations in the Ministry of Labor. Most unions are affiliated with the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions (MCTU) with a membership of approximately 300,000 workers. Despite the membership size, the MCTU Unions power is limited and weak. The government is a signatory to the ILO Convention protecting worker rights, ratified all eight of the fundamental International Labor Conventions, and the Forced Labor Protocol to fast-track implementation of Target 8.7, but enforcement is weak due to a serious labor inspector shortage and resource constraints. The Occupation Safety, Health and Welfare Act of 1997 is scheduled for review in 2022. Government designated labor officers, police officers and immigration officers also serve as trafficking in persons (TIP) enforcement officers. The Industrial Relations Court (IRC) has jurisdiction over labor disputes and other issues relating to employment. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the IRC to the High Court of Malawi but only on matters of law or jurisdiction, the IRC decision is final and binding on all other matters. The Labor Relations Act (LRA) governs labor-relations management in Malawi’s formal sector. Employers, labor unions, and the government lack sophistication regarding labor relations/disputes. There have not been any major strikes that posed any serious investment risk since 2012. In October 2021, government amended LRA and the Employment Act. The LRA amendment allows an employer to deduct wages from an employee who strikes for more than three days per annum and authorizes the Minister of Labor to designate categories of workers as essential, thereby prohibiting them from striking or lockdowns. The LRA removed the requirement of employer and employee panelists in the IRC, thereby loosening the bottleneck at the IRC. Amendments to the Employment Act prohibits forced and tenancy labor, provides special working conditions for pregnant and breastfeeding female employees, provides for paternity leave, and makes provisions for deduction of wages for the period an employee is absent from work due to participation in a strike. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Economic and Commercial Section 40/24 Kenyatta Drive, Lilongwe, Malawi Phone: +265-1-773-166 Email: LilongweECON@state.gov Maldives Executive Summary The Republic of Maldives comprises 1,190 islands in 20 atolls spread over 348 square miles in the Indian Ocean. Tourism is the main source of economic activity for Maldives, directly contributing close to 30 percent of GDP and generating more than 60 percent of foreign currency earnings. The tourism sector experienced impressive growth, from 655,852 arrivals in 2009 to 1.7 million in 2019, before a steep decline in 2020 resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Tourism began to recover in late 2020 and reached 1.3 million in 2021. This recovery in tourism will likely continue to drive the economy. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the government re-emphasized the need to diversify, with a focus on the fisheries and agricultural sectors. GDP growth averaged six percent during the decade through 2019, lifting Maldives to middle-income country status. Per capita GDP is estimated at USD 6,698 in 2020, the highest in South Asia. However, income inequality and a lack of employment opportunities remain a major concern for Maldivians, especially those in isolated atolls. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, GDP fell 33.5% percent in 2020. With the tourism industry’s recovery, GDP grew 31.6 percent in 2021. Maldives is a multi-party constitutional democracy, but the transition from long-time autocracy to democracy has been challenging. Maldives’ parliament ratified a new constitution in 2008 that provided for the first multi-party presidential elections. In 2018, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party was elected president, running on a platform of economic and political reforms and transparency, following former President Abdulla Yameen whose term in office was marked by corruption, systemic limitations on the independence of parliament and the judiciary, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association. The MDP also won a super majority (65 out of 87) seats in parliamentary elections in April 2019, the first single-party majority in Maldives since 2008. President Solih pledged to restore democratic institutions and the freedom of the press, re-establish the justice system, and protect fundamental rights. Corruption across all sectors, including tourism, was a significant issue under the previous government and remains a concern. Serious concerns also remain about a small number of violent Maldivian extremists who advocate for attacks against secular Maldivians and may be involved with transnational terrorist groups. In February 2020, attackers stabbed three foreign nationals – two Chinese and one Australian – in several locations in Hulhumalé. ISIS claimed responsibility for an April arson incident on Mahibadhoo Island in Alifu Dhaalu atoll that destroyed eight sea vessels, including one police boat, according to ISIS’ online newsletter al-Naba. There were no injuries or fatalities. Speaker of Parliament and former President Mohamed Nasheed was nearly killed in a May 6, 2021, IED attack motivated by religious extremism. Nasheed sustained life threatening injuries and several members of his security and bystanders were also injured. Nine individuals have been charged in connection with the attack, with one already convicted. Large scale infrastructure construction in recent years contributed to economic growth but has resulted in a significant rise in debt. The Maldives’ debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 58.5 percent in 2018 to an estimated 61.8 percent in 2019 according to the World Bank (WB); this further increased to 138 percent in 2020 according to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), an increase driven by a sharp drop-off in government revenue. Maldives welcomes foreign investment, although the ambiguity of codified law and competition from politically influential local businesses act as deterrents. U.S. investment in Maldives has been limited and focused on the tourism sector, particularly hotel franchising and air transportation. In 2021, construction, transportation, fisheries, and renewable energy also benefited from increased FDI. On December 28, 2020, Maldives submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) which includes an enhanced ambition of 26 percent decrease in emissions and carbon neutrality by 2030, conditioned on receiving financial, technological, and technical support. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 85 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,490 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Maldives opened to foreign investment in the late 1980s and currently pursues an open policy for foreign investment. A weak and, in some cases, arcane system of laws and regulations deters some investment. Foreign investment in Maldives has primarily involved resort management, but also includes telecommunications, accounting, banking, insurance, air transport, real estate, courier services, and some manufacturing. Invest Maldives, an organization within the Ministry of Economic Development, is the government’s lead investment promotion arm. Services provided by Invest Maldives include promoting Maldives as an investment destination, providing information to potential investors about Maldives, guidance on investment approval and business registration, and facilitating the licensing of business. Every year, Invest Maldives holds forums in collaboration with foreign consulates and embassies, business councils, and other institutions to attract foreign investment. Invest Maldives plans to expand its reach with the aim of diversifying Maldives economy. Maldives allows foreign parties to register companies and partnerships but does not allow foreign parties to register cooperative societies or as a sole proprietor. Under a new Foreign Direct Investment policy established in February 2020, foreign investment is allowed in all major sectors of the economy apart from the following areas, which are restricted for locals only: Forestry Mining of sand Other mining and quarrying Manufacture of tobacco products Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork except furniture Manufacture of rubber and plastics products Manufacture of handicrafts and souvenirs Retail trade Wholesale trade in sectors except construction materials Land transport services and transport via pipelines Postal and courier activities Logistics activities (in transportation and storage) Operating picnic islands Food and beverage service activities (including café, restaurants, bakeries, and other eateries) Programming and broadcasting activities Legal activities (law firms etc.) Photography and videography Rental and leasing activities (including lease of heavy-duty machineries etc.) Employment activities such as employment agencies and recruitment services Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities Services to building and landscape activities Public administration and defense; compulsory social security Clinics except physiotherapy clinics Repair of computers and personal and household goods The following sectors are open for foreign investment, but with a cap on equity ownership: Manufacture of fish products (75 percent) Manufacture of agricultural products (75 percent) Printing and reproduction of recorded media (49 percent) Manufacture of furniture (75 percent) Repair and installation of machinery and equipment (75 percent) Installation of equipment that forms an integral part of buildings or similar structures, such as installation of escalators and elevators (40 percent) Construction of buildings (65 percent) Civil engineering (65 percent) Wholesale trade of construction materials (75 percent) Franchising in international airports and approved locations (including products & services) (75 percent) Sea transport services (including ownership of vessels) (49 percent) Air transport services (including freight services) (75 percent) Warehousing and support activities for transportation (75 percent) Guest houses in approved locations (inclusive of all services) (49 percent) Real estate activities (65 percent) Accounting activities (75 percent) Architecture and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis (75 percent) Advertising (60 percent) Other professional, scientific, and technical activities (75 percent) Veterinary services (75 percent) Security and investigation activities (75 percent) Office administrative, office support and other business support activities (75 percent) Universities and colleges (75 percent) Private schools (75 percent) Computer training institutions (75 percent) Vocational and technical educational institutes (75 percent) Sports and recreation education (75 percent) Engineering schools (training and conduction of courses related to aircraft engineering) (75 percent) Educational support activities (75 percent) Residential care services (75 percent) Social work activities without accommodation (75 percent) Physiotherapy clinics (75 percent) Creative, arts and entertainment activities (excluding live music bands and DJs) (75 percent) Libraries, archives, museums, and other cultural activities (75 percent) Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities (75 percent) Water sports activities (49 percent) Dive centers and dive schools (75 percent) The following conditions are applied to foreign investments in the construction sector, as per the foreign contractor regulation: Construction companies valued below USD 5,000,000 are required to be at least 35 percent Maldivian owned. Construction companies valued above USD 5,000,000 may be 100 percent foreign owned. There is little private ownership of land; most land is leased from the government, but Maldivians are permitted to hold title to land. In August 2019, parliament repealed a July 2015 constitutional amendment that allowed foreigners to own land and islands in connection with major projects, provided they invested at least USD 1 billion and at least 70 percent of the land was reclaimed. Currently, there are no property and real estate laws or mechanisms to allow foreign persons to hold title to land. The Land Act allows foreigners to lease land on inhabited islands for up to a maximum of 50 years, but there is no formal process for registration of leasehold titles. The Uninhabited Land Act allows foreigners to lease land on uninhabited islands for purposes other than tourism for a maximum of 21 years for investments amounting to less than USD 1 million and up to a maximum of 50 years for investments over USD 10 million. A 2010 amendment to the Tourism Act allows investors to lease an island for 50 years in general. A subsequent 2014 amendment allows the extension of resort leases up to 99 years for a payment of USD 5 million. The changes aim to incentivize investors, make it easier to obtain financing from international institutions, and increase revenue for the government. Leases can be renewed at the end of their terms, but the formula for assessing compensation value of a resort at the end of a lease has not been developed. In 2016, Parliament approved additional amendments to the Tourism Act, whereby islands and lagoons can be leased for tourism development based on unsolicited proposals submitted to the Tourism Ministry (Law No: 13/2016). The Ministry of Economic Development screens and reviews all foreign investment proposals. The process includes standard due diligence efforts such as a local police screening of all investors, determining the financial standing of the proposed shareholders through a bank reference, and performing a background check on the investors involved. According to the government, each case is reviewed based on its merits accounting for factors such as the number of existing investors in the sector and the potential for employment and technology transfer. In practice, the investment review process is not as transparent as policy would indicate, with potential for corruption to influence the decision-making process. The approval procedure for foreign investments is as follows: Submit a completed Foreign Investment Application form to the Ministry of Economic Development, available at . Walk-in consultations are available for foreign investors wishing to discuss their proposals prior to submitting an application. Receive approval The standard processing time is three working days; however, if relevant ministries must be consulted, the approval may take 10-14 days. Register a business vehicle Once approval is received, an investor must register as a company, partnership, or a company which has been incorporated in another jurisdiction. Application forms for registering as a legal vehicle are available from the ministry’s website. Sign the Foreign Investment Agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development. This Agreement outlines the terms and conditions related to carrying out the specific business in Maldives. For tourism sector investments, a Foreign Investment Agreement is not required as the land lease signed with the Ministry of Tourism governs all matters relating to tourism businesses in Maldives. Obtain licenses and permits. Sectors which require operating licenses include fisheries and agriculture, banking and finance, health, tourism, transport, construction, and education. The most recent World Trade Organization trade policy review was conducted in March 2016: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp432_e.html . Maldives ranked 147 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index in 2019, scoring especially low on getting electricity; registering property; trading across borders; protecting minority investors; getting credit; and resolving insolvency. On average, it takes six steps and 12 days to start a business. The Ministry of Economic Development manages the process for business incorporations, permits, licenses and registration of logos, trade markets, seals, and other processes. The Ministry’s website details relevant policies and procedures: http://www.trade.gov.mv The Ministry of Economic Development also maintains an online business portal at https://business.egov.mv to access the following services: Name Reservation; Business Name Registration; Sole Proprietorship registration submission; Company Registration Submission; SME Categorization; Issuance of Corporate Profile Sheet; Logo Registration; Seal Registration; Trade Mark Registration, Request for Certificate of Incumbency; Request for Letter of Good Standing; and a Request for re-issuance of registration certificate. Foreign investment companies, including entities with any foreign shareholding, must receive foreign investment approval before they can register online. As of March 2022, the government had completed draft amendments to the Companies Act, which are scheduled to be submitted to parliament during the first session of 2022. As of March 2022, the Electronic Transactions Bill has been submitted to parliament and was undergoing committee review. A Bankruptcy Bill was submitted to Parliament in 2020 and was in the committee stage as of March 2022. The passage of these bills could affect business facilitation. In June 2019, the government signed a USD 10 million project with the Asian Development Bank to develop a National Single Window project designed to establish a national single window system for international trade and reengineered trade processes which was still ongoing as of March 2022. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment but does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad either. According to UNCTAD’s 2019 World Investment Report, Maldives has not registered any outward investment since 2005. 3. Legal Regime Maldives’ Parliament (the People’s Majlis) formulates legislation, while ministries and agencies, primarily the Ministry of Economic Development, develop regulations pertaining to investment. The Ministry of Tourism develops regulations relevant to the tourism sector. Certain business sectors require sector-level operating licenses from other ministries/agencies, including fisheries and agriculture, banking and finance, health, tourism, transport, construction, and education. The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) regulates the financial sector and issues banking licenses. The Capital Market Development Authority develops regulations for the capital market and pension industry and licenses securities market intermediaries. The current Parliament, sworn in in April 2019, regularly makes draft bills and regulations available for public comment. Since its inauguration in November 2018, the Solih administration has taken steps to improve fiscal transparency. For example, beginning in December 2018, the MoF began issuing weekly updates on fiscal operations on its public website. A limited write-up on total annual debt obligations for 2022 and projected annual debt obligations for 2023 and 2024 were included in a “budget book” published on the MoF website, along with the 2022 proposed budget. It includes the total amount of debt, disaggregated into the totals of domestic and foreign debt; however, it does not include details of contingent or state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt. Statistics on Central Government debt and on debt guaranteed by the government are published on the MoF website on a quarterly basis. Details of government-held debt are published bi-annually. Quarterly debt statistics include details on disbursed outstanding debt (both domestic and guaranteed), active external loans, external grants, and active sovereign guarantees. Quarterly debt can be found at https://www.finance.gov.mv/debt-management/debt-statistics . Details of SOE debt are published in the quarterly and annual reports on SOEs published by Public Enterprise Management (PEM) of the MoF at https://www.finance.gov.mv/public-finance/public-enterprises/audited-financial-statements-of-soes . Details of active sovereign guarantees as of September 21 can be accessed at: https://www.finance.gov.mv/public/attachments/mBb3dwgKLN1YZvSJOkAOdNDmzUSq8bn1uwXovIEK.pdf . The MMA, which functions as Maldives’ Central Bank, includes information on domestic debt obligations on a monthly basis on their website: http://mma.gov.mv/#/research/statisticalPublications/mstat/Monthly percent20Statistics . The MoF published a mid-year “Fiscal and Debt Strategy Report” on their website in July 2021. This report included details of the position of the debt portfolio at the end of 2020 and the estimated position by the end of 2021: https://www.finance.gov.mv/fiscal-and-debt-strategy-report . The website of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) ( www.mvlaw.gov.mv ) publishes the full text of all existing laws and regulations, but most of the documents are in the Dhivehi language. The AGO is establishing an English language database of laws and regulations while the Judiciary is working on a database of court judgements. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting is voluntary. Listed PLCs voluntarily report on sustainability aspects and Corporate Governance reporting is mandatory for all listed companies. Annual Reports of listed companies: https://www.cmda.gov.mv/en/public/listed-companies . Maldives is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and is a signatory of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Trade and investment related legislation and regulation are influenced by common law principles from the United Kingdom and other western jurisdictions. The judiciary has cited foreign case law from jurisdictions from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia when interpreting local trade-related statues. Maldives is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has submitted some of the notifications under Technical Barriers to Trade. However, the Ministry of Economic Development reports that technical assistance is required for Maldives to fully comply with WTO obligations. The sources of law in Maldives are its constitution, Islamic Sharia law, regulations, presidential decrees, international law, and English common law, with the latter being most influential in commercial matters. The Maldives has a Contract Law (Law No. 4/91) that codifies English common law practices on contracts. The Civil Court is specialized to hear commercial cases. The Employment Tribunal is mandated to hear claims of unfair labor practices. A bill proposing the establishment of a Mercantile Court has been pending in Parliament since 2013. The Judicial Services Commission is responsible for nominating, dismissing, and examining the conduct of all judges. The Attorney General acts as legal advisor to the government and represents the government in all courts except on criminal proceedings, which are represented by the Prosecutor General. A Supreme Court was established as the highest judicial authority in Maldives in 2008 under the new Maldives Constitution. In addition to the Supreme Court, there are six courts: the High Court; Civil Court; Criminal Court; Family Court; Juvenile Court; and a Drug Court. There are approximately 200 magistrate courts, one in each inhabited island. The Supreme Court and the High Court serve as courts of appeal. There are no jury trials. In February 2020, President Solih stated his intent to submit a bill introducing a circuit court system in Maldives. As of March 2022, the government was working on legislative amendments to the Judicature Act to establish the circuit court. Historically, the judicial process has been slow and, often, arbitrary. In August 2010, the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), the judicial watchdog, reappointed—and confirmed for life—191 of the 200 existing judges. Many of these judges held only a certificate in Sharia law, not a law degree. The Maldivian judiciary is a semi-independent institution but has been subjected frequently to executive influence, particularly the Supreme Court. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2015 stated the judicial system is perceived as politicized, inadequate, and subject to external influence. An estimated 25 percent of judges have criminal records. The media, human rights organizations, and civil society had repeatedly criticized the JSC for appointing judges deemed unqualified. This history led President Solih’s administration to make judicial reform a top priority. In 2019, the JSC was overhauled; it removed the former Supreme Court bench and initiated investigations into ethics standards complaints against several judges from the High Court, Criminal Court, Civil Court, Family Court, and several island magistrate courts. In August 2019, Parliament amended the Judicial Service Commission Act to return control of the Department of Judicial Administration (DJA), which is responsible for the management of courts, to the JSC. This amendment was intended to overcome longstanding issues of the former Supreme Court using its direct supervision of the DJA to punish judges exhibiting judicial independence by transferring them to a lower court or another island as retribution. Foreign parties can invest in Maldives through the Foreign Investment Law or the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act. Details are available on the Ministry of Economic Development’s Doing Business in the Maldives Guide and in the tax guide: https://www.maldivesembassy.or.th/media/attachments/2019/08/23/doing-business-maldives-trade-min.pdf https://www.mira.gov.mv/forms/m829-tax-guide-for-foreigners-doing-business-in-the-Maldive.pdf Invest Maldives ( https://investmaldives.gov.mv ) is the primary website for investments and provides information on areas that are open for investment in Maldives. Sector-wise, broad investment opportunities are presented on the website with links to conceptual project briefs for which Invest Maldives is seeking investment from potential investors. A Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy was published in February 2020 to consolidate existing practices and introduce new guidelines, including two new routes to get government approval for foreign direct investments and new caps on equity ownership for investments in certain sectors. The first and second amendments to the FDI policy were announced on June 13 and 15, 2021 respectively. The policy is available at https://trade.gov.mv/laws-regulations under Foreign Investment Act. Foreign investment in Maldives is governed by Law No. 25/79, covering agreements between the government and investors. The Business Registration Act (18/2014) requires foreign businesses to register as a company or partnership. The Companies Act (10/96) governs the registration and regulatory and operational requirements for public and private companies. The Partnership Act of 2011 governs the formation and regulation of partnerships. Foreign investments are currently approved for an initial period of five years, with the option to renew. Maldives introduced income taxes through an Income Tax Act in December 2019. Taxation under the act was set to commence on January 1, 2020 but remuneration was to come within the purview of income effective April 1, 2020. The Business Profit Tax regime imposed under the Business Profit Tax Act and the Remittance Tax regime imposed under the Remittance Tax Act was repealed with the commencement of the Income Tax Act. Under the Act, tax rates remain unchanged for banks at 25 percent on profits, while taxes of 15 percent on profits that exceed USD 32,425 (MVR 500,000) would be levied on corporations, partnerships, and other business entities. In September 2020, President Solih ratified the sixth amendment to the Employment Act, which provides a standalone regulatory framework for overseas employees. It includes guidance on registering with the online x-pat system (work permit processing portal), grant of quotas, collection of quota fees, grant of entry passes and work permits to enter and remain in the country for work, deposits and refunds, accommodation arrangements and standards, regularization and penalties for breaches. In November 2020, President Solih ratified the second amendment to the Maldives Immigration Act. Under the new amendment, there are two additional visa options for foreigners travelling to Maldives: a corporate resident visa and a meeting visa. The corporate resident visa is a permit issued to foreigners who have invested over $250,000 in Maldives or by maintaining $250,000 in a fixed deposit account in a Maldivian bank for five years. According to the amendment, shareholders and partners of companies registered and operating in Maldives may acquire a corporate resident visa for themselves and their families under the established rules and regulations. The meeting visa is a short-duration permit under which foreigners may visit Maldives for professional reasons. This may include attending a business conference, professional convention or a meeting approved by a government agency. A meeting visa is issued according to the guidelines defined by the Registrar of Businesses. In 2019, Maldives drafted the Competition and Fair Business Practices Act to ensure a fair market and equitable opportunities for all small and medium enterprises. President Solih ratified the bill on August 31, 2020, and it came into force in February 2021. The Ministry of Economic Development is the principal agency responsible for implementing the Act, including hearing, reviewing, and acting on competition-related complaints. No competition-related cases have been submitted to Ministry of Economic Development as of March 2022. According to the Law on Foreign Investment (No. 25/79), the government may, with or without notice, suspend an investment when an investor indulges in an act detrimental to the security of the country or where temporary closure is necessary for national security. If, after due investigation, it cannot be concluded within 60 days of the temporary closure that the foreign investor had indulged in an activity detrimental to the security of Maldives, the government will pay compensation. Capital belonging to an investment that is closed for these reasons may be taken out of the country in a mutually agreed upon manner. In December 2012, the Maldivian government took over operation of the Malé International Airport from GMR Infrastructure Limited, an Indian company, after the Maldivian government repudiated the 2012 contract. In 2016, the Maldivian government paid GMR USD 271 million in damages as ordered by a Singaporean Arbitration Tribunal. 4. Industrial Policies Maldives introduced a Special Economic Zones Act (Law No.: 24/2014) in September 2014, with the goal of encouraging private investment in large-scale projects in priority areas, including: export processing activities; transportation and transshipment; universities, hospitals, and research facilities; information communication and technology parks; international financial services; oil and gas exploration; and initiatives that introduce new technologies. SEZ investments in excess of USD 150 million qualify for special tax and regulatory incentives guaranteed under the SEZ law. The list of priority sectors is reviewed by the President on a yearly basis. Incentives under the SEZ law include: Exemption from business profit tax Exemption from goods and services tax Exemption from withholding tax: Flexible procedures in foreign employment Exemption from taxes on sale and purchase of land Option of acquiring freehold land by registered companies in Maldives with at least 50 percent local shareholding The duration of these tax exemptions depends on the business area of the investment and the scale of the investment. As of March 2021, no companies have invested in Maldives under the SEZ law. Sovereign Guarantee are issued as per the approved SG guidelines of the government in line with policy and priority. Guideline for issuance of sovereign guarantees is published on the Ministry of Finance website ( https://www.finance.gov.mv/media/regulations/guideline-for-the-issuance-of-sovereign-guarantees-unofficial-translation ). Details of active sovereign guarantees as of September 21, 2021 can be accessed at: https://www.finance.gov.mv/public/attachments/mBb3dwgKLN1YZvSJOkAOdNDmzUSq8bn1uwXovIEK.pdf . There are no discounts or tax incentives for clean energy investments issued through the government budget. However, there are some active Power Purchase Agreements between public utility companies and renewable energy investors. There is no set feed-in tariff. However, project proponents may propose a cost-effective tariff. There is no specific discount for electricity generated from renewable energy sources. Depending on the size and type of the investment, the government grants import duty exemptions, such as for items imported for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. As mentioned immediately above Maldives introduced a Special Economic Zones Act (Law No.: 24/2014) in September 2014. Please refer to the above section for details of investment incentives provided for under the Act. The Law on Foreign Investments requires Maldivian nationals to be employed unless employment of foreigners is a necessity. Qualifying employers are provided a quota, limiting the number of expatriates who can be employed. Quota levels depend on the sector and size of the investment. Employers obtain quotas from the Ministry of Economic Development before applying for employment approval. SEZ investments receive some exceptions to these rules. A report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) found that the quota system is cumbersome and difficult to implement and that inefficiencies and red tape create unnecessary administrative burdens while doing little to increase local employment. In addition, the ILO reported that when labor is not available because of quota requirements, employers often resort to the irregular labor market, providing incentives to the phenomena of visa trading. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property, movable and real, are recognized and enforced under the 2002 Land Act, and the councils on each island maintain registries. Rights in real estate are governed by the Land Act, the Uninhabited Islands Act (20/98) and the Tourism Act (2/99). Foreign parties cannot own land but can lease land for periods no longer than 99 years for business activity under the remaining regimes. Although the government has an intellectual property unit within the Ministry of Economic Development, it is not active. The government has not yet signed international agreements or conventions on intellectual property rights. A Trademarks Bill is in the legislative agenda for 2022 and Ministry of Economic Development is in the final stages of drafting process of the bill which is planned to be submitted to Parliament during the first parliamentary session of 2022. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is providing assistance to the government on the drafting of bills regarding trademarks and geographical indicators. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en 6. Financial Sector Maldives Stock Exchange (MSE), first opened in 2002 as a small securities trading floor, was licensed as a private stock exchange in 2008. The Securities Act of January 2006 created the Capital Market Development Authority (CMDA) to regulate the capital markets. The MSE functions under the CMDA. The only investment opportunities available to the public are shares in the Bank of Maldives, Islamic Bank of Maldives, five state-owned public companies, a foreign insurance company, a foreign telecommunications company, and a local shipping company. The market capitalization of all listed companies listed was 1.25 billion dollars as of March 2022. Foreigners can invest in the capital market as both retail and institutional investors. Capital market license holders from other jurisdictions can also seek licenses to carry out services in the Maldives capital market. There are no restrictions on foreign investors obtaining credit from banks in Maldives nor are there restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The Maldives financial sector is dominated by banking. The banking sector consists of eight banks, of which three are locally incorporated, four are branches of foreign banks and one is a fully owned subsidiary of a foreign bank. There are 52 branches of these banks throughout the country of which 33 are in the rural areas. Additionally, at the end of 2017 there were 116 automatic teller machines (of which 51 were in rural areas) and 230 agent banking service providers. Maldives has correspondent banking relationships with six banks. Maldives has not announced intentions to allow the implementation of blockchain technologies (cryptocurrencies) in its banking system. In October 2021, following an announcement by an international resort management company saying it would accept cryptocurrencies as payment for their services, the MMA announced that Maldivian law does not permit cryptocurrencies for valid business transactions. International money transfer services are offered by four remittance companies through global remittance networks. Two telecommunications companies offer mobile payment services through mobile wallet accounts and this service does not require customers to hold bank accounts. Non-bank financial institutions in the country consist of four insurance companies, a pension fund, and a finance leasing company, a specialized housing finance institution and money transfer businesses. Maldives Real Time Gross Settlement System and Automated Clearing House system is housed in the MMA for interbank payments settlements for large value and small value batch processing transactions respectively. There has been an increase in usage of electronic payments such as card payments and internet banking. All financial institutions currently operate under the supervision of the MMA. Rules relating to the foreign exchange market are stipulated in the Monetary Regulation of the MMA. Both residents and non-residents may freely trade and purchase currency in the foreign exchange market. Residents do not need permission to maintain foreign currency accounts either at home or abroad and there is no distinction made between foreign national or non-resident accounts held with the banks operating in Maldives. The exchange rate is maintained within a horizontal band, with the value of the Rufiyaa allowed to fluctuate against the U.S. dollar within a band of 20 percent on either side of a central parity of MVR12.85 per U.S. dollar. In practice, however, the rufiyaa has been virtually fixed at the band’s weaker end of Rf 15.42 per dollar, according to the IMF. Rules regarding foreign remittances are governed by the Regulation for Remittance Businesses under the Maldives Monetary Authority Act of 1981. There are no restrictions on repatriation of profits or earnings from investments. In 2016, the government imposed a three percent remittance tax on money transferred out of Maldives by foreigners employed in the Maldives. However, Maldives Inland Revenue Authority (MIRA) repealed the remittance tax effective from January 1, 2020, to reduce “out-of-bank” money transactions that had become commonplace following implementation of the tax. In 2016, Maldives Finance Minister announced plans to establish a “Sovereign Development Fund (SDF)” that would support foreign currency obligations incurred to executive public sector development projects. The government has not published any documents related to the SDF and does not have a published policy document regulating funding or a general approach to withdrawals regarding SDF. As of March 2022, the MoF is in the process of drafting a Sovereign Development Fund Act. Allocations to the SDF are included in the budget and published in the MoF’s weekly and monthly fiscal development reports published regularly on its website. The Ministry reported two sources of funding for the SDF – revenue gathered through Airport Development Fees charged to all travelers entering and departing Maldives and ad hoc allocations made by the MoF at its discretion. Expected ADF receipts are included in the Revenue Tables of the Budget. Reports from the MoF show that the size of the SDF fund had amassed USD 206.5 million as of February 25, 2021. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is limited but growing awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) or corporate social responsibility (CSR) among the business elite and tourism resort owners. All new government leases for tourism resorts contain CSR requirements and individual resorts often implement their own RBC programs. However, the government does not have a consistent policy or national action plan to promote responsible business conduct. As of March 2022, the Ministry of Economic Development is in the final stages of drafting an Industrial Relations bill and an Occupational Health and Safety bill. Both bills are scheduled to be submitted to Parliament during the first session of 2022. Several workers’ organizations monitor and advocate for RBC regarding workers’ rights, the most active of which is the Tourism Employees Association of the Maldives (TEAM). Further, many NGOs advocate for RBC in environment-related issues. Civil society organizations (CSOs) often work together to campaign for the introduction of new laws such as an Industrial Relations Law and an Occupational Health and Safety Law. These CSOs can function without harassment from the government, though COVID-related restrictions during the pandemic made conducting their activities difficult. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. On December 28, 2020, Maldives submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), which includes an enhanced ambition for a 26 percent decrease in emissions and carbon neutrality by 2030, conditioned on receiving financial, technological, and technical support. The new NDC lists various actions the government must undertake to achieve the targets: Increase renewable energy electricity production, including storage and grid stabilization. Increase supply and demand side efficiency. Increase generator efficiency and upgrade electrical grids to minimize loss. Implement a standard labelling program and improve building standards for energy efficiency. Increase waste to energy conversion. Complete installation of 8 MW production facility in Thilafushi and 1.5 MW production facility in Addu City, optimizing electrical production and grid connectivity for both. Establish vehicle/vessel emissions standard and an efficient transport management system. Promote hybrid-vehicles. Use Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for electricity generation within the greater Malé region. Replace diesel power production in the greater Malé region with the proposed LNG plant in Thilafushi. The government grants import duty exemptions on all items imported for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. As of March 2022, the government was in the process of developing a natural capital accounting mechanism. The Ministry of Finance is working with the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Change to develop policies on sustainable procurement for all government agencies. 9. Corruption Maldives made significant progress in its efforts to increase its transparency, jumping from 130 out of 180 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception index in 2019 to 75th in 2020. Its score increased from 29 out of 100 to 43 out of 100, surpassing that of regional competitors like Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. In 2021, Maldives fell ten spots in the rankings and saw its score fall to 40. Still, corruption practices exist at all levels of society, threatening inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The Solih administration has publicly pledged to tackle widespread corruption and judicial reform. As part of President Solih’s first 100 business day agenda, he established a Presidential Commission on Corruption and Asset Recovery to investigate corruption cases originating between February 2012 and November 2018. As of March 2022, the commission had not issued a report of its findings. Additional measures towards increased transparency include requiring public financial disclosures for cabinet members, political appointees, and all members of parliament. On December 15, 2021, the Parliament voted to dismiss all members of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) following a performance audit, which found that more than 16,000 cases were still pending. Maldives law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but enforcement is weak. The law on prevention and punishment of corruption (2000) defines bribery and improper pecuniary advantage and prescribes punishments. The law also outlines procedures for the confiscation of property and funds obtained through the included offenses. Penalties range from six months to 10 years banishment, or jail terms. According to non-governmental organizations, a narrow definition of corruption in the law, and the lack of a provision to investigate and prosecute illicit enrichment, limited the Anti-Corruption Commission’s work. Maldives acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in March 2007, and under the 2008 Constitution, an independent Anti-Corruption Commission was established in December 2008. The responsibilities of the Commission include inquiring into and investigating all allegations of corruption by government officials; recommending further inquiries and investigations by other investigatory bodies; and recommending prosecution of alleged offenses to the prosecutor general, where warranted. The Commission does not have a mandate to investigate cases of corruption of government officials by the private sector. Maldives is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention. Maldives is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. A number of domestic human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials, however, often have not been cooperative or responsive to their views. Upon assumption of office, President Solih’s administration pledged to submit a new NGO bill that would increase protections for non-government organizations. The bill completed parliamentary debate and is undergoing committee review as of March 2022. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Anti-Corruption Commission of the Maldives Address: Huravee Building, Male, Maldives, 20114 Telephone: (800)3300007 (Toll free number), (960) 331 0451, (960) 331 7410 (General Inquiries) Email: info@acc.gov.mv ; complaints@acc.gov.mv Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Ms. Asiath Rilweena Executive Director Transparency Maldives Address: MF Building, 7th Floor, Chaandhanee Magu, Male’, Republic of Maldives Telephone: +960 330 4017 Email: office@transparencymaldives.org 10. Political and Security Environment Maldives is a multi-party constitutional democracy, but the transition from long term autocracy to democracy has been challenging. Maldives gained its independence from Britain in 1965. For the first 40 years of independence, Maldives was run by President Ibrahim Nasir and then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who was elected to six successive terms by single-party referenda. August 2003 demonstrations forced Gayoom to begin a democratic reform process, leading to the legalization of political parties in 2005, a new constitution in August 2008, and the first multiparty presidential elections later that year, through which Mohamed Nasheed was elected president. In February 2012 Nasheed resigned under disputed circumstances. President Abdulla Yameen’s tenure, beginning in 2013, was marked by corruption, systemic limitations on the independence of parliament and the judiciary, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association. Yameen’s tenure was also characterized by increased reliance on PRC-financing for large scale infrastructure projects, which were decided largely under non-transparent circumstances and procedures. External debt rose rapidly during his tenure. In September 2018, Solih won his campaign for president running on a platform of economic and political reforms and transparency. His party, the MDP, then won a super majority (65 out of 87) seats in parliamentary elections in April 2019, the first single-party majority since the advent of multi-party democracy. President Solih pledged to restore democratic institutions and the freedom of the press, re-establish the justice system, and protect fundamental rights. There is a global threat from terrorism to U.S. citizens and interests. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners and “soft targets” such as restaurants, hotels, recreational events, resorts, beaches, maritime facilities, and aircraft. Concerns have increased about a small number of potentially violent Maldivian extremists who advocate for attacks against secular Maldivians and are involved with transnational terrorist groups. For more information, travelers may consult the 2020 Country Reports on Terrorism at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/maldives/. U.S. citizens traveling to Maldives should be aware of violent attacks and threats made against local media, political parties, and civil society. In the past there have been killings and violent attacks against secular bloggers and activists. For more information, travelers may consult the State Department’s 2020 Human Rights Report at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/maldives/ and https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html. Maldives has a history of political protests. Some of these protests have involved use of anti-Western rhetoric. There are no reports of unrest or demonstrations on the resort islands or at the main Velana International Airport. Travelers should not engage in political activity in Maldives. Visitors should exercise caution, particularly at night, and should steer clear of demonstrations and spontaneous gatherings. Those who encounter demonstrations or large crowds should avoid confrontation, remain calm, and depart the area quickly. While traveling in Maldives, travelers should refer to news sources, check the U.S. Mission to Maldives website and https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html for possible security updates, and remain aware of their surroundings at all times. The U.S. Mission to Maldives is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. There are no U.S. diplomatic personnel resident in Maldives, constraining the U.S. government’s ability to provide services to U.S. citizens in an emergency. Many tourist resorts are several hours’ distance from Malé by boat, necessitating lengthy response times by authorities in case of medical or criminal emergencies. For more information, visit https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Expatriate labor is allowed into Maldives to meet shortages. Maldives Immigration reported approximately 200,000 registered expatriate workers in the country in 2019, mostly in tourism, construction, and personal services. The government reported 63,000 unregistered expatriate migrant workers, but non-governmental sources estimate the number is even higher. During May 2020, President Solih announced that the government would repatriate unregistered Bangladeshi nationals in the Maldives, following which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development and the Bangladeshi High Commission collaboratively began a repatriation exercise, with the assistance from the Bangladeshi government. Close to 9,000 unregistered migrant workers were repatriated under the program as of March 2022. Notwithstanding the labor shortage, unemployment in Maldives is high, as many youths leaving lower secondary school have few in-country avenues to pursue higher secondary education. Although resorts may offer employment opportunities, locals are less likely to take advantage of these jobs as resort employment practices require employees to live and work on the island for long stretches of time, away from family. Religious and cultural reasons also discourage women from seeking employment on distant islands. The Law on Foreign Investments requires Maldivian nationals to be employed unless employment of foreigners is necessary. See section on “Performance and Data Localization” for more detail. The 2008 the Employment Act and a subsequent amendment to the Employment Act recognize workers’ right to strike and establish trade unions; however, current law does not adequately govern the formation of trade unions, collective bargaining, and the right to association. While the constitution provides for workers’ freedom of association, there is no law protecting it, which is required to allow unions to register and operate without interference and discrimination. As a matter of practice, workers’ organizations are treated as civil society. A regulation on strikes requires employees to negotiate with the employer first, and if this is unsuccessful, then the employees must file advance notice prior to a strike. The Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act effectively prohibits strikes by workers in the resort sector, the country’s largest money earner. Employees in the following services are also prohibited from striking: hospitals and health centers, electricity companies, water providers, telecommunications providers, prison guards, and air traffic controllers. Maldives became a member of the International Labor Organization in 2008 and has ratified the eight core ILO Conventions. Maldives has not ratified the four priority governance ILO Conventions. In 2019, the ILO called on the Government to take the necessary measures to eliminate child labor, including through adopting a national policy and a national action plan to combat child labor in the country. In November 2019, President Solih ratified the Child Rights Protection Act, which prohibits child labor. On August 2020, the government published the General Regulations under the Child Rights Protection Act. 14. Contact for More Information Brian Husar Political and Economic Officer U.S. Mission Maldives Colombo, Sri Lanka Phone: +94-11-249-8500 Email: commercialcolombo@state.gov Mali Executive Summary Title Despite enthusiasm for U.S. investment, there are significant obstacles to investing in Mali, including political instability, economic sanctions, allegations of corruption, poor infrastructure, and ongoing insecurity throughout the country. Mali remains under transition government rule after a coup d’etat in August 2020, followed by a further consolidation of military power in May 2021. The U.S. Department of State maintains a “Level 4: Do Not Travel” travel advisory for Mali due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Continued insecurity throughout Mali is exacerbated by the minimal presence of the state in many areas and has permitted terrorist groups to conduct attacks against Western targets and Malian security forces. Intercommunal violence stemming from conflict between livestock herders and crop farmers in central Mali further contributes to instability. Mali depends on bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and African Development Bank, to fund major development projects, particularly in health, infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Mali received significant financial support in 2020 to address the COVID-19 pandemic and to support post-pandemic economic recovery. Since then, however, donors such as Denmark and France have partially or fully interrupted their development support to Mali, intensifying the financing needs. The COVID-19 crisis interrupted a five-year period of consistent growth. As a result, Mali’s growth in 2020 reached only two percent against an initial projection of five percent. The transition government took measures to support households and businesses amid this economic slowdown, further increasing its fiscal deficit, which reached 6.2 percent of GDP in 2020, against an initial projection of 3.5 percent. In March 2021, the IMF projected GDP growth of six percent for Mali, as well as average inflation of two percent. Mali was relying on these positive projections to reduce its budget deficit to 4.5 percent of GDP, down from 5.5 percent a year ago. These projected figures will likely be significantly affected by the ECOWAS and WAEMU sanctions in force during the first half of 2022. Business contacts report both Malian and foreign businesses face corruption in procurement, customs procedures, tax payment, and land administration, although the transition government has committed to undertaking reform, including through improved public financial management practices and increased tax revenues. Efforts to strengthen revenue collection agencies, particularly customs, are ongoing following significant revenue shortfalls in 2018 that the IMF attributed to corruption, weak taxpayer compliance, and fraud. Malian businesses generally view U.S. products favorably and openly search for new partnerships with U.S. firms, particularly in infrastructure, energy, mining, and agriculture. Investors may consult the website of Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency (API-Mali) Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 124 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 0* https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 830 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD * A nonzero value that rounds to zero. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mali encourages foreign investment. In general, the law treats foreign and domestic investment equally. In practice, U.S. investors report facing many of the same challenges as other foreign investors do, including allegedly unfair application of tax collection laws, difficulties clearing goods through customs, and requests for bribes. Corruption in the judiciary is common and foreign companies may find themselves at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Malian investors in enforcing contracts and competing for public procurement tenders. The transition government has instituted policies promoting direct investment and export-oriented businesses. Foreign investors go through the same screening process as domestic investors. Criteria for authorizing an investment under Mali’s 2012 investment code include the size of the proposed capital investment, the use of locally produced raw materials, and the level of job creation. Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency (API-Mali) serves as a one-stop shop for prospective investors and serves both Malian and foreign enterprises of all sizes. API-Mali’s website ( https://apimali.gov.ml/ ) provides information on business registration, investment opportunities, tax incentives, and other topics relevant to prospective investors. Mali maintains an office in charge of business climate reform (Cellule Technique des Réformes du Climat des Affaires or CTRCA). Since 2015, Mali has also had a committee for monitoring business environment reforms that includes both government and private sector members. Mali adopted a law governing public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 2016 and has a dedicated PPP unit charged with reviewing and facilitating implementation of PPP projects in a multitude of sectors. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises with no restriction to forms of remunerative activities. There are some specific limits on ownership in the mining and media sector: Malian law requires the owners and primary shareholders of media companies be Malian nationals. Foreign investors in the mining sector can own up to 90 percent of a mining company. WAEMU, of which Mali is a member, requires Malian and foreign companies to report if they will hold foreign currency reserves in their Malian business accounts and to receive approval from the Ministry of Economy and Finances and from the Central Bank for West African States (BCEAO). The World Trade Organization (WTO) reviewed the trade and investment policies of WAEMU members, including Mali, in 2018. The review can be accessed here . The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner released reports on Mali human rights situation. Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency, API-Mali ( https://apimali.gov.ml/ ), serves as a one-stop shop to facilitate both foreign and local investment. API successfully reduced the average time to start a business in Mali to 72 hours, which it expects to further reduce to 48 hours. API provides investors with information relating to authorizations for business creation, waivers, the organization of investments promotion events, and other information. API opened regional satellite offices in Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou, and Mopti. There is no noted discrimination based on gender, age, or ethnicity in the process of business registration. Foreign companies wishing to register in Mali may receive tax and customs benefits depending on the size of investment. Small and medium-sized enterprises (for which there is no common definition across government entities) are also eligible for some fiscal advantages. The transition government has no specific policy to promote outward investment. Mali has gradually begun to introduce economic diplomacy by appointing economic advisors in its diplomatic representations. In general, its outward direct investment flows to neighboring countries. 3. Legal Regime In its 2022 Fiscal Transparency Report Survey, the Department of State determined Mali does not meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency nor did it make significant progress toward achieving that goal in the previous year. Mali has adopted laws designed to meet the requirements of fair competition, ease bureaucratic procedures, and facilitate the hiring and firing of employees, but in practice many international firms complain of lack of transparency in the regulatory system and challenges in enforcing regulatory requirements to the detriment of business prospects. There is no public comment period or other opportunity for citizens or businesses to comment upon proposed laws. Mali is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Mali is also a member of the African Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law (OHADA) and implements the Accounting System of West African States (SYSCOA), which harmonizes business practices among several African countries consistent with international norms. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or associations. Mali’s Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de régulation des marchés publics or ARMDS) is tasked with ensuring transparency in public procurement projects and may receive complaints from businesses on public procurement-related issues. ARMDS publishes information about its decisions in disputes as well as key laws relating to public procurement on its website at http://www.armds.ml/ . The transition government regularly reviews regulations in order to adapt them to the current national context or to international standards or commitments. The new mining code and its implementing decree, adopted respectively in 2019 and in 2020, will apply to future mining projects. In February, the ministry of mines declared it is working on the new mining code to improve it and correct deficiencies. In December 2021, the transition government approved a new customs code in order to simplify the customs procedures and facilitate international trade. The government planned also to reform the investment code. The tax code and the tax procedures book (Livre de procédures fiscales) were substantially amended in September 2020, mainly to introduce a mandatory registration of all taxpayers, to operate changes in the VAT refund, to classify companies in terms of risks for the tax office, to digitize tax return and payment. The tax office had also planned to make e-filing mandatory. More information is available on the tax office’s website here . The reform initiatives in Mali capitalize on experience, input from stakeholders (citizens, elected officials, and technical and financial partners), and reflect the requirements of the new directives establishing a harmonized, renewed framework for public finance in WAEMU member states. Mali has enacted the following directives: Law N°2013-031 of July 23, 2013, adopting the Code of Transparency in Public Finances; Law N°2013-028 of July 11, 2013, relating to the Finance Laws; Decree 2014-0349 of May 22, 2014, on the General Regulations of Public Accounting; and Decree 2014-0774 of October 14, 2014, on the State Chart of Accounts. Mali makes public finance documents, including the budgets for all government ministries and offices, available on the Ministry of Economy of Finance’s website (https://www.finances.ml/loidesfinances). Mali’s national budget provides details on the expenditures of government entities (including the presidency and prime minister’s office) and the revenues of tax collection authorities, including customs, the public debt directorate, the land administration directorate, and the treasury and public accounting directorate. The budget also includes information on public debt, as well as government subsidies to petroleum products and to the state-owned utility company (Energie du Mali or EDM). Mali also publishes a simplified version of the budget known as the citizen’s budget. Mali has multiple audit institutions tasked with monitoring public spending. The Malian supreme court’s accounts section is responsible for reviewing and approving the financial statements of all government departments. The Office of the Auditor General (Bureau du Vérificateur General, or BVG) is authorized to audit the accounts of all government entities as well as private companies or other entities that receive public funds. Its reports are made public and can be accessed at http://www.bvg-mali.org/ . Mali has other auditing institutions, including the Office to Fight against Illicit Enrichment (Office central de Lutte contre l’Enrichissement illicite or OCLEI), the General Comptroller of Public Services (Contrôle Général des Services Publics or CGSP), and the Support Unit for Administrative Auditing Bodies (Cellule d’Appui aux Structures de Contrôle de l’Administration or CASCA). Despite the existence of multiple audit institutions, management of public funds remains opaque and subject to corrupt practices, particularly in public procurements. Mali remains a suspended member of WAEMU and ECOWAS. Mali is a member of the WTO. Mali has not notified the WTO of any measures concerning investments related to trade in goods that are inconsistent with the requirements of Trade Related Investment Measures. Information on other notifications from Mali to the WTO can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/mali_e.htm under the “Notifications from Mali” section. Mali’s legal system is based on French civil law. Mali uses its investment code, mining code, commerce code, labor code, and code on competition and price to govern disputes. Disputes occasionally arise between the government or state-owned enterprises and foreign companies. Some investors report certain cases involve wrongdoing on the part of corrupt government officials. Although Mali’s judicial system is independent, many companies have noted it is subject to political influence. Numerous business complaints are awaiting an outcome in the courts. The Minister of Justice wields influence over the career paths of judges and prosecutors, which may compromise their independence. Corruption in the judicial system is common, leading to what foreign investors have characterized as flawed decisions. An independent commercial court was established in 1991 with the encouragement of the U.S. government to expedite the handling of business litigation. Commercial courts, located in Bamako, Kayes, and Mopti, can hear intellectual property rights cases. In areas where there is no commercial court, the local courts of first instance have the jurisdiction to hear business disputes. Decisions made by the courts of first instance are appealable in the court of appeals and/or in the supreme court. Since its inception, the commercial court has handled cases involving foreign companies. The court is staffed by magistrates and is assisted by elected Malian Chamber of Commerce and Industry representatives. Teams composed of one magistrate and two Chamber of Commerce and Industry representatives conduct hearings. The magistrate’s role is to ensure the court renders decisions in accordance with applicable commercial laws, including internationally recognized bankruptcy laws, and court decisions are enforced under Malian law. Mali’s investment code gives the same incentives to both domestic and foreign companies for licensing, procurement, tax and customs duty deferrals, export and import policies, and export zone status if the firm exports at least 80 percent of production. Incentives include exemptions from duties on imported equipment and machinery. Investors may also receive tax exemptions on the use of local raw materials. In addition, foreign companies can negotiate specific incentives on a case-by-case basis. Mali has reduced or eliminated many export taxes and import duties as part of ongoing economic reforms; however, export taxes remain for gold and cotton, Mali’s two primary exports. The government applies price controls to petroleum products and cotton, and occasionally to other commodities (such as rice) on a case-by-case basis. In most cases, foreign investors may own 100 percent of any business they create, except in the mining and media sectors. Foreign investors may also purchase shares in parastatal companies. Foreign companies may also start joint-venture operations with Malian enterprises. The repatriation of capital and profit is guaranteed. Despite having a generally favorable investment regime on paper, foreign investors have complained of facing challenges in practice, including limited access to financing, high levels of corruption, poor infrastructure (including inconsistent electricity access), a non-transparent judicial system, and the lack of an educated workforce. The following websites provide additional information relating to investments in Mali: Investment Promotion Agency: https://apimali.gov.ml/ Mali Trade Portal: https://tradeportal.ml/ National Council of Employers: http://www.cnpmali.org/index.php/lois-et-reglements/codes Niger River Authority (Officer du Niger): https://www.on-mali.org/on/ Ministry of Economy and Finances: http://www.finances.gouv.ml The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is responsible for reviewing free competition in the Malian marketplace. Mali’s national competition law (Law 2016-006 and Decree 2018-0332) and the WAEMU 2002 anti-trust rules are the primary judicial documents that govern competition in Mali. The competition law bans any agreements restricting competition or market access. It also bans control or fixation of prices through agreements. Abuses of dominance are prohibited. The commercial court (Tribunal of Commerce) and ARMDS are the primary judicial bodies that oversee competition-related concerns. Mali’s Organization of Industrial Entrepreneurs (Organisation Patronal des Industriels or OPI) has criticized corruption and smuggling as significant hurdles to fair competition. Contacts report Mali struggles to limit illegal imports of products such as sodas, juices, tobacco, medicines, and textiles (including fabrics). The General Directorate of Customs, the National Directorate for Commerce and Competition, and the Agency for the Sanitary Security of Foods occasionally intervene to address the import and commercialization of smuggled goods but have limited capacity to effectively address the problem. Expropriation of private property other than land for public purposes is rare. Mali has not unfairly targeted U.S. firms for expropriation. Under Malian law, the expropriation process must be public and transparent and follow the principles of international law. Compensation based on market value is awarded by court decision. The government may exercise eminent domain in various situations, including when undertaking large-scale public projects, in cases of bankrupt companies that had a government guarantee for their financing, or when a company has not complied with the requirements of an investment agreement with the government. In cases of illegal expropriations, Malian law affords claimants due process in principle. However, given reported corruption in the land administration sector, impartial adjudication of court cases involving land disputes is rare. Mali’s bankruptcy law is found in its commerce code, which does not criminalize bankruptcy. The commercial code makes a distinction between insolvency and the cessation of payment or accidental difficulty. It defines the judiciary process of compulsory liquidation. Generally, a bankrupt company will be sold piecemeal. 4. Industrial Policies Mali’s investment, mining, commerce, and labor codes aim to encourage investment and attract foreign investors. By law, there is no discrimination between foreign-owned firms and Malian entities with regard to investment opportunities. The investment code offers incentives to companies that reinvest profits to expand existing businesses or diversify into another relevant sector. The code also encourages the use of locally sourced inputs, which can offer tax exemptions. Companies that use at least 60 percent locally produced raw materials in their products are eligible for certain tax exemptions. Companies that invest at least five percent of their turnover in supporting local research and development are eligible for a reduction of payroll taxes for Malian employees. Companies (foreign or domestic) that export at least 80 percent of their production are entitled to tax-free status. As such, they benefit from duty-free status on all equipment and other inputs needed for their operations. Mali encourages investment in the cultural sector by reducing taxes on imports of cultural goods. In March 2020, Mali adopted an order exempting renewable energy equipment from VAT and import taxes. Mali may also provide short-term tax exemptions on certain essential products (such as rice, cooking oil, milk, and sugar) when the prices of those goods are unusually high. Most businesses are located in the capital city of Bamako. The investment code encourages the establishment of new businesses in other areas through incentives such as income tax exemptions for five- to eight-year periods, reduced energy prices, and the installation of water, electric power, and telecommunication lines in areas lacking public utilities. To date, there are no dedicated free trade zones in Mali. Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso have planned to establish a special economic zone involving the agricultural areas of Sikasso in Mali, Korogho in Cote d’Ivoire, and Bobo-Dioulasso in Burkina Faso, but the zone is not yet operational. The investment code states companies operating in special economic zones will benefit from reductions of taxes on profits and of corporate taxes to 25 percent over a period of seven years. The 2019 mining code requires large mining companies (for which there is no precise definition in the mining code) to recruit Malian nationals who possess the requisite skills and experience. Mining companies must also progressively replace foreign employees with Malian nationals who possess the requisite skills and experience. Feasibility studies for large mines must incorporate a plan to replace foreign employees with Malian employees. There is no requirement that foreign investment or foreign equity in a mine be reduced over time. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are protected under Malian law. Ownership of property is defined by the use, the profitability, and the ability of the owner to sell or donate the property. The government established the Malian Center for the Promotion of Industrial Property to implement property rights protection laws, including the WTO TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement. The Malian Center for the Promotion of Industrial Property is a member of the African Property Rights Organization and works with international agencies recognized by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are covered under property rights protection laws. These structures notwithstanding, property rights are not always adequately protected in practice. Mali’s National Land Agency (Direction Nationale des Domaines et du Cadastre or DNDC) is in charge of the land administration. In October 2021, Mali amended the land code to simplify the process of delivering land titles. The new code creates a one-stop-shop to handle land procedures. It reinforces traditional land rights (le droit coutumier) and enables the Minister of Land to cancel the attribution or confiscation of public properties. The new code considers the land title (le titre foncier), which gives full property ownership, as the unique property title. It also empowers the Ministry of Agriculture to deliver farming rights to rural agricultural communities. It clarifies the role of different offices in the management of lands affairs. All non-registered land belongs to the state. Various government officials, including prefects, governors, or subprefects, are no longer empowered to grant land ownership status. Mali is building a nationwide land registry to reduce competing claims for land. Mali is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Mali has ratified a number of international treaties related to intellectual property rights (IPR). There are two primary agencies involved with the protection of IPR in Mali: the Malian Office of the Rights of the Author (Bureau Malien du Droit d’Auteur or BUMDA) and the Malian Center for the Promotion of Intellectual Property (Centre Malien de Promotion de la Propriété Industrielle or CEMAPI). CEMAPI is the primary agency for patents and for industrial property rights violation claims, while BUMDA covers artistic and cultural works. In addition to registering copyrights, BUMDA conducts random searches during which it seizes and destroys counterfeit products. Mali’s Agency for the Sanitary Security of Foods, the National Directorate of Agriculture, and the National Directorate for Commerce and Competition are also charged with enforcing laws related to fair trade, fair competition, and IPR. In general, however, the government has limited capacity to combat IPR violations or to seize counterfeit goods. There is a significant number of reported IPR violations in the artistic sector as well as in the pharmaceutical sector. According to the Malian National Pharmaceutical Association, nearly 50 percent of pharmaceuticals sold in Mali are counterfeit. Many CDs, movies, and books are reported to be pirated. Several companies have noted children are often involved in selling counterfeit products such as clothes, CDs, and books. In the past, counterfeit products were typically imported from foreign cities, including Guangzhou and Dubai. However, BUMDA has reported counterfeit products increasingly originate in Mali and Nigeria. Mali is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investment is not a current practice in Mali. In 1994, the government instituted a system of treasury bonds available for purchase by individuals or companies. The payment of dividends or the repurchase of bonds may be done through a compensation procedure offsetting corporate income taxes or other sums due to the government. The WAEMU stock exchange program based in Abidjan has a branch in each WAEMU country, including Mali. One Malian company is quoted in the stock exchange. The planned privatization of EDM, Mali’s state-run electricity company, the telecommunications entity (Societé des Telecommunications du Mali or SOTELMA), the cotton ginning company (Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement du Textile or CMDT), and the Bamako-Senou Airport offer prospects for some companies to be listed on the WAEMU stock exchange. WAEMU statutes and the BCEAO govern the banking system and monetary policy in Mali. Commercial banks in Mali enjoyed considerable liquidity, though this was negatively affected by the imposition of financial sanctions during the first half of 2022. The majority of banks’ loanable funds, however, do not come from deposits, but rather from other liabilities, such as lines of credit from the BCEAO and North African and European banks. Despite having sufficient loanable funds, commercial banks in Mali tend to have highly conservative lending practices. Bank loans generally support short-term activities, such as letters of credit to support export-import activities and short-term lines of credit and bridge loans for established businesses. Small- and medium-sized businesses have reportedly had difficulty obtaining access to credit. The Guarantee Fund for Private Sector (le Fonds de Garantie du Secteur Privé or FGSP) is a partially state-owned financial institution which provides guarantees up to 50 percent of the loan that SMEs/SMIs and microfinance institutions could borrow from commercial banks. The FGSP also provides direct financing to the private sector. Mali recently increased the financial resources of the FGSP as a measure to support the private sector to face the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Mali also created a National Directorate of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 2020 in part to address the challenges SMEs face in accessing financing. In order to improve the business environment and soundness of the financial system, the BCEAO adopted a uniform law regarding credit reference bureaus. The government aligned its legislation with this regional requirement by authorizing a credit reference bureau in Mali to collect and process information from financial institutions, public sources, water and electricity companies, and other entities to create credit records for clients. The credit rating system aims to increase the solvency of borrowers and improve access to credit. Mali’s microfinance sector has grown rapidly. Despite this growth, microfinance institutions suffer from poor governance and management of resources and have not put in place all government regulations or regional best practices to ensure sufficient financial controls and transparency. Money laundering and terrorist financing are concerns in Mali. Although Mali’s anti-money laundering law designates several reporting entities, companies have noted very few comply with their legal obligations. While businesses are technically required to report cash transactions over approximately $10,000, most reportedly do not. Despite terrorist networks operating throughout Mali, the country’s financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), receives relatively few suspicious transaction reports concerning possible cases of terrorist financing. With the exception of casinos, designated non-financial businesses and professions are not subject to customer due diligence requirements. Mali is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Mali’s most recent mutual evaluation report, completed in November 2019, can be found at http://www.giaba.org/reports/mutual-evaluation/Mali.html . Mali does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mali has privatized or reduced government involvement in many state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there are still 45 state-owned or partially state-owned companies in Mali, including 12 mining companies, five banks, the national electricity company EDM, the telecommunications entity SOTELMA, the cotton ginning company CMDT, as well as cigarette company (Société nationale de tabac et allumettes du Mali or SONATAM), sugar companies Sukala and N-Sukala, and the Airports of Mali. The government no longer has shares in two banks, Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce (BSIC-Mali), and Coris Bank International-Mali, in which it had respectively 25 and 10 percent shares as of December 2017. The government reduced its shares in the Malian Development Bank (BDM) and Malian Solidarity Bank (BMS) while it maintained its share in the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole (BNDA), which increased its total capital stock by 21.5 percent in 2019 compared with 2018. Private and public enterprises compete under the same terms and conditions. No preferential treatment is given to SOEs, although they can be at a competitive disadvantage due to limited flexibility in their management decision-making process. Malian law guarantees equal treatment for financing, land access, tax burden, tax rebate, and access to raw materials for private firms and SOEs. The government is active in the agricultural sector. The parastatal Niger River Authority (Office du Niger) controls much of the irrigated rice fields and vegetable production in the Niger River inland delta, although some private operators have been granted plots of land to develop. The Office du Niger encourages both national and foreign private investment to develop the farmlands it manages. Under a Millennium Challenge Corporation-funded irrigation project, Mali granted titles to small private farmers; an adjacent tranche developed with MCC was to have been open to large-scale private investment through a public tender process. However, all MCC projects were suspended as a result of the coup d’état of March 2012 and discontinued when the projects reached the end of their implementation deadline. The national cotton production company, CMDT, which is yet to be privatized, provides financing for fertilizers and inputs to cotton farmers, sets cotton prices, purchases cotton from producers, and exports cotton fiber via ports in neighboring countries. The agricultural sector, including cotton growing, is subject to erratic rainfalls. The government also remains active in the banking sector. The state owns shares in five of the 14 banks in Mali: BDM (19.5 percent share), Banque Internationale pour le Mali (BIM) (10.5 percent), BNDA (36.5 percent), BMS (13.8 percent), and Banque Commerciale du Sahel (BCS) (3.3 percent). While the government no longer has a majority stake in BDM, it has significant influence over its management, including the privilege to appoint the head of the Board of Directors. Senior transition government officials from different ministries make up the boards of SOEs. Major procurement decisions or equity raising decisions are referred to the Council of Ministers. Government powers remain in the hands of ministries or government agencies reporting to the ministries. No SOE has delegated powers from the government. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. They hold a mandatory annual board of directors meeting to discuss financial statements prepared by a certified accountant and certified by an outside auditor in accordance with domestic standards (which are comparable to international financial reporting standards). Mali’s independent Auditor General conducts an annual review of public spending, which may result in the prosecution of cases of corruption. Audits of several state-owned mining companies have revealed significant irregularities. The government’s privatization program for state enterprises provides investment opportunities through a process of open international bidding. Foreign companies have responded successfully to calls for bids in several cases. The government publishes announcements for bids in the government-owned daily newspaper, L’Essor. The process is non-discriminatory in principle; however, there have been many allegations of corruption in public procurement. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is no general awareness or defined standard of responsible business conduct in Mali among producers or consumers. Despite the creation of the Malian Agency for Normalization and Quality Promotion (Agence Malienne de Normalisation et de Promotion de la Qualité or AMANORM) and the National Agency for the Sanitary Security of Foods (Agence Nationale pour la Securité Sanitaire des Aliments or ANSSA), some report Mali continues to produce, import, and export dangerous products and products of poor quality. Allegations of violations of hygiene and quality standards are common in the food-processing industry and investors have reported there is no general awareness about the dangers of unsafe and toxic chemical products in food production. Labor rights are not generally respected given Mali’s large and unregulated informal sector. Even formal businesses often hire workers informally, such that employees do not always receive social security, retirement, or other related benefits. Mali has various laws intended to prevent child and forced labor, as well as business practices harmful to the environment and local communities. Despite these laws, there are frequent reported cases of child labor and forced labor in the mining, agricultural, service, and industrial sectors. The mining code requires owners of mining and exploitation permits to present local development plans to mitigate the health, security, hygiene, environment, and cultural heritage impacts of their mining activities. Conflicts between local artisanal mining communities and foreign mining companies over land ownership rights are frequent. Local communities have voiced concern with the significant environmental impacts of mining, including from dredging, as well as the lack of government efforts to restore and rehabilitate the environment after mine closures. Foreign mining and oil exploration companies sometimes provide schools and health clinics to communities in proximity of their activities as a form of corporate social responsibility. These activities are not done in accordance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises but are rather the result of individual negotiations between the company and the leaders of neighboring communities. Mali is an active member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and since 2011 has been designated as a “compliant country.” The latest EITI decision available at https://eiti.org/board-decision/2019-47 notes Mali made “meaningful progress with considerable improvements in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard.” Acute insecurity and intercommunal violence in the northern and central regions as well as episodic terrorist attacks in the southern regions have contributed to the development of the private security sector, which proposes services to the government, local companies, foreign governments and companies, and international organizations. The deployment of Russia-backed private military company Wagner Group in Mali has raised concerns from the international community and the U.S. government that the group may further destabilize Mali’s territory. Mali is not a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Demographic pressure and natural resource exploitation have exacerbated environmental degradation in Mali. Desertification, CO₂ and methane gas emissions, waterway pollution, and the destruction of natural habitats constitute significant challenges for environmental protection. That said, Mali has taken some measures to reduce its greenhouse emissions, even as it considers itself a carbon sink. Mali released its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) in 2015, followed by a second, more robust NDC in 2021. This second NDC outlines Mali’s exposure to climate change as a result of increased temperatures and decreased rainfalls. The plan focuses on agriculture, forestry, energy, and waste, and specifically aims to strengthen Mali’s strategy for carbon sequestration and greenhouse gas reduction. The plan seeks to promote sustainable development through the promotion of green economy across various sectors. The National Policy for the Protection of the Environment and the National Policy for Climate Change are the main policy documents. While the Agency for Environment and Sustainable Development (Agence de l’Environnement et le Développement Durable, or AEDD) coordinates the implementation of climate policy, many other departments, including but not limited to the National Directorate for Water and Forest, the Agency for Renewable Energy (AER), the Agency for Rural Electrification (AMADER), and the Agency for Treatment of Wastewater, participate in its implementation. In 2021, Climatescope ranked Mali 62 out of 107 countries for energy transition investment attractiveness. Mali’s climate policy implementation may face significant challenges related to the limitation in financial resources and limited absorption capacity of large projects. More information can be found on this ClimateScope Report. 9. Corruption Many companies claim corruption is the most significant obstacle to foreign investment and economic development in Mali. While corruption is a crime punishable under the penal code, bribery is frequently reported in many large contracts and investment projects. Some investors report government officials often solicit bribes to complete otherwise routine procedures. The transition government has pledged to prioritize anti-corruption efforts. In 2021, Transparency International’s global corruption ranking for Mali decreased to 136th of 180 ranked countries (from 129th of 180 in 2020). Mali’s perceived public corruption score from Transparency International was 29 out of 100 in 2020 (with 0 being “highly corrupt” and 100 being “very clean”). Relative to other developing countries, Mali was rated at the 67th percentile for control of corruption on the FY2020 MCC Scorecard (based on World Bank and Brookings Worldwide Governance Indicators reports). Corruption is reportedly common in government procurement and dispute settlement. The government has addressed this issue by requiring procurement contracts to be inspected by the Directorate General for Public Procurement with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which determines whether the procedure meets fairness, price competitiveness, and quality standards. However, there are allegations of significant political interference in procurement. In addition, both foreign and domestic companies complain about harassment and requests for bribes from officials involved in tax collection. Mali’s international donor community has been working with the government to reduce corruption. Investors have found the judicial sector to be neither independent nor transparent. Questionable judgments in commercial cases have occasionally been successfully overturned at the supreme court. However, there is a general perception among the populace that while prosecution of minor economic crimes is routine, official corruption, particularly at the higher levels, goes largely unpunished. In 2004, then-president of Mali Amadou Toumani Touré created the Office of the Auditor General (BVG) as an independent agency tasked with auditing public spending. Since its inception, the BVG has uncovered several significant cases of corruption, including in the customs directorate. However, few findings of corruption have resulted in prosecutions. Growing pressure from international donors for more transparency in public resource management led to changing the appointment process for directors of finance and equipment across many ministries. As a result, in March 2017, the Minister of Economy and Finances dismissed 15 Directors of Finance and Equipment. Eighteen others were moved to other ministries. The government opened OCLEI in 2017 to combat illicit enrichment by government officials. OCLEI has the authority to collect asset declarations from public servants, to conduct investigations of government officials suspected of corruption, and to refer cases for prosecution if sufficient evidence is gathered against the defendant. However, OCLEI’s operations were suspended following civil servants’ union protests against asset declaration requirements. Negotiations between the unions, the government, and donors eventually yielded a satisfactory solution that enabled the office to resume operations, and the office has begun registering asset declarations for certain categories of civil servants. According to its 2017-2018 report, OCLEI received asset declarations from approximately 1,000 civil servants (nearly 70 percent of all civil servants in Mali are subject to assets declaration) over 2017-2018 and referred three suspected cases of corruption to the justice system. However, OCLEI came under significant pressure in 2020 when Mali’s main workers union requested the government close OCLEI. Following a cabinet reshuffle in 2019, the newly appointed Minister of Justice took measures to address corruption by appointing a new prosecutor in the Economic and Financial Specialized Judicial Office of Bamako, a court in charge of prosecution of corruption. Since these changes, many high-profile business and political leaders have been arrested due to corruption allegations. In 2021, Mali’s Auditor General released 11 financial audit reports, two performance audit reports, four reports of conformity, and four reports on the level of implementation of recommendations it made in previous audit reports. The Auditor General refers cases of fraud or other unlawful practices to the Economic and Financial Specialized Judicial Office of Bamako. Since the beginning of the transition government in 2020, reports from the Auditor General have led to the arrest of many high-profile former government officials for alleged involvement in corruption business dealings. Though these are welcome developments for some observers, others have highlighted the political motivations behind these arrests and the failure of the judicial branch to prosecute them properly and in a timely manner. In sum, the results of recent anti-corruption efforts remain a mixed bag. In September 2021, the National Transition Council (CNT) passed the law on the creation of the national court dedicated to combating economic and financial crimes. The Act amends provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and provides the legal basis for establishing a much-needed institution to prosecute economic and financial crimes wherever they occur in Mali. The new Criminal Procedure Code established three specialized anti-corruption chambers under the jurisdictions of appellate courts in Kayes, Bamako, and Mopti. The new, national anti-corruption court establishes a comprehensive system to fight corruption and to coordinate across numerous specialized agencies such as CENTIF, OCLEI, and BVG. It is also the single judicial point of contact for economic and financial crimes with authority to liaise on cooperation requests for international mutual assistance on corruption related criminal matters. Mali’s transition authorities have prioritized messaging about anti-corruption and the need for enhanced financial transparency in governance. The creation of a national anti-corruption court that is professionally staffed and empowered to aggressively prosecute economic and financial crimes is an important step toward real progress on this issue. 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. Department of State’s Fact Sheet on Mali is available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mali/. The current Travel Advisory for Mali is available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mali-travel-advisory.html. Throughout nearly three decades of multi-party democracy, Mali has consistently encouraged private enterprise and investment. However, the destabilizing effects of Mali’s 2012 coup d’état led to a deterioration of the economic situation and uncertainty in the investment climate. The August 2020 coup d’état and the May 2021 consolidation of military power have plunged the country into political uncertainty and instability, further exacerbating existing challenges. Mali remains under transition government rule, although ECOWAS and other international organizations maintain pressure on the government to organize elections in a timely manner. Mali continues to face significant political and security challenges amidst slow implementation of a peace agreement signed in 2015 that aims to resolve the ongoing conflict in northern Mali. A disparate group of signatory armed groups, militias, bandits, and terrorist groups continue to exert influence in wide swathes of Mali’s largely ungoverned northern areas as well as central Mali. Furthermore, terrorist groups have increased the frequency and range of their attacks—particularly against the base camps of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in northern and central Mali—in an effort to destabilize the country. The situation in central Mali—namely in the Segou and Mopti regions—is increasingly unstable due to intercommunal conflict, localized political violence, and the incursion of extremist groups into the region. Terrorist groups with varying degrees of allegiance to al-Qaeda and ISIS operate in Mali, and often pursue local agendas complementary to these global extremist movements. Groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which have merged under the banner of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continued to conduct terrorist attacks throughout 2021, primarily targeting international and Malian military forces. These groups have claimed responsibility for recent gun and improvised explosives attacks, kidnappings, and other violent actions in northern and central Mali. While the MINUSMA peacekeeping effort is still present in Mali, in February French authorities declared their intent to remove troops from the country. Malian security forces have undertaken counterterrorism operations in the central and the tri-border region since November 2021. However, they have been unable to counter every threat, and in many cases they are accused of targeting civilians. In March of this year, extremist groups attacked FAMa in Mondoro, resulting in dozens of dead, including among FAMa. The UN peacekeepers’ northern base camps are often targeted by terrorist groups. Attacks by violent extremist groups have moved beyond the traditional conflict zone in northern Mali to central and southern Mali, where many villages are controlled by extremist groups who prevent farmers from growing crops, destroy planted crops, and impose zakat. The tri-border area (the border with Burkina Faso and Niger) and some remote parts of southern Mali are increasingly under threat of attack. While Malian forces, backed by MINUSMA and French forces, had taken steps to reassert control over most of the major cities, much of northern and central Mali remain unstable, with large swaths of the country outside state control. AQIM, long entrenched in northeastern Mali, remains a threat. AQIM has demonstrated a pattern of kidnapping hostages for ransom and launching operations against neighboring Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger. AQIM and its local affiliates have been involved in various terrorist attacks targeting Westerners in Mali, including at a restaurant in Bamako in March 2015; at a hotel frequented by foreigners in Sevare in August 2015; against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in November 2015; and against the Campement de Kangaba hotel in June 2017. While previous extremist attacks have generally spared foreign companies, aside from hotels and restaurants, some attacks have targeted infrastructure projects involving foreign companies. In October 2017, extremists attacked a foreign company in charge of the construction of a road in Timbuktu and destroyed several vehicles. In March 2018, terrorists attacked and destroyed a USD 66 million dam construction project in Djenne. In April 2020, extremist groups carried out attacks in the southwestern region of Kayes, Mali’s gold-mining region. In 2021, extremist groups attacked mobile companies’ infrastructure in different areas of northern Mali, resulting in facility damage and service interruptions. In September 2021, a mining company convoy accompanied by Malian security forces was attacked by terrorists on the road from Bamako to Kayes, resulting in at least five deaths. While Malian armed forces have increased pressure on extremist groups, observers consider that the departure of the French forces may result in increased security challenges, including from signatories of the Algiers Peace Accord. U.S. citizens living or traveling in Mali are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) at https://step.state.gov/step to receive security messages and make it easier to be located in an emergency. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Labor is widely available in Mali, but companies have reported skilled labor is in short supply. Reliable unemployment data is difficult to obtain. While a 2021 survey by the transition government found an unemployment rate of 6.1 percent, the actual figure is likely much higher. The rate is generally higher for youth between the ages of 15-24, coming in at 9.9 percent according to the government’s 2021 survey. Workers have the right to unionize. Relations between labor and management are often contentious and strikes are common. The government has ratified all International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions protecting the rights of workers. Since June 2014, the government faced several strikes led by different unions, including the national union of workers (UNTM), the union of university and basic education professors, the union of workers from the tax office, the union of workers of the national radio and television company, the confederation of unions (CSTM), the union of judges, and the union of health workers. Since its inauguration in September 2020, the transition government has also faced a series of strikes across sectors. The private sector also participates in strikes, as seen in 2015, 2017, and 2022, which have affected banking, finance, and telecommunications companies. While employers and workers are often able to reach a resolution, strikes can significantly disrupt economic activities, particularly when they involve key sectors like transportation or the financial sector. The labor code adopted in 1992 (amended in December 2011, in June 2017, and in July 2019) streamlined hiring and firing procedures. Conflicts often arise when employers terminate contracts and fire employees. Large Malian and international employers have had difficulty enforcing their rights in court, given that powerful and independent labor unions play an important role in supporting their members and in other national affairs. Compensation plan negotiations and firing procedures are time-consuming and closely scrutinized by the Ministry of Labor and the judiciary. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. Employees who are laid off are not entitled to unemployment compensation but are entitled to other benefits, including one-month gross salary and compensation for untaken leave. Employers are required to provide advance notice and a certificate to laid off employees. Although not a requirement, it is advisable to have regular contacts with labor inspectors, especially when concluding new hiring contracts or considering terminations or reductions in force. Child labor and trafficking in persons continue to be serious problems in Mali. The ILO reports over 46 percent of children in Mali engage in child labor, including the worst forms of child labor such as child soldiering and hazardous activities in the agriculture and gold mining sectors. A 2021 transition government survey reported 11.6 percent of children between 5 and 17 years old are employed. The survey suggests the prevalence of child labor depends on the age, with 20 percent of children between the age of 10 and 17 years old being employed, compared with 2.5 percent of children aged 5 to 9 years old. Cotton, artisanal gold, and rice are included on the U.S. government’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. Additionally, rice is included on the U.S. government’s Executive Order 13126 List of Goods Produced by Forced and Indentured Child Labor. The government has action plans for monitoring child labor and unsafe working conditions. Labor inspection entities, however, are underfunded and unable to regularly conduct inspections or provide support for victims of violations. In June 2017, Mali amended its labor code to align Malian law on the minimum age of employment with the ILO standard, increasing the minimum age of employment from 14 up to 15. The amended labor law bans discrimination based on religion, race, or gender. It also requires equality in terms of remuneration and forbids forced and compulsory labor. Malta Executive Summary The Republic of Malta is a small, strategically located country 60 miles south of Sicily and 180 miles north of Libya, astride some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. A politically stable parliamentary republic with a free press, Malta is considered a safe, secure, and welcoming environment for American investors to do business. Malta joined the European Union in 2004, the Schengen visa system in 2007, and the Eurozone in 2008. With a population of about 516,100 and a total area of only 122 square miles, it is the EU’s smallest country in geographic size. The economy is based on services, primarily shipping, banking and financial services, online gaming, tourism, and professional, scientific, and technical activities. Manufacturing also plays a small, but important role. Maltese and English are the official languages. Given its central location in one of the world’s busiest trading regions, as well as its relatively small economy, Malta recognizes the important contribution that international trade and investment provides to the generation of national wealth. After robust economic growth of 5.3 percent in 2019, the Maltese economy registered a severe contraction in 2020 of -8.2 percent brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, thanks to the improvement of the public health situation in Malta, which allowed for a significant relaxation of restrictive measures, real GDP growth rebounded strongly to 5.9 percent in 2021. Malta’s unemployment rate stood at 3.1 percent in February 2022. While the top three credit rating agencies predicted the economic impact of the pandemic would be less pronounced on the Maltese economy when compared to other EU neighboring countries, Moody’s moved from a stable to a negative outlook. The current sovereign credit ratings are A-/A-2 with a stable outlook (S&P); A2 with a negative outlook (Moody’s); and A+ with a stable outlook (Fitch). Moody’s recent change to a negative outlook on the government’s debt burden is attributed to the Financial Action Task Force’s greylisting and risks linked to the recovery of the tourism sector. In 2020, the Government of Malta revamped its citizenship-by-investment program, which provides citizenship by naturalization to applicants (and their dependents). The new program still offers a track to citizenship through the introduction of a residency requirement before the acquisition of Maltese citizenship. The residency program offers two investment routes to acquire citizenship: i) individuals can apply after a one-year residency period if they invest €750,000 ($875,000) or more; or ii) applicants can opt to pay €600,000 ($700,500) if they apply after a three-year residency period. IIP conditions include a €700,000 ($814,000) minimum for purchasing immovable property, or a €16,000 per year minimum for leasing immovable property (which must be retained for at least five years), and a €150,000 minimum for investment in stocks, bonds, or debentures. Applicants must also make a mandatory €10,000 ($11,600) philanthropic donation and pass a due diligence test before filing the application. In March 2022, the government suspended the processing of applications for nationals of the Russian Federation and Belarus. The suspension applies to both Malta’s citizenship-by-investment scheme as well as a residency through investment scheme, which must be renewed on a yearly basis. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 27 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $1.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 25,370 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Malta seeks foreign direct investment (FDI) to increase its rate of economic growth. Malta provides incentives to attract investment in high-tech manufacturing (including plastics, precision engineering, electronic components, automotive components, and health technologies such as pharmaceuticals manufacturing and biotechnology), information and communications technology (ICT), research and development (R&D), aerospace, aviation maintenance and drones, education and training, registration of ships and aircrafts, transshipment and related service industries, finance services, and digital technologies, including artificial intelligence technologies, blockchain, innovative technologies, and digital gaming. Malta’s comparative advantages include membership in the EU, Eurozone, and Schengen Zone; proximity to European and North African markets; excellent telecommunications and transport connections; a fair and transparent business environment; a skilled, English-speaking labor force; and competitive wage rates (although the cost of living is comparable to many EU countries, labor costs are relatively low by comparison). Malta also offers financial, tax, and other investment incentives to attract FDI, although tax incentives, may change to reflect Malta’s agreement with the global tax harmonization outlined by the OECD. Foreign investment plays an integral part in the Government of Malta’s policies to reduce the role of the state in the economy and increase private sector activity. FDI will also play a key role in building Malta’s economic recovery post-pandemic as the country is in the process of shaping an economic strategy based on tangible niche market opportunities that will help it recover in the new economic and health conditions. Malta Enterprise, a government organization that promotes FDI in Malta, provides information to prospective investors, processes applications for government investment incentives, and serves as a liaison between investors and other government entities. The organization offers an attractive investment package for U.S. and other investors. The government seeks, as a top priority, companies operating in the following fields: High-end manufacturing; ICT, augmented and virtual reality, and digital gaming; Health technologies, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and emerging medical sectors including medical cannabis and medtech; Back office and regional support operations; Digital technologies including blockchain, artificial intelligence, innovative technologies, e-sports, and fintech; Knowledge-based service, including education and training and research and development; Logistics-based services, including marine technology, warehousing, and oil/gas services; and Film industry (Malta has one of the few sets in the world for water/boating scenes). Private foreign investors are free to make equity arrangements as they wish, from joint ventures to full equity ownership, however FDI in Malta is subject to Chapter 620 of the Laws of Malta, in line with EU regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The Government of Malta has set up a National Foreign Direct Investment Screening Office (NFDIS), the NFDIS’s scope and remit consists of screening new FDI projects, joint ventures with a foreign component, and the transfer of any shares and/or controlling interests in existing companies where the owner, titleholder, or ultimate beneficial owner originates from any country outside of the European Union. The sectors as per law which are subject to screening include the following: (a) critical infrastructure, whether physical or virtual, including energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defense, electoral or financial infrastructure, and sensitive facilities, as well as land and real estate crucial for the use of such infrastructure; (b) critical technologies and dual use items, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum, nuclear technologies, nanotechnologies, and biotechnologies; (c) supply of critical inputs, including energy or raw materials and food security; (d) access to sensitive information, including personal data, or the ability to control such information; and (e) the freedom and pluralism of the media. The Government of Malta recognizes the right to private ownership in theory and in practice. Private entities are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, following review by NFDIS if necessary. Many U.S. firms sell their products or services in Malta through licensing, franchise agreements, or similar arrangements. The government generally allows foreign companies to operate in merchandising areas, especially if they operate a licensing, franchising, or similar agreement through a local representative. It is the government’s stated policy not to allow public enterprises to operate at the expense of private entities. Some sectors, such as electricity generation, are also open to private sector participation. The government provides private enterprises with the same opportunities as public enterprises for access to markets and other business operations. The Government of Malta has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through a multilateral or civil society organization in the last five years. The Maltese Commercial Code provides for the establishment of several types of business entities according to the needs of an individual investor when setting up a company in Malta. The following are the available structures: Private limited liability companies; Public limited liability companies; General partnerships; and Limited partnerships. Foreign companies can also open subsidiaries or branch offices in Malta. When setting up a Maltese private company, the minimum share capital amount accepted is €1,165 ($1,300). The minimum for a public company is approximately €46,600 ($51,670), of which 25 percent must be deposited prior to registration. In case of private companies with an authorized share capital exceeding the minimum requirements, only 20 percent of the amount must be deposited. The maximum number of shareholders for limited liabilities companies is 50 and minimum is two (although a single-member company may also be registered under the Companies Act). The following are the main steps required to set up a company in Malta: Reserve a company name with the Maltese Business Registry; Draft the company’s memorandum and articles of association; Deposit the minimum share capital; and File the application with the Malta Business Registry. The documents to be filed with the Malta Registrar of Companies are: The memorandum and articles of association; A confirmation of the company name reservation; The bank receipt confirming the share capital deposit; and Passport copies of the shareholders, directors, and company secretary. The Malta Business Registry (MBR) is responsible for the registration of new commercial partnerships, the registration of documents related to commercial partnership, the issuing of certified documentation including certificates of good standing amongst others, the reservation of company names, the collection of registration and other fees, the publication of notices, and the imposition and collection of penalties. MBR also conducts investigations of companies and maintains the company and partnership register. The memorandum must be presented to MBR, which offers an online system allowing users to register a company and submit commonly used forms (including a bank receipt as proof of payment of the initial share capital). All the statutory forms and notices are available on the website free of charge. MBR may also request that due diligence on the directors, shareholders, and/or beneficial owners be provided before proceeding with the incorporation. Upon incorporation, companies must pay a registration fee payable to MBR according to the amount of share capital held by the company. Once all the requirements above are satisfied, MBR will normally carry out incorporation of a company within two to three working days. Once incorporation is complete, MBR will publish a Certificate of Incorporation that will also display the company registration number. MBR website: https://mbr.mt/ The Government of Malta also offers a one-stop shop for businesses – Business First – that assists companies with all processing of services and information to establish a company. Business First brings more than 50 essential services from various government departments and entities under one roof. It assists all enterprises based in Malta, including microenterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), larger companies, and foreign investors wishing to set up in the country. Business First website: https://businessfirst.com.mt/ TradeMalta, incorporated in 2014, is a public-private partnership between the government and the Chamber of Commerce to help Malta-based enterprises internationalize. TradeMalta is also the national organization tasked with marketing and coordinating both incoming and outgoing trade missions, promoting participation in international trade fairs, facilitating bilateral trade meetings, and researching new market opportunities. Although TradeMalta promotes outward investment and incentives for companies to seek international business, it does not provide financial incentives to set up FDI in other jurisdictions. This quasi-governmental organization is also tasked with maintaining business relationships with countries with whom Malta has a trading activity and dedicates its resources to identifying new markets, which are not considered traditional trading partners. (For the past three years, it has targeted African countries for outgoing trade missions.) The organization provides specialized training programs in international business development and marketing and administers incentive schemes and internationalization programs aimed at both novice and experienced exporters. The government actively supports and promotes franchising, joint-ventures, and other forms of international business opportunities between Malta-based businesses and foreign companies. 3. Legal Regime Malta has transparent and effective policies and regulations to foster competition. It has revised labor, safety, health, and other laws to conform to EU standards. All proposed regulations are published on a unified website, on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator, and directly distributed to interested stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement is currently required for all subordinate regulations as part of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) process as well as for some primary laws in selected policy areas. Each online consultation is accompanied by a feedback report, summarizing the views of participants and providing feedback on the comments received. According to an OECD 2019 report on Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, the transparency of the Maltese regulatory framework could be further strengthened by making RIAs available for consultations with stakeholders by systematically engaging with stakeholders during the development of primary laws, specifically at an early stage, before a preferred regulatory decision has been identified. In April 2021, the European Commission (EC) presented its proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). The Commission plans to introduce extensive mandatory reporting requirements for large companies and separate, proportionate standards for listed SMEs, a requirement that would extend to Malta. Companies will have to report on how sustainability issues affect their business, society, the environment and vice versa. As a result, nearly 50,000 companies in the EU – Maltese companies included – will have to report on sustainability matters. External audits will be required to verify the reported information. Companies will have to digitally report/tag the information, so it is machine readable. Once an agreement is reached in the negotiations on EU level (estimated Q2 2022) and the directive enters into force, the reporting requirements would be applicable from the 2023 financial year onwards for large companies. Listed SMEs would have to comply as of the 2026 financial year. In December 2021, Malta launched its first Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) portal, allowing the general public and investors to evaluate the environmental, social and governance credentials of the largest quoted companies in Malta. The ESG portal, facilitates local and foreign investors’ access to data measuring the level of importance companies are giving to ESG. This platform will serve to further encourage sustainable investment, as investors are increasingly looking into ESG credentials before investing. These companies are quoted on Malta’s Stock Exchange, and their ESG credentials can now be accessed via: https://sustainabledevelopment.gov.mt/esg/ . Malta’s regulatory system is derived from the acquis communautaire, the body of laws, rights, and obligations that are binding on all EU member states. Consequently, trade and investment relations with third countries are an EU responsibility under the Common Commercial Policy. However, with respect to investment, Malta does have some national competences in certain investment areas. In particular, where the EU does not have or is not negotiating an investment protection agreement, Malta can hold or negotiate one unilaterally. Malta also maintains competence in the areas of transport and portfolio investment, as well as corporate taxation. NFDIS implements the EU-wide mechanism for cooperation on investment as required by the new EU framework for investment screening which entered into force on April 10, 2019. Malta became a WTO member on January 1, 1995. However, all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade are now made at the EU level. Malta ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement on October 5, 2015 and is in full compliance with its implementation commitments. Malta’s Commercial Code regulates commercial activities and related legislation, such as the Banking Act, the Central Bank of Malta Act, and bankruptcy. In cases of bankruptcy, the court appoints a curator to liquidate the assets of the bankrupt company, organization, or individual, and distributes the proceeds among the creditors. The Maltese judiciary is independent, and courts are divided into superior courts, presided over by judges, and inferior courts, presided over by magistrates. Inferior courts have jurisdiction over minor offenses of a criminal nature and small civil matters. The judiciary traditionally functions through the Criminal, Civil, and Constitutional courts. The First Hall of the Civil Court hears commercial cases. Malta has a Criminal Court of Appeal and a second Court of Appeal for all other matters. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine questions and appeals on constitutional issues. There are also a number of administrative tribunals, such as the Industrial Tribunal, the Rent Regulation Board, the Sanction Monitoring Board, and the Board of Special Commissioners (for income tax purposes). Malta adopted the European Convention of Human Rights as part of its domestic law in 1987. The Maltese judiciary has a long tradition of independence. Once appointed to the bench, judges and magistrates have fixed salaries that do not require annual approval. Judges cannot be dismissed, except by a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives for proven misbehavior or the inability to exercise properly their function. The Maltese Constitution guarantees the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary and a fair trial. In December 2018, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission, issued an opinion on the constitutional arrangements, separation of powers, and independence of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies of Malta. The Commission recommended setting up an office of an independent Director of Public Prosecutions with security of tenure, being responsible for all public prosecutions, subject to judicial review. The opinion also recommended abolishing the possibility that judges can be dismissed by Parliament and suggested modifications to the system of the judicial appointments. Malta is currently in the process of implementing changes in accordance with the Venice Commission recommendation. Thus far various laws have been enacted to address reforms which include constitutional arrangements that divest powers from the Prime Minister to appoint the judiciary and law enforcement, and separation of powers between the judiciary and law enforcement. In the latest 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on Malta the European Commission noted that Maltese reforms enacted during 2020, in particular the reform of the system of judicial appointments and of judicial discipline, have contributed to strengthening the independence of the Maltese justice system. Additional reforms have been carried out to enhance checks and balances. Reforms of the appointment of persons exercising top executive functions and appointments to certain independent commissions, proposed in 2020, have been adopted. Remaining concerns regarding the appointment process for certain other public bodies will be addressed under the Constitutional Convention. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the timing and organization of this Convention are still to be set. Several laws govern foreign investment in Malta. The Income Tax Act of 1948 (as amended in 1994) establishes a single rate of taxation of 35 percent on income for limited liability companies in Malta. In certain qualifying cases, this rate can fall to five percent through a system of tax refunds on dividends paid. The Business Promotion Act authorizes the Government of Malta to allocate fiscal and other incentives to companies engaged in manufacturing (including software development), repair, or maintenance activities. The Malta Enterprise Act of 2003 enables Malta Enterprise to develop and administer incentives and other forms of support to liberalize and update legislation relevant to FDI. The Companies Act of 1995 regulates the creation of limited liability companies. The Companies Act also provides for the establishment of investment companies with variable share capital (SICAVS) and companies with share capital denominated in a foreign currency. The Malta Financial Services Authority Act of 1989 established the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), which is responsible for the regulation of banking and investment services in Malta. The Investment Services Act of 1994 regulates investment services in the banking and insurance sectors. In 2018, Malta enacted three new acts related to blockchain. The Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act (MDIA) establishes the Authority that oversees and regulates innovative technologies, along with the Innovative Technology Arrangement and Services Act (ITAS) that regulates Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services, such as the software and coding used in digital ledger technology (DLT), smart contract, and related applications, together with the technical administration and review services. In 2018, the MFSA was entrusted with the Virtual Financial Assets Act (VFA) that regulates Initial Virtual Financial Assets Offerings and delineates their licensing requirements. The National Foreign Direct Investment Screening Office Act of 2020 was set up in order to implement the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The purpose of the screening process is to protect European Union intelligence, knowledge and technology, as well as the security interests of the Union. Malta is a free-trade, open-economy country. The government does not approve or restrict any FDI, so long as it complies with EU and national regulations. Malta Enterprise reviews FDI before granting any incentives to a private entity or business. A due diligence process is carried out prior to approving greenfield investments. The MFSA undertakes the filings and regulatory screenings on financial investments. The Office for Competition, currently housed within the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority (MCCAA), is the office tasked with protecting competition in Malta. The Maltese Competition Act is modelled on EU competition law. The latest amendments to the Competition Act in 2011 strengthened its deterrent effect by widening the decision-making powers of the Office for Competition and further aligned both the substantive and procedural rules with those existing under EU law. The Government of Malta, in exceptional instances, expropriates private property for public purposes. In such cases, the government must take action in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of international law. Investors and lenders of expropriated property receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. In 1993, the government’s Property Division started accepting expropriation requests by public bodies only if the requests were accompanied by the compensation due to the landowners. In 2002, this practice was made law. As a result, the government may only expropriate private property if the presidential decree also includes a deposit for the compensation due. In recent years, the government has appropriated land mainly for the widening of roads; however, no particular sectors are at risk for expropriation or similar actions, and no laws force local ownership. The Companies Act and the Commercial Code Bankruptcy in Malta and the Set-off and Netting on Insolvency Act of 2003 regulate bankruptcy. The latter provides for the set-off and netting due to each party with respect to mutual credits, mutual debts, or other mutual dealings that are enforceable whether before or after bankruptcy or insolvency. The Maltese insolvency law regime distinguishes between bankruptcies of a person and bankruptcies of a commercial partnership other than a company. When a company cannot pay its debts, it may initiate insolvency proceedings. In such a case, the court examines carefully whether the financial situation of the company justifies its insolvency or whether it could remain operational and continue to pay its debts. Any officer of a company who, in the twelve months prior to the deemed date of dissolution, concealed assets or documents, disposed of assets, or otherwise acted in a fraudulent manner may be criminally liable. Separately, courts may find any such officers civilly liable for such acts and require them to pay back to the company any moneys due. The law also provides for proceedings in cases of wrongful trading by directors and fraudulent trading by any officer of the company. The Malta Association of Credit Management, known as MACM, is a members-owned, not-for-profit organization, providing a central national organization for the promotion and protection of all credit interests pertaining to Maltese businesses. More information at: https://www.macm.org.mt/ . 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Malta offers several investment incentives to attract FDI. All investment incentives are specified by law and cannot be made available in an ad hoc manner. However, the way in which incentives are designed allows the opportunity to offer relatively tailor-made solutions, even though treatment of local and foreign investors is identical. There are no stated requirements that a foreign investor should transfer technology, employ Maltese nationals, or reduce shareholding interest over time. These factors might, however, influence Malta Enterprise’s decision regarding a firm’s application for assistance. Malta Enterprise monitors compliance with any conditions set by the government as a condition of government assistance. Investors are not required to disclose proprietary information. The Government of Malta offers generous incentives to trading and financial companies registered with the Malta Financial Services Authority. Legislative changes in 1994 removed the distinction between offshore and onshore companies, so all companies in Malta are subject to a 35 percent tax rate on profits. However, the fact that the Maltese tax system is a full imputation system – and the only one remaining in the EU – means that a tax paid by a company will essentially remain a prepaid tax on behalf of the tax liability of the shareholders. Shareholders then are entitled to claim a tax refund, which may be equivalent to roughly 85 percent (in the case of trading income) of the tax paid at the corporate level. Companies operating within the Malta Freeport, a customs-free zone, may also benefit from reduced rates of taxation and investment tax credits. An additional tax benefit initiative recently introduced is to be given to businesses that reinvest a percentage of their retained profits into eligible projects in the same business or in another enterprise. The Government of Malta offers specific incentives for companies to engage in industrial research and development (see “Investment Incentives” section above). The government does not differentiate between U.S. or other foreign firms and local firms regarding participation in incentive programs. U.S. companies also can partner with local firms to participate in Horizon Europe, the EU Framework program for funding research and innovation. Horizon Europe will run until the end of 2027 and has a budget of €95.5 billion. Malta’s budgetary plans have placed environmental and social responsibility at the top of the country’s agenda, with a long-term vision aiming to support the post-pandemic economic regeneration. Malta Enterprise offers support to businesses based in Malta to engage in the twin green and digital transition, and to meet international ESG expectations. The agency has launched a number of specific support measures, including the Smart and Sustainable Investment Grant, which encourages enterprises to invest further in sustainability, leading to reduction of waste, increased use of sustainable materials, and higher levels of energy and water efficiency. Eligible businesses can benefit from up to €50,000 for every project, covering 50% of the total eligible costs. Furthermore, as part of Malta’s efforts to meet its emission targets and build a more sustainable future, Malta Enterprise is launching several programs, including a scheme designed to help enterprises replace their fossil fuel-powered vehicles with electric ones. Cognizant of the current worldwide challenges related to supply chains and to mitigate price hikes in the cost of international movement, the government has extended its rent subsidy incentive to reach an even larger number of eligible businesses, particularly in covering expenses for the rental cost of warehouses for stockpiling. Another related development, specifically to the address the circular economy, Malta launched the Blue Med Hub, with the aim of bringing together various blue economy experts and that of attracting start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises, both local and foreign, related to this field. The Hub will collaborate with African and Middle Eastern entities to open investment opportunities in this sector. Malta’s Freeport container port offers modern transshipment facilities, storage, assembling and processing operations, as well as an oil terminal and bunkering facilities. Following a corporate restructuring from 1998 through 2001, Malta established a distinction between authority and operator of the Freeport. Malta Freeport Corporation Ltd. (“Malta Freeport Authority”) fulfils the role of landlord and authority, whereas Malta Freeport Terminals Ltd. (“Malta Freeport”) carries out the role of operator. Malta Freeport Terminals Ltd. is the single operating company of the warehousing facilities and two container terminals, handling container vessels at 20,000 TEU and larger. In October 2004, the Government of Malta granted a 30-year concession for operation and development of Malta Freeport Terminals CMA CGM, which transferred its half of shares in Malta Freeport Terminals Ltd. to the Yilidirim Group of Turkey in November 2011 and sold a 49 percent interest in port operator Terminal Link to China Merchant Holdings (International) Company Ltd. in June 2013. For a company to carry out business within the Freeport zone, Malta Freeport Authority must grant it a license, and its operations must complement the Freeport’s activities. Through the utilization of these facilities, clients can engage in an extensive range of handling operations, including cargo consolidation, break-bulk, storage, re-packing, re-labelling, and onward shipping. Malta Freeport also offers assembly and processing options in accordance with the Malta Freeports Act. The operator must ensure that it does not label goods that have been processed in the Freeport with Malta as their country of origin unless their identity has been substantially transformed within the zone. Companies operating within the Freeport benefit from reduced tax rates, as well as investment tax credits without customs interventions. Malta Freeport offers round-the-clock industrial storage operations supported by a highly developed, customized infrastructure, as well as extensive transport networks, which link Malta to various important markets on a regular basis, including port connections in North America, Central America, and South America. Warehousing facilities lie only six kilometers from the island’s international airport, offering excellent opportunities for sea and air links stretching worldwide. Currently, no performance requirements exist, other than the goals that the investors link to applications for assistance with Malta Enterprise. Foreign investors can repatriate or reinvest profits without restriction and take disputes before the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The government does not require foreign investors to establish or maintain data storage in Malta. However, the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA), the independent regulatory body responsible for the governance of all gaming activities, does require gaming companies to hold their data in Malta. Foreign IT providers incorporated in Malta that process personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment, qualifying as data controllers within the Data Protection Act, and fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. The Data Protection Commissioner stated there has never been an instance where, during an investigation, the Commissioner has requested access to source code or to encryption functions. Any transfer of personal data by a controller established in Malta to a third country that does not ensure an adequate level of data protection is subject to the authorization of the Data Protection Commissioner as required by the Data Protection Act. In an attempt to facilitate and harmonize the implementation of this requirement, the European Commission adopted model clauses (Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules – the latter used for sharing of personal data within a group of companies) which controllers may use for this purpose. No authorization is required for transfers made to EU Member States, members of the EEA, third countries which are, from time to time, recognized by the European Commission to have an adequate level of protection, and to companies that are certified under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. Furthermore, any personal data shared (rather than transferred) between data controllers in Malta must rely on a legal basis. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), enacted in 2016, entered into force on May 25, 2018. The GDPR, which succeeds the Data Protection Directive of 1995, aims to protect EU citizens’ personal data, harmonize data privacy laws across the EU, and provide for better coordination among EU Member State data protection authorities. U.S. companies wishing to operate in Malta or to do business with Maltese individuals or entities should ensure compliance with the regulation. Data controllers processing personal data are subject to the rules emanating from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). These rules must be observed to ensure that the processing activities are carried out fairly and lawfully and with respect to the data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms. The competent authority in Malta that regulates and monitors observance with this law is the Office of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property and contractual rights are enforced by means of (a) legal warning; (b) warrants of seizure; (c) warrants of prohibitory injunction; (d) warrants of impediments of departures (if proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court); and (e) sale of property by court auction. The Code of Organization and Civil Procedures lays out procedures for registering and enforcing judgments of foreign courts. Rights and secured interests over immovable property must be publicly registered in order to be enforceable. The Government of Malta has occasionally been a party to international arbitrations and has abided by tribunal decisions. The 2006 Maltese Securitization Act provides for a range of securitization transactions within its secure regulatory framework and offers various legal and international tax benefits. Malta permits the creation of securitization cell structures, allowing for multiple cells with clear segregation of assets and liabilities between each cell. Foreign investors typically use securitization for passporting funds, which allows a firm registered in the European Economic Area (EEA) to do business in any other EEA state without the need for further authorization from each country, and for investment within the EU. Investors typically use this system over the securitization of property. The Maltese legal system adequately protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of intellectual property rights. In 2000, Malta implemented the pertinent provisions of the WTO Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Malta has fully incorporated EU and WTO rules into national law. Additional information on EU-wide provisions on copyright, patents, trademarks, and designs can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/ In addition, Malta is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). Malta is not listed in the USTR’s Special 301 report nor in the USTR’s Notorious Market Report. The Association against Copyright Theft claims that Malta’s local laws do not include high enough minimum fines to deter vendors from selling pirated material. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Malta’s Commerce Department within the Ministry for the Economy, European Funds and Lands is responsible for intellectual property-related issues. The Malta Customs Intellectual Property Rights Unit – Enforcement Directorate operates in terms of the Intellectual Property Rights cross- border European measures. Given Malta’s strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea shipping routes, Malta Customs has a significant role and requires the office to inspect the transit/transshipment cargo at Malta Freeport terminal. Over the past years, Malta Customs major detentions of counterfeited goods were destined to the Northern African countries originating from Asia. Customs have detained millions of counterfeit goods that include cigarettes, sport shoes, sportswear, toothpaste, shampoos, deodorants, clothing accessories, and garments. Since Malta joined the EU, Malta Customs statistical recordings of counterfeit goods detentions have been among the highest recorded at an EU level. Annual statistics can be found at the following link: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs-4/prohibitions-and-restrictions/counterfeit-piracy-and-other-ipr-violations/intellectual-property-rights-facts-and-figures_en For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Commerce Department, Lascaris Bastion, Valletta, VLT 1933, Malta Tel: +356 2122 6688 Email: commerce@gov.mt Website: http://commerce.gov.mt/en/Pages/Contact-Details.aspx 6. Financial Sector Malta’s Stock Exchange was established in 1993. In 2002, the Financial Markets Act effectively replaced the Malta Stock Exchange Act of 1990 as the law regulating the operations and setup of the Malta Stock Exchange. This legislation divested the Malta Stock Exchange of its regulatory functions and transferred these functions to the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). The Financial Markets Act also set up a Listing Authority, which is responsible for granting “Admissibility to Listing” to companies seeking to have their securities listed on the Exchange. To date, the few companies publicly listed on the Malta Stock Exchange have not faced the threat of hostile takeovers. Except for the EU regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the subsequent incorporation into the Laws of Malta as Chapter 620, Malta has no laws or regulations authorizing firms to adopt articles of incorporation/association that would limit foreign investment, participation, or control. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms; several U.S. auditing firms have local offices. The Maltese banking system is considered sound. In recent years, local commercial banks expanded the scope of their lending portfolios. Capital is available from both public and private sources; both foreign and local companies can obtain capital from local lending facilities. Commercial banks and their subsidiaries can provide loans at commercial interest rates. It is possible for new investors to negotiate soft loans from the government covering up to 75 percent of the projected capital outlay. No U.S. bank has a branch in Malta. BNF and HSBC Malta currently maintain direct correspondent banking relationships with U.S. banks. Some local banks act as correspondents of several U.S. banks via other EU banks, though such a relationship often results in higher transaction costs. The majority of banks have stopped opening accounts for companies that do not operate in Malta, those that operate in the electronic gaming sector, and those operating in the cryptocurrency sector. The few banks that still offer these services have tightened their due diligence processes, resulting in long delays to open accounts. Malta takes pride in being the first country to propose a legal framework for the creation of an Authority to regulate Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence, and Internet of Things (IOT) devices. In 2018, Government enacted three legislations that provide a regulatory framework on Distributed Ledger Technology, issuers of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), and related service providers dealing in virtual currencies, which currently fall outside the scope of a legislative and regulatory regime. In 2015, Malta established the National Development and Social Fund (NDSF) to manage and administer receipts from the country’s citizenship-by-investment program. Since inception through May 2021, it had raised a total of €599.8 million ($660.7 million). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute currently ranks Malta’s NDSF the world’s 80th largest sovereign wealth fund. The fund receives 70 percent of its contributions from the country’s citizenship program. Among some of the most noteworthy investments allocated by the NDSF are: €66 million ($72 million) in Social Housing, for the construction of a substantial amount of units; €1.5 million ($1.65 million) as an investment in artistic heritage, €3.5 million ($3.85 million) in Urban Greening projects and €950,000 ($1.46 million) investment in Mater Dei Hospital’s Cardiology Department to upgrade its two catheterization suites. NDSF funds are also being utilized by government to help soften the economic crises brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. The mission of the NDSF is to contribute towards, promote, and support major projects and initiatives of national importance and public interest. These initiatives and projects are intended to develop and improve the economy, public services, and the general well-being of present and future generations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Malta Investment Management Company Limited (MIMCOL) was established in 1988 to manage, restructure, and selectively divest the Government of Malta from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). MIMCOL also promotes private sector investment using cost-effective business practices across various SOEs. MIMCOL created strategies leading to the dissolution of SOEs with limited commercial prospects, as well as the profitable spin-off of non-core operations with commercial potential. MIMCOL’s focus then turned to SOEs deemed of strategic national value, but whose inefficient operations were reflective of a lack of competition. Eventually, MIMCOL prepared most SOEs for privatization and sold them off. Today, MIMCOL’s role has evolved into specialized assignments, such as strategic reviews of the management and operations of important parastatal companies and corporations operating in various sectors.MIMCOL’s sister company Malta Government Investments (MGI) holds a portfolio of 17 companies (excluding companies falling under the responsibility of other ministries and investments held directly by the government). This portfolio is not well defined. Most government investments are held by either the Board of Trustees within the Ministry for the Economy, European Funds and Lands or by Malta Government Investments Limited (MGI) as an agent for the Government of Malta. In recent years, the Maltese government has privatized a number of state-controlled firms, including the country’s largest bank, the postal service, shipyards, energy generation plants, and the wireless telecommunications industry. Although no plans exist to privatize Air Malta, the national airline, the Government of Malta was considering options for a strategic minority partner, though these plans are currently on hold. Ryanair also operates a subsidiary airline called Malta Air that incorporated its 61 Ryanair routes to and from Malta. The Ryanair fleet was registered with the Malta Aviation Authority. In 2015, the Government of Malta set up Projects Malta and Projects Plus Ltd to coordinate and facilitate public private partnerships between government ministries and the private sector. The government welcomes private investors, Maltese and non-Maltese, in privatization projects. It affords foreign investors equal treatment with domestic investors and sets few limitations on their operations. The government finalized its first international public-private partnership in the healthcare industry in 2015. Foreign investors can repatriate or reinvest profits without restriction and take disputes before the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become more prevalent in Malta in recent years, as global concerns such as climate change have risen to the forefront and as the EU has raised expectations for its member states regarding CSR. An increasing number of companies in Malta recognize the importance of their role in society and the real benefits of adopting a proactive approach to CSR. The Maltese government does not specifically request adherence to OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; however, it is expected that multinationals follow generally accepted CSR principles. Under the Code of Good Corporate Governance Guidelines, issued by the Malta Financial Services Authority in 2006, boards should seek to adhere to accepted CSR principles in day-to-day management practices and work closely with “suppliers, customers, employees, and public authorities.” Although corporate governance guidelines are non-binding in nature, public interest companies should highlight the adherence to such corporate governance principles in their annual reports. In line with recent amendments to the Companies Act, the directors’ report that accompanies the annual financial statements should include an analysis of both financial and non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to environmental matters. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In October 2019, the Maltese Parliament unanimously declared a climate emergency, a predicament identified in Malta’s 2015 Climate Action Act. The Climate Action Act was published as Chapter 543 of the Laws of Malta and is Malta’s main law on climate change. The Act provides legal obligations for coherent and coordinated governance to deal with this challenge on a national level. The subsidiary legislation under the Act transposes the legally binding commitments that the EU member States have under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1997 the Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Besides the Climate Action Act there are various national olicies, Stsrategies and plans that address climate action. Malta has committed to also move towards the EU’s collective efforts of climate neutrality by 2050. The same ambition is also embedded in Malta’s post-pandemic economic vision, whereby Malta unveiled an ambitious climate action plan – to achieve net-zero emissions in just 30 years and implement green changes to every aspect of life. Malta plans on fulfill its commitment through the implementation of its Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), launched in 2021. Malta’s Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) includes a first 10-year plan with a list of measures to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including a package of transport measures such as electrification of vehicles, extension of free public transport and incentives to encourage walking, cycling and other active transport such as e-bikes and pedelecs; and energy-efficiency in buildings such as photovoltaic panel schemes, support for solar water heaters, heat pumps, insulation and double-glazing. 9. Corruption Maltese law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implements these laws effectively. The Malta Police Force and the Permanent Commission against Corruption are responsible for combating official corruption. Past news reports suggest a number of government corruption allegations, which have resulted in legal action and resignations. While corruption remains an area of concern more broadly, public sector corruption, including bribery of public officials, is not a significant challenge for U.S. firms operating in Malta. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) completed its fifth evaluation of Malta in the autumn of 2018 and its findings were published in September 2019. Following the four previous rounds of evaluation and a follow-up compliance review, Malta introduced a number of legislative measures to combat corruption and is currently in the process of introducing further measures to improve its financial oversight. In 2019, the Committee of the Experts on the Evaluation of Anti Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) identified several shortcomings an gaps within the local AML/CFT framework, which triggered an assessment by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). FATF placed Malta on the Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring list, also known as the grey list in June 2021. In May 2021, MONEYVAL conducted their follow-up report on Malta, where they found that the country made considerable effort in its fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, giving the country a clean bill of health. In March 2022, the FATF plenary noted positive developments in Malta’s efforts on AML/CFT and announced that an evaluation team would visit the country to assess the implemented reforms up close, with an eye to discuss the country’s position on the grey list during the June 2022 Plenary. The latest MONEVAL follow up report is available at https://rm.coe.int/moneyval-2021-7-fur-malta/1680a29c70 In the wake of the FATF greylisting, Malta has taken significant steps over the years to combat corruption, including the establishment in 2002 of the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU) to support domestic and international law enforcement investigative efforts. The Prevention of Money Laundering and Funding of Terrorism Regulations were transposed into Maltese law in July 2008, and conform to EU Directive 2005/60/EC (the Third Directive) and Directive 2006/70/EC. Malta transposed the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive in December 2017 and, in April 2018, announced its first national Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Funding of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Strategy. Local Laws: U.S. firms should familiarize themselves with local anti-corruption laws, and, where appropriate, seek legal counsel. While the U.S. Department of Commerce cannot provide legal advice on local laws, the Department’s Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) can provide assistance with navigating the host country’s legal system and obtaining a list of local legal counsel. Assistance for U.S. Businesses: The U.S. Department of Commerce offers several services to aid U.S. businesses seeking to address business-related corruption issues. For example, the FCS can provide services that may assist U.S. companies in conducting due diligence as part of the company’s overarching compliance program when choosing business partners or agents overseas. The FCS can be reached directly through its offices in major U.S. and foreign cities or through its website at www.trade.gov/cs . The Departments of Commerce and State provide worldwide support for qualified U.S. companies bidding on foreign government contracts through the Department of Commerce’s Advocacy Center and Department of State’s Office of Commercial and Business Affairs. Problems, including alleged corruption by foreign governments or competitors, encountered by U.S. companies in seeking such foreign business opportunities can be brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. government officials, including local embassy personnel and through the Department of Commerce Trade Compliance Center “Report a Trade Barrier” website at http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp . Guidance on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA): The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) FCPA Opinion Procedure enables U.S. firms and individuals to request a statement of DOJ’s present enforcement intentions under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA regarding any proposed business conduct. The details of the opinion procedure are available on DOJ’s Fraud Section website: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa . Although the Department of Commerce has no enforcement role with respect to the FCPA, it supplies general guidance to U.S. exporters who have questions about the FCPA and about international developments concerning the FCPA. For further information, see the Office of the Chief Counsel for International Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce website at https://ogc.commerce.gov/collection/office-chief-counsel-international-commerce . Additional Anti-Corruption Resources Useful resources for individuals and companies regarding combating corruption in global markets include the following: Information about the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, including links to national implementing legislation, good practice guidance and country monitoring reports, is available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm . Transparency International (TI) publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 . TI also publishes an annual Global Corruption Report that provides a systematic evaluation of the state of corruption around the world. It includes an in-depth analysis of a focal theme, a series of country reports that document major corruption related events and developments from all continents and an overview of the latest research findings on anti-corruption diagnostics and tools. The World Bank Institute publishes Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These indicators assess six dimensions of governance in 212 countries, including Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home . The World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ . The World Economic Forum publishes the Global Enabling Trade Report, which presents the rankings of the Enabling Trade Index and includes an assessment of the transparency of border administration (focused on bribe payments and corruption) and a separate segment on corruption and the regulatory environment. The latest reports are available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/ . Additional country information related to corruption can be found in the U.S. State Department’s annual Human Rights Report available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/. Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization, publishes its annual Global Integrity Report, which provides indicators for 92 countries with respect to governance and anti-corruption. The report highlights the strengths and weaknesses of national level anti-corruption systems. https://www.globalintegrity.org/annual-reports/ . UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Malta signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005 and ratified it in 2008, but it has not signed the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. Contact at government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Malta Police Commissioner St. Calcedonius Square Floriana FRN 1530+356-2122 4001 cmru.police@gov.mt Mr. Charles Deguara Auditor General of National Audit Office Notre Dame Ravelin Floriana FRN 1600 +356-2205 5555 nao.malta@gov.mt Contact at watchdog organization: Permanent Commission Against Corruption Chateau De La Ville Archbishop Street Valletta VLT 2000 +356-2567 4309 Pcac.mjcl@gov.mt 10. Political and Security Environment Malta has faced some political turmoil since the 2017 assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, whose reporting focused on local government corruption and allegations of money laundering. Civil society protests led to resignations of a number of high-level officials, including the Prime Minister. Since then the country has elected a new Prime Minister who expressed commitment to good governance and rule of law reform, including increased protections for journalists. Despite this isolated cased of targeted violence against a journalist, Malta is generally considered to have a safe political system and is secure relative to other countries in the region. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Malta’s labor force at the end of 2021 stood at 274,110 (69.3 percent male), the employment rate of women remains low, parenthood has a significant effect on the participation of women on the labor market, and the gender employment gap is currently one of the highest in the EU. The country’s population is about 516,100, the smallest in the EU. Employed foreign nationals in Malta and Gozo at the end of 2020 amounted to 70,402. Since the joining of the Maltese Islands in the European Union, employment of foreign nationals increased drastically. EU member states share 44% of total foreign employment, Third Country Nationals (TCNs) share 55% of total foreign employment; and EFTA countries (such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) share 1% of total foreign employment. For 2021, the national minimum monthly wage was $872 (€784.72). The estimated average gross annual salary of employees stood at $23,307 (€20,969); this amount refers to the basic salary and excludes extra payments such as overtime, bonuses, and allowances. In 2021, on a sectoral basis, the highest recorded average gross annual salary for employees was in financial and insurance activities. Social insurance contributions add ten percent to the wage bill, together with a 0.3 percent contribution to the government maternity fund. Free or subsidized meals, commuting allowances, and health insurance are the most common fringe benefits. In addition, employees are entitled to 25 days of annual leave and public holidays that fall on a weekday. National law establishes a minimum number of sick leave days. Foreign companies that have invested in Malta have a high regard for the ability, productivity, and learning potential of Maltese workers, nearly all of whom speak English. In some industries, labor productivity is comparable to other countries in Western Europe. Maltese managers now run most of the foreign firms in Malta. Malta enjoys one of the lowest strike rates in Western Europe, and labor unrest is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Government of Malta strictly adheres to the ILO convention protecting workers’ rights. 14. Contact for More Information Maria Cassar Economic and Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy, Malta +356 2561 4120 maltabusiness@state.gov Mauritania Executive Summary The deterioration of the global economy that resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the Mauritanian economy and reversed the previously bright economic outlook that led to the reduction of the country’s poverty rate from 10.9 percent in 2008 to 6.0 percent in 2014. The Mauritanian government response has been swift in mitigating the impact of the pandemic with the support from international partners by way of assistance funds and debt service suspensions. As a response to the pandemic’s economic impact, President Ghazouani launched the Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP) in September 2020. ProPEP aims to boost the economy and improve the living conditions of vulnerable populations by reducing extreme poverty, expanding basic socio-economic infrastructures, organizing the information sector, and adopting a regulatory framework conducive to private sector development. As part of his annual speech to the parliament on January 29, Prime Minister Bilal presented a brighter picture of Mauritania’s economic outlook highlighting the government’s push to attract more investors. His presentation highlighted Mauritania’s natural resources which consist of deposits of copper, gypsum, uranium, and hydrocarbons including one of Africa’s largest offshores discoveries, the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) natural gas field. The 2022 budget reflects the Mauritanian government’s priorities as it attempts to revitalize the national economy and alleviate poverty, especially in the informal sector which was particularly impacted by COVID-19 and comprises 70 to 75 percent of the total economy. With its considerable natural resources, Mauritania places great importance on foreign direct investment (FDI). The continued global demand for iron-ore boded well for Mauritania throughout the pandemic as iron ore production is a main contributor to the country’s GDP. Real GDP is expected to grow from 2.8 percent in 2021 to 4.2 percent in 2022. Mauritania has substantial renewable energy potential, particularly when it comes to solar, wind, and hydro power resources. The natural gas reserves at GTA are expected to enter production in 2023. The energy sector (hydrocarbons and renewable energy) offers opportunities for increased U.S. direct investment in Mauritania. On February 28, Kosmos Energy announced that it will increase investments in Mauritania and Senegal in 2022 by USD 300 million to accelerate development of the GTA gas field. According to Power Africa, the Government of Mauritania is working to expand its electricity supply and encourage investment in the renewable energy sector to stimulate the economy with the aim of reaching universal access by 2030. To do this, the GIRM will: Increase new production capacity from local resources, mainly natural gas; Increase the share of renewable energies in its total energy production, targeting 60 % by 2030; Further develop the transmission network and interconnections with neighboring countries; and Implement decentralized solutions in isolated areas. Traditionally, U.S. investment in Mauritania has been primarily in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors. However, the Mauritanian government’s efforts to meet the challenges of food self-sufficiency provide an opportunity for U.S. agro-businesses to engage with Mauritania through supplies and equipment sales, as well as technical training. In 2019, Mauritania ranked as the United States’ 157th largest goods export market amounting to USD 91 million. Mauritania’s top export categories were machinery (USD 24 million), meat poultry (USD 15 million), vehicles (used and new) (USD 9 million), minerals fuels (USD 9 million). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 96 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,670 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) has been proactive in attracting more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and has signed several MOU’s with international firms mainly from the Gulf and Turkey Mauritania is rich in minerals, has one of Africa’s richest fishing grounds and excessive potential in renewable energy, natural gas, and agriculture. Mauritania’s geographical position makes it a potential hub between Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The GIRM promotes international investment through the Agency for the Promotion of Investment in Mauritania (APIM), which was launched in 2021. APIM aims to attract FDI to accelerate the government economic development plan. Through APIM, the government hopes to make Mauritania the new investment frontier for the Sahel by improving the investment code and providing a stable business environment. In addition to APIM, the Economic Governance and Investment Management Support Project (PA2GI) — an African Development Bank project active from 2021-2024 – will prioritize public and private investment in strategic sectors of the President’s Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP). It is an institutional support project intended to assist Mauritania in its efforts to ensure robust, sustainable and job-creating economic growth. It involves striving to ensure public investment optimization, private investment promotion and the strengthening of tax and land governance in support of Mauritania’s Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Shared Prosperity (SCAPP) and President Ghazouani’s Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP). There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in any sector of the economy. There are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. There are no other practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment. The government continues to prioritize foreign investment in all sectors of the economy and is working closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the international donor community to improve basic infrastructure and to update laws and regulations. Both domestic and foreign entities can engage in all forms of remunerative activities, except activities involving selling pork meat or alcohol. There are no limits on the transfer of profit or repatriation of capital, royalties, or service fees, provided the investments were authorized and made through official channels. The government performs mandatory screening of foreign investments. These screening mechanisms are routine and non-discriminatory. The “Guichet Unique” created in 2020 is a one-stop shop that takes care of all administrative needs related to registering a company. The Guichet Unique provides the administrative review for all sectors, except for the petroleum and mining sectors, which require approval from a cabinet meeting led by the president. The latest investment policy review occurred in February 2008. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review is available online, in French, at: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20085_fr.pdf . The report recommended that Mauritania diversify its economy, improve its investment potential through increasing revenue generated by the exploitation of natural resources, accelerate required reforms, and enhance the business and investment climate. On November 2021, Mauritania joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and participates in the agreement to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. By joining this framework, the GIRM joins the international efforts against tax evasion. In May 2018, Mauritania underwent its third World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review. The report is available online at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp471_e.htm . The report states that, since its second Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 2011, Mauritania has had five years of products (chiefly iron ore) and massive public investment in the new airport, the extension of the port of Nouakchott, and road infrastructure. In addition, the report indicates that Mauritania’s goods imports and export mechanism has been modernized and simplified since 2011. There are no civil society organization within Mauritania and neighboring counties that have provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Sporadically, Members of Parliament will request reviews of existing contracts (mainly in the fishing sector), but thus far, no formal results have been shared. The GIRM continues to amend its laws and regulations to facilitate business registration. Under the Ministry of Economy, the Public Private Partnership Unit is responsible for providing technical support and expertise to the inter-ministerial committee during the process of identification, preparation, development, and execution of PPP projects in Mauritania. Created in February 2020, this inter-ministerial committee consists of the Prime Minister, Minister of Commerce, Minister of Economy, Minister of Finance, and the Private Sector Association. The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and is charged with improving the business climate and driving investment. In March 2021, the government created the Agency for Promotion of Investment in Mauritania to facilitate the administrative work of foreign investors. APIM helps investors navigate the business permit process, various administrative procedures, and the rules and regulations concerning foreign workforces. To further expedite the business registration process, the government moved the one-stop shop Guichet Unique from the Nouadhibou Free Trade Zone Authority ( http://www.ndbfreezone.mr/ ) to become a stand-alone unit ( https://www.guichetunique-mr.info/ ) that is mandated to help set up companies and complete all business registration. This one-stop shop has started digitizing the business registration process which has led to the reduction of the standard registration time from seven days to 48 hours. The government is hoping this move to create an independent one- stop shop will serve to further encourage FDI. Government incentives toward promoting outward investment remain limited. Mauritania’s major exports are iron ore (46 percent), non-fillet frozen fish (16 percent), and gold (11 percent). There are no investment restrictions on domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The government continues to adopt laws and regulations to improve transparency. During the review period, the government passed the 2022 budget through the parliament, accessible to the public via the Ministry of Finance portal ( https://www.finances.gov.mr/ ). The expansionary budget aims to boost the economic recovery and longer-term inclusive growth. The accounting documents provided a complete picture of the government’s planned expenditures and revenue streams, including natural resource revenues. Budget documents were generally prepared according to internationally accepted principles. The government holds full authority in allocating the licenses for all natural resources and controls their finances. The criteria and procedures by which the government awards natural resource extraction contracts or licenses are specified in Mauritania’s investment code, mining code, and a new hydrocarbon law. Basic information on tenders is publicly available on government websites, through the relevant ministry portal, or via the private job search platform ( https://beta.mr/beta/liste_offres/3 ) . There is no law or policy impeding foreign investment in Mauritania. However, there is a complex and often overlapping system of permits and licenses required to establish and run a business. There continues to be a lack of transparency in implementation of the legal and regulatory policies. The government does not require companies environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, and laws and regulations do not discriminate against foreign investment. Please see Section 2- Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties The Mauritanian judicial system combines French and Islamic (Malikite school) judicial systems. The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary (Article 89), and an organic law also protects judges from undue influence. Civil and Commercial Codes exist and are designed to protect contracts, although dispute settlement can be difficult and court enforcement is slow and often inconsistent. The judicial system remains weak and unpredictable in its application of the law, due in part to the training judges receive in two separate and distinct legal systems: Shari’a law and laws modeled after the French legal system. Judges remain undercompensated and susceptible to tribal pressures and bribery. Specialized commercial law courts exist, but judges sometimes lack training and experience in commercial and financial law. Some judges may only have formal training in the Shari’a legal system, while others are only familiar with the French civil law system. A lack of standardization of applicable legal knowledge in the judiciary leads to inefficiency in the execution of judgments in a timely and efficient manner. Laws and decrees related to commercial and financial sectors exist, but they are not always publicly available. Most judgments are not issued within prescribed time limits and records are not always well maintained. Judgments of foreign courts are recognized by national courts, but enforcement is limited. During the last few years, the government has taken steps to provide training to judges and lawyers as an attempt to professionalize the system to reduce the backlog and work through cases in a more efficient manner. In 2017, the GIRM passed a small new claims law that covers cases valued at less than USD 11,000. In January 2020, the government opened a new international center for mediation and arbitration. The center provides an alternative legal office for settlement of investment disputes and allows arbitration and mediation from international courts. There were no new major investment laws or judicial decisions ratified last year. However, the government launched the Investment Promotion Agency (APIM in French) under the Ministry of Economy to develop and facilitate procedures and processes related to investment. The investment code, which was last updated in June 2012, was designed to encourage direct investment by enhancing the security of investments and facilitating administrative procedures. The code provides for free repatriation of foreign capital and wages for foreign employees. The code also created free points of importation and export incentives. Small and medium enterprises (SME), which register through OPPS, do not pay corporate taxes or customs duties. The Ministry of Economy’s Office of Procurement Commission of the Economic and Finance Sectors is the government agency that reviews tenders and bids in accordance with the law and regulations. Suppliers for large government contracts are selected through a tender process initiated at the ministry level. Invitations for some tenders are publicly announced in local newspapers and on government websites. After issuing an invitation for tenders, the Ministry of Economy’s commission in charge of reviewing tenders selects the offer that best fulfills government requirements. If two offers, i.e., one from a foreign company and one from a Mauritanian company, are otherwise considered equal, statutes require that the government award the tender to the Mauritanian company. In practice, this has resulted in contracts awarded to companies that have strong ties to government officials and tribal leaders, regardless of the merits of an individual offer. Preferential treatment remains common in government procurement, despite the government’s recent efforts to promote transparency in the public sector. In an effort to make tenders more transparent, the National Assembly adopted a bill on December 21, 2021, the Public Procurement Code on December 21, 2021, No. 21-025 repealing and replacing the law No. 044-2010 that was enacted On July 2010. This new code will help the government become more transparent in handling tenders. The current code is structured around: Reducing the measures of the preliminary control of the public procurement control body; Clarifying the circumstances in which the awarding of contracts by mutual agreement becomes possible; Excluding from the provisions of this law, public contracts related to defense and national security needs and procurement operations in emergency situations; Promoting small and medium-sized enterprises by facilitating their access to public contracts; and Making procedures more flexible to speed up the process of concluding public contracts and handling complaints. The revised Investment Code provides more property guarantees and protection to business owners. The Code protects private companies against nationalization, expropriation, and requisition. However, if a foreign enterprise is facing difficulties, the government can propose an expropriation plan to avoid bankruptcy and to protect jobs of local employees, with fair and equitable compensation. The only known case of expropriation since Mauritania’s independence was the nationalization of the French mining MIFERMA in November 1974. In that case, the two parties agreed on a compensation plan. The country has bankruptcy laws which carry the potential for criminal penalties. Mauritania’s bankruptcy laws were last updated in 2001. The bankruptcy law allows for the reorganization or restructuring of a business. There are very few reported cases of these laws being applied 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives such as free land, deferred and reduced taxes, and tax-free importation of materials and equipment are available to encourage foreign investors. The Ministry of Economy offers tax benefits, including exemptions in some instances, to enterprises in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and some companies in priority sectors throughout the country (e.g., mining, hydrocarbons, and fishing). The Investment Code outlines standard investment incentives, but foreign investors may negotiate other incentives directly with the government. In 2018, the government adopted the Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) law. This law supports the 2017 budget diversification agenda through increased private sector participation in non-extractives sectors. The law provides legal and regulatory framework for PPPs participation in the national economy. It also addresses land tenure and property rights issues to facilitate credit access. According to World Bank and IMF analysis, the PPP law will enable the country to reduce reliance on commodities and raises long-term growth prospects in a more sustained and inclusive manner. Although Mauritania has high energy potential, the government does not offer any incentives, such as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives, for clean energy investments (including renewable energy, energy storage, energy efficiency, clean hydrogen). The Investment Code creates Special Economic Zones (Free Export Zone or Cluster of Development in the Interior https://www.ndbfreezone.mr/en/home/ ) by decree. SEZs are subject to continuous monitoring by the Customs Service in a manner specified in the decree. Nouadhibou, the commercial capital of Mauritania, is designated as a Free Trade Zone by the government. The Nouadhibou Free Trade Zone has its own regulatory structure. As of January 2020, the Nouadhibou Free Trade Zone has granted 750 authorizations for companies, primarily in the tourism, services, and fisheries sectors. The Investment Code provides three main preferential tax regimes: Small and Medium Enterprises Regimes, which apply to any investment between USD 167,000 and USD 667,000; Free Export Zones/Clusters of Development; and Targeted Industries, which includes agriculture, artisanal fishing, tourism, renewable energy, and raw material processing. Land concessions allocated to companies located in Free Economic Zones will follow a rental rate determined by joint decision of the relevant Minister and the Minister of Economy, which sets land allocation prices. As for tax advantages, companies will be exempt from taxes, excluding personnel taxes such as for retirement and social security, if they have invested at least USD 1.6 million and generated at least 50 permanent jobs, and show a potential to export at least 80 percent of their goods or services. Additionally, under the provisions in the revised Investment Code, companies will not be taxed on patents, licenses, property, or land, but rather assessed a single municipal tax that cannot exceed an annual amount of USD 16,000. Companies established in free zones are exempt from taxes on profits for the first five years. Additionally, companies established in free zones benefit from a total exemption of customs duties and taxes on the importation and export of goods and services. The government mandates that companies may employ expatriate staff in no more than 10 percent of key managerial staff positions, in accordance with the Labor Code and are required to have a plan in place to “Mauritanize” expatriate staff positions. Expatriate staff may be hired more than 10 percent with authorization from the appropriate industry authority by establishing that no competent Mauritanian national is available for the vacancy. Foreign companies are required to transfer skills to local employees by providing training for lower-skilled jobs. The law is specifically geared toward extractive companies to encourage recruitment of Mauritanian Nationals. It is important to note that this law has not yet been enforced with companies operating within the Nouadhibou Free Trade Zone Authority. Current immigration laws do not discriminate nor are they considered to apply excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements inhibiting foreign investors’ mobility. However, some U.S. companies have expressed frustration with the difficulty in obtaining or renewing work and residency permits for their employees who are not Mauritanians. The government imposes performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment, or for access to tax and investment incentives. Foreign investors consistently report that government-sponsored requests for tenders lack coherence and transparency. The revised Investment Code requires investors to purchase from local sources if it is available and is of the same quality and price as could be purchased abroad. There is no requirement for investors to export a certain percentage of output or have access to foreign exchange only in relation to their exports. If imported “dumped” goods are deemed to be competing unfairly with a priority enterprise, the government will respond to industry requests for tariff surcharges, thus providing some potential protection from competition. Expatriate staff members working for companies in accordance with the Labor Code are eligible to import, free of customs duties and taxes, their personal belongings and one passenger vehicle per household, under the regime of exceptional temporary admission (Admission Temporaire Exceptionelle or ATE). All sales, transfers, or withdrawals are subject to permission of customs officials. The Mauritanian government does not have any requirements or a mechanism that impedes companies from transmitting data freely outside the country. There are no laws in place on local data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are protected under the Mauritanian Civil Code, which is modeled on the French code. It can be difficult to gain redress for grievances through the courts. Mortgages exist and are extended by commercial banks. There is a well-developed property registration system for land and real estate in most areas of the country, but land titling and tenure issues in southern Mauritania, particularly the area along the Senegal River, are the subject of much controversy. Investors should be fully aware of the history of the lands they are purchasing or renting and should verify that the local partner has the proper authority to sell/rent large tracts of land—particularly in this region—before agreeing to any deals. For instance, in early 2021, there was a case of an alleged land grab by local authorities in the villages of Mbagne and Ferala in southern Mauritania. The land was designated for a World Bank project but following regional protests, over ownership of the property, the World Bank withdrew. The World Bank placed the project on hold until the issue between the community and the government is resolved. The Ministry of Housing continues to digitize land licenses to provide more transparent land allocation. All information regarding the property titles is available at the Land Registry Agency housed at the Ministry of Housing, including information related to mortgages and other tax related matters. The Land Registry Agency performs due diligence prior to making the final title transfer. To register a property, owners need to have their notarized sale agreement along with the title certificate. There remains a large percentage (over 10 percent) of available owned land without a clear title. Even if property is legally purchased, there is always the possibility that the property is occupied by squatters. The legal protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) remains a relatively new concept in Mauritania. Those seeking legal redress for IPR infringements will find very little historical record of cases or legal structures in place to support such claims. There is no separate judicial circuit that specializes in IPR. Mauritania is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the African Organization of Intellectual Property (OAPI). In joining the latter, member states agree to honor IPR principles and to establish uniform procedures of implementation for the following international agreements: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Hague Convention for the Registration of Designs and Industrial Models, the Lisbon Convention for the Protection and International Registration of Original Trade Names, the Washington Treaty on Patents, and the Vienna Treaty on the Registration of Trade Names. Mauritania signed and ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 but has yet to implement it. The government also signed and ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention in 1976, but it has not signed or ratified the WIPO Internet treaties. The government is in the process of launching reforms related to property, product certification, and accreditation bodies to protect IPR. The Agency for Consumer Protection, housed at the Ministry of Commerce, oversees quality control and the prevention of sales of counterfeit goods in local markets, but its capabilities to track and enforce its regulations are very constrained. Mauritania is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ The government is favorable to portfolio investment. Private entities, whether foreign or national, have the right to freely establish, acquire, own, and/or dispose of interests in business enterprises and receive legal remuneration. Privatization and liberalization programs have also helped put private enterprises on an equal footing with respect to access to markets and credit. In principle, government policies encourage the free flow of financial resources and do not place restrictions on access by foreign investors. Most foreign investors, however, prefer external financing due to the high interest rates and procedural complexities that prevail locally. Credit is often difficult to obtain due to a lax legal system to enforce regulations that build trust and guarantee credit return. There are no legal or policy restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with investments. Investors are guaranteed the free transfer of convertible currencies at the legal market rate, subject to availability. Similarly, foreigners working in Mauritania are guaranteed the prompt transfer of their professional salaries. Commercial bank loans are virtually the only type of credit instrument. There is no stock market or other public trading of shares in Mauritanian companies. Currently, individual proprietors, family groups, and partnerships generally hold companies and portfolio investments. The IMF has assisted Mauritania with the stabilization of the banking sector and as a result, access to domestic credit has become easier and cheaper. A proliferation of banks has fostered competition that has contributed to the decline in interest rates from 30 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2018, to 6.5 percent in 2020, to an annual 5 percent as part of the Central Bank of Mauritania’s (CBM) measures to countering the effects of the global pandemic. This interest rate does not include origination costs and other fees. Nevertheless, the banking system remains fragile due to liquidity constraints in the financial markets. The country’s five largest banks are estimated to have USD 100 million in combined reserves; however, these figures cannot be independently verified, making an evaluation of the banking system’s strength impossible. As of April 2020, 25 banks, national and foreign, operate in Mauritania, even though only 15 percent of the population hold bank accounts. The Central Bank of Mauritania oversees regulating the Mauritanian banking industry, and the Central Bank has made reforms to streamline the financial sector’s compliance with international standards. The Central Bank performs yearly audits of Mauritanian banks. There are no restrictions enforced on foreigners who wish to obtain an individual or business banking account. In 2018, the Central Bank of Mauritania lost all correspondent banking relationships with banks in the United States due to de-risking policies enforced by U.S. banks. The Central Bank subsequently was able to reestablish a correspondent banking relationship in 2019; however, there are still no private Mauritanian banks that have been able to do the same. Local branches of international banks (such as France’s Société Générale or Morocco’s Attijari) do maintain correspondent banking relationships with U.S. banks and are able to clear transactions in USD. The Central Bank administers the National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves, a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which was established in 2006. The SWF is funded from the revenues received from the extraction of oil, any royalties, and corporate taxes from oil companies, and from the profits made through the fund’s investment activities. The fund’s mandate is to create macroeconomic stability by setting aside oil revenues for developmental projects. However, the management of the SWF lacks transparency and the projected revenue streams remain unrealized. SOEs and the parastatal sector in Mauritania represent important drivers of the economy. They have an impact on employment, service delivery, and most importantly fiscal reserves given their importance to the economy and the state budget. In 2020 parastatal companies and SOEs experienced significant business and financial problems in the form of increasing levels of debt, operational losses, and payment delays because of the COVID pandemic. This increase in fiscal reserve risk led the government to provide subsidies to SOEs. Hard budget constraints for SOEs are written into the Public Procurement Code but are not enforced. SOMELEC, the state-owned electricity company, has been operating in a precarious financial situation for many years. In principle, larger wholly government-owned enterprises are operated on a commercial basis. Nevertheless, many have operated at a loss since the 1970s and failed to provide the services for which they were responsible. Most state-owned enterprises in Mauritania have independent boards of directors. Most board members are usually appointed based on political affiliations. The Mauritanian government is putting a strong emphasis on liberalizing the trade and foreign investment frameworks and privatizing SOEs. While the GIRM has worked through its various economic reform program to privatize SOEs, (several SOEs remain, (most importantly the State Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM), the State Electricity Company (SOMELEC), the State Water Distribution Company (SNDE) and the National Airlines (Mauritania Airlines). The remaining SOEs are active in a wide range of sectors including energy, network utilities, mining, petroleum, telecommunications, transportation, commerce, and fisheries. Parastatal and wholly owned SOEs remain the major employers in the country. This includes the SNIM, which is by far the largest Mauritanian enterprise and second largest employer in the country after the government. The publicly available financial information on parastatal and wholly owned SOEs is incomplete and outdated, except for budget transfers. There is no publication of the expenditures SOEs allocate to research and development. In addition, they execute the largest portion of government contracts, receiving preference over the private sector. According to the Public Procurement Code, there are no formal barriers to competition with SOEs. However, informal barriers such as denial of access to credit and/or land exist. Post is not aware of any privatization programs during the reporting period. Historically, corporate social responsibility in Mauritania is not a widespread practice. However, this is changing as more foreign-owned companies enter the Mauritanian market. Certain state-run industries have provided basic educational and training opportunities for the children of their employees and/or scholarships for their employees to study abroad, but this is usually the extent of social responsibility initiatives. Companies in the mining and hydrocarbon industries send young Mauritanians overseas to complete their studies on scholarship programs; many of the scholarship recipients have family ties to powerful individuals in the companies. The larger fishing companies have recently started to provide more opportunities for qualified youth to study at the fishing and naval training school in Nouadhibou to prepare them for careers in the fishing industry. Current projects by foreign-owned companies include providing free water to local communities; building vocational training centers, health clinics, and roadways; and providing healthcare equipment and medicines to towns near company operations. Since 2011, three of Mauritania’s largest mining companies—Kinross, Mauritanian Copper Mines (MCM), and SNIM—funded a School of Mining with the goal of increasing the number of qualified Mauritanians to serve in the mining industry. The school has a partnership with the Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal and with the mining companies. The school is considered a public entity under the Ministry of Petroleum, Mines, and Energy. In 2017, Kosmos Energy provided financial support to Diawling National Park in the south of the country, and in 2018, launched the Kosmos Innovation Center in Mauritania to invest in youth entrepreneurs and small business who have big ideas with the goal of contributing to the overall economic growth of Mauritania. In addition to Kosmos, companies such as BP and other international oil companies now operating in Mauritania are likewise increasing corporate social responsibility programs. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Mauritania submitted its updated National Determined Contribution (NDC) in October 2021 primarily focusing on increasing Mauritania’s resilience to climate change through the promotion of low carbon growth, while increasing adaption for low lying coastal areas, upgrading infrastructure, and strengthening the country’s food security position. Highlights from the NDC Mauritania raised its climate ambition with a new target to cut greenhouse (GHG) emissions by 11% in 2030. With more substantial support, Mauritania could ensure carbon neutrality and potentially reach a 92% reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions. As well as increased mitigation targets, Mauritania enhanced the adaptation component of its NDC, including the creation of green jobs. The NDC is intended to serve as a framework for consultation and dialogue to design transformative resilience programs that meet the needs of the populations and ecosystems affected climate change. Mauritania’s NDC is based on the sectoral development programs and the strategic framework for the fight against poverty. These have the overall objective of contributing to development that is low-carbon and resilient to the impacts of climate change. The NDC provides that at the request of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD in French), each Ministry has a designated ‘Sectoral Focus Point’ in charge of climate change for its sector. Mauritania has thus developed a network of Sectoral Focus Points within ministerial departments to improve implementation of the objectives of the Convention. Mauritania launched its National Adaption Plan (NAP) process in April 2019 with a two-day capacity building workshop led by the MEDD. The NAP is a three-year plan supported by $2.6 million from the United Nation’s Green Climate Fund (GCF). This UN contribution will provide technical support to advance climate science, ecosystem-based adaption, environmental economics, and integrated adaption strategies in Mauritania. Mauritania’s NAP aims to strengthen the country’s technical and institutional capacities to better manage climate change adaptation planning. The NAP will improve quality and access to climate change data and enhance the monitoring and evaluation of adaptation planning at the national and local levels. According to the NAP-Global Support Programme (NAP-GSP), climate change is exacerbating desertification and loss of biodiversity in Mauritania. These trends are expected to worsen in the future based on current climate projections. The NAP supports Mauritania’s commitments to the Paris Agreement by addressing the adaptation component of Mauritania’s NDC to the UNFCCC. Mauritania recognizes its vulnerability to climate change and has made some progress to increase its climate resilience. As mentioned above, Mauritania is a member of multiple multilateral environmental agreements, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1994), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) (1996) and has signed onto several Protocols and sub-agreements, such as the Kyoto, Nagoya and Montreal Protocols and the Paris Agreement. Nationally, at the policy level, the country’s 2011-2016 planning framework (CSLPII, 2011-2016) included a vision on climate change with a plan of action considering the risks of climate change and a monitoring system (SEPANE 2). More recently, the Sector Environment and Sustainable Development Strategy, 2017-2021 (SNEDD) provides a strategic background for integrating environmental, climate change and sustainable development goals into other sectoral policy frameworks. The country’s National Development Strategy (SCAPP 2016 – 2030, adopted in 2018) guides this integration with more focus on the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC, 2015). Specifically, Mauritania has also developed a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (2004). In September 2015, Mauritania submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) for the Paris Climate Agreement. Since taking office in August 2019, President Ghazouani has made fighting corruption one of the cornerstones of his administration. In October 2019, the Court of Accounts published a detailed audit report covering fiscal years 2007 through 2017. The report highlighted lack of transparency in government tenders, weakness in public finances management, and provided credible recommendations. Based on the audit report findings, a parliamentarian committee was set up to further investigate four major government infrastructure and fisheries projects that were awarded to Chinese companies. The judiciary system moved forward with the investigation during the 2021 reporting period. On March 11, 2021, former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and 14 other suspects were charged for mismanagement of State property and resources, bribery, illicit enrichment, and money laundering. Aziz and the 14 other suspects were placed under judicial supervision (i.e. house arrest). In June 2021, after violating the terms of his house arrest, the investigative judge decided to send Aziz to pre-trial detention at the Nouakchott police academy. Tax evasion and corruption have deprived the government of a significant source of revenue, weakening its capacity to provide necessary services. In 2009, the government passed a law requiring all high-ranking government employees to publicly declare their assets, although this law is not enforced. Corruption is an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Mauritania, but firms generally rate access to credit, an underdeveloped infrastructure, and a lack of skilled labor as even greater impediments. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, bank loans, fishing license attribution, land distribution, access to port facilities and tax payments. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act punishable by two to 10 years imprisonment and fines up to USD 700, but there is little application of this law. Firms commonly pay bribes to obtain telephone, electricity, and water connections, and construction permits more quickly. There are several organizations that track corruption within Mauritania. Transparency International has a representative who reports on local corruption policies and events. In practice, annual auditing of government accounts is not enforced and therefore rarely conducted. However, the government rectified previously misreported financial data to be more transparent; this included publishing quarterly financial statements on a government treasury website: www.tresor.mr . In April 2016, a new anti-corruption bill was introduced to address the provisions of the UN Convention against Corruption and to provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruptions cases. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Cour Des Comptes Mauritanie Email ccomptes@cc.gov.mr Telephone: +222 4525 34 04 Fax: +222 4525 49 64 Contact at a “watchdog” organization: “Publiez ce que vous payez” (Publish What You Pay) Executive Office +222 4525-0455 +222 4641-7702 The August 2019 inauguration of President Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani marked the first democratic transition of power from one elected leader to another in the country’s history and ushered in a broad sense of optimism. Mauritania has not suffered a terrorist attack on its soil since 2011. And while the country continues to struggle in respecting human rights, the government is beginning to take concrete steps to address these issues. On October 20, 2021, President Ghazouani’s cabinet adopted the implementing decree for the Law on Associations (“NGO Law), which was adopted by the Parliament in January 2021. The law replaces the authoritative registration system with a declarative system more in line with international standards, allowing previously excluded non-government organizations to begin officially operating. The Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) is one such organization that benefits from this new regulation; IRA’s anti-slavery mission includes combating child forced labor. The Mauritanian economy is highly informal (especially in agriculture, artisanal fisheries/ mining, and animal husbandry) and according to the Ministry of Employment and Youth, the unemployment rate is estimated to be around 37 percent. While labor is abundant, there is a shortage of skilled workers and well-trained technical and managerial personnel in most sectors of the economy. As a result, there are few sectors of the economy that use advanced technologies because the skilled labor required to operate them is not readily available. The mining sector is led by the national company SNIM; the subsidiary of a Canadian gold mining company, Kinross-Tasiast; and the subsidiary of a Canadian company, MCM. These companies provide advanced training for their employees. The “Mauritanization law” requires that employers give priority to nationals over foreign workers, unless the skills required for the position cannot be filled by the national labor force. Employers must develop a “Mauritanization” plan to transfer skillsets to local workers within a period of two years. There are no restrictions on employers reducing their workforce in periods of unfavorable market conditions. However, the law requires that compensations be granted to laid-off employees. The International Labor Organization (ILO) reported in 2018 that a significant pay gap between staff in the labor inspectorate and staff in other government inspection departments who receive better remuneration (such as tax inspectors or education inspectors) led to attrition. The ILO also reported that the labor inspectorate was subject to undue influence by employers and the government, thereby reducing the effectiveness of inspection activity. The law provides that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. The two largest employers, the civil service and the state mining company, observed this law; most employers in the private sector reportedly did not. In the modern wage sector, women also received family benefits, including three months of paid maternity leave. Women face employment discrimination, because employers usually prefer to hire men, and women are overrepresented in low-paying positions In March 2021, in partnership with ILO, the Mauritanian Government organized regional consultations and roundtables with child labor and protection stakeholders to draw up the list of hazardous work for children under 18 years of age, as established by the international and national standards of child labor. After collecting data from all fifteen regions, the government consolidated the data in June 2021 and narrowed the list down to 44 activities officially identified as hazardous work. On January 17, 2022, with the support of the ILO, the Mauritanian Government banned hazardous child labor. The Ministry of Public Service and Labor issued a regulatory text listing hazardous work (LTD in French) that are prohibited for children. ( https://www.ilo.org/africa/countries-covered/mauritania/WCMS_835859/lang–en/index.htm ) The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) ranks Mauritania 157 out of 167 countries for the quality of infrastructure. This LPI sub-factor covers the quality and performance of ports, roads, railroads, and information technology. In addition, the World Economic Forum’s infrastructure quality rating for Mauritania’s is 2.6 out of 7, and 46 percent of companies in the country identify transportation inefficiencies as a major constraint on business. Currently, there is no investment with financial support from the Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In 2019, Arise and Meridiam SAS entered a joint venture to support the modernization of the Nouakchott Port via a specific public-private partnership with a long-term concession of 30 years. Meridiam SAS received USD 24,840,000 in OPIC financing and political risk insurance. The project is not expected to have a negative impact on the U.S. economy. There is no U.S. procurement associated with this project, and, therefore, the project is expected to have a neutral impact on U.S. employment. But the project is expected to have a significant economic impact by expanding Mauritania’s port infrastructure capacity. In December 2021, Arise inaugurated the new container terminal in Mauritania. This project represents a total investment of 278 million euros or USD 305 million. It is the first project developed under a Public Private Partnership scheme in Mauritania. Its scope covers the development, financing, construction, maintenance, and operation of a new and dedicated container terminal at the port of Nouakchott, designated to have an initial handling capacity of 250,000 TEUs (2), and the extension and deepening of the port area from previously 12m to 14,70 m to allow access of larger container vessels. The project foresees a significant potential for extending the capacity of the terminal in the future, which could be able to handle a potential maximum capacity of 600,000 TEU i.e., almost four times the actual container capacity. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2019 $7,914 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $96 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2018 142% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. U.S. Embassy Nouakchott Economic/Commercial Section NouakchottEconComm@state.gov Mauritius Executive Summary Mauritius is an island nation with a population of 1.3 million people. The Government of Mauritius (GoM) claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of approximately 2.3 million square kilometers, but its undisputed EEZ amounts to approximately 1.3 million square kilometers, in addition to jointly managing about 388,000 square kilometers of continental shelf with Seychelles. Mauritius has maintained a stable and competitive economy. Real GDP grew at an average of 4.7 percent from 1968 to 2017, enabling the country to achieve middle-income status in less than 50 years. In 2020, Mauritius’ GDP was $11 billion and its gross national income per capita amounted to $10,230. In July 2020, the World Bank classified Mauritius as a high-income country based on 2019 data, but Mauritius reverted to upper-middle income status in 2021 due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic severely damaged the economy. Tourism, which contributed around 20 percent to the economy pre-COVID, did not return as expected following the reopening of borders in October 2021. There was a moderate rebound in exports of goods, but exports of services declined further due to the difficult situation in the tourism sector. The GoM estimated that GDP growth would increase 4.8 percent in 2021, with contractions in tourism (18.8 percent) and sugar (9.6 percent), according to Statistics Mauritius. The IMF forecasted that the economy would grow 6.7 percent growth in 2022. Unemployment was estimated at 9.2 percent at the end of 2020, while inflation for 2021 was 4.0 percent. One of the poorest countries in Africa at independence in 1968, Mauritius has become one of the continent’s wealthiest. It successfully diversified its economy away from sugarcane monoculture to a manufacturing and service-based economy driven by export-oriented manufacturing (mainly textiles), tourism, financial and business services, information and communication technology, seafood processing, real estate, and education/training. Before COVID-19, authorities planned to stimulate economic growth in five areas: serving as a gateway for investment into Africa; increasing the use of renewable energy; developing smart cities; growing the blue economy; and modernizing infrastructure, especially public transportation, the port, and the airport. In November 2021 at the Conference of Parties 26 (COP 26), the GoM pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 40 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 figures. To achieve this target, the government plans to undertake major reforms in its energy, transport, waste, refrigeration and air-conditioning, agriculture, and conservation sectors. The government aims to produce 60 percent of the country’s energy from green sources by 2030, to phase out the total use of coal before 2030, and to increase energy efficiency by 10 percent based on 2019 figures. As part of the national strategy to modernize the public transport system, the light rail network that launched in 2019 is expected to be extended. The government was also working to diversify 70 percent of waste from the landfill by 2030 through the implementation of composting plants, sorting units, biogas plants and waste-to-energy plants. In 2020 and 2021, however, officials focused on supporting sectors whose revenue disappeared due to the pandemic. In May 2020, the Bank of Mauritius (BoM) set up the Mauritius Investment Corporation (MIC) to mitigate the economic downturn due to the pandemic. The BoM invested $2 billion of foreign exchange reserves in the MIC which were largely directed towards the pharmaceutical and blue economy sectors, in addition to assisting companies that suffered during the pandemic. The BoM also intervened regularly on the domestic foreign exchange market to supply foreign currency. Government policy in Mauritius is pro-trade and investment. The GoM has signed Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with 46 countries and maintains a well-regarded legal and regulatory framework. Mauritius has been eager to attract foreign direct investment from China and India, as well as courting more traditional markets like the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The China-Mauritius free-trade agreement went into effect on January 1, 2021. Mauritius also signed a preferential trade agreement with India, which went into effect in April 2021. The GoM promotes Mauritius as a safe, secure place to do business due to its favorable investment climate and tradition as a stable democracy. Corruption in Mauritius is low by regional standards, but recent political and economic corruption scandals illustrated there was room for improvement in terms of transparency and accountability. For instance, a commercial dispute between a U.S. investor and a parastatal partner that turned into a criminal investigation has raised questions of governmental impartiality. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 52 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $8,300 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $10,230 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mauritius actively seeks foreign investment. According to several surveys and metrics, Mauritius is among the freest and most business-friendly countries in Africa. Mauritius outperforms all other African countries on the Human Development Index where, in 2020, it ranked 66 out of 189 countries. The 2022 Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage Foundation, ranked Mauritius first among 47 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and 30th globally, compared to being 13th in 2021. This decline in the ranking is due to a drop in the country’s fiscal health score. The index also highlighted that while property rights and judicial effectiveness are strong, government integrity is relatively weak. The Economic Development Board (EDB) is the single gateway government agency responsible for promoting investment in Mauritius and helping guide investors through the country’s legal and regulatory requirements. In terms of investor retention policy, the EDB provides aftercare services that consider future business environment requirements for survival and/or expansion. The EDB has a customer service unit that receives investor suggestions and complaints, and it organizes workshops and roundtable sessions to inform investors about changes in investment policies. In 2021, the EDB also set up a Business Support Facility that provides facilitation and advisory services to all businesses in Mauritius: https://business-support-portal.edbmauritius.org/business-support-facility/ . A non-citizen can hold, purchase, or acquire real property under the Non-Citizens (Property Restriction) Act (NCPRA), subject to government approval. The NCPRA can be accessed on this link: https://dha.govmu.org/Pages/Services/PRA.aspx . A non-citizen is eligible for a residence permit upon purchasing residential property under the government-regulated Property Development Scheme (PDS), Integrated Resort Scheme (IRS), and Real Estate Scheme (RES) as long as the investment exceeds $375,000 or its equivalent in any freely convertible foreign currency. No government approval is required in certain situations provided under the NCPRA, namely: (i) holding of immoveable property for commercial purposes under a lease agreement not exceeding 20 years; (ii) holding of shares in companies that do not own immoveable property; (iii) holding of immoveable property by inheritance or effect of marriage to a citizen under the “régime legal de communauté”; (iv) holding of shares in companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius; and (v) through a unit trust scheme or any collective investment vehicle as defined in the Securities Act. Regarding business activities, the GoM generally does not discriminate between local and foreign investment. There are, however, some business activities where foreign involvement is restricted. These include television broadcasting, sugar production, newspaper and magazine publishing, and certain operations in the tourism sector. In 2019, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act was amended to increase the allowable equity participation of a foreign company investing in broadcasting to 49.9 percent from 20 percent. Control by foreign nationals in broadcasting was likewise capped at 49.9 percent. The IBA Act can be accessed via http://www.iba.mu/legal.htm . In the sugar sector, no foreign investor is allowed to make an investment that would result in 15 percent or more of the voting capital of a Mauritian sugar company being held by foreign investors. However, foreign investors may be exempt from this rule subject to authorization by the Financial Services Commission. Further details can be accessed on the following link: https://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/media/2124/securities-investment-by-foreign-investors-rules-2013.pdf . In the tourism sector, there are conditions on investment by non-citizens in the following activities: (i) guesthouse/tourist accommodation; (ii) pleasure craft; (iii) diving; and (iv) tour operators. Generally, the conditions include a minimum investment amount, number of rooms, or a maximum equity participation, depending on the business activity. In the construction sector, foreign consultants or contractors are required to register with the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). Details on registration procedures are available at http://cidb.govmu.org/English/Consultants-Contractors/Pages/default.aspx . The Investment Office of the EDB screens foreign investment proposals and provides a range of services to potential investors. The EDB is a useful resource for investors exploring business opportunities in Mauritius and assists with occupation permits, licenses, and clearances by coordinating with relevant local authorities. In 2021, the U.S. Embassy in Port Louis did not receive negative comments from U.S. businesses regarding the fairness of the government’s investment screening mechanisms. The Investment Office of the EDB reviews proposals for economic benefit, environmental impact, and national security concerns. The EDB then advises potential investors on specific permits or licenses required, depending on the nature of the business. Foreign investors may apply through the EDB for necessary permits; alternately, investors may apply directly to the relevant authorities. In the event an investment fails the review process, the prospective investor may appeal the decision within the EDB or with the relevant government ministry. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the GoM relaxed investment terms and conditions for foreign investors in 2020. For instance, the minimum investment for obtaining an occupation permit was halved to $50,000. The GoM also removed the minimum turnover and minimum amount invested for the Innovator Occupation Permit. Professionals with an occupation permit and foreign retirees with a residence permit were able to invest in other ventures without any shareholding restrictions. The permanent residence permit validity was doubled to 20 years. Non-citizens who had a residence permit under the various real estate schemes were no longer required to hold an occupation or work permit to invest and work in Mauritius. Additionally, the GoM introduced a 10-year Family Occupation Permit, which allows foreign families to invest and reside in Mauritius for a period of 10 years in exchange for a minimum contribution of $250,000 to the COVID-19 Projects Development Fund. More information is available at https://residency.mu/ . In 2020, the Non-Citizens (Employment Restriction) Act was amended to enable the following categories of individuals to engage in any occupation without a permit: (a) the holder of an occupation permit issued under the Immigration Act; (b) the holder of a residence permit issued under the Immigration Act; (c) a non-citizen who has been granted a permanent resident permit under the Immigration Act; and (d) a member of the Mauritian diaspora under the Mauritian Diaspora Scheme. In 2021, the GoM also introduced the premium investor certificate, which allows companies investing at least $11 million, as well as companies involved in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, to benefit from incentives. In 2018, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its 2017 Report on the Implementation of the Investment Policy Review (IPR) for Mauritius. UNCTAD worked with the GoM on the Industrial Policy and Strategic Plan, launched in December 2020, found here: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsinf2020d5_en.pdf . In November 2021, Mauritius concluded its fifth trade policy review with the World Trade Organization. The review concluded that Mauritius’ openness to trade and its stable and robust democratic system have contributed to its economic success in recent years. The review also highlighted that, after two decades of liberalizing reforms, Mauritius has transformed into an almost duty-free economy, with the notable exception of sugar, on which Most Favored Nation tariff rates reach 100 percent. The trade policy review is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s417_e.pdf . After the GoM put in place new measures to improve its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, in October 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Mauritius from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring concerning AML/CFT. In January 2022, the European Union Commission likewise removed Mauritius from its list of high-risk third countries. The GoM recognizes the importance of a good business environment to attract investment and achieve a higher growth rate. In 2019, the Business Facilitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act entered into force. The main reforms brought about by this legislation were expediting trade fee payments, reviewing procedures for construction permits, reviewing fire safety compliance requirements, streamlining of business licenses, and implementing numerous trade facilitation measures. The incorporation of companies and registration of business activities falls under the provisions of the Companies Act of 2001 and the Business Registration Act of 2002. All businesses must register with the Corporate and Business Registration Department (CBRD); the registration can be completed online at https://companies.govmu.org/Pages/default.aspx . In 2020, the Business Registration Act was amended so that the CBRD became the central repository of business licenses and information. According to the amendment, all government agencies must electronically forward a copy of any permit, license, authorization, or clearance to the registrar for publication in the Companies and Businesses Registration Integrated System (“CBRIS”). As a general rule, a company incorporated in Mauritius can be 100 percent foreign owned with no minimum capital. Upon completion of the registration process, the CBRD issues a certificate of incorporation. The company can subsequently apply for occupation permits (work and residence permits) and incentives offered to investors. EDB’s investment facilitation services are available to all investors, domestic and foreign. To this end, a Business Support Facility was established at the EDB in 2021. For more information, see https://business-support-portal.edbmauritius.org/ . In partnership with the Corporate and Business Registration Department, the Mauritius Network Services (MNS) has implemented the Companies and Business Registration Integrated System, a web-based portal that allows electronic submission for incorporation of companies and application for the Business Registration Number, file statutory returns, pay yearly fees, register businesses, and search for business information. In March 2019, the National Electronic Licensing System (NELS), which is co-financed by the European Union, was officially launched. NELS is a single point of entry for the processing of permits and licenses needed to start and operate a business. Through NELS, the submission of business licensing (including the Building and Land Use Permit, Environmental Impact Assessment, Occupation Certificate, Land Conversion Certificate, etc.) can now be done electronically. In 2020, the Economic Development Board Act was amended to allow companies to log any obstacles relating to obtaining licenses, permits, authorizations, or other clearances; to enquire about any issue and make recommendations to government agencies; and to publish any actions taken to resolve the reported obstacles. Mauritius also implemented the e-Registry System, where a national register of real estate properties and statistics on land dispute resolutions are now publicly available. An independent mechanism for filing of complaints was also implemented. The e-Registry System features an electronic dashboard for registry searches, submission of documents, online payment of registration fees, and electronic copies of registered documents. The GoM imposes no restrictions on capital outflows. Due to the small size of the Mauritian economy, the government encourages Mauritian entrepreneurs to invest overseas, particularly in Africa, to expand and grow their businesses. As part of its Africa Strategy, the government established the Mauritius Africa Fund, a public company with a budget of $13.8 million to support Mauritian investment in Africa. Through the Fund, the government participates as an equity partner for up to 10 percent of the seed capital invested by Mauritian investors in projects targeted towards Africa. The government has signed agreements with Senegal, Madagascar, and Ghana to establish and manage Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in these countries. The GoM and has invited local and international firms to set up operations in the SEZs. As per the 2018 Finance Act, Mauritian companies collaborating with the Mauritius Africa Fund for development of infrastructure in the SEZs benefit from a five-year tax holiday. To further facilitate investment, Mauritius has also signed Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with African states. Additionally, since 2012, the Board of Investment (now restructured as the Investment Office of the EDB) has been operating an Africa Center of Excellence, a special office dedicated to facilitating investment from Mauritius into Africa. This office also acts as a repository of business information for Mauritian entrepreneurs about investment opportunities in different sectors in Africa. According to the most recent figures available from the Bank of Mauritius, in 2020, gross direct investment flows abroad (excluding the offshore sector) amounted to $68 million. The top three sectors for outward investment were accommodation and food service activities (32 percent), manufacturing (12 percent), and real estate activities (9 percent). Investment abroad was focused mainly on developing countries, particularly in Africa, which received $31 million. Seychelles was the top recipient country, receiving $22 million. 3. Legal Regime Since 2006, the GoM has reformed trade, investment, tariffs, and income tax regulations to simplify the framework for doing business. Trade licenses and many other bureaucratic hurdles have been reduced or abolished. With a well-developed legal and commercial infrastructure and a tradition that combines entrepreneurship and representative democracy, Mauritius is one of Africa’s most successful economies. Business Mauritius, the coordinating body of the Mauritian private sector, participates in discussions with and presents papers to government authorities on laws and regulations affecting the private sector. Regulatory agencies do not request comments on proposed bills from the general public. Both the notice of the introduction of a government bill and a copy of the bill are distributed to every member of the Legislative Assembly and published in the Government Gazette before enactment. Bills with a “certificate of urgency” can be enacted with summary process. All proposed regulations are published on the Legislative Assembly’s website and are publicly available. At the time of writing of this report, the government was drafting a bill that would require regulatory bodies to submit an impact of upcoming regulations on the business environment. Companies in Mauritius are regulated by the Companies Act of 2001, which incorporates international best practices and promotes accountability, openness, and fairness. To combat corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing, the government also enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act. The National Code on Corporate Governance encourages companies to present a balanced assessment of the organization’s financial, environmental, social, and governance performance and outlook in its annual report and on its website. While Mauritius does not have a freedom of information act, members of the public may request information by contacting the permanent secretary of the relevant ministry. Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end-of-year report, are publicly available and provide a substantial picture of Mauritius’ planned expenditures and revenue streams. Mauritius is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The GoM implements its commitments to these regional economic institutions with domestic legal and regulatory adjustments, as appropriate). Mauritius is a signatory to the Tripartite Free Trade Area and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). AfCFTA took effect in January 2021. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the Tripartite FTA. Mauritius has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. The GoM notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to the extent possible. In July 2014, Mauritius notified its category A commitments to the WTO, and was among the first African countries to do so. Mauritius was also the fourth country to submit its instrument of acceptance for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Mauritius notified its category B & C commitments and its corresponding indicative dates of implementation in 2015. It also indicated its requirements to implement category C measures. With the coming into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in February 2017, Mauritius is implementing all its category A commitments. Of TFA’s 36 measures, Mauritius has classified 27 as category A, five as B, and four as C. Discussions with donors to obtain technical assistance to finance trade facilitation projects listed under category C are ongoing. Mauritius has already secured assistance from the World Bank and the World Customs Organization. To coordinate efforts to implement the TFA, in 2015 Mauritius set up a National Committee on Trade Facilitation co-chaired by representatives from government and the private sector. Members include MRA Customs, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Economic Developments Board, among others. The committee meets twice a year and discussion topics include identification of the TFA, policy recommendations of trade facilitation, dissemination of information on trade facilitation, and addressing the bottlenecks to trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mauritius is also part of the Cotonou Agreement, a 2000 treaty between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. On December 3, 2020, the EU and the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) reached a new agreement that succeeded the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and is expected to be signed in June 2022. The agreement will focus on human rights, democracy, and governance; security; human and social development; environmental sustainability and climate change; sustainable growth; and migration and mobility. The Mauritian legal system is based on a unique mixture of traditions. Mauritius draws legal principles from both French civil law and British common law traditions; its procedures are largely derived from the English system, while its substance is based in the Napoleonic Code of 1804. Commercial and contractual law is also based on the civil code. However, some specialized areas of law are comparable to other jurisdictions. For example, its company law is practically identical to that of New Zealand. Mauritian courts often resolve legal disputes by drawing on current legislation, the local legal tradition, and by means of a comparative approach utilizing various legal systems. The highest court of appeal is the judicial committee of the Privy Council of England. Mauritius is a member of the International Court of Justice. Mauritius established a Commercial Court in 2009 to expedite the settlement of commercial disputes. In 2020, the Courts Act was amended to provide for the creation of a Financial Crimes Division within the Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court. An amendment to the Courts Act provided for the establishment of a Land Division court at the Supreme Court to expedite land dispute resolutions. The GoM and judiciary are supportive of arbitration. Mauritius has two arbitration centers and is a party to the New York Convention 1958 and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration. Contracts are legally enforceable and binding. Ownership of property is enforced with the registration of the title deed with the Registrar-General and payment of the registration duty. Mauritian courts have jurisdiction to hear intellectual property claims, both civil and criminal. The judiciary is independent, and the domestic legal system is generally non-discriminatory and transparent. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is not aware of any recent cases of government or other interference in the court system affecting foreign investors. The Economic Development Board Act of 2017 governs investment in Mauritius, while the Companies Act of 2001 contains the regulations governing incorporation of businesses. The Corporate and Business Registration Department (CBRD) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development administers the Companies Act of 2001, the Business Registration Act of 2002, the Insolvency Act of 2009, the Limited Partnerships Act of 2011, and the Foundations Act of 2012. The Economic Development Board website provides information on investment incentives, procedures to establish a company in Mauritius, and occupation/work permits: https://www.edbmauritius.org/. The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) is an independent statutory body established in 2009 to enforce Competition Act 2007. It is mandated to safeguard competition by preventing and remedying anticompetitive business practices in Mauritius. Anticompetitive business practices, also called restrictive business practices, may be in the form of cartels, abuse of monopoly situations, and mergers that lessen competition. The institutional design of the Competition Commission houses both an adjudicative and an investigative organ under one body. While the Executive Director has power to investigate restrictive business practices (the Investigative Arm), the commissioners determine the cases (the Adjudicative Arm) on the basis of reports from the Executive Director. Any party dissatisfied with an order or direction of the commission may appeal to the Supreme Court within 21 days. Since it began operations, the Competition Commission has undertaken 62 investigations, of which 50 have been completed and 12 are ongoing as of March 2022. To date, the commission has also conducted 312 enquiries, which are preliminary research exercises prior to proceeding to investigations. The Competition Commission conducts market studies and five of the eight market studies have been completed. It has also issued six papers to the government on policy matters affecting competition. Regionally, the Competition Commission has assessed 166 mergers across the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa Free Trade Area (COMESA) member states that affected Mauritius. It has also assisted the African Competition Forum (ACF) on two cross-country market studies. The Competition Commission has also initiated a process to review and amend the Competition Act of 2007 to enable more effective enforcement. The process is expected to be completed in 2022. The Constitution includes a guarantee against nationalization. However, in 2015, the government passed the Insurance (Amendment) Act to enable the Financial Services Commission (FSC) to appoint special administrators in cases where there is evidence that the liabilities of an insurer and its related companies exceed assets by 1 billion rupees (approximately $25 million) and that such a situation “is likely to jeopardize the stability and soundness of the financial system of Mauritius.” The special administrators are empowered to seize and sell assets. The government enacted this law in the immediate aftermath of the financial scandal explained below. In April 2015, the Bank of Mauritius, the central bank, revoked the banking license of Bramer Bank, the banking arm of Mauritian conglomerate British American Investment (BAI) Group, citing an inadequate capital reserve ratio. As a result, Bramer Bank entered receivership and, by May 2015, the receiver had transferred the assets and liabilities of Bramer Bank to a newly created state-owned bank, the National Commercial Bank Ltd., thus effectively nationalizing Bramer Bank. In January 2016, the GoM merged the National Commercial Bank with another government-owned bank, resulting in Maubank, a new bank dedicated mainly to servicing small- and medium-sized enterprises. The GoM owns over 99 percent of Maubank shares. Efforts to privatize the bank in 2018 did not produce any results. The government likewise took over much of Bramer’s parent, the BAI Group. The FSC placed the BAI Group in conservatorship, alleging fraud and corporate mismanagement in BAI’s insurance business. Following passage of the Insurance (Amendment) Act in 2015, the FSC created the National Insurance Company, which took over the BAI Group’s core insurance business, and the National Property Fund, which took over other BAI Group assets, including a hospital and several retail outlets. CIEL Healthcare, a local private company, bought the hospital in 2017. In 2015, BAI’s former chairman filed a dispute against the GoM with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), alleging that the government illegally appropriated BAI’s assets. The former chairman, who is a Mauritian-French dual national, claimed that Mauritius had breached the Mauritius-France bilateral investment treaty and requested the restitution of his assets and payment of compensation by way of arbitration administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of the GoM. The former chairman had appealed this decision to the French-speaking Court of First Instance in Brussels, which ruled in favor of the GoM in June 2021. In May 2019, the former chairman filed two cases in the Mauritian Supreme Court to challenge the appointment of the special administrator for the Bramer Banking Corporation and BAI Co Ltd, the holding company of the BAI group. Both cases are ongoing. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Mauritius. The Insolvency Act of 2009 amended and consolidated the law relating to insolvency of individuals and companies and the distribution of assets in the case of insolvency and related matters. Most notably, the Act introduced administration procedures, providing creditors the option of a more orderly reorganization or restructuring of a business than in liquidation. A bankrupt individual is automatically discharged from bankruptcy three years after adjudication but may apply to be discharged earlier. The Act draws on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997. There were no special procedures that foreign creditors must comply with when submitting claims in insolvency proceedings. The law provides that foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the commencement of, and participation in, an insolvency proceeding as Mauritian creditors. The Second Schedule to the Insolvency Act applies to foreign creditors with respect to the procedures for proving their debts. The creditor must send to the liquidator of the company an affidavit, sworn by the creditor or an authorized person, that verifies the debt and contains a statement of account showing the particulars of the debt. The affidavit must also state whether the creditor is a secured creditor. Section 132 of the Act outlines the conditions under which a liquidator may be appointed for a foreign company and related procedures. In 2020, the Insolvency Act was amended to give the Bankruptcy Division of the Supreme Court power to order that a deed of company arrangement be binding on the company and all classes of creditors where there are at least two classes of creditors and one of the classes resolves that the company executes the deed. 4. Industrial Policies Mauritius applies investment incentives uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. The incentives are outlined in the Income Tax Act, the Customs Act, and the Value Added Tax Act. A number of incentives have been implemented to attract investors to Mauritius. These include: (i) reduced corporate tax rate of three percent for companies engaged in global trading activities; (ii) investment tax credit of five percent over three years on the cost of new plant and machinery excluding motor vehicles; (iii) five year tax holiday for Mauritian companies collaborating with the Mauritius Africa Fund with respect to investment in the development of infrastructure in Special Economic Zones, and; (iv) five year tax holiday on income derived from smart parking solutions or other green initiatives. Mauritius offers prospective investors a low-tax jurisdiction and a number of other fiscal incentives, including the following: (i) flat corporate and income tax rate of 15 percent or lower depending on business activity; (ii) 100 percent foreign ownership permitted; (iii) no minimum foreign capital required; (iv) no tax on dividends or capital gains; (v) free repatriation of profits, dividends, and capital; (vi) accelerated depreciation on acquisition of plant, machinery, and equipment; (vii) exemption from customs duty on imported equipment; and (viii) access to an extensive network of double taxation avoidance treaties. Additionally, the government has established a Property Development Scheme (PDS) to attract high net worth non-citizens who want to acquire residences in Mauritius. Buyers of a residential unit valued over $375,000 in certain projects are eligible to apply for a residence permit in Mauritius. The residential unit can be leased or rented out by the owner. The Regulatory Sandbox License (RSL) was implemented to promote innovation by eliminating barriers to investment in cutting-edge technology. An RSL gives an investor fast-track authorization to conduct business activity in a sector even if there is not yet a legal or regulatory framework in place for the sector. Further details on the RSL can be accessed via the following link: https://www.edbmauritius.org/schemes . The government offers tax incentives to companies that make clean energy investments through provisions in the 1995 Income Tax Act, the Customs Act, and the Value Added Tax Act. The tax incentives for a company include (i) double deduction of the expenditure of a fast charger for an electric car; (ii) an annual allowance of 100 percent on the capital expenditure for the acquisition of a solar energy unit; (iii) an annual allowance of 50 percent each year for a maximum two years on the capital expenditure for the acquisition of green technology equipment; (iv) tax exemption on interest earned by a company that invests in renewable energy projects through debentures and bonds; (v) eight-year tax holiday for a company that used deep ocean water for providing air conditioning services; (vi) customs duty and value-added tax exemption on any purchase of photovoltaic systems and chargers for electric vehicles. The Mauritius Freeport, a free trade zone, was established in 1992 and is a customs-free zone for goods destined for re-export. The freeport has grown dramatically in its 26-year history: developed space of cold and dry warehouses, processing units, open air storage facilities, and offices increased from 5,000 square meters in 1993 to over 400,000 square meters in 2021. Due to the pandemic, trade volume decreased to 258,972 metric tons in 2021 from 268,930 metric in 2020, and trade value increased to $816 million from $607 million during the same period. As of 2022, there were nine third-party freeport developers, three private freeport developers, and more than 200 freeport operators, representing over 3,500 jobs. Top trading partners for import in 2021 were Taiwan, China, India, Singapore and South Africa. Top trading partners for export in 2021 were South Africa, Madagascar, Reunion, United States and Taiwan. Top goods traded through the freeport included live animals, foodstuffs and beverages, plastic, and metal products. The government’s objective is to promote the country as a regional warehousing, distribution, marketing, and logistics center for eastern and southern Africa and the Indian Ocean rim. Through its membership in COMESA, SADC, and the IOC, Mauritius offers preferential access to a market of over 600 million consumers, representing an import potential of $100 billion. Companies operating in the freeport are exempt from corporate tax. Foreign-owned firms operating in the freeport have the same investment incentives and opportunities as local entities. Activities carried out in the freeport include warehousing and storage, breaking bulk, sorting, grading, cleaning and mixing, labeling, packing, repacking and repackaging, minor processing and light assembly, manufacturing activity, ship building, repairs and maintenance of ships, aircrafts, and heavy-duty equipment, storage, maintenance and repairs of empty containers, export-oriented seaport and airport based activities, freight forwarding services, quality control and inspection services, and vault activity for storing precious stones and metals, works of art, and the like. The Data Protection Act (DPA) of 2017 governs the protection of personal data in Mauritius. The GoM established the Data Protection Office in 2009. The Data Protection Commissioner is responsible for upholding the rights of individuals set forth in the DPA and for enforcing the obligations imposed on data controllers and processors. In 2016, Mauritius ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention for Protection of Individuals regarding Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108). Mauritius is the second non-European country and the first African country to sign the convention. The agreement gives individuals the right to protection of their personal data. In September 2020, Mauritius signed the Amending Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals regarding the Processing of Personal Data and, at the same time, deposited the instrument of ratification, becoming the sixth state to ratify the modernized Convention 108. Mauritian data protection law tracks the European Union’s Regulation on the Protection of Natural Persons with regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, commonly known as the General Data Protection Regulation. Mauritius’ DPA applies only when processing of personal data is concerned. Failure to comply with Section 28 of the DPA, which establishes the lawful purposes for which personal data may be processed, can result in a fine and up to five years imprisonment. Section 29 sets requirements for processing special categories of data, such as ethnic origin, political adherence, and mental health condition. There are no enforcement procedures for investment performance requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Real property rights are respected in Mauritius. A non-citizen can hold, purchase, or acquire immovable property under the Non-Citizens (Property Restriction) Act, subject to the government’s approval. Ownership of property is memorialized with the registration of the title deed with the Registrar-General and payment of the registration duty. The recording system of mortgages and liens is reliable. Traditional use rights are not an issue in Mauritius as there were no indigenous peoples present at the time of European colonization. Intellectual property rights (IPR) in Mauritius are protected by three pieces of legislation, namely the Industrial Property Act of 2019, the Copyrights Act of 2014, and the Protection against Unfair Practices (Industrial Property Rights) Act of 2022. The 2019 Industrial Property Act and the accompanying regulations entered into force on January 31, 2022. This act consolidates all industrial property-related issues in one statute. The protection framework covers patents; trademarks; industrial designs; utility models; layout-designs of integrated circuits; plant varieties; trade names, and geographic indications. The Industrial Property Act also allows the international filing of trademarks under the Madrid Protocol, the international filing of industrial designs under the Hague Agreement, and the filing of patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. However, Mauritius has not yet acceded to these international instruments. In 2017, the Copyright Act was amended to redefine and better safeguard the interests of copyright owners and to put in place a new regulatory framework for the Mauritius Society of Authors (MASA). MASA is responsible for collection of copyright fees and for administering the economic rights of copyright owners. Mauritius is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to the Paris and Bern Conventions for the protection of industrial property and the Universal Copyright Convention. Mauritius is a member of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO). However, as Mauritius has not yet acceded to the Harare or Banjul Protocols, it cannot be designated in patent, trademark or design applications filed via the ARIPO system. Trademark and patent laws comply with the WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Industrial Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. A trademark is initially registered for 10 years and may be renewed for successive periods of 10 years. A patent is granted for a maximum of 20 years. . While IP legislation in Mauritius is consistent with international norms, enforcement is relatively weak. In practice, police will usually take action against IP infringements only in cases where the IP owner has an official representative in Mauritius, as the courts require a representative to testify that the products seized are counterfeit. The Customs Department of the Mauritius Revenue Authority is the primary agency responsible for safeguarding Mauritian borders against counterfeit goods and piracy, and is also the competent authority that enforces IP rights. The Customs Department requires owners or authorized users of patents, industrial designs, collective marks, marks or copyrights to apply in writing to the Director General to suspend clearance of goods suspected of infringing intellectual property rights. Once an application is approved, it remains valid for two years. There are no administrative costs to pay for an application. It is recommended to file an application as a preventive measure. Customs may act upon its own initiative to suspend clearance if there is evidence that IP rights are being infringed. Customs will then contact the owner or authorized user for follow-up actions. For this reason, it is best for foreign companies to have a local representative in Mauritius. Owners of IP rights are recommended to join the Interface Public Members (IPM) which allows Customs officers to access operational data input by right owners concerning their products, thus facilitating the identification of counterfeit goods. The Customs Department keeps a record of counterfeit goods seized. Customs has authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods. In 2021, the Customs Department carried out seizures of a total of 30,036 goods valued at $78,030, a significant decline from pre-pandemic figures. The infringing party is responsible for paying for the storage and/or destruction of the counterfeit goods. Mauritius is not listed in the 2021 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the 2021 Notorious Market List. IPR Law Firms in Mauritius* Sanjeev Ghurburrun Director, Geroudis River Court, St Denis Street Port Louis, Mauritius Tel: +230 210 3838; Fax: + 230 210 3912 Email: sanjeev@geroudis.com www.geroudis.com Marc Hein Chairman, Juristconsult Chambers Level 12 Nexteracom Tower II, Ebene Cyber City Ebene, Mauritius Tel: +230 465 0020; Fax: +230 465 0021 Email: mhein@juristconsult.com www.juristconsult.com Michael Hough CEO, Eversheds Sutherland Suite 310, 3rd Floor Barkly Wharf, Le Caudan Waterfront Port Louis, Mauritius Tel: +230 5726 3941; fax: +230 211 0780 Email: michaelhough@eversheds-sutherland.mu www.eversheds-sutherland.com Marius Schneider, Attorney at Law Nora Ho Tu Nam, Senior Associate IPvocate Africa Legal Advisers Ltd Ebene Junction, Rue de la Democratie Ebene, Mauritius Tel: +230 466 8183 Email: office@ipvocateafrica.com www.IPvocateAfrica.com *Law firms listed for convenience and should NOT be taken to imply U.S. Government endorsement. 6. Financial Sector The GoM welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) was created in 1989 and was opened to foreign investors following the lifting of foreign exchange controls in 1994. Foreign investors do not need approval to trade shares, except for when doing so would result in their holding more than 15 percent in a sugar company, a rule detailed in the Securities (Investment by Foreign Investors) Rules of 2013. Incentives to foreign investors include no restrictions on the repatriation of revenue from the sale of shares and exemption from tax on dividends for all resident companies and for capital gains of shares held for more than six months. The SEM currently operates two markets: the Official Market and the Development and Enterprise Market (DEM). As of December 2020, the shares of 58 companies (local, global business, and foreign companies) were listed on the Official Market, representing a market capitalization of $7.0 billion, a fall of 17 percent from the previous financial year. This fall is mainly attributed to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Unique in Africa, the SEM can list, trade, and settle equity and debt products in U.S. dollars, Euros, Pounds Sterling, South African Rand, as well as Mauritian Rupees. A variety of new asset classes of securities such as global funds, depositary receipts, mineral companies, and specialist securities including exchange-traded funds and structured products have also been introduced on the SEM. In June 2021, guidelines for the issue and listing of sustainable bonds were published. The DEM was launched in 2006 and the shares of 38 companies were listed on this index with a market capitalization of $1.1 billion as of December 2020, falling by 10 percent from December 2019. Foreign investors accounted for 41.2 percent of the trading volume on the exchange for the financial year 2020-2021, which was the highest foreign participation recorded since the financial year 2015-2016. Standard & Poor’s, Morgan Stanley, Dow Jones, and FTSE have included the Mauritius stock market in a number of their stock indices. Since 2005, the SEM has been a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. The SEM is also a partner exchange of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative. In 2018, in line with its strategy to digitalize its investor services, the SEM launched the mySEM mobile application. In November 2020, the SEM amended its internal AML/CFT policies and procedures to align with the revamped AML/CFT framework. In 2021, the SEM secured a $600,000 grant from the African Development Bank to implement a state-of-the-art trading platform. The new trading platform is expected to go live by the end of March 2022. In 2020, the slowdown in domestic economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic caused many listed companies to publish reduced earnings and defer dividend payments. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. A variety of credit instruments is available to local and foreign investors through the banking system. Mauritius has a sophisticated banking sector. As of March 2022, 19 banks were licensed to undertake banking business, of which eight were local banks, eight were foreign-owned subsidiaries, and three were branches of foreign banks. One bank conducts solely Islamic banking. One bank, under conservatorship since April 1, 2020, was acquired and recapitalized by a new shareholder on October 15, 2021. Further details can be obtained at https://www.bom.mu/financial-stability/supervision/licensees/list-of-licensees . In 2021, the Mauritian banking sector accounted for an estimated 8 percent of GDP (excluding bank-owned leasing businesses) and is the main component of financial services, which contribute 12 percent of GDP. The total assets of the sector represented 420 percent of GDP at the end of September 2021, compared to 397 percent at the end of March 2021. The banking landscape is relatively concentrated, with the two, long-established domestic entities: the Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB) and the State Bank of Mauritius (SBM), which together constitute about 46 percent of the market share for total deposits, advances, and assets total domestic market. Maubank, a state-owned bank, became operational in 2016 following a merger between the Mauritius Post & Cooperative Bank and the National Commercial Bank. The Bank of China started operations in Mauritius in 2016. Other foreign banks present in Mauritius include HSBC, Barclays Bank, Bank of Baroda, Habib Bank, BCP Bank (Mauritius), Standard Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, State Bank of India, and Investec Bank. Per the Bank of Mauritius, total banking assets as of December2021 amounted to $48 billion. Mauritian banks are compliant with international norms such as Basel III, IFRS 9, US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), and the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). At the end of December 2021, non-banking, deposit-taking institutions, comprising leasing companies and finance companies, held assets amounting to $1.6 billion, an increase of about 2 percent since December 2020. According to the Banking Act of 2004, all banks are free to conduct business in all currencies. There are also six non-bank deposit-taking institutions, as well as 12 money changers and foreign exchange dealers. There are no official government restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Mauritius, but banks may require letters of reference or proof of residence for their due diligence. The Bank of Mauritius carries out the supervision and regulation of banks as well as non-bank financial institutions authorized to accept deposits. The Bank of Mauritius has endorsed the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as set out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In July 2017, the Banking Act was amended to double the minimum capital requirement from $ 5.8 million to $11.2 million. The Central Bank began reporting the liquidity coverage ratio in 2017 to improve the liquidity profile of banks and their ability to withstand potential liquidity disruptions. As part of its COVID-19 response, the BoM made $132 million available through commercial banks as special relief funds to help meet cash flow and working capital requirements. The cash reserve ratio applicable to commercial banks was reduced from 9 percent to 8 percent. The BoM also put on hold the Guideline on Credit Impairment Measurement and Income Recognition, which took effect in January 2020. In July 2019, the Bank of Mauritius Act was amended to allow the Bank of Mauritius to use special reserve funds in exceptional circumstances and with approval of the central bank’s board for the repayment of central government external debt obligations, provided that repayments would not adversely affect the bank’s operations. This provision was used in January 2020 to repay government debt worth $450 million, raising concerns about the central bank’s independence. The Mauritius Investment Corporation (MIC), a fully owned subsidiary of BoM, was also established with an initial capital of $2 billion drawn from the BoM’s reserves to provide support to economic operators through a range of equity and quasi-equity instruments. The latest International Monetary Fund Article IV report highlights that in response to the pandemic and in coordination with the government, the BoM deployed policies that led to a substantial deterioration of its balance sheet and could make it challenging to fulfill the price-stability mandate going forward. Most major banks in Mauritius have correspondent banking relationships with large banks overseas. In recent years, according to industry experts, no banks have lost correspondent banking relationships, and none reported being in jeopardy of doing so as of April 2022. The National Payment Systems (Authorization and Licensing) Regulations, which entered into force in June 2021, provides for the authorization of operators of payment systems, clearing systems, and settlement systems and licensing of payment service providers. In October 2021, the Bank of Mauritius launched the Climate Change Centre, which will integrate climate-related and environmental financial risks into its regulatory, supervisory, and monetary policy frameworks, while also supporting the development of sustainable finance. In February 2021, the BoM became a member of the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN). The BoM is currently working on a central bank digital currency (CBDC) pilot roll-out with technical assistance from the IMF. In January 2019, the Bank of Mauritius signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Mauritius Police Force on financial crimes and illicit activities relating to the financial services sector. In February 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named Mauritius as a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, commonly known as the Grey List. At that time, Mauritius made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its Mutual Evaluation Report in 2018, Mauritius has made progress on a number of its recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including amending the legal framework to require legal persons and legal arrangements to disclose of beneficial ownership information and improving the processes of identifying and confiscating proceeds of crimes. In October 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Mauritius from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring concerning anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) based on the following reforms: (i) outreach work to promote understanding of money-laundering and terrorist financing risks and obligations; (ii) development of effective risk-based supervision plans for the regulator; (iii) improved focus on access to beneficial ownership information in a timely manner; and (iv) training to law enforcement authorities to ensure that they have capabilities to carry out money laundering investigations. In January 2022, the European Union Commission removed Mauritius from its list of high-risk third countries. Effective March 2019, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) allows businesses that provide custodial services for digital assets. The FSC is the integrated regulator for the non-banking financial services sector and global business. In August 2020, the Peer-to-Peer Lending Rules, which enable the operation of peer-to-peer lending platforms in Mauritius by operators holding licenses issued by the FSC, entered into force. And in November 2021, the FSC launched the regulatory framework for crowdfunding. The Virtual Asset and Initial Token Offering Services Act 2021, which sets out a comprehensive legislative framework to regulate the business activities of virtual assets service providers and initial token offerings, entered into force in February 2022. Any person who is a virtual asset service provider, an issuer of initial token offerings in accordance with the Act, or a custodian (digital assets) in accordance with the Financial Services Act, needs to apply for a license or registration with the FSC. The GoM does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government’s stated policy is to act as a facilitator to business, leaving production to the private sector. The government, however, still controls key services directly or through parastatal companies in the power and water, television broadcasting, and postal service sectors. The government also holds controlling shares in the State Bank of Mauritius, Air Mauritius (the national airline), and Mauritius Telecom. These state-controlled companies have Boards of Directors on which seats are allocated to senior government officials. The government nominates the chairperson and CEO of each of these companies. In April 2020, Air Mauritius requested voluntary administration, similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States, because it could not comply with financial obligations. The national airline exited voluntary administration in September 2021 following a $280 million government bailout in the form of a loan arrangement through the central bank’s Mauritius Investment Corporation. In October 2021, a newly created state-owned enterprise, Airport Holdings Ltd., acquired 9.43 million shares in Air Mauritius, gaining effective control of the airline. The government also invests in a wide variety of Mauritian businesses through its investment arm, the State Investment Corporation. The government is also the owner of Maubank and the National Insurance Company. Two parastatal entities are involved in the importation of agricultural products: the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB) and the State Trading Corporation (STC). The AMB’s role is to ensure that the supply of certain basic food products is constant, and their prices remain affordable. The STC is the only authorized importer of petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, and flour. SOEs purchase from or supply goods and services to private sector and foreign firms through tenders. Audited accounts of SOEs are published in their annual reports. Mauritius is part of the OECD network on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in southern Africa. The Declaration of Assets Act (DoA Act) was enacted in December 2018 and took effect in June 2019. It provides that certain key officials of the public sector, including chief executives of state-owned enterprises, must declare their assets and liabilities with the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The declaration includes the assets and liabilities of spouses and minor children. This declaration is published on the website of ICAC. A list of SOEs is published in the Declaration of Assets (State-owned Enterprises) Regulations 2019: https://www.icac.mu/declaration-of-assets/ . The government has no specific privatization program. In 2017, however, as part of its broader water reform efforts, the government agreed to a World Bank recommendation to appoint a private operator to maintain and operate the country’s potable water distribution system. Under the World Bank’s proposed public-private partnership, the Central Water Authority (CWA) would continue to own distribution and supply assets, and will be responsible for business planning, setting tariffs, capital expenditure, and monitoring and enforcing the private operator’s performance. In March 2018, despite protest by trade unions and consumer associations, the Minister of Energy and Public Utilities reiterated his intention to engage by the end of the year a private operator as a strategic partner to take over the water distribution services of the CWA. To date, this has not materialized. The government has said for years it planned to sell control of Maubank, into which it has injected about $173 million since it nationalized the bank in 2015. In the 2019-2020 budget speech, the prime minister said the government would sell non-strategic assets to reduce government debt. The prime minister’s office never identified a list of assets, but in parliament the prime minister has mentioned Maubank, the National Insurance Company, and Casinos of Mauritius as possible divestments. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The National Committee for Corporate Governance (NCCG) was established under Section 63 of the Financial Reporting Act (2004) and is the coordinating body responsible for all matters pertaining to corporate governance in Mauritius. The NCCG was attached to the Ministry of Financial Services and Good Governance until 2021, when it was recognized as a corporate body following an amendment to the Financial Reporting Act. The purpose of the Committee is to: (i) establish principles and practices of corporate governance; (ii) promote the highest standards of corporate governance; (iii) promote public awareness about corporate governance principles and practices; and (iv) act as the national coordinating body responsible for all matters pertaining to corporate governance. The latest Code of Corporate Governance for Mauritius (2016) was launched on February 13, 2017 and can be accessed at https://nccg.mu/full-code. In 2021, the NCCG also launched a Corporate Governance Scorecard to introduce an objective and quantitative element for companies to report on compliance. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), also set up under the Financial Reporting Act (2004), aims to advocate for the provision of high-quality reporting of financial and non-financial information by public interest entities and to improve the quality of accountancy and audit service. Mauritius does not have a dedicated center for research on corporate governance. The Ministry of Financial Services and Good Governance was established following the December 2014 elections. Its mandate is to provide guidance and support for enforcement of good governance and the eradication of corruption. In 2015, the Financial Services Commission introduced a Code of Business Conduct as part of its Fair Market Conduct Program. The Financial Services Commission has also introduced several measures in 2020 and 2021 to comply with recommendations made by the Financial Action ask Force for enhancing anti-money laundering and combatting terrorism financing standards. The Mauritius Institute of Directors (MIoD) is an independent, private sector-led organization that also promotes high standards and best practices of corporate governance, with additional information available at http://www.miod.mu . In 2017, the government set up a National Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Foundation, which operated under the Ministry of Social Integration and Economic Empowerment. In 2019, this foundation became the National Social Inclusion Foundation (NSIF). The NSIF is managed by a council consisting of members from the private and public sectors, civil society, and academia. Under the 2016 Finance Act, every company registered in Mauritius must set up a CSR fund and annually contribute the equivalent of 2 percent of its taxable income from of the previous year. In 2017 and 2018, companies were required to remit at least 50 percent of their CSR funds to tax authorities for the National CSR Foundation. The required contribution increased in 2019 to 75 percent for CSR funds set up on or after January 1, 2019. The NSIF is supposed to channel the money to NGO projects in priority areas identified by the government. These priority areas are poverty alleviation, educational support, social housing, family protection, people with severe disabilities, and victims of substance abuse. Further details can be found on the NSIF and MRA websites: https://www.nsif.mu and https://www.mra.mu/download/CSRGuide.pdf . Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Mauritius is highly vulnerable to climate change and its impacts on socio-economic development. The Climate Change Act, which took effect in 2021, created an inter-ministerial council on climate change chaired by the prime minister to set national targets and objectives. The cabinet must approve all decisions that fall under this law. This act also provided for the creation of a Department on Climate Change under the Ministry of Environment, which is now operational. In November 2021, at the Conference of Parties 26 (COP 26), the GoM pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 40 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 figures. To achieve this target, the government plans to undertake major reforms in its energy, transport, waste, refrigeration and air-conditioning, agriculture, and conservation sectors. Details on the reforms for each of the six sectors will be available in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) action plan, which is scheduled for publication in April 2022. The Ministry of Environment is also working on policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070, and on a national mitigation strategy and action plan. The latter includes the development of an online NDC registry, which will serve as a monitoring, reporting, and verification tool to track biodiversity and ecosystem services to implement Mauritius’ NDC. The registry will record data on Mauritius’ adaptation and mitigation actions as well as financial and technological support required and received. The current NDC indicates that the government plans to finance part of the $6.5 billion required to implement the NDC targets through private sector contributions. The private sector in Mauritius has indicated interest in investing in solar, hydro, and biomass renewable energy technologies. Regulatory incentives that preserve clean air and biodiversity include: (i) exemption on excise duty applied for the purchase of a 180-kw electric car; (ii) 50 percent excise duty applied for the purchase of a hybrid car; (iii) 50 percent of registration fee applied for the purchase of both a 180-kw electric car and a hybrid car; (iv) excise duty on PET plastic bottles; (v) a petroleum levy on petroleum products; (vi) an environmental protection fee for battery and tyres upon purchase of an electric or hybrid car, (vii) a carbon levy upon purchase of a conventional motor car; and (viii) a permit fee for companies operating in a marine protected area. The government also offers tax incentives to companies who make clean energy investments through provisions in the Income Tax Act 1995, the Customs Act, and the Value Added Tax Act. The tax incentives for a company include (i) double deduction of the expenditure of a fast charger for an electric car; (ii) an annual allowance of 100 percent on the capital expenditure for the acquisition of a solar energy unit; (iii) an annual allowance of 50 percent (straight line) on the capital expenditure for the acquisition of green technology equipment; (iv) tax exemption on interest perceived by a company that invests in renewable energy projects through debentures and bonds; (v) eight-year tax holiday for companies that use deep ocean water for providing air conditioning services; (vi) customs duty and value added tax exemptions on any purchases of photovoltaic systems and chargers for electric vehicles. The tax incentives government provided on solar energy equipment encouraged investments in power production from solar energy. Statistics indicate that solar energy power production increased by 3.5 percent from 2018 to 2020. The European Union is currently providing technical assistance to the government to improve its public procurement policies under the ‘Switch to Green’ facility. The objective of the project is to encourage public organizations to make their activities more environmentally friendly through the adoption of sustainable consumption practices with respect to energy and water conservation, waste minimization, paperless work, and adoption of sustainable technology and business practices to improve service delivery. 9. Corruption The prevalence of corruption in Mauritius is low by regional standards, but graft and nepotism nevertheless remain concerns and are increasingly a source of public frustration. Several high-profile cases involving corruption have reinforced the perception that corruption exists at the highest political levels, despite the fact that Mauritian law provides for criminal penalties for corruption by officials. According to Transparency Mauritius, the absence of a law regulating the financing of political parties fuels corruption. A former prime minister was arrested in 2015 on allegations of money laundering, though courts have since dismissed all charges. The state prosecutors appealed the last dismissal in late 2019 and court proceedings are ongoing, with the latest hearing held in February 2022. A minister in the previous government stepped down in 2016 after allegations of bribery. In March 2017, allegations surfaced concerning possible political interference in the Financial Services Commission’s issuance of an investment banking license to Angolan billionaire Alvaro Sobrinho, who is being investigated for alleged corruption in Portugal. In March 2018, the president of Mauritius resigned after press reported that she bought apparel, jewelry, and a laptop computer with a credit card provided by an NGO financed by the same Angolan businessman. In June 2020, the prime minister dismissed his deputy prime minister following allegations of bribery and corruption in a public energy contract. In February 2021, the minister of commerce stepped down amid allegations of corruption and abuse of power. Investors should know that while the constitution and law require arrest warrants to be based on sufficient evidence and issued by a magistrate, police may detain an individual for up to 21 days under a “provisional charge” based on a reasonable suspicion, with the concurrence of a magistrate. Two French businessmen claimed that, in February 2015, authorities held them against their will. A U.S. investor has been unable to leave Mauritius since February 1, 2020, without charges filed against him. In 2002, the government adopted the Prevention of Corruption Act, which led to the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). ICAC has the power to investigate corruption and money laundering offenses and can also seize the proceeds of corruption and money laundering. The director and board members of ICAC are nominated by the prime minister. The Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Act of 2015 was announced as a measure to recover “unexplained wealth” and came into force in early 2016. Critics of the act dislike its presumption of guilt, which requires the accused to demonstrate a lawful source of questionable assets, as well as the application of the law retroactively for seven years. The 2018 Declaration of Assets Act (DoA) entered into force in June 2019 and defines which public officials are required to declare assets and liabilities to the ICAC. These public officials include members of the National Assembly, mayors, chairpersons and chief executive officers of state-owned enterprises and statutory bodies, among others. This declaration is published on the website of ICAC: https://www.icac.mu/declaration-of-assets/disclosure-of-declarations/ . Mauritius’ rating by the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International improved in 2021. The country was rated the 49th least-corrupt nation out of 180 countries, compared to 52nd in 2020 and 56th in 2019. However, Mauritius retained its first rank in overall governance in Africa for the 10th consecutive year, according to the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. U.S. investors, in conversations with embassy personnel, have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment in the country. They have, however, encountered attempts for bribery. Although the country lacks laws on political party financing, Mauritius has legislation to combat corruption by public officials. These include laws dealing with the declaration of assets, asset recovery, prevention of corruption, anti-money laundering, and criminal offenses related to abuse of office by public officials. However, legal loopholes exist, and enforcement is weak. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of government contracts by public entities occurred in 2020, namely the use of emergency procurement procedures during the pandemic to allegedly enrich friends and family of those in power. According to Transparency Mauritius, more companies have introduced control and risk management protocols and adopted code of ethics and good business conduct, even if these do no target government officials. The Prevention of Corruption Act targets mainly the public sector, but there is no whistleblower protection law. Mauritius has ratified the UNCAC, but has not yet adopted all the recommendations, such as the criminalization of corruption in the private sector. According to Transparency Mauritius, NGOs involved in fighting corruption are not given enough protection and funding. Navin Beekharry Director-General Independent Commission Against Corruption Reduit Triangle, Moka, Mauritius +230 402 6600 icacoffice@intnet.mu Rajen Bablee Director Transparency Mauritius 4th Floor, Fon Sing Building, 12 Edith Cavell Street, Port Louis, Mauritius + 230 213 0796 transparency.mauritius@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Mauritius has a long tradition of political and social stability. Civil unrest and political violence are uncommon. Free and fair national elections are held every five years with the last general elections held in November 2019. Those most recent elections took place without incident. The current prime minister, Pravind Jugnauth previously served as finance minister, and was appointed prime minister 2017 after his father resigned (in accordance with the constitution). Jugnauth won reelection in 2019. In August 2020 and February 2021, civilians engaged in mass protests following allegations of corruption and mismanagement by the government. The protests were orderly and without incident. Crime rates are low, but petty and violent crime can occur. Visitors should keep track of their belongings at all times due to the potential for pickpocketing and purse-snatching, especially in crowded and tourist areas. Visitors should also avoid walking alone, particularly on isolated beaches and at night, and should avoid demonstrations. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the GoM, employment of Mauritians stood at 476,100 in September 2021 (289,100 males and 187,000 females), a decrease from 507,100 in 2020, and 591,000 in 2019. The number of unemployed stood at 49,800 in September 2021, a decrease from 52,200 in 2020. In 2019, the number of unemployed was estimated at 39,700. The unemployment rate for the third quarter of 2021 was estimated at 9.5 percent, compared to 10.5 percent in the second quarter of 2021 and 10.4 percent in the third quarter of 2020. Employment in large establishments (employing 10 or more persons) as of March 2021 was estimated at 305,532 (186,227 male and 119, 305 female) out of which 30, 013 were foreign workers (23,961 males and 6,052 females). The labor market remains restricted by rising unemployment among graduates and low-skilled workers, and a high number of unemployed women. It is further characterized by a persistent mismatch between qualifications of the unemployed and the skills required in an increasingly services-oriented economy. Government labor market programs aimed at building human capital have been extended, with policies to develop skills of the unemployed focusing on apprenticeships and placements. In November 2016, the government introduced the National Skills Development Program (NSDP), a fully-funded technical training program for youth, which was still running as of April 2020. The NSDP is managed by the Human Resource Development Council (HRDC), which operates under the Ministry of Education and is responsible for promoting the development of the labor force in Mauritius. The HRDC, with technical and financial support from the French development agency, is also devising a National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) for 2020-2024. The aim of the NSDS is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of skills development programs. The HRDC, in collaboration with the Economic Development Board (EDB), has also established a Skills Development Support Scheme for Foreign Direct Investment to support foreign investors in training their employees. Through this scheme, the HRDC provides eligible employers up to 80 percent of the total amount disbursed on training; the remaining 20 percent is incurred by the employer. The objective is to develop technical expertise and specialization, and likewise boost the skills base for attracting FDI. In 2018, the government introduced the SME Employment Scheme, which allows SMEs to employ recent graduates, whose monthly stipends are paid by the government for one year. In 2019, the government expanded the program to diploma holders. In 2017, the National Assembly passed the National Employment Act. This act repealed the Employment and Training Act and introduced a modern legislative framework. The act provides the labor market with information on supply and demand of skills, job seekers, and training institutions; promotes placement and training of job seekers, including young persons and persons with disabilities; and promotes labor migration and home-based work. In November 2017, the Equal Opportunities Act was amended to protect prospective employees with criminal records from discrimination when being considered for recruitment or promotion. In 2018, the government introduced a minimum monthly wage of 9,000 Mauritian rupees (approximately $209) for all workers, which impacted over 100,000 low-paid workers. In November 2019, the cabinet, following a recommendation from the National Wage Consultative Council, increased the minimum wage again to 10,200 rupees ($237), effective January 2020. The minimum wage was further increased to 10,575 rupees ($246) in January 2022. Workers’ rights are protected under the 2019 Workers’ Rights Act. The legislation provides, among others: a portable retirement gratuity fund; fair compensation in case of termination; harmonization of working conditions in different sectors; the flexibility to request the right to work from home either on a full- or part-time basis; and equal remuneration for equal work. The act also expands the Equal Opportunities Act through several measures against discrimination in employment and occupation. Trade unions are independent of the government and employers. Mauritius has an active trade union movement that about 25 percent of the workforce, and labor-management relations are generally positive. The last major strike affecting the economy took place in 1979. The government generally seeks to avoid strikes through a system that promotes settlement through negotiation or arbitration. Disputes are resolved at the Conciliation and Mediation Section of the Ministry of Labor or at the Commission for Conciliation and Mediation. If the matter is not resolved, it is referred to the Employment Relations Tribunal. Mauritius participates actively in the annual International Labor Organization (ILO) conference in Geneva, Switzerland, and adheres to ILO core conventions protecting workers’ rights. 14. Contact for More Information Anjana Khemraz-Chikhuri Economic & Commercial Assistant U.S. Embassy to Mauritius and Seychelles, Port-Louis, Mauritius + 230 202 4400 ChikhuriA@state.gov Mexico Executive Summary In 2021, Mexico was the United States’ second largest trading partner in goods and services. It remains one of our most important investment partners. Bilateral trade grew 482 percent from 1993-2020, and Mexico is the United States’ second largest export market. The United States is Mexico’s top source of foreign direct investment (FDI) with a stock of USD 184.9 billion (2020 per the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey). The Mexican economy averaged 2.1 percent GDP growth from 1994 to 2021, contracted 8.3 percent in 2020 — its largest ever annual decline — and rebounded 5 percent in 2021. Exports surpassed pre-pandemic levels by five percent thanks to the reopening of the economy and employment recovery. Still, supply chain shortages in the manufacturing sector, the COVID-19 omicron variant, and increasing inflation caused the economic rebound to decelerate in the second half of 2021. Mexico’s conservative fiscal policy resulted in a primary deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, and the public debt decreased to 50.1 percent from 51.7 percent of GDP in 2020. The newly appointed Central Bank of Mexico (or Banxico) governor committed to upholding the central bank’s independence. Inflation surpassed Banxico’s target of 3 percent ± 1 percent at 5.7 percent in 2021. The administration maintained its commitment to reducing bureaucratic spending to fund an ambitious social spending agenda and priority infrastructure projects, including the Dos Bocas Refinery and Maya Train. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered into force July 1, 2020 with Mexico enacting legislation to implement it. Still, the Lopez Obrador administration has delayed issuance of key regulations across the economy, complicating the operating environment for telecommunications, financial services, and energy sectors. The Government of Mexico (GOM) considers the USMCA to be a driver of recovery from the COVID-19 economic crisis given its potential to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mexico. Investors report the lack of a robust fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis, regulatory unpredictability, a state-driven economic policy, and the shaky financial health of the state oil company Pemex have contributed to ongoing uncertainties. The three major ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s) maintained their sovereign credit ratings for Mexico unchanged from their downgrades in 2020 (BBB-, Baa1, and BBB, lower medium investment grade, respectively). Moody’s downgraded Pemex’s credit rating by one step to Ba3 (non-investment) July 2021, while Fitch and S&P maintained their ratings (BB- and BBB, lower medium and non-investment grades, respectively. Banxico cut Mexico’s GDP growth expectations for 2022, to 2.4 from 3.2 percent, as did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 2.8 percent from the previous 4 percent estimate in October 2021. The IMF anticipates weaker domestic demand, ongoing high inflation levels as well as global supply chain disruptions in 2022 to continue impacting the economy. Moreover, uncertainty about contract enforcement, insecurity, informality, and corruption continue to hinder sustained Mexican economic growth. Recent efforts to reverse the 2013 energy reforms, including the March 2021 changes to the electricity law (found to not violate the constitution by the supreme court on April 7 but still subject to injunctions in lower courts), the May 2021 changes to the hydrocarbon law (also enjoined by Mexican courts), and the September 2021 constitutional amendment proposal prioritizing generation from the state-owned electric utility CFE, further increase uncertainty. These factors raise the cost of doing business in Mexico. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 124 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi# Global Innovation Index 2021 55 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $184,911 1st out of top 5 https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609- F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5& sId=1482331048410 World Bank GNI per capita (current US$) 2020 $8,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mexico is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) in most economic sectors and has consistently been one of the largest emerging market recipients of FDI. Mexico’s proximity to the United States and preferential access to the U.S. market, macroeconomic stability, large domestic market, growing consumer base, increasingly skilled workers, and lower labor costs combine to attract foreign investors. The COVID-19 economic crisis showed how linked North American supply chains are and highlighted new opportunities for partnership and investment. Still, recent policy and regulatory changes have created doubts about the investment climate, particularly in the energy, agriculture, and the formal employment pensions management sectors. The United States has been the largest source of FDI in Mexico, with 34 percent of the stock as of 2020 (IMF). According to Mexico’s Secretariat of Economy, total FDI flows for 2021 were USD 31.6 billion, a 13.2 percent increase compared to 2020 (USD 27.9 billion). The automotive, aerospace, telecommunications, financial services, and electronics sectors typically receive large amounts of FDI. Most foreign investment is concentrated in northern states near the U.S. border, where most maquiladoras (export-oriented manufacturing and assembly plants) are located, or to Mexico City and the nearby “El Bajio” (e.g. Guanajuato, Queretaro, etc.) region. In the past, foreign investors have overlooked Mexico’s southern states, although the administration is focused on attracting investment to the region, including through large infrastructure projects such as the Maya Train, the Dos Bocas refinery, and the trans-isthmus logistics and industrial corridor. In 2021, the GOM ramped up public spending and widely promoted private investment in these projects. In December 2021, President Lopez Obrador issued a controversial decree naming these projects “national security” priorities, allowing them to proceed before the completion of environmental and other impact studies. Though courts enjoined the executive decree, it still generated concerns about the Lopez Obrador administration’s commitment to transparency. The 1993 Foreign Investment Law, last updated in March 2017, governs foreign investment in Mexico, including which business sectors are open to foreign investors and to what extent. It provides national treatment, eliminates performance requirements for most foreign investment projects, and liberalizes criteria for automatic approval of foreign investment. Mexico is also a party to several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agreements covering foreign investment, notably the Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the National Treatment Instrument. The GOM dissolved the former trade and investment promotion agency ProMexico in 2019, and Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) assumed most of its responsibilities with the establishment of the General Directorate for Global Investment (GDGI) in June 2021. The GDGI launched three specific projects: the California Economic Council; an interactive data base to attract FDI called the “Atlas Prospectivo;” and the U.S.-Mexico Task Force for Transport Electrification. The GDGI works closely with Mexico’s state secretaries of economy to promote trade and attract FDI through partnerships with SRE’s diplomatic missions overseas. Mexico reserves certain sectors, in whole or in part, for the State, including: petroleum and other hydrocarbons; control of the national electric system, radioactive materials, telegraphic and postal services; nuclear energy generation; coinage and printing of money; and control, supervision, and surveillance of ports of entry. Certain professional and technical services, development banks, and the land transportation of passengers, tourists, and cargo (not including courier and parcel services) are reserved entirely for Mexican nationals. See section six for restrictions on foreign ownership of certain real estate. Reforms over the past decade in the energy, power generation, telecommunications, and retail fuel sales sectors have liberalized access for foreign investors. While reforms have not led to the privatization of state-owned enterprises such as Pemex or the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), they have allowed private firms to participate. Still, the Lopez Obrador administration has made significant regulatory and policy changes that favor Pemex and CFE over private participants. The changes have led private companies to file lawsuits in Mexican courts and seek compensation through international arbitration. Hydrocarbons: Private companies participate in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities through contracts with the government under four categories: competitive contracts, joint ventures, profit sharing agreements, and license contracts. All contracts must include a clause stating subsoil hydrocarbons are owned by the State. The government held nine auctions allowing private companies to bid on exploration and development rights to oil and gas resources in blocks around the country. Between 2015 and 2018, Mexico auctioned more than 100 land, shallow, and deep-water blocks with significant interest from international oil companies. The administration has since postponed further auctions but committed to respecting the existing contracts awarded under the previous administration. Still, foreign players were discouraged when the GOM awarded operatorship of a major shallow water oil discovery made by a U.S. company-led consortium to Pemex. The private consortium had invested more than USD 200 million in making the discovery and is seeking compensation through international arbitration. Telecommunications: Mexican law states telecommunications and broadcasting activities are public services and the government will at all times maintain ownership of the radio spectrum. In January 2021, President Lopez Obrador proposed incorporating the independent Federal Telecommunication Institute (IFT) into the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT), to save government funds and avoid duplication. Non-governmental organizations and private sector companies said such a move would potentially violate the USMCA, which mandates signatories to maintain independent telecommunications regulators. As of March 2022, the proposal remains pending. Mexico’s Secretary of Economy Tatiana Clouthier underscored in public statements that President López Obrador is committed to respecting Mexico’s obligations under the USMCA, including maintaining an autonomous telecommunications regulator. Aviation: The Foreign Investment Law limited foreign ownership of national air transportation to 25 percent until March 2017, when the limit was increased to 49 percent. The USMCA, which entered into force July 1, 2020, maintained several NAFTA provisions, granting U.S. and Canadian investors national and most-favored-nation treatment in setting up operations or acquiring firms in Mexico. Exceptions exist for investments restricted under the USMCA. Currently, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have the right to settle any legacy disputes or claims under NAFTA through international arbitration for a sunset period of three years following the end of NAFTA. Only the United States and Mexico are party to an international arbitration agreement under the USMCA, though access is restricted as the USMCA distinguishes between investors with covered government contracts and those without. Most U.S. companies investing in Mexico will have access to fewer remedies under the USMCA than under NAFTA, as they will have to meet certain criteria to qualify for arbitration. Sub-national Mexican governments must also accord national treatment to investors from USMCA countries. Approximately 95 percent of all foreign investment transactions do not require government approval. Foreign investments that require government authorization and do not exceed USD 165 million are automatically approved unless the proposed investment is in a legally reserved sector. The National Foreign Investment Commission under the Secretariat of the Economy is the government authority that determines whether an investment in restricted sectors may move forward. The Commission has 45 business days after submission of an investment request to decide. Criteria for approval include employment and training considerations, and contributions to technology, productivity, and competitiveness. The Commission may reject applications to acquire Mexican companies for national security reasons. The Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) must issue a permit for foreigners to establish or change the nature of Mexican companies. There has not been an update to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) trade policy review of Mexico since June 2017 covering the period to year-end 2016. The October 2021 “Human Rights for a Just Energy Transition” report analyzes some of the energy policy decisions taken by the Mexican government in the last two years and provides investment-related recommendations: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/m%C3%A9xico-nuevo-informe-derechos-humanos-para-una-transici%C3%B3n-justa-destaca-regresi%C3%B3n-de-acci%C3%B3n-clim%C3%A1tica-y-derechos-humanos/ According to the World Bank, on average registering a foreign-owned company in Mexico requires 11 procedures and 31 days. Mexico ranked 60 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s most recent 2020 Doing Business report. In 2016, then-President Pena Nieto signed a law creating a new category of simplified businesses called Sociedad for Acciones Simplificadas (SAS). Owners of SASs are supposed to be able to register a new company online in 24 hours. Still, it can take between 66 and 90 days to start a new business in Mexico, according to the World Bank. The GOM maintains a business registration website, www.tuempresa.gob.mx, and one for general information on opening a business, https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa?tab=Abre. The Secretariat of Economy offers a one-stop shop website “Invest in Mexico” aimed at facilitating the administrative procedures for foreign investors: www.economia.gob.mx/invest-in-mx/. Companies operating in Mexico must register with the tax authority (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria or SAT), the Secretariat of the Economy, and the Public Registry. Additionally, companies engaging in international trade must register with the Registry of Importers, while foreign-owned companies must register with the National Registry of Foreign Investments. Since October 2019, SAT has launched dozens of tax audits against major international and domestic corporations, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in new tax assessments, penalties, and late fees. Multinational and Mexican firms have reported audits based on diverse aspects of the tax code, including adjustments on tax payments made, waivers received, and deductions reported during the Enrique Peña Nieto administration. Private sector stakeholders reported a continuation of SAT’s aggressive tax auditing practices in 2021. Various offices at the Secretariat of Economy and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs handle promoting Mexican outward investment and assistance to Mexican firms acquiring or establishing joint ventures with foreign firms. Mexico does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The National Commission on Regulatory Improvement (CONAMER), within the Secretariat of Economy, is the agency responsible for streamlining federal and sub-national regulation and reducing the regulatory burden on business. Mexican law requires secretariats and regulatory agencies to conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations and engage in notice and comment rule making, which CONAMER carries out. Impact assessments are made available for public comment via CONAMER’s website: https://www.gob.mx/conamer. The official gazette of state and federal laws currently in force in Mexico is publicly available via: http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/. Mexican law provides for a 20-day public consultation period for most proposed regulations. Any interested stakeholder can comment on draft regulations and the supporting justification, including regulatory impact assessments. Certain measures are not subject to a mandatory public consultation period. These include measures concerning taxation, responsibilities of public servants, the public prosecutor’s office executing its constitutional functions, and the Secretariats of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR). In 2021, there was a rise in rule making with waiver of full notice and public comment processes as President Lopez Obrador rushed regulations through “in the national interest.” Given SAT’s mandate to collect taxes and revenue from international trade, many of its regulations circumvent the notice and public comment process. In 2021, SAT proposed a new requirement for a “digital waybill complement” or “complemento de carta porte” for nearly all goods shipments within Mexican territory effective January 1, 2022. Mexican and U.S. private sector representatives called the digital document “onerous” as it requires 180 data points for shipments across all modalities—rail, truck, air, and maritime shipping—many of which are unknown at the onset of a shipment. Despite the domestic nature of the new requirement, U.S. companies raised concerns about the “carta porte” as a technical barrier to trade given the potential delays it could cause for shipments to and from ports of entry. The U.S. government has pushed for better SAT coordination with the private sector to address compliance challenges with the new requirement. This advocacy led to the postponement of “carta porte’s” entry into force to October 1, 2022 and public-private working groups to discuss implementation in the interim. The National Quality Infrastructure Program (PNIC) is the official document used to plan, inform, and coordinate standardization activities, both public and private. The PNIC is published annually by the Secretariat of Economy in Mexico’s Official Gazette. The PNIC describes Mexico’s plans for new voluntary standards (Normas Mexicanas; NMXs) and mandatory technical regulations (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas; NOMs) as well as proposed changes to existing standards and technical regulations. Interested stakeholders can request the creation, modification, or cancelation of NMXs and NOMs as well as participate in the working groups that develop and modify these standards and technical regulations. Mexico’s antitrust agency, the Federal Commission for Economic Competition (COFECE), plays a key role in protecting, promoting, and ensuring a competitive free market in Mexico as well as protecting consumers. COFECE is responsible for eliminating barriers both to competition and free market entry across the economy (except for the telecommunications sector, which is governed by its own competition authority) and for identifying and regulating access to essential production inputs. In September 2021, COFECE Commissioner President Alejandra Palacios stepped down following several months of public disagreements with President Lopez Obrador’s statist energy policy. Lopez Obrador has not named substitutions for COFECE’s Commissioners since November 2020, leaving the institution without a quorum for resolutions related to barriers to competition or the issuance of regulatory provisions. In addition to COFECE, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) and National Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH) are both technical-oriented independent agencies that play important roles in regulating the energy and hydrocarbons sectors. CRE regulates national electricity generation, coverage, distribution, and commercialization, as well as the transportation, distribution, and storage of oil, gas, and biofuels. CNH supervises and regulates oil and gas exploration and production and issues oil and gas upstream (exploration/production) concessions. In addition, the National Center for Energy Control (CENACE) is the independent electricity grid operator. Energy experts assert that these agencies, particularly CRE, are no longer fully independent as they have favored Pemex and CFE with regulations and permits over private participants. Mexico has seen a shift in the public procurement process since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Government entities are increasingly awarding contracts either as direct awards or by invitation-only procurements. In addition, there have been recent tenders that favor European standards over North American standards. Generally speaking, the Mexican government has established legal, regulatory, and accounting systems that are transparent and consistent with international norms. Still, Mexico’s current executive administration has eroded the autonomy and publicly questioned the value of specific antitrust and energy regulators and has proposed dissolving some of them to cut costs. Furthermore, corruption continues to affect equal enforcement of some regulations. The administration rolled out an ambitious plan to centralize government procurement in an effort to root out corruption and generate efficiencies. The administration estimated it could save up to USD 25 billion annually by consolidating government purchases in the Secretariat of Finance. Still, the expedited rollout and lack of planning for supply chain contingencies led to several sole-source purchases. The Mexican government’s budget is published online and readily available. The Bank of Mexico also publishes and maintains data about the country’s finances and debt obligations. Investors are increasingly concerned the administration is undermining confidence in the “rules of the game,” particularly in the energy sector, by weakening the political autonomy of COFECE, CNH, CENACE, and CRE. Still, COFECE has successfully challenged regulatory changes in the electricity sector that favor state-owned enterprises over private companies. The administration has appointed five of seven CRE commissioners over the Senate’s objections, which voted twice to reject the nominees in part due to concerns their appointments would erode the CRE’s autonomy. The administration’s budget cuts resulted in significant government layoffs, which has reportedly hampered agencies’ ability to carry out their work, a key factor in investment decisions. The independence of the CRE and CNH was further undermined by a memo from the government to both bodies instructing them to use their regulatory powers to favor state-owned Pemex and CFE. Investors expressed concern over the current executive administration setting a fee ceiling for AFORES, or private pensions management firms, starting in 2022 using a fast-tracked regulatory process with little industry consultation. Beginning with the Spanish conquest in the 1500s, Mexico had an inquisitorial criminal justice system adopted from Europe in which proceedings were largely carried out in writing and sealed from public view. Mexico amended its Constitution in 2008 to facilitate change to an oral accusatorial criminal justice system to better combat corruption, encourage transparency and efficiency, and ensure respect for the fundamental rights of both the victim and the accused. An ensuing National Code of Criminal Procedure passed in 2014 and is applicable to all 32 states. The national procedural code is coupled with each state’s criminal code to provide the legal framework for the new accusatorial system, which allows for oral, public trials with the right of the defendant to face his/her accuser and challenge evidence presented against him/her, right to counsel, due process, and other guarantees. Mexico fully adopted the new accusatorial criminal justice system at the state and federal levels in June 2016. Mexico’s Commercial Code, which dates to 1889, was most recently updated in 2014. All commercial activities must abide by this code and other applicable mercantile laws, including commercial contracts and commercial dispute settlement measures. Mexico has multiple specialized courts regarding fiscal, labor, economic competition, broadcasting, telecommunications, and agrarian law. The judicial branch and Prosecutor General’s office (FGR) are constitutionally independent from each other and the executive. The Prosecutor General is nominated by the president and approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate for a nine-year term, effectively de-coupling the Prosecutor General from the political cycle of elections every six years. With the historic 2019 labor reform, Mexico also created an independent labor court system run by the judicial branch (formerly this was an executive branch function). The labor courts are being brought online in a phased process by state with the final phase completed on May 1, 2022. Mexico’s Foreign Investment Law sets the rules governing foreign investment into the country. The National Commission for Foreign Investments, formed by several cabinet-level ministries including Interior (SEGOB), Foreign Relations (SRE), Finance (Hacienda), and Economy (SE) establishes the criteria for administering investment rules. Mexico has two constitutionally autonomous regulators to govern matters of competition – the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the Federal Commission for Economic Competition (COFECE). IFT governs broadcasting and telecommunications, while COFECE regulates all other sectors. For more information on competition issues in Mexico, please visit COFECE’s bilingual website at: www.cofece.mx. As mentioned above, Lopez Obrador has publicly questioned the value of COFECE and his party unsuccessfully introduced a proposal last year which would have dramatically reduced its resources and merged COFECE and other regulators into a less-independent structure. COFECE currently has the minimum quorum required of at least four commissioners in order to operate, out of a seven-members full board. However, COFECE lacks the required quorum of five commissioners in order to issue final resolutions determining competition barriers as well as anti-competitive practices. President Lopez Obrador has not appointed the remaining commissioners as required by law. USMCA (and NAFTA) contain clauses stating Mexico may neither directly nor indirectly expropriate property, except for public purpose and on a non-discriminatory basis. Expropriations are governed by international law and require rapid fair market value compensation, including accrued interest. Investors have the right to international arbitration. The USMCA contains an annex regarding U.S.-Mexico investment disputes and those related to covered government contracts. Mexico’s Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles) governs bankruptcy and insolvency. Congress approved modifications in 2014 to shorten procedural filing times and convey greater juridical certainty to all parties, including creditors. Declaring bankruptcy is legal in Mexico and it may be granted to a private citizen, a business, or an individual business partner. Debtors, creditors, or the Attorney General can file a bankruptcy claim. Mexico ranked 33 out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report (that last it produced). The average bankruptcy filing takes 1.8 years to be resolved and recovers 63.9 cents per USD, which compares favorably to average recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean of just 31.2 cents per USD. The “Buró de Crédito” is Mexico’s main credit bureau. More information on credit reports and ratings can be found at: http://www.burodecredito.com.mx/. 4. Industrial Policies Land grants or discounts, tax deductions, and technology, innovation, and workforce development funding are commonly used incentives. Additional federal foreign trade incentives include: (1) IMMEX: a promotion which allows manufacturing sector companies to temporarily import inputs without paying general import tax and value added tax (VAT); (2) Import tax rebates on goods incorporated into products destined for export; and (3) Sectoral promotion programs allowing for preferential ad-valorem tariffs on imports of selected inputs. Industries typically receiving sectoral promotion benefits are footwear, mining, chemicals, steel, textiles, apparel, and electronics. Manufacturing and other companies report it is becoming increasingly difficult to request and receive reimbursements from SAT of the VAT paid on inputs for the export sector, with significant reimbursement delays and arrears reaching tens of millions USD for some companies. The administration renewed until December 31, 2024 a program launched in January 2019 that established a border economic zone (BEZ) in 43 municipalities in six northern border states within 15.5 miles from the U.S. border. The BEZ program entails: 1) a fiscal stimulus decree reducing the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 16 percent to 8 percent and the Income Tax (ISR) from 30 percent to 20 percent; 2) a minimum wage increase to MXN 176.72 (USD 8.75) per day; and 3) the gradual harmonization of gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and electricity rates with neighboring U.S. states. The purpose of the BEZ program was to boost investment, promote productivity, and create more jobs in the region. Sectors excluded from the preferential ISR rate include financial institutions, the agricultural sector, and export manufacturing companies (maquilas). On December 30, 2020, President Lopez Obrador launched a similar program for 22 municipalities in Mexico’s southern states of Campeche, Tabasco, and Chiapas, reducing VAT from 16 to 8 percent and ISR from 30 to 20 percent and harmonizing excise taxes on fuel with neighboring states in Central America. Chetumal in Quintana Roo will also enjoy duty-free status. The benefits extend from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2024. Mexico does not follow a “forced localization” policy—foreign investors are not required by law to use domestic content in goods or technology. However, investors intending to produce goods in Mexico for export to the United States should take note of the rules of origin prescriptions contained within USMCA if they wish to benefit from USMCA treatment. Chapter four of the USMCA introduced new rules of origin and labor content rules, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. In 2020, the Central Bank of Mexico (or Banxico) and the National Banking and Securities Commissions (CNBV – Mexico’s principal bank regulator) drafted regulations mandating the largest financial technology companies operating in Mexico to either host data on a back-up server outside of the United States—if their primary is in the United States—or on physical servers in Mexico. As of March 2022, the draft regulations remain pending public comment. The financial services industry is concerned they could violate provisions of the USMCA financial services chapter prohibiting data localization. Mexico’s government is increasingly choosing its military for the construction and management of economic infrastructure. In the past two years, the government entrusted the Army (SEDENA) with building the new airport in Mexico City, and sections 6, 7, and part of section 5 of the Maya Train railway project in Yucatan state. SEDENA created a state-owned company to operate and manage the newly completed Mexico City airport. SEDENA is also issuing contracts for the construction of over 300 social development bank branches throughout Mexico. The government announced plans to give to the Navy (SEMAR) the rights for construction, management, and operations of the Trans-Isthmic Train project to connect the ports of Coatzacoalcos in Veracruz state with the Salina Cruz port in Oaxaca state. The government is in the process of transferring administration of land and sea ports from the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT) to SEDENA and SEMAR respectively and has appointed retired military personnel to port administrator positions at most ports. 5. Protection of Property Rights Mexico ranked 105 out of 190 countries for ease of registering property in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, falling two places from its 2019 report. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution guarantees the inviolable right to private property. Expropriation can only occur for public use and with due compensation. Mexico has four categories of land tenure: private ownership, communal tenure (ejido), publicly owned, and ineligible for sale or transfer. Mexico prohibits foreigners from acquiring title to residential real estate in so-called “restricted zones” within 50 kilometers (approximately 30 miles) of the nation’s coast and 100 kilometers (approximately 60 miles) of the borders. “Restricted zones” cover roughly 40 percent of Mexico’s territory. Foreigners may acquire the effective use of residential property in “restricted zones” through the establishment of an extendable trust (fideicomiso) arranged through a Mexican financial institution. Under this trust, the foreign investor obtains all property use rights, including the right to develop, sell, and transfer the property. Real estate investors should be careful in performing due diligence to ensure that there are no other claimants to the property being purchased. In some cases, fideicomiso arrangements have led to legal challenges. U.S.-issued title insurance is available in Mexico and U.S. title insurers operate here. Additionally, U.S. lending institutions have begun issuing mortgages to U.S. citizens purchasing real estate in Mexico. The Public Register for Business and Property (Registro Publico de la Propiedad y de Comercio) maintains publicly available information online regarding land ownership, liens, mortgages, restrictions, etc. Tenants and squatters are protected under Mexican law. Property owners who encounter problems with tenants or squatters are advised to seek professional legal advice, as the legal process of eviction is complex. Mexico has a nascent but growing financial securitization market for real estate and infrastructure investments, which investors can access via the purchase/sale of Fideicomisos de Infraestructura y Bienes Raíces (FIBRAs) and Certificates of Capital Development (CKDs) listed on Mexico’s BMV stock exchange. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in Mexico are covered by the Mexican Federal Law for Protection of Industrial Property (Ley Federal de Protección a la Propiedad Industrial) and the Federal Copyright Law (Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor). Responsibility for the protection of IPR is spread across several government authorities. The Prosecutor General’s Office (Fiscalia General de la Republica or FGR) oversees a specialized unit that prosecutes intellectual property (IP) crimes. The Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI), the equivalent to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, administers patent and trademark registrations, and handles administrative enforcement cases of IPR infringement. The National Institute of Copyright (INDAUTOR) handles copyright registrations and mediates certain types of copyright disputes, while the Federal Commission for the Prevention from Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) regulates pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and processed foods. The National Customs Agency of Mexico (ANAM) is responsible for ensuring illegal goods do not cross Mexico’s borders. The process for trademark registration in Mexico normally takes six to eight months. The registration process begins by filing an application with IMPI, which is published in IMPI’s Gazette for opposition by a third party. If no opposition is filed, IMPI undertakes a formalities examination, followed by a substantive examination to determine if the application and supporting documentation fulfills the requirements established by law and regulation to grant the trademark registration. Once the determination is made, IMPI then issues the registration. A trademark registration in Mexico is valid for 10 years from the date of registration and is renewable for 10-year periods. Any party with standing can challenge a trademark registration through a cancellation proceeding. IMPI employs the following administrative procedures: nullity, expiration or lapsing, opposition, cancellation, trademark, patent, and copyright infringement. Once IMPI issues a decision, the affected party may challenge it through an internal reconsideration process or go directly to the Specialized IP Court for a nullity trial. An aggrieved party can then file an appeal with a Federal Appeal Court based on the Specialized IP Court’s decision. In cases with an identifiable constitutional challenge, the plaintiff may file an appeal before the Supreme Court. To improve efficiency, in 2020 IMPI partnered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to launch the Parallel Patent Grant (PPG) initiative. Under this new work-sharing arrangement, IMPI will expedite the grant of a Mexican patent for businesses and individuals already granted a corresponding U.S. patent. This arrangement allows for the efficient reutilization of USPTO work by IMPI. The USPTO also has a Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) agreement with IMPI. Under the PPH, an applicant receiving a ruling from either IMPI or the USPTO that at least one claim in an application is patentable may request that the other office expedite examination of the corresponding application. The PPH leverages fast-track patent examination procedures already available in both offices to allow applicants in both countries to obtain corresponding patents faster and more efficiently. Mexico undertook significant legislative reform to comply with the USMCA. The Mexican Federal Law for Protection of Industrial Property (Ley Federal de Protección a la Propiedad Industrial) went into effect November 5, 2020. The decree issuing this law was published in the Official Gazette on July 1, 2020, in response to the USMCA and the CPTPP. This new law replaced the Mexican Industrial Property Law (Ley de la Propiedad Industrial), substantially strengthening IPR across a variety of disciplines. Mexico amended its Federal Copyright Law and its Federal Criminal Code to comply with the USMCA. The amendments went into effect July 2, 2020. These amendments should significantly strengthen copyright law in Mexico. Still, there are concerns that constitutional challenges filed against notice and takedown provisions as well as TPMs in the amendments may weaken these. provisions. Still, Mexico has widespread commercial-scale infringement that results in significant losses to Mexican, U.S., and other IPR owners. There are many issues that have made it difficult to improve IPR enforcement in Mexico, including legislative loopholes; lack of coordination between federal, state, and municipal authorities; a cumbersome and lengthy judicial process; relatively widespread acceptance of piracy and counterfeiting, and lack of resources dedicated to enforcement. In addition, the involvement of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), which control the piracy and counterfeiting markets in parts of Mexico and engage in trade-based money laundering by importing counterfeit goods, continue to impede federal government efforts to improve IPR enforcement. TCO involvement has further illustrated the link between IPR crimes and illicit trafficking of other contraband, including arms and drugs. Mexico remained on the Watch List in the 2021 Special 301 report published by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Obstacles to U.S. trade include the wide availability of pirated and counterfeit goods in both physical and virtual notorious markets. The 2021 USTR Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy listed these Mexican markets: Tepito in Mexico City, La Pulga Rio in Monterrey, and Mercado San Juan de Dios in Guadalajara. Mexico is a signatory to numerous international IP treaties, including the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Intellectual Property Rights Attaché for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean U.S. Trade Center Liverpool No. 31 Col. Juárez C.P. 06600 Mexico City Tel: (52) 55 5080 2189 National Institute of Copyright (INDAUTOR) Puebla No. 143 Col. Roma, Del. Cuauhtémoc 06700 México, D.F. Tel: (52) 55 3601 8270 Fax: (52) 55 3601 8214 Web: http://www.indautor.gob.mx/ Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) Periférico Sur No. 3106 Piso 9, Col. Jardines del Pedregal Mexico, D.F., C.P. 01900 Tel: (52 55) 56 24 04 01 / 04 (52 55) 53 34 07 00 Fax: (52 55) 56 24 04 06 Web: http://www.impi.gob.mx/ For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The Mexican government is generally open to foreign portfolio investments, and foreign investors trade actively in various public and private asset classes. Foreign entities may freely invest in federal government securities. The Foreign Investment Law establishes foreign investors may hold 100 percent of the capital stock of any Mexican corporation or partnership, except in those few areas expressly subject to limitations under that law. Foreign investors may also purchase non-voting shares through mutual funds, trusts, offshore funds, and American Depositary Receipts. They also have the right to buy directly limited or nonvoting shares as well as free subscription shares, or “B” shares, which carry voting rights. Foreigners may purchase an interest in “A” shares, which are normally reserved for Mexican citizens, through a neutral fund operated by one of Mexico’s six development banks. Finally, Mexico offers federal, state, and local governments bonds that are rated by international credit rating agencies. The market for these securities has expanded rapidly in past years and foreign investors hold a significant stake of total federal issuances. However, foreigners are limited in their ability to purchase sub-sovereign state and municipal debt. Liquidity across asset classes is relatively deep. Mexico established a fiscally transparent trust structure known as a FICAP in 2006 to allow venture and private equity funds to incorporate locally. The Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores) established the creation of three special investment vehicles which can provide more corporate and economic rights to shareholders than a normal corporation. These categories are: (1) Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima de Promotora de Inversion or SAPI); (2) Stock Exchange Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Promotora de Inversion Bursatil or SAPIB); and (3) Stock Exchange Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Bursatil or SAB). Mexico also has a growing real estate investment trust market, locally referred to as Fideicomisos de Infraestructura y Bienes Raíces (FIBRAS) as well as FIBRAS-E, which allow for investment in non-real estate investment projects. FIBRAS are regulated under Articles 187 and 188 of Mexican Federal Income Tax Law. Financial sector reforms signed into law in 2014 have improved regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries and have fostered greater competition between financial services providers. While access to financial services – particularly personal credit for formal sector workers – has expanded in the past four years, bank and credit penetration in Mexico remains low compared to OECD and emerging market peers. Coupled with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, reforms have created a positive environment for the financial sector and capital markets. According to the National Banking and Stock Commission (CNBV), the banking system remains healthy and well capitalized. Mexico’s banking sector is heavily concentrated and majority foreign-owned: the seven largest banks control 85 percent of system assets and foreign-owned institutions control 70 percent of total assets. The USMCA maintains national treatment guarantees. U.S. securities firms and investment funds, acting through local subsidiaries, have the right to engage in the full range of activities permitted in Mexico. Banxico maintains independence in operations and management by constitutional mandate. Its main function is to provide domestic currency to the Mexican economy and to safeguard the Mexican Peso’s purchasing power by gearing monetary policy toward meeting a 3 percent inflation target over the medium term. Mexico’s Financial Technology (FinTech) law came into effect in March 2018 and administration released secondary regulations in 2019, creating a broad rubric for the development and regulation of innovative financial technologies. The law covers both cryptocurrencies and a regulatory “sandbox” for start-ups to test the viability of products, placing Mexico among the FinTech policy vanguard. The reforms have already attracted significant investment to lending fintech companies and mobile payment companies. However, industry stakeholders suggest insufficient clarity in the authorities’ implementation of the secondary regulations may be eroding the legal certainty the FinTech Law brought to the sector. The CNBV has authorized fourteen fintechs under the FinTech Law to operate in the Mexican market and it is reviewing other applications. The Mexican Petroleum Fund for Stability and Development (FMP) was created as part of 2013 budgetary reforms. Housed in Banxico, the fund distributes oil revenues to the national budget and a long-term savings account. The FMP incorporates the Santiago Principles for transparency, placing it among the most transparent Sovereign Wealth Funds in the world. Both Banxico and Mexico’s Supreme Federal Auditor regularly audit the fund. Mexico is also a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Fund resources totaled MXN 23.4 billion (approximately USD 1.2 billion) in 2021. The FMP is required to publish quarterly and annual reports, which can be found at www.fmped.org.mx. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are two main SOEs in Mexico, both in the energy sector. Pemex operates the hydrocarbons (oil and gas) sector, which includes upstream, mid-stream, and downstream operations. Pemex historically contributed one-third of the Mexican government’s budget but falling output and global oil prices alongside improved revenue collection from other sources have diminished this amount over the past decade to about 8 percent. The Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) operates the electricity sector. While the GOM maintains state ownership, the 2013 constitutional reforms granted Pemex and CFE management and budget autonomy and greater flexibility to engage in private contracting. As a result of Mexico’s 2013 energy reform, the private sector is now able to compete with Pemex or enter into competitive contracts, joint ventures, profit sharing agreements, and license contracts with Pemex for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. Liberalization of the retail fuel sales market, which Mexico completed in 2017, created significant opportunities for foreign businesses. Given Pemex frequently raises debt in international markets, its financial statements are regularly audited. The Natural Resource Governance Institute considers Pemex to be the second most transparent state-owned oil company after Norway’s Equinor. Pemex’s ten-person Board of Directors contains five government ministers and five independent councilors. The administration has identified increasing Pemex’s oil, natural gas, and refined fuels production as its chief priority for Mexico’s hydrocarbon sector. Since taking office in 2018, the administration has taken numerous legal and regulatory steps to limit private competition for Pemex. Changes to the Mexican constitution in 2013 and 2014 opened power generation and commercial supply to the private sector, allowing companies to compete with CFE. Mexico held three long-term power auctions since the reforms, in which over 40 contracts were awarded for 7,451 megawatts of energy supply and clean energy certificates. CFE remains the sole provider of transmission and distribution services and owns all distribution assets. The 2013 energy reform separated CFE from the National Energy Control Center (CENACE), which controls the national wholesale electricity market and ensures non-discriminatory access to the grid for competitors, though recent actions call into question CENACE’s independence. Legal and regulatory changes adopted by the Mexican government attempt to modify the rules governing the electricity dispatch order to favor CFE. Dozens of private companies and non-governmental organizations have successfully sought injunctions against the measures, which they argue discriminate against private participants in the electricity sector. Independent power generators were authorized to operate in 1992 but were required to sell their output to CFE or use it to self-supply. Those legacy self-supply contracts have come under criticism with an electricity reform law and proposed constitutional amendment giving the government the ability to cancel contracts it deems fraudulent. Under the 2013 reform, private power generators may now install and manage interconnections with CFE’s existing state-owned distribution infrastructure. The 2013 reform also required the government to implement a National Program for the Sustainable Use of Energy as a transition strategy to encourage clean technology and fuel development and reduce pollutant emissions. The executive administration has identified increasing CFE-owned power generation as its top priority for the utility, breaking from the firm’s recent practice of contracting private firms to build, own, and operate generation facilities. CFE forced several foreign and domestic companies to renegotiate previously executed gas supply contracts, which raised significant concerns among investors about contract sanctity. One of the main non-market-based advantages CFE and Pemex receive vis-a-vis private businesses in Mexico is related to access to capital. In addition to receiving direct budget support from the Secretariat of Finance, both entities also receive implicit credit guarantees from the federal government. As such, both are able to borrow funds on public markets at below the market rate their corporate risk profiles would normally suggest. In addition to budgetary support, the CRE and SENER have delayed or halted necessary permits for new private sector gas stations, fuel terminals, fuel imports, and power plants, providing an additional non-market advantage to CFE and Pemex. Mexico’s 2014 energy reforms liberalized access to these sectors but did not privatize state-owned enterprises. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Mexico’s private and public sectors have worked to promote and develop corporate social responsibility (CSR) during the past decade. CSR in Mexico began as a philanthropic effort. It has evolved gradually to a more holistic approach, trying to match international standards such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Global Compact. Responsible business conduct reporting has made progress in the last few years with more companies developing a corporate responsibility strategy. The government has also made an effort to implement CSR in state-owned companies such as Pemex, which has published corporate responsibility reports since 1999. Recognizing the importance of CSR issues, the Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores) launched a sustainable companies index, which allows investors to specifically invest in those companies deemed to meet internationally accepted criteria for good corporate governance. In October 2017, Mexico became the 53rd member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which represents an important milestone in its Pemex effort to establish transparency and public trust in its energy sector. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Mexico published the National Strategy of Climate Change in 2013 with no further update since then and published the Special Program for Climate Change (PECC) in November 2021. Mexico presented its sixth climate change communications report to the UNFCCC in 2018 and submitted its National Determination Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC in December 2020. Mexico published its National Biodiversity Strategy in 2016. Mexico published the second extensive country study of Natural Capital in 2006. Mexico presented its Sixth National Report to the UN Convention on Biological Biodiversity in 2019. Mexico has not released an official net-zero carbon emissions policy or strategy. The PECC 2021 highlights include private sector climate change actions and fostering the inclusion of the private sector in the National Infrastructure Fund (Fonadin) to invest in sustainable infrastructure. In October 2019, the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) released an agreement to set the bases for a pilot program for a cap-and-trade emissions system for the energy and industry sectors. SEMARNAT hasn’t reported updates on this pilot program. The 2022 GOM budget allocated USD 3.84 billion for the Adaptation and Mitigation of the Effects of Climate Change and for the Promotion of the Use of Clean Technologies and Fuels. 9. Corruption Corruption exists in many forms in the GOM and society, including corruption in the public sector (e.g., demand for bribes or kickbacks by government officials) and private sector (e.g., fraud, falsifying claims, etc.), as well as conflict of interest issues, which are not well defined in the Mexican legal framework. Government and law enforcement officials are sometimes complicit with criminal elements, posing serious challenges for the rule of law. Some of the most common reports of official corruption involve government officials stealing from public coffers, creating fake companies to divert public funds, or demanding bribes in exchange for not prosecuting criminal activity or awarding public contracts. The current administration supported anti-corruption reforms (detailed below) and judicial proceedings in several high-profile corruption cases, including former governors. However, Mexican civil society asserts that the government must take more systematic, effective, and frequent action to address corruption at the institutional level. Mexico adopted a constitutional reform in 2014 to transform the current Office of the Attorney General into an Independent Prosecutor General’s office to increase its independence. President Lopez Obrador’s choice for Prosecutor General was confirmed by the Mexican Senate January 18, 2019. In 2015, Mexico passed a constitutional reform creating the National Anti-Corruption System (SNA) with an anti-corruption prosecutor and a citizens’ participation committee to oversee efforts. The system is designed to provide a comprehensive framework for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of corruption cases, including delineating acts of corruption considered criminal acts under the law. The legal framework establishes a basis for holding private actors and private firms legally liable for acts of corruption involving public officials and encourages private firms to develop internal codes of conduct. After seven years of operation, commentators attribute few successes to the SNA. The implementation status of the mandatory state-level anti-corruption legislation varies. The reform mandated a redesign of the Secretariat of Public Administration to give it additional auditing and investigative functions and capacities in combatting public sector corruption. Congress approved legislation to change economic institutions, assigning new responsibilities and in some instances creating new entities. Reforms to the federal government’s structure included the creation of a General Coordination of Development Programs to manage the federal-state coordinators (“superdelegates”) in charge of federal programs in each state. The law also created the Secretariat of Public Security and Citizen Protection, and significantly expanded the power of the president’s Legal Advisory Office (Consejería Jurídica) to name and remove each federal agency’s legal advisor and clear all executive branch legal reforms before their submission to Congress. The law eliminated financial units from ministries, with the exception of the Secretariat of Finance, SEDENA, and SEMAR, and transferred control of contracting offices in other ministries to the Hacienda. Separately, the law replaced the previous Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) with a Welfare Secretariat in charge of coordinating social policies, including those developed by other agencies such as health, education, and culture. The Labor Secretariat gained additional tools to foster collective bargaining, union democracy, and to meet International Labor Organization (ILO) obligations. Mexico ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and passed its implementing legislation in May 1999. The legislation includes provisions making it a criminal offense to bribe foreign officials. Mexico is also a party to the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Corruption and has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The government has enacted or proposed laws attacking corruption and bribery, with average penalties of five to 10 years in prison. Mexico is a member of the Open Government Partnership and enacted a Transparency and Access to Public Information Act in 2015, which revised the existing legal framework to expand national access to information. Transparency in public administration at the federal level improved noticeably but expanding access to information at the state and local level has been slow. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, Mexico ranked 124 of 180 nations. Civil society organizations focused on fighting corruption are high-profile at the federal level but are few in number and less powerful at the state and local levels. Business representatives, including from U.S. firms, believe public funds are often diverted to private companies and individuals due to corruption and perceive favoritism to be widespread among government procurement officials. The GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal states compliance with procurement regulations by state bodies in Mexico is unreliable and that corruption is extensive, despite laws covering conflicts of interest, competitive bidding, and company blacklisting procedures. The U.S. Embassy has engaged in a broad-based effort to work with Mexican agencies and civil society organizations in developing mechanisms to fight corruption and increase transparency and fair play in government procurement. Efforts with specific business impact include government procurement best practices training and technical assistance under the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s Global Procurement Initiative. Mexico ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2004. It ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999. Contact at government agency: Secretariat of Public Administration Miguel Laurent 235, Mexico City 52-55-2000-1060 Contact at “watchdog” organization: Transparencia Mexicana Dulce Olivia 73, Mexico City 52-55-5659-4714 Email: info@tm.org.mx 10. Political and Security Environment Mass demonstrations are common in the larger metropolitan areas and in the southern Mexican states of Guerrero and Oaxaca. While political violence is rare, drug and organized crime-related violence has increased significantly in recent years. Political violence is also likely to accelerate in the run-up to the June 2022 elections as criminal actors seek to promote election of their preferred candidates. The national homicide rate dropped to 27 homicides per 100,000 residents in 2021 from 29 homicides per 100,000 residents in 2020, although aggregate homicides remain near all-time highs. For complete security information, please see the Safety and Security section in the Consular Country Information page at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Mexico.html. Conditions vary widely by state. For a state-by-state assessment please see the Consular Travel Advisory at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html. Companies have reported general security concerns remain an issue for those looking to invest in the country. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico estimates in a biannual report that security expenses cost business as much as 5 percent of their operating budgets. Many companies choose to take extra precautions for the protection of their executives. They also report increasing security costs for shipments of goods. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) monitors and reports on regional security for U.S. businesses operating overseas. OSAC constituency is available to any U.S.-owned, not-for-profit organization, or any enterprise incorporated in the United States (parent company, not subsidiaries or divisions) doing business overseas ( https://www.osac.gov/Country/Mexico/Detail ). 11. Labor Policies and Practices Mexican labor law requires at least 90 percent of a company’s employees be Mexican nationals. Employers can hire foreign workers in specialized positions as long as foreigners do not exceed 10 percent of all workers in that specialized category. Mexico’s 56 percent rate of informality remains higher than countries with similar GDP per capita levels. High informality, defined as those working in unregistered firms or without social security protection, distorts labor market dynamics, contributes to persistent wage depression, drags overall productivity, and slows economic growth. In the formal economy, there exist large labor shortages due to a system that incentivizes informality. Manufacturing companies, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border and in the states of Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Querétaro, report labor shortages and an inability to retain staff due to wages sometimes being less that what can be earned in the informal economy, although the recent increases in the minimum wage are leading to increases in entry level wages which are attracting more workers. Shortages of skilled workers and engineers continue due to a mismatch between industry needs and what schools teach. Mexico has one of the lowest female labor participation rates in the OECD, 45 percent to a 76 percent male participation rate among people legally allowed to work (15 years or older). Barriers for female workers include the culturally assigned role for them as caretakers of children and the elderly. Most Mexican workers work for a micro business (41 percent) and 59 percent earn between USD 8.6 and USD 17 per day. The unemployment rate in Mexico has maintained a stable path ranging from 3.5 percent to 4.9 percent (its highest peak during the pandemic). This rate, however, masks the high level of underemployment (14.8 percent) in Mexico (those working part time or in the informal sector when they want full time, formal sector jobs). For 2020 the informal economy accounted for 22 percent of total Mexican GDP according to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography. Informal businesses span across all economic activities from agriculture to manufacturing. In Mexico labor informality also spans across all economic activities with formal businesses employing both formal and informal workers to reduce their labor costs. On May 1, 2019, Lopez Obrador signed into law a sweeping reform of Mexico’s labor law, implementing a constitutional change and focusing on the labor justice system. The reform replaces tripartite dispute resolution entities (Conciliation and Arbitration Boards) with independent judicial bodies and conciliation centers. In terms of labor dispute resolution mechanisms, the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs) previously adjudicated all individual and collective labor conflicts. Under the reform, collective bargaining agreements will now be adjudicated by federal labor conciliation centers and federal labor courts. Labor experts predict the labor reform will result in a greater level of labor action stemming from more inter-union and intra-union competition. The Secretariat of Labor, working closely with Mexico’s federal judiciary, as well as state governments and courts, created an ambitious state-by-state implementation agenda for the reforms, which started November 18, 2020, and will end during the second semester of 2022. On November 18, 2020 the first phase of the labor reform implementation began in eight states: Durango, State of Mexico, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Campeche, Chiapas, Tabasco, and Hidalgo. On November 3, 2021 the second phase started in 13 additional states, and the third phase will start during 2022 in 11 states. Further details on labor reform implementation can be found at: www.reformalaboral.stps.gob.mx . Mexico’s labor relations system has been widely criticized as skewed to represent the interests of employers and the government at the expense of workers. Mexico’s legal framework governing collective bargaining created the possibility of negotiation and registration of initial collective bargaining agreements without the support or knowledge of the covered workers. These agreements are commonly known as protection contracts and constitute a gap in practice with international labor standards regarding freedom of association. The percentage of the economy covered by collective bargaining agreements is between five and 10 percent, of which more than half are believed to be protection contracts. As of March 7, 2022, 3,267 collective bargaining contracts have been legitimized (reviewed and voted on by the workers covered by them), according to the Secretariat of Labor. The reform requires all collective bargaining agreements to be submitted to a free, fair, and secret vote every two years with the objective of getting existing protectionist contracts voted out. The increasingly permissive political and legal environment for independent unions is already changing the way established unions manage disputes with employers, prompting more authentic collective bargaining. As independent unions compete with corporatist unions to represent worker interests, workers are likely to be further emboldened in demanding higher wages. The USMCA’s labor chapter (Chapter 23) contains specific commitments on union democracy and labor justice which relate directly to Mexico’s 2019 labor reform and its implementation. In addition, the USMCA’s dispute settlement chapter (Chapter 31) includes a facility-specific labor rapid response mechanism to address labor rights issues and creates the ability to impose facility specific remedies to ensure remediation of such situations. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), government enforcement was reasonably effective in enforcing labor laws in large and medium-sized companies, especially in factories run by U.S. companies and in other industries under federal jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate in many small companies and in the agriculture and construction sectors, and it was nearly absent in the informal sector. Workers organizations have made numerous complaints of poor working conditions in maquiladoras and in the agricultural production industry. Low wages, poor labor conditions, long work hours, unjustified dismissals, lack of social security benefits and safety in the workplace, and lack of freedom of association were among the most common complaints. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 MXN 26,213 billion* 2021 USD 1,293 billion *https://www.inegi.org.mx/ https://www.imf.org/en/ Publications/WEO Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($billion USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 USD 184.9 billion IMF’s CDIS: https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609- F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId= 1482331048410 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 USD 20.9 billion BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 2.45%* 2020 2.7% *https://www.inegi.org.mx/ UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data* 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 545,612 100 % Total Outward 189,536 100 % United States 184,911 34 % United States 96,706 51 % Netherlands 112,657 21 % Spain 21,543 11 % Spain 88,430 16 % United Kingdom 17,163 9 % Canada 35,664 7 % Brazil 10,203 5 % United Kingdom 25,423 5 % Netherlands 8,908 5 % “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. * data from the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CCIS) ( https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 ) 14. Contact for More Information William Ayala AyalaWM@state.gov Economic Section U.S. Embassy in Mexico Paseo de la Reforma 305 Colonia Cuauhtemoc 06500 Mexico, CDMX Micronesia Executive Summary The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a lower middle income island nation of 104,832 in 2021, an eight percent population decline from 2019. The inhabitants live on 607 islands with a total land area of 271 square miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over one million square miles (2.6 million square km) in a remote area of the Western Pacific Ocean. The nation is composed of distinct, separate cultures and languages organized into four states under a weak national government. The FSM is part of the former U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, gaining independence in 1986. Since independence, the United States has provided over $100 million annually to the FSM under a Compact of Free Association (Compact or COFA) with the United States. FSM uses the funds for development under the administration of the U.S. Department of Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (DOI). The World Bank estimates FSM’s 2020 Gross Domestic Income (GDI) at $3,950 per person, a trend reflecting no growth over the previous 10 years. The national currency is the U.S. dollar. Commercial fishing remains the key economic sector in the FSM. The country’s primary sources of income are the sale of fishing rights ($70 million in FY2020), corporate income taxes, mainly from offshore corporate registrations for captive insurance ($10 million in FY 2020), and special revenue grants ($26 million in FY2020). The FSM continues largely as a subsistence economy, except in larger towns where the economy is centered on government employment and a small commercial sector. The cash economy is primarily fueled by government salaries paid by Compact funds (70 percent of employed adults work in the public sector) and, to a much lesser degree, by family remittances and Social Security benefits paid to FSM citizens who previously worked in the United States or who are the surviving spouse of an American citizen. Compact funding was anticipated to change in 2023 from direct funding in the form of sector grants, to the use by the FSM of proceeds derived from a trust fund developed from U.S. contributions over 20 years. (Note: The Compact of Free Association is under renegotiation as of June 2022 and it cannot be determined if the direct funding mechanism of sector grants will continue or end). As of September 2021, the balance of the Compact Fund stood at $1 billion. FSM has also created its own trust fund, contributing $17 million in FY2020, raising its overall balance to $307 million. (Note: audited balances for the FSM Trust Fund for FY2021 have not yet been published). The FSM GDP for 2018 was $402 million, a 19.5 percent increase from 2017 at constant prices. The economy recorded a trade deficit of $125 million in goods and services for the same year. FSM government debt at $83.2 million was low, giving FSM a low 23.7 debt/GDP ratio, one of the lowest in the Pacific. Major creditors are the Asian Development Bank (52.5 percent of debt) and the U.S. Rural Utility Services (20.7 percent of debt). Despite the low levels of debt in absolute terms, the International Monetary Fund deemed FSM to be at a high level of debt stress due to the uncertainty created by looming Compact Funding reductions in 2023 and the possible need to borrow to maintain operations of state governments. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is almost nonexistent due to prohibitions on foreign ownership of land and businesses (in specified industries), difficulties in registering companies (the process requires approvals from the state governments as well as the national government), poor private sector contract enforcement, poor protection of minority (foreign) investors’ rights, weak courts, and weak bankruptcy processes. In addition, lack of infrastructure, poor health and education systems, the scarcity of commercial flights, and high costs of imported goods and various business services also contribute to the lack of FDI. Pohnpei State’s Legislature amended its laws in September 2018 to reduce requirements on foreign investment. The law specified the business sectors that permit FDI, with the remaining sectors available for Pohnpei citizens only. Domestic capital formation is very low. Commercial banks are classified as foreign entities and their ability to provide commercial loans, especially secured by real estate, is very limited. Banks view all credit to FSM borrowers as essentially unsecured. Most national political power is delegated to the four states by the FSM Constitution, including regulation of foreign investment and restrictions on leases. Thus, investors must navigate nationwide between five different sets of regulations and licenses. U.S. citizens can live and work in the FSM indefinitely without visas under the Compact but cannot own property on most FSM islands. FSM voters select national legislators (senators). The national senators then caucus to select the president and vice-president from among the four at-large senators. There are no political parties. On May 11, 2019, Senators selected David Panuelo and Yosiwo George as president and vice president, respectively, for four-year terms. The most recent elections for Congress were held March 1, 2021. The FSM federal government closed its borders in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and did not allow any repatriations until May 2021. Since that time, it has repatriated citizens and essential workers intermittently via a single flight per month into the country. The shut-down has adversely affected the FSM’s tourism industry and the ability of the international community to implement infrastructure programs needed to support investment. Recently, flights have increased in frequency and quarantine has been reduced, with plans to fully reopen in August 2022. Only Yap State has undertaken any green energy initiatives with a single pilot wind project. It has also implemented several small-scale solar projects on outer islands. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 44 of 100(Regional) http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2012 $30 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,950 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are many structural impediments to increasing foreign investment in the FSM. The FSM has no department dedicated to promoting investment nor any ongoing dialogue with potential investors. These challenges, both regulatory and political, affect foreign investment and economic progress in general, and addressing them requires a constitutional and political will to change that is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Some political leaders at the state and national levels are owners of the largest businesses on the islands and strongly oppose the required structural changes that would result in increased competition. The FSM scores in the lowest quintile in almost all measures and international indices of economic activity and climate for doing business. In theory, the country’s courts support contractual agreements, but enforcement of judicial decisions is weak. Foreign firms doing business in the FSM have difficulty collecting debts owed by FSM governments, companies, and individuals, even after obtaining favorable judgments. For these reasons, the World Bank ranked the FSM very low in protecting minority investors (185th of 190 countries) and enforcing contracts (183rd of 190 countries). U.S. companies and individuals considering doing business with parties in the FSM should exercise due diligence and negotiate credit and payment arrangements that fully protect their interests. All four of the FSM states have limits on foreign ownership of small- and medium-sized businesses. Large projects are assessed by the respective state governments on a case-by-case basis. Each state requires a separate application for foreign investment permits. Foreign investment is strictly limited by local ownership requirements (51-60 percent minimum, depending on sector) and residency requirements of more than five years. Financing through bank loans is limited due to a weak financial sector. Local small- and medium-sized businesses are protected from foreign competition through legal restrictions. Larger projects in competition with a business sector already owned by public figures face strong political opposition. Politicians enthusiastically receive large and unrealistic development proposals, but do not move forward primarily due to land issues and traditional landowner disputes. The FSM does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. N/A FSM lacks a single window for online business registration or information portals providing comprehensive business registration information. The FSM Department of Resources and Development (R&D) maintains information on trade and investment on its website. However, all information is woefully out of date. Post understands obtaining licenses and permits in a timely manner may depend more on the relationship of the investor (or local legal counsel) with the official in charge, rather than any clear procedure or timeline. The World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report ranked the FSM as 158th of 190 countries globally in terms of procedures to register a business (Note: The World Bank is currently gathering data for its Business Enabling Environment Report that will replace the Ease of Doing Business Report). The FSM government does not promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. Given the small population and lack of capital formation, outward investment is negligible. 3. Legal Regime The FSM is not a signatory to any convention on transparency in international investment. Transparency of government actions is typically based more on personalities than on the law. Regulatory bodies sometimes involve themselves in issues beyond their jurisdiction. Conversely, other regulations are not uniformly enforced. It is often difficult to obtain public records, although some states and government organizations do require open meetings. While basic laws are accessible on the internet, text or summaries of proposed regulations are published before enactment but are not printed in an official journal or publication, and there is no appeal or administrative review process. In addition, government audits and statistical reports are not prepared promptly, and timely data are often unavailable (the most recent publications Using three or four year old data). The websites that provide the most relevant economic data on FSM are: National Public Auditor http://www.fsmopa.fm Department of Resources & Development http://www.fsmrd.fm FSM Statistics http://www.fsmstatistics.fm The FSM signed on to the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) in 2001 but did not ratify the agreement. PICTA is a free trade agreement on trade in goods among 14 members of the Pacific Islands Forum (excluding Australia and New Zealand). Eleven countries – Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu — have ratified PICTA. The FSM is not a member of any regional economic block, nor is it a member of the WTO. The FSM follows the U.S. common law system and uses U.S. case law as precedent. There are no specialized courts except for Land Courts in Pohnpei and Kosrae. All four states have State Courts and State Supreme Courts. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch, but is reported to be slow, weak, and lacking the ability to enforce judgments properly. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable. Appeals may be adjudicated in either the State or National courts. In September 2018, the Pohnpei State Legislature overrode the Governor’s veto of a bill on foreign investment regulations. The bill became state law over the objection of several local business leaders. The new law placed all decision-making power into the hands of one person, the Registrar of Corporations. FSM national and state governments use a “traffic light” system to regulate businesses, with red for prohibited, amber for restricted, and green for unrestricted. Industry classifications in this system vary from state to state. The individual states directly regulate all foreign investment, except in the areas of deep ocean fishing, banking, insurance, air travel, and international shipping, which are regulated at the federal level. Thus, a prospective investor who plans to operate in more than one state must obtain separate permits in each state, and often follow different regulations as well. The following are the regulations pertaining to restrictions by sector in each of the states: FSM National Red: Arms manufacture, minting of currency, nuclear power, radioactive goods. Amber: Increased scrutiny before approval for non-traditional banking services and insurance. Green: Banking, fishing, air transport, international shipping. Kosrae State Red: manufacture of toxic or biohazard materials, gambling, casinos, fishing using sodium/cyanide or compressed air. (Note: There is also currently a ban on all business transactions on Sundays in the capital town. End Note.) Amber: Real estate brokerage, non-ecology-based tourism, trade in reef fish, coral harvesting. Green: Eco-tourism, export of local goods, professional services. Pohnpei State Red: None presently defined, determined by board from among amber candidates. Amber: Everything not classified as green. Green: Businesses with greater than 60 percent FSM ownership, initial capitalization of $250,000 or more, professional services with capitalization of $50,000 or more, and Special Investment Sector businesses with 51 percent FSM ownership in retail, trade, exploration, development, and extraction of land or marine based mineral resources or timber. Chuuk State Red: Determined by the Director, none codified in law. Amber: Casinos, lotteries, and industries that pollute the environment, destroy local culture and tradition, or deplete natural resources. Green: Eco-tourism, professional services, intra-state airline services, exports of local goods. Yap State Red: Manufacture of toxic materials, weapons, ammunition, commercial export of reef fish, activities injurious to the health and welfare of the citizens of Yap. Amber: None at present. Green: All others. There is no law or agency governing competition in the FSM nor does the government require environmental, social, or governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high-and-low quality investments. The FSM Foreign Investment Act of 1997 guarantees no compulsory acquisition or expropriation of property of any foreign investment for which a Foreign Investment Permit is issued, except for violation of laws and regulations and in certain extraordinary circumstances. Those extraordinary circumstances include cases in which such action would be consistent with existing FSM eminent domain law, when such action is necessary to serve overriding national interests, or when either the FSM Congress or the FSM Secretary of Resources and Development has initiated expropriation. There has been no history of expropriation involving foreign investors or U.S. companies. A bankruptcy law has been in existence since 2005, but was used only three times, generally to avoid taxes. 4. Industrial Policies There are currently no government programs or incentives to attract foreign investment. There is no government agency tasked with developing an industrial strategy; however, the FSM government has made recommendations for growth in several sectors, most notably tourism, fishing, and aquaculture, without substantive measures to realize those goals. The telecommunications sector was opened to meet World Bank conditions for broadband development. However, rivalries between the state-owned telecom operator and the state-owned infrastructure operator have held back the development of broadband infrastructure to meet the needs of both businesses and consumers. The largest state-owned enterprise, Vital Energy, the parent of FSM Petroleum Corporation (FSMPC), built its first solar power plant in Guam in 2013 and plans to expand its renewable energy capacity into FSM in the future. Politicians have called for expansion of the tourism sector, but have created no tax, licensing, or leasing incentives to encourage investment. Although there is considerable potential for growth in the tourism sector, the remoteness of the FSM, land ownership prohibitions, business ownership restrictions, and the current lack of hotel facilities and tourism services mean growth in the tourism sector is unlikely to meet local expectations. Data prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic show that growth fell in the areas of scuba diving, boating, and fishing. The March 2020 FSM border closure brought the sector to a standstill, where it currently remains due to onerous quarantine restrictions. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the significant archaeological site of Nan Madol as a World Heritage Site in 2016 and has been working toward designating other sites in Yap, Kosrae, and Chuuk. Other efforts, including those by the U.S. Embassy and National Geographic Society, are underway to highlight the considerable cultural heritage extant in the FSM. The government currently does not offer incentives for green energy investments. There are no Foreign Trade Zones, Free Trade Zones, Special Economic Zones, or Free Ports in the FSM. The FSM government mandates local employment when qualified individuals are available. U.S. citizens may reside in and work in the FSM indefinitely. Citizens of other countries must apply for the appropriate permits. (Note: The Philippine government in 2017 imposed restrictions on the entry of new Filipino workers into the FSM under the Philippines Overseas Worker Program. Filipinos make up the vast majority of foreign workers in the FSM). There are no defined performance requirements for investments. 5. Protection of Property Rights The most important impediments to foreign direct investment (FDI) are derived from land and contract issues. Foreign ownership of land is prohibited; most land is owned and passed on within the clan structure, leading to conflicting title claims, the need to negotiate leases with multiple parties, and the possibility of changes when the original senior lessor dies. Dual citizenship is illegal, so Micronesian citizens born in the United States are unable to inherit or own property unless they renounce their U.S. citizenship. There is no system for land title insurance in any of the country’s four states. The combination of these factors ranked the FSM at 187th out of 190 countries globally in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report’s assessment of registering property. Although foreign nationals, including corporations, cannot own real property, they can own buildings or other structures and lease the land beneath on a long-term basis. Intellectual property rights (IPR) in the FSM are nominally protected and the country is a member state of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The country is not listed in the USTR Special 301 Report, nor is it listed in the Notorious Market Report. The Embassy has not received complaints from U.S. firms regarding IPR issues, and the only U.S. corporations currently operating in FSM are United Airlines and Matson Shipping. The only three U.S. chains present (Ace Hardware, True Value Hardware, and NAPA auto parts) are 100 percent locally owned franchises. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There are no stock or commodities exchanges in the FSM. The two commercial banks operating in the country, the Bank of Guam and the Bank of the FSM, can only make small, short-term unsecured loans because of the prohibition of using land or businesses as collateral, difficulties inherent in collecting debts, and the inability to identify collateral that can be attached and sold in the event of default. There are no credit reporting agencies. The Bank of the FSM is prohibited by its charter from investing in any securities not insured by the U.S. government, so the bulk of its holdings are in U.S. Treasury bonds. The Bank of Guam operates as a deposit collector and transactions facilitator in the FSM, with most of its loans made in Guam. The Bank of the FSM is protected from takeover by a trigger from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that will cancel its insurance status if foreign ownership exceeds 30 percent. Foreigners are not allowed to open accounts with the bank unless they provide proof of local residence and work permits and fulfill U.S. Treasury “know thy customer” requirements. Money exchange companies such as Western Union operate within FSM and handle the majority of remittances. Since most businesses are family owned, there are no shares that can be acquired for mergers, acquisitions, or hostile takeovers. The FSM enacted a secured transaction law in 2005 and established a filing office in October 2006 primarily to serve the foreign corporate registration market. The FSM has no sovereign wealth fund, but the government established a national trust fund modeled on the Compact Trust Fund to provide additional government income after 2023. That fund is managed by a U.S.-based commercial fund manager. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The FSM has established state monopolies and maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the areas of fuel distribution, telecommunications, and copra production. These companies are Vital Energy (the parent of FSM Petroleum Corporation, FSMPC), the FSM Telecommunications Corporation, the FSM Telecommunications Cable Corporation, and the FSM Coconut Development Authority, which was folded into Vital Energy in 2014. Legislation passed in 2016 opened the telecom market to private companies to qualify for World Bank funding for broadband development, including a submarine fiber optic cable to Yap and Palau. Other prominent SOEs include the National Fisheries Corporation, the FSM Development Bank, the College of Micronesia, and Caroline Islands Air, Inc. FSM does not currently adhere to the convention on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. There is currently no privatization program in the FSM. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is little awareness or definition of responsible business conduct (RBC) in the FSM. However, most local businesses are small and generally responsive to the community in which they operate. The two U.S.-based companies in the FSM generally follow RBC principles. The host government does not promote RBC or factor it into evaluations for public contracts, nor does the country adhere to the convention on OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The FSM Climate Change Policy Assessment (CCPA) takes stock of the Federated States of Micronesia’s climate response plans, from the perspective of their macroeconomic and fiscal implications. CCPA explores the possible impact of climate change and natural disasters and the cost of FSM’s planned response. It suggests macroeconomically relevant reforms that could strengthen the national strategy and identifies policy gaps and resource needs. FSM has made progress toward its Nationally Determined Contribution mitigation pledge by beginning to expand renewable power generation and improve its efficiency. The authorities plan to continue this and encourage the take-up of energy efficient building design and appliances. Accelerating adaptation investments is paramount, which requires addressing critical capacity constraints and increasing grant financing. It is recommended that FSM needs to increase its capacity to address natural disaster risks following the expiry of Compact-related assistance in 2023. It is advised to improve climate data collection and use, including on the costs of high and low intensity disasters and disaster response expenditure. The FSM government has not introduced any policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 as the FSM is a negligible contributor to global emissions. Hence, there are no regulatory incentives that target mitigation. Public procurement policies are focused on adaptation and climate resilience, namely reducing and responding to climate-induced natural disasters. Sea level rise and increased salinity in ground water has already begun to affect agricultural production on the country’s more remote outer islands. Accelerating adaptation investments is paramount, which requires addressing critical capacity constraints and increasing grant financing. FSM’s overall planning for adaptation is fragmented and individual sectoral projects include varying levels of adaptation measures. Progress has been hindered by capacity constraints, particularly in investment project execution at the state level. However, FSM has a financing gap of $400–500 million over the next 15 years between its ambitious climate change investment plans and currently available grant funding. 9. Corruption The FSM has laws prohibiting corruption and there are penalties for corrupt acts. The National Office of the Public Auditor, with support from the Department of Justice, is the entity most active in anti-corruption activities. Several senior ex-FSM Government officials were convicted of corruption under the FSM Financial Management Act, usually involving procurement fraud. An FSM government transportation official pled guilty April 3, 2019, in U.S. District Court to conspiring to launder bribe money he accepted from a U.S.-citizen president of a Honolulu civil engineering company. The official was then-FSM President Christian’s son-in-law who served 18 months in prison in the United States and was subsequently deported back to the FSM in 2021. Corruption is not a predicate offense under the money laundering statute. Bribery is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years in addition to disqualification from holding any government position. Traditional custom permits a lawbreaker to ask and receive forgiveness by paying a fine to those victimized. Given many FSM national, state, and municipal government officials also own businesses, there exists significant potential for conflicts of interest. The degree to which government officials accept direct bribes is unknown but believed to be commonplace, especially deriving from state actors. Pohnpei State and Yap State are currently prosecuting corruption cases. The Yap State governor and lieutenant governor reported receiving cash envelopes in inauguration presents which they promptly handed to Yap State’s Acting Attorney General who conducted an investigation. The FSM has not signed or ratified the UN Convention on Corruption or the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The FSM has no government agency specifically assigned with responsibility for combatting corruption. State prosecutors are the usual avenue for prosecuting corruption, with several cases brought to trial in the last few years, especially in Pohnpei State. The Public Auditor highlighted irregularities but relies on government prosecutors for enforcement capability. The Department of Justice in prior years prosecuted cases, but activity in this area recently has been varied; Pohnpei State and Yap State have been more active. The principal contact for these types of cases is: Joses Gallen Attorney General, FSM Department of Justice Palikir, Pohnpei +691-320-2608 jrg.fsm@gmail.com There are no non-governmental “watchdog” organizations in the FSM that monitor corruption. 10. Political and Security Environment FSM enjoys a stable, democratic form of government with no history of civil or political strife. The islands became part of a UN Trust Territory under U.S. administration following World War II, after periods of Spanish, German, and Japanese control. In 1979, the islands adopted a constitution, formally becoming the Federated States of Micronesia. Independence came in 1986 under a Compact of Free Association with the United States that was amended and renewed in 2004 and portions related to financial assistance currently are being renegotiated. Under this agreement, the U.S. Government guarantees the FSM’s external security. The country’s last presidential election was held in March 2019, in which incumbent Peter Christian lost his bid for a second term to current President David W. Panuelo. The population’s main concerns during the campaign season were related to the high unemployment rate, depletion of marine resources from overfishing, corruption, and a reliance on foreign aid. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Wages in FSM are low with minimum wage laws for government employees in all states and the federal government. Only Pohnpei has a minimum wage for the private sector at $1.75 per hour. However, employers report that they cannot hire employees for less than $3.00 per hour. Employment in the public sector is preferred because the wages are significantly higher. The minimum hourly wage for employment with the national government was $2.65. The minimum hourly wage for government workers in the individual states was: Pohnpei $2.00, Chuuk $1.25, Kosrae $1.42 and Yap $1.60. The FSM’s minimum wage was last adjusted January 1, 2015. There are no laws regulating hours of work (although a 40-hour work week is standard practice, with 32 hours standard in Kosrae State), nor are there enforceable standards of occupational safety and health. While there was one federal regulation that required that employers provide a safe workplace, neither the Department of Health nor the Environmental Protection Agency has enforcement capability, resulting in varying working conditions. There is no law for either the public or private sector that permits workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their continued employment. Skilled labor in FSM is limited, with few FSM citizens trained to perform tasks of any technical nature. Foreign workers, primarily Filipinos, are typically hired to fill roles requiring technical skills. In September 2018, after having banned all Filipino workers from working in the FSM in mid-2018, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs revised its deployment ban on Philippine labor coming to the FSM to ban only new recruits, exempting the 2,000 Filipino workers already in country. Philippine overseas foreign workers were FSM’s main source for educated and skilled labor but, with the ban in place, this pool can no longer be replenished. A labor dispute at a privately run hospital in Pohnpei led to the dismissal or resignation of several doctors and surgeons, all from the Philippines. As a result, service hours were cut and capacities are in doubt. The hospital is one of the embassy’s preferred medical providers, as the island’s only other hospital did not meet hygienic standards, although the medical care itself was generally adequate for non-specialized treatment. Likewise, wage disputes in Yap state resulted in the mass resignation of 40 doctors and nurses from the Yap State Hospital, triggering a state of emergency and frantic search for replacement medical personnel. Most doctors, nurses, accountants, lawyers, engineers, construction foremen, and heavy equipment operators are overseas workers from the Philippines. The FSM has no collective bargaining or strikes. Unemployment is high, and workers are easily replaced. There is no child labor, except in small family businesses. Occupational safety and health standards are low. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $3,950 www.worldbank.org/en/country www.fsmstatistics.fm Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1.0 2012 $30.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ www.FSMstatistics.fm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A $1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises- comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at: https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Frank Talluto Economic/Consular Officer 1286 U.S. Embassy Place, Kolonia, Pohnpei 96941 +691 320-2187 TallutoFP@state.gov Moldova Executive Summary Under the new pro-reform government, Moldova is making progress on economic reforms and strengthening democratic institutions. The pro-reform message voters sent when they chose Maia Sandu as Moldova’s first female President in November 2020 was solidified when the pro-Western, anti-corruption Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) won snap parliamentary elections in July 2021. The government enjoys wide support among the business community. In December 2021, the government secured a 40-month, $560 million governance-focused program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government also unlocked new EU MicroFinancial assistance and secured an Economic Recovery and Resilience plan of up to $660 million for 2021 – 2024 to help Moldova meet its development priorities. In 2021, Moldova’s economy grew by a record 13.9%, following an almost 8% contraction in 2020. Unemployment decreased, outmigration slowed, and consumer confidence grew. However, there are major concerns facing Moldova’s investment climate in 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had an immediate and significant negative impact on Moldova’s economy. Almost 20% of Moldova’s goods were imported from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus before the war; with those supply routes now frozen, Moldovans have had to substitute goods from the EU at significantly higher costs. Moldova relied on the port in Odesa and Ukraine’s railway system for much of its trade and now must pay significantly higher transport fees for goods to be trucked in from Romania via the land border. Experts predict GDP will grow by at most 0.3% in 2022. The government is committed to strengthening Moldova’s investment and business climate to attract foreign investment, which will help mitigate the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, energy crisis, and disruptions to Moldovan economy because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The government continues to deal with the fallout from the massive bank fraud in 2014, when more than a billion dollars was stolen from Moldova’s state coffers. Efforts are being taken to implement reforms, investigate and prosecute those responsible, and tackle the pervasive corruption that continues to undermine public trust and slow economic development. Moldova ranks 105 out of 180 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Moldova has adopted modern commercial legislation in accordance with WTO rules following negotiations linked to Moldova’s WTO accession. The main challenges to the business climate remain the lack of effective and equitable implementation of laws and regulations, and arbitrary, non-transparent decisions by government officials to give domestic producers an edge over foreign competitors in certain areas. For example, an environmental tax is applied on bottles and other packaging of imported goods, but not levied on bottles and packaging produced in Moldova. Additionally, the government may liberally cite public security or general social welfare as reasons to intervene in the economy in contravention of its declared respect for market principles. There are reports of problems with customs valuation of goods, specifically that the Customs Service has been applying the maximum possible values to imported goods, even if their actual purchase value was far lower. In June 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), committing the government to a course of reforms to bring its governmental, regulatory, and business practices in line with EU standards. In March 2022, in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the government formally applied for EU membership. The DCFTA has helped integrate Moldova further into the European common market and created more opportunities for investment in Moldova as a bridge between Western and Eastern European markets. Moldova now exports over 80 percent of its goods to European, North American, and other non-Russian markets. U.S. assistance, particularly in the agricultural, wine, information technology, and other key sectors, has been critical in promoting a competitive Moldova that is well-integrated into Western markets. While some large foreign companies have taken advantage of tax breaks in the country’s free economic zones, foreign direct investment (FDI) remains low. Finance, automotive, light industry, agriculture, food processing, IT, wine, and real estate have historically attracted foreign investment. Largely through USAID programs, Embassy Chisinau has supported the development of a number of these emerging sectors, yet risks remain. The National Strategy for Investment Attraction and Export Promotion 2016-2020 identified seven priority sectors for investment and export promotion: agriculture and food processing, automotive, business services such as business process outsourcing (BPO), clothing and footwear, electronics, information and communication technologies (ICT), and machinery. Private investors, including several U.S. companies, have shown strong interest in the ICT sector, especially after Moldova established a preferential tax regime for the sector. Improvements in the strength and transparency of the financial sector also helped attract interest. Many U.S. businesses have explored opportunities in the agricultural and energy sectors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 64 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,560 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment One of the poorest countries in Europe, Moldova relies heavily on foreign trade and remittances from abroad for its economic growth. Under Moldovan law, foreign companies enjoy national treatment in most respects. The government views FDI as vital for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. In 2021, a lack of qualified labor and the continued emigration of qualified, working-age Moldovans undermined official efforts to attract foreign investment. Moldova ratified its Association Agreement with the EU in 2016, with the intent of bringing closer political association and economic integration with the EU. The DCFTA, a component of the Association Agreement, provides for mutual elimination of customs duties on industrial and most agricultural products and for further liberalization of the services market. It also addresses other barriers to trade and reforms in economic governance, with the goal of strengthening transparency and competition and adopting EU product standards. Given its small economy, Moldova has relied on a liberalized trade and investment strategy to increase the export of its goods and services to the EU. A member of the WTO since 2001, Moldova has signed bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, including: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Free Trade Agreement Central European Free Trade Agreement EU DCFTA Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Rebublic of Moldova After Moldova signed the Association Agreement and DCFTA in 2014, Russia sought to pressure Chisinau through a series of politically motivated trade bans on Moldova’s exports of fruit, canned products, and fresh and processed meat. These embargos drove Moldova to expand and diversify its exports outside Russia and the former Soviet Union. The EU has now become the country’s largest export destination, absorbing more than 60% of all Moldovan exports. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 negatively impacted Moldova’s traditional trading partners and routes. Moldova seeks increased cooperation with the EU to eliminate import quotas on certain Moldovan goods to compensate for lost trade with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Trade with Europe is likely to increase. In addition to priority sectors, the government has identified in its national development strategy “Moldova 2020” seven priority public sector areas for development and reform: education; access to financing; road infrastructure; business regulation; energy efficiency; justice system; and social insurance. The government has made a formal commitment to accelerate the country’s development by making the economy more capital-intensive, sustainable, and knowledge-based. The government published an overall Action Plan for 2020-2021 and committed to implement outstanding AA/DCFTA requirements. The government has started work on the new National Action Plan. There are no formal limits on foreign control of property and land, with the significant exception that foreigners are expressly prohibited from owning agricultural or forest land, even via a locally domiciled corporation or business. Foreigners may become owners of such land only through inheritance and may only transfer the land to Moldovan citizens. However, foreigners are permitted to buy all other forms of property in Moldova, including land plots under privatized enterprises and land designated for construction. In 2006, Parliament further restricted the right of sale and purchase of agricultural land to the state, Moldovan citizens, and legal entities without foreign capital. There are reportedly Moldova-registered companies with foreign capital known to own agricultural land through loopholes in the previous law. The only straightforward option available to foreigners who wish to use agricultural land in Moldova is to lease the land. Under Moldovan law, foreign companies enjoy national treatment in most respects. The Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship prohibits discrimination against investments based on citizenship, domicile, residence, place of registration, place of activity, state of origin, or any other grounds. The law provides for equitable conditions for all investors and rules out discriminatory measures hindering management, operation, maintenance, utilization, acquisition, extension, or disposal of investments. The law mandates equitable treatment for local companies and foreigners regarding licensing, approval, and procurement. Companies registered in questionable tax havens are technically prohibited from holding shares in commercial banks. In November 2021, Moldova passed a law establishing a formal screening mechanism for strategic investments. The government has not yet drafted implementing regulations, thus the law has not come into effect. The law outlines a range of industries and assets critical to state security, including energy, transport, strategic infrastructure, electronic communications, mass media, elections, information technologies, high-end technologies, cryptography, defense, radioactive materials, cybersecurity, airspace, hydrometeorology, geophysics, and handling of personal data and state secrets. Any (yet to be defined) strategic investment requires prior approval from a governmental council chaired by the Prime Minister. The law restricts investment opportunities for investors from offshore zones, those convicted of certain crimes, involved in money laundering and financing of terrorism, or known to have links to foreign authorities that pose a risk to national security. The law has not yet come into effect because government has not yet drafted implementing regulations or determined the composition and functions of the governmental council or the timeline for investment reviews. By statute, special forms of legal organizations and certain activities require a minimum of capital to be invested (e.g., MDL 20,000 (USD 1,125) for joint stock companies, MDL 15 million (USD 844,000) for insurance companies, and MDL 100 million (USD 5.6 million) for banks). The latest Investment Policy Review of Moldova was conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as part of a broader South-East Europe Review in 2017 and can be accessed at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d6_en.pdf Moldova underwent a trade policy review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2015: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp423_e.htm All major business associations usually publish position papers and policy recommendations. These documents can be found on the respective websites: American Chamber of Commerce in Moldova www.amcham.md , European Business Association www.eba.md and Foreign Investors Association www.fia.md . Moldova has an investment promotion agency to assist prospective investors with information about business registration or industrial sectors, facilitate contact with relevant authorities, and organize study visits. The Investment Agency has an investment guide available on its website: invest.gov.md . The government has established a special council to promote investment projects of national importance and tackle bureaucratic impediments to larger investment. It has also taken steps over the years to simplify and streamline business registration and licensing, lower tax rates, strengthen tax administration, and increase transparency. The Public Services Agency, created in 2017, oversees business registrations. By law, registration should take three days for a standard procedure or four hours for an expedited procedure and is done in two stages. The first stage involves submission of an application and a set of documents, the range of which may vary depending on the legal form of the business (LLC, joint-stock company, sole proprietorship, etc.). At the second stage, the Agency issues a registration certificate and a unique identification number for the business, conferring full legal capacity to the entity. In 2010, the government introduced the “one-stop-shop” principle, under which businesses are relieved of the requirement to register separately with fiscal, statistical, social security, or health insurance authorities. There are currently no procedures for online business registration. Certain types of activity listed in the law on licensing require businesses to be first licensed by public authorities. In 2006, the Moldovan Parliament ratified the 1961 Hague Convention on Abolishing the Requirement for Legalization for Foreign Public Documents. Acceptance of U.S. apostilles applied on official documents simplifies the legalization of official documents issued in the United States that are required in the process of business registration. Moldova does not have an official policy or mechanism for promoting or incentivizing outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Laws and regulations are published in the official gazette called Monitorul Oficial, while a database of laws and regulations is available online at http://www.legis.md . The Moldovan government generally publishes significant laws in draft form for public comment. Draft laws are also available online, on the website of the Moldovan Parliament. Consultations with business and trade associations provide other opportunities for comment. A significant exception to these consultations is a mechanism that allows Parliament to also propose draft laws. The Prime Minister chairs an Economic Council, which liaises with the Moldovan business community to discuss government proposals and gather ideas to improve Moldova’s economy, especially in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The Foreign Investors Association (FIA) was established in 2004 with the support of the OECD. FIA engages in a dialogue with the government on topics related to the investment climate and produces an annual publication of concerns and recommendations to improve the investment climate. In 2006, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) registered in Moldova, presenting another voice for the business community. In 2011, a group of ten large EU investors founded the European Business Association (EBA). These are the three largest foreign business associations, and they regularly engage in policy discussions with the government. All regulations and governmental decisions related to business activity have been published in a special business registry, “Register of Regulations on Business Activity,” to raise the awareness of businesspeople about their rights, increase the transparency of business regulations, and help fight corruption. The government has an approved list of business permits and authorizations. Government agencies and inspectors cannot issue any form of documents not included in the list. The working group of the State Commission for Regulation of Entrepreneurial Activity, which was established as a filter to eliminate excessive business regulations, meets to vet draft governmental regulations dealing with entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, bureaucratic procedures are not always transparent, and red tape often makes processing registrations, ownership, and other procedures unnecessarily long, costly, and burdensome. Discretionary decisions by government officials provide room for abuse and corruption. While the government adopted laws to improve the business climate and reduce excessive state controls and regulation, effective implementation is insufficient. This inconsistent application of laws and regulations undermines fair competition and adds uncertainty particularly for small- and medium-sized businesses as well as new entrants. Moldova committed to implementing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2008. Use of IFRS is required by law for all public interest entities (financial entities, investment funds, insurance companies, private pension funds, and publicly listed entities) and national accounting standards (which approximate IFRS in many ways) are used by other firms, although many use IFRS as well due to foreign ownership. Moldova has a “one stop window” which provides clear and uniform rules for the release of information and standardized documents for business registration. Moldova launched a Trade Information Portal for the domestic and international traders. The new portal is available at www.trade.gov.md . It is the main source of official specialized information on related procedures and documents required for the import, export, and transit of goods. The Customs Service of Moldova also operates a call center to provide online support and guide economic agents through Moldova’s import/export procedures. A law simplifying the system of inspectorates and various inspection bodies was adopted in 2017 to increase efficiency and reduce regulatory burden. Through the reformation of inspection bodies, the government reorganized the state inspection agencies for better planning and monitoring of inspectors’ activity. By reducing the number of inspection agencies and introducing risk-based criteria for inspections, the government sought to improve the business climate by reducing the opportunity for inspections to be used for political purposes. The government does not have specific policies promoting companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure. The EU Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), has binding regulatory provisions committing Moldova to a reform agenda and to approximating domestic legislation to EU standards in a range of areas, including corporate law, labor, consumer protection, competition and market surveillance, general product safety, tax, energy, customs duties, public procurement, intellectual property rights, and others. Under the DCFTA, Moldova will gradually abolish duties and quotas in mutual trade in goods and services. It will also eliminate non-tariff barriers by adopting EU rules on health and safety standards, intellectual property rights, and other fields. The agreement contains a timeframe for implementation, with phase-ins up to ten years. Moldova has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001 and, as such, is a signatory to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These agreements contain major investment-related commitments, such as opening to the establishment of foreign service providers, prohibiting local content, trade-balancing, domestic sales requirements (TRIMs), and protection of intellectual property (TRIPS). No major WTO TRIMs inconsistencies have been reported. As a WTO member, Moldova must notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In 2016, Moldova ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and adopted several measures to conform to WTO requirements. The government has undertaken incremental steps since 2017 to draft a new Customs Code, which merges existing separate laws on customs procedures and goods crossing national borders and approximate national customs rules to the EU Customs Code. In 2017, the government changed customs rules to align with the EU Authorized Economic Operator requirements and Approved Exporter conditions. Moldova’s commercial litigation rules comply with WTO requirements. The main challenges to the business climate remain the lack of effective and equitable implementation of laws and regulations, and arbitrary, non-transparent decisions by government officials to give domestic producers an edge over foreign competitors in certain areas. For example, an environmental tax is applied on bottles and other packaging of imported goods, but not levied on bottles and packaging produced in Moldova. There are reports of problems with customs valuation of goods, specifically that the Customs Service has been applying the maximum possible values to imported goods, even if their actual purchase value was far lower. This has increased customs revenues but disadvantaged importers. Moldova has a civil law legal system with codified laws that govern different aspects of life, including business, trade, and economy. The country’s legal framework consists of its constitution, organic and ordinary laws passed by the Parliament, and administrative acts issued by the government and other public authorities. Although Moldovan courts are constitutionally independent, their structures have facilitated government and political interference; the courts suffer from inefficiency and low public trust. The court system consists of lower courts (i.e., trial courts), four courts of appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice, and a separate Constitutional Court. Moldova has a new justice reform strategy for 2022-2025. The new strategy continues the 2016 parliamentary initiative to “optimize” the country’s court system as part of broader justice sector reforms intended to reduce the number of trial courts in Moldova from 40 to 15. Specialized courts such as the Commercial Circumscription Court and Military Court were eliminated. Five trial courts from Chisinau were conceptually merged into one – the Chisinau trial court – although in 2018 the merged Chisinau trial court was further reorganized to specialize across five districts (investigative and contravention; criminal; administrative; bankruptcy; and civil, which includes adjudication of commercial disputes). The government will review court jurisdictions to ensure that the courts are structured in a way that provides access to justice for all citizens, and will begin to review the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s offices for the same reason. The 2016 reforms created two specialized quasi-independent prosecution offices. The Anticorruption Prosecution Office is responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption, bribery, abuse of power by public officials, and money laundering. The Prosecution Office on Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases investigates and prosecutes organized, transnational and particular complex crimes, including tax evasion, smuggling, intellectual property offenses, trafficking in persons, and narcotics. In 2017-2019, the Moldovan Prosecution Service continued the implementation of reforms under a law on the prosecution service passed in 2016. The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) led the drafting of new regulations for the specialized prosecution offices, regional, district and municipal offices. As of January 1, 2021, the State Tax Service is authorized to investigate economic crimes. The government further plans to restructure the anticorruption agencies to focus on high-level corruption. In addition to its international agreements, Moldovan laws affecting FDI include the Civil Code, the Law on Property, the Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship, the Law on Entrepreneurship and Enterprises, the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the Law on Small Business Support, the Law on Financial Institutions, the Law on Franchising, the Tax Code, the Customs Code, the Law on Licensing Certain Activities, and the Law on Insolvency. The current Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship came into effect in 2004. It was designed to be compatible with European standards in its definitions of types of local and foreign investment. It provides guarantees of investors’ rights, prohibitions against expropriation or similar actions, and for payment of damages if investors’ rights are violated. The law permits FDI in all sectors of the economy, while certain activities require a business license. Parliament adopted a new law setting up an investment screening mechanism in 2021 (see chapter 1 above). In 2012, Parliament passed a law on competition in line with EU practice and legislation. The National Competition Agency was subsequently renamed the Competition Council. The Competition Council oversees compliance with competition and state-aid provisions and initiates examination of alleged violation of competition laws. The Competition Council may request cessation of action, prescribe behavioral or structural remedies, and apply fines. The Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship states that investments cannot be subject to expropriation or to measures with a similar effect. However, an investment may be expropriated for purposes of public utility if it is not discriminatory and just compensation is provided. If a public authority violates an investor’s rights, the investor is entitled to compensation equivalent to the actual damages at the time of occurrence, including any lost profits. The government has given no indication of intent to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives by expropriation, or of intent to expropriate property owned by citizens of other countries. No particular sectors are at greater risk of expropriation or similar actions in Moldova. The previous governments have had a history of depriving investors, both national and foreign, of their businesses in various forms. Many of them have sued the government at the European Court for Human Rights for violation of the right to fair trial and of the respect for property, or in international arbitral tribunals. Moldova has a law on insolvency that provides for expedited insolvency proceedings, including by granting priority to secured creditors, restructuring mechanisms, reduced opportunities for appeals, moratorium provisions, strict statutory periods in the proceedings, and enhanced role of insolvency administrators. 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives are applicable for all Moldovan-registered businesses, irrespective of the country of origin of the investment. Certain incentives apply only in specially designated areas such as free economic zones and industrial parks. Until 2024, Moldovan legislation allows employees of IT companies to benefit from incentives on personal income tax and social security contributions. Also, a 2017 law on information technology parks established a single tax for residents of the digital IT parks, calculated as the maximum between seven percent from sales and 30 percent from the national average forecasted salary multiplied by the number of employees. There is also a range of tax incentives applicable if businesses meet certain requirements. Among those incentives are the following: value-added tax (VAT) and customs exemptions on long-term assets included in share capital; deferment of VAT liabilities on imports of materials used in manufacturing export-bound products; lower VAT rates for the hospitality and restaurant businesses; and lower social contributions and VAT rates for agricultural businesses. The Organization for SME Development (ODIMM) manages several business support programs for underrepresented investors such as Women in Business, Start for the Youth, and Attraction of Remittances in the Economy PARE 1+1. However, the government’s budget allocations to these programs is limited and ODIMM relies on funding from international donors. At present, seven free economic zones (FEZs), one international free port – Giurgiulesti – and one international free airport – Marculesti – are registered in Moldova. According to Moldovan law, these zones support job creation, attraction of foreign and domestic investments, and export-oriented production. The Law on Free Economic Zones regulates FEZ activity. Foreigners have the same investment opportunities as local entities. FEZ commercial entities enjoy the following advantages: 25 percent exemption from income tax; 50 percent exemption from tax on income from exports; for investments of more than USD 1 million, a three-year exemption from tax on income resulting from exports; and for investments of more than USD 5 million, a five-year exemption from tax on income from exports; zero value-added tax; exemption from excises; and a stand-still guarantee against any new changes in the law for ten years. In addition, residents investing at least USD 200 million in the FEZ are afforded a stand-still guarantee regarding new regulatory changes for the entire period of operation in the FEZ, but such protection cannot extend beyond 20 years. The government also passed a 2008 law creating eight industrial parks with the aim of attracting investments in industrial projects. Businesses operating in those parks do not receive any special tax treatment, but typically have access to ready-to-use production facilities, offices and lower office rents for 25 to 30 years. Typically, these are idle premises of former industrial State-owned enterprises. The government also recently set up 18 multifunctional industrial platforms throughout the country. These platforms represent plots of land accommodating technical and manufacturing infrastructure for economic – mostly manufacturing – activity that capitalize on regional resources. Similar to the FEZs, the Giurgiulesti Free International Port, Moldova’s only port accessible to sea-going vessels, was established in 2005. Commercial residents of the port enjoy the following advantages: 25 percent exemption from income tax for the first ten years following the first year when taxable income is reported; 50 percent exemption from tax on income for the remaining years; exemption from value-added tax and excises on imports and exports outside Moldova’s customs territory; zero valued-added tax on imports from Moldova; and a stand-still guarantee for commercial residents regarding any regulatory changes until February 17, 2030. The Marculesti International Free Airport, a former military air base, was established in 2008 as a free enterprise zone for a 25-year period to develop cargo air transport. Airport management is also interested in turning Marculesti into a regional hub for low-cost passenger airlines. IT parks are another area of special tax treatment with opportunities of virtual residence status, simplified tax payments and tax incentives for IT companies registered in Moldova. All incentives are applied uniformly to domestic and foreign investors. The Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship, in effect since 2004, does not protect new investors from legislative changes. No requirements exist for investors to purchase from local sources or to export a certain percentage of their output. The Embassy is not aware of any reports of forced data localization or special requirements targeting foreign IT providers. However, companies maintaining servers with customer databases outside Moldova must comply with cumbersome domestic procedures related to protection of personally identifiable information. Cross-border transfer of personal data requires prior authorization by the supervisory body for personal data processing. The Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure is responsible for developing strategies and policies on electronic communication. The National Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Information Technology (ANRCETI) is responsible for regulations and oversight. The National Center for Personal Data Protection (NCPDP) is the supervisory body for personal data processing. No limitations exist on access to foreign exchange in relation to a company’s exports. There are no special requirements that Moldovan nationals own shares of a company. Both joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned companies may be set up in Moldova. In fact, while not an official policy, in sectors of the economy that require large investments, experienced management, and technical expertise such as energy or telecommunications, the government has shown preference for experienced foreign investors over local investors. In other sectors, foreign and local investors formally receive equal treatment. Moldovan law allows investments in any area of the country, in any sector, provided that national security interests, anti-monopoly legislation, environmental protection, public health, and public order are respected. Some performance requirements are connected to tax incentives but are enforced equitably and described in the Tax Code and related governmental decisions and instructions. Foreign investors are required to disclose the same information as local investors. Moldova has no discriminatory visa, residence, or work-permit requirements inhibiting foreign investors’ mobility in Moldova. The government has set up a one-stop shop for foreigners applying for Moldovan residence and work permits in an effort to streamline a complicated procedure. Moldova has a liberal commercial regime with more than 100 countries. According to the Tax Code, Moldovan exports are exempt from value added tax. Although there are no formal import price controls, there are reports that Moldovan Customs Service may make arbitrary price assessments on certain types of imported goods for revenue-enhancing purposes. 5. Protection of Property Rights Moldova’s laws protect all property rights. There is a national cadastral office, which registers all ownership titles in the real estate registry. However, the mortgage market is still underdeveloped. In addition, the judicial sector remains weak and does not always fully guarantee the property rights of citizens and foreign investors. Despite efforts to improve its intellectual property rights (IPR) regime and set up relevant executive structures in the government, Moldova does not fully enforce its IPR laws due to conflicts of interest, lack of resources, and a low level of awareness and training among law enforcement agencies. The concept of IPR is largely unrecognized by the population. The country has an agency for the protection of IPR, the State Agency on Intellectual Property (AGEPI), which continues working on improving the legal framework and adjusting it to EU norms, increasing public awareness, and building capacity in law enforcement. Under the AA/DCFTA, the government is working to bring Moldova’s practices in line with the EU. Moldova is party to the majority of international treaties on IPR, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 26 World Intellectual Property (WIPO) treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Along with other public institutions, AGEPI works on fulfilling Moldova’s IPR obligations as provided by the 2017-2019 National Action Plan for the implementation of the Association Agreement. In 2018, Moldova adopted the third Action Plan on the implementation of the National Strategy on Intellectual Property through 2020. A new IP strategy is currently under consideration and a topic of discussion with WIPO, European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO). While some progress is being reported, there are still many outstanding issues related to IPR enforcement and geographical indications. In 2018, AGEPI was reorganized and consolidated. AGEPI created a free and publicly available online IPR database, which can be found at www.db.agepi.md . AGEPI continued to integrate its legal services and data into the international and regional platforms. In 2020, AGEPI signed a new Memorandum of Understanding on Electronic Communication of the Madrid System with the International Bureau of WIPO (BI) and integrated into the Madrid e-Filing platform. Moldova began implementing the European common practices to harmonize trademark and design protocols with the EUIPO. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, AGEPI redesigned most of its processes, including IP consultancy and support services, by moving online and encouraging IP holders to use electronic communication. Moldova’s criminal code prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. A law for the protection of pharmaceutical and medicinal product data came into force on January 1, 2020, the aim of which is to guarantee the confidentiality, non-disclosure, and non-reliance of data submitted while obtaining regulatory and market approval of the products. Moldovan authorities, including Customs, the Ministry of Interior, and the General Prosecutor’s Office, track statistics for IPR violations annually, but such reports are not readily available online. To improve IPR enforcement, in 2020 Moldovan authorities developed, with EU support, an IPR Information System to track the exchange of IPR data between agencies, including AGEPI, Customs, Prosecution, Police, the Agency for Consumer Protection and Market Surveillance, and the Agency for Court Administration. A report containing statistical and analytical data on IPR enforcement collected from all relevant stakeholders is released annually by the IPR Enforcement Observatory established by AGEPI. The 2021 Report is available in English and Romanian languages on the Observatory website: http://observatorpi.md/raport-national/ . Moldova is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report, nor is it included on the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en 6. Financial Sector Moldova’s securities market is underdeveloped. Official National Bank of Moldova (NBM) statistics include data on portfolio investments, yet there is a lack of open-source information fully reflect the trends and relevance of these investments. NBM data shows that most portfolio investments target banks, while the National Statistics Bureau does not differentiate between foreign direct investment and portfolio investments of less than 10 percent in a company. Laws, governmental decisions, NBM regulations, and Stock Exchange regulations provide the framework for capital markets and portfolio investment in Moldova. The government began regulatory reform in this area in 2007 with a view to spurring the development of the weak non-banking financial market. Since 2008, two bodies in particular – the NBM and the National Commission for Financial Markets – have regulated financial and capital markets. Foreign investors are not restricted from obtaining credit from local banks, the main source of business financing. However, stringent lending practices limit access to credit for Moldovan companies, especially SMEs. The government has eased some lending regulations to assist SMEs to obtain credit during the COVID-19 pandemic. Local commercial banks provide mostly short-term, high-interest loans and require large amounts of collateral, reflecting the country’s perceived high economic risk. Progress in lending activity suffered a sharp reversal in 2015 after the late-2014 banking crisis, triggered by a massive bank fraud, which severely weakened the banking system. Extreme monetary tightening by the NBM following significant currency flight connected to the resulting bank bailouts led to prohibitively high interest rates. In recent years, lending conditions improved as interest rates continued to hover around nine percent. However, inflation is expected to reach 28% in 2022 due to high global energy prices and regional instability. Large investments can rarely be financed through a single bank and require a bank consortium. Recent years have seen growth in leasing and micro-financing, leading to calls for clear regulation of the non-bank financial sector. As a result, Parliament passed a new law on the non-bank financial sector, which entered into effect on October 1, 2018. Raiffeisen Leasing remains the only international leasing company which has opened a representative office in Moldova. Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which exacerbated Moldova’s inflation, the private sector’s access to credit instruments has been limited by the insufficiency of long-term funding, high interest rates, and unrealistic lending forecasts by banks. Financing through local private investment funds is virtually non-existent. A few U.S. investment funds have been active on the Moldovan market. The government adopted a 2018-2022 strategy for the development of the non-banking financial sector aimed at bolstering the capital markets combined with prudential supervision. A new Central Securities Depository was established under the supervision of the National Bank of Moldova to bring greater transparency and integrity to ownership and the recordkeeping associated with it. Acting as an independent regulatory agency, the National Commission for Financial Markets (NCFM) supervises the securities market, insurance sector and non-bank financial institutions. A new capital markets law adopting EU regulations came into effect in 2013. It was designed to open up capital markets to foreign investors, strengthen NCFM’s powers of independent regulator, and set higher capital requirements on capital market participants. In 2014, a crisis at three Moldovan banks (which resulted in their closure and the loss of USD 1.2 billion), two of them among the country’s largest, undermined confidence in the banking system. The role of a Moldovan bank in the “Russian Laundromat” case, estimated to have laundered from USD 20 to 80 billion further underscored these challenges. The crisis shook Moldova’s banking system, causing some foreign correspondent banks to terminate ties with Moldovan banks and others to significantly tighten their lending. In March 2020, Moldova successfully completed its IMF program after implementing reforms in financial and banking sectors. As a result of these reforms, the financial sector is better prepared to withstand the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. There is a high degree of capital and liquidity, and an overall reduction of non-performing loans to below eight percent. Moldovan banks remain the main, albeit currently limited, source of business financing. The non-bank financial institutions however have been gaining sizable market share, especially in individual and SME lending, where banks have been encumbered by prudential banking rules. Bank assets account for about 55 percent of GDP. Banks are also the largest loan providers, with loans amounting to approximately USD 3.2 billion. Lending activity decreased in 2019 and 2020, recovered somewhat in 2021, and decreased again in response to high projected inflation. Moldova currently has 11 commercial banks. The NBM regulates the commercial bank sector and reports to Parliament. Foreign bank subsidiaries must register in Moldova and operate under the local banking legislation. Although the integrity of true bank ownership records are questionable, foreign investors’ share in Moldovan banks’ capital is approximately 87 percent of total capital, and includes such major foreign investors as OTP Bank (Hungary), Erste Bank (Austria), Banca Transilvania (Romania) and Doverie Holding (Bulgaria). As of December 31, 2021, total bank assets were MDL 118.5 billion (USD 6.7 billion), a 14.2% increase from 2020. Moldova’s three largest commercial banks account for roughly 65 percent of the total bank assets, as follows: Moldova Agroindbank – MDL 37.2 billion (USD 2.1 billion); Moldindconbank – MDL 24.4 billion (USD 1.4 billion); and OTP Bank – MDL 16.8 billion (USD 949.8 million). To prevent another crisis, the NBM instituted special monitoring of these top three banks over concerns about the transparency of bank shareholders; this monitoring was lifted in April 2020. After 2016, the Moldovan Parliament adopted legislation that would strengthen the independence of decision making at the NCFM and NBM – to help address systemic supervisory problems that had a negative effect on Moldova’s financial sector. To strengthen the system of tracking shares and shareholders, with USAID assistance, authorities put in place a law establishing the aforementioned Centralized Securities Depository. In addition, all bank shares must be sold and purchased on the Moldovan Stock Exchange. These measures have improved the transparency and reliability of the financial sector. NBM’s Banking Law of 2018 and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Law from 2016 bring the financial sector closer to harmonization with EU standards, including through the application of stronger risk-based supervision to banks, increased enforcement powers and monetary penalties applied to banks, structures to address problem banks, and strengthening the NBM’s ability to conduct risk assessments. Also, NBM required banks to increase their credit loss provisioning and take urgent action to reinforce internal risk management as well as procedures on related-party financing. In addition, the NBM developed a methodology to better identify the related parties at banks. The embassy is not aware of any sovereign wealth funds run by the government of Moldova. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since gaining independence in 1992, Moldova has privatized most State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and most sectors of the economy are almost entirely in private hands. However, the government still fully or partially controls some enterprises operating in a variety of economic sectors. The major SOEs are northern electricity grids, Chisinau heating companies, fixed-line telephone operator Moldtelecom, and the state railway company. The government keeps a registry of state-owned assets, which is available on the website on the Public Property Agency http://www.app.gov.md/registrul-patrimoniului-public-3-384 . SOEs are governed by the law on stock companies and the law on state enterprises as well as several governmental decisions. SOEs have boards of directors usually comprised of representatives of the line ministry, the Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Finance. As a rule, SOEs report to the respective ministries, with those registered as joint stock companies being required to make their financial reports public. Moldova does not incorporate references to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs in its normative acts. Moldovan legislation does not formally discriminate between SOEs and private-run businesses. By law, governmental authorities must provide a level legal and economic playing field to all enterprises. However, SOEs are generally seen as better positioned to influence decision-makers than private sector competitors. In some cases, SOEs have allegedly used these advantages to prevent open competition in individual sectors. The Law on Entrepreneurship and Enterprises has a list of activities restricted solely to SOEs, which includes, among others, human and animal medical research, manufacture of orders and medals, postal services (except express mail), sale and production of combat equipment and weapons, minting, and real estate registration. Moldova launched the first of several waves of privatization in 1994. In 2007, Parliament passed a new law governing management and privatization of SOEs. Two major privatizations in 2013 – of the then-largest bank, Banca de Economii, and the 49-year concession of the Chisinau Airport – subsequently proved highly controversial. Privatization efforts in 2014 and 2015 emphasized public-private partnerships as means for companies to gain access to SOEs in infrastructure-related projects. In 2018, the government held several rounds of privatization, selling its stake in 19 companies, including airline Air Moldova and gas interconnector Vestmoldtransgaz. The government resumed privatizations in 2020 after a moratorium announced in 2019 following controversies over past sales. In the first six months of 2021, the government sold off MDL 91.2 million (USD 5.16 million) worth of state-owned assets in open outcry auctions. To date, Moldova has conducted privatizations through open tenders organized at the stock exchange, open to interested investors. The government may also use open outcry auctions for some properties, so-called investment or commercial tenders to sell entire companies to buyers taking on investment commitments, or to the highest bidders or public-private partnerships for infrastructure related projects. The government publishes privatization announcements on the website of the Public Property Agency and in the official journal Monitorul Oficial. 8. Responsible Business Conduct While Moldovan legislation deals with issues pertaining to environment, workers’ rights, social fairness or governance, there is little awareness of the concept of the due diligence approach to ensuring responsible business conduct. The country’s corporate culture and private sector are still at an early stage of development and still seeking to define the nature of interactions between private business, government authorities, broader stakeholders, and the public at large. There is no governmental policy to encourage enterprises to follow OECD or UN Guidelines in this area. Foreign companies operating in Moldova are gradually introducing the concept of corporate social responsibility as an aspect of responsible business conduct. AmCham Moldova has set a leading example, with its corporate members engaging in a forestation project, in the rehabilitation of medical facilities, and in Christmas collection projects for orphanages. The COVID pandemic prompted many businesses to make donations of personal protection equipment and meals to frontline workers. Moldova is among countries where children engage in the worst forms of child labor, including commercial sexual exploitation, sometimes as a result of human trafficking. Children also engage in child labor in agriculture. Moldova is not a signatory of the Montreux Document of the Private Military and Security Companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Moldova’s draft National Development Strategy Moldova 2030 addresses the issue of climate change. The government approved the Environment Strategy for 2014-2023 and an accompanying Action Plan. In 2017, the country approved the Low Emissions Development Strategy until 2030. The Energy Strategy outlines climate change mitigation in the Energy sector until 2030. Under the Climate Change Coordinating Mechanism, approved by the government in 2020, the National Commission on Climate Change has been established as an inter-institutional body to coordinate and promote measures and actions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. Moldova has committed under its updated National Determined Contribution to reduce greenhouse gas emission to 70% unconditionally or even 88% if the country gains access to technologies and financial resources at low cost. The law on promotion of the use of renewable energy set the target of 17% for renewables as share of final gross energy consumption. 9. Corruption While Moldova has taken steps to adopt European and international standards to combat corruption and organized crime, corruption remains a major problem. Since winning a majority in Parliament in July 2021 elections, the ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) has focused on several facets of the fight against corruption. The government has replaced or suspended under-performing or corrupt officials. In its first months in office, the government increased transparency regarding beneficial ownership by offshore interests, amended the constitution to increase judicial independence, enacted investment screening legislation, passed a bill to vet judicial and prosecutorial oversight bodies for integrity issues, and implemented measures to increase accountability in the Prosecutor General’s office. A Constitutional Court ruling allowed for confiscation of unjustified assets from government officials with a lower burden of proof. The government announced plans to implement extraordinary vetting of judges and prosecutors, and reform anti-corruption agencies. In 2012-13, the government enacted a series of anti-corruption amendments. This package included new legislation on “integrity testing” related to a disciplinary liability law for judges. It also extended confiscation and illicit enrichment statutes in the Moldovan Criminal Code as per the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The Constitutional Court subsequently restricted integrity testing (e.g., excluding random testing as “entrapment”), but enactment of these reforms substantially augmented Moldova’s corruption-fighting toolkit. The National Anticorruption Center (NAC), created in 2012, focuses on investigating public corruption and bribery crimes, and is subordinated to the Parliament (the CCECC had been organized under the executive branch). Moldovan judges, who had previously enjoyed full immunity from corruption investigations, can now be prosecuted for crimes of corruption without prior permission from their self-governing body, although the Superior Council of Magistrates still must approve any search or arrest warrant against a judge. The government has developed and enacted a series of laws designed to address legislative gaps such as the Law on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the Law on Conflict of Interests, and the Law on the Code of Conduct for Public Servants. The Criminal Code criminalizes two forms of public sector corruption: passive and active. These statutes apply only to corrupt acts and bribery committed by public officials. In 2016, part of the reform of the prosecution system, Moldova adopted the Law on the Prosecution Service, and created two specialized prosecution agencies – the Anticorruption Prosecution Office (APO) and the Prosecution Office for Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases (PCCOCS). Beginning in 2015, specialized prosecution offices began to investigate and prosecute individuals allegedly involved in the “billion dollar” banking theft and a series of high-profile bribery, corruption, and tax evasion cases, though with only limited progress. These offices face multiple challenges, including lack of independent budgets, high workload, external interference, and serious questions about their independence, transparency and impartiality. In 2018, APO and PCCOCS started recruitment for seconding investigators to their offices. According to the 2016 prosecution reform law, these investigators are responsible for supporting prosecutors to investigate complex corruption cases. However, even with a nearly full complement of seconded investigators, APO still relies on NAC investigators to conduct many corruption-related investigations and prosecutions. In 2018, a new statutorily created agency, the Criminal Assets Recovery Agency (CARA), began operating as a specialized unit within NAC. The selection and appointment of the agency’s leadership is coordinated through a competitive process by the NAC. In 2016, Parliament passed the Law on the National Integrity Authority (NIA) and the Law on Disclosure of Assets and Conflict of Interest by public officials. The NIA became operational in 2018. The director, deputy director, and all inspectors are hired in competitive processes, but the agency has not yet hired a full complement of inspectors. NIA continues to lack staff and sufficient resources to fulfill its mission. The issuance of “integrity certificates” to individuals with well-known ties to the billion-dollar heist further degraded the organization’s reputation. The transparency and efficiency of NIA needs further improvement. Moldova’s 2017-2020 National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy was drafted and passed following public consultations and is structured along the “integrity pillars” concept that aims to strengthen the integrity climate among civil servants at all levels. It includes a role for civil society organizations (CSOs) through alternative monitoring reports and promoting integrity standards in the private sector. The strategy addresses the complexity of corruption by employing sector-based experts to evaluate specific integrity problems encountered by different vulnerable sectors of public administration. The deadline for the strategy had to be extended as many actions were not implemented. Moldovan law requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit corruption and corrupt behavior. Moldova’s Criminal Code also includes articles addressing private sector corruption, combatting economic crime, criminal responsibility of public officials, active and passive corruption, and trading of influence. This largely aligns Moldovan statutory law with international anti-bribery standards by criminalizing the acts of promising, offering, or giving a bribe to a public official. Anticorruption laws also extend culpability to family members. A new illicit enrichment law allows a simplified procedure for unjustified asset confiscation. The Anticorruption Prosecution Office has initiated three illicit enrichment cases against judges to date. The country has laws regulating conflicts of interest in awarding contracts and the government procurement process; however these laws are not assessed as widely or effectively enforced. In 2016, Parliament added two new statutes to the Criminal Code criminalizing the misuse of international assistance funds. These provisions provide a statutory basis for prosecutors to investigate and prosecute misuse of international donor assistance by Moldovan public officials in public acquisitions, technical assistance programs, and grants. Despite the established anticorruption framework, the number of anticorruption prosecutions has not met international expectations (given corruption perceptions), and enforcement of existing legislation is widely deemed insufficient. In 2021, Moldova ranked 105 out of 180 (from 115 the prior year) among countries evaluated in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2021, Moldova ranked 105 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Opinion polls show the fight against corruption is a top priority for the Moldovan public. The 2021 edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index elevated Moldova from the “hybrid regime” to “flawed democracy” category with an overall score of 6.10, the first upgrade since 2017. Moldova’s score jumped from 5.78 to 6.10 thanks to “improvements in the functioning of the government and in political participation,” with scores of 7.0 for electoral process and pluralism (on a scale of 0 to 8), 6.76 for civil liberties, 6.67 for political participation, 5.71 for functioning of government, and 4.38 for democratic political culture. Moldova rose 11 positions and is now ranked 69 out of 167 countries. The Freedom House Moldova “Nations in Transit Report” 2021 noted the commitment by President Sandu to implementing anti-corruption policies, which she had begun to do during a brief period as PM in 2019. Public competitions have been mostly non-transparent and based on controversial regulations or political loyalty to, or membership in, the ruling political group, rather than on the basis of merit. The investigation into the “billion-dollar” banking sector has been progressing relatively slowly despite the government’s renewed efforts to persecute the organizers. Official data reported that as of March 2022, only USD 187 million has been recovered, mainly from taxes, credits, and the sale of assets belonging to the three banks liquidated following the theft. The stolen assets have not been recovered, there remains no assurance that significant remaining funds will be recovered. Freedom House’s most recent report, Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2021, found Moldova continues to be only “partially free,” earning 62.5/100 points for political rights/civil liberties. Its overall score has increased by 0.5 point, primarily because of an improvement in the tax burden score. Moldova is ranked 41st among 45 countries in the Europe region, and its overall score is below the regional average but above the world average. The Moldovan economy remains in the moderately free category. Economic freedom is constrained by post-Soviet Moldova’s ongoing vulnerability to corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, a rigid labor code, and dependence on energy imports. The rule of law in particular remains very weak, especially in the judicial system. Opinion surveys conducted by reputable pollsters like the International Republican Institute (IRI) show that a majority of Moldovans see corruption as a major problem for the country, though it ranks below other economic issues. Perceptions of corruption improved between 2019 and 2021, with fewer numbers of respondents in 2021 saying they had paid a bribe in the past 12 months or had been impacted personally by corruption. Respondents were by far most likely to be asked for a bribe by health care professionals, followed by education and the police officials. In 2007, Moldova ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, subsequently adopting amendments to its domestic anticorruption legislation. Moldova does not adhere to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery. However, Moldova is part of two regional anticorruption initiatives: the Stability Pact Anticorruption Initiative for South East Europe (SPAI), and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe. Moldova cooperates closely with the OECD through SPAI and with GRECO, especially on country evaluations. In 1999, Moldova signed the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Moldova ratified both conventions in 2003. In 2020, Moldova joined OECD’s Istanbul Anticorruption Action Plan. Moldova is one of the participating countries in the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN), a driver of anticorruption reforms in the region. In October 2020, Moldova’s second Compliance Report, adopted by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in the fourth round of evaluation, concluded the current level of compliance of Moldova with the GRECO recommendations is generally insufficient. Following the evaluation, 18 recommendations were addressed to Moldova. Subsequently, out of 18 recommendations, four were rated as satisfactorily treated or implemented, and 10 were partially implemented, and four remain unimplemented. Iulian Rusu Director National Anti-Corruption Center Bulevardul Stefan cel Mare si Sfant 168, Chisinau MD2004, Moldova Tel. +373 22-257 257 (secretariat)/800-55555 (hotline)/22-740 777(special line) secretariat@cna.md Lilia Carasciuc Executive Director Transparency International Moldova Strada 31August 1989 nr. 98, of.205, Chisinau MD2004, Moldova Tel. +373-22 203-484(office)/800-10 000 (hotline) office@transparency.md Corruption Map: https://anticoruptie.md/ro/harta-coruptiei The Corruption Map is a platform for free expression, open to every person who has been a victim or witness of acts of corruption, abuse, human rights violations, etc. 10. Political and Security Environment Levels of street crime and other types of violent crime are equal or lower in Moldova than in neighboring countries and businesses typically only employ the most basic security procedures to safeguard their personnel. Moldova has not had significant instances of transnational terrorism. While there have been occasional instances of political violence in the past decade, these cases have typically been directed against Moldovan state institutions and have not generally impacted the international business community in Moldova. There have been no significant instances of political violence in the last four years and all recent large demonstrations have been peaceful. The embassy has received no reports over the past ten years of politically motivated damage to business projects or installations in Moldova. In 2015 and early 2016, there was public outcry over the political class’s failure to prevent (and even its facilitation of) a massive bank fraud in which about 11 percent of GDP disappeared from the country’s then-three largest banks. Round-the-clock anti-government protests culminated in January 2016 in clashes with riot police when protesters tried to prevent Parliament from voting in a new government. The clashes were limited and did not turn into full-blown violence or cause extensive damage that would affect businesses in any way, and the government remained in power. In 2021, protesters held rallies in front of Parliament without causing significant damages or clashing violently with police. Separatists control the Transnistria region of Moldova, located between the Nistru River and the eastern border with Ukraine. Although a brief armed conflict took place in 1991-1992, the sides signed a cease-fire in July 1992. Local authorities in Transnistria maintain a separate monetary unit, the Transnistrian ruble and a separate customs system. Despite the political separation, economic cooperation takes place in various sectors. The government has implemented measures requiring businesses in Transnistria to register with Moldovan authorities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with Russia, and Ukraine acting as guarantors/mediators and the United States and EU as observers, supports negotiations between Moldova and the separatist region Transnistria (known as the “5+2” format). 11. Labor Policies and Practices For years, Moldova prided itself on its skilled labor force, including numerous workers with specialized and technical skills. However, many skilled workers have left Moldova for better paying jobs in other countries. This has led to shortages of skilled workers in Moldova. There are imbalances in the labor market arising from a general lack of workers with vocational training that employers need, on one hand, and lack of job opportunities for academically educated people, on the other. Labor shortages are reported in manufacturing, engineering, and IT. Low birth rates, emigration, and an aging population, coupled with a lack of immigration, represent a challenge to Moldova’s labor pool more generally. Around a fifth of the labor force is estimated to work abroad (around 800,000). According to World Bank population projections, if current emigration trends continue, Moldova will lose another 20 percent of its population by 2050. The informal economy accounts for up to 25% of GDP. Some estimate the percentage of the “grey economy” is increasing, particularly in the construction sector. Agriculture holds by far the largest share in informal economy. According to official statistics, approximately 17 percent of the working population is employed in the informal economy; the non-agricultural workforce in the informal economy is 11.3%. UNDP studies say that during the COVID-19 pandemic informal economy has trended down mostly because of the lockdown that affected businesses in industries where informal economy is mostly spread (agriculture, hospitality, restaurants, trade, and transportation). During the pandemic, both formal and informal employment decreased, but informal employment at a much faster pace. Official unemployment was 3.2 percent in 2021, which is misleading given the low labor participation rate of 39.8 percent, owing to large numbers of Moldovans migrating abroad, which reduces the number of job seekers at home. Youth unemployment is more than double the national average at 9.2 percent. Employment in Moldova is largely based on agriculture, low productivity sectors, and crafts. Moldova’s Constitution guarantees the right to establish or join a trade union. Trade unions have influence in the large and mostly State-owned enterprises and have historically negotiated for strong labor relations, minimum wage, and basic worker rights. Unions also have a say in negotiating collective labor agreements in various industries. Unions are less active and effective in small private companies. Moldova is a signatory to numerous conventions on the protection of workers’ rights. The country has moved toward adopting international standards in labor laws and regulations. In recent years, the government made changes to labor legislation in favor of employers and somewhat reducing unions’ input on issues related to hiring and firing personnel. Nevertheless, labor legislation is stringent in matters dealing with severance payments or leave, regulations that some foreign investors view as an impediment to labor flexibility and as putting a heavy burden on employers. The government has drafted legislation to modernize the labor market, with a focus on skills development and vocational education training reform. The Moldovan General Federation of Trade Unions has been a member of the ILO since 1992 and has been affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Unions (ICFU) since 1997. The Federation split into two separate unions in 2000, but merged in 2007, forming the National Trade Union Confederation (CNSM), which obtained membership in the International Trade Union Confederation in 2010. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Chisinau, Moldova Str. Alexei Mateevici 103, Chisinau MD 2009, Moldova Main switchboard +373 (22) 40 83 00 Fax: +373 (22) 23 30 74/40 84 10 chisinaucommerce@state.gov Mongolia Executive Summary Mongolia’s frontier market and vast mineral reserves represent potentially lucrative opportunities for investors but vulnerability to external economic and financial shocks, ineffective dispute resolution, and lack of input from stakeholders during rulemaking warrant caution. Mongolia imposes few market-access barriers, and investors face few investment restrictions, enjoying mostly unfettered market access. Such franchises as fast food and convenience stores, outperforming expectations, suggest that investors can bring successful international business models to Mongolia. The cashmere-apparel and agricultural sectors also show strong promise. However, investing into such politically sensitive sectors as mining carry higher risk. Mongolia attracts investors’ attention but has trouble converting interest into actual investments. Unless and until Mongolia embraces a stable business environment that both transparently creates and predictably implements laws and regulations, many investors will find its market too risky and opt for more competitive countries. An essential step to mitigating these risks is for Mongolia to implement the U.S.-Mongolia Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment (known as the Transparency Agreement), which requires a public-comment period before new regulations become final. Mongolia has implemented some of this agreement but is five years behind full implementation of public-notice commitments. 2021 also saw resolution of some of the disputes hampering progress of the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine, expected to provide 25 percent of Mongolia’s GDP as soon as 2024. Agreements over cost- and debt-sharing of a portion of the mine’s development, and commitments to more transparency by Oyu Tolgoi’s partners over management and development decisions, signals that Mongolia can and will work out disputes within the terms of its contractual obligations. Government and parliament continue to address threats to judicial independence by implementing 2019 constitutional amendments and 2020 statutory judicial reforms that have improved transparency and reduced political influence in the appointment and removal of judges. Investors, however, continue to cite long delays in reaching court judgments, followed by similarly long delays in enforcing decisions, as well as reports that administrative inspection bodies, such as the tax authority, will fail to act on politically sensitive decisions or cases involving politically exposed Mongolians. Businesses note substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at all levels; and cite an excessively slow tax dispute resolution process as an indirect expropriation risk. In June 2022, parliament streamlined procedures for, and reduced the required number of, permits and licenses. Government effort to move delivery of most services onto digital platforms may also increase the efficiency of its business registration processes. COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are stressing Mongolia’s economy. In late 2021, Mongolia’s parliament passed its New Recovery Policy, a 10-year development plan to increase national productivity by improving transport logistics, energy production, industrialization, urban and rural infrastructure, and green development. This program depends on restoring market access for mining exports, the primary revenue source. However, as of early 2022, China’s zero-COVID policies continue to create bottlenecks along the Mongolia-China border. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prompting unprecedented international sanctions on Russia, has created uncertainty about access to imports of petroleum products, electricity, and such key commodities as wheat and fertilizer. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 58 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 662 USD Bank of Mongolia World Bank GNI per capita 2020 6,957 USD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mongolia generally does not discriminate against foreign investors with two major exceptions. First, foreign investors must invest a minimum of $100,000 to establish a venture; in contrast, Mongolian investors face no investment minimums. Second, only Mongolian adult citizens may own real estate. Additionally, while foreign investors may obtain use rights for the underlying land, these rights last for five years with a one-time, five-year renewal. The government imposes no such restriction on its nationals. Mongolia offers the “One-Stop-Shop for Investors,” which provides investors with services related to visas, taxation, notarization, and business registration. Mongolia’s recently created Ministry of Economy and Development has publicly stated that it will create a new foreign investment and foreign trade support entity to assume the duties of the One-Stop-Shop, which remains operational ( https://investmongolia.gov.mn/ ). Regardless of what shape the new agency takes, investors encourage the government to develop policies aimed at retaining existing foreign direct investment in country. Except for real estate, foreign and domestic investors have the same rights to establish, sell, transfer, or securitize structures, shares, use rights, companies, and movable property. Mongolia generally imposes no statutory or regulatory limits on foreign ownership and control of investments, except for foreign state-owned entities. The Mining Law allows the government to acquire up to 50 percent of mineral deposits deemed of “strategic” value to the state by parliament. Since 2019, Article 6.2 of Mongolia’s Constitution also requires the state to take a “majority” share of the “benefits” of strategic mining projects. Investors are waiting for the government to clarify the meaning of “benefits” derived from mining activities, which according to government officials may mean profit and may also include such non-cash contributions as development programs, employment, or technology transfers. Investors also observe that excessive regulatory discretion allows bureaucrats de facto control over the use of legally granted rights, corporate governance decisions, and ownership stakes, stating that in some cases regulators make up rules beyond their actual statutory remit. Finally, Mongolia has no formal or informal investment-screening mechanism, although the National Security Council has barred investments from some foreign state-owned entities. Mongolia underwent its regular World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review in 2021 (WTO | Mongolia ). Mongolia’s business registration process is reasonably clear. Foreign and domestic enterprises must register with the State Registration Office ( https://burtgel.gov.mn/ ). Registrants can obtain required forms online and submit them by email. The State Registration Office aims at a two-day turnaround for the review and approval process. Investors report bureaucratic discretion often adds weeks or even months to the process and state more transparent adherence to the relevant laws and regulations would yield a consistent, streamlined process. Once approved by the State Registration Office, a company must register with the General Tax Authority ( http://en.mta.mn/ ). Upon hiring its first employees, a company must register with the Social Insurance Agency ( http://www.ndaatgal.mn/v1/ ). The ease of opening a business does not apply to closing a business, however. Foreign investors and legal contacts report the onerous bureaucratic and judicial process of disestablishment takes no less than 18-24 months. While the Mongolian Government neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, it does not generally restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, although politically exposed persons and their families may undergo additional scrutiny or may even be barred from investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Law on Legislation sets out who may draft and submit legislation; the format of these bills; the respective roles of the Mongolian parliament, government, and president; and the procedures for obtaining and employing public comment on pending legislation. The Law on Legislation states that law initiators – members of parliament, the president of Mongolia, or cabinet ministers – must fulfill these criteria: (1) provide a clear process for developing and justifying the need for draft legislation; (2) set out methodologies for estimating costs to the government related to a bill’s implementation; (3) evaluate the impact of the legislation on the public; and (4) conduct public outreach before submitting bills to parliament. Initiators must post draft legislation for public comment and publish reports evaluating costs and impacts on parliament’s official website ( Parliament of Mongolia/Projects ) at least 30 days prior to submitting bills to parliament. Posts must explicitly state the time for public comment and review. Initiators must solicit comments in writing, organize public meetings, seek comments through social media, and carry out public surveys. No more than 30 days after the public comment period ends, initiators must prepare a matrix of all comments, including those used to revise the bill as well as those not used, which must be posted on parliament’s official web site. After a law’s passage, parliament must monitor and evaluate its implementation and impacts. Investors report that while legislators have not implemented all these requirements, most relevant legislation is posted on parliament’s website before passage. Ministries and agencies have not fulfilled these statutory requirements, according to businesses. While General Administrative Law Article 6 aligns Mongolia’s regulatory drafting process with Transparency Agreement obligations, investors report the government is not generally enforcing it. Under the Transparency Agreement, originators of regulations must seek public comment by posting draft regulations in a single journal of national circulation, designated as LegalInfo.mn ( HYPERLINK “https://www.legalinfo.mn/%22%20/t%20%22_blank” t “_blank” LegalInfo). Drafters must record, report, and respond to significant public comments. The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs must certify each regulatory drafting process complies with the General Administrative Law before a regulation enters force. After approval, the statutorily responsible government agency monitors implementation and impacts. Businesses also note unpredictable, nontransparent regulatory burdens at the local—province and county—levels. They note inconsistent application of regulations and statutes among central, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions and a lack of expertise among local inspectors. Regional tax, health, and safety inspectors are cited as particularly problematic. The Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Center of Mongolia annually ranks local regulatory burdens: http://en.aimagindex.mn/competitiveness . Mongolia’s so-called Glass Budget Law requires all levels of government to publicly post proposed and actual budget expenditures, and the law, according to businesses and transparency experts, has generally been followed. However, parliament can waive these transparency requirements for emergencies and for budgetary bills and has on several occasions in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The government neither promotes nor requires companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The government does, however, limit the right to invest in such high-risk securities as digital tokens and cryptocurrencies to professional investors and other high net-worth individuals. Mongolia, which has generally eschewed regional economic blocs, acceded to the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) in 2021. Also, Mongolia often seeks to adapt European standards and norms in such areas as construction materials, food, and environmental regulations; looks to U.S. standards in the hydrocarbon sector; and adopts a combination of Australian and Canadian standards and norms in the mining sector. Mongolia also tends to employ World Organization for Animal Health standards for its animal health regulations. Mongolia, a member of the WTO, asserts it will notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. Investors state that judges frequently avoid controversial decisions in business disputes, preferring to delay judgment for as long as possible—sometimes years. If a decision is made, businesses face similarly long delays enforcing court orders. In some instances, cases have taken so long that by the time an enforcement is executed, the counterparty has liquidated assets and vanished. Investors note similarly long delays with respect to inspection agencies, such as the Tax Dispute Settlement Resolution Council, as well as with other inspection agency panels, especially those related to mineral licenses and health matters. In 2021, parliament revised the Law of the Judiciary to bring it into line with the amended constitution. This law limits the powers of the government, parliament, and the president to influence the selection and removal of judges; and vests the Judicial Disciplinary Council with responsibility for disciplining jurists, except in matters involving criminal acts. Investors have praised these reforms, saying are helping to restore judicial independence severely. Under Mongolia’s hybrid civil law-common law system, trial judges may use prior rulings to adjudicate similar cases but have no obligation to follow legal precedent as such. Mongolian laws, and even their implementing regulations, often lack the specificity needed for consistent judicial and prosecutorial interpretation and application. All courts may rule on matters of fact as well as matters of law at any point in the judicial process. Mongolia has specialized laws for contracts but no dedicated courts for commercial activities. Contractual disputes are usually adjudicated through the Civil Court division of the district court system. Criminal Courts adjudicate crime cases brought by the General Prosecutors Office. Disputants may appeal to the City Court of Ulaanbaatar and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Mongolia. Mongolia has several specialized administrative courts adjudicating cases brought by citizens, foreign residents, and businesses against official administrative acts. Mongolia’s Constitutional Court, the Tsets, rules on constitutional issues. The General Executive Agency for Court Decisions enforces judgments and orders. Investors and legal sector experts say that the Administrative Court is procedurally competent, fair, and consistent but that the Civil Courts deliver highly inconsistent judgments. The 2013 Investment Law sets the general statutory and regulatory frame for all investors in Mongolia. Under the law, foreign investors may access the same investment opportunities as Mongolian citizens and receive the same protections as domestic investors. Investment domicile, not investor nationality, determines if an investment is foreign or domestic. The law provides for a more stable tax environment and offers tax and other incentives for investors; and authorizes a single point of registration, the State Registration Office ( www.burtgel.gov.mn ), for all investors. The law offers qualifying companies transferable tax-stabilization certificates valid for up to 27 years. Affected taxes may include the corporate-income tax, excise taxes, customs duties, value-added tax, and royalties. Investors cite two primary national-treatment issues with respect to investment rules. First, foreign nationals and companies may not own real estate; only Mongolian adult citizens may own real estate. While foreign investors may obtain use rights for the underlying land, these rights expire after a set number of years with limited rights of renewal. Government officials have said that in some cases municipal, provincial, and central government officials may waive land-use rights limits and recommend that investors contact the relevant agency or ministry for more information on how to apply for these waivers. Foreign investors also object to the regulatory requirement that each foreign investor in any given venture must invest a minimum of $100,000. Although the Investment Law has no such requirement, Mongolian regulators impose it on all foreign investors without requiring the same minimum from Mongolian investors. The Ministry of Economy and Development manages the “One-Stop-Shop for Investors,” which provides investor services on visas, taxation, social insurance, notarization, and business registration ( https://investmongolia.gov.mn/ ). The Ministry of Economy and Development has publicly stated that it will establish in 2022 a new foreign investment and foreign trade support entity to assume the duties of the One-Stop-Shop, although no date has been provided. Mongolia’s Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection reviews domestic transactions for competition-related concerns. For a description of the Agency go to AFCCP . The Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection launched no 2021 competition cases affecting U.S. FDI. U.S. investors generally find the AFCCP applies its norms and procedures transparently, although they remain concerned the agency favors local economic interests over foreign interests. AFCCP decisions may be appealed to the courts. State entities at all levels may confiscate or modify land-use rights for purposes of economic development, national security, historical preservation, or environmental protection. Mongolia’s constitution recognizes private real-property rights and derivative rights, and Mongolian law specifically bars the government from expropriating assets without payment of adequate, market-based compensation. Investors express little disagreement with such takings in principle but state that a lack of clear lines of authority among the central, provincial, and municipal governments has led to loss of property and use rights in practice. For example, the Minerals Law provides no clear division of local, regional, and national jurisdictions for issuances of land-use permits and special-use rights. Faced with unclear lines of authority and frequent differences in practices and interpretation of rules and regulations by different levels of government, investors may find themselves unable to fully exercise legally conferred rights. Some expropriation cases involve court expropriations after third-party criminal trials at which investors are compelled to appear as “civil defendants” – but are not allowed to fully participate in the proceedings. In these cases, government officials are convicted of corruption, and the court then orders the civil defendant to surrender a license or property, or pay a tax penalty or fine, for having received an alleged favor from the criminal defendant with no judicial proceedings to determine if property or licenses were obtained illegally. Businesses claim the tax dispute settlement processes has become a form of indirect expropriation. 2020 amendments to the Tax Law allow tax officials to require disputants to place the entire disputed tax assessment in escrow as a precondition for disputing the tax assessments, which encourages officials to issue punitive tax assessments that make using settlement processes prohibitively expensive and confiscatory. Bankruptcy law treats bankruptcy as a civil matter requiring judicial adjudication. Mongolia allows registration of mortgages and other debt instruments backed by real estate, structures, and other immovable collateral (mining and exploration licenses, intellectual property rights, and other use rights); and movable property (cars, equipment, livestock, receivables, and other items of value). Although investors may securitize movable and immovable assets, local law firms hold that the bankruptcy process remains too vague, onerous, and time-consuming for practical use. Reporting that foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings usually require no less than 18 months, with 36 months not uncommon, legal advisors state that a lengthy appeals process, perceived corruption, and government interference may create years of delay. Moreover, while in court, creditors face suspended interest payments and limited access to the asset. 4. Industrial Policies The government generally offers the same tax preferences to foreign and domestic investors; and occasionally waives tariffs for imports of essential fuel and food products or for imports in such targeted sectors as agriculture or energy. Exemptions may apply to Mongolia’s 5-percent import duty and 10-percent value-added tax (VAT). The government may offer traditional and green energy sector investments such incentives as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives. The government may also extend tax credits on a case-by-case basis to investments in such sectors as minerals processing, agriculture, and infrastructure. Under the Investment Law, foreign-invested companies, properly registered and paying taxes in Mongolia, qualify as domestic Mongolian entities for investment incentive packages that, among other benefits, offer tax stabilization for up to 27 years. While in theory the government can issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects, it seldom does so in practice. The Mongolian government has had a free-trade zone program since 2004. Two free-trade zones are along the Trans-Mongolian Highway and Railroad: (1) the northern Mongolia-Russia border town of Altanbulag; and (2) the southern Mongolia-China border town of Zamiin-Uud. Both free-trade zones are relatively inactive, requiring development. A third free-trade zone is located at the port-of-entry of Tsagaannuur in the far western province of Bayan-Olgii bordering Russia. Mongolian officials also suggest the new Ulaanbaatar International Airport may host a Special Economic Zone that may have some of the characteristics of existing free-trade zones but may also offer a broader range of yet-to-be-determined incentives. Mongolia does not generally require foreign investors to use local goods, services, or equity; or to engage in import substitution. Neither foreign nor domestic businesses need to export a certain percentage of output or use foreign exchange to cover exports. The government applies the same geographical restrictions to foreign and domestic investors, involving border security, environmental concerns, and local-use rights. The government does not impose onerous or discriminatory visa, residence, or work permit requirements on U.S. investors—although foreign and domestic firms must meet certain industry-specific, local-hire requirements. The Mongolian government strongly encourages but does not legally compel domestic sourcing of inputs, especially for firms engaged in natural-resource extraction. The Minerals Law states that holders of exploration and mining licenses should preferentially supply extracted minerals at market prices to Mongolian processing facilities and should procure goods and services and hire subcontractors from business entities registered in Mongolia. Although facing no legal requirement to source locally, investors occasionally report that central, provincial, or municipal governments will delay permitting and licensing until domestic and foreign enterprises make some effort to source locally. Hiring Mongolians is often a de facto necessity because the government sometimes issues work visas for foreign employees only if employers have attempted to hire domestically. These requirements do not apply to members of boards of directors. Despite pressure to source locally, foreign investors generally set their own export and production targets without concern for government-imposed quotas or requirements. Mongolia does not require (but often encourages) technology transfers. The government generally imposes no offset requirements for major procurements. Investors, not the government, generally decide on technology, intellectual property, and finance as they see fit. Except for an unenforced provision of the Minerals Law requiring mining companies to list 10 percent of the shares of the Mongolian-registered mining company on the Mongolian Stock Exchange, foreign-invested businesses are not required to sell shares into the Mongolian market. Equity stakes are generally at the discretion of investors, Mongolian or foreign. In cases where investments may have national economic, political, security, or social impacts, the government has, without a clear statutory basis, restricted the type of financing foreign investors may use, their choice of partners, or to whom they sell shares or equity stakes. The government generally requires neither data localization nor compels IT providers to turn over source code or provide surveillance access, except for criminal investigations. Businesses may freely transmit customer or other business-related data abroad, except for financial data, which is subject to data localization requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Mongolian Constitution provides that “the State shall recognize any forms of public and private properties.” Statute limits real-estate ownership to adult citizens of Mongolia. Civil law allows private Mongolian citizens or government agencies to assume property ownership or use rights if the current owner or holder of use rights does not use that property or those rights. In the case of use rights, revocation and assumption is almost always written into the formal agreements covering the rights. Squatters may, under certain circumstances, claim effective property ownership of unused structures. Foreign investors may own permanent physical structures and obtain use rights to land and resources, but only Mongolian citizens may own real estate, and only in municipalities. Land ownership does not convey ownership of, or necessarily access to, surface or subsurface resource rights, which remain with the state. Outside municipalities, the state owns the land and resources in perpetuity and may lease those resources to public and private entities. Ownership of a structure may vest the owner with control over the use rights of the land upon which the structure sits. Use rights are granted for terms ranging from 3 to 60 years, depending on the particular use right. However, foreign nationals and foreign companies can lease land-use rights for no more than 10 years: a five-year term and a single five-year renewal. Although Mongolia has a well-established register for immovable property – structures and real estate – it lacks a central register for use rights; consequently, investors, particularly those investing in rural Mongolia, have no easy way to learn who might have conflicting rights. Complicating matters, Mongolia’s civil-law system is still developing a formal process for apportioning multiple use rights on adjacent lands or adjudicating disputes arising from conflicting use rights. As of 2022, the Mongolian government has no accurate figure for land with clear titles. Creditors may seize and dispose of property offered as collateral, although this process is often subject to lengthy legal delays. Debt instruments backed by real estate, fixed structures, and other immovable collateral may be registered with the Immovable Property Office of the State Registration Office ( www.burtgel.gov.mn ). Movable property (cars, equipment, livestock, receivables, and other items of value) may also be registered with the State Registration Office as collateral. Investors report that the movable-property registration system, while generally reliable, experiences occasional technical capacity issues. Film, television, and digital content from the United States enjoy strong copyright protection in Mongolia. Mongolia’s Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will quickly block access to internet addresses of offending sites once listed by the Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia. However, use of pirated software by Mongolian government ministries, home-use consumers, and businesses is rampant. Patent protection for pharmaceutical and medical device importers is virtually non-existent, with trademark law generally the only recourse for rightsholders. While enforcement agencies will seize trademark-infringing drugs, simply removing the infringing trademark still allows the importer to bring in the patent-infringing drug. Medical devices encounter similar problems. Trademark infringement also includes stores distributing counterfeit apparel and fake spare parts for heavy equipment. However, the Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia has not focused on these areas because rightsholders have not filed complaints. IPR violations below MNT 50 million ($17,000) are subject to administrative enforcement; those above MNT 50 million are subject to criminal enforcement. Enforcement agencies do pursue criminal and civil intellectual property (IP) cases, suggesting a willingness by Mongolian courts, prosecutors, administrative investigators, and police to attack the problem. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Mongolia has few restrictions on capital flows and has respected IMF Article VIII by not restricting international payments and transfers. However, capital markets are underdeveloped, with little ability to trade futures or derivatives on traditional markets. The state-owned Mongolian Stock Exchange ( http://www.mse.mn/en/aboutus_en ) is the primary venue for domestic capital and portfolio investments, although fintech companies have begun promoting investments using digital tokens and other virtual assets. Credit is available on local market terms to foreign investors in a variety of forms. Mongolia’s four largest commercial banks – Khan, Trade and Development Bank (TDB), Xac, and Golomt – are majority owned by combinations of Mongolian and foreign investors and collectively hold 84.3 percent of all banking assets, or about $12.1 billion (as of December 2021). Mongolian commercial banks had rates of non-performing loans (NPLs) averaging 10 percent in December 2021, a decrease from December 2020’s 11.8 percent, although these classifications do not conform with international standards given COVID-19 forbearance measures. Ongoing COVID-19 rules enabling postponement of consumer loan and mortgage payments create additional forbearance risk in the banking sector. The Bank of Mongolia, Mongolia’s central bank, regulates banking operations. Foreigners may establish domestic accounts so long as they can prove lawful residence in Mongolia. Parliament amended Mongolia’s Law on Banking in 2021. The amended law states that ownership by a shareholder and their related parties collectively and as certified by the Bank of Mongolia shall not exceed 20 percent. Banks have until December 31, 2023, to comply with this divestment requirement. In addition, Mongolia’s four systemically important commercial banks – Khan, TDB, Xac, and Golomt – and the state-owned State Bank must list themselves on the Mongolian Stock Exchange by June 30, 2022. The new rules may improve bank governance by creating accountability to a broader group of shareholders, although there are concerns that the stipulated timeline may not be conducive to sector stability. The IMF has reported unaddressed macroprudential concerns regarding the relatively large banking system, resulting in the Extended Fund Facility’s unsuccessful completion in 2020. The banking system is broadly undercapitalized, while commercial banking practices and regulatory supervision are inadequate for ensuring macroeconomic stability. Mongolia also has a significant number of illiquid banks. Potential investors in Mongolia’s banking sector should conduct careful due diligence as sector participants and regulators have expressed concerns that the balance sheets of certain systemically important banks may have been inflated or misreported to create the perception of higher capital-adequacy ratios than is accurate. International and domestic sector participants observe that the Bank of Mongolia does not exercise adequate macroprudential oversight over banks, enabling these banks to misreport their assets. It has also allowed insolvent smaller banks to continue operating despite not having enough assets to cover liabilities. Investors contemplating IPO participation should carefully factor in the additional systemic risk associated with these regulatory concerns. Mongolia’s 2020 removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” jurisdictions under enhanced monitoring may give confidence to investors that the country takes seriously anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism concerns. However, sector participants note ongoing challenges in developing new correspondent relations with banks in foreign jurisdictions, with some counterparty banks citing high compliance costs. Mongolia’s Ministry of Finance manages two sovereign wealth funds (SWF) funded through diversion of mining sector revenues: the Fiscal Stabilization Fund and the Future Heritage Fund. The Fiscal Stabilization Fund diverts revenues that might promote boom and bust cycles of spending; however, Mongolia’s recent fiscal crises have depleted this fund. The Future Heritage Fund, resembling Norway’s Global Pension Fund, accumulates mining revenues for the future and invests the proceeds exclusively outside Mongolia. Mongolia’s Future Heritage Fund follows the Santiago Principles, and Mongolia is an associate member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Ministry of Finance and the IMF project the Future Heritage Fund should start accumulating $104-125 million annually in 2023, coinciding with increased revenues from the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine. These SWFs are not meaningfully funded as of 2022, however. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mongolia has state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the banking and finance, energy production, mining, and transport sectors. The Ministry of Finance manages the State Bank of Mongolia and the Mongolian Stock Exchange, and the SOE Erdenes Mongol holds most of the government’s mining assets. The Ministry of Roads and Transport Development manages the Mongolian Railway Authority. The Government Agency for Policy Coordination on State Property ( http://www.pcsp.gov.mn/en ) publicly stated that it administers 106 non-mining and non-financial assets but does not provide a complete, official list of its SOEs. State Property Agency representatives have publicly said their SOE count does not include aimag (provincial) and soum (county) level locally-owned enterprises (LOEs), which number in the hundreds. Investors are concerned SOEs crowd out more efficient private-sector investment. Investors can compete with SOEs, but an opaque regulatory framework limits competition. Businesses have observed that government regulators favor SOEs, such as streamlining processes for environmental permits or ignoring health and safety issues at SOEs. Mongolian SOEs do not adhere to the OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines for SOEs. Although legally required to follow the same international best practices on disclosure, accounting, and reporting used by private companies, SOEs tend to follow these rules only when seeking international investment and financing. Many international best practices are not institutionalized in Mongolian law, and SOEs tend to follow existing Mongolian rules. At the same time, foreign-invested firms follow the international rules, causing inconsistencies in corporate governance, management, disclosure, minority-shareholder rights, and finance. The government perennially floats privatization for such state-held assets as the Mongolian Stock Exchange, the national air carrier MIAT, the Mongol Post Office, and mining assets, through sales of shares or equity but has not identified how or when it would do so. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The practice of responsible business conduct (RBC) in Mongolia has improved. Most international companies make good-faith efforts to work with local communities. Larger domestic firms tend to follow accepted international responsible business conduct practices and underwrite a range of related activities, while smaller companies, lacking resources, often limit responsible business conduct actions to the locales in which they work. Locally, firms adopting responsible business conduct are perceived favorably by the communities in which they operate. Nationally, responses range from praise from politicians to condemnation by certain civil-society groups alleging responsible business conduct nothing more than a cynical attempt to buy public approval. Public awareness of responsible business conduct is limited, with only a few NGOs involved in responsible business conduct promotion or monitoring, and those concentrated on such large private-sector projects as the Oyu Tolgoi mega-mine, while shying away from state-owned entities. Given Mongolia’s high social media penetration, businesses should be aware that discussions regarding their activities could be ongoing on international and domestic social media sites; and should monitor social media discussions to ensure their activities are portrayed accurately. The government attempts to enforce legislation on human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other laws protecting individuals from adverse business impacts. While the Company Law articulates rules of corporate governance, accounting requirements, and shareholder rights, it has no rules for executive compensation. Mongolia has no official position on OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas and no domestic legislation on due diligence for companies sourcing minerals originating from conflict-affected areas. The government has not adopted the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UN principles on responsible business conduct: http://www.oecd.org/about/ ). Mongolia is a member in good standing of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ( EITI ). There have been no alleged/reported human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC of which foreign businesses should be aware. However, businesses should be aware that a disorganized system for granting and enforcing use rights for land, timber, water, and mining assets has given rise to the perception among local communities that central, provincial, and municipal governments are improperly granting rights in contravention to local customs and statutes. Mongolia has a private security industry, and many public and private entities avail themselves of private security services. However, Mongolia has neither signed the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies nor supports the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. While Mongolia has included climate change as a factor in policy formulation across agencies and ministries, the government has no specific green investment plan but very general environmental policies. The Government of Mongolia’s 2020-2024 action plan includes issues related to climate change and references establishment of a green financing system. Regarding policy efforts to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, the government has offered neither policy recommendations nor specific regulatory or legal measures for carbon reduction. Consequently, the government has no expectations that the private sector will undertake measures to achieve net-zero emissions. More broadly, the government continues to examine ways to incentivize preserving biodiversity, particularly through eco-labelling and tax credits. Finally, procurement policies have yet to be greened. While the Law of Procurement includes a policy related to green procurement, implementation has lagged, business and environmental communities have reported. 9. Corruption Investors have acknowledged that corruption is widespread in Mongolia, leading some to curtail additional investments or to exit Mongolia entirely. Given the level of corruption, U.S. businesses are advised to be especially diligent in complying with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Although Mongolian law penalizes corrupt officials, the government does not always implement the law effectively or evenhandedly. Private enterprises report instances where officials and political operatives demand bribes to transfer-use rights, settle disputes, clear customs, ease tax obligations, act on applications, obtain permits, and complete registrations. NGOs and private businesses report judicial corruption is also present. Factors contributing to corruption include conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, limited access to information, an underfunded civil-service system, low salaries, and limited government control of key institutions. Mongolia does not require companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. U.S. and other foreign businesses have reported that they accept the need for and have adopted internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. (For Mongolia anti-corruption efforts: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mongolia/. The Independent Agency Against Corruption (IAAC) has primary responsibility for investigating corruption, assisted at times by the National Police Agency’s Organized Crime Division. Mongolia has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention ( UNAC ) but not the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Independent Agency Against Corruption (IAAC) District 5, Seoul Street 41 Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 14250 Telephone: +976-70110251; 976-11-311919 Email: contact@iaac.mn Web: http://www.iaac.mn/home?lang=en Transparency International Mongolia O. Batbayar, Executive Director, Mongolia Chapter Office 803, 8th floor, Dalai Tower, Unesco Street, Sukhbaatar District – Khoroo 1, Ulaanbaatar 14230 Web: https://www.transparency.org/country/MNG 10. Political and Security Environment Mongolia’s political and security environment is peaceful and stable. Crime is low in the capital Ulaanbaatar but fluctuates seasonally. Street-level petty theft and assault occur with some regularity, while more complex financial and fraud-based crimes are rising. U.S. investors are generally welcomed by the Mongolian people; however, in small numbers and in specific areas, anti-foreign sentiment fueled by fringe nationalist groups occurs. These sentiments do not focus on U.S. investors exclusively and are subject to current events. Resource sector investors have reported that disputes between those with legal rights to utilize local resources and residents can lead to protests, disorder, and, in rare cases, violence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The National Statistics Office of Mongolia reports official unemployment was 8.1 percent (99,400 people) of Mongolia’s 1.23-million-person labor force (December 2021). Youth unemployment hovers around 18 percent of total unemployed. 42 percent (519,420) of the labor force lives in Ulaanbaatar and 58 percent (707,084) in rural areas. Women accounted for 47.6 percent (583,621) of total labor, with women’s unemployment at 7.4 percent; women compose 43.6 percent (43,333) of total unemployed. The latest statistics on labor-age disabled workers from 2019 put the total pool of workers at 98,166, of whom 9,179 were employed. 5,617 foreign workers from 77 countries are officially registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, of whom two-thirds work in construction and mining. 63 percent of registered foreign workers are from China, despite COVID-19-related travel restrictions. Unskilled labor is abundant, but chronic shortages persist in most professional categories requiring advanced degrees or vocational training, including all types of engineers and professional tradespeople in the construction, mining, and services sectors. Foreign-invested companies address shortages by providing in-country training, increasing salaries and benefits to retain employees, or hiring expatriate workers with expertise unavailable in Mongolia. Mongolia’s 2021 Revised Labor Law (RLL) came into force January 2022. However, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, responsible for enforcing this statute, has not adopted all necessary regulations to support enforcement. The RLL formalizes most practices described below, which had heretofore been customary between employer and employee or achieved through regulatory fiat. It also creates a new system for employers using long shifts for their crews, mostly in the resource extraction sectors. The RLL stipulates that work and resting shifts must be equal—for example, 14 days on must be balanced by 14 days off—and that overtime must be limited. Employers report these new rules effectively require them to hire more employees to achieve the same staffing levels under old rules and with more administrative burdens. As Mongolia faces chronic shortages of skilled employees, employers are concerned the RLL will lead to rising costs as headcounts might have to increase while productivity per worker decreases, threatening the commercial viability of those businesses with limited capacity to absorb or pass on these additional costs. The RLL retains the requirement that companies employ Mongolian workers in all labor categories where the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection determines a Mongolian can perform the task as well as a foreigner. This provision primarily applies to unskilled labor categories. Investors can locate and hire workers without hiring agencies, if hiring practices follow the RLL. If employers want to hire expatriate laborers and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection for that employee, the employer can pay a monthly waiver fee. Depending on a project’s importance, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection can exempt employers from 50 percent of the waiver fees per worker. However, employers report difficulty in obtaining waivers. (For details on Mongolian labor law: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mongolia/). Because Mongolia’s winters limit operations in infrastructure development, construction, and mining, employers tend to use a higher degree of temporary contract labor than companies operating year-round. The RLL allows employers and employees to use short-term contracts; however, such contracts are limited to work lasting less six months comprising less than 30 percent of an entity’s labor force. The RLL allows most workers to form or join independent unions and professional organizations and protects rights to strike; but denies these rights to foreign workers, certain public servants, and workers without formal employment contracts. However, all groups have the right to organize. The law protects the right to participate in trade union activities without retaliation, and the government has protected this right in practice. The law provides for reinstatement of workers fired for union activity, but this provision is not always enforced. Some employees occasionally face obstacles to forming or joining unions, and some employers have taken steps to weaken existing unions. For example, some employers prohibit participation in union activities during working hours or refuse to conclude collective bargaining agreements in contracts. The RLL allows employers to fire or lay off workers for cause. Depending on the circumstances, however, severance may be required, and workers may seek judicial review of their dismissal. Under the RLL, retirement is no longer a legal justification for firing an employee, and mass redundancy layoffs require 90-days’ notice. Employers and legal experts report that Mongolia’s courts usually support employee claims, especially if the plaintiff or defendant is a foreign business. The severance laws require employers to pay laid off workers one month of the contracted salary, but fired workers receive no severance. Laid off or fired workers are entitled to three months of unemployment insurance from the Social Insurance Agency. The Law on Collective Bargaining regulates relations among employers, employees, trade unions, and the government. Wages and other conditions of employment are set between employers (whether public or private) and employees, with trade union input in some cases. Laws protecting the rights to collective bargaining and freedom of association are generally enforced. The Mongolian Confederation of Trade Unions represents most workers in the resource extraction and construction-related sectors in collective bargaining activities but not government and agricultural sector employees. The Confederation of Trade Unions also mediates specific grievances through government-sanctioned Tripartite Labor Dispute Settlement Committees. Tripartite Labor Dispute Settlement Committees resolve most disputes between workers and management and consist of representatives Confederation of Trade Unions, employers, and the government. Cases not resolved by these Committees may go to court. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is concerned about child-labor practices and variations between Mongolian law and international labor standards. Authorities report employers often require minors to work more than weekly permitted hours, paying them less than the minimum wage. The General Agency for Specialized Inspections ( GASI ) enforces all labor regulations but is understaffed. ILO conventions ratified by Mongolia: Mongolia (ilo.org) 14. Contact for More Information The Economic and Commercial Section U.S. Embassy P.O. Box 341 Ulaanbaatar 14192, Mongolia Telephone: +976-7007-6001 Email: Ulaanbaatar-Commercial Montenegro Executive Summary Montenegro’s economy is centered on three sectors, with the government largely focusing its efforts on developing tourism, energy, and to a lesser extent, agriculture. The tourism sector officially accounts for about 25 percent of GDP, although some analysts believe it accounts for over one-third when taking into account the grey economy. In the energy sector, the most important development project in the transmission system was the construction of a one-way underwater electricity cable to export power to Italy, which included the development of a 433-kilometer-long tunnel approximately 1,200 meters below the Adriatic Sea surface. The project cost 800 million euro and began operation in December 2019. There are several other ongoing energy projects, including the controversial ecological reconstruction of the coal-fired thermal plant in Pljevlja in partnership with China’s Dongfang Electric Corporation, as well as the development of a 55-megawatt wind power plant in Gvozd, a project supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Montenegrin government also signed concession agreements for exploratory offshore oil and gas drilling, which began in March 2021, although preliminary results indicate that the drill site is not feasible for exploitation. According to the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG), foreign direct investment (FDI) to Montenegro in 2021 totalled €898.4 million. Although no one source country dominates FDI, significant investments have come from Italy, Hungary, China, Russia, and Serbia, with other investments also coming from the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the United States. Montenegro has one of the highest public debt-to-GDP ratios in the region, currently at 83 percent. Infrastructure development remains a government priority, including the second section of Montenegro’s first highway, a project designed to better connect the more developed south with the relatively underdeveloped north of the country. The pandemic hit Montenegro’s economy hard, with the unemployment rate reaching 24 percent by the end of 2021. In addition, GDP declined by 15.3 percent in 2020, the biggest drop in Europe. The country enjoyed a strong recovery in 2021, however, with the government announcing a GDP growth rate of 14 percent for the year, one of the highest in Europe. Economic recovery will continue to face challenges, however. Developments in Ukraine and Russia, two of the Montenegro’s main sources of tourists, will threaten economic growth. An internal political crisis, after Parliament in early February 2022 passed a motion of no-confidence in the Government and subsequently removed the Parliament’s Speaker, also threatens economic stability. As of late March 2022, a caretaker Government was running the country’s day-to-day operations and ongoing negotiations to form a new Government were taking place, with the possibility of snap elections if these talks fail. Montenegro began implementing a wide-ranging economic reform program known as Europe Now, which eliminated all individual health care contributions, almost doubled the minimum wage, increased pensions, and introduced a system of progressive taxation. As a candidate country on its path to joining the European Union (EU), Montenegro has opened all 33 negotiating chapters (and closed three). But the county’s candidacy is dependent on progress against interim benchmarks in rule of law. The European Commission’s 2021 Country Report for Montenegro termed progress in this area as “limited.” Despite regulatory improvements, corruption remains a significant concern. Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017. Montenegro has not joined the Open Balkan Initiative, previously known as “Mini-Schengen,” an initiative championed by Serbia and Albania designed to facilitate trade, services, and movement of people throughout the Western Balkans. Table 1 Measure Year Index /Rank Website Address Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 64 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 50 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 NA http://www.apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 7,900 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Montenegro regained its independence in 2006, and since then, the country has adopted an investment framework that in principle encourages growth, employment, and exports. Montenegro, however, is still in the process of establishing a liberal business climate that fosters foreign investment and local production. The country remains dependent on imports from neighboring countries despite its significant potential in some areas of agriculture and food production. Although the continuing political transition has obstructed the elimination of all structural barriers, the government generally recognizes the need to remove impediments to remain competitive, reform the business environment, open the economy to foreign investors, and attract further FDI. In general, there are no distinctions made between domestic and foreign-owned companies. Foreign companies can own 100 percent of a domestic company, and profits and dividends can be repatriated without limitations or restrictions. Foreign investors can participate in local privatization processes and can own land in Montenegro generally on the same terms as locals. Expropriation of property can only occur for a “compelling public purpose” and compensation must be made at fair market value. There has been no known expropriation of foreign investments in Montenegro, however long-standing property restitution cases dating back to WWII remain unresolved. International arbitration is allowed in commercial disputes involving foreign investors. Registration procedures have been simplified to such an extent that it is possible to complete all registration processes online. In addition, bankruptcy laws have been streamlined to make it easier to liquidate a company; accounting standards have been brought up to international norms; and custom regulations have been simplified. There are no mandated performance requirements. Montenegro has enacted specific legislation outlining guarantees and safeguards for foreign investors. Montenegro has also adopted more than 20 other business-related laws, all in accordance with EU standards. The main laws that regulate foreign investment in Montenegro are: the Foreign Investment Law; the Enterprise Law; the Insolvency Law; the Law on Fiduciary Transfer of Property Rights; the Accounting Law; the Law on Capital and Current Transactions; the Foreign Trade Law; the Customs Law; the Law on Free Zones; the Labor Law; the Securities Law; the Concession Law, and the set of laws regulating tax policy. Montenegro has taken significant steps in both amending investment-related legislation in accordance with global standards and creating necessary institutions for attracting investments. However, as is the case with other transition countries, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation remains weak and inconsistent. While Montenegro has taken steps to make the country more open for foreign investment, some deficiencies still exist. The absence of fully developed legal institutions has fostered corruption and weak controls over conflicts of interest. The judiciary is still slow to adjudicate cases, and court decisions are not always consistently reasoned or enforced. Montenegro’s significant grey economy impacts its open market, negatively affecting businesses operating in accordance with the law. Favorable tax policies established at the national level are often cancelled out with taxes introduced by different municipalities on the local level. To better promote investment and foster economic development, the government adopted in December 2019 a new Law on Public Private Partnerships and established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA), merging the Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and the Secretariat for Development Projects. MIA seeks to promote Montenegro as a competitive investment destination by facilitating investment projects in the country. Together with the Privatization and Capital Investment Council, MIA promotes investment opportunities in various sectors of the Montenegrin economy, primarily focusing on the tourism, energy, technology, and agricultural sectors. These two institutions will maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors already present in Montenegro and, at the same time, seek to promote future projects and attract new investors to do business in Montenegro. MIA is also the state agency that leads the controversial Economic Citizenship Program, which started on January 1, 2019, and was designed to accelerate Montenegro’s economic development by creating new tourism, agriculture and processing capacities and create new jobs, especially in the underdeveloped northern part of the country. The program was intended to last three years and be available for up to 2,000 applicants. Thus far, 700 applications have been submitted, and in December 2021, the program was extended until the end of 2022. More information is available at http://www.mia.gov.me . In September 2021, the U.S.-Montenegro Economic Dialogue was launched to provide a constructive bilateral platform to improve the business climate, explore promising commercial opportunities, and deepen shared prosperity between the two countries. Montenegro’s Foreign Investment Law, which was adopted by the Parliament in 2011, establishes the framework for investment in Montenegro. The law eliminates previous investment restrictions, extends national treatment to foreign investors, allows for the transfer and repatriation of profits and dividends, provides guarantees against expropriation, and allows for customs duty waivers for equipment imported as capital-in-kind. There are no limits on foreign control and right to private ownership or on establishing companies in Montenegro. There are no institutional barriers to foreign investors, including U.S. businesses. As an aspiring EU Member State, Montenegro monitors and implements best practices regarding foreign investments, according to government officials, but the country still has no screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment in Montenegro. In December 2021, the Embassy hosted a presentation to Montenegrin officials by the U.S. Department of Treasury on the U.S. government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investment screening mechanism. Montenegrin officials have stated the Government’s intention is to have a screening mechanism in place for investment in strategic national security sectors by 2023. The WTO secretariat conducted its first review of Montenegrin trade policies and practices in April 2018 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp469_e.htm ). The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Montenegro prepares a biannual Business Climate Report (BCR), an assessment of issues on which the Government needs to take action to improve the country’s business environment. The most recent 2019-2020 edition was the sixth BCR to date, and recommends that the Government tackle the grey economy, improve public procurement procedures, address weak labor legislation, and correct inconsistencies in the implementation of existing laws. More information is available at http://www.amcham.me/advocacy/publications/ The White Book is the most recognized publication of the Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council. It is published every year and its main goal is to help the improvement of the business environment in the country through various recommendation provided by the Council’s members. All reports are available on the following website: http://mfic.me/activities/white-book Other useful links: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&search=Montenegro&language=en https://ejatlas.org/country/montenegro The Central Register of the Commercial Court (CRPS) is responsible for business registration procedures ( www.crps.me ). The court maintains an electronic database of registered business entities, and contracts on financial leasing and pledges. The process to register a business in Montenegro takes an average of 4-5 working days. The minimum financial requirement for a Limited Liability Company (LLC) is just EUR 1 (USD 1.1), and three documents are required: a founding decision, bylaws, and a copy of the passport (if an individual is founding a company) or a registration form for the specific type of company. Samples of all documents are available for download at the CRPS website. Montenegrin law permits the establishment of six types of companies: entrepreneur, limited liability company, joint stock company, general partnership, limited partnership, and part of a foreign company. All included in the business activities need to open a bank account. Once a bank account is established, the company reports to the tax authority in order to receive a PIB (taxation identification number) and VAT (Value Added Tax) number. For classification of companies by size, based on number of employees, the government’s definition is as follows: (i) small enterprises (from one to 49 employees), (ii) medium-sized enterprises (from 50 to 249) and (iii) large enterprises (more than 250 employees). While the Montenegrin government is very active in attracting and inviting foreign investors to do business in Montenegro, the government is not as dedicated to promoting outward investments. There are no government restrictions to domestic investors for their investments abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Montenegro signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in July 2007. The agreement has been signed by seven other countries (Albania, North Macedonia, Moldova, UNMIK/Kosovo, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). A free trade agreement with Turkey has been in force since March 2010. Montenegro had a free trade agreement with Russia, but the agreement is not currently in force, nor are the free trade agreements with Kazakhstan and Belarus, which have a customs union with Russia. In 2011 Montenegro signed a free trade agreement with Ukraine and with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). Montenegro has not signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. The United States restored Normal Trade Relations (Most-Favored Nation status) to Montenegro in December 2003. This status provides improved access to the U.S. market for goods exported from Montenegro. Montenegro has also been designated as a beneficiary developing country under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program which expired on January 1, 2021. As a result, Montenegrin imports entering the United States that were eligible for duty free treatment under GSP up to December 31, 2020 (jewelry, ores, stones, and various agricultural products) are now subject to regular duties. Montenegro does not have a double taxation treaty with the United States. On March 1, 2018, Montenegro’s Parliament approved the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between the governments of Montenegro and the United States. Implementation of FATCA will help the countries better track and report tax evasion. The country has signed 43 taxation treaties with various countries on income and property, which regulate double taxation. The treaties in force are with the following countries: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, India, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, North Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Treaties with Spain and Qatar are pending. Investment treaties seek to ensure a stable framework for investment and better use of economic resources. They define the conditions for investments, allowing free transfer of funds, the right of subrogation, compensation in the event of expropriation and settlement of disputes between investors and countries, including the settlement of disputes between the countries themselves. Montenegro has 24 BITs in force and more than half have been concluded with the EU member states. Additional information can be found at https://www.gov.me/clanak/ostali-sporazumi Montenegro joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS in December 2019. More information available at https://www.oecd.https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/search/?term=montenegro/tax/beps/search/?term=montenegro 3. Legal Regime The main law governing foreign investment, the Montenegrin Law on Foreign Investment, is based on the national treatment principle, which is a basic principle of GATT/WTO that prohibits discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods with respect to internal taxation or other government regulation. All proposed laws and regulations put forth by the government are published in draft form and open for public comment, generally for a 30-day period.Regulations are often applied inconsistently, particularly at the municipal level. Many regulations are in conflict with other regulations, or are ambiguous, creating confusion for investors. As noted in the American Chamber of Commerce’s (AmCham) biannual Business Climate Survey conducted in 2020, many municipalities lack adequate detailed urban plans, complicating investment plans. Some municipalities have made efforts to speed up procedures in order to improve the business environment for investors. While at the national level there are fewer obstacles for investments and other activities, many larger-scale projects involve both local and national authorities, and it is often necessary to work with both administrations to complete a project. AmCham members surveyed are dissatisfied with the duration of the court proceedings (79.5 percent) and unequal implementation of the law (63.6 percent). At the same time, over 70 percent of AmCham member companies surveyed believe that conditions for doing business when it comes to the duration of the court proceedings, and unequal implementation of the laws have not changed in the past two years. Foreign investors are subject to the same conditions as domestic investors when it comes to establishing a company and making an investment. There are no other regulations in place which might deprive a foreign investor of any rights or limit the investor’s ability to do business in Montenegro. The Law of Foreign Investments is currently fully harmonized with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.In 2004, the Parliament established an Energy Regulatory Agency, which maintains authority over the electricity, gas, oil, and heating energy sectors. Its main tasks include approving pricing, developing a model for determining allowable business costs for energy sector entities, issuing operating licenses for energy companies and for construction in the energy sector, and monitoring public tenders. The energy law mandates that in the energy sectors, when prices are affected by monopoly positions of some participants, business costs will be set at levels approved by the Agency. In those areas deemed to function competitively, the market will determine prices. The price of gasoline is set nationally every two weeks and is uniform across all petrol stations.The Agency for Electronic Communication and Postal Services (known by its Montenegrin acronym EKIP) was established by the government in 2001. It is an independent regulatory body whose primary purpose is to design and implement a regulatory framework and to encourage private investment in the sector. In March 2021, EKIP prepared a “Study on the Strategy for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks in Montenegro”. In December 2021, the Government adopted the “Roadmap for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks” and is planning an auction to allocate radio frequencies for the 5G network (700 MHz, 3.5 GHz and 26 GHz) at the end of 2022. A “5G Strategy” is also expected to be adopted by mid-2022. While there is a full legal and regulatory infrastructure in place to conduct public procurement, U.S. companies have complained in numerous cases about irregularities in the procurement process at the national level and maintain there is an inability to meaningfully challenge decisions they believe were erroneously taken through the procurement apparatus. In other cases, the system delivers appropriate outcomes, though in a complex and time-consuming way. Public procurement is conducted jointly by the Public Procurement Directorate, the Ministry of Finance (as the main line ministry for the procurement area), and the State Commission for Control of Public Procurement Procedures in the protection of rights area. The Public Procurement Directorate began operations in 2007 while the State Commission for the Control of Public Procurement Procedures was established in 2011. The State Commission takes decisions in the form of written orders and conclusions made at its meetings. The decisions are made by a majority of present members. The State Commission’s Rules of Procedure specify the method for this work. The revised Law of Public Procurement entered into force in December 2019. The Administrative Court oversees cases involving public procurement procedures. The Montenegro State Audit Institution (SAI) is an independent supreme audit institution for verification of the entire government’s financial statements, including state-owned enterprises. The audits are made publicly available on the SAI’s website (http://www.dri.co.me/). Accounting standards implemented in Montenegro are transparent and consistent with international norms. In addition, various international companies that conduct accounting and auditing procedures are present in the country. More information on whether Montenegrin Government publish or consult with the public about proposed regulations is available at https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/montenegro Montenegro is a candidate country for membership to the EU, with accession negotiations launched on June 29, 2012. All 33 negotiating chapters have been opened, while three are provisionally closed, the last one in 2017. Montenegro is currently taking steps to harmonize its regulations and accepted best practices with those of the EU, as part of the negotiation process. The government has not notified the WTO of any measures that are inconsistent with the WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), nor have there been any independent allegations that the government maintains any such measures. Montenegro’s legal system is of a civil, continental type based on Roman law. It includes the legal heritage of the former Yugoslavia, and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. As of 2006, when the country regained its independence, Montenegrin codes and criminal justice institutions were applicable and operational. Montenegro’s Law on Courts defines a judicial system consisting of three levels of courts: Basic, High, and the Supreme Court. Montenegro established the Appellate Court and the Administrative Court in 2005 for the appellate jurisdiction in criminal and commercial matters, and specialized jurisdiction in administrative matters. The specialized Commercial Court has first instance jurisdiction in commercial matters. Apart from those, there are also specialized Misdemeanors Courts. The Basic Courts have first instance jurisdiction in civil cases and criminal cases in which a prison sentence of up to 10 years is possible. There are 15 Basic Courts for Montenegro’s 23 municipalities. Two High Courts in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje have appellate review of basic court decisions. The High Courts also decide on jurisdictional conflicts between the basic courts. They are also first instance courts for serious crimes where prison sentence of more than 10 years is specified. The Podgorica High Court has specialized judges and department who deal with organized crime, corruption, war crimes, money laundering, and terrorism cases.According to the Law on Courts, there is just one Commercial Court based in Podgorica. The Commercial Court has jurisdiction in the following matters: all civil disputes between legal entities, shipping, navigation, aircraft (except passenger transport), and disputes related to registration of commercial entities, competition law, intellectual property rights (IPR), bankruptcy, and unfair trade practices. The High Court hears appeals of Basic Court decisions, and High Courts’ first instance decision may be appealed to the Appellate Court which is also a second instance court for decisions of the Commercial Court. The Supreme Court is the third (and final) instance court for all decisions. The Supreme Court is the court of final judgment for all civil, criminal, commercial, and administrative cases, and it acts only upon irregular (i.e., extraordinary legal remedies). There is also the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, which checks constitutionality and legality of legal acts and acts upon constitutional complaints in relation to human rights violations. The Commercial Court system faces challenges, including weak implementation of legislation and confusion over numerous changes to existing laws; development of a new system of operations, including electronic communication with clients; and limited capacity and expertise among the judges as well as a general backlog in cases. Over the last several years, the adoption of 20 new business laws has significantly changed and clarified the legislative environment. Recently adopted legislative reforms improved the efficiency and effectiveness of court proceedings, a trend which is already visible through the introduction of Public Enforcement Agents. In order to attract foreign investment and to lead interested investors through the process, the government established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA) ( www.mia.gov.me ) and the Privatization and Capital Investment Council https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte ). These organizations aim to promote Montenegro’s investment climate and opportunities in the local economy, with a focus on the tourism, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors. In 2013, the Agency for Protection of Competition was established as a functionally independent entity after the Law on Protection of Competition entered into force and the Central Register of Economic Entities registered the law. The area of free market competition, regulated by the law, represents the area that has direct and significant impact on economic development and investment activity, by raising the level of the quality of goods and services, thus creating the conditions for lower prices and creation of a modern, open market economy. This, in turn, provides Montenegro with the possibility to participate in the single market of the EU and in other international markets. More information available on the Agency’s website: http://www.azzk.me/jml/index.php/en/ Montenegro provides legal safeguards against expropriation with protections codified in several laws adopted by the government. There have been no cases of expropriation of foreign investments in Montenegro. However, Montenegro has outstanding claims related to property nationalized under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A number of unresolved restitution cases involve U.S. citizens. The cases are in various stages of adjudication and have languished for over a decade. At the end of 2007, Parliament passed the new Law on Restitution, which supersedes the 2004 Act. In line with the law, three review commissions have been formed: one in Bar (covering the coastal region); one in Podgorica (for the central region of Montenegro); and one in Bijelo Polje (for the northern region of Montenegro). The basic restitution policy in Montenegro is restitution in kind, when possible, and cash compensation or substitution of other state land when physical return is not possible. In addition, Montenegro provides safeguards from expropriation actions through its Foreign Investment Law. The law states that the government cannot expropriate property from a foreign investor unless there is a “compelling public purpose” established by law or based on the law. If an expropriation is executed, compensation must be provided at fair market value plus one basis point above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate for the period between the expropriation and the date of payment of compensation. The Bankruptcy Law, adopted in 2011, mandates that debtors are designated insolvent if they cannot meet financial obligations within 45 days of the date of maturity of any debt obligation. However, the law still offers some latitude for restrictive measures and discretionary government interference. Bankruptcy is criminalized in Montenegro and a responsible officer in a business entity who caused bankruptcy and damage to another person by irrational spending of assets or their bargain selling, by excessive borrowing, undertaking disproportional obligations, recklessly concluding contracts with insolvent entities, omitting to collect claims in time, by destroying or concealing property or by other acts which are not in compliance with prudent business practices shall be punished by a prison term from six months to five years. 4. Industrial Policies The Ministry of Economic Development, in cooperation with the World Bank Group (WBG), has created an Investment Incentives Inventory, which provides a comprehensive list of available financial and non-financial support programs for the private sector as well as domestic and foreign investors offered by the Government of Montenegro. This initiative is part of the WBG-supported Regional Investment Reform Agenda, whose objective is the development of commonly accepted investment standards for the Western Balkans region in order to improve the attractiveness of the region for regional and other foreign investors. Montenegro’s goals are to leverage this program to spur a higher inflow of investments and achieve a higher level of entrepreneurship, trade and job creation. The inventory contains data on 40 incentive measures that are available to domestic and foreign investors through various support programs intended for the private sector. The MIA overseas the incentive program implementation. More information is available on the Agency’s website ( https://mia.gov.me/investment-incentive-inventory ). In 2004, Montenegro adopted the Law on Free Zones, which offers businesses benefits and exemptions from custom duties, taxes, and other duties in specified free trade zones. The Port of Bar is currently the only free trade zone in Montenegro. All free zone users have many benefits provided by the law and other regulations (import free of customs duties, customs fees and VAT; storage of goods in a duty-free regime for an unlimited period of time; low corporate tax, simplified procedures) in addition to the use of infrastructure, port handling services, and telecommunication services. All regulations relating to free trade zones are in compliance with EU legal standards. Complete equality has been guaranteed to foreign investors in reference to ownership rights, organizing economic activities in the zone, complete free transfer of profit and deposit, and the security of investments. More info is available at http://www.lukabar.me/ The government does not impose any performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. There is a defined package of incentives offered to foreign investors, including duty exemptions for imported equipment. AmCham Montenegro and the Foreign Investors’ Council announced that Montenegro has improved and liberalized its business environment due to amendments to the Law on Foreigners. This law addressed previous requirements placed on hiring practices. According to revisions to the law, businesses no longer need to prove that there are no local citizens of the required vocational profile that are available for a particular job before the company decides to hire a foreigner. The government does not use “forced localization,” the policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology. The only exception is an agreement with a Chinese company that is constructing the country’s first national highway. The agreement for this project, which is currently the largest infrastructure project in Montenegro, requires that 30 percent of the labor contract be engaged locally. 5. Protection of Property Rights In 2002 Montenegro enacted the Law on Secured Transactions and established a collateral registry at the Commercial Court in 2003. The registry’s operational guidelines have been drafted and approved by the Commercial Court. The main goal of the Law on Secured Transactions is to establish a clear and transparent framework for property transactions. In 2004, Montenegro adopted a new Law on Mortgages by which immovable property may be encumbered by security interest (mortgage) to secure a claim for the benefit of a creditor who is authorized, in the manner prescribed by the law, to demand satisfaction of the claim by foreclosing the mortgaged property with priority over creditors who do not have a mortgage created on that particular property, as well as over any subsequently registered mortgage, regardless of a change in the owner of the encumbered immovable property. The Real Estate Administration has taken progressive steps over the last few years to improve the quality and service provided in the registry, though additional improvements are needed. The acquisition and disposition of IPR are protected by the Law on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, which entered into force in 2006. The law provides for fines for legal entities of up to EUR 30,000 (approximately USD 37,000) for selling pirated and/or counterfeited goods. It also provides ex-officio authority for market inspectors in the areas mentioned above. An additional set of amendments to the existing Law on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights were adopted over the last several years (beginning in 2006) in line with the EU regulations, and it is expected to bring more efficiency in implementation as well as a multifunctional approach to property-rights protection. In 2005, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Regulation on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Border Measures that provides powers to customs authorities to suspend customs procedures and seize pirated and counterfeit goods. Statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods is published by the Revenue and Customs Administration and available on their webpage www.upravaprihoda.gov.me . Montenegro’s Penal Code penalizes IPR violations, allows ex-officio prosecution, and provides for stricter criminal penalties; however, copyright violation is a significant problem in the outerwear and apparel market, and unlicensed software can be easily found on the general market. The Law on Optical Disks was adopted in 2006; it requires the registration of business activity when reproducing optical disks for commercial purposes and provides for surveillance of optical disk imports and exports, as well as imports and exports of polycarbonates. The Montenegrin Intellectual Property Office is the competent authority within the state administration system for the activities related to industrial property rights, copyrights, and related rights. The Intellectual Property Office was established under the Regulation on Organization and Manner of Work of the State Administration in 2007, and officially started working on in 2008. At the end of 2007, the Customs Administration signed a Letter of Intent for acceptance of Standards to be Employed by Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement (SECURE) Standards, adopted by the World Customs Organization (WCO), to promote the efficient protection of IPR by customs authorities.Montenegro is not on the Special 301 Watch List. Montenegro is not listed in the Notorious Markets List. However, the sale of pirated optical media (DVDs, CDs, software) as well as counterfeit trademarked goods, particularly sneakers and clothing, is widespread. According to the 2018 joint survey of Business Software Alliance and the International Data Corporation (IDC), the most recent report available, the software piracy rate in Montenegro is among the highest in Europe constituting 74 percent of the market, two percentage points below the 2015 study. Enforcement is slowly improving as customs, police, and judicial authorities obtain the necessary tools, but institutional capacity and public awareness is still limited. To further improve intellectual property protection, AmCham Montenegro established an IPR Committee in April 2009, which currently operates under the Grey Economy Committee. The main goal of the committee is to work closely with the Montenegrin institutions which deal with IPR, to increase public awareness of the importance of intellectual property protection, and to help the Government of Montenegro strengthen its administrative capacities in this field. More information about the committee’s activities can be found on AmCham’s website http://www.amcham.me/ . Montenegro became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2006, with more information available on the WIPO’s website http://www.wipo.int/members/en/details.jsp?country_id=193 6. Financial Sector The banking sector in Montenegro is fully privatized with 11 privately owned banks operating in the country. The banking sector operates under market terms. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, and they have access to a variety of credit instruments since the majority of the banks in Montenegro belong to international banking chains. The largest foreign banks are OTP (Hungary) operating as CKB in Montenegro, Erste Bank (Austria) and NLB (Slovenia). The remaining, smaller foreign banks do not belong to large international groups. A new set of banking laws were adopted in December 2019, and some of the existing laws have been amended to improve regulation of the banking sector, provide a higher level of depositor safety, and increase trust in the banking sector itself. The Law on the Protection of Deposits was adopted in the same year to bring local legislation on protecting deposits up to European standards. In accordance with the law, a fund for protecting deposits has been established and deposits are guaranteed up to the amount of EUR 50,000 (approximately USD 55,000). Until 2010, Montenegro had two stock exchanges. After a successful merger (in 2010), only one stock exchange operates on the capital market under the name of Montenegro Stock Exchange (MSE). The turnover of the MSE included 1,618 transactions, which totaled EUR 46.5 million in 2021, a 50 percent increase over 2020. In December 2013, the Istanbul Stock Exchange purchased 24.38 percent of the MSE ( www.montenegroberza.com ). Three types of securities are traded: shares of companies, shares of investment funds, and bonds (old currency savings bonds, pension fund bonds, and bonds from restitution.) The MSE is organized on the principle of member firms, which trade in their own names and for their own account (dealers) in the name and for the account of their clients (brokers). Members of the MSE can be a legal entity registered as a broker under the Law on Securities provided, they meet conditions laid down by the Statute of the Stock Exchange. In addition, members may include banks and insurance companies, once approved by the Commission for Securities to perform stock exchange trade. MSE currently has 6 stockbrokers. According to Central Bank of Montenegro, the banking sector remained solvent and liquid. Total bank assets amounted to EUR 5.33 billion at the end of 2021, an increase of EUR 741.6 million or 16.2 percent over the previous year. Loans make up the dominate share of bank balance sheets, amounting to EUR 3.36 billion at the end of 2021, a 6.4 percent increase over 2020. Non-performing loans accounted for 6.2 percent of the total. In 2021, lending activity grew by 13.9 percent over 2020, while the interest rate dropped to 5.66 percent due to increased competition. Montenegro is one of a few countries that does not belong to the Euro zone but uses the Euro as its official currency (without any formal agreement). Since its authority is limited in monetary policies, the Central Bank, in its role as the state’s fiscal agent, has focused on control of the banking system and maintenance of the payment system. The Central Bank also regulates the process for establishing a bank. A bank can be founded as a joint-stock company and acquire the status of a legal entity by registering in the court register. An application for registration in the court register must be submitted 60 days from when the bank is first licensed. On March 1, 2018, Montenegro’s Parliament approved the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between the governments of Montenegro and the United States. There are no difficulties in the free transfer of funds exercised on the basis of profit, repayment of resources, or residual assets. The Central Bank of Montenegro publishes statistics on remittances as a proportion of GDP, with the latest data available indicating that in 2020 remittances accounted for approximately 12.3 percent of GDP. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Montenegro. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since the beginning of the privatization process in 1999, nearly 90 percent of formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized. The most prominent SOEs still in operation include the Port of Bar, Montenegro Railways, Airports of Montenegro, Plantaze Vineyards, Electric Power Industry of Montenegro (EPCG), several companies in the tourism industry, including Ulcinjska and Budvanska Rivijera, and the newly established national carrier ToMontenegro that had its inaugural flight in June 2021. All of these companies are registered as joint-stock companies, with the government appointing one or more representatives to each board based on the ownership structure. All SOEs must provide an annual report to the government and are subject to independent audits. In addition, SOEs are listed and have publicly available auditing accounts on the Montenegrin Securities Commission’s website www.scmn.me . Political affiliation has been known to play a role in job placement in SOEs. In August 2021, the Government of Montenegro established a new state entity known as Montenegro Works that is to have financial and administrative oversight over all SOEs. While it has established a board of directors, hired a management team, and received two years of funding from the Government, its operations remain in their infancy, and it has not yet received approval from Parliament for its long-term objectives and operations. The privatization process in Montenegro is currently in its final phase. The majority of companies that have not yet been privatized are of strategic importance to the Montenegrin economy and operate in such fields as energy, transport, and tourism. Further privatization of SOEs should contribute to better economic performance, increase the competitiveness of the country, and enable the government to generate higher revenues (while lowering its outlays), which will enhance capital investments and reduce debts. The Montenegrin government is the main institution responsible for the privatization process. The Privatization and Capital Investment Council was established in 1996 to manage, control, and implement the privatization process as well as to propose and coordinate all activities necessary for the non-discriminatory and transparent application process for capital projects in Montenegro. The prime minister of Montenegro is the president of the Privatization and Capital Investment Council. More information about the council, the privatization process, and the actual privatization plan is available on the council’s website https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte . 8. Responsible Business Conduct While there are several good examples of companies undertaking responsible business conduct (RBC) in Montenegro, practices are still developing and are not adopted evenly across the private sector. The government, together with various business organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the international community, organizes events in order to promote and encourage RBC. Since last year, efforts have focused on introducing the RBC concept in the education system. The promotion of RBC through the media has also been used as an effective tool as the media can play a pivotal role in raising awareness about RBC initiatives. The concept of corporate social responsibility (a term that preceded RBC) features regularly on the agenda of many companies in Montenegro. The most recent survey showed that large private companies and associations are, indeed, more engaged in RBC activities, whereas small companies cited the lack of knowledge about RBC and the lack of support and interest from clients as the main reasons for not participating. Montenegro is a country with relatively low per capita greenhouse gas emissions, producing 1.8 tons of CO2 per person, compared to a world average of 4.8 tones per person, according to the most recent available data. In 2015, the Government adopted its National Strategy in the Field of Climate Change by 2030. Montenegro increased its nationally determined contributions (NDC) target to decrease greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement from 30 percent to 35 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. The Government is also developing a national energy and climate plan, as well a strategy on air quality management. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Corruption and the perception of corruption are significant problems in Montenegro’s public and private sectors. Corruption routinely places high on the list of citizen concerns in opinion polls, in addition to risks cited by foreign investors. Montenegro placed 64th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International (TI) 2021 Corruption Perception Index list. An improved legal framework to help combat corruption and organized crime has been in force since the adoption of the Law on Prevention of Corruption in 2014 and the Law on the Special State Prosecution in 2015. The government has also taken substantial steps to strengthen the Rule of Law, including the establishment of a special police unit focused on corruption and organized crime, the creation of an Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, the creation of a new independent Office of the Special State Prosecutor that handles major cases including organized crime and corruption, and the appointment of the Chief Special State Prosecutor. In line with these laws, the Special Prosecution, the Special Police Team, and the Agency for Prevention of Corruption became operational in 2015 and 2016. In 2015, Montenegro’s Parliament adopted the Law on the Confiscation of Proceeds from Criminal Activities, which provides for expanded procedures for the freezing, seizure, and confiscation of illicit proceeds. It also authorizes the creation of multi-disciplinary financial investigation teams. In February 2019, a multi-institutional operational team for fight against commercial crime was founded. The Head of Crime Police presides over the team, and it consists of representatives of the police, Customs Authority, Tax Authority, and Administration for Inspection Affairs. A focus of the team’s work is on the prevention, investigation, and fight against misuse in commercial activity. The Parliament also adopted the Law on the Center for Training of the Judiciary and State Prosecution which created a new independent judicial training institute, with greatly expanded powers and autonomy. Over the past year, the government has made some progress in the fight against corruption by opening investigations against a few representatives at both the local and national government level. The adoption of the Law on Courts has created one centralized Special Department for Organized Crime, Corruption, War Crimes, Terrorism and Money Laundering in the Podgorica High Court. The government encourages state institutions and the private sector to establish internal codes of conduct. They are encouraged to have ethical codes, as well as obliged to have preventive integrity plans. Montenegro is a signatory to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. It also succeeded to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery, formally signed by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro prior to Montenegro’s independence. To date, no foreign firms have lodged complaints against the government under any of these agreements. Several U.S. firms have specifically noted corruption as an obstacle to direct investment in Montenegro, and corruption is seen as one of the typical hurdles to be overcome when doing business in the country. The government procurement sector remains vulnerable to corruption, according to reputable NGOs that analyze the issue. The purchase and sale of government property generally continues to be conducted in a non-transparent environment with frequent allegations of cronyism. In December 2020, the government established the High-Level National Anti-Corruption Council. The members of the Council are the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Social Welfare, as well as representatives of the academia and the NGOs MANS and Institute Alternativa. The Council’s task is to collect documentation related to all suspicious government activities, and then submit any questionable findings to the relevant authorities, including the Prosecutor’s Office in all cases where there is a suspicion of corrupt activities and damage to the budget of Montenegro. However, in January 2022, due to the political instability facing the country, the NGO representatives and several other Council members left the body, putting its survival in doubt. Contact at government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Vladimir Novovic Chief Special Prosecutor for Fighting Organized Crime, Corruption, War Crimes and Terrorism and Money Laundering, Office of the Special State Prosecutor Email: specijalno@tuzilastvo.me Jelena Perovic Director, Agency for the Prevention of Corruption Email: kabinet@antikorupcija.me MANS (Network for Affirmation of the NGO sector) is a non-governmental organization that fights against corruption and organized crime in Montenegro. The NGO is engaged in investigating concrete cases of corruption and organized crime, monitoring the implementation of legislation and government policy, providing free legal aid to citizens, CSOs, media and businesses, developing law and policy proposals and analysis, and conducting advocacy campaigns. Vanja Calovic Executive Director MANS (Network for Affirmation of NGO sector) Email: mans@t-com.me Website: www.mans.co.me 10. Political and Security Environment Montenegro has a multi-party-political system with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. Seventeen months after the August 2020 national elections removed the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) after almost three decades in power and a new Government was formed, the coalition government of Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapic collapsed on February 4, after Parliament backed a vote of no confidence called by the smallest block within the coalition, Black and White, along with DPS and other opposition parties. President and DPS leader Milo Djukanovic on March 3, 2022, named Deputy Prime Minister and Black and White leader Dritan Abazovic as the Prime Minister designate. The Krivokapic cabinet continued to operate under a “technical mandate” while negotiations on forming a new minority government took place, with the DPS and other opposition parties announcing they would offer their support. As of late March 2022, a caretaker government managed the country’s day-to-day activities; if negotiations to form a new government fail, national elections would be held. Former Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic was elected President of Montenegro in April 2018 for a five-year term. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Montenegro’s total labor force consists of approximately 250,000 people with almost 50,000 workers, or close to 20 percent of the labor pool, employed in the public sector. The unemployment rate was 24 percent as of December 2021, according to the country’s Unemployment Agency. As the result of the Europe Now reform program passed in December 2021 and taking effect as of January 2022, the minimum wage in Montenegro has almost doubled from EUR 250 to EUR 450 per month, which has also led to the increase of the country’s average salary from EUR 537 to EUR 686 per month. A stated goal of the reform program was to tackle the informal economy, estimated at almost 30 percent of GDP, with large numbers of workers officially earning only the minimum wage, but receiving additional payments in cash out of sight of the tax authorities. According to AmCham, finding skilled middle managers represents a serious challenge for its member companies, and many foreign companies choose instead to hire foreigners for skilled positions. To tackle youth unemployment, Montenegro is prioritizing efforts to improve practical job skills, including English language training and digital literacy. However, university students in Montenegro obtain little or no practical work experience while studying for their bachelor’s degree. It is widely mentioned in business circles that Montenegrin young adults prefer public sector work to private companies, despite the higher salaries, due to the perceived job security and less demanding workload. 2019 was marked by the intensive work on the Labor Law in a form of a dialogue among social partners regarding disputable legal solutions and the new Labor Law has been adopted in December 2019. Over the past few years, private sector employment has increased, and total employment in the public sector (including SOEs) has decreased. Employment in Montenegro is led by three major sectors: tourism, maritime and offshore jobs (including on cruise ships or freighters), and manufacturing. The new Montenegrin Labor Act introduced important employment regulations. The maximum duration of a fixed-term contract has been extended from 24 months to 36 months. Employers that employ more than 10 employees must adopt an internal general policy which lists positions and sets out job descriptions. Part-time positions cannot be for fewer than 10 hours per week, except for the GM/CEO. Full-time positions are 40 hours per week. Minimum statutory annual leave is 20 working days for regular jobs and 30 working days for jobs with severe conditions where full-time work hours are reduced from 40 to 36 hours per week. As of October 2019, Sunday became a non-working day for trade shops in Montenegro. Employees who have a six-day long work week are entitled to a minimum of 24 working days of annual leave. Employers are obliged to adopt an annual leave plan prior to April 30 each calendar year for the current year. Employers are not allowed to compensate employees for unused annual leave, except in the case of employment termination that occurs before the employee has consumed his or her entire annual leave allowance for the given year. Should an employer’s operations be shut down, employees can receive 60 percent of their average salary earned over the previous six months, but not less than the minimum wage, for a maximum period of four months within a given calendar year. The new Labor Law contains an explicit provision stating that an employer may only pay salaries to the employee’s bank account. Employment may not be terminated during pregnancy or maternity/ parental leave, except in case of a serious breach of work duties. Maternity leave may be taken for 365 days, beginning 28 days prior to childbirth. In cases in which employees claim unlawful termination, the employee must initiate proceedings before the Agency for Peaceful Resolution of Labor Disputes or before the Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution. After doing so, the employee may initiate court proceedings against the employer. Court proceedings must be initiated within 15 days from the end of the mandatory mediation. The statute of limitations for monetary claims arising out of employment is four years from the date on which the obligation became due. Claims for payment of pension and disability insurance contributions are not subject to any statute of limitations. The procedure for determining a breach of work duties has been adjusted, now allowing for dismissal for breach without having to first conduct disciplinary proceedings in the following cases: (i) if the employee’s behavior is such that he/she cannot continue to work for the employer (e.g. coming to work intoxicated; drinking or using narcotics during work; refusing to undergo a medical examination to determine intoxication; abusive, offensive, or inappropriate behavior towards customers or employees, etc.); (ii) if the employee knowingly provided inaccurate data during the hiring process; (iii) abuse of sick leave; (iv) failure to return to work after the end of unpaid leave. The Law on Peaceful Resolution of Labor Disputes was adopted in 2007. It introduces out-of-court settlements of labor disputes. The Law on the Employment of Nonresidents took effect in 2009 and mandates the government to set a quota for nonresident workers in the country. In December 2020, the Government established a quota 20,454 work permits for foreigners in 2021. Procedures for hiring foreign workers were simplified, and taxes for nonresident workers have been significantly decreased to help domestic companies that are experiencing problems engaging domestic staff, particularly for temporary and seasonal work. The Law on Foreigners in Montenegro came into force in 2015. At the beginning of 2016, amendments suggested by AmCham Montenegro and business organizations (including the Montenegrin Employers’ Federation, Montenegrin Chamber of Economy, Montenegro Business Alliance, and Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council) were adopted that improve and liberalize Montenegro’s business environment. According to changes to the law, businesses are no longer required to provide official records proving that the company was unable to hire Montenegrin nationals with the required skills before hiring foreigners. Changes were made to the Law on Pensions and Care of Invalids in 2017, including gradually increasing the age of retirement from 65 to 67 years (for both men and women) by 2042. These revisions are designed to eliminate anticipated shortfalls in the pension fund. The amended Law on Pensions and Care of Invalids which improves the conditions for retirement and harmonization of pensions, and increases the minimum pension was adopted in July 2020. The new Law improves the conditions for retirement, because one quarter of the period of service that was the most unfavorable for future retirees is excluded from the accounting period. Until 2008, there was only one trade union confederation at the national level in Montenegro, the Confederation of Trade Unions of Montenegro (SSCG). SSCG is the successor of the former socialist trade union and inherited the property, organizational structure, and rights to participation in the tripartite bodies on the national level. As of 2008, a new confederation, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Montenegro (USSCG), split away from SSCG. All international labor rights are recognized within domestic law, such as freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, child labor employment discrimination, minimum wage, occupation safety and health, as well as weekly working hours. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2019 USD 5,543 2020 USD 4,770 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2019 N/A 2020 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2019 N/A 2020 N/A BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 8.3 2020 10.6 UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 5,697 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Russian Federation 619 10.8% Azerbaijan 464 8.1% Italy 367 6.4% Republic of Serbia 334 5.8% Cyprus 329 5.7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for more information Walter Andonov Political and Economic Deputy Chief U.S. Embassy Montenegro Email: andonovwb@state.gov Morocco Executive Summary At the confluence of Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, Morocco seeks to transform itself into a regional business hub by leveraging its geographically strategic location, political stability, and world-class infrastructure to expand as a regional manufacturing and export base for international companies. Morocco actively encourages and facilitates foreign investment, particularly in export sectors like manufacturing, through positive macro-economic policies, trade liberalization, investment incentives, and structural reforms. The Government of Morocco implements strategies aimed at boosting employment, attracting foreign investment, and raising performance and output in key revenue-earning sectors, with an emphasis placed on value-added industries such as renewables, automotive, aerospace, textile, pharmaceuticals, outsourcing, and agro-food. Most of the government’s strategies are laid out in the New Development Model released in April of 2021. As part of the Government’s development plan, Morocco continues to make major investments in renewable energy, is on track to meet its stated goal of 64 percent total installed capacity by 2030, and announced an even more ambitious goal of 80 percent by 2050. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2021 , Morocco attracted the ninth-most foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa in 2020. Peaking in 2018 when Morocco attracted $3.6 billion in FDI, inbound FDI dropped by 55 percent to $1.7 billion in 2019 and remained largely unchanged at $1.7 billion in 2020. UAE, France, and Spain hold a majority of FDI stocks. Manufacturing attracted the highest share of FDI stocks, followed by real estate, trade, tourism, and transportation. Morocco continues to orient itself as the “gateway to Africa,” and expanded on this role with its return to the African Union in January 2017 and the launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) which entered into force in 2021. In June 2019, Morocco opened an extension of the Tangier-Med commercial shipping port, making it the largest in Africa and the Mediterranean; the government is developing a third phase for the port which will increase capacity to five million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Tangier is connected to Morocco’s political capital in Rabat and commercial hub in Casablanca by Africa’s first high-speed train service. But weak intellectual property rights protections, inefficient government bureaucracy, corruption, inadequate money laundering safeguards and the slow pace of regulatory reform remain challenges. In 2021, Morocco was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” of countries subjected to increased monitoring due to deficiencies int the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Morocco has ratified 72 investment treaties for the promotion and protection of investments and 62 economic agreements, including with the United States and most EU nations, that aim to eliminate the double taxation of income or gains. Morocco is the only country on the African continent with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, eliminating tariffs on more than 95 percent of qualifying consumer and industrial goods. The Government of Morocco plans to phase out tariffs for some products through 2030. The FTA supports Morocco’s goals to develop as a regional financial and trade hub, providing opportunities for the localization of services and the finishing and re-export of goods to markets in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Since the U.S.-Morocco FTA came into effect bilateral trade in goods has grown nearly five-fold. The U.S. and Moroccan governments work closely to increase trade and investment through high-level consultations, bilateral dialogue, and other forums to inform U.S. businesses of investment opportunities and strengthen business-to-business ties. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 77 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $457 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,020 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Morocco actively encourages foreign investment through macro-economic policies, trade liberalization, structural reforms, infrastructure improvements, and incentives for investors. The Investment Charter, Law 18-95 of October 1995, is the current foundational Moroccan text governing investment and applies to both domestic and foreign investment (direct and portfolio). An updated Investment Charter is under development and is expected to significantly expand incentives for foreign investment. The new charter aims to increase the private investment by two-thirds of total investment by 2035, includes additional incentives to draw investment to promising sectors and less favored regions, and provide additional support for the development of strategic industries such as defense and pharmaceuticals. The Ministry of Industry is executing its second Industrial Acceleration Plan (PAI), running from 2021-2025, which aims to build on the progress made in the previous 2014-2020 PAI and expand industrial development throughout all Moroccan regions. The PAI is based on establishing “ecosystems” that integrate value chains and supplier relationships between large companies and small- and medium-sized enterprises. Moroccan legislation governing FDI applies equally to Moroccan and foreign legal entities, except for certain protected sectors. Morocco’s Investment and Export Development Agency (AMDIE) is the national agency responsible for the development and promotion of investments and exports. Following the reform to law 47-18 governing the country’s Regional Investment Centers (CRIs) in 2019, each of the 12 regions is empowered to lead their own investment promotion efforts. Each of the CRI’s websites aggregate relevant information for interested investors and include investment maps, priority sectors, procedures for creating a business, production costs, applicable laws and regulations, and general business climate information, among other investment services. The websites vary by region, with some functioning better than others. AMDIE and the 12 CRIs work together throughout the phases of investment at the national and regional level. For example, AMDIE and the CRIs coordinate contact between investors and partners. Regional investment commissions examine investment applications and send recommendations to AMDIE. The inter-ministerial investment committee, for which AMDIE acts as the secretariat, approves any investment agreement or contract which requires financial contribution from the government. The CRIs also provide an “after care” service to support investments and assist in resolving issues that may arise. Over the last year, AMDIE made a significant push to promote international investment into Morocco under its “Morocco Now” branded campaign. Further information about Morocco’s investment laws and procedures is available on AMDIE’s “Morocco Now” website or through the individual websites of each of the CRIs. For information on agricultural investments, visit the Agricultural Development Agency website or the National Agency for the Development of Aquaculture website . When Morocco acceded to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in November 2009, it guaranteed national treatment of foreign investors. The only exception to this national treatment of foreign investors is in those sectors closed to foreign investment (noted below), which Morocco delineated upon accession to the Declaration. The National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct (NCP), whose presidency and secretariat are held by AMDIE, is the lead agency responsible for the adherence to this declaration. Foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises, barring certain restrictions by sector. While the U.S. Mission is unaware of any economy-wide limits on foreign ownership, Morocco places a 49 percent cap on foreign investment in air and maritime transport companies and maritime fisheries. Foreigners from cannot own agricultural land, though they can lease it for up to 99 years; however, a new law opening agricultural land to foreign ownership has passed into law and its implementing text is forthcoming. The Moroccan government holds a monopoly on phosphate extraction through the 95 percent state-owned Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP). The Moroccan state also has a discretionary right to limit all foreign majority stakes in the capital of large national banks but apparently has never exercised that right. The Moroccan Central Bank (Bank Al-Maghrib) may use regulatory discretion in issuing authorizations for the establishment of domestic and foreign-owned banks. In the oil and gas sector, the National Agency for Hydrocarbons and Mines (ONHYM) retains a compulsory share of 25 percent of any exploration license or development permit. As part of law 47-18 governing the country’s Regional Investment Centers, a reform mandated the various approval authorities for investment projects be consolidated into one “Unified Regional Commission” which has since turned an approval process which averaged 180 days into a process which takes 30 days or less, and sometimes as little as one business day. The U.S. Mission is not aware of instances in which the Moroccan government refused foreign investors for national security, economic, or other national policy reasons, nor is it aware of any U.S. investors disadvantaged or singled out by ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms, relative to other foreign investors. The last third-party investment policy review of Morocco was the World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016 Trade Policy Review (TPR), which found that the trade reforms implemented since the prior TPR in 2009 contributed to the economy’s continued growth by stimulating competition in domestic markets, encouraging innovation, creating new jobs, and contributing to growth diversification. Although some civil society organizations have been critical of certain development projects/initiatives, particularly those with environmental or social impacts, Post is unaware of a comprehensive review focused on investment policy concerns. Prior to its discontinuation of the Doing Business Report, in 2020 the World Bank ranked Morocco 53 out of 190 economies, rising seven places since from the previous report in 2019 and climbing 75 places during the last decade from 128 in 2010. Since 2012, Morocco has implemented reforms that facilitate business registration, such as eliminating the need to file a declaration of business incorporation with the Ministry of Labor, reducing company registration fees, and eliminating minimum capital requirements for limited liability companies. Each of the 12 Regional Investment Centers (CRI) maintains a website which guides investors through the registration process. Foreign companies may use the online business registration mechanism. Foreign companies, except for French companies, are required to provide an apostilled Arabic translated copy of their articles of association and an extract of the registry of commerce in their country of origin. Moreover, foreign companies must report the incorporation of the subsidiary a posteriori to the Foreign Exchange Office (Office de Changes) to facilitate repatriation of funds abroad such as profits and dividends. According to the World Bank, registering a business in Morocco takes an average of nine days, significantly less than the Middle East and North Africa regional average of 20 days. Morocco does not require that the business owner deposit any paid-in minimum capital. Following the passing of electronic creation of businesses law 18-17 , the new system went live in 2021, allowing for the creation of businesses online via an electronic platform managed by the Moroccan Office of Industrial and Commercial Property (OMPIC). All procedures related to the creation, registration, and publication of company data can be carried out via this platform. A new national commission will monitor the implementation of the procedures. The Simplification of Administrative Procedures Law 55-19, passed in 2020, aims to streamline administrative processes by identifying and standardizing document requirements, eliminating unnecessary steps, and making the process fully digital via the National Administration Portal , the site launched in 2021 but is currently only available in Arabic. The business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in the economy. Notably, according to the World Bank, the procedure, length of time, and cost to register a new business is equal for men and women in Morocco. The U.S. Mission is unaware of any official assistance provided to women and underrepresented minorities through the business registration mechanisms. In cooperation with the Moroccan government, civil society, and the private sector, there have been several initiatives aimed at improving gender equality in the workplace and access to the workplace for foreign migrants, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. The Government of Morocco prioritizes investment in Africa as part of its strategy to expand its commercial and trade connections throughout the continent and secure its self-proclaimed title of “Gateway to Africa”. The African Development Bank ranks Morocco as the second biggest African investor in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa, and the largest African investor in West Africa. OCP Africa, a subsidiary of Morocco’s state-owned phosphate giant OCP, has presence in 16 African countries and continues to invest in infrastructure supporting its phosphate exports. According to Morocco’s Office of Exchange, under the supervision of Minister of Economy and Finance, $808 million, or 43 percent of Morocco’s total outward FDI, was invested in the African continent in 2021. The U.S. Mission is not aware of a standalone outward investment promotion agency, although AMDIE’s mission includes supporting Moroccans seeking to invest outside of the country for the purpose of boosting Moroccan exports. Nor is the U.S. Mission aware of any restrictions for domestic investors attempting to invest abroad. However, under the Moroccan investment code, repatriation of funds is limited to “convertible” Moroccan Dirham accounts. Morocco’s Foreign Exchange Office (“Office des Changes,” OC) implemented several changes for 2022 that liberalize the country’s foreign exchange regulations. Moroccans going abroad for tourism can now exchange up to $10,000 in foreign currency per year, with the possibility to attain further allowances indexed at 30 percent of income tax filings with a maximum cap of $30,000. Business travelers can also obtain larger amounts of foreign currency, provided their company has properly filed and paid corporate income taxes. Another new provision permits banks to use foreign currency accounts to finance investments in Morocco’s Industrial Acceleration Zones. 3. Legal Regime Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and a mixed legal system of civil law based primarily on French law, with some influences from Islamic law. Legislative acts are subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court excluding royal decrees (Dahirs) issued by the King, which have the force of law. Legislative power in Morocco is vested in both the government and the two chambers of Parliament, the Chamber of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nuwab) and the Chamber of Councilors (Majlis Al Mustashareen). The principal sources of commercial legislation in Morocco are the Code of Obligations and Contracts of 1913 and Law No. 15-95 establishing the Commercial Code. The Competition Council and the National Authority for Detecting, Preventing, and Fighting Corruption (INPPLC) have responsibility for improving public governance and advocating for further market liberalization. All levels of regulations exist (local, state, national, and supra-national). The most relevant regulations for foreign businesses depend on the sector in question. Ministries develop their own regulations and draft laws, including those related to investment, through their administrative departments, with approval by the respective minister. Each regulation and draft law is made available for public comment. Key regulatory actions are published in their entirety in Arabic and usually French in the official bulletin on the website of the General Secretariat of the Government. Once published, the law is final. Public enterprises and establishments can adopt their own specific regulations provided they comply with regulations regarding competition and transparency. Morocco’s regulatory enforcement mechanisms depend on the sector in question; enforcement is legally reviewable, and made publicly available via the different agencies’ websites. The National Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ANRT), for example, is the public body responsible for the control and regulation of the telecommunications sector. The agency regulates telecommunications by participating in the development of the legislative and regulatory framework. Morocco does not have specific regulatory impact assessment guidelines, nor are impact assessments required by law. Morocco does not have a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The Moroccan Ministry of Finance posts quarterly statistics (compiled in accordance with IMF recommendations) on public finance and debt on their website. A report on public debt is published on the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s website and is used as part of the budget bill formulation and voting processes. The fiscal year 2022 debt report was published on December 20, 2021. Morocco joined the WTO in 1995 and reports technical regulations that could affect trade with other member countries to the WTO. Morocco is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and has a 91.2 percent implementation rate of TFA requirements. European standards are widely referenced in Morocco’s regulatory system. In some cases, U.S. or international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are also accepted. The Moroccan legal system is a hybrid of civil law (French system) and some Islamic law, regulated by the Decree of Obligations and Contracts of 1913 as amended, the 1996 Code of Commerce, and Law No. 53-95 on Commercial Courts. These courts also have sole competence to entertain industrial property disputes, as provided for in Law No. 17-97 on the Protection of Industrial Property, irrespective of the legal status of the parties. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 2015 Morocco Commercial Law Assessment Report , Royal Decree No. 1-97-65 (1997) established commercial court jurisdiction over commercial cases including insolvency. Although this led to some improvement in the handling of commercial disputes, the lack of training for judges on general commercial matters remains a key challenge to effective commercial dispute resolution in the country. In general, litigation procedures are time consuming and resource-intensive, and there is no legal requirement with respect to case publishing. Disputes may be brought before one of eight Commercial Courts located in Morocco’s main cities and one of three Commercial Courts of Appeal located in Casablanca, Fes, and Marrakech. There are other special courts such as the Military and Administrative Courts. Title VII of the Constitution provides that the judiciary shall be independent from the legislative and executive branches of government. The 2011 Constitution also authorized the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council, headed by the King, which has the authority to hire, dismiss, and promote judges. Enforcement actions are appealable at the Courts of Appeal, which hear appeals against decisions from the court of first instance. The principal source of investment legislation in Morocco is Law No. 18-95 that established the 1995 Investment Charter. An updated Investment charter is under development and is expected to go into effect in 2022 Morocco’s CRIs and AMDIE provide users with investment-related information on laws and regulations, both general and specific to various industry sectors and geographic jurisdictions along with procedural information, calls for tenders, and additional resources for business creation. Each CRI hosts a website that is meant to act as an entry point to their “one-stop-shop” services that guide investors through the investment process. These websites have improved significantly and are regularly updated. Morocco’s Competition Law No. 06-99 on Free Pricing and Competition outlines the authority of the Competition Council as an independent executive body with investigatory powers. Together with the INPPLC, the Competition Council is one of the main actors charged with improving public governance and advocating for further market liberalization. Law No. 20-13, adopted on August 7, 2014, amended the powers of the Competition Council to bring them in line with the 2011 Constitution. The Competition Council’s responsibilities include making decisions on anti-competition practices and controlling concentrations, with powers of investigation and sanction; providing opinions in official consultations by government authorities; and publishing reviews and studies on the state of competition. In January 2022, the Competition Council published a legal compliance guide , in partnership with the Moroccan Employers Association, to provide additional guidance for companies and professional organizations in establishing a competition law compliance program. In February 2022, Tangier-based Moroccan Association of Transport and Logistics (AMTL), a labor union, called on transport professionals to raise transport fees by 20 percent, citing the rise in diesel prices. Soon after, Morocco’s Competition Council announced an investigation. Under Morocco’s liberal market laws, prices are determined according to offer and demand principles, and no single entity holds the right to fix market prices. At the same time that the AMTL issued the memo, Morocco’s government stepped into open dialogue with labor unions, causing the AMTL to retract their memo. Following reported mishandling of an investigation into the alleged collusion by oil distribution companies in 2020, King Mohammed VI convened an ad hoc committee to investigate the Competition Council’s dysfunctions. In March 2021, the king appointed a new council president, and parliament adopted a new bill strengthening the Competition Council by improving its legal framework and increasing transparency. Expropriation may only occur in the public interest for public use by a state entity, although in the past, private entities that are public service “concessionaires,” mixed economy companies, or general interest companies have also been granted expropriation rights. Article 3 of Law No. 7-81 (May 1982) on expropriation, the associated Royal Decree of May 6, 1982, and Decree No. 2-82-328 of April 16, 1983, regulate government authority to expropriate property. The process of expropriation has two phases: in the administrative phase, the State declares public interest in expropriating specific land and verifies ownership, titles, and appraised value of the land. If the State and owner can come to agreement on the value, the expropriation is complete. If the owner appeals, the judicial phase begins, whereby the property is taken, a judge oversees the transfer of the property, and payment compensation is made to the owner based on the judgment. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any recent, confirmed instances of private property being expropriated for other than public purposes (eminent domain), or in a manner that is discriminatory or not in accordance with established principles of international law. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Morocco is a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and signed its convention in June 1967. Morocco is a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Law No. 08-05 provides for enforcement of awards made under these conventions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Morocco is signatory to over 70 bilateral treaties recognizing binding international arbitration of trade disputes, including one with the United States. Law No. 08-05 established a system of conventional arbitration and mediation, while allowing parties to apply the Code of Civil Procedure in their dispute resolution. Foreign investors commonly rely on international arbitration to resolve contractual disputes. Commercial courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitration awards. Generally, investor rights are backed by a transparent, impartial procedure for dispute settlement. There have been no claims brought by foreign investors under the investment chapter of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement since it came into effect in 2006. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any investment disputes over the last year involving U.S. investors. Morocco officially recognizes foreign arbitration awards issued against the government. Domestic arbitration awards are also enforceable subject to an enforcement order issued by the President of the Commercial Court, who verifies that no elements of the award violate public order or the defense rights of the parties. As Morocco is a member of the New York Convention, international awards are also enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the convention. Morocco is also a member of the Washington Convention for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and as such agrees to enforce and uphold ICSID arbitral awards. The U.S. Mission is not aware of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Morocco has a national commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution with a mandate to regulate mediation training centers and develop mediator certification systems. Morocco seeks to position itself as a regional center for arbitration in Africa, but the capacity of local courts remains a limiting factor. To remedy this shortcoming, the Moroccan government established the Center of Arbitration and Mediation in Rabat, and the Casablanca Finance City Authority established the Casablanca International Mediation and Arbitration Center, which now see a majority of investment disputes. The U.S. Mission is aware of several investment and commercial disputes and has advocated on behalf of U.S. companies to resolve the disputes. Morocco’s bankruptcy law is based on French law. Commercial courts have jurisdiction over all cases related to insolvency, as set forth in Royal Decree No. 1-97-65 (1997). The Commercial Court in the debtor’s place of business holds jurisdiction in insolvency cases. The law gives secured debtors priority claim on assets and proceeds over unsecured debtors, who in turn have priority over equity shareholders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranked Morocco 73 out of 190 economies in “Resolving Insolvency”. The GOM revised the national insolvency code in March of 2018, but further reform is needed. 4. Industrial Policies As set out in the Investment Code, Morocco offers incentives designed to encourage foreign and local investment. Morocco’s exisiting Investment Charter gives the same benefits to all investors regardless of the industry in which they operate (except agriculture and phosphates, which remain outside the scope of the Charter). Post is unaware of any special incentives designated for businesses owned by underrepresented investors. With respect to agricultural incentives, Morocco’s Green Generation 2020-2030 plan aims to improve the competitiveness of the agribusiness industry by supporting value chains and making the industry more resilient and environmentally sound. Agricultural companies with revenues exceeding $500,000 qualify for a lower corporate tax rate of 20 percent. The Moroccan government launched its “investment reform plan” in 2016 to create a favorable environment for the private sector to drive growth. The plan includes the adoption of investment incentives to support the industrial ecosystem, tax and customs advantages to support investors and new investment projects, import duty exemptions, and a value added tax (VAT) exemption. Special VAT exemptions are available for medical products and vaccines and products/materials related to solar panel production. AMDIE’s website has more details on investment incentives, but generally these incentives are based on sectoral priorities (automotive, aerospace, textile, agro-food industry, pharmaceuticals, outsourcing). Investments of $5 million or above qualify for government subsidies of land cost (20 percent), external infrastructure costs (5 percent), and training costs (20 percent). The Moroccan Government offers several guarantee funds and sources of financing for investment projects to both Moroccan and foreign investors. For example, the Caisse Centrale de Garantie (CCG), a public finance institution, offers co-financing, equity financing, and guarantees. Beyond tax exemptions granted under ordinary law, Moroccan regulations provide specific advantages for investors with investment agreements or contracts with the Moroccan Government if they meet the required criteria. These advantages include subsidies for certain expenses related to investment through the Industrial Development and Investment Fund subsidies of certain expenses for the promotion of investment in specific industrial sectors and the development of new technologies through the Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development, exemption from customs duties within the framework of Article 7.I of the Finance Law 12-98, and exemption from the Value Added Tax (VAT) on imports and domestic sales. Morocco has several free zones offering companies incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and reduced customs duties. These zones aim to attract investment by companies seeking to export products from Morocco. As part of a government-wide strategy to strengthen its position as an African financial hub, Morocco offers incentives for firms that locate their regional headquarters in Morocco at Casablanca Finance City (CFC), Morocco’s flagship financial and business hub launched in 2010. For details on CFC eligibility, see CFC’s website . In 2021, Morocco was removed from the European Union’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (the so-called “EU Tax Haven Grey List”, not to be confused with FATF AML/CFT grey list), after amending some tax policy measures deemed as potentially harmful based on the tax advantages offered to export companies, companies operating in free zones, and CFC. To enhance its competitiveness and investment attractiveness and to be aligned with international best practices, Morocco’s 2020 budget law transformed the country’s free zones into “Industrial Acceleration Zones” with a 15 percent corporate tax rate following an initial five years of exemption, compared to a previous corporate tax rate of 8.75 percent over 20 years. The zones also allow for flat 20 percent income tax applicable for all employees working within the zone, much lower than the graduated income tax which can reach up to 38 percent. Additionally, the Moroccan government also offers a VAT exemption for investors using and importing equipment goods, materials, and tools needed to achieve investment projects whose value is at least $20 million. Similarly, the CFC regime provides companies holding CFC status a tax benefit exemption for five years followed by a reduced rate of 15 percent (compared to a rate of 31 percent). It applies to financial services (such as investment services and holding companies) and non-financial services activities (such as advisory and regional headquarters and distribution centers). The CFC regime is open to both Moroccan and foreign companies and provides the same tax benefits. The Moroccan government views foreign investment as an important vehicle for creating local employment. Visa issuance for foreign employees is contingent upon a company’s inability to find a qualified local employee for a specific position and can only be issued after the company has verified the unavailability of such an employee with the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competency (ANAPEC). If these conditions are met, the Moroccan government allows the hiring of foreign employees, including for senior management. The process for obtaining and renewing visas and work permits can be onerous and may take up to six months, except for CFC members, where the processing time is reportedly one week. Although there is no formal requirement to use domestic content in goods or technology, the government has announced its intent to pursue an import-substitution policy as part of its COVID-19-related industrial recovery plan and has amended its finance law to increase custom duties on finished products coming from non-FTA countries. Additionally, the plan established a special industrial project bank with the goal of supporting projects in 11 target sectors. The WTO Trade Related Investment Measures’ (TRIMs) database does not indicate any reported Moroccan measures that are inconsistent with TRIMs requirements. Though not required, tenders in some industries, including solar and wind energy, are written with targets for local content percentages. Both performance requirements and investment incentives are uniformly applied to both domestic and foreign investors depending on the size of the investment. The Moroccan Data Protection Act (Act 09-08 ) stipulates that data controllers may only transfer data if a foreign nation ensures an adequate level of protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the treatment of their personal data. Morocco’s National Data Protection Commission (CNDP) defines the exceptions according to Moroccan law. Local regulation requires the release of source code for certain telecommunications hardware products. However, the U.S. Mission is not aware of any Moroccan government requirement that foreign IT companies should allow the Moroccan government to review or have backdoor access to their source-code or systems. 5. Protection of Property Rights Morocco permits foreign individuals and foreign companies to own land, except agricultural land. Passed in 2021 Land Reform bill 62-19, which will open rural land acquisition to joint ventures and limited partnerships, is awaiting the publication of regulatory texts. Foreigners may acquire agricultural land to carry out an investment or other economic project that is not agricultural in nature, subject to first obtaining a certificate of non-agricultural use from the authorities. Morocco has a formal registration system maintained by the National Agency for Real Estate Conservation, Property Registries, and Cartography (ANCFCC), which issues titles of land ownership. Approximately 30 percent of land is registered in the formal system, and almost all of that is in urban areas. In addition to the formal registration system, there are customary documents called moulkiya issued by traditional notaries called adouls. While not providing the same level of certainty as a title, a moulkiya can provide some level of security of ownership. Morocco also recognizes prescriptive rights whereby an occupant of a land under the moulkiya system (not lands duly registered with ANCFCC) can establish ownership of that land upon fulfillment of all the legal requirements, including occupation of the land for a certain period (10 years if the occupant and the landlord are not related and 40 years if the occupant is a family member). There are other specific legal regimes applicable to some types of lands, including: Collective lands: lands which are owned collectively by some tribes, whose members only benefit from rights of usufruct; Public lands: lands which are owned by the Moroccan State; Guich lands: lands which are owned by the Moroccan State, but whose usufruct rights are vested upon some tribes; Habous lands: lands which are owned by a party (the State, a certain family, a religious or charity organization, etc.) subsequent to a donation, and the usufruct rights of which are vested upon such party (usually with the obligation to allocate the proceeds to a specific use or to use the property in a certain way). Morocco’s rating for “Registering Property” dropped in 2020 by 13 places, resulting in a ranking of 81 out of 190 countries worldwide in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report in this category. Despite reducing the time it takes to obtain a non-encumbrance certificate, Morocco made property registration less transparent by not publishing statistics on the number of property transactions and land disputes for the previous calendar year, resulting in a lower score than in 2019. The Ministry of Industry and Trade oversees the Moroccan Office of Industrial and Commercial Property (OMPIC), which serves as a registry for patents and trademarks in the industrial and commercial sectors. The Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Communication oversees the Moroccan Copyright Office (BMDA), which registers copyrights for literary and artistic works (including software), enforces copyright protection, and coordinates with Moroccan and international partners to combat piracy. In 2020, OMPIC launched its second strategic plan, Strategic Vision 2025, following the conclusion of its 2016-2020 strategic plan. The new 2025 plan has three pillars: the creation of an environment conducive to entrepreneurship, creativity, and innovation; the establishment of an effective system for the protection and defense of intellectual property rights; and the implementation of economic and regional actions to enhance intangible assets and market-oriented research and development. In 2016 OMPIC partnered with the European Patent Office (EPO) and developed an agreement for validating European patents in Morocco, and now receives roughly 80 percent of total applications via this channel. In 2021 OMPIC was certified to classify technical documents using the Cooperative Patent Classification, an extension of the International Patent Classification program which is jointly managed by the EPO and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In 2021, OMPIC recorded more than 14,000 applications, a 24 percent increase from the previous year, and now exceeds pre-pandemic levels. In 2016, the Ministry of Communication and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) signed an MOU to expand cooperation to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in Morocco. The memorandum committed both parties to improving the judicial and operational dimensions of Morocco’s copyright enforcement, including the launch of WIPOCOS, a WIPO-developed database for collective royalty management organizations or societies. Law No. 23-13 on Intellectual Property Rights increased penalties for violation of those rights and better defined civil and criminal jurisdiction and legal remedies. It also set in motion an accreditation system for patent attorneys to better systematize and regulate the practice of patent law. Law No. 34-05, amending and supplementing Law No. 2-00 on Copyright and Related Rights, includes 15 items (Articles 61 to 65) devoted to punitive measures against piracy and other copyright offenses. These range from civil and criminal penalties to the seizure and destruction of seized copies. Judges’ authority in sentencing and criminal procedures is proscribed, with little power to issue harsher sentences that would serve as stronger deterrents. Moroccan authorities continue to express a commitment to cracking down on all types of counterfeiting, but due to resource constraints, only focus enforcement efforts on the most problematic areas, specifically those with public safety and/or significant economic impacts. In 2019, the Customs and Indirect Tax Administration (ADII) seized 700,000 items and received 689 requests to stop the sale of counterfeit goods. In 2015, Morocco and the European Union concluded an agreement on the protection of Geographic Indications (GIs), which is pending ratification by both the Moroccan and European parliaments. Should it enter into force, the agreement would grant Moroccan GIs sui generis, which is especially relevant as it is a prominent element of its Green Generation 2020-2030 agricultural development plan. The U.S. government continues to urge Morocco to pursue a transparent and substantive assessment process for the EU GIs in a manner consistent with Morocco’s existing obligations, including those under the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement. Morocco is not listed in USTR’s most recent Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. For assistance, please refer to the U.S. Embassy local lawyers’ list, as well as to the regional U.S. IP Attaché. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter MehravariPatent AttorneyIntellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North AfricaU.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark OfficeTel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov 6. Financial Sector Morocco encourages foreign portfolio investment and Moroccan legislation applies equally to Moroccan and foreign legal entities and to both domestic and foreign portfolio investment. The Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE), founded in 1929 and re-launched as a private institution in 1993, is one of the few exchanges in the region with no restrictions on foreign participation. The CSE is regulated by the Moroccan Capital Markets Authority. Local and foreign investors have identical tax exposure on dividends (10 percent) and pay no capital gains tax. With a market capitalization of around $68 billion and 75 listed companies, CSE is the second largest exchange in Africa (after the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). Nonetheless, the CSE saw only 10 new listings between 2012-2022. There was only one new initial public offering (IPO) in 2021. Short selling, which could provide liquidity to the market, is not permitted. The Moroccan government initiated the Futures Market Act (Act 42-12) in 2015 to define the institutional framework of the futures market in Morocco and the role of the regulatory and supervisory authorities. As of March 2022, futures trading was still pending implementation and is not expected to commence until 2023. The Casablanca Stock Exchange demutualized in November of 2015. This change allowed the CSE greater flexibility and more access to global markets, and better positioned it as an integrated financial hub for the region. The Moroccan government holds a 25 percent share of the CSE but has announced its desire to sell to another major exchange to bring additional capital and expertise to the market. Morocco has accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, sections 2(a), 3, and 4, and its exchange system is free of restrictions on making payments and transfers on current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market. Morocco has a well-developed banking sector, where penetration is rising rapidly and recent improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals have helped resolve previous liquidity shortages. Morocco has some of Africa’s largest banks, and several are major players on the continent and continue to expand their footprint. The sector has several large, homegrown institutions with international footprints, as well as several subsidiaries of foreign banks. According to Bank Al-Maghrib (the Moroccan central bank) there are 24 banks operating in Morocco (five of which are Islamic “participatory” banks), six offshore institutions, 27 finance companies, 12 micro-credit associations, and 20 intermediary companies operating in funds transfer. Among the 19 traditional banks, the top seven banks comprise 90 percent of the system’s assets (including both on- and off-balance-sheet items). Attijariwafa, Morocco’s largest bank, is the sixth largest bank in Africa by total assets (approximately $63 billion in December 2021) and operates in 25 countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Al Mada, the Moroccan royal family holding company is the largest shareholder holding 47 percent of the company’s stock. Foreign (mainly French) financial institutions are majority stakeholders in seven banks and nine finance companies. Moroccan banks have built up their presence overseas mainly through the acquisition of local banks, thus local deposits largely fund their subsidiaries. The overall strength of the banking sector has grown significantly in recent years. Since financial liberalization, credit is allocated freely and Bank Al-Maghrib has used indirect methods to control the interest rate and volume of credit. According to the World Bank, only 41 percent of Moroccan adults use formal financial products or services, leaving significant opportunities remaining for firms pursuing rural and less affluent segments of the market. At the start of 2017, Bank Al-Maghrib approved five requests to open Islamic banks in the country. By mid-2018, over 80 branches specializing in Islamic banking services were operating in Morocco. The first Islamic bonds (sukuk) were issued in October 2018. In 2019, Islamic banks in Morocco granted $930 million in financing. The GOM passed a law authorizing Islamic insurance products (takaful) in 2019, which became commercially available in early 2022. Following an upward trend beginning in 2012, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to bank credit stabilized in 2017 through 2019 at 7.6 percent. COVID-related complications caused the NPL rate to jump to 9.9 percent in the end of 2020 but it had partially recovered to 8.4 percent in January 2022. Morocco’s accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Morocco is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Bank Al-Maghrib is responsible for issuing accounting standards for banks and financial institutions. Bank Al Maghrib requires that all entities under its supervision use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Securities Commission is responsible for issuing financial reporting and accounting standards for public companies. Moroccan Stock Exchange Law ( Law 52-01 ) stipulates that all companies listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE), other than banks and similar financial institutions, can choose between IFRS and Moroccan Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In practice, most public companies use IFRS. Legal provisions regulating the banking sector include Law No. 76-03 on the Charter of Bank Al-Maghrib, which created an independent board of directors and prohibits the Ministry of Finance and Economy from borrowing from the Central Bank except under exceptional circumstances. Even with the financial crisis caused by COVID-19, the central bank did not provide financing directly to the state, but instead used other monetary tools (such as reducing reserve requirements) to intervene and reinforce the banking sector. Law No. 34-03 (2006) reinforced the supervisory authority of Bank Al-Maghrib over the activities of credit institutions. Law No. 51-20, passed in 2021, aims to further the strengthen the financial systems by reinforcing the supervision of financial conglomerates, improving interest rate targeting to protect consumers while, at the same time, increasing financial inclusion, and providing enhanced privacy protections. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in Morocco and are subject to provisions regulating the banking sector. At present, the U.S. Mission is not aware of Morocco losing correspondent banking relationships. There are no restrictions on foreigners’ abilities to establish bank accounts. However, foreigners who wish to establish a bank account are required to open a “convertible” account with foreign currency. The account holder may only deposit foreign currency into that account; at no time can they deposit dirhams. There are anecdotal reports that Moroccan banks have closed accounts without giving appropriate warning and that it has been difficult for some foreigners to open bank accounts. A Crowdfunding law (15-18) was passed into law in 2021, establishing a legal regulatory and legal framework for collaborative financing. The law aims to increase the financial inclusion by providing new source of financing to entrepreneurs. Morocco prohibits the use of cryptocurrencies, noting that they carry significant risks that may lead to penalties. Notwithstanding the current ban, Bitcoin trading in Morocco is among the highest in North Africa, with an estimated 2.4 percent of the population owning the cryptocurrency. Foreign Exchange The income from foreign investments financed in foreign currency can be transferred tax-free, without amount or duration limits. This income can be dividends, attendance fees, rental income, benefits, and interest. Capital contributions made in convertible currency, contributions made by debit of forward convertible accounts, and net transfer capital gains may also be repatriated. For the transfer of dividends, bonuses, or benefit shares, the investor must provide balance sheets and profit and loss statements, annexed documents relating to the fiscal year in which the transfer is requested, as well as the statement of extra-accounting adjustments made to obtain the taxable income. A currency-convertibility regime is available to foreign investors, including Moroccans living abroad, who invest in Morocco. This regime facilitates their investments in Morocco, repatriation of income, and profits on investments. Morocco guarantees full currency convertibility for capital transactions, free transfer of profits, and free repatriation of invested capital, when such investment is governed by the convertibility arrangement. Generally, the investors must notify the government of the investment transaction, providing the necessary legal and financial documentation. With respect to the cross-border transfer of investment proceeds to foreign investors, the rules vary depending on the type of investment. Investors may import freely without any value limits to traveler’s checks, bank or postal checks, letters of credit, payment cards or any other means of payment denominated in foreign currency. For cash and/or negotiable instruments in bearer form with a value equal to or greater than 100,000 Moroccan Dirham, importers must file a declaration with Moroccan Customs at the port of entry. Declarations are available at all border crossings, ports, and airports. Morocco has achieved relatively stable macroeconomic and financial conditions under an exchange rate peg (60/40 Euro/Dollar split), which has helped achieve price stability and insulated the economy from nominal shocks. In March of 2020, the Moroccan Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Administrative Reform, in consultation with the Central Bank, adopted a new exchange regime in which the Moroccan dirham may now fluctuate within a band of ± 5 percent compared to the Bank’s central rate (peg). The change loosened the fluctuation band from its previous ± 2.5 percent. The change is designed to strengthen the capacity of the Moroccan economy to absorb external shocks, support its competitiveness, and contribute to improving growth. Remittance Policies Amounts received from abroad must pass through a convertible dirham account. This type of account facilitates investment transactions in Morocco and guarantees the transfer of proceeds for the investment, as well as the repatriation of the proceeds and the capital gains from any resale. AMDIE recommends that investors open a convertible account in dirhams on arrival in Morocco to quickly access the funds necessary for notarial transactions. Ithmar Capital is Morocco’s investment fund and financial vehicle, which aims to support the national sectorial strategies. Ithmar Capital is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. The $1.8 billion fund was launched in 2011 by the Moroccan government, supported by the royal Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development. This fund initially supported the government’s long-term Vision 2020 strategic plan for tourism and has several large-scale development projects under development. The fund is currently part of the long-term development plan initiated by the government in multiple economic sectors. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible business conduct (RBC) has gained strength in the broader business community in tandem with Morocco’s economic expansion and stability. The Moroccan government does not have any regulations requiring companies to practice RBC nor does it give any preference to such companies. However, companies generally inform Moroccan authorities of their planned RBC involvement. Morocco joined the UN Global Compact network in 2006 and in 2022 counts 24 private company as signatories, including the Confederation General des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), Morocco’s largest private sector lobbying group that represents more than 90,000 private companies. The Compact provides support to companies that affirm their commitment to social responsibility. While there is no legislation mandating specific levels of RBC, foreign firms and some local enterprises follow generally accepted principles, such as the OECD RBC guidelines for multinational companies. NGOs and Morocco’s active civil society are also taking an increasingly active role in monitoring corporations’ RBC performance. In 2017 a non-governmental National Observatory for RBC (ORSEM) was created with the objective of promoting responsible business practices, and in 2021, in collaboration with AtlantaSanad Assurance, a Moroccan insurance company, published its first corporate social responsibility guide. Morocco does not currently participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, though it has held some consultations aimed at eventually joining EITI. No domestic transparency measures exist that require disclosure of payments made to governments. There have not been any cases of high-profile instances of private sector impact on human rights in the recent past. Morocco is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and Post is unaware of any private military companies operating in the country. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain As part of its development strategy, outlined within the New Development Model, the Kingdom of Morocco seeks to ensure that new economic initiatives consider any environmental, economic, or social impacts and strengthen the sustainable management of natural resources and generally promote environmentally friendly economic activities. Following its commitments at past international environmental conventions, Morocco progressed in this area by implementing political, economic, and legal reforms. At the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in 2021 (COP26), Morocco signed on to several climate-change commitments, including the U.S.-led Global Methane Pledge to reduce overall methane emissions by 30 percent (from 2020 levels) by 2030. Morocco has also signed on to the Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI), which supports the Moroccan government’s commitment to transition to a green economy, one of the pillars of the country’s National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS). In June 2021, Morocco was one of the few countries in the world that submitted a revised Nationally Defined Contribution (NDC) to greenhouse gas reductions, strengthening the Kingdom’s 2030 target by revising overall 2030 emissions targets to be more ambitious, from 17 percent to 18.3 percent. Morocco has tied economic development planning to climate action. As part of the New Development Model announced in 2021, environmental protection, the development of green economies and industries, and the preservation and more rigorous management of its limited water sources are given utmost importance, constituting two of the Model’s five pillars. Through Morocco’s 2008 Plan Vert and subsequent Green Generation 2020-2030 national strategies, the government committed to increasing energy production using renewables, removing subsidies on fossil fuels, expanding employment in sustainable industries, and improving the management of its water and ocean resources. Through numerous solar and wind renewable energy projects, Morocco is pursuing an ambitious goal to generate 64 percent of its electricity needs from renewables and is expected to meet that goal by 2030. Ranking as the 22nd most water-scarce country in 2019 by the World Resource Institute, the Moroccan Government directed significant resources over the past five years to managing the country’s water resources, earmarking $12 billion in 2020 for a seven-year program that will focus on building dams to increase water storage capacity, improving water consumption, preserving water resources, and increasing water supply in rural areas. Morocco ranked 26 out of 76 leading countries in MIT’s Green Future Index, and 2nd in Global Green Growth Institute’s Global Green Growth Index for the African region. In 2021 Morocco launched a “Green Economy War Room” in its capital city, Rabat, as a collaboration between the Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency (AMEE) and the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and the Digital and Green Economy. The creation of the center intends to support over 150 different investment projects to maintain and boost Morocco’s pivot toward a model of a sustainable green economy. A law proposed by the National Regulatory Authority for Electricity (ANRE), which builds off of Morocco’s Renewable Energy law 13-09, is currently undergoing public comment. The law will allow ANRE to monitor and control access to the national transmission and distribution grid, with the ultimate purpose of authorizing independent power producers to inject renewable energy into the national grid. The law is an important step forward, paving the way for increased uptake and use of low-carbon renewable energies within the Moroccan electricity grid. The law will also allow the Moroccan regulator the ability to oversee the national grid’s interconnections with foreign transmission grids, thereby allowing Morocco the ability to support other countries’ transition to lower carbon energy solutions. This law will be instrumental in the future development of the Moroccan renewable energy sector and further increase its attractiveness for private investors, support Morocco’s ambitions of greater regional integration, and provide a platform for other low carbon initiatives, such as electric vehicles and smart grid systems, to build from. To further reduce emissions, Morocco aspires to be a global leader in the future industrial production, domestic consumption, and export of green hydrogen fuel. Morocco’s aspirations are tied to its renewable energy potential and proximity to existing energy connections with Europe and Africa. The Ministry of Energy Transition has accelerated the “ National Strategy for Green Hydrogen,” originally announced in August 2021, with a goal to capture up to four percent of the global green hydrogen market through 2050. In 2022, the Ministry launched a “GreenH2 Morocco” initiative to bring together public and private sector players in the field to prepare an appropriate regulatory framework. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) signed an agreement with the Government of Morocco in 2021 to advance technical research and development (R&D) in green hydrogen and build a suitable regulatory development. Prospects for the green hydrogen sector in Morocco are promising as the initial source of manufacturing energy, solar and wind, are plentiful, and the country already has extensive export connections for green products with Europe – a significant buyer of green energy. While several national initiatives are in the works to set the stage for Morocco to become a global leader in green hydrogen, success remains dependent on future engineering innovations, market maturity, and the establishment of an international business and regulatory environment capable of facilitating trade and developing necessary investment.” 9. Corruption In February 2021, Morocco was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) “grey list” of countries of concern regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. Following the grey list designation, Morocco made a high-level commitment to work with the FATF and Middle East and North Africa FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime. Morocco has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including passing new AML legislation, but significant challenges remain. In Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index , Morocco’s score dropped by one point causing its ranking to fall one additional position to 87th out of 180 countries. According to the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Moroccan law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were reports of government corruption in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches during the year. According to the Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019 report published in July 2019, 53 percent of Moroccans surveyed think corruption increased in the previous 12 months, 31 percent of public services users paid a bribe in the previous 12 months, and 74 percent believe the government is doing a bad job in tackling corruption. The 2011 constitution mandated the creation of a national anti-corruption entity. Morocco formally established the National Authority for Probity, Prevention, and Fighting Corruption (INPLCC) but it did not become operational until 2018 when its board was appointed by the king. The INPLCC is tasked with initiating, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of policies for the prevention and fight against corruption, as well as gathering and disseminating information on the issue. In 2021 parliment passed Law No 19-46 to strengthen INPPLC’s effectiveness in its fight against corruption, creating an integrated framework aimed at improving cooperation and coordination, criminalizing corruption, and improving prevention efforts. Additionally, Morocco’s anti-corruption efforts include enhancing the transparency of public tenders and implementation of a requirement that senior government officials submit financial disclosure statements at the start and end of their government service, although their family members are not required to make such disclosures. Few public officials submitted such disclosures, and there are no effective penalties for failing to comply. Morocco does not have conflict of interest legislation. In 2018, thanks to the passage of an Access to Information (AI) law, Morocco joined the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral effort to make governments more transparent. As part of its 2021-2023 Open Government National Action Plan, Morocco launched a national portal for open government , to share its various commitments and allow its citizens to monitor progress and submit their suggestions and concerns. Although the Moroccan government does not require that private companies establish internal codes of conduct, the Moroccan Institute of Directors (IMA) was established in June 2009 with the goal of bringing together individuals, companies, and institutions willing to promote corporate governance and conduct. IMA published the four Moroccan Codes of Good Corporate Governance Practices. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Morocco signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007 and hosted the States Parties to the Convention’s Fourth Session in 2011. However, Morocco does not provide any formal protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. For more information on corruption issues, please view the Human Rights Report. Although the U.S. Mission is not aware of cases involving corruption regarding customs or taxation issues, American businesses report encountering unexpected delays and requests for documentation that is not required under the FTA or standardized shipping norms. Resources to Report Corruption National Authority for Probity, Prevention, and Fighting Corruption (INPPLC) Avenue Annakhil, Immeuble High Tech, Hall B, 3eme etage, Hay Ryad-Rabat +212-5 37 57 86 60 Contact@inpplc.ma Transparency International National Chapter 24 Boulevard de Khouribga, Casablanca 20250 Telephone number: +212-22-542 699 Contact@transparencymaroc.ma 10. Political and Security Environment Morocco enjoys political stability. There has not been any recent damage to commercial facilities and/or installations with a continued impact on the investment environment. Demonstrations occur in Morocco and usually center on economic, social, or labor issues. Demonstrations can attract hundreds to thousands of people in major city centers. Participants are typically, but not always, non-violent and the demonstrations are peaceful and orderly. Morocco has historically experienced terrorist attacks. Travelers should generally exercise increased caution due to terrorism as terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks in Morocco. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and local government facilities. Visitors are encouraged to consult the Department of State’s Morocco Travel Advisory for the most current information. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In the Moroccan labor market, many Moroccan university graduates cannot find jobs commensurate with their education and training, and employers report insufficient skilled candidates. The educational system does not prioritize STEM literacy and industrial skills and many graduates are unprepared to meet contemporary job market demands. In 2011, the Moroccan government restructured its employment promotion agency, the National Agency for Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC), to assist new university graduates prepare for and find work in the private sector that requires specialized skills. The government also is pursuing a strategy to increase the number of students in vocational and professional training programs. The Bureau of Professional Training and Job Promotion (OFPPT), Morocco’s main public provider for professional training, has made several large-scale investments to address the country’s skills gap, counting more than 390 training centers with a capacity to attend 500,000 individuals annually. According to official government figures, unemployment stood at slightly above pre-pandemic levels at 11.8 percent in early 2022, with youth (ages 15-24) unemployment spiking at over 26 percent in 2020. The female labor participation rate remains extremely low at 21.6 percent, ranking 180 out of 189 countries surveyed in a 2018 World Bank survey. Of the female population in the work force, unemployment remains higher than average at 13.2 percent. The World Bank and other international institutions estimate that actual unemployment – and underemployment – rates may be higher. According to a study by Morocco’s central bank, Morocco made considerable progress incorporating its informal economy, which now hovers slightly below 30 percent of GDP. In 2021 newly elected Head of Government Aziz Akhannouch announced an aggressive plan to create 1 million jobs in the private and public sector over his government’s five-year mandate, which in part will be accomplished by increasing government positions, encouraging growth and hiring in the private sector, and further legitimizing Morocco’s informal sector. Pursuing a forward-leaning migration policy, the Moroccan government has regularized the status of over 50,000 sub-Saharans migrants since 2014. Regularization provides these migrants with legal access to employment, employment services, and education and vocation training. The majority of sub-Saharan migrants who benefitted from the regularization program work in call centers and education institutes, if they have strong French or English skills, or domestic work and construction. Under Moroccan Labor Code, Law Number 65-99, there are two types of employment contracts: fixed-term and permanent. Under a fixed-term labor contract, the duration of employment ends on a defined date and early termination initiated by the employer will result in damages equivalent to the amount of corresponding wages for the remainder of the contract. A permanent employment contract can be terminated at any time through the implementation of a well-defined dismissal procedure. The law prohibits the dismissal of an employee without a valid reason and failure to follow these very strict procedure would likely result in the Labor Court ruling the dismissal to be unfair and result in damages being awarded to the dismissed employee. In the case of economic or structural layoffs, the employer must notify the employee’s union presentative and seek permission from the provincial governor prior to conducting any layoffs. In the case of dismissal for misconduct, the bar of proving gross misconduct is typically high and it is common for labor courts to rule in the favor of the dismissed employee – even those who commit a blatant act of gross misconduct – if the employer does not follow the dismissal procedure properly. Dismissals deemed as unfair carry heavy financial penalties to employers. In the case of a dismissal determined to be unfair of an employee who has worked six months or more in the same company, the Labor Code dictates the employer must compensate the dismissed employee including pay-in-lieu of notice, indemnity, damages, and other miscellaneous costs. These costs balloon as the seniority and base salary of the dismissed employee increases. Cases where employers and employees go to court are rare, as both sides typically opt for an amicable resolution settled out of court which allows employers to negotiate reduced compensation payments and quicker payouts to the employee. Businesses have the added incentive to settle outside of court since Labor Courts have a reputation of siding with the employee on wrongful dismissal lawsuits. Labor law is applicable in all sectors of employment; there are no specific labor laws to foreign trade zones or other sectors. More information is available from the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Economic Diplomacy unit. Morocco has roughly 20 collective bargaining agreements in the following sectors: Telecommunications, automotive industry, refining industry, road transport, fish canning industry, aircraft cable factories, collection of domestic waste, ceramics, naval construction and repair, paper industry, communication and information technology, land transport, and banks. The sectoral agreements that exist to date are in the banking, energy, printing, chemicals, ports, and agricultural sectors. According to the State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices, the Moroccan constitution grants workers the right to form and join unions, strike, and bargain collectively, with some restrictions (S 396-429 Labor Code Act 1999, 65-99). The law prohibits certain categories of government employees, including members of the armed forces, police, and some members of the judiciary, from forming or joining unions and from conducting strikes. The law allows several independent unions to exist but requires 35 percent of the total employee base to be associated with a union for the union to be representative and engage in collective bargaining. The government generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Employers limited the scope of collective bargaining, frequently setting wages unilaterally for the majority of unionized and nonunionized workers. Domestic NGOs reported that employers often used temporary contracts to discourage employees from affiliating with or organizing unions. Legally, unions can negotiate with the government on national-level labor issues. Labor disputes (S 549-581 Labor Code Act 1999, 65-99) are common, and in some cases result in employers failing to implement collective bargaining agreements and withholding wages. Trade unions complain that the government sometimes uses Article 288 of the penal code to prosecute workers for striking and to suppress strikes. Labor inspectors are tasked with mediation of labor disputes. In general, strikes occur in heavily unionized sectors such as education and government services, and such strikes can lead to disruptions in government services but usually remain peaceful. In response to the widespread difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco’s Special Commission for the Development Model presented King Mohammed VI the New Development Model in May 2021. This model will serve as a roadmap for Moroccan development with a special focus on decreasing poverty, improving social services and expanding social security protections. Chapter 16 of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) addresses labor issues and commits both parties to respecting international labor standards. 14. Contact for More Information Foreign Commercial Service U.S. Consulate General Casablanca, Morocco +212522642082 FCSCasaSpecialist@trade.gov Mozambique Executive Summary Mozambique’s lengthy coastline, deep-water ports, favorable climate, rich soil, and vast natural resources give the country significant potential, but investors face challenges related to the business environment. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) made progress on public financial management reforms and publishing budget and debt figures, took steps to reform State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and arrested or prosecuted high-level officials on corruption-related charges. It reached an agreement with the IMF and promoted dialogue with the private sector and donor community on economic reforms. Challenges include Mozambique’s opaque and complicated taxation policies, barriers to private land ownership, corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, high interest rates, poor infrastructure, and difficulties obtaining visas. Infrastructure outside of Maputo is often poor, while bureaucracy and corruption slow trade at many points of entry. Mozambican labor law makes it difficult to hire and fire workers, and court systems are bogged down in labor disputes. The domestic workforce also lacks many advanced skills needed by industry, and the visa regime makes bringing in foreign workers difficult. Insecurity related to a terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique has resulted in multi-billion-dollar onshore LNG projects being delayed, although a smaller offshore floating LNG platform remains on track to begin production by October 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted the extractive industry and tourism sector, and pandemic-related restrictions affected many other economic sectors. Following a recession in 2020, the economy returned to 2.5 percent economic growth in 2021. In 2022, the GRM began to ease some restrictions, although COVID-19 measures have continued to limit the hours restaurants and other businesses can operate and impose testing requirements on travelers. Mozambique is eager to partner with the United States on climate issues, although it lacks resources. It joined the Agricultural Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM4C) and is considering joining the Global Methane Pledge. As the GRM made progress on rural electrification, it incorporated solar energy and solicited investment for hydropower projects. U.S. development agencies and international financial institutions contributed to energy projects in solar and natural gas. The U.S. Department of Energy helped identify areas where small renewable solar and wind projects could be built alongside agricultural activities. These areas may provide opportunities for sustainable foreign direct investment in the renewable energy market. Mozambique is a growing producer of critical minerals, including graphite, lithium, and titanium. In 2021, Mozambique joined the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, enabling Mozambique to legally export diamonds. The GRM worked constructively with the United States and other members of the donor community. In March 2022, it reached an agreement with the IMF for a three-year, $470 million program that aims to reinforce economic recovery while addressing challenges related to debt and financing and encouraging good governance and improved management of public resources. The GRM is working with the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) towards signing a second MCC compact (Compact II) in 2023. Compact II will entail business-enabling reforms and will undertake investments in Zambézia Province that focus on transportation infrastructure, commercial agriculture, and climate change mitigation. While Compact II is still under development, it has potential to contribute to key sectors and help create an enabling environment for additional investments. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 147 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 122 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2018 $491 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $460 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GRM welcomes foreign investment and sees it as a critical driver of economic growth and job creation. Except for a few sectors related to national security, all business sectors are open to foreign investment. Mozambique’s 1993 Investment Law (no. 3/93) and a 2009 decree (no. 43/2009) govern foreign investments. Many observers perceive the Investment Law as obsolete, although the GRM has not yet taken steps to revise it. In general, large investors receive more support from the GRM than small and medium-sized investors. GRM authorities must approve all foreign and domestic investment, including guarantees and incentives. Regulations for the 2009 Code of Fiscal Benefits law (no. 4/2009), were established under a 2009 Decree (no. 56/2009). The Agency for Promotion of Investments and Exports (APIEX, Agencia para a Promocao de Investimentos e Exportacoes) is the primary investor contact within the GRM, operating under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), with the objective of promoting and facilitating private and public investment. APIEX also oversees the promotion of national exports and assists investors with administrative, financial, and property issues. Through APIEX, investors can receive exemptions from some customs and value-added tax (VAT) duties when importing “Class K” equipment, which includes capital investments. Contact information for APIEX is: Agency for Promotion of Investments and Exports http://www.apiex.gov.mz/ Rua da Imprensa, 332 (ground floor) Tel: (+258) 21313310 Ahmed Sekou Touré Ave., 2539 Maputo Telephone: (+258) 21 321291 Mobile: (+258) 823056432 GRM dialogue with the private sector is primarily coordinated by Mozambique’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC). Most businesses in Mozambique interact with the GRM via the country’s largest business association, the Confederation of Economic Associations (CTA, Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique). CTA was formed in 1996 and continues to be the most influential business association in Mozambique. CTA hosts an annual conference for private sector dialogue with the GRM (Conferencia Annual do Sector Privado; CASP), which is usually attended by the President of Mozambique and senior cabinet officials. With some exceptions, Mozambique’s Investment Law and its regulations generally do not distinguish between investor origin or limit foreign ownership or control of companies. The 2011 “Mega-Projects Law” (no. 15/2011) stipulates that 5 – 20 percent of the equity capital of public-private partnerships, large-scale ventures, and major business concessions be owned by Mozambicans. The Petroleum Law (no. 14/2014) states that the GRM regulates the exploration, research, production, transportation, trade, refinery, and transformation of liquid hydrocarbons and their by-products, including petrochemical activities. Article 4.6 of this law establishes the state-owned oil company, the National Hydrocarbon Company (Empresa National das Hidrocarbonetos; ENH) as the GRM’s exclusive representative for investment and participation in oil and gas projects. ENH typically owns up to 15 percent of shares in oil and gas projects in the country. Depending on the size of the investment, the GRM approves both domestic and foreign investments at the provincial or national level, but there is no other formal investment screening process. In March 2022, CTA published a report entitled “ Accelerating actions for economic recovery in Mozambique’s Private Sector.” The report lists seven key recommendations announced at the March 30-31 CASP conference: 1) Reduce the number of days required to obtain a business license; 2) reduce the cost of finance; 3) apply incentives to increase industrialization; 4) increase the number of products certified at international standards; 5) strengthen small and medium enterprises through legal reforms and payment of all government debts to companies; 6) increase agricultural productivity through fiscal reform; and 7) increase influx of international tourists to Mozambique by facilitating visas and lowering value added taxes paid by tourists. Starting a business in Mozambique is a lengthy, bureaucratic, and complex process that has contributed to Mozambique’s relatively low score on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. In the 2020 report (the most recent available), Mozambique ranked 176 out of 190 economies worldwide for ease of starting a new business, scoring well below the regional average for sub-Saharan Africa. Its low rank is due in part to the relatively high cost of registering a business and number of procedures required to complete the process. Registering a business typically involves many steps including reserving a name, signing an incorporation contract, paying registration fees, publishing the company’s name and statutes in the national gazette, registering with the tax authority, and notifying relevant agencies of the start of activity. According to the World Bank, this process takes approximately seventeen days. There is not a business registration website; however, APIEX maintains a guide to starting a business with some resources. In 2020, the City of Maputo consolidated some of the steps by establishing a “one stop shop” (balcão de atendimento unico; BAU), reducing the number of days required to register a new company to eleven. The GRM has initiated several projects to promote competitiveness within the private sector. The MIC collaborated with CTA to create an action plan for improving the business environment (Plano de Acção para Melhorar a Ambiente de Negocios; PAMAN) in the 2019-2021 period, although the GRM achieved only 38.6 percent of the proposed reforms. In 2020, the GRM partnered with CTA to launch the Programa Nacional de Certificação Empresarial (PRONACER) to support small and medium enterprises. The GRM does not promote or incentivize outward investment. It also does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, Mozambique does require domestic investors to remit investment income from overseas, except for amounts required to pay debts, taxes, or other expenses abroad. 3. Legal Regime Investors face numerous requirements for permits, approvals, and clearances, which often take substantial time and effort to obtain. The difficulty of navigating the system creates vulnerabilities to corruption, a risk that is aggravated by relatively low wages earned by administrative clerks. Labor, health, safety, and environmental regulations may go unenforced or are selectively enforced. In some cases, civil servants have reportedly threatened to enforce antiquated regulations that remain on the books in order to obtain favors or bribes. The private sector, through CTA, maintains an ongoing dialogue with the GRM, holding quarterly meetings with the Prime Minister and an annual meeting with the President. On behalf of its members and other business associations, CTA provides feedback to the GRM on laws and regulations that impact the business environment. However, because of its exclusive role in communicating with the GRM on behalf of the private sector, some businesses have expressed concerns that not all voices are heard. In addition, some businesses have argued that CTA is not an effective advocate given its political affiliation with long-time ruling party Frelimo. Numerous other business associations exist, including a newly accredited American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), formed in 2019 to represent the interests of the U.S. business community in Mozambique. The GRM requires businesses in certain sectors to apply for an Environmental License, via the Environmental Impact Evaluation Process, regulated under the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation (no. 54/2015). The Ministry of Land and Environment and its subordinate institutions and directorates issue licenses following the Environmental Impact Evaluation Process, which entails creation of an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). Draft bills are made available for public comment through business associations or in public meetings. The GRM publishes changes to laws and regulations in the National Gazette, which is available electronically. Public comments are usually limited to input from a few private sector organizations, such as CTA. There have been complaints of short comment periods and that comments are not properly reflected in the National Gazette. Overall fiscal transparency in Mozambique is improving in the wake of the “hidden debts” scandal, which broke in 2016. GRM reporting on public debts has improved, with SOE debt now included in the national budget. However, publicly available budget documents still do not provide a complete picture of the GRM’s revenue streams, particularly with regard to SOE earnings, which generally do not have publicly available audited financial statements. The GRM also maintains off-budget accounts not subject to adequate audit or oversight. For published portions of the budget that were relatively complete, the information provided was generally reliable. The March 2022 IMF agreement contains reform measures designed to improve the GRM’s public financial management. Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2016, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Eswatini (then-Swaziland), signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. Mozambique exports aluminum under this EPA agreement. The GRM ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in July 2016 and notified the WTO in January 2017. The GRM established a National Trade Facilitation Committee to coordinate the implementation of the TFA. Mozambique is a member of the WTO and generally notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. The National Institute of Norms and Quality (Instituto Nacional de Normalização e Qualidade, INNOQ) falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and is the WTO enquiry point for TBT-related issues. INNOQ is a member of the International Standards Organization (ISO) and carries the mandate to issue ISO 9001 certificates. According to the WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Mozambique , no specific trade concerns have been raised about Mozambique’s TBT measures in the WTO TBT Committee. Like most countries in Africa, Mozambique generally uses standards based on existing ISO and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards for most products. Mozambique’s legal system is based on Portuguese civil law and customary law. The GRM updated its Commercial Code in 2005 and 2018. In recent years, Mozambique’s legal system has shown a degree of independence. In August 2021, the Maputo City Judicial Court began proceedings for 19 defendants in the “hidden debts” trial, who were accused of illicitly acquiring over $2 billion in state-backed loans under the guise of developing a tuna fishing fleet and coastal protection system. The court completed hearings in March 2022, and anticipated verdicts to be announced on August 1, 2022. It is unclear whether Mozambique’s General Prosecutor will pursue further indictments. The former Finance Minister responsible for signing the illicit state-backed loan guarantees in the scandal remains under custody in South Africa, pending possible extradition to the United States. The General Prosecutor’s office has also pursued suspects in separate corruption-related cases. The 2009 Code of Fiscal Benefits (no. 4/2009) and 2009 Decree (no. 56/2009) form the legal basis for foreign direct investment in Mozambique. Operating within these regulations, APIEX analyzes the fiscal and customs incentives available for a particular investment. Investors must establish foreign business representation and acquire a commercial representation license. During project development, investors must document their community consultation efforts related to the project. If the investment requires the use of land, the investor must present, among other documents, a topographic plan or an outline of the site where the project will be developed. If the investment involves an area under 1,000 hectares and the investment is under approximately $25 million, the governor of the province where it will be located can approve the investment. While APIEX has the authority to approve any project up to $40 million, the Minister of Economy and Finance (MEF) must approve national or foreign investments between $40 million and $225 million. If the investment occupies an area of 10,000 hectares, or an area greater than 100,000 hectares for a forestry concession, or it amounts to more than $225 million, the Council of Ministers must approve it. APIEX provides additional information regarding Mozambique’s investment requirements. The 2013 “Competition Law” (no. 10/2013), established a modern legal framework for competition and created the Competition Regulatory Authority, inspired by the Portuguese competition enforcement system. Violating the prohibitions contained in the Competition Law (either by entering into an illegal agreement or practice or by implementing a concentration subject to mandatory filing) could result in a fine of up to five percent of the turnover of the company in the previous year. Competition Regulatory Authority decisions may be appealed in the Judicial Court in Maputo for cases leading to fines or other sanctions, or to the Administrative Court for merger control procedures. There have been no significant cases of nationalization since the adoption of the 1990 Constitution. Mozambican law holds that “when deemed absolutely necessary for weighty reasons of national interest or public health and order, the nationalization or expropriation of goods and rights shall result in the owner being entitled to just and equitable compensation.” The GRM adopted a comprehensive legal regime for bankruptcy in 2013 known as the “Insolvency Law” (no. 1/2013). This law streamlines the bankruptcy process, sets the rules for business recovery, facilitates potential recovery for struggling businesses, and establishes legal methods to declare bankruptcy. Under the law, creditors can approve a proposed rescue plan, request that a debtor be declared insolvent, and challenge suspicious transactions. 4. Industrial Policies The GRM reformulated its Code of Fiscal Benefits in 2009 (Law no. 4/2009 and Decree no. 56/2009). These benefits aim to encourage development in Mozambique by reducing the amount of tax to be paid by certain companies or entities in the public interest. The law contains specific incentives for entities that intend to invest in certain geographical areas within Mozambique that have natural resource potential but lack infrastructure and have low levels of economic activity. Additional modest incentives are available for professional training and the construction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure, including but not limited to roads, railways, water supply, schools, and hospitals. Mozambique has six Special Economic Zones (SEZs) including one specific SEZ for Agriculture, and five Industrial Free Zones (IFZs). Created in 2007, Mozambique’s SEZs are zones of general economic activity, geographically delimited and governed by a special customs regime in which goods entering, circulating, transforming, and leaving Mozambican territory are exempt from tax, customs and foreign exchange obligations. Goods produced in SEZs can be sold domestically or abroad, although goods sold domestically are treated by Mozambican authorities as an export to the domestic market and are therefore subject to the applicable customs duties. Mozambique’s six SEZs are distributed in Nampula, Sofala, Zambézia, Niassa and Gaza provinces. Mozambique’s IFZs are similar to SEZs, except that they are designed specifically for industry, and firms operating in IFZs must export at least 70% of their total production. Investments in IFZs are eligible for specific tax incentives. Mozambique’s five IFZs are located in the provinces of Maputo, Nampula, and Tete. Investors should pay close attention to documents and procedures requested to establish a business locally or request fiscal and customs incentives if investing in an SEZ or IFZ. Investors have complained that some GRM officials may not be aware of the benefits conferred by tax-free status, particularly related to customs and duty-free imports. The GRM established the Limpopo Valley Agribusiness SEZ (ZEEA-L) in January 2021, with the objective of exploring and developing the agricultural potential of the Limpopo Valley. The zone falls under the 2009 Code of Fiscal Benefits. ZEEA-L is part of the GRM’s World Bank funded 2020-2024 SUSTENTA Program, which aims to stimulate investment in agriculture by integrating family farming into productive value chains. Although the concept of local content in terms of employment and procurement by international firms has featured prominently in Mozambican public discourse, the GRM does not require investors to purchase from local sources, nor does it require technology or proprietary business information to be transferred to a local company. However, within certain sectors, the GRM has implemented specific local content requirements. In the oil and gas sector, the Petroleum Law (no. 21/2014) requires oil and gas companies to give preference to Mozambican individuals and companies if the goods or services are of an internationally comparable quality and competitively priced. The exact local content requirements for each project operating under this law are negotiated within the “Local Content Working Group,” an inter-ministerial body responsible for implementing the GRM’s local content strategy. In March 2022, President Nyusi declared that Mozambique would not adopt a local content law, which he said would make Mozambique uncompetitive. Companies may hire foreign workers only when there are not sufficient Mozambican workers available to meet specific job qualifications. The Ministry of Labor enforces maximum quotas on foreign workers as a percentage of the workforce within companies, which varies based on the size of the company. The 2007 Labor Law (no. 23/2007) sets minimum quotas for the percentage of Mozambicans a company operating in Mozambique must employ. Many companies have found a work-around by hiring foreigners as outside consultants. Work permits for foreigners cost approximately $370 and take at least one month to be issued. All investments must specify the number and category of Mozambican and foreign workers. The GRM currently has no data localization policies in effect. Several international companies offer cloud services to Mozambique; however, none operate in-country data centers. In addition to the GRM-operated Maluana Park and Teledata centers, Mozambique hosts three private data centers: SEACOM, Webmasters, and Eduardo Mondlane University. None of Mozambique’s facilities are carrier-neutral and they do not host individual servers. In February 2022, Mozambique became the first African country to grant a license to SpaceX’s satellite-based internet service provider Starlink. The government agency responsible for enforcing IT policies and rules is: UTICT – Unidade Tecnica de Implementacao da Politica de Informatica Technical Implementation Unit for IT Policy Tel: (258) 21 309 398; 21 302 241 Mobile (258) 305 3450 Email: cpinfo@infopol.gov.mz 5. Protection of Property Rights The legal system recognizes and protects property rights to buildings and movable property, although private land ownership is not permitted, as all land is owned by the State. The GRM grants land-use concessions called Direitos de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terra (DUAT) for periods of up to 50 years with options to renew for additional periods. In practice, DUATs serve as proxies for land titles, although there is no robust market for DUATs as they are not easily transferable. The process to award DUATs is not transparent and the GRM at times has granted overlapping DUATs that require lengthy negotiations to resolve. It takes an average of 90 days to issue a DUAT. Banks in Mozambique tend to rely on property other than land – cars, private houses, and infrastructure – as collateral. While CTA and other entities have made efforts to make DUATs “bankable,” it is not currently possible to securitize DUATs for lending purposes. In urban areas, the DUAT of a plot passes automatically to the purchaser following the sale of a house or building. In rural areas, the purchaser of physical infrastructure or improvements and crops must request authorization from the GRM for the DUAT to be transferred. This requirement is often cited as a barrier to obtaining loans in the agricultural sector and is seen as a potential barrier to investment and the transition to more intensive commercial forms of agriculture. Investors should be aware of the requirement to obtain endorsement of their projects in terms of land use and allocation at a local level from affected communities. APIEX assists investors in finding land for development and obtaining appropriate documentation, including agricultural land. The GRM advises companies on relocating individuals currently occupying land designated for development; however, companies are ultimately responsible for planning and executing resettlement programs. Despite enforceable laws and regulations protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) and a relatively simple registration process, it remains difficult for investors to protect their IPR in Mozambique. Private sector organizations work with various GRM entities on an IPR taskforce to combat IPR infringement and related public safety issues stemming from the use of counterfeit products, but enforcement in Mozambique remains sporadic and inconsistent. Mozambique’s National Inspectorate of Economic Activities (INAE) has conducted seizures, confiscating fake Hewlett-Packard (HP) toner cartridges and falsely branded Nike, Adidas, Ralph Lauren, and other merchandise in several raids in 2019. However, in general, enforcement and prosecutions are limited. Pirated DVDs and other counterfeit goods are commonly sold in Mozambique. The Parliament passed a copyright and related rights bill in 2000 (no. 4/2001), which, when combined with the 1999 Industrial Property Act, brought Mozambique into compliance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). The law provides for the security and legal protection of industrial property rights, copyrights, and other related rights. In addition, Mozambique is a signatory to the Bern Convention, as well as the New York and Paris Conventions. Mozambique joined the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) in February 2020. Joining ARIPO paved the way for Mozambique to implement the Banjul Protocol and the GRM deposited its instrument of accession to the protocol at ARIPO in May 2020. Mozambique’s adhesion to ARIPO should facilitate filing trademarks, as ARIPO processes are standardized across all member states and valid across all jurisdictions. Mozambique is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=MZ . 6. Financial Sector The Mozambique Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Mocambique, BVM) is a public institution under the guardianship of the MEF and the supervision of the Central Bank of Mozambique. In general, the BVM is underutilized as a means of financing and investment. However, the GRM has expressed interest in reforming market rules to increase capitalization and potentially prepare to require foreign companies active in Mozambique to be listed on the local stock exchange. Corporate and GRM bonds are traded on the BVM, but there is only one dealer that operates in the country, with all other brokers incorporated into commercial banks, which act as primary dealers for treasury bills. The secondary market in Mozambique remains underdeveloped. Available credit instruments include medium- and short-term loans, syndicated loans, foreign exchange derivatives, and trade finance instruments, such as letters of credit and credit guarantees. The BVM remains illiquid, in the sense that very limited activity occurs outside the issuing time. Investors tend to hold their instruments until maturity. The market also lacks a bond yield curve as GRM issuances use a floating price regime for the coupons with no price discovery for tenures above 12 months. In 2022 the Central Bank accepted technical assistance manuals from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission related to regulation of the BVM. The GRM notified the IMF that it has accepted the obligations of Article VIII sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement, effective May 20, 2011. According to a December 2021 Mozambican Bank Association (MBA) survey, there are 20 commercial banks operating in Mozambique. The top three banks – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI), Banco Internacional de Moçambique SA (BIM), and Standard Bank – account for 68 percent of total banking assets. However, Mozambique’s other banks have been gaining market share. MyBucks Banking Corporation SA, Societe Generale Mocambique SA and Banco Nacional de Investimento SA have recorded impressive asset growth rates of 78 percent, 64 percent, and 51 percent respectively in recent years. The non-performing loan ratio for the sector improved from 11.3 percent in December 2019 to 10.2 percent in December 2020, the most recent years for which such figures are available. It was possible to see an increase in the expected credit losses going into the income statement for the year 2020 when compared to the year 2019. The total level of impairment going into the income statement increased from 4.8 billion meticais to 6.3 billion meticais for the period 2019 to 2020. Despite recent challenges including the COVID-19 pandemic, damaging cyclones, and terrorist activity in Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique’s economy has been recovering following a recession in 2020. According to the 2021 MBA survey, Mozambique’s banking system has continued to grow at around 17 percent annually, with an annual increase in the volume of deposits of 22 percent, an increase in financing by 10 percent, and an expansion in the number of bank branches nationwide by 2 percent over the previous year. According to 2019 FinScope data, only 21 percent of the population had access to a bank account, which is well below the country’s target of 60 percent. As of March 2021, Mozambique had 719 bank agencies, 1,742 ATMs, and 36,839 point of sale devices. Most banking locations are concentrated in provincial capitals, and rural districts often have no banks at all. Thanks to the partnership between mobile communications companies and banks for electronic or mobile-money transactions, access to financial services is improving, with many Mozambicans using the mobile money service M-PESA. The number of services available from ATMs is also increasing. There are 1,697 banking agents in the country that provide basic banking services to customers without access to a bank branch. With financing already prohibitively expensive for most Mozambicans, the Central Bank increased interest rates by 200 basis points to 15.25 percent in March 2022, following commodity price rises associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Credit is allocated on market terms, but eligibility requirements exclude much of the population from obtaining credit. Banks request collateral, but since DUATs generally cannot be used as collateral, the majority of Mozambican applicants do not qualify for loans. Foreign investors’ export activities in food, fuel, and health markets have access to credit in foreign currency. All other sectors have access to credit only in the local currency. In October 2020, Mozambique’s Central Bank published an initial proposal for a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to manage the expected increase in GRM revenues from natural gas projects in northern Mozambique. The GRM is still studying the proposal, although the March 2022 IMF program includes adoption of a SWF law as one of its proposed reforms, and President Nyusi has recently signaled that implementing the SWF remains a GRM priority. The initial SWF draft from the Central Bank calls for 50 percent of GRM revenue from extractive industries to be used to fund the SWF for a period of 20 years, and sets up strict payout criteria for any withdrawals from the SWF before it reaches maturity. In general, the GRM’s proposal follows the Santiago Principles, and the Central Bank consulted with the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds to refine its proposal. The GRM’s National Petroleum Institute (INP) estimates total government revenues from LNG projects in the Rovuma Basin would amount to $49.4 billion over the lifetime of the projects through 2048. A Central Bank proposed model published in 2020 had estimated total revenues could amount to as much as $96 billion. However, delay of both the Area 1 and Area 4 onshore projects and fluctuating international energy prices could impact Mozambique’s real returns from this sector. In March 2021, TotalEnergies declared force majeure and halted work on its Area 1 project, citing concerns over insecurity around the project site in Cabo Delgado province. The Exxon-Mobil-led Area 4 onshore project has yet to see a Final Investment Decision (FID). The Eni-led Floating LNG platform, also part of Area 4, is set to begin LNG production in 2022, with projected production of 3.4 million tons per annum. 7. State-Owned Enterprises According the State Holdings Management Institute (IGPE), Mozambique has twelve SOEs , 18 companies that are majority state-owned, and 23 companies with minority state ownership, which IGPE does not consider to be SOEs. Some of the largest SOEs, such as Airports of Mozambique (Aeroportos de Moçambique) and Electricity of Mozambique (Electricidade de Moçambique), have monopolies in their respective industries. In some cases, SOEs enter into joint ventures with private firms to deliver certain services. For example, Ports and Railways of Mozambique (CFM, Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique) offers some concessions. Many SOEs benefit from state subsidies. In some instances, SOEs have benefited from non-compete contracts that should have been competitively tendered. SOE accounts are generally not transparent and not thoroughly audited by the Supreme Audit Institution. Unsustainable SOE debt represents a liability for the GRM, and SOEs were at the heart of the hidden debt scandal revealed in 2016. In 2018, the Parliament passed Law no. 3/2018, which broadens the definition of SOEs to include all public enterprises and shareholding companies. The law seeks to unify SOE oversight and harmonize the corporate governance structure, instituting additional financial controls, borrowing limits, and financial analysis and evaluation requirements for SOEs. The law requires the oversight authority to publish a consolidated annual report on SOEs, with additional reporting requirements for individual SOEs. The Council of Ministers approved regulations for the SOE law in early 2019, and in 2020 the MEF published limited information on SOE debt. The GRM is working with the IMF and the international donor community in an effort to reform its SOEs. In March 2021, the GRM hired a consulting company to study models for restructuring SOEs and selected four SOEs to be restructured: Mozambican Insurance Company (EMOSE), the Correios de Moçambique (Post Office), the Sociedade de Gestão Imobiliária (DOMUS) and the Matola Silos and Grain Terminal (STEMA). Mozambique’s privatization program has been relatively transparent, with tendering procedures that are generally open and competitive. Most remaining parastatals operate as state-owned public utilities with GRM oversight and control, making their privatization more politically sensitive. While the GRM has indicated an intention to include private partners in most of these utility industries, progress has been slow. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Larger companies and foreign investors in Mozambique tend to follow their own responsible business conduct (RBC) standards. For some large investment projects, RBC-related issues are negotiated directly with the GRM. RBC is an increasingly high-profile issue in Mozambique, especially in the extractive industries, where some projects require resettlement of communities. The GRM joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in May 2009. The EITI Governing Board labeled Mozambique as a compliant country in 2012, and Mozambique continues to make meaningful progress towards implementing the EITI standards. Following the emergence of a violent extremist insurgency in northern Mozambique in 2017, the GRM turned to private military companies (PMCs) to provide logistical and tactical support to Mozambican military and police forces in 2020 and 2021. In March 2021, Amnesty International accused one PMC operating in Mozambique of carrying out indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The GRM’s contract with this PMC ended on April 6, 2021. Mozambique is not a signatory of the Montreaux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, does not support the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and does not participate as a government in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. In March 2021, officials from the Ministries of Defense and Justice and the semi-independent Human Rights Commission participated in a series of workshops organized by the Center for Democracy and Development on the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights in Cabo Delgado Province. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In response to climate-related challenges, in November 2012 the GRM approved The National Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy (NCCAMS), covering the 2013-2025 period. The NCCAMS aims to reduce climate risk, both at the community and national level, while promoting low-carbon development and the green economy. To mitigate climate change risk, the GRM revised its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and announced its increased climate change ambitions during COP26. The Government of Mozambique committed to reducing their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 40.48 Metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2EQ) between 2020 and 2025, totaling 99.22 MtCO2EQ by 2030. While these GHG reductions represent a slight increase in mitigation goals, its revised NDC primarily focuses on increasing its ambitions to increase climate adaptation and limit the impact of climate change-related droughts and natural disasters. In addition, the National Directorate for Climate Change under the Ministry of Land and Environment leads the GRM’s climate change policy development and coordinates adaptation and resilience activities with other ministries. Mozambique has developed district-level climate adaptation plans for about 75 percent of its districts; however, funding has not yet been secured to implement many of the activities defined in the plans. The GRM also plans to increase climate resilience by promoting flood-resilient solutions for water, sanitation and hygiene in rural areas, increasing efforts to combat vector-borne diseases associated with climate change, improving management and conservation of land and marine biodiversity, reducing deforestation, and improving fire management programs. In 2021, Mozambique became the first country to receive a results-based payment for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) for its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility program in Zambezia province, which could serve as a model for reforestation as a mechanism for funding conservation. Other legislation the Government of Mozambique is implementing includes: The National Action Program for Climate Change Adaptation (NAPA- 2008) The Country has ratified the UN Action Plan approved in 2003 The Convention to Combat Desertification (CDD) The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Sustainable Resilience and Sanitation Water Services The Mozambique Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience The Country is also a signatory of the Paris Declaration Agreement for Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and is committed to the 17SDGs 9. Corruption While corruption remains a major concern in Mozambique, the GRM has undertaken some steps to address the problem. Working with the IMF, it published the July 2019 Diagnostic Report on Transparency, Governance and Corruption , which identifies 29 anti-corruption reform measures. The March 2022 IMF agreement intends to use these measures as benchmarks for subsequent reforms. The Mozambican judicial system conducted a trial for 19 defendants in the “hidden debts” case, hearing from more than 70 witnesses. The trial was aired publicly in a positive step to counter the perception that senior Mozambican government officials can commit crimes with impunity. The Maputo City Court has set sentences for August 1, 2022; the court has announced it is considering seizing assets of the accused to partially compensate the nation for the over $2 billion in fraudulent state-backed loans. Mozambique’s civil society and journalists remain vocal on corruption-related issues. Action related to the “hidden debts” scandal is being led by a civil society umbrella organization known as the Budget Monitoring Forum (Forum de Monitoria de Orcamento, FMO) that brings together around 20 different organizations for collective action on transparency and corruption issues. A civil society organization that participates in the FMO, the Center for Public Integrity (CIP), also continues to publicly pressure the GRM to act against corrupt practices. CIP finds that many local businesses are closely linked to the GRM and have little incentive to promote transparency. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Ana Maria Gemo Central Anti-Corruption Office (Gabinete Central de Combate a Corrupção) Avenida 10 de Novembro, 193 +258 82 3034576 gabinetecorrupção@yahoo.com.br Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Borges Nhamirre Project Coordinator Extractive Industries Center for Public Integrity (CIP, Centro de Integridade Publica) Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, 124 +258 84 8866440 borgesfaduco@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment In July 2021, Mozambican security forces deployed to Cabo Delgado Province were joined by Rwandan and SADC military contingents. Since that time, the combined forces have made security gains against the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISIS-M). However, the ongoing insurgency continues to deter investment in northern Mozambique. Sporadic terrorist attacks continue to occur, mainly against civilians, in the northern provinces. As of mid-2022, TotalEnergies had yet to resume construction of its Area 1 LNG facility following suspension of its operations and declaration of force majeure in April 2021. The United States designated ISIS-M as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group in March 2021. ISIS provides support to combatants in northern Mozambique and occasionally claims credit for their attacks. Since 2017, the ISIS affiliate carried out more than 500 deliberate attacks against unarmed civilians, causing an estimated 3,100 deaths and up to 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of April 2022, the GRM had begun implementing plans to stabilize the region with support from the international donor community and encouraging IDPs to return to their homes. Following the ceasefire and peace agreement signed in August 2019, Mozambique’s disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants from political opposition group Renamo is nearing conclusion. The October 2021 death of Mariano Nhongo, leader of the Renamo Military Junta splinter group, corresponded with a drop in the number of attacks along major highways in Manica and Sofala provinces. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), an estimated six million Mozambicans, or 80 percent of the economically active population in Mozambique, work in the informal sector. Mozambique’s Ministry of Labor generally had not effectively enforced minimum wage, hour of work, and occupational safety and health standards in the informal economy; labor law is only enforced in the formal sector. There is an acute shortage of skilled labor in Mozambique. As a result, many employers hire foreign employees who have required skills. The GRM limits the number of expatriates a business can employ in relation to the number of Mozambican citizens it employs. The GRM passed labor regulations in 2016 strengthening the requirement for employers to devise skills transfer programs to train Mozambican nationals to eventually replace the foreign workers. The constitution and law provide that workers, with limited exceptions, may form and join independent trade unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, although unions must be approved by the government. The GRM takes 45 days to register employers’ or workers’ organizations, a delay the ILO has deemed excessive. Approximately three percent of the labor force is affiliated with trade unions. An employee fired with cause does not have a right to severance, while employees terminated without cause do. Unemployment insurance does not exist and there is not a social safety net program for workers laid off for economic reasons. The law does not allow workers to strike until a complex mediation and arbitration process has been conducted, which typically takes two to three weeks. The law also provides for voluntary arbitration for “essential services” personnel monitoring the weather and fuel supply, postal service workers, export-processing-zone workers, and those loading and unloading animals and perishable foodstuffs. With support from international donors, the GRM is reviewing its Labor Law to align with international conventions related to forced labor, health and safety issues in mining, and the worst forms of child labor. The proposed revisions would extend the maternity leave period from 60 to 90 days; address sexual harassment; incorporate special conditions in the fisheries sector; provide for telework and intermittent work; address suspension of contracts in cases of force majeure or for technological, structural or market reasons; address private employment agencies; and provide for recruitment of retired persons. CTA and donors are applying pressure for the draft law to be reviewed by the Labor Consultative Commission (CCT) then sent to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament for approval. 14. Contact for More Information Elizabeth Filipe Economic Assistant Avenida Marginal, 5467 Maputo, Mozambique (258) 84-095-8000 filipeec@state.gov Namibia Executive Summary The Namibian government prioritizes attracting more domestic and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth, combat unemployment, and diversify the economy. The Ministry of Industrialization and Trade (MIT) is the governmental authority primarily responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Foreign Investment Act of 1993 (FIA). The MIT is working on new business legislation, the Namibia Investment Promotion and Facilitation Act, but the legislation is still in draft form. As a result, the FIA remains the guiding legislation on investment. The FIA calls for equal treatment of foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. The government emphasizes the need for investors to partner with Namibian-owned companies and/or have a majority of local employees to operate in country. The mining, fishing, and tourism sectors have historically attracted significant investment in Namibia. There are large Chinese foreign investments, particularly in the uranium mining sector. South Africa has considerable investments in the diamond mining and banking sectors, while Canada has investment in gold, zinc, and lithium mining. Spain and Russia have investments in the fishing industry. Foreign investors from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and other countries have investment in oil exploration off the Namibian coast. Logistics, manufacturing, and mining for diamonds and critical minerals such as gold lithium, and uranium also attract investment. The investment climate in Namibia is generally positive. Despite global economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Namibia has maintained political stability and continues to offer key advantages for inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), such as an independent judicial system, protection of property and contractual rights, good quality physical and telecommunications infrastructure, and easy access to South Africa and the region. Namibia is upgrading its transportation infrastructure to facilitate investment and position itself as a regional logistics hub. An expansion at Walvis Bay Port concluded in 2019, renovations at Hosea Kutako International Airport are ongoing, and there are plans to extend and rehabilitate the national rail line, notably to improve connection from Walvis Bay port to neighboring countries. Namibia has the best roads on the African continent, according to the World Economic Forum. Namibia also has access to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU, which is also headquartered in Namibia), the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Free Trade Area, and markets in Europe and Asia. With the second highest solar radiation in the world and vast land and wind resources, Namibia is also positioning itself to be a global leader in renewable energies and green hydrogen, with potential to improve local and regional access to energy and efforts to combat climate change. Factors that may inhibit FDI into Namibia are the country’s relatively small domestic market, high transport costs, high energy prices, and limited skilled labor pool. Corruption is a problem but not endemic. A recent scandal in the fishing sector resulted in the arrests of ministers and business leaders, cost Namibia around a billion USD, and strained public trust. As a post-apartheid country with one of the highest rates of inequality in the world, Namibia continues to look for ways to address historic economic imbalances. Proposed legislation, the New Equitable Economic Empowerment Bill (NEEEB), which has been in draft form for more than a decade, will look to create economic and business opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including in the areas of ownership, management, human resource development, and value addition. Parliament aims to pass the bill in 2022, but further delays are possible. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 100 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2017 USD -78 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,500 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Namibian government welcomes increased foreign investment to help develop the national economy and benefit its population. The Foreign Investment Act of 1993 (FIA) currently governs Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Namibia and guarantees equal treatment for foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes between investors and the government, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. Investment and tax incentives are also available for the manufacturing sector. The government prioritizes investment retention and maintains ongoing dialogue with investors, including through investment conferences, international events such as the Dubai Expo, and high-level meetings with investors. The government is cognizant that some of its bureaucratic processes (such as the time it takes to get a business visa) impede the ease of doing business and is working to address such challenges. The Namibian Investment Promotion Act, which would replace the FIA, has been under review since 2016. The Namibia Investment Promotion and Development Board (NIPDB) housed in the Office of the President, serves as Namibia’s official investment promotion and facilitation office. Established in 2020, the NIPDB is tasked with assisting investors in minimizing bureaucratic red tape, including obtaining work visas for foreign investors, by coordinating with government ministries as well as regulatory bodies. The NIPDB is the first point of contact for potential investors and offers comprehensive services from the initial inquiry stage through to operational stages. The NIPDB also provides general information packages, coordinates trade delegations, and assists with advice on investment opportunities, incentives, and procedures. The NIPDB is headed by a highly regarded chartered accountant, and analysts agree that it is doing a better job at facilitating investment compared to past investment promotion mechanisms. The NIPDB website is https://nipdb.com/ . Under the FIA, foreign and domestic entities may establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Immigration, Safety, and Security grants renewable and non-renewable temporary employment permits for a period of up to 12 months for skills not locally or readily available. However, work permits and long-term residence permits are subject to bureaucratic hurdles and are hard to obtain for jobs that could be performed by a Namibian. Complaints about delays in renewing visas and work permits are common. Foreigners must pay a 10 percent non-resident shareholder tax on dividends. There are no capital gains or marketable securities taxes, although certain capital gains are taxed as normal income. As a member of the Common Monetary Area, the Namibian dollar (NAD) is pegged at parity with the South African rand. There are no general mandatory limits on foreign ownership, but some sectors have a mandatory joint ownership between a local firm and foreign firm, such as in the natural resources sector. Government procurements usually also require a variable percentage of local ownership. Post is not aware of any investment screening mechanism recently introduced by Namibia. Namibia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the last five years by the OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD. The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia is a member and host, was last reviewed by the WTO in 2015. In the past five years, several think tanks – such as the highly regarded Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and the Economic Policy Research Association (EPRA) – have provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns, including on the draft Namibia Investment Promotion and Facilitation Bill, which prompted the government to reconsidering the bill’s passage. Links to some examples: https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/IPPR-Improving-the-Business_WEB.pdf ; https://www.epra.cc/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/EPRA-report-on-2021-INVESTMENT-BILL-FINAL.pdf Foreign and domestic investors may conduct business in the form of a public or private company, branch of a foreign company, closed corporation, partnership, joint venture, or sole trader. Companies are regulated under the 2004 Companies Act, which covers both domestic companies and those incorporated outside Namibia but traded through local branches. To operate in Namibia, businesses must also register with the relevant local authorities, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and the Social Security Commission. Most investors find it helpful to have a local presence or a local partner in order to do business in Namibia, although this is not currently a legal requirement, except in sectors that require a joint venture partner. Companies usually establish business relationships before tender opportunities are announced. Some accounting and law firms provide business registration services. The Business and Intellectual Property Authority (BIPA) is the primary institution which serves the business community and ensures effective administration of business and intellectual property rights (IPRs) registration. BIPA serves as a one-stop-center for all business and IPR registrations and related matters. It also provides general advisory services and information on business registration and IPRs. Website: http://www.bipa.gov.na/. Namibia provides incentives for outward investment mainly aimed at stimulating manufacturing, attracting foreign investment to Namibia, and promoting exports. To take advantage of the incentives, companies must be registered with MIT and the Ministry of Finance. Tax and non-tax incentives are accessible to both existing and new manufacturers. The list of Namibia’s investment incentives can be found online at: https://www.namibweb.com/tin.htm . Namibia is in the process of creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to offer favorable conditions for companies wishing to manufacture and export products. The planned SEZs would replace the old Export Processing Zone regime. 3. Legal Regime Namibia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are relatively transparent and consistent with international norms. Post is not aware of any government requirements for companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate investments. Draft bills, proposed legislation, and draft regulations are normally not available for public comment and are not required to be, although there are consultations on such documents throughout the government. Depending on the topic, bills are customarily drafted within the relevant ministry with stakeholder or public consultation and then presented to the parliament for debate. Comments on draft legislation and regulations may also be solicited through public meetings or targeted outreach to stakeholder groups. Such comments are also not required to be made public and generally are not. There is no formal process of appeal or reconsideration of published regulations. Approved legislation and regulations are publicly available and published in the Government Gazette, the official journal of the government of Namibia. The Government Gazette is digitalized and public. Public finances are generally transparent, with the annual budget and mid-term budget reviews published on the Ministry of Finance’s website and in the Government Gazette. The Ministry of Finance has begun in the past few years holding consultations with interest groups during the budget preparation process. The Bank of Namibia publishes the Government of Namibia’s debt position – including explicit and contingent liabilities – in its annual reports and quarterly bulletins. The national coordinating bureau for standards is the Namibian Standards Institution. Namibia is also a member of the International Organization for Standardization. As a member of SACU and SADC, Namibia’s national regulations conform to both regional agreements. Namibia is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on draft technical regulations. The Namibian court system is independent and is widely perceived to be free from government interference. Namibia’s legal system, based on Roman Dutch law, is similar to that of South Africa. The system provides effective means to enforce property and contractual rights, but the speed of justice is generally very slow due to a backlog of cases across the judicial spectrum. Regulation and enforcement actions are appealable. The Minister of Justice may introduce legislation in Parliament in 2022 that would permit plea bargains to expedite cases and reduce backlog to advance rule of law in Namibia. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) provides for liberal foreign investment conditions and equal treatment of foreign and local investors. With limited exceptions, all sectors of the economy are open to foreign investment. There is no local participation requirement in the FIA, but the Namibian government is increasingly emphasizing the need for investors to partner with Namibian-owned companies and/or to have a majority of local employees in order to operate in the country. The FIA reiterates the protection of investment and property provided for in the Namibian Constitution. It also provides for equal treatment of foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes between investors and the government, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. The Business and Intellectual Property Agency (BIPA) acts as a one-stop-shop for business registrations and provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirement for investors. More information is available online at: http://www.bipa.na/ . In August 2016, Namibia promulgated and gazetted the Namibia Investment Promotion Act (NIPA). However, the Minister of Industrialization and Trade pulled back the legislation in November 2021 due to substantive legal concerns raised by the private sector and the NIPBD. The revised Namibia Investment Promotion Act (NIPA) will replace the FIA once revisions are complete and approved by Parliament. The NIPA provides for transparent admission procedures for investors, the reservation of certain categories of business and sectors, and the establishment of an integrated client service facility or one-stop-shop for investors within the NIPDB. Established in 2009, the Namibia Competition Commission (NaCC) is the principal institution that promotes and safeguards fair competition in Namibia. The Commission is tasked with: providing consumers with competitive prices and product choices; promoting employment and advancing the social economic welfare of Namibians; expanding opportunities for Namibian participation in world markets while recognizing the role of foreign competition in Namibia; ensuring that small businesses have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Namibian economy; and promoting a greater spread of ownership, particularly increasing ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. The NaCC has the mandate to review any potential mergers and acquisitions that might limit the competitive landscape or adversely impact the Namibian economy. For example, in August 2020, the NaCC blocked the sale of Schwenk Namibia’s stake in Ohorongo Cement to West China Cement Ltd. over fears the deal could lead to anti-competitive behavior in the local cement market. In the ruling, the competition watchdog said that, if the USD 870 million deal was allowed to proceed, it would stifle competition and lead to possible collusion and price-fixing. The Minister of Industrialization and Trade is the final arbiter on merger decisions and may accept or reject a NaCC decision. Any investor can file an appeal with the ministry, though no formal process for doing so has been established. The Namibian Constitution enshrines the right to private property but allows the state to expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation. The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 (ACLRA) is the primary legal mechanism allowing for expropriation, but the government has adhered to a “willing seller/willing buyer” policy as part of land reform programs. In 2004, the government announced it would proceed with land expropriations after much criticism about the slow pace of land reform. To date, the government has only expropriated farms from a small number of owners, and in each instance ultimately either compensated the owner or returned the land. In March 2008, Namibia’s High Court ruled against the government in Gunter Kessl v. Ministry of Lands and Resettlement – the sole instance in which expropriation was legally challenged – and in doing so established a strong legal precedent protecting individual land rights. Non-binding resolutions adopted at the Second National Land Conference in 2018 resolved to abolish the “willing seller/willing buyer” policy and bar foreign ownership of agricultural land; however, no legislation formalizing these resolutions has been proposed. The Namibian Constitution makes pragmatic provision for different types of economic activity and a “mixed economy” (Article 98), accepts the importance of foreign investment (Article 99), and enshrines the principle that the ownership of natural resources is vested in the Namibian state (Article 100) and the right to property (Article 16). Section 11 of the FIA reiterates the commitment to market compensation in the case of expropriation, which is also codified in Article 16 of the Constitution. Holders of a Certificate of Status Investment must be compensated in foreign currency and can opt for international arbitration if any disputes arise. The Companies Act of 1973, amended in 2004, governs company and corporate liquidations while the Insolvency Act 12 of 1936, as amended by the Insolvency Amendment Act of 2005, governs insolvent individuals and their estates. The Insolvency Act details sequestration procedures and the rights of creditors. Through the law, all debtors (whether foreign or domestic) may file for both liquidation and reorganization, and a creditor may file for both liquidation and reorganization. However, as reorganization (judicial management) is rarely successful in Namibia, the most likely insolvency procedure is liquidation. International credit monitoring agency TransUnion is a licensed credit bureau in Namibia. 4. Industrial Policies Incentives are mainly aimed at stimulating manufacturing, attracting foreign investment to Namibia, and promoting exports. To take advantage of Namibia’s incentives, companies must be registered with MIT and the Ministry of Finance. Tax and non-tax incentives are accessible to both existing and new manufacturers. MIT has produced a brochure on Special Incentives for Manufacturers and Exporters that is available from the Namibia Investment Promotion and Development Board (NIPDB). Post is not aware of any special incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors, such as women. Namibia aims to become a renewable energy hub of Africa. The country therefore offers favorable import incentives on renewable energy technologies, exempting solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries from import duties. The Namibian Government aims to stimulate economic growth and employment and to establish Namibia as a gateway location to the Southern African region. To this end, the government has introduced numerous incentives that are largely concentrated on stimulating manufacturing in Namibia and promoting exports into the region and to the rest of the world. General tax regulations that are indicative of the government’s commitment are: Non–resident Shareholders’ Tax is only 10%; Dividends accruing to Namibian companies or resident shareholders are tax-exempt; Machinery and equipment can be fully written off over a period of three years; Buildings of non-manufacturing operations can be written off: 20% in the first year and the balance at 4% over the ensuing 20 years; Import or purchase of manufacturing machinery and equipment is exempted from Value Added Tax (VAT); and, Through trade agreements, preferential market access to the European Union (EU), United States, and other markets for manufacturers is provided. The government does sometimes issue guarantees, but reluctantly. Joint financing for foreign direct investment is occasionally implemented through the Namibia Industrial Development Agency (NIDA) or another, sector-relevant state-owned enterprise. In March 2021, the EU removed Namibia from its list of tax havens after Namibia successfully implemented reforms to bring its tax systems up to the EU’s required standards. The EU had identified the preferential treatment and tax incentives to manufacturers and export processing zones (EPZ) as harmful tax regimes and allowed Namibia until December 2021 to adapt existing legislation. In June 2020, the Namibian government repealed the EPZ that had offered tax incentives to companies located in Namibia to manufacture and export products. Namibia is in the process of creating an improved Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy which aims to increase responsiveness to investors’ needs and address the weaknesses of the EPZ regime. This process is ongoing, and the government aims to complete it in 2022. The government actively encourages partnerships with historically disadvantaged Namibians. Namibia’s Affirmative Action Act of 1998 strives to create equal employment opportunities, improve conditions for the historically disadvantaged, and eliminate discrimination. The Equity Commission requires all firms to develop an affirmative action plan for management positions and to report annually on its implementation. The Equity Commission also facilitates training programs, provides technical and other assistance, and offers expert advice, information, and guidance on implementing affirmative action in the workplace. In certain industries, the government has employed specific techniques to increase Namibian participation. In the fishing sector, for example, companies pay lower quota fees if they operate Namibian-flagged vessels based in Namibia with crews that are predominantly Namibian. Economic empowerment legislation for previously disadvantaged groups, called the New Equitable Economic Empowerment Bill (NEEEB) is under consideration in the legislature. The bill is being reviewed and could be reintroduced in Parliament during 2022. The bill is likely to contain provisions relating to ownership, management, value addition, human resource capacity building, job creation, and corporate social responsibility that aim to help previously disadvantaged Namibians. While not yet legally bound to do so, many companies in Namibia are already implementing aspects of NEEEB. The Namibian government does not have “forced localization” requirements for data storage. Domestic content is encouraged. State-owned enterprises are including local ownership/ participation. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Namibian Constitution guarantees all persons the right to acquire, own, and dispose of all forms of property throughout Namibia, but also allows Parliament to make laws concerning expropriation of property (see Expropriation and Compensation Section) and to regulate the right of foreign nationals to own or buy property in Namibia. There are no restrictions on the establishment of private businesses, size of investment, sources of funds, marketing of products, source of technology, or training in Namibia. All deeds of sales are registered with the Deeds Office. Property is usually purchased through real estate agents and most banks provide credit through mortgages. The Namibian Constitution prohibits expropriation without just compensation (Article 16). Namibia is a party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Namibia is also a party to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Namibia is a signatory to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The responsibility for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is divided among three government ministries. The MIT oversees industrial property and is responsible for the registration of companies, private corporations, patents, trademarks, and designs through its Business and Intellectual Property Authority (BIPA). The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) manages copyright protection, while the Ministry of Environment, Forestry, and Tourism (MEFT) protects indigenous plant varieties and any associated traditional knowledge of these plants. Two copyright organizations, the Namibian Society of Composers and Authors of Music (NASCAM) and the Namibian Reproduction Rights Organization (NAMRRO), are the driving forces behind the government’s anti-piracy campaigns. NASCAM administers IPR for authors, composers, and publishers of music. NAMRRO protects all other IPR, including literary, artistic, broadcasting, satellite, traditional knowledge, and folklore. Namibia has been in the process of finalizing its intellectual property legislation for several years, which BIPA eventually will administer. Namibia is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector There is a free flow of financial resources within Namibia and throughout the Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of the SACU, which include Namibia, Botswana, eSwatini, South Africa, and Lesotho. Capital flows with the rest of the world are relatively free, subject to the South African currency exchange rate. The Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) registers portfolio managers and supervises the actions of the Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX) and other non-banking financial institutions. Although the NSX is the second-largest stock exchange in Africa, this ranking is largely because many South African firms listed on the Johannesburg exchange are also listed (dual-listed) on the NSX. By law, Namibia’s Government Institution Pension Fund (GIPF) and other Namibian funds are required to allocate a certain percentage of their holdings to Namibian investments. Namibia has a world-class banking system that offers all the services needed by a large company. Foreign investors are able to get credit on local market terms. There are no laws or practices by private firms in Namibia to prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control; nor are there any laws or practices by private firms or government precluding foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia. Namibia’s central bank, the Bank of Namibia (BON), regulates the banking sector. Namibia has a highly sophisticated and developed commercial banking sector that is comparable with the best in Africa. There are eight commercial banks: Standard Bank, Nedbank Namibia, Bank Windhoek, First National Bank (FNB) Namibia, Trustco Bank, Letshego Bank Limited, Banco BIC, and Banco Atlantico. Bank Windhoek and Trustco Bank are the only locally-owned banks; Trustco Bank specializes in micro-finance. Standard Bank, Nedbank, and FNB are South African subsidiaries; Banco BIC and Banco Atlantico are Angolan. A significant proportion of bank loans come in the form of bonds or mortgages to individuals. There is little or no investment banking activity. The Development Bank of Namibia (DBN) and Agribank are Namibian government-owned banks with a mandate for development project financing. Agribank’s mandate is specifically to serve the agriculture sector. While there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to open bank accounts, a non-resident must open a “non-resident” account at a Namibian commercial bank to facilitate loan repayments. This account would normally be funded from abroad or from income from rentals received on the property purchased, subject to the bank holding the account being provided with a copy of any rental contract. Non-residents who are in possession of a valid Namibian work permit/permanent residency are considered to be residents for the duration of their work permit and are therefore not subject to borrowing restrictions placed on non-residents without the necessary permits. The BON does not recognize cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, as legal tender in Namibia. The BON is reluctant to allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions. Namibia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), but the government has publicly stated its intention to create one. The Government Institution Pension Fund (GIPF) provides retirement and benefits for employees in the service of the Namibian government as well as institutions established by an act of the Namibian Parliament. 7. State-Owned Enterprises While Namibian companies are generally open to foreign investment, government-owned enterprises have generally been closed to all investors (Namibian and foreign), with the exception of joint ventures discussed below. More than 90 state-owned enterprises (SOEs, also known as parastatals) include a wide variety of commercial companies, financial institutions, regulatory bodies, educational institutions, boards, and agencies. Generally, employment at SOEs is highly sought-after because their remuneration packages are not bound by public service constraints. Parastatals provide most essential services, such as telecommunications, transport, water, and electricity. A list of SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Public Enterprises’ website: www.mpe.gov.na . The following are the most prominent SOEs: Namibia Airports Company (airport management company) Namibia Institute of Pathology (medical laboratories) Namibia Wildlife Resorts (tourism) Namport (maritime port authority) Nampost (postal and courier services) Namwater (water sanitation and provisioning) Roads Contractor Company Telecom Namibia (primarily fixed-line) TransNamib (rail company) NamPower (electricity generation and transmission) Namcor (national petroleum company) Epangelo (mining) In 2021, the government liquidated the state-owned airline, Air Namibia, which had become a financial burden. When the Minister of Finance tabled the budget in March 2021, he announced that the Namibian government will reduce its stake in state-owned enterprises as a way of raising capital, unburdening the government from the budgetary drain of perpetual SOE-bailouts, and giving room for the private sector to play a more prominent role in the economy. The government is looking to reduce its stake or completely divest in certain SOEs. The government owns numerous other enterprises, from media ventures to a fishing company. Parastatals own assets worth approximately 40 percent of GDP and most receive subsidies from the government. Most SOEs are perennially unprofitable and have only managed to stay solvent with government subsidies. In industries where private companies compete with SOEs (e.g., tourism and fishing), SOEs are sometimes perceived to receive favorable concessions from the government. Foreign investors have participated in joint ventures with the government in a number of sectors, including mobile telecommunications and mining. In 2015, the Namibian President created a new Ministry of Public Enterprises intended to improve the management and performance of SOEs. Legislation to shift oversight of commercial SOEs from line ministries to the Ministry of Public Enterprises was passed by Parliament in 2019. However, the Ministry of Public Enterprises reached the end of its mandate in 2022 and will be absorbed into the Ministry of Finance. Namibia does not have a privatization program, but the government has taken steps towards privatization of certain SOEs. In 2021, the government sold its shares in Namibia’s biggest telecommunications company, Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC), and purportedly used the proceeds to reduce the government’s debt. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Most large firms, including SOEs, have well defined (and publicized) social responsibility programs that provide assistance in areas such as education, health, environmental management, sports, and small and mid-sized enterprise (SME) development. Many firms include Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programs within their larger Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. Firms operating in the mining sector – Namibia’s most lucrative industry – generally have visible CSR programs that focus on education, community resource management, environmental sustainability, health, and BEE. Many Namibian firms have HIV/AIDS workplace programs to educate their employees about how to prevent contracting and spreading the virus/disease. Some firms also provide anti-retroviral treatment programs beyond what may be covered through government and private insurance systems. Namibia’s mining sector is considered a leader in the region for its sound mining policy and responsible business conduct. Namibia ranked as the best jurisdiction in Africa on its mining policy in a 2019 Fraser Institute survey. The Namibian Chamber of Mines ( https://chamberofmines.org.na ) is an independent association of mining businesses that monitors and encourages responsible business practices and corporate social responsibility from its members and the mining industry at large. Namibia is also a member of the U.S. Department of State’s Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI), which seeks to promote sound mining governance and resilient energy mineral supply chains. Namibia is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Namibia is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Already one of the most arid countries on the planet, Namibia has been experiencing extensive drought in the past decade. Namibia’s Harambee Prosperity Plan II (2021-2025) and Fifth National Development Plan (2017-2022) as well as its 2021 updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) are the guiding documents for Namibia’s climate adaptation strategy. In the near-term Namibia’s adaptation activities are focused on prevention and repair of infrastructure and systems. Namibia is in the process of creating an overarching National Adaptation Plan, which will supply further detail for national adaptation priorities and implementation of long-term strategies. Namibia has committed to reducing its overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 92 percent by 2030 from the business-as-usual baseline level. Namibia aims to achieve this goal mainly through reducing deforestation and restoring grasslands and forest, with additional contributions coming from updating old industrial equipment and using cleaner energy fuels. Namibia has declared it aims to be the first African country to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Namibia does not yet have official regulatory or other government policy incentives to help it achieve its climate policy outcomes. With the second highest solar radiation in the world, plentiful wind resources, and ample land, Namibia is well placed to develop a renewable energy industry. Namibia is looking to use its renewable resources to transition from its current dependency on coal generated electricity from South Africa to becoming a net energy renewable energy exporter to the region. Namibia also has bold plans to become a world green hydrogen leader and in 2021 awarded its first international tender for development of a green hydrogen plant that could begin production for international export in 2026. Namibia plans to form partnerships with private sector international firms to continue rolling out its green hydrogen industry over the next several years. The government has also created a website devoted to its green hydrogen plans: gh2namibia.com 9. Corruption The Anti-Corruption Act of 2003 created an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), which began operations in 2006. The ACC attempts to complement civil society’s anti-corruption programs and support existing institutions such as the Ombudsman’s Office and the Office of the Attorney General. Anti-corruption legislation is in place to combat public corruption, but often is not well-implemented due to budgetary constraints. In a nationwide survey commissioned by the ACC and released in 2016, corruption was listed at the third-most important development challenge facing Namibia (6 percent, after unemployment at 37 percent and poverty at 30 percent). 78 percent of survey respondents rated corruption as “very high” in Namibia. The highest result comes from those in rural areas. Namibia’s 2021 rating by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index worsened to 58 out of 180 from a score of 57 in 2020. Afrobarometer has also reported a downward trend regarding perception of corruption in Namibia over the past decade. In 2019, Namibia was embroiled in a fishing industry corruption scandal in which government ministers and business leaders were charged and imprisoned for allegedly co-opting the national fishing quota system for personal gain. The scandal allegedly cost Namibia billions of U.S. dollars and has tarnished the reputation of the ruling political party. The accused are in prison awaiting trial. The scandal has resulted in Namibia and its ACC taking a closer look at other industries susceptible to corruption, but many Namibians criticize the government for not doing enough to combat corruption Namibia has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and the African Union’s African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Namibia has also signed the Southern African Development Community’s Protocol against Corruption. Paulus Noa Director Namibia Anti-Corruption Commission Corner of Montblanc & Groot Tiras Street, Windhoek +264-61-370-600 anticorruption@accnamibia.org Contact at a “watchdog” organization:Graham Hopwood Director Namibia Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 70-72 Frans Indongo Street, Windhoek +264-61-240-514 info@ippr.org.na National anti-corruption network Integrity Namibia operated by IPPR hosts an online Whistleblower reporting portal: info@integritynamibia.org 10. Political and Security Environment Namibia has been a stable multiparty and multiracial democracy since becoming independent in 1990. The protection of human rights is enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, and the government generally respects those rights. Political violence is rare and damage to commercial projects and/or installations as a result of political violence is unlikely. The State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights for Namibia provides additional information. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Namibian law allows for the formation of independent trade unions to protect workers’ rights and to promote sound labor relations and fair employment practices. The law provides for the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively on specific issues; however, the law prohibits workers in certain sectors, such as the police, military, and correctional facilities, from joining unions. Except for workers in services designated as essential, such as public health and safety, workers may strike once mandatory conciliation procedures are exhausted and 48 hours’ notice is given to the employer and labor commissioner. Workers may take strike actions only in disputes involving specific worker interests, such as pay raises. Namibia has ratified all of the International Labor Organization’s fundamental conventions. Businesses operating within export processing zones are required to adhere to the Labor Act. The 2007 Labor Act contained a provision that prohibited the hiring of temporary or contract workers (“labor hire”), but the provision was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Labor Amendment Act of 2012 introduced strict regulations with respect to the use of temporary workers, according to which temporary workers must generally receive equal compensation and benefits as non-temporary workers. Child labor in Namibia occurs in certain sectors, such as domestic and agricultural work, and its occurrence and prevalence are difficult to verify. Although Namibia has ratified all key international conventions concerning child labor, there continue to be gaps in Namibia’s domestic legal framework. There is a shortage of specialized skilled labor in Namibia. Employers often cite labor productivity and the shortage of skilled labor as the biggest obstacles to business growth. The most recent Global Competitiveness Report (2019) ranked Namibia 94th out of 141 economies. An inadequately educated workforce, access to financing, and low innovation capability are listed in the report as the most problematic factors for doing business. The government offers manufacturing companies special tax deductions of up to 25 percent if they provide technical training to employees. The government will also reimburse companies for costs directly related to employee training under approved conditions. As of April 1, 2014, the Namibian government implemented a Vocational Education and Training (VET) levy to facilitate and encourage vocational education and training. The levy, which is payable to the Namibia Training Authority (NTA), is imposed on every employer with an annual payroll of at least NAD 1,000,000 (approximately USD 54,000), at the rate of one percent of the employer’s total annual payroll. The NTA will collect and administer the levy and will use the funds to provide financial and technical assistance to employers, vocational training providers, employees, students, and other bodies to promote vocational education and training. In addition, companies can get a rebate from NTA of up to 50 percent of training costs for their employees. The role of the informal economy in Namibia cannot be underestimated, as it provides integral support to more formal business activities. According to the most recent Namibian Labour Force Survey (2018), the informal economy employs more than half of employed Namibians. Informal economic activity includes small-scale entrepreneurs, traders, and service providers such as cleaners, cooks, and laborers. Informal economic activity is the primary employment means of women in rural areas. Namibian economic analysts posit that informal sector activities contribute to around 70 percent of GDP in any given year. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2021 $12.2 2020 $10.6 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $-78 2018 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $0 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 49.3% 2018 48.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf * Source for Host Country Data: Namibia Statistics Agency and Bank of Namibia A glaring omission from the International Monetary Foundation’s (IMF) report on inward direct investment to Namibia is China’s contribution, which the Bank of Namibia reports as 42.4% of the total in 2021 and 39.5% in 2020. China is included in the Bank of Namibia’s report but is omitted from the IMF reports. The Embassy assesses that China’s investment in Namibia is increasing not decreasing. Notorious tax haven British Virgin Islands is a notable top destination for inward direct investment sources into Namibia. There are some other discrepancies between the information reported in the IMF report and the Bank of Namibia’s report, such as the inclusion of Botswana in 2020. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 6,342 100% Data Not Available China 1,975 39.5% South Africa 1,975 29.7% Mauritius 517 8% United Kingdom 353 4.2% British Virgin Islands 136 2.3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 and the Bank of Namibia’s 2021 Annual Report . Nepal Executive Summary Nepal’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately USD33.7 billion, and trade totaling USD13.6 billion. Despite considerable potential – particularly in the energy, tourism, information and communication technology (ICT), infrastructure and agriculture sectors – political instability, widespread corruption, cumbersome bureaucracy, and inconsistent implementation of laws and regulations have deterred potential investment. While the Government of Nepal (GoN) publicly states its keenness to attract foreign investment, this has yet to translate into meaningful practice. The COVID pandemic further slowed reform efforts that might have made Nepal a more attractive investment destination. Despite these challenges, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country has been increasing in recent years. Historically, few American companies have invested in Nepal; and yet the U.S. still features among the top 10 foreign investors in Nepal, constituting about 3% of the total FDI stock. In 2017, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a USD500 million Compact with the GoN that will focus on electricity transmission and road maintenance. The GoN has agreed to contribute an additional USD130 million for these Compact programs. Following years of delay, the GoN ratified the Compact on February 27 and attention has now turned to implementation. Despite the delay, MCC ratification showed that the GoN is committed to honoring its international commitments. Nepal’s location between India and China presents opportunities for foreign investors. Nepal also possesses natural resources that have significant commercial potential. Hydropower – Nepal has an estimated 40,000 megawatts (MW) of commercially-viable hydropower electricity generation potential, which could become a major source of income through electricity exports. Other sectors offering potential investment opportunities include agriculture, tourism, the ICT sector, and infrastructure. The tourism sector is slowly recovering from the downturn due to the pandemic. Nepal offers opportunities for investors willing to accept inherent risks and the unpredictability of doing business in the country and possess the resilience to invest with a long-term mindset. While Nepal has established some investment-friendly laws and regulations in recent years, significant barriers to investment remain. Corruption, laws limiting the operations of foreign banks, lingering challenges in the repatriation of profits, controlled currency exchange facilities, prohibition of FDI in certain sectors as well as a minimum foreign investment threshold of NPR 50 million (USD415,000), and the government’s monopoly over certain sectors of the economy (such as electricity transmission and petroleum distribution), undermine foreign investment in Nepal. Millions of Nepalis seek employment overseas, creating a talent drain, especially among educated youth. A lack of understanding of international business standards and practices among the political and bureaucratic class, and a legal and regulatory regime that is not quite aligned with international practices also hinder, impede and frustrate foreign investors. Nepal’s tax regime, in particular, may be inconsistent with international practices, and could trip-up foreign investors as has happened in two cases in recent years. Immigration laws and visa policies for foreign workers are cumbersome. Inefficient government bureaucratic processes, a high rate of turnover among civil servants, and corruption exacerbate the difficulties for foreigners seeking to work in Nepal. Political uncertainty is another continuing challenge for foreign investors. Nepal’s ruling parties have spent much of their energy over the last years on internal political squabbles instead of governance. Nepal’s geography also presents challenges. The country’s mountainous terrain, land-locked geography, and poor transportation infrastructure increases costs for raw materials and exports of finished goods. Trade unions – each typically affiliated with parties or even factions within a political party – and unpredictable general strikes create business risk. The persistent use of intimidation, extortion, and violence – including the use of improvised explosive devices – by insurgent groups targeting domestic political leaders, GoN entities, and businesses remains a source of potential instability, although the country’s most prominent insurgent group (led by Netra Bikram Chand, also known as Biplav) agreed in March 2021, to enter peaceful politics, which may reduce this threat. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 111 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD1,190 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There is recognition within the GoN that foreign investment is necessary to boost economic growth to meet the GoN’s target of becoming a middle-income country by 2030. While the GoN’s stated attitude toward FDI is positive, this has yet to translate into meaningful practice. The most significant foreign investment laws are the revised Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act (FITTA) of 2019, the Public-Private Partnership and Investment Act (PPIA) of 2019, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1962, the Immigration Rules of 1994, the Customs Act of 2007 (a revised act is under Parliamentary review), the Industrial Enterprise Act of 2016 (and its 2020 revision), the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act of 2016 (and its 2019 amendment), the Company Act (2006), the Electricity Act of 1992, the Privatization Act of 1994, and the Income Tax Act (2002). Also important is the annual budget, which outlines customs, duties, export service charges, sales, airfreight and income taxes, and other excise taxes that affect foreign investment. The FITTA attempted to create a friendlier environment for foreign investors. It streamlined the process for inbound foreign investment by requiring approval of FDI within seven days of application. Similarly, the FITTA streamlined the profit repatriation approval process, mandating decisions within 15 days. The revised FITTA set up a Single Window Service Center, through which foreign investors can avail themselves of the full range of services provided by the various government entities involved in investment approvals, including the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies (MOICS), the Labor and Immigration Departments, and the Central Bank. The FITTA included a provision requiring the government to set a minimum threshold for foreign investment and publish it in the Nepal Gazette. On May 23, 2019, citing that provision, the government raised the minimum foreign investment threshold ten-fold to NPR 50 million (USD415,000) from the existing NPR 5 million (USD41,500). The new FITTA commits to providing “national treatment” to all foreign investors and that foreign companies will not be nationalized. Under the FITTA, investments up to NPR 6 billion (USD52 million) come under the purview, including approval authority, of the MOICS Department of Industry (DOI), and anything above that amount falls under the authority of the Investment Board of Nepal (IBN). Other relevant laws include the Industrial Enterprise Act, the SEZ Act, an updated Labor Act (2017), and a pending Intellectual Property Rights Act. The Industrial Enterprise Act is intended to promote industrial growth in the private sector, includes a “no work, no pay” provision, and allows companies to take certain steps – such as buying land and establishing a line of credit – while environmental assessments and other regulatory requirements are being carried out. In practice, U.S. and other foreign companies comment that corruption, bureaucracy, inefficient implementation of existing procedures and requirements, and a weak regulatory environment make investing in Nepal a tough proposition. Another significant piece of legislation that could affect investment decisions in Nepal is the Customs Act (2007), which established invoice-based customs valuations and replaced many investment tax incentives with a lower, uniform rate. In 2017, the Department of Customs started to use the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) world software platform. In addition, the Electricity Act includes special terms and conditions for investment in hydropower development and the Privatization Act of 1994 authorizes and defines the procedures for privatization of state-owned enterprises. There is no public evidence of direct executive interference in the court system that could affect foreign investors. However, in recent years there has been public and media criticism of the politicization of the judiciary, including appointments of judges to Appellate Courts and the Supreme Court allegedly based on their political affiliations. The IBN, a high-level government body chaired by the Prime Minister, was formed in 2011 to promote economic development in Nepal. In addition to approving large-scale investment projects, the IBN is also the GoN body charged with assessing and managing public-private partnership (PPP) projects. It has the task of attracting large foreign investors to Nepal and was a key organizer of the last two Investment Summits in 2017 and 2019. It is the primary point of contact for large investors (above USD50 million), especially those engaged in public infrastructure projects. The Nepal Business Forum (http://www.nepalbusinessforum.org/) was formed in 2010 with the “aim of improving the business environment in Nepal through better interaction between the business community and government officials.” The NBF does not meet according to a regularized schedule, and the Embassy is not aware of any formal mechanisms or platforms to enable on-going dialogue, aside from the IBN, DOI, and the NBF. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises in Nepal and engage in various forms of remunerative activity. The FITTA 2019 slightly increased the number of sectors open to foreign investment. Outside of the restricted sectors listed below, foreign investment up to 100 percent ownership is permitted in most sectors. The GoN announced the opening of FDI in the primary agricultural sector for exports in January 2021. However, the matter is sub judice at the Supreme Court (as of March 2022), and so remains unimplemented. During 2018 and 2019, the Market Monitoring Unit of the MOICS’s Department of Supply Management raided business establishments, seized records, closed business outlets, and brought charges against private businesses in various sectors, including retail, healthcare, and education, alleging that companies were charging prices that were too high. Such raids are sporadic rather than a matter of sustained policy but contribute to creating an uncertain business environment. The sectors excluded from foreign investment are listed in the annex of the FITTA 2019 and include: Primary agricultural sectors including animal husbandry, fisheries, beekeeping, oil-processing (from seeds or legumes), milk-based product processing; (Note: The GoN is attempting to open this sector for FDI if 75 percent of the products are exported. However, the matter is under review at the Supreme Court.) Small and cottage enterprises; Personal business services (haircutting, tailoring, driving, etc.); Arms and ammunition, bullets, gunpowder and explosives, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, industries related to atomic energy and radioactive materials; Real estate (excluding construction industries), retail business, domestic courier services, catering services, money exchange and remittance services; Tourism-related services – trekking, mountaineering and travel agents, tourist guides, rural tourism including arranging homestays; Mass media (print, radio, television, and online news), feature films in national languages; Management, accounting, engineering, legal consultancy services, language, music, and computer training; and Any consultancy services in which foreign investment is above 51 percent. Investment proposals are screened by the DOI or the IBN to ensure compliance with the FITTA and other relevant laws. Historically, the lack of clear, objective criteria and timeframes for decisions have resulted in complaints from prospective investors. While the GoN intended the FITTA to address these issues, the regulations enabling the implementation of the Act were only completed in January 2021, and anecdotal evidence suggests services to prospective investors through the One Window Service Center at the DOI are slowly improving. The IBN website provides resources to prospective investors including the Nepal Investment Guide (http://www.ibn.gov.np/). Similarly, the DOI maintains a website that should be helpful to investors (http://www.investnepal.gov.np). U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out relative to other foreign investors by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. U.S. companies often note that they struggle to compete with firms from neighboring countries when it comes to cost, but this is not a factor resulting from any specific GoN policy. There have been no recent investment policy reviews of Nepal. The last one by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was conducted in 2003. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a trade policy review in 2019, available online at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=((%20@Title=%20nepal)%20or%20(@CountryConcerned=%20nepal))%20and%20(%20(%20@Symbol=%20wt/tpr/g/*%20))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) conducted a Country Private Sector Diagnostics, available at: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publications_listing_page/creating+markets+in+nepal+country+private+sector+diagnostic. In recent years, GoN officials have proclaimed Nepal “open for business” and explicitly welcomed foreign investment. While the GoN likes to appear enthusiastic in its efforts to attract foreign investors, the reality has not yet matched the rhetoric. Three laws directly affecting foreign investment (FITTA, PPP, and SEZ) were hurriedly revised and passed by Parliament but left little time for stakeholder consultations or transparency in the process. Both foreign and domestic private sector representatives often state that the GoN has not done enough to improve the business environment. While welcome provisions were included in the FITTA—for example, a streamlined approval process and single window service center—an assessment of the true effects of the reforms await full implementation. After obtaining a letter of approval from DOI or IBN, Nepal’s Office of Company Registrar (OCR) maintains a website (http://ocr.gov.np/index.php) on which foreign companies can register. OCR’s website also links to an information portal (http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/nepal), maintained by UNCTAD and the International Chamber of Commerce, with resources and information for potential investors interested in Nepal. According to the portal, registering a company takes “between three days and a week with the law authorizing up to 15 days.” Independent think tanks, however, have noted the online system does not eliminate corruption, and bureaucrats frequently request additional documentation that must be submitted in person, rather than online. Users ranked the Nepal portion of the OCR business registration website a four out of ten, according to the UNCTAD supported Global Enterprise Registration website www.GER.co. The Act Restricting Investment Abroad (ARIA) of 1964 prohibits outbound investment from Nepal. Some enterprising Nepalis have found ways around the Act, but for most Nepali investors, outward investment is a practical impossibility. The GoN is currently in the process of revising the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, which is expected to annul the ARIA, paving the way to limited capital account convertibility. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Nepal has Bilateral Investment Agreements in force with four countries: France (1985), Germany (1988), the United Kingdom (1993), and Finland (2011). In addition, Nepal has Bilateral Investment Agreement signed (but not in force) with Mauritius (signed 1999). Another one was signed with India in 2011 but was terminated in 2017. Nepal has a free trade agreement with India, the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade, signed in 2002. Nepal is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Nepal is also a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Free Trade Area, along with Bhutan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, and Thailand. Nepal does not have a bilateral investment treaty or free trade agreement with the United States, but has a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Nepal has “Double Tax Avoidance” treaties with China, India, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, Austria, Norway, and Qatar. The United States Embassy in Nepal (Post) is not aware of any recent or upcoming changes to the taxation regime. Nepal’s shift to a federalist structure, however, means that there will be new tax policies at the local and provincial levels. How consistent Nepal’s tax regime is with international standards is questionable. In 2019, a Malaysian company, Axiata (owner of NCell, the largest private telecom company in Nepal), was made to pay $450 million for alleged tax evasion over the 2016 transfer of NCell’s ownership from its previous owners, Swedish firm Telia Sonera. The Supreme Court’s verdict on this case has set the precedent for placing buyers on the hook for the tax liabilities of the sellers. Axiata has taken the matter to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is still deliberating on the case. More recently, Bottlers Nepal Ltd (BNL), a subsidiary of the Coca-Cola Company, is similarly embroiled in a tax evasion dispute with the GoN in relation to a 2014 offshore transfer of ownership. Nepal’s Department of Revenue Investigation (DRI) has taken BNL to court under the Income Tax Act 2002 and the Revenue Leakage (Investigation and Control) Act 1996. While the final verdict is pending from the ICSID (on Ncell) and BNL’s case has only just entered the local court, the current implication of both these cases is that Nepal’s tax regime—particularly the above two Acts—needs to be carefully considered by foreign investors when buying/selling companies in Nepal to understand their local tax liabilities. 3. Legal Regime The GoN has many laws, policies, and regulations that look good on paper, but are often not fully and consistently enforced. Frequent government changes and staff rotations within the civil service result in officials who are often unclear on applicable laws and policies or interpret them differently than their predecessors. Many foreign investors note that Nepal’s regulatory system is based largely on personal relationships with government officials, rather than systematic and routine processes. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not transparent and are not consistent with international norms. The World Bank gives Nepal a score of 1.75 (on a scale of one to five) on its “Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance” index https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/nepal, and notes that ministries in Nepal do not routinely create lists of “anticipated regulatory changes or proposals” and do not have the “legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment.” Historically, rule-making and regulatory authority resided almost exclusively with the central government in Kathmandu. Nepal’s 2015 Constitution outlines a three-tiered federalist model. Following elections in 2017, seven provincial governments and 753 local government units were established. Foreign businesses can expect to continue to interact with bureaucrats at the central government level in the near term, as national regulations remain the most relevant for foreign businesses. However, this could change over time as provincial governments become more established. Traditionally, once acts are drafted and passed by Parliament, it has been incumbent upon the related government agencies and ministries to draft regulations to enforce the acts. Regulations are passed by the cabinet and do not need parliamentary approval. Nepal still lacks an established mechanism or system for the review of regulations based on scientific or data-driven assessments, or for conducting quantitative analyses for such purposes. The World Bank notes that the GoN is not required by law to solicit comments on proposed regulations, nor do ministries or regulatory agencies report on the results of the consultation on proposed regulations. Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes that are managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are neither fully transparent nor consistent with international norms. Though auditing is mandatory, professional accounting standards are low, and practitioners may be poorly trained. As a result, published financial reports can be unreliable, and investors often rely instead on businesses reputations unless companies voluntarily use international accounting standards. Publicly listed companies in Nepal follow the 2013 Nepal Financial Reporting Standards (NFRSs), which were prepared on the basis of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 2012, developed by the IFRS Foundation and their standard-setting body, the International Accounting Standards Board. Audited reports of publicly listed companies are usually made available. Draft bills or regulations are sometimes made available for public comment, although there is no legal obligation to do so. The government agency that drafts the bill is responsible for undertaking a public consultation process with key stakeholders by issuing federal notices for comments and recommendations, although it is unclear in practice how many government agencies actually do so. Additionally, all parliamentarians are given copies of the draft bills to share with their constituencies. This applies to all draft laws, regulations, and policies. Parliamentary rules, however, require that draft amendments to bills be proposed only within 72 hours of a bill’s introduction, giving minimal time for lawmakers, constituents, or stakeholders to submit considered feedback. In practice, post’s observation has been that there is no clear timeline for the process of creating and passing bills, including the time period provided for public or stakeholder consultation. Generally, the government agency that drafted the bill, legislation, policy, or regulation posts the actual draft (in Nepali language) online. Once approved, the Department of Printing, an office that is part of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, posts all acts online. Regulatory actions and summaries of these actions are available at the Office of the Auditor General and the Ministry of Finance. Both of these government agencies post periodic reports on the regulatory actions taken against agencies violating laws, rules, and regulations. Such summaries and reports are available online in Nepali. Individual ministries are responsible for enforcement of regulations under their purview. The enforcement process is legally reviewable, making the agencies publicly accountable. There are several government entities, including the Parliamentary Accounts Committee, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) that oversee the government’s administrative and regulatory processes. Post is not aware of any regulatory reform efforts. Nepal’s budget and information on debt obligations are widely and easily accessible to the general public. The annual budget is substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Nepal’s supreme audit institution reviews the government’s accounts, and its reports are publicly available. Nepal is one of eight members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union of nations in South Asia including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Under SAARC, Nepal is also a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which came into force on January 1, 2006 with the goal of creating a duty-free trade regime among SAARC member countries. According to SAFTA rules, member countries were supposed to reduce formal tariff rates to zero by 2016. However, tariff barriers remain in place for hundreds of “sensitive” goods produced by various SAARC member countries that do not qualify for duty-free status. Nepal is also a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an international organization of seven South Asian and Southeast Asian nations: Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal – known collectively as BBIN – are working together to develop a platform for sub-regional cooperation in such areas as water resources management, power connectivity, transportation, and infrastructure development. The four BBIN nations agreed on a motor vehicle agreement (MVA – both cargo and passengers) in 2015. In early 2018, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal also agreed on operating procedures for the movement of passenger vehicles, and in early 2020, the same three countries met to draft a memorandum of understanding to implement the MVA, without obligation to Bhutan. Nepal’s regulatory system generally relies on international norms and standards developed by the United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other international organizations and regulatory agencies. Nepal joined the WTO in March 2004. According to its WTO accession commitments, the GoN agreed to provide notice of all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, GoN officials are unable to confirm whether this procedure is followed consistently. Nepal ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in January 2017. As a least developed country (LDC), Nepal could benefit from additional technical assistance from WTO members through the TFA Facility. A 2017 Asia Development Bank report noted, “Nepal has been making progress in undertaking trade facilitation reforms over the years, particularly those related to the customs.” The WTO’s December 2018 policy review (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp481_crc_e.htm) noted Nepal’s efforts to diversify its narrow production and export base and encouraged Nepal to pursue further economic reform, including through its National Trade Integration Strategy (https://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/countryprofiles/dtis/Napal-DTIS-2016.pdf) as well as address its supply side constraints, most notably high transit and transportation costs. According to the TFA Facility’s website (http://www.tfafacility.org), Nepal has submitted provisions for all three categories, a key step for implementing TFA Category A, B, and C requisites. Nepal’s court system is based on common law and its legal system is generally categorized under civil and criminal offences and laws. Contract law is codified. In theory, contracts are automatically enforced, and a breach of contract can be challenged in a court of law. In practice, enforcement of contracts is weak. Nepal’s contracts are guided by the Contract Act of 2000. Nepal does not have a commercial code. All civil courts are authorized to hear commercial complaints. A ‘commercial bench’ has been established at the High Court, but judges who preside on this bench are the same judges dealing with civil and criminal cases as well. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system. In general, the judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. In some isolated or high-profile cases, however, court judgments have come under criticism for alleged political interference favoring particular individuals and groups. There remains widespread public perception that bribery and judicial conflicts of interest affect some judicial outcomes. In March 2019, three laws directly affecting foreign investment (FITTA, PPP, and SEZ) were hurriedly revised and passed by Parliament ahead of the 2019 Investment Summit. This left little time for effective stakeholder consultations and transparency. While welcome provisions were included in the FITTA (a promised single window service center and a streamlined approval process, for example), the regulations to implement the reforms were only completed in January 2021 and observers remain skeptical given the GoN’s record of making lofty announcements without delivering on them in practice. As drafted, even these pieces of reform legislation retain various institutional and procedural impediments to smooth businesses practices which will dissuade all but the most risk-tolerant investors. The Competition Promotion and Market Protection Board, comprised of GoN officials from various ministries and chaired by the Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies, is responsible for reviewing competition-related concerns. Post is not aware of any competition cases that have involved foreign investors. MOICS’ Department of Supplies Management has a mandate to crack down on cartels and protect consumers. In the previous two years, it has played a more active role in cracking down on businesses—ranging from retailers to healthcare facilities to private schools—for alleged price-gouging. However, private sector representatives have said that this department is interfering with the free market and is being used by businesses with political connections to target competitors, rather than as a mechanism to protect consumers. Nepal’s private sector is dominated by cartels and syndicates—often under the banner of business associations – which are often successful in limiting competition from new market entrants in multiple sectors. In 2018, the GoN issued new permits for transportation companies, and the Minister of Physical Infrastructure and Transport called the cartels “a curse to the nation.” Subsequently, however, the GoN has taken few additional steps to crack down on cartels. The Industrial Enterprise Act of 2016 states that “no industry shall be nationalized.” To date, there have been no cases of nationalization in Nepal, nor are there any official policies that suggest expropriation should be a concern for prospective investors. However, companies can be sealed or confiscated if they do not pay taxes in accordance with Nepali law, and bank accounts can be frozen if authorities have suspicions of money laundering or other financial crimes. Nepal does not have a history of expropriations. There have been no government actions or shifts in government policy that indicate expropriations will become more likely in the foreseeable future. There is no single specific act in Nepal that exclusively covers bankruptcy. The 2006 Insolvency Act provides guidelines for insolvency proceedings in Nepal and specifies the conditions under which such proceedings can occur. Additionally, the General Code of 1963 covers bankruptcy-related issues. Creditors, shareholders, or debenture holders can initiate insolvency proceedings against a company by filing a petition at the court. If a company is solvent, its liquidation is covered by the Company Act of 2006. If the company is insolvent and unable to pay its liabilities, or if its liabilities exceed its assets, then liquidation is covered by the Insolvency Act of 2006. Under the Company Act, the order of claimant priority is as follows: 1) government revenue; 2) creditors; and 3) shareholders. Under the Insolvency Act, the government is equal to all other unsecured creditors. Monetary judgments are made in local currency. Firms and entrepreneurs who have declared bankruptcy are blacklisted from receiving loans for 10 years. 4. Industrial Policies The Nepal Laws Revision Act of 2000 eliminated most tax incentives, however, exports are still favored, as is investment in certain “priority” sectors, such as agriculture, tourism, and hydropower. Incentives for these sectors usually take the form of reduced or subsidized interest rates on bank loans. There is no discrimination against foreign investors with respect to export/import policies or non-tariff barriers. The GoN also offers tax incentives to encourage industries to locate outside the Kathmandu Valley. Newly formed provincial governments are likely to consider offering their own investment incentives in the future. Post is unaware of the GoN issuing guarantees for FDI projects, but it has been open to joint financing arrangements. In August 2016, Nepal’s Parliament approved the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, which provides numerous incentives for investors in SEZs, including exemptions on customs duties for raw materials, streamlined registration processes, guaranteed access to electricity, and prohibition of labor strikes. A revision to the SEZ Act in 2019 provided more incentives, including reducing to 60 percent the requirement that industries within an SEZ export 75 percent of their production. The GoN maintains plans to have a network of up to 15 SEZs throughout the country and is currently developing the country’s first two special economic zones in Bhairahawa and Simara, which are partly operational. Both are located in southern Nepal near the border with India. There are no mandates for local employment. However, numerous foreign investors and foreign workers have complained that obtaining work visas is an extremely onerous process, requiring the approval of multiple GoN agencies and instances of demands for bribes when obtaining and renewing visas. (For information on work visas, http://www.nepalimmigration.gov.np. A recommendation letter from the relevant ministry overseeing the investment has become a de facto requirement. The GoN limits the number of expatriate employees permitted to work at a company, expressing concern that foreign workers are “taking jobs” from Nepali citizens. Representatives of foreign companies have told Post that these attitudes and extremely inflexible immigration laws make it difficult to legally get a visa for short-term employees or consultants. There are no mandates for local employees in senior management and on boards of directors. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest, other than those already discussed above, such as the list of sectors from which foreign investment is restricted. The GoN does not use “forced localization” policies designed to compel companies to relocate all or part of their global business operations within its borders. Nepal also does not have any requirements for IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. In late 2018, parliament passed the Privacy Act and implementing regulations are being drafted. While the new regulations may clarify restrictions and responsibilities of companies around personal data management, Nepal has not previously had any regulations that would impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside Nepal. Similarly, there are no laws related to storage of data for law enforcement or privacy purposes. Post is unaware of any Nepali laws regarding performance requirement, defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as “stipulations, imposed on investors, requiring them to meet certain specified goals with respect to their operations in the host country.” 5. Protection of Property Rights The Secured Transactions Act (2006) applies to all transactions involving mortgages or liens where the effect is to secure an obligation with collateral, including pledge (when lender takes actual possession of goods), hypothecation (when possession remains with the borrower), hire-purchase, sale of accounts and secured sales contracts, and lease of goods. The GoN has established the Secured Transactions Registry Office for registering notices under this Act. Pursuant to this Act, the GoN may also designate any office to perform the notice registration function. There are no debt markets in which securitization (use of a physical asset to back up a financial instrument) would be used. However, physical assets, particularly property and land, are often used to secure personal and small business loans. Nepal is ranked 97th in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report for registering property. The report notes that registering property requires four procedures that typically take six days to complete. There are no exclusive regulations for land lease or acquisition by foreign and/or non-resident investors. The FITTA and related laws governing foreign investment clearly state that investors can own property, but the title rests with the business/company rather than the foreign investor in an individual capacity. The GoN does not maintain official statistics on untitled land. The Ministry for Agriculture, Land Management and Cooperatives (previously known as the Ministry of Land Reform and Management) has been working for decades to identify property titles and registration. Political instability, poor record-keeping, and resistance from stakeholders, however, has made this a difficult task. Most arable land has a title, although titles have sometimes been acquired in a fraudulent manner. For legally purchased property, ownership does not revert to other owners. But, if that property remains unoccupied or unused for an extended period, there is the possibility that squatters may occupy and claim the land. Although such occupation is not legally enforceable, there are hundreds of cases of unsettled or unlawful occupation of property languishing in Nepal’s court system, most dating back to the 1996-2006 Maoist insurgency. In 2007, Nepal ratified the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), which guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples. Post is not aware of any legal case in Nepal citing this convention. Nepal has a consolidated act on IP (The Patent, Design, and Trademark Act of 1965) that provides protection for industrial property, including patents, designs, and trademarks and a separate act on Copyright (The Copyright Act of 2002). Patent protection is afforded to inventions, principles, formulae, and design protection, including physical shape and appearance. Trademark protections include the word, sign, picture, or a combination thereof to differentiate the product from others in the market. The Copyright Act of 2002 covers most modern forms of authorship and provides for adequate periods of protection. Unlike other jurisdictions, Trademarks must be registered in Nepal to receive protection. Once registered, trademarks are protected for a period of seven years. For registration and grant of industrial designs and patents, an applicant must file formal applications with Nepal’s Intellectual Property office. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, & Supplies’ Department of Industry looks after patent and trademark issues, while the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Civil Aviation oversee copyright issues. The Department of Industry also acts as a semi-judiciary unit in cases of protection of industrial property and the settlement of disputes and other administrative procedures. Nepal is a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the Paris Convention for Industrial Property. In 2017, the Government of Nepal (GoN) finalized an IPR Policy to be used as the foundation for new IPR legislation. In 2018, GoN came out with a comprehensive draft law on IP. However, the draft is still under governmental review. The draft legislation substantially improves existing IP laws and regulations and endeavors to codify all industrial property laws in one place. Once enacted, the law on IPR aims to bring the Nepalese national law in line with international IP standards. Nepal is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. However, enforcement of existing IPR violations is sporadic at best. Law enforcement officials do not have adequate training on IPR issues and offenders can often pay a small bribe to avoid prosecution. Nepal’s IPR laws are several decades old and penalties are too low to have deterrent effect. Awareness of IPR issues is low in the private sector and in the legal system. As a result, Nepal faces serious challenges in preventing the sale of counterfeit goods. The primary marketplaces in Nepal are flooded with counterfeit products, including electronic equipment, clothing, digital media, and pharmaceutical products. Nepal does not track seizures of counterfeit goods, neither does it have a strong track record of prosecuting IPR violations. Improving Nepal’s IPR policies has been a top priority for the U.S. Embassy, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has conducted nearly a dozen training courses on various aspects of IPR policy for Nepali officials over the past several years. As a result, Nepal’s Cabinet approved a new IPR Policy in March 2017 that has served as the foundation for new IPR legislation. Representatives from USPTO have reviewed the draft IPR bill, most recently in 2019, and provided the GoN recommendations on how the policy could be strengthened. This IPR Bill is currently awaiting clearance by the Ministry of Finance and will then be presented to the cabinet and parliament for ratification. It is expected that this new IP Act will be enacted some time in 2022; however, as this is an election year, it could be postponed to 2023. As Nepal works to update its IPR legislation, USPTO and the U.S. Embassy continue to advocate for stronger IPR protection. 6. Financial Sector The Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) is the only stock exchange in Nepal. The majority of NEPSE’s 255 listed companies are hydropower companies and banks, with the NEPSE listings for banks driven primarily by a regulatory requirement rather than commercial considerations. There are few opportunities for foreign portfolio investment in Nepal. Foreign investors are not allowed to invest in the Nepal Stock Exchange nor permitted to trade in the shares of publicly listed Nepali companies; only Nepali citizens and Non-Resident Nepalis (NRNs) are allowed to invest in NEPSE and trade stock. The FITTA, however, allows for the creation of a “venture capital fund” to enable foreign institutional investors to take equity stakes in Nepali companies. The Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON) regulates NEPSE, but the Board does little to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. While both NEPSE and SEBON have been enhancing their capabilities in recent years, Post’s view is that the NEPSE is far from becoming a mature stock exchange and likely does not have sufficient liquidity to allow for the entry and exit of sizeable positions. Some experts have raised concerns about the Ministry of Finance’s degree of influence over both SEBON and NEPSE and have cited lack of independence from government influence as an impediment to the development of Nepal’s capital market. (See: https://milkeninstitute.org/reports/framing-issues-modernizing-public-equity-market-nepal.) Nepal moved to full convertibility (no foreign exchange restrictions for transactions in the current account) when it accepted Article VIII obligations of IMF’s Articles of Agreement in May 1994. In line with this, the GoN and NRB refrain from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, although special credit arrangements exist for farmers and rural producers through the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal. Foreign-owned companies can obtain loans on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit and investment instruments. These include public stock and direct loans from finance companies and joint venture commercial banks. Foreign investors can access equity financing locally, but in order to do so, the investor must be incorporated in Nepal under the Companies Act of 2006 and listed on the stock exchange. The banking sector has grappled with shortages of loanable funds in the last couple of years resulting in high interest rates on loans. One of the major reasons for this is slow and inefficient government spending leading to lack of liquidity in the system. With the return of relative political stability in 2018, it was hoped this problem would be reduced but it has continued. The NRB has promoted mergers in the financial sector and published merger bylaws in 2011 to help consolidate and better regulate the banking sector. As of January 2021, there were 27 commercial banks, 19 development banks, and 21 finance companies registered with the NRB. This total does not include micro-finance institutions, savings and credit cooperatives, non-government organizations (NGOs), and other institutions, which provide many of the functions of banks and financial institutions. There are no legal provisions to defend against hostile takeovers, but there have been no reports of hostile takeovers in the banking system. Nepal’s poor infrastructure and challenging terrain has meant that many parts of the country do not have access to financial services. A 2015 study by the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) reported that 61 percent of Nepalis had access to formal financial services (40 percent to formal banking). Following local elections in 2017, the GoN established 753 local government units and promised that each unit would be served by at least one bank. As of January 2020, 8 local units were still without a bank. Most of the local units without banks are in remote locations with few suitable buildings and a lack of proper security and internet connectivity. Nepal’s banking sector is relatively healthy, though fragmented, and NRB bank supervision, while improving, remains weak, allegedly due to political influence according to several private sector representatives. The GoN hopes to strengthen the banking system by reducing the number of smaller banks and it has actively encouraged consolidation of commercial banks; there are currently 27 commercial banks, down from 78 in 2012. Most banks locate their branches in and around Kathmandu and in the large cities of southern Nepal. Some banks are owned by prominent business houses, which could create conflicts of interest. There are also a large number of cooperative banks that are governed not by the NRB but by the Ministry of Agricultural, Land Management, and Cooperatives. These cooperatives compete with banks for customers. In January 2017, Parliament approved the Bank and Financial Institutions (BAFI) Act. First introduced in 2013, BAFI is designed to strengthen corporate governance by setting term limits for Chief Executive Officers and board members at banks and financial institutions. The legislation also aims to reduce potential conflicts of interest by prohibiting business owners from serving on the board of any bank from which their business has taken loans. In 2018, NRB was criticized for not taking action to relieve a liquidity crunch and the Nepal Banker’s Association came to a gentlemen’s agreement to limit deposit rates. The NRB did not protest this action, leading to some criticism that it was not fulfilling its role as a regulator against what many perceived as cartel behavior. The NRB regulates the national banking system and also functions as the government’s central bank. As a regulator, NRB controls foreign exchange; supervises, monitors, and governs operations of banking and non-banking financial institutions; determines interest rates for commercial loans and deposits; and determines exchange rates for foreign currencies. As the government’s bank, NRB manages all government income and expenditure accounts, issues Nepali bills and treasury notes, makes loans to the government, and determines monetary policy. Existing banking laws do not allow retail branch operations by foreign banks, which compels foreign banks to set up a local bank if choosing to operate in Nepal. For example, Standard Chartered formed Standard Chartered Nepal. All commercial banks have correspondent banking arrangements with foreign commercial banks, which they use for transfers and payments. Standard Chartered is the only correspondent bank with a physical presence in Nepal and handles foreign transactions for the NRB. Nepal will be undergoing a review by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2021 to assess its anti-money laundering regime. Although unlikely, Nepal risks losing its correspondent banking relationships or increased FATF monitoring if it fails this assessment. Foreigners who are legal residents of Nepal with proper work permits and business visas are allowed to open bank accounts. Nepal has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are 36 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Nepal, including Nepal Airlines Corporation, Nepal Oil Corporation, and the Nepal Electricity Authority. Since 1993, Nepal has initiated numerous market policy and regulatory reforms in an effort to open eligible government-controlled sectors to domestic and foreign private investment. These efforts have had mixed results. The majority of private investment has been made in manufacturing and tourism—sectors where there is little government involvement and existing state-owned enterprises are not competitive. Many state-owned sectors are not open for foreign investment. Information on the annual performance of Nepal’s SOEs’ can be found on this website. https://mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/Annual%20Status%20Review%20of%20Public%20Enterprises%202019_20200213054242.pdf. Corporate governance of SOEs remains a challenge and executive positions have reportedly been filled by people connected to politically appointed government ministers. Board seats are generally allocated to senior government officials and the SOEs are often required to consult with government officials before making any major business decisions. A 2011 executive order mandates a competitive and merit-based selection process but has encountered resistance within some ministries. Third-party market analysts consider most Nepali SOEs to be poorly managed and characterized by excessive government control and political interference. According to local economic analysts, SOEs are sometimes given preference for government tenders, although official policy states that SOEs and private companies are to compete under the same terms and conditions. Private enterprises do not have the same access to finance as SOEs. Private enterprises mostly rely on commercial banks and financial institutions for business and project financing. SOEs, however, also have access to financing from state-owned banks, development banks, and other state-owned investment vehicles. Similar concessions or facilities are not granted to private enterprises. SOEs receive non-market-based advantages, given their proximity to government officials, although these advantages can be hard to quantify. Some SOEs, such as the Nepal Electricity Authority or the Nepal Oil Corporation have monopolies that prevent foreign competitors from entering those market sectors. The World Bank in Nepal assesses corporate governance benchmarks (both law and practice) against the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, focusing on companies listed on the stock market. Awareness of the importance of corporate governance is growing. The NRB has introduced higher corporate governance standards for banks and other financial institutions. Under the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the World Bank recommended in 2011 that the GoN strengthen capital market institutions and overhaul the OCR. Although some reforms were initiated, many were never finalized and no reforms have been instituted at the OCR. The Privatization Act of 1994 authorizes and defines the procedures for privatization of state-owned enterprises to broaden participation of the private sector in the operation of such enterprises. The Privatization Act of 1994 generally does not discriminate between national and foreign investors, however, in cases where proposals from two or more investors are identical, the government gives priority to Nepali investors. Economic reforms, deregulation, privatization of businesses and industries under government control, and liberalized policies toward FDI were initiated in the early 1990s. During this time, sectors such as telecommunications, civil aviation, coal imports, print and electronic media, insurance, and hydropower generation were opened for private investment, both domestic and foreign. The first privatization of a state-owned corporation was conducted in October 1992 through a Cabinet decision (executive order). Since then, a total of 23 state-owned corporations have been privatized, liquidated, or dissolved, though the process has been static since 2008. The last company to be (partially) privatized was Nepal Telecom in 2008 (although the GoN still is the majority shareholder). Since then, no SOEs have been privatized. In the past, privatization was initiated with a public bidding process that was transparent and non-discriminatory. Procedural delays, resistance from trade unions, and a lack of will within the GoN, however, have created obstacles to the privatization process. The Corporate Coordination and Privatization Division of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for management of the privatization program. Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs of state-owned enterprises. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of the general international expectations of responsible business conduct (RBC) remains very low in Nepal. Government rules, policies, and standards related to RBC are mostly limited to environmental issues. Social and governance issues are poorly promoted and enforced by the government. Government laws, policies, and rules concerning RBC, including environmental and social standards, are in place. However, the government agencies and officials responsible for enforcing them have been criticized for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. The GoN has not drafted a national action plan for RBC and does not factor RBC policies into procurement decisions. Workers’ organizations and unions are the most vocal entities promoting or monitoring RBC. Other than the Department of Labor, which works with workers’ organizations and unions, government agencies do not actively encourage foreign and domestic enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles. The ILO is working to promote RBC in the agricultural sector, focusing on the tea, ginger, cardamom, and dairy industries. The GoN’s efforts to develop and enforce laws for environmental protection, consumer protection, labor rights, and human rights have been sporadic and lacking in efficacy. Ministries and concerned departments occasionally initiate special campaigns to enforce laws and regulations protecting these rights, but this is not standard practice. Government agencies often do not enforce these laws, and the minor penalties imposed provide minimal deterrent effect. Post is not aware of any cases of private sector projects’ effects on human rights. Various government agencies monitor business entities’ compliance with different standards and codes. For example, OCR looks after governance issues, the Inland Revenue Department monitors accounting, and the Department of Labor monitors executive compensation standards. There are no independent NGOs or investment funds focusing on promoting or monitoring RBC, although organizations like Goodweave help promote child labor-free products. The GoN does not encourage adherence to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. There are virtually no extractive industries in Nepal, other than sand mining in riverbeds and the country does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Some report that corruption is rampant in Nepal. In the words of a World Bank official, corruption in Nepal is “endemic, institutionalized, and driven from the top.” Corruption takes many forms but is pervasive in the awarding of licenses, government procurement, and revenue management. The primary law used to combat corruption in Nepal is the Prevention of Corruption Act 2002. This law prohibits corruption, bribery, money laundering, abuse of office, and payments to facilitate services, both in the public and private sector. According to a report by GAN Integrity, a company that works with businesses to mitigate corporate risk, “implementation and enforcement [of the Prevention of Corruption Act] is inadequate, leaving the levels of corruption in the country unchallenged.” The report goes on to note that Nepal’s judicial system is “subject to pervasive corruption and executive influence,” that “corruption is rife among low-level [police] officers,” and that “Nepali tax officials are prone to corruption, and some seek positions in the sector specifically for personal enrichment.” The full report is available at: https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/nepal. The CIAA is Nepal’s constitutional body for corruption control. The 2015 constitution empowers the CIAA to conduct “investigations of any abuse of authority committed through corruption by any person holding public office.” In practice, CIAA arrests and investigations tend to focus on lower-level government bureaucrats. According to the 2020 Corruption Perception Index released by Transparency International (TI), Nepal ranked 117th among 180 countries, placing it in the range of “highly corrupt” countries. In January 2018, local media reported that the CIAA is drafting a bill to replace the Prevention of Corruption Act, with the goal of making the new law compatible with the UN Convention against Corruption that Nepal signed in 2011. Nepal is not a member of the OEDC Anti-Bribery Convention. While anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties, there are no laws or regulations that are specifically designed to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. GoN officials are aware that there should be no conflict of interest when contracts are awarded, but how this is implemented is left to the discretion of the concerned government agency. The GoN does not require companies to establish codes of conduct. Post is not aware of private companies that use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials, however, this does not mean that there are no companies that use such programs. American consulting firm Frost and Sullivan (www.frost.com) maintains an office in Kathmandu and investigates local investment partners for a fee. NGOs involved in investigating corruption do not receive special protections. Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority CIAA Headquarter, P.O. Box No. 9996, Tangal, Kathmandu, Nepal Phone: +9771-4440151, 4429688, 4432708 International nongovernmental organization: Mr. Bharat Bahadur Thapa President, Transparency International Nepal P.O. Box 11486, Chakhkhu Bakhkhu Marga, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu +977 1 4475112, 4475262 Email: trans@tinepal.org Local nongovernmental organization: Prof. Dr. Srikrishna Shrestha President, Pro Public P.O. Box: 14307, Gautambuddha Marg, Annamnagar Phone: +977-01-4268681, 4265023; Fax: +977-01-4268022 Email: mailto:propublic@wlink.com.np 10. Political and Security Environment In 2017, Nepal successfully held local, provincial, and national elections to fully implement its 2015 constitution. The Madhesi population in Nepal’s southern Terai belt, together with other traditionally marginalized ethnic and caste groups, believes the constitution is insufficiently inclusive and that its grievances are not being addressed. Post-election, however, this feeling of disenfranchisement may be somewhat assuaged due to the fact that Madhesi parties achieved a majority in the Province 2 provincial assembly elections. The Nepal Communist Party (NCP)—formed by the merger of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist (UML)) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center)—swept the 2017 elections to form a two-thirds majority government in 2018. However, internal wrangling within the NCP broke into the open and dominated much of 2020, resulting in Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli dissolving the parliament in December 2020. Although the parliament was reinstated by the Supreme Court on February 23, 2021, a March 7 Supreme Court ruling broke up the NCP into its original constituents, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and CPN-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) parties. Eventually, PM Oli was ousted, and a coalition government under Nepali Congress PM Sher Bahadur Deuba is currently in office with the responsibility to hold new elections during 2022. Criminal violence, sometimes conducted under the guise of political activism, remains a problem. Bandhs (general strikes) called by political parties and other agitating groups sometimes halt transport and shut down businesses, sometimes nationwide. However, in the last several years, few bandhs have been successfully carried out in Kathmandu. Americans and other Westerners are generally not targets of violence. U.S. citizens who travel to or reside in Nepal are urged to register with the Consular Section of the Embassy by accessing the Department of State’s travel registration site at https://step.state.gov/step,. The Consular Section provides updated information on travel and security on the embassy website, http://np.usembassy.gov., and can be reached through the Embassy switchboard at (977) (1) 423-4500, by fax at (977) (1) 400-7281, by email at consktm@state.gov. U.S. citizens also should consult the Department of State’s Consular Information Sheet for Nepal and Worldwide Caution Public Announcement on the Department of State’s home page at http://travel.state.gov, by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United States and Canada, or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, by a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Over the last ten years, there have been frequent calls for strikes, particularly in the Terai. Occasionally, protesters have vandalized or damaged factories and other businesses. On February 22, 2019, a small improvised explosive device (IED) was placed overnight outside the entrance of NCell, Nepal’s second largest mobile carrier. One person died and two others were injured. The Indian-run Arun 3 hydro-power plant has been targeted by IEDs on three occasions and in early-2018 the U.S. Embassy issued a security notice about credible threats of violence targeting the private Chandragiri Hills Cable Car attraction. Such incidents remain infrequent, but unpredictable. Demonstrations have on occasion turned violent, although these activities generally are not directed at U.S. citizens or businesses. Biplav, a splinter Maoist group that threatened or attempted to extort NGOs, businesses, and educational institutions across Nepal in recent years, reached an agreement with the government in March 2021 to give up violence and enter peaceful politics. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Nepal’s labor force is characterized by an acute lack of skilled workers and an abundance of political party-affiliated unions. Only a small proportion (14%) of Nepal’s working age population has a secondary or above secondary education. In Nepal, there is little demand for skilled workers, and prior to the COVID pandemic, thousands of skilled and unskilled Nepalis departed each year to work in foreign countries, primarily Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia. Thousands more also sought employment in India, which shares an open border with Nepal. Nepal’s unemployment rate of 11% and high rates of underemployment have provided push factors, but the gap between overseas migrant workers’ and domestic wage rates has made it difficult for Nepal’s agricultural and construction sectors to find enough workers, and many companies import laborers willing to work for lower wages from India. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, the country’s literacy rate is 65.9 percent, with the literacy rate for men at 75.1 percent and 57.4 percent for women. Vocational and technical training are poorly developed, and the national system of higher education is overwhelmed by high enrollment and inadequate resources. Many secondary school and college graduates are unable to find jobs commensurate with their education levels. Hiring non-Nepali workers is not, with the exception of India, a viable option as the employment of foreigners is restricted and requires the approval of the Department of Labor. The Act and Labor Regulations of 2018 limit the number of foreign employees a firm can employ and the length of time foreign employees can remain in Nepal to three years for those with non-specialized skills and five years for those with technical expertise. These terms are renewable, but only after the employee has departed Nepal for at least one-year, further undermining firm’s ability to retain needed staff based on business needs. Under Nepali law, it has historically been difficult to dismiss employees. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. In some cases, Nepal’s labor laws have forced companies to retain employees, even after a business has closed. Workers at state-owned enterprises often receive generous severance packages if they are laid off. Unemployment insurance does not exist. Many private enterprises hire workers on a contract basis for jobs that are not temporary in nature as a way to avoid cumbersome labor laws. In some commercial banks and other businesses, security guards, drivers, and administrative staff jobs are filled by contract workers. The Industrial Enterprise Act of 2016 and the Labor Act of 2017 both include a “no work, no pay” provision, and the later clarifies processes for hiring and firing employees. In practice, it remains difficult to fire workers in Nepal and the Labor Act encourages the hiring of Nepali citizens wherever possible. Some labor union representatives said the new Labor Act 2017 is generally worker friendly. It is unclear how effectively this law is being enforced. The new act details requirements for time off, payment, and termination of employees. It also has some provisions to end discrimination in the workplace. According to the act, the employer is prohibited from discriminating against any employee based on religion, color, sex, caste and ethnicity, origin, language or belief or any other related basis. The Labor Act also confirms that employees shall have the right to form a trade union. By law, labor unions in Nepal are independent of the government and employer. In practice, however, all labor unions are affiliated with political parties, and have significant influence within the government. The constitution provides for the freedom to establish and join unions and associations. It permits restrictions on unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar circumstances. Labor laws permit strikes, except by employees in essential services such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. Sixty percent of a union’s membership must vote in favor of a strike for it to be legal, though this law is often ignored. Laws also empower the government to halt a strike or suspend a union’s activities if the union disturbs the peace or adversely affects the nation’s economic interests; in practice, this is rarely done. Labor unions have staged frequent strikes, often unrelated to working conditions, although they have become less frequent and less effective in recent years. Political parties will frequently call for national strikes that are observed only in particular regions or that only last for a few hours. In the past year, Post is not aware of any strike that lasted long enough to pose an investment risk. The SEZ Act approved in August 2016 prohibits workers from striking in any SEZ. There are two SEZs that are partially operational, but the GoN hopes to eventually have as many as 15. However, private sector interest in SEZs has been lukewarm. Total union participation is estimated at about one million, or about 10 percent of the total workforce. The three largest trade unions are affiliated with political parties. The Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) is the most active and its organizing tactics have led to violent clashes with other trade unions in the past. The ANTUF and its splinter group, the ANTUF-R, are aggressive in their defense of members and frequently engage in disputes with management. Labor union agitation is often conducted in violation of valid contracts and existing laws, and unions are rarely held accountable for their actions. Collective bargaining is only applied in establishing workers’ salaries. Trade unions, employers, and government representatives actively engage in this practice. Nepal’s Labor Act, updated in 2017, includes two types of labor dispute resolution mechanisms, one for individual disputes and one for collective disputes for businesses with 10 or more employees. If a dispute cannot be resolved by the employee and management, the case is forwarded for mediation. If mediation is unsuccessful, it is settled through arbitration. For individual disputes, the employee is required to submit an application to the business regarding their claim. The company’s management should then discuss the claim with the employee in order to settle it within 15 days. If a claim made by the employee cannot be settled between the employee and the company, the issue may be forwarded to the Department of Labor where discussions shall be held in the presence of Department of Labor officials. If the employee is not satisfied with the decision made by the Department of Labor, they can appeal to the Labor Court. The Labor Act is applicable only to companies, private firms, partnerships, cooperatives, associations, or other organizations in operation or established, incorporated, registered, or formed under prevailing laws of Nepal regardless of their objective to earn profit or not. The Labor Act does not apply to the following entities: Civil Service, Nepal Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, entities incorporated under other prevailing laws or situated in Special Economic Zones to the extent separate provisions are provided, and working journalists, unless specifically provided in the contract. Nepal’s enforcement of regulations to monitor labor abuses and health and safety standards is weak. Operations in small towns and rural areas are rarely monitored. International labor rights are recognized within domestic law. No new labor-related laws have been enacted in the past year. The GoN does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons, though it is making significant efforts to do so. The definition of human trafficking under Nepal’s Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act (HTTCA) does not match the definition of human trafficking under international law. In June 2020, Nepal formally acceded to the Palermo Protocol. Children in Nepal are engaged in child labor, including in the production of bricks, carpets, and embellished textiles, although the GoN claims to be serious about ending child labor. The Labor Inspectorate’s budget, the number of labor inspectors, and relevant resources and training are all insufficient for effective enforcement of Nepal’s labor laws, including those related to child labor. The most recent Human Rights Report can be found at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/. The Department of Labor’s 2018 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor is available at: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/nepal Nepal has a modest level of trade with the United States, with USD180 million in bilateral trade in 2020 (down from USD214 million the previous year). In late 2016, the Nepal Trade Preferences Program – which grants duty free access to certain products made in Nepal – went into effect. Nepal exported approximately USD2.4 million worth of goods in 2020 under this program (down from USD3.1 million the previous year). To remain eligible for this program, Nepal must meet certain labor standards. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 USD33.7 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD51.7 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 USD 0 2021 USD 0 Not permitted under Nepali law Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A 2020 5% https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Nepal Rastra (central) Bank Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward USD1,682 100% Total Outward Amount 100% India USD529 31% N/A China, P.R.: Mainland USD262 16% N/A West Indies (St. Kitts & Nevis) USD129 8% N/A Ireland USD109 7% N/A Singapore USD105 6% N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Nepalis are prohibited from investing abroad as per the Act Restricting Investment Abroad (ARIA), 1964. Post has heard this Law might be abrogated soon, but as of April 2022, no outward investment is permitted from Nepal. 14. Contact for More Information Raphael Sambou Economic/Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy Kathmandu +977 1 423 4192 Email: sambour@state.gov Abhishek Basnyat Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Kathmandu +977 1 423 4469 Email: basnyatap@state.gov New Zealand Executive Summary After weathering the pandemic better than most countries, the New Zealand economy has begun to overheat. Net debt to GDP has increased from 19.5 percent prior to the onset of Covid restrictions to 34.5 percent at the end of 2021. The increase in debt has been due in part to spending measures the government has undertaken for Covid response and recovery. These measures were able to support economic activity during extensive Covid-related domestic lockdowns and travel restrictions, but along with supply chain disruptions, they have begun to contribute to higher inflation. Nationwide labor shortages across a variety of sectors have also had a sizeable impact on the economy. In response to war in Ukraine, the New Zealand government rapidly passed historic sanctions legislation targeting individuals, companies, and assets associated with Russia’s invasion. Sanctions are expected to have a limited direct impact on the investment climate in New Zealand. While a swift border closure and the imposition of lockdowns originally helped stamp out community transmission of Covid, the appearance of the Omicron variant in January 2022 resulted in an outbreak that put pressure on the health system. At time of writing, border restrictions were being phased out in favor of a management approach to the pandemic. The government announced its plans to open the New Zealand border to travelers from visa-waiver countries on May 1. By October, it is expected that the border will fully reopen. Since 2020, the tourism sector has suffered the most, while primary exports and the housing market have helped to sustain the economy. Unemployment is currently 3.2 percent, a record low. New Zealand has an international reputation for an open and transparent economy where businesses and investors can make commercial transactions with ease. Major political parties are committed to an open trading regime and sound rule of law practices. This has been regularly reflected in high global rankings in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report and Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption index. New Zealand is party to a multitude of free trade agreements (FTA). In February 2022, the country signed its latest, an FTA with the United Kingdom. Successive governments accept that foreign investment is an important source of financing for New Zealand and a means to gain access to foreign technology, expertise, and global markets. Some restrictions do apply in a few areas of critical interest including certain types of land, significant business assets, and fishing quotas. These restrictions are facilitated by a screening process conducted by a government agency. The current Labour-led government welcomes productive, sustainable, and inclusive foreign investment, but since being elected in October 2017 and reelected in October 2020, there has been a modest shift in economic priorities to social initiatives while continuing to acknowledge New Zealand’s dependence on trade and foreign investment. Cabinet has agreed a whole-of-government framework that will drive climate change policy. This national initiative is currently underway to reduce the country’s emissions and is developing a pathway for farmers to reduce agricultural emissions. The rapidly developing digital and e-commerce landscape is supported by government initiatives that expand the knowledge base, while making a priority of digital inclusion. Along with its focus on post-pandemic recovery, the New Zealand government has invested in a digital, innovative future that aims to secure multilateral agreements with e-commerce rules that address the complexities of the evolving digital economy. The 2022 Investment Climate Statement for New Zealand uses the exchange rate of NZD 1 = USD 0.70 Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 1 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation Index 2021 26 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $12,900 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/new-zealand World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $41,550 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment New Zealand has an open and transparent economy. Foreign investment is generally encouraged without discrimination. Some restrictions do apply in a few areas of critical interest including certain types of land, significant business assets, and fishing quotas. These restrictions are facilitated by a screening process conducted by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO), described in the next section. New Zealand maintains an expanding network of bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements that include investment components. New Zealand also has a well-developed legal framework and regulatory system, and the judicial system is generally effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. Investment disputes are rare, and there have been no major disputes in recent years involving U.S. companies. The Labour Party-led government elected in 2017 and re-elected in 2020 has continued its program of tighter screening of some forms of foreign investment and has moved to restrict the availability of permits for oil and gas exploration by applying section 20B of the Overseas Investment Act 2005, which will be discussed in greater detail below for its discretionary aspect. The opposition National Party, gaining ground in early 2022 polling, wants to lift restrictions on exploration, as well as ease requirements for “responsible mining.” The current Labour government has also focused on different aspects of trade agreement negotiation compared with the previous government, such as an aversion to investor-state dispute settlement provisions. New Zealand otherwise screens overseas investments to ensure quality investments are made that benefit New Zealand. The screening process is undertaken by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO), the government agency responsible for regulating foreign direct investment into the country. The Office is responsible for high value investments in “significant business assets,” investments in sensitive land, and investments in fishing quota. The Overseas Investment Act (OIA) 2005 was amended in 2021 with a package of reforms aimed at strengthening aspects of the OIA for high-risk investments, while also seeking to streamline the approval process for low-risk applications. Depending on the type of investment, overseas investors must pass one or more of a series of tests. They are as follows: Investor Test Benefit to New Zealand Test National Interest Assessment The Investor Test: The purpose of this test is to determine if an overseas investor is qualified to own or control assets considered sensitive to New Zealand. The Investor Test assesses the potential for the investor to be a risk to New Zealand by assessing the investor’s character and capability. Factors considered include past convictions, immigration or tax disputes, and any past probation on serving as a company director. More information can be found here: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2005/0082/latest/LMS468073.html Investors who have met the conditions of the screening process for the Investor Test, and whose circumstances have not changed, do not need to be reassessed for any subsequent approval. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/investor-test The Benefit to New Zealand Test: The purpose of this test is to screen for the investment’s potential to benefit New Zealand. This test is applied to investments involving sensitive land or a fishing quota. Benefit is assessed against seven factors, including the potential for positive impact on the economy or the environment, enhanced public access, and protection of sacred indigenous land. The OIO considers the potential for economic benefit to be the most important of these factors. The Benefit to New Zealand Test also screens for participation in the investment by New Zealanders. Applications by overseas investors that include oversight or participation by New Zealanders are given greater weight. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/benefit-new-zealand-test/oversight-or-participation-new-zealanders National Interest Test: In 2020, due to the stress placed on businesses by Covid, the Labour Government introduced a further National Interest Assessment. This threshold serves to potentially deny overseas investment that is at cross purposes with New Zealand’s strategic interests. The Minister of Finance, along with the OIO, reviews these applications. The National Interest Test is mandatory for applications that involve either land or assets that will be used for Strategically Important Businesses (SIBs) or land or assets that involve investment by a foreign government. SIBs include a wide cross-section of investment interests that impact national security, such as critical infrastructure or companies that are direct suppliers to the security agencies. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/national-interest-assessment During the peak of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Government put in place the Emergency Notification Regime (ENR), a temporary protocol requiring investments of any type to go through a screening process. The ENR aimed to protect New Zealand assets from fire sales during a period of heightened market uncertainty. It was lifted in 2021 when it became clear to the Government that the impact to the economy of Covid had been mitigated, though the ENR still applies to transactions entered into prior to June 7, 2021. The ENR was replaced with the National Security and Public Order notification protocol, which applies to overseas investments in SIBs or Significant Business Assets (SBAs). More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/find-out-if-you-need-notify-us-your-transaction SIBs versus SBAs: The OIO screens for investments in both Strategically Important Businesses (see above), and for Significant Business Assets (SBAs). The vast majority (70-80 percent) of investor applications trigger the SBA screening. An SBA is defined as an investment in New Zealand securities, assets, or businesses worth more NZD 100 million (USD 70 million), or an investment that acquires 25 percent or more ownership or controlling interest in a New Zealand asset. For some investors, the dollar threshold is higher, such as those investors who are citizens of countries with whom New Zealand has an FTA. For Australian investors, the threshold is NZD 552 million (USD 386 million). Consent is needed for overseas investors who want to invest in a significant business asset or in New Zealand business assets worth less than NZ$ 100 million if those assets involve sensitive land or fishing quota. Land is considered “sensitive” if it is residential, larger than five hectares (12 acres) of farmland, or if it is any land that is used for commercial or industrial purposes. Sensitive land is also located on some domestic islands, where there is no size threshold. In marine and coastal areas, there is no minimum size to meet the sensitivity threshold. For a detailed table explaining the different types of sensitivities and what land may be subject to greater restrictions, please visit: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/our-investment-pathways/investing-land-provide-benefit-new-zealand/identifying-sensitive-land Crown entity New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) is New Zealand’s primary investment promotion agency. In addition to its domestic presence, NZTE has 41 international offices, including four in the United States. The NZTE helps investors develop investment plans, access opportunities, and facilitate connections with private sector advisors based in New Zealand. They also offer ongoing support once an investment has been made. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/investment-and-funding/how-we-help . Under certain conditions, foreign investors can bid alongside New Zealand businesses for government funding for research and development (R&D) grants. For more see: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/science-and-technology/science-and-innovation/international-opportunities/new-zealand-r-d/ . Most of the programs that are operated by NZTE, the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE), and Callaghan Innovation, provide financial assistance, and support through skills and knowledge, or supporting innovative business ventures in the early stages of operation. For more see: https://www.business.govt.nz/how-to-grow/getting-government-grants/what-can-i-get-help-with/ . The New Zealand-United States Business Council, established in 2001, is a non-partisan organization funded by business and the government. It fosters a strong and mutually beneficial relationship between New Zealand and the United States through both government-to-government contacts, and business-to-business links. The American Chamber of Commerce in Auckland provides a platform for New Zealand and U.S. businesses to network among themselves and with government agencies. To visit Council’s and the Chamber’s websites, please visit: https://www.nzuscouncil.org/ https://www.amcham.co.nz/ The New Zealand government does not discriminate against U.S. or other foreign investors in their rights to establish and own business enterprises. It has placed separate limitations on foreign ownership of strategic businesses, such as airline Air New Zealand and telecommunications infrastructure provider Chorus Limited. While waivers are granted, in some cases for investment of “significant economic value,” they are limited and subject to a technical, bespoke process that requires direct contact with the OIO: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/contact The 2022 OECD Economic Survey of New Zealand offered a number of key recommendations, particularly around growth sustainability and the Government’s response to Covid-19. Link to the OECD Survey here: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2022_a4fd214c-en The most recent WTO Trade Policy review was in 2015. Linked here: https://bit.ly/35uMLDq In 2022, the NZUS Business Council, along with economics consultancy Sense Partners, produced a report on New Zealand’s bilateral trade relationship with the United States. The report highlighted a trade relationship in the services sector (e.g., computer services, gaming) that is becoming increasingly important: the United States is now New Zealand’s largest services export market. The report’s key takeaway is that the bilateral relationship is strong and presents ample opportunity for future growth. To read the report, please visit: https://www.nzuscouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/REPORT-NZUS-trade-relationship-Stability-and-diversity-in-a-time-of-change.pdf The New Zealand government has shown a strong commitment to continue efforts to facilitate business. There are no restrictions on the movement of funds into or out of the country. Overseas investors are required to adhere to legislation that applies equally domestic businesses. The global trend to tighten anti-money laundering laws has increased the reporting requirements of the banking sector. To prevent the increasing use of New Zealand-based shell companies for illegal activities, legislation was introduced in 2014 that requires a New Zealander to serve as company director. For more information: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0046/latest/DLM4094913.html The Companies Office maintains a business registry of publicly available information on company directors. The website is accessed by creditors and those interested in doing business with the company or its directors. Registration is completed online. Those registering a new company typically register with the Companies Office, along with the Inland Revenue Department (IRD): https://companies-register.companiesoffice.govt.nz/ https://www.ird.govt.nz/ The New Zealand Business Number (NZBN) Act 2016 allocates unique identifiers to eligible businesses to allow them to conduct business efficiently. Tax registration is required if a company is an employer or if the company pays the Goods and Services Tax (GST), which is currently 15 percent. The threshold for GST registration is NZD 60,000 (USD 42,000) of turnover over a one-year period. For more information about New Zealand and taxation, including the 2016 extension of GST registration to overseas suppliers of “remote services” to New Zealanders, please visit: https://www.ird.govt.nz/gst/registering-for-gst The New Zealand government does not place restrictions on domestic investors to invest abroad. NZTE is the government’s international business development agency. It promotes outward investment and provides resources and services for New Zealand businesses to prepare for export and advice on how to grow internationally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and Customs New Zealand each operates business outreach programs that advise businesses on how to maximize the benefit from FTAs to improve the competitiveness of their goods offshore. They also provide information on how to meet requirements such as rules of origin. 3. Legal Regime New Zealand laws governing competition are transparent, non-discriminatory, and consistent with international norms. The country ranks high on the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, scoring 4.25 out of a possible 5.0, but is marked down for lack of transparency at some government departments responsible for communicating regulatory plans that are in the pipeline. Draft bills and regulations, including those related to FTAs and investment law, are generally made available for public comment through a consultation process. The Treaty of Waitangi – New Zealand’s founding document that commits to protect the indigenous Māori culture and to enable Māori to live in New Zealand as Māori – is foundational to public policy in the country. Governing the Crown’s relationship with Māori, the Treaty’s impact on regulation and investment has resulted in a focus on equitable outcomes for Māori in relevant sectors. For more information on Treaty principles, please visit: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/employment-and-skills/employment-strategy/maori-employment-action-plan/te-tiriti-principles/ More information about regulations, including The Overseas Investment Regulatory System and a regulatory timeline can be found here: https://www.treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/regulation Most standards are developed through Standards New Zealand, a business unit within MBIE. And most standards in New Zealand are set in coordination with Australia. Regulations are developed by “Order in Council,” or law made by someone other than Parliament, that give effect to the government’s decisions. Orders in Council are the main method the Government uses to put into action the decisions that need legal force, such as new or amended regulations. MBIE is responsible for the stewardship of 16 regulatory systems covering about 140 statutes. In June 2019, MBIE released a discussion paper on the proposed IP Laws Amendment Bill, an omnibus bill that is intended to make technical amendments to the Patents Act 2013, the Trademarks Act 2002, and the Designs Act 1953 to ensure that they remain workable. In November 2019, the Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act 2019 passed and amended about 14 Acts including laws regarding business insolvency, takeovers, trademarks, and limited partnerships. More information about these proposed amendments can be found here: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/proposed-intellectual-property-laws-amendment-bill/ Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and widely available online. New Zealand accounting standards are issued by the New Zealand Accounting Standards Board. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are adopted via New Zealand equivalents, which fully adhere to IFRS. These Standards are developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). Foreign companies whose securities are publicly traded in New Zealand are required to apply NZ IFRS, although the Registrar of Companies and the Financial Markets Authority can give exceptions in certain circumstances. For more information, please visit: https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/view-jurisdiction/new-zealand/ New Zealand does not have a government-mandated Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) sustainability reporting framework or standard. In October 2021, the government approved legislation for a mandatory climate disclosure law that will require financial entities with assets greater than NZD 1 billion (USD 700 million) to report the expected impact of climate change on businesses, such as how they will manage climate risks. Draft bills and regulations including those relating to FTAs and investment law, are generally made available for public comment, through a public consultation process. In a few instances there has been criticism of New Zealand governments choosing to follow a “truncated” or shortened public consultation process or adding a substantive legislative change after public consultation through the process of adding a Supplementary Order Paper to the Bill. While regulations are not in a centralized location in a form similar to the United States Federal Register, the New Zealand government requires the major regulatory departments to publish an annual regulatory stewardship strategy. The Regulatory Quality Team within the New Zealand Treasury is responsible for the strategic coordination of the Government’s regulatory management system. Treasury exercises stewardship over the regulatory management system to maintain and enhance the quality of government-initiated regulation. The Treasury’s responsibilities include the oversight of the performance of the regulatory management system as a whole and making recommendations on changes to government and Parliamentary systems and processes. These functions complement the Treasury’s role as the government’s primary economic and fiscal advisor. New Zealand’s major regulatory departments are the Department of Internal Affairs, IRD, MBIE, Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for Primary Industries, the Ministry of Transport, and the Financial Markets Authority. In recent years, there has been a revision to the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) requirements in order to help New Zealand’s regulatory framework keep up with global standards. To improve transparency in the regulatory process, RIAs are published on the Treasury’s website at the time the relevant bill is introduced to Parliament, or the regulation is published in the newspaper, or at the time of Ministerial release. An RIA provides a high-level summary of the problem being addressed, the options and their associated costs and benefits, the consultation undertaken, and the proposed arrangements for implementation and review. In 2018, the government introduced three omnibus bills that contain amendments to legislation including economic development, employment relations, and housing: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/cross-government-functions/regulatory-stewardship/regulatory-systems-amendment-bills/ . The government’s objective with this package of legislation is to ensure that they are effective, efficient, and accord with best regulatory practice by providing a process for making continuous improvements to regulatory systems that do not warrant standalone bills. In November 2019, the Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act 2019 passed and amended about 14 Acts including laws regarding business insolvency, takeovers, trademarks, and limited partnerships. In June 2019, MBIE released a discussion paper on the proposed IP Laws Amendment Bill, an omnibus bill that is intended to make technical amendments to the Patents Act 2013, the Trademarks Act 2002, and the Designs Act 1953 to ensure that they remain workable. The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) has drawn criticism from foreign and domestic investors as a barrier to investment in New Zealand. The RMA regulates access to natural and physical resources such as land and water. Critics contend that the resource management process mandated by the law is unpredictable, protracted, and subject to undue influence from competitors and lobby groups. In some cases, companies have been found to exploit the RMA’s objections submission process to stifle competition. Investors have raised concerns that the law is unequally applied between jurisdictions because of the lack of implementing guidelines. The Resource Management Amendment Act 2013 and the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009 were passed to help address these concerns. In 2020, the Resource Management Act was amended under the RMA Act 2020. The objectives of the amendment were to reduce the complexity of the RMA, increase certainty, restore public participation opportunities, and improve RMA processes. For more information: https://environment.govt.nz/acts-and-regulations/acts/resource-management-amendment-act-2020/#overview-of-the-changes The Covid pandemic has encouraged New Zealand’s efforts to boost the digitization of government services. In 2022, the Digital Identity Program was introduced, which aims to incorporate the country’s long-term strategy for a digital public service. The Program offers a regulatory framework that sets out rules for the delivery of digital identity services. It modernizes the digital identity system by innovating how people access and share their information. And under the concept of mutual recognition, it aligns with other likeminded countries such as Australia and Canada in its provision of digital identity services. The Program also touches on free trade agreements by considering a digital trust framework that promotes privacy and security, and allows for easier electronic transacting, thereby reducing barriers in digital trade. For more information, please visit: https://www.digital.govt.nz/digital-government/programmes-and-projects/digital-identity-programme/about-the-digital-identity-programme/ The Government of New Zealand is generally transparent about its public finances and debt obligations. The annual budget for the government and its departments publish assumptions, and implications of explicit and contingent liabilities on estimated government revenue and spending. In recent years, the Government of New Zealand has introduced laws to enhance regulatory coordination with Australia as part of their Single Economic Market agenda. In February 2017, the Patents (Trans-Tasman Patent Attorneys and Other Matters) Amendment Act took effect creating a single body to regulate patent attorneys in both countries. Other areas of regulatory coordination include insolvency law, financial reporting, food safety, competition policy, consumer policy and the 2013 Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement Treaty, which allows the enforcement of civil judgements between both countries. On December 1, 2020, the Privacy Act 2020 came into force, replacing the Privacy Act 1993. The Privacy Act 2020 provides the rules in New Zealand for protecting personal information and puts responsibilities on agencies and organizations about how they must go about fulfilling this statutory requirement. The Act has 13 Information Privacy Principles and requires agencies to report to the Privacy Commissioner if they have a “notifiable privacy breach.” New Zealand is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Standards New Zealand is responsible for operating the TBT Enquiry Point on behalf of MFAT. From 2016, Standards New Zealand became a business unit within MBIE administered under the Standards and Accreditation Act 2015. Standards New Zealand establishes techniques and processes built from requirements under the Act and from the International Organization for Standardization. New Zealand ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2015 and it entered into force in February 2017. New Zealand was already largely in compliance with the TFA which is expected to benefit New Zealand agricultural exporters and importers of perishable items to enhanced procedures for border clearances. New Zealand’s legal system is derived from the English system and comes from a mix of common law and statute law. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch and is generally transparent and effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. The highest appeals court is a domestic Supreme Court, which replaced the Privy Council in London and began hearing cases July 1, 2004. New Zealand courts can recognize and enforce a judgment of a foreign court if the foreign court is considered to have exercised proper jurisdiction over the defendant according to private international law rules. New Zealand has well-defined and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy laws. Arbitration is a widely used dispute resolution mechanism and is governed by the Arbitration Act of 1996, Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act of 1982, and the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1979. Legislation to modernize and consolidate laws underpinning contracts and commercial transactions came into effect in September 2017. The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 consolidates and repeals 12 acts that date between 1908 and 2002. The Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act, passed in December 2017, clarifies which jurisdiction’s law is applicable in actions of tort and abolishes certain common law rules, and establishes the general rule that the applicable law will be the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort in question occur. Overseas investments in New Zealand assets are screened only if they are defined as sensitive by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO). The OIO, a dedicated unit located within Land Information New Zealand (LINZ), administers the Overseas Investment Act, which sets out the criteria for assessing applications for foreign investment. The government ministers for finance, land information, and primary industries are responsible for assessing OIO recommendations and can choose to override OIO recommendations on approved applications. Ministers’ decisions on OIO applications can be appealed by the applicant in the New Zealand High Court. Ministers have the power to confer a discretionary exemption from the requirement for a prospective investor to seek OIO consent under certain circumstances. For more see: http://www.linz.govt.nz/regulatory/overseas-investment . The OIO monitors foreign investments after approval. All consents are granted with reporting conditions, which are generally standard in nature. Investors must report regularly on their compliance with the terms of the consent. Offenses include: defeating, evading, or circumventing the OIO Act; failure to comply with notices, requirements, or conditions; and making false or misleading statements or omissions. If an offense has been committed under the Act, the High Court has the power to impose penalties, including monetary fines, ordering compliance, and ordering the disposal of the investor’s New Zealand holdings. In 2017 the Government announced a reform of the Overseas Investment Act shortly after being elected and has already implemented Phase One reforms with strengthened requirements for screening foreign investment in residential houses, building residential housing developments, and farmland acreage. Screening for investments in forestry were eased slightly to help meet the Government’s One Billion Tree policy. Phase Two began in 2019 when the Government consulted on and released details for the introduction of a National Interest test to the screening process to protect New Zealand assets deemed sensitive and “high-risk.” In 2020, in response to the economic impact of COVID-19, the Government agreed to further changes to the OIA. Measures were introduced to reduce the regulatory burden of the screening process for inward foreign investment and implementations from Phase Two reforms were delayed. In February 2022, the private sector called on the OIO to remove its “Forestry Pathway” exemption due to over-investment in the sector by foreign investors who are reportedly sidelining farmland for forestry, a situation that is also impacting New Zealand’s access to domestic carbon credits. In February 2020 New Zealand reported its first conviction under the Overseas Investment Act. The offender was charged for obstructing an OIO investigation that was initiated because he had not obtained OIO consent for his property purchase and for later submitting a fraudulent application. A second criminal conviction was reported in June 2020 after the offender was found to have submitted a fraudulent loan agreement. The Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) website reports on enforcement actions taken against foreign investors, including the number of compliance letters issued, the number of warnings and their circumstances, referrals to professional conduct body in relation to an OIO breach, and disposal of investments. For more see: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/enforcement/enforcement-action-taken . The Commerce Act 1986 prohibits contracts, arrangements, or understandings that have the purpose, or effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, unless authorized by the Commerce Commission, an independent Crown entity. Before granting such authorization, the Commerce Commission must be satisfied that the public benefit would outweigh the reduction of competition. The Commerce Commission has legislative power to deny an application for a merger or takeover if it would result in the new company gaining a dominant position in the New Zealand market. The Commerce Commission also enforces certain pieces of legislation that, through regulation, aim to provide the benefits of competition in markets with certain natural monopolies, such as the dairy, electricity, gas, airports, and telecommunications industries. The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act of 2001 (DIR) established dairy co-operative Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra). The DIR is designed to manage Fonterra’s dominant position in the domestic dairy market, until sufficient competition has emerged. A review by the Commerce Commission in 2016 found competition insufficient, but the findings from a subsequent review in 2018 resulted in the introduction of the DIR Amendment Bill (No 3) which passed its first reading in August 2019 and was finalized and passed on August 6, 2020. This amendment aims to ease the requirement that Fonterra accept all milk from new suppliers, allowing the cooperative the option to refuse milk if it does not meet environmental standards or if it comes from newly converted dairy farms. The bill will also limit Fonterra’s discretion in calculating the base milk price. It also requires Fonterra’s dairy companies to enable supplying shareholders to transfer their shares to share milkers by agreement. The Commerce Commission is also charged with monitoring competition in the telecommunications sector and motor fuel market. It has a regulatory role to promote competition within the electricity industry, which has natural monopolies in the transmission and distribution businesses. In March 2020, the Commission completed a project that set a default to determine price caps that will apply to the 17 electricity distributors in New Zealand from April 2020 to March 2025. The Commerce (Criminalization of Cartels) Amendment Act was passed in April 2019 to align New Zealand law with other jurisdictions – particularly Australia – by criminalizing cartel behavior. The Commerce Commission has international cooperation arrangements with Australia since 2013 and Canada since 2016, to allow the sharing of compulsorily acquired information, and provide investigative assistance. The arrangements help effective enforcement of both competition and consumer law. In May 2020, the Commerce Commission issued guidance easing restrictions on businesses to collaborate in order to ensure the provision of essential goods and services to New Zealand consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2019, the Government announced proposed amendments to section 36 of the Commerce Act, which relates to the misuse of market power. The government is seeking consultation on repealing sections of the Commerce Act that shield some intellectual property arrangements from competition law, to prevent dominant firms misusing market power by enforcing their patent rights in a way they would not do if there were a more competitive market. It also seeks to strengthen laws and enforcement powers against the misuse of market power by aligning it with Australia and other developed economies, particularly because New Zealand competition law currently does not prohibit dominant firms from engaging in conduct with an anti-competitive effect. Section 36 of the Act only prohibits conduct with certain anti-competitive purposes. Expropriation is generally not an issue in New Zealand, and there are no outstanding cases. The government’s KiwiBuild program aims to build 100,000 affordable homes by 2028, with half being in Auckland. The NZD 3.8 billion (USD 2.7 billion) Housing Acceleration Fund also targets the national housing shortage with an infrastructure fund of public and private developments. Recent and legacy legislation has made it easier for the government and developers to acquire and develop land, particularly in high-density urban areas. Under the Public Works Act 1981, the New Zealand government has the ability to force landowners to sell in order to facilitate public works projects. There is little public dissent over the issue; New Zealanders are generally satisfied with the Act’s provisions for fair market value compensation, although there have been high-profile disputes over sacred Māori land that have been litigated in court. In August 2020, the Urban Development Act (UDA) was passed into law. The Act established powers for Kainga Ora, a newly created Crown Agency that provides rental housing for families in need and facilitates urban development through residential building projects. Under the UDA, compulsory acquisition powers were created for Kainga Ora, who can theoretically make a forced acquisition of residential land after meeting critical thresholds, such as the establishment of a Special Development Project process that has government oversight. In December 2021, the Resource Management Act was amended, weakening the consent process required in order to build residential developments in medium- to high-density urban areas. While the aim of the Act was to urgently address the housing shortage, for which there is bipartisan agreement, there was some concern that the consultation process was overly swift. Overall, the thrust of all three pieces of legislation is to support needed development. The most recent legislation makes this process easier for residential development. To date, there have been no cases involving compulsory acquisition of residential property, nor has the issue been of great concern. The lack of precedent for due process in the treatment of residents affected by liquefaction of residential land caused by the Canterbury earthquake in 2011 resulted in prolonged court cases against the Government based largely on the amount of compensation offered to insured home and/or landowners and the lack of any compensation for uninsured owners. One offer made by the government to uninsured Christchurch landowners for 50 percent of the rated value of their property was deemed unlawful in the Court of Appeal in 2013. A later offer was made by the government to uninsured residents, but only for the value of their land and not their house. In 2018, the government opted to settle with a group of uninsured home and landowners, but some objected to the compensation because it was based on 2007/08 rating valuations. There were also reports some insurance companies paid out less to policy holders than the full value of some houses if they found based on the structural characteristics of the house that it was repairable, even though the repairs would be legally prohibited if in the RRZ. LINZ currently manages Crown-owned land in the Christchurch Residential Red Zone (RRZ) and can temporarily agree short-term leases of this land under the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016. For more see: https://www.linz.govt.nz/crown-property/types-crown-property/christchurch-residential-red-zone . Bankruptcy is addressed in the Insolvency Act 2006, the Receiverships Act 1993, and the Companies Act 1993. New Zealand bankrupts are subject to conditions on borrowing and international travel, and violations are considered offences and punishable by law. The registration system operated by the Companies Office within MBIE, is designed to enable New Zealand creditors to sue an overseas company in New Zealand, rather than forcing them to sue in the country’s home jurisdiction. An overseas company’s assets in New Zealand can be liquidated for the benefit of creditors. All registered ‘large’ overseas companies are required to file financial statements under the Companies Act of 1993. See: https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/learn-about/overseas-companies/managing-an-overseas-company-in-new-zealand The government has recognized the need for more insolvency law reform beyond the 2006 Act which repealed the Insolvency Act 1967. The Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act which passed in November 2019 included amendments to the Insolvency Act that strengthened some regulations and assigned more powers to the Official Assignee. After the previous government established an Insolvency Working Group in 2015, MBIE published a proposed set of reforms in November 2019, based on the group’s recommendations from 2017. The current government plans to introduce an insolvency law reform bill in early 2020. The omnibus COVID-19 Response (Further Management Measures) Legislation Bill passed on May 15 included provisions to provide temporary relief for businesses facing insolvency, and exemptions for compliance, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 4. Industrial Policies New Zealand has no specific economic incentive regime because of its free trade policy. The New Zealand government, through its bodies such as Tourism New Zealand and NZTE, assists certain sectors such as tourism and the export of locally manufactured goods. The government generally does not have a practice of jointly financing—or issuing guarantees—for foreign direct investment projects. It does provide some opportunities and initiatives for foreign investors to apply for joint financing if the projects involve R&D, science, or innovation that will benefit the economy. Callaghan Innovation is a stand-alone Crown Entity established in February 2013. It connects businesses with research organizations offering services, and the opportunity to apply for government funding and grants that support business innovation and capability building. Callaghan Innovation requires businesses applying for any of their research and development grants to have at least one director who is resident in New Zealand and to have been incorporated in New Zealand, have a center of management in New Zealand, or have a head office in New Zealand. For more information see: http://www.business.govt.nz/support-and-advice/grants-incentives . Through Business.Govt.NZ, an agency in association with MBIE, NZTE, and Callaghan Innovation, targeted support is offered for underrepresented investors such as Māori. For more information about grants and funding or mentoring, see: https://www.business.govt.nz/how-to-grow/getting-government-grants/grants-and-help-for-your-new-business/ New Zealand does not have any foreign trade zones or duty-free ports. New Zealand does not have any Special Economic Zones, although the government asked MBIE to investigate the possibility in 2017. The government of New Zealand does not maintain any measures that violate the Trade Related Investment Measures text in the WTO. There are no government mandated requirements for company performance or local employment, and foreign investors that do not require OIO approval are treated equally with domestic investors. Overseas investors that require OIO approval must comply with legal obligations governing the OIO and the conditions of its approval. Investors are generally required to report annually to the OIO for up to five years from consent, but if benefits are expected to occur after that five-year period, monitoring will reflect the time span within which benefits will occur. Failure to meet obligations under the investors’ consent can result in fines, court orders, or forced disposal of their investment. Businesses wanting to establish in New Zealand and seeking to relocate their employees to New Zealand will need to apply for and satisfy the conditions of the Employees of Relocating Business Resident Visa: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/relocating-with-an-employer-resident-visa . New Zealand supports the ability to transfer data across borders, and to not force businesses to store their data within any particular jurisdiction. While data localization and cloud computing is not specifically legislated for, all businesses must comply with the Privacy Act 1993 to protect customers’ “personal information.” However, under certain circumstances, approval is required from the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to store electronic business and tax records outside of New Zealand, and under Section 23 of the Tax Administration Act 1994. Alternatively, taxpayers can use an IRD-authorized third party to store their information without having to seek individual approval. It remains the taxpayer’s responsibility to meet their obligations to retain business records for the retention period (usually seven years) required under the Act. Indigenous data sovereignty is highly topical in New Zealand. The principles of Māori data sovereignty refer to the inherent rights that the indigenous peoples of New Zealand have in relation to the collection, storage, and usage of Māori data. This is particularly relevant for those public and private sector entities sharing data via cloud applications across borders. In November 2021, the Waitangi Tribunal in Wai 2522 determined that CPTPP breaches the Crown’s obligations to Māori by failing to protect Māori rights and interests in data sovereignty and in the digital domain. The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent commission of inquiry established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 that makes recommendations on claims brought by Māori to the courts around issues relating to Māori rights that are in breach of the original Treaty of Waitangi. The Tribunal opted to refrain from making formal recommendations and is planning to put processes in place after mediation between claimants and the Crown. Going forward, free trade agreements will be subject to greater scrutiny as they pertain to the rights of the indigenous. Under the CPTPP trade agreement, the New Zealand government has retained the ability to maintain and amend regulations related to data flows with CPTPP countries, but in such a way that does not create barriers to trade. These rules come with a “public policy safeguard” that gives CPTPP governments the discretion to control the movement and storage of data for legitimate public policy objectives to ensure governments can respond to the changing technology in areas such as privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity. As part of CPTPP, New Zealand has committed not to impose ‘localization requirements’ that would force businesses to build data storage centers or use local computing facilities in CPTPP markets in order to provide certainty to businesses considering their investment choices. Another provision requires CPTPP countries not to impede companies delivering cloud computing and data storage services. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), which came into effect on January 7, 2021 for Singapore, New Zealand and Chile, includes a series of modules covering measures that affect the digital economy. Module 4 on Data Issues includes binding provisions on personal data protection and cross-border data flows that build on the CPTPP. In addition to the CPTPP obligations, DEPA encourages the adoption of data protection trust-marks for businesses to verify conformance with privacy standards. The agreement is an open plurilateral one that allows other countries to join the agreement as a whole, select specific modules to join, or replicate the modules in other trade agreements. In March 2018, the government introduced the Privacy Bill that replaced the Privacy Act 1993. The bill aims to modernize privacy regulations and came into effect on June 30, 2020. It incorporates provisions in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The provisions of the bill extend the law’s reach to apply to agencies located outside of New Zealand if that agency is doing business in New Zealand. The bill also introduces a requirement to report serious privacy breaches. New Zealand does not have any requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption, although there may be obligations on individuals to assist authorities under Section 130 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. This Act will be reviewed in 2022 as part of the Government’s response to Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 2019 terror attack on the Christchurch mosques. There is not a particular government agency that enforces all privacy law, however the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is empowered through the Privacy Act 1993 and has a wide ability to consider developments or actions that affect personal privacy. Separately, New Zealand courts have developed a privacy tort allowing individuals to sue another for breach of privacy. The government encourages businesses to switch from fossil fuels to cleaner power to fuel their industry. In October 2021, the government announced 23 new projects that will receive government co-investment from Round Two of the Government Investment in Decarbonizing Industry (GIDI) Fund. The recipients will receive NZD 28.7 million (USD 20 million) and will match this with NZD 54.5 million (USD 38.2 million) of their own funding. The approved projects cover a range of sectors including meat, dairy, and other food production, as well as timber, energy supply, and chemical manufacturing. All applicants had to demonstrate significant economic and employment impact from their projects, have carbon reduction plans, and be ready to complete projects by October 2023. The first two rounds of the GIDI Fund supported projects that will deliver lifetime emissions cuts of 6.6 million tons. This equates to 14-18 percent of the gross long-lived emission reductions required from the Climate Commission’s first carbon budget for the period 2022-2025. 5. Protection of Property Rights New Zealand recognizes and enforces secured interest in property. Most privately owned land in New Zealand is regulated by the Land Transfer Act 2017. These provisions guide the issuance of land titles, the registration of interest in land against land titles, and guarantee of title by the State. The Registrar-General of Land develops standards and sets an assurance program for the land rights registration system. New Zealand’s legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Mortgages are widely available and liens are used as security. For more information: https://www.treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/other-services/bona-vacantia-ownerless-property/standard-requirements/liens Land leasing by foreign or non-resident investors is governed by the OIO Act. About eight percent of New Zealand land is owned by the Crown. The Land Act 1948 created pastoral leases which run for 33 years and can be continually renewed. Rent is reviewed every 11 years, basing the rent on how much stock the land can carry for pastoral farming. The Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998 and its amendments contain provisions governing pastoral leases that apply to foreign and domestic lease holders. Holders of pastoral leases have exclusive possession of the land, and the right to graze the land, but require permission to carry out other activities on their lease. There are several types of land ownership in New Zealand: freehold title, leasehold, unit title, strata title, and cross-lease. Most of the land in New Zealand is freehold, also referred to as “fee simple,” or absolute ownership of the land and anything built on it. Unit titles make up the most common form of ownership for apartment developments and for commercial multi-unit developments. For more information on types of property ownership: https://www.settled.govt.nz/ Prior to purchasing property or land in New Zealand, prospective buyers are encouraged to perform due diligence by accessing a report from Land Information New Zealand (LINZ): https://www.linz.govt.nz/ Unoccupied, legally purchased property has historically been subject to adverse possession, a legal method allowing squatters to take ownership of a property after 20 continuous years of occupation. The method, a narrow exception to a legal principle under the Land Transfer Amendment Act of 1963, has been used in more than 200 applications since 1993. The Act was repealed in 2017 and replaced with the Land Transfer Act, which still provides for some squatters’ rights. More information on the Land Transfer Act 2017 can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/land/land-registration/land-transfer-act-2017 New Zealand has a strong record on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and is an active participant in international efforts to strengthen IPR enforcement globally. In 1984, New Zealand joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is a member of a multitude of WIPO bodies and treaties. New Zealand participates in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council. The country operates on a common law legal system and enjoys a strong and independent justice system. The Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) assists those whose copyright has been infringed upon. There are both civil and criminal enforcement options. These options are administered through a variety of agencies, including MBIE and the Customs Service. Though there have been isolated incidents of IP theft, it is uncommon. https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/copyright/enforcing-copyright/ In 2018, the government began a public consultation to review the Copyright Act. This is the first step in making changes to copyright law and regulations, which were last reviewed in 2004. In 2019, MBIE published the results of the public consultation that outlined revised objectives for copyright law in New Zealand. In 2020, based on advice from stakeholders, the results of the consultation were withdrawn from the public. The government is now publicly consulting on potential changes to the objectives themselves. While the particulars of these revisions are unclear, the overarching theme is to ensure New Zealand’s copyright laws and regulations are fit for purpose in a rapidly changing technological environment. For more: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/business/intellectual-property/copyright/review-of-the-copyright-act-1994/ New Zealand does not publish specific statistics on seizures of counterfeited goods. The country has a robust procedure for the prosecution of IPR violations. New Zealand Police are authorized to investigate and prosecute trademark counterfeiters. New Zealand is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report. It is not mentioned in the Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The New Zealand government has a generally positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investment, provided the investment is not considered to be sensitive in nature by the screening body, the Overseas Investment Office (OIO). New Zealand welcomes sustainable, productive, and inclusive investment. The New Zealand Exchange, or the NZX, is the country’s securities and futures exchange. The Financial Market Authority (FMA) is the government agency responsible for regulating investments and financial markets. The regulatory system is effective, transparent, and supportive of inward flows. In 2020, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies in New Zealand was 63 percent of GDP, at USD 132 billion. The small size of the market reflects in part the risk averse nature of New Zealand investors, preferring residential property and bank term deposits over equities or credit instruments for investment. As of year-end 2021, New Zealand’s stock of investment in residential property is valued at NZD 1.7 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion). New Zealand adheres to International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII and does not place restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms for a variety of instruments, but foreigners and non-residents find difficulty in securing lending in New Zealand. To open a bank account, the applicant must be a permanent resident. Bank deposits are currently not guaranteed. In 2022, the Labour government plans to introduce a bill that will guarantee deposits up to NZD 100,000 (USD 70,000) from 2023. Banking services in the country are robust; bank account penetration is nearly 100 percent. The sector is dominated by Australian banks; by total assets, three of the country’s four largest banks are Australian owned. Overall, the banking sector is worth NZD 644 billion (USD 450 billion) by total assets, small by global standards. Loans and advances account for the vast majority (80 percent) of bank assets. Derivatives are held mainly for hedging purposes. The RBNZ estimates that the non-performing loans ratio is 0.4 percent – out of a total loan portfolio worth NZD 522 billion (USD 350 billion). The banking sector has undergone reforms to better withstand shocks. In 2019, the RBNZ proposed a significant increase to banks’ capital requirements to safeguard them from shocks to the financial system. Increased capital requirements will now be phased in over a five- to seven-year period. By the end of the transition period in 2028, all registered banks in the country will have to meet the new requirements, which will be some of the most stringent in the world and may squeeze access to credit. Worth NZD 60 billion (USD 42 billion), the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZ Super) is the country’s sovereign wealth fund. 85 percent of the fund is invested offshore in both developed and emerging markets, the bulk of it in passive funds in North America. 4 percent of the fund is invested domestically in timber, bonds, private companies, rural land, and infrastructure. NZ Super is a member country of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) and assesses the performance of the fund against the Santiago Principles. The fund has historically ranked as fully compliant with the Principles. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Treasury monitors 12 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), three mixed-ownership-model entities, and 29 Crown entities. Together, these entities make up the broader SOE sector in New Zealand, which is concentrated in the energy and transportation sectors. In the year to June 2021, the asset base of the 12 SOEs was NZD 50.7 billion (USD 35.5 billion). While figures for net income are not available, the operating balance for the sector was NZD 184 million (USD 129 million). In the same period, mixed ownership companies reported an asset base of NZD 28.8 billion (USD 20.2 billion) and an operating balance of NZD 410 million (USD 287 million). For more information on the financial performance of the SOEs and Crown entities, please visit https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/year-end/financial-statements-2021-html where a partial list of SOEs is available. The Treasury’s Governance & Appointments team provides advice to Ministers on board appointments, which typically involve local personnel. Legislation of SOEs falls under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, which sets up processes to improve efficiency in the sector. All SOEs are registered as public companies and are bound by the Companies Act and the Fair Trade Act, which clearly define the relationships between companies and their directors/shareholders, and the market. In the late 1990s, competition law under the Commerce Act was strengthened to provide for penalties for misuse of a dominant position. The Commerce Commission “ComCom” sets out guidelines and policies for anti-competitive behavior. A suspected breach of the Commerce Act, inclusive of those involving an SOE, is reported to ComCom’s website at https://comcom.govt.nz/contact-us and is immediately investigated. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the government began a rapid course of deregulation and privatization that lasted through the late 1990s. The Ports of Auckland were partially privatized in 1988. The government sold its holdings in Bank of New Zealand, one of the country’s largest banks, in 1992 to National Australian Bank. Air New Zealand was sold to a consortium in 1988. Other telecoms, and energy and transportation companies were sold off. Some of these interests were re-purchased by the government, such as Air New Zealand moving back to into government ownership in 2001. In 2014 the government completed a program of asset sales to raise funds to reduce public debt. It involved the partial sale of three energy companies and Air New Zealand, with the government retaining its majority share in each. The bulk of the initial share float was made available to New Zealand share brokers and international institutions, and unsold shares were made available to foreign investors. Foreign investors are free to purchase shares on the secondary market. Subsequent “public private partnerships” in the infrastructure space in the mid-2000s offered the public a chance to participate in government-sponsored projects. In 2019, the Infrastructure Transaction Unit was created within Treasury as an interim measure to provide support to agencies and local authorities in planning and delivering major infrastructure projects. The New Zealand Infrastructure Commission Act was passed in September 2019, to create Crown Entity InfraCom, and it will be responsible for delivering New Zealand’s Public Private Partnership (PPP) Program https://infracom.govt.nz/major-projects/public-private-partnerships/ . The government is increasing its focus on PPP due to its significant NZD 15 billion (USD 10.5 billion) funding package announced in December 2019 and May 2020. MBIE administers the procurement process. In October 2019, MBIE issued substantive changes to the New Zealand Government’s Procurement Rules. The Procurement Rules contain a specific section on non-discrimination, which in part states, “All suppliers must be given an equal opportunity to bid for contracts. Agencies must treat suppliers from another country no less favorably than New Zealand suppliers. Procurement decisions must be based on the best value for money, which isn’t always the cheapest price, over the whole-of-life of the goods, services or works. Suppliers must not be discriminated against because of a) the country the goods, services or works come from; or b) their degree of foreign ownership or foreign business affiliations.” Where applicable foreign bidders who are ultimately successful, may still be required to meet tax obligations and approval from the Overseas Investment Office. More information can be found here: www.procurement.govt.nz 8. Responsible Business Conduct The New Zealand government actively promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is widely practiced throughout the country. There are New Zealand NGOs dedicated to facilitating and strengthening CSR, including the New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development, the Sustainable Business Network, and the American Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand. New Zealand is committed to both the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Multi-national businesses are the main focus, such as a New Zealand company that operates overseas, or a foreign-owned company operating in New Zealand. The guidance can also be applied to businesses with only domestic operations that form part of an international supply chain. Individuals wishing to complain about the activity of a multi-national business that happened in another country, will need to contact the National Contact Points of that country. In New Zealand, MBIE is the NCP to carry out the government’s responsibilities under the guidelines. To help businesses meet their responsibilities, MBIE has developed a short version of the guidelines to assess the social responsibility ‘health’ of enterprises, and for assessing the actions of governments adhering to the guidelines. If further action is needed, MBIE provide resolution assistance, such as mediation, but do not adjudicate or duplicate other tribunals that assess compliance with New Zealand law. MBIE is assisted by a liaison group that meets once a year, with representatives from other government agencies, industry associations, and NGOs. As reported over the past five years in the Trafficking in Persons report, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in New Zealand. Foreigners from South and East Asia, the Pacific, and some countries in Latin America are vulnerable to working as forced laborers in several of New Zealand’s tourist, construction, and agribusinesses. Temporary migrant workers in sectors most negatively affected by pandemic, such as hospitality and tourism, are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption New Zealand is renowned for its efforts to ensure a transparent, competitive, and corruption-free government procurement system. The country consistently achieves top ratings in Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Perception Index. Stiff penalties against bribery of government officials as well as those accepting bribes are strictly enforced. The Ministry of Justice provides guidance on its website for businesses to create their own anti-corruption policies, particularly improving understanding of the New Zealand laws on facilitation payments. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investing in New Zealand. New Zealand supports multilateral efforts to increase transparency of government procurement regimes. The country joined the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in 2012, citing benefits for exporters, while noting that there would be little change for foreign companies bidding within New Zealand’s totally deregulated government procurement system. New Zealand’s accession to the GPA came into effect in August 2015. New Zealand also engages with Pacific Island countries in capacity building projects to bolster transparency and anti-corruption efforts. The country has signed and ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In 2003, New Zealand signed the UN Convention against Corruption and ratified it in 2015. The legal framework for combating corruption in New Zealand consists of domestic and international legal and administrative methods. Domestically, New Zealand’s criminal offences related to bribery are contained in the Crimes Act 1961 and the Secret Commissions Act 1910. If the acts occur outside New Zealand, proceedings may be brought against them under the Crimes Act if they are a New Zealand citizen, resident, or incorporated in the country. Penalties include imprisonment up to 14 years and foreign bribery offences can incur fines up to the greater of NZD 5 million (USD 3.4 million) or three times the value of the commercial gain obtained. The New Zealand government has a strong code of conduct, the Standards of Integrity and Conduct, which applies to all State Services employees and is rigorously enforced. The Independent Police Conduct Authority considers complaints against New Zealand Police and the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner was established in August 2005 to deal with complaints about the conduct of judges. New Zealand’s Office of the Controller and Auditor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman take an active role in uncovering and exposing corrupt practices. The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 was enacted to protect public and private sector employees who engage in “whistleblowing.” The Ministry of Justice is responsible for drafting and administering the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation and regulations. The AML/CFT Amendment Act 2017 extends the 2009 Act to cover a wider group of professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, along with businesses that deal in high-value goods. The New Zealand Police Financial Intelligence Unit estimate that NZD 1.3 billion (USD 910 million) of criminal proceeds is laundered in New Zealand annually, driven in part by the ease of forming a business in the country. The Department of Internal Affairs is working on a solution for businesses that are facing difficulty meeting their AML/CFT obligations during COVID-19. After a standard review of the 2017 general election and 2016 local body elections, the Justice Select Committee conducted an inquiry in 2019 on the issue of foreign interference through politicized social media campaigns and from foreign donations to political candidates standing in New Zealand elections. New Zealand intelligence agencies acknowledged political donations as a legally sanctioned form of participation in New Zealand politics but raised concerns when aspects of a donation are obscured or are channeled in a way that prevents scrutiny of the origin of the donation, when the goal is to covertly build and project influence. In December 2019 the government passed the Electoral Amendment Act under urgency to ban donations from overseas persons to political parties and candidates over NZD 50 (USD 35) down from the previous NZD 1,500 (USD 1050) maximum, to reduce the risk of foreign money influencing the election process. The Serious Fraud Office and the New Zealand Police investigate bribery and corruption matters. Agencies such as the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General and the Office of the Ombudsmen act as watchdogs for public sector corruption. These agencies independently report on and investigate state sector activities. Serious Fraud Office P.O. Box 7124 – Wellesley Street Auckland, 1141 New Zealand www.sfo.govt.nz Transparency International New Zealand is the recognized New Zealand representative of Transparency International, the global civil society organization against corruption. Transparency International New Zealand P.O. Box 5248 – Lambton Quay Wellington, 6145 New Zealand www.transparency.org.nz 10. Political and Security Environment New Zealand is a stable liberal democracy with almost no record of significant political violence. The New Zealand government raised its national security threat level for the first time from “low” to “high” after the terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch on March 15, 2019. One month later it lowered the risk to “medium” where a “terrorist attack, or violent criminal behavior, or violent protest activity is assessed as feasible and could well occur.” The incident led to wide-ranging gun law reform that restricts semi-automatic firearms and magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds. An amnesty buy-back scheme of prohibited firearms administered by the NZ Police ran until December 20, 2019. A series of anti-vaccine mandate protests in Wellington commenced February 8, 2022, and lasted for 23 days. Although not overtly violent, they included groups that blocked roads, trespassed, and caused general disruption. The issue has not been politicized, however, with complete cross-aisle agreement from all parties in Parliament not to respond to the demands of the protestors – who remain a tiny minority in a country that is among the most completely vaccinated in the world. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Following restrictive Covid-related immigration policies, the New Zealand labor market tightened further from already-tight levels pre-Covid. Unemployment is currently 3.2 percent. Labor shortages are reported across a multitude of sectors but are most pronounced in construction and agriculture, where specialty skills and migrant workers are impacted by immigration regulations. New Zealand’s informal economy is considered to be relatively modest, contributing approximately one-tenth of GDP. The relatively small size of the informal economy can be explained by low levels of corruption, along with respect for the rule of law and regulations. New Zealand operates a Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme that allows the horticulture and viticulture industry to recruit workers from the Pacific Islands for seasonal work to supplement the New Zealand workforce. There have been prosecutions and convictions for the exploitation of migrant workers, with reports that the hospitality, agriculture, viticulture, and construction industries are most effected. New Zealand recruitment agencies that recruit workers from abroad must use a licensed immigration adviser. Impacted by Covid, the RSE scheme underwent changes during the pandemic. While immigration was heavily restricted between 2020 and 2022, the RSE was eventually expanded in early 2022 with an announcement by the Government that the cap would be increased for Pasifika workers in the horticulture sector. New Zealand has consistently maintained an active and visible presence in the International Labour Organization (ILO), being a founding member in 1919, and its representatives have attended the annual International Labour Conferences since 1935. The ILO and the government of New Zealand have collaborated on several initiatives, including the elimination of child labor in Fiji, employment creation in Indonesia, and the improvement of labor laws in Cambodia. The government has taken a more proactive approach to enforcing employment law in New Zealand, because the migrant worker population has increased rapidly in recent years and the resources to protect those workers have not kept up with the increase. The government has been steadily increasing the number of labor inspectorates – situated within MBIE – to double the number in 2017. There is no stated government policy on the hiring of New Zealand nationals, however certain jobs within government agencies that handle sensitive information may have a citizenship requirement, minimum duration of residency, and require background checks. Labor laws are generally well enforced, and disputes are usually handled by the New Zealand Employment Relations Authority. MBIE provides guidance for employers on minimum standards of employment mandated by law, guidelines to help promote the employment relationship, and optional guidelines that are useful in some roles or industries. Agreements on severance and redundancy packages are usually negotiated in individual agreements. For more see: https://www.employment.govt.nz/ After a three-year review and consultation, the government introduced the Screen Industry Workers Bill in February 2020. The previous government passed the Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Act 2010 – commonly referred to as the “Hobbit law” -which put limits on the ability of workers on film productions to collective bargaining. New Zealand law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements, to bargain collectively, and to conduct legal strikes, with some restrictions. Contractors cannot join unions, bargain collectively, or conduct strike action. Police have the right to organize and bargain collectively but sworn police officers do not have the right to strike or take any form of industrial action. In November 2019 MBIE sought feedback on a discussion document entitled “Better protections for contractors” to strengthen legal protections for contractors. They aim to ensure that contractors receive their minimum rights and entitlements, reduce the imbalance of bargaining power between firms and contractors who are vulnerable to poor outcomes, and ensure that system settings encourage inclusive economic growth and competition. Submissions closed in February 2020. The ERA requires registered unions to file annual membership returns with the Companies Office. MBIE estimate total union membership at 380,659 for the March 2020 quarter, representing 16.4 percent of all employees in the New Zealand labor force. Industrial action by employees who work for providers of key services are subject to certain procedural requirements, such as mandatory notice of a period determined by the service. New Zealand considers a broader range of key “essential services” than international standards, including: the production and supply of petroleum products; utilities, emergency workers; the manufacture of certain pharmaceuticals, workers in corrections and penal institutions; airports; dairy production; and animal slaughtering, processing, and related inspection services. The number of work stoppages has been on a downward trend until the Labour-led government took office in 2017. The number of work stoppages increased from 3 in 2016 (involving 430 employees causing 195 lost workdays), to 143 in 2018 (involving 11,109 employees causing 192 lost workdays and NZD 1.2 million (USD 780,000) in lost wages), to 159 in 2019 (involving 53,771 employees causing 142,670 lost workdays and NZD 9.2 million (USD 6 million) in lost wages). In 2020 there were 112 work stoppages involving 595 employees causing 613 lost workdays and NZD 120,000 (USD 84,000) in lost wages. (While figures have not been released for 2021, health care and rail workers voted on strike action during 2021 and 2022.) Work stoppages include strikes initiated by unions and lockouts initiated by employers, compiled from the record of strike or lockout forms submitted to MBIE under the Employment Relations Act 2000. The data does not cover other forms of industrial action such as authorized stop-work meetings, strike notices, protest marches, and public rallies which have also increased in recent years. Several strikes during the year involved employees of United States businesses or franchises particularly within the fast-food industry. The New Zealand government does not get involved in individual work disputes unless the striking employees violate their legislated responsibilities. The Labour-led government campaigned on a promise to lift the minimum wage to NZD20 (USD 13) by April 2021. From April 1, 2022, the minimum wage for adult employees who are 16 and over and are not new entrants or trainees is NZD 21.20 (USD 14.84) per hour. The new entrants and training minimum wage is NZD 16.96 (USD 11.87) per hour. In recent years some local government agencies have raised minimum wages for their staff up from the government mandated rate to a “living wage” of nearly NZD 22.75 (USD 15.93) as of 2021. All businesses in New Zealand affected by COVID-19 have been eligible to receive from the government a wage subsidy from March, to pay their employees 80 percent of their salary to stem job losses. The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 sets out the health and safety duties for work carried out by a New Zealand business. The Act contains provisions that affect how duties apply where the work involves foreign vessels. These provisions take account of the international law principle that foreign vessels are subject to the law that applies in the flag state they are registered under. Generally New Zealand law does not apply to the management of a foreign-flagged vessel but does apply to a New Zealand business that does work on that vessel. The Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Bill 2014 has required all foreign charter fishing vessels to reflag to New Zealand and operate under New Zealand’s full legal jurisdiction since May 2016. In March 2017, the New Zealand government’s ratification of the ILO’s Maritime Labor Convention (MLC) came into effect. While New Zealand law is already largely consistent with the MLC, ratification gives the Government jurisdiction to inspect and verify working conditions of crews on foreign ships in New Zealand waters. More than 99 percent of New Zealand’s export goods by volume are transported on foreign ships. About 890 foreign commercial cargo and cruise ships visit New Zealand each year. The Maritime Transport Amendment Act 2017 implements New Zealand’s accession to the intergovernmental International Oil Pollution Compensation’s Supplementary Fund Protocol, 2003. The fund gives New Zealand access to compensation in the event of a major marine oil spill from an oil tanker and exercises New Zealand’s right to exclude the costs of wreck removal, cargo removal and remediating damage due to hazardous substances from liability limits. Accession to the Protocol was prompted in part by New Zealand’s worst maritime environmental disaster in October 2011 when a Greek flagged cargo ship ran aground creating a 331 ton oil spill resulting in NZD 500 million (USD 350 million) in clean-up costs. On April 4, 2022, the Public Health Response Order 2021 requiring mandatory Covid vaccinations was removed for some workers. Mandatory vaccines remain in place for those employed in health and disability sectors, prison staff, and those working at the border. Border restrictions to enter New Zealand are also currently being eased. From May 1, travelers from visa waiver countries will be permitted to enter the country. From October, the border is expected to fully reopen. For more information, please visit: https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/covid-19/border-closures-and-exceptions/border-entry-requirements 14. Contact for More Information Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Wellington PO Box 1190 Wellington 6140 New Zealand +64-4-462-6000 Nicaragua Executive Summary Investors should be extremely cautious about investing in Nicaragua. The regime of President Ortega and Vice President Murillo continues to suspend constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, detain political prisoners, and disregard the rule of law, creating an unpredictable investment climate rife with reputational risk and arbitrary regulation. President Ortega awarded himself a fourth consecutive term in November 2021 after arbitrarily jailing opposition figures, barring all credible opposition political parties from participating in elections, blocking legitimate international election observation efforts, and committing widespread electoral fraud. Through a sham judicial process, regime-controlled courts subsequently convicted more than 40 political prisoners – including all of those who aspired to run against Ortega as presidential candidates – on vague, spurious charges. The Ortega-Murillo regime has also targeted the independent media and journalists and in 2021 seized La Prensa, Nicaragua’s only print newspaper. Independent universities have faced invasive governmental investigations and extreme budget cuts, causing 14 university closures. The regime-controlled National Assembly subsequently took control of six universities, leaving 30,000 students in limbo. In 2020, the National Assembly approved six repressive laws that alarmed investors. Some of the most concerning include: a gag law that criminalizes political speech; a foreign agents law that requires organizations and individuals to report foreign assistance and prevents any person receiving foreign funding from running for office; and a consumer protection law that could prevent financial institutions from making independent decisions on whether to service financial clients, including OFAC-sanctioned entities. Tax authorities have seized properties following reportedly arbitrary tax bills and jailed individuals without due process until taxes were negotiated and paid. Arbitrary fines and customs inspections prejudice foreign companies that import products. In response to the Ortega-Murillo regime’s deepening authoritarianism, almost all international financial institutions have stopped issuing new loans to Nicaragua, and external financing will fall sharply beyond 2022. The regime is publicly betting that a new economic partnership with the People’s Republic of China – following a break in diplomatic relations with Taiwan and establishment of ties with China in December 2021 – will provide fresh investment and financing to make up for its growing isolation. Nicaragua’s economic forecast is uncertain and subject to downside risks. Independent economists predict Nicaragua’s economic growth will slow considerably to a rate of less than 3 percent in 2022. Growth in 2021 was unexpectedly high at more than 9 percent but followed three years of contractions from 2018 to 2020. Official estimates from the Nicaraguan Central Bank project growth between 4 and 5 percent in 2022. Inflation increased to 7 percent in 2021. The number of Nicaraguans insured through social security, a measure of the robustness of the formal economy, remains 6 percent below 2018 levels. After several years of very low activity, Nicaragua’s credit market began expanding in 2021. The uncertainty surrounding the government’s 2019 tax reforms – and multiple years of still-unresolved legal challenges – continue to pause companies’ plans for expansion or reinvestment. Nicaragua’s economy still has significant potential for growth if investor confidence can be restored by strengthening institutions and improving the rule of law. Its assets include: ample natural resources; a well-developed agricultural sector; an organized and sophisticated private sector committed to a free economy; ready access to major shipping lanes; and a young, low-cost labor force that supports the manufacturing sector. The United States is Nicaragua’s largest trading partner – it is the source of roughly one quarter of Nicaragua’s imports, and the destination of approximately two-thirds of Nicaragua’s exports. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,850 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Nicaraguan government seeks foreign direct investment to project normalcy and signal international support. As traditional sources of foreign direct investment have declined amid the ongoing political crisis, the government has increasingly pursued investment from ideologically friendly countries such as Iran, Russia, and China. Investment incentives target export-focused companies that require large amounts of unskilled or low-skilled labor. Local laws and practices generally do not treat foreign and domestic investors differently. Foreign investors report significant delays in receiving residency permits, requiring frequent travel out of the country to renew visas. ProNicaragua is the country’s official investment and export promotion agency. The agency is highly politicized and run by the President’s and Vice President’s OFAC-sanctioned son Laureano Ortega. ProNicaragua provides information packages, investment facilitation, and prospecting services to interested investors. Personal connections and affiliation with influential industry associations and chambers of commerce are critical for foreigners investing in Nicaragua. Though municipal and ministerial authorities may enact decisions relevant to foreign businesses, all actions are subject to de facto approval by the Presidency. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Any individual or entity may make investments of any kind. In general, Nicaraguan law provides equal treatment for domestic and foreign investment. Investors should be cautious of the 2020 Foreign Agents Law. While the law targets NGOs and exempts business entities, some companies have been required to register or end their social responsibility efforts. The law requires anyone receiving funding from foreign sources to register with the Ministry of the Interior and provide monthly, detailed accounts of how funds are intended to be used. The government used the law to strip 48 NGOs of their legal status as of April 2022. Nicaragua allows foreigners to be shareholders of local companies, but the company representative must be a Nicaraguan citizen or a foreigner with legal residence in the country. Many companies satisfy this requirement by using their local legal counsel as a representative. Legal residency procedures for foreign investors can take up to 18 months and require in-person interviews in Managua. The government can limit foreign ownership for national security or public health reasons under the Foreign Investment Law. The government generally requires all investments in the petroleum and mining sectors to include one of Nicaragua’s state-owned enterprises as a partner. Investments in the mining sector have similar requirements. The government does not formally screen, review, or approve foreign direct investments. However, in practice, President Ortega and Vice President Murillo maintain de facto review authority over any foreign direct investment. This review process is not transparent. The WTO conducted a trade policy review of Nicaragua in 2021. The review noted that Nicaragua’s trade policy had remained largely unchanged since the previous review in 2012. While the Government of Nicaragua is eager to attract foreign investment, it lacks a systematic business facilitation effort and instead relies on one-on-one engagement with potential investors. Nicaragua does not have an online business registration system. Companies must typically register with the national tax administration, social security administration, and local municipality to ensure the government can collect taxes. Those registers are typically not available to the public. According to the Ministry of Growth, Industry, and Trade (MIFIC), the process to register a business takes a minimum of 14 days. In practice, registration usually takes much longer. Establishing a foreign-owned limited liability company takes eight procedures and 42 days. Nicaragua does not promote or incentivize outward investment and does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Nicaraguan government does not use transparent policies to establish clear “rules of the game.” Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems exist but implementation is opaque. The government does not foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. The Ortega-Murillo regime maintains direct control over various sectors of the economy to enrich loyalists. Investors regularly complain that regulatory authorities are arbitrary, negligent, or slow to apply existing laws, at times in an apparent effort to favor one competitor over another. The executive branch retains ultimate rule-making and regulatory authority. In practice, the relevant government agency is empowered to levy fines directly. In some instances, the prosecutor’s office may also enforce regulations. These actions are widely perceived to be controlled by the executive branch and are neither objective nor transparent. There have not been recent regulatory or enforcement reforms. Prior to 2018, leading business chambers managed some informal regulatory processes. Leading business chambers filled policy voids left by inadequate government institutions and procedures, meeting with influential government officials to resolve common business issues. This model largely collapsed, however, as business chambers wanted to avoid the reputational risks of making ad hoc deals with the increasingly authoritarian Ortega-Murillo regime. There are currently few options to resolve commercial issues with the government. There is no accountancy law in Nicaragua. International accounting standards are not a focus for most of the economy, but major businesses typically use IFRS standards or U.S. GAAP standards. The national banking authority officially requires loans to be submitted using IFRS standards. There is no legal requirement to disclose environmental, social, or governance indicators. Draft legislation is ostensibly made available for public comment through meetings with associations that will be affected by the proposed regulations. In practice, drafts are typically not published on official websites or made available to the public. The legislature is not required by law to give notice. The executive branch proposes most investment legislation, and the regime-controlled National Assembly rarely makes modifications. Nicaragua publishes regulatory actions in La Gaceta, the official journal of government actions, including official summaries and the full text of all legislation. La Gaceta is available online. There are no effective oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure the government follows administrative processes. Public finances and debt obligations are not transparent, with little accountability or oversight. The Central Bank has increasingly refused to publish key economic data starting in 2018, including public finances and debt obligations. The Central Bank published limited data in 2020 as a condition of funding from the International Monetary Fund. All CAFTA-DR provisions are fully incorporated into Nicaragua’s national regulatory system. However, authorities regularly flout national regulations, and investors claim that customs practices regularly violate CAFTA-DR provisions. Nicaragua is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and reported in July 2018 that it had implemented 81 percent of its commitments to date; however, Nicaragua’s trade facilitation is challenged by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and lack of transparency. Nicaragua is a member of the WTO and generally notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Nicaragua is a civil law country in which legislation is the primary source of law. The legislative process is found in Articles 140 to 143 of the Constitution. However, implementation and enforcement of these laws is neither objective nor transparent. Contracts are ostensibly legally enforced through the judicial system, but extrajudicial factors are more likely to influence rulings than the facts at issue. The legal system is weak and cumbersome. Nicaragua has a Commercial Code, but it is outdated and rarely used. There are no specialized courts. Members of the judiciary, including those at senior levels, are widely believed to be corrupt and subject to significant political pressure and direction from the executive branch, specifically the President and Vice President. The judicial process is neither competent, fair, nor reliable. Regulations and enforcement actions are technically subject to judicial review, but appeals procedures are neither transparent nor objective. Nicaragua has laws that relate to foreign investment, but implementation, enforcement, and interpretation are subject to corruption and political pressure. The CAFTA-DR Investment Chapter establishes a secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors in Central America and the Dominican Republic. The agreement provides six basic protections: 1) nondiscriminatory treatment relative to domestic investors and investors from third countries; 2) limits on performance requirements; 3) the free transfer of funds related to an investment; 4) protection from expropriation other than in conformity with customary international law; 5) a minimum standard of treatment in conformity with customary international law; and 6) the ability to hire key managerial personnel without regard to nationality. The full text of CAFTA-DR contains additional details. Nicaragua’s Foreign Investment Law (2000/344) defines the legal framework for foreign investment. It permits 100 percent foreign ownership in most industries. (See Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment for exceptions.) It also establishes national treatment for investors, guarantees foreign exchange conversion and profit repatriation, clarifies foreigners’ access to local financing, and reaffirms respect for private property. The Ministry of Growth, Industry, and Trade’s (MIFIC) information portal details applicable laws and regulations for trade and investment. It contains administrative procedures for investment and income generating operations such as the number of steps, contact information for relevant entities, required documents costs, processing time, and applicable laws. The site is available only in Spanish. The mission of the Institute for the Promotion of Competition (Procompetencia) includes investigating and disciplining businesses engaged in anticompetitive practices. In practice, it has no effective power, and the Ortega-Murillo regime controls decisions regarding competition. Nicaragua has a long history of government expropriation without due process. Considerable uncertainty remains in securing property rights (see Protection of Property Rights). Conflicting land title claims are abundant and judicial appeals are very challenging. Since 2018, the government has cancelled the legal status of 118 NGOs, including 14 universities. The government seized six universities’ assets and is turning them into publicly administered and controlled institutions. In December 2021, the government broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and officially recognized the People Republic of China (PRC). Subsequently, the government blocked Taiwan’s donation of its former Embassy, confiscated the property, and gave it to the PRC. Multiple landowners have reported land invasions by government-affiliated actors since the political crisis began in 2018. Landowners were sometimes able to end these invasions through government connections or bribes. In instances where the government claimed legal right to the land, offers of compensation – if any – were calculated on cadastral value, a vast underestimate of market value. The Ortega-Murillo regime has stated on numerous occasions that it would not act to evict those who had illegally taken possession of private property. In late 2020 and early 2021, the Government of Nicaragua disposed of real property seized from independent news outlets. The Government did not follow due process and transferred the facilities to the Ministry of Health to install health clinics. Bankruptcy provisions are included in the Civil and Commercial Codes, but there is no tradition of bankruptcy in Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s rules on bankruptcy focus on the liquidation of business entities rather than the reorganization of debts and do not provide equitable treatment of creditors. Insolvent companies usually close without going through formal bankruptcy proceedings and set up a new entity. Creditors are effectively unprotected. Creditors typically attempt to collect as much as possible directly from the debtor to avoid an uncertain judicial process or abandon any potential claims. 4. Industrial Policies Nicaragua has several investment incentives available to foreign investors. The government has also occasionally issued sweeping tax incentives to promote large one-time investments, such as for a foreign-owned power plant in 2020. The Social Housing Construction Law (2009/677) provides incentives for the construction of housing units 36-60 m2 in size with construction costs less than $30,000 per unit. Developers are exempt from paying local taxes on the construction, purchase of materials, equipment, or tools. The Hydroelectric Promotion Law (amended 2005/531) and the Law to Promote Renewable Resource Electricity Generation (2005/532) provide incentives to invest in electricity generation, including duty-free imports of capital goods and exemptions for income and property taxes. Regulatory concerns limit investment despite these incentives (see Transparency of the Regulatory System). The National Assembly must approve all projects larger than 30 megawatts. The law promoting renewable energy provides tax exemptions to investors in the renewable energy sector. The government has amended the law several times to extend the exemptions, most recently in September 2020. The law includes exemptions, each valid from two to five years, from the following taxes: import duty; value added tax; income tax; municipal tax; natural resources exploitation tax; and tax stamp. Amendments made in February 2022 to the Energy Stability law (2005/554) authorize tax exemptions for the import and purchase of any electric vehicle intended for public or private use. The Tourism Incentive Law (amended 2005/575) includes the following incentives for investments of $30,000 or more outside Managua and $100,000 or more within Managua: income tax exemption of 80 to 90 percent for up to 10 years; property tax exemption for up to 10 years; exoneration from import duties on vehicles; and value added tax exemption on the purchase of equipment and construction materials. The Fishing and Fish Farming Law (2004/489) exempts gasoline used in fishing and fish farming from taxes. The Forestry Sector Law (2003/462) provides income, property, and municipal tax incentives for plantation investments and tax exemptions on importing wood processing machinery and equipment. The Special Law on Mining, Prospecting and Exploitation (2001/387) exempts mining concessionaires from import duties on capital inputs (see Transparency of the Regulatory System for additional information on the mining sector). Nicaragua does not have a practice of issuing guarantees for foreign direct investment. It has jointly financed some foreign infrastructure projects. Nicaraguan law mandates joint ventures with government agencies in the energy sector. The Free Zones Incentive Law (Decree 46-91 and amendments) and the Free Zone Export Law passed in 2015 (including Decree 12-2016) grant free trade zone (FTZ) companies special tax treatment, including: a permanent exemption from all import duties and taxes for raw materials, equipment, and other materials necessary to operate the business, provided all products are exported; 100 percent income tax exemption for the first 10 years of operation, and 60 percent income tax exemption thereafter; and exemptions from all export, value added, consumption, municipal, transportation, and property transfer taxes. FTZ companies must pay a deposit to guarantee final salaries and other expenses if a company goes out of business. FTZ salaries are negotiated separately from other wage negotiations and are set for five-year periods. FTZ companies may employ foreign employees with the permission of the FTZ Commission. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as local firms. The majority of FTZ companies are foreign owned, and most production is aimed at the U.S. market. Nicaragua’s FTZs have historically been a key driver of the Nicaraguan economy. FTZ exports fell 15 percent in 2020 due to reduced demand caused by the pandemic. Exports rebounded in 2021, increasing 37 percent. Companies in the FTZ currently employ more than 131,000 workers, surpassing a previous 2019 high. Prior to the ongoing crisis, companies in the FTZ reported good relations with the government and frequent interaction with the FTZ Commission, which regulates the FTZ. Companies in the FTZ report few interactions with the government and less interference than companies operating outside the FTZs in the Nicaraguan economy. The government does not impose performance requirements, conditions on permission to invest, or minimum levels of domestic content for foreign investors to use in goods or technology. Nicaraguan tax and customs incentives apply equally to foreign and domestic investors. Nicaragua does not impose measures that prevent or unduly impede freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. Nicaraguan authorities may electronically monitor individuals’ activities. Under Nicaragua’s 2020 Cybercrimes Law, telecom providers must retain one year’s worth of data for all users. A local judge may issue an order, at the National Police or Prosecutor General’s request, to force internet providers to release specific information about an individual customer, as well as collect, extract, or record data about this customer, such as real time data traffic. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and enforcement are notoriously unreliable in Nicaragua. The government regularly fails to enforce court decisions on the seizure, restitution, or compensation of private property. Legal claims are subject to non-judicial considerations, and members of the judiciary, including those at senior levels, are widely believed to be corrupt or subject to political pressure. During ongoing crisis, Ortega-Murillo regime loyalists illegally took over privately owned lands, with implicit and explicit support from municipal and national government officials. Some land seizures were politically targeted and directed against the political opposition. Under the first Ortega-led government in the 1980s, the expropriation of 28,000 foreign-owned and Nicaraguan-owned properties created a significant number of real estate claims and counterclaims. Property registries suffer from years of poor recordkeeping, making it difficult to establish a title history. In 2019, the Supreme Court modified property registry rules to prohibit most access to these records. Mortgages and liens exist, but the recording system is not reliable. Investors should conduct extensive due diligence and use extreme caution before investing in real property. Unscrupulous individuals have engaged in protracted confrontations with U.S. investors to wrest control of prime properties, particularly in tourist areas. Judges and municipal authorities are known to collude with such individuals, and a cottage industry supplies false titles and other documents. In the Autonomous Caribbean Regions, communal land cannot be legally purchased; however, a known scheme involves individuals selling communal land with apparently legal documentation before communal authorities strip buyers of their property. Those interested in purchasing property in Nicaragua should seek experienced legal counsel early in the process. The Capital Markets Law (2006/587) provides a legal framework for securitization of movable and real property. There are no specific restrictions regarding foreign or non-resident investors aside from certain border and other properties considered important to national security. Given the state of the public records registry, it is not possible to determine what percentage of land does not have clear title. There is no defined government effort to resolve this. Squatters can obtain ownership of unoccupied property, particularly if they have government backing. Nicaragua established standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) through CAFTA-DR implementing legislation, which is consistent with U.S. and international IPR standards. Enforcement of IPR law is limited. Infringement on rights and theft – particularly media piracy and trademark violations – are common. The United States has expressed concerns about the implementation of Nicaragua’s patent obligations under CAFTA-DR, including: the mechanism through which patent owners receive notice of submissions from third parties; how the public can access lists of protected patents; and the treatment of undisclosed test data. Nicaragua does not publicly report on seizures of counterfeit goods. Nicaragua is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report or its Review of Notorious Markets for Piracy and Counterfeiting. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profile for Nicaragua . 6. Financial Sector There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investment. Nicaragua does not have its own equities market and there is no regulatory structure to facilitate publicly held companies. There is a small bond market that trades primarily in government bonds but also sells corporate debt to institutional investors. The Superintendent of Banks and Other Financial Institutions (SIBOIF) supervises the bond market. The overall size and depth of Nicaragua’s financial markets and portfolio positions are very limited. Nicaragua has officially accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. New policies, however, threaten the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets, as well as foreign currency convertibility. Banks must now request foreign currency purchases in writing, 48 hours in advance, and the Central Bank reserves the right to deny these requests. While the banking system has grown and developed in the past two decades, Nicaragua remains underbanked relative to other countries in the region. Only 31 percent of Nicaraguans aged 15 or older have bank accounts, and only 8 percent have any savings in such accounts, approximately half the rate of other countries in the region according to World Bank data. Nicaragua also has one of the lowest mobile banking rates in Central America. Following a sharp contraction in 2018, the banking sector recovered slightly in 2019 and 2020. In 2021, liquidity ratios continued high and stable at 45 percent and portfolios increased 5.5 percent. Despite expanded lending, banks remain cautious when granting new financing. The ratio of non-performing loans to banking sector assets was 15 percent in 2021. Despite improving indicators, the banking sector remains vulnerable to sociopolitical uncertainty. Since 2018, banks have reduced their branches from 612 to 445 across the country. The banking industry remains conservative and highly concentrated, with four banks – Banpro, LAFISE, BAC, and Fichosa – controlling an estimated 77 percent of the country’s market. The 2018 crisis sparked large withdrawals of deposits from the banking system. Those withdrawals have stabilized, but total assets remain below pre-crisis levels. In 2021, the financial system had total assets worth $4.7 billion – a 9 percent increase over 2020’s $4.3 billion, but 14 percent lower than in March 2018’s $5.5 billion. The Central Bank of Nicaragua was established in 1961 as the regulator of the monetary system with the sole right to issue the national currency, the córdoba. Foreign banks can open branches in Nicaragua. Since 2018, Nicaragua has lost several correspondent banking relationships. Wells Fargo Bank withdrew altogether, and Bank of America withdrew correspondent services from a local bank. Recent amendments to the Consumer Protection Law could force local banks to service suspicious account holders – including persons designated under international sanctions regimes – further jeopardizing correspondent banking relationships. Foreigners can open bank accounts if they are legal residents in the country. The Foreign Investment Law allows foreign investors residing in the country to access local credit, and local banks have no restrictions on accepting property located abroad as collateral. In 2019, the Department of Treasury’s OFAC designated Bancorp – a subsidiary of ALBANISA, a joint venture between the state-owned oil companies of Nicaragua and Venezuela – for money laundering and corruption. Bancorp submitted its dissolution to the Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions (SIBOIF), but the closure was secretive and outside the legal framework that governs financial institutions in Nicaragua. In 2021, OFAC designated two senior government officials overseeing the banking system. OFAC designated the President of the Central Bank for implementing Nicaragua’s consumer protection law that could obligate Nicaraguan financial institutions to facilitate sanctionable transactions. OFAC also designated the head of SIBOIF for forcing commercial banks to provide financial information on the regime’s political opponents. Nicaragua does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises It is virtually impossible to identify the number of companies that the Nicaraguan government owns or controls, because they are not subject to any regular audit or accounting measures and are not fully captured by the national budget or in other public documents. Beyond the official state-owned enterprises (SOE), which are not transparent or subject to oversight, the Ortega-Murillo regime uses a vast network of front men to control companies. State-controlled companies receive non-market-based advantages, including tax exemption benefits not granted to private actors. In some instances, these companies are given monopolies through implementing legislation. In other instances, the government uses formal and informal levers to advantage its businesses. The government owns and operates the National Sewer and Water Company (ENACAL), National Port Authority (EPN), National Lottery, and National Electricity Transmission Company (ENATREL). Private sector investment is not permitted in these sectors. In sectors where competition is allowed, the government owns and operates the Nicaraguan Insurance Institute (INISER), Nicaraguan Electricity Company (ENEL), Las Mercedes Industrial Park, Nicaraguan Food Staple Company (ENABAS), Nicaraguan Post Office, International Airport Authority (EAAI), Nicaraguan Mining Company (ENIMINAS), and Nicaraguan Petroleum Company (Petronic). Many of Nicaragua’s SOEs and quasi-SOEs were established using ALBANISA, now OFAC sanctioned. The Ortega-Murillo regime used ALBANISA funds to purchase television and radio stations, hotels, cattle ranches, power plants, and pharmaceutical laboratories. ALBANISA’s large presence in the Nicaraguan economy and its ties to the government disadvantage companies trying to compete in industries dominated by ALBANISA or government-managed entities. In 2020, the government nationalized Nicaragua’s main electricity distributor Disnorte-Dissur, which was previously owned by ALBANISA. In 2020, following the OFAC designation of state-owned petroleum distributor Distribuidor Nicaraguense de Petroleo (DNP), the government created four new entities: the Nicaraguan Gas Company (ENIGAS); the Nicaraguan Company to Store and Distribute Hydrocarbons (ENIPLANH); the Nicaraguan Company for Hydrocarbon Exploration (ENIH); and the Nicaraguan Company to Import, Transport, and Commercialize Hydrocarbons (ENICOM). Through the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS), the government owns a pharmaceutical manufacturing company, and other companies and real estate holdings. The Military Institute of Social Security (IPSM), a state pension fund for the Nicaraguan military, controls companies in the construction, manufacturing, and services sectors. In January 2022, OFAC sanctioned three members of the IPSM board of directors. Nicaragua does not have an active privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Many large businesses have active Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) programs that include improvements to the workplace environment, business ethics, and community development initiatives. Prominent business groups such as CCSN and the Nicaraguan Union for Corporate Social Responsibility (UniRSE) are working to create more awareness of corporate social responsibility. Nicaragua’s Foreign Agents Law has forced many businesses to curtail or end their corporate social responsibility operations to avoid the burdensome and intrusive registration process. The government does not factor RBC policies or practices into its procurement decisions, nor does it explicitly encourage RBC principles. The government does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. There are no domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments. Nicaragua is not a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In June 2021, Nicaragua announced the creation of a national climate management system and guidelines for a national climate policy. However, the regulation contained few details and is still being developed. Nicaragua has not set a net-zero carbon emissions goal or outlined a long-term low-carbon strategy. 9. Corruption Nicaragua has a legal framework criminalizing corruption, but there is no expectation that the framework will be enforced. A general state of permissiveness, lack of strong institutions, ineffective system of checks and balances, and the Ortega-Murillo regime’s complete control of government institutions, create conditions for rampant corruption. The judicial system remained particularly susceptible to bribes, manipulation, and political influence. Businesses reported that corruption is an obstacle to investment, particularly in government procurement, licensing, and customs and taxation. The government does not require private companies to establish internal controls. However, Nicaraguan banks have robust compliance and monitoring programs that detect corruption. Multiple government officials and government-controlled entities have been sanctioned for corruption. Nicaragua ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2006 and the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1999. It is not party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Nicaragua’s supreme audit institution is the Contraloria General de la República de Nicaragua (CGR). The CGR can be reached at +505 2265-2072 and more information is available on the CGR website . 10. Political and Security Environment The regime of President Daniel Ortega and his wife and Vice President Rosario Murillo dominates Nicaragua’s highly centralized, authoritarian political system. Ortega is serving in his fourth consecutive term as president following rigged elections in November 2021. The regime’s rule has been marked by increasing human rights abuses, consolidation of executive control, and consolidation of strategic business sectors that enrich Ortega and his inner circle. Political risk remains high, and the future of the country’s political institutions remains uncertain. An ongoing sociopolitical crisis began in April 2018 when regime-controlled police violently crushed a peaceful student protest. The ensuing conflict killed more than 325 people, injured thousands, imprisoned hundreds of peaceful protestors, and exiled more than 100,000. The regime amended terrorism laws to include prodemocracy activities and used the legislature and justice system to characterize civil society actors as terrorists, assassins, and “coup-mongers.” The regime continues to hold 170 political prisoners – most suffering from a lack of adequate food and proper medical care. Prisoners were arrested for activities considered normal in a free society, including practicing independent journalism, working for civil society organizations, seeking to compete in elections, or publicly expressing an opinion contrary to the government. Excessive use of force, false imprisonment, and other harassment against opposition leaders – including many private sector leaders – is common. The regime-controlled Nicaraguan National Police maintains a heavy presence throughout Nicaragua, including randomized checkpoints. In response to the Ortega-Murillo regime’s antidemocratic behavior and human rights abuses, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Treasury have imposed visa and financial restrictions on multiple government agencies and hundreds of individuals. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Nicaragua’s labor market is highly informal. According to government statistics from third quarter 2021, 44 percent of the population is underemployed. These individuals operate in the informal sector, facing economic instability and lacking social security benefits. Independent economists estimate most underemployed people earn 25 to 50 percent of the minimum wage, which itself is not sufficient to afford the basic basket of goods. Social security provider INSS reported in December 2021 the number of enrolled employees remained 6 percent below pre-2018 levels. Independent think tanks estimate that 1.6 million people or 25 percent of the population lived below the poverty line in 2021. Despite the absence of reliable government data, independent economists estimate unemployment at 5 percent. Official government estimates of 4 percent are skewed by the government’s definition of unemployment, which considers any individual who worked at least one hour in a month, regardless of remuneration, to be employed. Nicaragua lacks skilled and technical labor. The government-run National Technological Institute (INATEC) regulates technical education and professional training in Nicaragua. Employers often import administrative or managerial employees from outside of the country, as permitted by law. Article 14 of the Nicaraguan Labor Code states that 90 percent of any company’s employees must be Nicaraguan. The Ministry of Labor may make exceptions when justified for technical reasons. Minimum wages are low and, prior to 2018, revised through an inclusive dialogue process between the private sector, labor unions, and the government. Nicaragua’s minimum wages are reviewed yearly for nine sectors of the economy, while a tenth sector – free trade zones – reviews its minimum wage every five years. The most recent negotiations did not include COSEP, formerly the most influential independent business chamber and traditional private sector representative. This year APRODESNI, a newly created and regime-aligned alternative chamber, was the official private sector representative. In 2022, the minimum wages for all nine sectors were increased 7 percent. The next review for the free trade zone minimum wage will be in 2023 and will cover the period 2023-2027. Nicaraguan labor law requires employers to pay at year-end the equivalent of an extra month’s salary. Upon termination of an employee, the employer must pay a month’s salary for each year worked, up to five months’ salary. There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws, including in the free trade zones. The CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter establishes commitments to ensure effective labor law enforcement within the country and comply with commitments made to the International Labor Organization. Nicaraguan law provides for the right of public and private sector workers, except for the military and police, to form and join independent unions of their choice without authorization and to bargain collectively. Workers can exercise this right in practice, but unions not affiliated with the regime face challenges. A collective bargaining agreement cannot exceed two years and is automatically renewed if neither party requests revision. Strikes are legal but rare due to the government’s control over unions. The Nicaraguan Ministry of Labor can receive labor complaints and emit enforceable resolutions in labor disputes. The Ministry can perform health and safety inspections and virtual and in-person labor inspections. For more information regarding labor conditions in Nicaragua, please see the annual Human Rights Report and the Department of Labor Child Labor reports 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $12,621 2020 $12,621 World Bank: www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -$3 BEA: https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $3 BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 7.7% 2020 7.1 % UNCTAD: https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Nicaraguan Central Bank https://www.bcn.gob.ni/publicaciones/periodicidad/anual/informe_anual/index.php Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section U.S. Embassy Managua +505 7877-7600 ManaguaEcon@state.gov Niger Executive Summary Niger is eager to attract foreign investment and has taken slow but deliberate steps to improve its business climate, including making reforms to liberalize the economy, encourage privatizations, appeal to foreign investors, increase imports and exports, and create new export processing zones. In April 2021, newly elected President Bazoum Mohamed was inaugurated in Niger’s historic first democratic transfer of executive power. Bazoum intends to build upon the advancement of his predecessors to continue to develop the nation’s mineral and petroleum wealth, while seeking to develop agricultural businesses that can take advantage of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. Pre-COVID economic growth averaged roughly six percent per year and the government managed positive 1.5 percent growth through the 2020 pandemic year. The Government of Niger (GoN) continues to seek foreign investment – U.S. or otherwise. President Bazoum frequenty reiterates the need for FDI during official visits. In 2017, the GoN created the High Council for Investment, which is an organization tasked with supporting and promoting foreign direct investments in Niger, and is furthering appeals for foreign investment with the development of the GUCE, Guichet Unique du Commerce Exterieur, an information and facilitation system for foreign trade, electronic and dematerialized, intended to simplify and modernize procedures to facilitate the passage of goods entering and leaving the national territory. U.S. investment in the country is very small; there is currently only one U.S. firm operating in Niger outside of U.S. Government-related projects. Many U.S. firms see risk due to the country’s limited internet, transport, and energy infrastructure, terrorist threats, the perception of political instability, lack of educated and skilled/experienced workers, and a climate that is dry and very hot. Foreign investment dominates key sectors: France in the the uranium sector, Morocco is making inroads with telecommunications, bank and real estate development, while Chinese and Turkish investment is paramount and expanding in the oil, mining,construction, and hospitality sectors. Much of the country’s retail stores, particularly those related to food, dry goods and clothing are operated by Lebanese and Moroccan entrepreneurs. GoN focus areas for investment include the mining and petroleum sector, infrastructure and construction, transportation, and agribusiness. The GoN also hopes to draw investment into petroleum exploration into proven reserves with the 2023 target completion of a crude oil export pipeline. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 129 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $550 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoN is committed to attracting FDI and has repeatedly pledged to take whatever steps necessary to encourage the development of private sector and increase trade. The country offers numerous investment opportunities, particularly in agriculture, livestock, energy, telecommunication, industry, infrastructure, hydrocarbons, services and mining. In the past several years, new investor codes have been implemented, the most recent being in 2014. A Public-Private Partnership law was adopted in 2018, transparency has improved, and customs and taxation procedures have been simplified and computirized. There are no laws that specifically discriminate against foreign and/or U.S. investors. The GoN has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with prospective foreign investors on matters of taxation and customs, despite some difficulties recently observed on the introduction of an electronic system for VAT. The Investment Code adopted in 2014 guarantees the reception and protection of foreign direct investment, as well as tax advantages available for investment projects. The Investment Code allows tax exemptions for a certain period and according to the location and amount of the projects to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the Ministry of Commerce. The code guarantees fair treatment of investors regardless of their origin. The code also offers tax incentives for sectors that the government deems to be priorities and strategic, including energy production, agriculture, fishing, social housing, health, education, crafts, hotels, transportation and the agro-food industry processing. The code allows free transfer of profits and free convertibility of currencies. The Public-Private Partnership law adopted in 2018 and implemented since then gives projects of the public private partnership type for their operations in the design and /or implementation phase, total exemption from duties and taxes collected by the State, including VAT, on the provision of services, works and services directly contributing to the realization of the project. However, parts and spare parts, and raw materials intended for projects benefit from a duty exemption and customs taxes only when not available in Niger. In the design and /or production phase, private public partnership type benefit from free registration agreements and all acts entered into by the contracting authority and the contracting partner within the framework of the project. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors including U.S. investors. The High Council for Investment of Niger (HCIN) reports directly to the President of the Republic. HCIN is the platform of public-private dialogue with a view to increasing Foreign Direct Investments, improving Niger’s business environment, and defining private sector priorities to possible investors. In 2018, the GoN added by Presidential Decree a Nigerien Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment and Strategic Projects (ANPIPS). This new agency reports to the HCIN and implements the lead agencies policy initiatives. The government put in place an Institutional Framework for Improving Business Climate Indicators office (Dispositif Institutionnel d’Amélioration et de Suivi du Climat des Affaires), within the Ministry of Commerce, focused on improving business climate indicators. Its goal is to create a framework that permits the implementation of sustainable reforms. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises. Energy, mineral resources, and national security related sectors restrict foreign ownership and control; otherwise, there are no limitations on ownership or control. In the extractive industries, any company to which the GoN grants a mining permit must give the GoN a minimum 10 percent share of the company. This law applies to both foreign and domestic operations. The GoN also reserves the right to require companies exploiting mineral resources to give the GoN up to a 33 percent stake in their Nigerien operations. Although Ministry of Planning authorization is required, foreign ownership of land is permitted. In 2015, under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce, the GoN validated a new Competition and Consumer Protection Law, replacing a 1992 law that was never operational. Niger adheres to the Community Competition Law of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and directives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as those offered to investors by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) all of which provide benefits and guarantees to private companies. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises. A legal Investment Code governs most activities except accounting, which the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) governs. The Mining Code governs the mining sector and the Petroleum Code governs the petroleum sector, with regulations enforced through their respective ministries. The investment code guarantees equal treatment of investors regardless of nationality. Companies are protected against nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning throughout the national territory, except for reasons of public utility. The state remains the owner of water resources through the Niger Water Infrastructure Corporation (SPEN), created in 2001, and is responsible for the management of the state’s hydraulic infrastructure in urban and semi-urban areas, of its development, and project management. Concessions for the use of water and for the exploitation of works and hydraulic installations may be granted to legal persons governed by private law, generally by presidential decree. An investment screening mechanism does not exist under the Investment Code. The Office of the President, however, will review investment proposals for administration approval prior to further negotiation. In the past five years, the government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through a multi-lateral organization. Neither the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), nor the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has carried out a policy review for Niger. Niger’s one-stop shop, the Maison de l’Entreprise (Enterprise House) is mandated to enhance business facilitation by mainstreaming and simplifying the procedures required to start a business within a single window registration process. From 2016 to 2019, the cost and time needed to register businesses dropped from 100,000 CFA (about $190) to 17,500 CFA (about $33), including reducing the time to get construction permits and the cost of getting access to the water and electricity networks. Further reforms have included the creation of an e-regulations website (https://niger.eregulations.org/procedure/2/1?l=fr ), which allows for a clear and complete registration process. Foreign companies may use this website. The website lists government agencies, with which a business must register. The business registration process is about 3 days. Company registration can be done at the Centre de Formalités des Entreprises (CFE), at the Maison de l’Entreprise. Applicants must file the documents with the Commercial Registry (Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier – RCCM), which has a representative at the one-stop shop. At the same location, a company can register for taxes, obtain a tax identification number (Numéro d’Identification Fiscale – NIF), register with social security (Caisse nationale de Sécurité Sociale – CNSS), and with the employment agency (Agence Nationale pour la Promotion de l’Emploi – ANPE). Employees can be registered with CNSS at the same location. Professional activity carried out in Niger is governed by the General Tax Code. Commercial activities are subject to income tax and the general VAT regime unless specific investment clauses have been codified. Granted exemptions normally only concern activities in line with the object of the institution and a specific investment clause (humanitarian activities, health, education, etc.). Companies with a turnover excluding tax of more than 50 million CFA per calendar year($80,000) are subject to Value Added Tax. Companies with a lower turnover are not subject to VAT. As such, they cannot charge VAT, nor deduct that which has been paid upstream (suppliers). From January 1, 2021, any taxable person who delivers goods or provides services for the needs of another taxable person or an ordinary consumer is required to issue them an electronic invoice. The Investment Code offers VAT-inclusive tax exemptions depending on the size of the business. At the moment of company registration, the applicant may also request for the publication of a notice of company incorporation on the Maison de l’Entreprise website: http://mde.ne/spip.php?rubrique10 . The notice of company incorporation can alternatively be published in an official newspaper (journal d’annonces légales). The government does not promote outward investment. The government’s policy objectives, as specified in the second Nigerien Renaissance Program (section 1.2), is the development of international markets, especially that of ECOWAS, for Nigerien exports rather than investment. The GON does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GoN possesses transparent policies and requisite laws to foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis, but does not enforce them equally, in large part due to corruption and weak governmental systems. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Legal Regime – related to the Investment Code, Labor Code and Commercial Acts – applies the provisions of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). It also offers free access to public procurement and with a moderate transparency in the procedures for awarding contract. Niger does not have any regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. A company in Niger must be entered in the Register of Companies, must obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN), be registered with the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and with the National Employment Promotion Agency (ANPE). There, however, is a large informal sector that does not submit to any of the legal provisions and is not formally regulated. Rule-making regulatory, and anti-corruption authorities exist in telecommunication, public procurement, and energy, all of which are relevant for foreign businesses, and are exercised at the national level. Law No 2015-58 established the Energy Sector Regulatory Agency, an independent administrative authority, to regulate the energy sector at the national level, but effectively only in major cities. The December 2012 law No 2012-70 created the Telecommunications and Post Office Regulatory Authority (ARTP). ARTP regulates all aspects of telecommunications operators. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Legal Regime – related to the Tax Code, Customs Code, Investment Code, Mining Code, Petroleum Code, Labor Code and Commercial Acts – applies the provisions of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa OHADA. It also offers free access to public procurement and transparency in the procedures for awarding contracts. GoN officials have confirmed their intent to comply with international norms in its legal, regulatory, and accounting systems, but frequently fall short. Clear procedures are frequently not available. Draft bills are not always available for public comment, although some organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, are invited to offer suggestions during the drafting process. The GoN encourages but does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies. Niger does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published but does have a Directorate of National Archives where key regulatory actions are kept in print; this direction is under the Ministry Secretary of Government. Foreign and national investors, however, can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment at the following site: http://niger.eregulations.org/ . The site includes information on income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures. The General Inspectorate of Administrative Governance and the Regional Directorates of Archives are in place to oversee administrative processes. Their efforts are reinforced by incentives for state employees, unannounced inspections in public administrations, and an introduction of a sign-in system and exchange meetings. No major regulatory system and/or enforcement reforms were announced in 2021. Regulations are developed via a system of ministerial collaborations and discussions, consultation with the State Council and the Council of Ministers. This is followed by discussions in the National Assembly, approval by the Constitutional Council and finally approved by the President for publication and distribution to interested stakeholders. Based on the Constitution of 2011, the regulatory power belongs to the President and the Prime Minister to issue regulations for the national territory. Other administrative authorities also have regulatory power, such as ministers, governors, or prefects and mayors, who have the power of enforcement at the local level. Ministries or regulatory agencies do not conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations. However, ministries or regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. Public comments are generally not published. Public finances and debt obligations are not sufficiently transparent. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union, however, are currently funding projects to improve financial oversight and debt transparency. The 2021 assessment indicated some progress for public information on debt obligations and the release of a bi-annual national debt report. Niger is a part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 15-member West African trade block. National policy generally adheres to ECOWAS guidelines concerning business regulations. Niger is a member of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures: http://niger.eregulations.org/ (French language only). Niger is a member of the WTO, but as a lower income member, is exempt from Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. The GoN does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Niger ratified a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in August 2015. The country has reported some progress on implementing the TFA requirements. Niger’s legal system is a legacy of the French colonial system. The legal infrastructure is insufficient, making it difficult to use the courts to enforce ownership of property or contracts. While Niger’s laws protect property and commercial rights, the administration of justice can be slow and unequal. Niger has a written commercial law that is heavily based on the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). Niger has been a member of OHADA since 1995. OHADA aims to harmonize business laws in 16 African countries by adopting common rules adapted to their economies, setting up appropriate judicial procedures, and encouraging arbitration for the settlement of contractual disputes. OHADA regulations on business and commercial law include definition and classification of legal persons engaged in trade, procedures for credit and recovery of debts, means of enforcement, bankruptcy, receivership, and arbitration. In 2015, Niger set up a Commercial Court in Niamey. In 2020, 453 cases, including 24 inherited from 2019, were in summary proceedings, of which 351 were the subject of a judgment and whose minutes are available, 38 conciliation, 68 cases canceled and two remaining and postponed to 2021. The average processing time is 37 days. Article 116 of the constitution clearly states that the judicial system is independent of the executive and legislative branches. However, the personnel management process for assignments and promotions is through politically appointed personnel in the Ministry of Justice, seriously weakening the independence of the judiciary and raising questions about the fairness and reliability of the judicial process. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the court system. However, it is extremely rare for individuals or corporations to challenge government regulations or enforcement actions in court due to costs and administrative obstacles. For example, the GoN may require companies to submit up to 75 percent of a claimed tax discrepancy prior to legal appeal. Niger offers guarantees to foreign direct investors pertaining to security of capital and investment, compensation for expropriation, and equality of treatment. Foreign investors may be permitted to transfer income derived from invested capital and from liquidated investments, provided the original investment is made in convertible currencies. Law 2015-08 from 2015 established a specialized Commercial Court in Niamey. This is a mixed court with professional magistrates, who are lawyers by training, who work in tandem with lay-judges, and who generally come from the commercial sector. The concept was to have commercial disputes resolved by a panel of judges with legal training, combined with judges who have experience in the commercial sector. The Commercial Court has 26 judges, who make up five chambers. Unlike U.S. trial courts, where cases are handled by a single judge, in Niger, cases are adjudicated by a panel of judges. Judicial decisions that have come out in the past years can be found on the Commerce Tribunal of Niamey’s website: http://www.tribunalcommerceniamey.org/index.php . The Chamber of Commerce and Industry houses a specialized institution, known as the Investment Promotion Center (CPI) which supports domestic and foreign investors in terms of business creation, extension and rehabilitation. The GoN also established the The Single Window for Foreign Trade (Guichet Unique du Commerce Exterieur), an information and facilitation system for foreign trade, electronic and dematerialized, intended to simplify and modernize procedures to facilitate the passage of goods entering and leaving the national territory of Niger. Its main missions are to: facilitate foreign trade operations by improving procedures and information flows among stakeholders; facilitate, simplify and rationalize the procedures relating to the application, issue and collection of authorizations prior to import, export and transit operations; facilitate, simplify and rationalize, for all the modes of transport concerned, the procedures relating to the processing, entry and exit of goods from the territory of the Republic of Niger; and facilitate and simplify the completion of administrative and logistical formalities while respecting the prerogatives of all stakeholders. In 2015, the Ministry of Trade validated a new Competition and Consumer Protection Law, replacing a 1992 law that was never fully operational. Niger also adheres to the Community Competition Law of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Investment Code guarantees that no business will be subject to nationalization or expropriation except when deemed “in the public interest” as prescribed by the law. The code requires that the government compensate any expropriated business with just and equitable payment. There have been a number of expropriations of commercial and personal property, most of which were not conducted in a manner consistent with Nigerien law requiring “just and prior compensation.” It is in fact rare for property owners to be compensated by the government after expropriations of property. In cases of expropriation carried out by the GoN, claimants and community leaders have alleged a lack of due process. These complaints are currently limited to community forums and press coverage. Many of the families impacted lack the knowledge and ability to exercise their rights under the law. High rates of illiteracy, complexity of the legal system, and lack of resources to retain competent legal counsel present insurmountable barriers to legal remedies for people whose property has been expropriated. Even in situations where educated and wealthy business owners have had their property expropriated, legal challenges to expropriation are not lodged. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Niger is a contracting state of both the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention of 1958. There is no domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention and/or under the ICSID Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Investment Code offers the possibility for foreign nationals to seek remedy through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Niger does not have a BIT or FTA with the United States that would provide dispute settlement processes. Over the past 10 years, there were no investment disputes that involved a U.S. person. Local courts are generally reluctant to recognize foreign arbitral awards issued against the GoN. Niger does not have a record of extrajudicial actions against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Niger has an operational center for mediation and arbitration of business disputes. The center’s stated aim is to maintain investor confidence by eliminating long and expensive procedures traditionally involved in the resolution of business disputes. The Investment Code provides for settlement of disputes by arbitration or by recourse to the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Disputes on Investment. However, investment dispute mechanisms in contracts are not always respected and exercising due diligence is extremely important. There was no publicly available information in 2021on foreign arbitral award enforcement in Niger. Procedures are in place but are often not adhered to because of a lack of resources and corruption in the judicial system. The Investment Code offers the possibility for foreign nationals to seek remedy through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Niger has laws related to insolvency and/or bankruptcy. Creditors have the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting a creditor’s claims and may vote on debtors’ bankruptcy reorganization plans. However, the creditors’ rights are limited: creditors do not have the right to receive from a reorganized firm as much as they may have received from one that had been liquidated. Likewise, the law does not require that creditors be consulted on matters pertaining to an insolvency framework following the declaration of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. According to data collected by the World Bank’s Doing Business survey, resolving insolvency takes five years on average and costs 18 percent of the debtor’s total assets. Globally, Niger stands at 114 in the 2020 ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. Niger strength of insolvency framework index (0–16) is 9. 4. Industrial Policies Niger offers incentives that are dependent on the size of the investment and number of jobs that will be created. The Investment Code offers VAT-inclusive tax exemptions depending on the size of the business. Potential tax exemptions include start-up costs, property, industrial and commercial profits, services and materials required for production, and energy use. Exemption periods range from ten to fifteen years and include waivers of duties and license fees. There are no restrictions on foreign companies opening a local office in Niger, though they must obtain a business certificate from the Ministry of Trade. The Investment Code has established three different tiers of incentives for investors, based on minimum investment amounts, listed below: Tier 1: Promotional tier, for investments of 25 million CFA francs (about $40,000) or above. Tier 2: Priority tier, for investments of 50 million CFA francs (about $81,000) or above. Tier 3: Conventional tier, for investments of at least 2 billion CFA (about $3.25 million). During the investment phase, the approved investments are exempt from import duties and taxes on material and equipment needed for the project that are not available locally. The advantages provided during the operational phase include exemption from profit tax (35 percent). Apart from these regimes, two additional incentive schemes are part of the investment code. These apply to companies operating in remote regions, energy, agro-industry, and low-cost housing sectors. The government of Niger has a practice of jointly financing foreign direct investment projects through the Public-Private Partnership law. This enacted law no. 2018-40 (June 2018) regulating contracts public-private partnership stated for example in Article 59: In the design and/or development phase implementation, public-private partnership type projects benefit for their operations of a total exemption from duties and taxes collected by the State with the exception of VAT on the services of services. In 2016, the GON updated its antiquated Customs Code to conform with the requirements of Community Customs Codes of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 2017, the GON modernized the customs procedures with the electronic payment tax which is in pace in in Niamey and is being implemented through Niger’s seven other regions. In 2016, internal customs procedures migrated to SYDONIAWORLD, a system designed to improve efficiency and permit centralized oversight and control. In 2015, Niger was the first Least Developed Country (LDC) to ratify the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The country seeks to implement the trade policy of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and has joined the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union. Niger is landlocked and relies on the ports of Cotonou in Benin and Lomé in Togo as its primary seaports. Importers also use the ports of Tema, in Ghana and sometimes Lagos, Nigeria. Delivery can take months due to delays at borders and internal control points along the route. The relatively low number of commercial flights to Niger means that transport costs are high. The country’s main trade partners are Nigeria, the European Union, the United States, China, Cote d’Ivoire, and Algeria. In July 2019, Niger created a free industrial export zone, permitting a logistics zone allowing certain tax advantages for the companies with established transportation operations. The government also created in July 2019 the second industrial zone of Niamey, which aimed to reduce the difficulties linked to the quality of infrastructure and production factors, including the high cost of construction, lack of urbanized areas, roads and various networks and the lack of space in the current industrial area of Niamey which no longer meets national and international environmental and safety standards. The construction of an oil pipeline in the country will also attenuate the pressure on roads as the flux of oil trucks will be reduced considerably. The African Continental Free Trade Area (ZLECAF) entered into force on January 1, 2021. Niger is active member of the treaty. While Niger does require that companies attempt to hire a Nigerien before applying for a work visa for a foreign national, in practice the rule is not enforced. In addition, it allows for a company to appeal to the Ministry of Labor, if a foreigner is refused a work visa. There are also no localization requirements for senior management or boards of directors. There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, worik permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. In principle, there are no government/authority imposed conditions restricting investments beyond limited sectors for national security as cited in the section on “Limits on Foreign Control.” There are no forced localization policies requiring investors to use domestic goods in content. Performance requirements are not imposed as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding foreign direct investments. Niger does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. Niger has no regulations regarding data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights Interests in property are enforced when the landholder is known, but property disputes are common, particularly involving community-owned land or land in rural areas where customary land titles are still common. Mortgages are relatively new instruments; Bank Atlantique introduced the first mortgages in 2014. The bank retains the title to the property until the loan is repaid. Foreign ownership of land is permitted but requires authorization from the Ministry of Planning. Tax policies for foreign ownership of residential and commercial land was established by the 2018 national budget law. There is no understood proportion of land that has a clear title. Property records are unreliable and often under dispute. There is currently no effort by the government to register land titles independent of active transactions. Traditional use rights are at the core of land disputes between Nigerien farmers and traditional nomadic herders. According to data collected by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business survey conducted in 2019, registering property in Niger requires four procedures, takes 13 days and costs 7.4 percent of the property value. Globally, Niger stands at 115 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of registering property. In 2014, Niger made transferring property easier by reducing registration fees. As a signatory to the 1983 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Niger provides national protection under Nigerien patent and trademark laws to foreign businesses. Niger is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a signatory to the Universal Copyright Convention. No new IP laws or regulations have been enacted in the past year. Niger does not regularly track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods. There is no specific information about working conditions in the production or sale of counterfeit goods. While there have been some cases of seizure, government statistics are not available. Enforcement of IP is weak due to limited capacity. Niger is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. 6. Financial Sector Niger’s government welcomes foreign portfolio investment where possible. Niger’s capital markets are extremely underdeveloped, and the country do not have its own stock market. However, the country shares a regional stock market The Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) with the eight (8) Member States in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This is the only stock market in the world shared by several countries, run totally in digital format. Although an effective regulatory system exists, and policies in fact encourage portfolio investment, there is little market liquidity and hence little opportunity for such investment. The agency UMOA-Titres (AUT), a regional agency to support public securities issuance and management in the WAEMU (bonds market), is dedicated to helping member states use capital markets to raise the resources they need to fund their economic development policies at reasonable cost. There are no limits on the free flow of financial resources. The government works closely with the IMF to ensure that payments and transfers overseas occur without undue restrictions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreigners do not face discrimination. Credit is allocated on market terms through large corporations. Although foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market, limited domestic availability tends to drive investors to international markets. To access a variety of credit instruments, the private sector often looks to multinational institutions in Niger or international sources for credit. Private actors in the agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries sectors (which account for more than 40 percent of GDP) receive less than one percent of total bank credit. The banking sector in Niger is generally healthy and well capitalized, but suffers from low financial inclusion. The gross domestic savings rate increased by 1.4 percentage points, standing at 17.4% in 2017 (including the decentralized financial system). According to the Central Bank statistics, only 8 % of th active adult population have bank accounts (2020). In the WAEMU States, the average is 45%. The proportion of women excluded from financial services is 89% and that of people living in rural areas is 85% in 2020. As of December 31, 2020, the resources mobilized by the banking system amounted to 1250.67 billion CFA (2.23 billion USD), an increase of 164.73 billion cfaf (294.1 million USD) or 15.2 percent compared to the same period of 2019. Foreign banks control about 80 percent of the sector’s assets, with SONIBANK, BIA Niger, Ecobank and Bank of Africa (BOA) being the largest banks operating in the country. The Central Bank of West African States governs Niger’s banking institutions and sets minimum reserve requirements through its national Central Bank representation. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account, and foreign banks and their subsidiaries operate within the economy without undue restrictions. Niger is a part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which utilizes the CFA, pegged to the Euro at 655.61 CFA per euro. Foreign Exchange There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors in converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment, including remittances. Funds are freely convertible into any world currency. However, the government must approve currency conversions above 2 million CFA (approximately 3,413 USD). The exchange rate is determined via the euro’s fluctuations on the international currency market. The CFA is pegged to the euro. Remittance Policies Niger’s Investment Code offers the possibility to transfer income of any kind, including capital investment and the proceeds of investment liquidation, regardless of the destination. There are no limitations or waiting periods on remittances, though the Ministry of Finance must approve currency conversions above 2 million CFA (approximately 3,250 USD). Niger does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), and does not subscribe to the Santiago Principles. The government has plans for a build-up of reserves at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) using oil revenues. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of expectations regarding RBC, as well as business’ obligations to proactively conduct due diligence and do no harm. Ordinance No. 97-001 of 10 January 1997 on the Institutionalization of Environmental Impact Assessments, Article 4 of which states: “Activities, projects or programs of development which, by the importance of their size or their impact on the natural and human environments, may affect the latter are subject to prior authorization from the Minister of the Environment. This authorization is granted on the basis of an assessment of the consequences of the project activities or the program updated by an environmental impact study prepared by the promoter.” For example, in the extractive industries sector, the GoN has focused on ensuring existing obligations are met and that communities benefit from investments. Nigerien law states that 15 percent of revenues derived from extractive industries must be returned to the municipality affected by the project. However, such payments are difficult to track and the GoN is not active or engaged in follow-up. There have been no high-profile instances of private sector impact on human rights in the recent past. The GoN attempts to enforce domestic laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections. However, a lack of resources makes such enforcement difficult and only somewhat effective. The government has not put in place corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards. There is limited NGO focus on responsible business practices. Those looking at transparency in contracts and business practices are generally able to work freely regarding engagement with businesses. Niger is not a member of the OECD and does not adhere to OECD guidelines, including those related to supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. There are no Nigerien-owned companies that deal exclusively with minerals, including those that may originate from conflict-affected areas. Niger was officially readmitted to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in February 2020 after a three-year absence. The constitution mandates full disclosure of all payments from foreign government stemming from mining operations, as well as publication of all new exploration and exploitation contracts in the mining sector. However, in practice, payments from foreign countries to GoN officials have at times been controversial due to non-reporting of such payments. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain The GoN does have a strategy to meet National Determined Contributions (NDC) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) contributions by 23 percent by 2030. This strategy relies principly on foreign donors to assist Niger in creating cleaner energy generation and agricultural efficiency. Niger is one of the most vulnerable nations to the impacts of climate change in the world, and forsees reductions in water and arable land resources in coming years. Conversely, Niger has one of the lowest GHG per capita levels in the world. The GoN encourages private investors to practice environmentally friendly and sustainable practices, but does not require GHG limits or environmental restrictions that exceed national or ECOWAS limits. 9. Corruption The constitution, adopted in 2010, contains provisions for greater transparency in government reporting of revenues from the extractive industries, as well as the declaration of personal assets by government officials, including the President. On April 6th, 2021 President Bazoum Mohamed submitted a written sworn statement of his assest to the National Court of Auditors and made the fight against corruption central to his five-year term program. The High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HALCIA) has the authority to investigate corruption charges within all government agencies. HALCIA is limited by a lack of resources and a regulatory process that is still developing. Despite the limitations, HALCIA was able to conduct a number of successful investigations during 2020-2021. Laws related to anti-corruption measures are in place and apply to government officials, their family members, and all political parties. Legislation on Prevention and Repression of Corruption was passed into law in January 2018; a strategy for implementation was still pending in 2022. Niger has laws in place designed to counter conflict of interest in awarding contracts and/or government procurements. Bribery of public officials by private companies is officially illegal, but occurs regularly despite GoN denunciations of such conduct. Law number 2017-10 of March 31, 2017, prohibits bribery of public officials, international administrators, and foreign agents, bribes within the private sector, illicit enrichment and abuse of function by public authorities. The High Authority Against Corruption and Relating Crimes (HALCIA) is further tasked with working with private companies on internal anti-corruption efforts. Bribery of public officials, however, occurs on a regular basis. Though most companies officially discourage such behavior, internal controls are rare except among the largest (mostly foreign) enterprises. The government/authority encourages or requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. The government does not provide any additional protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. The government/authority encourages or requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Niger has joined several international and regional anti-corruption initiatives including the UN Convention against Corruption in 2008, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2005, and the Protocol on Combating Corruption of the economic community of the states of West Africa (ECOWAS) in 2006. Niger is alsoa member state of the GIABA, which is an institution of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responsible for facilitating the adoption and implementation of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) in West Africa. As of April 2022, there is only one large U.S. telecommunications firm invested in Niger, although it gained its assets through acquisition of a U.K. company. This low number is due to reasons that include, but are not limited to, the perception of corruption. Cases of suspected corruption occasionally appear in media reports concerning GoN procurement, the award of licenses and concessions and customs. Resources to Report Corruption Maï Moussa Elhadji Basshir, President High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Infractions (HALCIA) BP 550 Niamey – Niger (227) 20 35 20 94/ 95/ 96/ 97 contact@halcia.ne Wada Maman President Transparency International Niger (TI-N) BP 10423, Niamey – Niger (227) 20 32 00 96 / 96 28 79 69 anlcti@yahoo.fr 10. Political and Security Environment Niger has been politically stable since 2010, when the most recent of Niger’s coup d’états (there have been four since 1990) concluded within less than a year in a return to democratic governance. The most recent general elections were held in in December 2020, with a presidential run-off in February 2021. President Bazoum Mohamed was elected in the first democratic transfer of executive power in Niger’s history. Although Niger’s politics are often contentious and antagonistic, political violence is rare. Most parties agree that national security and peaceful cohabitation among Niger’s ethnicities are the government’s principal priority. However, protests and strikes about non-payment of salaries for public employees, lack of funding for education, and general dissatisfaction with social conditions remain a concern. Public protest over issues like poverty, corruption, and unemployment can also sometimes turn violent. In 2020, police arrested several protesters engaged in burning tires and vandalizing property in protest of embezzlement at the Ministry of National Defense. Protests also followed the government’s announcement of social lockdown procedures in March 2020 to respond to COVID-19. Niger experiences security threats on three distinct border areas. Niger is a founding member of the G5 Sahel fighting terrorism in the Sahel while integrating the poverty reduction dimension to mitigate the effects of youth underemployment and violent extremism. The collapse of the Libyan state to the north has resulted in a flow of weapons and extremists throughout the Sahel region. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa terrorists regularly launch attacks in the Diffa Region in Niger’s southeast. Jama’at al Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), which is a loose affiliation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun; along with ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), threaten Niger’s northern and northwestern borders. Terrorists regularly crossed the Mali border to attack civilian and security sites in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions. Niger has a history of western residents and aid workers being kidnapped by terrorist groups or kidnapping for ransom gangs, as recently as October 2020. So far, more than 40 out of the 266 communes in Niger are in a state of emergency. The State Department’s Travel Advisory for Niger from April 2022 advises travels to be aware that violent crimes including robbery are common and terrorism is a threat. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Niger has an abundance of available labor, primarily unskilled. One of the most pressing concerns within the Ministry of Labor is the lack of jobs available to recent high school and university graduates, who often face long spells of unemployment or underemployment. There is very high unemployment among young workers, many of whom are uneducated and illiterate. Migration from the rural areas to the cities is a problem, as the majority of recently-arrived workers are unskilled. Such workers most often turn up in the informal economy. While informal activities are generally not reported, the World Bank estimates from 2021 stated that between 70 and 80 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is in the informal economy. Niger, as part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) must accept laborers from neighboring ECOWAS states. While such laborers do exist within the Nigerien economy, this phenomenon is not common enough to cause friction and/or widespread resentment among local laborers. The informal economy in Niger is vast and employs a majority of the nation’s population not involved in subsistence farming. In cities, most workers in the non-government sector are employed in an informal manner, including domestic services, markets and vending, and construction and maintenance. U.S. companies are encouraged to avoid informal employment arrangements as it presents a liability to Ministry of Labor inspectors. Given both the need for foreign direct investment and the abundance of available labor within the country, labor laws are mostly modified, rather than waived to accommodate foreign firms. Many large foreign firms, including Orano and CNPC, are allowed to bring workers into the country provided that Nigerien laborers make up a substantial percentage of the overall workforce. As a member of ECOWAS, Niger routinely accepts labor, as obligated, from other member states. According to Article 9 of Niger’s 2010 Labor Code, firms must hire Nigerien nationals via direct recruitment or through public or private hiring agencies. There are no restrictions on employers regarding hiring or laying off employees to respond to fluctuating market conditions. However, before making the decision, the employer must consult with the Inspector of Labor. An employee laid off for economic reasons receives, in addition to severance pay, a non-taxable allowance paid by the employer equal to one month’s gross salary. Given both the need for foreign direct investment and the abundance of available labor within the country, labor laws are mostly modified, rather than waived to accommodate foreign firms. Currently there are no special economic zones in Niger. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are generally respected and workers routinely exercise them. Unions have exercised the right to bargain collectively for wages above the legal minimum in the formal sectors and to improve working conditions. Niger’s labor code, adopted in September 2012, and its decree No. 2017-682/PRN/MET/PS of August 2017 regulates employment, vocational training, remuneration, collective bargaining, labor representation, and labor disputes. The code also establishes the Consultative Commission for Labor and Employment, the Labor Court and regulates the Technical Consultative Committee for Occupational Safety and Health. The Labor Code lays out clear procedures for dispute resolution mechanisms in its Title VII on labor disputes. Labor hearings are public except at the reconciliation stage. Although strikes are routine and common, most stem from non-payment of salaries and unsatisfactory working conditions existing within the public sector. Such strikes do not pose an investment risk. Although Niger has ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor and the ILO Convention 138 on the minimum age for employment, traditional caste-based servitude is still practiced in some parts of the country. In addition, child labor remains a problem particularly in the agricultural sector and the commercial and artisanal mining sectors. Gender discrimination is quite common within all workplaces. There were no labor related laws or regulation enacted during the last year. The Labor Code adopted in September 2012 and its decree No. 2017-682/PRN/MET/PS of August 2017 with the regulatory part of the Labor Code remains the most recent legislation related to labor. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $11,191 2020 $13,741 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 6,617 100% Total Outward N/A N/A France 2,836 42% China 2,678 40% Turkey 240 4% India 133 2% Algeria 113 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Andrew Caruso Economic Officer US Embassy, Niamey +227 99-49-90-40 CarusoAN@State.gov Boubacar Gaoh Mohamed Economic and Commercial Assistant BP 11201, Niamey, Niger +227-85948158 +227 99-49-90-76 BoubacarGaohM@State.gov Nigeria Executive Summary Nigeria’s economy – Africa’s largest – exited recession with a 3.4% GDP growth rate in 2021 following a contraction of 1.9% the previous year. The IMF forecasts growth rates of under 3% in 2022 and 2023 while the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics predicts a more robust 4.2% growth rate in 2022. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration has prioritized diversification of Nigeria’s economy beyond oil and gas, with the stated goals of building a competitive manufacturing sector, expanding agricultural output, and capitalizing on Nigeria’s technological and innovative advantages. With the largest population in Africa, Nigeria is an attractive consumer market for investors and traders, and offering abundant natural resources and a low-cost labor pool. The government has undertaken reforms to help improve the business environment, including by facilitating faster business start-up by allowing electronic stamping of registration documents and making it easier to obtain construction permits, register property, obtain credit, and pay taxes. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows nevertheless declined from roughly $1 billion in 2020 to $699 million in 2021 as persistent challenges remain. Corruption is a serious obstacle to Nigeria’s economic growth and is often cited by domestic and foreign investors as a significant barrier to doing business. Nigeria’s ranking in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index fell slightly from its 2020 score of 149 out of 175 countries to154 of 180 in 2021. Businesses report that corruption by customs and port officials often leads to extended delays in port clearance processes and to other issues importing goods. Nigeria’s trade regime is protectionist in key areas. High tariffs, restricted foreign exchange availability for 44 categories of imports, and prohibitions on many other import items have the aim of spurring domestic agricultural and manufacturing sector growth. The government provides tax incentives and customs duty exemptions for pioneer industries including renewable energy. A decline in oil exports, rising prices for imported goods, an overvalued currency, and Nigeria’s expensive fuel subsidy regime continued to exert pressure on the country’s foreign exchange reserves in 2021. Domestic and foreign businesses frequently cite lack of access to foreign currency as a significant impediment to doing business. Nigeria’s underdeveloped power sector is a bottleneck to broad-based economic development and forces most businesses to generate a significant portion of their own electricity. Reform of Nigeria’s power sector is ongoing, but investor confidence continues to be weakened by regulatory uncertainty and limited domestic natural gas supply. Security remains a concern to investors in Nigeria due to violent crime, kidnappings for ransom, and terrorism in certain parts of the country. The ongoing Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) insurgencies have included attacks against civilian and military targets in the northeast of the country. Nigeria has experienced a rise in kidnappings for ransom and attacks on villages by armed gangs in the North West and North Central regions. Criminal attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region that restricted oil production in 2016 have eased, but a significant rise in illegal bunkering and oil theft has left the sector in a similar state of decreased output. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 154 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 118 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $6,811 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,000 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act of 1995, amended in 2004, dismantled controls and limits on FDI, allowing for 100% foreign ownership in all sectors, except those prohibited by law for both local and foreign entities. These include arms and ammunitions, narcotics, and military apparel. In practice, however, some regulators include a domestic equity requirement before granting foreign firms an operational license. Nevertheless, foreign investors receive largely the same treatment as domestic investors in Nigeria, including tax incentives. The Act also created the NIPC with a mandate to encourage and assist investment in Nigeria. The NIPC features a One-Stop Investment Center (OSIC) that includes participation by 27 governmental and parastatal agencies to consolidate and streamline administrative procedures for new businesses and investments. The NIPC is empowered to negotiate special incentives for substantial and/or strategic investments. The Act also provides guarantees against nationalization and expropriation. The NIPC occasionally convenes meetings between investors and relevant government agencies with the objective of resolving specific investor complaints. The NIPC’s role and effectiveness is limited to that of convenor and moderator in these sessions as it has no authority over other government agencies to enforce compliance. The NIPC’s ability to attract new investment is thus limited due to its inability to resolve certain such investment challenges. The Nigerian government continues to promote import substitution policies such as trade restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions, and local content requirements in a bid to funnel investment toward domestic production capacity and to reduce Nigeria’s reliance on foreign imports. The import bans and high tariffs used to advance Nigeria’s import substitution goals have been undermined by smuggling of targeted products through the country’s porous borders, and by corruption in the import quota systems developed by the government to incentivize domestic investment. The government opened land borders in December 2020, which were progressively closed to commercial trade starting in August 2019 with the aim of curbing smuggling and bolstering domestic production. Investment by foreign and domestic private entities is prohibited in industries contained in the “negative list.” These include production of arms and ammunition, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and military and paramilitary wear and accoutrements. The Federal Executive Council maintains the right to amend the list as it deems fit. There are currently no limits on foreign control of investments; however, some Nigerian regulatory bodies have insisted on domestic equity as a prerequisite to doing business. The NIPC Act of 1995, amended in 2004, liberalized the ownership structure of business in Nigeria, allowing foreign investors to own and control 100% of the shares in any company. One hundred percent ownership of firms is allowed in the oil and gas sector while ownership of mineral resources is vested in the federal government. However, the dominant models for oil extraction are joint venture and production sharing agreements between oil companies (both foreign and local) and the federal government. Foreign investors must register with the NIPC after incorporation under the Companies and Allied Matters Act reviewed in 2020. A foreign company intending to operate in Nigeria must incorporate a company or subsidiary. It may apply for an exemption to this requirement if it meets certain conditions including working on a specialized project specifically for the government, or on a project funded by a multilateral or bilateral donor or a foreign state-owned enterprise. However, a foreign entity can invest in a Nigerian company without incorporation. Importers of foreign technology must obtain a certificate from the National Office of Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP). One of the prerequisites for obtaining the certificate is the provision of a Technology Transfer Agreement duly approved by NOTAP. The NIPC Act prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of foreign enterprises except in cases of national interest and stipulates modalities for “fair and adequate” compensation should that occur. The World Bank published an Investment Policy and Regulatory Review of Nigeria in 2019. It provides an overview of Nigeria’s legal and regulatory framework as it affects FDI, foreign investors, and businesses at large and is available at https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/305141586325201141/nigeria-2019-investment-policy-and-regulatory-review. The WTO published a trade policy review of Nigeria in 2017, which also includes a brief overview and assessment of Nigeria’s investment climate. That review is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp456_e.htm. The government established the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) in 2016 with the objective of removing constraints to starting and running a business in Nigeria. PEBEC’s implementation was supported by Presidential Executive Orders aimed at improving business transparency and efficiency. PEBEC’s focus areas include: starting a business, cross-border and domestic movement of people and goods, obtaining credit and resolving insolvency, enforcing contracts, registering property, acquiring construction permits and electricity, and paying taxes. PEBEC’s significant achievements were in the areas of starting a business, acquiring construction permits and electricity, registering property, and enforcing contracts. Despite these improvements, Nigeria remains a difficult place to do business, with companies suffering from regulatory uncertainty, policy inconsistency, poor infrastructure, foreign exchange shortages and customs inconsistency and inefficiency. These many challenges are reflected in the fact that Nigeria’s leading trade indices lag behind regional averages. The One-Stop Investment Center (OSIC), housed within the NIPC, co-locates 27 relevant government agencies including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and the Immigration Service to provide fast-tracked, efficient, and transparent services to investors. The OSIC assists with visas for investors, company incorporation, business permits and registration, tax registration, immigration, and customs issues. Investors may pick up documents and approvals that are statutorily required to establish an investment project in Nigeria. In 2021, NIPC launched the electronic OSIC which allows investors to register businesses, submit documents, and pay fees remotely on its Single Window Investors’ Portal (SWIP). All businesses, both foreign and local, are required to register with CAC before commencing operations. CAC began online registration as part of PEBEC reforms. Online registration is straightforward and consists of three major steps: name search, reservation of business name, and registration. A registration guideline is available on the website as is a post-registration portal for enacting changes to company details. The CAC online registration website is https://pre.cac.gov.ng/home. The registration requires the signature of a Legal Practitioner and attestation by a Notary Public or Commissioner for Oaths. Business registration can be completed online but the certificate of incorporation is usually collected at a CAC office upon presentation of the original application and supporting documents. Online registration can be completed in as little as three days if there are no issues with the application. On average, a limited liability company (LLC) in Nigeria can be established in seven days. This average is significantly faster than the 22-day average for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also faster than the OECD average of nine days. Timing may vary in different parts of the country. Companies must register with the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) for tax payments purposes. If the company operates in a state other than the Federal Capital Territory, it must also register with the relevant state tax authority. CAC issues a Tax Identification Number (TIN) to all businesses on completion of registration which must be validated on the FIRS website https://apps.firs.gov.ng/tinverification/ and subsequently used to register to pay taxes. The FIRS then assigns a tax office with which the business will engage for tax payments purposes. Some taxes may also be filed and paid online on the FIRS website. Foreign companies are also required to register with NIPC which maintains a database of all foreign companies operating in Nigeria. Investors can register online through NIPC’s SWIP platform: https://swip.nipc.gov.ng/auth.php?a=r. Companies which import capital must do so through an authorized dealer, typically a bank, after which they are issued a Certificate of Capital Importation. This certificate entitles the foreign investor to open a bank account in foreign currency and provides access to foreign exchange for repatriation, imports, and other purposes. A company engaging in international trade must get an import-export license from the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). Businesses may also be required to register with and/or obtain licenses from other regulatory agencies which supervise the sector within which they operate. Nigeria does not promote outward direct investments. Instead, it focuses on promoting exports especially as a means of reducing its reliance on oil exports and diversifying the sources of its foreign exchange earnings. The Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) administered a revised Export Expansion Grant (EEG) in 2018 when the federal government set aside 5.1 billion naira ($13 million) in the 2019 budget for the EEG scheme. The Nigerian Export-Import (NEXIM) Bank provides commercial bank guarantees and direct lending to facilitate export sector growth, although these services are underused. NEXIM’s Foreign Input Facility provides normal commercial terms of three to five years (or longer) for the importation of machinery and raw materials used for generating exports. Agencies created to promote industrial exports remain burdened by uneven management, vaguely defined policy guidelines, and corruption. Nigeria’s inadequate power supply and lack of infrastructure, coupled with the associated high production costs, leave Nigerian exporters at a significant disadvantage. Many Nigerian businesses fail to export because they find meeting international packaging and safety standards is too difficult or expensive. Similarly, firms often are unable to meet consumer demand for a consistent supply of high-quality goods in sufficient quantities to support exports and meet demand. Most Nigerian manufacturers remain unable to or uninterested in competing in the international market, given the size of Nigeria’s domestic market. Domestic firms are not restricted from investing abroad. However, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN mandates that export earnings be repatriated to Nigeria, and controls access to the foreign exchange required for such investments. Noncompliance with the directive carries sanctions including expulsion from accessing financial services and the foreign exchange market. Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in April 2020 prohibited investment and trading platforms from facilitating Nigerians’ purchase of foreign securities listed on other stock exchanges. SEC cites Nigeria’s Investment and Securities Act of 2007, which mandates that only foreign securities listed on a Nigerian exchange should be sold to the Nigerian investing public. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Nigeria belongs to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a free trade area comprising 15 countries located in West Africa. Nigeria signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) – a free trade agreement consisting of 54 African countries, which became operational on January 1, 2021 – but its legislature has yet to ratify it and implementation of the agreement remains nascent. Nigeria has bilateral investment agreements with: Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Uganda, and the United Kingdom. Fifteen of these treaties (those with China, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom) have been ratified by both parties. The government signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States in 2000. U.S. and Nigerian officials held their latest round of TIFA talks in 2016. In 2017, Nigeria and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to formally establish the U.S.–Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID). The ministerial-level meeting with private sector representatives was last held in February 2020. The CID coordinates bilateral private sector-to-private sector, government-to-government, and private sector-to-government discussions on policy and regulatory reforms to promote increased, diverse, and sustained trade and investment between the United States and Nigeria, with an initial focus on infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, investment, and regulatory reform. Nigeria has 14 ratified double taxation agreements, including: Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Nigeria does not have such an agreement with the United States. Nigeria’s Finance Act of 2021 empowered the FIRS to collect corporate taxes from digital firms at a “fair and reasonable turnover” rate, which translates to 6% of turnover generated in Nigeria. This will address the profit attribution issues raised following the ambiguity of the Finance Act of 2019 which subjected non-resident companies with significant economic presence to corporate and sales taxes. Most of the affected companies are digital firms, many with U.S. headquarters. Nigeria enacted the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) which overhauled the institutional, regulatory, administrative, and fiscal arrangements for the oil and gas industry. While the legislation provides long-awaited additional clarity and updates Nigeria’s governance structures and fiscal terms for the traditional energy sector, U.S. oil companies contend that it has not increased Nigeria’s competitiveness relative to other oil producing countries and may fail to attract significant new investments in the sector. Nigeria is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing but declined to sign the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges in October 2021. 3. Legal Regime Nigeria’s legal, accounting, and regulatory systems comply with international norms, but application and enforcement remain uneven. Opportunities for public comment and input into proposed regulations rarely occur. Professional organizations set standards for the provision of professional services, such as accounting, law, medicine, engineering, and advertising. These standards usually comply with international norms. No legal barriers prevent entry into these sectors. Ministries and regulatory agencies are meant to develop and make public anticipated regulatory changes or proposals and publish proposed regulations before their application. The general public should have the opportunity to comment through targeted outreach, including business groups and stakeholders, and during the public hearing process before a bill becomes law, but this is not always the case. There is no specialized agency tasked with publicizing proposed changes and the time period for comment may vary. Ministries and agencies do conduct impact assessments, including environmental, but assessment methodologies may vary. The National Bureau of Statistics reviews regulatory impact assessments conducted by other agencies. Laws and regulations are publicly available. Fiscal management occurs at all three tiers of government: federal, 36 state governments and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, and 774 local government areas (LGAs). Revenues from oil and non-oil sources are collected into the federation account and then shared among the different tiers of government by the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) in line with a statutory sharing formula. All state governments can collect internally generated revenues, which vary from state to state. The fiscal federalism structure does not compel states to be accountable to the federal government or transparent about revenues generated or received from the federation account. However, the federal government can demand states meet predefined minimum fiscal transparency requirements as prerequisites for obtaining federal loans. For instance, compliance with the 22-point Fiscal Sustainability Plan, which focused on ensuring better state financial performance, more sustainable debt management, and improved accountability and transparency, was a prerequisite for obtaining a federal government bailout in 2016. The federal government’s finances are more transparent as budgets are made public and the financial data are published by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Debt Management Office (DMO), the Budget Office of the Federation, and the National Bureau of Statistics. The state-owned oil company (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)) began publishing audited financial data in 2020. Foreign companies operate successfully in Nigeria’s service sectors, including telecommunications, accounting, insurance, banking, and advertising. The Investment and Securities Act of 2007 forbids monopolies, insider trading, and unfair practices in securities dealings. Nigeria is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Nigeria generally regulates investment in line with the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, but the government’s local content requirements in the oil and gas sector and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector may conflict with Nigeria’s commitments under TRIMS. ECOWAS implemented a Common External Tariff (CET) beginning in 2015 with a five-year phase in period. An internal CET implementation committee headed by the Fiscal Policy/Budget Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) was set up to develop the implementation work plans that were consistent with national and ECOWAS regulations. The CET was slated to be fully harmonized by 2020, but in practice some ECOWAS Member States have maintained deviations from the CET beyond the January 1, 2020, deadline. The country has put in place a CET monitoring committee domiciled at the Ministry of Finance, consisting of several ministries, departments, and agencies related to the CET. The country applies five tariff bands under the CET: zero duty on capital goods, machinery, and essential drugs not produced locally; 5% duty on imported raw materials; 10% duty on intermediate goods; 20% duty on finished goods; and 35% duty on goods in certain sectors that the Nigerian government seeks to protect including palm oil, meat products, dairy, and poultry. The CET permits ECOWAS member governments to calculate import duties higher than the maximum allowed in the tariff bands (but not to exceed a total effective duty of 70%) for up to 3% of the 5,899 tariff lines included in the ECOWAS CET. Nigeria has a complex, three-tiered legal system comprised of English common law, Islamic law, and Nigerian customary law. Most business transactions are governed by common law modified by statutes to meet local demands and conditions. The Supreme Court is the pinnacle of the judicial system and has original and appellate jurisdiction in specific constitutional, civil, and criminal matters as prescribed by Nigeria’s constitution. The Federal High Court has jurisdiction over revenue matters, admiralty law, banking, foreign exchange, other currency and monetary or fiscal matters, and lawsuits to which the federal government or any of its agencies are party. The Nigerian court system is generally slow and inefficient, lacks adequate court facilities and computerized document-processing systems, and poorly remunerates judges and other court officials, all of which encourages corruption and undermines enforcement. Judges frequently fail to appear for trials and court officials lack proper equipment and training. The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary; however, the judicial branch remains susceptible to pressure from the executive and legislative branches. Political leaders have influenced the judiciary, particularly at the state and local levels. The Doing Business report credited business reforms for improving contract enforcement by issuing new rules of civil procedure for small claims courts, which limit adjournments to unforeseen and exceptional circumstances but noted that there can be variation in performance indicators between cities in Nigeria (as in other developing countries). For example, resolving a commercial dispute takes 476 days in Kano but 376 days in Lagos. In the case of Lagos, the 376 days includes 40 days for filing and service, 194 days for trial and judgment, and 142 days for enforcement of the judgment with total costs averaging 42% of the claim. In Kano, however, filing and service only takes 21 days with enforcement of judgement only taking 90 days, but trial and judgment accounts for 365 days with total costs averaging lower at 28% of the claim. In comparison, in OECD countries the corresponding figures are an average of 589.6 days and averaging 21.5% of the claim and in sub-Saharan countries an average of 654.9 days and averaging 41.6% of the claim. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act allows 100 percent foreign ownership of firms. Foreign investors must register with the NIPC after incorporation under the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2020. The NIPC Act prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of foreign enterprises except in case of national interest, but the Embassy is unaware of specific instances of such interference by the government. The NIPC website (nipc.gov.ng) provides information on investing in Nigeria, and its One-Stop Investment Center co-locates 27 government agencies with equities in the foreign company registration process. The Nigerian government enacted the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection (FCCPC) Act in 2019. The Act repealed the Consumer Protection Act of 2004 and replaced the previous Consumer Protection Council with a Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission while also creating a Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal to handle issues and disputes arising from the operations of the Act. Under the terms of the Act, businesses will be able to lodge anti-competitive practices complaints against other firms in the Tribunal. The Act prohibits agreements made to restrain competition, such as price fixing, price rigging, collusive tendering, etc. (with specific exemptions for collective bargaining agreements and employment, among other items). The Act empowers the President of Nigeria to regulate prices of certain goods and services on the recommendation of the Commission. The law prescribes stringent fines for non-compliance. The law mandates a fine of up to 10% of the company’s annual turnover in the preceding business year for offences. The law harmonizes oversight for consumer protection, consolidating it under the FCCPC. An entity may seek redress from a court of law if it is not satisfied with the ruling of the FCCPC. The federal government has not expropriated or nationalized foreign assets recently, and the NIPC Act forbids nationalization of a business or assets unless the acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose. In such cases, investors are entitled to fair compensation and legal redress. The federal government’s drive to domesticate foreign investments has led to a number of seemingly discriminatory actions against a prominent South African firm. Nigeria’s attorney general demanded the payment of $2 billion which he alleged the company owed in taxes over ten years, a suit which was later dropped in 2020 in favor of negotiations with the FIRS. In 2018, the company paid $53 million to settle a CBN case in which it was accused of illegally repatriating $8.1 billion. Another South African company is involved in a $4.7 billion tax dispute with the FIRS. Reflecting Nigeria’s business culture, entrepreneurs generally do not seek bankruptcy protection. Claims often go unpaid, even in cases where creditors obtain judgments against defendants. Under Nigerian law, the term bankruptcy generally refers to individuals whereas corporate bankruptcy is referred to as insolvency. The former is regulated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1990, as amended by Bankruptcy Decree 109 of 1992. The latter is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) revised in 2020. Insolvency solutions in CAMA 2020 focus on rescuing insolvent corporates, where debt recovery options are feasible, instead of the former objective which focused largely on the wind-up process. Once determined insolvent, company shareholders are allowed to enter into a binding agreement with creditors or apply to a court to appoint an administrator thereby obviating the need for claims by creditors. The debt threshold required for triggering compulsory liquidation is 200,000 naira ($480). The Act also ranks the claims of secured creditors above all other claims and forbids shareholders or administrators from favoring a creditor above another within the same creditor class. The Embassy is not aware of U.S. companies that have had to avail themselves of the insolvency provisions under Nigerian law. 4. Industrial Policies The Nigerian government maintains different and overlapping incentive programs. The Industrial Development/Income Tax Relief Act provides incentives to pioneer industries deemed beneficial to Nigeria’s economic development and to labor-intensive industries, such as apparel. There are currently 99 industries and products that qualify for the pioneer status incentive through the NIPC, following the addition of 27 industries and products to the list in 2017. The government has added a stipulation calling for a review of the qualifying industries and products to occur every two years. Companies that receive pioneer status may benefit from a tax holiday from payment of company income tax for an initial period of three years, extendable for one or two additional years. A pioneer industry sited in an economically disadvantaged area is entitled to a 100% tax holiday for seven years and an additional 5% depreciation allowance over and above the initial capital depreciation allowance. Additional tax incentives are available for investments in domestic research and development, for companies that invest in local government areas deemed disadvantaged, for local value-added processing, for investments in solid minerals and oil and gas, and for several other investment scenarios. The NIPC in conjunction with FIRS published a compendium of investment which houses all fiscal incentives backed by Nigerian law as well as sectoral fiscal concessions approved by the government. The compendium is available at https://www.nipc.gov.ng/compendium/preface/. The Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) administers an Export Expansion Grant (EEG) scheme to improve non-oil export performance. The program was suspended in 2014 due to concerns about corruption on the part of companies that collected grants but did not actually export. It was revised and relaunched in 2018. The NEXIM Bank provides commercial bank guarantees and direct lending to facilitate export sector growth, although these services are underused. NEXIM’s Foreign Input Facility provides normal commercial terms for the importation of machinery and raw materials used for generating exports. Repayment terms are typically up to seven years, including a moratorium period of up to two years depending on the loan amount and the project being finance. Agencies created to promote industrial exports remain burdened by uneven management, vaguely defined policy guidelines, and corruption. The NIPC states that up to 120% of expenses on research and development (R&D) are tax deductible, provided that such R&D activities are carried out in Nigeria and relate to the business from which income or profits are derived. Also, for the purpose of R&D on local raw materials, 140% of expenses are allowed. Long-term research will be regarded as a capital expenditure and written off against profit. The government similarly offers incentives for the importation of equipment, parts, and machinery used in renewable energy generation, transmission, and/or storage. Solar cells in modules or panels attract zero import duty and are exempt from paying value added tax (VAT). Solar-powered coolers, solar-powered generators, wind-powered generators, battery-manufacturing inputs, and nuclear reactors are subject to a relatively low duty rate of 5% and are exempt from paying VAT. The Nigerian Export Processing Zone Authority (NEPZA) allows duty-free import of all equipment and raw materials into its export processing zones. Up to 100% of production in an export processing zone may be sold domestically based on valid permits and upon payment of applicable duties. Investors in the zones are exempt from foreign exchange regulations and taxes and may freely repatriate capital. Foreign investors still face challenges with unreliable implementation of the regulations applied to export processing zones and are sometimes asked to pay import duties or restricted from accessing foreign exchange. The Nigerian government also encourages private sector participation and partnership with state and local governments under the free trade zones (FTZ) program. There are three types of FTZs in Nigeria: federal or state government-owned, private sector-owned, and public-private partnerships. NEPZA regulates Nigeria’s FTZs regardless of the ownership structure. Workers in FTZs may unionize but may not strike for an initial ten-year period. Nigeria ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and the Agreement entered into force in 2017. Nigeria already implements items in Category A under the TFA and has identified, but not yet implemented, its Category B and C commitments. In 2016, Nigeria requested additional technical assistance to implement and enforce its Category C commitments. (See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm) Foreign investors must register with the NIPC, incorporate as a limited liability company (private or public) with the CAC, procure appropriate business permits, and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (when applicable) to conduct business in Nigeria. Manufacturing companies sometimes must meet local content requirements. Long-term expatriate personnel do not require work permits but are subject to needs quotas requiring them to obtain residence permits that allow salary remittances abroad. Expatriates looking to work in Nigeria on a short-term basis can either request a temporary work permit, which is usually granted for a two-month period and extendable to six months, or a business visa, if only traveling to Nigeria for the purpose of meetings, conferences, seminars, trainings, or other brief business activities. Authorities permit larger quotas for professions deemed in short supply, such as deep-water oilfield divers. U.S. companies often report problems in obtaining quota permits. The Nigerian government’s Immigration Regulations 2017 introduced additional means by which foreigners can obtain residence in Nigeria. Foreign nationals who have imported an annual minimum threshold of capital over a certain period may be issued a permanent residence permit if the investment is not withdrawn. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act of 2010 restricts the number of expatriate managers to 5% of the total number of personnel for companies in the oil and gas sector. The National Office of Industrial Property Act of 1979 established the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) to regulate the international acquisition of technology while creating an environment conducive to developing local technology. NOTAP recommends local technical partners to Nigerian users in a bid to reduce the level of imported technology, which currently accounts for over 90% of technology in use in Nigeria. NOTAP reviews the Technology Transfer Agreements (TTAs) required to import technology into Nigeria and for companies operating in Nigeria to access foreign currency. NOTAP reviews three major aspects prior to approval of TTAs and subsequent issuance of a certificate: Legal – ensuring that the clauses in the agreement are in accordance with Nigerian laws and legal frameworks within which NOTAP operates; Economic – ensuring prices are fair for the technology offered; and Technical – ensuring transfer of technical knowledge. U.S. firms complain that the TTA approval process is lengthy and can routinely take three months or more. NOTAP took steps to automate the TTA process to reduce processing time to one month or less; however, from the date of filing the application to the issuance of confirmation of reasonableness, TTA processing still requires 60 business days. https://notap.gov.ng/new_dev/register-a-technology-transfer-agreement/ The Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act of 2010 contains certain technology-transfer requirements that may violate a company’s intellectual property rights. In 2013, the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), under the auspices of the Ministry of Communication, issued the Guidelines for Nigerian Content Development in the ICT sector. NITDA re-issued an updated version of the Guidelines in 2019. The Guidelines require telecommunications companies to ensure that at least 80% of network infrastructure value and volume be locally sourced, use indigenous companies to build network infrastructure, and use locally developed or manufactured software components. The Guidelines also require multinational ICT equipment manufacturers operating in Nigeria to provide a detailed local content development plan for the creation of jobs, recruitment of Nigerians, human capital development, use of indigenous ICT products and services for value creation; all government agencies to procure at least 40% computer hardware and associated devices from NITDA-approved original equipment manufacturers; and ICT companies to host all consumer and subscriber data locally. Enforcement of the Guidelines is largely inconsistent. The government generally lacks capacity and resources to monitor labor practices, technology compliancy, and digital data flows. There are reports that individual Nigerian companies periodically lobby the National Assembly and/or NITDA to address allegations (warranted or not) against foreign firms that they are in non-compliance with the guidelines. The goal of the Guidelines is to promote development of domestic production of ICT products and services for the Nigerian and global markets, but some assessments indicate they pose risks to foreign investment and U.S. companies by interrupting their global supply chain, increasing costs, disrupting global flow of data, and stifling innovative products and services. Industry representatives remain concerned about whether the guidelines would be implemented in a fair and transparent way toward all Nigerian and foreign companies. All ICT companies, including Nigerian companies, use foreign manufactured equipment as Nigeria does not have the capacity to supply ICT hardware that meets international standards. The Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) and the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) exercise exclusive jurisdiction over customs services and port operations respectively. Nigerian law allows importers to clear goods on their own, but most importers employ clearing and forwarding agents to minimize tariffs and lower landed costs. The Nigerian government closed land borders to trade in August 2019, purportedly to stem the tide of smuggled goods entering from neighboring countries. Nigeria reopened land borders to trade in December 2020, but it continues to restrict the import of items such as rice and vehicles through its land borders. The NCS maintains a wider import prohibition list available at https://customs.gov.ng/?page_id=3075, while the CBN continues to restrict access to foreign exchange for the importation of 44 classes of goods. The initial list that contained 41 items (https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2015/ted/ted.fem.fpc.gen.01.011.pdf ) has since been expanded to include fertilizer, maize, dairy products, and sugar (except for three companies that the CBN exempts from the lack of access to foreign exchange for sugar imports) with the CBN adding items in an ongoing basis as part of its “backward integration” strategy. The Nigerian government implements a destination inspection scheme whereby all inspections occur upon arrival into Nigeria, rather than at the ports of origin. In 2013, the NCS regained the authority to conduct destination inspections, which had previously been contracted to private companies. NCS also introduced the Nigeria Integrated Customs Information System (NICIS) platform and an online system for filing customs documentation via a Pre-Arrival Assessment Report (PAAR) process. The NCS still carries out 100% cargo examinations, and shipments take more (sometimes significantly more) than 20 days to clear through the process. In addition to creating significant delays and additional fees for security and storage for items awaiting customs clearance, NCS’s continued reliance on largely manual customs processes creates opportunities for significant variation, individual discretion, and corruption in the application of customs regulations. At the time of this report, a growing number of companies were engaged in disputes with the customs agency due to NCS arbitrarily reclassifying their imports into new classification categories with higher import tariffs. Shippers report that efforts to modernize and professionalize the NCS and the NPA have largely been unsuccessful – port congestion persists and clearance times are long. A presidential directive in 2017 for the Apapa Port, which handles over 40% of Nigeria’s legal trade, to run a 24-hour operation and achieve 48-hour cargo clearance has not met its stated goals. The port is congested, inefficient and the proliferation of customs units incentivizes corruption from official and unofficial middlemen who complicate and extend the clearance process. Delays for goods entering the country via the Apapa Port were exacerbated under COVID; U.S. companies have reported wait times to berth ships at the port of up to 90 days. Freight forwarders usually resort to bribery of customs agents and port officials to avoid long delays clearing imported goods through the NPA and NCS. The NPA set up an Electronic Truck Call-up System in January 2021 to increase efficiency in the management of cargo movement across the Apapa Port. However, the impact made by this initiative remains to be felt. Other ports face logistical and security challenges leaving most operating well below capacity. Nigeria does not currently have a true deep-sea port although one is under construction near Lagos and expected to be operational by 2023. Investors sometimes encounter difficulties acquiring entry visas and residency permits. Foreigners must obtain entry visas from Nigerian embassies or consulates abroad, seek expatriate position authorization from the NIPC, and request residency permits from the Nigerian Immigration Service. In 2018, Nigeria instituted a visa-on-arrival system, which works relatively well but still requires lengthy processing at an embassy or consulate abroad before an authorization is issued. Some U.S. businesses have reported being solicited for bribes in the visa-on-arrival program. The visa-on-arrival system is not an option for employment or residence. Investors report that the residency permit process is cumbersome and can take from two to 24 months and cost $1,000 to $3,000 in facilitation fees. The Nigerian government announced a visa rule in 2011 to encourage foreign investment, under which legitimate investors can obtain multiple-entry visas at points of entry. Obtaining a visa prior to traveling to Nigeria is strongly encouraged. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Nigerian government recognizes secured interests in property, such as mortgages. The recording of security instruments and their enforcement remain subject to the same inefficiencies as those in the judicial system. In the World Bank Doing Business 2020 Report, Nigeria ranked 183 out of the 190 countries surveyed for registering property, a decline of one point over its 2019 ranking. Property registration in Lagos required an average of 12 steps over 105 days at a cost of 11.1% of the property value while in Kano registering property averages 11 steps over 47 days at a cost of 11.8% of the property value. Owners transfer most property through long-term leases, with certificates of occupancy acting as title deeds. Property transfers are complex and must usually go through state governors’ offices, or the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory for lands located in the federal capital, as state governments have jurisdiction over land ownership. Authorities have often compelled owners to demolish buildings deemed to be in contravention of building codes or urban masterplans, including government buildings, commercial buildings, residences, and churches, even in the face of court injunctions. Acquiring and maintaining rights to real property can be problematic. Clarity of title and registration of land ownership remain significant challenges throughout rural Nigeria, where many smallholder farmers have only ancestral or traditional use claims to their land. Nigeria’s land reforms have attempted to address this barrier to development but with limited success. Proof of ownership in the absence of land titles may be established through traditional history of ownership, proving possession over a sufficient length of time, and showing sustained enjoyment of the land. The government may acquire land for an overriding public purpose which may be excised to an individual or entity if the land has not been committed. Enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Nigeria faces challenges in three areas: (1) limited capacity within the judicial and law enforcement systems, (2) weak regulatory and statutory regimes, (3) and poor funding and resource allocation. Nigeria’s legal and institutional infrastructure for protecting IPR remains in need of further development, even though laws on the books can enforce most IPR. The areas in which the legislation is deficient include online piracy, geographical indications, and animal breeders’ rights. In 2021, Nigeria enacted a new law giving plant breeders IPR over new and improved seeds for increased crop production. Draft copyright bills, one sponsored by a Senator and the other approved by the Federal Executive Council, were harmonized into one earlier this year. The harmonized bill defines technological protection measures (known as TPMs), remuneration rights, and broadcasting. It also provides anti-piracy penalties and prohibits the circumvention of TPMs as well as the falsification, alteration, or removal of electronic rights management information (RMI). The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) has long noted that the Copyright Act should be amended to provide stiffer penalties for violators. Statutory penalties for copyright offenses remain relatively low and rights-holders note that offenses are typically met with non-deterrent, modest fines. The harmonized bill proposes stricter penalties for IPR infractions. However, a firm timeline for passage of a new copyright law remains elusive. Existing copyright protection in Nigeria is governed by the Copyright Act Chapter C28, Laws of the Federation 2004, which provides an adequate basis for enforcing copyright and combating piracy. The Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC), an agency supervised by the Ministry of Justice, administers the Act. Nigeria is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and in 2017 it ratified two WIPO treaties that it signed in 1997: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), as well as the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, and the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for persons who are Blind, Visually impaired persons, or otherwise Print disabled. These treaties address important digital communication, broadcast, and online infringement issues that have become increasingly relevant in the globalized economy. The pending Copyright Bill of 2021 would domesticate the ratified treaties. The NCC has primary responsibility for copyright enforcement but is understaffed and underfunded relative to the magnitude of the copyright challenges in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the NCC continues to carry out enforcement actions on a regular basis. Violations of IPRs continue to be widespread. Anti-counterfeiting groups such as the IACC report that the Nigerian police work to combat counterfeiting and readily engage with trademark owners but lacks the capacity to fully enforce these laws. Authorized penalties for counterfeiting and trademark infringements remain relatively low and rightsholders note that offenses are typically met with non-deterrent, modest fines. A Senator has introduced legislation, the Trademarks Bill 2019, which remains pending and may address some of these issues. Depending on the scale and type of counterfeiting involved, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) would be responsible for enforcing counterfeiting and trademark infringement offenses. The Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) has general authority to seize and destroy contraband. If NCS suspects unauthorized importation of copyright protected works, it will require the presumed copyright owner to issue a notice for NCS to treat such works as infringing. The implementing procedures for this practice have not been developed as it is handled on a case-by-case basis between the NCS and the NCC. Once seizures are made, the NCS invites the NCC to inspect and subsequently take delivery of the consignment of fake goods for purposes of further investigation because the NCC has the statutory responsibility to investigate and prosecute copyright violations. The NCC bears the costs of moving and storing infringing goods. If, after investigations, any persons are identified with the infringing materials, a decision to prosecute may be made. Where no persons are identified or could be traced, the NCC may obtain an order of court to enable it to destroy such works. The NCC works in cooperation with rights owners’ associations and stakeholders in the copyright industries on such matters. Similarly, NAFDAC and FCCPC work in cooperation with rights owners’ associations and stakeholders in the counterfeiting and trademark industries. Nigeria is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the WIPO country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The NIPC Act of 1995, amended in 2004, liberalized Nigeria’s foreign investment regime, which has facilitated access to credit from domestic financial institutions. The government, and the CBN in particular, has sought to diversify foreign exchange inflows by encouraging foreign portfolio investments (FPI). High returns on the CBN’s open market operation (OMO) bills as well as the exclusion of certain classes of domestic investors from the market yielded high levels of FPI. However, a tightening of monetary policy, foreign exchange shortages, revised CBN guidelines on OMO bills, and capital restrictions amidst COVID-19 disruptions have led to a decline in FPI. CBN officials indicate that OMO offerings to foreigners will be phased out – a departure from its strategy of attracting hard currency investments to shore up foreign exchange supply – once current obligations have been redeemed due to the large interest repayment burden placed on the CBN. Foreign investors who have incorporated their companies in Nigeria have equal access to all financial instruments. Some investors consider the capital market, specifically the Nigerian Exchange Group (NXG), a financing option, given commercial banks’ high interest rates and the short maturities of local debt instruments. Financial institutions provide credit on market terms, but rates are relatively high due to high inflation and a high benchmark interest rate. The NXG completed a demutualization process in 2021 which transformed the company, previously privately held and called the Nigerian Stock Exchange, to a public company limited by shares. The NXG all-share index closed 2021 with over 42,000 points, a 4% increase from the end of 2020. As of December 2021, the NXG had 157 listed companies with an equity market capitalization of 22.3 trillion naira ($53.5 billion), an increase of 6% from 2020. The share of foreign investment in equity trading declined to 22% in 2021 from 35% in 2020 and over 50% in 2018. This decline is indicative of foreign investors’ diminishing appetite for Nigerian securities especially as repatriation concerns continue to mount. The NXG sovereign bond index declined year-on-year by 14% in 2021. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the government agency tasked with regulating and developing the capital market. SEC creates operational guidelines and licenses securities and market intermediaries. The Nigerian government has considered requiring companies in certain sectors such as telecoms, oil, and gas, or over a certain size to list on the NXG as a means to encourage greater corporate participation and sectoral balance in the Nigerian stock exchange, but those proposals have not been enacted. The government employs debt instruments, issuing treasury bills of one year or less, and bonds of various maturities ranging from two to 30 years. Nigeria is increasingly relying on the bond market to finance its widening deficit, especially as domestic bond rates fell well below Nigeria’s Eurobond rates in 2021. In addition, Nigeria continues its reluctance or refusal to accept certain conditionalities attached to multilateral borrowing, and has increasingly forgone World Bank and Africa Development Bank loans that have required it to free the exchange rate, eliminate subsidies, create an agricultural exchange, easing trade restrictions, amont other macro/fiscal reforms. The government’s preferred option in recent times has been the capital market, foreign or domestic. It has also made increased use of Export–Import Bank of China loans, as these conditions are not as rigorous as is the case with multilateral institutions. Domestic borrowing accounted for 76% of new government borrowings in the first eleven months of 2021. Some state governments have issued bonds to finance development projects, while some domestic banks have used the bond market to raise additional capital. Nigeria’s SEC has issued stringent guidelines for states wishing to raise funds on capital markets, such as requiring credit assessments conducted by recognized credit rating agencies. The CBN is the apex monetary authority of Nigeria; it was established by the CBN Act of 1958 and commenced operations on July 1, 1959. It has oversight of all banks and other financial institutions and is designed to be operationally independent of political interference although the CBN governor is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The amended CBN Act of 2007 mandates the CBN to have the overall control and administration of the monetary and financial sector policies of the government. The new Banking and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) of 2020 broadens CBN’s regulatory oversight function to include financial technology companies as it prohibits the operations of unlicensed financial institutions. The revised BOFIA also grants partial immunity to the CBN and its officials from judicial intervention on actions arising from activities undertaken to implement the Act. Furthermore, the Act forbids restorative orders and limits remedies sought against the CBN where it has revoked a license to monetary compensation. Foreign banks and investors are allowed to establish banking business in Nigeria provided they meet the current minimum capital requirement of 25 billion naira ($60 million) and other applicable regulatory requirements for banking license as prescribed by the CBN. The CBN regulations for foreign banks regarding mergers with or acquisitions of existing local banks in the country stipulate that the foreign institutions’ aggregate investment must not be more than 10% of the latter’s total capital. Any foreign-owned bank in Nigeria that wishes to acquire or merge with a local bank must have operated in Nigeria for a minimum of five years. To qualify for merger or acquisition of any of Nigeria’s local banks, the foreign bank must have achieved a penetration of two-thirds of the states of the federation, that is, to have branches in at least 24 out of the 36 states in Nigeria. The CBN also stipulates that the foreign bank or investors’ shareholding arising from the merger or acquisition should not exceed 40% of the total capital of the resultant entity. The CBN currently licenses 24 deposit-taking commercial banks in Nigeria. Following a 2009 banking crisis, CBN officials intervened in eight commercial banks and worked to stabilize the sector through reforms, including the adoption of uniform year-end International Financial Reporting Standards to increase transparency, a stronger emphasis on risk management and corporate governance, and the nationalization of three distressed banks. The CBN has since intervened in the sector using bridge banks and capital injections to avoid bank failures. The CBN has licensed three non-interest banks since it released operational guidelines in 2011. There are six licensed merchant banks which provide asset management and capital market activities, the latter through a subsidiary registered by SEC, and 882 microfinance banks licensed by the CBN to provide services largely to those not served by conventional banks. The CBN reiterated its commitment to increasing the level of financial inclusion in the country from 60% in 2020 to 95% by 2024. The CBN plans to achieve this goal by leveraging technology and relaxing its criteria for financial services market entry. Most notably, telecom companies previously excluded from providing financial services are now eligible for payment service banking and digital financial services licenses. The CBN also licenses agents to provide financial services on behalf of commercial banks and other licensed financial services providers in underserved areas. According to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey for 2021, there were 5,158 bank branches in Nigeria in 2020 which amounted to 4.5 branches per 100,000 adults; the number of automated teller machines per 100,000 adults was to 16.1; there were 142 mobile money agents per thousand square kilometers; and the number of registered mobile money agents per thousand adults fell by more than half to 61. The banking sector remained resilient in 2021 despite the risks and challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The five largest banks recorded 3%, 9% and 6% increases in revenues, profits, and assets, respectively, in the first half of the year. The CBN reported that non-performing loans (NPLs) declined to 4.9% in December 2021, breaching the 5% prudential threshold for the first time in over a decade. This is a significant decline from 6.4% and 9.4% in June of 2020 and 2021, respectively. The steady fall in NPLs is attributable to the CBN’s post-COVID forbearance measures as well as increased banking sector recoveries, disposals, and write-offs. The industry average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 14.5% as of December 2021, compared to a minimum regulatory threshold of 10% for ordinary banks and 15% for domestically systemically important banks (D-SIBS) and banks with international authorization. According to the CBN’s 2019 Financial Stability Report, seven D-SIBs account for 64% of banking assets, 65% of industry deposits, and 66% of industry loans, hence their failure could disrupt the entire financial system and the country’s economy. D-SIBS usually record higher CARs while smaller banks pull down the industry average. D-SIBS recorded an average CAR of 19.8% compared to the then average of 15.2%. Weaker banks thereby pose a risk to Nigeria’s financial system stability. In its first monetary policy meeting of 2022, the CBN noted downside risks to the sector were associated with sluggish post-COVID growth and resolved to “closely monitor” and “swiftly respond to emerging challenges.” Total banking sector assets rose from 51 trillion naira ($122.3 billion) in 2020 to 59 trillion naira ($141.4 billion) while deposits increased to 38.4 trillion naira ($92 billion) in 2021. Nigeria’s five largest banks by assets, considered Tier 1 banks by the CBN, recorded combined total assets of 40 trillion naira ($96 billion) – about two-thirds of the industry total – in the first half of 2021. Access Bank leads the pack with 10.1 trillion naira ($24.2 billion) in assets, followed by Zenith Bank with 8.5 trillion naira (20.4 billion), UBA with 8.3 trillion naira ($20 billion), First Bank with 8 trillion naira ($19.2 billion), and GTB with 5 trillion naira ($12 billion). The CBN has continued its system of liquidity management using unorthodox monetary policies. The measures included an increase in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) to 27.5% – among the highest globally – to absorb the excess liquidity within the system which was a direct consequence of the lack of investment opportunities. The CBN arbitrarily debited banks for carrying excess loanable deposits on their books resulting in the effective CRR for some banks rising as high as 50%, which limited banks’ capacity to lend. The CBN also enforced a 65% minimum loan to deposit ratio in order to increase private sector credit and boost productivity. In December 2020, the CBN released some of the excess CRR back to banks by selling them special bills in an attempt to improve liquidity and support economic recovery. Under Nigerian laws and banking regulations, one of the conditions any foreigner seeking to open a bank account in Nigeria must fulfill is to be a legal resident in Nigeria. The foreigner must have obtained the Nigerian resident permit, known as the Combined Expatriate Residence Permit and Aliens Card which can only be processed by a foreigner that has been employed by a Nigerian company through an expatriate quota. Another requirement is the biometric BVN, which every account holder in Nigeria must have according CBN regulations. Only a company duly registered in Nigeria can open a bank account in the country. Therefore, a foreign company is not entitled to open a bank account in Nigeria unless its subsidiary has been registered in Nigeria. The Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) manages Nigeria’s sovereign wealth fund. It was created by the NSIA Act in 2011 to harness Nigeria’s robust oil revenues toward economic stability, wealth creation, and infrastructure development. The NSIA received $1 billion seed capital in 2013 which grew to $2.1 billion in 2020 as a result of additional investments and retained earnings. The NSIA manages an additional $1.5 billion from third-party-managed funds for a total assets under management of $3.6 billion. The NSIA is a public agency that subscribes to the Santiago Principles, which are a set of 24 guidelines that assign “best practices” for the operations of Sovereign Wealth Funds globally. The NSIA invests through three ring-fenced funds: the Future Generations Fund is assigned 30% of NSIA’s assets with the objective of preserving and growing the value of said assets for the benefit of future Nigerians. The minimum investment horizon is 20 years, the investment base currency is the U.S. dollar, and the minimum target return is U.S. inflation + 4%. The Fund invests primarily in “growth assets,” “deflation hedges,” and “inflation hedges.” the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund aims to plug Nigeria’s infrastructure gap by investing in, and catalyzing foreign investments for, domestic infrastructure projects. The Fund is assigned 50% of NSIA’s assets. Investments are in naira and U.S. dollars and the return-on-investment target is U.S. inflation plus 5%. The Fund cannot allocate more than 50% of its assets to investment managers (not more than 25% to a single manager) or more than 35% to a single infrastructure sector. The Fund may also invest not more than 10% of its assets in “development projects’ in underserved regions or sectors. Priority sectors are power, healthcare, real estate, technology and communications infrastructure, aviation assets, agriculture, water and sewage treatment and delivery, roads, port, and rail. the Stabilization Fund was created to act as a buffer against short-term economic instability and is assigned 20% of NSIA’s assets. The Fund invests in conservative, short-term, and liquid assets since it may be drawn down to augment government revenue shortages. The base currency is the U.S. dollar. Investment options range from global sovereign and corporate debt, credit focused debt, cash, and to an extent, derivatives. The minimum credit quality rating is “A” over a 12-month period. At least 50% of the NSIA’s assets are invested domestically in infrastructure projects. The NSIA does not take an active role in the management of companies. The Embassy has not received any report or indication that NSIA activities limit private competition. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government does not have an established practice consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but SOEs have respective enabling legislations that govern their ownership. To legalize the existence of state-owned enterprises, provisions have been made in the Nigerian constitution relating to socio-economic development and in section 16 (1). The government has privatized many former SOEs to encourage more efficient operations, such as state-owned telecommunications company Nigerian Telecommunications and mobile subsidiary Mobile Telecommunications in 2014. SOEs operate in a variety of sectors ranging from information and communication; power; oil and gas; transportation including rail, maritime, and airports; and finance. Nigeria does not operate a centralized ownership system for its state-owned enterprises. Most SOEs are 100% government owned. Others are owned by the government through the Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOFI) or solely or jointly by MOFI and various agencies of government. The enabling legislation for each SOE also stipulates its governance structure. The boards of directors are appointed by the president and occasionally on the recommendation of the relevant minister. The boards operate and are appointed in line with the enabling legislation which usually stipulates the criteria for appointing board members. Directors are appointed by the board within the relevant sector. In a few cases, however, appointments have been viewed as a reward to political allies. Operational autonomy varies amongst SOEs. Most SOEs are parastatals of a supervising ministry or the presidency with minimal autonomy. SOEs with regulatory or industry oversight functions are often technically independent of ministerial supervision; however, ministers and other political appointees often interfere in their operations. All SOEs are required to remit a share of their profits or operational surpluses to the federal government. This “independent revenue” more than doubled from 2020 to 1.1 trillion naira ($2.6 billion) in 2021 and exceeded budget projections by 13%. This was as a result of the government’s drive to increase non-oil revenues as well as increasingly stringent oversight of SOE remittances. The 60 largest SOEs (excluding the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)) generated a combined 1.2 trillion naira ($2.9 billion) in revenues and spent a total 410 billion naira ($983 million) in the first eleven months of 2021. The government often provides certain grants to SOEs that are inefficiently run and/or loss-making. For example, and over the past five years, the government has allocated 102 billion naira ($245 million) to the Transmission Company of Nigeria, 402 billion naira ($964 million) to the Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading Company, 154 billion naira ($369 million) to the Nigerian Railway Corporation, and 24 billion naira ($58 million) to the Ajaokuta Steel Company. These SOEs wereall ostensibly established to generate and remit revenue. NNPC is Nigeria’s most prominent state-owned enterprise. Under the implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act, NNPC was incorporated as a limited liability company in September 2021, although the incorporation process does not appear to have led to a de facto change in the company’s operations and the government maintains 100% ownership. NNPC Board appointments are made by the presidency, but day-to-day management is overseen by the Group Managing Director (GMD). The GMD reports to the Minister of Petroleum Resources. In the current administration, the President has retained that ministerial role for himself, and the appointed Minister of State for Petroleum Resources acts as the de facto Minister of Petroleum in the president’s stead with certain limitations. NNPC is Nigeria’s biggest and arguably most important state-owned enterprise and is involved in exploration, refining, petrochemicals, products transportation, and marketing. It owns and operates Nigeria’s four refineries (one each in Warri and Kaduna and two in Port Harcourt), all of which are currently and largely inoperable. NNPC remits proceeds from the sale of crude oil less operational expenses to the federation account which is managed by the federal government on behalf of all tiers of government. It is also expected to pay corporate and petroleum profits taxes to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). NNPC began publishing audited financial statements in 2020 for the three prior fiscal years, a significant step toward improving transparency of NNPC operations. The government generated crude oil net revenue of 1.5 trillion naira ($3.6 billion) in 2020 in large part due to NNPC’s $10 billion gross revenue and the government’s removal of the gasoline subsidy for half of 2020 in the face of low global oil prices. However, despite higher oil prices, crude oil revenue fell to 970 billion naira ($2.3 billion) in the first eleven months of 2021. This is largely due to declining crude production and the significant subsidy costs which NNPC deducts from revenue before remitting the balance to the government. NNPC’s dual role as industry operator and unofficial regulator as well as its proximity to government lends it certain advantages its competitors lack. For instance, the CBN often prioritizes NNPC’s foreign exchange requests and has offered the corporation a subsidized exchange rate for its importation of petroleum products in the past. In addition, its proximity to government affords it high-level influence. NNPC’s inputs formed a critical part of the government’s position during the drafting of the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021. NNPC’s objection to the sale of an international oil company’s subsidiary with which it operates a joint venture has stayed the government approval required for the divestment. The government also owns equity in some private-sector-run entities. It retained 60% and 40% equity in the generation and distribution companies, respectively, that emerged from the power sector privatization exercise in 2013. Despite being privately-run, revenues across the power sector value chain are hindered by the overall inefficiencies and illiquidity in the sector. Consequently, a government facility finances a sizeable portion of the sector’s activities. The Transmission Company of Nigeria, of which the government retained full ownership, is largely financed by the government. The government owns 49% of Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Limited (NLNG) with the balance held by several international oil companies. NLNG is one of Nigeria’s most profitable companies and the dividends paid to the government accounted for nearly 3% of federal government revenues in 2021. The Privatization and Commercialization Act of 1999 established the National Council on Privatization, the policy-making body overseeing the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the implementing agency for designated privatizations. The BPE has focused on the privatization of key sectors, including telecommunications and power, and calls for core investors to acquire controlling shares in formerly state-owned enterprises. The BPE has privatized and concessioned more than 140 enterprises since 1999, including an aluminum complex, a steel complex, cement manufacturing firms, hotels, a petrochemical plant, aviation cargo handling companies, vehicle assembly plants, and electricity generation and distribution companies. The electricity transmission company remains state-owned. Foreign investors can and do participate in BPE’s privatization process. The government also retains partial ownership in some of the privatized companies. The federal government and several state governments hold a 40% stake, managed by BPE, in the power distribution companies. The National Assembly has questioned the propriety of some of these privatizations, with one ongoing case related to an aluminum complex which is the subject of a Supreme Court ruling on ownership. In addition, the failure of the 2013 power sector privatization to restore financial viability to the sector has raised criticism of the privatized power generation and distribution companies. The federal government estimates it will raise 91 billion naira ($218 million) from privatization proceeds in 2022. The government did not earn any revenues from privatization in 2021 despite a 205-billion-naira ($492 million) budget projection. BPE has several ongoing transactions including the sale of government assets in the agricultural sector, the concession of trade fair complexes, and private-public partnership in the Nigeria Commodity Exchange amongst others. Additional information on ongoing transactions can be found on the BPE website: https://bpe.gov.ng/category/transactions/on-going-transactions/. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is no specific Responsible Business Conduct law in Nigeria. Several legislative acts incorporate within their provisions certain expectations that directly or indirectly regulate the observance or practice of corporate social responsibility. In order to reinforce responsible behavior, various laws have been put in place for the protection of the environment. These laws stipulate criminal sanctions for non-compliance but are not consistently enforced. There are also regulating agencies which exist to protect the rights of consumers. Additionally, the Nigerian government has no specific action plan regarding OECD Responsible Business Conduct guidelines. Nigeria participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and is an EITI compliant country. Specifically, in February 2019 the EITI Board determined that Nigeria had made satisfactory progress overall with implementing the EITI Standard after having fully addressed the corrective actions from the country’s first Validation in 2017. The next EITI Validation study of Nigeria will occur in 2022. The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), and the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (the Commission) also ensure comprehensive standards and guidelines to direct the execution of projects with proper consideration for the environment. These two agencies replaced the now defunct Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and its Environmental Guidelines and Standards of 1991 for the petroleum industry. These two agencies aim to continue the DPR’s mission to preserve and protect the environmental issues of the Niger Delta. The Nigerian government provides oversight relating to the competition, consumer rights, and environmental protection issues. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, the Standards Organization of Nigeria, and other entities have the authority to impose fines and ensure the destruction of harmful substances that otherwise may be sold to the general public. The main regulators and enforcers of corporate governance are the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission (which register all incorporated companies). Nigeria has adopted multiple reforms on corporate governance. The Companies Allied Matter Act 2020 and the Investment Securities Act provide basic guidelines on company listing. More detailed regulations are covered in the NSX Listing rules. Publicly listed companies are expected to disclose their level of compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance in their Annual Financial Reports. 9. Corruption Domestic and foreign observers identify corruption as a serious obstacle to economic growth and poverty reduction. Nigeria ranked 154 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. Businesses report that bribery of customs and port officials remains common and often necessary to avoid extended delays in the port clearance process, and that smuggled goods routinely enter Nigeria’s seaports and cross its land borders. Since taking office in 2015, President Buhari has focused on implementing a campaign pledge to address corruption, though his critics contend his anti-corruption efforts often target political rivals. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act of 2004 established the EFCC to prosecute individuals involved in financial crimes and other acts of economic “sabotage.” Traditionally, the EFCC has achieved the most success in prosecuting low-level internet scam operators. A relatively few high-profile convictions have taken place, such as a former governor of Adamawa State, a former governor of Bayelsa State, a former Inspector General of Police, and a former Chair of the Board of the Nigerian Ports Authority. The EFCC also arrested a former National Security Advisor (NSA), a former Minister of State for Finance, a former NSA Director of Finance and Administration, and others on charges related to diversion of funds intended for government arms procurement. EFCC investigations have led to 5,562 convictions since 2010, with 2,200 in 2021. In 2020 the EFCC announced that the Buhari administration convicted 1,692 defendants and recovered over $2.6 billion in assets over the previous four-year period. In 2021, EFCC’s investigation of a former petroleum minister resulted in seizure of properties valued more than $80M. The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2001 established an Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to prosecute individuals, government officials, and businesses for corruption. The Corrupt Practices Act punishes over 19 offenses, including accepting or giving bribes, fraudulent acquisition of property, and concealment of fraud. Nigerian law stipulates that giving and receiving bribes constitute criminal offences and, as such, are not tax deductible. Between 2019-2020 the ICPC filed 178 cases in court and secured convictions in 51 cases. The ICPC announced in early 2022 that it had recovered cash and assets valued at 166.51 billion naira (about $400 million at the official exchange rate) from corrupt persons in the preceding two and half years. In 2021, the Deputy Commissioner of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and Chief of the Intelligence Response Team (IRT), Abba Kyari, often publicly referred to as “Nigeria’s Supercop,” was suspended from the NPF and arrested for drug dealing, evidence tampering, and corruption for reportedly accepting bribes from a Nigerian internet fraudster Ramon Abbas, popularly known as “Hushpuppi,” who pleaded guilty to money laundering in the United States. The Nigeria Police Service Commission finalized the suspension of Kyari on July 31, following the release of unsealed court documents filed in a U.S. District Court ordering the arrest of Kyari for his involvement in a $1.1 million fraud scheme with Abbas. Kyari is alleged to have solicited payment for the detainment and arrest of Abbas at Abbas’s behest. In 2016, Nigeria announced its participation in the Open Government Partnership, a significant step forward on public financial management and fiscal transparency. The Ministry of Justice presented Nigeria’s National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership. Implementation of its 14 commitments has made some progress, particularly on the issues such as tax transparency, ease of doing business, and asset recovery. The National Action Plan, which ran through 2019, covered five major themes: ensuring citizens’ participation in the budget cycle, implementing open contracting and adoption of open contracting data standards, increasing transparency in the extractive sectors, adopting common reporting standards like the Addis Tax initiative, and improving the ease of doing business. Full implementation of the National Action Plan would be a significant step forward for Nigeria’s fiscal transparency, although Nigeria has not fully completed any commitment to date. The Buhari administration created a network of agencies intended to work together to achieve anticorruption goals – the EFCC, the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) – and which are principally responsible for the recovery of the ill-gotten assets and diverted tax liabilities. The government launched the Financial Transparency Policy and Portal, commonly referred to as Open Treasury Portal, in 2019, to increase transparency and governmental accountability of funds transferred by making the daily treasury statement public. The Open Treasury Portal mandates that all ministries, departments, and agencies publish daily reports of payments in excess of N5m ($13,800). Agencies are also required to publish budget performance reports and other official financial statements monthly. Anticorruption activists demand more reforms and increased transparency in defense, oil and gas, and infrastructure procurement. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act of 2007 provided for the establishment of the NEITI organization, charged with developing a framework for transparency and accountability in the reporting and disclosure by all extractive industry companies of revenue due to or paid to the Nigerian government. NEITI serves as a member of the international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which provides a global standard for revenue transparency for extractive industries like oil and gas and mining. Nigeria is party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Nigeria is not a member of the OECD and not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Foreign companies, whether incorporated in Nigeria or not, may bid on government projects and generally receive national treatment in government procurement, but may also be subject to a local content vehicle (e.g., partnership with a local partner firm or the inclusion of one in a consortium) or other prerequisites which are likely to vary from tender to tender. Corruption and lack of transparency in tender processes have been a far greater concern to U.S. companies than discriminatory policies based on foreign status. Government tenders are published in local newspapers, a “tenders” journal sold at local newspaper outlets, and occasionally in foreign journals and magazines. The Nigerian government has made modest progress on its pledge to conduct open and competitive bidding processes for government procurement with the introduction of the Nigeria Open Contracting Portal in 2017 under the Bureau of Public Procurement. The Public Procurement Law of 2007 established the Bureau of Public Procurement as the successor agency to the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit. It acts as a clearinghouse for government contracts and procurement and monitors the implementation of projects to ensure compliance with contract terms and budgetary restrictions. Procurements above 100 million naira (approximately $243,000) reportedly undergo full “due process,” but government agencies routinely flout public procurement requirements. Some of the 36 states of the federation have also passed public procurement legislation. Certain such reforms have also improved transparency in procurement by the state-owned NNPC. Although U.S. companies have won contracts in numerous sectors, difficulties in receiving payment are not uncommon and can deter firms from bidding. Supplier or foreign government subsidized financing arrangements appear in some cases to be a crucial factor in the award of government procurements. Nigeria is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. 10. Political and Security Environment Political, criminal, and ethnic violence continue to affect Nigeria. Boko Haram and Islamic State – West Africa (ISIS-WA) have waged violent terrorist campaigns, killing of thousands of people in the country’s North East. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked civilians, military, police, humanitarian, and religious targets; recruited and forcefully conscripted child soldiers; and carried out scores of attacks on population centers in the North East and in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Abductions by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continue. These attacks resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries, numerous human rights abuses, widespread destruction, the internal displacement of more than three million persons, and the external displacement of at least 327,000 Nigerian refugees to neighboring countries as of the end of 2021. ISIS-WA terrorists demonstrated increased ability to conduct complex attacks against military outposts and formations. During 2021, ISIS-WA terrorists took over significant territory formerly held by Boko Haram. ISIS-WA expanded efforts to implement shadow governance structures in large swaths of Borno State. President Buhari has sought to address matters of insecurity in Nigeria. While the terrorists maintain the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the North East, Nigeria is also facing rural violence in many parts of the country carried out by criminals who raid villages and abduct civilians for ransom. Longstanding disputes between migratory pastoralist and farming communities, exacerbated by increasingly scarce resources and intensified by climate change impacts, also continue to afflict the country. Due to challenging security dynamics throughout the country, the U.S. Mission to Nigeria has significantly limited official travel in the North East, and travel to other parts of Nigeria requires security precautions. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a political separatist group declared a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government in 2013, established a militant arm in December 2020, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). ESN has been blamed for a surge in attacks in early 2021 against Nigerian police and security installations across the South East, the region in which IPOB claims the most support. Following extradition from Kenya and subsequent arrest of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu in June 2021, IPOB/ESN issued a “stay at home” order on Mondays for the five states of the South East (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo). Residents or visitors to the area who disobey the order have faced violent intimidation, which has led to a near complete shutdown of activity across the South East each Monday and other days significant to Kanu’s trial. The U.S. Mission to Nigeria does not allow official travel in those states on days that a stay-at-home order is in place. Decades of neglect, persistent poverty, and environmental damage caused by oil spills and illegal refining activities have left Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta region vulnerable to renewed violence. Though each oil-producing state receives a 13% derivation of the oil revenue produced within its borders, and several government agencies, including the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, are tasked with implementing development projects, bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption have prevented these investments from yielding meaningful economic and social development in the region. Niger Delta criminals have demonstrated their ability to attack and severely damage oil instillations at will, as seen when they cut Nigeria’s production by more than half in 2016. Attacks on oil installations decreased due to a revamped amnesty program and high-level engagement with the region at the time, but the underlying economic woes and historical grievances of the local communities were not addressed. As a result, insecurity in various forms continues to plague the region. More significant in recent years is the region’s shift from attacks against oil infrastructure to illegal oil bunkering and illicit refining. In its July 2021 audit, the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) reported that Nigeria lost 42.25 million barrels of crude oil to oil theft in 2019, valued at $2.77 billion. While the Nigerian Navy Eastern Naval Command disclosed that it had deactivated 175 illegal refineries and seized 27 vessels throughout its area of operation over a period of 11 months during 2021, such illegal activities have nonetheless continued, and oil theft remains a significant issue for both the industry and the region’s environment. In 2021, Nigeria reportedly lost $3.5 billion in revenue to crude oil theft, representing approximately 10% of the country’s foreign reserves, and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) still reports hundreds of oil spills each year. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Nigeria’s skilled labor pool has declined over the past decade due to inadequate educational systems, limited employment opportunities, and the migration of educated Nigerians to other countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and South Africa. The low employment capacity of Nigeria’s formal sector means that almost three-quarters of all Nigerians work in the informal and agricultural sectors or are unemployed. Companies involved in formal sector businesses, such as banking and insurance, possess an adequately skilled workforce. Manufacturing and construction sector workers often require on-the-job training. The result is that while individual wages are low, individual productivity is also low, which means overall relative labor costs can be high. The Buhari Administration is pushing reforms in the education sector to improve the supply of skilled workers but this and other efforts run by state governments are in their initial stages. The labor movement has long been active and influential in Nigeria. Labor organizations remain politically active and are prone to call for strikes on a regular basis against the national and state governments. Since 2000, unions have successfully called eight general strikes. While most labor actions are peaceful, difficult economic conditions fuel the risk that these actions could become violent. Nigeria’s constitution guarantees the rights of free assembly and association and protects workers’ rights to form or belong to trade unions. Several statutory laws, nonetheless, restrict the rights of workers to associate or disassociate with labor organizations. Nigerian unions belong to one of three trade union federations: the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), which tends to represent junior (i.e., blue collar) workers; the United Labor Congress of Nigeria (ULC), which represents a group of unions that separated from the NLC in 2015; and the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC), which represents the “senior” (i.e., white collar) workers. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, total union membership stands at roughly seven million. A majority of these union members work in the public sector, although unions exist across the private sector. The Trade Union Amendment Act of 2005 allowed non-management senior staff to join unions. Collective bargaining in the oil and gas industry is relatively efficient compared to other sectors. Issues pertaining to salaries, benefits, health and safety, and working conditions tend to be resolved quickly through negotiations. Workers under collective bargaining agreements cannot participate in strikes unless their unions comply with the requirements of the law, which includes provisions for mandatory mediation and referral of disputes to the Nigerian government. Despite these restrictions on staging strikes, unions occasionally conduct strikes in the private and public sectors without warning. In 2021, localized strikes occurred in the education, government, energy, power, and healthcare sectors. The law forbids employers from granting general wage increases to workers without prior government approval, but the law is not often enforced. In April 2019, President Buhari signed into law a new minimum wage, increasing it from 18,000 naira ($50 at the 2019 official exchange rate) to 30,000 naira ($73 at the 2021 official exchange rate) per month. More than 15 state governments have yet to commence with the implementation of the new minimum wage. [Note: The federal government has even threatened to sanction the management of the National Assembly over its breach of the provisions of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2019, for failing to pay its employees at the new minimum rate as of April 18, 2019.] Nigeria’s Labor Act provides for a 40-hour work week, two to four weeks of annual leave, and overtime and holiday pay for all workers except agricultural and domestic workers. No law prohibits compulsory overtime. The Act establishes general health and safety provisions, some of which specifically apply to young or female workers and requires the Ministry of Labor and Employment to inspect factories for compliance with health and safety standards. Under-funding and limited resources undermine the Ministry’s oversight capacity, and construction sites and other non-factory work sites are often ignored. Nigeria’s labor law requires employers to compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of workers killed in industrial accidents. The Nigerian Minister of Labor and Employment may refer unresolved disputes to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and the National Industrial Court (NIC). In 2015, the NIC launched an Alternative Dispute Resolution Center. Union officials question the effectiveness and independence of the NIC, believing it unable to resolve disputes stemming from Nigerian government failure to fulfill contract provisions for public sector employees. Union leaders criticize the arbitration system’s dependence on the Minister of Labor and Employment’s referrals to the IAP. The issue of child labor remains of great concern in Nigeria, where an estimated 15 million children under the age of 14 are working, and about half this population being exploited as workers in hazardous situations according to the International Labor Organization (ILO). Nigeria’s laws regarding minimum age for child labor and hazardous work are inconsistent. Article 59 of the Labor Act of 1974 sets the minimum age of employment at 12, and it is in force throughout Nigeria. The Act also permits children of any age to do light work alongside a family member in agriculture, horticulture, or domestic service. The Federal 2003 Child Rights Act (CRA) codifies the rights of children in Nigeria and must be ratified by each State to become law in its territory. To date, 28 states and the Federal Capital Territory have ratified the CRA, with all eight of the remaining states located in northern Nigeria. [Note: The legislatures in Kebbi and Yobe States tentatively approved the law and are only awaiting their governors’ signatures to ratify the bills.] The CRA states that the provisions related to young people in the Labor Act apply to children under the CRA, but also that the CRA supersedes any other legislation related to children. The CRA restricts children under the age of 18 from any work aside from light work for family members; however, Article 59 of the Labor Act applies these restrictions only to children under the age of 12. This language makes it unclear what minimum ages apply for certain types of work in the country. While the Labor Act forbids the employment of youth under age 18 in work that is dangerous to their health, safety, or morals, it allows children to participate in certain types of work that may be dangerous by setting different age thresholds for various activities. For example, the Labor Act allows children age 16 and older to work at night in gold mining and the manufacturing of iron, steel, paper, raw sugar, and glass. Furthermore, the Labor Act does not extend to children employed in domestic service. Thus, children are vulnerable to dangerous work in industrial undertakings, underground, with machines, and in domestic service. In addition, the prohibitions established by the Labor Act and CRA are not comprehensive or specific enough to facilitate enforcement. In 2013, the National Steering Committee (NSC) for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor in Nigeria validated the Report on the Identification of Hazardous Child Labor in Nigeria. The report has languished with the Ministry of Labor and Employment and still awaits the promulgation of guidelines for operationalizing the report. The Nigerian government adopted the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition), Enforcement, and Administration Act of 2015. While not specifically directed against child labor, many sections of the law support anti-child labor efforts. The Violence against Persons Prohibition Act was signed into law in 2015 and, while not specifically focused on child labor, it covers related elements such as “depriving a person of his/her liberty,” “forced financial dependence/economic abuse,” and “forced isolation/separation from family and friends” and is applicable to minors. Draft legislation, such as a new Labor Standards Act which includes provisions on child labor, and an Occupational Safety and Health Act that would regulate hazardous work, have remained under consideration in the National Assembly since 2006. Admission of foreign workers is overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. Employers must seek the consent of the Ministry in order to employ foreign workers by applying for an “expatriate quota.” The quota allows a company to employ foreign nationals in specifically approved job designations as well as specifying the validity period of the designations provided on the quota. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $422,240 2020 $432,294 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $9,405 BEA data available at BEA : Nigeria – International Trade and Investment Country Facts Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $132 BEA data available at BEA : Nigeria – International Trade and Investment Country Facts Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.55% https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=NG * Source for Host Country Data: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $74,256 100% Total Outward $13,213 100% Netherlands, The $13,640 18% United Kingdom $2,380 18% United States $9,405 13% Netherlands, The $1,217 9% France $8,798 12% Bermuda $1,014 8% United Kingdom $8,132 11% Ghana $917 7% Bermuda $7,696 10% Norway $808 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Trade and Investment Officer Plot 1075 Diplomatic Drive Abuja, Nigeria Telephone: +234 (0)9 461 4000 Email: EconNigeria@state.gov North Macedonia Executive Summary The Republic of North Macedonia, an EU candidate country, and a NATO member since March 2020, continues to be receptive to U.S. commercial investments. The COVID-19 pandemic has deeply impacted North Macedonia’s economy and delayed foreign direct investment inflow. The government’s COVID stimulus measures helped limit the economic drop to 6.1 percent in 2020, and assisted the recovery in 2021, which saw four percent GDP growth. Government support also cushioned the impact of the crisis on the labor market, with unemployment falling to 15.7 percent in 2021 and then to 15.2 percent in Q1 of 2022. In its Growth Acceleration Plan, the government set targets to double average annual GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 5 percent in the period 2022-2026, create 156,000 new jobs, and reduce unemployment to 8.6 percent. It also committed to “green growth” by accelerating the energy transition and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Declaration on Green Agenda signed November 2020. Although economic effects of the pandemic linger, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is exacerbating the energy crisis and supply chain woes. While doing business is generally easy in North Macedonia and the legal framework is largely in line with international standards, corruption is a consistent issue. Large foreign companies operating in the Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ) generally report positive investment experiences and maintain good relations with government officials. However, the country’s overall regulatory environment remains complex, and frequent regulatory and legislative changes, coupled with inconsistent interpretation of the rules, create an unpredictable business environment conducive to corruption. The government generally enforces laws, but there are numerous reports that some officials remain engaged in corrupt activities. Transparency International ranked North Macedonia 87th out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2021, 24 spots higher from the prior year, with a score of 39/100 in absolute terms. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs continues to coordinate government activities related to foreign investments. The government made limited efforts in 2021 to attract new investment, focusing instead on economic recovery from the pandemic. However, the government did court foreign companies and investors for public projects in transportation and energy infrastructure. The State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption has opened number of corruption-related inquiries, including several involving high-level officials, and the government appointed a new Deputy Prime Minister for Good Governance, who will focus on structural and procedural changes to reduce opportunities for corruption. Fitch Ratings reaffirmed North Macedonia’s previous credit rating of BB+ with a negative outlook, and Standard & Poor’s reaffirmed its credit rating at BB- with a stable outlook. There are several areas to watch in 2022. In 2021, Embassy Skopje identified digitalization and green energy as areas ripe for U.S. investment due to the government’s growing commitment to invest in these strategic sectors. North Macedonia’s location, at the crossroads of pan-European transport corridors VIII and X, is an advantage as companies consider “near-shoring” their production to be closer to consumption centers in Europe as fallout from the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continue to snarl global supply chains. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 59 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 12 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 5,750 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI remains one of the government’s main pillars of economic growth and job creation, although the COVID-19 pandemic prevented government officials from greater engagement with potential investors in 2021. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. In March 2018, the government passed its “Plan for Economic Growth” ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk/?q=node/275 ), and in 2021 it amended the Law on Financial Support of Investments ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Izmeni%20i%20dopolnuvanja%20ZFPI%202021.pdf ), which provides substantial incentives to foreign companies operating in the 15 free economic zones. The incentives include a variety of measures such as job creation subsidies, capital investment subsidies, and financial support to exporters. North Macedonia is a signatory to multilateral conventions protecting foreign investors and is party to a number of bilateral investment protection treaties, though none with the United States. Since August 2020, the office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk ) has coordinated the government’s activities related to foreign investments. Invest North Macedonia—the Agency for Foreign Investments and Export Promotionis the primary government institution in charge of facilitating foreign investments. It works directly with potential foreign investors, provides detailed explanations and guidance for registering a business in North Macedonia, produces analysis on potential industries and sectors for investing, shares information on business regulations, and publishes reports about the domestic market. The North Macedonia Free Zones Authority, http://fez.gov.mk/ , a governmental managing body responsible for developing free economic zones throughout the country, also assists foreign investors interested in operating in the zones. It manages all administrative affairs of the free economic zones and assists foreign investors to identify appropriate investment locations and facilities. North Macedonia does not maintain a “one-stop-shop” for FDI, requiring investors to navigate through several bureaucratic institutions to implement their investments. The government maintains contact with large foreign investors through frequent meetings and formal surveys to solicit feedback. Large foreign investors have direct and easy access to government leaders, whom they can contact for assistance to resolve issues. The Foreign Investors Council, https://www.fic.mk/Default.aspx?mId=1 , advocates for foreign investors and suggests ways to improve the business environment. Foreign investors can invest directly in all industry and business sectors except those limited by law. For instance, investment in the production of weapons and narcotics remains subject to government approval, while investors in sectors such as banking, financial services, insurance, and energy must meet certain licensing requirements that apply equally to domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investment may be in the form of money, equipment, or raw materials. Under the law, if assets are nationalized, foreign investors have the right to receive the full value of their investment. This provision does not apply to national investors. North Macedonia does not have a national investment screening mechanism in line with international standards. Invest North Macedonia conducts screening and due diligence reviews of foreign direct investments in a non-standard, non-public procedure and on an ad-hoc basis. The main purpose of the screening is to ensure the investment will bring economic benefits for the country and to protect national security. The process does not disadvantage foreign investors. More information about the screening process is available directly from Invest North Macedonia, at https://investnorthmacedonia.gov.mk/. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) latest review of North Macedonia’s trade policy (2019) is available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/S390R1.pdf&Open=True . The most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) investment policy review on North Macedonia, from March 2012, is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2011d3_en.pdf . A 2017 regional investment policy review of South-East Europe covering seven economies, including North Macedonia, is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d6_en.pdf . The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has not done an investment policy review on North Macedonia to date. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have mentioned aspects of the government’s policies for attracting foreign investment in their regular country reports but have not provided specific policy recommendations. There have been no useful reviews of investment policy and practice from domestic or third country civil society organizations. All legal entities in the country must register with the Central Registry of the Republic of North Macedonia (Central Registry). Foreign businesses may register a limited liability company, single-member limited liability company, joint venture, or joint stock company, as well as branches and representative offices. There is a one-stop-shop system which enables investors to register their businesses within a day by visiting one office, obtaining the information from a single place, and addressing one employee. Once the company is registered with the Central Registry, the registration is valid for all other agencies. In addition to registering, some businesses must obtain additional working licenses or permits for their activities from relevant authorities. More information on business registration documentation and procedures is available at the Central Registry’s website, http://www.crm.com.mk . All investors may register a company online at http://e-submit.crm.com.mk/eFiling/en/home.aspx . Applications must be submitted by an authorized registration agent. The online business registration process is clear, complete, and available for use by foreign companies. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, but it does not promote or provide incentives for outward investments. The publicly reported total stock of outward investments is small, worth approximately $138 million, the majority of which is in production facilities, pharmaceuticals, metal processing, and wholesale and retail trade in the Balkan region, the Netherlands, Germany, and Russia. 3. Legal Regime The government has made progress adopting reform priorities called for by the EU, NATO, and other bodies, leading to well-defined laws, institutional structures, and regulatory legal frameworks. However, laws are not regularly drafted based on data-driven evidence or assessments and, at times, move through parliament using shortened legislative procedures. While laws are in place, enforcement and universal implementation of laws and regulations are generally lacking and can be a problem for businesses and citizens. North Macedonia has simplified regulations and procedures for large foreign investors operating in the Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ). While the country’s overall regulatory environment is complex and not fully transparent, the government is making efforts to improve transparency. The government is implementing reforms designed to avoid frequent regulatory and legislative changes, coupled with inconsistent interpretations of the rules, which create an unpredictable business environment that enables corruption. The current government has published all incentives for businesses operating in North Macedonia, which are standardized and available to domestic and international companies. However, companies worth more than $1 billion that want to invest in North Macedonia can negotiate terms different from the standard incentives. The government can offer customized incentive packages if the investment is of strategic importance. Rule-making and regulatory authorities reside within government ministries, regulatory agencies, and parliament. Almost all regulations most relevant to foreign businesses are on the national level. Regulations are generally developed in a four-step process. First, the regulatory agency or ministry drafts the proposed regulation. The proposal is then published in the Unique National Electronic Register of Regulations (ENER: https://ener.gov.mk/ ) for public review and comment. After public comments are considered and properly incorporated into the draft, it is sent to the central government to be reviewed and adopted in an official government session. Once the government has approved the draft law, it is sent to parliament for full debate and adoption. The public consultation process has improved, with businesses, the public, and NGOs having an increasing role in commenting on draft regulations and proposing changes through ENER. There is no single centralized location which maintains a copy of all regulatory actions. All newly adopted regulations, rules, and government decisions are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia after they are adopted by the government or parliament or signed by the corresponding minister or director. Public comments are neither published nor made public as part of the regulation, and limited information is available in English. North Macedonia accepts International Accounting Standards, and the legal, regulatory, and accounting systems used by the government are consistent with international norms. North Macedonia has aligned its national law with EU directives on corporate accounting and auditing. The government has systems in place to regularly communicate and consult with the business community and other stakeholders before amending and adopting legislation, through ENER and through dialogues with businesses, the civil sector, and academia. Interested parties, including chambers of commerce, can review the legislation published on ENER. The online platform is intended to facilitate public participation in policymaking, increase public comment, and provide a phase-in period for legal changes to allow enterprises to adapt. Key institutions influencing the business climate publish official and legally-binding instructions for the implementation of laws. These institutions are obliged to publish all relevant laws, by-laws, and internal procedures on their websites; however, some do not make regular updates. The government makes significant efforts to ensure respect for the principles of transparency, merit, and equitable representation. The government continued to implement the Strategy for Public Administration Reform and Action Plan (2018-2022), and the National Plan for Quality Management of Public Administration, which focus on policy creation and coordination, strengthening public service capacities, and increasing accountability and transparency, in close coordination with the EU. The Open Data Strategy (2018-2020) and Transparency Strategy (2019-2021) put forth measures to encourage the release and use of public data as an effective tool for innovation, growth, and transparent governance and contributed to greater transparency of government bodies, both at the central and local levels. In 2022, Prime Minister Dimitar Kovachevski introduced a new Deputy Prime Minister for Good Governance Policies, who is responsible for good governance, anticorruption policies, and the digitalization of government services. The DPM’s office will replace the previous Cabinet for the Fight Against Corruption and Crime, Sustainable Development and Human Resources. The new DPM is expected to oversee the implementation of the Public Administration Reform Strategy under development by the Ministry of Information Society and Administration during 2022. Public finances and debt obligations are fairly transparent. The Ministry of Finance publishes budget execution data monthly; public debt figures, including contingent liability, quarterly; and the fiscal strategy is updated annually. As a candidate country for accession to the EU, North Macedonia is gradually harmonizing its legal and regulatory systems with EU standards. As a member of the WTO, North Macedonia regularly notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of proposed amendments to technical regulations concerning trade. North Macedonia ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in July 2015, the 50th out of 134 members of the WTO to do so. In October 2017, the government formed a National Trade Facilitation Committee, chaired by the Minister of Economy, which includes 22 member institutions. The Committee identified areas which need harmonization with the TFA and is working toward implementation. North Macedonia’s legal system is based on the civil law tradition, with increasing adversarial-style elements, and includes an established legal framework for both commercial and contract law. The Constitution established independent courts to rule on commercial and contractual disputes between business entities, and court rulings are legally executed by private enforcement agents. Enforcement actions may be appealed before the court. The enforcement procedure fees were lowered and simplified in 2019. Commercial disputes up to €15,000 require mediation as a precondition to initiating legal action within the courts. Cases involving international elements may be decided using international arbiters. Ratified international instruments are considered an integral part of national legislation and cannot be altered by a national law, per the Constitution. Throughout 2021, businesses complained that lengthy and costly commercial disputes adjudicated through the court system created legal uncertainty. Businesses, however, have not been inclined to use mediation, despite it being a swifter and often less costly way to resolve disputes. In December 2021, Parliament adopted a new and improved Mediation Law providing for broader use of mediation as a voluntary, contract-based, or legally-mandated alternative prior to addressing a matter in court. Numerous international reports note rule of law remains a key challenge in North Macedonia, pointing to undue executive, business, and political interference in the judiciary, and poor funding for and management of administrative courts. These obstacles often result in lengthy and costly trials. The government continued major reforms throughout 2021 to improve judicial independence and impartiality, but contract enforcement and a perceived lack of transparent public procurement practices remain challenges for businesses. There is no single law regulating foreign investments, nor a “one-stop-shop” website which provides all relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Rather, the legal framework is comprised of several laws including the Trade Companies Law, the Securities Law, the Profit Tax Law, the Customs Law, the Value Added Tax (VAT) Law, the Law on Trade, the Law on Acquiring Shareholding Companies, the Foreign Exchange Operations Law, the Payment Operations Law, the Law on Foreign Loan Relations, the Law on Privatization of State-owned Capital, the Law on Investment Funds, the Banking Law, the Labor Law, the Law on Financial Discipline, the Law on Financial Support of Investments, and the Law on Technological Industrial Development Zones (free economic zones). An English language version of the consolidated Law on Technological Industrial Development Zones is available at https://fez.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/law-in-tidz-eng.pdf , and additional information at https://www.worldfzo.org/Portals/0/OpenContent/Files/487/Macedonia_FreeZones.pdf . No new major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions related to foreign investments were passed during the past year; however, some existing laws were amended slightly. The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) is responsible for enforcing the Law on Protection of Competition. The CPC issues opinions on draft legislation which may impact competition. The CPC reviews the impact on competition of proposed mergers and can prohibit a merger or approve it with or without conditions. The CPC also reviews proposed state aid to private businesses, including foreign investors, under the Law on Control of State Aid and the Law on State Aid . The CPC determines whether the state aid in question gives economic advantage to the recipient, is selective, or adversely influences competition and trade. More information on the CPC’s activities is available at http://kzk.gov.mk/en . There were no significant competition cases in 2021. The Law on Expropriation ( http://www.mioa.gov.mk/sites/default/files/pbl_files/documents/legislation/zakon_za_eksproprijacija_konsolidiran_032018.pdf ) states the government can seize or limit ownership and real estate property rights to protect the public interest and to build facilities and carry out other activities of public interest. According to the Constitution and the Law on Expropriation, property under foreign ownership is exempt from expropriation except during instances of war or natural disaster, or for reasons of public interest. Under the Law on Expropriation, the state is obliged to pay market value for any expropriated property. If the payment is not made within 15 days of the expropriation, interest will accrue. The government has conducted a number of expropriations, primarily to enable capital projects of public interest, such as highway and railway construction, for which the government offered market value compensation. Expropriation procedures have followed strict legal regulations and due process. The government has not undertaken any measures that have been alleged to be, or could be argued to be, indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. North Macedonia’s bankruptcy law governs the settlement of creditors’ claims against insolvent debtors. Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated over the property of a debtor, be it a legal entity, an individual, a deceased person, joint property of spouses, or a business. However, bankruptcy proceedings may not be implemented over a public legal entity or property owned by the Republic of North Macedonia. The Government of North Macedonia’s suspension of bankruptcy proceedings for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis continued throughout 2021. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked North Macedonia 30th out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency. The Macedonian Credit Bureau ( https://mkb.mk/en/ ), commercial banks, and the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia serve as credit monitoring authorities. 4. Industrial Policies Both the Law on Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ) and the Law on Financial Support of Investments offer incentives to investors. Investors in the TIDZ are eligible for tax exemptions for a period of up to 10 years of operation in proportion to the size of investment and number of employees. Investors in the TIDZ are exempt from paying duties for equipment and machines as well as from municipality construction taxes. The land lease rate is so low as to be merely symbolic, and investors are eligible for a grant equal to 10 percent of the cost of plant construction and new machinery, as well as a grant for improving competitiveness. North Macedonia’s legislative framework for FDI is generally harmonized with EU state aid regulations. The salaries of employees working for TIDZ employers are exempt from personal income tax for a period of up to ten years after the first month in which the employer starts paying out salaries. The government does not issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. Depending on the industry and size of the investment, the government may decide to cover up to 50 percent of eligible investment costs over a period of 10 years. To date, the government has not announced any incentives to stimulate clean energy investments. North Macedonia currently has 15 free economic zones in various stages of development throughout the country. The Directorate for Technological Industrial Development Zones ( HYPERLINK “http://fez.gov.mk/” h http://fez.gov.mk/) is responsible for establishing, developing, and supervising 14 of them, including seven fully operational TIDZ: Skopje 1 and 2, Prilep, Stip, Kicevo, Struga, and Strumica. The Tetovo TIDZ is a public-private partnership. U.S. companies operate in TIDZ throughout North Macedonia, including automotive components manufacturers ARC Automotive (Skopje 1), Adient (Stip and Strumica), Aptiv (Skopje 1), Gentherm (Prilep), Lear (Tetovo), and Dura Automotive and Dura Structures & Extrusion (Skopje 2), and electronic component manufacturer Kemet (Skopje 1). North Macedonia does not normally impose performance requirements, such as mandating local employment (working level or management level) or domestic content in goods or technology, as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. Foreign investors in the TIDZ may employ staff from any country. In 2016, North Macedonia simplified the procedure for expatriates to obtain permission to live and work in the country. North Macedonia does not impose a “forced localization” policy for data. The government does not prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. Post is not aware of any requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. However, based on the new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in May 2018, North Macedonia’s Directorate for Personal Data Protection adopted in February 2020 amendments to the Law on Personal Data Protection to harmonize North Macedonia’s laws with the new EU regulations. Depending on the sector and type of investment, various government authorities oversee and assess the fulfillment of investment promises made by foreign investors. Government entities include the Agency for Foreign Investments and Export Promotion (Invest North Macedonia), the Directorate for Technological Industrial Development Zones , and the Ministry of Economy. There is no discriminatory export or import policy affecting foreign investors. Almost 96 percent of total foreign trade is unrestricted. Current tariffs and other customs-related information are published on the website of the Customs Administration ( https://customs.gov.mk/index.php/en/ ). 5. Protection of Property Rights Laws protect ownership of both movable and real property, but implementation of these laws remains inconsistent. Mortgages and liens are regularly utilized, and the recording system is reliable. Highly centralized control of government owned “construction land,” the lack of coordinated local and regional zoning plans, and the lack of an efficient construction permitting system continue to impede business and investment. However, the government has improved the cadaster system by fully digitalizing all investment and holdings records, which has increased the security and speed of real estate transactions. Land leased or acquired by foreign and/or non-resident investors is regulated by the Law on Ownership and Other Real Rights. EU and OECD residents have the same rights as local residents in lease or acquisition of construction land or property, whereas for non-EU and non-OECD residents, property ownership is regulated under terms of reciprocity. Foreign residents cannot acquire agricultural land in North Macedonia. Foreign investors may acquire property rights for buildings used in their business activities, as well as full ownership rights over construction land through a locally registered company. If a foreign company registers a local company in any form (subsidiary, local partner, or joint venture representation office), it can acquire land with full ownership rights similar to a domestic company. Purchased land belongs to the owner and, even if it remains unoccupied, cannot revert to other owners such as squatters. The exception to this is agricultural land granted by the government as concessions. If the consignee does not use the land per the agreement, then the government can cancel the concession and take back possession of the land. Responsibility for safeguarding intellectual property rights (IPR) is distributed among numerous institutions. The State Office of Industrial Property governs patents, trademarks, service marks, designs, models, and samples. A unit within the Ministry of Culture administers the protection of authors’ rights and other related rights (e.g., music, film, television). The State Market Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring markets and preventing the sale of counterfeit and pirated goods. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for IPR-related crimes committed on the internet. The Customs Administration has the right to seize suspect goods to prevent their distribution pending confirmation from the rights holder of the authenticity of the goods. The National Coordination Body for Intellectual Property, which previously organized interagency raids to seize counterfeit products, usually focused on small sellers in open-air markets and mostly targeted trademark infringements. The body has been inactive for the past three years. As North Macedonia awaits a date to begin EU accession negotiations, it continues to harmonize its IPR laws and regulations with EU standards, but still needs to demonstrate adequate enforcement of those laws. The European Commission’s 2021 report on North Macedonia noted progress in raising awareness in the fight against counterfeiting, smuggling, and the importation of counterfeit goods, as well as an increase in seized goods. The EU report noted the creation of an information platform for law enforcement institutions to exchange data on IPR, but said it needs to be fully functional in order to create a credible enforcement record and gather reliable statistics on the institutional handling of IPR infringements. The EU also noted the need for further improvement of the legal framework on IPR, notably the collective rights management system, by aligning with the Collective Rights Management Directive, and industrial property rights, by aligning with the Enforcement Directive and the Trade Secrets Directive. The new draft National Intellectual Property Strategy and Action Plan 2022-2026 was prepared in December 2021 and is pending adoption by the Government. The Strategy proposes transfer of competences for all tasks related to the protection of copyright and all related rights from the Ministry of Culture to the State Office of Industrial Property, incorporating all IPR segments into one regulatory institution. The strategy also anticipates better coordination with other government agencies on the mapping and cataloging of autochthonous agricultural products. While North Macedonia has many laws in place to protect IPR, infringement is frequent, and the court system should be improved. Prosecutors and judges for both civil and criminal cases are aware of IPR but lack adequate experience due to the small number of IPR cases. There are no specialized courts to handle IPR cases. Many rights holders do not pursue legal action since IPR violators usually lack the financial resources to pay damages. Courts are sometimes reluctant to find accused IPR violators guilty due to stiff mandatory minimum sentences for small-time distributors of counterfeit goods. The penalties for IPR infringement range from 30 to 60 days closure of businesses, monetary fines of up to €5,000 ($5,492), or a prison sentence of up to five years. North Macedonia does not track and report cumulative statistics on IPR infringement or seizures of counterfeit goods, and therefore lacks a credible enforcement record. North Macedonia is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Market List. North Macedonia is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to a number of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The government openly welcomes foreign portfolio investors. The establishment of the Macedonian Stock Exchange (MSE) in 1995 made it possible to regulate portfolio investments, although North Macedonia’s capital market is modest in turnover and capitalization. Market capitalization in 2021 was $4.3 billion, a 22.2 percent increase from the previous year. The main index, MBI10, increased by 30.8 percent, reaching 6,153 points at year-end. Foreign portfolio investors accounted for an average of 10.5 percent of total MSE turnover, 2.9 percentage points more than in 2020. The current regulatory framework does not appear to discriminate against foreign portfolio investments. There is an effective regulatory system for portfolio investments, and North Macedonia’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates the market and licenses all MSE members to trade in securities. In 2021, the total number of listed companies was 96, four less than in 2020, and total turnover increased by 56.8 percent. Compared to international standards, overall liquidity of the market is still modest for entering and/or exiting sizeable positions. Individuals generally trade on the MSE as individuals, rather than through investment funds, which have been present since 2007. There are no legal barriers to the free flow of financial resources into the products and factor markets. The National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM) respects IMF Article VIII and does not impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. A variety of credit instruments are provided at market rates to both domestic and foreign companies. In its regular report on Article IV consultations, published January 2021, the International Monetary Fund noted that North Macedonia’s banking system was well-capitalized and profitable, but emphasized the need for continued vigilance. It assessed the monetary policy as appropriately accommodative and encouraged the Central Bank to stand ready to tighten monetary policy if inflation were expected to become persistently higher than in the euro area, or if sustained pressure on foreign currency reserves materialized. Besides their own cash flow, domestic companies secure their financing mostly from bank loans due to the lack of corporate bonds and other securities as credit instruments. Financial resources are almost entirely managed through North Macedonia’s banking system, consisting of 13 banks and a central bank, the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM). The number of banks dropped by one with the merger of Austrian-owned Sparkasse Bank with French-owned Ohridska Bank, completed in July 2021. The banking sector is highly concentrated, with three of the largest banks controlling 58.2 percent of the banking sector’s total assets of about $11.7 billion and collecting 71 percent of total household deposits. The largest commercial bank in the country had total assets of $2.8 billion, or 27.3 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The seven smallest banks, which have individual market shares of less than 5 percent each, accounted for 12.7 percent of total banking sector assets. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country on equal terms as domestic operators, subject to licensing and prudent supervision from the NBRNM. In 2021, foreign capital was present in 12 of North Macedonia’s 13 banks, and was dominant in 9 banks, controlling 71.1 percent of total banking sector assets, 81.8 percent of total loans, and 69.1 percent of total deposits. According to the NBRNM, the banking sector’s non-performing loans at the end of Q3 of 2021 ( were 3.6 percent of total loans, increasing by 0.2 percentage points on an annual basis. Non-performing loans remained low despite the lifting of the NBRNM’s anti-COVID crisis measures in March 2021, which for almost a year allowed temporary postponement of loan installment payments. Total profits at the end of Q3 of 2021 reached $138 million, 22.1 percent higher than the same period in 2020. Banks’ liquid assets at the end of Q3 of 2021 were 31.6 percent of total assets, 1.7 percentage points higher than in the same period in 2020, remaining comfortably high. In 2021, the NBRNM conducted different stress-test scenarios on the banking sector’s sensitivity to increased credit risk, liquidity shocks, and insolvency shocks, all of which showed the banking sector is healthy and resilient, with a capital adequacy ratio remaining above the legally required minimum of eight percent. The actual capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector at the end of Q3 of 2021 was 17.3 percent, 0.4 percentage points higher than the same period in 2020, with all banks maintaining a ratio above 15 percent. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. All commercial banks and the NBRNM have established and maintain correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks. The banking sector lost no correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor were there any indications that any current correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. There is no intention to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions in North Macedonia. Alternative financial services do not exist in the economy. The transaction settlement mechanism is solely through the banking sector. North Macedonia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are about 120 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in North Macedonia, the majority of which are public utilities, predominately owned by the central government or the 81 local governments. The government estimates about 8,600 people are employed in SOEs. SOEs operate in several sectors of the economy, including energy, transportation, and media. There are also industries such as arms production and narcotics in which private enterprises may not operate without government approval. SOEs are governed by boards of directors, consisting of members appointed by the government. All SOEs are subject to the same tax policies as private sector companies. SOEs are allowed to purchase or supply goods or services from the private sector and are not given non-market-based advantages, such as preferential access to land or raw materials. There is no published registry with complete information on all SOEs in the country. The government has yet to implement broad public administration reform, which would also include SOEs, especially addressing their employment policies and governance. North Macedonia is not a signatory to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. In February 2018, the government sent its bid to the World Trade Organization to upgrade its status from observer to a full member of the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The negotiation process is still ongoing. North Macedonia’s privatization process is almost complete, and private capital is dominant in the market. The government is trying to resolve the status of one remaining state-owned loss-making company in a non-discriminatory process through an international tender. Foreign and domestic investors have equal opportunity to participate in the privatization of the remaining state-owned assets through an easily understandable, non-discriminatory, and transparent public bidding process. Neither the central government nor any local government has announced plans to fully or partially privatize any of the utility companies or SOEs in their ownership. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible business conduct (RBC) is a nascent concept in North Macedonia, and the number of enterprises which contribute to sustainable development is very limited. The government has not taken any major measures to encourage RBC and has not defined RBC or policies to actively promote or encourage it. The government has not conducted a “National Action Plan” on RBC and does not factor RBC policies into its procurement decisions. There have not been any high-profile controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or resolution of such cases in the recent past. Previously, the government has failed to fully enforce laws related to labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other laws and regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. North Macedonia passed the Law on Trade Companies in 2004 and the Securities Law in 2005, which regulate corporate governance. Together these laws provide a clear distinction between the rights and duties of shareholders versus the operations and management of the company. Shareholders generally cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of the company. The American Chamber of Commerce in North Macedonia had a committee on Community Engagement and Responsible Business Conduct, which, beginning in 2015, organized seminars on relevant topics and maintained a database of corporate social responsibility activities carried out by over 260 companies. The government does not take any measures to encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsibility Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. North Macedonia does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Government of North Macedonia adopted the Long-Term Strategy (LTC) for Climate Action and Action Plan in September 2021, and set its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change, per the Paris Agreement. The majority of North Macedonia’s emissions come from energy generation, buildings, and transportation. North Macedonia has set ambitious climate goals, including a 51% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, but has been slow to roll out policies to that effect. There are no environmental or green growth considerations in public procurement policies, nor are there regulatory incentives for investments. However, all infrastructure projects require environmental impact assessments. In addition, every polluting industry must obtain an Integrated Prevention and Pollution Control Permit (IPPC), issued by the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning or the municipality where the facility will be located, depending on its size and expected emissions. The IPPC is regulated by the Law on Environment. 9. Corruption North Macedonia has laws intended to counter bribery, abuse of official position, and conflicts-of-interest, and government officials and their close relatives are legally required to disclose their income and assets. However, enforcement of anti-corruption laws has often been weak and selectively targeted government critics and low-level offenders. There have been credible allegations of corruption in law enforcement, the judiciary, and many other sectors. In April 2021, Parliament adopted the 2021-2025 National Strategy for the Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest and related Action Plan, consolidating the country’s commitment to prevent corruption and sanction corrupt behavior. The State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (SCPC) ( https://www.dksk.mk/index.php?id=home ), was proactive in opening and following up on number of corruption-related inquiries focused on high-level officials from across the political spectrum for alleged nepotism and conflict of interest. The cases initiated by the former Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) (which emanated from a wiretapping scandal which revealed extensive abuse of office by former public officials and corruption involving public tenders) continued to move forward through the court system. A number of cases were subject to final rulings resulting in prison sentences, and new cases were opened on the basis of investigative material from the former Special Prosecutor’s Office. Transparency International ranked North Macedonia 87th out of 180 countries in the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, a climb of 24 places, for a lack of government efforts to combat corruption and conflict of interest in public administration. To deter corruption, the government uses an automated electronic customs clearance process, which allows businesses to monitor the status of their applications. In order to raise transparency and accountability in public procurement, the Bureau for Public Procurement introduced an electronic system which allows publication of notices from domestic and international institutions, tender documentation previews without registering in the system, e-payments for system use, electronic archiving, and electronic complaint submission ( https://www.e-nabavki.gov.mk/PublicAccess/Home.aspx#/home). The government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials. A number of domestic NGOs focus on anti-corruption and transparency in public finance and tendering procedures. There are frequent reports of nepotism in public tenders. The government does not provide any special protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. North Macedonia has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and has signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Many businesses operating in North Macedonia, including some U.S. businesses, identified corruption as a problem in government tenders, in efforts to secure licenses, and in the judiciary. No local firms or non-profit groups provide vetting services of potential local investment partners. Foreign companies often hire local attorneys, who have knowledge of local industrial sectors and access to the Central Registry and business associations, who can provide financial and background information on local businesses and potential partners. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption Ms. Biljana Ivanovska, President Dame Gruev 1 1000 Skopje, North Macedonia +389 2 321 5377 dksk@dksk.org.mk Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Organized Crime and Corruption Prosecution Office Ms. Vilma Ruskovska, Chief Boulevard Krste Misirkov BB, Sudska Palata 1000 Skopje, North Macedonia +389 2 321 9884 ruskovska@jorm.gov.mk Ministry of Interior Organized Crime and Corruption Department Mr. Lazo Velkovski, Head of the Department Dimce Mircev bb 1000 Skopje, Macedonia + 389 2 314 3150 + 389 2 314 3150 Transparency International – Macedonia Ms. Slagjana Taseva, President Naum Naumovski Borce 58 P.O. Box 270 1000 Skopje, North Macedonia +389 2 321 7000 info@transparency.mk 10. Political and Security Environment North Macedonia generally has been free from political violence over the past decade, although interethnic relations have been strained at times. Public protests, demonstrations, and strikes occur sporadically, and often result in traffic jams, particularly near the center of Skopje. Following 2016 parliamentary elections, an organized group of protestors leveraged ongoing protests and eventually stormed the parliament building on April 27, 2017, in reaction to the change of government and the election of Talat Xhaferi as Speaker of Parliament, the first ethnic Albanian to assume that post since the country’s independence. More than 100 people were injured, including several members of the government and seven MPs. On March 18, 2019, 16 individuals were convicted and given lengthy prison sentences for their involvement in the attack, including the former head of the Public Security Bureau (who had previously served as Minister of Interior) and former security officers. On July 26, 2021, in the so-called Parliament Violence Organizers’ case, the trial court issued roughly six-year prison sentences against the former VMRO-DPMNE Speaker of Parliament Trajko Veljanoski, former Minister of Education and Science Spiro Ristovski, former Minister of Transport and Communications Mile Janakieski, and former Administration for Security and Counterintelligence Director Vladimir Atanasovski, for organizing the attack on Parliament. Prosecutor and defense appeals were pending before the appellate court as of March 8, 2022. The related cases against the former VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and former counter-intelligence official Nikola Boshkoski, both fugitives, were ongoing. There is neither widespread anti-American nor anti-Western sentiment in North Macedonia. A poll released February 2022 showed that 45.2 percent of all respondents saw the United States as the most influential foreign actor in country. There have been no incidents in recent years involving politically motivated damage to U.S. projects or installations. Violent crime against U.S. citizens is rare. Theft and other petty street crimes do occur, particularly in areas where tourists and foreigners congregate. North Macedonia has been a member of NATO since 2020. The country has been an EU candidate country since December 2005 and, in March 2020, the General Affairs Council of the European Union decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia, which was endorsed by the European Council the following day. However, Bulgaria refused to approve North Macedonia’s EU negotiating framework in November 2020, effectively blocking the official launch of EU accession talks. In January 2022, the new governments of North Macedonia and Bulgaria re-launched efforts to resolve outstanding bilateral issues through intensified talks with a view to lifting Bulgaria’s veto. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Foreign investors, especially those in labor-intensive industries, find North Macedonia’s competitive labor costs and high number of English speakers attractive. The average net wage in December 2021 was MKD 29,943 ($534) per month. Тhe minimum net wage for April 2021 through March 2022 was set to MKD 15,194 ($270) per month. In January 2022, the government raised the minimum wage to 18,000 MKD ($321), effective April 2022. In the fourth quarter of 2021, North Macedonia’s labor force consisted of 934,482 people, of which 795,276 (84.8 percent) were officially employed and 142,206 (15.2 percent) were officially unemployed. North Macedonia’s employed labor force is roughly 60.4 percent male and 39.6 percent female. The largest number of employees are engaged in manufacturing (20 percent), trade (15.9 percent), and agriculture (11 percent). The total unemployment rate for youth ages 15 to 24 years old is 30.9 percent. About 18 percent of the unemployed have a university education. Informal sectors of the economy, including agriculture, are estimated to account for 22 percent of employment. According to the IMF and domestic experts, the informal economy is estimated at approximately 40 percent of the overall economy. In 2019 the government adopted an Action Plan for Combating the Informal Economy 2020-2021 which includes priorities such as improving, measuring and monitoring, raising public awareness of the negative impact to society, and strengthening the tax code. Despite the relatively high unemployment rate, foreign investors report difficulties in recruiting and retaining workers. Positions requiring technical and specialized skills can be especially difficult to fill due to a mismatch between industry needs, the educational system, and graduates’ aspirations. Many well-trained professionals with highly marketable skills, such as IT specialists, outsource to foreign companies or choose to work outside the country. To address shortages of factory workers, the government encourages the dispersal of labor-intensive manufacturing investments to different parts of the country, and companies often bus in workers from other areas. The Operational Plan for Active Programs and Measures for Employment and Services in the Labor Market for 2021 defines active government measures, programs, and services for self-employment and employment to stimulate job creation. The Plan also provides subsidies for new and existing jobs, internships, specialized skills training, vocational training for unemployed persons, and re-qualification or retraining. The Labor Law and accompanying measures do not discriminate against gender, rase or ethnicity. Relations between employees and employers are regulated by individual employment contracts, collective agreements, and labor legislation. The Law on Working Relations regulates all forms of employment relations between employees and employers to include retirement, lay-offs, and union operations. Severance and unemployment insurance are also covered by the same law. Most labor-related laws are in line with international labor standards and generally align with recommendations of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Labor laws apply to both domestic and foreign investments, including those in the free economic zones, and employees under each are equally protected. The Employment Agency ( http://www.av.gov.mk/home.nspx ) provides professional, organizational, administrative and other services related to employment and unemployment insurance and provides support, assistance and services to all stakeholders in the labor market. Employment of foreign citizens is regulated by the Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners: http://mtsp.gov.mk/content/pdf/zakoni/Zakon_vrabotuvanje_stranci_21715.pdf . There is no limitation on the number of employed foreign nationals or the duration of their stay. Work permits are required for foreign nationals, and an employment contract must be signed upon hiring. The employment contract, which must be in writing and kept on the work premises, should address the following provisions: description of the employee’s duties, duration of the contract (finite or indefinite), effective start and termination dates, workplace location, hours of work, rest and vacation periods, qualifications and training, salary, and pay schedule. The law establishes a 40-hour work week with a minimum 24-hour rest period, paid vacation of 20 to 26 workdays, and sick leave benefits. Employees may not legally work more than an average of eight hours of overtime per week over a three-month period, or 190 hours per year. According to the collective agreement for the private sector between employers and unions, employees in the private sector have a right to overtime pay at 135 percent of their regular rate. In addition, the law entitles employees who work more than 150 hours of overtime per year to a bonus of one month’s salary. Although the government sets occupational safety and health standards for employers, those standards are not enforced in the informal sector. The Law allows free associating in trade unions if workers agree to organize themselves in such a format. Trade unions are interest-based, legally autonomous labor organizations. Membership is voluntary, and activities are financed by membership dues. About 22 percent of legally employed workers are dues-paying union members. Although legally permitted, there are no unions in the factories operating in the free economic zones. Most unions, with exception of a few local branches, are generally not independent of the influence of government officials, political parties, and employers. There are two main associations of trade unions: The Union of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Each association is comprised of independent branch unions from the public and private sectors. Both associations, along with representatives from the Organization of Employers of North Macedonia and relevant government ministries, are members of the Economic – Social Council. The Council meets regularly to discuss issues of concern to both employers and employees, and reviews amendments to labor-related laws. The rights of workers in industrial divisions are regulated by National Collective Bargaining Agreements, and there are two on the national level—one for the public sector and one for the private sector. Only about 25 percent of the labor force is covered by these agreements. National collective agreements in the private sector are negotiated between representative labor unions and representative employer associations. The national collective agreement for the public sector is negotiated between the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and labor unions. Separate contracts are negotiated by union branches at the industry or company level. Collective bargaining agreements are most prevalent in the metal industry, private sector education, and court administration. An out-of-court mechanism for labor dispute resolution was introduced in 2015 with ILO assistance. North Macedonia’s labor regulations comply with international labor standards and are in line with the ILO. In 2018, the government adopted a number of changes to the Law on Labor relations, most of which related to workers’ rights in procedures for termination of work contracts, severance pay, and apprenticeships. http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/content/pdf/zakoni/2018/ZRO%20izmeni%202018.pdf 14. Contact for More Information Arben Gega Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy – Skopje Samoilova 21 1000 Skopje, Republic of North Macedonia Tel: +389 2 310 2403 E-mail: gegaa@state.gov Norway Executive Summary Norway is a modern, highly developed country with a small but very strong economy. Per capita GDP is among the highest in the world, boosted by decades of success in the oil and gas sector and other world-class industries like shipping, shipbuilding, and aquaculture. The major industries are supported by a strong and growing professional services industry (finance, ICT, legal), and there are emerging opportunities in fintech, cleantech, medtech, and biotechnology. Strong collaboration between industry and research institutions attracts international R&D activity and funding. Norway is a safe and straightforward place to do business, ranked 9 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, and fourth out of 180 on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Norway is politically stable, with strong property rights protection and an effective legal system. Productivity is significantly higher than the EU average. Norway has managed the coronavirus pandemic with relative success two years in, maintaining a low death rate, protecting health facilities’ capacity, and cushioning economic shocks. Swift implementation of social mobility restrictions, strong political unity, and broad public support were among the country’s key success factors. Norway’s solid financial footing, including fiscal reserves in its trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund and monetary policy maneuverability, enabled the government to finance generous support packages to mitigate the pandemic’s economic impact on workers and businesses. Norwegian lawmakers and businesses welcome foreign investment as a matter of policy and the government generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. Some restrictions exist on foreign ownership and use of natural resources and infrastructure. The government remains a major owner in the Norwegian economy and retains monopolies on a few activities, such as the retail sale of alcohol. While not a member of the European Union (EU), Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA, which also includes Iceland and Liechtenstein) with access to the EU single market’s movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. The Norwegian government continues to liberalize its foreign investment legislation with the aim of conforming more closely to EU standards and has cut bureaucratic regulations over the last decade to make investment easier. Foreign direct investment in Norway stood at USD 160 billion at the end of 2021 and has more than doubled over the last decade. There are approximately 8,100 foreign-owned companies in Norway, and over 700 U.S. companies have a presence in the country, employing more than 58,000 people. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 20 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 21.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 78,290 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Norwegian lawmakers and businesses welcome foreign investment as a matter of policy and the government generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. The Government established “Invest in Norway,” an official investment promotion agency, to help attract and assist foreign investors, including in the key offshore energy sector and in less developed regions such as northern Norway. While not a member of the European Union, Norway is an EEA signatory and continues to liberalize its foreign investment legislation to conform more closely to EU standards. Current laws, rules, and practices follow below. Norway’s investment policies vis-á-vis third countries, including the United States, will likely continue to be governed by reciprocity principles and by bilateral and international agreements. The European Economic Area (EEA) free trade accord, which came into force for Norway in 1995, requires the country to apply principles of national treatment to EU members and the other EEA members – Iceland and Liechtenstein – in certain areas where foreign investment was prohibited or restricted in the past. Norway’s investment regime is generally based on the national treatment principle, but ownership restrictions exist on some natural resources and on some activities (fishing/ maritime/ road transport). State ownership in companies can be used as a means of ensuring Norwegian ownership and domicile for these firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conducted an Economic Survey for Norway in 2022: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-norway-2022_df7b87ab-en The OECD also conducted a Peer Review of Norway in 2019: https://www.oecd.org/dac/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-norway-2019-75084277-en.htm The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review for Norway in 2018: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/S373.pdf Altinn.no is a web portal that serves as a one-stop shop for establishing a company and contains the necessary forms; it also provides an electronic platform for dialogue between the business/industry sector, citizens and other stakeholders, and government agencies. The business registration processes are straight-forward, complete, and open to foreign companies. Please note, however, that registration of Norwegian Registered Foreign Business Enterprises (NUF) cannot be done electronically. A guide for establishing a business is available at the following address: https://www.altinn.no/en/start-and-run-business/ The government does not directly incentivize outward investment. However, the Government of Norway (GON) acknowledges that for Norwegian companies to be successful, they need to grow in markets and economies that are larger than Norway, so the trade and investment promotion agency Innovation Norway has offices in key foreign markets, including four offices in the United States, in Houston, New York City, San Francisco and Washington D.C.. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, owns 1.4 percent of all listed companies in the world. 3. Legal Regime The transparency of Norway’s regulatory system is generally on par with that of the EU. Norway is obliged to adopt EU directives under the terms of the EEA accord in the areas of social policy, consumer protection, environment, company law, and statistics. The Norwegian Accounting Act requires, in line with EU Directive 2014/95/EU, Norwegian public companies and other large companies to publish annual reports on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors. In addition, ESG implementation is receiving increasing public attention and support, and companies with strong ESG profiles may experience a competitive advantage. All draft bills are made available for comment through a public consultation process. The Norwegian parliament, the Storting, exercises legislative power in Norway and must approve all formal laws (acts, directives, and regulations). Draft bills are available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/consultations/id1763/ Norwegian laws and regulations are available at: https://lovdata.no/info/information_in_english Norway’s public finances and debt obligations are transparent. The Government publishes the National Budget and revised budget on the website http://www.statsbudsjettet.no and an annual White Paper to Parliament on the State’s account: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/okonomi-og-budsjett/statlig-okonomistyring/statsregnskapet/id438868 . The Ministry of Finance has a webpage on Government debt: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/economic-policy/the-central-governments-outstanding-debt/id443404/ Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and as such implements applicable EU directives under the terms of the agreement. Norway is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The Norwegian legal system is similar to that of other Nordic countries but does not consist of a single comprehensive civil code. Norwegian law is based on the principle of freedom of contract, subject only to limited restrictions. Contracts, whether oral or written, are generally binding on the parties. Norway welcomes foreign investment as a matter of policy and generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. Ownership restrictions exist on some natural resources and on some activities (fishing/maritime road transport). A new National Security Act entered into force January 1, 2019, and provides the legal foundation for enhanced government screening of foreign investments based on national security concerns. Norway’s legal system is robust and trusted. Current legislation governing competition went into effect in 2004 and is enforced by the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA). Under the authority of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries the NCA is authorized to conduct non-criminal proceedings and impose fines, or “infringement fees,” for anti-competitive behavior. The size of the fees may vary according to a number of factors, including company turnover and severity of the offense. The 2004 legislation also empowers the NCA to halt mergers or acquisitions that threaten to significantly weaken competition. Companies planning such transactions are generally obliged by law to report their plans to the NCA, which may conduct a review. However, if the combined annual turnover in Norway does not exceed NOK 1 billion (USD 113 million) or the annual turnover of one of the companies is less than NOK 100 million (USD 11.3. million), notification is not required. There have been no cases of questionable expropriation in recent memory. Government takings of property are generally limited to non-discriminatory land and property condemnation for public purposes (road construction, etc.). The Embassy is not aware of any cases in which compensation has not been prompt, adequate, and effective. Norway has strong bankruptcy laws and is ranked 5 out of 190 for ease of “resolving insolvency” on the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report. According to the World Bank, the average duration for bankruptcy proceedings in Norway is half that of the OECD, at just under a year. A new temporary Restructuring Act entered into force on May 11, 2020, making the judicial restructuring process applicable to companies in financial difficulties. The Act, which was adopted in response to the economic consequences of the global Covid-19 pandemic, replaces the National Bankruptcy Act until 1 July 2023. The Storting hopes to enact permanent legislation based on the experience gained from this interim period. 4. Industrial Policies Norway’s SkatteFUNN research and development (R&D) tax incentive scheme is a government program designed to stimulate R&D in Norwegian trade and industry. Businesses and enterprises that are subject to taxation in Norway are eligible to apply for tax relief. For more information, see: https://www.oecd.org/sti/RDTax%20Country%20Profiles%20-%20NOR.pdf Norway has no foreign trade zones and does not contemplate establishing any. Norway generally does not impose performance requirements on foreign investors, nor offer significant general tax incentives for either domestic or foreign investors. There is an exception, however, for investments in sparsely settled northern Norway where reduced payroll taxes and other incentives apply. There are no free-trade zones, although taxes are minimal on Svalbard, a remote Arctic archipelago which is subject to special treaty provisions but administered by Norway. A state industry and regional development fund provides support (e.g., investment grants and financial assistance) for industrial development in areas with special employment difficulties or with low levels of economic activity. Norway does not require “forced localization” nor imposes requirements on data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights Norway recognizes secured interests in property, both movable and real. The system for recording interests in property is recognized and reliable. Norway maintains an open and effective legal and judicial system that protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of rights in property, including land, buildings, and mortgages. Norway adheres to key international agreements for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) (e.g., the Paris Union Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Copyright Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, and the Rome Convention). It has notified its main IPR laws to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Norway’s IPR statutes cover the major areas referred to in the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The chief domestic statutes governing IPR include: the Patents Act of December 15, 1967, as amended; the Designs Act of March 14, 2003; the Copyrights Act of May 12, 1961, as amended; the Layout-design Act of June 15, 1990, as amended; the Marketing Act of January 9, 2009; and the Trademarks Act of March 26, 2010. The above legislation also protects trade secrets and industrial designs, including semiconductor chip layout design. As a European Economic Area (EEA) member, Norway adopted legislation intended to implement the 2001 EU Copyright Directive, though subsequent court cases exposed shortcomings in the legislation (see below). 6. Financial Sector Norway has a highly computerized banking system that provides a full range of banking services, including internet banking. There are no significant impediments to the free market-determined flow of financial resources. Foreign and domestic investors have access to a wide variety of credit instruments. The financial regulatory system is transparent and consistent with international norms. The Oslo Stock Exchange, which was acquired by Europe’s largest stock exchange Euronext in 2019, facilitates portfolio investment and securities transactions in general. Norwegian banks are generally considered to be on a sound financial footing, and the banking sector holds around USD 530 billion in assets. Conservative asset/liquidity requirements limited the exposure of banks to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. The Ministry of Finance reduced the requirement for banks’ countercyclical capital buffer from 2.5 percent to 1 percent in March 2020 as part of the government’s economic response to COVID-19. Norges Bank’s (Norway’s Central Bank) Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee has advised the Ministry of Finance to raise the countercyclical capital buffer requirement to 1.5 percent, effective from June 30, 2022. The Ministry of Finance increased the systemic risk buffer requirement for banks from 3 percent to 4.5 percent from year-end 2020. Foreign banks have been permitted to establish branches in Norway since 1996. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), was established in 1990 and was valued at NOK 11.673 trillion (USD 1.356 trillion) at year-end 2021. The management mandate requires the fund to be invested widely, outside Norway. Petroleum revenues are invested in global stocks and bonds, and the current portfolio includes over 9,100 companies and approximately 1.4 percent of global stocks. The fund is invested across four asset classes. The fund aims to invest in most markets, countries, and currencies to achieve broad exposure to global economic growth. 41.6 percent of the fund’s investments in 2021 were in the United States, which is its single largest market. The fund plays an active role in its investments and aims to vote in almost all general shareholder meetings. In 2004, Norway adopted ethical guidelines for GPFG investments that prohibit investment in companies engaged in various forms of weapons production, environmental degradation, tobacco production, human rights violations, and what it terms “other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.” In March 2019 the GON announced that companies classified by index provider FTSE Russell as being in the subsector “0533 Exploration & Production” in the sector “0001 Oil & Gas” no longer would be part of the GPFG portfolio. Current holdings in these companies will be phased out over time. More broadly focused energy companies, which have investments in renewable and sustainable energy sources as well as oil & gas divisions, may still be included. The fund currently has over 174 companies on its exclusion and observation list, at least 45 of which are U.S. companies. The ethical guidelines also highlight seven focus areas in term of sustainability: children’s rights, climate change, water management, human rights, tax and transparency, anti-corruption, and ocean sustainability. The fund adheres to the Santiago Principles and is a member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government continues to play a strong role in the Norwegian economy through its ownership or control of many of the country’s leading commercial firms. The public sector accounts for nearly 66 percent of GDP. The Norwegian government is the largest owner in Norway, with ownership stakes in a range of key sectors (e.g., energy, transportation, finance, and communications). 74 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are managed directly by the relevant government ministries, and approximately 33 percent of the stock exchange’s capitalization is in government hands. State ownership in companies can be used as a means of ensuring Norwegian ownership and domicile for these firms. Norway is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a signatory to all relevant annexes. SOEs are thus covered under the agreement. Successive Norwegian governments have sustained stable levels of strong, transparent, and predictable government ownership. The former center-right government took limited steps to reduce ownership stakes. The GON publishes the annual state ownership report, available in English here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/business-and-industry/state-ownership/statlig-eierskap-publikasjoner/id737457/ and a white paper on state ownership in companies available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-8-20192020/id2678758 . Norway has no current plans to privatize any SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is very much part of Norwegian corporate and political consciousness. Significant attention has been given to ethical and sustainable business practices over the last several years; the GON has issued a series of white papers, most recently in 2015, on promoting human rights through foreign policy and foreign development assistance. In 2009, a white paper laid out responsibility of Norwegian businesses in the global economy and in 2006-2007, the GON set down guidelines for ethical and responsible conduct in state-owned enterprises, and incorporated climate policy, procurement policy, and development policy as parts of the GON’s broader CSR vision. As an OECD member, Norway adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Norway’s National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines raises awareness of the due diligence approach of the Guidelines and handles complaints against Norwegian businesses with international operations, in the event they are not behaving in accordance with the Guidelines. The NCP facilitates resolution of these complaints through dialogue and mediation. Kompakt is the Government’s consultative body on matters relating to CSR: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/business-cooperation-abroad/innsikt/kompakt_en/id633619/ The Norwegian Accounting Act requires companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange to provide a report on their policies and practices for corporate governance. The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, composed of nine independent organizations, issues and updates the Norwegian Code of Practice for the above-mentioned companies. Transparency and disclosure are key to the development of corporate social responsibility. Large enterprises are required under Section 3-3c of the Accounting Act to report on their CSR activities. Public disclosure requirements are increasingly regulated. The work of the EU in this area may lead to the development of regulations of relevance to Norway. In the mining sector, Norway encourages adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas and participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In order to prevent tax evasion and the use of tax havens to conceal financial information, large enterprises and public-interest entities that are active in the extractive industry or in the logging of primary forests are required to report on a country-by-country basis. In addition, Norway has entered into a number of new bilateral tax information exchange agreements in recent years. Norway is a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers, and a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . In 2021, Norway ranked 11th out of 34 countries in the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation’s (ITIF) Global Energy Innovation Index (GEII) which provides a multifaceted assessment of national contributions to the global clean energy innovation system. Norway aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 55 percent by 2030, and to become a low-emission country by 2050. To promote the implementation of Norway’s climate targets, the Climate Change Act was implemented in 2017 ( https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2017-06-16-60 ). The government implemented several initiatives to achieve its climate targets, some of which provide financial incentives to invest in green technologies: Norfund (Norway’s development finance organization): Enova: Innovation Norway: Nysnø Invest: Norwegian laws, regulations, and white papers on climate and environment can be accessed at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/id2000006/?topic=925 9. Corruption Business is generally conducted “above the table” in Norway, and Norway ranks fourth out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Corrupt activity by Norwegian or foreign officials is a criminal offense under Norway’s Penal Code. Norway’s anti-corruption laws cover illicit activities overseas, subjecting Norwegian nationals/companies who bribe officials in foreign countries to criminal penalties in Norwegian courts. In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an anti-corruption initiative, focused on limiting corruption in international development efforts. Norway is a member of the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption watchdog Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and ratified the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2004, without any reservations. Norway has ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention (2006) and is a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) (Mailing) Address: Postboks 2096 Vika, 0125 Oslo Telephone: +47 23 29 10 00 Email: post.okokrim@politiet.no Contact at “watchdog” organization: Guro Slettemark (Secretary General) Transparency International Norge Address: Kristian Augusts gate 14, 0164 Oslo Telephone: +47 908 74 626 E-mail: slettemark@transparency.no 10. Political and Security Environment Norway is a vibrant, stable democracy. Violent political protests or incidents are extremely rare, as are politically motivated attacks on foreign commercial projects or property. However, on July 22, 2011, a Norwegian individual motivated by extreme anti-Islam ideology carried out twin attacks on Oslo’s government district and on the Labor Party’s youth summer camp in Utøya, killing 77 people. The individual, now in prison, operated alone and this incident is not generally considered an indicator of increased political violence in the future. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Obtaining work permits for foreign labor, particularly for semi-skilled workers, can be cumbersome. Skilled and semi-skilled labor is usually available in Norway. The labor force as of year-end 2021 totaled about 2.917 million persons, representing 72.3 percent of the working-age population. 2.817 million persons were employed at year end 2021 (72.3% of male labor force and 67.3% of female labor force), with unemployment at 3.4 percent. Union membership is in excess of 1.94 million persons, 68 percent of the labor force. The unions are independent of the government but some, such as the largest (LO), have close and historic ties with the Labor Party. Norway has a highly centralized and constructive system of collective bargaining. The government may impose mandatory wage mediation should strikes threaten key sectors of the economy, particularly the oil and gas and transportation sectors. Mandatory wage mediation has been used 120 times since 1953, most recently in 2021 to end a strike among municipality workers ranging from nurses and teachers to janitors. Employee benefits are generous, e.g., one year paid parental leave (shared between parents, and financed chiefly by the government), and unemployment benefits for up to 104 weeks. There are special provisions for layoffs linked to lower activity for the employer. The average number of hours worked per week in one’s primary job, 33.6 in 2020, is the third lowest in the OECD, after the Netherlands and Denmark. Productivity, however, is high – significantly higher than the EU average. Sickness and absenteeism rates have been between 6-8 percent over the last decade and stood at 6.1 percent at the end of 2020. Relatively high disability rates, especially among young people, are a concern. Norwegian blue-collar hourly earnings are comparatively high. High wages encourage the use of relatively capital-intensive technologies in Norwegian industry. Top-level executives and highly skilled engineers, on the other hand, are generally paid considerably less than their U.S. counterparts, which, when combined with relatively high wages at the bottom of the wage scale, contributes to Norway’s very high level of income equality relative to other OECD countries. 14. Contact for More Information Stephen SCHLIEMAN Economic Officer Embassy of the United States of America Morgedalsvegen 36 0378 Oslo Norway +47 2130 8665 oslopolecon@state.gov Oman Executive Summary Oman’s location at the crossroads of the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and South Asia and in proximity to larger regional markets is an attractive feature for potential foreign investors. Some of Oman’s most promising development projects and investment opportunities involve its ports and free zones, most notably in Duqm, where the government envisions a 2,000 square-kilometer free trade zone and logistics hub. With a “friends of all, enemies of none” foreign policy, Oman does not face the external security challenges of some of its neighbors. Oman’s domestic political situation remains stable, despite increasing economic pressure and the need to create employment for young Omanis. Oman’s economy and government finances rely heavily on oil and gas revenue. High energy prices in 2022 are improving Oman’s economic prospects but will not immediately overcome the effects of years of relatively low energy prices, weak economic growth, budget deficits, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government announced a medium-term fiscal plan in November 2020 to fix its heavily indebted finances by cutting down on spending and raising revenues, primarily through taxes. Some of the measures negatively affected capital flow, and in an economy dependent on state spending the suspension or cancellation of government projects during Oman’s economic contraction further hit the struggling private sector. Government leadership recognizes these challenges and is working to improve Oman’s investment climate and to achieve its economic development goals under Oman’s Vision 2040 development plan. Omani Sultan Haitham bin Tarik al Said, who assumed the sultancy in January 2020, has prioritized foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction as an imperative to boost local job creation, particularly as COVID-19-related restrictions have loosened. Toward this end, Oman is in the process of developing further advantages for foreign investors, including a program of tax and fee incentives, permissions to invest in several new industries in the economy, expanded land use, increased access to capital, and labor and employment incentives for qualifying companies. In September 2021, Oman allowed expatriate residents with work visas to own residential units and offered long-term residency visas to attract investors. Five- and 10-year renewable residence visas are available to foreign investors in the tourism, real estate, education, health, information technology, and other key sectors. In March 2022, Oman announced that it would reduce the cost of foreign worker permit fees by up to 85 percent, reversing a hike in the fees it had implemented in June 2021 that some businesses had found problematic. The success of Oman’s reform efforts will depend on its ability to open key sectors to private sector competition and foreign investment, minimize bureaucratic red tape, pay off its overdue bills, balance its desire for “Omanization” with the realities of training and restructuring its work force, and translate its promises of economic reform into increased FDI flows and job creation. The government also needs to undertake more fundamental reforms for investment such as making its tender system transparent, increasing access to credit, and speeding up approvals for new businesses. Sultan Haitham and his government are actively courting FDI into many of its sectors. In February 2021, the Ministry of Finance signed three memoranda of understanding with the Saudi Fund for Development to finance several projects amounting to about $244 million. In January 2022, Oman also signed a Sovereign Investment Partnership with the United Kingdom, its largest FDI partner, to facilitate joint investments in both countries. Sultan Haitham and his government are also seeking to make fuller use of the 2009 U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA), under which U.S. businesses and investors have the right to 100-percent ownership of their companies and can import their products to Oman duty-free. U.S. companies operating in Oman sometimes raise concerns over a lack of clarity and consistency on business license and visa renewal criteria, as well as an increase in associated costs. The top complaints of businesses relate to requirements for hiring and retaining Omani national employees and a heavy-handed application of “Omanization” quotas. Payment delays to companies that completed work on government infrastructure projects are also a problem across various sectors. Smaller companies without in-country experience or a regional presence face considerable bureaucratic obstacles conducting business here. Beginning in 2020, the government also temporarily ceased the issuance of most new project awards and purchases to curb expenditures. Companies created under Oman’s new Foreign Capital Investment Law (FCIL), promulgated in 2020, have come under the government’s radar and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP) is re-evaluating investor visas that it issued in 2020. The FCIL removed minimum-share capital requirements and limits on the amount of foreign ownership in an Omani company. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 56 of 179 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 76 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 197 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD 14, 170 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Oman actively seeks foreign direct investment and is in the process of improving the regulatory framework to encourage such investments. The Foreign Capital Investment Law (FCIL) allowed 100-percent foreign ownership in most sectors and removed the minimum capital requirement. The law effectively provided all foreign investors with an open market in Oman, privileges already extended to U.S. nationals due to the provisions in the 2009 U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA), although the FTA goes further in providing American companies with national treatment. The Omani government’s “In-Country Value” (ICV) policy seeks to incentivize companies, both Omani and foreign, to procure local goods and services and provide training to Omani national employees. The government includes bidders’ demonstration of support for ICV as one factor in government tender awards. While the government initially applied ICV primarily to oil and gas contracts, the principle is now embedded in government tenders in all sectors, including transportation and tourism. New-to-market foreign companies, including U.S. firms, may find the bid requirements related to ICV prohibitive. With the implementation of the FTA in 2009, U.S. firms may establish and fully own a business in Oman without a local partner. Although U.S. investors are provided national treatment in most sectors, Oman has an exception in the FTA for legal services, limiting U.S. ownership in a legal services firm to no more than 70 percent. Foreign lawyers may not represent cases in Omani courts at any level. The government also has a “negative list” that restricts foreign investment to safeguard national security interests. The list includes some services related to radio and television transmission as well as air and internal waterway transportation. MOCIIP further extended this list to include approximately 70 sectors when the FCIL came into effect. Since late 2021, the government is employing stringent screening requirements for the issuance and renewals of investor visas, criteria which the government has not made public. U.S. investors raise concerns that these rules are neither consistent nor transparent, and result in a significant increase in renewals costs. Oman bans non-Omani ownership of real estate and land in various governorates and in some restricted areas. Non-Omanis can buy property only in designated areas called “Integrated Tourism Complexes” and in certain Ministry of Housing-designated multi-story, commercial and residential real estate buildings in Muscat, subject to eligibilities. Oman permits the establishment of real estate investment funds (REIFs) to encourage new inflows of capital into Oman’s property sector. Foreign investors, as well as expatriates in Oman, may own property units in REIFs. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review of Oman in November 2021. The 2021 report is not yet publicly available. The previous WTO Trade Policy Review was in April 2014 (Link to 2014 report: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp395_e.htm .) The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP) works to attract foreign investors and smooth the path for business formation and private-sector development. It works closely with government organizations and businesses in Oman and abroad to provide a range of business support. MOCIIP also offers a range of business investor advice geared to support foreign companies considering investment in Oman, based on company-specific needs and key target sectors that the country’s diversification program identifies. Oman’s “Invest in Oman” website ( https://investinoman.om ) provides information on Oman as a business location. MOCIIP has an online business registration site, known as “Invest Easy” ( business.gov.om ), through which businesses can obtain a Commercial Registration certificate from MOCIIP. MOCIIP can normally complete most registrations in approximately three or four business days; however, some commercial registration and licensing decisions may require the approval of multiple ministries and could take longer. The “Invest Easy” portal integrates several government agencies into a single portal and serves as a single window for businesses in Oman. The government neither promotes nor provides incentives for outward investment but does not restrict its citizens from investing abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Although Oman does not have a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States, the FTA contains a chapter governing investment. Oman has 28 BITs, with the following countries: Algeria, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Oman does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States, but it has signed double taxation treaties with 35 countries. More information can be found on Oman’s Tax Authority’s website: https://tms.taxoman.gov.om/portal/double-tax-agreements . Oman is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. In October 2021, Oman agreed that certain multinational enterprises (MNEs) will be subject to a minimum 15% tax rate, effective from 2023. 4. Industrial Policies Oman offers several incentives to attract foreign investors such as competitive lease rates for certain types of companies established in recognized industrial estates, free zones, and specific locations, but only on a case-by-case basis. Oman has no personal income tax or capital gains tax. However, some of Oman’s investment incentives, such as for reductions in utility rates, have diminished in recent years. Most industrial and commercial consumers now pay cost-reflective tariffs for utilities. Oman in recent years has also eliminated many tax exemptions for foreign investors. Oman taxes corporate earnings at 15 percent. The Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones (OPAZ) oversees the Special Economic Zone at Duqm, Almazuna Free Zone, Salalah Free Zone, Sohar Free Zone, and any other special zone or free zone in Oman to complement its port development projects in Duqm, Salalah, and Sohar. These areas include strategically located ports and are well connected with modern infrastructure and facilities. An incentive package for investors includes a tax holiday, duty-free treatment of all imports and exports, and tax-free repatriation of profits. Additional benefits include streamlined business registration, processing of labor and immigration permits, assistance with utility connections, and lower “Omanization” employment quota requirements. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Omani entities. Oman’s labor market policy of Omanization includes minimum employment quotas for Omani nationals. These quota targets vary depending on the sector; they can be as low as 10 percent in the Special Economic Zone at Duqm (SEZAD) and as high as 90 percent in the banking sector. Most government ministries have achieved Omanization rates at or near 100 percent. Omanization targets are prevalent throughout the private sector, but the government enforces them inconsistently. In practice, each company in Oman submits an Omanization plan to the Ministry of Labor (MoL), which has the authority to adjust required Omanization percentages. In response to the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the MoL adopted stronger measures to force companies to increase their employment of Omanis and to retain their Omani employees. Employers seeking to hire expatriate workers must seek a visa allotment from the MoL and Royal Oman Police (ROP). The MoL and ROP scrutinize visa allocations, often using opaque criteria. Foreign investors complain of the difficulty in hiring expatriates to the point that it deters companies from investing or expanding in Oman. The ROP allows expatriate workers to switch employers upon completion or termination of their employment contracts without the need to obtain a “no-objection” certificate (NOC) from their current employers. The MoL imposes a six-month ban on visas for expatriates in 87 job categories across 10 private sector industries. The MoL has extended the dates for this ban several times and periodically adds job categories to the visa ban. Oman has no requirements for companies to turn over source code or to provide access to surveillance. However, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) requires service providers to house servers in Oman if they are to provide services in Oman. The TRA is the lead agency on establishing data quotas in Oman. 5. Protection of Property Rights Oman does not recognize or enforce securitized interests in property, both moveable and real. Mortgages and liens exist in the country. Foreign nationals are generally not able to own real estate in Oman, other than residential property in so-called “integrated tourism complexes” — zoned areas that permit foreign nationals to own property on a freehold basis. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MHUP) allows foreign nationals to purchase units in multi-storied commercial and residential buildings under the usufruct system, with limitations. Individuals record their interest in property with the Land Registry at the MHUP. The legal system, in general, facilitates the acquisition and disposition of property rights. Certain lands are reserved for tribal use and ownership, but no clear definitions or regulations governing these lands prevail. These tribes legally own the land, as opposed to the government owning the land, and they therefore control access and any commercial activities on it. According to the World Bank, it takes 18 days on average to register property in Oman, and the cost of the registration process as a percentage of the property value (six percent) is on par with elsewhere the region. In 2019, the World Bank ranked Oman 57th in the world for registering property. Oman has a relatively robust legal and regulatory framework for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Oman is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. U.S. stakeholders have reported difficulty encouraging appropriate agencies, including the Consumer Protection Authority (CPA), the Public Prosecution, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP), and the Royal Oman Police, to take IPR enforcement action. Confusion sometimes exists over which government agencies are responsible for investigating different types of IPR violations. CPA officials have told U.S. officials that they do not accept responsibility for complaints arising from brand-owners; rather, they only act on consumer complaints. Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs officials have also confirmed that the Law of Copyrights and Neighboring Rights (Royal Decree No. 65/2008) stipulates that the MOCIIP shall be responsible for IPR enforcement at the retail level, including for inspections and seizures. Under its obligations as a signatory to the 2009 U.S.-Oman FTA (FTA), Oman offers IPR protection for copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, geographical indications, and patents. FTA-related revisions to IPR protection in Oman are strengthened by Oman’s passage of World Trade Organization-consistent intellectual property laws on copyrights, trademarks, industrial secrets, geographical indications, and integrated circuits. The FTA’s chapter on IPR can be found at: https://om.usembassy.gov/business/u-s-oman-free-trade-agreement/texts-free-trade-agreement/. Oman is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is registered as a signatory to the Madrid, Paris, and Bern conventions on trademarks and intellectual property protection. Oman has signed the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Oman is a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Trademark laws in Oman are compliant with Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). MOCIIP registers trademarks and notes them in the Official Gazette. Local law firms can assist companies with the registration of trademarks. Oman’s copyright protection law extends protection to foreign copyrighted literary, technical, or scientific works; works of the graphic and plastic arts; and sound and video recordings. In order to receive protection for a foreign-copyrighted work, the rights holder must register the work with the Omani government by depositing a copy of it with the government and paying a fee. Trademarks are valid for 10 years while patents are generally protected for 20 years. Literary works, software and audiovisual content receive protection for 50 years. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=OM . Ministry of Commerce and Industry – National Intellectual Property Office Eng. Khalid Al Hinai Director of the National Intellectual Property Office Tel: +968 2482 8126 Email: khdhinai@moci.gov.om Oman Chamber of Commerce & Industry Dr. Al Fadhil bin Abbas al-Hinai, CEO Tel: +968-2479- 9146 Fax: +968-2479-1713 E-mail: salehm@chamberoman.om Web: www.chamberoman.om U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Regional IP Attaché Pete C. Mehravari, Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi U.S. Department of Commerce Tel: +965 2259 1455 E-mail: Peter.mehravari@trade.gov Web: https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/intellectual-property-rights-ipr-attach-program/intellectual United States Trade Representative IPR Director for the GCC Jacob Ewerdt Tel: +1 (202) 395-9564 E-mail: Jacob.P.Ewerdt@ustr.eop.gov Web: http://www.ustr.gov U.S. Department of Commerce – International Trade Administration International Trade Specialist Drew Pederson Tel: +1-202-482-0879 E-Mail: Drew.Pederson@trade.gov Web: http://www.trade.gov 6. Financial Sector Oman has no restrictions on the flow of capital and the repatriation of profits. Foreigners may invest in the Muscat Stock Exchange so long as they do so through an authorized broker. Access to Oman’s limited commercial credit and project financing resources is open to Omani firms with foreign participation. As of 2022, the market does not have sufficient liquidity to allow for the entry and exit of sizeable amounts of capital. According to the 2020 annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions of the International Monetary Fund, Article VIII practices are reflected in Oman’s exchange system. The Commercial Companies Law requires the listing of joint stock companies with capital in excess of $5.2 million. The law also requires companies to exist for two years before their owners can float them for public trading. Publicly traded firms in Oman are still a relatively rare phenomenon; most businesses are private family enterprises. The banking system is sound and well capitalized with low levels of non-performing loans and generally high profits. Oman’s banking sector consists of 16 licensed local and foreign commercial banks, two specialized banks and eight Islamic commercial banks. Bank Muscat, the largest domestic bank operating in Oman, has $32.7 billion in assets. The Central Bank of Oman (CBO) is responsible for maintaining the internal and external value of the national currency. It is also the single integrated regulator of Oman’s financial services industry. The CBO issues regulations and guidance to all banks operating within Oman’s borders. Foreign businesspeople must have a residence visa or an Omani commercial registration to open a local bank account. Oman imposes no restrictions for foreign banks to establish operations in the country so long as they comply with CBO instructions. The Oman Investment Authority (OIA) is Oman’s principal Sovereign Wealth Fund. OIA is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. Omani law does not require sovereign wealth funds to publish an annual report or submit their books for an independent audit. The OIA focuses on two main investment categories: tradable public markets assets that include global equity, fixed income bonds and short-term assets; and non-tradable private markets assets, which include private investments in real estate, logistics, services, commercial, and industrial projects. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in many sectors in Oman, including oil and gas extraction, oil and gas services, oil refining, liquefied natural gas processing and export, manufacturing, telecommunications, aviation, infrastructure development, and finance. The government does not have a standard definition of an SOE but tends to limit its working definition to companies wholly owned by the government and more frequently refers to companies with partial government ownership as joint ventures. Almost all SOEs in Oman fall under the Oman Investment Authority (OIA). The government does not publish a complete list of companies in which it owns a stake. In theory, the government permits private enterprises to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with access to markets, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies, except in sectors deemed sensitive by the Omani government such as mining and telecommunications. SOEs purchase raw materials, goods, and services from private domestic and foreign enterprises. Public enterprises, however, have comparatively better access to credit. Board membership of SOEs is traditionally composed of various government officials, with a cabinet-level senior official usually serving as chairperson. Especially since the government reorganization began in August 2020, the government is making efforts to include private-sector officials on SOE boards. OIA has made efforts to enhance the efficiency and governance of SOEs, including by publishing audited financial statements, assessing each entity’s business strategy and public policy considerations, and mitigating financial exposures. OIA is developing a code of governance for SOEs. It restructured several companies under its supervision and formed new boards of directors drawing from both the public and private sectors. SOEs receive operating budgets, but, like budgets for ministries and other government entities, the budgets are flexible and not subject to hard constraints. The information that the Omani government published about its 2022 budget did not include allocations to and earnings from most SOEs. The Omani government has indicated that it hopes to reduce its budget deficits by privatizing or partially privatizing some state-owned enterprises. Although the plan for privatization is not publicly available, the Omani government has already reorganized some of its holdings for public offerings. In March 2020, for example, State Grid Corporation of China acquired a 49-percent stake in the Oman Electricity Transmission Company from Nama Holding, a government-owned holding company for five electricity transmission and distribution companies. The government’s divestment of a portion of its ownership in telecommunications firm Omantel is also an example of a partial privatization. In this case, the government in 2014 offered 19 percent of Omantel’s ownership as stock on the Muscat Stock Exchange, but only to Omani investors. The government today owns a 51-percent share of Omantel, according to the company’s website. The government allows foreign investors to participate fully in some privatization programs, including in drafting public-private partnership frameworks. In December 2021, the Ministry of Finance, which has the mandate to procure projects and services via the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) route, initiated the bidding process for its first PPP infrastructure project under the Law of Partnership between Public and Private Sectors (the PPP Law). 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is becoming increasingly prevalent among local and foreign companies operating in Oman, and several companies have dedicated CSR departments and programs. While CSR programs may differ, they invariably seek to engender goodwill in the communities they serve and to provide a social benefit. Examples include competitions in elementary and secondary schools for academic performance and artistic skill; sponsorship of charitable, academic, and social events; training programs; entrepreneurship incubators; and the organization of women’s or tribal empowerment events. The press covers consumer rights violations, mostly the sale of expired food or counterfeit medicine or car parts. A general culture of accountability is prevalent, as is a sense that companies who violate CSR tenets will suffer in business and market share. No independent consumer organizations that promote CSR exist. However, many business associations, including the Oman American Business Center (the local U.S. Chamber of Commerce affiliate), pursue CSR initiatives as a part of their annual activities. Companies generally follow CSR guidelines set forth by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Oman’s Council of Ministers directs state-owned companies to allocate a portion of their CSR budgets to support training programs and the employment of Omani citizens. Additionally, each government ministry has a department dedicated to facilitating CSR compliance and initiatives. The government has not waived regulations promoting CSR to attract foreign investment. In December 2021, MOCIIP issued a mandate instructing private companies to allocate 20 percent of their CSR budgets to the state-funded charitable organization, the Oman Charitable Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Oman does not have a “net zero” greenhouse gas emissions goal. Oman in 2019 adopted a National Strategy for Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change: 2020-2040. Oman has also included environmental indicators, such as the Environmental Performance Index, in its Vision 2040. Oman joined the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in 1994 and maintains and regularly updates a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. In July 2021, Oman submitted its second nationally determined contribution to the Paris Agreement on climate change (NDC). In the NDC, Oman targets a seven-percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions below projected levels by 2030. Oman’s second NDC does not explicitly reference private sector contributions, although some actions, such as reducing gas flaring and increasing renewable energy generation capacity, will fall on state-owned and private enterprise. Oman’s public procurement policies do not factor in any environmental considerations. Investment projects with the potential to cause pollution must conduct an environmental impact assessment and obtain a permit from the Environment Authority. Oman has several laws regulating pollution, including Ministerial Decree 41/2017 for air quality and Royal Decree 34/74 on marine pollution. 9. Corruption U.S. businesses do not generally identify corruption as one of the top concerns of operating in Oman. The Sultanate has the following legislation in place to address corruption in the public and private sectors: 1) The Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (the “Anti-Corruption Law” promulgated by Royal Decree 112/2011). The law predominantly concerns employees working within the public sector. It is also applicable to private-sector companies if the government holds at least a 40-percent share in the company, or in situations where a private-sector company engages in punishable offenses with government bodies or officials. 2) Minimum sentencing guidelines for public officials guilty of embezzlement are three years, per the Omani Penal Code. The definition of “public officials” includes officers of parastatal corporations in which the Omani government has at least a 40-percent controlling interest. The new penal code may make Oman seem more investment friendly, by virtue of modern references to corporations as legal entities, as an example. However, its language on money laundering remains ambiguous and descriptions of licit and illicit banking are unclear, potentially contributing to confusion about investment regulations. A lack of domestic whistleblower-protection legislation in Oman has resulted in the private sector taking the lead in enacting internal anti-bribery and whistleblowing programs. Omani and international companies doing business in Oman that plan to implement anti-corruption measures will likely find it difficult to do so without also putting in place an effective whistleblower-protection program and a culture of zero tolerance. Ministers are not allowed to hold offices in public shareholding companies or serve as the chairperson of a closely held company. However, many influential figures in government maintain private business interests and some are also involved in public-private partnerships. These activities either create or have the potential to create conflicts of interest. Oman’s Tender Law precludes Tender Board officials from adjudicating projects involving interested relatives to “the second degree of kinship.” Oman has stiff laws, regulations, and enforcement against corruption, and authorities have pursued several high-profile cases. The Courts have signaled that they will not tolerate corruption. In its annual report released in February 2021, the State Audit Institution (SAI) reported that, pursuant to its annual audit of government departments, Oman’s Public Prosecution sentenced several government employees to imprisonment, fines, dismissal from jobs and permanent bans on holding further public jobs due to charges of bribery. SAI reported 2,767 cases of administrative and financial irregularities in 2020, a 51-percent increase over 2019. Oman joined the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (the “UNCAC”) in 2013. Oman is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. State Audit Institution https://www.sai.gov.om/en/contactus.aspx Phone number: +968 8000 0008 Oman has no “watchdog” organizations that monitor corruption. 10. Political and Security Environment Oman is stable, and politically motivated violence is rare. Oman’s first head of state transition since 1970 occurred on January 11, 2020, with the peaceful rise to power of Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, in accordance with Oman’s Basic Law of the State. Omani law provides for limited freedom of assembly, and the government allows some peaceful demonstrations to occur. Oman experienced Arab Spring-related demonstrations in 2011. These were far smaller than in other Arab countries, although demonstrations in the northwestern Omani city of Sohar resulted in casualties, property destruction, and the blocking of pedestrian and vehicle access to the city’s port. In recent years, high youth unemployment has been among the Omani government’s most significant concerns, and the government prioritizes providing employment opportunities for Omani nationals. On regional security, Oman is committed to securing its border with Yemen, ensuring that Yemen’s instability does not affect Oman, countering illicit trade and terrorist travel, and supporting freedom of navigation through its strategic territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Oman’s labor market is a significant factor for foreign business and investors to consider. Sultan Haitham made clear in his first royal decrees and nationally televised speeches that addressing unemployment among Omani nationals would be a top priority. Unemployment figures in Oman vary, but the most severely impacted demographic is young men and women. No statistics about employment in the informal economy are available, but this sector is primarily limited to agriculture and fishing in rural areas. Omani national private sector employees often work in administrative or managerial roles carved out for them through Omanization. Most drivers and secretaries are required to be Omanis across all sectors. In general, a surplus of workers exists in desirable fields, such as information technology and engineering. A shortage of workers prevails in labor-intensive sectors, particularly construction, due to Omanization laws curbing the number of foreign workers who can be brought in to fill these roles. Foreign workers play a significant role in the Omani economy. Indians and Bangladeshis alone constitute approximately half of the workforce. Omani citizens enjoy a high degree of protection, making labor dispute resolution very difficult and lengthy. Both the Ministry of Labor (MoL) and the courts have broad powers to reinstate Omani national employees or mandate a severance package that provides pay for several months or, in some cases, several years. Foreign workers may also appeal termination to the MoL but they have less legal protection than Omani nationals. While unions are allowed to operate in the private sector, they are not very influential and do not engage in collective bargaining. Most unions only exist to ensure that employers provide government-mandated benefits to employees, such as required annual raises. Workers generally direct appeals for wage increases to the government. During the Arab Spring protests in 2011, the government passed a law increasing worker benefits. In May 2021, unemployed young Omanis protested in front of MoL offices in numerous cities, though not in Muscat, over job layoffs and unemployment. The largest was in the port city of Sohar, where Omani security forces dispersed protesters with tear gas and arrests. The demonstrations were the first significant protests under Sultan Haitham. Several small-scale protests over the lack of jobs, inadequate unemployment benefits, and recruitment policies have occurred outside MoL headquarters in Muscat and Salalah in past years. The Omani government takes public concern about unemployment very seriously. Oman is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Oman has ratified four of the eight core ILO standards, including those on forced labor, abolition of forced labor, minimum working age, and the worst forms of child labor. Oman has not ratified conventions related to freedom of association, collective bargaining, equal remuneration, or the conventions related to the elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occupation. The issue of forced labor remains a problem in Oman, but the government continues to demonstrate increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons. Expatriate workers can switch employers upon completion or termination of their employment contracts without the need to obtain a “no-objection” certificate (NOC) from their current employers. Government guidelines in place since 2020 bolster Omani nationals’ employment and authorize the termination of expatriate laborers in response to the economic slowdown. Oman’s new labor law, initially expected to be issued in April 2021, is delayed. Government officials have not shared publicly the contents of any proposed draft. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics According to the Oman’s National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI) — the only host-country source of foreign direct investment (FDI) data — total FDI in the Sultanate through the third quarter of 2021 was RO 16.43 billion, representing a 5.6-percent increase over the same period in 2020. FDI inflow at the end of the third quarter of 2020 stood at RO 0.88 billion ($2.29 billion). The United Kingdom remains by far the biggest investor in FDI (RO 8.3 billion – $21.6 billion), followed by the United States (RO 2 billion – $5.2 billion), UAE (1.2 billion – $3 billion), Kuwait (RO 914 million – $2.4 billion), and China (RO 773.4 million – $2 billion). Major foreign investors that have entered the Omani market that include SV Pittie Textiles (India), Moon Iron & Steel Company (India), Sebacic Oman (India), BP (UK), Sembcorp (Singapore), Daewoo (Korea), LG (Korea), Veolia (France), Huawei (China), SinoHydro (China), DEME (Belgium), ACME Group (India), Equinix (United States), Oracle (United States), and Vale (Brazil). Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $73,886 2020 $64,648 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A 2020 197 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -18 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 56.1 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI). Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment* Outward Direct Investment** Total Inward 42,739 100% Total Outward 16,764 100% United Kingdom 21,662 51% UAE 1,099 N/A% USA 5,247 12% Saudi Arabia 288 N/A% UAE 3,087 7% India 205 N/A% Kuwait 2,2,378 6% United Kingdom 77 N/A% China 2,011 5% Kuwait 77 N/A% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source for Host Country Data: National Centre for Statistical Analysis, 2021 Q3 (Inward). **2017 Q4 (Outward). Data on Oman from the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is not available. 14. Contact for More Information Economic & Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy, P.O. Box 202, Postal Code 115, MSQ, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman +968-2464-3623, muscatcommercial@state.gov Pakistan Executive Summary Pakistan has sought to foster inward investment, restructure tax collection, boost trade and investment, and fight corruption. It entered a $6 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program in July 2019, committing to carry out structural reforms that have been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In February 2022, the IMF Board authorized release of the latest tranche of the program, bringing the total disbursed to $3 billion. Nevertheless, progress has been slow in reforming taxation and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Pakistan has successfully tapped global bond markets three times since March 2021. Pakistan’s economy outperformed downbeat forecasts during the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP expanding 5.6 percent in FY 2021 (July 2020 – June 2021). Pakistan has made significant progress since 2019 in transitioning to a market-determined exchange rate. The current account deficit, on the decline through 2020, has increased substantially and constrains policy efforts. Rising inflation is another major constraint on policy, having risen in FY 2021 and reaching 13 percent in January 2022. While Pakistan has a nominally open foreign direct investment (FDI) regime, it remains a challenging environment for investors. The security situation has improved in recent years but remains dynamic, dispute resolution processes are lengthy, enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) is weak, taxation is inconsistent, and regulations vary across Pakistan’s provinces. Incoming FDI declined by 8.9 percent in FY 2021 compared to FY 2020, and levels of investment have historically lagged behind Pakistan’s regional peers. The Pakistani government updated its National Climate Change Policy and National Wildlife Policy in 2021, which address issues in water, agriculture, forestry, coastal areas, biodiversity, and vulnerable ecosystems. Pakistan also introduced the 2020-2023 National Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan, the 2020-2025 National Electric Vehicle Policy for 2-3 Wheelers and Commercial Vehicles, and the Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy in 2019. The United States has consistently been one of Pakistan’s largest sources of FDI. In FY 2021, the PRC was Pakistan’s number one source of new FDI, largely due to projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for which only PRC-approved companies could bid. Over the last three years, U.S. companies have pledged more than $1.5 billion of investment in Pakistan. American companies have profitable operations across a range of sectors, notably fast-moving consumer goods, agribusiness, and financial services. Other sectors attracting U.S. interest include franchising, information and communications technology (ICT), renewable energy, and healthcare services. The Karachi-based American Business Council, a local affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has 61 U.S. member companies, most of which are Fortune 500 companies and span a wide range of sectors. The Lahore-based American Business Forum, with 23 founding members and 22 associate members, also helps U.S. investors. The U.S.-Pakistan Business Council, a division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supports U.S.-based companies who do business with Pakistan. In 2003, the United States and Pakistan signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as the primary vehicle to address impediments to bilateral trade and investment flows and to grow commerce between the two economies. In March 2022, the United States and Pakistan held TIFA intersessional talks. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 99 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 256 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/pakistan World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1416.1 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Pakistan seeks inward investment to boost economic growth, particularly in the energy, agribusiness, information and communications technology, and industrial sectors. Since 1997, Pakistan has established and maintained a largely open investment regime. Pakistan introduced an Investment Policy in 2013 that further liberalized investment policies in most sectors to attract foreign investment and signed an economic co-operation agreement with China, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in April 2015. CPEC Phase I, which concluded in late 2019, focused primarily on infrastructure and energy production. CPEC Phase II, which is ongoing, is reportedly pivoting away from infrastructure development to mainly promote Pakistan’s industrial growth by establishing special economic zones throughout the country. The PRC has also pledged to provide $1 billion in socio-economic initiatives focused on agriculture, health, education, poverty alleviation, and vocational training by 2024. However, progress on Phase II is significantly delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal constraints, and regulatory issues. The government took almost two years to pass legislation formalizing the CPEC Authority (a centralized federal body charged with overseeing CPEC implementation across the country). Some opportunities are only open to approved Chinese companies, and CPEC has ensured those projects and their investors receive authorities’ attention. To support its Investment Policy, Pakistan also has implemented sectoral policies designed to provide additional incentives to investors in those specific sectors. The Automotive Policy 2016, Export Enhancement Package 2019, Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy 2019, Merchant Marine Shipping Policy 2019 (with 2020 updates), the Electric Vehicle Policy 2020-2025, the Textile Policy 2021 (which took over two years for final approval), and then Prime Minister Imran Khan’s reform package for IT sector development (announced in February 2022) are a few examples of sector-specific incentive schemes. Sector-specific incentives typically include tax breaks, tax refunds, tariff reductions, the provision of dedicated infrastructure, and investor facilitation services. The last Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF) – which lays out the government’s broad trade policy outlooks and priorities – expired in 2018; the Cabinet approved an updated STPF 2020-25 in November 2021. Following the expiration, incentives introduced through STPF 2015-18 remained in place until the updated STPF came into effect. Nonetheless, foreign investors continue to advocate for Pakistan to improve legal protections for foreign investments, protect intellectual property rights, and establish clear and consistent policies for upholding contractual obligations and settlement of tax disputes. The Foreign Private Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FPIPPA), 1976, and the Furtherance and Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, provide legal protection for foreign investors and investment in Pakistan. The FPIPPA stipulates that foreign investment will not be subject to higher income taxes than similar investments made by Pakistani citizens. All sectors and activities are open for foreign investment unless specifically prohibited or restricted for reasons of national security and public safety. Specified restricted industries include arms and ammunitions; high explosives; radioactive substances; securities, currency and mint; and consumable alcohol. There are no restrictions or mechanisms that specifically exclude U.S. investors. Pakistan’s investment promotion agency is the Board of Investment (BOI). BOI is responsible for attracting investment, facilitating local and foreign investors, implementation of projects, and enhancing Pakistan’s international competitiveness. BOI assists companies and investors who seek to invest in Pakistan and facilitates the implementation and operation of their projects. BOI is not a one-stop shop for investors, however. Pakistan pursues investor retention through “business dialogues” such as webinars and seminars with existing and potential investors. BOI plays the leading role in initiating and managing these dialogues. However, Pakistan does not have a dedicated ombudsman’s office focused on investment retention. Foreigners, other than Indian and Israeli citizens/entities, can establish, own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of businesses in Pakistan, excepting those involved in arms and ammunitions; high explosives; radioactive substances; securities, currency and mint; and consumable alcohol. There are no restrictions or mechanisms that specifically exclude U.S. investors. There are no laws or regulations authorizing domestic private entities to adopt articles of incorporation discriminating against foreign investment. Pakistan does not place limits on foreign ownership or control. The 2013 Investment Policy eliminated minimum initial capital requirements across sectors so that there is no minimum investment requirement or upper limit on the allowed share of foreign equity, with the exception of investments in the airline, banking, agriculture, and media sectors. Waiver to these limits require approval from the cabinet and prime minister. Foreign investors in the services sector may retain 100 percent equity, subject to obtaining permission, a “no objection certificate,” and license from the concerned agency, as well as fulfilling the requirements of the respective sectoral policy. In the education, health, and infrastructure sectors, 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed, while in the agriculture sector, the threshold is 60 percent, with an exception for corporate agriculture farming, where 100 percent ownership is allowed. Small-scale mining valued at less than PKR 300 million (roughly $1.7 million) is restricted to Pakistani investors. Foreign banks may establish locally incorporated subsidiaries and branches, provided they have $5 billion in paid-up capital or belong to one of the regional organizations or associations to which Pakistan is a member (e.g., Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)). Absent these requirements, foreign banks are limited to a 49-percent maximum equity stake in locally incorporated subsidiaries. There are no restrictions on payments of royalties and technical fees for the manufacturing sector, but there are restrictions on other sectors, including a $100,000 limit on initial franchise investments and a cap on subsequent royalty payments of 5 percent of net sales for five years. Royalties and technical payments are subject to remittance restrictions listed in Chapter 14, Section 12 of the SBP Foreign Exchange Manual (http://www.sbp.org.pk/fe_manual/index.htm). Pakistan maintains investment screening mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. The BOI is the lead organization for such screening. Pakistan blocks foreign investments where the screening process determines the investment could negatively affect Pakistan’s national security. Though BOI is the official lead agency for investment screening mechanism, they lack in-house capacity for running such screenings and rely heavily on intelligence agencies for the required due diligence. Pakistan has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past three years. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is the leading civil society think tank in Pakistan and in 2020 reported on “excessive regulations” as the key barrier to attracting more foreign investment. Details are at https://sdpi.org/excessive-regulations-hurdle-to-foreign-investment/news_detail. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (SDPI), a public sector think tank, produced a report in 2021 on reasons Pakistan has attracted less investment than China or India. Details are at https://pide.org.pk/research/why-do-we-have-less-investment-than-china-and-india/. The Board of Investment’s “Doing Business Reform Strategy 2018-21” is the national roadmap for improving Pakistan’s investment climate. In last few years, the government has simplified pre-registration and registration facilities and automated land records to simplify property registration, eased requirements for obtaining construction permits and utilities, introduced online/electronic tax payments, and facilitated cross-border trade by expanding electronic submissions and processing of trade documents. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) manages company registration, which is available to both foreign and domestic companies. Companies first provide a company name and pay the requisite registration fee to the SECP. They then supply documentation on the proposed business, including information on corporate offices, location of company headquarters, and a copy of the company charter. Both foreign and domestic companies must apply for national tax numbers with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to facilitate payment of income and sales taxes. Industrial or commercial establishments with five or more employees must register with Pakistan’s Federal Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) for social security purposes. Depending on the location, registration with provincial governments may also be required. The SECP website (https://www.secp.gov.pk/) offers a Virtual One Stop Shop (OSS) where companies can register with the SECP, FBR, and EOBI simultaneously. The OSS can be used by foreign investors. Pakistan does not promote or incentivize outward investment. While Pakistan does not explicitly restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, cumbersome and time-consuming approval processes, involving multiple entities including the SBP, SECP, and the Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, discourage outward investments. Despite those processes, larger Pakistani corporations have made investments in the United States in recent years. 3. Legal Regime Pakistan generally lacks transparency and effective policies and laws that foster market-based competition in a non-discriminatory manner. The Competition Commission of Pakistan has a mandate to ensure market-based competition, but laws and regulations are opaque, vary among provinces, and are sometimes applied to benefit domestic businesses. All businesses in Pakistan are required to adhere to certain regulatory processes managed by the chambers of commerce and industry. Rules, for example on the requirement for importers or exporters to register with a chamber, are equally applicable to domestic and foreign firms. To date, Post is not aware of incidents where such rules have been used to discriminate against foreign investors in general or U.S. investors specifically. The Pakistani government is responsible for establishing and implementing legal rules and regulations, but sub-national governments have a role as well depending on the sector. Prior to implementation, non-government actors and private sector associations can provide feedback to the government on regulations and policies, but governmental authorities are not bound to follow their input. Regulatory authorities are required to conduct in-house post-implementation reviews of regulations in consultation with relevant stakeholders. However, these assessments are not made publicly available. Since the 2010 introduction of the 18th amendment to Pakistan’s constitution, which delegated significant authorities to provincial governments, foreign companies must comply with provincial, and sometimes local, laws in addition to federal law. Foreign businesses complain about the inconsistencies in the application of laws and policies from different regulatory authorities. There are no rules or regulations in place that discriminate specifically against U.S. firms or investors, however. The SECP is the main regulatory body for foreign companies operating in Pakistan, but it is not the sole regulator. Company financial transactions are regulated by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), labor by Social Welfare or the Employee Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI), and specialized functions in the energy sector are administered by bodies such as the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), and Alternate Energy Development Board (AEDB). Each body has independent management, but all must submit draft regulatory or policy changes through the Ministry of Law and Justice before any proposed rules or regulations may be submitted to parliament or, in some cases, the executive branch. The SECP is authorized to establish accounting standards for companies in Pakistan, however, execution and implementation of those standards is poor. Pakistan has adopted most, though not all, International Financial Reporting Standards. Though most of Pakistan’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, execution and implementation is inefficient and opaque. The Pakistani government requires companies to provide environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures on their projects in country, but there is no single regulatory mechanism or central regulation for such requirements. For instance, companies must work with the Ministry of Climate Change on environmental disclosures; the EOBI on social disclosures, such as those that concern pensions; and SECP on governance disclosures. However, implementation and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for such requirements are weak and opaque. Most draft legislation is made available for public comment but there is no centralized body to collect public responses. The relevant authorities, usually the responsible ministry for proposed legislation, gathers public comments as it deems necessary; otherwise, the government submits legislation directly to the legislative branch. For business and investment laws and regulations, the Ministry of Commerce relies on stakeholder feedback obtained from chambers and associations – such as the American Business Council (ABC) and Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OICCI) – rather than publishing regulations online for public review. There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. Different regulators publish their regulations and implementing actions on their respective websites. In most cases, regulatory implementing actions are not published online. Businesses impacted by non-compliance with government regulations may seek relief from the judiciary, Ombudsman’s offices, and the Parliamentary Public Account Committee. These forums are designed to ensure the government follows required administrative processes. Pakistan did not announce any enforcement reforms during the last year. Pakistan is in the process of updating its IPR laws to make them consistent and to improve IPR enforcement through draft amendments on trademark, patent, and copyright legislation. If drafted according to international IP treaties, and fully implemented, updated laws can improve IPR enforcement in Pakistan and boost foreign investor willingness to bring innovations to Pakistan. Enforcement processes are legally reviewable – initially by specialized IP Tribunals, but also through the High and Supreme Courts of Pakistan. Few of these processes are digitalized. The government publishes limited debt obligations in the budget document in two broad categories: capital receipts and public debt, which are published in the “Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts.” These documents are available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/, https://www.fbr.gov.pk/, and http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/index2.asp . The government does not publicly disclose the terms of bilateral debt obligations. Pakistan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). However, there is no regional cooperation between Pakistan and other member nations on regulatory development or implementation. Pakistan’s judicial system incorporates British standards. As such, most of Pakistan’s regulatory systems use British norms to meet international standards. Pakistan has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1, 1995, and provides most favored nation (MFN) treatment to all member states, except India and Israel. In October 2015, Pakistan ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Pakistan is one of 23 WTO countries negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement. Pakistan notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, albeit at times with significant delays. Most international norms and standards incorporated in Pakistan’s regulatory system, including commercial matters, are influenced by UK law. Laws governing domestic or personal matters are strongly influenced by Islamic Sharia law. Regulations and enforcement actions may be appealed through the court system. The Supreme Court is Pakistan’s highest court and has jurisdiction over the provincial courts, referrals from the federal government, and cases involving disputes among provinces or between a province and the federal government. Decisions by the courts of the superior judiciary (the Supreme Court, the Federal Sharia Court, and five High Courts – Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court, Balochistan High Court, Islamabad High Court, and Peshawar High Court) have national standing. The lower courts are composed of civil and criminal district courts, as well as various specialized courts, including courts devoted to banking, intellectual property, customs and excise, tax law, environmental law, consumer protection, insurance, and cases of corruption. Pakistan’s judiciary is influenced by the government and other stakeholders. The lower judiciary is influenced by the executive branch and seen as lacking competence and fairness. It currently faces a significant backlog of unresolved cases. Pakistan’s Contract Act of 1872 is the main law that regulates contracts with Pakistan. British legal decisions, under some circumstances, are also cited in court rulings. While Pakistan’s legal code and economic policy do not discriminate against foreign investments, enforcement of contracts remains problematic due to a weak and inefficient judiciary. Theoretically, Pakistan’s judicial system operates independently of the executive branch. Although higher courts are widely viewed as credible, lower courts are often considered corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from outside influences including the executive branch, the military, and other prominent figures. As a result, there are doubts concerning the competence, fairness, and reliability of Pakistan’s judicial system. In addition, concern over potential contempt of court proceedings inhibits businesses and the public from reporting on perceived weaknesses of the judicial system. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable. Specialized tribunals and departmental adjudication authorities are the primary forum for such appeals. Decisions made by a tribunal or adjudication authority may be appealed to a high court and then to the Supreme Court. Pakistan’s investment and corporate laws permit wholly owned subsidiaries with 100 percent foreign equity in most sectors of the economy. In the education, health, and infrastructure sectors, 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed. In the agricultural sector, the threshold is 60 percent, with an exception for corporate agriculture farming, where 100 percent ownership is allowed. Most foreign companies operating in Pakistan are “private limited companies,” which are incorporated with a minimum of two shareholders and two directors registered with the SECP. While there are no regulatory requirements on the residency status of company directors, the chief executive must reside in Pakistan to conduct day-to-day operations. If the chief executive is not a Pakistani national, she or he is required to obtain a multiple-entry work visa. Corporations operating in Pakistan are statutorily required to retain full-time audit services and legal representation. Corporations must also register any changes to the name, address, directors, shareholders, CEO, auditors/lawyers, and other pertinent details to the SECP within 15 days of the change. To address long process delays, in 2013, the SECP introduced the issuance of a provisional “Certificate of Incorporation” prior to the final issuance of a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC). The certificate of incorporation includes a provision noting that company shares will be transferred to another shareholder if the foreign shareholder(s) and/or director(s) fails to obtain a NOC. No new law, regulation, or judicial decision was announced or went into effect during the last year which would be significant to foreign investors. There is no “single window” website for investment in Pakistan which provides direct access to all relevant laws, rules, and reporting requirements for investors. Established in 2007, the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) is designed to ensure private and public sector organizations are not involved in any anti-competitive or monopolistic practices. Complaints regarding anti-competitive practices can be lodged with CCP, which conducts the investigation and is legally empowered to impose penalties; complaints are reviewable by the CCP appellate tribunal in Islamabad and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The CCP appellate tribunal is required to issue decisions on any anti-competitive practice within six months from the date in which it becomes aware of the practice. As of early 2022, the CCP was investigating a cement sector cartel; it found that cement manufacturers in Pakistan established a cartel and kept prices at an artificially high level, raising excess revenues worth $250 million, but its review was not yet final. In 2021, the CCP also conducted an inquiry into sugar prices and submitted a report to the Prime Minister’s office, with the Federal Investigation Agency tasked to follow up on the inquiry. However, to date no action has been taken on the report’s findings. The CCP has also conducted an inquiry regarding the banking sector on the charges of forming a cartel to bid up interest rates for public sector debt. The CCP generally adheres to transparent norms and procedures. Agency decisions are reviewable by the CCP appellate tribunal and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Two Acts, the Protection of Economic Reforms Act 1992 and the Foreign Private Investment Promotion and Protection Act 1976, protect foreign investment in Pakistan from expropriation, while the 2013 Investment Policy reinforced the government’s commitment to protect foreign investor interests. Pakistan does not have a strong history of expropriation. Pakistan does not have a single, comprehensive bankruptcy law. Foreclosures are governed under the Companies Act 2017 and administered by the SECP, while the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1962 governs liquidations of banks and financial institutions. Court-appointed liquidators auction bankrupt companies’ property and organize the actual bankruptcy process, which can take years to complete. On average, Pakistan requires 2.6 years to resolve insolvency issues and has a recovery rate of 42.8 percent. Pakistan was ranked 58 of 190 for ease of “resolving insolvency” rankings in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report. The Companies Act 2017 regulates mergers and acquisitions. Mergers are allowed between international companies, as well as between international and local companies. In 2012, the government enacted legislation for friendly and hostile takeovers. The law requires companies to disclose any concentration of share ownership over 25 percent. Pakistan has no dedicated credit monitoring authority. However, SBP has authority to monitor and investigate the quality of the credit commercial banks extend. 4. Industrial Policies The government’s investment policy provides both domestic and foreign investors the same incentives, concessions, and facilities for industrial development. Though some incentives are included in the federal budget, the government relies on Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) – ad hoc arrangements implemented through executive order – for industry specific taxes or incentives. The government does not offer research and development incentives. Nonetheless, certain technology-focused industries, including information technology and solar energy, benefit from a wide range of fiscal incentives. Pakistan does not currently provide formal investment incentives such as grants, tax credits or deferrals, access to subsidized loans, nor reduced cost of land to individual foreign investors, including underrepresented groups such as women. In general, the government does not issue guarantees nor jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. The government made an exception for CPEC-related projects and provided sovereign guarantees for the investment and returns, along with joint financing for specific projects. To encourage use of electrical vehicles (EV), the Government of Pakistan incentivized imports of EVs via the Electric Vehicles Policy 2020-2025 as completely built up (CBU)/finished vehicles and EV specific parts in complete knock down (CKD)/unassembled vehicles. Incentives include rebates on customs duties, regulatory duties, exemptions from sales tax, and lower tariff rates. (Note: The Electric Vehicles Policy has been implemented following the Cabinet approval on December 21, 2021. End Note.) The government issued the Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy (2019) to boost the share of electricity generated from renewable sources from around 5 percent to 20 percent by 2025 and to 30 percent by 2030 (60 percent, including hydropower). The policy aims to achieve these targets by offering fiscal incentives to alternative and renewable energy projects. Key features of the policy include waiving import duties for imported plants and machinery by an existing or new industrial concern for manufacturing. The policy also exempts renewable energy projects from corporate income taxes to incentivize new projects. Interest in establishing solar and wind projects in Pakistan remains domestic driven. Feed-in-tariffs were used under the old renewable energy policy of 2006 to attract renewable energy projects; under the new policy the government must announce competitive auctions. Domestic companies remain keen to participate in future auctions to develop greenfield solar and wind power projects. In addition, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has a Green Banking initiative aimed at including environmental considerations in banking products, services, and operations. As part of this initiative, the SBP issued the Financing Scheme for Renewable Energy on June 20, 2016, with a view to promote renewable energy projects in the country. The scheme can be financed by all commercial banks and development finance institutions (DFIs). Prospective sponsors wanting to set up renewable energy power projects with a capacity up to 50MW – provided the projects are approved by the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) – can borrow up to PKR 6 billion (about $33 million) for a single renewable energy project for 12 years. The mark-up rate on this scheme is capped and fixed at 6 percent per annum. Despite the SBP program, commercial banks remain risk averse to financing smaller residential and commercial business loans as they find the process cumbersome, not very profitable, and lacking guarantees. To boost exports, the government established fiscal and institutional incentives for export-oriented industries who located operations in Export Processing Zones (EPZ), the first of which was established in Karachi in 1989. Subsequently, EPZs were established in Risalpur, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Saindak, Gwadar, Reko Diq, and Duddar. However, today, only Karachi, Risalpur, Sialkot, and Saindak EPZs remain operational. These zones offer investors tax and duty exemptions on equipment, machinery, and materials (including components, spare parts, and packing material); indefinite loss carry-forward; and access to the EPZ Authority (EPZA) “Single Window,” which facilitates import and export authorizations. The 2012 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, amended in 2016, allows both domestically focused and export-oriented enterprises to establish companies and public-private partnerships within SEZs. According to the Pakistan’s 2013 Investment Policy, any manufacturer that introduces technologies that are unavailable in Pakistan can receive the same incentives available to companies operating in Pakistan’s SEZs. Pakistan has a total of 23 designated SEZs. All investors in SEZs are offered a number of incentives, including a ten-year tax holiday, one-time waiver of import duties on plant materials and machinery, and streamlined utilities connections. Despite these benefits to both foreign and domestic firms, Pakistan’s SEZs have struggled to attract investment due their lack of basic infrastructure. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Peshawar Economic Zone Office opened in 2020 an Industrial Facilitation Center to provide potential investors with a one-stop shop for existing and new foreign investors. Pakistan also intends to establish nine SEZs under CPEC; those SEZs remain in nascent stages of development and currently lack basic infrastructure. Apart from SEZ-related incentives, the government offers special incentives for Export-Oriented Units (EOUs) – a stand-alone industrial entity exporting 100 percent of its production. EOU incentives include duty and tax exemptions for imported machinery and raw materials, as well as the duty-free import of vehicles. EOUs are allowed to operate anywhere in the country. Pakistan provides the same investment opportunities to foreign investors and local investors. Foreign investors are allowed to sign technical agreements with local investors without disclosing proprietary information. Foreign investors are not required to use domestic content in goods or technology or hire Pakistani nationals, either as laborers or as representatives on the company’s board of directors. There are no specific performance requirements for foreign entities operating in the country. Similarly, there are no special performance requirements on the basis of origin of the investment. However, onerous requirements exist for foreign citizen board members of Pakistani companies, including additional documents required by the SECP as well as vetting by the Ministry of Interior. Such requirements discourage foreign nationals from becoming board members of Pakistani companies. There are no specific performance requirements and/or investment incentives. In the ICT sector, there are currently no requirements for foreign providers to disclose source code or provide access to encryption. However, the Government of Pakistan has plans to introduce regulations requiring such disclosure. Currently Pakistan does not restrict data transfer outside of the economy or country’s territory except when involving the banking industry. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) requires financial institutions to have local data storage and any transfer of data outside of Pakistan requires formal approval from SBP. Currently, Pakistan is in the process of approving a “personal data protection” bill, and in 2020 approved and in 2021 began implementing the “Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Content Rules.” Each requires data localization and requires platforms with more than 500,000 Pakistani users to register with the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and establish a physical office in Pakistan within nine months of the implementation of the rules. Within three months of the local office’s establishment, a person must be appointed for coordination, and a data server system must be set up within 18 months. The rules are also slated to be applied to internet service providers. All companies and providers are instructed to restrict content contrary to the “security, prestige, and defense of the country.” The government agencies involved are: the State Bank of Pakistan, the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority. 5. Protection of Property Rights Although Pakistan’s legal system includes the enforcement of property rights and both local and foreign owner interests, it offers incomplete protection for the acquisition and disposition of real property. There is no data with respect to the percentage of land with clear title, and land title problems are common. Except for the agricultural sector, where foreign ownership is limited to 60 percent, no specific regulations regarding the leasing of land or acquisition by foreign or non-resident investors exists. Corporate farming by foreign-controlled companies is permitted if the subsidiaries are incorporated in Pakistan. There are no limits on the size of corporate farmland holdings, and foreign companies can lease farmland for up to 50 years, with renewal options. Mortgages and liens exist, but there are no reliable recording systems. The absence of a centralized system to record mortgages and lien frequently create legal issues for determining property rights. The 1979 Industrial Property Order safeguards industrial property in Pakistan against government use of eminent domain without sufficient compensation for both foreign and domestic investors. The 1976 Foreign Private Investment Promotion and Protection Act guarantees the remittance of profits earned through the sale or appreciation in value of property. Though protections exist for the legal purchase of land, land titles – even for unoccupied land – remain a challenge. Improvements to land titling have been made by the Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial governments, which have dedicated significant resources to digitizing land records. In the newly merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, land rights are held collectively by the tribes, not privately by individuals, and there are functionally no ownership records. However, the provincial government is currently undertaking a long-term land registration process in the newly merged districts for tribally owned land. In urban centers, undocumented possession of unoccupied land (squatting) is widespread. If an owner can prove that the land was acquired through legitimate means, government agencies are generally supportive of taking possession of their property. The Government of Pakistan has identified protecting intellectual property (IP) rights as a reform priority and has taken concrete steps over the last two decades to strengthen its IP regime. In 2005, Pakistan created the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) to consolidate government control over trademarks, patents, and copyrights. IPO’s mission also includes coordinating and monitoring the enforcement and protection of IPR through law enforcement agencies. Enforcement agencies include the local police, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), customs officials at the FBR, the CCP, the SECP, the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP), and the Print and Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). IPO’s creation consolidated policymaking, but confusion surrounding enforcement agencies’ roles still constrains IP enforcement and IP rights holders struggle to elicit action against infringements. Although IPO established ten enforcement coordination committees to improve IP enforcement, and has signed MOUs with the FBR, CCP, Collective Management Office, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, and SECP to share information, coordination is insufficient and cumbersome. Weak penalties and agency redundancies allow counterfeiters to evade punishment, and rights holders are often unclear on the correct forum in which to file a complaint. The IPO as an institution has historically suffered from leadership turnover, limited resources, and a lack of government attention. Since 2016, the Government of Pakistan has taken steps to improve the IPO’s effectiveness, starting with bringing IPO under the administrative responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce. The IPO Act 2012 stipulates a three-year term, 14-person policy board with at least five seats dedicated to the private sector. Section 8(2) of the IPO Act also stipulates, “the board shall meet not less than two times in a calendar year.” However, the IPO Policy Board only met just once in 2021 after holding no meetings in 2020. The board members completed their three-year tenure in June 2021. In February 2022, the Ministry of Commerce nominated a new chairman and the other positions on the 14-person policy board. IPO is severely under-resourced in human capital; only 50 percent of its approved staffing positions are filled. Filling the remaining positions has been on hold since 2019, pending Ministry of Law approval of IPO’s rules and new hiring procedures. The IPO is also responsible for raising public awareness of IPR issues in collaboration with the private sector. COVID-19 has slowed IPO momentum in this area. In 2021, the IPO held just 15 webinars and virtual interactions, down from more than 100 in-person seminars in 2019 (pre-pandemic). A significant portion of IPO’s events focused on Pakistan’s new Geographical Indication (GI) Law. Academics and private attorneys who follow IPR issues say the creation of the IPO has enhanced public awareness, albeit slowly. While difficult to quantify, contacts have also observed increased local demand for IPR protections, including from small businesses and startups. Many Pakistani educational institutions rarely include IPR in their curricula and lack an established culture of commercializing innovations or garnering respect for IP. However, over the past several years, over 65 Offices of Research, Innovation, and Commercialization (ORICs) have been established and received technical assistance regarding identifying, evaluating, protecting, and commercializing university-developed IP. In addition, the International Islamic University now includes an IPR-specific course in its curriculum and Lahore University of Management Sciences has IPR courses included in its MBA program’s curriculum. IPO officials have expressed interest in collaborating further with Pakistani universities to raise IPR awareness. IPO has been working with the Higher Education Commission to offer IPR curricula at other universities but has achieved limited traction. Private and public sector contacts highlighted that the educational system is a “missing link” in IPR awareness and enforcement. In collaboration with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Technology Innovation Support Centers have been established at 47 different universities in Pakistan. In 2016, Pakistan established three specialized IP tribunals: one in Karachi covering the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan; one in Lahore covering Punjab; and one in Islamabad covering Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan. IPO had initiated a plan to create additional tribunals in 2019, however, the proposal is awaiting approval from the Ministry of Law. These tribunals have not been a priority in terms of assigning judges. They have experienced high turnover, as judges do not find IP tribunals an attractive posting, and the assigned judges do not receive any specialized technical training in IP law. Mission Pakistan, in coordination with the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), has provided technical assistance to IP tribunal judges since 2016. However, the high turnover of IP tribunal judges has limited the effectiveness of these capacity-building programs. Moreover, higher court justices, who often lack expertise in IP law, often overrule IP tribunal decisions by issuing injunctions overriding IP tribunal enforcement orders. Since the inception of the IP tribunals, no significant ruling by an IP tribunal has been implemented nor ultimately enforced. Pakistan’s IPR legal framework remains inadequate. Pakistan’s IP legal framework consists of 40-year-old subordinate IP laws on copyright, patents, and trademarks alongside the 2012 IPO Act. The IPO Act provides the overall legal basis for IP licensing and enforcement while subordinate laws apply to specific IP fields, but inconsistencies in the laws make IP enforcement difficult. Since 2000, Pakistan has made piecemeal updates to IPR laws in an incomplete bid to bring consistency to IPR treatment within the legal system. With the help of Mission Pakistan, CLDP, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), IPO is updating Pakistan’s IPR laws to minimize inconsistencies and improve enforcement, but progress has been slow. As of January 2022, three new draft amendments – one each on trademark, patent, and copyright – were at various stages of review. IPO is also revising patent legislation to incorporate clauses that would allow Pakistan to eventually accede to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT); the IPO plans to submit the revised version to the Commerce Ministry for further approvals by mid-2022. On the draft copyright amendment, as of January 2022 the IPO was collecting private sector feedback with a goal to submit the amendment to the of Commerce Ministry by the end of 2022 On May 24, 2021, Pakistan acceded to the Madrid Protocol on Trademarks, and as of mid-January 2022, Pakistan received more than 600 applications under the protocol. The IPO also expressed its intention to accede to the Marrakesh Treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), as well as the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. No substantive progress has been made to date to prepare Pakistan for accession to these treaties. Mission Pakistan continues to support capacity building and awareness efforts through ongoing programming with a variety of Pakistani entities. In 2021, USPTO and CLDP continued to include IPR engagement virtually as part of their technical assistance programming in Pakistan. In 2021, examples of such programming included a USPTO-CLDP virtual program on counterfeit medicines (with three multi-phase modules already completed and a fourth being planned in 2022). USPTO and CLDP also provided Trademark Examination Training to increase the knowledge and skills of IPO’s examiners. Pakistan is currently on the Office of the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report Watch List. Pakistan does not track and report on its seizures of counterfeit goods. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: John Cabeca Intellectual Property Counselor for South Asia U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Foreign Commercial Service email: john.cabeca@trade.gov website: https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-attache-program tel: +91-11-2347-2000 For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Pakistan’s three stock exchanges (Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi) merged to form the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) in January 2016. As a member of the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges and the South Asian Federation of Exchanges, PSX is also an affiliated member of the World Federation of Exchanges and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Per the Foreign Exchange Regulations, foreign investors can invest in shares and securities listed on the PSX and can repatriate profits, dividends, or disinvestment proceeds. The investor must open a Special Convertible Rupee Account with any bank in Pakistan in order to make portfolio investments. In 2017, the government modified the capital gains tax and imposed a 15 percent tax on stocks held for less than 12 months, 12.5 percent on stocks held for more than 12 but less than 24 months, and 7.5 percent on stocks held for more than 24 months. The 2012 Capital Gains Tax Ordinance appointed the National Clearing Company of Pakistan Limited to compute, determine, collect, and deposit the capital gains tax. The SBP and SECP provide regulatory oversight of financial and capital markets for domestic and foreign investors. Interest rates depend on the reverse repo rate (also called the policy rate). Pakistan has adopted and adheres to international accounting and reporting standards – including IMF Article VIII, with comprehensive disclosure requirements for companies and financial sector entities. Foreign-controlled manufacturing, semi-manufacturing (i.e. goods that require additional processing before marketing), and non-manufacturing concerns are allowed to borrow from the domestic banking system without regulated limits. Banks are required to ensure that total exposure to any domestic or foreign entity should not exceed 25 percent of a bank’s equity. Foreign-controlled (minimum 51 percent equity stake) semi-manufacturing concerns (i.e., those producing goods that require additional processing for consumer marketing) are permitted to borrow up to 75 percent of paid-up capital, including reserves. For non-manufacturing concerns, local borrowing caps are set at 50 percent of paid-up capital. While there are no restrictions on private sector access to credit instruments, few alternative instruments are available beyond commercial bank lending. Pakistan’s domestic corporate bond, commercial paper and derivative markets remain in the early stages of development. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the central bank of Pakistan. According to the most recent statistics published by the SBP (2021), only 23 percent of the adult population uses formal banking channels to conduct financial transactions, while 24 percent are informally served by the banking sector. The remaining 53 percent of the adult population do not utilize formal financial services. Women are more likely to be unbanked than men. Pakistan’s financial sector has improved in recent years according to international banks and lenders. The SBP’s most recent review of the banking sector, in July 2021, noted improving asset quality, stable liquidity, robust solvency, and a slow pick-up in private sector advances. The asset base of the banking sector expanded by 12.2 percent during 2021 due to a surge in banks’ deposits and investments, which increased by 10.4 percent and 18.7 percent respectively. The five largest banks, one of which is state-owned, control 57.8 percent of all banking sector assets. SBP conducted the 8th wave of the Systemic Risk Survey in July 2021. The survey results indicated respondents perceived key risks for the financial system to be mostly exogenous and global in nature. Importantly, the policy measures rolled out by SBP to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 have been very well received by the stakeholders. The risk profile of the banking sector remained satisfactory, and moderation in profitability and asset quality improved as non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans (infection ratio) was at 8.9 percent at the end of FY 2021 (June 30, 2021). In FY 2021, total assets of the banking industry were estimated at $165.7 billion and net non-performing bank loans totaled approximately $5 million. The penetration of foreign banks in Pakistan is low, making a small contribution to the local banking industry and the overall economy. According to a study conducted by the World Bank Group in 2018 (the latest data available), the share of foreign bank assets to GDP stood at 3.5 percent while private credit by deposit stood at 15.4 percent of GDP. Foreign banks operating in Pakistan include Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank, Deutsche Bank, Samba Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of Tokyo, and the Bank of China. International banks are primarily involved in two types of international activities: cross-border flows, and foreign participation in domestic banking systems through brick-and-mortar operations. SBP requires foreign banks to hold at minimum $300 million in capital reserves at their Pakistani flagship location and maintain at least an 8 percent capital adequacy ratio. In addition, foreign banks are required to maintain the following minimum capital requirements, which vary based on the number of branches they are operating: 1 to 5 branches: $28 million in assigned capital; 6 to 50 branches: $56 million in assigned capital; Over 50 branches: $94 million in assigned capital. Foreigners require proof of residency – a work visa, company sponsorship letter, and valid passport – to establish a bank account in Pakistan. There are no other restrictions to prevent foreigners from opening and maintaining a bank account. Pakistan does not have its own sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and no specific exemptions for foreign SWFs exist in Pakistan’s tax law. Foreign SWFs are taxed like any other non-resident person unless specific concessions have been granted under an applicable tax treaty to which Pakistan is a signatory. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Pakistan has 212 SOEs operating in various sectors: 85 commercial SOEs, 83 subsidiaries of those commercial SOEs, and 44 non-commercial SOEs (defined as not-for-profits, trusts, universities, training institutions, and welfare funds). The commercial SOEs mainly operate in seven sectors: power; oil and gas; infrastructure, transport, and communication; manufacturing, mining, and engineering; finance; industrial estate development and management; and wholesale, retail, and marketing. They provide stable employment and other benefits for more than 450,000 workers, but a number require annual government subsidies to cover their substantial losses. Three of the country’s largest SOEs include: Pakistan Railways (PR), Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), and Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM). According to the IMF, the total debt of SOEs amounts to 2.3 percent of GDP – just over $7 billion in 2019. Note: IMF and WB data for 2020-21 regarding SOEs is not yet available, however, according to SBP provisional data from December 2021, the total debt of Pakistani SOEs is $8.59 billion. End Note. The IMF required audits of PIA and PSM by December 2019 as part of Pakistan’s IMF Extended Fund Facility. PR is the only provider of rail services in Pakistan and the largest public sector employer with approximately 90,000 employees. PR has received commitments for $8.2 billion in CPEC loans and grants to modernize its rail lines. PR relies on monthly government subsidies of approximately $2.8 million to cover its ongoing obligations. In 2019, government payments to PR totaled approximately $248 million. The government provided a $37.5 million bailout package to PR in 2020. The Government of Pakistan extended bailout packages worth $89 million to PIA in 2019 and $250 million in 2021. Established to avoid importing foreign steel, PSM has accumulated losses of approximately $3.77 billion per annum. The government has provided $562 million to PSM in bailout packages since 2008. In September 2020, Pakistan’s Cabinet approved a $124 million restructuring plan of PSM, offering its employees a Voluntary Separation Scheme to Cut Losses. The company loses $5 million a week, and has not produced steel since June 2015, when the national gas company shut off supplies to PSM facilities due to its greater than $340 million in outstanding unpaid utility bills. SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages from the host government. Two prominent examples are carrier PIA and steelmaker PSM, which operate at a loss while receiving financial bailouts from the federal government. Post is not aware of negative impacts to U.S firms as a result. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) introduced corporate social responsibility (CSR) voluntary guidelines in 2013. Adherence to the OECD guidelines is not known. Terms to purchase public shares of SOEs and financial institutions are the same for both foreign and local investors. On March 7, 2019, the government announced plans to carry out a privatization program but postponed plans because of significant political resistance. Even though the government is still publicly committed to privatizing its national airline (PIA), the process has been stalled since early 2016 when three labor union members were killed during a violent protest in response to the government’s decision to convert PIA into a limited company, a decision which would have allowed shares to be transferred to a non-government entity and pave the way for privatization. A bill passed by the legislature requires the government retain 51% equity in the airline in the event it is privatized, reducing the attractiveness of the company to potential investors. The Privatization Commission describes the privatization process as transparent and non-discriminatory; the process described at http://privatisation.gov.pk/?page_id=88. A description of privatization transactions since 1991 is at http://privatisation.gov.pk/?page_id=125 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is no unified set of standards defining responsible business conduct (RBC) in Pakistan. Though large companies, especially multi-national corporations, exhibit awareness of RBC standards, broader awareness is lacking. The Pakistani government has not established standards or strategic documents specifically defining RBC standards and goals. The Ministry of Human Rights published its most recent “Action Plan for Human Rights” in May 2017. Although it does not specifically address RBC or business and human rights, one of its six thematic areas of focus is implementation of international and UN treaties. Pakistan is signatory to nearly all International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. International organization, civil society, and labor union contacts all note that there is a lack of adequate implementation and enforcement of labor laws. Some NGOs, worker organizations, and business associations are working to promote RBC, but not on a wide scale. According to NGOs, international organizations, and civil society contacts, children continued to work in conditions of forced and bonded labor. In rural areas, forced child labor appeared to occur most frequently in the agriculture and brick making industries. Pakistan does not have domestic measures which require supply chain due diligence for companies sourcing minerals originating from conflict-affected areas. In 2021, DOL started a pilot project to support tracing in supply chains for cotton in Punjab. It does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and/or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . The Pakistani government updated its National Climate Change Policy and National Wildlife Policy in 2021. These policies address sectoral issues in water, agriculture, forestry, coastal areas, biodiversity, and other vulnerable ecosystems. Pakistan also introduced the 2020-2023 National Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan, the 2020-2025 National Electric Vehicle Policy for 2-3 Wheelers and Commercial Vehicles, and the Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy in 2019. Pakistan submitted its revised National Determined Contribution (NDC) in October 2021 and has pledged to cut methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030 . Pakistan has not announced a net-zero year for carbon emissions, but aims to reduce total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50 percent by 2030 emissions versus a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Under the revised target, the share of renewables in power generation will increase from 30 to 60 percent, relying primarily on hydroelectric generation. Additionally, the 2021 NDC’s targets included: a 30 percent increase in the share of electric vehicles (from 0 to 30 percent), a moratorium on new investments in coal power plants and prohibition of coal imports starting in 2030, and the expansion of nature-based solutions (NbS) to sequester CO2 through reforestation and afforestation programs. The Pakistani government shelved two CPEC coal power projects of 2,400 MW at Muzaffargarh and Rahim Yar Khan in favor of 3,700 MW of hydropower projects in Kohala, Suki Kinari and Karot in KPK and Punjab. However, in 2021, the government rescinded tax exemptions on renewable technologies, instituting a 20 percent tax on the imports of solar panels and wind turbines and increasing sales tax for imported electric vehicles from 5 percent to 17 percent. Given Pakistan’s limited fiscal and financial means, the government cannot deliver on its climate commitments without additional external financing. The federal government encourages the private sector’s role in implementing its climate ambition developing NbS to address Pakistan’s mitigation and adaptation needs. Pakistan established a Public Private Partnership Authority (PPPA) in 2017 with a mandate to develop, procure, and implement infrastructure projects focused on adaptation and mitigation on a public-private partnership basis. However, engagement with the private sector is confined mostly to the energy sector. With support from GIZ, the government conducted a four-year campaign, “RBF Off-Grid Electrification Project,” to encourage private sector investment, supporting eight private sector companies to finance off-grid solar installation at 1,700 households in Sindh and Punjab. In 2016, the State Bank of Pakistan introduced a Financing Scheme for Renewable Energy to make financing available for consumers in the private sector to invest in renewable electricity generation. Till February 2022, SBP has provided PKR 74 billion (about $400 million) in financing to over 1,175 projects with a combined capacity of 1,375 MW in renewable energy. The Pakistani government is working to institute market- and non-market-based approaches to diversify its climate funding, including nature performance bonds, green/blue bonds, and carbon pricing. However, those are still in the formative stage. In 2021, the government secured a “letter of Intent” with bilateral creditors – Canada, the UK, and Germany – on working on nature performance bonds. Through these, a mechanism will be devised through which funding will be released to Pakistan in exchange for supporting biodiversity conservation. In May 2021, the Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda) launched its first “green” Eurobond, the Indus bond, a 10-year, $500 million bond with at a 7.5 percent interest rate, for the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand dams. The federal government’s flagship programs on environmental conservation are focused on adaptation: the “Ten Billion Tree Tsunami” (afforestation), the “Protected Areas Initiative” (a national parks system), the “Clean Green Pakistan” movement (building parks, managing solid waste, and improving sanitation), and a nominal ban on plastic bags piloted in Islamabad and then adopted by Punjab and Sindh. The government has adopted an electric vehicle (EV) policy that lowers the GST on EVs for buyers, offers lower financing rates for manufacturers, and establishes targets for EV charging infrastructure, and mandates that 30 percent of new car sales by 2030, and 90 percent of new sales by 2040 be EVs. The government has also adopted the Euro-5 emission standards and converted 11,000 traditional brick kilns to use emissions-reducing zig-zag technology. The SBP approved “green banking” guidelines in 2017 to promote environmental risk management by commercial banks and to encourage the use of climate financing. The federal government’s public procurement rules are silent on environmental concerns, but the National Planning Commission’s guidelines on federal government projects requires environmental impact assessments prior to project commencement. In practice, environmental assessments in Pakistan are pro forma exercises with scant follow up or enforcement. 9. Corruption Pakistan ranked 140 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. The organization noted significant and persistent corruption within Pakistan due to gaps in accountability and enforcement of penalties, along with the lack of merit-based promotions and relatively low salaries. Bribes are classified as criminal acts under the Pakistani legal code and are punishable by law, but are widespread across most levels of government. While higher courts are widely viewed as credible, lower courts are generally considered corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from prominent wealthy, religious, political, and military figures. Political interference in judicial appointments increases the government’s influence over the court system. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Pakistan’s anti-corruption body, suffers from insufficient funding and professionalism, and is viewed by many as politically biased. NAB prosecutions alleging bureaucratic malfeasance deter agencies from acting on legitimate regulatory concerns affecting the business sector. Justice (R) Javed Iqbal Chairman National Accountability Bureau Ataturk Avenue, G-5/2, Islamabad +92-51-111-622-622 chairman@nab.gov.pk Ms. Yasmin Lari Chair Transparency International 5-C, 2nd Floor, Khayaban-e-Ittehad, Phase VII, D.H.A., Karachi +92-21-35390408-9 ti.pakistan@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Despite improvements to the security situation in recent years, the presence of foreign and domestic terrorist groups within Pakistan continues to pose threats to U.S. interests and citizens. Many multinational companies operating in Pakistan employ private security and risk management firms to mitigate the significant threats to their business operations. Although the number of attacks by terrorist groups has declined over the last decade, increased activity since 2021 has renewed security concerns in some regions. Baloch militant groups continue to target the Pakistani military as well as PRC-affiliated installations in Balochistan, where Gwadar port is being developed under CPEC. There are greater security resources and infrastructure in the major cities, particularly Islamabad, and security forces in those areas may be better able to respond to emergencies. The BOI, along with provincial investment promotion agencies, can coordinate airport-to-airport security and secure lodging for foreign investors. To inquire about this service, investors can contact the BOI for additional information – https://www.invest.gov.pk/ Abductions/kidnappings of foreigners for ransom remains a concern. While security challenges exist in Pakistan, the country has not grown increasingly politicized or insecure in the past year. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to Pakistan’s most recent labor force survey (conducted in 2017-2018), the civilian workforce consists of approximately 65.5 million workers. Women are far under-represented in the formal labor force. The survey estimated overall labor participation at approximately 45 percent, with male participation at 68 percent and females at 20 percent. The largest percentage of the labor force works in the agricultural sector (38.5 percent), followed by the services (37.84 percent), and industry/manufacturing (16 percent) sectors. Although the official unemployment rate hovered at roughly 6 percent pre-COVID-19, the figure is likely significantly higher. Additionally, there are as-yet no reliable unemployment statistics since the COVID-19 outbreak. A large share of workers is in the informal sector, with over 32 percent of Pakistan’s GDP represented by the informal economy, according to estimates from the World Bank’s most recent Informal Economy Database. In 2019, the ILO reported informal workers have limited access to labor welfare services. A Labor Force Survey from 2017-18 cites higher rates of informal sector employment in rural areas than in urban areas. Occupational health and safety laws and inspections do not apply to the informal sector. In 2018, the UN Population Fund estimated that 29 percent of Pakistan’s population was between the ages of 10 and 24 and, according to 2017-18 labor force survey estimates, unemployment for those between the ages of 15 and 24 was 10.5 percent. Pakistan has a complex system of labor laws. According to the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, jurisdiction over labor matters is managed by the provinces. Each province is in the process of developing its own labor law regime. They are currently at different stages of labor law development, but none have been finalized yet. State administrators, workers in state-owned enterprises and export-processing zones, and public-sector workers are prohibited by federal law from engaging in collective bargaining or striking. Nevertheless, there have been numerous strikes at state-owned enterprises, typically opposing privatization. Provincial laws covering industrial relations also limit strikes and lockouts. Neither the federal or provincial governments effectively enforce applicable labor laws, and the penalties for violating those laws were not commensurate with laws involving the denial of civil rights. Most unions functioned independently of government and political party influence. Labor leaders raised concerns regarding employers who sponsor management-friendly or only-on-paper worker unions – so-called yellow unions – to prevent effective unionization. There were no reported cases of the government dissolving a union without due process, however unions can be administratively “deregistered” without judicial review. Although freedom of association is guaranteed under Article 17 of Pakistan’s Constitution, the ILO indicates that the Pakistani state and employers have used “disabling legislation and repressive tactics” to make union formation and collective bargaining “extremely difficult.” A report compiled by ILO in 2018 noted there were a total of 7,906 registered trade unions with a total membership of 1,414,160. However, this may underreport the actual figure because it pertains to the number of members declared at the time of union registration. As membership grows over time, provincial labor departments and the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) do not regularly update their records. According to worker representative organizations, the estimated unionized workforce is approximately two million, which would represent roughly 3 percent of the total workforce in Pakistan. Provincial labor departments are responsible for managing trade union and industrial labor disputes. Each province has its own industrial relations legislation, and each has labor courts to adjudicate disputes. Recent strikes have been spearheaded by public sector workers such as teachers and public health workers. Labor NGOs assisted workers by providing technical training and capacity-building workshops to strengthen labor unions and trade organizations. They also worked with established labor unions to organize workers in the informal sector and advocated policies and legislation to improve the rights, working conditions, and wellbeing of workers, including laborers in the informal sector. The minimum wage as set by the federal government was 20,000 rupees (about $110) per month, which exceeded its definition of the poverty line income for an individual, which was 9,500 Pakistani rupees (about $52) per month. The minimum wage was also greater than the World Bank’s estimate for poverty level income. However, minimum wage laws did not cover significant sectors of the labor force, including workers in the informal sector, domestic servants, and agricultural workers. In addition, enforcement of minimum wage laws was uneven. Legal protections for laborers are uneven across provinces, and implementation of labor laws is weak nationwide. Labor inspectorates have inadequate resources, which lead to inadequate frequency and quality of labor inspections. Some labor courts are reportedly corrupt and biased in favor of employers. Pakistani labor laws generally do not cover domestic workers, including child domestic workers. In 2020, the Pakistani government amended the Employment of Children Act 1991 to include child domestic labor as hazardous work. While the decision applies only to the Islamabad Capital Territory, provinces can adopt the measure via a provincial assembly resolution. The federal government is currently conducting a child labor survey; the first results for Gilgit-Baltistan were published on October 27, 2021, and reported child labor prevalence in the province at 13.1 percent, with 1 in 7 children working. The remaining provincial survey reports are expected to be completed in 2022. The ILO’s 2016-2020 Pakistan Decent Work Country Program states that “exploitative labor practices in the form of child and bonded labor remain pervasive…” and notes “the absence of reliable and comprehensive data to accurately assess the situation of hazardous child labor, worst forms of child labor, or forced labor.” The report also identifies weak compliance with, and enforcement of, labor laws and regulations as contributing to poor working conditions – including unhealthy and unsafe workplaces –and the erosion of worker rights. Nationwide, health and safety standards were poor in multiple sectors and failed to meet international standards. In 2019, the Punjab Provincial Assembly passed the Punjab Domestic Workers Act 2019. The law prohibits the employment of children under age 15 as domestic workers and stipulates that children between 15 and 18 may only perform part-time, non-hazardous household work. The law also mandates a series of protections and benefits, including limits to the number of hours worked weekly, and paid sick and holiday leave. In 2017 the Sindh Provincial Assembly passed the Sindh Prohibition of Employment of Children Act, 2017. In April 2021, the Balochistan Assembly passed the Balochistan Forced and Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act 2021 and the Balochistan Employment of Children (Prohibition & Regulation) Act 2021. The Abolition Act banned hazardous work for children below 14 years of age and established a Committee on the Rights of the Child to oversee its implementation. It also made it a punishable offense to employ adolescents above 14 years of age in hazardous work if they are not paid wages equal to adults. In 2019, pursuant to resolution adopted by the Balochistan Assembly aimed at eradicating child labor in coal mines, the Balochistan government banned employment of children under the age of 15 in coal mines via a notification to the provincial chief inspector of Mines. In August 2021, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assembly passed the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Home Based Workers (Welfare and Protection) Act, 2021, which prohibits children under the age of 14 from engaging in domestic and forced labor. Pakistan is a labor exporter, particularly to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. According to Pakistan’s Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment’s 2020 “Export of Manpower Analysis,” (the latest report available) the bureau had registered more than 11 million Pakistanis going abroad for employment since 1971, with more than 96 percent traveling to GCC countries. Pakistanis working overseas have sent more than $20 billion in remittances each year since 2015. Despite the negative impacts of COVID-19, which resulted in many overseas Pakistanis returning to Pakistan since January 2021, formal remittances from overseas Pakistani workers increased by 24.9 percent during the first six months of FY 2021 compared to the corresponding period of 2020. Overall, Pakistan’s workforce is insufficiently skilled. Federal and provincial government initiatives such as the National Vocational and Technical Training Commission and the Punjab government’s Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority aim to increase the employability of the Pakistani workforce. However, the ILO’s most recent 2016-2020 Pakistan Decent Work Country Program finds that neither national nor provincial policies for skills and entrepreneurship development are consistently applied. The ILO report notes that “a small fraction of vulnerable workers are covered by social security in one form or another, while access to comprehensive social protection systems is also limited.” The ILO’s 2016 Decent Work Country Profile, the latest data available, states that in 2015, only 9.4 percent of the economically active population – excluding public sector employees – were contributing to formal social security systems such as old age, survivors’, and disability pensions. Pakistan remains a beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program as well as the EU’s GSP+ program, both of which require labor standards to be upheld. 14. Contact for More Information Jane J. Park Economic Officer – Trade and Investment Embassy Islamabad +92 51 201 4000 ParkJJ2@state.gov Palau Executive Summary The Republic of Palau is a small island nation of about 350 islands in the western Pacific Ocean, with an estimated population of about 21,000 people. The government is the country’s largest employer, with approximately 30 percent of the workforce, and the tourism sector is Palau’s biggest economic driver, contributing an estimated 40 percent to GDP. GDP in 2021 was $257 million, approximately $14,243 per capita. Palau’s official currency is the U.S. dollar, and the country has three FDIC–insured U.S. banks. Apart from tourism, commercial industries include wholesale/retail trade, business services, commercial fisheries, and construction. Fish, coconuts, breadfruit, bananas, and taro cultivation constitute the subsistence sector, though the country’s agricultural base is small. Palau has a limited export base and production capacity, thus highly vulnerable to external shocks. Primary exports include frozen fish (tuna), tropical aquarium fish, ornamental clams and corals, coconut oil, and handicrafts. Palau continues to rely heavily on imports and continues to run trade deficits ($45.8 million in 2018). The country exports $0.5 million to the United States in 2021. Palau’s economy remains dependent on donor funding. Since independence, Palau has operated under a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States, which provides it with U.S. direct assistance, subsidies, and other financial support. In 2019, U.S. assistance to Palau was $32 million, roughly one-fourth of government spending. Palau receives additional aid from Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and international organizations such as the World Bank, ADB, and UDP. Palau’s economy was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a devastating effect on tourism. The economy shrank 8.7% and 19.7% in 2020 and 2021, respectively. To offset COVID-related losses, the ADB provided Palau with $41 million in 2020. The Foreign Investment Act guides the foreign investment process in Palau, and Foreign Investment Regulations restrict some sectors to Palauan citizens, including wholesale or retail sale of goods, all land and water transportation, travel and tour agencies, and commercial fishing. Other sectors are semi-restricted, requiring a Palauan partner. Foreigners cannot own land in Palau, but they can lease land and own buildings on leased land. While the government welcomes foreign investors, Palau’s investment climate poses challenges. Some U.S. investors have made allegations of corrupt practices when seeking government permits, doing business with local partners, and in public procurement processes. Establishing secure land title may be complicated due to the complexity of Palau’s traditional land ownership system and occasional over-lapping claims. Palau is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization, the WTO, or any other organization or convention protecting intellectual property rights. Palau has no bilateral investment protection agreements and is not a member of any free trade associations. Human resource constraints are a challenge for foreign investors and, third country nationals from Bangladesh and the Philippines comprise a large proportion the labor force. FDI flows accounted for $24 million in 2020, up slightly compared to 2019 ($22 million), despite the pandemic. The stock of FDI grew to $488 million in 2020. Traditionally, FDI has be is mostly directed towards the tourism and real estate sectors. Main investment partners include China, Taiwan, and Singapore. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $10 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 $14,243 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government actively seeks foreign direct investment, and the country’s Foreign Investment Board (FIB) is responsible for approving and regulating foreign investment. There are no specific financial incentives extended to foreign investors. The Foreign Investment Regulations detail the significant number of restricted and semi-restricted sectors. Semi-restricted businesses can include foreign ownership, as long as a Palauan citizen also has an ownership interest. These semi-restricted businesses are as follows: handicraft and gift shops; bakeries; bar services; operations [selling] products being produced by wholly Palauan-owned manufacturing enterprise; equipment rentals for both land and water within the Republic, including equipment for purpose of tourism; and any such other businesses, as the Foreign Investment Board may determine. Sectors not listed as either closed or semi-restricted are presumed to be open for foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Board may, however, amend the semi-restricted sector list for “any such other businesses as the Board may determine.” The Government of Palau has not conducted an investment policy review through any organization or institution in the past five years. 3. Legal Regime Regulatory and accounting systems are largely consistent with international norms. Bureaucratic procedures (e.g. permitting processes, approvals, etc.) may lack transparency and be influenced by cronyism, partly due to the country’s small size and extensive family networks. Proposed laws and regulations are available in draft form for public comment pursuant to the Administration Procedures Act, Title 6 of the Palau National Code. Generally, tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws and policies do not impede investment. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The Government of Palau, through the Financial Investment Act and the Environmental Protection Act, requires companies’ ESG disclosure to facilitate transparency and inform the application process in distinguishing between low- and high-end investment. The Pacific Island Forum, of which Palau is a member, has a model regulatory and policy framework focused on competition, fair trading, and consumer protections. Palau is not a WTO member. The legal system in Palau is composed of a mix of civil, common, and customary law. Palau also has a specialized Land Court for disputes arising from conflicting claims of land ownership, which is a complex issue in the country. The legal system is patterned on common law proceedings as they exist in the United States. The judiciary comprises a four-member Supreme Court, a Court of Common Pleas, and a Land Court. The Supreme Court has a trial division and an appellate division. Court rulings, legal codes, and public law can be found on their website: http://www.palausupremecourt.net/ . All non-citizens wishing to invest in the Republic of Palau must obtain a Foreign Investment Business License (FIBL). The FIBL is obtained from the Registrar of Foreign Investment in the office of the Attorney General. In coordination with the Investment Promotion Unit at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce, the Ministry of Finance reviews the application and ensures that the business does not fall under the categories of the National Reserved List listed above. The application process usually takes 7-10 working days. Palau does not currently have any anti-trust legislation, although the Foreign Investment Board considers competition-related concerns in its review process. Although the Palauan constitution provides for the right of the government to condemn land for national interest (“eminent domain”), there are no reported property-expropriation cases. Most of the land is privately owned by Palauan citizens through complex family lineages. There is no legal provision for bankruptcy in the Republic of Palau. It ranks 166 out of 190 for resolving insolvency in World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Palau does not offer incentives to domestic or foreign investors. The Free Trade Zone Act of 2003 established the Ngardmau Free Trade Zone Authority. Another “Tax Free Zone” was established in the state of Melekeok, covering a one-mile radius around the Federal capitol building. Palau does not currently have laws or regulations on domestic storage or localization requirements. The Palau government requires all investors employing non-resident workers to agree to: Cover the cost of repatriating non-resident workers to the place hired. Train one or more citizen workers to perform the work for which the non-resident worker is employed. This requirement is set and evaluated on a case-by-case basis and is usually included as part of a whole package that also includes investment incentives such as favorable taxation statuses. U.S. Citizens do not require a visa to enter Palau and may be employed in Palau without obtaining a work permit or a visa. They must register as a non-resident worker with the Bureau of Immigration annually. 5. Protection of Property Rights Other than the foreign-ownership restrictions for certain business sectors, there are no restrictions on private entities to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Establishing secure land title may be complicated due to the complexity of the traditional land ownership system and occasional over-lapping claims. Banks offer mortgages, and the recording system is reliable. The Land Court has primary responsibility to adjudicate disputes over land ownership. Non-Palauans may not purchase land, although they are able to lease for up to 99 years. Non-citizen investors must negotiate lease agreements directly with private owners or the state government. Palau is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO, or any other organization or convention protecting intellectual property right. In general, Palau does not strictly enforce intellectual property rights. Embassy Contact Mission Deputy +680-587-2920 6. Financial Sector There are no stock exchanges or financial regulatory institutions in the country. Palau uses the U.S. dollar and has no central bank. The country has three FDIC–insured banks: Bank of Hawaii, Bank Pacific, and Bank of Guam. All three are publicly owned U.S. companies with headquarters in Guam. There are several smaller private banks and a national bank, the National Development Bank of Palau. The Palau Financial Institutions Commission is the regulatory body responsible for establishing and maintaining the financial supervisory system in Palau. Palau has no sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or asset management bureau (AMB), but the Compact of Free Association established a Trust Fund for Palau that is independently overseen by the COFA Trust Fund Board composed 5 members who are appointed by the President of Palau and confirmed by the Senate. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Palau, most of the major industries are controlled by state-owned- or quasi-state enterprises. These include the utilities sector, telecommunications, and the national bank. The SOE sector continues to underperform and to impose significant risks and burden on the fiscal system and economy. Palau has no on-going privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Many businesses provide corporate donations to environmental and social Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and /or engage in environmental corporate social responsibility programs to preserve Palau’s environment and wildlife. Most CSR activities are conducted via donation, partly attributable to the available tax deduction of up to 10 percent of a company’s Gross Revenue for donations to non-profit organizations. Palau has some basic worker protection laws, including a minimum wage and protections for foreign workers. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a challenge to doing business in Palau, despite a robust legal mechanism to detect and prosecute corruption. The Code of Ethics regulates transactions by national and state public employees, officials, and elected officials, as well as persons making campaign contributions. The law prohibits personal gain through governmental transactions, prohibits conflict of interest, restricts incompatible outside employment, prohibits solicitation of gifts and severely restricts the size of campaign contributions, limiting such contributions to Palauan citizens. The Special Prosecutor Act established the Office of the Special Prosecutor, who has the power to investigate and prosecute the national and state governments, and its officials, for violations of the Constitution and laws of the Republic or for failure to implement such laws. Local media often reports on alleged corruption cases and serves as an informal watchdog. Palau does not appear in Transparency International’s Index of Corruption. There are no formal anti-corruption NGOs or international watchdogs based in Palau. 10. Political and Security Environment Palau is stable, and not prone to political violence. The World Bank placed Palau in the 84th percentile in its 2015 rating of country political stability. 11. Labor Policies and Practices With an estimated total of 12,500 Palauan nationals in country (including non-working individuals, such as children and elderly) and 4,300 estimated foreign workers, foreign labor comprises a large proportion of Palau’s labor force. Palau has a fairly low unemployment rate across all age categories. Under the Compact of Free Association, Palauan citizens are entitled to live, attend school, and work in the United States visa-free as “nonimmigrant residents.” Accordingly, many skilled and professional workers migrate to the U.S. for its higher wages and standards of living. Professional, medical, management, and other special labor skills are in high demand in Palau. Given the scarcity of resident qualified workers, Palau allows investors to employ non-resident workers provided they agree to cover the cost of repatriation, that they hire and train at least one citizen to perform the same work. In October 2013, Palau established the minimum wage for workers. Foreign workers are generally hired on a contract basis with opportunities for annual renewals. As of 2020, there are no new labor related laws or regulations enacted during the last year as well as no pending draft bills. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2015 $287 2019 $274 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $10 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information David Ryan Sequeira Deputy Chief of Mission U.S. Embassy Koror Republic of Palau Tel: +680-587-2920 x 2002 SequeiraDR@state.gov Panama Executive Summary Panama’s investment climate is mixed. Over the last decade, Panama was one of the Western Hemisphere’s fastest growing economies. Its economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic is outpacing most other countries in the region, with a 15.3 percent growth rate in 2021 (after a contraction of 17.9 percent in 2020) and a projected growth rate of 7.8 percent for 2022, according to the World Bank. Panama also has one of the highest GDP per capita rates in the region and has several investment incentives, including a dollarized economy, a stable democratic government, the world’s second largest free trade zone, and 14 international free trade agreements. Although Panama’s market is small, with a population of just over 4 million, the Panama Canal provides a global trading hub with incentives for international trade. However, Panama’s structural deficiencies weigh down its investment climate with high levels of corruption, a reputation for government non-payment, a poorly educated workforce, a weak judicial system, and labor unrest. Panama’s presence on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list since June 2019 for systemic deficiencies in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing increases the risk of investing in Panama, notwithstanding the government’s ongoing efforts to increase financial transparency. The government is eager for international investment and has several policies in place to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As such, it continues to attract one of the highest rates of FDI in the region, with $4.6 billion in 2020, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. As of March 18, 2022, Panama’s sovereign debt rating remains investment grade, with ratings of Baa2 (Moody’s), BBB- (Fitch), and BBB (Standard & Poor’s with a negative outlook). Panama’s high vaccination rates of 80 percent of the eligible population with at least one dose and 70 percent with at least two doses as of March 21 have contributed to its economic recovery. As the global economy rebounded, Panama’s services and infrastructure-reliant industries bounced back significantly in 2021. Sectors with the highest economic growth in 2021 included mining (148 percent increase), construction (29 percent), commerce (18 percent), industrial manufacturing (11 percent), and transportation, storage, and communications (11 percent). Panama ended 2021 with a year-on-year inflation rate variation of 2.6 percent, according to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). The government’s assertion that it is climate-negative creates opportunities for economic growth, aided by laws 37, 44, and 45 that provide incentives to promote investment in clean energy sources, specifically wind, solar, hydroelectric, and biomass/biofuels. Panama’s investment climate is threatened, however, by high government fiscal deficits, unemployment, and inequality. The pandemic resulted in government debt ballooning by $3 billion in 2021 to over $40 billion. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at around 64 percent, well above the 46 percent it stood at before the pandemic. Unemployment peaked at 18.5 percent in September 2020, a 20-year high, but has since fallen to 11.3 percent as of October 2021. Yet high levels of labor informality persist. Additionally, Panama is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with the 14th highest Gini Coefficient and a national poverty rate of 14 percent. The World Bank’s 2022 Global Economic Prospects Report and the World Economic Forum’s 2022 Global Risks Report noted that Panama should focus on inclusive economic growth and structural reforms to avoid economic stagnation and an employment crisis. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 83 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $4.6 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Panama welcomes FDI and relies heavily on investment to fuel its economy. With few exceptions, the Government of Panama makes no distinction between domestic and foreign companies for investment purposes. Panama benefits from stable and consistent economic policies, a dollarized economy, and a government that consistently supports trade and open markets and encourages foreign direct investment. Panama has had one of the highest levels of FDI in Central America, a trend that continued even during the pandemic. Through the Multinational Headquarters Law (SEM), the Multinational Manufacturing Services Law (EMMA), and a Private Public Partnership framework, Panama offers tax breaks and other incentives to attract investment. Executive Decree No. 722 of October 2020 created a new immigration category: Permanent Residence as a Qualified Investor, after an initial investment of $300,000. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MICI) is responsible for overseeing foreign investment, prepares an annual foreign investment promotion strategy, and provides services required by investors to expedite investments and project development (for more details, please visit: https://www.mici.gob.pa/noticias/gobierno-nacional-crea-programa-de-residencia-para-inversionistas-calificados). The Cortizo administration created a new Minister Counselor for Investment position that reports directly to the President, with the aim of attracting new investors and dislodging barriers that confront current ones. MICI, in cooperation with the Minister Counselor for Investment, facilitates the initial investment process and provides integration assistance once a company is established in Panama. The Export and Investment Promotion Authority “PROPANAMA” was created by Law 207 on April 5, 2021. It provides investors with information, expedites specific projects, leads investment-seeking missions abroad, and supports foreign investment missions to Panama. In some cases, other government offices work with investors to ensure that regulations and requirements for land use, employment, special investment incentives, business licensing, and other conditions are met. Entities that carry out a minimum investment of two million dollars in Panama enjoy the benefits of legal stability, with national, municipal, and customs tax incentives and stability in the labor regime for a period of ten years. In 2021, the United States ran a $7.5 billion trade surplus in goods with Panama. The U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) entered into force in October 2012. The TPA has significantly liberalized trade in goods and services, including financial services. The TPA also includes sections on customs administration and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment, telecommunications, electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental protections. In March 2022, however, the Panamanian government (GoP) formally asked the U.S. government to review certain agricultural tariff provisions of the TPA. Over the last year, Panamanian producers have become increasingly vocal in demanding that their government renegotiate new protections in the face of declining Panamanian tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports. As of March 2022, the U.S. government was reviewing the GoP’s request. Panama is one of the few economies in Latin American that is predominantly services-based. Services represent nearly 80 percent of Panama’s GDP. The TPA has improved U.S. firms’ access to Panama’s services sector and gives U.S. investors better access than other WTO members under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. All services sectors are covered under the TPA, except where Panama has made specific exceptions, such as for postal services, air transportation, and water distribution. Under the agreement, Panama has provided improved access to sectors like express delivery and granted new access in certain areas that had previously been reserved for Panamanian nationals. However, some American companies face problems in this sector, including allegations of tax evasion by some local companies. In addition, Panama is a full participant in the WTO Information Technology Agreement. Panama passed a Private Public Partnership (PPP) law in 2019 (Ley 93) and published regulations for the program in 2020 (Decree 840) as an incentive for private investment, social development, and job creation. The law is a first-level legal framework that orders and formalizes how the private sector can invest in public projects, thereby expanding the State’s options to meet social needs. Panama’s 2022 budget includes funding to implement PPP projects. Panama has been selected to host Bloomberg’s “New Economy Gateway” forum in May 2022, which will cover sustainable investment and the future of trade. It will be the first time that this forum has been held outside of Asia. The Panamanian government imposes some limitations on foreign ownership in the retail, maritime, and media sectors, in which, in most cases, owners must be Panamanian. However, foreign investors can continue to use franchise arrangements to own retail within the confines of Panamanian law (under the TPA, direct U.S. ownership of consumer retail is allowed in limited circumstances). There are also limits on the number of foreign workers in some foreign investment structures. In addition to limitations on ownership, around 200 professions in both the public and private sectors, including within the Panama Canal Authority, are reserved for Panamanian nationals. Medical practitioners, lawyers, engineers, accountants, and customs brokers must be Panamanian citizens. Furthermore, the Panamanian government instituted a regulation that rideshare platforms must use drivers who possess commercial licenses, which are available only to Panamanians, and is considering the implementation of additional regulations that would further restrict American ride-sharing companies. With the exceptions of retail trade, the media, and many professions, foreign and domestic entities have the right to establish, own, and dispose of business interests in virtually all forms of remunerative activity, and the Panamanian government does not screen inbound investment. Foreigners do not need to be legally resident or physically present in Panama to establish corporations or obtain local operating licenses for a foreign corporation. Business visas (and even citizenship) are readily obtainable for significant investors. Panama generally allows private entities to establish and own businesses and engage in remunerative activities. It does not have a formal investment screening mechanism, but the government monitors large foreign investments, especially in the energy sector. Panama does not currently impose any sector-specific restrictions or limitations on foreign ownership or control. There are no licensing restrictions, although Executive Decree 81 of May 25, 2017, established controls over dual-use goods for reasons of national security. Panama does not currently have any requirements for controls over technology transfers. Panama has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization in the past three years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a “Trade Policy Review” of Panama as of December 2021. Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise mandated in WTO agreements in which member countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals: WTO | Trade policy review -Panama2022 Post has no knowledge of any civil society organization that has provided comprehensive reviews of concerns about investment policy. Procedures regarding how to register foreign and domestic businesses, as well as how to obtain a notice of operation, can be found on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website ( https://www.panamaemprende.gob.pa/ ), where one may register a foreign company, create a branch of a registered business, or register as an individual trader from any part of the world. Corporate applicants must submit notarized documents to the Mercantile Division of the Public Registry, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Social Security Institute. Panamanian government statistics show that applications from foreign businesses typically take between one to six days to process. Historically, government procurement procedures have presented barriers to trade with Panama. The Cortizo administration has publicly committed to ensuring greater transparency in the award of government tenders. Law 153, officially passed in May 2020, provides greater transparency in public procurement by mandating that all public entities use an electronic procurement system https://www.panamacompra.gob.pa/Inicio/#!/ . Other agencies where companies typically register are: Business Registration: https://ampyme.gob.pa/?page_id=144 Tax administration: https://dgi.mef.gob.pa/ Corporations, property, mortgage: https://www.rp.gob.pa Social security: http://www.css.gob.pa Municipalities: https://mupa.gob.pa Panama does not incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Panamanian legal, accounting, and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. Panama has five regulatory agencies, four that supervise the activities of financial entities (banking, securities, insurance, and “designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)” and a fifth that oversees credit unions. Each of the regulators regularly publishes on their websites detailed policies, laws, and sector reports, as well as information regarding fines and sanctions. Panama’s banking regulator began publishing fines and sanctions in late 2016, which tend to be significantly lower than neighboring countries. The securities and insurance regulators have published fines and sanctions since 2010. Law 23 of 2015 created the regulator for DNFBPs, which began publishing fines and sanctions in 2018. In January 2020, the regulator for DNFBPs was granted independence and superintendency status like that of the banking regulator. The Superintendency of the Securities Market is generally considered a transparent, competent, and effective regulator. Panama is a full signatory to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Relevant ministries or regulators oversee and enforce administrative and regulatory processes. Any administrative errors or omissions committed by public servants can be challenged and taken to the Supreme Court for a final ruling, a process that often involves a long and arduous dispute resolution. Regulatory bodies can impose sanctions and fines which are made public and can be appealed. Panama does not promote or require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Laws are developed in the National Assembly. A proposed bill is discussed in three rounds, edited as needed, and approved or rejected. The President then has 30 days to approve or veto a bill the Assembly has passed. If the President vetoes the bill, it can be returned to the National Assembly for changes or sent to the Supreme Court to rule on its constitutionality. If the bill was vetoed for reasons of unconstitutionality, and the Supreme Court finds it constitutional, the President must sign the bill. Regulations are created by agencies and other governmental bodies but they can be modified or overridden by higher authorities. In general, draft bills, including those for laws and regulations on investment, are made available on the National Assembly’s website and can be introduced for discussion at the bill’s first hearing. All bills and approved legislation are published in the Official Gazette in full and summary form and can also be found on the National Assembly’s website: https://www.asamblea.gob.pa/buscador-de-gacetas . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures in Panama are based on standards set by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation, including financial reporting standards for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Panama is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, the names and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing times, and legal bases justifying the procedures. Information on public finances and debt obligations (includes explicit and contingent liabilities) is transparent. It is published on the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s website under the directorate of public finance, but not consistently updated: https://fpublico.mef.gob.pa/en . Mining regulations are changing. In 2018, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the law on which the country largest mining investment contract was based. According to some industry experts, the ruling was a deliberate move to force contract renegotiations and achieve more favorable terms for the government. In 2022, the same company’s concession was renegotiated for renewal, with its royalties to the government increasing significantly as a result. Panama’s enormous potential for generating mining income is undercut by long delays in the government’s concession and permit approval process, according to foreign investor contacts. Panama is part of the Central American Customs Union (CACU), the regional economic block for Central American countries. Panama has adopted many of the Central American Technical Regulations (RTCA) for intra-regional trade in goods. Panama applies the RTCA to goods imported from any CACU member and updates Panama’s regulations to be consistent with RTCA. However, Panama has not yet adopted some important RTCA regulations, such as for processed food labeling, and dietary supplements/vitamins. The United States and Panama signed an agreement regarding “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Standards Affecting Trade in Agricultural Products,” which entered into force on December 20, 2006. The application of this agreement supersedes the RTCA for U.S. food and feed products imported into Panama. A 2006 law established the Panamanian Food Safety Authority (AUPSA) to issue science-based sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) import policies for food and feed products entering Panama. Since 2019, AUPSA and other government entities have implemented or proposed measures that restrict market access. These measures have also increased AUPSA’s ability to limit the import of certain agricultural goods. The Panamanian government, for example, has issued regulations on onions and withheld approval of genetically-modified foods, limiting market access and resulting in the loss of millions in potential investment. In March 2021, Panama passed a bill to eliminate the AUPSA. In its place, the bill created the Panamanian Food Agency (APA). APA began operations on October 1, 2021, and has responsibility for both imports and exports. The APA intends to improve efficiency for agro-exports and industrial food processes, as well as increase market access. Historically, Panama has referenced or incorporated international norms and standards into its regulatory system, including the Agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex Alimentarius, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the International Plant Protection Convention, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Customs Organization, and others. Also, Panama has incorporated into its national regulations many U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations, such as the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance. Panama, as a member of the WTO, notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, in the last five years it has ignored comments on its regulations offered by other WTO members, including but not limited to the United States. When ruling on cases, judges rely on the Constitution and direct sources of law such as codes, regulations, and statutes. In 2016, Panama transitioned from an inquisitorial to an accusatory justice system, with the goal of simplifying and expediting criminal cases. Fundamental procedural rights in civil cases are broadly similar to those available in U.S. civil courts, although some notice and discovery rights, particularly in administrative matters, may be less extensive than in the United States. Judicial pleadings are not always a matter of public record, nor are processes always transparent. Panama has a legal framework governing commercial and contractual issues and has specialized commercial courts. Contractual disputes are normally handled in civil court or through arbitration, unless criminal activity is involved. Some U.S. firms have reported inconsistent, unfair, and/or biased treatment from Panamanian courts. The judicial system’s capacity to resolve contractual and property disputes is often weak, hampered by a lack of technological tools and susceptibility to corruption. The World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report rated Panama’s judicial independence at 129 of 141 countries. The Panamanian judicial system suffers from significant budget shortfalls that continue to affect all areas of the system. The transition to the accusatory system faces challenges in funding for personnel, infrastructure, and operational requirements, while addressing a significant backlog of cases initiated under the previous inquisitorial system. The judiciary still struggles with lack of independence, a legacy of an often-politicized system for appointing judges, prosecutors, and other officials. On January 11, 2022, President Cortizo committed $15 million to the Judicial Branch to implement Law 53 of August 27, 2015, which mandates that judges be selected by a merit-based process instead of by appointment, but implementation still faces serious challenges. Under Panamanian law, only the National Assembly may initiate corruption investigations against Supreme Court judges, and only the Supreme Court may initiate investigations against members of the National Assembly, which has led to charges of a de facto “non-aggression pact” between the two branches. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed through the legal system from Municipal Judges, to Circuit Judges, to Superior Judges, and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Panama has different laws governing investment incentives, depending on the activity, including its newest law intended to draw manufacturing investment, the 2020 Multinational Manufacturing Services Law (EMMA). In addition, it has a Multinational Headquarters Law (SEM), a Tourism Law, an Investment Stability Law, and miscellaneous laws associated with particular sectors, including the film industry, call centers, certain industrial activities, and agricultural exports. In addition, laws may differ in special economic zones, including the Colon Free Zone, the Panama Pacifico Special Economic Area, and the City of Knowledge. Government policy and law treat Panamanian and foreign investors equally with respect to access to credit. Panamanian interest rates closely follow international rates (i.e., the U.S. federal funds rate, the London Interbank Offered Rate, etc.), plus a country-risk premium. The Ministries of Tourism, Public Works, and Commerce and Industry, as well as the Minister Counselor for Investment, promote foreign investment. However, some U.S. companies have reported difficulty navigating the Panamanian business environment, especially in the tourism, branding, imports, and infrastructure development sectors. Although individual ministers have been responsive to U.S. companies, fundamental problems such as judicial uncertainty are more difficult to address. U.S. companies have complained about several ministries’ failure to make timely payments for services rendered, without official explanation for the delays. U.S. Embassy Panama is aware of tens of millions of dollars in overdue payments that the Panamanian government owes to U.S. companies. Some private companies, including multinational corporations, have issued bonds in the local securities market. Companies rarely issue stock on the local market and, when they do, often issue shares without voting rights. Investor demand is generally limited because of the small pool of qualified investors. While some Panamanians may hold overlapping interests in various businesses, there is no established practice of cross-shareholding or stable shareholder arrangements designed to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website lists information about laws, transparency, legal frameworks, and regulatory bodies. https://www.mici.gob.pa/direccion-general-de-servicios-al-inversionista/informacion-para-el-inversionista-direccion-general-de-servicios-al-inversionista Panama’s Consumer Protection and Anti-Trust Agency, established by Law 45 on October 31, 2007, and modified by Law 29 of June 2008, reviews transactions for competition-related concerns and serves as a consumer protection agency. Panamanian law recognizes the concept of eminent domain, but it is exercised only occasionally, for example, to build infrastructure projects such as highways and the metro commuter train. In general, compensation for affected parties is fair. However, in at least one instance a U.S. company has expressed concern about not being compensated at fair market value after the government revoked a concession. There have been no cases of claimants citing a lack of due process regarding eminent domain. The World Bank 2020 Doing Business Indicator, the most recent report available, ranked Panama 113 out of 190 jurisdictions for resolving insolvency because of a slow court system and the complexity of the bankruptcy process. Panama adopted a new insolvency law (similar to a bankruptcy law) in 2016, but the Doing Business Indicator ranking has not identified material improvement for this metric. 4. Industrial Policies Panama provides Industrial Promotion Certificates (IPCs) to incentivize industrial development in high-value-added sectors. Targeted sectors include research and development, management and quality assurance systems, environmental management, utilities, and human resources. Approved IPCs provide up to 35 percent in tax reimbursements and preferential import tariffs of 3 percent. Panama does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing FDI projects. Law 1 (2017) modified Law 28 (1995) by exempting exports from income tax and exempting from import duty machinery for companies that export 100 percent of their products. Producers that sell any portion of their products in the domestic market pay only a three percent import tariff on machinery and supplies. Law 41, the Special Regime for the Establishment and Operation of Multinational Company Headquarters (SEM), was enacted in 2007 to encourage multinational investment in Panama. The law focuses on administrative back-office operations, such as payroll, accounting, and other functions. Any company that is licensed under SEM will automatically qualify for MSM. The GoP enacted Law 159 on Manufacturing Services for Multinational Companies (EMMA) in 2020 as a special incentive law to attract Foreign Direct Investment in manufacturing, remanufacturing, maintenance and product repair, assembly, logistics services, and refurbishing. The EMMA law is a complement to the SEM law and offers tax and employee incentives, reducing import duties and fees for equipment and supplies used in the manufacturing process, to companies that qualify. In 2012, Panama introduced a tourism incentive law to promote foreign investment in tourism and the hospitality industry. The incentives are available outside the district of Panama to companies registered through the National Tourism Registry of the Panama Tourism Authority (ATP) and provide tax incentives and exemptions on real estate, imported good, construction materials, appliances, furniture, and equipment. Panama further modified the law in 2019 to provide additional tax credits for new projects and extensions on existing projects. These tax credits must be used within ten years from the start of a project. Law 186 of December 2, 2020, facilitates entrepreneurship through a simplified registration system and tax incentives for entrepreneurs. Panama has enacted a list of laws that provide attractive incentives for domestic and foreign investment in the energy sector. These laws encourage all-source energy projects such as hydroelectric plants, LNG plants, biofuel and biomass plants, wind, and solar. Some of the incentives include a 5 percent discount on income tax. For biofuel and biomass projects, incentives include a 10-year exemption from income taxes, a total exemption from entry fee costs, and a 10-year exemption from distribution or transmission rights for spot market operations. Law No. 37 of June 10, 2013, establishes incentives for the construction, operation, and maintenance of solar power plants and/or installations. Executive Decree No. 45 of June 10, 2009, provides incentives for hydroelectric generation systems and other new renewable and clean sources listed in Law No.45 of August 4, 2004, which establishes incentives for hydroelectric plants and other renewable and clean energy sources, as well as other favorable provisions. Law No. 44 of April 25, 2011, establishes incentives for the construction and operation of wind power plants for the public electricity sector/service. Panama is home to the Colon Free Trade Zone, the Panama Pacifico Special Economic Zone, and 18 other “free zones,” (12 active and six in development). The Colon Free Trade Zone has more than 2,500 businesses, the Panama Pacifico Special Economic Zone has more than 345 businesses, and the remaining free zones host 126 companies in total. These zones provide special tax and other incentives for manufacturers, back-office operations, and call centers. Additionally, the Colon Free Zone offers companies preferential tax and duty rates that are levied in exchange for basic user fees and a five percent dividend tax (or two percent of net profits if there are no dividends). Banks and individuals in Panama pay no tax on interest or other income earned outside Panama. No taxes are withheld on savings or fixed time deposits in Panama. Individual depositors do not pay taxes on time deposits. Free zones offer tax-free status, special immigration privileges, and license and customs exemptions to manufacturers who locate within them. Investment incentives offered by the Panamanian government apply equally to Panamanian and foreign investors. There are no legal performance requirements such as minimum export percentages, significant requirements of local equity interest, or mandatory technology transfers. There are no requirements that host country nationals be chosen to serve in roles of senior management or on boards of directors. There are no established general requirements that foreign investors invest in local companies, purchase goods or services from local vendors, or invest in research and development (R&D) or other facilities. Depending on the sector, companies may be required to have 85-90 percent Panamanian employees. There are exceptions to this policy, but the government must approve these on a case-by-case basis. Fields dominated by strong unions, such as construction, have opposed issuing work permits to foreign laborers and some investors have struggled to fully staff large projects. Visas are available and the procedures to obtain work permits are generally not considered onerous. As part of its effort to become a hub for finance, logistics, and communications, Panama has endeavored to become a data storage center for companies (see data protection law below). According to the Panamanian Authority for Government Innovation (AIG, http://www.innovacion.gob.pa/noticia/2834 ), most of these firms offer services to banking and telephone companies in Central America and the Caribbean. Panama boasts strong international connectivity, with seven undersea fiber optic cables and an eighth currently under construction. Panama’s data protection law (Law 81 of 2019) established the principles, rights, obligations, and procedures that regulate the protection of personal data. The National Authority for Transparency and Access to Information (ANTAI) oversees the law’s enforcement, which began in March 2021. For extra-territorial transfer of data, the implementing regulation allows for contractual clauses or adequacy findings. An adequacy finding for the United States is still pending. In September 2021, AIG issued a resolution requiring government entities with mission-critical or sensitive data in the cloud to transition such data to in-country storage facilities by December 2022. This would have an impact on foreign companies offering cloud services to the public sector in Panama. AIG is developing a data classification scheme to accompany this requirement and clarify which data can be held in data centers outside Panama. The personal privacy of communications and documents is provided for in the Panamanian Constitution as a fundamental right (Political Constitution, article 29). The Constitution also provides for a right to keep personal data confidential (article 44). The Criminal Code imposes an obligation on businesses to maintain the confidentiality of information stored in databases or elsewhere and establishes several crimes for the misuse of such information (Criminal Code, articles 164, 283, 284, 285, 286). Panama’s electronic commerce legislation also states that providers of electronic document storage must guarantee the protection, reliability, and proper use of information and data stored on behalf of their customers (Law 51, July 22, 2008, article 55). 5. Protection of Property Rights Mortgages and liens are widely used in both rural and urban areas and the recording system is reliable. There are no specific regulations regarding land leasing or acquisition by foreign and/or non-resident investors. A large portion of land in Panama, especially outside of Panama City, is not titled. A system of rights of possession exists, but there are multiple instances where such rights have been successfully challenged. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report ( http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/panama ) notes that Panama is ranked 87 out of 190 countries on the Registering Property indicator and ranks 141st in enforcing contracts. Panama enacted Law 80 (2009) to address the lack of titled land in certain parts of the country; however, the law does not address deficiencies in government administration or the judicial system. In 2010, the National Assembly approved the creation of the National Land Management Authority (ANATI) to administer land titling; however, investors have complained about ANATI’s capabilities and lengthy adjudication timelines. ANATI has attempted to clean up some titling issues and sought international assistance to modernize. The judicial system’s capacity to resolve contractual and property disputes is generally considered weak and susceptible to corruption, as illustrated by the most recent World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019 ( http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf ), which ranks Panama’s judicial independence as 129 out of 141 countries. Americans should exercise greater due diligence in purchasing Panamanian real estate than they would in purchasing real estate in the United States. Engaging a reputable attorney and a licensed real estate broker is strongly recommended. If legally purchased property is unoccupied, property ownership can revert to other owners (squatters) after 15 years of living on or working the land, although the parties must go to court to resolve ownership. Panama has an adequate and effective domestic legal framework to protect and enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). The legal structure is strong and enforcement is generally good. Although theft and infringement on rights occur, they are not so common as to include Panama on the Special 301 Watch List or Priority Watch List. There were no new IPR laws or regulations proposed or enacted in the past year, although Customs is in the process of modifying its contraband legislation. The U.S.-Panama TPA improved standards for the protection and enforcement of a broad range of IPR, including patents; trademarks; undisclosed tests and data required to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products; and digital copyright products such as software, music, books, and videos. To implement the requirements of the TPA, Panama passed Law 62 of 2012 on industrial property and Law 64 of 2012 on copyrights. Law 64 also extended copyright protection to the life of the author plus 70 years, mandates the use of legal software in government agencies, and protects against the theft of encrypted satellite signals and the manufacturing or sale of tools to steal signals. Panama is a member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Panama’s Industrial Property Law (Law 35 of 1996) provides 20 years of patent protection from the date of filing, or 15 years from the filing of pharmaceutical patents. Panama has expressed interest in participating in the Patent Protection Highway with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Law 35, amended by Law 61 of 2012, also provides trademark protection, simplified the registration of trademarks, and allows for renewals for 10-year periods. The law grants ex-officio authority to government agencies to conduct investigations and seize suspected counterfeit materials. Decree 123 of 1996 and Decree 79 of 1997 specify the procedures that National Customs Authority (ANA) and Colon Free Zone officials must follow to investigate and confiscate merchandise. In 1997, ANA created a special office for IPR enforcement; in 1998, the Colon Free Zone followed suit. The Government of Panama is making efforts to strengthen the enforcement of IPR. A Committee for Intellectual Property (CIPI), comprising representatives from five government agencies (the Colon Free Zone, the Offices of Industrial Property and Copyright under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MICI), the Customs Administration (ANA), and the Attorney General), under the leadership of the MICI, is responsible for the development of intellectual property policy. Since 1997, two district courts and one superior tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction of antitrust, patent, trademark, and copyright cases. Since January 2003, a specific prosecutor with national authority over IPR cases has consolidated and simplified the prosecution of such cases. Law 1 of 2004 added crimes against IPR as a predicate offense for money laundering, and Law 14 establishes a 5 to 12-year prison term. Various Panamanian entities track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods, but there is no single repository or website that consolidates this information. Panama’s Public Ministry has a Specialized Prosecutors Office dedicated to IPR violations, but there have so far been relatively few criminal prosecutions for IPR violations. Panama executes search warrants on businesses that trade in counterfeit goods, but such items are usually seized administratively without criminal prosecutions. Panama is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report. One online market on the Notorious Markets List is reportedly operated from Panama. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Embassy point of contact: Colombia Primola Economic Specialist PrimolaCE@state.gov Local lawyers list: https://pa.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ 6. Financial Sector Panama has a stock market with an effective regulatory system developed to support foreign investment. Article 44 of the constitution guarantees the protection of private ownership of real property and private investments. Some private companies, including multinational corporations, have issued bonds in the local securities market. Companies rarely issue stock on the local market and, when they do, often issue shares without voting rights. Investor demand is generally limited because of the small pool of qualified investors. While some Panamanians may hold overlapping interests in various businesses, there is no established practice of cross-shareholding or stable shareholder arrangements designed to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. Panama has agreed to IMF Article VIII and pledged not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. In 2012, Panama modified its securities law to regulate brokers, fund managers, and matters related to the securities industry. The Commission structure was modified to follow the successful Banking Law model and now consists of a superintendent and a board of directors. The Superintendency of the Securities Market is generally considered a competent and effective regulator. Panama is a full signatory to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Government policy and law with respect to access to credit treat Panamanian and foreign investors equally. Panamanian interest rates closely follow international rates (i.e., the U.S. federal funds rate, the London Interbank Offered Rate, etc.), plus a country-risk premium. Panama’s banking sector is developed and highly regulated and there are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. Foreigners are required to present a passport and taxpayer identification number and an affidavit indicating that the inflow and outflow of money meets the tax obligations of the beneficiary’s tax residence. The adoption of financial technology in Panama is nascent, but there are several initiatives underway to modernize processes. Some U.S. citizens and entities have had difficulty meeting the high documentary threshold for establishing the legitimacy of their activities both inside and outside Panama. Banking officials counter such complaints by citing the need to comply with international financial transparency standards. Several of Panama’s largest banks have gone so far as to refuse to establish banking relationships with whole sectors of the economy, such as casinos and e-commerce, in order to avoid all possible associated risks. Regulatory issues have made it difficult for some private U.S. citizens to open bank accounts in Panama, leaving some legitimate businesses without access to banking services in Panama. Panama has no central bank. The banking sector is highly dependent on the operating environment in Panama, but it is generally well-positioned to withstand shocks. The banking sector could be impacted if Panama’s sovereign debt rating continues to fall. As of March 18, 2022, the sovereign debt rating remains investment grade, with ratings of Baa2 (Moody’s), BBB- (Fitch), and BBB (Standard & Poor’s). Approximately 4.7 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. Panama’s 2008 Banking Law regulates the country’s financial sector. The law concentrates regulatory authority in the hands of a well-financed Banking Superintendent ( https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/ ). Traditional bank lending from the well-developed banking sector is relatively efficient and is the most common source of financing for both domestic and foreign investors, offering the private sector a variety of credit instruments. The free flow of capital is actively supported by the government and is viewed as essential to Panama’s 68 banks (2 official banks, 39 domestic banks, 17 international banks, and 10 bank representational offices). Foreign banks can operate in Panama and are subject to the same regulatory regime as domestic banks. Panama has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the last three years despite its inclusion on the FATF grey list since June 2019. There are no restrictions on, nor practical measures to prevent, hostile foreign investor takeovers, nor are there regulatory provisions authorizing limitations on foreign participation or control, or other practices that restrict foreign participation. There are no government or private sector rules that prevent foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia. Financing for consumers is relatively open for mortgages, credit cards, and personal loans, even to those earning modest incomes. Panama’s strategic geographic location, dollarized economy, status as a regional financial, trade, and logistics hub, and favorable corporate and tax laws make it an attractive destination for money launderers. Money laundered in Panama is believed to come in large part from the proceeds of drug trafficking. Tax evasion, bank fraud, and corruption are also believed to be major sources of illicit funds in Panama. Criminals have been accused of laundering money through shell companies and via bulk cash smuggling and trade at airports and seaports, and in active free trade zones. In 2015, Panama strengthened its legal framework, amended its criminal code, harmonized legislation with international standards, and passed a law on anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Panama also approved Law 18 (2015), which severely restricts the use of bearer shares; companies still using them must appoint a custodian and maintain strict controls over their use. In addition, Panama passed Law 70 (2019), which criminalizes tax evasion and defines it as a money laundering predicate offense. In 2021, Panama passed Law 254, which modifies six distinct laws in order to give the non-financial regulator more authority and strengthen know-your-customer (KYC) requirements. For example, it modifies Law 23 of 2015 to align Panama with accounting records standards and increase sanctions for money laundering violations from $1 million to $5 million; it also modifies Law 52 of 2016 to require resident agents for offshore corporations to hold or have access to a copy of the company’s accounting records. In June 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) added Panama to its grey list of jurisdictions subject to ongoing monitoring due to strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. FATF cited Panama’s lack of “positive, tangible progress” in measures of effectiveness. Panama agreed to an Action Plan in four major areas: 1) risk, policy, and coordination; 2) supervision; 3) legal persons and arrangements; and 4) money laundering investigation and prosecution. The Action Plan outlined concrete measures that were to be completed in stages by May and September 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, FATF granted Panama two extensions, pushing the deadline to January 2021. In its March 2022 plenary, FATF recognized that Panama had largely completed eight of fifteen items on its Action Plan and highlighted the items Panama must still address, while noting the country’s progress since the last plenary meeting. In February 2022, the European Union (EU) kept Panama on its tax haven blacklist along with American Samoa, Fiji, Guam, Palau, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. The EU does not consider Panama to have met international criteria on transparency and exchange of tax information. Panama, however, remains committed to complying with the recommendations of the OECD’s domestic tax base erosion and profit shifting action plan. Panama has made strides in increasing criminal prosecutions and convictions related to money laundering and tax evasion. However, law enforcement needs more tools and training to conduct long-term, complex financial investigations, including undercover operations. The criminal justice system remains at risk for corruption. Panama has made progress in assessing high-risk sectors, improving inter-ministerial cooperation, and approving – though not yet implementing – a law on beneficial ownership. Additionally, the GoP and the United States signed an MOU in August 2020 that created an anti-money laundering and anti-corruption task force that has advanced investigations of financial crimes. The United States provides training to the task force to combat money laundering and corruption, as well as training for judicial investigations and prosecutions. Panama started a sovereign wealth fund, called the Panama Savings Fund (FAP), in 2012 with an initial capitalization of $1.3 billion. The fund follows the Santiago Principles and is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The law mandates that from 2015 onward contributions to the National Treasury from the Panama Canal Authority in excess of 3.5 percent of GDP must be deposited into the Fund. In October 2018, the rule for accumulation of the savings was modified to require that when contributions from the Canal exceed 2.5 percent of GDP, half the surplus must go to national savings. At the end of 2021, the value of the FAP’s assets totaled $1.4 billion. Since the beginning of its operations, FAP has generated returns of $455.6 million and contributions to the National Treasury of $235.6 million. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Panama has 16 non-financial State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) and 8 financial SOEs that are included in the budget and broken down by enterprise. Each SOE has a Board of Directors with Ministerial participation. SOEs are required to send a report to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Comptroller General’s Office, and the Budget Committee of the National Assembly within the first ten days of each month showing their budget implementation. The reports detail income, expenses, investments, public debt, cash flow, administrative management, management indicators, programmatic achievements, and workload. SOEs are also required to submit quarterly financial statements. SOEs are audited by the Comptroller General’s Office. The National Electricity Transmission Company (ETESA) is an example of an SOE in the energy sector, and Tocumen Airport and the National Highway Company (ENA) are SOEs in the transportation sector. Financial allocations and earnings from SOEs are publicly available at the Official Digital Gazette ( http://www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/ ). There is a website under construction that will consolidate information on SOEs: https://panamagov.org/organo-ejecutivo/empresas-publicas/ #. Panama’s privatization framework law does not distinguish between foreign and domestic investor participation in prospective privatizations. The law calls for pre-screening of potential investors or bidders in certain cases to establish technical capability, but nationality and Panamanian participation are not criteria. The Government of Panama undertook a series of privatizations in the mid-1990s, including most of the country’s electricity generation and distribution, its ports, and its telecommunications sector. There are presently no privatization plans for any major state-owned enterprise. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Panama maintains strict domestic laws relating to labor and employment rights and environmental protection. While enforcement of these laws is not always stringent, major construction projects are required to complete environmental assessments, guarantee worker protections, and comply with government standards for environmental stewardship. The ILO program “Responsible Business Conduct in Latin America and the Caribbean” is active in Panama and has partnered with the National Council of Private Enterprise (CoNEP) to host events on gender equality. Panama does not yet have a State National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights. In February 2012, Panama adopted ISO 26000 to guide businesses in the development of corporate social responsibility (CSR) platforms. In addition, business groups, including the Association of Panamanian Business Executives (APEDE) and the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), are active in encouraging and rewarding good CSR practices. Since 2009, the AmCham has given an annual award to recognize member companies for their positive impact on their local communities and environment. Panama has two goods on the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor”: melons and coffee. DOL removed sugarcane from the list in 2019. Child labor is also prevalent among street vendors and in other informal occupations. There have been several disputes over the resettlement of indigenous populations to make room for hydroelectric projects, such as at Barro Blanco and Bocas del Toro. The government mediates in such cases to ensure that private companies are complying with the terms of resettlement agreements. Despite human resource constraints, Panama effectively enforces its labor and environmental laws relative to the region and conducts inspections in a methodical and equitable manner. Panama encourages adherence to the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas and supports the Kimberley Process. Panama is not a government sponsor of either the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The National Council of Organized Workers (CONATO) and the National Confederation of Trade Union Unity (CONUSI) are the most active labor organizations advocating for worker rights in the private sector. They enjoy access to and dialogue with key decisionmakers. CONATO is currently participating in a nationwide dialogue to defend the sustainability of the workers retirement fund. CONUSI is focused on labor rights in the construction sector. Panama is a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Panama follows the standards set by the International Standards Organization (ISO) and certifies security companies in quality management and security principles consistent with ISO standards. Panama ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) through Law 10 of April 12, 1995. Law 8 of March 25, 2015, includes a title on climate change and chapters on mitigation and adaptation. Executive Decree 36 of May 28, 2018, established the Ministry of Environment, which includes the Climate Change Directorate, in accordance with Law 41 of July 1, 1998, the General Law on the Environment. The government relies on the Green Climate Fund, established within the framework of the UNFCCC, to finance programs and projects for mitigation and adaptation, promulgated by the public and private sectors. The National Climate Change Policy (PNCC), approved through Executive Decree No. 35 of February 26, 2007, establishes the framework for all entities seeking to contribute to the stabilization of GHGs, promote adaptation measures, and ensure sustainable development. Since the approval of the PNCC, the Ministry of Environment has proposed a project to update the PNCC and the development of a Climate Change Framework Law. The PNCC project is intended to influence the national climate agenda by reformulating current public policy to update it consistent with international commitments that have emerged since 2007 and current national actions with a 2050 compliance horizon. The project aims to strengthen climate governance through the: Update of the National Climate Change Policy of Panama to 2050 (PNCC2050), its Action Plan and the formulation of a set of indicators for monitoring and evaluation. Formulation of a draft Framework Law on Climate Change (LMCC) through a process of citizen participation and agreement. Panama presented three National Communications, in 2000, 2011, and 2019; a biennial update report in2019; its first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2016; and an update to the First Nationally Determined Contribution (CDN1) in 2020. Panama’s enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is in line with the 2030 Paris Agreement to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius and to maintain negative or net zero GHG emissions through 2050. Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo claimed at the United Nations Climate Change conference (COP26) in November 2021that Panama is one of only three countries in the world whose emissions are “carbon negative,” along with Bhutan and Suriname. In 2021, Panama began the “Reduce Your Corporate Footprint” (Corporate RTH) program, which is the first voluntary state program for the management of the carbon and water footprint at the organizational level in the country. This program establishes a standardized process to identify, calculate, report and verify the carbon and water footprint within the operational limits of public, private, and civil society organizations that are legally constituted in the national territory. Panama’s national strategy for climate change aims to boost and increase the use of renewables, protect coastal regions, create green jobs, integrate transportation networks, design a carbon market, manage GHG emissions, boost adaptation capabilities, and contribute to the socioecological wellbeing of all Panamanians. The Ministry of Environment is developing a roadmap for implementation of its climate change commitments presented in 2021. 9. Corruption Corruption is among Panama’s most significant challenges. Panama ranked 105 out of 180 countries in the 2021 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). High-profile alleged procurement irregularities in 2020, including several related to pandemic response, contributed to public skepticism of government transparency. U.S. investors allege that corruption is present in the private sector and at all levels of the Panamanian government. Purchase managers and import/export businesses have been known to overbill or skim percentages off purchase orders, while judges, mayors, members of the National Assembly, and local representatives have reportedly accepted payments for facilitating land titling and favorable court rulings. The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) precludes U.S. companies from engaging in bribery or other similar activities, and U.S. companies look carefully at levels of corruption before investing or bidding on government contracts. The process to apply for permits and titles can be opaque, and civil servants have been known to ask for payments at each step of the approval process. The land titling process has been troublesome for many U.S. companies, some of which have waited decades for cases to be resolved. U.S. investors in Panama also complain about a lack of transparency in government procurement. The parameters of government tenders often change during the bidding process, creating confusion and the perception that the government tailors tenders to specific companies. Panama passed Law 153 on May 8, 2020, to modernize its public procurement system and address some of these concerns. Panama’s government lacks strong systemic checks and balances that incentivize accountability. All citizens are bound by anti-corruption laws; however, under Panamanian law, only the National Assembly may initiate corruption investigations against Supreme Court judges, and only the Supreme Court may initiate investigations against members of the National Assembly, which has led to charges of a de facto “non-aggression pact” between the branches. Another key component of the judicial sector, the Public Ministry (Department of Justice) and the Organo Judicial (Judicial Branch), have struggled with a historical susceptibility to political influence. In late 2016, Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht admitted to paying $59 million in bribes to win Panamanian contracts worth at least $175 million between 2010 and 2014. Odebrecht’s admission was confined to bribes paid during the Martinelli administration; however, former President Juan Carlos Varela (2014-2019) is also under investigation on charges of corruption related to Odebrecht. Odebrecht agreed to pay a large fine as part of a judicial settlement, but Panama has imposed sanctions because Odebrecht failed to make all the required payments. While Odebrecht continues to operate in Panama, two Odebrecht projects have been cancelled: the Hydraulic Project Chan II and the new Tocumen Airport. The Government of Panama is now seeking to ban Odebrecht from any other public procurement tenders. Panama has anti-corruption mechanisms in place, including whistleblower and witness protection programs and conflict-of-interest rules. However, the public perceives that anti-corruption laws are weak and not applied rigorously and that government enforcement bodies and the courts are not effective in pursuing and prosecuting those accused of corruption. The lack of a strong professionalized career civil service in Panama’s public sector has also hindered systemic change. The fight against corruption is hampered by the government’s refusal to dismantle Panama’s dictatorship-era libel and contempt laws, which can be used to punish whistleblowers. Acts of corruption are seldom prosecuted, and perpetrators are almost never jailed. Under President Cortizo, Panama has taken some measures to improve the business climate and encourage transparency. These include a public-private partnership (APP) law passed in September 2019 that covers construction, maintenance, and operations projects valued at more than $10 million. The law is designed to implement checks and balances and eliminate discretion in contracting, a positive step that will increase transparency and create a level playing field for investors. In addition, the public procurement law that was approved in May 2020 is aimed at improving bidding processes so that no tenders can be “made to order”. Panama ratified the UN’s Anti-Corruption Convention in 2005 and the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1998. However, there is a perception that Panama should more effectively implement both conventions. ELSA FERNÁNDEZ AGUILAR National Director Autoridad Nacional de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacion (ANTAI) Ave. del Prado, Edificio 713, Balboa, Ancon, Panama, República de Panama (507) 527-9270 efernandez@antai.gob.pa www.antai.gob.pa Olga de Obaldia Executive Director Fundacion Para el Desarrollo y Libertad Ciudadana (Panama’s TI Chapter) Urbanización Nuevo Paitilla. Calle 59E. Dúplex Nº 25. Ciudad de Panamá. PANAMÁ (507) 2234120 odeobaldia@libertadciudadana.org https://www.libertadciudadana.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment Panama is a peaceful and stable democracy. On rare occasions, large-scale protests can turn violent and disrupt commercial activity in affected areas. Mining and energy projects have been sensitive issues, especially those that involve development in designated indigenous areas called comarcas. One U.S. company has reported not only protests and obstruction of access to one of its facilities, but costly acts of vandalism against its property. The unrest is related to disagreements over compensation for affected community members. The GoP has attempted to settle the dispute, but without complete success. In May 2019, Panama held national elections that international observers agreed were free and fair. The transition to the new government was smooth. Panama’s Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the government respects this right. No authorization is needed for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative purposes is required. Unions, student groups, employee associations, elected officials, and unaffiliated groups frequently attempt to impede traffic and disrupt commerce in order to force the government or private businesses to agree to their demands. Homicides in Panama increased by 11 percent in 2021, to 554, 57 more than were recorded in 2020. Strife among rival gangs and turf battles in the narcotrafficking trade contributed significantly to the increase in the homicide rate in 2021. Panamanian authorities assess that 70 percent of homicides in the country are linked to organized crime, especially transnational drug trafficking and gangs. The 2021 homicide rate of 12.95 per 100,000 people is still among the lowest in Central America, but is consistent with an upward trend since 2019, year-on-year. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to official surveys carried out in October 2021, the unemployment rate in Panama improved significantly, but the level of informality and the size of the economically active population (EAP) worsened. That is, fewer people were looking for work. As of October 2021, the unemployment rate stood at 11.3 percent and the informality rate at 47.6 percent, while the economically active population had decreased by 66.5 percent, according to the labor market survey (EML) carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). There is a shortage of skilled workers in accounting, information technology, and specialized construction, and a minimal number of English-speaking workers. Panama spends approximately 13 percent of its budget, or 3 percent of GDP, on education. While Panama has one of the highest minimum wages in the hemisphere, the 2018-2019 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report ranked Panama 89 out of 141 countries for the skillsets of university graduates. The government’s labor code remains highly restrictive. The Panamanian Labor Code, Chapter 1, Article 17, establishes that foreign workers can constitute only 10 percent of a company’s workforce, or up to 15 percent if those employees have a specialized skill. By law, businesses can only exceed these caps for a defined period and with prior approval from the Ministry of Labor. Several sectors, including the Panama Canal Authority, the Colon Free Zone, and export processing zones/call centers, are covered by their own labor regimes. Employers outside these zones, such as those in the tourism sector, have called for greater flexibility, easier termination of workers, and the elimination of many constraints on productivity-based pay. The Panamanian government has issued waivers to regulations on an ad hoc basis to address employers’ demands, but there is no consistent standard for obtaining such waivers. The law allows private sector workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. Public sector employees may organize to create a professional association to bargain collectively on behalf of its members, even though public institutions are not legally obligated to bargain with the association. Members of the national police are the only workers prohibited from creating professional associations. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination and requires reinstatement of workers terminated for union activity, but does not provide adequate mechanisms to enforce this right. The Ministry of Labor’s Board of Appeals and Conciliation has authority to resolve certain labor disagreements, such as internal union disputes, enforcement of the minimum wage, and some dismissal issues. The law allows arbitration by mutual consent, at the request of the employee or the ministry, and in the case of a collective dispute in a privately held public utility. It allows either party to appeal if arbitration is mandated during a collective dispute in a public-service company. The Board of Appeals and Conciliation has exclusive competency for disputes related to domestic employees, some dismissal issues, and claims of less than $1,500. The Ministry of the Presidency’s Conciliation Board hears and resolves complaints by public-sector workers. The Board refers complaints that it fails to resolve to an arbitration panel, which consists of representatives from the employer, the professional association, and a third member chosen by the first two. If the dispute cannot be resolved, it is referred to a tribunal under the Board. Observers, however, have noted that the Ministry of the Presidency has not yet designated the tribunal judges. The alternative to the Board is the civil court system. Panama does not have a system of unemployment insurance. Instead, workers receive large severance payments from their employer upon termination. During the COVID-19 pandemic, employers were permitted to furlough workers for longer than normally permitted, without paying severance. Law 201 of February 25, 2021 allowed employers to establish temporary measures to preserve employment and normalize labor relations by extending furloughs to the end of 2021, This law ended on December 31, 2021. Yet even after its expiration, some companies have kept workers furloughed because of a lack of resources to rehire them or pay their severances. Press reports suggest these companies have yet to recover from the pandemic-related economic crisis. 14. Contact for More Information Colombia Primola Economic Specialist – Economic Section E-mail: PrimolaCE@state.gov Office: +507-317-5491 Cell: +(507) 6613-4687 Papua New Guinea Executive Summary Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the largest economy among the Pacific Islands and offers enormous trade and investment potential. Key investment prospects are in infrastructure development, a growing urban-based middle-class market, abundant natural resources in mining, oil and gas, forestry, and fisheries. Under the banner of “Take-Back PNG,” Prime Minister James Marape’s government endorsed a fair, open, and collective approach in its decision-making processes, especially decisions concerning the proper management of the country’s resources and investment returns. Under Marape, PNG reaffirmed its openness to trade and investment, is stepping up reforms to recover from high debt levels and seeks to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), especially in the natural resources sector to stimulate its economy. Since taking office, the Marape Administration – despite being comprised of many of the same officials as the prior O’Neill Administration – blamed the O’Neill Government for the country’s poor fiscal regime, lack of infrastructure development, the high cost of logistical services, the breakdown of law and order, a cumbersome public sector, and poorly performing state-owned enterprises. To address these problems, the government regularly reaffirmed its need for FDI to stimulate its economy, announced a fiscal stimulus package which supports funding for local business to aid PNG’s economic recovery. The country has faced dwindling FDI compared to pre-COVID-19 years, however investments increased at the start of 2021. Business confidence increased in 2022 sparked by renewed interest in PNG and evidenced by several key mergers and acquisitions in late 2021. Mining companies continue to be an attractive investment destination. Growth in mining industry is estimated to be 5.4%, underpinned by the expected reopening of the Porgera mine and improvements in OK Tedi and Wafi Golpu production in 2022. Furthermore, telecommunication companies are also anticipating growth and seen as good foreign investment opportunities in PNG and the Pacific. Telstra Australia acquired telecommunication giant Digicel Pacific which has the largest market share in PNG. Vodafone PNG – Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Ltd which operates across Fiji, Western Samoa, American Samoa, Kiribati, Cook Island and Vanuatu started operations as the third mobile operator in PNG with an anticipated investment exceeding US $399 million. Australia was the top investing country in 2021, followed by Malaysia, the USA, Hong Kong, and the PRC. By sector investments, the energy sector had the highest investments, and investment proposals, followed by the retail, and wholesale sector, then manufacturing, mining and petroleum, and other sectors; despite recording increase in investments. The government recognizes the need for climate change action and has submitted its Enhanced National Determined Contributions (NDC). PNG’s proposed climate change mitigation, and adaptation strategies to achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050 are conditionally. The government has mainstreamed climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies into its national long-term visions, plans, and strategies. PNG’s climate change envoy at the COP26, stressed, and leveraged preservation of the country’s rainforests for climate change action, and the need for economic development and sustainable FDI along these lines. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2016 $ 235 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2.72 billion https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime The Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (ICCC) is charged with fostering competition. While there are transparent policies in place, the competition regime is oriented towards regulating existing monopolies and does little to foster competition. Tax, labor, environment, health, and safety and other laws do not distort or impede investment. There are long bureaucratic delays in the processing of work permits and frequent complaints about corruption and bribery in government departments. The IPA and the Government are moving, with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation, towards a more streamlined regulatory framework to encourage foreign investment. One example of this trend is the IPA’s move to an online registration process for businesses. There are informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations and private sector associations. There are impediments to the licensing of skilled foreign labor that are imposed by local professional associations, such as the Papua New Guinea Institute of Engineers and the Law Society (both of which have their own regulatory processes), that foreigners must go through before they can work/practice in the country. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia or organizations. Proposed laws and regulations are made available for public comment, but comments are not always taken into consideration or acted on by lawmakers or regulators. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, but there are delays in the dispute resolution system due to a lack of human resources in the judiciary. The Companies Act requires all banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, listed companies on the stock exchange, securities companies, superannuation funds, and private companies (including exempt companies) to utilize the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing their financial statements. Foreign companies and their subsidiaries are required to follow similar financial reporting and audit requirements as domestic companies, regardless of size. Although the Listing Rules of the Port Moresby Stock Exchange do not set out additional financial reporting requirements for listed companies, the rules do require listed companies to publicly disclose their audited financial statements. The government, through the Environmental Act 2000, encourages businesses to prevent and minimize environmental harm. The Conservation Environmental and Protection Authority (CEPA) ensures businesses comply with environmental regulations imposed under the Environmental Act 2000. Companies seeking to invest in businesses that pose a threat to the environment are required to conduct an environmental impact assessment report. However, these reports are rarely made available to the public. When possible, proposed laws are made available for public comment, but comments are not always taken into consideration or acted on by lawmakers. Frequently, important Parliamentary decisions, such as the annual budget, are taken with no hearings and little or no debate before voting. Regulatory decisions can sometimes be capricious and opaque, but they do not specifically target foreign-owned businesses. Most regulatory decisions can be appealed to courts with jurisdiction. Many PNG government functions and documents are available online, but not all, and they are not centralized. Government agencies have acts and regulations that encourage transparency in the administrative process, which are rarely enforced. The Treasurer, Ian Ling-Stuckey commissioned the review and amendment of the Central Bank Act 2000 by an appointed independent advisory group. The findings were made public and proposed amendments to the act were passed in parliament which included governance reforms. The reserve bank’s objectives were also expanded from primarily controlling inflation and unemployment to now include economic growth, the general development of PNG economy, and managing national economic crises. Following these changes, the government appointed a monetary policy board and replaced the head of the reserve bank. The Marape government also amended the Kumul Consolidated Holdings Act to promote good governance, increase transparency, and improve the performance of the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). There is strong political will in PNG to restore public confidence and engagement in the government’s fiscal reporting systems. However, greater action by reporting agencies is critical to realize full and timely reporting practices in PNG’s public finance management systems. Overall, the government needs greater coordination among reporting agencies to deliver their mandated functions and responsibilities effectively. This includes all government agencies consistently and fully reporting all required financial activities, with proper financial statements to the supreme audit institution. The lack of full and timely reporting practices continues to undermine public finance management systems, and publicly available budget information. At the same time, most budget documents remain incomprehensible to many ordinary citizens due to low financial literacy levels and the lack of proper public and civic awareness programs. PNG is a party to the Melanesian Free Trade Agreement. The agreement came into effect in 2017 and does address the need for competent regulatory authorities in each country (PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji). However, the regulatory chapter is small and is designed to be strengthened and improved going forward. When international standards are used in PNG, they are most often Australian models due to PNG’s history under Australian colonial governance and their continuing close economic ties. The government has notified the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade only once. That notification covered food safety issues and was issued in 2006. The legal system is based on English common law. Contract law in Papua New Guinea is very similar to and applies in much the same way as in other common law countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. There is, however, considerably less statutory regulation of the application and operation of contracts in Papua New Guinea than in those other countries. The Supreme Court is the nation’s highest judicial authority and final court of appeal. Other courts are the National Court; district courts, which deal with summary and non-indictable offenses; and local courts, established to deal with minor offenses, including matters regulated by local customs. While often painstakingly slow, the judiciary system is widely viewed as independent from government interference. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in matters of constitutional interpretation and enforcement and has appellate jurisdiction in appeals from the National Court, certain decisions of the Land Titles Commission, and those of other regulatory entities as prescribed in their own Acts. The National Court also has original jurisdiction for certain constitutional matters and has unlimited original jurisdiction for criminal and civil matters. The National Court has jurisdiction under the Land Act in proceedings involving land in Papua New Guinea other than customary land. Foreign investors can either be incorporated in PNG as a subsidiary of an overseas company or incorporated under the laws of another country and therefore registered as an overseas company under the Companies Act 1997. The 1997 Companies Act and 1998 Companies Regulation oversee matters regarding private and public companies, both foreign and domestic. All foreign business entities must have IPA approval and must be certified and registered with the government before commencing operations in PNG. While government departments have their own procedures for approving foreign investment in their respective economic sectors, the IPA provides investors with the relevant information and contacts. In 2013, the government amended the Takeovers Code to include a test for foreign companies wishing to buy into the ownership of local companies. The new regulation states that the Securities Commission of Papua New Guinea (SCPNG) shall issue an order preventing a party from acquiring any shares, whether partial or otherwise, if the commission views that such acquisition or takeover is not in the national interest of PNG. This applies to any company, domestic or foreign, registered under the PNG Companies Act, publicly traded, with more than 5 million US$ 1.53 million in assets, with a minimum of 25 shareholders, and more than 100 employees. In recent years, this law was not used to prevent ExxonMobil’s acquisition of InterOil or Chinese company Zijin Mining’s purchase of 50 percent of the Porgera Joint Venture gold mine. The IPA website (https://www.ipa.gov.pg/ ) is the official online information platform to engage with the public on matters relating to the IPA’s mandated roles and function. The 2002 Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act is the law that governs competition. It also established the Independent Consumer & Competition Commission (ICCC), the country’s premier economic regulatory body and consumer watchdog; introduced a new regime for the regulation of utilities, in relation to prices and service standards; and allowed the ICCC to take over the price control tasks previously undertaken by the Prices Controller as well as the consumer protection tasks previously undertaken by the Consumer Affairs Council. The ICCC’s website is http://www.iccc.gov.pg . The ICCC reviewed the merger and acquisition of Oil Search Limited by Santos Australia, Digicel Pacific by Telstra Australia, and the proposal by Kina Bank to acquire Westpac. ICCC conducted stakeholder consultations for each of the mergers and acquisitions to determine the effect on consumers and market competition. It approved the Santos/Oil Search and Digicel/Telstra deals while denying the acquisition of Westpac by Kina. The judicial system upholds the sanctity of contracts, and the Investment Promotion Act of 1992 expressly prohibits expropriation of foreign assets. The 2013 nationalization of the Ok Tedi copper-gold-silver mine was an Act of Parliament, considered and voted on in the regular order of business. There was no recourse or due process beyond the Parliament. ICSID Convention and New York Convention PNG signed the instrument of Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) on June 22, 2019. The Instrument of Accession was deposited with the UN Treaties Depository in New York on July 17, 2019, and PNG became the 160th country to accede to the New York Convention. As a signatory to the New York Convention, PNG’s National Executive Council endorsed reform to the country’s outdated Arbitration Act 1951 (Chapter 46 of the Revised Laws of PNG) through the adoption of new legislation based on international model laws to implement the New York Convention and to provide enhanced support for modern arbitration in PNG. PNG has been a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) since 1978. In agreements with foreign investors, GPNG traditionally adopts the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL model law). While no specific domestic legislation exists for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention or ICSID Convents, in early 2018, an Arbitration Technical Working Committee (ATWC) was formed to advance arbitration reform in PNG. Consisting of members of the PNG Judiciary and representatives of the First Legislative Counsel and other relevant inter-governmental departments and agencies, the ATWC produced a draft Arbitration Bill 2019 in consultation with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Asian Development Bank and internationally recognized arbitration experts. The draft Arbitration Bill 2019 aims to conform with best modern international arbitration law practice. The draft bill is subject to further vetting before its enactment. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Investment disputes may be settled through diplomatic channels or through the use of local remedies before having such matters adjudicated at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or through another appropriate tribunal of which Papua New Guinea is a member. The Investment Promotion Act 1992, which is administered by the IPA, also protects against expropriation, cancellation of contracts, and discrimination through the granting of most favored nation treatment to investors. PNG does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, and no claims have been made under such an agreement. There is not a recent history of international judgments against GoPNG nor is there a recent history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. PNG does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States. Over the last 10 years, there here have been no known disputes involving a U.S. person or other foreign investors, nor have the local courts heard cases to recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the governments. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts According to the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce & Industry, local and foreign parties settle disputes in Papua New Guinea through the courts. Litigation in PNG is perceived to be an expensive and drawn-out process, sometimes taking years for a decision to be handed down. There is no domestic arbitration body outside of the courts and contract enforcement. A 2015 international arbitration decision in favor of Interoil (which has since been acquired by ExxonMobil) and against Oil Search was reportedly respected in PNG. To date, there have been no cases in which SOEs were involved in investment disputes. Papua New Guinea’s bankruptcy laws are included in chapter 253 of the Insolvency Act of 1951 and sections 254 through 362 of the Companies Act of 1997, which covers receivership and liquidation. Bankruptcy and litigation searches can only be conducted in person at the National Court in Port Moresby. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Papua New Guinea takes an average of three years, and typically costs 23 percent of the debtor’s estate. The average recovery rate is 25.2 cents on the dollar. Globally, Papua New Guinea stands at 141 out of 189 economies for the Ease of Resolving Insolvency on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Survey. 4. Industrial Policies Performance requirements/incentives are applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. The investment incentives currently available are designed primarily to encourage the development of industries that are considered desirable for the long-term economic development of Papua New Guinea or specific underdeveloped regions within the country. A 10-year exemption from tax is available where certain new businesses are established in specified rural development areas. Businesses, resident, or non-resident, engaged in the following activities qualify for this exemption: Agricultural production of any kind; Manufacturing of any kind; Construction; Transport, storage, and communications; Real estate; Business services; and Provision of accommodation, motels, or hotels. The following have been specified as rural development areas: Central province – Goilala; Enga province – Kandep, Lagalp, Wabag, Wapenamunda; Gulf province – Kaintiba, Kikori; Eastern Highlands province – Henganofi, Lufa, Okapa, Wonenave; Southern Highlands province – Jimi, Tambal; Madang province – Bogia, Rai Coast, Ramu; Milne Bay province – Losula, Rabaraba; Morobe province – Finschaffen, Kabwum, Kaiapit, Menyamya, Mumeng; East New Britain province – Pomio; West New Britain province – Kandrian; East Sepik province – Ambuti, Angoram, Lumi, Maprik; West Sepik province – Amanab, Nuku, Telefomin; and Simbu province – Gumine, Karimui. The Investment Promotion Act contains guarantees that there will be no nationalization or expropriation of foreign investors’ property except in accordance with law, for public purposes defined by law, or in payment of compensation as defined by law. Accelerated depreciation rates are available for new manufacturing and agricultural plants, generous deductions are available for capital expenditure on land used for primary production, and accelerated deductions are available for mining and petroleum companies. A 10-year exemption from tax is available where certain new businesses are established in specified rural development areas. The exemption does not apply to businesses in areas in which a special mining lease or a petroleum development license is granted. Businesses that commence exporting qualifying goods manufactured by them in Papua New Guinea are exempt from income tax on the profits derived from those sales for the first three complete years. For the following four years, the profit derived from the excess of export sales over the average export sales of the three previous years is exempt from income tax. The list of qualifying goods includes, among other items: motor vehicles, matches, paint, refined petroleum, soaps, wooden furniture, dairy products, flour, chopsticks, artifacts, clothing and manufactured textiles, and jewelry. A wage subsidy is payable to new businesses that manufacture new manufactured products. The business will receive a prescribed percentage of the value of the minimum wage paid by the business, multiplied by the number of Papua New Guineans permanently employed by the business. Eligible products are, broadly, all products listed under division D of the International Standard Classification of All Economic Activities (Third Revision), provided the products are not subject to quota pricing without import pricing or to tariff protection. Registered foreign companies must file an annual certification with the Registrar of Companies accompanied by audited financial statements. A foreign company must apply for Certification under the Investment Promotion Act 1992 within 14 days of registering. Any foreign company automatically falls under this category and therefore must complete the same process. However, a company may apply to be exempted from certain requirements. A company which chooses to conduct business through a branch registered in Papua New Guinea can repatriate its profits without being subject to withholding tax. On the other hand, the dividends of a Papua New Guinea incorporated subsidiary may attract dividend withholding tax. A higher rate of income tax is imposed on non-resident companies. If a foreign company merely wishes to have a representative office in Papua New Guinea, it may be exempt from lodging tax returns if it derives no income in Papua New Guinea. The Companies Act adopts similar principles and standards of corporate regulation to those in place in New Zealand. Companies registered in Papua New Guinea must lodge an annual return every year with the Registrar of Companies within six months of the end of its financial year. Currently, the Papua New Guinea government is reviewing its structure. There are no discriminatory or preferential export and import policies affecting foreign investors, and there are low levels of import taxes. The government is removing import taxes on electric vehicles, effective in 2022 to support green energy investments; there are no other tax incentives for green investments. The creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in PNG have been a policy initiative by the past two administrations but continue to lack appropriate legislative framework. The following geographical areas have been designated for SEZs: Ihu SEZs in Gulf Province Vanimo Free Trade Zone Sepik Special Economic Zone Manus Special Economic Zone Bana (AROB) SEZ Agriculture Province in EHP, WHP, Morobe, Sepik and others Paga Hill Special Tourism Economic Zone, NCD Nadzab Industrial SEZ Western Province SEZ Pacific Marine Industrial Zone (PMIZ) For each SEZ, the government plans to operate Gold and Regional Value Chain Industries, maintain one-stop shop regimes, and grant fiscal and customs and operational incentives up to ten years. The government is progressing the IHU SEZ, and PMIZ, allocating US $28.5 million for the PMIZ in 2022, and received a loan of US $28.5 million from PRC to develop the IHU SEZ. All non-citizens seeking employment in PNG must have a valid work permit before they can be hired. The work permit must be granted by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) in accordance with the Employment of Non-Citizens Act of 2007. It can take weeks or even months to obtain both a work permit and visa for non-citizens to work in Papua New Guinea, and delays are common due to a lengthy bureaucratic clearance process. In the past, the government has used its immigration powers to block visas for personnel coming to Papua New Guinea to fill positions that it believes can be filled by Papua New Guineans. There are no governmental authority-imposed conditions on permission to invest, nor forced localization imposed on foreign investors. NICTA (National Information & Communication Technology Authority) Data Integrity Act called CCE (Controlled Customer Equipment) is strictly enforced. Only illegal transmission of state/military data will be charged against the state or military. These are the two Acts that enforce data integrity (Data Interference and System Interference). In any case the fine is an amount not exceeding US $28,500 or 10 years in prison. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights exist and are enforced. Mortgages and liens do exist. For non-customary land, the system is reliable. PNG’s legal system does not allow direct foreign ownership of land. To get around this limitation, long-term government leases are used. The legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights, but there are substantial delays particularly within the Department of Lands. The IPA through the Intellectual Property Office of PNG (IPOPNG) administers the Trademarks Act, Chapter 385, Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act (2000) and the Patents and Industrial Design Act (2000). Protections for intellectual property rights relating to the reproduction and sale of counterfeit and pirated products, particularly music and movies, are insufficient. Such counterfeit products are openly sold on the streets and in shops. Sales persist despite sporadic law enforcement action. Other counterfeit products that infringe on copyrights, patents, and/or trademarks are often imported from Asian countries and sold in Papua New Guinea. Customs periodically seizes such shipments, but there are significant gaps in their enforcement regime. Adequate protection for trade secrets and semiconductor chip layout design exists in law, and minimal infringements appear to occur. PNG primarily tracks seizures of counterfeit good through media reports, as no formal publication process exists. PNG does prosecute IPR violations. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investments are unregulated and limited to the availability of stocks. PNG has one stock market in Port Moresby, PNGX Limited (Formerly POMSoX). Founded in 1999, it is closely aligned with the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and mimics its procedures. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market, much more so than in previous years due to the liberalization of policies, provided those foreign investors have a good credit history. Credit instruments are limited to leasing and bank finance. PNG’s commercial banking sector comprises four commercial banks. Two are Australian institutions, Westpac and Australian and New Zealand Group (ANZ) banks, with local banks Bank of South Pacific (BSP) and Kina Bank. BSP is both the largest bank and non-mining taxpayer in PNG. BSP operates 79 branches, 52 sub-branches, 351 agents, 499 ATMs, 11,343 electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS) units and 4261 employees. Official government sources indicate that much remains to be done in terms of financial inclusion, with nearly three quarters of PNG’s population lacking access to formal financial services. Most of those excluded represent the low-income population in rural areas, urban settlements, especially women. Based on the Oxford Business Group business update issue of 2018, assets in the commercial sector have recorded exponential growth since 2002, with the Bank of PNG reporting that total commercial banking assets rose from US $1.2 billion in that year to reach US $6.3 billion in 2011. Growth has been slower in recent years, however, with total assets rising from US $7.1 billion in 2012 to a high of US $8.49 billion 2020. The banking system in Papua New Guinea is sound. The Bank of Papua New Guinea acts as the central bank for Papua New Guinea. The Central Banking Act of 2000 outlines the powers, functions, and objectives of the Bank. Foreigners are required to show documentation either of their employment or their business along with proof of a valid visa in order to register for a bank account. Foreign Exchange While there are no legal restrictions on such activities, a lack of available foreign exchange makes such conversions, transfers, and repatriations time consuming. Bank of Papua New Guinea requires that all funds held in PNG be held in PNG kina. This rule was announced with little notice and caught many businesses off-guard in 2016. While there was an appeal process for businesses that wished to keep non-PGK accounts, none of the appeals were granted. Due to the backlog on demand, and insufficient foreign exchange, the reserve bank rations foreign exchange. The reserve bank rations foreign exchange, by prioritizing business activities, and demand. The reserve bank determines the exchange rate policy, and since 2014 uses a crawling pegged foreign exchange rate policy, such that the local currency is pegged and fluctuates, with its major trading partners currencies including the USD. Remittance Policies There have been no recent changes or plans to change remittance policies. Remittance is done only through direct bank transfers. All remittances overseas in excess of US$ 15,340 per year require a tax clearance certificate issued by the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC). In addition, approval of PNG’s Central Bank – the Bank of Papua New Guinea – is required for annual remittances overseas in excess of US$ 153,420 While there are no legal time limitations on remittances, foreign companies have waited many months for large transfers or performed transfers in small increments over time due to a shortage of foreign exchange. Sovereign Wealth Funds A Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill was passed in Parliament on July 30, 2015. However, falling commodity prices have severely impacted government revenues. Plans for the SWF have been put on hold indefinitely. Following legislative changes to SOE’s policy on dividend payments to the government, enabling the Marape administration to transfer annually seven percent of dividends received from SOE’s in the resources sector to the SWF. 8. Responsible Business Conduct PNG does not have a national action plan for responsible business conduct (RBC). However, most multinational companies in PNG do operate with a set of standards. The concept of social responsibility activities is pervasive in the extractive industries and guides conducive interactions with all stakeholders. There are currently no NGOs specifically monitoring RBC in PNG. While PNG does not have specific policies, most large, international companies use international best practices as standards. PNG is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). PNG EITI’s efforts have thus far been hampered by a lack of cooperation from relevant government ministries and a severe lack of data. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues The national climate change strategies, and policies are aimed at addressing climate change and achieving economic development, and growth, without specific expectations on the private sector to divest from intensive greenhouse gas emitting input sources. Although, there are existing policies for sustainable forest management, conservation of biodiversity, and other ecosystem management, these are laws, and regulations without substantial incentives for encouraging sustainable environmental, and resources management. During the Somare led government carbon trading schemes were trailed through the REDD+ program as an incentive for rainforest preservation, however yielded substandard outcomes due to poor governance, limited information sharing on the carbon trading scheme. This incentive has been pursued again by the Marape government, which in 2021 signed an agreement with the Australian government to develop the carbon trading markets in the country. The country’s national procurement policy considers the efficient use of resources, and environmental sustainability. Public investment projects are either funded by donors or co- financed through loans from development partners that have their own procurement policies and guidelines, which the PNG government includes in its procurement process when tendering projects. For example, the Australian loan funded of US $420 million for the upgrading of PNG’s major port infrastructure, and the upgrade of the Milne Bay wharf funded through the Strategic Climate Fund Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. Although the national procurement policy includes environmental considerations, however, fully funded government infrastructure projects are rarely climate resilient and environmentally sustainable. The awarding of infrastructure contracts follows procurement policies but lack monitoring and compliance checks on the quality and standard of infrastructure built. The government has several national climate change action strategies, including; the Sustainable Development Goal 13 Roadmap, the Climate Compatible Development Policy, PNG’s Action Plan for Enhanced Transparency Framework on AFOLU, and the REDD+ National Forest Monitoring System (2021–2025); National REDD+ Strategy (2017) PNG REDD+ Finance, and the Investment Prospectus (2020). These strategies outline the country’s response to climate change and map a pathway to reduce the country’s climate change vulnerability and greenhouse gas emissions. The Change Development Authority (CCDA) is the agency responsible for coordinating and facilitating climate change actions, working in partnership with the PNG National Forestry Authority (PNGNFA) and CEPA to monitor natural resources. The CCDA and PNGFA are developing and maintaining a monitoring and reporting database on forest change and greenhouse gas emissions. The government started implementation of the SDG13 Roadmap by banning round log exports starting in 2030; ceasing the issuance of new logging permits; piloting a forest conservation program; developing carbon trade markets with the assistance from the Indo Pacific Carbon Offset Scheme; and restricting the import, trade, and handling of ozone depleting substances in all equipment in 2022 to be followed by a complete ban in 2025. 9. Corruption Corruption is widespread in Papua New Guinea, particularly the misappropriation of public funds, “skimming” of inflated contracts, and nepotism. In January 2021 Transparency International ranked PNG 124 out of 180 countries and rated it the most corrupt of the Pacific Island nations. The country’s improvement in corruption rankings is attributed to the establishment of the Independent Corruption Advisory Committee in 2021. Although giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act, penalties differ for Members of Parliament (MPs), public officials, and ordinary citizens. For MPs the penalty is imprisonment for no more than seven years; for public officials the penalty is imprisonment for no more than seven years and a fine at the discretion of the court; for ordinary citizens the penalty is a fine not exceeding US$ 123 or imprisonment of no more than one year. A bribe by a local company or individual to a foreign official is a criminal act. A local company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from taxes. The government encourages companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. However, overall enforcement of existing laws is insufficient. Most of the larger domestic companies and international firms from Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have effective internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery. Many firms from elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia, particularly those in the resource extraction sectors, lack such programs. Papua New Guinea has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Papua New Guinea is not a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime or the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. PNG’s Ombudsman Commission and the Police Fraud & Anti-Corruption Directorate are generally the main avenues to report and seek protection to matters pertinent to investigating corruption. The Ombudsman Commission is mandated to investigate and recommend to concerned authorities to take action, while the Police Fraud & Anti-Corruption Directorate has the powers to prosecute. U.S. firms routinely identify corruption as a challenge to foreign direct investment. Some critical areas in which corruption is pervasive include budget management, forestry, fisheries, and public procurement. In addition, the findings from the recent business survey, “Results of the 2017 Survey of Businesses in Papua New Guinea,” highlighted that “corruption is becoming an increasing problem with most firms reporting that they make ‘irregular payments’ to government officials.” A considerable number of those surveyed indicated that problems lay in either Lands or Customs/Finance/Tax institutions. Resources to Report Corruption Twain Pambuai Director of Corporate Services Ombudsman Commission +675 308 2618 Twain.pambuai@ombudsman.gov.pg Arianne Kassman, Executive Director Transparency International +675 320 2188 exectipng@gmail.com Lawrence Stephens, ChairmanTransparency International +675 320 2188 taubadasaku@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment Tribal conflicts occur regularly, particularly in the Highlands and Sepik regions of the country, and election-related violence broke out following the 2017 national elections. While foreign investors/interests are not generally the target of these confrontations, project infrastructure can be inadvertently damaged, or their operations disrupted. Most of the disruption and damage caused to projects is due to disputes between landowners and the central government, which are fueled by an often-true perception that the central government has failed to uphold its financial commitments to landowners. Landowners in these disputes have taken out their frustration with the central government by damaging the infrastructure or disrupting the operations of foreign projects in their regions. The central bureaucracy is increasingly politicized, which has eroded the capacity of government departments and allowed nepotism and political cronyism to thrive in parts the public service. Civil disturbances have been triggered by the government’s failure to deliver financial and development commitments, particularly to landowners in the resource project areas. They have also occurred in major urban areas based on disputes between long-term residents and newly arrived migrants or between competing criminal networks. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Papua New Guinea does not have a primary information system to keep track of the country’s labor market, according to PNG’s Department of Labor & Industrial Relations. PNG’s Department of Labor & Industrial Relations is responsible for labor and industrial matters in the country. The absence of a proper information system hinders reliable and readily available labor data and statistics. In addition, the lack of specific legislative and policy guidelines has limited plans and exercises on collecting data on a regular and reliable basis over the years. The Department confirmed the use of sectoral employment movements and trends to track PNG’s labor market. PNG’s informal economy sector is concentrated in the sale agricultural products in primarily local open marketplaces. According to the United Nations Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Report 2020, the informal sector contributes 30 percent of the country’s GDP, where 65 percent of informal sector workers are in rural areas engaged in cash cropping, vegetable farming, and retailing. In urban areas the informal activities include the selling of vegetables; roadside and street vending of retail products; and services and labor-intensive manufacturing services. The government rarely regulates informal market activities, providing the opportunity for individuals to engage in the selling of counterfeit and cheap manufactured products. Transactions in the informal sector rely on social networks and kinships utilizing verbal agreements. There have been reported cases of exploitation of these informal agreements by foreign nationals to acquire traditional and customary land to establish businesses. The Central Bank of Papua New Guinea’s quarterly employment index is the widely used reference for labor market statistics in the country. The index covers 500 private companies, which represent 80 per cent of the formal private sector, employing about 10,000 workers. The Bank conducts periodic interviews with each company to verify their employment and revenue levels on a quarterly basis. The index generally represents employment levels by region and industry throughout the country. With limited accountability in PNG’s labor market, most private businesses tend to have more bargaining power to determine the size and level of skilled workers for their operations. This has largely seen highly paid jobs dominated by mostly expatriate workers under contractual arrangements. It has also given rise to large numbers of skilled jobs occupied by expatriate workers. The lack of proper national labor market surveys continues to keep the actual availability of employment and workforce unchecked and open to displacement of national skilled workforce. Youth unemployment is rampant throughout the country with fifty per cent of the population under the age of twenty-five years. The high unemployment figures reflect the small sector of formal business activities, as well as a downturn in the extractive resource sectors, which is heavily relied on to generate government revenue streams and create employment. The country continues to see a shortage of highly skilled or specialized and experienced workforce in financial and industry management capacities. This is mainly due to high turnover in national staff in organizations and the slowness in localizing roles in a business. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations 2009 Work Permit Guideline explains the Papua New Guinea Classification of Industrial Divisions and the country’s Classification of Occupations, which are an integral part of the Work Permit System. In practice, the Guideline is accommodative to industry labor demands. Permits are accessible by providing a simple justification suitable for hirer’s work requirements. There are no seasonal adjustment restrictions in PNG. While companies do provide severance packages as a practice when conducting layoffs, there is no specific legal requirement to do so. There is no social insurance or other safety net programs for unemployed workers. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $23.26 2020 $23.59 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $2411 2016 $235 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $2 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 27.1% 2020 16.6% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Host Country Source: Central Bank of PNG,PNG Investment Promotion Authority. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI No updated data is available. 14. Contact for More Information Geoffrey Grimes Economic Officer GrimesGT@state.gov Kathleen Natera Economic Specialist NateraK@state.gov US Embassy Port Moresby +675 308-2100 Paraguay Executive Summary Paraguay has a small but growing open economy, which for the past decade averaged 3.2 percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per year, and has the potential for continued growth over the next decade. Major drivers of economic growth in Paraguay are the agriculture, retail, and construction sectors. The Paraguayan government encourages private foreign investment. Paraguayan law grants investors tax breaks, permits full repatriation of capital and profits, supports maquila operations (special benefits for investors in manufacturing of exports), and guarantees national treatment for foreign investors. Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s all have upgraded Paraguay’s credit ratings over the past several years. In December 2021, Fitch maintained Paraguay’s credit rating at BB+ with a stable outlook, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Paraguay scores at the mid-range or lower in most competitiveness indicators. Judicial insecurity hinders the investment climate, and trademark infringement and counterfeiting are major concerns. Since President Mario Abdo Benitez took office, his government passed several new laws to combat money laundering. Previously, the government has taken measures to improve the investment climate, including the passage of laws addressing competition, public sector payroll disclosures, and access to information. A number of U.S. companies, however, continue to have issues working with government offices to solve investment disputes, including the government’s unwillingness to pay debts incurred under the previous administration and even some current debts. Paraguay was the first country in the region to quarantine as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which considerably impacted the services sector of the economy. Since March 2020, the government of Paraguay took a series of economic measures in response to the pandemic, which included tax breaks for some sectors, lower policy rates, new financing for health supplies, subsidies for suspended formal and informal sector workers, and soft loans for businesses, among others. Although Paraguay lifted most sanitary restrictions, some of these economic measures, such as tax breaks in the form of VAT reductions in rent and activities linked to the hotel, tourism, and service sectors, are still in force. These prompt measures to mitigate the economic and social impact of the pandemic, caused Paraguay to incur additional debt, resulting in an increase in its debt to GDP ratio from 22.4 percent in 2019 to 33.6 percent in 2021. The government also has a sustainable government procurement policy and, although it does not have climate change regulatory incentives, it does have policies and regulations that support the preservation of biodiversity, forests, clean air and water, the use of nature-based solutions, and seek other ecological benefits. Despite the government’s significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, it continues to occur in agriculture and ranching as well as in the production of bricks. Children of impoverished families also accompanied a parent or guardian in his or her work activities and work in the streets begging or selling small merchandise. Paraguay’s export and investment promotion bureau, REDIEX, prepares comprehensive information about business opportunities in Paraguay. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 88 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $197 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Paraguayan government publicly encourages private foreign investment, but U.S. companies often struggle with practices that inhibit or slow their activities. Paraguay guarantees equal treatment of foreign investors and permits full repatriation of capital and profits. Paraguay has historically maintained the lowest tax burden in the Latin American region, with a 10 percent corporate tax rate and a 10 percent value added tax (VAT) on most goods and services. Despite these policies, U.S. companies continue to have difficulty with investments and contracts in Paraguay, including questionable public procurement adjudications, seemingly frivolous legal entanglements taking multiple years to resolve, non-payment and delayed payments from Paraguayan government customers, and opaque permitting processes that slow project execution. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) signed in February 2021 an MOU with the Ministry of Justice to strengthen the rule of law and provide additional legal security to foreign investments in the country. Within MIC, REDIEX provides useful information for foreign investors, including business opportunities in Paraguay, registration requirements, laws, rules, and procedures. Foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises. Foreign businesses are not legally required to be associated with Paraguayan nationals for investment purposes, though this is strongly recommended on an unofficial basis, by national authorities. There is no restriction on repatriation of capital and profits. Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of business interests. Under the Investment Incentive Law (60/90) and the maquila program, the government has an approval mechanism for foreign investments that seeks to estimate the proposed investment’s economic impact in areas including employment, incorporation of new technologies, and economic diversification. The WTO conducted an Investment Policy Review in 2017. Please see following website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp460_e.htm Paraguay has responded to complaints about its traditionally onerous business registration process — previously requiring new businesses to register with a host of government entities one-by-one — by creating a portal in 2007 that provides one-stop service. The Sistema Unificado de Apertura y Cierre de Empresas – SUACE ( www.suace.gov.py ) – is the government’s single platform for registering a local or foreign company. The process takes about 35 days. On January 8, 2020, President Abdo Benitez signed law 6480 to facilitate the creation of SMEs. A new registration process allows individuals to complete the required forms online and at no cost. The approval process takes between 24 and 72 hours. This new registration process has been operational since July 2020 and can be accessed through http://eas.suace.gov.py/suace_frontend/ . There are no restrictions to Paraguayans investing abroad. The Paraguayan government does not incentivize or promote outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Proposed Paraguayan laws and regulations, including those pertaining to investment, are usually available in draft form for public comment after introduction into senate and lower house committees. In most instances, there are public hearings where members of the general public or interested parties can provide comments. Regulatory agencies’ supervisory functions over telecommunications, energy, potable water, and the environment are inefficient and opaque. Politically motivated changes in the leadership of regulating agencies negatively impact firms and investors. Although investors may appeal to the Comptroller General’s Office in the event of administrative irregularities, corruption has historically been common in Paraguayan institutions, as time-consuming processes provide opportunities for front-line civil servants to seek bribes to accelerate the paperwork. While regulatory processes are managed by governmental organizations, the Investment Incentive Law (60/90) establishes an Investment Council that includes the participation of two private sector representatives. Public finances and debt obligations of government institutions, agencies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are available online and mostly centralized by the Ministry of Finance. As Mercosur’s purpose is to promote free trade and fluid movement of goods, people, and currency, each country member is expected to adjust their regulations based on multilateral treaties, protocols, and agreements. Paraguay is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. Paraguay has a Civil Law legal system based on the Napoleonic Code. A new Criminal Code went into effect in 1998, with a corresponding Code of Criminal Procedure following in 2000. A defendant has the right to a public and oral trial. A three-judge panel acts as a jury. Judges render decisions on the basis of (in order of precedence) the Constitution, international agreements, the codes, laws Private entities may file appeals to government regulations they assess to be contrary to the constitution or Paraguayan law. The Supreme Court is responsible for answering these appeals. The judiciary is a separate and independent branch of government, however there are frequent media reports of political interference with judicial decision making. Judicial corruption also remains a concern, including reports of judges investing in plaintiffs’ claims in return for a percentage of monetary payouts. Paraguay has a specialized court for civil and commercial judicial matters. The Investment Incentive Law (60/90) passed in 1990 permits full repatriation of capital and profits. No restrictions exist in Paraguay on the conversion or transfer of foreign currency, apart from bank reporting requirements for transactions in excess of USD 10,000. This law also grants investors a number of tax breaks, including exemptions from corporate income tax and value-added tax. The 1991 Investment Law (117/91) guarantees equal treatment of foreign investors and the right to real property. It also regulates joint ventures (JVs), recognizing JVs established through formal legal contracts between interested parties. This law allows international arbitration for the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the Government of Paraguay. In December 2015, the president signed an Investment Guarantee Law (5542/15) to promote investment in capital-intensive industries. Implementing regulations were published in 2016. The law protects the remittance of capital and profits, provides assurances against administrative and judicial practices that might be considered discriminatory, and permits tax incentives for up to 20 years. There is no minimum investment amount, but projects must be authorized by a joint resolution by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. In 2013 the Paraguayan Congress passed a law to promote public-private partnerships (PPP) in public infrastructure and allow for private sector entities to participate in the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation. The government signed implementing regulations for the PPP law in 2014. As a result, the Executive Branch can now enter into agreements directly with the private sector without the need for congressional approval. In 2015, the Government of Paraguay implemented its first contract under the new law. In 2016, it awarded its second PPP to a consortium of Spanish, Portuguese, and local companies to expand and maintain two of the country’s federal highways. Paraguay’s bid for an airport expansion PPP in Asuncion in 2016, was officially cancelled in October 2018 due to concerns over the contracting process. No other PPPs have been awarded since, although some are under consideration by the Ministry of Public Works. Large infrastructure projects are usually open to foreign investors. Paraguay took steps in 2019 to demonstrate increased transparency in its financial system with the aim of attracting additional foreign investment. In December 2019, President Abdo Benitez signed into law the last of a series of twelve anti-money laundering laws at the recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering in Latin America (GAFILAT). The laws comply with international standards and facilitate the fight against money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. More information on the anti-money laundering laws and regulations can be found here: http://www.seprelad.gov.py/disposiciones-legales-i68 Paraguay’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The published budget was adequately detailed and considered generally reliable. Revised estimates were made public in end-of-year and in-year execution reports. Paraguay’s Comptroller’s Office selected sections of the government’s accounts for audit according to a risk assessment because it lacks sufficient resources to audit the entire executed budget annually. REDIEX provides a website to facilitate access to relevant legislation, laws, and regulations for investors, also available in English: www.bit.do/REDIEX20 Paraguay passed a Competition Law in 2013, which entered into force in April 2014. Law 4956/13 explicitly prohibits anti-competitive acts and created the National Competition Commission (CONACOM) as the government’s enforcement arm. Private property has historically been respected in Paraguay as a fundamental right. Expropriations must be sanctioned by a law authorizing the specific expropriation. There have been reports of expropriations of land without prompt and fair compensation. Paraguay has a bankruptcy law (154/63) under which a debtor may suspend payments to creditors during the evaluation period of the debtors’ restructuring proposal. If no agreement is reached, a trustee may liquidate the company’s assets. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Paraguay stands at 105 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. The report states resolving insolvency takes 3.9 years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold as piecemeal sale. The average recovery rate is 23 cents on the dollar. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Paraguay. 4. Industrial Policies Paraguay grants investors a number of tax breaks under Law 60/90, including exemptions from corporate income tax and value-added tax. Paraguay also has a temporary entry system, which allows duty free admission of capital goods such as machinery, tools, equipment, and vehicles to carry out public and private construction work. The government also allows temporary entry of equipment for scientific research, exhibitions, training or testing, competitive sports, and traveler or tourist items. In addition to Law 60/90, Paraguay has an industrial parks law (4903/13) that offers several tax breaks and a 50 percent reduction in the cost of industrial patents. Law 4427/12 also provides incentives for the production, development or assembly of high technology goods in the form of tax breaks and import tariff exemptions on inputs and raw materials. The Paraguay government seeks increased investment in the maquila sector, and Paraguayan law grants investors a number of incentives. The maquila program entitles a company to foreign investment participation of up to 100 percent and to special tax and customs treatment. In addition to tax exemptions, inputs are allowed to enter Paraguay tax free, and up to 10 percent of production is allowed for local consumption after paying import taxes and duties. Companies are also exempted from paying remittance taxes over incomes and dividends. However, Paraguayan maquiladoras must comply with all Paraguayan labor laws. There are few restrictions on the type of product that can be produced under the maquila system and operations are not restricted geographically. Ordinarily, all maquila products are exported. The government of Paraguay does not offer specific incentives to clean energy investments, however it does publicly support them. Paraguay offers a preferential energy tariff for energy intensive industries through law 7406/11. Further details of all investment incentives regulations can be found at REDIEX´s website: http://www.rediex.gov.py/leyes-normativas-y-tramites/Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation Paraguayan Law 523/95 (which entered into force in 2002) permits the establishment of free trade zones (FTZs) granting several tax exceptions, including payments of VAT and corporate taxes, to companies operating in the commercial, industry, and services sector. Companies established under this law, which export over 90 percent of their sales in monetary values, must only pay 0.5 percent of their income in sales. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, in December 2020, the Ministry of Finance issued a decree to expand the services covered under the FTZ Law, incorporating financial services and companies working in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector. Paraguay has two FTZs in Ciudad del Este – one that operates largely as a manufacturing center and a second that focuses on warehouse storage. Paraguay is a landlocked country with no seaports but has numerous private and public inland river ports. About 80 percent of commercial goods are transported by barge on the Paraguay-Parana river system that connects Paraguay with Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Montevideo, Uruguay. Paraguay has agreements with Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile on free trade ports and warehouses for the reception, storage, handling, and trans-shipment of merchandise. Low water levels caused by prolonged drought has made shipping on Paraguay’s waterways increasing difficult, and barges are frequently forced to travel at 50 percent capacity. Paraguay does not mandate local employment or have excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. However, the bureaucratic process to comply with these requirements can be lengthy. Voting board members of any company incorporated in Paraguay must have legal residence, which takes a minimum of 90 days to establish, posing a potential obstacle to foreign investors. Paraguay does not have a “forced localization” policy requiring foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology. There are no requirements for maintaining a certain amount of data storage within Paraguay or for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. Paraguayan law requires internet service providers to retain IP address for six months for certain commercial transactions. Under the argument of incentivizing domestic production during the COVID-19 pandemic, on September 10, 2020 the Paraguayan Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass a modification to Paraguay’s Public Contracting Law (4558/11), increasing the preference in government bids to locally produced goods in public procurements open to foreign suppliers from 20 to 40 percent. Foreign firms can bid on tenders deemed “international” and on “national” tenders through the foreign firm’s local agent or representative. Opponents question the constitutionality of the new legislation. The government continues to make efforts to enhance transparency and accountability, including through the use of an internet-based government procurement system. The country’s National Public Procurement Directorate (DNCP, in Spanish) is generally well regarded, but does not have legal authority to impose sanctions on companies or public entities found to have engaged in procurement irregularities. Paraguay is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement. 5. Protection of Property Rights The 1992 constitution guarantees the right of private property ownership. While it is common to use real property as security for loans, the lack of consistent property surveys and registries often makes it impossible to foreclose. The latest figures published by the National Rural and Land Development Institute (INDERT, in Spanish) indicate there is 47.5 percent more titled land in Paraguay than physically exists, while other private organizations suggest 70 percent of privately owned land has some sort of problem related to the property title and its registration process. Correct property title registration is a major problem, particularly in the interior of the country. In some cases, acquiring title documents for land can take two years or more. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranks Paraguay 80 of 190 for ease of “registering property,” noting the process requires six procedures, averages 46 days, and costs 1.8 percent of the property value. In 2008, the Truth and Justice Commission (CVJ), an organization created by Law 225/03 to investigate human rights violations committed during the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, presented a report, which revealed that in the Eastern Region of Paraguay almost 8 million hectares of ill-gotten lands were illegally awarded during 1954-2003. Accounting the Chaco Region, it is estimated that this figure would increase to 20 million hectares. Paraguay has a “squatter’s rights” law by which ownership of property can be gained by possession of it beyond the lapse of 20 years. Congress has proposed bills in the past to improve regulation of properties and establish a new National Directorate of Public Registries with the intention of facilitating the adequate registration of land ownership and create a special Congressional Commission to correct underlying problems with property titles; however, the bills remain in the Congress. After the previous head of INDERT was removed from the position due to accusations of bribery in October 2020, the new leadership has made noticeable efforts to regularize property title registration in various regions of the interior of the country and has considerably increased the number of regularized property titles and revenues collected by the institution. Paraguay has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report Watch List since 2019, due in part to Paraguay’s unfulfilled commitments under a 2015-2020 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on intellectual property rights between the United States and Paraguay. The USTR and Paraguayan government will transition and update these commitments in an Intellectual Property Workplan that will be managed under the U.S.-Paraguay Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) mechanism. Ciudad del Este has been named in either the USTR Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy or the Special 301 Report for over 20 years. The border crossing at Ciudad del Este, and the city itself, serves as a hub for the distribution of counterfeit and pirated products in the Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay tri-border region and beyond. Informality and border porosity in the area remains a challenge. Concerns remain about inadequate protection against unfair commercial use of proprietary test or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for agrochemical or pharmaceutical products and the shortcomings in Paraguay’s patent regime. Law 3283 from 2007 and Law 3519 from 2008, (1) require pharmaceutical products and agrochemical products to be registered first in Paraguay to be eligible for data protection; (2) allow regulatory agencies to use test data in support of similar agricultural chemical product applications filed by third parties; and (3) limit data protection to five years. Additionally, Law 2593/05 that modifies Paraguay’s patent law has no regulatory enforcement. Because of this, foreign pharmaceutical companies have seen their patented products openly replicated and marketed under other names by Paraguayan pharmaceutical companies. Although law enforcement authorities track seizures of counterfeit goods independently, there is no consolidated report available online, and the statistics vary between government offices. The National Directorate of Intellectual Property (DINAPI, in Spanish) reported 440 seizures of counterfeit goods in 2021 with an estimated retail price of USD 3.4 million. This represented a $0.1 million increase from 2020. In terms of law enforcement related to IPR, Judicial Branch contacts reported that Asuncion had 613 referrals, 87 investigations, 19 indictments, secured eight convictions for IP crimes in the greater Asuncion area (up from two in 2020), and reported the destruction of counterfeit goods with an estimated value of $2.2 million in 2021; Ciudad del Este had 126 referrals, six investigations, no indictments, and no conviction. In some instances, authorities worked together to investigate cases and pursue legal actions, but overall weak information-sharing and interagency coordination continued to hamper IPR enforcement efforts. Paraguay has ratified all of the Uruguay Round accords, including the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and has ratified two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaties. The Paraguayan Congress ratified the TRIPS Agreement in July 2018. Paraguay signed and ratified September 17, 2020 the Treaty of Nice, which establishes a classification of goods and services for the purposes of registering trademarks and service marks, and the Locarno Agreement, which establishes a classification for industrial designs. WIPO officially received on May 31, 2021 Paraguay’s instrument of accession to the Nice Agreement and Locarno Agreement. In December 2019, DINAPI officially announced the establishment of an Interagency Coordination Center (ICC), responsible for providing a unified government response to intellectual property rights violations. The ICC has convened five times since its inception. In July 2020, a group of Paraguayan Lower House legislators presented a draft bill to establish a temporary suspension of royalty payments for patented, genetically modified soy seeds until the end of 2021, ostensibly to provide relief to farmers during the COVID-19 crisis. The bill’s opponents argued this proposed legislation violates IPR guarantees in Paraguay’s Constitution, the 1630/2000 Patent Law on Inventions, international treaties such as TRIPS, UPOV, and trade agreements negotiated and concluded (MERCOSUR-EU and MERCOSUR-EFTA). In October 2020, the Lower House voted to approve the draft bill. The Senate rejected the bill in April 2021, and the Lower House officially accepted this rejection in July 2021. Congress reached this decision after representatives from DINAPI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Service for Plant and Seed Quality and Health Agency, and private sector unions complained the bill would violate international agreements and affect legal security and the intellectual property rights acquired on biotechnology invention patents, potentially jeopardizing future investments in the country. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property (IP) offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Regional IP Attaché U.S. Consulate General – Rio de Janeiro + 55 (21) 3823-2499 Deputy Political and Economic Counselor U.S. Embassy Asuncion + 595 (21) 213-715 National Intellectual Property Directorate: https://www.dinapi.gov.py/ Paraguayan-American Chamber of Commerce: http://www.amcham.com.py/ Local Lawyers: https://py.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/274/attorneys.pdf 6. Financial Sector Credit is available but expensive. As of January 2021, banks charged on average 23 percent interest on consumer loans (up to 32 percent), with the vast majority favoring repayment horizons of one year. Loans for up to 10 years are available at higher interest rates. High collateral requirements are generally imposed. Private banks, in general, avoid mortgage loans. Because of the difficulty in obtaining bank loans, Paraguay has seen growth in alternative and informal lending mechanisms, such as “payday” lenders. These entities can charge up to 85 percent interest on short-term loans according to banking contacts. The high cost of capital makes the stock market an attractive, although underdeveloped option. Paraguay has a relatively small capital market that began in 1993. As of March 2022, the Asuncion Stock exchange consisted of 119 companies. Many family-owned enterprises fear losing control, dampening enthusiasm for public offerings. Paraguay passed a law in 2017 abolishing anonymously held businesses, requiring all holders of “bearer shares” to convert them. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in country, as such Paraguay currently has three foreign bank branches and four majority foreign-owned banks. The Paraguayan government issued Paraguay’s first sovereign bonds in 2013 for USD 500 million to accelerate development in the country. Since then, Paraguay has issued bonds each year. During 2021, Paraguay issued sovereign bonds for a total of USD 826 million and recently in 2022 for USD 501 million. The debt component of the 2021 bond raised USD 500 million of new money at the lowest cost ever for a Paraguayan sovereign bond (2.74 percent). The transaction’s historically low interest rate, oversubscription, and its extension of Paraguay’s maturity profile reflect increased investor confidence in Paraguay. Proceeds are expected to finance key infrastructure development programs designed to promote economic and social development and job creation, cover health needs, and re-finance previous debt at a lower interest rate. Commercial banks also issue debt to fund long-term investment projects. Paraguay became an official member of the IMF in December 1945 and its Central Bank respects IMF Article VIII related to the avoidance of restrictions on current payments. Paraguay’s banking system includes 17 banks with an approximate total USD 25.5 billion in assets and USD 18.4 billion in deposits. The banking system is generally sound but remains overly liquid. Long-term financing for capital investment projects is scarce. Most lending facilities are short-term. Banks and finance companies are regulated by the Banking Superintendent, which is housed within, and is under the direction of, the Central Bank of Paraguay (BCP, in Spanish). The Paraguayan capital markets are essentially focused on debt issuances. As the listing of stock is limited, with the exception of preferred shares, Paraguay does not have clear rules regarding hostile takeovers and shareholder activism. Paraguay has a high percentage of unbanked citizens. Six out of ten adults do not have bank accounts. Many Paraguayans use alternative methods to save and transfer money. In recent years, the use of e-wallets has grown considerably to fill this void. According to the BCP, the total transactions increased by 70 percent, from USD 1.1 million in 2020 to USD 1.9 million in 2021. Although active e-wallets accounts increased from 1.6 million in 2019 to 3.1 million in December 2020, BCP reports show active e-wallet accounts decrease to 2.4 million in December 2021. This reduction can be attributed to a decrease in COVID-19 subsidies transferred to the e-wallet of beneficiaries outside of the formal banking sector. The growth experienced in the e-wallets sector made the Central Bank publish regulations on e-wallets in February 2020 to expand their “know your customer” (KYC) and other requirements to match those of traditional bank operations. Paraguay does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in December 2020, the Ministry of Finance presented to Congress the draft law for the Strengthening of Fiscal Governance that will reform Paraguay´s current Fiscal Responsibility Law and create Paraguay´s first wealth fund to strengthen the country´s macroeconomic stability in years of poor economic development and/or emergency situations. The bill has not been voted by Congress as of March 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Paraguay has seven major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), active in the petroleum distribution, cement, electricity (distribution and generation), water, aviation, river navigation, and cellular telecommunication sectors. Paraguay has another two minor SOEs, one dedicated to the production of alcoholic beverages through raw sugar cane and another, essentially inactive, focused on railway services. In general, SOEs are monopolies with no private sector participation. Most operate independently but maintain an administrative link with the Ministry of Public Works & Communications. SOEs have audited accounts, and the results are published online. Public information and audited accounts from 2020 indicate SOEs employ over 16,500 people and have assets for $4.6 billion. Reported net incomes in 2020 of all SOEs are less than $36 million. SOEs’ corporate governances are weak. SOEs operate with politically appointed advisors and executives and are often overstaffed and an outlet for patronage, resulting in poor administration and services. Some SOEs burden the country’s fiscal position, running deficits most years. SOEs are not required to have an independent audit. The Itaipu and Yacyreta bi-national hydroelectric dams, which are considered semi-autonomous entities administered by joint bilateral government commissions (since they are on shared international borders), have a board of directors. Link to the list of Paraguayan SOEs: https://www.economia.gov.py/index.php/dependencias/direccion-general-de-empresas-publicas/direccion-general-de-empresas-publicas Paraguay does not have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is growing with the support of Paraguay’s largest firms. Additionally, the private sector is taking measures to institutionalize ethical business conduct under initiatives such as the Pacto Etico y Cumplimiento (PEC). An initiative sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce and USAID, PEC was established by over 100 local, U.S., and international companies that committed to creating a code of ethics and undergoing a rigorous auditing process to reach certification. In 2021, PEC offered the country’s first-ever corporate ethics certification course, in partnership with a local university, which certified 35 public and private sector professionals. The Paraguayan government does not have any formal programs or policies to encourage PEC or RBC, but has shown interest in PEC’s work. In June 2021, PEC signed a cooperation agreement with the National Integrity and Transparency Team working under the National Anticorruption Secretariat to promote ethics, integrity and transparency in the business sector by developing and implementing ethical policies. The DNCP issued in March 2020 a resolution to include RBC policies into the standard requirements of public procurements. In March 2021, the Paraguayan government drafted language in a new public procurement bill that introduces a “value for money” framework and allows contracting agencies to weigh other qualifiers, like life-cycle cost, in addition to lowest price when awarding contracts. This bill is still pending congressional approval. If passed, the law will improve the opportunities of U.S. providers interested in entering the Paraguayan market. Paraguay is neither a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies nor a member of International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Despite the government’s significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, it continued to occur in agriculture and ranching as well as in the production of bricks. Children commonly worked in the streets as beggars, windshield cleaners, or vendors of newspapers and lottery tickets. Children of impoverished families also accompanied a parent or guardian in his or her work activities. Approximately 47,000 children, mostly girls, served under the criadazgo system in which middle- and upper-income families in urban areas informally “employ” young domestic workers, often the children of impoverished families, in exchange for housing and education. Government representatives and civil society organizations (CSO) estimated that more than 416,000 children were at risk of child labor. Indigenous and farming communities often protest about the government improperly allocating land or natural resources as well as unfair evictions. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Paraguay´s economy is highly dependent on agriculture, especially the soybean and beef industries which, in terms of exports, have grown 52 and 28 percent respectively in the past decade. Rapid agricultural expansion has led to deforestation, impacting local rain patterns and leaving the country vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, which has considerably affected agricultural production and exports in the recent years. Increasingly powerful agricultural interests have successfully lobbied against environmental regulations. Paraguay’s climate change legal framework dates from 1992 and includes over ten domestic laws, a National Climate Change Policy, and several related strategies and plans for adaptation and mitigation. Paraguay does not currently have a policy to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Paraguay´s latest Nationally Determined Contributions states a commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent in 2030 compared to a “business as usual” scenario tied to a 1990-2015 baseline. This 20 percent goal is further broken down into 10 percent achieved by Paraguay’s unilateral efforts and 10 percent with external assistance. As a low net GHG emitter, Paraguay’s climate change efforts tend to prioritize adaptation over mitigation. Paraguay´s Adaptation Plan focuses on private sector contributions to achieving relevant targets and goals, although it does not set quantitative benchmarks. The National Climate Change Directorate, under the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MADES), issued a National Climate Change Mitigation Plan in 2017 to reduce emissions in six priority areas: 1) transportation management; 2) stoves for the efficient use of biomass from reforestation; 3) sustainable use of the Chaco forests; 4) restoration of forest landscapes; 5) waste management; and, 6) sustainable architecture. However, the government agenda continues to focus on adaptation due to the growing frequency of adverse climate events, including droughts, floods, and wildfires. Furthermore, mitigation efforts are limited to avoiding deforestation, which oftentimes contradicts national economic development policies based on the expansion of agricultural frontier. Although the government of Paraguay does not have regulatory incentives to decrease emissions it does have policies and regulations that support the preservation of biodiversity, clean air and water, the use of nature-based solutions, manage forests, and seek other ecological benefits. However, Paraguay often struggles to enforce its regulations due to its lack of financial, human, and technical resources. The DNCP issued a new Sustainable Procurement Policy in March 2020 that takes into consideration environmental issues during the procurement process including soil contamination, water consumption, waste generation, greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption, use of toxic substances, use of clean technologies, and conservation of natural resources. 9. Corruption Paraguayan law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, impunity impedes effective implementation. Historically, officials in all branches and at all levels of government have engaged in corrupt practices. Furthermore, the Comptroller Office estimates 90 percent of public institutions have deficiencies in their oversight systems. Judicial insecurity and corruption mar Paraguay’s investment climate. Many investors find it difficult to enforce contracts and are frustrated by lengthy bureaucratic procedures, limited transparency and accountability, and impunity. A recent trend is for private companies to insist on arbitration for dispute resolution and bypass the judicial system completely. The Paraguayan government has taken several steps in recent years to increase transparency and accountability, including the creation of an internet-based government procurement system, the disclosure of government payroll information, the appointment of nonpartisan officials to key posts, and increased civil society input and oversight. Notwithstanding, corruption and impunity continue to affect the investment climate. In December 2020 President Abdo Benitez signed a decree approving a National Integrity, Transparency, and Anti-Corruption Plan (NITAP) that was developed with USAID´s technical assistance and has been reviewed by key stakeholders, including the private sector, NGOs, and academia. The NITAP is Paraguay’s five-year (2021-2025) road map to foster integrity and transparency, and fight corruption and impunity. The document includes more than 70 actions and commitments that involve all levels of the three branches of government, as well as the private sector, academia and NGOs, among other key stakeholders. USAID is supporting several actions of the NITAP. Although the DNCP has a Good Governance Code that provides internal controls, ethic principles and addresses conflict-of-interest in government procurements, it remains one of the areas where corruption in most pervasive. DNCP issued a resolution in January 2021 creating a committee that would work on identifying and eliminating discriminatory conditions and requirements that would limit participants and free competition in government procurement. The constitution requires all public employees, including elected officials and employees of independent government entities, to disclose their income and assets at least 15 days after taking office and again within 15 days after finishing their term or assignment, but at no point in between, which is problematic for congressional representatives that are re-elected numerous times. Public employees are required to include information on the assets and income of spouses and dependent children. Officials are not required to file periodically when changes occur in their holdings. Civil Society groups and NGOs noted an increase of tools and regulations over the past years to promote access to information, transparency and combat corruption. However, impunity remains the main challenge as political parties dominate the Judicial System. UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery: Paraguay signed and ratified the UN Anti-corruption Convention in 2005. Resources to Report Corruption: General Auditors Office Bruselas 1880, Asuncion, Paraguay + 595 21 620 0260 atencion@contraloria.gov.py Public Ministry Nuestra Señora de la Asunción c/ Haedo, Asuncion, Paraguay + 595 21 454 611 comunicaciones@ministeriopublico.gov.py Anti-Corruption Secretariat General Santos 698 c/ Siria, Asunción + 595 21 220 002/3 info@senac.gov.py Seeds for Democracy Roma 1055 casi Colón, Asuncion, Paraguay + 595 21 420 323 semillas@semillas.org.py 10. Political and Security Environment In March 2021 protesters gathered daily for more than two weeks to call for the resignations of President Abdo Benitez and Vice President Velazquez for their inadequate efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic, and to repudiate the corruption within their administration. Clashes between police and protesters on the first night of protests resulted in 20 wounded (eight protesters, 12 police) and protesters set fire to the ruling ANR party headquarters March 17. Paraguay does not have large numbers of kidnappings, but a few high-profile cases have occurred in recent years, most of them attributed to suspected members of the organized criminal group Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). In September 2020, the EPP kidnapped former Vice President Oscar Denis and his employee Adelio Mendoza near Denis’ property in Concepcion department. The Paraguayan government has responded to the EPP threat with combined military and police operations, but its failure to recover hostages – including Denis, whose whereabouts are still unknown at the time of this report – from such a small group has seriously damaged its credibility. Land invasions, marches, and organized protests occur, mostly by rural and indigenous communities making demands on the government, but these events have rarely turned violent. Paraguay experienced an unprecedented and sustained increase in violence that has permeated the country in 2021 and continued in 2022. The violence particularly intensified before the municipal elections carried out in October 2021. According to the Interdisciplinary Center of Social Investigation, sicarios (hitmen) have killed 150 Paraguayans between January and October 2021 and such cases have been in an upward trend since then. Most of these reported homicides are drug-related. In a September report, the Global Organized Crime Index ranked Paraguay fourth highest in criminality among 35 countries in the Americas. 11. Labor Policies and Practices With an average annual population growth rate of 1.5 percent during the past decade and 63.3 percent of the population below the age of 35 as of 2021, job creation to meet the large and growing labor force is one of the most pressing issues for the government. However, the weak education system limits the supply of well-educated workers and is an obstacle to growth. Paraguay´s workforce as of 2021 had 3.8 million workers, 58 percent are men and 42 percent are women. Although, current levels of unemployment are at 6.8 percent for year 2021 (down 0.4 percent from 2020), unemployment for women stands at 9.6 percent while unemployment for men stands at 4.8 percent. It was estimated by the National Statistics Institute (INE, in Spanish) that the COVID-19 lockdowns and quarantine measures caused up to 217,904 people to be inactive due to the pandemic, however the Ministry of Labor reported in February 2021 all inactive workers related to the pandemic were reincorporated to the labor force. A rise in unemployment caused by pandemic restrictions forced the government to create new social welfare programs and bolster existing ones. Economies in cities like Ciudad del Este and Encarnacion that rely on cross-border trade have been especially impacted by international border closures. The government has passed multiple bills to provide economic assistance to workers in those communities. Informal employment remains high in Paraguay. According to the INE, informal employment represented 63.7 percent of the total working population in 2021 and studies published by the World Bank suggested the rate reached 71 percent for 2019. Although SMEs make up 97 percent of all companies in Paraguay, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce estimates 70 percent of these SMEs work in the informal economy. Latest reports estimate Paraguay´s informal economy represents 46 percent of the country´s GDP (or USD 21.3 billion). Paraguay’s labor code makes it very difficult to lay off a formally registered, full-time employee who has completed ten consecutive years of employment. Firms often opt for periodic renewals of “temporary” work contracts instead of long-term contracts. Paraguayan law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions (with the exception of the armed forces and the police), bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibits binding arbitration and retribution against union organizers and strikers. While the law prohibits anti-union discrimination and sets financial penalties, employers are not required by law to reinstate workers fired for union activity, even in cases where labor courts fine firms for anti-union discrimination. The minimum age for formal, full-time employment is 18, including for domestic workers. Adolescents between the ages of 14 and 17 may work if they have a written authorization from their parents, attend school, do not work more than four hours a day, and do not work more than a maximum of 24 hours per week. Adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18 who do not attend school may work up to six hours a day, with a weekly ceiling of 36 hours. For more background on labor issues in Paraguay, please refer to the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at: www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/ . and the latest Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices at: https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2020 $36.1 2020 $35.7 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $796 2020 $197 BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct- investment-and-multinational-enterprises- comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 17.1% 2020 19.0% UNCTAD data available at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx Significant discrepancies can be noted between the local and the USG statistical sources in terms of U.S. FDI in Paraguay for 2020. UNCTAD total inbound of FDI as a percentage of Paraguay’s GDP differs less than two percent when compared to Paraguay’s local statistics. However, if compared to other international statistics, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the relation between total inbound stocks of FDI as a percentage of Paraguay’s GDP is consistent with local statistics. *Host country statistical data source: Central Bank of Paraguay Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $6,180 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Spain $801 12.9% N/A N/A N/A USA $796 12.9% N/A N/A N/A The Netherlands $759 12.3% N/A N/A N/A Brazil $715 11.6% N/A N/A N/A Uruguay $431 6.9% N/A N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. The information obtained through the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is consistent with the information provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay. Peru Executive Summary The Government of Peru’s (GOP’s) focus on sound fiscal management and macroeconomic fundamentals contributed to the country’s region-leading economic growth since 2002. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a severe economic contraction of over 11 percent in 2020, but Peru recovered with 13.3 percent GDP growth in 2021. Recent political instability (Peru has had four presidents since 2020) is restricting near-term growth, with consensus forecasts calling for approximately 3.0 percent GDP growth in 2022, and 2.9 percent in 2023. COVID-19 health costs and an economic stimulus package strained Peru’s fiscal accounts somewhat, but the deficit stabilized to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2021. The surge in spending, however, continues to impact Peru’s debt, which increased from 26.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to 36.1 percent in 2021. Net international reserves remain strong at $78.4 billion. Global price pressures moved inflation higher, to 4.0 percent in 2021, a significant spike from the 1.8 percent in 2020. Inflation continued in 2022, with Peru’s 12-month rate through March reaching 6.8 percent. Along with recent political instability, corruption, and social conflict negatively impact Peru’s investment climate. As of April 1, 2022, President Castillo had appointed four cabinets since taking office in July 2021. Allegations of corruption plague the current and previous administrations. Transparency International ranked Peru 105th out of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Peru’s Ombudsman office reported 157 active social conflicts in the country as of February 2022. More than half of them (86) occurred in the mining sector, which represents 10 percent of Peru’s economic output. Citing political instability, including contentious relations between the administration and congress, and governance challenges, the three major credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P) downgraded Peru’s sovereign credit ratings since Castillo’s inauguration. All three, however, maintained Peru at investment grade. Peru fosters an open investment environment, which includes strong protections for contract and property rights. Peru is well integrated in the global economy including with the United States through the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force in 2009. Peru’s investment promotion agency ProInversion seeks foreign investment in nearly all areas of the economy, particularly to support infrastructure. Prospective investors would benefit from seeking local legal counsel to navigate Peru’s complex bureaucracy. Private sector investment made up more than two-thirds of Peru’s total investment in 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank/Amount Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 70 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 7,394 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 6,030 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Peru seeks to attract investment, both foreign and domestic, in nearly all sectors. Peru reported $2 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2021 and seeks increased investment for 2022. It has prioritized public-private partnership projects in transportation infrastructure, electricity, education, telecommunications, ports, health, and sanitation, among other sectors. Peru’s 1993 Constitution grants national treatment for foreign investors and permits foreign investment in almost all economic sectors. Under the constitution, foreign investors have the same rights as national investors to benefit from investment incentives, such as tax exemptions. In addition to the constitutional provisions, Peru has several laws governing FDI including the Foreign Investment Promotion Law (Legislative Decree (DL) 662 of September 1991) and the Framework Law for Private Investment Growth (DL 757 of November 1991). Other important laws include the Private Investment in State-Owned Enterprises Promotion Law (DL 674) and the Private Investment in Public Services Infrastructure Promotion Law (DL 758). Article 6 of Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF (the implementing regulations of DLs 662 and 757) authorized private investment in all industries except within natural protected areas and weapons manufacturing. Peru and the United States benefit from the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force on February 1, 2009. The PTPA established a more secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors in Peru. The PTPA protects all forms of investment. U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in Peru on an equal footing with local investors in almost all circumstances. The PTPA can be found here: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa The GOP created the investment promotion agency ProInversion in 2002 to manage privatizations and concessions of state-owned enterprises and natural resource-based industries. The agency currently focuses on private concessions in the energy, education, transportation, health, sanitation, and telecommunication sectors, and organizes international roadshow events to attract investors. Specific project opportunities are available on the ProInversion website: https://www.investinperu.pe/es/app/cartera-de-proyectos-de-proinversion . Companies are required to register all foreign investments with ProInversion. Peru’s National Competitiveness Plan 2019 – 2030 outlined a set of recommendations aimed to make Peru’s economy and investment climate more competitive. The 2019 National Infrastructure Plan (PNIC) identified 52 priority infrastructure projects to help address an estimated $110 billion infrastructure gap, some of which are underway including construction of Lima metro lines, an expansion to the Jorge Chavez International Airport, and multiple energy projects. Investors report in recent years that Peru’s energy projects advance more quickly than transport and agricultural projects, which can suffer extended delays. The GOP announced in February 2022 that it will update the PNIC by July 2022 with an emphasis on sustainable development opportunities. Of note, in May 2021, Peru signed a government-to-government (G2G) agreement with France for a $3.1 billion highway project, an opportunity that was not included in the PNIC. Although Peru has generally supported private investments since the 1990s, administrations occasionally pass measures that some observers regard as contrary to the nation’s open and free market orientation. In December 2011, for example, Peru signed into law a 10-year moratorium on the entry of live genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for cultivation. In December 2020, the government extended the moratorium for an additional 15 years, until 2035. Peru’s Constitution (Article 6 under Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF) authorizes foreign investors to carry out economic activity provided that investors comply with all constitutional precepts, laws, and treaties. Exceptions exist, including exclusion of foreign investment activities in natural protected reserves and military weapons manufacturing. Peruvian law requires majority Peruvian ownership in media; air, land, and maritime transportation infrastructure; and private security surveillance services. Foreign interests cannot “acquire or possess under any title, mines, lands, forests, waters, or fuel or energy sources” within 50 kilometers of Peru’s international borders. However, foreigners can obtain concessions in these areas and in certain cases the GOP may grant a waiver. The GOP does not screen, review, or approve foreign direct investment outside of those sectors that require a governmental waiver. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry ) on Peru in February 2020. The WTO commented that foreign investors received the same legal treatment as local investors in general, although Peru restricted foreign investment on property at the country’s borders, and in air transport and broadcasting. The report highlighted the government’s ongoing efforts to promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) and strengthen the PPP legal framework with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles. The report noted that Peru maintained a regime open to domestic and foreign investment that fostered competition and equal treatment. In January 2022, the OECD formally opened accession discussions with Peru. The GOP expects the OECD will adopt an individual Accession Roadmap for Peru later in 2022, which will establish the terms, conditions, and process for accession. The process will include a rigorous evaluation by more than 20 OECD technical committees that will establish expectations covering a wide range of policy areas, including open trade and investment, public governance, integrity and anti-corruption, and environmental protection. There is no deadline for completion of the accession processes, although typically the process takes three-to-five years or more. The outcome and timeline will depend on Peru’s political will and capacity to adjust its regulations and policies to further align with OECD standards and best practices. Peru has not had a third-party investment policy review through the OECD or UNCTAD in the past five years. Post is also not aware of any major civil society-led investment policy review within the last five years. The GOP does not have a specific regulatory agency that facilitates business operations, but the Institute for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Consumer Protection, and Competition (INDECOPI) reviews the enactment of new regulations by government entities that can place burdens on business operations. INDECOPI has the authority to block any new business regulation. INDECOPI also has a Commission for Elimination of Bureaucratic Barriers: https://www.indecopi.gob.pe/web/eliminacion-de-barreras-burocraticas/presentacion . Peru allows foreign business ownership, provided that a company has at least two shareholders and that its legal representative is a Peruvian resident. Businesses must reserve a company name through the national registry, SUNARP, and prepare a deed of incorporation through a Citizen and Business Services Portal ( https://www.serviciosalciudadano.gob.pe/ ). After a deed is signed, businesses must file with a public notary, pay notary fees of up to one percent of a company’s capital, and submit the deed to the Public Registry. The company’s legal representative must obtain a certificate of registration and tax identification number from the national tax authority SUNAT (www.sunat.gob.pe). Finally, the company must obtain a license from the municipality of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Depending on the core business, companies may need to obtain further government approvals such as sanitary, environmental, or educational authorizations. Peru’s Trade Commission Offices (OCEXs), which promote the exports of Peruvian goods and services, under the supervision of Peru’s export promotion agency PromPeru, are located in numerous countries, including the United States. The GOP does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Laws and regulations most relevant to foreign investors are enacted and implemented at the national level. Most ministries and agencies make draft regulations available for public comment. El Peruano, the state’s official gazette, publishes regulations at the national, regional, and municipal level. Ministries generally maintain current regulations on their websites. Rule-making and regulatory authority also exists through executive agencies specific to different sectors. The Supervisory Agency for Forest Resources and Wildlife (OSINFOR), the Supervisory Agency for Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN), and the Supervisory Agency for Telecommunications (OSIPTEL), all of which report directly to the President of the Council of Ministers, can enact new regulations that affect investments in the economic sectors they manage. These agencies also have the right to enforce regulations with fines. Regulation is generally reviewed on the basis of scientific and data-driven assessments, but public comments are not always received or made public. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Accounting, legal, and regulatory standards are consistent with international norms. Peru’s Accounting Standards Council endorses the use of IFRS standards by private entities. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are transparent and publicly available at the Ministry of Economy and Finance website: https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/estadisticas-sp-18642/deuda-del-sector-publico . Peru is a member of regional economic blocs. Under the Pacific Alliance, Peru looks to harmonize regulations and reduce barriers to trade with other members: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Peru is a member of the Andean Community (CAN), which issues supranational regulations (based on consensus of its members) that supersede domestic provisions. Peru follows international food standard bodies, including: CODEX Alimentarius, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) guidelines for Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards. When CODEX does not have limits or standards established for a product, Peru defaults to the U.S. maximum residue level or standard. Peru’s system is generally more aligned with the U.S. regulatory system and standards than with its other trading partners. Peru notifies all agricultural-related technical regulations to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee. Peru uses a civil law system. Companies are generally regulated through Peru’s civil code, which includes sections governing contracts and general corporate law. Peru’s civil court system resolves conflicts between companies. Companies can also access conflict resolution services in civil courts. Litigation processes in Peruvian courts are slow. Peru has an independent judiciary. The executive branch does not interfere with the judiciary as a matter of policy. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through administrative process and the court system. Peru is in the process of reforming its justice system. The National Justice Board (Junta Nacional de Justicia), which began operating in January 2020, supervises the selection processes, appointments, evaluations, and disciplinary actions for judges. Peru has a stable and attractive legal framework used to promote private investment. The 1993 Peruvian Constitution includes provisions that establish principles to ensure a favorable legal framework for private investment, particularly for foreign investment. A key constitutional and regulatory principle is equal treatment of domestic and foreign investment. Some of the main private investment regulations include: Legislative Decree 662, which establishes foreign investment legal stability regulations; Legislative Decree 757, which establishes Peru’s private investment growth framework law; and Supreme Decree 162-92-EF, which establishes private investment guarantee mechanism regulations. Peru’s legal system is available to investors. All laws relevant to foreign investment along with pertinent explanations and forms can be found on the ProInversion website: https://www.investinperu.pe/en/climate/legal-framework-for-investments . INDECOPI is the GOP agency responsible for reviewing domestic competition-related concerns. Congress published a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) control law in January 2021. The law currently requires INDECOPI to review and approve M&As involving companies, including multinationals, that have combined annual sales or gross earnings over $146 million in Peru and if the value of the sales or annual gross earnings in Peru of two or more of the companies involved in the proposed M&A operation exceed $22 million each. A legislative decree issued in September 2018 (DL 1444) modified the public procurement law to allow government agencies to use government-to-government (G2G) agreements to facilitate procurement processes. The GOP considers the G2G procurement model as a suitable method for expediting priority infrastructure projects in a manner that is more transparent and less susceptible to corruption. However, the USG, outside of the US Army Corps of Engineers, does not have a mechanism to support Peru’s G2G contracts. Peru expanded the use of G2G agreements in 2021 to include large infrastructure projects including a $1.6 billion general reconstruction initiative (related to damages caused by the El Nino event of 2017) and a $3.0 billion Central Highway project. The Peruvian Constitution states that Peru can only expropriate private property based on public interest, such as public works projects or for national security. Article 70 of the Constitution establishes that the State can only expropriate through a judicial process or prior mandate of the law, and only after payment of compensation, including for damages. Peruvian law bases compensation for expropriation on fair market value. Article 70 also guarantees the inviolability of private property. Public dialogue has at times touched the theme of expropriation or nationalization of the extractives sectors, including during political campaigns, but the GOP has not to date moved forward with any direct expropriation of sectors or businesses. Landowners have alleged indirect expropriation due to government inaction and corruption in “land-grab” cases that have, at times, been linked to projects endorsed by subnational governments. Peru has a creditor rights hierarchy similar to that established under U.S. bankruptcy law, and monetary judgments are usually made in the currency stipulated in the contract. However, administrative bankruptcy procedures are slow and subject to judicial intervention. Compounding this difficulty are occasional laws passed to protect specific debtors from action by creditors that would force them into bankruptcy or liquidation. In August 2016, the GOP extended the period for bankruptcy from one year to two years. Peru does not criminalize bankruptcy. 4. Industrial Policies Peru offers foreign and national investors legal and tax stability agreements to stimulate private investment. These agreements guarantee that the statutes on income taxes, remittances, export promotion regimes (such as drawbacks, or refunds of duties), administrative procedures, and labor hiring regimes in effect at the time of the investment contract will remain unchanged for that investment for 10 years. To qualify, an investment must exceed $10 million in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors or $5 million within two years in other sectors. An agreement to acquire more than 50 percent of a state-owned company’s shares in a privatization process may also qualify an investor for a legal or tax stability agreement, provided that the added investment will expand the installed capacity of the company or enhance its technological development. The government does not currently offer any incentives for clean energy investments. Peru was accepted as a member of the Association of Free Zones of the Americas (AZFA) as well as the World Free Zone Organization (WFZO) in 2019. Peru has nine Special Economic Zones (SEZ): Free Zones in Tacna, Cajamarca, Chimbote; and Special Development Zones (SDZ) in Ilo, Matarani, Paita, Tumbes, Loreto, and Puno (the last three are currently not in operation). MINCETUR Supreme Decree 005-2019 published in August 2019 implemented regulations for the SDZ of Ilo, Matarani, Paita, and Tumbes. SDZ businesses can perform activities in seven economic sectors: industry, logistics, repair/overhaul, telecommunications, information technology, science, technological research, and development. SDZs enjoy the same economic benefits as the SEZs. The MINCETUR Foreign Trade Facilitation Office oversees Peru’s free trade zones. Companies can become SEZ users through public auctions. This condition grants access to tax benefits and customs advantages promoting entry, permanence, and exit facilitation procedures for goods. Benefits include: Taxes Income Tax exemption (rate outside of the SEZ is 29.5 percent) General Sales Tax (IGV) exemption (rate outside of the SEZ is 16 percent) Municipal Promotion Tax exemption (rate outside of the SEZ is 2 percent) Excise Tax (ISC) exemption (rate outside of the SEZ ranges from 2 to 30 percent depending on the product) Ad Valorem tariff exemption when importing products from overseas (rates outside of the SEZ are 0, 6, and 11 percent) Exemption from all central, regional, or municipal government taxes created in the future, except for social security (EsSalud) contributions and fees Customs Entry of machinery, equipment, raw materials and supplies from abroad is eligible for the suspension of import duties and taxes payments Indefinite permanence of goods within the SEZ, as long as company maintains user status Products manufactured in the SEZ can be exported directly without having to undergo a nationalization customs regime Products manufactured in the SEZ can be entered into national territory under international agreements and conventions Entry of goods into the SEZ is direct and does not require prior storage Peru adopted the Personal Data Protection Law (Law Number 29733) in 2011, and it went into effect in 2013. A data controller who processes personal data must notify the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (ANPDP), which maintains a public register. Personal data is defined as any information on an individual which identifies or makes him/her identifiable through reasonable means, including: biometric data; data on racial and ethnic origin; political, religious, philosophical or moral opinions or convictions; personal habits; union membership; and information related to health or sexual preference. Unless otherwise exempted by statute, data controllers are generally required to obtain the consent of data subjects for the processing of personal data. Consent must be prior, informed, expressed, and unequivocal. A data controller may transfer personal data to places outside of Peru only if the recipients have adequate protection measures. Data controllers must adopt technical, organizational, and legal measures to guarantee the security of personal data and avoid their alteration, loss, unauthorized processing or access. Peru’s law does not require any notifications to any data subject or any other entity upon a breach. Peru does not have special regulations related to the processing of the personal data of minors. The ANPDP is responsible for enforcement and can issue administrative sanctions/fines based upon whether the violation is mild, serious, or very serious. The law provides a “principle for availability of recourse for the data subject [i.e., the actual person to which to the identifiable personal data refers],” stating that any data subject must have the administrative and/or jurisdictional channel necessary to claim and enforce their rights when they are violated by the processing of their personal data. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. In January 2020, Peru established the Digital Trust Framework (Urgency Decree 007-2020) which provides for personal data protection and transparency, consumer protection, and digital security. The law established the National Digital Secretariat (SEGDI) under the Prime Minister’s Office as the overall coordinator and governing body for digital security, but it placed data protection and transparency under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights MINJUS. The order created a national data center as a digital platform to manage, direct, articulate, and supervise the operation, education, promotion, collaboration, and cooperation of data nationwide. 5. Protection of Property Rights Peru enforces property rights and interests. Mortgages and liens exist, and the recording system is reliable, performed by SUNARP, the National Superintendency of Public Records. Foreigners and/or non-resident investors cannot own land within 50 km of a border. Peru is listed on the Watch List in the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) 2021 Special 301 Report. According to the report, Peru has yet to fully address several of the most important and longstanding recommendations from previous Watch List appearances, including fulfilling its intellectual property (IP) obligations under the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), namely Articles 16.11.8 and 16.11.29(b)(ix) regarding statutory damages and Internet Service Provider (ISP) safe harbor protections, respectively. Nevertheless, the Government of Peru has increased its enforcement activity over the past five years and generally offers strong regulatory intellectual property rights (IPR) protections. Peru’s legal framework provides for easy registration of trademarks, and inventors have been able to patent their inventions since 1994. Peruvian law does not provide pipeline protection for patents or protection from parallel imports. Peru’s Copyright Law is generally consistent with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and it provides the same protections for U.S. companies as Peruvian companies in all IPR categories under the PTPA and other international commitments such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Peru’s intellectual property and competition authority INDECOPI is a reliable partner for the U.S. government, the private sector, and civil society, and it has made good faith efforts to decrease the trademark and patent registration backlog and filing time. Although INDECOPI is the GOP agency charged with promoting and defending intellectual property rights, IPR enforcement also involves other GOP agencies and offices, including: the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía), the Peruvian National Police (PNP), the Tax and Customs Authority (SUNAT), the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), the Judiciary, and the Ministry of Health’s (MINSA’s) Directorate General for Medicines (DIGEMID). In 2021, the GOP approved regulations for a System of Guaranteed Protections for Traditional Specialties (TSG) and Geographical Indications (GIs), which cover various food and food preparations, such as prepared dishes, beer, chocolate and derived products, pastry, bakery, and pastry products, drinks based on plant extracts, alcoholic beverages and/or cocktails, and cheese and dairy products. The GOP also published a Supreme Decree in 2021 regulating access to genetic resources and by-products, including rules on fair and equitable sharing of benefits in access contracts, as well as the obligation to file with INDECOPI the authorization or access contract in patents, industrial designs, plant breeder’s certificates and other intellectual property applications that use genetic resources or by-products with Peruvian origin. For additional information on Peru’s intellectual property regime, including national laws and points of contact, please see WIPO’s country profile for Peru at: https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=PE . 6. Financial Sector Peru allows foreign portfolio investment and does not place restrictions on international transactions. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Peruvian mutual funds managed $8 billion in December 2021. Private pension funds managed a total of $33 billion in December 2021. The Lima Stock Exchange (BVL) is a member of the Integrated Latin American Market, which includes stock markets from Pacific Alliance countries. As of July 2018, mutual funds registered in Pacific Alliance countries may trade in the Lima Stock Exchange. The Securities Market Superintendent (SMV) regulates the securities and commodities markets. SMV’s mandate includes controlling securities market participants, maintaining a transparent and orderly market, setting accounting standards, and publishing financial information about listed companies. SMV requires stock issuers to report events that may affect the stock, the company, or any public offerings. Trading on insider information is a crime, with some reported prosecutions in past years. SMV must vet all firms listed on the Lima Stock Exchange or the Public Registry of Securities. SMV also maintains the Public Registry of Securities and Stockbrokers. London Stock Exchange Group FTSE Russell downgraded Peru from Secondary Emerging Market to Frontier status in March 2020. In a statement, the BVL stated that the decision is not necessarily replicable among the other index providers adding that Morgan Stanley Capital International, which is considered a main benchmark for emerging markets, is not expected to reconsider the BVL’s status. Citing, in part, political instability that has undermined investor confidence and constrained growth prospects, the three major credit agencies downgraded Peru’s sovereign credit ratings since the beginning of President Pedro Castillo’s term in July 2021: Moody’s downgraded in September 2021, Fitch in October 2021, and S&P Ratings in March 2022. Despite the downgrades, all three agencies maintain investment grade ratings for Peru. Peru’s banking sector is highly consolidated. Sixteen commercial banks account for 90 percent of the financial system’s total assets, valued at $172 billion in December of 2021. In 2021, three banks accounted for 72 percent of loans and 69 percent of deposits among commercial banks. Peru has a relatively low level of access to financial services (50 percent nationwide), with access significantly lower outside of Lima and other major urban areas. The Central Bank of Peru (BCRP) is an independent institution, free to manage monetary policy to maintain financial stability. The BCRP’s primary goal is to maintain price stability via inflation targeting between one to three percent. Year-end inflation rose to 4.0 percent in 2021, up from 1.8 percent in 2020. Inflation continued in 2022, with Peru’s 12-month rate through March reaching 6.8 percent. President Castillo reappointed the BCRP’s well-respected President Julio Velarde for a fourth consecutive five-year term in October 2021. Analysts consider the banking system to be generally sound, thanks in part to lessons learned during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Non-performing bank loans accounted for 3.9 percent of gross loans as of December 2021, nearly identical to the 3.8 percent registered in 2020. The rapid implementation of the $39.5 billion BCRP loan guarantee program in response to the COVID-19 pandemic attenuated loan default risk and prevented any major systemic risk to the financial system. Under the PTPA, U.S. financial service firms have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and insurance companies. While foreign banks are allowed to freely establish banks in the country, they are subject to the supervision of Peru’s Superintendent of Banks and Securities (SBS). Peruvian law and regulations do not authorize or encourage private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association to limit or restrict foreign participation. However, larger private firms often use “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict investment by outsiders (not necessarily foreigners) in their firms. As families or close associates often control ownership of Peruvian corporations, hostile takeovers are practically non-existent. In the past few years, several companies from the region, China, North America, and Europe have begun actively buying local companies in power transmission, retail trade, fishmeal production, and other industries. Peru’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) manages the Fiscal Stabilization Fund which serves as a buffer for the GOP’s fiscal accounts in the event of adverse economic conditions. It consists of treasury surplus, concessional fees, and privatization proceeds, and is capped at four percent of GDP. The fund was nearly completely exhausted to finance increased spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, dropping from $5.5 billion at the end of 2019 to $1 million at the end of 2020, but has since recovered to $4.3 billion by the end of 2021. The Fund is not a party to the IMF International Working Group or a signatory to the Santiago Principles. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Peru wholly owns 35 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 34 of which are under the parastatal conglomerate FONAFE. The list of SOEs under FONAFE can be found here: https://www.fonafe.gob.pe/empresasdelacorporacion . FONAFE appoints an independent board of directors for each SOE using a transparent selection process. There is no notable third-party analysis on SOEs’ ties to the government. SOE ownership practices are generally consistent with OECD guidelines. The largest SOE is PetroPeru which refines oil, operates Peru’s main oil pipeline, and maintains a stake in select concessions. In March 2022, S&P Ratings downgraded PetroPeru’s global foreign currency rating to “junk” status, citing PricewaterhouseCoopers’ refusal to sign the firm’s 2021 financial audit. The GOP initiated an extensive privatization program in 1991, in which foreign investors were encouraged to participate. Since 2000, the GOP has promoted multi-year concessions as a means of attracting investment in major projects, including a 30-year concession to a private group (Lima Airport Partners) to operate the Lima airport in 2000 and a 30-year concession to Dubai Ports World to improve and operate a new container terminal in the Port of Callao in 2006. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Peru has legal and regulatory frameworks to support responsible business conduct (RBC) standards. However, Peru does not have a holistic action plan or national standards for RBC, and there are still challenges of enforcement – particularly in remote regions of the country and with respect to informal workers, indigenous people, and other vulnerable groups. Many Peruvian and multinational companies already adhere to high standards for RBC. Several independent NGOs freely monitor and promote RBC. Standards for conduct on environmental, social, and governance issues are implemented through sector-specific regulation. The UN Working Group on Business & Human Rights is pressing Peru to join the Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and Security Initiative as part of its work towards implementing the UN Principles. Given its importance to the Peruvian economy, the extractives sector has been a GOP priority for promoting RBC. Supreme Decree No. 042-2003-EM promotes social responsibility in the mining sector, encouraging local employment opportunities, community investment, and purchase of local goods and services. The decree requires mining companies publish an annual report on sustainable development activities. In 2012, Peru joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a compliant country, requiring the GOP and extractive industries to regularly and openly publish government revenues and private firm financials related to oil, gas, and mining. The EITI Board found that Peru had made meaningful progress in meeting the EITI Standard in its first EITI validation in 2017. However, Peru failed to submit its National EITI report due March 2022. Given the reporting lapse, the EITI Board is reviewing Peru’s EITI revalidation. ProInversion serves as the National Point of Contact (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE), to which Peru is an adherent. The NCP participates in activities with the NCP OECD Network located in 50 countries and is in permanent coordination with the OECD Responsible Business Conduct working group. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Peru’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) goals include reaching national net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. As of March 2022, the Government of Peru is working to update its National Climate Change Strategy (last updated 2015) to align it with the NDC goals. In March 2022 MINAM reiterated the importance of reducing carbon and meetings REDD+ obligations. Peru generally lacks a developed regulatory regime related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 9. Corruption Corruption in Peru is widespread and systematic, affecting all levels of government and the whole of society, which, until recently, had developed a high tolerance to corruption. Embezzlement, collusion, bribery, extortion, and fraud in the justice system, politics, and public works by high-level authorities and key public officers is common. Corruption in public procurement is relatively common due to weak control and risk management systems, lack of ethical or integrity values among some public officials, lack of transparency and accountability in procurement processes, social tolerance of corruption, and minimal enforcement. This embedded dynamic has eroded trust in public entities and the private sector. In 2021, Peru fell to 105 (from 94 in 2020) among 180 countries in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, below Chile (27), Colombia (87), and Argentina (96), and tied with Ecuador. According to Transparency International, this backsliding reflected, in part, continued problems with structural corruption, impunity, and political instability. National surveys on corruption by Proética, Transparency International’s National Chapter in Peru, identified corruption as one of the leading public issues in the country. The OECD’s January 2022 decision to open accession discussions with Peru may provide momentum for anti-corruption efforts. It is illegal in Peru for a public official or an employee to accept any type of outside remuneration for the performance of his or her official duties. The law extends to family members of officials and to political parties. In 2019, Peru made the irregular financing of political campaigns a crime, carrying penalties up to eight-years jail time. Peru has ratified both the UN Convention against Corruption and the OAS’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Peru has signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and has adopted OECD public sector integrity standards through its National Integrity and Anticorruption Plan. The Public Auditor (Contraloria) oversees public administration. In January 2017, Peru passed legislative decrees extending the scope of civil penalties for domestic acts of bribery, including by NGOs, corporate partners, board members, and parent companies if subsidiaries acted with authorization. Penalties include an indefinite exclusion from government contracting and substantially increased fines. The Public Auditor also began auditing construction projects in real time, rather than after project implementation, in an effort to improve transparency. It is also auditing the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Secretary of Public Integrity of the Prime Minister Office and General Coordinator Eloy Munive Pariona Jr. Carabaya Cdra. 1 S/N – Lima, (51) (1) 219-7000, ext. 1137 emunive@pcm.gob.pe General Comptroller’s Office Jr. Camilo Carrillo 114, Jesus Maria, Lima (51) (1) 330-3000 contraloria@contraloria.gob.pe ProEtica, the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International Samuel Rotta Executive Director Calle Manco Capac 816, Miraflores, Lima (51) (1) 446-8581, 446-8941, 446-8943 srotta@proetica.org.pe 10. Political and Security Environment President Pedro Castillo is Peru’s fifth president in five years (and fourth president since 2020), a reflection of both deep polarization and continued power struggles between the legislative and executive branches over multiple administrations. Allegations of corruption and incompetence among cabinet ministers spurred Castillo to designate four cabinets in seven months. There are also ongoing investigations of persons close to the president for alleged high-level corruption. Castillo’s Peru Libre party holds the largest congressional voting bloc, 34 of 130 seats, in an opposition-led congress that took office July 28. Eleven political parties in the legislature divide the congress in thirds among left, right, and center. Pedro Castillo has been subject to two failed impeachment motions since his July 2021 inauguration, one in December and the second in March. According to a March 2022 IPSOS poll, Castillo held just a 26 percent approval rating, while President of Congress Maricarmen Alva held just 20 percent approval. According to the Ombudsman, there were 157 active social conflicts in Peru as of March 2022. Although political violence against investors is rare, protests are common. In many cases, protestors sought public services not provided by the government. Widespread protests in late 2020 across several agricultural producing regions resulted in the repeal and rewriting of the nation’s agricultural law. Protests throughout 2021 and 2022 across several mining producing regions also resulted in temporary suspension of activities at several mining operations, including an intermittent suspension at Peru’s second largest copper mine, Las Bambas, for several months in 2021 and 2022. Violence remains a concern in coca-growing regions. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, “SL”) narco-terrorist organization continued to conduct a limited number of attacks in its base of operations in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) emergency zone, which includes parts of Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, and Junin regions. Estimates vary, but most experts and Peruvian security services assess SL membership numbers between 250 and 300, including 60 to 150 armed fighters. SL collects “revolutionary taxes” from those involved in the drug trade and, for a price, provides security and transportation services for drug trafficking organizations to support its terrorist activities. At present, there is little government presence in the remote coca-growing zones of the VRAEM. The U.S. Embassy in Lima restricts visits by official personnel to these areas because of the threat of violence by narcotics traffickers and columns of the Shining Path. Information about insecure areas and recommended personal security practices can be found at http://www.osac.gov or http://travel.state.gov. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Labor is abundant, although several large investment projects in recent years led to localized shortages of highly skilled workers in some fields. According to the National Bureau for Statistics (INEI), 76.8 percent of the labor force was informal as of December 2021, following an uptick in informal labor caused by the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic impact. Unemployment was 7.4 percent in 2020. Unemployment is most prevalent among 14-24 year olds (14.7 percent in 2020). Additionally, 96 percent of unemployed people reside in urban areas. Workers in Peru are usually paid monthly. Some workers, like formal miners, are relatively highly paid and, per statute, receive a share of company profits up to a maximum total annual amount of 18 times their base monthly salary. The statutory monthly minimum wage is PEN 930/month ($266 USD). INEI estimated the poverty line to be PEN 344/month ($99) per person, although it varied by region due to different living costs. Many workers in the unregulated informal sector, most of them self-employed, make less than minimum wage. Peru’s labor law provides for a 48-hour workweek and one day of rest and requires companies to pay overtime for more than eight hours of work per day and additional compensation for work at night. Peru does not have a specific unemployment insurance program, however the “Compensation for Time of Service” (CTS) requirement mandates an employer pay one month’s salary of an employee per year of work into the employee’s CTS Account set for that purpose. When employees stop working for the employer (willingly or not), they can access the CTS Account. In addition, a fired employee receives one month’s salary per year worked, up to a maximum of twelve months. In December 2020, in response to agricultural worker protests, Congress repealed a 2019 Executive Order (Urgency Decree 043-2019) that had extended policies originally designed to support investment in the agriculture sector. With Congress’s repeal, businesses in the non-traditional exports (NTE) sector, which includes textiles and certain agricultural products, became subject to the same labor rules as other sectors, such as a five-year limit on consecutive short-term contracts. Labor unions are independent of the government and employers. Approximately six percent of Peru’s private sector labor force was unionized in 2017 (latest date available), with unionization highest in the electricity, water, construction, and mining sectors (ranging from 22 to 39 percent unionization in each sector). Union membership is more common in the public sector (16 percent). The labor procedure law (No. 29497) requires the resolution of labor conflicts in less than six months, allows unions or their representatives to appear in court on behalf of workers, requires proceedings to be conducted orally and video-recorded, and relieves the employee from the burden of proving an employer-employee relationship. Either unions or management can request binding arbitration in contract negotiations. Strikes can be called only after approval by a majority of all workers (union and non-union), voting by secret ballot, and only in defense of labor rights. Unions in essential public services, as determined by the government, must provide a sufficient number of workers during a strike to maintain operations. According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL’s) Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/peru ), some children in Peru have been subjected to the worst forms of child labor, including in mining and in commercial sexual exploitation, sometimes as a result of human trafficking. However, in 2020 (the last available report), USDOL reported that Peru made significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. While the government has made improvements in recent years, it often does not dedicate sufficient personnel and resources to labor law enforcement. The Ministry of Labor created the National Labor Inspectorate Superintendent (SUNAFIL) in 2014 and oversees regional offices to represent the labor inspectorate nationally. In 2021, SUNAFIL employed 822 labor inspectors. SUNAFIL labor inspectors also help identify and investigate cases of forced and child labor. Additional information on forced labor in Peru can be found in the 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/peru/. 14. Contact for More Information Michael Gunzburger Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Peru +51 1-618-2414 gunzburgerml@state.gov Esteban Sandoval Senior Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Peru +51 1-618-2672 sandovalej@state.gov Poland Executive Summary Poland’s strong fundamentals and timely macroeconomic policies have enabled the country’s economy to withstand several recent turbulent periods. In 2021, the Polish economy was recovering rapidly from the pandemic-induced recession, which had interrupted almost 30 years of continuous economic expansion. Policy actions including broad fiscal measures and unprecedented monetary support cushioned the socio-economic impact of the pandemic. Already in the second quarter of 2021, output returned to pre-crisis levels and annual growth in 2021 averaged 5.7 percent. The post-pandemic recovery has been sustained by robust private consumption. Despite pandemic-related challenges and the deterioration of some aspects of the investment climate, Poland remained an attractive destination for foreign investment. Solid economic fundamentals and promising post-COVID recovery forecasts continued to draw foreign, including U.S., capital. The Family 500+ program and additional pension payments continued in 2021 as key elements of the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s social welfare and inequality reduction agenda. The government increased the minimum wage and the labor market remained relatively strong, supported by a package of measures introduced in 2020 and continued in 2021 known as the “Anti-Crisis Shield.” The support measures amounted to approximately $55 billion. Prospects for future growth of the Polish economy are uncertain due to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. High inflation, the highest in 20 years, is likely to continue and interest rates, which will rise along with it, will negatively impact the economy. The approval of Poland’s National Recovery Plan (KPO), however, and the transfer of EU funds envisaged therein, should make a positive impact. In 2021, the government introduced an “Anti-Inflation Shield’ including a temporary reduction in value added tax (VAT) on electricity, gas, and heating as well as foodstuffs to prevent significant deterioration in consumption. A fiscal stimulus program (the “Polish Deal”) was also introduced and took effect in 2022. After only a few months of its implementation, the government has radically amended it. New solutions aimed at insulating the economy from the effects of the war in Ukraine will be introduced under the banner of an “Anti-Putin Shield.” These measures will include compensation to Polish businesses that operated in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus; subsidies to the state-owned gas pipeline operator; regulated gas tariffs for households and “sensitive recipients” such as hospitals; subsidies for farmers to combat rising fertilizer prices; and a reduction of the income tax threshold. The proposal is still subject to consultations but is expected to be enacted into law in 2022. The current anti-inflationary measures are likely to be extended until the end of 2022. All of these policies will drastically increase fiscal spending and curtail tax revenue. The Polish government has made gradual progress in simplifying administrative processes for firms, supported by the introduction of digital public services, but weaknesses persist in the legal and regulatory framework. Implemented and proposed legislation dampened optimism in some sectors (e.g., retail, media, energy, digital services, and beverages). Investors point to lower predictability and the outsized role of state-owned and state-controlled companies in the Polish economy as an impediment to long-term balanced growth. The government continues to push for the creation of state-controlled “national champions” that are large enough to compete internationally and lead economic development. Despite a polarized political environment, and a few less business-friendly sector-specific policies, the broad structures of the Polish economy are solid. Foreign investors are not abandoning projects planned before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and some are even transferring activities from Ukraine and Belarus to Poland. Prospects for future growth will depend on the course of the war in Ukraine, but in the near-term, external and domestic demand and inflows of EU funds, as well as various government aid programs, are likely to continue to attract investors seeking access to Poland’s market of over 38 million people, and to the broader EU market of over 500 million. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology finished public consultations on its Industry Development White Paper, which identifies the government’s views on the most significant barriers to industrial activity and serves as the foundation for Poland’s Industrial Policy (PIP) – a strategic document focused on digitization, security, industrial production location, the Green Deal, and modern society which sets the direction for long-term industrial development. In early 2022, the Ministry announced there was need for further analysis and introduction of new economic solutions due to the considerable changes in the EU energy policy, supply chain disruptions, and the geopolitical situation. Poland’s well-diversified economy reduces its vulnerability to external shocks, although it depends heavily on the EU as an export market. Foreign investors also cite Poland’s well-educated work force as a major reason to invest, as well as its proximity to major markets such as Germany. U.S. firms represent one of the largest groups of foreign investors in Poland. The volume of U.S. investment in Poland was estimated at over $4.2 billion by the National Bank of Poland in 2020 and at around $25 billion by the Warsaw-based American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham). With the inclusion of indirect investment flows through subsidiaries, it may reach over $62 billion, according to KPMG and AmCham. Historically, foreign direct investment (FDI) was largest in the automotive and food processing industries, followed by machinery and other metal products and petrochemicals. “Shared office” services such as accounting, legal, and information technology services, including research and development (R&D), is Poland’s fastest-growing sector for foreign investment. The government seeks to promote domestic production and technology transfer opportunities in awarding defense-related tenders. There are also investment and export opportunities in the energy sector—both immediate (natural gas), and longer term (nuclear, hydrogen, energy grid upgrades, photovoltaics, and offshore wind)—as Poland seeks to diversify its energy mix and reduce air pollution. Biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and health care industries opened wider to investments and exports as a result of the COVID-19 experience. 2021 turned out to be a record year for venture capital investment in Poland. Compared to 2020, the value of investments in this area increased by 66 percent, exceeding $800 million. Around 15 percent of these transactions were investments in the sector of medical technologies. Defense remains a promising sector for U.S. exports. The Polish government is actively modernizing its military inventory, presenting good opportunities for the U.S. defense industry. A law increasing the defense budget was adopted in March 2022. The law also amends the mechanism of military financing, expansion, and procurement. The defense budget is to increase to 3 percent of GDP from 2023, exceeding the NATO target of 2 percent. Under the new law, the Council of Ministers will be tasked with determining, every four years, the direction of the modernization and development of the armed forces for a 15-year planning period. Information technology and cybersecurity along with infrastructure also are sectors that show promise for U.S. exports, as Poland’s municipalities focus on smart city networks. A $10 billion central airport project may present opportunities for U.S. companies in project management, consulting, communications, and construction. The government seeks to expand the economy by supporting high-tech investments, increasing productivity and foreign trade, and supporting entrepreneurship, scientific research, and innovation through the use of domestic and EU funding. The Polish government is interested in the development of green energy, hoping to utilize the large amounts of EU funding earmarked for this purpose in the coming years and decades. The Polish government plans to allocate money from the EU Recovery Fund (once Poland’s plan is approved) to pro-development investments in such areas as economic resilience and competitiveness, green energy and the reduction of energy intensity, digital transformation, the availability and quality of the health care system, and green and intelligent mobility. A major EU project is to synchronize the Baltic States’ electricity grid with that of Poland and the wider European network by 2025. Another government strategy aims for a commercial fifth generation (5G) cellular network to become operational in all cities by 2025, although planned spectrum auctions have been repeatedly delayed. Some organizations, notably private business associations and labor unions, have raised concerns that policy changes have been introduced quickly and without broad consultation, increasing uncertainty about the stability and predictability of Poland’s business environment. For example, the government had announced an “advertising tax” on media companies with only a few months warning after firms had already prepared budgets for the current year. Broadcasters were concerned the tax, if introduced, could irreparably harm media companies weakened by the pandemic and limit independent journalism. Other proposals to introduce legislation on media de-concentration and limitations on foreign ownership have raised concern among foreign investors in the sector; however, those proposals seem to have stalled for the time being. The Polish tax system has undergone a major transformation with the introduction of many changes over recent years, including more effective tax auditing and collection, with the aim of increasing budget revenues. Through updated regulations in November 2020, Poland has adopted a range of major changes concerning the taxation of doing business in the country. The changes include the double taxation of some partnerships; deferral of corporate income tax (CIT) for small companies owned by individuals; an obligation to publish tax strategies by large companies; and a new model of taxation for real estate companies. In the financial sector, legal risks stemming from foreign exchange mortgages constitute a source of uncertainty for some banks. The Polish government has supported taxing the income of Internet companies, proposed by the European Commission, considering it a possible new source of financing for the post-COVID-19 economic recovery. A tax on video-on-demand services and the proposed advertising tax are two examples of this trend. On April 8, 2021, Poland’s president signed legislation amending provisions of Poland’s customs and tax laws in an effort to simplify certain customs and tax procedures. The “Next Generation EU” recovery package will benefit the Polish economic recovery with sizeable support. Under the 2021-2027 European Union budget, Poland will receive $78.4 billion in cohesion funds as well as approximately $27 billion in grants and $40 billion in loan access from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. The Polish government projects this injection of funds, amounting to around 4.5 percent of Poland’s 2021 GDP, should contribute significantly to the country’s growth over the period 2021-2027. As the largest recipient of EU funds (which have contributed an estimated 1 percentage point to Poland’s GDP growth per year), any significant decrease in EU cohesion spending would have a large negative impact on Poland’s economy. The risk of a suspension of EU funds is low, but the government has refused to comply with several rulings of the European Court of Justice. Observers are closely watching the European Commission’s three open infringement proceedings against Poland regarding rule of law and judicial reforms initiated in April 2019, April 2020, and December 2021. The Commission’s concerns include the introduction of an extraordinary appeal mechanism in the enacted Supreme Court Law, which could potentially affect economic interests in that final judgments issued since 1997 can now be challenged and overturned in whole or in part, including some long-standing judgments on which economic actors have relied. Other issues regard the legitimacy of judicial appointments after a reform of the National Judicial Council that raise concerns about long-term legal certainty and the possible politicization of judicial decisions and undermining of EU law. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to an increase in economic, financial, and political risks. Managing the fallout from the war in Ukraine will be the government’s priority. Poland faces a large-scale refugee influx and, as of April 2022, has already received close to three million refugees. The Polish government reacted rapidly, granting refugees the right of temporary residence and access to key public services (health, education), social assistance, and housing. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the war in Ukraine, if it ends within a few months, will cause a small and short slowdown in the growth of the Polish economy. The relatively limited consequences of the invasion for Poland’s economy are primarily due to the large influx of refugees to Poland. The EBRD expects this to be a strong consumption stimulus that will cushion the impact of weakening exports due to the war. The Polish and global economies are currently operating in conditions of high uncertainty. Any forecasts, therefore, are subject to a large margin of error. The state of the Polish economy and the validity of forecasts will depend on the further course of the war in Ukraine, the decision of Ukrainian refugees on whether to stay in Poland, and the EU’s approval of Poland’s KPO. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 42 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 40 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 11,127 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 15,240 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Poland welcomes foreign investment as a source of capital, growth, and jobs, and as a vehicle for technology transfer, research and development (R&D), and integration into global supply chains. The government’s Strategy for Responsible Development identified key goals for attracting investment, including improving the investment climate, a stable macroeconomic and regulatory environment, and high-quality corporate governance, including in state-controlled companies. By the end of 2020, according to IMF and National Bank of Poland data, Poland had attracted around $250 billion (cumulative) in foreign direct investment (FDI), principally from Western Europe and the United States. In 2020, reinvested profits again dominated the net inflow of FDI to Poland. The greatest reinvestment of profits occurred in services and manufacturing, reflecting the change of Poland’s economy to a more service-oriented and less capital-intensive structure.Foreign companies generally enjoy unrestricted access to the Polish market. However, Polish law limits foreign ownership of companies in selected strategic sectors, and limits acquisition of real estate, especially agricultural and forest land. Additionally, the current government has expressed a desire to increase the percentage of domestic ownership in some industries such as media, banking, and retail which have large holdings by foreign companies and has employed sectoral taxes and other measures to advance this aim. In March 2018, Sunday trading ban legislation went into effect, which has gradually phased out Sunday retail commerce in Poland, especially for large retailers. Since February 1, 2022, changes to the ban on Sunday trading are in force. According to these rules, it is possible to open stores that provide postal services on non-trading Sundays if the revenues from this activity exceed 40 percent of the total revenues of a given branch. Sales records must be kept separately for each commercial outlet, even if the entrepreneur has several such outlets. Fines for breaking the Sunday trading ban are from $230 to $23,250 (PLN 1,000 to PLN 100,000). From February 1, 2022, the same penalty applies for not keeping required monthly records. From 2020, the trade ban applies to all but seven Sundays a year. In 2020, a law was adopted requiring producers and importers of certain sugary and sweetened beverages to pay a fee. The government has been planning to introduce an advertising tax – hailed as a “solidarity fee”- covering a wide array of entities including publishers, tech companies and cinemas. Only small media businesses would be exempt from the new levy. Polish authorities have also publicly favored introducing a comprehensive digital services tax. While the government continues to acknowledge the value of FDI as a driver of growth, it has tended to focus on lessening Poland’s dependence on foreign capital by championing re-industrialization largely in the knowledge-based industries as well as shifting to more self-reliance in lending to small- and medium-sized firms in the banking sector. There are a variety of agencies involved in investment promotion: The Ministry of Economic Development and Technology has two departments involved in investment promotion and facilitation: the Investment Development and the Trade and International Relations Departments. The Deputy Minister supervising the Investment Development Department is also the ombudsman for foreign investors. https://www.gov.pl/web/przedsiebiorczosc-technologia/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) promotes Poland’s foreign relations including economic relations, and along with the Polish Chamber of Commerce (KIG), organizes missions of Polish firms abroad and hosts foreign trade missions to Poland. https://www.msz.gov.pl/ ; https://kig.pl/ The Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH) is the main institution responsible for promotion and facilitation of foreign investment. The agency is responsible for promoting Polish exports, for inward foreign investment and for Polish investments abroad. The agency operates as part of the Polish Development Fund, which integrates government development agencies. PAIH coordinates all operational instruments, such as commercial diplomatic missions, commercial fairs, and programs dedicated to specific markets and sectors. The Agency has opened offices abroad including in the United States (Washington, D.C, Chicago, Houston, and New York). PAIH’s services are available to all investors. https://www.paih.gov.pl/en The American Chamber of Commerce has established the American Investor Desk – an investor-dedicated know-how gateway providing comprehensive information on investing in Poland and investing in the USA: https://amcham.pl/american-investor-desk In July 2021, PAIH and AmCham signed a cooperation agreement. Its purpose is to promote and create favorable conditions for the development of exports and investments on the Polish and American markets. Poland allows both foreign and domestic entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in most forms of remunerative activity per the Entrepreneurs’ Law which went into effect on April 30, 2018. Forms of business activity are described in the Commercial Companies Code. Poland does place limits on foreign ownership and foreign equity for a limited number of sectors. Polish law limits non-EU citizens to 49 percent ownership of a company’s capital shares in the air transport, radio and television broadcasting, and airport and seaport operations sectors. Licenses and concessions for defense production and management of seaports are granted on the basis of national treatment for investors from OECD countries. Pursuant to the Broadcasting Law, a television broadcasting company may only receive a license if the voting share of foreign owners does not exceed 49 percent and if the majority of the members of the management and supervisory boards are Polish citizens and hold permanent residence in Poland. In 2017, a team comprised of officials from the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), and the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) was created in order to review and tighten restrictions on large media and limit foreign ownership of the media. In December 2021, the President vetoed modifications to the media law limiting foreign ownership of the sector. There is concern that governing party politicians have not completely abandoned their plans and may attempt to bypass the president’s veto in such a way as to modify the media law. Over the past six years, Poland’s ranking on Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index has dropped to 64th from 18th. The governing Law and Justice (PiS) party aims to decrease foreign ownership of media, particularly outlets critical of their governing coalition. Approaches have included proposals to set caps on foreign ownership, the use of a state-controlled companies to purchase media, and the application of economic tools (taxes, fines, advertising revenue) to pressure foreign and independent media. In the insurance sector, at least two management board members, including the chair, must speak Polish. The Law on Freedom of Economic Activity (LFEA) requires companies to obtain government concessions, licenses, or permits to conduct business in certain sectors, such as broadcasting, aviation, energy, weapons/military equipment, mining, and private security services. The LFEA also requires a permit from the Ministry of Economic Development for certain major capital transactions (i.e., to establish a company when a wholly or partially Polish-owned enterprise has contributed in-kind to a company with foreign ownership by incorporating liabilities in equity, contributing assets, receivables, etc.). A detailed description of business activities that require concessions and licenses can be found here: https://www.paih.gov.pl/publications/how_to_do_business_in_Poland Polish law restricts foreign investment in certain land and real estate. Land usage types such as technology and industrial parks, business and logistic centers, transport, housing plots, farmland in special economic zones, household gardens and plots up to two hectares are exempt from agricultural land purchase restrictions. Since May 2016, foreign citizens from European Economic Area member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, as well as Switzerland, do not need permission to purchase any type of real estate including agricultural land. Investors from outside of the EEA or Switzerland need to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (with the consent of the Defense and Agriculture Ministries), pursuant to the Act on Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners, prior to the acquisition of real estate or shares which give control of a company holding or leasing real estate. The permit is valid for two years from the day of issuance, and the ministry can issue a preliminary document valid for one year. Permits may be refused for reasons of social policy or public security. The exceptions to this rule include purchases of an apartment or garage, up to 0.4 hectares of undeveloped urban land, and “other cases provided for by law” (generally: proving a particularly close connection with Poland). Laws to restrict farmland and forest purchases (with subsequent amendments) came into force April 30, 2016, and are addressed in more detail in Section 5, Protection of Property Rights. Since September 2015, the Act on the Control of Certain Investments has provided for the national security-related screening of acquisitions in high-risk sectors including: energy generation and distribution; petroleum production, processing and distribution; telecommunications; media; mining; and manufacturing and trade of explosives, weapons and ammunition. Poland maintains a list of strategic companies which can be amended at any time, but is updated at least once a year, usually in late December. The national security review mechanism does not appear to constitute a de facto barrier for investment and does not unduly target U.S. investment. According to the Act, prior to the acquisition of shares of strategic companies (including the acquisition of proprietary interests in entities and/or their enterprises) the purchaser (foreign or local) must notify the controlling government body and receive approval. The obligation to inform the controlling government body applies to transactions involving the acquisition of a “material stake” in companies subject to special protection. The Act stipulates that failure to notify carries a fine of up to PLN 100,000,000 ($22,300,000) or a penalty of imprisonment between six months and five years (or both penalties together) for a person acting on behalf of a legal person or organizational unit that acquires a material stake without prior notification. As part of the COVID-19 Anti-Crisis Shield, on June 24, 2020, legislation entered into force extending significantly the FDI screening mechanism in Poland for 24 months. In the absence of new permanent regulations and due to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, there is a high probability that this legislation will be extended. An acquisition from a country that is not a member of the EU, the EEA, or the OECD requires prior clearance from the President of the Polish Competition Authority if it targets a company generating turnover exceeding EUR 10 million ($10.5 million) that either: 1) is a publicly-listed company, 2) controls assets classified as critical infrastructure, 3) develops or maintains software crucial for vital processes (e.g., utilities systems, financial transactions, food distribution, transport and logistics, health care systems); or 4) conducts business in one of 21 specific industries, including energy, gas and oil production, storage, distribution and transportation; manufacture of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and medical instruments; telecommunications; and food processing. The State Assets Ministry is preparing similar and more permanent measures. In November 2019, the governing PiS party reestablished a treasury ministry, known as the State Assets Ministry, to consolidate the government’s control over state-owned enterprises. The government dissolved Poland’s energy ministry, transferring that agency’s mandate to the State Assets Ministry. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets announced he would seek to consolidate state-owned companies with similar profiles, including merging Poland’s largest state-owned oil and gas firm PKN Orlen with state-owned Lotos Group and establishing a National Food Holding. At the same time, the government is working on changing the rules of governing state-owned companies to have better control over the firms’ activities. The government has not undergone any third-party review focused on investment policy by a multilateral or civil society organization in the last five years, The OECD published its 2020 economic survey of Poland. It can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/poland-economic-snapshot/ Additionally, the OECD Working Group on Bribery has provided recommendations on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Poland here: https://www.oecd.org/poland/poland-should-urgently-implement-reforms-to-boost-fight-against-foreign-bribery-and-preserve-independence-of-prosecutors-and-judges.htm In 2021, government activities and regulations focused primarily on addressing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Polish government has continued to implement reforms aimed at improving the investment climate with a special focus on the small- and medium-enterprise (SME) sector and innovations. Poland reformed its R&D tax incentives with new regulations and changes encouraging wider use of the R&D tax breaks. As of January 1, 2019, a new mechanism reducing the tax rate on income derived from intellectual property rights (IP Box) was introduced. Please see Section 5, Protection of Property Rights of this report for more information. A package of five laws referred to as the “Business Constitution”—intended to facilitate the operation of small domestic enterprises—was gradually introduced in 2018. The main principle of the Business Constitution is the presumption of innocence of business owners in dealings with the government. Poland made enforcing contracts easier by introducing an automated system to assign cases to judges randomly. Despite these reforms and others, some investors have expressed serious concerns regarding over-regulation, over-burdened courts and prosecutors, and overly burdensome bureaucratic processes. Tax audit methods have changed considerably. For instance, in many cases an appeal against the findings of an audit must now be lodged with the authority that issued the initial finding rather than a higher authority or third party. Poland also enabled businesses to get electricity service faster by implementing a new customer service platform that allows the utility to better track applications for new commercial connections. The Ministry of Finance and the National Tax Administration have launched an e-Tax Office, available online at https://www.podatki.gov.pl/ . The website, which will be constructed in stages through September 2022, will make it possible to settle all tax matters in a single user-friendly digital location. Running a business in Poland will be facilitated by e-invoices. From January 2022, entrepreneurs will be able to use it voluntarily. Taxpayers choosing an e-invoice will receive a VAT refund faster – the refund period will be shortened by 20 days (from 60 to 40). The government plans, starting in 2023, to have entrepreneurs use this solution obligatorily. A special tax unit, the “Investor Desk,” has been established at the Finance Ministry to handle tax matters of strategic investors. This unit, working with other agencies focused on foreign investments in Poland, will support large investors with administrative requirements. In Poland, business activity may be conducted in the forms of a sole proprietorship, civil law partnership, as well as commercial partnerships and companies regulated in provisions of the Commercial Partnerships and Companies Code. Sole proprietorship and civil law partnerships are registered in the Central Registration and Information on Business (CEIDG), which is housed with the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology here: https://prod.ceidg.gov.pl/CEIDG.CMS.ENGINE/?D;f124ce8a-3e72-4588-8380-63e8ad33621f Commercial companies are classified as partnerships (registered partnership, professional partnership, limited partnership, and limited joint-stock partnership) and companies (limited liability company and joint-stock company). A partnership or company is registered in the National Court Register (KRS) and maintained by the competent district court for the registered office of the established partnership or company. A 2018 law introduced a new type of company—PSA (Prosta Spółka Akcyjna – Simple Joint Stock Company). PSAs are meant to facilitate start-ups with simpler and cheaper registration procedures. The minimum initial capitalization is 1 PLN ($0.23) while other types of registration require 5,000 PLN ($1,126) or 50,000 PLN ($11,260). A PSA has a board of directors, which merges the responsibilities of a management board and a supervisory board. The provision for PSAs entered into force in July 2021. From October 12, 2022, an amendment to the Commercial Companies Code and certain other acts will enter into force. It introduces the so-called “holding law,” developed by the Commission for Owner Oversight Reform in the Ministry of State Assets. The amendment lays down the principles of how a parent company may instruct its subsidiaries and stipulates the parent company’s liability and the principles of creditor, officer, and minority shareholder protections. This amendment constitutes an important change for many companies operating in Poland, including foreign parent companies. Holding companies meeting certain requirements will be eligible for an exemption from CIT of 95 percent of dividends received from subsidiaries and full exemption from CIT of capital gains from the sale of shares of subsidiaries for unrelated entities. Only a limited liability company or a joint stock company, being considered a Polish tax resident, may be considered a holding company. The requirement of holding at least 10 percent of shares of a subsidiary and for a period of at least one year applies. Both the holding company and the subsidiary cannot belong to a tax capital group and cannot benefit from tax exemptions (e.g., activity in the special economic zone). The holding company must conduct genuine business activity in Poland. Capital gains from the sale of real estate-rich companies are not exempt. New regulations will apply only to capital companies. On January 1, 2021, a new law on public procurement entered into force. This law had been adopted by the Polish Parliament on September 11, 2019. The new law aims to reorganize the public procurement system, further harmonize it with EU law, and improve transparency. Beginning in July 2021, commercial companies were required to submit electronically all applications for registration, deletion, and changes to the National Court Register. All company files are now available electronically and the registration process should speed up significantly. National Court Register (KRS): https://www.gov.pl/web/gov/uslugi-dla-przedsiebiorcy A certified e-signature may be obtained from one of the commercial e-signature providers listed on the following website: https://www.nccert.pl/ Agencies with which a business will need to file in order to register in the KRS include: Central Statistical Office to register for a business identification number (REGON) for civil-law partnership http://bip.stat.gov.pl/en/regon/subjects-and-data-included-in-the-register/ ZUS – Social Insurance Agency http://www.zus.pl/pl/pue/rejestracja Ministry of Finance http://www.mf.gov.pl/web/bip/wyniki-wyszukiwania/?q=business percent20registration Both registers (KRS and REGON) are available in English and foreign companies may use them. Poland’s Single Point of Contact site for business registration and information is: https://www.biznes.gov.pl/en/ The Polish Agency for Investment and Trade (PAIH), under the umbrella of the Polish Development Fund (PFR), plays a key role in promoting Polish investment abroad. More information on PFR can be found in Section 6, Financial Sector and at its website: https://pfr.pl/ . PAIH has 58 offices worldwide, including four in the United States. PAIH assists entrepreneurs with the administrative and legal procedures related to specific projects. PAIH also works with entrepreneurs in the development of legal solutions and finding suitable locations, reliable partners, and suppliers. The agency implements pro-export projects such as “Polish Tech Bridges” dedicated to the outward expansion of innovative Polish SMEs. Poland is a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Poland co-founded and actively supports the Three Seas Initiative, which seeks to improve north-south connections in road, energy, and telecom infrastructure in 12 countries on NATO’s and the EU’s eastern flank. In May 2019, the national development bank, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), and the Romanian development bank EximBank founded the Three Seas Fund, a commercial initiative to support the development of transport, energy and digital infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. As of March 2022, there were nine core sponsors involved in the Fund. There were no breakthroughs in 2021 for the Three Seas Initiative, however, 2021 did bring long-awaited stabilization as well as the recognition of the initiative among the majority of international partners in the region. The Three Seas Initiative may be able to play a significant role in the inclusion process for Ukraine in European structures. Under the Government Financial Support for Exports Program, BGK grants foreign buyers financing for the purchase of Polish goods and services. The program provides the following financing instruments: credit for buyers granted through the buyers’ bank; credit for buyers granted directly from BGK; the purchase of receivables on credit from the supplier under an export contract; documentary letters of credit post-financing; the discounting of receivables from documentary letters of credit; confirmation of documentary letters of credit; and export pre-financing. BGK has international offices in London and Frankfurt. In July 2019, BGK, the European Investment Bank, and four other development banks (French Deposits and Consignments Fund, Italian Deposits and Loans Fund, the Spanish Official Credit Institute, and the German Credit Institute for Reconstruction), began the implementation of the “Joint Initiative on Circular Economy” (JICE), the goal of which is to eliminate waste, prevent its generation, and increase the efficiency of resource management. PFR TFI S.A, an entity also under the umbrella of PFR, supports Polish investors planning to or already operating abroad. PFR TFI manages the Foreign Expansion Fund (FEZ), which provides loans, on market terms, to foreign entities owned by Polish entrepreneurs. See https://www.pfrtfi.pl/ and https://pfr.pl/en/offer/polish-international-development-fund.html 3. Legal Regime The Polish Constitution contains a number of provisions related to administrative law and procedures. It states administrative bodies have a duty to observe and comply with the law of Poland. The Code of Administrative Procedures (CAP) states rules and principles concerning participation and involvement of citizens in processes affecting them, the giving of reasons for decisions, and forms of appeal and review. As a member of the EU, Poland complies with EU directives by harmonizing rules or translating them into national legislation. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist at the central, regional, and municipal levels. Various ministries are engaged in rule-making that affects foreign business, such as pharmaceutical reimbursement at the Ministry of Health or incentives for R&D at the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. Regional and municipal level governments can levy certain taxes and affect foreign investors through permitting and zoning. Polish accounting standards do not differ significantly from international standards. Major international accounting firms provide services in Poland. In cases where there is no national accounting standard, the appropriate International Accounting Standard may be applied. However, investors have complained of regulatory unpredictability and high levels of administrative red tape. Foreign and domestic investors must comply with a variety of laws concerning taxation, labor practices, health and safety, and the environment. Complaints about these laws, especially the tax system, center on frequent changes, lack of clarity, and strict penalties for minor errors. Poland has improved its regulatory policy system over the last several years. The government introduced a central online system to provide access for the general public to regulatory impact assessments (RIA) and other documents sent for consultation to selected groups such as trade unions and business. Proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment, and ministries must conduct public consultations. Poland follows OECD recognized good regulatory practices, but investors say the lack of regulations governing the role of stakeholders in the legislative process is a problem. Participation in public consultations and the window for comments are often limited. New guidelines for RIA, consultation and ex post evaluation were adopted under the Better Regulation Program in 2015, providing more detailed guidance and stronger emphasis on public consultation. Like many countries, Poland faces challenges to fully implement its regulatory policy requirements and to ensure that RIA and consultation comments are used to improve decision making. The OECD suggests Poland extend its online public consultation system and consider using instruments such as green papers more systematically for early-stage consultation to identify options for addressing a policy problem. OECD considers steps taken to introduce ex post evaluation of regulations encouraging. Bills can be submitted to Parliament for debate as “citizens’ bills” if authors collect 100,000 signatures in support for the draft legislation. NGOs and private sector associations most often take advantage of this avenue. Parliamentary bills can also be submitted by a group of parliamentarians, a mechanism that bypasses public consultation and which both domestic and foreign investors have criticized. Changes to the government’s rules of procedure introduced in June 2016 reduced the requirements for RIA for preparations of new legislation. Administrative authorities are subject to oversight by courts and other bodies (e.g., the Supreme Audit Chamber – NIK), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, special commissions and agencies, inspectorates, the Prosecutor and parliamentary committees. Polish parliamentary committees utilize a distinct system to examine and instruct ministries and administrative agency heads. Committees’ oversight of administrative matters consists of: reports on state budget implementation and preparation of new budgets, citizens’ complaints, and reports from NIK. In addition, courts and prosecutors’ offices sometimes bring cases to Parliament’s attention. The Ombudsperson’s institution works relatively well in Poland. Polish citizens have a right to complain and to put forward grievances before administrative bodies. Proposed legislation can be tracked on the Prime Minister’s webpage, RPL Strona Główna (rcl.gov.pl) and the Parliament’s webpage: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/proces.xsp The government promotes and encourages companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. For example, the Strategic Investments Program launched by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) offers co-financing, up to 95 percent of the value, for investments by local governments. As part of the assessment of applications, implementation of innovative technologies and compliance with sustainable development goals are taken into account. Tax relief for corporate social responsibility (CSR), intended for all entrepreneurs, will come into force in 2022. Companies will be able to deduct an additional 50 percent from the tax base for costs incurred on activities such as sports, culture, higher education, and science. CSR relief may be deducted up to the amount of income obtained in the tax year. The government also organizes or supports conferences and campaigns such as “Our Climate” and “TOGETAIR 2022,” with the aim of raising awareness of ways to transition to a climate-neutral, green, competitive, and inclusive economy. Poland has consistently met the Department of State’s minimum requirements for fiscal transparency: 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report – United States Department of State Poland’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. NIK audited the government’s accounts and made its reports publicly available, including online. The budget structure and classifications are complex, and the Polish authorities agree more work is needed to address deficiencies in the process of budgetary planning and procedures. State budgets encompass only part of the public finances sector. The European Commission regularly assesses the public finance sustainability of Member States based on fiscal gap ratios. In 2022, Poland’s public finances will be exposed to a higher general government deficit, uncertainty in financial markets resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the macroeconomic environment with elevated inflation, and the monetary policy of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and major central banks, including the European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Since its EU accession in May 2004, Poland has been transposing European legislation and reforming its own regulations in compliance with the EU system. Poland sometimes disagrees with EU regulations related to renewable energy and emissions due to its important domestic coal industry. Poland participates in the process of creation of European norms. There is strong encouragement for non-governmental organizations, such as environmental and consumer groups, to actively participate in European standardization. In areas not covered by European normalization, the Polish Committee for Standardization (PKN) introduces norms identical with international norms, i.e., PN-ISO and PN-IEC. PKN actively cooperates with international and European standards organizations and with standards bodies from other countries. PKN has been a founding member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and a member of the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) since 1923.PKN also cooperates with the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Poland has been a member of the WTO since July 1, 1995 and was a member of GATT from October 18, 1967. All EU member states are WTO members, as is the EU in its own right. While the member states coordinate their positions in Brussels and Geneva, the European Commission alone speaks for the EU and its members in almost all WTO affairs. PKN runs the WTO/TBT National Information Point in order to apply the provisions of the TBT with respect to information exchange concerning national standardization.Useful Links: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/harmonised-standards/ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html?locale=en ) The Polish legal system is code-based and prosecutorial. The main source of the country’s law is the Constitution of 1997. The legal system is a mix of Continental civil law (Napoleonic) and remnants of communist legal theory. Poland accepts the obligatory jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but with reservations. In civil and commercial matters, first instance courts sit in single-judge panels, while courts handling appeals sit in three-judge panels. District Courts (Sad Rejonowy) handle the majority of disputes in the first instance. When the value of a dispute exceeds a certain amount or the subject matter requires more expertise (such as those regarding intellectual property rights), Circuit Courts (Sad Okregowy) serve as first instance courts. Circuit Courts also handle appeals from District Court verdicts. Courts of Appeal (Sad Apelacyjny) handle appeals from verdicts of Circuit Courts as well as generally supervise the courts in their region. The Polish judicial system generally upholds the sanctity of contracts. Foreign court judgements, under the Polish Civil Procedure Code and European Community regulation, can be recognized. There are many foreign court judgments, however, which Polish courts do not accept or accept partially. There can also be delays in the recognition of judgments of foreign courts due to an insufficient number of judges with specialized expertise. Generally, foreign firms are wary of the slow and over-burdened Polish court system, preferring other means to defend their rights. Contracts involving foreign parties often include a clause specifying that disputes will be resolved in a third-country court or through offshore arbitration. (More detail in Section 4, Dispute Settlement.) Since coming to power in 2015, the PiS-led government has pursued far-reaching reforms to Poland’s judicial system. The reforms have led to legal disputes with the European Commission over threats to judicial independence. The reforms have also drawn criticism from legal experts, NGOs, and international organizations. Poland’s government contends the reforms are needed to purge the old Communist guard and increase efficiency and democratic oversight in the judiciary. Observers have noted, in particular, the introduction of an extraordinary appeal mechanism in the 2017 Supreme Court Law. The extraordinary appeal mechanism states that final judgments issued since 1997 can be challenged and overturned in whole or in part during a three-year period starting from the day the legislation entered into force, April 3, 2018. On February 25, 2021, the lower house of Parliament (Sejm) passed an amendment to the law further extending the deadline for submitting extraordinary complaints by three years (until April 3, 2024). The President signed the bill into law on March 31, 2021. During 2021, the Extraordinary Appeals Chamber received 744 new complaints of which 280 were recognized and accepted for examination. During 2021, the Chamber reviewed 103 complaints. On April 8, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued interim measures ordering the government to suspend the work of the Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber with regard to disciplinary cases against judges. The ECJ is evaluating an infringement proceeding launched by the European Commission in April 2019 and referred to the ECJ in October 2019. The Commission has argued that the country’s disciplinary regime for judges “undermines the judicial independence of…judges and does not ensure the necessary guarantees to protect judges from political control, as required by the Court of Justice of the EU.” The Commission stated the disciplinary regime did not provide for the independence and impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber, which is composed solely of judges selected by the restructured National Council of the Judiciary, which is appointed by the Sejm. The ECJ has yet to make a final ruling. The European Commission and judicial experts have complained the government has ignored the ECJ’s interim measures. On April 29, 2020, the European Commission launched another infringement procedure regarding a law that came into effect on February 14, 2020. The law allows judges to be disciplined for impeding the functioning of the legal system or for questioning another judge’s professional state or the effectiveness of his or her appointment. It also requires judges to disclose memberships in associations. The Commission stated the law “undermines the judicial independence of Polish judges and is incompatible with the primacy of EU law.” It also stated the law “prevents Polish courts from directly applying certain provisions of EU law protecting judicial independence and from putting references for preliminary rulings on such questions to the [European] Court of Justice.” On December 3, 2020, the Commission expanded its April 29 complaint to include the continued functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber in apparent disregard of the ECJ’s interim measures in the prior infringement procedure. On January 27, 2021, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Polish government for response. On July 14 and 15, 2021, the ECJ issued two rulings against Polish government changes to Poland’s judicial disciplinary system. These rulings directly conflicted with a July 14, 2021, Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruling that said the ECJ had exceeded its authority. On July 20, 2021, the European Commission threatened financial sanctions and gave the Polish government until August 16, 2021, to confirm compliance with the ECJ rulings. On August 16, the Polish government sent a letter to the Commission in response to the ultimatum, promising new legislation in “the coming months” to fix Poland’s judicial disciplinary regime and liquidate the controversial Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. On September 7, 2021, the Commission announced it had requested the ECJ impose financial penalties against Poland for not complying with ECJ rulings. The Commission also initiated a new infringement procedure against Poland to ascertain details about the Polish government’s planned legislation. On October 27, 2021, the ECJ imposed a €1 million daily fine against Poland for the government’s failure to suspend the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, as ordered by the ECJ in July. As of April 2022, the Polish Parliament has not completed the legislative process to consider legislation that responds to the European Commission’s concerns. Foreign nationals can expect to obtain impartial proceedings in legal matters. Polish is the official language and must be used in all legal proceedings. It is possible to obtain an interpreter. The basic legal framework for establishing and operating companies in Poland, including companies with foreign investors, is found in the Commercial Companies Code. The Code provides for establishment of joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, or partnerships (e.g., limited joint-stock partnerships and professional partnerships). These corporate forms are available to foreign investors who come from an EU or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member state or from a country that offers reciprocity to Polish enterprises, including the United States.With few exceptions, foreign investors are guaranteed national treatment. Companies that establish an EU subsidiary after May 1, 2004 and conduct or plan to commence business operations in Poland must observe all EU regulations. However, in some cases they may not be able to benefit from all privileges afforded to EU companies. Foreign investors without permanent residence and the right to work in Poland may be restricted from participating in day-to-day operations of a company. Parties can freely determine the content of contracts within the limits of European contract law. All parties must agree on essential terms, including the price and the subject matter of the contract. Written agreements, although not always mandatory, may enable an investor to avoid future disputes. The Civil Code is the law applicable to contracts. Useful websites (in English) to help navigate laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for foreign investors: Polish Investment and Trade Agency: https://www.paih.gov.pl/en Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF): https://www.knf.gov.pl/en/ Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK): https://uokik.gov.pl/legal_regulations.php Biznes.gov.pl is intended for people who plan to start a new business in Poland. The portal is designed to simplify the formalities of setting up and running a business. It provides up-to-date regulations and procedures for running a business in Poland and the EU; it supports electronic application submission to state institutions; and it answers questions regarding running a business. Information is available in Polish and English. https://www.biznes.gov.pl/en/przedsiebiorcy/ In 2022, the Polish Government introduced a new measure – an investment agreement – for strategic investors who would like to obtain clarity and certainty regarding the tax consequences of a given investment. The agreement (commonly referred to as “Interpretation 590”) is concluded with the Ministry of Finance and will be binding on the tax administration. An Interpretation 590 includes the following features: Its objective is to provide flexibility, completeness, and comprehensiveness in determining the tax consequences of an investment project. It is available to investors planning an investment in Poland worth at least PLN 100 million (approximately $22 million) and, from 2025 onward, PLN 50 million (approximately $11 million). The agreement will be valid for the stated period, limited to five tax years (with the possibility to extend). Separate applications to various tax authorities (e.g., individual tax rulings, advance pricing arrangements (APA), anti-GAAR clearance, etc.) are not required as all of these matters would be covered with one investment agreement. The scope of information provided in the agreement should not be limited by the provisions of the Tax Code governing individual tax rulings. One agreement could cover all potential tax consequences of an investment. The agreement will be subject to a fee of PLN 50,000 (approximately $11,200) for the initial application and PLN 100,000 to 500,000 (approximately $22,400 to $112,000) after concluding the agreement, with the exact fee depending on the volume of the investment and scope of the investment agreement). The above changes reflect an increasing focus of the Polish Government to attract significant investments into Poland. A special tax unit, the “Investor Desk” has been established, at the Finance Ministry, to handle tax matters of strategic investor. This unit, along with other agencies focused on foreign investments in Poland, will support significant investors passing through administrative requirements. The tax authorities are often open to discussing strategic investments and providing support in applying formal measures which, with new measures in place, should be even more common and accessible to investors. Poland has a high level of nominal convergence with the EU on competition policy in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Lisbon Treaty. Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) is well within EU norms for structure and functioning, with the exception that the Prime Minister both appoints and dismisses the head of UOKiK. This is supposed to change to be in line with EU norms, however, as of April 2022, the Prime Minister was still exercising his right to remove and nominate UOKiK’s presidents. The Act on Competition and Consumer Protection was amended in mid-2019. The most important changes, which concern geo-blocking and access to fiscal and banking secrets, came into force on September 17, 2019. Other minor changes took effect in January 2020. The amendments result from the need to align national law with new EU laws. Starting in January 2020, UOKiK may intervene in cases when delays in payment are excessive. UOKiK can take action when the sum of outstanding payments due to an entrepreneur for three subsequent months amounts to at least PLN 5 million ($1.1 million). In 2022, the minimum amount decreases to PLN 2 million ($450,000). The President of UOKiK issues approximately 100 decisions per year regarding practices restricting competition and infringing on collective interests of consumers. Enterprises have the right to appeal against those decisions to the court. In the first instance, the case is examined by the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, and in the second instance, by the Appellate Court. The decision of the Appellate Court may be challenged by way of a cassation appeal filed to the Supreme Court. In major cases, the General Counsel to the Republic of Poland will act as the legal representative in proceedings concerning an appeal against a decision of the President of UOKiK. As part of COVID-related measures, the Polish Parliament adopted legislation amending the Act of July 24, 2015, on the Control of Certain Investments, introducing full-fledged foreign direct investment control in Poland and giving new responsibilities to UOKiK. Entities from outside the EEA and/or the OECD have to notify the Polish Competition Authority of the intention to make an investment resulting in acquisition, achievement or obtaining directly or indirectly “significant participation” or the status of a dominant entity within the meaning of the Act of July 24, 2015, on the Control of Certain Investments in an entity subject to protection. The law entered into force on July 24, 2020 and is valid for 24 months. In view of the war taking place across Poland’s eastern border and in the absence of significant amendments to the original Act on the Control of Certain Investments, there is a high likelihood that the temporary amendment adopted in 2020 will be extended, with possible modifications. In late 2020, the government proposed legislation concerning UOKiK’s investigative powers, cooperation between anti-monopoly authorities, and changes to fine imposition and leniency programs. One of the amendments also stipulates that the President of UOKiK will be elected to a 5-year term and the dismissal of the anti-monopoly authority will only be possible in precisely defined situations, such as a legally valid conviction for a criminal offense caused by intentional conduct and the deprivation of public rights or of Polish citizenship. Adoption of these solutions is linked to the implementation of the EU’s ECN+ directive. All multinational companies must notify UOKiK of a proposed merger if any party to it has subsidiaries, distribution networks, or permanent sales in Poland. Examples of competition reviews can be found at: https://uokik.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?news_id=17406 (PKN Orlen/Polska Press) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17198 (Agora/Eurozet) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17202 (Orlen/Polska Press) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17198 (BPH Bank spread clauses) Decisions made by the President of UOKiK can be searched here: https://decyzje.uokik.gov.pl/bp/dec_prez.nsf In December 2021, UOKiK launched its first competition probe into a major online platform, beginning an investigation into whether Apple’s latest privacy update unlawfully favors its own personalized advertising service. UOKiK has also initiated two proceedings concerning the application of competition law to employment-related arrangements. This follows a growing global trend of competition authorities combating no-poach or wage-fixing arrangements. The President of UOKiK has the power to impose significant fines on individuals in management positions at companies that violate the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and in the case of violations of consumer rights. The maximum fine that can be imposed on a manager is PLN 2 million ($450,000) and, in the case of managers in the financial sector, up to PLN 5 million ($1.12 million). UOKiK imposed such fines on individuals for the first time in 2021 and as of March 2022, they have been imposed in three cases. Two cases concerned horizontal agreements regarding price fixing and market sharing, and one case concerned vertical restraints on resale prices. More decisions imposing fines on individuals can be expected as there are additional pending cases. In October 2020, UOKiK issued a €6.48 billion ($6.8 billion) fine on Gazprom for failing to notify the agency about a joint financing agreement. Article 21 of the Polish Constitution states that “expropriation is admissible only for public purposes and upon equitable compensation.” The Law on Land Management and Expropriation of Real Estate states that property may be expropriated only in accordance with statutory provisions such as construction of public works, national security considerations, or other specified cases of public interest. The government must pay full compensation at market value for expropriated property. Acquiring land for road construction investment, and recently also for the Central Communication Port and the Vistula Spit projects, has been liberalized and simplified to accelerate property acquisition, particularly through a special legislative act. Most acquisitions for road construction are resolved without problems. There have been a few cases, however, in which the inability to reach agreement on remuneration has resulted in disputes. Post is not aware of any recent expropriation actions against U.S. investors, companies, or representatives. Poland’s bankruptcy law has undergone significant change and modernization in recent years. There is now a bankruptcy law and a separate, distinct restructuring law. Bankruptcy in Poland is criminalized if a company’s management does not file a petition to declare bankruptcy when a company becomes illiquid for an extended period of time or if a company ceases to pay its liabilities. https://www.paih.gov.pl/polish_law/bankruptcy_law_and_restructuring_proceedings In order to reduce the risk of overwhelming the bankruptcy courts with an excess of cases resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, changes were introduced in the bankruptcy process for consumers, shifting part of the duties to a trustee. A second significant change was the introduction of simplified restructuring proceedings. During restructuring proceedings, a company appoints an interim supervisor and is guaranteed protection against debt collection while seeking approval for specific restructuring plans from creditors. The simplified proceedings enjoy great support among entities at risk of insolvency. These changes were originally intended to remain in force only until June 30, 2021, later extended until November 30, 2021. The popularity of simplified restructurings among distressed entrepreneurs led the Polish Parliament to retain them for an indefinite period of time. The latest implementation of the amendments to the bankruptcy law brought about other amendments to the proceedings, as follows: The announcement on the opening of the proceedings to approve the arrangement will be made by the arrangement supervisor, not by the debtor himself or herself; The announcement may be made only after the debtor has submitted the list of receivables and the list of disputed receivables; The arrangement supervisor will list the agreements that are essential for the functioning of the debtor’s enterprise so as to prevent its termination; The court’s decision on the cancellation of the effects of making the announcement may be appealed; and The case files will be kept by the arrangement supervisor. These amendments entered into force on December 1, 2021. On December 1, 2021, the National Debtors Register (NDR or Krajowy Rejestr Zadluzonych) began operations. Its purpose is to increase the safety of business transactions through easier verification of contractors, as well as to contribute to the acceleration of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings. This registry makes proceedings more transparent and easier to follow because all important information regarding the proceedings is available online in one place. In addition to its informational function, the National Debtors Register also serves as a platform for bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings. Applications and letters in proceedings are filed exclusively via the NDR system. Voting on the arrangement and collecting creditors’ votes also takes place via this system, as does the preparation and delivery of court judgments. Certain statutorily defined groups of entities will be exempt from the obligation to file letters in bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings through the NDR. 4. Industrial Policies Poland’s Plan for Responsible Development identified eight industries for development and investment incentives: aviation, defense, automotive parts manufacturing, ship building, information technology, chemicals, furniture manufacturing, and food processing. More information about the plan can be found at this link: https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/plan-na-rzecz-odpowiedzialnego-rozwoju . Poland encourages energy sector development through its energy policy adopted by the government in February 2021. The policy can be found at: https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/polityka-energetyczna-polski . On March 29, 2022, the government adopted an update to “Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040” (PEP2040) According to the update, Poland will strengthen its energy sovereignty through faster development of renewable energy sources, including hydroelectric plants, photovoltaics, and offshore windmills. By 2040, these energy sources should account for nearly half of the national electricity production, an increase from 34 percent assumed in the previous plan. On March 30, 2022, the government also confirmed its intention to loosen the rules for building onshore wind farms. The assumptions can be found here: https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/zalozenia-do-aktualizacji-polityki-energetycznej-polski-do-2040-r The policy foresees a primary role for fossil fuels until 2040 as well as strong growth in electricity production. The government will continue to pursue developing nuclear energy and offshore wind power generation, as well as distributed generation. Poland’s National Energy and Climate Plan for years 2021-2030 (NECP PL) developed in line with the EU Regulation on the Governance of the Energy and Climate Action, together with PEP2040, pave the road to the new European Green Deal. Poland may spend approximately $420 billion on the transformation of its energy sector in 2021-2040, according to the energy policy. These investments would include about $230 billion in the fuel and energy sectors and about $90 billion in the generation segment, of which 80 percent will be spent on nuclear energy and renewables investments.A new economic program called the “Polish Deal” includes significant changes to the tax system including incentives to attract capital to Poland. The program is undergoing additional amendments after implementation in January 2022. The program consists of support schemes for enterprises, new investment and development projects, and incentives for innovators, as well as reforms of the healthcare system and social welfare, education, environmental, and energy policies. Incentives for innovators include the IP Box, tax relief for R&D costs, innovative employers, robotization and prototype development. Other incentives include tax relief for expansion, consolidation, IPO, and CSR activities. More information on the changes that may affect international business can be found at: https://insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/tax/poland-the-polish-deal The government has a strategy for establishing a commercial 5G network in all cities by 2025. Due to repeated postponements of frequency auctions, however, this goal may not be feasible. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology finished public consultations on its Industry Development White Paper, which identified the government’s views on its most significant barriers to industrial activity. The document was to serve as a foundation for Poland’s Industrial Policy (PIP). Public comments received focused on issues related to the education system not being tailored to the needs of industry, a workforce deficit, difficulties in obtaining funding for R&D, environmental regulations, complex administrative procedures and legislation, labor regulations, and high energy prices. The PIP was slated to become a strategic document, setting the direction for long-term industrial development and focusing on five areas: digitization, security, industrial production location, the Green Deal, and modern society. In early 2022, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology decided that the PIP did not take into account the dynamic changes that took place in 2021, in particular, the energy market situation, the disruption of the supply chain of raw materials and semi-finished products, or the impact of the “Fit for 55” package on the functioning of industry in Poland. The Ministry has stated it will present appropriate economic policy tools after analyzing the current situation.A company investing in Poland, either foreign or domestic, may receive assistance from the Polish government. Foreign investors have the potential to access certain incentives such as: income tax and real estate tax exemptions; investment grants; grants for research and development, and grants for other activities such as environmental protection, training, logistics, or use of renewable energy sources. Large priority-sector investments may qualify for the “Program for Supporting Investment of Considerable Importance for the Polish Economy for 2011-2030.” The program, amended in October 2019, is one of the instruments enabling support for new investment projects, particularly relevant for the Polish economy. Its main goal is to increase innovation and the competitiveness of the Polish economy. Under the amended program, it is possible to co-finance large strategic investments as well as medium-sized innovative projects. Projects that adapt modern technologies and provide for research and development activities are awarded. The program is also conducive to establishing cooperation between the economic sector and academic centers. The support is granted in the form of a subsidy, based on an agreement concluded between the Minister of Economic Development and Technology and the investor. The agreement regulates the conditions for the payment of subsidies and the investment implementation schedule. Under the program, investment support may be granted in two categories: eligible costs for creating new jobs and investment costs in tangible and intangible assets. Companies can learn more at: https://www.paih.gov.pl/why_poland/investment_incentives/programme_for_supporting_investments_of_major_importance_to_the_polish_economy_for_2011_-_2030 https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj/program-wspierania-inwestycji-o-istotnym-znaczeniu-dla-gospodarki-polskiej-na-lata-2011-2030 The Polish Investment Zone (PSI), the system of tax incentives for investors which replaced the previous system of special economic zones (SEZ), was launched September 5, 2018. Under the law on the PSI, companies can apply for a corporate income tax (CIT) exemption for a new investment to be placed anywhere in Poland. More information on government financial support is available at: https://www.paih.gov.pl/why_poland/investment_incentives The Polish government is seeking to increase Poland’s economic competitiveness by shifting toward a knowledge-based economy. Public and private sector investment in R&D has been steadily growing since 2016, supported by EU funds dedicated to R&D and innovation. Businesses may also take advantage of the EU Horizon Europe program which succeeded the research funding program Horizon 2020. The EU institutions set the 2021–2027 budget for Horizon Europe at €95.5 billion (including €5.4 billion from the Next Generation of the EU Recovery Fund). The first Horizon Europe Strategic Plan (2021-2024), which sets out key strategic orientations for the support of research and innovation, was adopted on March 15, 2021. More information is available at: Ministry of Funds and Regional Development: https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/otwarte-konkursy-nabory-dotacje-i-dofinansowania Ministry of Economic Development and Technology: https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj/programy-i-projekty Horizon Europe 2021-2027: https://ec.europa.eu/info/horizon-europe_en#proposal As of January 1, 2019, the Innovation Box, or IP Box, reduces the tax rate applicable to income derived from intellectual property rights to 5 percent. Taxpayers applying the IP Box are entitled to benefit from the tax preference until a given right expires (20 years in the case of a patented invention). In order to benefit from the program, taxpayers are obliged to separately account for the relevant income. Foreign investors may take advantage of this benefit as long as the relevant IP is registered in Poland. Pursuant to new regulations in force from January 1, 2022, entrepreneurs will be able to use the R&D relief and the IP Box relief simultaneously. Taxpayers have the right to deduct eligible R&D costs when determining income from qualifying intellectual property rights. Effective starting the 2021 tax year, Poland introduced a set of optional rules, referred to as the “Estonian CIT,” for corporate taxpayers. The new rules permit eligible companies to defer payment of corporate income tax up to the time they distribute their profits. The update of the National Reform Program (NRP) heralded the introduction of a new incentive measure for enterprises in the form of tax relief related to investments in automation and robotization (robotization relief). This relief is introduced for a period of 5 years and covers expenses from the beginning of the 2022 fiscal year until the end of the 2026 fiscal year. It is available to all entities subject to income tax and investing in robotization, regardless of the sector or size of operations. The new tax relief operates in a similar manner as the existing R&D tax relief, enabling taxpayers to make an additional deduction of eligible costs (expenses detailed in an exhaustive list) from the tax base. Within the framework of robotization relief, it will be possible to deduct 50 percent of eligible costs. There are numerous grants, preferential loans, and other financial instruments to encourage investment that protects the environment by increasing energy efficiency and to promote renewable energy sources and cogeneration systems. Incentives are available mostly from EU funds and national funds and can cover up to 85 percent of eligible costs.The Polish government does not issue sovereign guarantees for FDI projects. Co-financing may be possible for partnering on large FDI projects, such as the planned central airport project or a nuclear power plant project. Foreign-owned firms have the same opportunities as Polish firms to benefit from foreign trade zones (FTZs), free ports, and special economic zones (since January 2019, they make up the Polish Investment Zone). The 2004 Customs Law (with later amendments) regulates the operation of FTZs in Poland. The Minister of Finance establishes duty-free zones. The Minister designates the zone’s managing authorities, usually provincial governors, who issue operating permits to interested companies for a given zone.Most activity in FTZs involves storage, packaging, and repackaging. As of October 2021, there were seven FTZs: Gliwice, near Poland’s southern border; Terespol, near Poland’s border with Belarus; Mszczonow, near Warsaw; Warsaw’s Frederic Chopin International Airport; Szczecin; Swinoujscie; and Gdansk. Duty-free shops are available only for travelers to non-EU countries.There are bonded warehouses in: Bydgoszcz-Szwederowo; Krakow-Balice; Wroclaw-Strachowice; Katowice-Pyrzowice; Gdansk-Trojmiasto; Lodz-Lublinek; Poznan-Lawica; Rzeszow-Jasionka, Warszawa-Modlin, Lublin, Szczecin-Goleniow; Radom-Sadkow, and Olsztyn-Mazury. Commercial companies can operate bonded warehouses. Customs and storage facilities must operate pursuant to custom authorities’ permission. Only legal persons established in the EU can receive authorization to operate a customs warehouse. The Polish Investment Zone (PSI), a system of tax incentives for investors which replaced the previous system of special economic zones (SEZ), was launched September 5, 2018. Under the law on the PSI, companies can apply for a corporate income tax (CIT) exemption for a new investment to be placed anywhere in Poland. The CIT exemption is calculated based on the value of the investment multiplied by the percentage of public aid allocated for a given region based on its level of development (set percentage). The CIT exemption is for 10-15 years, depending on the location of the investment. Special treatment is available for investment in new business services and R&D. A point system determines eligibility for the incentives. Entities operating in special economic zones are entitled to change the depreciation rates for new assets starting in 2021. The deadline for utilizing available tax credits from the previous SEZ system is the end of 2026 (extended from 2020). The regulations also contain important changes for entities already operating in SEZs, even if they do not plan new investment projects. This includes the possibility of losing the right to tax incentives in the event of fraud or tax evasion. Investors should consider carefully the potential benefits of the CIT exemption in assessing new investments or expansion of existing investments in Poland. On January 1, 2022, an amendment to the Act on Special Economic Zones came into force, which was largely related to a change in the regional aid map. Information on the latest changes is available at: https://www.paih.gov.pl/why_poland/Polish_Investment_Zone On April 8, 2021, legislation amending provisions of Poland’s customs and tax laws was signed into law. The main customs-related change combines into a single procedure the issuance of decisions on customs and tax duties with the payment of fuel surcharges and emission fees on imported goods. Here is a link to the platform for electronic fiscal and customs services: https://puesc.gov.pl/ Poland has no policy of “forced localization” designed to force foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology. Investment incentives apply equally to foreign and domestic firms. Over 40 percent of firms in Special Economic Zones are Polish. There is little data on localization requirements in Poland and there are no requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (backdoors into hardware and software or turn over keys for encryption). Exceptions exist in sectors where data are important for national security such as critical telecommunications infrastructure and in gambling. Operators of public telecommunications networks and providers of publicly available telecommunications services must store certain telecommunications data in the territory of Poland for a period of 12 months. In the case of online gambling, the devices for processing and archiving of data concerning gambling games are installed and stored in the EU/EEA. Financial sector laws restrict or preclude the ability of certain entities (e.g., banks, payment service providers) to outsource some key activities to providers located or operating outside of the EU. This restriction may affect storage of client data in a cloud environment, for example. Data protection in Poland is primarily governed by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) (GDPR) which has been implemented into Polish law by the Act of 10 May 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data . In addition, the Act of 21 February 2019 Amending Sectoral Laws to Ensure Application of GDPR adjusts the Polish legal system to the requirements under the GDPR. The Act introduced changes to over 160 sectoral acts, including the Labor Code, the Banking Law, and the Act on Electronic Services. In Poland, there are several statutory minimum or maximum data retention periods set out by law. In other cases, retention periods must be established based on the GDPR storage limitation principle stating that personal data should not be retained for longer than is necessary. Examples of retention periods set out by law include: Employee documentation for ten to 50 years; Accidents and injury at work documentation for ten years from making of the files; Employee CCTV recordings for three months from the date of recording (if the recorded event is subject to further proceedings, then as long as needed); and Tax documentation for five years from the end of the calendar year in which tax payment was due. In the case of personal data processing in relation to journalistic, artistic, or literary activity, retention periods do not apply. In the telecommunication sector, the Office of Electronic Communication (UKE) ensures telecommunication operators fulfill their obligations. In radio and television, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) acts as the regulator. Polish regulations protect an individual’s personal data that are collected in Poland regardless of where the data are physically stored. The Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) enforces personal data regulations. On December 8, 2021, the provisions of the Act on Open Data and the Re-use of Public Sector Information entered into force. This Act, passed on August 11, 2021, introduced into the Polish legal system the provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20, 2019, on open data and the re-use of public sector information. It retains the principle of unconditional and free of charge access to or provision of public sector information for the purpose of its re-use (with certain exceptions). It provides for the implementation of solutions that go beyond the minimum set in the Directive, making the re-use of public sector information more efficient and bringing about an increase in the innovation of products and services of the private sector that uses this data. The new regulations make it possible to increase the volume of public data that can be used, for example, to carry out analysis and research, or for the needs of AI solutions or the Internet of Things. New regulations make it possible, in particular, for public authorities to develop repositories, such as data portals. The re-use of public sector information must be carried out in compliance with the relevant rules, including the regulations on personal data protection, in particular, the provisions of the GDPR. Polish law limits non-EU citizens to 49 percent ownership of a company’s capital shares in the air transport, radio and television broadcasting sectors, as well as in airport and seaport operations. There are also legal limits on foreign ownership of farm and forest lands as outlined in Section 2 of this report under Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment. Pursuant to the Broadcasting Law, a TV broadcasting company may only receive a license if the voting share of its foreign owners does not exceed 49 percent and if they hold permanent residence in Poland. In the insurance sector, at least two members of management boards, including the chair, must speak Polish. 5. Protection of Property Rights Poland recognizes and enforces secured interests in property, movable and real. The concept of a mortgage exists in Poland, and there is a recognized system of recording such secured interests. There are two types of publicly available land registers in Poland: the land and mortgage register (ksiegi wieczyste), the purpose of which is to register titles to land and encumbrances thereon; and the land and buildings register (ewidencja gruntow i budynkow), the function of which is more technical as it contains information concerning physical features of the land, class of land, and its use. Generally, real estate in Poland is registered and legal title can be identified on the basis of entries in the land and mortgage registers which are maintained by relevant district courts. Each register is accessible to the public and excerpts are available on application, subject to a nominal fee. The registers are available online. Poland has a non-discriminatory legal system accessible to foreign investors that protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights, including land, buildings, and mortgages. However, foreigners (both individuals and entities) must obtain a permit to acquire property (See Section 1 Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment). Many investors, foreign and domestic, complain the judicial system is slow in adjudicating property rights cases. Under the Polish Civil Code, a contract to buy real property must be made in the form of a notary deed. Foreign companies and individuals may lease real property in Poland without having to obtain a permit. Widespread nationalization of property during and after World War II has complicated the ability to establish clear title to land in Poland, especially in major municipalities. While the Polish government has an administrative system for reviewing claims for the restitution of communal property, former individual property owners must file and pursue claims in the Polish court system in order to receive restitution. There is no general statute of limitations regarding the filing or litigation of private property restitution claims, but there are exceptions for specific cases. For example, in cases involving the communist-era nationalization of Warsaw under the Bierut Decree, there were claims deadlines that have now passed, and under current law, those who did not meet the deadlines would no longer be able to make a claim for either restitution or compensation. During 2021, Warsaw city authorities continued implementing a 2015 law dubbed the Small Reprivatization Act. This law aimed to stop the problem of speculators purchasing Warsaw property claims for low values from the original owners or their heirs and then applying for a perpetual usufruct or compensation as the new legal owner. NGOs and advocacy groups expressed serious concerns that the 2015 law fell short of providing just compensation to former owners who lost property as a result of the nationalization of properties by the communist-era government, and also properties taken during the Holocaust era. Legal experts expressed concern that the law limited the ability of petitioners to reclaim property unjustly taken from their lawful owners. The World Jewish Restitution Organization asserted that the time limits included in the law were insufficient for potential claimants, particularly Holocaust survivors and their heirs, to meet difficult documentary requirements. Critics state the law might extinguish potential claims by private individuals of properties seized during World War II or the communist era, if no one comes forward to pursue a restitution claim within the time limit. Any potential claimants who come forward within six months after publication of the affected property by the City of Warsaw will have an additional three months to establish their claim. The city began publishing lists in 2017 and continued to do so during 2021. The city’s website contains further information on these cases and the process to pursue a claim: https://bip.warszawa.pl/Menu_podmiotowe/biura_urzedu/SD/ogloszenia/default.htm In 2021, the government significantly altered legal and administrative procedures for private property restitution and compensation. On June 24, Parliament adopted a revision to the Code of Administrative Procedure that significantly restricted the ability of individuals to seek the return of private property seized under Nazi occupation or during the Communist era. The law made it impossible to challenge any administrative decision issued more than 30 years prior and ended any pending administrative challenges to those decisions. The legislation limited the primary process by which claimants can seek restitution or compensation for expropriated property, according to NGOs and lawyers specializing in the issue. Individuals who already successfully challenged administrative decisions were still able to seek return of their property or compensation in the courts. The president signed the legislation into law on August 14, and the law entered into force on September 16. It is sometimes difficult to establish clear title to properties. There are no comprehensive estimates of land without clear title in Poland. The 2016 Agricultural Land Law banned the sale of state-owned farmland under the administration of the National Center for Support of Agriculture (NCSA) for five years. Long-term state-owned farmland leases are available for farmers looking to expand their operations up to 300 hectares. Foreign investors can (and do) lease agricultural land. The 2016 Agricultural Land Law also imposed restrictions on sales of privately-owned farmland, giving the NCSA preemptive right of purchase. In June 2019, the Polish Parliament amended the Agricultural Land Law to loosen land sale requirements. The amendment increased the size of private agricultural land, from 0.3 to 1.0 hectare that could be sold without the approval of the NCSA. The new owner is not allowed to sell the land for five years. The Law on Forest Land similarly prevents Polish and foreign investors from purchasing privately-held forests and gives state-owned entities (Lasy Panstwowe) preemptive right to buy privately-held forest land. The 2011 amendment to the law of Management of Farmland Administered by NCSA and 2016 Agricultural Land Law adversely affected tenants with long-term state-owned land leases. Several entities, including U.S. companies, faced the prospect of returning some currently leased land to the Polish government over the coming years. Three of these entities appealed to the Ombudsman, who requested the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) to verify the law’s compliance with the constitution, but the cases were dismissed by the CT in the fall of 2020. On March 17, 2021, a law amending the 2016 Agricultural Land Law was adopted. The amendment extended the ban on selling state-owned farmland under the administration of the NCSA for another five years, until May 1, 2026. The 2021 amendment did not change the land lease situation for larger operators, who remain ineligible to have their land leases extended unless 30 percent of the land under lease had been returned. Additionally, eligible renters can apply for the prolongation of the lease contracts, but for larger farmers, under 2020 Order of the Director General of NCSA, they can be extended up to eight years. Polish intellectual property rights (IPR) law is more strict than European Commission directives require. Poland is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Enforcement is improving across all sectors of Poland’s IPR regime. 2021 saw a sudden drop in piracy statistics in Poland, compared to other EU countries. According to Blu Media Study’s “Poles’ Finances in Times of the 2021 Pandemic,” as many as six out of ten Poles use online subscription services. Poles use services that provide access to movies and series (39 percent of participants) most often, and to music (15 percent), games and online journalism (11 percent each) less frequently. Pirated series in Poland in 2021 were dominated by productions from platforms that were inaccessible to Polish consumers. A popular Polish cyberlocker platform is included on the 2021 Notorious Markets List. Poland does not appear in the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report. In cases of IPR violations, Polish law requires a rights holder to start the prosecution process. In Poland, authors’ and creators’ organizations and associations track violations and share these with prosecutors. Rights holders express concern that penalties for digital IPR infringement are not high enough to deter violators. In August 2021, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland published assumptions to the draft of the new Act on Industrial Property Law, which would replace the current Act of 30 June 2000 – Industrial Property Law. Below are the main assumptions to the draft of the new act: Utility models – the bill provides for the introduction of provisions streamlining and speeding up the application procedure, by replacing the current examination system with a registration system. It means that (similarly as with trademarks and industrial designs) the Polish Patent Office would no longer by default examine the substantive conditions for granting a protection right to a utility model but would focus only on the formal aspects of the application. This amendment aims to speed up the examination of applications for registration and shorten the time from an average 24 months to about 12 months. Industrial designs – the definition of an industrial design and the conditions for obtaining protection have been changed, so that the national regulations are fully harmonized with Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs. Trademarks – the bill provides for shortening the period of filing opposition to two months from the date of publication of information about the application, dropping the current mandatory two-month settlement period for the parties during the opposition proceedings (the so-called cooling-off period), and abolition of the joint protection right. Geographical indications – the bill provides for a new procedure of registration of these rights. The proposed provisions would apply only to non-agricultural products. Trade secrets – to solve the problem of unlawful acquisition of information, the bill provides for the introduction of a so-called deposit, corresponding to the provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. A deposit, containing technical and technological information constituting a trade secret, may make it easier to prove the priority of the existence of information constituting a trade secret and the subject matter of that information. Official fees – the bill provides for systematization of the regulations on the fee collection structure and record keeping, eliminating doubts as to the amount of and eligibility for the payment of fees. The draft act also introduces a new solution, according to which when filing applications for at least three different objects of industrial property within three months, the fee for the application for each of them may be reduced by 30 percent. The proposed solution offers greater support to innovators who are at the stage of building their portfolio of intellectual property rights with a commercialization aim. The planned date of the adoption of the draft of the new legislation was the first quarter of 2022. On July 1, 2020, intellectual property courts, in the form of Intellectual Property Divisions (IPDs), were introduced in Poland. This role was entrusted to five Regional Courts – Gdansk, Katowice, Lublin, Poznan and Warsaw. Courts of Appeal in Warsaw and Poznan deal with cases at second instance. In accordance with applicable regulations, cases involving greater technical complexity, namely cases concerning computer programs, inventions, utility models, topographies of integrated circuits, plant varieties and business secrets of a technical nature, are in principle dealt with only in Warsaw. The creation of the intellectual property courts, with their judges specializing in adjudication in the area of intellectual property law, is a step in the right direction, and the experience gained so far from the proceedings before these courts seems to confirm the validity of this decision. Tax incentives for IPR known collectively as “IP Box” or “Innovation Box,” included in the November 2018 tax amendment, have been applicable since January 2019. See Section 4 – Investment Incentives. Polish customs tracks seizures of counterfeit goods. In 2021, compared to 2018, 67 percent more goods infringing intellectual property arrived in Poland. According to the DLA Piper and Amazon report the value of smuggling reached $45 million (PLN 203 million), which was 3.5 times more than a year earlier. Illegal practices are likely to increase due to the war in Ukraine. General information on copyright in Poland: https://www.paih.gov.pl/polish_law/intellectual_property_rights Polish Patent Office: http://www.uprp.pl/o-urzedzie/Lead03,14,56,1,index,pl,text/ Chancellery of the Prime Minister: https://www.gov.pl/cyfryzacja/co-robimy For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The Polish regulatory system is effective in encouraging and facilitating portfolio investment. Both foreign and domestic investors may place funds in demand and time deposits, stocks, bonds, futures, and derivatives. Poland’s equity markets facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Poland’s stock market is the largest and most developed in Central Europe. In September 2018, it was reclassified as developed market status by FTSE Russell’s country classification report. The stock market’s capitalization generally falls in the range of 30-40 percent, however, in 2021 it reached 50 percent of GDP. Although the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is itself a publicly traded company with shares listed on its own exchange after its partial privatization in 2010, the state retains a significant percentage of shares which allows it to control the company. In April 2021, the WSE celebrated its 30-year anniversary. Over the three decades, it has become a hub for foreign institutional investors targeting equity investments in the region. It has also become an increasingly significant source of capital. In addition to the equity market, Poland has a wholesale market dedicated to the trading of treasury bills and bonds (Treasury BondSpot Poland). This treasury market is an integral part of the Primary Dealers System organized by the Finance Ministry and part of the pan-European bond platform. Wholesale treasury bonds and bills denominated in zlotys and some securities denominated in euros are traded on the Treasury BondSpot market. Non-government bonds are traded on Catalyst, a WSE managed platform. The capital market is a source of funding for Polish companies. While securities markets continue to play a subordinate role to banks in the provision of finance, the need for medium-term financial support for the modernization of the electricity and gas sectors is likely to lead to an increase in the importance of the corporate bond market. The Polish government acknowledges the capital market’s role in the economy in its development plan. Foreigners may invest in listed Polish shares, but they are subject to some restrictions in buying large packages of shares. The impact of the pandemic was still being felt in 2021, stimulating volatility in financial markets and improving liquidity. The Capital Markets Development Strategy, published in 2018, identifies 20 key barriers and offers 60 solutions. Some key challenges include low levels of savings and investment, insufficient efficiency, transparency, and liquidity of many market segments, and lack of taxation incentives for issuers and investors. The primary aim of the strategy is to improve access of Polish enterprises to financing. The strategy focuses on strengthening trust in the market, improving the protection of individual investors, the stabilization of the regulatory and supervisory environment, and the use of competitive new technologies. The strategy is not a law but sets the direction for further regulatory proposals. The Ministry of Finance assumes in its development directions for 2021-2024, the liquidation of approximately 50 percent of barriers to the development of the financial market identified in the strategy. The development activities pursued in 2021 included the adoption of the WSE Group ESG Strategy 2025 in December 2021. The ESG Strategy sets out the ambitions and objectives in the area of sustainable development for 2022-2025. In 2021, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) published its first ESG reporting guidelines for listed companies – a handbook developed in collaboration with industry experts. WSE joined a group of approximately 60 stock exchanges around the world that have written guidance on ESG reporting. Poland’s consumer and business environment is increasingly concerned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors, although a lack of standardized reporting mechanisms is leaving investors confused about the true extent of their portfolio’s ESG performance. The guidelines provide small and mid-sized companies with a roadmap for measuring their impact on the environment while defining a code of good practice for market leaders. From the international perspective, the guidelines will strengthen the position of the Polish capital market and investor interest in companies listed on the WSE. In December 2020, the WSE partnered with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to bring clarity to ESG reporting by listed companies in Poland and the region of Central and Southeast Europe. Poland is one of the most rigorously supervised capital markets in Europe according to the European Commission. The Employee Capital Plans program (PPK)—which is designed to increase household saving to augment individual incomes in retirement—could provide a boost to Poland’s capital markets and reduce dependence on foreign saving as a source for investment financing. The program has been delayed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.High-risk venture capital funds are an increasingly important segment of the capital market which is developing fast. The funds remain active and Poland is a leader in this respect in Central and Eastern Europe. 2021 was a breakthrough year for Polish start-up firms and most of these firms have shrugged off the impact of the pandemic or even benefitted from it. The development of Polish start-ups also translates into jobs creation. The 15 companies that raised the most venture capital (VC) funding in 2019–2021 employed more than 1,300 people in 2021. The average share of Polish employees in these companies was 58 percent. Poland had its first two start-ups reach “unicorn” status in 2021, medical appointment service DocPlanner and hair appointment app Booksy. More unicorns are expected to emerge in 2022. VC funding most often goes to companies working in the health innovation domain, according to a report by PFR Ventures and Inovo Venture Partners. In 2021, they accounted for more than 14 percent of all transitions. SaaS (subscription model) remains the most popular business model. VC investment hit a record high in Poland in 2021, increasing 66 percent over the year before to reach almost $900 million. The government’s package of tax relief for IPOs, investment in stock exchange debutants, and VC fund investing became available in January 2022. Poland provides full IMF Article VIII convertibility for current transactions. Banks can and do lend to foreign and domestic companies. Companies can and do borrow abroad and issue commercial paper, but the market is less robust than in Western European countries or the United States. The Act on Investment Funds allows for open-end, closed-end, and mixed investment funds, and the development of securitization instruments in Poland. In general, no special restrictions apply to foreign investors purchasing Polish securities.Credit allocation is on market terms. The government maintains some programs offering below-market rate loans to certain domestic groups, such as farmers and homeowners. Foreign investors and domestic investors have equal access to Polish financial markets. Private Polish investment is usually financed from retained earnings and credits, while foreign investors utilize funds obtained outside of Poland as well as retained earnings. Polish firms raise capital in Poland and abroad.Recent changes in the governance structure of the Polish Financial Supervisory Authority (KNF) are aimed at increasing cross governmental coordination and a better-targeted response in case of financial shocks, while achieving greater institutional effectiveness through enhanced resource allocation. KNF’s supplementary powers have increased, allowing it to authorize the swift acquisition of a failing or likely to fail lender by a stronger financial institution. On July 20, 2021, a draft act was published on the amendment of certain acts in connection with ensuring the development of the financial market and protection of investors in this market. As follows from the justification to the draft act, the act aims to organize and improve the functioning of financial market institutions by eliminating barriers to access to the financial market, improving supervision over the financial market, protecting clients of financial institutions and minority shareholders, and increasing the level of digitization in performance of supervisory duties by KNF. The draft act provides for tightening of many administrative sanctions that may be imposed on entities subject to the supervision of KNF. In practice, this may lead to the imposition of fines in a much higher amount, which in turn will significantly increase the risk related to the conduct of business activity subject to supervision. On July 21, 2021, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority presented its strategy for the years 2021-2025. The document is the overarching plan that defines the mission, vision, and values of the KNF organization. The Polish financial sector is well capitalized and has limited direct exposure to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The economic fallout from the pandemic has not threatened banking sector stability. Fiscal, monetary, and macroprudential support measures implemented at the beginning of the pandemic have helped the sector emerge from the pandemic-induced recession relatively unscathed. The banking sector plays a dominant role in the financial system, accounting for about 70 percent of financial sector assets. The sector is mostly privately owned, with the state controlling about 40 percent of the banking sector and the biggest insurance company. Poland had 30 locally incorporated commercial banks at the end of 2021, according to KNF. The number of locally-incorporated banks has been declining over the last five years. Poland’s 520 cooperative banks play a secondary role in the financial system but are widespread. The state owns eight banks. Over the last few years, growing capital requirements, lower prospects for profit generation, and uncertainty about legislation addressing foreign currency mortgages has pushed banks towards mergers and acquisitions. KNF welcomes this consolidation process, seeing it as a “natural” way to create an efficient banking sector.The Polish National Bank (NBP) is Poland’s central bank. At the end of 2021, the banking sector was overall well capitalized and solid. Poland’s banking sector meets European Banking Authority regulatory requirements. The share of non-performing loans decreased in 2021 after a sharp rise in 2020. In December 2021, the share of non-performing loans was 5.7 percent of portfolios, an improvement from 6.8 percent a year earlier. Poland’s central bank is willing and able to provide liquidity support to the banking sector, in local and foreign currencies, if needed. Poland is a member of the EU, but not of the euro currency area or banking union. As a result, it shares a single market and many harmonized economic rules with the EU but retains its own currency and monetary policy. The banking sector is liquid, remains profitable, and major banks are well capitalized, although disparities exist among banks. Banks remained under pressure in 2020 and the first half of 2021 due to low interest rates, the issue of conversion of Swiss francs mortgage portfolios into Polish zlotys, and a special levy on financial institutions (0.44 percent of the value of assets excluding equity and Polish sovereign bonds). Banks managed to restore their profits in 2021, but the low profitability of the banking sector remains a challenge, especially for smaller banks, although it does not generate risks to the system’s stability. Legal risks for foreign exchange mortgages issued in primarily Swiss francs during 2006-2008, remain a major source of risk in the banking system. The probability of the most costly scenarios unfolding for banks, however, has diminished. In a process begun by the government and shaped by court decisions handed down by the European Court of Justice and Poland’s Supreme Court, since 2019, Polish citizens have been able to convert Swiss franc denominated loan principal into local currency while continuing to pay interest on the terms of the original loan agreement (Swiss franc LIBOR) with the banks absorbing any foreign exchange loss. About one-third of housing loans are still in foreign currency, particularly Swiss francs, according to the NBP. This is down from 62 percent at the start of 2011, but the fall in the value of the zloty has made such loans costly for borrowers and a risk to commercial banks’ asset quality. The financial regulator has restricted the availability of loans in euros or Swiss francs in order to minimize the banking system’s exposure to exchange risk resulting from fluctuations. Only individuals who earn salaries denominated in these currencies continue to enjoy easy access to loans in foreign currencies. Since 2015, the Polish government established an active campaign aiming to increase the market share of national financial institutions. Since 2017, Polish investors’ share in the banking sector’s total assets exceeds the foreign share in the sector. The state controls around 40 percent of total assets, including the two largest banks in Poland. These two lenders control about one third of the market. Rating agencies warn that an increasing state share in the banking sector might impact competitiveness and profits in the entire financial sector. There is concern that lending decisions at state-owned banks could come under political pressure. Nevertheless, Poland’s strong fundamentals and the size of its internal market mean that many foreign banks will want to retain their positions. Poland has well developed payments systems, integrated with those of the EU and overseen by the NBP. Apple Pay and Google Pay have launched operations in Poland. In 2020, NBP had relationships with 27 commercial and central banks and was not concerned about losing any of them. Poland does not have a sovereign wealth fund sensu stricto. However, the Polish Development Fund (PFR) is often referred to as Poland’s Wealth Fund. PFR is an umbrella organization pooling resources of several governmental agencies and departments, including EU funds. A strategy for PFR was adopted in September 2016 registered in February 2017. PFR supports the implementation of the Responsible Development Strategy. PFR operates as a group of state-owned banks and insurers, investment bodies, and promotion agencies. The group implements programs enhancing long-term investment and economic potential and supporting equal opportunities as well as environmental protection. The budget of PFR initially reached PLN 14 billion ($3.1 billion), which managers estimate is sufficient to raise capital worth PLN 90-100 billion ($20-22 billion). Various actors within the organization can invest through acquisition of shares, through direct financing, seed funding, and co-financing venture capital. Depending on the instruments, PFR expects different rates of return. While supportive of overseas expansion by Polish companies, the PFR’s mission is domestic. PFR directs the strategic vision for the corporate group which includes four distinct subsidiaries: PFR Ventures – the largest fund of funds (FoF) in the CEE region offering repayable financing to innovative SMEs through selected financial intermediaries such as venture capital funds or business angels; PFR Portal PPK – a company dedicated to supervising the Employee Capital Plans (PPK), which is a common and voluntary long-term saving system for employees in Poland, developed and co-financed by employers and the state; PFR TFI – a company focused on incepting and managing closed-end investment funds oriented towards alternative assets (e.g., real estate, infrastructure projects, PE or VC) as well as managing a part of the assets raised in the PPK program; PFR Nieruchomosci – the real estate arm of the group which aims to improve the potential of the national housing market by implementing investments of significant importance to local communities. PFR’s core function was initially focused on fostering private sector development by direct (equity) and indirect investment across a wide range of sectors, including technology, infrastructure, and energy. Over the years, the group’s mandate has broadened and now includes the following areas: Bridging infrastructure gaps in the Polish economy (including transport, municipal, and digital infrastructure); Venture capital market development (direct investment and via existing private sector venture capital funds); Facilitating the government’s pension reform by managing a long-term pension savings scheme; and Fostering investment in affordable housing and developing the housing rental market. PFR group has been used by the government to implement several unique policy projects, including emergency support to private sector entities, promotion of the private pension savings scheme and, more recently, the provision of sizable financial support (PLN 100 billion or $22 billion) to the private sector amid the COVID-19 pandemic. PFR ‘s assets currently represent about 3.2 percent of Poland’s GDP. ESG (environmental, social, and corporate governance) reporting is becoming a standard for more and more organizations. To meet the needs of entrepreneurs, the PFR team has prepared a special list of start-ups and tools supporting ESG reporting, which is aimed at facilitating the adaptation of companies to the new standards. In March 2022, the European Investment Bank and PFR signed an agreement on strategic cooperation. The cooperation agreement concerns the co-financing of investments mainly in the areas of sustainable economy development, environmental protection, climate change mitigation and adaptation, improvement of energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable energy sources. In the period 2022-2025, financing the energy transformation will be one of the three basic pillars of the Polish Development Fund’s activity. The main emphasis will be placed on the development of infrastructure contributing to increasing energy security and reducing the emission intensity of the Polish energy sector, both at the national and local levels. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) exist mainly in the defense, energy, transport, banking, and insurance sectors. The main Warsaw stock index (WIG) is dominated by state-controlled companies. The government intends to keep majority share ownership and/or state-control of economically and strategically important firms and is expanding the role of the state in the economy, particularly in the banking, energy, foodstuffs, and media sectors. Some U.S. investors have expressed concern that the government favors SOEs by offering loans from the national budget as a capital injection and unfairly favoring SOEs in investment disputes. Since Poland’s EU accession, government activity favoring state-owned firms has received careful scrutiny from Brussels. Since the Law and Justice (PiS) government came to power in 2015, there has been a considerable increase in turnover in managerial positions of state-owned companies (although this has also occurred in previous changes of government, but to a lesser degree) and increased focus on building national champions in strategic industries to be able to compete internationally. There have also been cases of takeovers of foreign private companies by state-controlled companies the viability of which has raised doubts. SOEs are governed by a board of directors and most pay an annual dividend to the government, as well as prepare and disclose annual reports. A list of companies classified as “important for the economy” is at this link: https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/wykaz-spolek Among them are companies of “strategic importance” whose shares cannot be sold, including: Grupa Azoty S.A., Grupa LOTOS S.A., KGHM Polska Miedz S.A., Energa S.A., and the Central Communication Port. The government sees SOEs as drivers and leaders of its innovation policy agenda. For example, several energy SOEs established a company to develop electro mobility. The performance of SOEs has remained strong overall and broadly similar to that of private companies. International evidence suggests, however, that a dominant role of SOEs can pose fiscal, financial, and macro-stability risks. As of June, 2021 there were 349 companies in partnership with state authorities. Among them there are companies under bankruptcy proceedings and in liquidation and in which the State Treasury held residual shares. According to the Minister of State Assets, companies controlled by the state create 15 percent of GDP. Here is a link to the list of companies, including under the control of which ministry they fall: http://nadzor.kprm.gov.pl/spolki-z-udzialem-skarbu-panstwa . The Ministry of State Assets, established after the October 2019 post-election cabinet reshuffle, has control over almost 180 enterprises. Their aggregate value reaches several dozens of billions of Polish zlotys. Among these companies are the largest chemical, energy, and mining groups; firms in the banking and insurance sectors; and transport companies. This list does not include state-controlled public media, which are under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, or the State Securities Printing Company (PWPW) supervised by the Interior Ministry. Supervision over defense industry companies has been shifted from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of State Assets. The same standards are generally applied to private and public companies with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. Government officials occasionally exercise discretionary authority to assist SOEs. In general, SOEs are expected to pay their own way, finance their operations, and fund further expansion through profits generated from their own operations. On February 21, 2019, an amendment to the Act on the Principles of Management of State-Owned Property was adopted, which provides for the establishment of a new public special-purpose fund – the Capital Investment Fund. The fund is a source of financing for the purchase and subscription of shares in companies. The fund is managed by the Prime Minister’s office and financed by dividends from state-controlled companies. Starting October 12, 2022, the Act amending the Commercial Companies Code and certain other acts will enter into force. It introduces the so-called “holding law” developed by the Commission for Owner Oversight Reform with the Ministry of State Assets. It lays down the principles of how a parent company may instruct its subsidiaries and stipulates the parent company’s liability and the principles of creditor, officer, and minority shareholder protections. This amendment constitutes an important change for many companies operating in Poland including foreign parent companies. The new regulations, which have encountered some controversy, will apply only to capital companies. The legislation distinguishes between the separate activities of holding companies and of groups of companies. Protections have been extended to minority shareholders and creditors of subsidiaries, identifying threats that may result from binding instructions of the parent company for these groups. The PiS-led government has increased control over Poland’s banking and energy sectors. Proposed legislation to “deconcentrate” and “repolonize” Poland’s media landscape, including through the possible forced sale of existing investments, has met with domestic and international protest. Critical observers allege that PiS and its allies are running a pressure campaign against foreign and independent media outlets aimed at destabilizing and undermining their businesses. These efforts include blocking mergers through antimonopoly decisions, changes to licensing requirements, and the proposed new advertising tax. Increasing government control over state regulatory bodies, advertising agencies and infrastructure such as printing presses and newsstands, are other possible avenues. Since 2015, state institutions and state-owned and controlled companies have ceased to subscribe to or place advertising in independent media, cutting off an important source of funding for those media companies. At the same time, public media has received generous support from the state budget. In December 2020, state-controlled energy firm PKN Orlen, headed by PiS appointees, acquired control of Polska Press in a deal that gives the governing party indirect control over 20 of Poland’s 24 regional newspapers. Because this acquisition was achieved without legislative changes, it has not provoked diplomatic repercussions with other EU member states or a head-on collision with Brussels over the rule of law. Having successfully taken over a foreign-owned media company with this model, there are concerns PKN Orlen will continue to be used for capturing independent media not supportive of the government. In Poland, the same rules apply to SOEs and publicly-listed companies unless statutes provide otherwise. The state exercises its influence through its rights as a shareholder in proportion to the number of voting shares it holds (or through shareholder proxies). In some cases, an SOE is afforded special rights as specified in the company’s articles, and in compliance with Polish and EU laws. In some non-strategic companies, the state exercises special rights as a result of its majority ownership but not as a result of any specific strategic interest. Despite some of these specific rights, the state’s aim is to create long-term value for shareholders of its listed companies by adhering to the OECD’s SOE Guidelines. State representatives who sit on supervisory boards must comply with the Commercial Companies Code and are expected to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. The European Commission noted that “Polska Fundacja Narodowa” (an organization established to promote Polish culture worldwide and funded by Polish SOEs) was involved in the organization and financing of a campaign supporting the controversial judiciary changes by the government. The Commission stated this was broadly against OECD recommendations on SOE involvement in financing political activities. SOE employees can designate two fifths of the SOE’s Supervisory Board’s members. In addition, according to Poland’s privatization law, in wholly state-owned enterprises with more than 500 employees, the employees are allowed to elect one member of the management board. SOEs are subject to a series of additional disclosure requirements above those set forth in the Company Law. The supervising ministry prepares specific guidelines on annual financial reporting to explain and clarify these requirements. SOEs must prepare detailed reports on management board activity, plus a report on the previous financial year’s activity, and a report on the result of the examination of financial reports. In practice, detailed reporting data for non-listed SOEs is not easily accessible. State representatives to supervisory boards must go through examinations to be able to apply for a board position. Many major state-controlled companies are listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and are subject to the “Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies.” On September 30, 2015, the Act on Control of Certain Investments entered into force. The law creates mechanisms to protect against hostile takeovers of companies operating in strategic sectors (gas, power generation, chemical, copper mining, petrochemical and telecoms) of the Polish economy (see Section 2 on Investment Screening), most of which are SOEs or state controlled. In 2020, the government amended the legislation preventing hostile take overs. The amendments will be in force for 24 months. They are a part of the pandemic-related measures introduced by the Polish government. The SOE governance law of 2017 (with subsequent amendments) is being implemented gradually. The framework formally keeps the oversight of SOEs centralized. The Ministry of State Assets exercises ownership functions for the majority of SOEs. A few sector-specific ministries (e.g., Culture and Infrastructure) also exercise ownership for SOEs with public policy objectives. The Prime Minister’s office oversees development agencies such as the Polish Development Fund, the Industry Development Agency, and ElectroMobility Poland S.A. The Polish government has completed the privatization of most of the SOEs it deems not to be of national strategic importance. With few exceptions, the Polish government has invited foreign investors to participate in major privatization projects. In general, privatization bidding criteria have been clear and the process transparent. The majority of SOEs classified as “economically important” or “strategically important” are in the energy, mining, media, telecommunications, and financial sectors. The government intends to keep majority share ownership of these firms, or to sell tranches of shares in a manner that maintains state control. The government is currently focused on consolidating and improving the efficiency of the remaining SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct In Poland, the principle of sustainable development has been given the rank of a fundamental right resulting from the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 5 of the Constitution says: “The Republic of Poland guards the independence and inviolability of its territory, ensures the freedoms and rights of people and citizens as well as the security of citizens, protects the national heritage and protects the environment, guided by the principle of sustainable development.” Polish law provides for many restrictions imposed on investors in order to ensure that all undertaken investments do not affect the environment with respect to provided indicators. Public authorities have a significant role in granting appropriate permits, and public consultations are carried out beforehand. The Ordinance of the Minister of Investment and Development (the name has since changed to the Economic Development and Technology Ministry) of May 10, 2018, established working groups responsible for sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The chief function of the working groups is to create space for dialogue and exchange of experiences between the public administration, social partners, NGOs, and the academic environment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC). Experts cooperate within five working groups: 1) Innovation for CSR and sustainable development; 2) Business and human rights; 3) Development of non-financial reporting; 4) Socially responsible administration; and 5) Socially responsible universities. Zespół ds. Zrównoważonego Rozwoju i Społecznej Odpowiedzialności Przedsiębiorstw – Ministerstwo Funduszy i Polityki Regionalnej – Portal Gov.pl (www.gov.pl) The greater team issues recommendations concerning implementation of the CSR/RBC policy, in particular, the objectives of the Strategy for Responsible Development. More information on recent developments in the CSR area and future events is available under this link: https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/spoleczna-odpowiedzialnosc-przedsiebiorstw-csr2 On October 8, 2021, the Council of Ministers adopted the National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for 2021-2024 (NAP). The implementation of the first edition of the National Action Plan for 2017-2020 was completed and the Final Report was prepared. The report concerns tasks aimed at improving the observance of human rights, the implementation of which was carried out on the basis of schedules developed by individual ministries and other institutions involved in the NAP. Biznes i prawa człowieka – Ministerstwo Funduszy i Polityki Regionalnej – Portal Gov.pl (www.gov.pl) The mission is not aware of reports of human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC in Poland.An increasing number of Polish enterprises are implementing the principles of CSR/RBC in their activities. One of these principles is to openly inform the public, employees, and local communities about the company’s activities by publishing non-financial reports. An increasing number of corporate sector entities understand that sharing experience in the field of integration of social and environmental factors in everyday business activities helps build credibility and transparency of the Polish market. Many companies voluntarily compile ESG/CSR activity reports based on international reporting standards. Most reports are published by companies from the fuel, energy, banking, food industries, logistics, and transport sectors. There is also growing interest in voluntary reporting in the healthcare, retail, and construction sectors. Surveys indicate, however, that companies still have a long way to go in ESG reporting.The attitude of Poles to environmental issues is changing, and so are their expectations regarding business. According to a study by ARC Rynek i Opinia for the Warsaw School of Economics, 59 percent of Poles consciously choose domestic products more often and 57 percent avoid products that harm the environment. In Poland, provisions relating to responsible business conduct are contained within the Public Procurement law and are the result of transposition of very similar provisions contained in the EU directives. For example, there is a provision for reserved contracts, where the contracting authority may limit competition for sheltered workshops and other economic operators whose activities include social and professional integration of people belonging to socially marginalized groups. Independent organizations including NGOs and business and employee associations promote CSR in Poland. The Responsible Business Forum (RBF), founded in 2000, is the oldest and largest NGO in Poland focusing on corporate social responsibility: http://odpowiedzialnybiznes.pl/english/ CSR Watch Coalition Poland, part of the OECD Watch international network aims to advance respect for human rights in the context of business activity in Poland in line with the spirit of the UNBHR-GPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs): https://www.oecdwatch.org/organisations/csr-watch-coalition-poland/ Poland’s largest CSR and sustainable development review, published by the Responsible Business Forum, confirms the enormous mobilization and commitment in the fight against the pandemic. Many businesses have launched new CSR activities to deliver assistance and support. The 19th edition of the “Responsible Business in Poland. Good Practices” report has seen a more than 40 percent increase in activities reported. The total number of reported practices hit an all-time high of almost 2,000. Experts from the RBF note a lower number of long-standing practices which shows that the pandemic has led to suspension or discontinuation of certain CSR activities. The pandemic has also fueled the development of CSR partnerships, which is reflected in the activities reported. Businesses collaborated, for instance, in the production of sanitizer gel, provision and delivery of medicines and PPE to hospitals, and social welfare centers. Research shows that sustainability and CSR are increasingly translating into consumer choices in Poland. According to SW Research for Stena Recycling, nearly 70 percent of Poles would like their favorite products to come from sustainable production and are willing to switch to more sustainably produced products. More than half believe that the circular economy can have a direct, positive impact on the environment. In December 2016, Poland was the first country in the world to issue a green bond. The bond served to highlight the government’s support for projects with clear environmental benefits, as well as finance Poland’s key environmental goals, i.e., Poland’s National Renewable Energy Plan and the National Program for the Augmentation of Forest Cover. Green bonds are becoming increasingly popular in Poland. In December 2020, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) partnered with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to bring clarity to ESG reporting from listed companies in Poland and the region of Central and Southeast Europe. In 2021, the WSE published its first ESG reporting guidelines for listed companies – a handbook developed in collaboration with industry experts. The WSE joined a group of approximately 60 stock exchanges around the world that have written guidance on ESG reporting. Poland’s consumer and business environment is increasingly concerned with ESG factors, although a lack of standardized reporting mechanisms is leaving investors confused about the true extent of their portfolio’s ESG performance. The guidelines provide small and mid-sized companies with a roadmap for measuring their impact on the environment while defining a code of good practice for market leaders. Poland launched the Chapter Zero Poland Program, which is part of the international Climate Governance Initiative established by the World Economic Forum. The program brings together members of the supervisory boards and presidents of major companies to raise awareness of the consequences of climate change for business and the impact of business on climate. Poland maintains a National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/krajowy-punkt-kontaktowy-oecd Starting in March 2021, the EU regulation SFDR 2019/2088 on disclosure of information related to sustainable development (environmental, labor, human rights, and anti-corruption) in the financial services sector applies in Poland and other EU countries.The NCP promotes the OECD MNE Guidelines through seminars and workshops. Investors can obtain information about the Guidelines and their implementation through Regional Investor Assistance Centers. Information on the OECD NCP activities is under this link: https://www.gov.pl/web/fundusze-regiony/oecd-national-contact-point Poland is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The primary extractive industries in Poland are coal and copper mining. Onshore, there is also hydrocarbon extraction, primarily conventional natural gas, with limited exploration for shale gas. The Polish government exercises legal authority and receives revenues from the extraction of natural resources and from infrastructure related to extractive industries such as oil and gas pipelines through a concessions-granting system, and in most cases through shareholder rights in state-owned enterprises. The Polish government has two revenue streams from natural resources: 1) from concession licenses; and 2) from corporate taxes on the concession holders. License and tax requirements apply equally to both state-owned and private companies. Natural resources are brought to market through market-based mechanisms by both state-owned enterprises and private companies. Poland was among the original ratifiers of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies in 2008. One company from Poland is a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . The updated nationally determined contributions (NDC) as of December 18, 2020, submitted by Poland envision an at least 55 percent domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. On March 29, 2022, the Council of Ministers adopted the assumptions for updating the “Energy Policy of Poland until 2040” (PEP2040) – Strengthening Energy Security and Independence. The updated energy policy of Poland will take into account energy sovereignty, a particular element of which is to ensure rapid independence of the national economy from imported fossil fuels from the Russian Federation. The assumptions provide for increasing technological diversification and expansion of capacities based on domestic sources, including further development of renewable energy sources and consistent implementation of nuclear energy and improvement of energy efficiency, but also further diversification of supplies and providing alternatives to oil and natural gas. Actions taken will be aimed at the development of new low-carbon technologies and their integration into the system. Priority will be given to actions that strengthen the development of electricity grids and energy storage, while the use of coal-fired units may increase from time to time in the face of uncertainty in the natural gas market. Poland shall also undertake negotiating efforts to reform the EU climate policy mechanisms to enable a low-carbon and ambitious transformation, contributing to the achievement of the EU’s targets, while taking into account the temporary increased use of conventional generation capacity. Due to recent unlawful Russian aggression against Ukraine, Poland’s neighbor, the Polish government decided to periodically increase the use of domestic hard coal deposits in case of a threat to the energy security of the state. Originally the government assumed that coal units would be replaced more quickly and to a greater extent by gas units, but under current circumstances there will be a greater transition directly from coal sources to renewables and nuclear ones. The requirement to end the use of coal by 2049 will still be binding. Even though Poland has committed to the Fit for 55 package, it has not yet adopted an individual commitment to become climate-neutral by 2050. Instead, Poland continues to say that the EU as a whole will be climate-neutral by that date, suggesting that other EU members may have to have negative emissions by 2050 to make up for Poland’s emissions. The PEP2040 with recent amendments, however, sets up ways of reducing the use of coal and gas while increasing the role of RES (wind, solar, biomass) and nuclear. Other policies which aim to achieve climate goals include PEP2030 – Polityka Ekologiczna Panstwa 2030 (which encompasses 3 specific objectives: Environment and Health, Environment and Economy, and Environment and Climate). There is also Poland’s Hydrogen Strategy to 2030 with an Outlook to 2040 which sets out the main objectives of hydrogen economy development in Poland and the directions of activities needed to achieve them. The Circular Economy program ( GOZ – gospodarka o obiegu zamknietym) is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. The National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, along with the Ministry of Climate and Environment, established and financed a pilot program entitled “Circular economy in municipalitie” in 2017. The pilot ran until 2020 with three municipalities participating (Łukowica -Małopolskie Province, Tuczno – Zachodniopomorskie Province and Wieluń – Łódzkie Province). The private sector is already implementing some solutions to achieving relevant targets and goals due to EU regulations and pressure from the financial/banking sector and foreign investors. Poland has an unfavorable energy mix due to its heavy dependency on coal (71 percent of energy comes from coal fired plants). The cost of transitioning to a net-zero economy by 2050 will be approximately 350 billion euros ($370 billion) and with be realized through the implementation of several programs which aim to achieve clean air, preserve biodiversity, and promote ecological solutions. Most of the government’s flagship programs should be implemented by 2030 or 2040. Programs to promote clean and accessible energy include Poland’s energy policy until 2040 (PEP2040), which emphasizes energy security; amendments to the Energy Efficiency Act and to the RES Act (still not finalized); the Polish nuclear energy program (PPEJ), and biomethane and hydrogen programs. There are also programs implemented and financed by the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (a body supervised by the Ministry of Climate and Environment). These include Mój Prąd, Agroenergia, District heating, and Polska Geotermia Plus, which are all planned to run until 2025 and are focused on local governments, institutions, and individual citizens. Programs dedicated to fight air pollution are: Stop SMOG, Clean Air Program, and Thermal modernization relief. There also are programs dedicated to supporting cities and municipalities in adapting to the challenges caused by climate changes: Adaptation to climate change and limiting the effects of environmental threats and City with Climate (blue and green infrastructure and green public transport). Available tax solutions and loans: Thermo-modernization relief up to PLN 53,000 ($12,000) per taxpayer in the home, to be used for items such as insulation or replacement of the heating system. In the case of spouses who are co-owners of a building, the limit increases to PLN 106,000 ($24,000). R&D relief which allows the deduction of up to 200 percent of R&D expenses. In practice, most of the activities eligible for the R&D tax credit can be described as ecological, such as an increase in energy efficiency, improvement in the recyclability of materials, and various industrial innovations. A tax on non-recycled plastic in force since the beginning of 2021. The fee is added to Poland’s EU membership fee and has not yet been passed on to businesses. In addition, a so-called “plastic directive” prohibiting the sale of disposable cutlery, plates, and ear buds will come into force in Poland in March/April 2022. Zero excise tax for natural gas intended to power internal combustion engines, i.e., liquefied natural gas (LNG), compressed natural gas (CNG), biogas, and hydrogen and biohydrogen. The policy has been in force since August 2019. Zero excise tax on electric and hybrid vehicles (according to the Act of 11 January 2018 on electromobility and alternative fuels). The provision originally applied to hybrid vehicles only until January 2021 but was extended for two more years for cars with internal combustion engines of no more than two liters. Ecolabelling: Many companies in Poland have already earned the right to label their products with the European Ecolabel. The certificates are awarded by the Polish Centre for Testing and Certification (PCBC). Entrepreneurs who obtain the certificate for specific products have the right to mark them with a distinctive sign with the Ecolabel logo. Protected areas: The 2004 Act on Nature Conservation describes the following forms of nature conservation: national parks; nature reserves; landscape parks; protected landscape areas; NATURA 2000 areas; species protection of plants, animals and fungi, and other forms of nature conservation: monuments of nature, documentation sites, ecological arable lands, and landscape/nature complexes.species protection of plants, animals and fungi, and; other forms of nature conservation: monuments of nature, documentation sites, ecological arable lands, and landscape/nature complexes. Ecosystem management plans: Projects related to this topic are run by the National Fund for Environment Protection and Water Management and supervised by the Ministry of Climate as the Operator of the program, “Environment, Energy and Climate Change.” Nature-based solutions (NBS): Includes all solutions based on green and blue infrastructure (ex: greening of cities, water management) and are mainly introduced by local governments and as an education topic to raise awareness among citizens. 9. Corruption Poland has laws, regulations, and penalties aimed at combating corruption of public officials and counteracting conflicts of interest. Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to members of political parties who are members of Parliament. There are also anti-corruption laws regulating the finances of political parties. According to a local NGO, an increasing number of companies are implementing voluntary internal codes of ethics. In 2021, the Transparency International (TI) index of perceived public corruption ranked Poland as 42nd least corrupt among 180 countries/territories (three places higher than on the 2020 TI index). The Polish Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) and national police investigate public corruption. The Justice Ministry and the police are responsible for enforcing Poland’s anti-corruption criminal laws. The Finance Ministry administers tax collection and is responsible for denying the tax deductibility of bribes. Reports of alleged corruption most frequently appear in connection with government contracting and the issuance of a regulation or permit that benefits a particular company. Allegations of corruption by customs and border guard officials, tax authorities, and local government officials show a decreasing trend. If such corruption is proven, it is usually punished. Overall, U.S. firms have found that maintaining policies of full compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is effective in building a reputation for good corporate governance and that doing so is not an impediment to profitable operations in Poland. Poland ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2006 and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery in 2000. Polish law classifies the payment of a bribe to a foreign official as a criminal offense, the same as if it were a bribe to a Polish official. For more information on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Poland, please visit: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/poland-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne (Central Anti-Corruption Bureau – CBA) al. Ujazdowskie 9, 00-583 Warszawa +48 800 808 808 kontakt@cba.gov.pl To report corruption, use this link: www.cba.gov.pl ; and: https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/zglos-korupcje/445,Zglos-korupcje-osobiscie-lub-pisemnie.html The Batory Foundation, as part of a broader operational program (ForumIdei), continues to monitor public corruption, carries out research into this area, and publishes reports on various aspects of the government’s transparency. Contact information for Batory Foundation is: batory@batory.org.pl; 22 536 02 00. 10. Political and Security Environment Poland is a politically stable country. Constitutional transfers of power are orderly. The last presidential elections took place in June 2020 and parliamentary elections took place in October 2019; observers considered both elections free and fair. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which conducted the election observation during the June 2020 presidential elections, found the presidential elections were administered professionally, despite legal uncertainty during the electoral process due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic. Prime Minister Morawiecki’s government was re-appointed in November 2019. Local elections took place in October 2018. Elections to the European Parliament took place in May 2019. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for the fall of 2023. There have been no confirmed incidents of politically motivated violence toward foreign investment projects in recent years. The February 24, 2022, Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to have major consequences for Poland. Poland, a leading NATO member, has become a special hub for transporting military equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces. Poland is dealing with a massive inflow of refugees, which could impact domestic political stability. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Poland has a well-educated, skilled labor force. Productivity, however, remains below OECD averages but is rising rapidly and unit costs are competitive. In the last quarter of 2021, according to the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS), the average gross wage in Poland was PLN 5,995 per month ($1,500) compared to 5,458 ($1,444) in the last quarter of 2020. Poland’s economy employed roughly 16.780 million people in the fourth quarter of 2021. Eurostat measured total Polish unemployment at 2.9 percent, with youth unemployment at 11 percent in December 2021. The unemployment rate was the same among male and female workers. GUS reports unemployment rates differently and tends to be higher than Eurostat figures. Unemployment varied substantially among regions: the highest rate was 8.6 percent (according to GUS) in the north-eastern part of Poland (Warmia and Mazury), and the lowest was 3.1 percent (GUS) in the western province of Wielkopolska, at the end of the fourth quarter of 2021. Unemployment was lowest in major urban areas. Polish workers are usually eager to work for foreign companies, in Poland and abroad. Since Poland joined the EU, up to two million Poles have sought work in other EU member states. According to the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, more than 2 million “simplified procedure” work declarations were registered in 2021, of which 1.7 million were for Ukrainian workers (compared to 1.3 million a year earlier). Under the revised procedure, local authorities may verify if potential employers have actual job positions for potential foreign workers. The law also authorizes local authorities to refuse declarations from employers with a history of abuse, as well as to ban employers previously convicted of human trafficking from hiring foreign workers. The 2018 revision also introduced a new type of work permit for foreign workers, the so-called seasonal work permit, which allow for legal work up to nine months in agriculture, horticulture, tourism, and similar industries. Ministry of Family and Social Policy statistics show that during 2021, more than 400,000 seasonal work permits of this type were issued, of which more than 387,000 went to Ukrainians. Ministry of Family and Social Policy statistics also show that in 2021, more than 504,000 foreigners received work permits, including more than 325,000 Ukrainians, compared with 295,272 in 2020. On March 12, 2022, the new law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of the country entered into force. Under the new law, Ukrainian citizens who fled their country as a result of the war can legally stay and work in Poland for up to 18 months. Polish companies suffer from a shortage of qualified workers. According to a 2022 report, “Barometer of Professions,” commissioned by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, several industries suffer shortages, including the construction, manufacturing, healthcare, transportation, education, food processing, and financial industries. The most sought-after workers in the construction industry include concrete workers, steel fixers, carpenters, and bricklayers. Manufacturing companies seek electricians, electromechanical engineers, tailors, welders, woodworkers, machinery operators, and locksmiths. Employment has expanded in service industries such as information technology, manufacturing, and administrative and support service activities. The business process outsourcing industry in Poland has experienced dynamic growth. The state-owned sector employs about a quarter of the work force, although employment in coal mining and steel are declining. Since 2017, the minimum retirement age for men has been 65 and 60 for women. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and dismissal for cause (firing). In the case of layoffs (when workers are dismissed for economic reasons in companies which employ more than 20 employees), employers are required to offer severance pay. In the case of dismissal for cause, the labor law does not require severance pay. Most workers hired under labor contracts have the legal right to establish and join independent trade unions and to bargain collectively. Individuals who are self-employed or in an employment relationship based on a civil law contract are also permitted to form a union. The law provides for the rights of workers to form and join independent trade unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and provides legal measures under which workers fired for union activity may demand reinstatement. Trade union influence is declining, though unions remain powerful among miners, shipyard workers, government employees, and teachers. The Polish labor code outlines employee and employer rights in all sectors, both public and private, and has been gradually revised to adapt to EU standards. However, employers tend to use temporary and contract workers for jobs that are not temporary in nature. Employers have used short-term contracts because they allow firing with two weeks’ notice and without consulting trade unions. Employers also tend to use civil instead of labor contracts because of ease of hiring and firing, even in situations where work performed meets all the requirements of a regular labor contract. Polish law requires equal pay for equal work and equal treatment with respect to signing labor contracts, employment conditions, promotion, and access to training. The law defines equal treatment as nondiscrimination in any way, directly or indirectly on the grounds of gender, age, disability, race, religion, nationality, political opinion, ethnic origin, denomination, sexual orientation, and whether or not the person is employed temporarily or permanently, full time or part time. The 1991 Law on Conflict Resolution defines the mechanism for labor dispute resolution. It consists of four stages: first, the employer is obliged to conduct negotiations with employees; the second stage is a mediation process, including an independent mediator; if an agreement is not reached through mediation, the third stage is arbitration, which takes place at the regional court; the fourth stage of conflict resolution is a strike. The Polish government adheres to the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) core conventions and generally complies with international labor standards. However, there are several gaps in enforcing these standards, including legal restrictions on the rights of workers to form and join independent unions. Cumbersome procedures make it difficult for workers to meet all of the technical requirements for a legal strike. The law prohibits collective bargaining for key civil servants, appointed or elected employees of state and municipal bodies, court judges, and prosecutors. There were some limitations with respect to identification of victims of forced labor. Despite prohibitions against discrimination with respect to employment or occupation, such discrimination occurs. Authorities do not consistently enforce minimum wage, hours of work, and occupational health and safety, either in the formal or informal sectors. The National Labor Inspectorate (NLI) is responsible for identifying possible labor violations; it may issue fines and notify the prosecutor’s office in cases of severe violations. According to labor unions, however, the NLI does not have adequate tools to hold violators accountable and the small fines imposed as punishment are an ineffective deterrent to most employers. The United States has no FTA or preference program (such as GSP) with Poland that includes labor standards. The grey economy’s share in Poland’s GDP is expected to increase to 18.9 percent in 2022, from 18.3 percent in 2021, according to Poland’s Institute of Forecasts and Economic Analyses (IPAG). IPAG estimates that the total value of the shadow economy in Poland will reach EUR 126.4 billion (PLN 590 billion) in 2022. According to IPAG, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine remains a significant factor of uncertainty and may additionally boost the grey economy to 19.4 percent. According to worldeconomics.com, the size of Poland’s informal economy is estimated to be 22.4 percent which represents approximately $354 billion at GDP PPP levels. In 2021, Poland ranked 18 in the Mastercard Index of Women Entrepreneurs (MIWE) ranking offering women good conditions for running a business, down 12 places from 2020. According to the Mastercard report, 29 percent of companies in Poland are run by women. At the end of 2021, the share of women on the boards of the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange was only 17 percent, a decrease by one percent compared to 2020. According to the analysis of data from the National Court Register carried out by the Dun & Bradstreet business intelligence agency, the number of companies owned by women in Poland at the end of 2021 decreased by three percent compared to 2020 and accounted for 32.5 percent of all companies. The number of women in the position of CEO decreased from 23.5 percent to 19.5 percent and as members of management boards from 30 percent to 25 percent. According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS) data, the share of women in the Polish labor market amounts to over 40 percent. The pandemic undoubtedly contributed to the decline in women’s business activity. According to the report of the Foundation Success Written with Lipstick, one-third of surveyed business owners and co-owners admitted that they had problems with running a business in 2021, over a quarter recorded a drop in revenues, and eight percent had to suspend activities. Every fifth entrepreneur had to change the business profile of her company due to the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to dominate 2021, affecting the business world and forcing employers and employees to adapt to new working conditions. Due to the growing popularity of remote work, the Ministry of Labor has continued works aimed at introducing remote work to the provisions of the Labor Code for good. New regulations will be introduced in the first half of 2022. 14. Contact for More Information Anna Jaros Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Warsaw +48 22 504 2000 econwrw@state.gov Portugal Executive Summary The Portuguese economy bounced back from the pandemic, expanding by 4.9 percent in 2021 after an 8.4 percent contraction the prior year, benefitting from EU fiscal and monetary stimulus and a very high vaccination rate. The labor market has shown remarkable resiliency, with unemployment at 6 percent in January 2022, down from 7 percent a year before. GDP is expected to grow again by an estimated 5 percent in 2022, despite the economic shocks from the Russian war against Ukraine The country will have a chance to boost its economic recovery, deploying more than €16 billion in EU grants and credit expected to fund state coffers between 2021 and 2026. It is expected these funds will be allocated in support of energy and digital transitions. Increased flows of fossil fuels contributed to a 40 percent jump in trade in goods and services between Portugal and the United States to a record $10 billion in 2021. However, bilateral trade remains lop-sided with a large U.S. trade deficit of around $2.2 billion. Many U.S. companies nvest in business/service delivery centers in Portugal, taking advantage of Portugal’s relatively low-cost, talented, and multilingual labor force. The country continues to push to improve market attractiveness. Portugal’s export and FDI promotion agency (AICEP) celebrated a record €2.7 billion of contracted FDI in 2021, double that locked-in during the last (2019) high mark. Portugal’s metalworking, auto component, and machinery industries predominate the recent FDI trends, accounting for about 30 percent of the contracted flows, according to the Government . Portugal’s tech startup scene is thriving, featuring at least six fast-growing firms with ‘Portuguese-U.S. DNA’ that achieved ‘unicorn’ status with valuations above $1 billion– Outsystems, Talkdesk, Feedzai, Remote, SwordHealth and Anchorage. These high-tempo firms are flourishing after tapping into opportunities in the U.S. startup ecosystem that provides not only funding but also knowhow, networks, and customers, ultimately producing jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Established in 2012, Portugal’s “Golden Visa” program gives fast-track residence permits to foreign investors who meet certain conditions, such as making substantial capital transfers or certain real estate acquisitions. Between 2012 and February 2022, Portugal issued 10,442 ‘Golden Visas’, representing €6.2 billion of investment, of which more than €5.6 billion went to real estate. Chinese nationals have been the main beneficiaries of the special program for residence permits, accounting for almost 50 percent (5,066) of the 10,442 total, followed by Brazilians with 1,072. Russian citizens were assigned 431 Golden visas since 2012. As of January 2022, Portugal modified the “Golden Visa” program to restrict the purchase of real estate to regions outside urban hotspots such as Lisbon, Porto, and overbuilt areas of the popular Algarve with the aim of boosting rural investment. Loopholes in the program appear to be enabling urban purchases in any event. On March 28, the European Commission urged member states to immediately repeal existing investor citizenship schemes, which the Commission claimed pose inherent risks. In terms of risks, the independent Portuguese data protection agency (CNPD) has targeted U.S. companies by issuing a succession of judicial opinions warning against the use of U.S. technology firms – including Cloudflare, Respondus, and Amazon Web Services (AWS), arguing that as they are headquartered in the United States and therefore subject to U.S. law, by definition, they have inadequate data privacy standards. CNPD has not found any specific wrongdoing by any U.S. technology firm but bases its rulings on the grounds that a target company is headquartered in the United States. On March 25, President Biden and EU Commission President von der Leyen announced a deal in principle on the Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, which will supplement the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield Framework (Privacy Shield). However, it remains to be seen how this new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework will affect EU-U.S. data flows in Portugal. Portugal ranks second highest in terms of PRC investments in Europe (in relation to GDP). These investments are predominantly in the premier Portuguese companies, which the PRC leverages to reach other markets in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Portugal’s investment screening regime was established in 2014, but the Government of Portugal has never strictly enforced it. Despite the security risks, the Government continues to allow investments by and collaboration with untrusted vendors in 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Huawei is using its educational and gender-equity programs to increase influence with high achieving students and access to key technology policymakers in the Government and private sector. The PRC is also attempting to gain a foothold in Portuguese 5G, AI, solar, and related infrastructure industries. Portugal’s public debt, estimated at 127percent of GDP at the end of 2021, remains an issue, particularly if there is a shift in the benign monetary and sovereign risk sentiment that enabled Lisbon to enjoy issuing debt at record low prices in the last few years. The pace of corporate and household indebtedness has also increased. Portugal’s primary trading partners are Spain, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Portugal suffers an acute brain drain, with high emigration rates among professionals leaving for higher paying careers in Switzerland, France, the UK, and elsewhere. Beyond Europe, Portugal maintains significant links with Portuguese-speaking countries including Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal has one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe and net immigration (from Ukraine, Brazil, and other Portuguese-speaking countries) has prevented a fall in population. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will impact the Portuguese growth curve. Except for grain imports from Ukraine, energy intermediate goods, and liquified natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia, the country’s trade and investment relationship with both countries is limited. In LNG specifically, Russia accounted for 15 percent of imports, well below the 45 percent EU average. However, Portugal is a net importer of energy products, fully dependent on outside supply of crude and refined fossil fuels. It also imports natural gas for energy and generation, which acts as a key complement to the fast-growing renewable energy footprint of its solar, wind and hydro power assets. The country’s commercial balance will be negatively impacted by a long period of high global energy prices. Portugal’s low installed solar capacity of about 7 percent of the energy mix is expected to reach 8 GW of solar capacity, or 27 percent of the mix by 2030. The Government is promoting significant investments in wind and solar energy development to meet its target of 47 percent energy from renewables by 2030. By 2021 the country reduced its external energy dependence by 9 percentage points (from 2005), seeking greater supply security by increasing domestic energy generation and reducing the consumption of primary energy by 17 percent. The Government has also talked about plans to launch a 2-5 GW offshore wind auction this summer (without providing details), in hopes of speeding up the deployment of large-scale offshore wind capacity to reduce energy dependence on Russia. Portugal’s path to a carbon neutral economy includes incentives for energy efficiency; promoting diversification of energy sources; increasing electrification; reinforcing and modernizing infrastructure; developing more interconnections; market stability for investors; reconfiguring and digitalizing the market; incentives for research and innovation, promoting low-carbon processes, products and services; and improving energy services and information for consumers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 32 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 31 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.54 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 21,790 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Portugal (GOP) actively pursues and protects foreign investment, seeing it as a driver of economic growth, with a very positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Portuguese law is based on non-discrimination principles, meaning foreign and domestic investors are subject to the same rules. Foreign investment is not subject to any special registration or notification to any authority, with exception of a few specific activities. The Portuguese Agency for Foreign Investment and Commerce (AICEP) is the lead for promotion of trade and investment. AICEP is responsible for attracting FDI, global promotion of Portuguese brands, and export of goods and services. It is the primary point of contact for investors with projects over € 25 million or companies with a consolidated turnover of more than € 75 million. For foreign investments not meeting these thresholds, AICEP will make a preliminary analysis and direct the investor to assistance agencies such as the Institute of Support to Small- and Medium- Sized Enterprises and Innovation (IAPMEI), a public agency within the Ministry of Economy that provides technical support, or to AICEP Capital Global, which offers technology transfer, incubator programs, and venture capital support. AICEP does not favor specific sectors for investment promotion. It does, however, provide a “Prominent Clusters” guide on its website, where it advocates investment in Portuguese companies by sector. Additionally, Portugal has introduced the website Simplex, designed to help navigate starting a business. The Portuguese government maintains regular contact with investors through the Confederation of Portuguese Business (CIP), the Portuguese Commerce and Services Confederation (CCP), the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP) and other industry associations. There are no legal restrictions in Portugal on foreign investment. To establish a new business, foreign investors must follow the same rules as domestic investors, including mandatory registration and compliance with regulatory obligations for specific activities. There are no nationality requirements and no limitations on the repatriation of profits or dividends. Non-resident shareholders must obtain a Portuguese taxpayer number for tax purposes. EU residents may obtain this number directly from the tax administration (in person or by means of an appointed proxy); non-EU residents must appoint a Portuguese resident representative to handle matters with tax authorities. Portugal enacted a national security investment review framework in 2014 which gave the Council of Ministers authority to block specific foreign investment transactions that would compromise national security. Reviews can be triggered on national security grounds in strategic industries like energy, transportation, and communication. Investment reviews can be conducted in cases where the purchaser acquiring control is an individual or entity not registered in an EU member state. In such instances, the review process is overseen by the relevant Portuguese Ministry based on the assets in question. Portugal has yet to activate its investment screening mechanism. Portuguese government approval is required in the following sensitive sectors: defense, water management, public telecommunications, railways, maritime transportation, and air transport. Any economic activity that involves the exercise of public authority also requires government approval; private sector companies can operate in these areas only through a concession contract. Portugal additionally limits foreign investment with respect to the production, transmission, and distribution of electricity, the production of gas, the pipeline transportation of fuels, wholesale services of electricity, retailing services of electricity and non-bottled gas, and services incidental to electricity and natural gas distribution. Concessions in the electricity and gas sectors are assigned only to companies with headquarters and effective management in Portugal. Investors wishing to establish new credit institutions or finance companies, acquire a controlling interest in such financial firms, and/or establish a subsidiary must have authorization from the Bank of Portugal (for EU firms) or the Ministry of Finance (for non-EU firms). Non-EU insurance companies seeking to establish presence in Portugal must post a special deposit and financial guarantee and must have been authorized for such activity by the Ministry of Finance for at least five years. In the past five years, the Government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. To combat the perception of a cumbersome regulatory environment, the government has created ‘cutting red tape’ measures described in the website Simplex (simplex.gov.pt) that details steps taken since 2005 to reduce bureaucracy, and the Empresa na Hora (“Business in an Hour”) program that facilitates company incorporations by citizens and non-citizens. In 2007, the government established AICEP, a promotion agency for investment and foreign trade that also manages industrial parks and provides business location solutions for investors through its subsidiary AICEP Global Parques. Established in 2012, Portugal’s “Golden Visa” program gives fast-track residence permits to foreign investors who meet certain conditions, such as making substantial capital transfers, creating and certain real estate acquisitions. Between 2012 and February 2022, Portugal issued 10,442 ‘Golden Visas’, representing €6.2 billion of investment, of which more than €5.6 billion went to real estate. Chinese nationals have been the main beneficiaries of the special program for residence permits, accounting for almost 50 percent (5,066) of the 10,442 total, followed by Brazilians with 1,072. Russian citizens were assigned 431 Golden visas since 2012. As of January 2022, Portugal modified the “Golden Visa” program to restrict the purchase of real estate to regions outside urban hotspots such as Lisbon, Porto and overbuilt areas of the popular Algarve with the aim of boosting rural investment. Loopholes in the program appear to be enabling urban purchases in any event. On March 28, the European Commission urged member states to immediately repeal existing investor citizenship schemes, which the Commission claimed pose inherent risks. Other measures implemented to help attract foreign investment include the easing of some labor regulations to increase workplace flexibility and EU-funded programs. Portuguese citizens can alternatively register a business online through the “Citizen’s Portal” available at Portal do Cidadão . Companies must also register with the Directorate General for Economic Activity (DGAE), the Tax Authority (AT), and with the Social Security administration. The government’s standard for online business registration is a two to three day turnaround, but the online registration process can take as little as one day. Portugal defines an enterprise as micro-, small-, and medium-sized based on its headcount, annual turnover, or the size of its balance sheet. To qualify as a micro-enterprise, a company must have fewer than 10 employees and no more than €2 million in revenues or €2 million in assets. Small enterprises must have fewer than 50 employees and no more than €10 million in revenues or €10 million in assets. Medium-sized enterprises must have fewer than 250 employees and no more than €50 million in revenues or €43 million in assets. The Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Support Institute ( IAPMEI ) offers financing, training, and other services for SMEs based in Portugal. More information on laws, procedures, registration requirements, and investment incentives for foreign investors in Portugal is available at AICEP’s website . The Portuguese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. On the contrary, it promotes outward investment through AICEP’s customer managers, export stores and its external commercial network that, in cooperation with the diplomatic and consular network, are operating in about 80 markets. AICEP provides support and advisory services on the best way of approaching foreign markets, identifying international business opportunities for Portuguese companies, particularly SMEs. 3. Legal Regime The government of Portugal employs transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition, and the legal system welcomes FDI on a non-discriminatory basis, establishing clear rules of the game. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international norms. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent, with data regularly published by the Bank of Portugal, the IGCP debt management agency, and the Ministry of Finance. Regulations drafted by ministries or agencies must be approved by Parliament and, in some cases, by European authorities. All proposed regulations are subject to a 20-to-30-day public consultation period during which the proposed measure is published on the relevant ministry or regulator’s website. Only after ministries or regulatory agencies have conducted an impact assessment of the proposed regulation can the text be enacted and published. The process can be monitored and consulted at the official websites of Parliament and the Official Portuguese Republic Journal. Ministries or regulatory agencies report the results of the consultations through a consolidated response published on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator. Rule-making and regulatory authorities exist across sectors including energy, telecommunications, securities markets, financial, and health. Regulations are enforced at the local level through district courts, on the national level through the Court of Auditors, and at the supra-national level through EU mechanisms including the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank. The OECD, the European Commission, and the IMF also publish key regulatory actions and analysis. UTAO , the Parliamentary Technical Budget Support Unit, is a nonpartisan body composed of economic and legal experts that support parliamentary budget deliberations by providing the Budget Committee with quality analytical reports on the executive’s budget proposals. In addition, the Portuguese Public Finance Council conducts an independent assessment of the consistency, compliance with stated objectives, and sustainability of public finances, while promoting fiscal transparency. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Since 2005, all listed companies must comply with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (“IFRS”), which closely parallels the U.S. GAAP-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Portugal’s Competition Authority enforces adherence to domestic competition and public procurement rules. The European Commission further ensures adhesion to EU administrative processes among its member states. Public finances are generally deemed transparent, closely scrutinized by Eurostat and monitored by an independent technical budget support unit, UTAO, and the Supreme Audit Institution ‘Tribunal de Contas.’ Over the last decades, Portugal has also consolidated within the State accounts many state-owned enterprises, making budget analysis more accurate. Portugal has been a member of the EU since 1986, a member of the Schengen area since 1995, and joined the Eurozone in 1999. With the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force in 2009, trade policy and rules on foreign direct investment became mostly EU competencies, as part of the bloc’s common commercial policy. The European Central Bank is the central bank for the euro and determines monetary policy for the 19 Eurozone member states, including Portugal. Portugal complies with EU directives regarding equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Portugal has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 1995. The Portuguese legal system is a civil law system, based on Roman law. The hierarchy among various sources of law is as follows: (i) Constitutional laws and amendments; (ii) the rules and principles of general or common international law and international agreements; (iii) ordinary laws enacted by Parliament; (iv) instruments having an effective equivalent to that of laws, including approved international conventions or decisions of the Constitutional Court; and (v) regulations used to supplement and implement laws. The country’s Commercial Company Law and Civil Code define Portugal’s legal treatment of corporations and contracts. Portugal has a Supreme Court and specialized family courts, labor courts, commercial courts, maritime courts, intellectual property courts, and competition courts. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and are adjudicated in national Appellate Courts, with the possibility to appeal to the European Court of Justice. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch and the judicial process procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable. The Bank of Portugal defines FDI as “an act or contract that obtains or increases enduring economic links with an existing Portuguese institution or one to be formed.” A non-resident who invests in at least 10 percent of a resident company’s equity and participates in the company’s decision-making is considered a foreign direct investor. Current information on laws, procedures, registration requirements, and investment incentives for foreign investors in Portugal is available at AICEP’s website . The domestic agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns is the Portuguese Competition Authority and the international agency is the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition. Portuguese law specifically prohibits collusion between companies to fix prices, limit supplies, share markets or sources of supply, discriminate in transactions, or force unrelated obligations on other parties. Similar prohibitions apply to any company or group with a dominant market position. The law also requires prior government notification of mergers or acquisitions that would give a company more than 30 percent market share in a sector, or mergers or acquisitions among entities whose total sales exceeded €150 million during the preceding financial year. The Competition Authority has 60 days to determine if the merger or acquisition can proceed. The European Commission may claim authority on cross-border competition issues or those involving entities large enough to have a significant EU market share. Under Portugal’s Expropriation Code, the government may expropriate property and its associated rights if it is deemed to support the public interest, and upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The code outlines criteria for calculating fair compensation based on market values. The decision to expropriate as well as the fairness of compensation can be challenged in national courts. Portugal’s Insolvency and Corporate Recovery Code defines insolvency as a debtor’s inability to meet commitments as they fall due. Corporations are also considered insolvent when their liabilities clearly exceed their assets. A debtor, creditor or any person responsible for the debtor’s liabilities can initiate insolvency proceedings in a commercial court. The court assumes the key role of ensuring compliance with legal rules governing insolvency proceedings, with particular responsibility for ruling on the legality of insolvency and payment plans approved by creditors. After declaration of insolvency, creditors may submit their claims to the court-appointed insolvency administrator for a specific term set for this purpose, typically up to 30 days. Creditors must submit details regarding the amount, maturity, guarantees, and nature of their claims. Claims are ranked as follows: (i) claims over the insolvent’s estate, i.e. court fees related to insolvency proceedings; (ii) secured claims; (iii) privileged claims; (iv) common, unsecured claims; and (v) subordinated claims, including those of shareholders. 4. Industrial Policies The Portuguese government offers investment incentives that can be tailored to individual investors’ needs and capital, based on industry, investment size, and project sustainability, including grants, tax credits and deferrals, access to loans, and reduced cost of land. Investment agency AICEP actively recruits investors across the globe, intermediating the terms on a case-by-case basis for the larger investments. The Autonomous Regions of Madeira and the Azores also offer investment incentives. Since Portugal is an EU Member, potential investors may be able to access European funds, providing further incentives. Such support has been used by Portugal to co-finance key investments in the areas of research and development, information and communications technology, transport, water, solid waste, energy efficiency and renewable energy, urban regeneration, health, education, and culture. In 2020, Portugal merged ‘PME Investmentos’ and the ‘Instituição Financeira de Desenvolvimento’ (IFD) to create the Banco Português de Fomento. The IFD is a national promotion bank tasked with providing credit to companies, managing State-guarantee schemes and supporting companies by helping them strengthen their capital structure, exports, and internationalization. It manages a €200 million co-investment fund. Through Portugal Ventures, a state-financed private equity company, the government has a risk capital arm that finances the growth of the Portuguese entrepreneurship ecosystem. This entity is part of the public business sector, operating under the same terms and conditions that apply to private companies and subject to the general domestic and community competition rules. As a venture capital firm, its funds are under the supervision of the Portuguese Securities Market Commission, CMVM. The pandemic-response 2022-2026 Recovery and Resiliency Plan (RRP) devotes over €180 million to finance hydrogen and renewable gases investment projects, to be allocated to proposed capex via a competitive bidding process. The Government also offers a wide range of incentives for clean energy and sustainability via the Environmental Fund , attributing grants to projects that include electric charging points and purchase of low emission vehicles, namely public transport operators. As the portfolio of renewable energy choices quickly improves its commercial attractivity without need for public support, particularly solar, Portugal is shifting the focus of incentives to up and coming technologies, namely hydrogen. Portugal has one foreign trade zone (FTZ)/free port in the Autonomous Region of Madeira, established in 1987. Continued operation of the International Business Centre of Madeira ’s corporate tax regime is authorized by EU rules on incentives granted to member states. Industrial and commercial activities, international service activities, trust and trust management companies, and offshore financial branches are all eligible. Companies established in the foreign trade zone/free port enjoy import- and export-related benefits, financial incentives, tax incentives for investors and companies. In December 2020, the European commission said that companies on the island of Madeira illegally benefitted from tax cuts under the FTZ, as they failed to meet the key requirement of contributing to the region’s growth. Portugal was asked to reimburse funds deemed incompatible with EU state aid rules, plus interest, from companies that failed to meet the conditions, the Commission said in a statement. Under EU rules, company profits benefitting from income tax reductions must originate exclusively from substantive activities carried out in Madeira and these companies must create and maintain jobs in Madeira, conditions the Commission is concerned Portuguese authorities may have failed to respect. Portugal does not impose performance requirements or mandate specific local employment conditions for foreign investors. Qualification standards for investment incentives are applied uniformly to domestic and foreign investors. There is a high level of labor mobility between Portugal and other EU member states. To work in Portugal, non-EU foreign nationals must be sponsored for a work permit by a Portuguese employer. An investor may also obtain permission to reside and work via the ‘Golden Visa’ scheme. There are no nationality-related restrictions that affect a foreign national’s ability to serve in senior management or on a board of directors. Foreign or expatriate workers with appropriate work authorizations are entitled to the same rights and subject to the same laws as employees with Portuguese citizenship. While Portugal does not force data localization, according to the Portuguese Data Protection Law (pursuant to the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive) “data controllers,” i.e., people or corporations that process personal data, must register with the National Commission for Data Protection (CNPD). Data transfers outside the EU are only allowed if the recipient country or company ensures an adequate level of protection. Portugal is subject to new rules stipulated in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption; the same rules apply to foreign IT providers as apply to national providers. Data transfers to other countries within the EU do not require prior authorization from the CNPD. However, data transfers to countries outside the EU can only take place in compliance with the Data Protection Law, meaning the receiving state must also provide an adequate level of protection to personal data. If the receiving state does not ensure an adequate level of protection, the CNPD can authorize the transfer under specific conditions, as outlined in Act 67/98. CNPD can also authorize a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a receiving state that does not provide an adequate level of protection only if the controller provides adequate safeguards to protect the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. As members of the EU, business entities operating in Portugal are asked to comply with the bloc’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). CNPD issued a set of orders for private firms to halt or refrain from data transfers to the United States, implying that U.S. technology companies subject to sending data to the United States may risk being non-compliant with EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), justifying the enforcement with a narrow interpretation of the Schrems II decision and Privacy Shield invalidation. Generally, there are no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. 5. Protection of Property Rights Portugal reliably enforces property rights and interests. The Portuguese Constitution ensures the right to private property and grants Parliament the power to establish rules on the renting of property, the determination of property in the public domain, and the rules of land management and urban planning. The Civil Code of 1967 provides the right to absolute and full ownership, which can be restricted by mortgage, liens, or other security interests. Additional laws have established or modified rules on time-sharing, condominiums, and land registration. Property registration can be undertaken online at Predial Online . Foreign investors can directly own/purchase property freehold or leasehold, to build industrial and commercial premises or can purchase through a real estate company. If legally purchased property is unoccupied, Portuguese law allows ownership to revert to other owners, including squatters, through an adverse domain process set out in Chapter VI of the Portuguese Civil Code (CCP), Article 1287. Intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement and theft are uncommon in Portugal. It is fairly easy for investors to register copyrights, industrial property, patents, and designs with Portugal’s Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) and the Inspectorate-General of Cultural Activities (IGAC). Intellectual property can be registered online for a small fee. For more details, consult: https://inpi.justica.gov.pt/Servicos and https://www.igac.gov.pt/ . The Portuguese government became party to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 2003. Portuguese legislation for the protection of IPR has been consistent with WTO rules and EU directives since 2004. The Arbitration Centre for Industrial Property, Domain Names, and Company Names (ARBITRARE) was established in 2009 to facilitate voluntary arbitration of IPR disputes in English or Portuguese, and in 2012, the government created an IPR court with two judges. In 2019, Portugal brought into force a new industrial property package of legislation, enhancing the protection of a wide range of IPR, including patents, geographical indications, trademarks and designs. See more at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/members/profile/PT . Portugal is a participant in the eMAGE and eMARKS projects, which provide multilingual access to databases of trademarks and industrial designs. Portugal’s Food and Economic Security Authority (ASAE), in partnership with other national law enforcement agencies, provides statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods at: https://www.asae.gov.pt/inspecao-fiscalizacao/resultados-operacionais.aspx . Portugal is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Portuguese stock exchange is managed by Euronext Lisbon, part of the NYSE Euronext Group, which grants listed companies access to a global and diversified pool of investors. The Portuguese Stock Index-20 (PSI20) is Portugal’s benchmark index representing the largest (only 19, not 20) and most liquid companies listed on the exchange. The Portuguese stock exchange offers a diverse product portfolio: shares, funds, exchange traded funds, bonds, and structured products, including warrants and futures. The Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) supervises and regulates securities markets, and is a member of the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Additional information on CMVM can be found here: http://www.cmvm.pt/en/Pages/homepage.aspx . Portugal respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from placing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are eligible for local market financing. Private sector companies have access to a variety of credit instruments, including bonds. Portugal has 145 credit institutions, of which 61 are banks. Portugal’s banking assets totaled €431 billion at the end of June 2021. Portuguese banks’ non-performing loan portfolios improved markedly since the global financial crisis. Total loans stood at around €244 billion in mid-2021, 4.3 percent of which constitute non-performing loans, above the Eurozone average of around 2.2 percent. Banks’ return on equity was 4.6 percent in the first half of 2021 versus 0.3 percent the year before. In terms of capital buffers, the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio stabilized at 15.3 percent as of June 2021. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in Portugal. In terms of decision-making policy, a general ‘four-eyes policy,’ with two individuals approving actions, must be in place at all banks and branches operating in the country, irrespective of whether they qualify as international subsidiaries of foreign banks or local banks. Foreign branches operating in Portugal are required to have such decision-making powers that enable them to operate in the country, but this requirement generally does not prevent them from having internal control and rules governing risk exposure and decision-making processes, as customary in international financial groups. No restrictions exist on a foreigners’ ability to establish a bank account and both residents and non-residents may hold bank accounts in any currency. However, any transfers of €10,000 or more must be declared to Portuguese customs authorities. See more at: https://www.bportugal.pt/ . The Ministry of Labor, Solidarity, and Social Security manages Portugal’s Social Security Financial Stabilization Fund (FEFSS), with total assets of around €22 billion. It is not a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and does not subscribe to the voluntary code of good practices (Santiago Principles), or participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. Among other restrictions, Portuguese law requires that at least 25 percent of the fund’s assets be invested in Portuguese public debt, and limits FEFSS investment in equity instruments to that of EU or OECD members. FEFSS acts as a passive investor and does not take an active role in the management of portfolio companies. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently over 40 major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in Portugal in the banking, health care, transportation, water, and agriculture sectors. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) has revenues greater than one percent of GDP. The bank has the largest market share in customer deposits, commercial loans, mortgages, and many other banking services in the Portuguese market. Parpublica is a government holding company for several smaller SOEs, providing audits and reports on these. More information can be found at: http://www.parpublica.pt/ . The activities and accounts of Parpublica are fully disclosed in budget documents and audited annual reports. In addition, the Ministry of Finance publishes an annual report on SOEs through a specialized monitoring unit (UTAM) that presents annual performance data by company and sector: In 2020, Parpublica managed assets totaling €11 billion, employs 4,400 workers and the net income of the holding was €80 million. When SOEs are wholly owned, the government appoints the board, although when SOEs are majority-owned the board of executives and non-executives’ nomination depends on the negotiations between government and the remaining shareholders, and in some cases on negotiations with EU authorities as well. According to Law No. 133/2013, SOEs must compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, subject to Portuguese and EU competition laws. Still, SOEs often receive preferential financing terms from private banks. In 2008 Portugal’s Council of Ministers approved resolution no. 49/2007, which defined the Principles of Good Governance for SOEs according to OECD guidelines. The resolution requires SOEs to have a governance model that ensures the segregation of executive management and supervisory roles, to have their accounts audited by independent entities, to observe the same standards as those for companies publicly listed on stock markets, and to establish an ethics code for employees, customers, suppliers, and the public. The resolution also requires the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate General of the Treasury and Finances to publish annual reports on SOEs’ compliance with the Principles of Good Governance. Credit and equity analysts generally tend to criticize SOEs’ over-indebtedness and inefficiency, rather than any poor governance or ties to government. Portugal launched an aggressive privatization program in 2011 as part of its EU-IMF-ECB bailout, including SOEs in the air transportation, land transportation, energy, communications, and insurance sectors. Foreign companies have been among the most successful bidders in these privatizations since the program’s inception. The bidding process was public, transparent, and non-discriminatory to foreign investors. On July 2, 2020, the government of Portugal nationalized a 71.7 percent stake in energy company Efacec, controlled by Angola’s Isabel dos Santos, given its strategic importance for the economy, in a move aimed at ending legal uncertainty and facilitating the sale of her shares. On February 24, 2022, the government approved the sale of Efacec to Portuguese group DST, which pledged to inject €81 million to strengthen the firm’s capital structure. In December 2021, the European Commission approved a €2.55 billion state aid package for Portugal’s State-owned air carrier TAP. In exchange, the airline is executing a restructuring plan, reducing its workforce, and implementing pay cuts. It also pledged to reduce its fleet by twelve aircraft to 88 by the end of 2021. The plan expects TAP to produce €1.3 billion in operating cost reductions per year by 2025 and return TAP Portugal to profitability by 2023-2024. Infrastructure Minister Pedro Nuno Santos has flagged that the Government will look for private investors and there already several interested parties. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is strong awareness of responsible business conduct in Portugal and broad acceptance of the need to consider the community among the key stakeholders of any company. The Group of Reflection and Support for Business Citizenship (GRACE) was founded in 2000 by a group of companies, primarily multinational enterprises, to expand the role of the Portuguese business community in social development. The Ministry of Economy and AICEP encourage foreign and local enterprises to observe the due diligence approach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and both agencies jointly comprise the National Contact Point (NCP) to provide support for mediating disputes that may arise regarding the Guidelines. The Portuguese Business Ethics Association (APEE) is dedicated to promoting corporate social responsibility and works in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy’s Directorate-General of Economic Activities. It promotes events like Social Responsibility Week and celebrates protocols and agreements with companies to ensure they follow responsible business conduct principles incorporated into the labor code. Portugal’s Competition Authority both encourages and enforces competition rules, including ethical business practices. The Competition Authority operates a leniency program for companies that self-identify lapses. There have not been any high profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights. The Portuguese government enforces domestic laws effectively and fairly through the domestic courts system, and through the supra-national European Court of Human Rights. Within its constitution, Portugal states that constitutional precepts concerning fundamental rights must be interpreted and observed in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Portuguese legal and regulatory framework on corporate governance includes not only regulations and recommendations from the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM), but also specific legal provisions from the Portuguese Companies Code and the Portuguese Securities Code. CMVM promotes sound corporate governance for listed companies by setting out a group of recommendations and regulations on the standards of corporate governance. CMVM regulations are binding for listed companies. Non-governmental organizations also promote awareness of environmental and good governance issues in business. These include Quercus Portugal, which publishes guidelines and organizes events to promote environmental responsibility in business practices, and Transparencia e Integridade Associacao Civica (TIAC), which produces reports on corruption on everything from soccer match-fixing to conflicts of interest in public and private enterprise. TIAC also allows whistle-blowers to anonymously submit reports of corruption through their website. Portugal represents a success story in fighting child labor from its supply chain, as the public and private sector came together decisively to eradicate child labor issues from the 1990’s. However, Portugal remains a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor trafficking. In 2019, a series of large COVID-19 outbreaks unveiled how groups of migrant workers at berry farms were subject to poor housing and sanitary conditions. Portugal does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The country’s two main umbrella unions, CGTP-Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses and UGT-União Geral dos Trabalhadores, also regularly denounce and combat non-compliant business practices, particularly related to labor rights violations. Portugal potentially holds some of the largest lithium reserves in Europe and is preparing to advance with battery-grade ore mining. While some recognize the role of lithium for energy transition, several NGOs issued negative opinions of planned mine projects, warning about open-pit methods that will provoke dust, noise, and detonations around the clock, damaging the lifestyle and health of local population. Environmentalists also warn about the risks to local species such as water moles, the Iberian wolf and river mussels. In January 2020, 14 civil society and environmental associations signed a national manifest against Portugal’s mining plans Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Portugal’s national climate strategy aims to reach net zero emissions by 2050. In its 2021-2030 National Energy and Climate plan, Portugal sets out goals for decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy security, internal energy markets and research, innovation, and competitiveness. Portugal’s installed solar capacity is now about 7 percent of the energy mix and is expected to reach 8 GW of solar capacity, or 27 percent of the energy mix by 2030. The Government is promoting significant investments in wind and solar energy development to meet its target of 47 percent energy from renewables by 2030. Portugal reduced its external energy dependence by 9.1 percentage points in 2021 versus 2005, increasing domestic energy generation and reducing the consumption of primary energy by 17 percent, ensuring greater supply security. Portugal’s path to a carbon neutral economy includes: incentives for energy efficiency; promoting diversification of energy sources; increasing electrification; reinforcement and modernization of infrastructure; development of interconnections; market stability for investors; reconfiguration and digitalization of the market; incentives for research and innovation, promotion of low-carbon processes, products and services; and improved energy services and information for consumers. When it comes to public procurement and instruments for the State to accelerate the climate transition, Portugal has a ‘once-in-a-generation chance’ to boost its efforts. The country can use around €16.6 billion in European Union (EU) pandemic response funds expected to flow to state coffers between 2021 and 2026 to support its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), of which the government will allocate 47 percent to efforts that help climate objectives. Public procurement and investment policies dictate that large infrastructure, industrial, mining, and other environmentally sensitive initiatives require the approval of impact assessment studies, supervised and assessed by the Portuguese Agency for the Environment (APA), before moving forward. 9. Corruption U.S. firms do not identify corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment. Portugal has made legislative strides toward further criminalizing corruption. The government’s Council for the Prevention of Corruption, formed in 2008, is an independent administrative body that works closely with the Court of Auditors to prevent corruption in public and private organizations that use public funds. Transparencia e Integridade Associacao Civica, the local affiliate of Transparency International, also actively publishes reports on corruption and supports would-be whistleblowers in Portugal. In 2010, the country adopted a law criminalizing violation of urban planning rules and increasing transparency in political party funding. In 2015, Parliament unanimously approved a revision to existing anti-corruption laws that extended the statute of limitations for the crime of trading in influence to 15 years, and criminalized embezzlement by employees of state-owned enterprises with a prison term of up to eight years. The laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties. Despite being seen as generally aligned with the best international practices in terms of preventing and combating corruption, a June 2019 interim report by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that only one of the fifteen recommendations contained in GRECO´s Fourth Round Evaluation Report had been implemented satisfactorily or dealt in a satisfactory manner by Portugal at end-2019 in terms of compliance with GRECO anti-corruption recommendations addressed to lawmakers, judges and prosecutors. Portugal ranked 32nd out of 180 countries in Transparency International (TI)’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an improvement of one position from the previous year. Portugal approved a national anti-corruption strategy in December 2021. This legislative package includes a working group that prepares a national report, revises the whistle-blower protection framework, fraud-proofs legislation, improves public procurement processes, reinforces the transparency of political party financing, and ensures that companies have corruption prevention plans in place. Portugal has laws and regulations to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. Parliamentarians are required to declare their income, assets, and interests to the Authority for Transparency attached the Constitutional Court. The Portuguese government encourages (and in some cases requires) private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Most private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. As described above, the Competition Authority operates a leniency program for companies that self-identify infringements of competition rules, including ethical lapses. Portugal has ratified and complies with both the UN Convention against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Council for the Prevention of Corruption Avenida da Republica, 651050-189, Lisbon, Portugal +351 21 794 5138 Email: cp-corrupcao@tcontas.pt Contact at “watchdog” organization: Transparency International – Transparencia e Integridade Associacao Civica Rua dos Fanqueiros, 65-3º A1100-226, Lisbon, Portugal +351 21 8873412 Email: secretariado@transparencia.pt 10. Political and Security Environment Since the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Portugal has had a long history of peaceful social protest. Portugal experienced its largest political rally since its revolution in response to proposed budgetary measures in 2012. Public workers, including nurses, doctors, teachers, aviation professionals, and public transportation workers organized peaceful demonstrations periodically in protest of insufficient economic support, low salary levels, and other measures. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Numerous labor reform packages aimed at improving productivity were implemented after the 2011 bailout, but overall labor productivity remains a challenge. The annualized monthly minimum wage increased stands at €823. After the difficulties of the eurozone debt crisis, when many Portuguese migrated out of the country along with some resident migrants, net-migration became positive again in 2017 and has strengthened since. The largest communities of workers come from Brazil, Cape Verde, Romania, Ukraine, UK, China, France, Italy, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal and India. In the Southern Algarve region, the tourism sector employs most of the migrant workers. Alentejo and the coastal regions of central Portugal, with their intensive agriculture sectors, host substantial Asian workers’ communities, especially from Bangladesh. Employers are allowed to conduct collective dismissals linked to adverse market or economic conditions, or due to technological advancement, but must provide advance notice and severance pay. Depending on the seniority of each employee, an employer must provide between 15 to 75 days of advance notice, and pay severance ranging from 12 days’ to one month’s salary per year worked. Employees may challenge termination decisions before a Labor Court. Labor laws are uniformly applicable and enforced, including in Portugal’s foreign trade zone/free port in the Autonomous Region of Madeira. Collective bargaining is common in Portugal’s banking, insurance, and public administration sectors. More information is available at the Directorate General for Labor Relations site. Portugal has labor dispute resolution mechanisms in place through Labor Courts and Arbitration Centers. Labor strikes are not violent and of short duration. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. Portugal is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and has ratified all eight Fundamental Conventions as well as all four Governance (Priority) Conventions. The Labor Code caps the work schedule at eight hours per day, and 40 hours per week. The public sector employee workweek, with certain exclusions, was capped at 35 hours in July 2016. Employees are entitled to at least 22 days of annual leave per year. Employers must pay employees a Christmas and vacation bonus, both equivalent to one month’s salary. Gender pay gap inequality in Portugal worsened from 10.9 percent in 2019 to 11.4 percent in 2020, which is still better than the average EU difference (13 percent), according to Eurostat data . Portugal has shown progress in developing gender equality and gender mainstreaming policies, according to European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). The 2030 National Strategy on Gender Equality, aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, established a plan to: promote gender equality; tackle violence against women and domestic violence; and, combat discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and sexual characteristics. Portugal’s Fraud Management and Economics Observatory estimates that the informal economy is worth about 27 percent of GDP, according to its last available analysis in 2015. The President of the Observatory said in 2020 that the weight of the informal economy has likely “increased significantly” with the onset of the pandemic. 14. Contact for More Information Embassy of the United States Avenida das Forças Armadas 1600-081+351 21-770-2000 Email: icsportugalqueries@state.gov Qatar Executive Summary The State of Qatar is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Despite a decrease in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which stemmed from depressed hydrocarbon sales and the COVID-19-induced economic slowdown, Qatar’s real GDP recovered by the second quarter of 2021 and is expected to grow by four percent in 2022, according to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) projections. This positive outlook is driven mainly by Qatar Energy’s ambitious plans to expand LNG production by more than 60 percent over the next five years. To maintain high-level government spending on projects in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar projects a modest $2.2 billion budget deficit in 2022, based on an oil price assumption of $55 per barrel. The government remains the dominant actor in the economy, though it encourages private investment in many sectors and continues to take steps to encourage more foreign direct investment (FDI). The dominant driver of Qatar’s economy is the energy sector, which has attracted tens of billions of dollars in FDI. In line with the country’s National Vision 2030’sgoal of establishing a knowledge-based and diversified economy, the government of Qatar has recently introduced reforms to its foreign investment and foreign property ownership laws. These recent legislations allow up to 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses in most sectors and real estate in newly designated areas. In 2020, the government also enacted legislation to regulate and promote public-private partnerships. There are significant opportunities for foreign investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education, tourism, energy, information and communications technology, and services. The government allocated $20 billion for major projects in these sectors in 2022. Measured by the amount of inward FDI stock, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, finance, and insurance are the primary sectors that attract foreign investors. The government provides various incentives to attract local and foreign investments, including exemptions from customs duties and certain land-use benefits. The corporate tax rate is 10 percent for most sectors, and there is no personal income tax. One notable exception is the corporate tax of 35 percent on foreign firms in the extractive industries, including but not limited to those in natural gas extraction. Although the government of Qatar took recent measures to prosecute human rights violations, including improving its human trafficking legislation, addressing forced labor, and setting minimum wages, the country continues to face significant challenges that may affect foreign businesses. These include but are not limited to restrictions on free expression and peaceful assembly, restrictions on labor unions, discrimination against women in law and practice, and reports of forced labor. To curb corruption and anti-competitive practices, the government created a regulatory regime consisting of various enabled government agencies, including the Transparency Authority, the National Competition Protection Authority, and the Anti-Monopoly Committee. To improve transparency, the government streamlined its procurement processes in 2016, creating an online portal for all government tenders. Nonetheless, personal connections reportedly play a significant role in business deals. In recent years, Qatar has significantly bolstered its U.S. investments through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and its subsidiaries, notably Qatari Diar. In 2019, QIA pledged to allocate $45 billion to U.S. investments, after it opened an office in New York City in 2015 to facilitate its U.S. investments. The November 2021 fourth annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue further strengthened strategic and economic partnerships and addressed obstacles to investment and trade. The fifth round of strategic talks is expected to take place in Doha in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 31 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 68 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 15.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 55,990 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Over the past few years, the government of Qatar enacted reforms to incentivize and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Recent FDI-friendly legislations include Law 1/2019 permitting full foreign ownership in most economic sectors, Law 16/2018 regulating foreign real estate investment and ownership, and Law 12/2020 regulating public-private partnerships. Implementing regulations for some of these laws is still pending. In 2019, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry set up the Investment Promotion Agency-Qatar to further attract inward FDI. Other FDI facilitating bodies include the Qatar Financial Centre, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and the Qatar Free Zones Authority, all of which offer full foreign ownership and repatriation of profits, tax incentives, and investment funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises. The government’s economic spending plans are also expected to create additional opportunities for foreign investors. For 2022, the government has allocated $20 billion for new non-oil sector projects, including new residential land development and the improvement of public services. The government also plans to increase LNG production, its primary source of revenue, to 126 million metric tons by 2027, and Qatari officials expect significant investment opportunities for international companies in the upstream and downstream sectors. The government extends preferential treatment to suppliers who use local content in their bids on government contracts. Participation in tenders with a value of five million Qatari riyals ($1.37 million) or less is limited to local contractors, suppliers, and merchants registered with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Higher-value tenders, in theory, do not require any local commercial registration; in practice, certain exceptions exist. Qatar maintains an ongoing dialogue with the United States through both official and private sector tracks, including the annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue and official trade missions. Qatari officials have repeatedly emphasized a desire to increase American investments in Qatar and Qatari investments in the United States. Although Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity (replacing Law 13/2000) grants foreign investors the ability to invest in Qatar – either by partnering with a Qatari investor owning 51 percent or more of the enterprise or by applying to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for up to 100 percent foreign ownership – not all sectors are open to foreign investment. Law 1/2019 limits foreign ownership to 49 percent in the sectors of banking, insurance, and commercial agencies, barring a special dispensation from the Cabinet. Some sectors, such as telecommunications, are monopolized by local state-owned enterprises and are closed off to domestic or foreign competition. Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties allows foreign individuals, companies, and real estate developers freehold ownership of real estate but limits ownership to nine designated zones and usufructuary rights up to 99 years in 16 other zones. Foreigners may also own villas within selected residential complexes and retail outlets in specific commercial complexes. Foreign real estate investors and owners are eligible for residency in Qatar for as long as they own their property. The Ministry of Justice created a Committee on Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Real Estate in December 2018 to regulate non-Qatari real estate ownership and use. The Invest in Qatar Center within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the entity responsible for vetting full foreign ownership applications. U.S. investors and companies are not disadvantaged by existing ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms more than other foreign investors. Qatar underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) policy review in April 2021. The review may be viewed on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp396_e.htm Recent reforms have further streamlined the commercial registration process. Local and foreign investors may apply for a commercial license through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s physical one-stop-shop or online through the Invest in Qatar Center’s portal. Per Law 1/2019, upon submitting a complete application, the Ministry will issue its decision within 15 days. Rejected applications can be resubmitted or appealed. Upon approval, registering a small-size limited liability company in Qatar is estimated to take eight to nine days. For more information on the application and required documentation, visit: https://invest.gov.qa Domestic and foreign companies may also opt to register in one of Qatar’s economic zones: Qatar Financial Centre: http://www.qfc.qa/ Qatar Free Zones Authority: https://qfz.gov.qa/ Qatar Science and Technology Park: https://qstp.org.qa/ Qatar does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. According to the World Bank, Qatar’s outward foreign investment stock reached $2.7 billion in 2020. Sectors that accounted for most of Qatar’s outward FDI are finance and insurance, transportation, storage, information and communication, and mining and quarrying. Per the latest statistics, Qatari investment firms held investments in over 80 countries, the top destinations being the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other Arab countries. 3. Legal Regime Qatar has taken measures to protect competition and ensure a free and efficient economy. The World Trade Organization recognizes Qatar’s legal framework to be conducive to private investment and entrepreneurship and enabling the development of an independent judiciary system. In addition to the National Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee, regulatory authorities exist for most economic sectors and are mandated to monitor economic activity and ensure fair practices. According to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, Qatar lacks a transparent rulemaking mechanism. Government ministries and regulatory agencies do not share regulatory plans or publish draft laws for public consideration. An official public consultation process does not exist in Qatar. Relevant ministries develop Laws and regulations. The 45-member Shura Council (30 of which are publicly elected officials) must reach a consensus to pass draft legislation, which is then returned to the Cabinet for further review and to the Amir for final approval. The text of all legislation is published online and in local newspapers upon approval by the Amir. All Qatari laws are issued in Arabic and eventually translated to English. Qatar-based legal firms provide translations of Qatari legislation to their clients. Each approved law explicitly tasks one or more government entities with implementing and enforcing legislation. These entities are clearly defined in the text of each law. In some cases, the law also sets up regulatory and oversight committees consisting of representatives of concerned government entities to safeguard enforcement. Qatar’s official legal portal is http://www.almeezan.qa . Qatar’s primary commercial regulator is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Commercial Companies’ Law 11/2015 requires that publicly traded companies submit financial statements to the Ministry in compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS). Publicly listed companies must also publish financial statements at least 15 days before annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. All companies must prepare accounting records according to standards promulgated by the IAS Board. Since joining the United Nations’ initiative on sustainable development (SSEI) in 2016, the Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) has encouraged, but not required, publicly traded companies to report on environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG). In November 2021, the QSE launched an ESG Index listing the top 20 securities with the best ESG profile, indicating that ESG disclosures may soon become a requirement of all listed companies. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) is the primary financial regulator that oversees all financial institutions in Qatar, per Law 13/2012, which established a Financial Stability and Risk Control Committee to promote financial stability and enhance regulatory coordination, headed by the QCB Governor. According to Law 7/2005, the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) Regulatory Authority is the independent regulator of the QFC firms and individuals conducting financial services in or from the QFC. Still, the QCB also oversees financial markets housed within QFC. QFC regulations are available at http://www.qfcra.com/en-us/legislation/ . The government of Qatar is transparent about its public finances and debt obligations. QCB publishes quarterly banking data, including external government debt, government bonds, treasury bills, and Sukuk (Islamic bonds) at http://qcb.gov.qa/English/Publications/Pages/Publications.aspx Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a political and economic regional bloc. Laws based on GCC regulations must be approved through Qatar’s domestic legislative process and are reviewed by the Qatari Cabinet and the Shura Council before implementation. Qatar has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1996 and usually notifies its draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Qatar’s legal system is based on civil and Islamic Sharia laws. The Constitution takes precedence over all laws, followed by legislation, decrees, and ministerial resolutions. The Supreme Judicial Council appoints all judges under Law 10/2003, oversees Qatari courts, and functions independently from the executive branch of the government, per the Constitution. Qatari courts adjudicate civil and commercial disputes per civil and Sharia laws. International agreements have equal status with Qatari laws; the Constitution ensures that international pacts, treaties, and agreements to which Qatar is party are respected. Contract enforcement is governed by the Civil Code Law 22/2004. Law 21/2021 promogulated the establishment of an Investment and Commerce Court to oversee all commercial lawsuits and disputes. Pending the establishment of the new court, domestic and commercial disputes continue to be settled in civil courts. Decisions made in civil courts and the new Investment and Commerce Court can be appealed before the Court of Appeals or later the Court of Cassation. Law 20/2021 on Mediation in the Settlement of Civil and Commercial Disputes is applied when parties agree to mediate and settle commercial disputes. Companies registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry are subject to Qatari courts and laws, primarily the Commercial Companies Law 11/2015. Meanwhile, companies set up through Qatar Financial Center (QFC) are regulated by commercial laws based on English Common Law and the courts of the QFC Regulatory Authority. The QFC legal regime is separate from the Qatari legal system—except for criminal law—and is only applicable to companies licensed by the QFC. Similarly, companies registered within the Qatar Free Zones Authority are governed by specialized regulations. Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity and Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties aim to encourage greater foreign investment in the economy by authorizing, incentivizing, and protecting foreign ownership. The MOCI’s Invest in Qatar Center is Qatar’s main investment registration body. It gives preference to investments that add value to the local economy and align with the country’s national development plans. It has a physical “one-stop-shop” and an online portal. For more information on investment opportunities, commercial registration application, and required documentation, visit https://invest.gov.qa . Different laws and regulations govern foreign direct investment at the Qatar Financial Centre ( http://www.qfc.qa/ ), the Qatar Free Zones Authority (https://qfz.gov.qa/), the Qatar Science and Technology Park ( https://qstp.org.qa/ ), and Manateq ( https://www.manateq.qa/ ). Specific sectors are not open for domestic or foreign competition, such as public transportation and fuel distribution and marketing. In such sectors, semi-public companies maintain a predominant role. Law 19/2006 for the Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practice established the Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee to receive complaints about anti-competition violations. The law protects against monopolistic behavior by entities outside the state if deemed to impact the Qatari market. The law also allows state institutions and government-owned companies absolute or predominant roles in some sectors. Qatari laws permit international law firms with at least 15 years of continuous experience in their countries of origin to operate in Qatar; however, they can only be licensed if Qatari authorities deem their fields of specialization useful to Qatar. Cabinet Decision Number 57/2010 stipulates that the Doha office of an international law firm can practice in Qatar only if its main office in the country of origin remains open. Under current legislation (Law 1/2019 and Law 16/2018), the government protects foreign investment and property from direct or indirect expropriation, unless for public benefit, in a non-discriminatory manner, and after providing adequate compensation. Law 13/1988 covers the rules of expropriation for public benefit. The same procedures are applied to the expropriated property of Qatari citizens. Expropriation is unlikely to occur in the investment zones where foreigners may purchase or obtain rights to property. However, the law does not restrict the expropriation power in these areas. There were two Cabinet-approved expropriation decisions in 2021 and one decision in 2020. Two concurrent bankruptcy regimes exist in Qatar. The first is the local regime, set out in Commercial Law 27/2006 (Articles 606-846). The bankruptcy of a Qatari citizen or a Qatari-owned company is rarely announced. The law aims to protect creditors from a bankrupted debtor whose assets are insufficient to meet the amount of the debts. The government sometimes plays the role of the guarantor to prop up domestic businesses and safeguard creditors’ rights. Bankruptcy is punishable by imprisonment, but the length of the prison sentence depends on violations of other penal codes, such as concealment or destruction of company records, embezzlement, or knowingly contributing to insolvency. The second bankruptcy regime is encoded in QFC’s Insolvency Regulations of 2005 and applies to corporate bodies and branches registered within the QFC. Some firms offer full dissolution bankruptcy services to QFC-registered companies. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) established the Qatar Credit Bureau in 2010 to promote credit growth in Qatar. The Credit Bureau provides QCB and the banking sector with a centralized credit database to inform economic and financial policies and support the implementation of risk management techniques as outlined in the Basel II Accord. 4. Industrial Policies Qatar does not impose a personal income tax and the new foreign investment law (Law 1/2019) offers a variety of other incentives to foreign investors, which may include the following: Exemption from 10 percent corporate tax for up to 10 years. Exemption from customs duties on imports of necessary machinery and equipment. Exemption from customs duties on imports of raw materials or imports of half-manufactured goods necessary for production and not available in the local market. Up to 100 percent foreign ownership and no limit on repatriation. The legislation provides for the establishment of some industrial projects in designated industrial zones under the Qatar Free Zones Authority; those projects receive the following incentives: Exemption from 10 percent corporate tax for up to 20 years. Zero custom duties on imports. Potential access to a $3 billion government-backed fund. One hundred percent foreign ownership and no limit on repatriation. Opportunities for joint ventures with local companies. Possible access to a backed investment fund. Qatar Energy determines the amount of foreign equity and the extent of incentives for industrial energy-related projects; Law 8/2018 regulates the process. Qatar has several free zones and business facilitation options, namely the Qatar Financial Center, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and Qatar Free Zones Authority: Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) is an onshore business platform that allows international financial institutions and professional service companies to establish offices in Qatar with 100 percent foreign ownership and full repatriation of profits. Locally sourced profits are subject to a 10 percent corporate tax. The QFC has an independent regulatory regime based on English common law. The QFC Regulatory Authority acts as the regulator for financial firms operating under QFC’s umbrella. The QFC Regulatory Tribunal and Qatar International Court hear and adjudicate cases. Judgments issued though these bodies are only of value if enforced by Qatari courts against persons and/or Qatar-based assets. Goldman Sachs International, Mastercard Gulf, Uber, and Oracle are among the companies registered with QFC. The Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP) is a hub designed to conduct research and development and facilitate expertise and technology transfer. The hub offers grants and incubators to foreign and local innovators. QSTP permits licensed foreign companies to own up to 100 percent and fully repatriate capital and income. Companies operating at the QSTP can import goods and services duty-free and export goods produced at the park tax-free. Firms operating at the park are also exempt from all taxes, including the 10 percent corporate tax. The property of these businesses cannot be seized under any circumstance, but capital and other cash may be seized on the orders of a local court. Microsoft, ExxonMobil, GE, Cisco, Cypher Learning, and ConocoPhillips are QSTP member companies. The Qatar Free Zones Authority (QFZ) oversees two free zones in Qatar: Ras Bufontas near the country’s international airport and Um Alhoul adjacent to the country’s largest commercial seaport. Companies operating in these free zones are permitted 100 percent foreign ownership, corporate tax exemption for 20 years, full repatriation of profits, custom duties exemption on all imports, and a range of other incentives. Google, DHL, and Volkswagen are notable examples of multinational companies operating at the QFZ. Law 12/2020 on Organizing the Partnership between the Public and Private Sector represents the government’s most recent attempt to attract foreign investors and develop the private sector. There are no laws that obligate the private sector to hire Qatari nationals. Still, the public sector and institutions working closely with the government on projects and joint ventures (such as energy companies operating in Qatar) are required to hire Qatari nationals. Workforce localization policy (known as “Qatarization”) in the public sector is a central focus of the country’s National Vision 2030, and foreign investors wishing to operate wholly owned companies will be required to submit a Qatarization plan. In 2020, the Cabinet approved a new ministerial decree to mandate that Qataris make up at least 60 percent of the workforce of state-owned companies or companies where the government is a majority investor, and 80 percent of the human resources workforce. Children of Qatari women are considered Qataris for purposes of calculating this localization ratio. The government allocates visa slots for hiring nationals of specific countries based on preset quotas; such slots are non-transferable without obtaining approval from the Ministry of Labor. While Qatar does not follow a forced localization policy, the government provides preferential treatment to suppliers that use local content in bids when competing for government contracts. The government of Qatar also gives a 10 percent price preference to goods produced with Qatari content. As a rule, participation in government tenders with a value of QAR 5,000,000 or less (equivalent to approximately $1.37 million) is limited to local contractors, suppliers, and merchants registered with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce. Tenders involving higher valuations do not, in theory, require any local commercial registration; however, in practice, certain exceptions exist. In 2019, Qatar’s national oil and gas company, Qatar Energy, announced a localization initiative, Tawteen, which requires all suppliers and bidders to undergo an assessment by a third-party auditor to determine their In-Country Value (ICV) score. Qatar Energy and its subsidiary companies would assess bidders’ ICV scores in addition to technical and commercial criteria when evaluating bids. The formula for calculating a company’s ICV score can be found at https://www.tawteen.com.qa/In-Country-Value/ICV-Overview-(1) . No specific performance requirements exist for Qatar-based foreign investment. While disclosure of financial and employment data is required, proprietary information is not. There are no known formalized requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to the authorities for surveillance. Cross-border data transmission is allowed in compliance with the law. Qatar’s Communications Regulatory Authority – established as an independent body by Amiri Decree 42/2014 – regulates the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Qatar was the first Gulf nation to enact a Data Protection Law 13/2016, which requires companies to comply with restrictions related to collecting, disclosing, and safekeeping of personal data. The regulator responsible for enforcing the Data Protection Law is the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. 5. Protection of Property Rights A set of laws, ministerial decrees, and resolutions make up the country’s jurisprudence on property rights and ownership. Law 16/2018 designates nine zones where foreign investors, companies, and real estate developers are permitted full property ownership. The law also allows foreign investors the usufructuary right of up to 99 years in 16 other zones. Additionally, foreigners may own villas within residential complexes and retail outlets in specific commercial complexes. The government grants non-Qatari real estate owners residency for as long as they own their properties. Meanwhile, Law 6/2014 regulates real estate development and stipulates that non-Qatari companies should have at least ten years of experience and be headquartered in Qatar to carry out real estate development activities at selected locations. The Government of Qatar enforces property leasehold rights. Qatar’s Rent Law 4/2008 extends more protections to the lessee while regulating lessors. The government grants several enforceable rights to the lessee, including protection from rent hikes during the lease period and enforcement of the lease contract terms should the lessor transfer ownership. The government protects lessors against tenants’ violations of lease agreements. Qatar’s Leasing Dispute Settlement Committee enforces these regulations. The committee hears and issues binding decisions and requires all lessors to register their lease agreements with this committee. The Ministry of Municipality oversees the preparation of all records related to the selling, leasing, waiver, and bequeathing of real estate. A reliable electronic database exists to check for encumbrances, including liens, mortgages, and restrictions, and keep all titles and deed records in digital format. While Qatar’s intellectual property (IP) legal regime is still under development, it is robust and includes a wide range of legislation that protects different types of IP rights. Qatar’s IP legislation consists of the Trademark and Copyright Law (enacted in 2002), the Protection of Trade Secrets and Protection of Layout Design law (2005), the Patent Law (2006), and most recently, the Protection of Industrial Designs and Models law (2020). Qatar has signed many international IP treaties, and Qatari laws and regulations guarantee the implementation of those treaties. These laws grant foreign applicants the same rights as Qataris, provided they are nationals of a state that gives Qatar reciprocal treatment. Intellectual property owners can apply for IP rights at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), which is mandated, by Law 20/2014, to enforce IP laws and regulations. An IP Protection Department has been set up with offices focusing on trademarks, copyrights, patents, industrial designs, and innovations within the ministry. The following are the periods of validity for the different types of registered IP: Patents: Valid for 20 years from the date of filing. The Ministry of Public Health requires the registration of all imported pharmaceutical products and rejects registration requests for unauthorized copies of products patented in other countries. Qatar also recognizes pre-existing GCC patents on pharmaceutical products. The GCC Patent Office used to provide an affordable and efficient option for companies seeking intellectual property protection throughout the six GCC member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). Effective January 2021, the office stopped accepting new patent filings. The decision now forces companies seeking patent registration in the GCC region to file separate applications in each country, pay six separate fees, and endure a substantial waiting period before their patents are registered in all six states. Copyrights: Protected for 50 years after the author’s death. Per Qatari law, failure to register at MOCI will not affect the protection of the copyright. While the law does not protect unpublished works and does not criminalize end-user piracy, Qatar is party to the Berne and Paris Conventions. It abides by their mandates regarding unpublished works. The IP Protection Department works with law enforcement authorities to prosecute unlicensed video and software resellers. Trademarks: Valid for ten years but can be renewed indefinitely; trademarks unused for five consecutive years are subject to cancellation. The GCC Customs Union approved a common trademark law; Qatar is taking steps to enact it. Industrial Designs: Valid for five years from submission date but can be renewed two additional times. This law covers the visual design rather than an original product’s functional or technical aspects. Law 10/2020 on the Protection of Industrial Designs was enacted in May 2020. The law on Intellectual Property Border Protection (Law 17/2011) forbids the importation of any products that infringe on any intellectual property rights protected in Qatar and obligates the General Authority of Customs to take measures to prevent the entry of infringing products into Qatar. Given sufficient evidence, the law also permits IP rights holders to block the release of imported products that infringe on their rights. In 2017, the General Authority of Customs launched an electronic system to detect counterfeit goods coming into the country. The system is accredited by the World Customs Organization and has been introduced to limit the importation of counterfeit goods. The United States Trade Representative Office (USTR) does not consider Qatar a market that engages in, turns a blind eye to, or benefits from piracy and counterfeit products. Qatar is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report. The existing Penal Code imposes hefty fines on individuals dealing in counterfeit products. It prescribes prison terms for offenders convicted of counterfeiting, imitating, fraudulently affixing, selling products, offering services of a registered trademark, or other IP violations. The General Authority of Customs, the MOCI Consumer Protection and IP Protection Departments, and the Ministry of Interior conduct surveys, search shops, and seize and destroy counterfeit products. Qatar is a member of the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is a signatory of several WIPO treaties. For additional information on national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. Companies and individuals seeking assistance on pursuing IP protections and enforcement claims in Qatar can consult a list of local attorneys posted on the U.S. Embassy Doha website: https://qa.usembassy.gov/legal-assistance/ U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Regional IP Attaché Peter C. Mehravari, Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Department of Commerce Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates +965 2259-1455 Peter.mehravari@trade.gov Web: https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/intellectual-property-rights-ipr-attach-program/intellectual United States Trade Representative IPR Director for the GCC Jacob Ewerdt +1-202-395-3866 Jacob.p.ewerdt@ustr.eop.gov Web: http://www.ustr.gov 6. Financial Sector The Government of Qatar has permitted foreign portfolio investment since 2005. There are no restrictions on the flow of capital in Qatar. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) adheres to conservative policies to maintain a stable banking sector. It respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments or transfers for international transactions. It allocates loans on market terms and treats foreign companies the same way it does local ones. Existing legislation currently limits foreign ownership of Qatari companies listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange to 49 percent. In April 2021, the Cabinet approved a draft law (still pending implementation) that will allow full foreign ownership of the capital of listed companies. Foreign portfolio investment in national oil and gas companies or companies with the right to explore national resources cannot exceed 49 percent. Almost all import transactions require standard letters of credit from local banks and their correspondent banks in the exporting countries. Financial institutions extend credit facilities to local and foreign investors within standard international banking practices. Creditors typically require foreign investors to produce a letter of guarantee from their local sponsor or equity partner. Under QCB guidelines, banks operating in Qatar give priority to Qataris and public development projects in their financing operations. Additionally, banks usually refrain from extending credit facilities to single customers exceeding 20 percent of the bank’s capital and reserves. QCB does not allow cross-sharing arrangements among banks. QCB requires banks to maintain a maximum credit ratio of 90 percent. The Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) was found in 1997, is a member of the World Federation of Exchanges, and was recently upgraded by MSCI and the S&P Dow Jones Indices. QSE has 43 listed companies and aims to include many other local SMEs in the mid-term. QSE has been appointed by the Qatar Central Bank as the main entity tasked with promoting Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting among listed companies. Qatar has a comprehensive banking sector that offers conventional and Shariah-compliant products and services. The country’s banking sector is composed of 16 banks, 9 of which are Qatari banks, and the remaining 7 are foreign financial institutions. The industry is dominated by government-owned Qatar National Bank (QNB) which enjoys around 50% of domestic market share in total assets, loans, and deposits with smaller lenders competing for the remaining opportunities. Qatar also has a state-run Development Bank created to support local SMEs. Qatari banks are well capitalized with a low non-performing loans ratio that stood at 2.3% in 2020 and is expected to remain low in 2021. The GOQ has always supported its banking sector where necessary (recent examples include during the GCC rift in 2017 and COVID-19 pandemic in 2020) and is expected to continue to do so, given the country’s substantial resources. To open a bank account in Qatar, foreigners must present proof of residency and have a minimum salary of QAR 5000 ($1300). The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) is the primary regulator of the financial sector in the country and governs both conventional and Shariah-compliant institutions. QCB manages liquidity by mandating a reserve ratio of 4.5 percent and utilizing treasury bonds, bills, and other macroprudential measures. Banks that do not abide by the required reserve ratio are penalized. QCB uses repurchase agreements backed by government securities to inject liquidity into the banks. According to QCB data, total domestic liquidity reached $170.1 billion in November 2021, and only two percent of Qatar’s bank loans in 2020 were nonperforming. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, was established in 2005 and is chaired by the Amir. The fund does not publicly disclose the size of its investments, but they are estimated to amount to $450 billion, according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). QIA pursued at first direct investments in luxury brands, prime real estate, and banks abroad. The fund is now looking for opportunities in healthcare, technology industry, and infrastructure investments. In 2015, QIA opened an office in New York City and is now on track to complete a $45 billion commitment of investments in the United States, in addition to a $10 billion that will be invested in infrastructure projects. QIA’s real estate subsidiary, Qatari Diar, has operated an office in Washington, D.C., since 2014. QIA announced in May 2020 that it planned to increase its exposure in Asia and Africa, away from Europe, where the fund had invested heavily over the past decade. QIA has domestic investments including in Qatar National Bank (50%), the country’s largest lender by assets, Qatar Islamic Bank (16%) and flag carrier Qatar Airways (100%). The fund has also subsidiaries that invest locally in sports, hospitality and real estate development. QIA was one of the early supporters of the Santiago Principles and among the few members who drafted the principles’ initial and final versions. It continues to be a proactive supporter of its implementation. QIA supported the establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and helped create the Forum’s constitution. QIA was also a founding member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The State Audit Bureau oversees state-owned enterprises (SOEs), several operating as monopolies or holding exclusive rights in most economic sectors. Despite the dominant role of SOEs in Qatar’s economy, the government has affirmed support for the local private sector. It encourages small and medium-sized enterprise development as part of its National Vision 2030. The Qatari private sector is favored in bids for local contracts and generally receives favorable terms for financing at local banks. The following are Qatar’s major SOEs: Energy and Power: Qatar Energy, its subsidiaries, and its partners operate all oil and gas activities in the country. The government wholly owns QE. Non-Qataris can invest in its stock exchange listed subsidiaries, but shareholder ownership is limited to two percent and total non-Qatari ownership to 49 percent. Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation (Kahramaa) is the sole utility provider in the country and is majority-owned by Qatari government entities. To privatize the sector, the Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC) was established in 2001 as a separate and private provider that sells its desalinated water and electricity to Kahramaa. Other privatization efforts included the Ras Laffan Power Company, based in 2001, and 55 percent owned by a U.S. company. Aerospace: Qatar Airways is the country’s national carrier and is wholly owned by the state. Services: Qatar General Postal Corporation is a state-owned postal company. Several other delivery companies compete in the courier market, including Aramex, DHL Express, and FedEx Express. Information and Communication: Ooredoo Group is a telecommunications company founded in 2013. Ooredoo (previously known as Q-Tel) dominates both the cell and landline telecommunications markets in Qatar and partners with telecommunications companies in 13 Middle East, North Africa, and Asia markets. It is the dominant player in the Qatari telecommunications market and is 70 percent owned by Qatari government entities. Ooredoo Group is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange. Vodafone Qatar is Qatar’s only other telecommunications operator, with the quasi-governmental entity Qatar Foundation owning 62 percent of its shares. Other Qatari government entities and Qatar-based investors own the remaining 38 percent. Vodafone Qatar is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange. Qatari SOEs may adhere to their own corporate governance codes and are not required to follow the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Some SOEs publish online corporate governance reports to encourage transparency, but there is no general framework for corporate governance across all Qatari SOEs. SOEs listed on the stock exchange must publish financial statements at least 15 days before annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. When an SOE is involved in an investment dispute, the case is reviewed by the appropriate sector regulator (for example, the Communications Regulatory Authority for the information and communication sector). There is no ongoing official privatization program for major SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness in Qatar of responsible business conduct. Many companies publicize their Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, the majority of which cover environmental issues as well. Qatar participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as an economy dependent on extractive industries. Nonetheless, the Qatari government has not improved transparency regarding its petroleum industry management, as no regulatory body oversees resources extraction or revenue management. Moreover, Qatar has no freedom of information law. The Government of Qatar maintains a reporting regime for suspicious transactions and requirements for consumer due diligence and record-keeping. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has a dedicated Consumer Protection and Combating Commercial Fraud Department, which has intensified its efforts by monitoring records and inspection of stores and factories that sell or manufacture counterfeit goods. The ministry prosecutes business misconduct and announces these violations publicly. Qatari law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor and reserves two percent of jobs in government agencies and public institutions for persons with disabilities. The law also prohibits the employment of children under 16 years of age. The Ministry of Labor (MOL), the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) conduct training sessions for migrant laborers to inform them of their rights while in Qatar. In 2018, the United States and Qatar signed a government-to-government memorandum of understanding on exchanging expertise and fostering capacity building on combating human trafficking. In 2019, the U.S. Department of Labor and MOL signed a Memorandum of Understanding on labor, focusing on labor inspections and protecting domestic workers’ rights in Qatar. Some Qatari non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focus on labor rights and often work with the government. Researchers from international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to visit and report on labor developments in the country with limited interference from authorities. International labor NGOs have been able to send researchers to Qatar under the sponsorship of academic institutions and quasi-governmental organizations such as the NHRC. Global media and human rights organizations continue to allege numerous abuses against foreign workers, including forced or compulsory labor, withheld wages, unsafe working conditions, and poor living accommodations. Private security companies cannot operate in Qatar without an appropriate license granted by the MOI, per Law 19/2009 on Regulating the Provision of Private Security Services. As of 2009, Qatar has been a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . In October 2021, the Government of Qatar launched its National Environment and Climate Change Strategy. National environmental goals included achieving 25 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, reaching net-zero emissions by 2060, conserving over 25 percent of the land, restoring marine biodiversity, reducing groundwater abstraction by 60 percent, promoting 100 percent use of recycled water, requiring 30 percent recycled material use in public infrastructure procurement, and increasing the rate of recycling of municipal waste to 15 percent and construction waste to 35 percent. Sustainability has been a focus of Qatar’s National Development Strategy 2018-2022 and an important component of the Qatar National Vision 2030. Qatar requires all projects in the industrial, agricultural, urban development, and infrastructural sectors to acquire environmental impact assessments from the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, which was established in October 2021. As of February 2022, the government stopped extending additional incentives for companies that adopt environmental conservation measures. Law 30/2002 is the primary legislation protecting the environment. It prohibits polluting equipment, machinery, and vehicles and restricts the dumping and treatment of liquid or solid wastes to certain designated areas. The law also limits emissions of harmful vapors, gases, and smoke by the energy sector. Despite these initiatives, Qatar suffers from ecological threats such as water insecurity, temperature anomalies, and air pollution. 9. Corruption Corruption in Qatar does not generally affect the conduct of business, although the power of personal connections plays a significant role in business culture. Qatar ranked as the second least corrupt country in the Middle East and North Africa, according to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, and ranked 31st out of 180 nations globally with a score of 63 out of 100, with 100 indicating full transparency. Qatari law imposes criminal penalties to combat corruption by public officials, and the government actively implements these laws. Corruption and misuse of public money are a focus of the executive office. Law 22/2015 imposes hefty penalties for corrupt officials. Decree 6/2015 restructured the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, granting it juridical responsibility, a budget, and direct affiliation with the Amir’s office. The authority’s objectives are to prevent corruption and ensure that ministries and public employees operate with transparency. Transparency is also mandated when investigating alleged crimes against public property or finances perpetrated by public officials. Law 11/2016 grants the State Audit Bureau more financial authority and independence, allowing it to publish parts of its findings (provided that confidential information is removed), a power it did not previously have. Individuals convicted of embezzlement are subject to prison terms of no less than five and up to ten years. The penalty can be extended to a minimum term of seven and a maximum term of fifteen years if the perpetrator happens to be a public official in charge of collecting taxes or exercising fiduciary responsibilities over public funds. Qatar State Security Bureau and the Office of the Public Prosecutor handle investigations of alleged corruption charges. The Criminal Court makes final judgments. Bribery is a crime in Qatar, and the law imposes penalties on public officials convicted of acting in return for monetary or personal gain and on other parties who take actions to influence or attempt to influence a public official through monetary or other means. The current Penal Code (Law 11/2004) governs corruption regulations and stipulates that individuals convicted of bribery may be sentenced up to ten years in prison and fines amounts equal to the amount of the bribe but no less than $1,374. To promote a fairer, more transparent, and more expeditious public-sector tendering process, the government issued Procurement Law 24/2015, which abolished the Central Tendering Committee and established in its stead a Procurement Department within the Ministry of Finance that has oversight over most government tenders. The new department has an online portal that consolidates all government tenders and provides relevant information to interested bidders, facilitating the process for foreign investors ( https://monaqasat.mof.gov.qa ). Qatar is not a party to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. However, Qatar ratified the UN Convention for Combating Corruption (by Amiri Decree 17/2007) and established a National Committee for Integrity and Transparency (by Amiri Decree 84/2007). The permanent committee is headed by the Chairman of the State Audit Bureau. In 2013, Qatar opened the Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law Center in Doha in partnership with the United Nations. The center’s purpose is to support, promote, and disseminate legal principles to fight corruption (https://rolacc.qa/). Despite these efforts, some American businesses cite a lack of transparency in government procurement and customs as recurring issues when operating in the Qatari market. U.S. investors and Qatari nationals who happen to be agents of U.S. firms are subject to the provisions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Administrative Control and Transparency Authority is also responsible for receiving transparency-related complaints within the public sector: Administrative Control and Transparency Authority Al Bida St., Al Dafna, Doha, PO Box: 25558 974 44305220, +974 44305222, and +974 44069909 info@acta.gov.qa To file complaints: http://actadev.wpengine.com/en/complaints/ 10. Political and Security Environment Qatar is a politically stable country with low rates of crime. There are no political parties, labor unions, or organized domestic political opposition. The U.S government rates Qatar as a medium risk country for terrorism, including threats from transnational actors. The State Department encourages U.S. citizens in Qatar to stay in close contact with the U.S. Embassy in Doha for up-to-date threat information. The Department invites U.S. visitors to Qatar to enroll in its Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive further information on safety conditions in Qatar: https://step.state.gov/step/. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Qatar has one of the world’s highest migrant workers to indigenous population ratios, with foreigners making up nearly 90 percent of the country’s population. Qatar’s resident population is estimated at 2.78 million as of January 2022, doubling in the last decade. Qatari citizens are estimated to number approximately 300,000 – around 11 percent of the total population. Qatar’s labor force consists primarily of expatriate workers. The largest group of foreign workers comes from the Indian sub-continent. Males make up around 72 percent of the population. As of the second quarter of 2021, about 60 percent of the female population aged 15 years and above were economically active, compared to 95 percent of males. However, local statistics may not fully account for all employed females as calculations as primarily based on residency statuses, which are family, not employment-based for most migrant females. Qatar’s unemployment rates are among the lowest globally, with a 0.1 percent unemployment rate for men and a 0.5 percent unemployment rate for women, as of 2021. The government mandates that Qataris make up at least 60 percent of the employees of state-owned enterprises or companies where the government is a majority investor and 80 percent of those entities’ human resources workforce. Children of Qatari women are considered Qataris for purposes of calculating this localization ratio. Over three-quarters of employed Qatari citizens work for the government. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) regulates the recruitment of expatriate labor. Labor Law 14/2004 largely governs employment in Qatar and allows the terminating party to terminate employment without providing reasons. The law requires employers to pay employees owed wages and other benefits in full, provided they have performed expected work duties during the notice period, which varies based on years of employment. The English common law governs companies registered with QFC, and labor issues are administered by QFC’s Regulation 10/2006. There are no labor unions in Qatar. Non-citizens are not eligible to form worker committees or go on strike. However, according to an agreement between MOL and the International Labor Organization (ILO), joint worker committees including 50-50 representation of workers and employers exist in a small number of cases for all medium to large-sized companies. Law 12/2004 on Private Associations and Foundations and subsequent regulations grant Qatari citizens the right to form workers’ committees in private enterprises with more than 100 Qatari citizen workers. Qatari citizens employed in the private sector also have the right to participate in approved strikes. Still, the restrictive conditions imposed by the law make the likelihood of an approved strike remote. Regardless of nationality, individuals working in the public sector are prohibited from joining unions. Workers at labor camps occasionally go on strike over non-payment or delayed wages; however, this practice is technically illegal. Local courts handle disputes between workers and employers, but the process is widely regarded as inefficient. To speed up the process of resolving labor disputes, the government established Labor Disputes Settlement Committees headed by a judge and representatives from MOL. As of 2018, there are three such committees, all of which operate outside of the traditional Supreme Judicial Committee structure and are required to address any complaints within three weeks. Law 17/2020 sets the minimum basic wage for workers and domestic workers at $275 per month and $220 for lodging and meals if not provided by the employer. To combat the problem of late and unpaid wages, the government issued Law 1/2015, amending specific provisions of Labor Law 14/2004 on wage protection and mandating electronic payment to all employees subject to the local labor law. The government requires all employers to open bank accounts for their employees and pay wages electronically through a system subject to audits by an inspection division at the MOL; this requirement, however, does not apply to domestic workers. Employers who fail to pay their workers face penalties between $550 and $1,650 per case and possible prison sentences. Those penalties, however, are rarely implemented. The system currently applies to over 1.4 million workers. The Labor Law prohibits the employers’ withholding of workers’ passports and stiffens penalties for transgressors. To eliminate forced labor, the government issued Law 19/2020, enabling employees to switch employers without requiring the employer’s permission. This new legislation complimented Law 13/2018, allowing workers covered by the Labor Law to leave the country without requiring exit permits. To protect workers from fraudulent employment contracts, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) established the Qatar Visa Centers (QVCs) to simplify residency procedures for expatriate workers from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. In partnership with MOI and MOL, contracted companies set up QVCs in these countries to facilitate biometric enrollment, medical records verification, and work contracts before contracted workers enter Qatar. Qatar is a member of the ILO and maintains that its labor law meets ILO minimum requirements. In 2017, Qatar made commitments to address some ILO complaints by launching a comprehensive three-year ILO technical cooperation program. In 2018, the ILO opened a Doha office. In 2018, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a labor-related MOU with the Department of State during the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. The MOU laid out plans for cooperation in combating trafficking-in-persons, including strengthening the labor sector to reduce instances of forced labor. In 2019, MOL signed an MOU with the U.S. Department of Labor to enhance cooperation in labor inspection and protecting domestic workers’ rights. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy, Doha 22nd February Street, Al Luqta District, P.O. Box 2399, Doha, Qatar +974-4496-6000 EskandarGA@state.gov Republic of the Congo Executive Summary The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), and the Government of Republic of the Congo (ROC) project an increase of 2.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022, a recovery from a 0.8 percent GDP decline in 2021. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the ROC struggled with the effects of the 2014 drop in oil prices. Poor governance and a lack of economic diversification pushed the ROC to near insolvency, reduced its creditworthiness, and forced the central bank to expend significant foreign currency reserves. Oil represents the largest sector of the economy and contributes upwards of 60 percent of the government’s annual declared revenue. The primary non-oil sectors are timber, telecommunications, banking, construction, and agriculture. ROC has resources for economic diversification, with vast swaths of arable land, some of the largest iron ore and potash deposits in the world, a heavily forested land mass, and a deep-water International Ship and Port Facility Security Code-certified port. ROC is eligible for the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preferences since October 2000, providing incentive for export-related investment. ROC also participates in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The largest current infrastructure project is major road repairs on the section of highway between Brazzaville and Owando; the initial project was completed in 2016. ROC’s nascent internet and inconsistent supplies of electricity and water present major hurdles to and opportunities for foreign direct investment. Significant sections of the country’s road system need maintenance or paving. The limited railroad network competes with truck and bus traffic for commercial cargo. However, large infrastructure projects are in progress in several major cities, and the government reports spending significant amounts on infrastructure improvements. Investors report that the commercial environment in ROC has not improved substantially in recent years. ROC ranked 162 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. American businesses operating in ROC and those considering establishing a presence regularly report obstacles linked to corruption, lack of transparency, subjective application of legal codes and host government inefficiency in matters such as registering businesses, obtaining land titles, paying taxes, and negotiating natural resource contracts. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 162 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,770 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROC government welcomes FDI in most sectors, particularly in the oil sector, which accounts for 90 percent of FDI inflows. The government stated an urgent need to attract investment outside of the petroleum sector in March 2021. Since March 2021, the country has attracted additional investment interest from the United Arab Emirates, Italy, Turkey, Russia, the People’s Republic of China, France, Egypt, Rwanda, and the United States. As a stipulation of the International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility awarded in January 2022, ROC pledged to undertake legislative, regulatory, and institutional reforms to improve the investment climate. No known laws or practices discriminate against foreign investors, including U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in any sector of the economy. The United States and ROC signed an investment agreement in 1994. ROC’s Agency for the Promotion of Investments (API), established in 2013, promotes economic diversification by seeking to expand the pool of external investors into government-directed sectors. API provides French-language advisory services to potential investors and maintains a database of government projects seeking private investor partners. To benefit from API services, the interested company must match with pre-determined preferred sectors. The government has made no significant efforts at a systemic level to retain foreign investments or to maintain dialogue with investors, however, officials maintain strong personal ties with investors to support investment, but rarely share these connections throughout the government, resulting in competition amidst ministers for investment contacts and dollars. The High Committee for Public-Private Dialogue, established in 2012, convened one meeting in 2021. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. ROC has no known limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign business entities investing in the petroleum sector must pursue a joint venture with the Congolese National Petroleum Company (SNPC). An ROC executive order from November 15, 2019, requires foreign companies in the hydrocarbons sector to employ Congolese in 80 percent of management positions and 90 percent of all employee positions. ROC has no formal investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. The government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. No civil society organization provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. The ROC Agency for Business Creation, (French acronym ACPCE), serves as a “one-stop shop” for establishing a business. ACPCE has offices in Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, N’kayi, Ouesso, and Dolisie. To establish a business in ROC, investors must provide ACPCE with two copies of the company by-laws, two copies of capitalization documents (e.g. a bank letter or an affidavit), a copy of the company’s investment strategy, ownership documents or lease agreements for the company’s offices in ROC, and CPA-approved financial statements within three years after operations start. The ACPCE website https://dgpme.cg/acpce.php serves as an information-only website. Business registration cannot be completed through the website. The business registration process takes from 4 to 12 weeks normally for all companies and must be initiated in person with ACPCE. The ROC government does not publicly promote or incentivize outward investment. The ROC government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Lack of transparency poses one of the greatest hurdles to FDI, as investors must navigate an opaque regulatory bureaucracy. Companies routinely find themselves embroiled in tax, customs, and labor disputes arbitrated by court officials who make decisions that do not conform with Congolese law and ROC Ministry of Justice regulations. ROC has no known informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The government develops new regulations internally and rarely requests formal input from industry representatives. Various ministries have regulatory authority over the individual industries in their area of responsibility, with overall authority coordinated by the Ministry of Economy. The government does not usually offer a formal, public-comment period. ROC’s accounting, legal, and regulatory frameworks are transparent in their structure, though the application often lacks transparency and fairness. ROC uses Francophone Africa’s Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization (French acronym OHADA) system of accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures. The government does legally require extractive industries to conduct environmental impact surveys ahead of activities. Mining and timber sector companies are required to do ongoing environmental and social offset activities. Oversight on these required activities is self-reported from businesses. The GROC lacks the capacity to enforce and assure disclosures. The government does not make draft bills or regulations available for public comment. The government publishes new laws and regulations in ROC’s Official Journal. The Official Journal is available for download at the website of the Secretary General of the Government who maintains the Official Journal online at http://www.sgg.cg . Most government ministries have an inspector general that conduct oversight to ensure that government agencies follow administrative processes. The Office of the President has an inspector general who oversees the entire government. In 2021, the government passed the new Anti-Corruption Law, aiming to target corruption among public officials across all sectors of government. The new legislation is a complement to the 2017 Public Transparency and Financial Management law that focused on transparency of public funds and the officials managing them. The new law increases fines and potential jail time for corruption and is meant to mitigate loss of funds to corruption. No new reforms were made in the reporting period. The inspector general process is not legally reviewable, digitalized, nor accountable to the public. The government publishes some public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. The Ministry of Finance publishes the arrangements on its website, https://www.finances.gouv.cg/ . ROC participates as a member in the Economic Community of Central African States (French acronym CEEAC), a regional economic cooperation community, and in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (French acronym CEMAC), a monetary union of six Central African states. CEMAC forms the base of local regulatory systems, including the stock exchange, the central bank, and the language for rules and regulations on investment and the economy. CEMAC sets the regional debt threshold for member countries and limits external cash transfers for companies based in member countries, and institutes banking regulations shared by member countries. ROC’s regulatory system for business disputes and regulations governing company registration structure and incorporation incorporates Francophone African regulatory norms promulgated by Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Rights (OHADA). ROC participates as a member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government did not provide information as to whether it notifies the WTO Committee of all draft regulations relating to Technical Barriers to Trade. ROC signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement but has not begun implementing the agreement. The French civil law legal system serves as the basis of the Congolese legal system. Contracts are enforced by referring to the commercial court system. OHADA provides the basis for ROC’s national commercial law, supplemented by ROC-specific provisions, such as requiring companies to register with the commercial courts. A commercial court exists in ROC but has not convened since 2016. The judicial system remains independent in principle. In practice, however, the executive branch intervenes in the judicial system on an ad hoc basis. The judicial process is procedurally competent, but its fairness and the reliability of judgments and applications of the legal code are questionable. Appellate courts exist and receive appeals of enforcement actions. Public Law 6-2003, which established the country’s Investment Charter, states that Congolese law will resolve investment disputes. Judgments of foreign courts are difficult to enforce in ROC. Though the government does not usually deny foreign court judgments outright, it may propose process or procedural delays that prolong matters indefinitely without resolution. ROC’s commercial court has authority over any legal disputes involving foreign investors. Investors may also file legal complaints in the OHADA court – based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire – which has jurisdiction throughout Francophone Africa. ROC’s Hydrocarbons Law and Mining Code of 2016 contain industry-specific regulations for foreign investments. The government published no substantive changes to laws, regulations, or judicial decisions related to foreign investment during the reporting period. The ROC Agency for Business Creation ACPCE is the first stop for establishing a business. Its website has limited information about laws, rules, and reporting requirements: https://dgpme.cg/acpce.php . The newly formed American Chamber of Commerce also serves as a resource for American investors. No agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns, either domestic or international in nature. Ministries in general monitor individual industries and review industry-related transactions. The ROC government may legally expropriate property if it finds a public need for a given public facility or infrastructure (e.g. roads, hospitals, etc.). No recent history of expropriation regarding private companies exists. Historically, however, the ROC government has expropriated private property from Congolese citizens to build roads and stadiums. Law entitles the claimants to a fair market value compensation, but the government distributed such compensation inconsistently. Beginning in 2012, the ROC government expropriated land of Congolese private property owners in the Kintele suburb of Brazzaville to build a sports complex for the 2015 African Games. The government offered minimal compensation to property owners. At the time, citizens publicly complained of a lack of legal recourse against the government. The government has not taken any measures alleged to be indirect expropriations such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments during the reporting period. However, there is an abundance of corrupt employees within the tax authority who charge companies more than they are due, irrespective of the legal tax regime. ROC has no specific law that governs bankruptcy. As a member of OHADA, ROC applies OHADA bankruptcy provisions in the event of corporate or individual insolvency. No laws criminalize bankruptcy. ROC does not have a credit bureau or other credit monitoring authority serving the country’s market. 4. Industrial Policies When a potential investor believes its investment will bring substantial investment and job creation to the Congolese economy, it may apply for preferential tax and customs treatment through the Ministry of Finance’s National Committee on Investments. The Minister of Finance chairs this committee, which includes the Minister of Economy and Industrial Development, the Minister of Planning, and the Minister of Budget. The committee reviews applications annually. Presidential decree No. 2004-30 of February 18, 2004, defines the requirements for foreign and national companies to benefit from incentives offered by the Congolese Investment Charter. The decree promulgates four types of incentives: (1)Incentives to export; (2)Incentives to reinvest the company’s profit in ROC; (3) Incentives for businesses in remote areas or areas that are difficult to access; and (4)Incentives for social and cultural investment. Examples of incentives include reduced or exempted taxes below the corporate tax rate of 30 percent; reduced customs duties over a period of five to 10 years; a 50 percent reduction in business registration fees; and an accelerated depreciation mechanism. For companies owned at least 25 percent by domestic entities, other incentives include a reduced dividend tax rate of 10 percent, capital gains tax reductions, deductions for business expenditures, reduced rents, and deductible remunerations. Businesses may negotiate other incentives during the incorporation process. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. The government has yet to offer any incentives, such as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives for clean energy investments. The ROC government has named four special economic zones (SEZs): in the main economic hub of Pointe-Noire, the capital Brazzaville, and the cities of Ouesso and Oyo. ROC signed memoranda of understanding with the Governments of Mauritius, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China to advise on the development of the SEZs. The government expressed a desire to attract U.S. investment to the SEZs. Little activity has yet to develop in the SEZs, and no known timeline exists to render the SEZs operational. Major foreign direct investment must demonstrate an economic windfall for the local community (e.g. increased local employment) for approval of an investment agreement from the National Committee on Investment to receive tax and investment benefits. ROC’s labor code requires the top manager of all companies to be a Congolese national. The government frequently waives this requirement for multinational companies. No known performance requirements exist for foreign or local companies. No known restrictions apply to U.S. or other foreign firms’ participation in ROC government-financed or subsidized research and development programs. No known procedures for performance requirements exist in the Republic of the Congo. When a potential investor believes its investment will bring substantial investment and job creation to the Congolese economy, it may apply for preferential tax and customs treatment by applying to the Ministry of Finance’s National Committee on Investments. No requirements for foreign information technology providers exist to provide source code and/or access to encryption. No known measures prevent companies from transmitting customer or other business data outside of the country. No known rules require local data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights The government enforces property rights and interests, though companies and individuals cite inconsistent enforcement. Mortgages and liens exist. The recording system is generally reliable. No known specific regulations regarding land lease or acquisition by foreign investors exist. The government has no definitive registry of untitled land. There are ongoing efforts by the government to push property owners to register land titles. Property ownership can transfer to other owners if the property remains unoccupied for 10 consecutive years while having been simultaneously occupied by another user (squatter). As a member of CEMAC, the ROC participates in the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI). OAPI manages a single copyright system for all member states. Additionally, as a member of the WTO, ROC is obligated to ensure that intellectual property (IP) legislation conforms to WTO norms and standards. The Ministry of Commerce leads issues related to counterfeit products. Local authorities have historically seized and destroyed contraband items, such as counterfeit medical supplies and black-market food products. Determining the extent of IP infringement is challenging because the ROC maintains no formal system of tracking and reporting seizures of counterfeit goods. Additionally, the ROC government reportedly uses unlicensed software on its computers. The government has not enacted any new IP-related laws or regulations in the past year. Local authorities have historically seized and destroyed contraband items but determining the extent of IP infringement is challenging because the ROC maintains no formal system of tracking and reporting seizures of counterfeit goods. ROC is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report. ROC is not listed in the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The ROC government maintains a neutral attitude toward foreign portfolio investment and does not widely practice foreign portfolio investment. ROC does not have a national stock exchange. ROC-based companies may seek regional listing on the Douala Stock Exchange, which merged with the CEMAC Zone Stock Exchange. BEAC puts in place a regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. The government and Central Bank respect IMF Article VIII in principle, however, within the last year the BEAC imposed restrictions on international payments and transfers. Mining and oil companies expressed concerns about the new restrictions. The BEAC monitors credits and market terms. Foreign investors can obtain credit on the local market so long as they have a locally registered company. ROC, however, offers only a limited range of credit instruments. Banking penetration is estimated at 10- to 12-percent. High intermediation costs and high collateral requirements limit the pool of customers. Microfinance banks and mobile banking remain the fastest growth areas in the banking sector. The current economic crisis and the government’s consecutive years of fiscal deficits strained the banking sector over the past five years. Overall loan default is around 20 percent in the reporting period. Non-performing loans amount to approximately 20 percent in 2022. The Republic of the Congo’s largest banks is BGFI Congo with estimated total assets of about $200 million in 2021. Fiscal transparency issues limit any estimate of the total assets controlled by ROC’s largest banks. The assets of the largest banks decreased in recent years as a result of the economic crisis. ROC participates in the CEMAC zone and the BEAC system. BEAC’s regulatory body, the Banking Commission of Central Africa (French acronym COBAC), supervises the Congolese banking sector. Foreign banks and branches may operate in ROC and constitute the majority of banking operations in ROC. BEAC banking regulations govern foreign and domestic banks in ROC. No banks have left ROC in the past fifteen years. No known restrictions exist on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. GROC maintains no formal Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). An ROC law legalized the framework to establish an SWF in 2016 at the BEAC, intending to open ROC to mostly risk-free foreign assets. The SWF has yet to be established. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the Congolese economy in the 1970s and 1980s. The number of SOEs remains comparatively small following a wave of privatization in the 1990s. The national oil company (SNPC), electricity company (E2C), and water supply company (LCDE) constitute the largest remaining SOEs. SOEs report to their respective ministries. The government publishes no official list of SOEs. Constraints on SOEs operating in the non-oil sector appear to be monitored sufficiently and are subject to civil society and media scrutiny. The operations of SNPC, however, continue to be opaque. SOEs must publish annual reports subject to examination by the government’s supreme audit institution. In practice, these examinations do not always occur. Private companies may compete with public companies and have in some cases won contracts sought by SOEs. Government budget constraints limit SOE’s operations. The Republic of the Congo has not adhered to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. ROC has no known privatization programs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) remains a well-known concept in ROC that local communities view favorably. Foreign oil companies constitute the primary CSR actors. Telecommunications and transportation companies and banks have increasingly supported CSR initiatives to improve their public image. The government utilizes CSR contributions to help finance hospitals, education, nutrition programs, and road construction. The government has not taken any specific measures to encourage responsible business conduct (RBC). The government has not established a national contact point or ombudsman for RBC, nor has it established a national action plan to define and drive its approach to RBC. The government encourages RBC by partnering with or endorsing companies’ CSR initiatives. RBC policies do not factor significantly into government procurement decisions. There are no known or alleged human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC that foreign businesses should be aware of. There are no known claims in the last five years by indigenous or other communities that a government entity improperly allocated land or natural resources. No known high-profile, controversial instances of private sector entities negatively impacting human rights exist. The GROC enforces domestic laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and commerce inconsistently. No known corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards exist to protect shareholders. No independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations specifically promote or monitor RBC practices. Civil society groups promote individual matters of interest on a case-by-case basis. ROC does not adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. No domestic measures require supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals that may originate from conflict-affected areas. ROC participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The latest report was published in 2020. No domestic transparency measures require the disclosure of payments made to the government and/or of RBC policies or practices. ROC has a small private security industry. However, the use of private security companies is becoming more widespread for private companies and well-off individuals. ROC is not signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, and/or a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers, and/or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . The GROC national development plan includes activities for the international framework following the REDD+ initiative (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), and the United Nations required National Strategy and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which details each country’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts. The GROC has no policy specific to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. ROC absorbs more carbon than it emits. The ROC government has no strategy to reach net-zero carbon emissions. The GROC has no regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, or other desirable ecological benefit. Known public procurement policies include environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. However, implementation and enforcement capacity are weak. 9. Corruption ROC adopted a law against corruption by public officials, “Code de Transparence dans les Finances Publiques,” on March 9, 2017. It adopted another comprehensive law against corruption, “Prévention et Lutte contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées” on January 24, 2022. The ROC government inconsistently enforces both of these laws. The corruption laws apply to elected and appointed officials. They do not extend to family members of officials or to political parties. No specific laws or regulations address conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. ROC does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies, particularly multinationals, use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. ROC is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention. ROC does not provide protection to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) investigating corruption. NGOs report that government corruption results in self-censoring of reporting and investigations into corruption. U.S. firms routinely cite corruption as an impediment to investment, particularly in the petroleum sector. Corruption can be found in nearly all sectors including government procurement, award of licenses or concessions, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory systems, customs, and taxation. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Emmanuel Ollita Ondongo Président Haute Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption (HALC) Centre Ville, Brazzaville, République du Congo +242 06 944 6165 or +242 05 551 2229 emmallita2007@yahoo.fr Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Christian Mounzeo Président Rencontre pour la Paix et les Droits de l’Homme (RPDH, the local chapter of “Publish What You Pay” – Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez) B.P. 939 Pointe-Noire, République du Congo +242 05 019 8501 or +242 05 358 3577 http://www.rpdh-cg.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment The most recent period of civil strife and violence ended in December 2017, when anti-government forces in the Pool region, which surrounds the capital of Brazzaville, signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. Before this violence, the country was in civil conflict from 1997 to 1999. There are no known examples of damage to commercial projects and/or installations in the past ten years. Civil disturbances have occasionally resulted in damage to high-profile, public places such as police stations. While elections in 2021 were peaceful, political violence and civil unrest may occur. In the past, political demonstrations have led to armed clashed, deaths, and injuries. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Migrant workers from multiple Asiatic, European, and African origins work in the extractive industries, predominantly in skilled positions and management roles. Foreign workers are also present in major construction companies, usually as engineers and management. Women make up the bulk of the informal market sector. Women are employed across all sectors, but rarely seen in public transportation roles or as mechanics. It is very difficult for people with handicaps to work in the formal sector, but there are no statistics that capture the extent of the barriers. Indigenous populations are underrepresented in the labor force due to a lack of access to education, their concentration in rural underdeveloped areas, and discrimination. There are no statistics indicating the percentage of skilled versus unskilled labor in ROC, but the weakness of the secondary education system, lack of post-secondary education options in the country, low availability of trade schools or trade apprenticeships, and limited access to equipment lends itself to a higher concentration of unskilled labor. Unemployment in ROC remains high, with youth and women disproportionately affected. ROC does not publish unemployment data, affecting international partners abilities to publish data. The last World Bank report on unemployment estimates unemployment was 22.8 percent in 2020. The majority of the population operates in the informal sector of the economy and does not declare revenues and profits, pay taxes, or pay employee benefits to the state. According to a Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise’s study in 2019, financed by the World Bank, 93.4 percent of businesses in ROC operate in the informal sector. Women are more represented in the informal sector, especially in local public markets. The same study asserts women entrepreneurs face additional structural challenges establishing and operating a business and accessing credit. The study does not include the percentage of women represented in the informal sector. Skilled labor shortages exist in several technical areas, including medicine, engineering, math, science, and banking. The government has no specific training programs to address these shortages. Several laws and government policies including the Hydrocarbon Law, the Local Content Law, and industry-specific bargaining agreements require preferential treatment in the hiring process to Congolese nationals. Government regulations govern employment adjustments in response to changing market conditions and include a severance requirement. Employers must demonstrate that market conditions have changed and obtain government approval before adjusting employment. Congolese severance laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. An employer must generally document malfeasance to terminate an employee for cause. There is no unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. Most workers laid off for economic reasons rely on their former employer’s unemployment compensation. The government may waive some labor laws to attract or retain investment on a case-by-case basis. ROC has, for example, waived the requirement for certain multinationals to hire a Congolese general manager. No known labor law exceptions exist for Special Economic Zones versus the economy writ large. Collective bargaining is widely used in the ROC, and more than half of companies used it in various industries. These industries include the extractive sectors, telecommunications, construction and public works, local international organization offices, and the finance sector. The Labor Court system mediates and arbitrates labor disputes. There were no major strikes that posed an investment risk occurred during the reporting period. There are no serious questions of compliance in law or practice with international labor standards for working conditions that may pose a reputational risk to investors exist. The International Labor Organization has not identified any potential gaps in law or practice with international labor standards. The government did not enact any new labor laws or regulations during the last year. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section Embassy of the United States of America Boulevard Denis Sassou Nguesso Brazzaville, Republic of Congo + 242 06 612 2000 brazzavillepolecon@state.gov Romania Executive Summary Title Romania welcomes all forms of foreign investment. The government provides national treatment for foreign investors and does not differentiate treatment due to source of capital. Romania’s strategic location, membership in the European Union (EU), relatively well-educated workforce, competitive wages, and abundant natural resources make it a desirable location for firms seeking to access European, Central Asian, and Near East markets. U.S. investors have found opportunities in the information technology, automotive, telecommunications, energy, services, manufacturing, healthcare, consumer products, insurance, and banking sectors. Since the 1989 revolution, Romania has embarked on an uneven, but ascending economic growth path. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Romania’s economy declined by 3.9 percent in 2020, and rebounded with a 5.9 percent real GDP growth rate in 2021. As of February, the European Commission (EC) projected 4.2 percent real GDP growth for Romania in 2022. However, spillover effects from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rising global energy prices, and an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have led several international financial institutions to adjust the growth rate downwards, predicting closer to 3 percent GDP growth in 2022. On March 9, 2022, Romania lifted all COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Romania supported businesses and workers by broadening eligibilities for unemployment benefits, enabling employers to adopt flexible work models, and instituting a temporary credit and lease payment moratorium. Romania stands to receive 27 billion EUR in grants and loans from “Next Generation EU” funding via the National Resilience and Recovery Plan (NRRP). The NRRP funding, which will be disbursed between 2021 to 2026, aims to support Romania’s green transition, digitalization efforts, and health system resilience. However, a demonstrated lack of administrative capacity to absorb and implement projects using EU funding may impact Romania’s ability to absorb the funds and dampen the NRRP’s impact. As an EU member state, Romania’s climate objectives align with EU strategies, including the 2030 Agenda and the European Green Deal. However, legacy environmental issues limit Romania’s ability to deliver on biodiversity and clean air goals. Environmental challenges include poor air quality, inadequate waste management practices, and insufficient protective measures for natural areas. Illegal logging remains a concern despite progress towards improved traceability of extracted wood. The investment climate in Romania remains a mixed picture, and potential investors should undertake due diligence when considering any investment. The European Commission’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania pointed to persistent legislative instability, unpredictable decision-making, low institutional quality, and corruption as factors eroding investor confidence. Frequent reorganizations of public institutions also contributed to a significant degree of instability. The government’s sale of minority stakes in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in key sectors, such as energy generation and exploitation, has stalled since 2014. In 2020, the Romanian government enacted a two-year ban on the sale of state equities of SOEs. Successive governments have weakened enforcement of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate governance code by resorting to appointments of short-term interim managers to bypass the leadership requirements outlined in the corporate governance code. Instability in the management of SOEs hinders the ability to plan and invest. Consultations with stakeholders and impact assessments are required before enacting legislation. However, these requirements have been unevenly followed, and public entities generally do not conduct impact assessments. Frequent government changes have led to rapidly changing policies and priorities that serve to complicate the business climate. Romania has made significant strides to combat corruption, but it remains an ongoing challenge. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 48 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country historical stock positions) 2020 $3.93B https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,580 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Romania actively seeks foreign direct investment and offers a market of around 19.2 million consumers, a relatively well-educated workforce at competitive wages, a strategic location, and abundant natural resources. To date, favored areas for U.S. investment include IT and telecommunications, energy, services, manufacturing – especially in the automotive sector, healthcare, consumer products, insurance, and banking. InvestRomania, within the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Tourism, is the government’s lead agency for promoting and facilitating foreign investment in Romania. Romania’s accession to the EU on January 1, 2007, helped solidify institutional reform. However, the lack of legislative and regulatory predictability and impact assessments, as well as low institutional capacity, continue to negatively affect the investment climate. As in any foreign country, prospective U.S. investors should exercise careful due diligence, including consultation with competent legal counsel, when considering an investment in Romania. Governments in Romania have repeatedly allowed political interests or budgetary imperatives to supersede accepted business practices in ways harmful to investor interests. The energy sector has suffered from unanticipated changes. In 2018, offshore natural gas companies benefited from a streamlined permitting process but were hit with a windfall profit tax that previously applied only to onshore gas production. Additionally, in February 2018, legislation changed the reference price for natural gas royalties from the Romanian market price to the Vienna Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) price, significantly increasing royalties. The Government of Romania (GOR) liberalized the natural gas market on July 1, 2020, and the electricity market as of January 1, 2021, for both household and non-household consumers. As energy prices surged during the winter of 2021-2022, the GOR capped energy prices for households and subsidized remaining balances. To reduce the effect on the state budget, the GOR levied a windfall tax on natural gas and electricity producers’ 2021 profits. In March 2021, the Romanian Parliament passed a bill reinforcing the government’s authority to vet transfers of petroleum agreements to companies from non-EU countries, and to determine if a transfer poses a threat to Romania’s national security. Transfer of a petroleum agreement must be approved through a government decision. Investments involving public authorities can be more complicated than investments or joint ventures with private Romanian companies. Large deals involving the government, particularly public-private partnerships, can be stymied by vested political and economic interests or bogged down due to a lack of coordination between government ministries. Designed to recoup drug reimbursement costs that exceeded state-budgeted amounts, Romania’s claw back tax was 27.65 percent in 2019. In May 2020, the GOR approved a revised and differentiated claw back tax, capped at 25 percent for innovative medicines, 20 percent for generic medicines, and 15 percent for locally produced medicines. While the 2020 legislation provided some relief to pharmaceutical companies, the claw back tax continued to negatively affect the availability of drugs in the Romanian marketplace. In February 2022, the Romanian Competition Council fined five plasma therapies producers for allegedly colluding to limit immunoglobulin supplies in the Romanian market between 2015 – 2018. Foreign and domestic private entities are free to establish and own business enterprises, and to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Romanian legislation and regulation provide national treatment for foreign investors, guarantee free access to domestic markets, and allow foreign investors to participate in privatizations. There is no limit on foreign participation in commercial enterprises. Foreign investors are entitled to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises in Romania (although joint ventures are more typical), and to convert and repatriate 100 percent of after-tax profits. Romania has established legal parameters to resolve contract disputes expeditiously. Mergers and acquisitions are subject to review by the Competition Council. Under the Competition Law, the Competition Council must notify Romania’s Supreme Defense Council of mergers or acquisitions of stocks or assets that could affect national security. The Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) then reviews the referred mergers and acquisitions for potential threats to national security. The Romanian capital account was fully liberalized in 2006, prior to joining the EU in 2007. Foreign firms are allowed to manage and administer their investments, and to assign their contractual obligations and rights to other Romanian or foreign investors. Romania has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through multilateral organizations in over ten years. In January 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) opened accession discussions with Romania. Over a multi-year period, OECD technical commissions will assess Romania’s candidacy against OECD standards and policies in areas such as the investment climate, governance, and environmental protection. In January 2022, the OECD published an economic survey with initial recommendations on how Romania can further its socioeconomic development. Among other findings, the report recommended that Romania continue to digitalize and modernize its tax administration to raise tax collection and improve tax compliance; to strengthen its administrative capacity to absorb EU funds; and to address gaps in transportation infrastructure. The National Trade Registry has an online service available in Romanian at https://portal.onrc.ro/ONRCPortalWeb/ONRCPortal.portal . InvestRomania offers free assistance and advisory services to foreign investors and international companies for business activities, such as project implementation and opening new offices or manufacturing facilities. More information is available at http://www.investromania.gov.ro/web/ . According to the World Bank, it takes six procedures and 20 days to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC) in Romania compared to the regional average for Europe and Central Asia of 5.2 procedures and 11.9 days. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign parent company establishing a subsidiary in Romania must authenticate and translate its documents. As of March 2022, foreign companies did not need to seek investment approval. A Trade Registry judge must hold a public hearing on the company’s application for registration within five days of submission of the required documentation. Applicants can submit and monitor the status of their registration documents online. Companies in Romania are free to open and maintain bank accounts in any foreign currency, although, in practice, Romanian banks offer services only in Romanian lei (RON) and certain hard currencies (Euros and U.S. dollars). The minimum capital requirement for domestic and foreign LLCs is RON 200 (USD 45). Areas for improvement include making all registration documents available to download online in English. Romania defines microenterprises as having less than nine employees, small enterprises as having less than 50 employees, and medium-sized enterprises as having less than 250 employees. Regardless of ownership, microenterprises and SMEs enjoy “de minimis” and other state aid schemes from EU funds or from the state budget. Business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women in the economy. There are no restrictions or incentives on outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Romanian law requires consultations with stakeholders, including the private sector, and a 30-day comment period on legislation or regulation affecting the business environment (the “Sunshine Law”). Some draft pieces of legislation pending with the government are available in Romanian at http://www.sgg.ro/acte-normative/ . Proposed items for cabinet meetings are not always publicized in advance or in full. Generally, the agenda of cabinet meetings should include links to the draft pieces of legislation (government decisions, ordinances, emergency ordinances, or memoranda) slated for government decision, but this is not always the case. Pending parliament legislation is available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.home for the Chamber of Deputies and at https://www.senat.ro/legis/lista.aspx for the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies is the decision-making body for economic legislation. Foreign investors point to the excessive time required to secure necessary zoning permits, environmental approvals, property titles, licenses, and utility hook-ups. The Sunshine Law (Law 52/2003 on Transparency in Public Administration) requires public authorities to allow the public to comment on draft legislation and sets the general timeframe for stakeholders to provide input; however, comments received are not published. The Sunshine Law’s public consultation timelines do not have enforceable penalties or sanctions, and thus public authorities can bypass its provisions without harm. In some cases, public authorities have set deadlines much shorter than the standards set forth in the law or passed a piece of legislation before the deadline for public input expired. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitalized and is not made accountable to the public. As an EU member state since 2007, Romanian legislation is largely driven by the EU Acquis Communautaire, the accumulated body of EU legislation. European Commission (EC) regulations are directly applicable while national legislation implements directives at the national level. Romania’s regulatory system incorporates European standards. Romania has been a WTO member since January 1995 and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since November 1971. Technical regulation notifications submitted by the EU are valid for all Member States. The EU signed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in October 2015. Romania has implemented all TFA requirements. Romania recognizes property and contractual rights, but enforcement through the judicial process can be lengthy, costly, and difficult. Foreign companies engaged in trade or investment in Romania often express concern about the Romanian courts’ lack of expertise in commercial issues. Romania has no specialized commercial courts, but it does have specialized civil courts. Judges generally have limited experience in the functioning of a market economy, international business methods, intellectual property rights, or the application of Romanian commercial and competition laws. As stipulated in the Constitution, the judicial system is independent from the executive branch and generally considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Affected parties can challenge regulations and enforcement actions in court. Such challenges are adjudicated in the national court system. Inconsistency and a lack of predictability in the jurisprudence of the courts or in the interpretation of the laws remains a major concern for foreign and domestic investors and for wider society. Even when court judgments are favorable, enforcement of judgments is inconsistent and can lead to lengthy appeals. Failure to implement court orders or cases where the public administration unjustifiably challenges court decisions constitute obstacles to the binding nature of court decisions. Mediation as a tool to resolve disputes is gradually becoming more common in Romania, and a certifying body, the Mediation Council, sets standards and practices. The professional association, the Union of Mediation Centers in Romania, is the umbrella organization for mediators throughout the county. Court-sanctioned and private mediation is available at recognized mediation centers in every county seat. Romania has no legal mechanism for court-ordered mediation, but judges can encourage litigants to use mediation to resolve their cases. If litigants opt for mediation, they must present their proposed resolution to a judge upon completion of the mediation process. The judge must then approve the agreement. Since Romania joined the EU in 2007, the country has worked assiduously to create an EU-compatible legal framework consistent with a market economy and investment promotion. At the same time, implementation of these laws and regulations frequently lags or is inconsistent, and lack of legislative predictability undermines Romania’s appeal as an investment destination. Romania’s legal framework for foreign investment is encompassed within a substantial body of law largely enacted in the late 1990s. It is subject to frequent revision. Romania enacted major changes to the Civil Code in October 2011, including replacing the Commercial Code, consolidating provisions applicable to companies and contracts into a single piece of legislation, and harmonizing Romanian legislation with international practices. The Civil Procedure Code, which provides detailed procedural guidance for implementing the new Civil Code, came into force in February 2013. Fiscal legislation is revised frequently, often without scientific or data-driven assessment of the impact the changes may have on the economy. Given the state of flux of legal developments, investors are strongly encouraged to engage local counsel to navigate the various laws, decrees, and regulations as several pieces of investor-relevant legislation have been challenged in both local courts and the Constitutional Court. Few hostile takeover attempts have been reported in Romania. Romanian law has not focused on limiting potential mergers or acquisitions. No Romanian laws prohibit or restrict private firms’ free association with foreign investors. Romania has extensively revised its competition legislation, bringing it closer to the EU Acquis Communautaire and corporate best practices. As of 2014, companies with a market share below 40 percent were no longer considered to have a dominant market position. This approach eliminates the need for the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) to conduct full investigations, saving considerable time and money for all parties involved. Resale price maintenance and market and client sharing are still prohibited, regardless of the size of either party’s market share. The authorization fee for mergers or takeovers ranges between EUR 10,000 (USD 11,944) and EUR 50,000 (USD 59,720). The Fiscal Procedure Code requires companies that challenge an RCC ruling to front a deposit while awaiting a court decision on the merits of the complaint. Romania’s Public Procurement Directives outline general procurements of goods and equipment, utilities procurement (“sectorial procurement”), works and services concessions, and remedies and appeals. An extensive body of secondary and tertiary legislation accompanies the four 2016 laws and has been subject to repeated revisions. Separate legislation governs defense and security procurements. In a positive move, this body of legislation moved away from the previous approach of using lowest price as the only public procurement selection criterion, allowing authorities to use price, cost, quality-price ratio, or quality-cost ratio. The revised laws also allow bidders to provide a simple form (the European Single Procurement Document) to participate in the award procedures. Only the winner must later submit full documentation. As of April 2021, only companies from EU member states or signatory countries of the WTO Public Procurement Agreement have been allowed to bid on public procurements in Romania. Public procurement laws stipulated that challenges regarding procedure or an award can be filed with the National Complaint Council (NCC) or the courts. Disputes regarding execution, amendment, or termination of public procurement contracts can be subject to arbitration. The revised laws also stipulated that a bidder must notify the contracting authority before challenging either the award or procedure. Not fulfilling this notification requirement can result in the NCC or the courts rejecting the challenge. The EC’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania noted that despite improved implementation, public procurement remained inefficient. According to the report, 97 percent of businesses thought corruption was widespread in Romania, and 87 percent said it was widespread in public procurements managed by national authorities. The law on direct investment includes a guarantee against nationalization and expropriation or other equivalent actions. The law allows investors to select the court or arbitration body of their choice to settle disputes. Several cases involving investment property nationalized during the Communist era remain unresolved. In doing due diligence, prospective investors should conduct a thorough title search to ensure land or assets are not subject to any pending restitution claims. Romania’s bankruptcy law contains provisions for liquidation and reorganization that are generally consistent with Western legal standards. These laws usually emphasize enterprise restructuring and job preservation. To mitigate the time and financial cost of bankruptcies, Romanian legislation provides for administrative liquidation as an alternative to bankruptcy. However, investors and creditors have complained that liquidators sometimes lack the incentive to expedite liquidation proceedings and that, in some cases, their decisions have served vested outside interests. Both state-owned and private companies tend to opt for judicial reorganization to avoid bankruptcy. In December 2009, the debt settlement mechanism Company Voluntary Agreements (CVAs) was introduced as a means for creditors and debtors to establish partial debt service schedules without resorting to bankruptcy proceedings. However, global economic crisis prompted Romania to shorten insolvency proceedings in 2011. According to the World Bank 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Romania takes 3.3 years on average compared to 2.3 years in Europe and Central Asia. Such cases cost 10.5 percent of the debtor’s estate with the most likely outcome being a piecemeal sale of the company. The average recovery rate is 34.4 cents on the dollar. 4. Industrial Policies Currently, customs and tax incentives are available to investors in six free trade zones. State aid is available for investments in free trade zones under EU regional development assistance rules. In 2007, Romania adopted EU regulations on regional investment aid and instituted state aid schemes for large investments, SMEs, and job creation. Both Romanian and EU state aid regulations aim to limit state aid in any form, such as direct state subsidies, debt rescheduling schemes, debt for equity swaps, or discounted land prices. The European Commission (EC) must be notified of and approve GOR state aid that exceeds the pre-approved monetary threshold for the corresponding category of aid. To benefit from the remaining state aid schemes, the applicant must secure financing separate from any public support for at least 25 percent of the eligible costs, either through his own resources or through external financing, and must document this financing in strict accordance with Ministry of Finance guidelines. Under amendments passed in 2010, the state aid scheme for regional projects scores applications based not only on the economics of the project, but also on the GDP per capita and unemployment rate for the county of intended investment. When granting state aid, the Ministry of Finance requires that the state revenues through taxes equals the state aid granted. Numerous foreign and U.S firms have successfully applied for and received Romanian state aid. The green certificate system, part of the Renewable Energy Law, provided incentives for certain types of renewable energy. The incentives are not available for renewable energy investments made after January 1, 2017, but investors that qualified under the support system can trade certificates until 2032. Green certificates are traded in parallel with the energy produced. They are intended to provide an additional source of revenue for renewable energy producers. Repeated revisions to the support system – including deferring release of the certificates and lowering the mandatory green certificate quota that consumers and suppliers must acquire – have created instability in the renewables investment climate. Energy intensive industrial consumers receive exemptions from acquiring green certificates. The GOR responded to the international energy crisis in winter 2021-2022 by suspending the green certificate system between April and December of 2022. As an EU member state, Romania must receive EC approval for any state aid it grants that is not covered by the EU’s block exemption regulations. The Romanian Competition Council acts as a clearinghouse for the exchange of information between the Romanian authorities and the EC. The EC has launched formal investigations into several privatizations where the state aid grantors failed to properly notify the EC of aid associated with the privatizations. Investors should ensure that the government entities with which they work fully understand and fulfill their duty to notify competition authorities. Investors may wish to consult with EU and Romanian competition authorities in advance to ensure a proper understanding of notification requirements. Companies operating in Romania can also apply for aid under EU-funded programs that are co-financed by Romania. When planning a project, prospective applicants should note that a project cannot start before the financing agreement is finalized. The application, selection, and negotiation process can be lengthy. Applicants also must secure financing for non-eligible expenses and for their co-financing of the eligible expenses. Finally, reimbursement of eligible expenses – which must be financed upfront by the investor – is often very slow. Procurements financed by EU-funded programs above a certain monetary threshold must comply with public procurement legislation. To increase the rate of EU funds absorption, Romania has amended regulations to allow applicants to use the assets financed under EU-funded programs as collateral. However, Romanian public institutions’ understaffing and lack of management expertise, cumbersome procedures, and applicants’ difficulty obtaining private financing still significantly impede the absorption and implementation of EU funds. Free Trade Zones (FTZs) received legal authority in Romania in 1992 under the authority of the Ministry of Transportation. General provisions include unrestricted entry and re-export of goods, and exemption from customs duties. The law further permits the leasing or transfer of buildings or land for terms of up to 50 years to corporations or natural persons, regardless of nationality. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Romanian entities in FTZs. Currently six FTZs, primarily located on the Danube River or close to the Black Sea, operate in Sulina, Constanta-Sud Agigea, Galati, Braila, Curtici-Arad, and Giurgiu. The administrator of each FTZ is responsible for all commercial activities performed within the zone. The government generally does not mandate local employment. A notable exception is the Offshore Law (Law 256/2018), which requires that at least 25 percent of the employees of offshore titleholders be Romanian citizens with fiscal residence in Romania. No excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibit mobility of foreign investors or their employees. The government imposed no conditions on permission to invest. The government does not require investors to establish or maintain data storage in Romania. Romania neither follows nor has legislation requiring localization in relation to goods, technology, or data. Romania does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access for government surveillance. Romania has no measures preventing or unduly impeding companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. The government imposed no performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Romanian Constitution, adopted in December 1991 and revised in 2003, guarantees the right to ownership of private property. Mineral and airspace rights, and similar rights, are excluded from private ownership. Under the revised Constitution, foreign citizens can gain land ownership through inheritance. With EU accession, citizens of EU member states can own land in Romania, subject to reciprocity in their home country. Companies owning foreign capital may acquire land or property needed to fulfill or develop company goals. If the company is dissolved or liquidated, the land must be sold within one year of closure and may only be sold to a buyer(s) with the legal right to purchase such assets. Investors can purchase shares in agricultural companies that lease land in the public domain from the State Land Agency. However, legislation passed in Fall 2020 imposed additional restrictions and limitations on the purchase of agricultural land by foreign investors. The 2006 legislation that regulates the establishment of specialized mortgage banks also makes possible a secondary mortgage market by regulating mortgage bond issuance mechanisms. Commercial banks, specialized mortgage banks, and non-bank mortgage credit institutions offer mortgage loans. Romania’s mortgage market is now almost entirely private; the state-owned savings bank (CEC Bank) also offers mortgage loans. Since 2000, the Electronic Archives of Security Interests in Movable Property (AEGRM) has overseen the filing of transactions regarding mortgages, assimilated operations, or other collateral provided by the law as well as their advertising. Most urban land has clear title, and the National Cadaster Agency (NCA) is slowly working to identify property owners and register land titles. According to the National Cadaster Plan, 2023 is the deadline for full registration of lands and buildings in the registry. According to NCA data, the cadaster registry contained 1.9 million hectares of land and 37.7 percent of the estimated real estate assets (buildings) as of March 2020. Romania has marginally improved implementing digital records of real estate assets, including land. However, the cadaster property registry is far from complete; inaccurate and incomplete information for land ownership continues to challenge private investors and SOEs alike. Romania was removed from the Watch List of the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report in 2022 due to taking significant actions to improve IP protection and enforcement. In January 2022, Romania appointed its first-ever national IP enforcement coordinator, who has been charged with developing a national IP strategy and coordinating interagency efforts. Romania has also taken other actions to improve efforts to investigate and prosecute IP crime. For example, last year, the economic police established a new department dedicated to online piracy cases and also dedicated a minimum of two additional officers per county to IP investigations. Moreover, the General Prosecutor Office’s Intellectual Property Coordination Department resumed coordination of IP working group sessions, holding meetings last year with representatives of different ministries involved in IP as well as private sector representatives. The United States will continue to monitor Romania’s efforts to finalize a national IP strategy, to implement that strategy, and to take specific actions to prioritize IP protection and enforcement. Romania is a signatory to international IPR-related conventions, including the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and has enacted legislation protecting patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Romania passed broad IPR protection enforcement provisions as required by the WTO, yet gaps remain in enforcement. Romania signed the Internet Convention to protect online authorship. In January 2020, Romania passed a law to enhance the transparency of collective rights management of copyrights. In July 2020, Romania passed legislation implementing the EU Trademark Directive, and in October 2021, approved draft legislation to implement the EU Copyright Directive. The new legislation introduced a series of changes, including removal of requirements for graphic representation of trademarks and allowing for registration of sound marks, multimedia marks, and holograms. To increase transparency, the law included provisions to clarify dates of completed trademark registration and their entry into force. Romania is both a transit and destination country for counterfeit goods. The People’s Republic of China is the top country of origin for counterfeit goods. Customs officers can seize counterfeit products ex-officio and destroy them upon inspection and declaration by the rights holder. The government is responsible for paying for the storage and destruction of the counterfeit goods. The National Customs Directorate reported the seizure of 3.79 million items of counterfeited goods in 2021, compared to 0.74 million items in 2020. The value of seized goods decreased from USD 6.84 million in 2019 to USD 3.59 million in 2020, but jumped to USD 12.09 million in 2021. Customs authorities closely coordinate their efforts with the European Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, and other stakeholders to increase transborder cooperation in line with the EU’s IPR action plan. Romania is a party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Paris Convention. Romanian patent legislation generally meets international standards with foreign investors accorded equal treatment with Romanian citizens under the law. Patents are valid for 20 years. Romania has been party to the European Patent Convention since 2002. Patent applications can be filed online. Since 2014, Romania has also enforced a distinct law regulating employee inventions. The right to file a patent belongs to the employer for up to two years following the departure of the employee. Romania is party to the Madrid Agreement, the Singapore Treaty, and the Trademark Law Treaty. Romania’s trademark and geographical indications law was amended in 2010 to make it fully consistent with equivalent EU legislation at that time. The EU has since adopted the Trademark and Geographic Indications Directive (EU Directive 2436/2015). Romania implemented the law under Law 84/1998, which entered force in July 2020. Romania is a member of the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The Romanian Copyright Office (ORDA) promotes and monitors copyright legislation. The General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) provides national coordination of IPR enforcement. Many magistrates still tend to view copyright piracy as a victimless crime, and this attitude has resulted in weak enforcement of copyright law. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Romania welcomes portfolio investment. In September 2019, the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE Russell) promoted the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) to Emerging Secondary Capital Market status from Frontier Capital Market classification. The Financial Supervision Authority (ASF) regulates and supervises securities and insurance markets as well as private pension funds. The ASF implements the registration and licensing of brokers and financial intermediaries, the filing and approval of prospectuses, and the approval of capital market mechanisms. The BVB resumed operations in 1995 after a nearly 50-year hiatus. The BVB operates a two-tier system with the main market consisting of 83 companies. The official main index, BET, is based on an index of the 19 most active stocks. BET-TR is the total return on market capitalization index, adjusted for the dividends distributed by the companies included in the index. Overall, the BVB calculates and distributes in real time 11 indexes. In 2015, the BVB opened an alternative trading system (MTS-AeRO) with relaxed listing criteria. MTS-AeRO has 298 listed companies, which are mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The BVB allows trade in corporate, municipal, and international bonds. Investors can use gross basis trade settlements, and trades can be settled in two net settlement cycles. The BVB’s integrated group includes trading, clearing, settlement, and registry systems. The BVB’s Multilateral Trading System (MTS) allows trading in local currency of 15 foreign stocks listed on international capital markets. Public institutions do not impose restrictions on payments and transfers. Country funds, hedge funds, private pension funds, and venture capital funds continue to participate in the capital markets. Minority shareholders have the right to participate in any capital increase. Romanian capital market regulation complies with EU standards with accounting regulations incorporating EC Directives IV and VII. Thirty-three banks and one credit cooperative national union currently operate in Romania. The largest is the privately-owned Transilvania Bank (19.5 percent market share), followed by Austrian-owned Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR-Erste, 13.9 percent); French-owned Romanian Bank for Development (BRD-Société Générale, 10.5 percent); Dutch-owned ING (9.3 percent); Austrian-owned Raiffeisen (9.2 percent); state-owned National Savings Bank (CEC Bank) (7.9 percent); and Italian-owned UniCredit (7.8 percent). The banking system is stable, well-provisioned, and profitable relative to its European peers. According to the National Bank of Romania (BNR), despite the COVID-19 pandemic, NPLs accounted for 3.35 percent of total bank loans as of December 31, 2021. As of September 2021, the banking system’s solvency rate was 23.07 percent, which has remained steady over recent years, while the banking system’s return on equity was 13.6 percent compared to an EU average of only 7.4 percent. The government and the BNR have encouraged foreign investment in the banking sector, and mergers and acquisitions are not restricted. The only remaining state-owned banks are the CEC Bank and EximBank, comprising 11.43 percent of the market combined, which grew after the latter’s 2020 acquisition of Banca Romaneasca from Greek-owned NBG. While the BNR must authorize all new non-EU banking entities, banks and non-banking financial institutions already authorized in other EU countries need only notify the BNR of plans to provide local services based on the EU passport. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government instituted a credit/lease installment moratorium in 2020 and extended it to March 15, 2021. Borrowers were permitted a total of nine months of non-payment of their installments. About 240,838 borrowers applied and were approved for the installment moratorium. The residual stock at the end of the application period represented 12.7 percent of the total non-government credit balance. In January 2020, the government repealed plans to establish a Sovereign Development and Investment Fund (SDIF). 7. State-Owned Enterprises According to the World Bank, Romania has approximately 1,200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of which around 300 are majority-owned by the Romanian government. There is no published list of all SOEs, as some are subordinated to the national government and some to local authorities. SOEs are governed by executive boards under the supervision of administration boards. Implementation of the Corporate Governance Code (Law 111/2016) remains incomplete and uneven. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. Majority state-owned companies that are publicly listed, as well as state-owned banks, are required to be independently audited. Many SOEs are currently managed by interim boards, often with politically appointed members that lack sector and business expertise. The EC’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania noted that the Corporate Governance Law is still only loosely applied. The appointment of interim boards has become standard practice. Administrative offenses carry symbolic penalties, which do not change behavior. The operational and financial results of most SOEs deteriorated in 2019 and 2020. Successive governments have resorted to distributing the dividends of profitable SOEs to increase state budget revenues. Privatization has stalled since 2014. The government has repeatedly postponed the initial public offering (IPO) for hydropower producer Hidroelectrica. Fondul Proprietatea, a minority owner in Hidroelectrica, announced its intent to divest its 15 percent stake of the company through a separate IPO. As a member of the EU, Romania is required to notify the EC’s General Directorate for Competition of significant privatizations and related state aid. Prospective investors should seek legal counsel to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. In previous privatizations, the government’s failure to consult with, and then formally notify the EC resulted in delays and complications. State aid schemes aim to enhance regional development and job creation through financial support for new jobs or investment in new manufacturing assets. The Ministry of Finance issues public calls for applications under the schemes. Private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access and credit. Energy production, transportation, and mining are majority state-owned sectors. The GOR retains majority equity in electricity and natural gas transmission. The Ministry of Energy has authority over energy generation assets and natural gas production. According to the EU’s Third Energy Package directives, the same entity cannot control generation, production and/or supply activities, and at the same time control or exercise any right over a transmission system operator (TSO). Consequently, natural gas carrier Transgaz and national electricity carrier Transelectrica are under the Government’s General Secretariat. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure has authority over the entities in the transportation sector, including rail carrier CFR Marfa, national air carrier Tarom, and the Constanta Port Administration. Romania currently has no plans to privatize companies in the transportation sector. Romanian law allows for the inclusion of confidentiality clauses in privatization and public-private partnership contracts to protect business proprietary and other information. In some high-profile privatizations, Parliament has compelled the public disclosure of such provisions. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Romania adhered to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise in 2004. The government regularly sends representatives to the working sessions of the OECD Investment Committee and its Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct. Romania established an OECD National Contact Point in 2005 to promote the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Romania’s investment promotion agency, InvestRomania, currently serves as the contact point. Several NGOs in Romania monitor, advocate, and raise concerns on RBC issues. No high-profile cases of private sector impact on human rights were recorded in 2020. However, the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD), the government agency responsible for applying domestic and EU anti-discrimination laws, imposed several fines on companies for discrimination against their own staff or prospective employees. The cases involved discrimination based on gender, disability, HIV status, or ethnicity and harassment over labor union membership and childcare leave. The government has not fully implemented a law which prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities in employment, education, transportation, and access to health care. Romania does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) but has adhered to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas since 2012. Organized crime investigators conducted inquiries related to lack of due diligence and non-transparent supply chains for timber and other wood products. In 2021, prosecutors investigated non-compliant wood shipments transitioning the port of Constanta. Violence against environmentalists and journalists monitoring the forestry sector has been well-documented. On September 16, 2021, a group attacked two journalists and an environmental activist while they were documenting illegal logging in Romania. Forestry worker unions claimed that more than 650 rangers and technical workers were attacked, threatened, or had their property destroyed between 2017-2019, and that six died during the same period. As an EU member state, Romania’s climate objectives align with EU strategies, including the 2030 Agenda and the European Green Deal. In 2019, Romania had the third lowest greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the EU (4.3 tons per capita compared to an EU average of 7.8 tons). However, when calculating the carbon intensity rate as emissions per GDP, Romania’s emissions were the fifth highest in the EU. Romania’s draft Integrated National Energy and Climate Change Plan for 2021-2030 targeted a 43.9 percent reduction in European Trading System (ETS) emissions and a two percent reduction in non-ETS emissions for 2030 compared to 2005. In December 2020, the European Commission submitted updated and enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) targeting emissions reductions of at least 55 percent by 2030 from 1990 levels. The new NDCs significantly updated the previous 40 percent target included under the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework. Romania is currently updating its biodiversity strategy for 2020-2030, which should reflect objectives identified by the EU’s biodiversity strategy for 2030. Romania boasts a diverse geography and has many protected areas in biologically diverse areas such as mountains, plains, and coastal wetlands. Romania has more than 300 square miles of old-growth forests, the most in the EU. Romanian forests and woodlands represent a substantial carbon sink and cover six percent of the total forest and woodland carbon dioxide uptake at the EU level. However, Romania struggles with an extensive list of legacy environmental challenges, such as poor air quality, inadequate waste management practices, and insufficient protective measures for natural areas. These legacies may hamper Romania’s ability to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity and clean air. Recurrent and underreported illegal logging remains a concern despite progress by the government to improve wood traceability. In 2018, the Romanian government excluded non-governmental organizations from the management of protected natural areas, which diminished the quality of management of affected sites. Unpredictability remains a concern as environmental legislation can be amended with insufficient consultation, and sometimes leads to a lack of alignment and compliance with EU biodiversity provisions and goals. In 2022, parliament considered legislation to replace existing national hunting quotas per species with individual daily quotas per hunter, potentially affecting migratory and protected song-bird populations. Overall environmental taxes remain low, representing 1.92 percent of GDP and 5.57 percent of Romanian tax revenue in 2020, down from 2.12 percent and 5.89 percent in 2019. Sectoral regulatory incentives are in place to limit carbon emissions and promote more sustainable business and consumer practices. Romanian legislation upholds the EU principle of extended producer responsibility, applicable to all waste generated via the purchases of electric and electrical appliances as well as for plastic, glass, metal, and paper packaging. Producers and municipalities need to uphold recycling quotas and targets. On October 4, 2021, the GOR adopted a legislative framework to create a Deposit Return System (DRS) for beverage packaging. The DRS, which is expected to become fully operational by 2025, requires consumers to pay a guarantee as part of the purchase price which they recover when they return the packaging to retailers. Romania aims to replace 250,000 cars older than 15 years by 2026. Companies or individuals that trade in older vehicles are eligible to receive vouchers up to RON 15,000 (USD 3,454) to purchase a hybrid vehicle or up to RON 57,000 (USD 13,126) to purchase an electric vehicle. Romania has used EU-funded programs to improve energy efficiency in buildings, both privately and publicly owned. It also has run programs to incentivize replacement of low-efficiency household appliances with new energy-efficient ones. In 2022, the EC Complementary Delegated Act defined technical screening criteria for specific nuclear and gas activities covered by EU taxonomy. Inclusion of these activities, under strict conditions, created opportunities for Romania to further adopt advanced technologies, construct and operate new nuclear power plants (NPPs), and upgrade existing NPPs. The Delegated Act recognized nuclear energy to play a role in the green energy transition beyond 2050, though limited permits to 2045 for new NPPs and 2040 for NPP upgrades. It stipulated that gas-fired power generation should transition to renewable gas or low carbon emissions by 2035. Covered natural gas activities included gas-fired power generation, high efficiency cogeneration, and centralized heating and cooling. The Delegated Act affirmed the right of the EU member states to develop energy programs based on national priorities and available energy resources. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World Comply Chain 9. Corruption Romania’s fight against high- and medium-level corruption, a model in Southeastern Europe over the past decade, suffered significant setbacks between 2017 and late 2019 due to a concerted campaign under a previous Social Democratic Party (PSD)-led government that aimed to weaken anti-corruption efforts, the criminal and judicial legislative framework, and judicial independence. Professional associations, NGOs, the EU, and NATO-allied governments raised concerns about legislative initiatives that furthered this trend during that period. In Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Romania placed 45 out of 100, up one spot since 2020, placing Romania among the lowest ranked of the EU member states. The current governing coalition lists justice reform and the fight against corruption among its official priorities, but it remains to be seen whether it will achieve tangible results. Domestic and international rule-of-law experts and law enforcement observe that many of the amendments to the criminal code introduced by the former PSD-led government between 2017-2019 remain in place today and continue to weaken the investigative tool kit in the fight against corruption. The current governing coalition (PSD-PNL-UDMR) has said it hopes to bring the new “Justice Laws” to parliament for debate in 2022 with the aim of reversing most of these provisions of the 2017-2019 Justice Laws. The European Commission under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), and the Council of Europe’s (COE) Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) prepared 2021 reports that leave some room for optimism. The June 2021 CVM report, which covered activities from October 2019, noted the GOR committed to reaching all CVM objectives in 2020, but progress has been limited. A May 18, 2021, ruling by the EU’s Court of Justice confirmed that the recommendations of the CVM are mandatory for Romania. GRECO’s 2021 report, while acknowledging some progress, assessed Romania’s compliance with its recommendations for fighting corruption as “very low.” The OECD 2022 economic survey also warned that corruption remained a major problem in Romania, arguing that past modifications of Justice Laws and the pressures targeting DNA prosecutors have weakened anticorruption efforts. A major issue signaled by the CVM, GRECO, and the Venice Commission remains the controversial Section to Investigate Offenses in the Judiciary (SIIJ). The DNA’s 2020 performance report for the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) showed that the failure to incorporate Constitutional Court decisions in the legislative framework has negatively affected the agency’s efficiency. The existence of the SIIJ continued to be a source of discontent for DNA and civil society. In March 2022, President Iohannis signed into law a bill passed by Parliament that aimed to dismantle the structure. The Venice Commission published a subsequent opinion criticizing the GOR’s hasty adoption of the bill. Against international recommendations, the law dismantled the SIIJ and created a new structure to handle the cases, rather than returning the corruption and organized crime files to DNA and DIICOT. Civil society representatives and the main opposition party, Save Romania Union (USR), warned that the new structure envisioned to take the place of SIIJ could be even more damaging to judicial independence. The Romania chapter of the EC’s 2020 report on rule of law within the EU, mentioned in the 2021 CVM, noted that in 2020 the government continued to affirm its commitment to judicial reform after the reversals between 2017 and 2019. In December 2021, the Government adopted an Anticorruption Strategy for 2021-2025. The document represents a political commitment to support all relevant institutions fighting corruption and was also a milestone in Romania’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan. The strategy focuses on asset recovery and strengthening the National Agency for Managing Seized Assets (ANABI). Conflicts of interest, respect for standards of ethical conduct, and integrity in public office remained concerns for all three branches of government. Individual executive agencies enforced sanctions slowly, and agencies’ inspection bodies were generally inactive. Romania implemented the revised EU Public Procurement Directives in 2016 by passing new laws to improve and make public procurements more transparent. The National Agency for Public Procurement (ANAP) has general oversight over procurements and can draft legislation, but procurement decisions remain with the procuring entities. State entities as well as public and private beneficiaries of EU funds are required by law to follow public procurement legislation and use the e-procurement system. Sectoral procurements, including private companies in energy and transportation, must follow the public procurement laws and tender via the e-procurement website. The April 2021 EU Country Report for Romania, which included data on the public procurement system in Romania for the period between 2018-2020, noted that the practical application of innovation-driven public procurement solutions remained a challenge. In October 2016, the “Prevent” IT system, an initiative sponsored by the National Integrity Agency (ANI) for ex-ante checks of conflicts of interests in public procurement, was signed into law. The mechanism aims to avoid conflicts of interest by automatically detecting conflicts of interest in public procurement before the selection and contract award procedure. According to ANI, between January-December 2021, the system checked over 7,800 public procurement procedures to prevent conflicts of interest. National laws prohibit bribery and other acts of corruption, both domestically and for Romanian companies doing business abroad. The judiciary remains mostly paper-based and inefficient although digitization progressed some during the pandemic. Romania loses several cases each year in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) due to excessive trial length. The National Agency for Fiscal Administration (ANAF) has a mandate to ensure that all taxes are collected and prevent fiscal and customs frauds. Asset forfeiture laws exist, but a functioning regime remains under development. While private joint stock companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery, since 2017 the government has rolled back corporate governance rules for state-owned enterprises and has repeatedly resorted to profit and reserves distribution in dividends to bolster the budget. U.S. investors have complained of both government and business corruption in Romania, most frequently naming the customs service, municipal officials, and local financial authorities. According to the EC’s February 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania, corruption continued to be a major problem for the business environment in Romania. A 2019 business Eurobarometer survey showed that 88 percent of businesses consider corruption to be a serious problem for their company when doing business in Romania. Since 2013, the share of companies that perceived corruption as a problem increased in Romania by 23 percentage points, the largest increase in the EU and in stark contrast with the EU average which continued to decrease (to 37 percent). Overall, 97 percent of businesses thought that corruption was widespread in Romania and 87 percent said it was widespread in public procurement managed by national authorities. Romania is a member of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC). NGOs enjoy the same legal protections as any other organizations, but NGOs involved in investigating corruption receive no additional protections. The United States welcomes participation from private and public sector entities on anti-corruption programs and trainings. Romania is a member of the UN Anticorruption Convention and the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). Romania is not a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. As of March 2002, Romania was implementing 12 commitments from their 2020-2022 action plan. This action plan featured commitments related to civic space, participation, consultation, social services, anti-corruption, fiscal transparency, justice and integrity, health and social accountability, de-bureaucratization, and open data. Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption: National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) Str. Stirbei Voda nr. 79-81, Bucuresti +40 21 312 73 99 anticoruptie@pna.ro http://www.pna.ro/sesizare.xhtml?jftfdi=&jffi=sesizare Contacts at “watchdog” organizations: Laura Stefan Executive Director Expert Forum Strada Semilunei, apt 1, Sector 2, Bucuresti +40 21 211 7400 laura.stefan@expertforum.ro office@expertforum.ro Cristina Guseth Director Freedom House Romania Bd. Ferdinand 125, Bucuresti +40 21 253 2838 guseth@freedomhouse.ro Elena Calistru President Funky Citizens Colivia, Pache Protopopescu 9 +40 723 627 448 elena@funkycitizens.org 10. Political and Security Environment Romania does not have a history of politically motivated damage to foreign investors’ projects or installations. Major civil disturbances are rare, though some have occurred in past years. In 2021, the extreme-right party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) capitalized on widespread discontent with the government’s response to the pandemic, a sluggish economy, and surging energy prices to organize a series of protests. The current coalition, one in a series of coalitions over the past two years, supports economic reform and a business-friendly environment, but it is uncertain how much progress the coalition will make on its goals. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Romania has traditionally boasted a large, skilled labor force at comparatively low wage rates in most sectors. The labor pool has tightened in highly skilled professions, in particular the information technology and health sectors, due to emigration and a deteriorating primary and secondary education system that fails to adequately prepare many graduates, particularly in rural areas, for university. The university system is generally regarded as good, particularly in technical fields, though foreign and Romanian business leaders have urged reform of outdated higher education curricula to better meet the needs of a modern, innovation-driven market. Payroll taxes remain steep. As a result, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the labor force works in the underground economy as “independent contractors” where their salaries are neither recorded, nor taxed. Even for registered workers, underreporting of actual salaries is common. The total unemployment rate in Romania increased during the COVID-19 pandemic from 4.9 percent in 2019 to 6.1 percent in 2020, and was 5.3 percent as of Q3 2021. The registered unemployment rate, which covers jobless individuals registered with the labor offices, stood at 2.8 percent in October 2021, down from 3.3 the previous year. At 69.2 percent in 2020, the labor force participation rate – the portion of the working age population (15-64 years) who are employed or actively seeking employment – remained among the lowest in the EU. Romanian employers in the engineering, machinery, IT services, and healthcare sectors reported difficulties in hiring and retaining employees as Romania faces a shortage of medium- to high-skill workers. As Romania’s emigration crisis deepens, other industries, including food service and construction, also face worker shortages. According to the EC, Romanians were the largest working age group of EU citizens residing in other member states in 2020 (18.6 percent of the working age resident population, up from 11.5 in 2010). Many emigrants are young and well- qualified, constraining the supply of skilled labor remaining in Romania. The World Bank estimated that between 2000 and 2018, Romania’s population fell from 22.5 million to 19.5 million with emigration accounting for more than 75 percent of the decline. Romania faces a shortage of healthcare staff as doctors and nurses continue to seek work abroad, motivated not only by the higher salaries, but also by the country’s antiquated medical system. According to the Ministry of Health, roughly 10,000 doctors left Romania between 2017 and 2018. The government lacks a comprehensive strategy to remedy labor shortages despite taking steps in recent years to attract and retain talent. Employees in some sectors benefit from fiscal incentives. For example, IT professionals are eligible for certain income tax exemptions. In 2018, the GOR introduced an additional income tax and social contributions exemption for a period of ten years for construction sector employees. The provision also introduced a specific minimum wage of RON 3,000 (USD 728) for construction workers. In 2017, the GOR adopted a unitary wage law to establish a more consistent framework for wages across the public sector. The law provided for a salary increase of at least 25 percent for most public sector employees; wages for some workers in the healthcare sector doubled in nominal terms as of March 2018. Unions and businesses continue to debate specific applications of the Unitary Wage Law. The Labor Code regulates the labor market in Romania, controlling contracting, jurisdiction, and the application of regulations. It applies to both national and foreign citizens working in Romania or abroad for Romanian companies. As an EU member state, Romania has no government policy that requires the hiring of nationals, but it has annual work permit quotas for other non-EU nationals. As of 2020, employers are exempt from obtaining General Immigration Inspectorate (IGI) approval for nationals from Moldova, Ukraine, and Serbia for full-time labor contracts of up to nine months per year. For 2022, the government increased the annual work permits to 100,000, up from 50,000 permits approved for 2021. Work permits are valid for one year and are renewable with an individual work contract. Employers pay a EUR 100 tax for most foreign workers, except for seasonal workers and those present in Romania on student visas, for whom the tax is EUR 25. The government also reduced the cost of employing non-EU citizens in 2018, no longer requiring employers to pay a minimum wage equivalent to the gross average wage. Normal minimum wage law applies with the exception that highly skilled non-EU workers must receive at least twice the gross minimum wage. Foreign companies still resort to expensive staff rotations, special consulting contracts, and non-cash benefits. Since the 1989 revolution, labor-management relations have occasionally been tense, the result of economic restructuring and personnel layoffs. Trade unions, much better organized than employers’ associations, are vocal defenders of their rights and benefits. Employers are required to make severance payments for layoffs according to the individual labor contracts, company terms and conditions, and the applicable collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Code discerns between layoffs and firing; severance payments are due only in case of layoffs. There is no treatment of labor specific to special economic zones, foreign trade zones, or free ports. Romanian law allows workers to form and join independent labor unions without prior authorization, and workers freely exercise this right. Labor unions are independent of the government. Unions and employee representatives must typically notify the employer before striking and must take specific steps provided by law before launching a general strike, including holding discussions and attempting reconciliation with management representatives. Companies may claim damages from strike organizers if a court deems a strike illegal. Labor dispute mechanisms are in place to mediate any conflicts between employers and employees regarding economic, social, and professional interests. Unresolved conflicts are adjudicated in court according to the civil code. An employee, employer, or labor union may initiate proceedings. In 2021, employees from auto manufacturing, transportation, and the medical sectors went on strike or protested publicly. They sought higher pay, better working conditions, and sufficient staffing. Union representatives allege that few incidents of anti-union discrimination are officially reported because it is difficult to prove that employers laid-off employees in retaliation for union activities. The government has generally respected the right of association, and union officials state that registration requirements stipulated by law are complicated, but generally reasonable. The current law permits, but it does not impose, collective labor agreements for groups of employers or sectors of activity. Companies with more than 21 employees may use collective bargaining, which provides for written agreements between employees and the employer or employers’ association. According to the Ministry of Labor, companies and employees had finalized 3,829 collective labor agreements as of Q3 2021 compared to 5,742 in 2020. Since 2014, parliament has periodically considered reintroducing collective bargaining nationwide, a practice that previously established minimum pay and working conditions for the entire economy, but which the Social Dialogue Act eliminated in 2011. As an EU and International Labor Organization (ILO) member state, Romania observes international labor rights. National law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, but enforcement is not uniform or effective. As penalties are insufficient to deter violations, reports indicated that such practices continued to occur, often involving Roma, disabled persons, and children. The minimum age for most forms of employment is 16, but children may work with the consent of parents or guardians at age 15, provided the tasks correlate with their abilities. Employment in harmful or dangerous jobs is forbidden for those under the age of 18; the government maintains a list of dangerous jobs in which the employment of minors is restricted. Romania does not waive or derogate labor laws and regulations to attract or retain investments. Since 2011, employers have had more flexibility to evaluate employees based on performance, and hiring and firing procedures have been significantly relaxed. Romania aims to ensure that its labor market is dynamic, sustainable, resilient, pro-active, and based on social innovation by 2027 with a 75 percent employment rate for of people aged 20-64. As of March 2022, Romania had yet to finalize its National Labor Strategy for 2021-2027. The minimum wage has more than tripled in nominal terms since 2012, rising from RON 700 (USD 170) to RON 2,550 (USD 583) per month in 2022. Romania no longer requires a differentiated minimum wage for employees with a university degree. Starting in 2022, employers can only pay the minimum wage for the first two years of an employment contract. The measure has a transition period of two years, and employees currently paid the minimum wage will be eligible for wage growth in 2024. Despite these measures, Romania had the highest rate of employed persons at risk of poverty among EU member states: 14.9 percent in 2020. Wage increases have outpaced productivity growth since 2016. This led to a marked growth in hourly labor costs, which posted a 6.39 percent nominal increase in Q3 2021 as compared with the same period in 2020. On January 31, the Romanian Competition Council opened an investigation into unlawful wage setting practices by the automotive industry. The Council investigated informal “no-poach” agreements that decreased competition among companies and created artificial labor market access barriers, particularly for automotive engineers. In December 2017, the GOR shifted the burden of mandatory payroll deductions for pensions, healthcare, and income taxes from employers to employees. To avoid reductions in employee net pay and retain labor in a tight market, many companies increased salaries to offset employee losses. Other companies, wary of further possible changes, offered monthly bonuses rather than formally amending employee contracts. Separately, in December 2019, parliament reduced payroll taxes for part-time workers. The bill reversed 2017 provisions when, in an effort to curtail underreporting of work, the government increased the minimum payroll taxes that employers must pay for their part-time employees to equal those for a full-time employee earning minimum wage. Coupled with the change in the legal tax incidence of social contributions described above, the law had the unintended consequence that some employees owed more in social contributions than their monthly earnings. In February 2018, the GOR issued an ordinance allowing part-time workers to pay social contributions for their actual gross income only, mandating that the employer make up the difference. Effective January 1, 2020, part-time employees are taxed based on their actual earnings, and employers do not cover additional charges. In 2018, the GOR passed new legislation specifying how the labor code applies to companies employing teleworkers and defining the distinction between teleworkers and employees who work full-time from home. In response to COVID-19 restrictions, the GOR extended the categories of employees eligible for unemployment benefits to independently registered businesspeople, lawyers, and individuals with income deriving from copyright and sports activities. In August 2020, the GOR adopted a flexible work scheme model that required employers to cover half of full-time wages. In turn, the GOR paid 75 percent of the difference between the gross wage and the basic wage paid to the employee based on actual working hours. The law also allows for one caretaker of school-age children to receive paid days off during school closures. As of 2022, the GOR had extended furlough provisions for businesses affected by COVID-19 restrictions. The GOR has announced plans to ensure that additional medical staff hired on temporary contracts since the onset of the pandemic can remain in the medical system in the long run to cover staff gaps. On March 9, 2022, Romania lifted all COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $249B 2020 $249B www.worldbank.org/en/country https://insse.ro/cms/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data U.S. FDI in 2020 partner country (stock positions, USD)** 2020 $1.26B $7.52B 2020 $3.93B BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (stock positions, USD) N/A N/A 2020 $80M BEA data available at ttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % of host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.93% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Host Country Data Sources: BNR: https://www.bnr.ro/ ONRC: https://www.onrc.ro/ ** The BNR calculated 2020 U.S. FDI in Romania at USD 1.26 billion when using the immediate investor origin principle, and at USD 7.52 billion when using the final investor origin principle. Separately, the Romanian National Trade Register Office (ONRC) calculated 2021 U.S. FDI in Romania at USD 1.22 billion when using only registered capital. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment (as of December 31, 2020) Total Inward $110,743 100% 1. The Netherlands $24,392 22.0% 2. Germany $13,505 12.2% 3. Austria $13,247 12.0% 4. Italy $9,335 8.4% 5. France* $6,883 6.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. * The BNR estimated the United States to be #5 when accounting for investments made by foreign subsidiaries of origin country companies. 14. Contact for More Information Toumil Allen B-dul Dr. Liviu Librescu 4-6 +40-21-200-3343 InfoBuch@state.gov Rwanda Executive Summary Rwanda has a history of strong economic growth and a reputation for low corruption. Though Rwanda averaged high GDP growth of 7.1 percent from 2009-2019, its economy suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Government of Rwanda (GOR) statistics, GDP growth was 9.5 percent in 2019 before the economy went into its first recession since 1994 with a 3.4 percent GDP contraction in 2020. The Rwandan economy is now showing signs of recovery, as GDP grew 10.9 percent in 2021. Rwanda has relied on a multi-round domestic economic stimulus plan to fuel a recovery, though some worry about the effect of these policies on the country’s sovereign debt. In late 2020 and early 2021, the GOR took significant policy reforms intended to return the economy to growth, improve Rwanda’s competitiveness in selected strategic growth sectors, increase foreign direct investment (FDI), and attract foreign companies to operate in the newly created Kigali International Financial Centre. The country presents several FDI opportunities in sectors including: manufacturing, infrastructure, energy distribution and transmission, finance, fintech, off-grid energy, agriculture and agro-processing, affordable housing, tourism services, and information and communications technology (ICT). Rwanda has a partnership with Qatar to construct a new greenfield international airport at Bugesera, just outside of Kigali (estimated completion in 2025 or 2026). This project has already generated significant opportunities for foreign investment and will continue to do so as related projects (roads, hotels, logistics, etc.) come online. The Rwandan Investment Code calls for equal treatment for both foreigners and nationals in certain operations, free transfer of funds, and compensation in cases of expropriation. Some investors have voiced concerns that a new land law passed in 2021 may run counter to some of the provisions in the Investment Code and similar provisions in the 2008 U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Many companies report that although it is easy to start a business in Rwanda, it can be difficult to operate a profitable or sustainable business due to a variety of hurdles and constraints. These include the country’s landlocked geography and resulting high freight transport costs, a small domestic market, limited access to affordable financing, payment delays with government contracts, challenges with tax administration, low-level corruption, and issues in competing with state-owned or affiliated enterprises. Government interventions designed to support overall economic growth can significantly affect investors, with some expressing frustration that they were not consulted prior to the abrupt implementation of government policies and regulations that affected their businesses. The American business community in Rwanda is well-established and represents a variety of sectors. The American Chamber of Commerce-Rwanda was founded in 2019. As of March 2022, it had 39 members. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 102 of 132 https://www.globalinnovation index.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $114 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ (most recent year available) World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $830 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Over the past decade, the GOR has undertaken a series of policy reforms intended to improve the investment climate, wean Rwanda’s economy off foreign assistance, and increase FDI levels. Rwanda enjoyed strong economic growth until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, averaging 7.1 percent annual GDP growth over the prior decade. Rwanda also enjoys a reputation for low corruption. In 2020, Rwanda experienced a 3.4 percent GDP contraction, marking its first recession since the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s economy is now showing signs of recovery, as GDP grew 10.9 in 2021. The Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was established in 2006 to fast-track investment projects by integrating all government agencies responsible for the entire investor experience under one roof. This includes key agencies responsible for business registration, investment promotion, environmental compliance clearances, export promotion, and other necessary approvals. New investors can register online at the RDB’s website and receive a certificate in as few as six hours, and the agency’s “one-stop shop” helps investors secure required approvals, certificates, and work permits. In February 2021, Rwanda made significant changes to the Investment Code to address previous investor complaints and included new incentives to attract investments in strategic growth sectors. The GOR created the Rwanda Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), passed an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing law, and passed a law on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters to fully criminalize money laundering and terrorism financing and align the country with OECD rules. The GOR also amended the Company Act and passed a law on partnerships to allow professional service providers to register as partners rather than limited liability companies. Several investors have said tax policy implementation is a top concern affecting their operations in Rwanda. Investors cited instances in which tax incentives and deals negotiated with RDB and line ministries were interpreted differently by the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). Several investors reported their initial tax incentives packages were well-respected by all government agencies, including the RRA, but later attempts to expand the business or scale up faced significant obstacles when some of the investment incentives were changed or no longer honored. Officials at RRA recognized these gaps but stated investors were welcome to work with them to resolve tax disputes. RRA officials added that the RRA’s supervisory ministry, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), was often called upon to resolve line ministries’ divergent interpretations of tax policy. Under Rwandan law, foreign firms should receive equal treatment regarding taxes and equal access to licenses, approvals, and procurement. Foreign firms should receive value added tax (VAT) rebates within 15 days of receipt by the RRA, but firms complain that the process for reimbursement can take months and occasionally years. Refunds can be further delayed pending the results of RRA audits. A few investors cited punitive retroactive fines arising from audits that took many years to complete. RRA aggressively enforces tax requirements and imposes penalties for errors – deliberate or not – in tax payments. Investors cited lack of coordination among ministries, agencies, and local government authorities (for example, district-level officials) leading to inconsistencies in implementation of promised incentives. Others pointed to a lack of clarity on who the regulator is on certain matters. Rwanda has neither statutory limits on foreign ownership or control nor any official economic or industrial strategy that discriminates against foreign investors. Local and foreign investors have the right to own and establish business enterprises in all forms of remunerative activity. Foreign nationals may hold shares in locally incorporated companies. The GOR has continued to privatize state holdings, though the government, ruling party, and military continue to play a dominant role in Rwanda’s private sector. Under the 2021 land law, foreign investors can acquire real estate subject to a general limit on land ownership. Some foreign investors expressed fear implementation of the land law would pose new barriers to investment and/or place existing investments at risk due to the law’s requirements for foreign investors to acquire investment certificates. Freehold is granted only to Rwandan citizens for properties of no more than two hectares but may also be granted to foreigners for properties in designated Special Economic Zones or through a Presidential Order for exceptional circumstances of strategic national interests. Long-term leases (emphyteutic leases) in residential and commercial areas are available to both citizens and foreigners acquiring land through private means. These leases typically last 99 years and are renewable. Foreign investors can also acquire land through concessional agreements to use government private land. Such agreements cannot exceed 99 years but can be renewed. In February 2019, The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review for the East African Community (EAC) covering Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, along with an annex specific to Rwanda . RDB offers one of the fastest business registration processes in Africa. New investors can register online at RDB’s website ( https://rdb.rw/neworg1/business-registration/ ) or register in person at RDB offices in Kigali. Once RDB generates a certificate of registration, company tax identification and employer social security contribution numbers are automatically created. The RDB “One Stop Center” assists firms in acquiring visas and work permits and connections to electricity and water. It also provides support with conducting required environmental impact assessments. The Investment Code provides incentives for internationalization. A small- or medium-sized registered investor with an investment project involved in export is entitled to a 150 percent tax deduction of all qualifying expenditures relating to internationalization. Emerging investors are entitled to the same deduction. Eligible registered investors receive pre-approval of qualifying expenditures through a joint review process administered by the RRA, RDB and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). The Commissioner General of RRA ultimately approves qualifying expenditures in consultation with the CEO of RDB. An eligible registered investor may claim the tax deduction on a maximum of $100,000 of qualifying expenditures each year. There are no restrictions limiting domestic firms seeking to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GOR generally employs transparent policies and effective laws that are largely consistent with international norms. Rwanda is a member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The Rwanda eRegulations system is an online database designed to bring transparency to investment procedures in Rwanda. Investors can find further information on administrative procedures here . The GOR publishes Rwandan laws and regulations in the Official Gazette, which is available online here . Government institutions generally have clear rules and procedures, but implementation can sometimes be uneven. Investors have cited breaches of contracts and incentive promises and the short time given to comply with changes in government policies as hurdles to complying with regulations. Government institutions generally have clear rules and procedures, but implementation can sometimes be uneven. Investors have cited breaches of contracts and incentive promises and the short time given to comply with changes in government policies as hurdles to complying with regulations. There is no formal mechanism to publish draft laws for public comment, although civil society sometimes has the opportunity to review them. There is no informal regulatory process managed by nongovernmental organizations. Regulations are usually developed rapidly to achieve policy goals. Some investors have complained this process results in new regulations being adopted without the backing of scientific or data-driven assessments. Regulators do not publicize comments they receive. Public finances and debt obligations are generally made available to the public before budget enactment. Finances for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are not publicly available, though in 2021 some limited financial information for a small group of large SOEs was made public. Civil society organizations may request SOEs’ financial information by providing a legitimate reason, but these requests are not routinely granted. There is no government effort to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia or organizations. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms but are not always enforced. Consumer protection associations exist but are largely ineffective. The business community has been able to lobby the government and provide feedback on some draft government policies through the Private Sector Federation (PSF), a business association with strong ties to the government. In some cases, the PSF has welcomed foreign investors’ efforts to positively influence government policies. On the other hand, some investors have criticized the PSF for advocating for the government’s positions more so than conveying business concerns to the government. Rwanda is a member of the EAC Standards Technical Management Committee. Approved EAC measures are generally incorporated into the Rwandan regulatory system within six months and are published in the Official Gazette like other domestic laws and regulations. Rwanda is also a member of the Standards Technical Committee for the International Standardization Organization, the African Organization for Standardization, and the International Electrotechnical Commission. Rwanda is a member of the International Organization for Legal Metrology and the International Metrology Confederation. The Rwanda Standards Board represents Rwanda at the African Electrotechnical Commission. Rwanda has been a member of the WTO since May 22, 1996, and Rwanda notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on draft technical regulations. The Rwandan legal system was originally based on the Belgian civil law system. Following the revision of the legal framework in 2002, the introduction of a new constitution in 2003, and the country’s entrance to the Commonwealth in 2009, the Rwandan legal system now consists of a mixture of civil law and common law. The judiciary addresses commercial disputes and facilitates enforcement of property and contract rights. Though it suffers from a lack of resources and capacity, it continues to improve. The judiciary is generally independent and impartial in civil matters, with some exceptions involving state interests. Investors state the government occasionally takes a casual approach to contract sanctity and sometimes fails to enforce court judgments in a timely fashion. National laws governing commercial establishments, investments, privatization and public investments, land, and environmental protection are the primary directives governing investments in Rwanda. Since 2011, the government has reformed tax payment processes and enacted additional laws on insolvency and arbitration. The Investment Code establishes policies on FDI, including dispute settlement (Article 13). The RDB publishes investment-related regulations and procedures here . According to a WTO policy review report dated January 2019, Rwanda is not a party to any countertrade and offsetting arrangements or agreements limiting exports to Rwanda. The most recent laws (passed between 2020-22) on FDI are below: Amended Company Act Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance Law on Partnerships Law on Transfer Pricing Law on Insolvency Law on Land Reference Prices 2021 New Instructions on Modalities of Management, Lease, Auction and Acquisition of Mortgage Law on Financial Service Consumer Protection New Land Law The GOR created the Competition and Consumer Protection Unit at MINICOM in 2010 to address competition and consumer protection issues. The government is now setting up the Rwanda Inspectorate, Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (RICA), a new independent body with the mandate to promote fair competition among producers. The body will reportedly aim to ensure consumer protection and enforcement of standards. To learn more on competition laws in Rwanda, please review the law and related policy here . Market forces determine most prices in Rwanda, but in some cases, the GOR intervenes to fix prices for items considered sensitive. On international tenders, a 10 percent price preference is available for local bidders, including those from regional economic integration bodies in which Rwanda is a member. Some U.S. companies expressed frustration that while authorities require them to operate as a formal enterprise that meets all Rwandan regulatory requirements, some local competitors are allowed to operate informally without complying fully with all regulatory requirements. Other investors have claimed SOEs, ruling party-aligned, and politically connected business competitors receive preferential treatment in securing public incentives and contracts. Some investors reported it was not always possible to compete aggressively in some sectors in which the existing domestic competition enjoyed strong political ties. Those who attempted to compete aggressively in those sectors risked losing their investment because of political interference, they explained. More information on specific types of agreements, decisions and practices considered to be anti-competitive in Rwanda can be found here . The Investment Code forbids the expropriation of investors’ property in the public interest unless the investor is fairly compensated. A 2015 expropriation law includes explicit protections for property owners. A 2017 study by Rwanda Civil Society Platform stated the government conducted expropriations on short notice and did not provide sufficient time or support to help landowners negotiate fair compensation. The report included a survey that found only 27 percent of respondents received information about planned expropriation well in advance of action. While mechanisms exist to challenge the government’s offer, the report noted that landowners are required to pay all expenses for the second valuation, which represents a prohibitive cost for rural farmers or the urban poor. Media have reported that wealthier landowners used their position to challenge valuations and have received higher amounts. Political exiles and other embattled opposition figures have been involved in taxation lawsuits that resulted in their “abandoned properties” being sold at auction, allegedly at below market values. Rwanda ranked 38 out of 190 economies for resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report and is number two in Africa. It takes an average of two and a half years to conclude bankruptcy proceedings in Rwanda. Per the World Bank 2020 Doing Business Report, the recovery rate for creditors on insolvent firms was reported at 19.3 cents on the dollar, with judgments typically made in local currency. In April 2018, the GOR instituted a new insolvency and bankruptcy law. One major change was the introduction of an article on “pooling of assets” allowing creditors to pursue parent companies and other members of the group (for example, in cases in which a subsidiary is in liquidation). The law can be accessed here . . On February 8, 2021, Rwanda passed a new Company Act with several bankruptcy and insolvency provisions. The new law can be found here . On February 17, 2021, Rwanda published a new law on partnerships with several provisions on partnerships’ insolvency. The new law can be accessed here . 4. Industrial Policies The Investment Code offers a package of benefits and incentives for registered investors in priority and strategic growth sectors under certain conditions. These benefits and incentives include preferential corporate income tax, withholding tax, tax holidays, exemption from custom duties for products used in export processing zones, and internationalization. More information on incentives and benefits related to philanthropic investors, the mining sector, the film industry, industrial and innovation parks, angel investors, start-ups, immigration, accelerated depreciation, and capital gain tax exemption, can be found in the annex of the Investment Code here . In addition, MINECOFIN, upon recommendation by RDB’s Private Investment Committee, can issue a Ministerial Order offering more incentives for investments deemed of strategic importance. According to some investors, poor coordination between the RDB, RRA, MINICOM, and the Directorate of Immigration and Emigration led to inconsistent application of incentives. Investors reported tax incentives included in deals signed by the RDB were not honored by the RRA in a timely manner or sometimes were not honored at all. For its part, RRA noted investors who started with one agreement with RDB often saw their tax incentives shift when they entered into new arrangements with a line ministry. Senior RRA officials stated they were aware of this disconnect but said they were obligated to fulfill their mandate to grow the domestic revenue base through the application of tax law. Additionally, investors continue to face challenges with receiving payment for services rendered for GOR projects, VAT refund delays, and expatriation of profits. In 2016, the GOR instituted a law governing public-private partnership (PPPs) as a step toward courting investments in key development projects. The law provides a legal framework concerning establishment, implementation, and management of PPPs. Detailed guidelines for the law can be accessed here . Kigali’s Special Economic Zone (KSEZ) is regulated by the SEZ Authority of Rwanda (SEZAR), which is based at the RDB. Land in KSEZ is acquired through the Prime Economic Zone Secretariat, a private developer, under the regulations of SEZAR. The price per square meter is $62, and the minimum size that can be acquired is one hectare (2.5 acres). Bonded warehouse facilities are now available both in and outside of Kigali for use by businesses importing duty-free materials. The GOR has established a list of benefits for investors operating in the SEZs. These include tax and land ownership advantages. A company basing itself in the SEZ can also opt to be a part of the Economic Processing Zone. Several criteria must be satisfied to qualify. These include requirements to maintain extensive records on equipment, materials and goods, suitable offices, and security provisions. Holding an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) license allows a company to operate in the KSEZ and will exempt a company from VAT, import duties, and corporate tax. The company is then obliged to export a minimum of 80 percent of production. Even after considering savings due to these government incentives, a few investors reported that land in the SEZs was significantly more expensive than land outside the zones. The GOR has stated that there are no fiscal, immigration, or customs incentives beyond those provided in the Investment Code, though media have occasionally speculated that certain investors received additional incentives. The negative list of goods prohibited under the EAC Customs Management Act applies in SEZs. In November 2018, the GOR approved the Bugesera Special Economic Zone (BSEZ), located 45 minutes from Kigali. A new airport is under construction near the BSEZ as well. Procedural information about operating in SEZs can be accessed here . The SEZ policy was revised in 2018. Under the new policy, foreigners and locals may only lease land (formerly, foreign investors were able to purchase land outright in SEZs). To learn more, please review the new policy here . For a quick survey of companies currently operating in Rwandan special economic zones, please visit the Economic Zone catalogue here . There is no legal obligation for nationals to own shares in foreign investments and no requirement that shares of foreign equity be reduced over time. However, the government strongly encourages local participation in foreign investments. According to the Data Protection Law of 2021, storage of personal data outside Rwanda is permitted only if the data controller or processor holds an authorization certificate from a competent supervisory authority. Investors have expressed strong concerns over the implementation of this law and are working to negotiate the implementing regulations of the law. There is also no requirement for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption technology. IT companies dealing with government data cannot store it outside Rwanda or transfer it without GOR approval. Rwandans’ private data must be stored in Rwanda. There is no formal requirement that a certain number of senior officials or board members be citizens of Rwanda unless as a pre-condition to benefits from increased investment incentives. For example, the Investment Code specifies that for an international company that moves its headquarters or regional office to Rwanda to be able to recruit any number of required managerial, professional, and technical foreign employees, at least 30 percent of professional staff must be Rwandan. A preferential corporate income tax rate of three percent is granted to collective investment schemes, special purpose vehicles, and pure holding companies if at least 30 percent of their professional staff are Rwandans and at least two professional or qualified Rwandan residents are members of their board of directors. While the government does not impose conditions on the transfer of technology, it does encourage foreign investors to transfer technology and expertise to local staff to help develop Rwanda’s human capital. There is no legal requirement that investors must purchase from local sources or export a certain percentage of their output, though the government offers tax incentives for the latter. 5. Protection of Property Rights The law protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Investors involved in commercial agriculture have leasehold titles and can secure property titles if necessary. The Investment Code states that investors shall have the right to own private property, whether individually or collectively. According to the 2021 land law, which can be accessed here , foreign investors can acquire real estate, though there is a general limit on land ownership. Freehold is granted only to Rwandan citizens for no more than 2 hectares (5 acres) and to foreigners for properties located in designated Special Economic Zones, or through a Presidential Order for exceptional circumstances of strategic national interests. Through the new land law of 2021, the GOR increased the length of long-term leases (emphyteutic leases) in residential and commercial areas for both citizens and foreigners acquiring land through private means to 99 years. Foreign investors can also acquire land through concessional agreements to use government private land. Such agreements cannot exceed 99 years but can be renewed. Mortgages are a nascent but growing financial product in Rwanda, increasing from 770 properties in 2008 to 13,394 in 2017, according to the RDB. In 2020, RDB reported registering 16,624 mortgages in 2019. Foreign investors have noted challenges related to the maintenance of their existing leases and some investors fear provisions of the 2021 Land Law will lead to significant investment risks. These investors noted foreigners may face barriers to gaining an investment certificate needed to develop land. Investors also expressed fear that once granted, an investment certificate could be revoked by the government, leading to a loss of assets. Implementation of the law is ongoing. The RDB and the Rwanda Standards Board (RSB) are the main regulatory bodies for Rwanda’s intellectual property rights law. The RDB registers intellectual property rights, providing a certificate and ownership title. Every registered IP title is published in the Official Gazette. The fees payable for substance examination and registration of IP apply equally for domestic and foreign applicants. From 2016, any power of attorney granted by a non-resident to a Rwandan-based industrial property agent must be notarized (previously, a signature would have been sufficient). Registration of patents and trademarks is on a first time, first right basis so companies should consider applying for trademark and patent protection in a timely manner. It is the responsibility of the copyright holders to register, protect, and enforce their rights where relevant, including by retaining their own counsel and advisors. Through the RSB and the RRA, Rwanda has worked to increase protection of IP rights, but many goods that violate patents, especially pharmaceutical products, make it to market nonetheless. As many products available in Rwanda are re-exports from other EAC countries, it can be difficult for authorities to take action against counterfeit goods without regional cooperation. Also, investors reported difficulties in registering patents and having rules against infringement of their property rights enforced in a timely manner. In 2021, the GOR submitted a new IP law to Parliament that will organize a patent and trade office for Rwanda. As a COMESA member, Rwanda is automatically a member of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization. Rwanda is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is working toward harmonizing its legislation with WTO trade-related aspects of IP. Rwanda has yet to ratify WIPO internet treaties, though the government has taken steps to implement and enforce the WTO TRIPS agreements. Rwanda is not listed in USTR’s 2019 Special 301 report or the 2019 Notorious Markets List. In July 2020, Rwanda acceded to the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles here . 6. Financial Sector In February 2021, the GOR introduced new incentives to support the Rwanda Stock Exchange and the Capital Market Authority through the Investment Code. A preferential withholding tax of five percent is applicable to dividends and interest income paid to investors in companies listed on the Rwanda Stock Exchange. A preferential corporate income tax rate of three percent applies to collective investment schemes. A preferential corporate income tax rate of fifteen percent applies to fund management entities, wealth management services, financial advisory entities, financial technology entities, captive insurance schemes, mortgage finance institutions, fund administrators, finance lease entities, and asset backed securities. In December 2017, the GOR established Rwanda Finance Limited (RFL), a state-owned enterprise charged with creating the Kigali International Financial Centre (KIFC). The goal is to create a conducive ecosystem to entice pan-African and international financial service providers and investment funds to Rwanda. KIFC is scheduled to be launched on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) taking place in Kigali in June 2022. RFL has successfully pushed the GOR to change many Rwandan investment, banking, and commercial laws to align with OECD/EU and AML/CFT requirements. Many U.S. investors express strong concern over local access to affordable credit and advise that those interested in doing business in Rwanda arrive with their own financing already in place. Interest rates are high for the region, banks offer predominantly short-term loans, collateral requirements can be higher than 100 percent of the value of the loan, and Rwandan commercial banks rarely issue significant loan values. The prime interest rate is 16-18 percent. Large international transfers are subject to authorization. Investors who seek to borrow more than $1 million must often engage in multi-party loan transactions, usually by leveraging support from larger regional banks. Credit terms generally reflect market rates, and foreign investors can negotiate credit facilities from local lending institutions if they have collateral and “bankable” projects. In some cases, preferred financing options may be available through specialized funds including the Export Growth Fund, BRD, or FONERWA. The banking sector holds more than 67 percent of total financial sector assets in Rwanda. In total, Rwanda’s banks have assets of around $3.8 billion, which reflects an 18.5 percent increase from June 2018 to June 2020, according to the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR). Rwanda’s financial sector remains highly concentrated. The share of the three largest banks’ assets increased from 46.5 percent in December 2018 to 48.4 percent in December 2019. The largest, the partially state-owned Bank of Kigali (BoK), holds more than 30 percent of all assets. The total number of bank and micro-finance institution (MFI) accounts increased from 7.1 million to 7.7 million between 2018 and 2019. Local banks often generate significant revenue from holding government debt and from charging a variety of fees to banking customers. The capital adequacy ratio decreased to 23.7 percent in June 2020 from 24.1 percent over the year but was still well above the prudential minimum of 15 percent, suggesting the Rwandan banking sector continues to be generally risk averse. Non-performing loans increased from 4.9 percent in December 2019 to 5.5 percent in June 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s disruption of economic activities. The IMF gives the NBR high marks for its effective monetary policy. NBR introduced a new monetary policy framework in 2019, which shifted toward an inflation-targeting monetary framework in place of a quantity-of-money framework. In April 2020, the NBR arranged a $53.4 million liquidity fund for local banks facing challenges from COVID-19. The NBR allowed banks to restructure loans affected by the pandemic by authorizing an average of four months in loan holidays. Additionally, in March 2020, the NBR took a decision to suspend distribution of dividends from profits generated in 2019. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in Rwanda. Several Kenya-based banks operate in the country. In November 2020, the GOR signed an MOU with the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) to host the permanent headquarters of Afrexim Fund for Export Development in Africa (FEDA) in Kigali. Rwandans primarily rely on cash or mobile money to conduct transactions, though use of debit and credit cards is expanding. Use of mobile money has grown by more than 500 percent since March 2020 due in part to changes brought about by COVID-19 and business closures. In 2012, the Rwandan government launched the Agaciro Development Fund (ADF), a sovereign wealth fund that includes investments from Rwandan citizens and the international diaspora. By September 30, 2019, the fund was worth 235.02 billion RWF in assets ($235 million). The ADF operates under the custodianship of the NBR and reports quarterly and annually to MINECOFIN. ADF is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and is committed to the Santiago Principles. In addition to returns on investments, voluntary contributions from citizens and the private sector, and other donations, ADF receives around $5 million every year from tax revenues and five percent of proceeds from every public asset that the GOR has privatized. The fund also receives five percent of royalties from minerals and other natural resources each year. ADF invests mainly in Rwanda. While the fund can invest in foreign non-fixed income investments, such as publicly listed equity, private equity, and joint ventures, the AGDF Corporate Trust Ltd (the fund’s investment arm) held no financial assets and liabilities in foreign currency, according to the 2018 annual report (the most recent report available). 7. State-Owned Enterprises Rwandan law allows private enterprises to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Since 2006, the GOR has made efforts to privatize SOEs; reduce the government’s non-controlling shares in private enterprises; and attract FDI, especially in the ICT, tourism, banking, and agriculture sectors, but progress has been slow. Currently there are 17 SOEs including water and electricity utilities, as well as companies in construction, ICT, aviation, mining, insurance, agriculture, finance, and other sectors. Some investors complain about unfair competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses. SOEs are governed by boards with most members having other government positions. Rwanda continues to carry out a privatization program that has attracted foreign investors in strategic areas ranging from telecommunications and banking to tea production and tourism. As of 2017 (the latest data available), 56 companies have been fully privatized, seven were liquidated, and 20 more were in the process of privatization. RDB’s Strategic Investment Department is responsible for implementing and monitoring the privatization program. Some observers have questioned the transparency of certain transactions, noting that a number of transactions were undertaken not through public offerings but through mutual agreements directly between the government and the private investors, some of whom have personal relationships with senior government officials. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a growing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) within Rwanda, and several foreign-owned companies operating locally implement CSR programs. Rwanda also has guidelines on corporate governance by publicly listed companies. One of the most relevant sectors for CSR-minded investors is mining. Rwanda implements the OECD’s Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Rwanda also implements the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative tracing scheme. In 2016, the Better Sourcing Program (currently RCS Global Group) began an alternative mineral tracing scheme in Rwanda. Rwanda is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Recent U.S. sanctions announcements against individuals fueling conflict in the eastern DRC via trafficking of illicit conflict minerals, including gold, mention Rwanda and Uganda as supply chain transit points. In recognition of the firm’s strong commitment to CSR, the U.S. Department of State awarded Sorwathe, a U.S.-owned tea producer in Kinihira, Rwanda, the Secretary of State’s 2012 Award for Corporate Excellence (ACE) for Small and Medium Enterprises. In 2015, the U.S. firm Gigawatt Global was also a finalist for the Secretary of State’s ACE award in the environmental sustainability category. In January 2021, Illinois-based Abbot laboratories was given the ACE award in recognition of its work to expand preventative health care in rural areas of Rwanda. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The GOR is known for aggressively pioneering environmental protection initiatives. For example, in March 2022, the fifth session of the United Nations Environmental Assembly adopted a resolution co-authored by Rwanda and Peru to end plastic pollution. Rwanda’s Parliament had in 2019 already passed a law banning single use plastic containers. The law built on an earlier ban on the manufacture and use of plastic bags. With respect to the ban on single use plastic containers, several investors complained that GOR did not consult effectively with concerned stakeholders and observed that alternative packaging materials were either unavailable or could only be obtained at high cost. The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol was adopted in October 2016 in Rwanda, and 197 participating countries committed to cut the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by more than 80 percent over the next 30 years. The GOR manages the Rwanda Green Fund (FONERWA) to spur investment in green innovation. UK Aid and other donors have invested in the fund. FONERWA claims 46 projects it supports have created more than 176,000 green jobs and avoided emissions equivalent to 126,014 tons of carbon dioxide. 9. Corruption Rwanda is ranked among the least corrupt countries in Africa, with Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index putting the country among Africa’s four least corrupt nations and 52nd in the world. The GOR maintains a high-profile anti-corruption effort, and senior leaders consistently emphasize that combating corruption is a key national goal. The government investigates corruption allegations and generally punishes those found guilty. High-ranking officials accused of corruption often resign during the investigation period, and the GOR has prosecuted many of them. Rwanda has ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and is a signatory to the African Union Anticorruption Convention. U.S. firms have identified the perceived lack of government corruption in Rwanda as a key incentive for investing in the country. At the same time, some investors have reported widespread corruption at lower, administrative levels of government, including with customs, tax, and police officials. There are no local industry or non-profit groups offering services for vetting potential local investment partners. The Ministry of Justice’s online repository of judgments can be a useful source of information on companies and individuals in Rwanda. The Rwanda National Public Prosecution Authority issues criminal records on demand to applicants. Contacts at government agencies responsible for combating corruption include: Ms. Madeleine Nirere, Chief Ombudsman, Ombudsman (Umuvunyi) P.O Box 6269, Kigali, Rwanda Telephone: +250 252587308 omb1@ombudsman.gov.rw / sec.permanent@ombudsman.gov.rw Ms. Rosine Uwamaliya, Commissioner for Internal Audit and Integrity, Rwanda Revenue Authority Avenue du Lac Muhazi, P.O. Box 3987, Kigali, Rwanda Telephone: +250 252595504 or +250 788309563 rosine.uwamaliya@rra.gov.rw Mr. Alexis Kamuhire, Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General Avenue du Lac Muhazi, P.O. Box 1020, Kigali, Rwanda Telephone: +250 78818980 oag@oag.gov.rw Contacts at “watchdog” organizations include: Mr. Apollinaire Mupiganyi, Executive Director, Transparency International Rwanda P.O: Box 6252 Kigali, Rwanda Telephone: +250 788309563 amupiganyi@transparencyrwanda.org / mupiganyi@yahoo.fr 10. Political and Security Environment Rwanda is a stable country with relatively little violent crime. According to a 2017 report by the World Economic Forum, Rwanda is the ninth safest country in the world. Gallup’s Global Law and Order Index report of 2020 ranked Rwanda as the second safest place in sub-Saharan Africa. Investors have cited the stable political and security environment as an important driver of investments. A strong police and military provide a security umbrella that minimizes potential criminal activity. The U.S. Department of State recommends that U.S. citizens exercise caution when traveling near the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo border, given the possibility of fighting and cross-border attacks involving armed rebel and militia groups. Relations between Burundi and Rwanda are currently warming but have been tense in recent years, and there remains a risk of cross-border incursions and armed clashes. Since 2018, there have been a few incidents of sporadic fighting in districts bordering Burundi and the DRC and in Rwanda’s Nyungwe National Park and Volcanoes National Park. In 2021, Rwandan authorities arrested several individuals accused of being ISIS members. Authorities stated the individuals were planning an imminent attack in Kigali. There have been several reported cross-border attacks in Western Rwanda on Rwandan police and military posts since 2016. Despite occasional violence along Rwanda’s borders with the DRC and Burundi, there have been no incidents involving politically motivated damage to investment projects or installations since the late 1990s. Relations with Uganda have been tense in recent years, but leaders continue to emphasize they are seeking a political solution. As of March 2022, Rwanda-Uganda relations appear to be improving. For example, in early 2022, Rwandan and Ugandan officials agreed to reopen the largest border crossing between the two countries. The border crossing had been largely closed to regular traffic since February 2019. Please see the following link for State Department Country Specific Information. 11. Labor Policies and Practices General labor is available, but Rwanda suffers from a shortage of skilled labor, including accountants, lawyers, engineers, tradespeople, and technicians. Higher institutes of technology, private universities, and vocational institutes are improving and producing more highly trained graduates each year. The Rwanda Workforce Development Authority sponsors programs to support both short and long-term professional trainings targeting key industries in Rwanda. Rwanda’s informal economy is concentrated in the agriculture sector, which contributes 24 percent of GDP but employs close to 70 percent of the country’s population. The Government of Rwanda has taken steps to formalize large portions of its informal economy, for example, by banning street vendors. Rwanda also requires all private sector employers to formalize contracts. The economic disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic have eliminated many formal employment opportunities and forced many workers back into the informal sector. Investors are strongly encouraged to hire Rwandan nationals whenever possible. According to the Investment Code, a registered investor who invests an equivalent of at least $250,000 may recruit three foreign employees. However, several foreign investors reported difficulties bringing in qualified staff in accordance with the Investment Code due to Rwandan immigration rules and practices. In some cases, these problems occurred even though investors had signed agreements with the government regarding the number of foreign employees. Rwanda has ratified all the International Labor Organization’s eight core conventions. Policies to protect workers in special labor conditions exist, but enforcement remains inconsistent. The government encourages, but does not require, on-the-job training and technology transfer to local employees. The law restricts voluntary collective bargaining by requiring prior authorization or approval by authorities and requiring binding arbitration in cases of non-conciliation. The law provides some workers the right to conduct strikes, but due to numerous restrictions, workers rarely engage in strikes. In 2020, the government published additional specifications for labor representatives, regulations against strikes, and guidelines providing labor inspectors greater authority to access to workplaces and assess fines. The GOR has been known to take swift action against foreign companies with poor labor practices upon initial complaints from workers. There is no unemployment insurance or other social safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. Labor laws are not waived to attract or retain investment. There are no labor law provisions specific to SEZs or industrial parks. Collective bargaining is a relatively new concept in Rwanda and is not common. Few professional associations fix minimum salaries for their members and some investors have expressed concern that labor law enforcement is uneven or opaque. The official minimum wage has not changed since 1974 and is 100 Rwandan francs ($0.10) per day. 14. Contact for More Information David Schneider Economic and Commercial Officer United States Embassy 30 KG 7 Avenue, P.O. Box 28 Kigali, Rwanda +250-252-596-538, KigaliEcon@state.gov Saint Kitts and Nevis Executive Summary The Federation of St. Christopher and Nevis (St. Kitts and Nevis) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The government seeks to facilitate a conducive business climate to attract more foreign investment. St. Kitts and Nevis remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural disasters, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of St. Kitts and Nevis had an estimated GDP of $745 million (2 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, after contracting in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting impact on the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 10 percent in 2022, effectively reversing this contraction. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly reduced the economic gains St. Kitts and Nevis had made in recent years. The impact of the pandemic on tourism, a mainstay of St. Kitts and Nevis’s economy that generates over 60 percent of GDP, has had ripple effects across the economy. The government has introduced measures to protect workers and key economic sectors. After the introduction of vaccines in 2021 the government lifted a strict quarantine for visitors, effectively rebooting the tourism industry. St. Kitts and Nevis has identified priority sectors for investment. These include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information technology, education services, renewable energy, and limited light manufacturing. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in St. Kitts or Nevis, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits, dividends, and import capital. The country’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It has a Double Taxation Agreement with the United States, although the agreement only addresses social security benefits. In 2016, St. Kitts and Nevis signed an Intergovernmental Agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in St. Kitts and Nevis to report banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 476 http://www.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita ($M USD) 2020 19,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of St. Kitts and Nevis strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. The country is home to the ECCB, the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE), and the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission. In the federation, each island has a separate investment promotion agency, the St. Kitts Investment Promotion Agency (SKIPA), and the Nevis Investment Promotion Agency (NIPA). Both agencies have introduced several investment incentives for businesses that consider locating in the federation. SKIPA and NIPA provide “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors, guiding them through the various stages of the investment process. The government encourages investment in all sectors, but targeted sectors include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information and communication technologies, international education services, renewable energy, ship registries, and limited light manufacturing. Local laws do not dictate any limits on foreign control in St. Kitts and Nevis. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. Foreign investment in St. Kitts and Nevis is generally not subject to any restrictions, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as citizens. The only exception to this is the requirement that foreign investors obtain an Alien Landholders License to purchase residential or commercial property. The OECS, of which St. Kitts and Nevis is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in the last three years. No civil society organization has provided a review of investment policy-related concerns. SKIPA and NIPA facilitate domestic and foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advise the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. Both agencies provide business support services and market intelligence to investors. Businesses must register with the Financial Services Regulatory Commission, the Registrar of Companies, the Ministry of Finance, the Inland Revenue Department, and the Social Security Board. It is not mandatory to use an attorney prepare to incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in St. Kitts and Nevis are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It has a Double Taxation Agreement with the United States, but this agreement is limited solely to social security benefits. St. Kitts and Nevis’s Double Taxation Agreements meet Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) standards, as well as Tax Information Exchange Agreements standards. St. Kitts and Nevis maintains double taxation agreements with several countries including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. It has Double Taxation Conventions (DTCs) with Monaco, San Marino, and some Caribbean Community countries. St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and is party to the OECD’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. St. Kitts and Nevis is also party to the following agreements: The Treaty of Chaguaramas established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to promote economic integration among its 15 member states. Investors operating in St. Kitts and Nevis have preferential access to the entire CARICOM market. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas established the CSME, which permits the free movement of goods, capital, and labor within CARICOM member states. The Revised Treaty of Basseterre established the OECS. The OECS consists of seven full members: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and four associate members: Anguilla, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the British Virgin Islands. The OECS aims to promote harmonization among member states concerning foreign policy, defense and security, and economic affairs. The six independent countries of the OECS ratified the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, establishing the OECS Economic Union in 2011. The Economic Union established a single financial and economic space within which all factors of production, including goods, services, and people, move without hindrance. The European Community and the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) the CARICOM states signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008. CARIFORUM consists of the independent Anglophone CARCOM member states, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname. The overarching objectives of the EPA are to alleviate poverty in CARIFORUM states, to promote regional integration and economic cooperation, and to foster the gradual integration of the CARIFORUM states into the world economy by improving their trade capacity and creating investment-conducive environments. The EPA promotes trade-related developments in areas such as competition, intellectual property, public procurement, the environment, and protection of personal data. The UK and the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) states CARIFORUM signed an EPA in 2019, committing to trade continuity after Britain’s departure from the European Union. The CARIFORUM-UK EPA eliminates all tariffs on all goods imported from CARIFORUM states into the UK, while Caribbean states will continue to gradually cut import tariffs on most of the region’s imports from the UK. The UK and CARIFORUM signed an EPA in 2019, committing to trade continuity after Britain’s departure from the European Union. The CARIFORUM-UK EPA eliminates tariffs on all goods imported from CARIFORUM states into the UK, while those Caribbean states will continue to gradually cut import tariffs on most of the region’s imports from the UK. The objective of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is to promote economic development through private sector initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean by expanding foreign and domestic investment in non-traditional sectors, diversifying economies, and expanding exports. The Caribbean Basin Initiative permits duty-free entry of products manufactured or assembled in St. Kitts and Nevis into the United States. The Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) is an economic and trade development assistance program for Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Through CARIBCAN, Canada provides duty-free access to its national market for most products originating in Commonwealth Caribbean countries. 3. Legal Regime The Government of St. Kitts and Nevis provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The St. Kitts Ministry of Finance and SKIPA and the Nevis Ministry of Finance and NIPA provide oversight of the system’s transparency as it relates to investment. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosures by companies. The incorporation and registration of companies differs somewhat on the country’s two constituent islands. In St. Kitts, the Companies Act regulates the process. In Nevis, the Nevis Island Business Corporation Ordinance regulates the incorporation of companies. There are no nationality restrictions for directors in a company, and in general, national treatment is applied. All registered companies must have a registered office in St. Kitts and Nevis. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lies with the unicameral parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis. The parliament consists of 11 members elected in single-seat constituencies (eight from St. Kitts and three from Nevis) for a five-year term. Although St. Kitts and Nevis does not have legislation that guarantees access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains an information service and a website where it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The government budget and limited debt obligation information are available on the website: https://www.gov.kn/ . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in St. Kitts and Nevis. The independent Office of the Ombudsman guards against abuses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating any complaint relating to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice due to the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. Regulations are developed nationally and regionally. Nationally, the relevant line ministry reviews regulations. Ministries then submit the results of their reviews to the Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs and Communications for the preparation of the draft legislation. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs and Communications reviews all agreements and legal commitments (national, regional, and international) to be undertaken by St. Kitts and Nevis to ensure consistency prior to finalization. SKIPA has the main responsibility for project-level supervision, while the Ministry of Finance monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. Regulatory actions under the purview of the country’s Financial Services Regulatory Commission are posted on its website. St. Kitts and Nevis’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. As a member of the OECS and the Eastern Caribbean Customs Union, St. Kitts and Nevis subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, St. Kitts and Nevis is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The St. Kitts and Nevis Bureau of Standards develops, establishes, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, the health and safety of consumers, the environment, food and food products, and the facilitation of trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, St. Kitts and Nevis, through the St. Kitts and Nevis Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. St. Kitts and Nevis ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate reductions in trade costs, and enhance participation in the global value chain. St. Kitts and Nevis has already implemented some TFA requirements. A full list is available at: https://tfadatabase.org/members/saint-kitts-and-nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis bases its legal system on the British common law system. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC), junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The ECSC Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on interpretation of the Constitution. Parties may appeal to the ECSC, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. Final appeal is to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the UK. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ considers and determines appeals from CARICOM member states, which are parties to the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Currently, St. Kitts and Nevis is subject only to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and St. Kitts and Nevis are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. St. Kitts and Nevis’ policy is to attract foreign direct investment into the priority sectors identified under its National Diversification Strategy. These include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information technology, education services, and limited light manufacturing. However, investment opportunities also exist in renewable energy and other services. The main laws concerning foreign investment include the Fiscal Incentive Act, the Hotels Aid Act, and the Companies Act. SKIPA and NIPA offer websites useful for navigating procedures and registration requirements for foreign investors at https://investstkitts.kn and https://investnevis.org . St. Kitts also offers an online investment handbook at https://goldenbookskn.com . Under St. Kitts and Nevis’ citizenship by investment (CBI) program, foreign individuals can obtain citizenship without needing to establish residence (or gaining voting rights). Applicants are required to undergo a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. A minimum investment for a single investor to qualify is $200,000 in real estate or a $150,000 contribution to the Sustainable Growth Fund. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate and evidence of the source of funds. Applications for CBI status for real estate projects should be submitted to SKIPA for review and processing. Further information is available at: http://www.ciu.gov.kn/ . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. St. Kitts and Nevis does not have domestic legislation regulating competition. St. Kitts and Nevis employs eminent domain laws which allow the government to expropriate private property. The government is required to compensate owners. There are also laws that permit the acquisition of private businesses, and the government claims such laws are constitutional. The concept of eminent domain and the expropriation of private property is typically governed by laws that require governments to adequately compensate owners of the expropriated property at the time of its expropriation or soon thereafter. In some cases, the procedure for compensation of owners favors the government valuation. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of two separate and outstanding cases involving the seizure of private land by the government. In the first case, the government of St. Kitts and Nevis was ordered in 2013 to pay a judgement to the American claimant in a series of installments. After completing the first two installments to the American claimant in 2013 and 2014, the government subsequently defaulted. Although a local court ordered the government to pay the 2015 and 2016 installments, it has yet to do so. The government alleges that another individual has made a claim on part of the property and that it must wait until a court determines the outcome of the other claim before completing payments to the American claimant. In 2020, a court ruled that the balance of payment due was to be deposited by the government into a court-controlled account to facilitate payment upon resolution of the other property claim. During the reporting period, the government did not deposit the balance into a court-controlled account. By the end of 2021, no further payments had been made to the estate of the American claimant. The court case deciding on the competing claim has not yet been scheduled. In the second case, in 2015, an American company signed an agreement with the government to provide 2 million gallons of water. According to the American company, the government expropriated the company’s drilling equipment in 2018 without compensation. In 2019, the government agreed to pay a $1 million settlement to the company and to deposit an additional $500,000 into an escrow account. The company subsequently agreed to a settlement of $750,000 in addition to the escrow deposit. Although the government agreed to the payments, it has not released the funds. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an additional agreement was reached between the parties in December 2020, regarding the delivery of water and the payment of all fees. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown continues to recommend caution when conducting business in St. Kitts and Nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor, including the ability of creditors to pursue necessary actions to resolve outstanding debts. 4. Industrial Policies To increase investment in the country, the government of St. Kitts and Nevis implemented a series of investment incentives codified in the Fiscal Incentives Act. The Fiscal Incentives Act includes a tax holiday of up to 15 years; additional tax rebates of up to five years; exemption from customs duties on material and equipment deemed necessary to establish or update an enterprise; repatriation of profits, dividends, royalties, and imported capital by arrangement with the Ministry of Finance; and protection of investment through government agreement. Four types of enterprises qualify for tax holidays. The length of the tax holiday for the first three types of enterprises depends on the amount of value added in St. Kitts and Nevis. The Fiscal Incentives Act (Amendment) Bill, 2019, amended the definition of the fourth type of enterprise, known as enclave industry. Enclave enterprises are now permitted to sell goods within the CARICOM region and in the local market, in addition to exporting these goods. Enterprise Value Added Maximum Tax Holiday Group I At least 50 percent or more 15 years Group II At least 25 percent but less than 50 percent 12 years Group III At least 10 percent but less than 25 percent 10 years Enclave Enclave 15 years Companies that qualify for tax holidays may import duty-free all equipment, machinery, spare parts, and raw materials used in production. The Hotels Aid Act provides relief from customs duties on items brought into the country for use in the construction, extension, and equipping of a hotel of not less than ten bedrooms. In addition, the Income Tax Act provides special tax relief benefits for hotels of more than 30 bedrooms. These hotels are exempt from income tax for ten years. If the hotel contains fewer than 30 bedrooms, gains or profits are exempt from income tax for five years. Value Added Tax is levied on the total accommodation charges of a hotel or guest house and on the cost of food and beverages sold by a restaurant. This total tax rate is ten percent. Tax laws do not require investors in St. Kitts and Nevis to pay a capital gains tax. Qualified companies enjoy full exemption from taxes on corporate profits for a period not exceeding 15 years. Corporate tax does not apply to exempt companies or to enterprises that were granted tax concessions. There is no personal income tax. Additional tax concessions are available at the end of the tax holiday period. Normally, individuals and ordinary companies remitting payments to parties outside St. Kitts and Nevis must deduct ten percent withholding tax from profits, administration, management or head office expenses, technical services fees, accounting and audit expenses, royalties, non-life insurance premiums, and rent. However, this tax does not apply to profits of an approved enterprise such as exempt trusts, limited partnerships, companies, or foundations. The Unincorporated Business Tax Act mandates a levy on the gross revenue of services provided by professionals such as doctors, lawyers, dentists, and other specified persons listed in the schedule at a rate of four percent. The government of St. Kitts and Nevis does not issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. No incentives are offered for businesses owned by underrepresented investors such as women. For 2-5MW investments in solar, wind, and waste-to-energy, 10MW investments in geothermal energy, and investments in LED and solar streetlights, the government of St. Kitts and Nevis offers exemptions from import duties and custom service charges on related equipment. Due to the small market size, these incentives have had limited impact to date on facilitating green investment. There are no foreign trade zones, free ports, or special economic zones in St. Kitts and Nevis. However, there are four fully developed industrial sites where production facilities can be constructed to specifications and leased at nominal rates. The Development Bank of St. Kitts and Nevis manages and services the sites on behalf of the government. St. Kitts and Nevis does not mandate local employment. The provisions of the Labor Code outline the requirements for acquiring a work permit and prohibit anyone who is not a citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis or the OECS from engaging in employment without a work permit. When St. Kitts and Nevis grants work permits to senior management because no qualified nationals are available for the post, the government may recommend a counterparty trainee who is a citizen. There are no excessively onerous visa, residency, or work permit requirements. As a member of the WTO, St. Kitts and Nevis is party to the Agreement to the Trade Related Investment Measures. While there are no formal performance requirements, the government encourages investments that will create jobs and increase exports and foreign exchange earnings. There are no requirements for participation either by nationals or by the government in foreign investment projects. There is no requirement that enterprises must purchase a fixed percentage of goods or technology from local sources, but the government encourages local sourcing. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Except for the requirement to obtain an Alien Landholders License, foreign investment in St. Kitts and Nevis is not subject to any restrictions, and foreign investors receive national treatment. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. There are no measures or draft measures that prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Civil law protects physical property and mortgage claims. Foreign investors are required to obtain an Alien Landholders License to purchase residential or commercial property. The cost of these licenses is ten percent of the value of the land, plus fees associated with an attorney or other local service provider. Cabinet grants these licenses. Foreign investors are not required to pay the Alien Landholders License Tax in areas designated as special development zones, such as Frigate Bay or certain parts of the Southeast Peninsula. The Land Registry Act of 2017 was enacted to modernize records, identify property owners, and register clear land titles. St. Kitts and Nevis has a legislative framework supporting its commitment to the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). While the legal structures governing IPR are adequate, enforcement is inconsistent. The Intellectual Property Office of St. Kitts and Nevis (IPOSKN) is responsible for administering all laws related to IPR and overseeing the registration of patents, trademarks, and service marks. Its website is https://ipo.gov.kn . St. Kitts and Nevis is signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It is also a member of the UN World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME commits all 15 members to implement IPR protection and enforcement. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA contains the most detailed obligations regarding IPR in any trade agreement to which St. Kitts and Nevis is party. The CARIFORUM-EU EPA recognizes to the protection and enforcement of IPR. Article 139 of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties and of the [WTO] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).” The Customs Department of St. Kitts and Nevis can seize prohibited or counterfeit goods. However, the courts rule on the forfeiture and disposal of such goods. Complainants arrange with Customs to secure the goods until a judgment is rendered. St. Kitts and Nevis is in the process of reviewing its existing laws in relation to the importation of counterfeit and prohibited goods. St. Kitts and Nevis is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2021 Special 301 Report or USTR’s 2020 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is also a member of the ECSE and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. St. Kitts and Nevis is open to portfolio investment. St. Kitts and Nevis accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3 and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The Act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. St. Kitts and Nevis is a signatory to this agreement, and the ECCB controls St. Kitts and Nevis’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in St. Kitts and Nevis. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.5 billion (6.8 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. St. Kitts and Nevis is well served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. Some citizens still participate in informal community group lending. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB started an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash, was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries including St. Kitts and Nevis. While initially declared a success, its platform crashed in early 2022 and remained offline for almost two months before resuming in March, raising questions about the project’s reliability. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency was intended to operate alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. St. Kitts and Nevis enacted the Virtual Assets Bill, 2020, to regulate virtual currencies with the expectation that they will become increasingly prevalent. The bill is intended to facilitate the ease of doing business in a cashless society, and to combat theft, fraud, money laundering, Ponzi schemes, and terrorist financing. Neither the government of St. Kitts and Nevis, nor the ECCB, of which St. Kitts and Nevis is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in St. Kitts and Nevis work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. There are currently ten SOEs in St. Kitts and Nevis in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior managers report. A list of SOEs can be found at http://www.gov.kn . St. Kitts and Nevis does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. The government encourages corporate social responsibility but does not have regulations in place to mandate such activities by private companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. St. Kitts and Nevis has a national climate strategy via its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), submitted in 2021, and is currently finalizing a national adaptation plan for which it has received funding under the Green Climate Fund. It does not have a specific strategy for monitoring natural capital. The NDC includes a pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent by 2030 and has identified several mitigation strategies to achieve this goal. These include an effort to transition to 100 percent renewable energy by 2030, improvements to efficiency in electricity transmission and distribution, and development of electric vehicle infrastructure. The government hopes to receive substantial external support, primarily from the international community, in pursuit of these goals. Beyond the previously mentioned investment incentives, there are no current regulatory incentives in place to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, and other desirable ecological benefits. Public procurement policies do not currently consider environmental and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implements these laws effectively. Media and private citizens reported government corruption was a problem. Public officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws. The Financial Intelligence Unit and the police force’s white-collar crime unit investigate reports on suspicious financial transactions, but these reports were not available to the public. Government agencies involved in enforcement of anti-corruption laws include the Royal St. Kitts and Nevis Police Force, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the Financial Intelligence Unit. The Financial Intelligence Unit investigates financial crimes, but no independent body has been established to handle allegations of government corruption. Simone Bullen-Thompson Solicitor-General Legal Department Church Street, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis Tel: 869-465-2170 Email: simone_bullen@hotmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. St. Kitts and Nevis’ general elections are constitutionally due in 2025. 11. Labor Policies and Practices St. Kitts and Nevis has a labor force of approximately 25,000 with a literacy rate of 98 percent. Local colleges largely meet the country’s technical and training needs. There is also a large pool of professionals to draw from in fields such as law, medicine, information technology, and accounting. Many of the professionals in St. Kitts and Nevis trained in the United States, Canada, the wider Caribbean, or the UK, and often also gain work experience before returning to St. Kitts and Nevis. The government set the minimum wage at $3.31 an hour. The law provides for a 40-hour workweek and for premium pay for work above the standard workweek. There is no legal prohibition on excessive or compulsory overtime. Although not required by law, workers generally received at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law also calls for paid holidays and work on rest days to be paid at double the standard rate, as well as equal pay for equal work. According to the IMF, the informal economy is among the smallest in the region and is estimated to represent no more than 25 percent of GDP. The informal economy has extremely limited impact on contracts, industry access, and other economic aspects that might impact investment opportunities. Although there is no legislation governing the organization and representation of workers, the constitution speaks to the freedom of association and the right to organize and collective bargaining. St. Kitts and Nevis ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions on freedom of association and the right to organize and collective bargaining. The law permits the police, civil servants, hotel workers, construction workers, and employees of small businesses to organize staff associations. Staff associations do not have bargaining powers but are used to network and develop professional standards. Local laws allow labor unions to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for union members. A union representing more than fifty percent of the employees at a company may apply for the company to recognize the union for collective bargaining. Companies generally recognize the establishment of a union if the majority of its workers voted in favor of organizing the union, but the companies are not legally obligated to do so. Collective bargaining takes place on a workplace-by-workplace basis and is not industry-wide. In practice, but not by law, there are restrictions on strikes by workers who provide essential services, such as the police and civil servants. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination but does not require employers found guilty of such action to rehire employees who were fired for union activities. However, the employer must pay lost wages and severance pay. The ILO Committee of Experts reported in 2015 that workers are not protected against antiunion discrimination during recruitment or on the job. The ILO provided technical assistance to the government in labor law reform, labor administration, employment services, labor inspection, and occupational safety and health. The Labor Commissioner mediates all types of disputes between labor and management. By law, the system of industrial relations in St. Kitts and Nevis allows for labor grievances through a process of conciliation and mediation by the Department of Labor and the Commissioner, an independent hearing, arbitration, and finally a court of law. In practice, however, few disputes go to the Commissioner for resolution. If neither the Commissioner nor the Ministry of Labor can resolve the dispute, the law allows a case to be brought before a civil court. The law does not provide remedies for labor law violations, and the Ministry of Labour does not provide information on the adequacy of resources, inspections, and penalties for violations. Penalties are outdated and fines are insufficient to deter violations. The Department of Labour provided employers with training on their rights and responsibilities. Investors in St. Kitts and Nevis are responsible for maintaining workers’ rights and safeguarding the environment. While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the Factories Act provides general health and safety guidance to Labor Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety conditions. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued employment, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to their continued employment. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 927.4 2019 1,053 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 472 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI St. Kitts and Nevis does not appear in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean and the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States 246-227-4000 Email: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Saint Lucia Executive Summary Saint Lucia is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). Saint Lucia had an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1.6 billion in 2020 according to the latest figures obtained from the World Bank. Tourism is Saint Lucia’s main economic sector, while real estate and transport are other leading sectors. The Saint Lucian economy continues to be impacted by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The country has seen a slight economic rebound with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank forecasts 12.1 percent growth in 2022. The government remains committed to creating a welcoming and open business climate to attract more foreign investment to the country. Investment opportunities are focused primarily in tourism and hotel development, information and communication technology, manufacturing, international financial services, agribusiness, and creative industries. The Government of Saint Lucia provides several incentives to encourage domestic and foreign private investment. For example, foreign investors in Saint Lucia can repatriate all profits, dividends, and import capital. The Saint Lucia legal system is based on the British common law system, but its civil code and property law are greatly influenced by French law. Saint Lucia does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States but has bilateral investment treaties with the United Kingdom and Germany. In 2014, the Government of Saint Lucia signed an Intergovernmental Agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Saint Lucia to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 42/180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 433 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita ($M USD) 2019 10,950 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Saint Lucia strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). Invest Saint Lucia has introduced several investment incentives for businesses that consider locating in Saint Lucia, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Invest Saint Lucia is managed by a Chief Executive Director and is overseen by a board of directors appointed by the government under the Office of the Prime Minister and Minister of Commerce, International Trade, Investment, Enterprise Development and Consumer Affairs. The state-run agency Invest Saint Lucia provides “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors, helping to guide them through the various stages of the investment process. It assesses investment proposals for viability and in accordance with the laws of Saint Lucia and provides investment promotion services. Applicable government agencies, rather than Invest Saint Lucia, grant investment concessions. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, a waiver of import duty on imported plant machinery and equipment and imported raw and packaging materials, and export allowance or tax relief on export earnings. Various laws provide fiscal incentives to encourage establishing and expanding foreign and domestic investment. The Saint Lucian government encourages investment in all sectors, but targeted sectors include tourism, smart manufacturing and infrastructure, information and communication technologies, alternative energy, education, and business/knowledge processing operations. Local laws do not place any limits on the amount of foreign ownership or control in the establishment of a business in Saint Lucia. The government allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in any sector. Currently, there are no restrictions on foreigners investing in military or security-related businesses or natural resources. Trade licenses and other approvals/licenses may be required before establishment. Invest Saint Lucia evaluates all FDI proposals and provides intelligence, business facilitation, and investment promotion to establish and expand profitable business enterprises in Saint Lucia. Invest Saint Lucia also advises the government on issues that are important to the private sector and potential investors and advocates for an improved business climate, growth in investment opportunities, and improvements in the international competitiveness of the local economy. It focuses on building and promoting Saint Lucia as an ideal location for investors, seeking and generating new investment in strategic sectors, facilitating domestic and foreign direct investment as a one stop shop for investors, and identifying major issues and measures geared towards assisting the government in the ongoing development of a National Investment Policy. The Government of Saint Lucia treats foreign and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The OECS, of which Saint Lucia is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by Invest Saint Lucia to ensure the projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Saint Lucia offers an online resource that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. It is available at http://www.investstlucia.com/ . The Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property office maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration. Relevant officials can review applications submitted electronically. Applicants, however, must pay the registration fee in-person at the Registry office. The Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property office can only accept payment in the form of cash and checks. Personal checks are not accepted. It is advisable to consult a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.rocip.gov.lc . The general practice for starting a business is to retain an attorney to prepare all incorporation documents. A business must register with the Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property Office, the Inland Revenue Authority, and the National Insurance Corporation. The Government of Saint Lucia continues to support the growth of women-led businesses. The government seeks to support equitable treatment of women in the private sector through non-discriminatory processes for business registration, awarding of fiscal incentives, and assessing investments. The Government of Saint Lucia is committed to the full participation of people with disabilities in the society and the economy. It actively engages with people with disabilities in society to ensure the equal participation of people with disabilities in formal and informal sectors of the economy. The Government of Saint Lucia prioritizes investment retention as a key component of its overall economic strategy. While the Government of Saint Lucia is encouraging more domestic savings, it continues to require significant foreign investment to fill the investment gap. Local laws do not place ay restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. The government actively encourages local companies in Saint Lucia to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Saint Lucia does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. Saint Lucia has bilateral investment treaties with the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Saint Lucia is also party to the following: Saint Lucia has signed taxation agreements with other CARICOM countries. There is no taxation treaty with the United States, but there is a bilateral Tax Information Agreement. 3. Legal Regime The legal framework in Saint Lucia seeks to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Commerce, International Trade, Investment, Enterprise Development, and Consumer Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister and Invest Saint Lucia provide oversight on the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. The government offers a range of incentives for foreign investors. The Invest Saint Lucia Act addresses government policy for attracting investment. The Trade License Act, Aliens Licensing Act, Special Development Areas Act, Income Tax Act, Free Zones Act, Tourism Incentives Act, Investment and Stimulus Act, and Fiscal Incentives Act also impact foreign investment. The government announced plans to update these pieces of legislation to ensure that Saint Lucia remains compliant with international tax and exchange of information requirements. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lie with the bicameral parliament. The parliament consists of a lower house, which has 17 members elected for five-year terms in single-seat constituencies, and a Senate with 11 appointed members. Relevant laws govern all regulations relating to foreign investment in Saint Lucia. These laws are developed in the respective ministries and drafted by the Office of the Attorney General. FDI is covered by the enacting legislation for Invest Saint Lucia, the citizenship by investment program, and some sector-specific laws such as the Fiscal Incentives Act or tourism-related laws. Saint Lucia’s laws are available online at http://www.govt.lc . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government often solicits input from various stakeholder groups and via town hall meetings when formulating new legislation. The government also uses public awareness efforts such as television and radio call-in programs to inform and shape public opinion. The government publishes copies of proposed laws and regulations in the Official Gazette before they are presented in the House of Assembly. Although Saint Lucia does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains an information service website on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The government budget and an audit of that budget are available on the website. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Saint Lucia. The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Saint Lucia to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions registered under the Banking Act of 2015. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman is a constitutional entity created to guard against abuses of power by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner is independent. The Parliamentary Commissioner investigates complaints relating to actions or omissions by any government official or government body where such actions or omissions cause an injustice or harm a member of the public. In developing regulations, respective ministries advise the Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice, and National Security regarding necessary elements and parameters of proposed legislation. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice, and National Security subsequently drafts legislation, ensuring compatibility with the nation’s domestic and international legal commitments. Invest Saint Lucia has the main responsibility for investment supervision, whereas the Ministry of Finance monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. Saint Lucia’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include financial penalties and other sanctions. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Saint Lucia subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. Each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies, with the objective of progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Saint Lucia is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless it seeks specific concessions not to implement such regulations. The Saint Lucia Bureau of Standards is a statutory body established under the Standards Act. It establishes, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development and efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, and protecting the environment, food products, quality of life, and the facilitation of trade. It also conducts international standards consultations and training. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Saint Lucia is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Saint Lucia is working to improve customs efficiency, modernize customs operations, and address inefficiencies in the clearance of goods. Saint Lucia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in December 2015. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate reductions in trade costs, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Saint Lucia has already implemented several TFA requirements. Saint Lucia bases its legal system on the British common law system, but its civil code and property law are influenced by French law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. The final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal, established in 2001 by the Agreement Establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ considers and determines appeals from the CARICOM member states that are parties to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ. Currently, Saint Lucia is subject only to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and Saint Lucia are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The judicial system remains relatively independent of the executive branch of government and is free of political interference in judicial matters. Invest Saint Lucia’s FDI policy is to actively pursue FDI in priority sectors and advise the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract sustainable investment. Invest Saint Lucia reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Saint Lucia provides “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors to guide them through the various stages of the investment process. Invest Saint Lucia offers a website that is useful to navigate the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors: http://www.investstlucia.com/ . Under Saint Lucia’s CBI program, foreign individuals may obtain citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship by Investment Act of 2015, which grants the right to citizenship by investment. Program applicants are required to submit to a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. The minimum investment for a single applicant to qualify is a $100,000 contribution to the National Economic Fund. A $190,000 contribution covers a family of four made up of the principal applicant, spouse, and up to two dependents. Alternatively, a real estate purchase valued at $300,000 or more will also qualify. There are also provisions for enterprise investment in approved projects and a government bond option. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the unit also created a special Covid-19 Relief Bond with a minimum investment of $250,000. This bond option is available until the end of 2022. More information on the citizenship by investment program is available at https://www.cipsaintlucia.com . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM member states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Saint Lucia does not yet have legislation regulating competition. The OECS agreed to establish a regional competition body to handle competition matters within its single market. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the government can acquire land for a public purpose. The government must serve a notice of acquisition to the person from whom the land is acquired. Saint Lucia employs a system of eminent domain to pay compensation in such cases. There were no reports that the government discriminated against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws forcing local ownership in specified sectors. There is one case of expropriation involving an American citizen-owned property. An American citizen purchased 32 acres of land in Saint Lucia in 1970. The government expropriated the land in 1985 by an act of law. The claimant has been seeking redress and those efforts have been unsuccessful to date. The government denied the claimant’s request without explanation in 2014. The government has been largely unresponsive to repeated attempts by the claimant to appeal the decision. The government also claims to have lost property records that the claimant says support their ownership claim. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown continues to advocate with the government to ensure the claimant is allowed to fully exercise their due process rights. Saint Lucia has a limited bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. The act was updated in 2020. 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Saint Lucia provides incentives to encourage investment by providing tax and non-tax concessions to businesses that can add value to the country’s economic development. Approval for incentives is granted by the Cabinet upon application, taking into consideration the type, size, scope, and employment potential of the business. Saint Lucia’s Trade License Act, Aliens Licensing Act, International Business Companies Act, Development Incentives Act, Special Development Areas Act, Income Tax Act, Free Zones Act, Fiscal Incentives Act, Tourism Incentives, and Tourism Stimulus and Investments Act together constitute a broad framework of incentives for foreign investors. Except for pork and chicken, there are no requirements for an enterprise to purchase a fixed percentage of goods from local sources. Companies purchasing chicken must purchase a minimum of 28 percent locally produced chicken. Companies purchasing pork must purchase a minimum of 40 percent locally produced pork. The Fiscal Incentives Act of 1974 provides for fiscal incentives to facilitate local and foreign investment in the productive sectors of Saint Lucia’s economy. The law gives export-oriented manufacturing enterprises special consideration. Investors may apply for incentives with the relevant ministry or ministries, providing a copy of the application to Invest Saint Lucia. The criteria for fiscal incentive qualification are that an enterprise must be incorporated and registered in Saint Lucia; contribute to the economic development of Saint Lucia; utilize domestic human and natural resources; form linkages with other economic sectors; contribute to foreign exchange earnings; train local personnel; and introduce plant upgrades via technological transfers. The Fiscal Incentives Act provides a list of incentives, including a tax holiday of up to 15 years for approved projects, a waiver of import duty on imported machinery and plant equipment, a waiver of import duty on imported raw and packaging materials, and an export allowance on export earnings. Under the Fiscal Incentives Act, four types of enterprises qualify for tax holidays. The length of the tax holiday for the first three depends on the amount of value added in Saint Lucia. The fourth type, known as enclave industry, must produce goods exclusively for export outside the CARICOM region. The government amended the Fiscal Incentives Act in early 2020 to expand incentives offered to local businesses as a means of spurring development and investment. The Fiscal Incentives Act now includes four subsectors of the service industry: creative industry, professional services, spa and wellness, and information and communications technology. Enterprise Value Added Maximum Tax Holiday Group I 50% or more 15 years Group II 25% to 50% 12 years Group III 10% to 25% 10 years Enclave Enclave 15 years The standard corporate income tax rate is 30 percent. An International Business Company (IBC) may elect either to be exempted from paying income tax or to be liable for income tax on the chargeable income of the company at the rate of 1 percent. An IBC is not subject to stamp duties, withholding tax, or capital gains tax. Amendments to the act passed in 2017 sought to encourage IBCs to establish headquarters in Saint Lucia by offering various incentives, including a waiver of customs duty on materials, articles, or equipment used exclusively by the company’s head office, and exemption from income tax for employees. Various special licensing requirements apply to the acquisition of land, development of buildings, expansion of existing construction, and certain aspects of the tourism industry. Individuals or corporate bodies who are not citizens and seek to acquire land may require a license prior to execution, depending upon the amount of land. The Special Development Areas Act encourages investment in designated areas throughout the island. These areas include Vieux-Fort, Anse la Raye, Soufriere, Canaries, Choc Estate, and Dennery. Special concessions offered under this law include exemption on stamp duty and import duty on inputs for the construction of new buildings and the renovation or refurbishment of existing buildings; land and house tax; stamp duty payable by vendors and purchasers on the initial purchase of property; higher tax allowances; and accelerated depreciation. Types of businesses that may qualify for these concessions are residential complexes, commercial or industrial buildings, facilities directed towards the improvement or expansion of services to the tourism sector, water-based activities, tourism projects highlighting the heritage and natural environment of Saint Lucia, arts and cultural investments, agriculture-based activities, and fisheries-based activities. The Tourism Incentives Act effectively provides for earnings exemption from income tax. This exemption would apply to a tourism project managed by or on behalf of a company entitled to distribute profits to shareholders or debenture holders as capital monies. The project would be free of tax during the two-year period following the end of the tax holiday. The act also allows for customs duty exemptions and permits the duty-free importation of materials and equipment used exclusively in connection with the construction and equipping of the tourism project. The Tourism Stimulus and Investment Act also allows for the waiver of VAT and property tax. Saint Lucia maintains a Free Zone. It is an enclosed area treated for customs purposes as lying outside the customs territory of the island. Goods of foreign origin may be held pending eventual transshipment, re-exportation and, in some cases, importation into the local market without payment of customs duties. There are various types of companies operating in the Free Zone, including distributors of appliances, furniture, household and office supplies/items; manufacturers; duty-free suppliers of liquor, cigarettes, fragrances, wines, and pharmaceuticals. The Free Zone Act aims to promote export development and foreign investment projects in a “bureaucracy-free, duty-free, and tax-free” environment for prescribed activities. Incentives include exemption from customs duties, taxes, and related charges on all classes of goods entering the Free Zone for commercial or operating purposes. There are no restrictions or taxes on foreign exchange transactions and no taxes on dividends for the first 20 years of operation. There are also no work permit fees for management personnel of Free Zone businesses, and no import or export licenses or price controls. Finally, there is no company income tax for the first five years, and thereafter a reduced corporate income tax. The Free Zone Act was last amended in 2018. The Government of Saint Lucia does not mandate local employment. However, the government expects foreign investors to add value to the local economy, which can be achieved by providing local employment. The 2006 Labor Code provides guidelines for employment, dismissal, and payment of severance and other benefits. It also defines permanent employment, fixed term employment, and contract for service. The government requires all non-CARICOM citizens and companies intending to conduct business in Saint Lucia and who own more than 49 percent of the company’s shares to obtain a trade license. The Ministry of Commerce, Manufacturing, Business Development, Cooperatives and Consumer Affairs issues trade licenses. Under the Foreign National and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Regulation, anyone outside OECS seeking to conduct business or be employed in Saint Lucia must apply for a work permit. Applications are available from the Labor Department of the ministry with responsibility for labor. There are no excessively onerous visa, residency, or work permit requirements. While there are no formal performance requirements, the government encourages investments that create jobs and increase exports and foreign exchange earnings. Local laws do not place any restrictions on foreign investment in Saint Lucia. Foreign investors are entitled to receive the same treatment as nationals of Saint Lucia. Foreign investors seeking to purchase property for residential or commercial purposes must obtain an Alien Landholding License. No sectors are officially closed to private enterprise, although some activities, such as telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting, banking, and insurance require government licenses. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of a local enterprise or participation in a joint venture. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (e.g. back doors into hardware and software keys for encryption, etc.). 5. Protection of Property Rights Civil law protects physical property and mortgage claims. There are some special license requirements pertaining to acquisition of land, development of buildings, expansion of existing construction, and special standards for various aspects of the tourism industry. Individuals or corporate bodies who are not CARICOM nationals and who seek to acquire land must apply for and obtain an alien landholder’s license as required under the Alien Landholding Act prior to acquisition. Saint Lucia has two primary provisions governing the protection of intellectual property rights. They are the copyrights act and the trademarks act. 6. Financial Sector Saint Lucia is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Saint Lucia is open to portfolio investment. Saint Lucia has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Foreign tax credit is allowed for the lesser of the tax payable in the foreign country or the tax charged under Saint Lucia tax law. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Saint Lucia is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Saint Lucia’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Saint Lucia. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Saint Lucia as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.8 billion (6.4 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Saint Lucia as stable. Saint Lucia is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by the U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Saint Lucia in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. Saint Lucia does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Saint Lucia, nor the ECCB (of which Saint Lucia is a member) maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Saint Lucia work in partnership with ministries or under their remit, carrying out specific ministerial responsibilities. There are 39 SOEs in Saint Lucia operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. SOEs in Saint Lucia do not generally pose a threat to investors. The Saint Lucian government established most SOEs with the goal of creating economic activity in areas where it perceives the private sector has very little interest. SOEs are wholly owned government entities and are headed by boards of directors to which senior management reports. A list of SOEs in Saint Lucia is available at http://www.govt.lc/statutory-bodies . Saint Lucia currently does not have a targeted privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Saint Lucia’s government and citizens are known to engage in responsible business conduct. The private sector typically engages in projects that benefit society, and support environmental, social, and cultural causes. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Saint Lucia remains susceptible to natural disasters and other effects due to climate change. Saint Lucia has developed a multi-stakeholder policy framework on the environment that focuses on climate resilience and adaptation, disaster risk reduction, protection of biodiversity, effective natural resources and environmental management through the enforcement of policies, legislation and regulations. The National Environmental Policy was amended in 2019 to lay out a coherent strategy to adopt and implement policies and regulations as it relates to hazard mitigation, climate change adaption, and developing planning processes and procedures. Saint Lucia is party to the Paris Agreement. In 2021, the government updated its Nationally Determined Contribution to the United Nations to signal its commitment to limiting the global average temperature increase and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 9. Corruption Most locals and foreigners do not view corruption related to foreign business and investment as a major problem in Saint Lucia. There are, however, isolated reports of allegations of official corruption, particularly among customs officials. Local laws provide for access to information. The law also requires government officials to present their financial assets annually to the Integrity Commission. While authorities do not make public the disclosure reports filed by individuals, the commission submits a report to parliament each year. The commission lacked the ability to compel compliance with the law, and as a result, compliance was low. The Parliamentary Commissioner, Auditor General, and Public Services Commission are responsible for combating corruption. Parliament can also appoint a special committee to investigate specific allegations of corruption. The country is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2011. Saint Lucia has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, notably the Integrity in Public Life Act of 2004. Government agencies involved in enforcement of anti-corruption laws include the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Integrity Commission, and the Financial Intelligence Unit. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Vacant (previous Chairman resigned in September 2021 and his successor is yet to be named) Chairman Integrity Commission 2nd Floor, Graham Louisy Administrative Building, Waterfront Castries, Saint Lucia (758) 468-2187 icstlucia@gmail.com Paul Thompson Director Financial Intelligence Authority Gablewoods North P.O., Castries LC02 501, Saint Lucia (758) 451-7126 slufia@candw.lc 10. Political and Security Environment Saint Lucia is considered politically stable and does not have a recent history of political violence. Elections are peaceful and considered generally free and transparent. The next election is constitutionally due in 2026. 11. Labor Policies and Practices There is no formal national minimum wage in Saint Lucia, though a government-appointed minimum wage commission recommended establishing a minimum wage. The legislated workweek is 40 hours, with a maximum of eight hours per day. Overtime hours are at the discretion of the employer and the agreement of the employee. Pay is time-and-a-half for work over eight hours and double for work on Sundays and public holidays. Workers paid monthly are entitled to a minimum of 14 paid vacation days after one year. Workers paid on a daily or biweekly schedule have a minimum of 14 vacation days after 200 working days. Special legislation covers work hours for shop assistants, agricultural workers, domestic workers, and workers in industrial establishments. Labor laws, including occupational health and safety standards, apply to all workers whether they are in the formal or informal sectors. Under the Foreign National and Commonwealth Citizens (Employment) Regulation, anyone outside of the OECS wanting to conduct business or be gainfully employed in Saint Lucia must apply for a work permit. Applications can be obtained from the Labor Department, which is currently under the auspices of the Ministry Education, Innovation, Gender Relations, and Sustainable Development. According to the World Bank, Saint Lucia had an estimated labor force of approximately 102,250 in 2020. The most available literacy rate is of 72.8 percent (2010 census). The local state college, which offers technical and vocational courses, meets most of the country’s technical and training needs. There is also a pool of professionals to draw from in fields such as law, medicine, business, information technology, and accounting. Many of the professionals in Saint Lucia trained in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the wider Caribbean, where many of them gained work experience before returning to the country. The law, including applicable statutes and regulations, specifies the right of most workers to form and join independent unions, strike, and bargain collectively. The law also prohibits anti-union discrimination, and workers fired for union activity have the right to reinstatement. The law places restrictions on the right to strike by workers who provide essential services such as police and fire departments, health services, and utilities (electricity, water, and telecommunications). Workers in these organizations must give 30 days’ notice before striking. Once workers give notice, authorities usually refer the matter to an ad hoc tribunal set up under the Essential Services Act. The government selects tribunal members, following rules to ensure tripartite representation. The ad hoc labor tribunals try to resolve disputes through mandatory arbitration. The ministry’s labor commissioner monitors violations of labor law. The government does not effectively enforce labor laws, and there were insufficient resources for investigation and enforcement of labor standards. The Ministry of Education, Innovation, Gender Relations, and Sustainable Development employed five labor officers (inspectors) who, due to financial constraints, focused mainly on occupational health and safety concerns. The government sets appropriate occupational safety and health standards. Violations of the labor code can result in fines of up to $1,371 ($3,704 Eastern Caribbean dollars) and up to two years in prison. The labor department is currently drafting updated legislation to improve enforcement. Investors in Saint Lucia are responsible for maintaining workers’ rights and safeguarding the environment. The Labor Commissioner settles disputes over safety issues. Workers have the right to report or leave unsafe work environments without jeopardy to their continued employment. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2019 2119 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 433 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 11 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 65.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank – https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/gdp-datas/comparative-report/1 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available; Saint Lucia does not appear in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available; Saint Lucia does not appear in the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy Bridgetown, Barbados +1 (246) 227-4000 BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Executive Summary St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). In the most recent available figures from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ 2020 estimated gross domestic product (GDP) was 783 million USD (2.12 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2020. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is still recovering from the explosive eruptions from La Soufriere volcano in April 2021. Volcanic ash blanketed most of the northern half of the St. Vincent, which includes much of the country’s agricultural districts. This, coupled with the ongoing challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, has exacerbated the economic situation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The government is hoping that construction projects in the tourism sector and civil infrastructure will provide a much-needed economic boost this year. The economy might struggle to hit its forecasted growth of around 4.57 percent in 2022, as the agriculture and tourism sectors are impacted by the ongoing pandemic and volcanic reconstruction efforts. The country seeks to diversify its economy across several niche markets, particularly tourism, international financial services, agricultural processing, scientific and medical research, light manufacturing, renewable energy, creative industries, and information and communication technologies. The Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign exchange. Through the Invest St. Vincent and the Grenadines Authority (Invest SVG), the government facilitates FDI and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. The government does not impose limits on foreign control, nor are there requirements for local ownership or ownership in locally registered companies. The island’s legal system is based on the British common law system. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It has double-taxation treaties with the United States, Canada, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2016, St. Vincent and the Grenadines signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in St. Vincent and the Grenadines to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 36 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 7 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 7,460 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, through Invest SVG, strongly encourages FDI, particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign currency. The government is open to all investment, but is currently prioritizing investment in niche markets, particularly tourism, international financial services, agricultural processing, light manufacturing, renewable energy, scientific and medical research, creative industries, and information and communication technologies. Invest SVG’s FDI policy is designed to attract investment into priority sectors. It advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs that attract and facilitate investment. The government offers special incentive packages for foreign investments in the hotel industry and light manufacturing. The government offers other incentive packages on an ad hoc basis. There are no limits on foreign control in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, nor are there requirements for local investment or ownership in locally registered companies, although non-nationals must apply for a license from the Prime Minister’s Office to acquire more than 50 percent of a company. An attorney must submit the application and Cabinet must approve it. Companies holding at least five acres of land may restrict or prohibit the issue or transfer of their shares or debentures to non-nationals. The government has not officially closed any industries to private investment, although some activities such as telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting, banking, and insurance require a government license. The OECS, of which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. Invest SVG facilitates domestic and foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. Invest SVG provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It also reviews all investment projects applying for government incentives to ensure they conform to national interests and provide economic benefits to the country. Its website is http://www.investsvg.com . In addition to its website, the country offers an online guide that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. The guide is available at http://theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/saintvincentandthegrenadines . The general practice is to retain an attorney to prepare all incorporation documents. Local laws dictate that a business must register with the Commerce and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), the Ministry of Trade, the Inland Revenue Department, and the National Insurance Service. The CIPO has an online information portal that describes the steps to register a business in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. There is no online registration process, but the required forms are available online. These must be printed and submitted to the CIPO. More information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.vc . There is no restriction on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhances the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties St. Vincent and the Grenadines has not signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. The country, however, has bilateral tax treaties with the United States, Canada, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1989, Germany and St. Vincent and the Grenadines signed a treaty for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment. In 2018, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the UAE concluded an Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and an Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is also party to the following economic communities and organizations: Caribbean Community The Treaty of Chaguaramas established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973. Its purpose is to promote economic integration among its 15 member states. Investors operating in St. Vincent and the Grenadines have preferential access to the entire CARICOM market. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) established the CSME, which permits the free movement of goods, capital, and labor among CARICOM states. CARICOM has bilateral agreements with Cuba, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. In 2013, CARICOM entered into a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States The Revised Treaty of Basseterre established the OECS. The OECS consists of seven full members (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), and three associate members (Anguilla, Martinique, and the British Virgin Islands). Guadeloupe signed an accession agreement to the OECS in 2019. The purpose of the Treaty is to promote harmonization among member states in foreign policy, defense and security, and economic affairs. The six independent countries and Montserrat ratified the Revised Treaty of Basseterre establishing the OECS Economic Union, which entered into force in 2011. The Economic Union established a single financial and economic space within which goods, services, and people move without hindrance. CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement The Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) and the European Community signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008. The overarching objectives of the EPA are to alleviate poverty, promote regional integration and economic cooperation, and foster the gradual integration of the CARIFORUM states into the world economy by improving trade capacity and creating an investment-conducive environment. The EPA promotes trade-related developments in areas such as competition, intellectual property, public procurement, the environment, and the protection of personal data. CARIFORUM-UK Economic Partnership Agreement The UK and the CARIFORUM states signed an EPA in 2019, committing to trade continuity after Britain’s departure from the European Union. The CARIFORUM-UK EPA eliminates all tariffs on all goods imported from CARIFORUM states into the UK, while those Caribbean states will continue to gradually cut import tariffs on most of the region’s imports from the UK. Caribbean Basin Initiative The Caribbean Basin Initiative facilitates the economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies. It promotes economic development through private sector initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean by expanding foreign and domestic investment in non-traditional sectors, diversifying country economies, and expanding their imports. The Caribbean Basin Initiative provides beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. It permits duty-free entry of products manufactured or assembled in St. Vincent and the Grenadines into the United States. Caribbean/Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) CARIBCAN is an economic and trade development assistance program for Commonwealth Caribbean countries in which Canada provides duty-free access to its national market for most products originating in Commonwealth Caribbean countries. 3. Legal Regime St. Vincent and the Grenadines uses transparent policies and laws to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. Accounting, legal, and regulatory practices are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the profession in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Rulemaking and regulatory authority rests in the unicameral House of Assembly, which has fifteen elected members and six appointed senators who sit for a five-year term. The Public Accounts Committee and Director of Audits ensure the government follows administrative processes. National laws govern all regulations relating to foreign investment. Ministries develop these laws, and the Ministry of Legal Affairs drafts them. Laws pertaining to Invest SVG also govern FDI. Invest SVG has the main responsibility for investment supervision, while the Ministry of Economic Planning, Sustainable Development, Industry, Information, and Labor tracks investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. The government publishes most draft bills in local newspapers for public comment. In addition, the government circulates bills at stakeholder meetings. Some bills and laws are published on the government website at www.gov.vc . The government sometimes establishes a select committee to suggest amendments to specific draft bills. In some instances, these mechanisms may also apply to investment laws and regulations. There is no obligation for the government to consider proposed amendments prior to implementation. The government discloses information on public finances and debt obligations. The annual budget address can be found online. The country’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to implement all appropriate measures to fulfill its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found St. Vincent and the Grenadines to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions registered under the Banking Act of 2015. Local laws dictate that an external company must be registered with the Commercial Registry in St. Vincent and the Grenadines if it wishes to operate in the country. Companies using or manufacturing chemicals must first obtain approval of their environmental and health practices from the St. Vincent and the Grenadines National Standards Institution and the Environmental Division of the Ministry of Health. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, St. Vincent and the Grenadines subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, the country must implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under the OECS Authority, unless it seeks specific concessions not to do so. The country’s Bureau of Standards is a statutory body which prepares and promulgates standards in relation to goods, services, processes, and practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, St. Vincent and the Grenadines must harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. St. Vincent and the Grenadines ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2017 and subsequently notified its Category A measures. Included in the Trade Facilitation Agreement are measures to improve risk management techniques and a post-clearance audit system to eliminate delays and congestion at the port. While St. Vincent and the Grenadines has implemented some TFA requirements, it has missed two implementation deadlines. A full list of measures undertaken pursuant to the TFA is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines . The country’s legal system is based on the British common law system. The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. The judicial system consists of lower courts, called magistrates’ courts, and a family court. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil (commercial) matters and makes determinations on constitutional matters. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, a court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. The country has a strong judicial system that upholds the sanctity of contracts and prevents unwarranted discrimination towards foreign investors. The government treats foreign investors and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The police and court systems are generally unbiased in commercial matters. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is only subject to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Invest SVG provides guidance on the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Invest SVG has the authority to screen and review FDI projects. The review process is transparent and contingent on the size of capital investment and the project’s projected economic impact. The investor must complete a series of steps to obtain a business license. These steps are listed at http://www.investsvg.com . All potential investors seeking an incentive package must submit their proposals for review by Invest SVG to ensure the project is consistent with the nation’s laws and interests and would provide economic benefits to the country. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. There is no legislation to regulate competition in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the government may acquire land for a public purpose. The government must serve a notice of acquisition to the person from whom the land is acquired. A Board of Assessment determines compensation and files its award in the High Court. The value of the land is based on the amount for which the land would be sold on the open market by a willing seller. Under the Alien’s (Land-Holding Regulation) Act, the government can hold properties forfeit without compensation if the terms of investment are not met. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of any outstanding expropriation claims or nationalization of foreign enterprises in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act governs the country’s bankruptcy framework and grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. 4. Industrial Policies Through the Fiscal Incentives Act, St. Vincent and the Grenadines offers many incentives to investors and provides the necessary information on the laws, criteria, and application procedures to qualify for these incentives. The list of incentives includes exemption from or reduction of duty payments on the importation or purchase of materials and other equipment for use in construction and operation of the business. Other incentives are the exemption from or a reduction of duty on the importation or purchase of vehicles for use in operation of the business, and a reduction of property tax of up to ten percent for land and buildings used in the operation of the business. The government also provides tax holidays as an investment incentive. Group I enterprises (50 percent or more local value added) enjoy a 15-year tax holiday; Group II enterprises (25 to 49 percent local value added) are granted 12 years; Group III enterprises (10 to 24 percent local value added) receive ten years. Enclave enterprises (producing wholly for markets outside of CARICOM) enjoy a 15-year tax holiday. The Industry Unit under the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, Sustainable Development, and Information Technology administers this act. These fiscal incentives may be granted to manufacturing and processing companies producing “Approved Products.” Companies must apply to the Cabinet to become “Approved Enterprises” producing such products. Local value is determined by the percentage of annual sales not contributed by imported materials and services, non-CARICOM national labor, profits, and other income payments distributed to members outside of CARICOM, and depreciation on imported machinery and equipment. Tax holidays are also granted to capital-intensive industries investing at least $9.25 million (25 million Eastern Caribbean dollars). Local laws dictate that companies must meet export performance requirements to take advantage of certain tax incentives. For example, enclave enterprises must produce goods exclusively for export outside the CARICOM region. Foreigners may finance investments using domestic or foreign capital sources. The Fiscal Incentives Act confers income tax credits in the form of export allowance to qualifying enterprises for the export of approved products. In the tourism sector, the Hotels Aid Act provides incentives for the renovation, refurbishment, and expansion of existing hotels and for the construction of new hotels. Concessions for expansions of not less than five guest rooms are also available. The Ministry of Tourism administers the act. The corporate tax rate ranges from 15 to 30 percent, except for companies granted tax holidays under the Fiscal Incentives Act. Companies manufacturing goods for local or export markets and which have maintained a special account conforming to Comptroller of Inland Revenue requirements have access to reduced tax rates. Offshore businesses are also subject to value added tax (VAT) on taxable goods imported into St. Vincent and the Grenadines. VAT is 16 percent. An international company may import machinery and equipment free from certain taxes and custom duties if the imports are capital goods to be used in a company’s business. The government recognizes trusts if they are in writing and follow the formal requirements for a deed or settlement under the International Trust Act. The act recognizes several types of international trusts: protective or spendthrift trusts, charitable trusts, and purpose trusts. A Registrar of Trusts has direct regulatory responsibilities relating to registration, certificate issuance, and review of trust documentation. At least one trustee must be registered and licensed for an international trust to be registered. The government confers certain benefits on registered trusts, including exemptions from various taxes and duties provided the settler was not insolvent at the time the trust was created or did not become insolvent because of the creation of the trust. The exemptions include income tax, excise tax, customs duties, and stamp duty exemptions. These are applicable if certain conditions are met, one of which being that the trust must not be domiciled in the country. The Comptroller of Inland Revenue is empowered to assess a trust’s eligibility for tax exemptions and may require the registered trustee to provide financial information. According to the Trust Act, if at least one beneficiary of a registered trust becomes a resident after the trust is registered, and if the trust is in good standing, the fact of the residency of the beneficiary will not invalidate the trust. Neither the trust nor its beneficiaries will be entitled to tax exemptions for any year during which the trust had one or more resident beneficiaries. An international trust, except one that is an international company, will not become void or voidable due to a settler’s bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, the law of the settler’s domicile or ordinary residence notwithstanding. While there is no formal legislation in relation to incentives in the information and telecommunications sector, commercial presence and establishment is at the discretion of the Cabinet on advice from the National Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. The Export Free Zones Act of 1999 provides for the designation or establishment of export free zones, which allow for the duty-free import of inputs for processing and export. While allowable under law, there are no foreign trade zones or free trade zones in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The government does not mandate local employment. The Employment of Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens Act provides foreign nationals or Commonwealth citizens must obtain valid work permits. The ministry responsible for national security oversees work permit applications. The government may modify or cancel work permits after a seven-day notice if the holder fails to comply with the conditions of the permit. There is no requirement that enterprises purchase a fixed percentage of goods from local sources. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance (back doors into hardware and software keys for encryption, etc.). The country has not adopted any specific data protection legislation. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Aliens’ Land Holding Act regulates the holding of land and mortgages related to land by individuals who are non-nationals and companies controlled by non-nationals. Non-nationals must apply for and be granted a license to hold land. The breach of any condition of the license authorizes forfeiture to the government of the interest held by the non-national. License conditions may require that land be developed within a specific timeframe. Non-nationals must use a locally licensed attorney to apply for a land license. The applications are processed through the office of the Prime Minister. If approved, the non-national must file the license at the Registry of the High Court. The Registry collects all applicable registration fees and stamp duties. St. Vincent and the Grenadines has a legislative framework protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). While legal structures governing IPR are adequate, enforcement measures are inconsistent. The administration of IPR laws is the responsibility of the Office of the Attorney General. The CIPO administers the registration of patents, trademarks, and service marks. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It is also a member of the UN World Intellectual Property Organization and is a signatory to its treaties. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2022 Special 301 Report or in its 2021Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. Article 66 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME commits all 15 members to implement stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement. The EPA between CARIFORUM states and the European Community contains the most detailed obligations with respect to intellectual property in any trade agreement to which St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a party. The EPA recognizes the protection and enforcement of intellectual property. Article 139 of the EPA requires parties to “ensure an adequate and effective implementation of the international treaties dealing with intellectual property to which they are parties, and of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).” The Enforcement Division of the Customs and Excise Department spearheads the preventative and enforcement aspects of IPR protection, which includes the detention, seizure, and forfeiture of counterfeit goods. The Enforcement Division also conducts investigations of customs offenses and administers fines and penalties. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is also a participant on the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and regulated by the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission. The Securities Act of 2001 regulates activities on the ECSM. The ECSE and its subsidiaries, the Eastern Caribbean Central Securities Depository and the Eastern Caribbean Central Securities Registry, facilitate activities on the ECSE. The main activities are the primary issuance and secondary trading of corporate and sovereign securities, the clearance and settlement of issues and trades, maintaining securities holders’ records, and providing custodial, registration, transfer agency, and paying agency services while respecting listed and non-listed securities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is open to portfolio investment. St. Vincent and the Grenadines accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a credit bureau. Eight participating governments passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a signatory to this agreement. Therefore, the ECCB controls the country’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act 2015 is a harmonized piece of legislation across all ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Ministers of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $833 million (2.25 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was six percent of deposit liabilities. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in August 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines nor the ECCB, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the following sectors: water, transportation, housing, transportation (ports), electricity, tourism, information and communication, telecommunications, investment and investment services, financial services, fisheries, agriculture, sports and culture, civil engineering, and infrastructure. SOEs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines are wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. They are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they do not have a mandate to compete with private-sector companies. There is no single published list of SOEs, though information about individual SOEs is available. There are no targeted privatization programs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government and the public view responsible business conduct positively. The private sector is involved in projects that benefit society, including in support of environmental, social, and cultural causes. Individuals benefit from business-sponsored initiatives when employees of local and foreign-owned enterprises volunteer and when companies make monetary or in-kind donations to local causes. The NGO community, while comparatively small, is involved in fundraising and volunteerism in gender, health, environmental, and community projects. The government sometimes partners with NGOs and generally encourages philanthropy. There are no alleged or reported human or labor rights concerns relating to responsible business conduct of which foreign businesses should be aware. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies or a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Saint Vincent and the Grenadines remains susceptible to natural disasters and other effects due to climate change. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has developed a multi-stakeholder policy framework on the environment that focuses on climate resilience and adaptation, disaster risk reduction, protection of biodiversity, effective natural resources, and environmental management through the enforcement of policies, legislation, and regulations. The National Economic, Social and Development Plan seeks to address sustainable national development and is working toward integrated climate change adaptation. The National Adaptation Plan seeks to fulfill the government’s UN obligations and integrate all policies, programs and activities as it relates to climate change. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is party to the Paris Agreement. 9. Corruption The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implements these laws. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a signatory to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, but not to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. The Director of Public Prosecutions has the authority to prosecute a number of corruption-related offenses. Corruption allegations are investigated by the Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force. There is generally no statutory standard obligation for public officers to disclose financial information to a specific authority. If confiscation proceedings are initiated or contemplated against a corrupt official, the courts can order disclosure of financial information. The Financial Intelligence Unit has the authority to conduct financial investigations with a court order. The law also provides for public access to information. Only a narrow list of exceptions outlining the grounds for nondisclosure exists, but there is no specific timeline for relevant authorities to make the requested response or disclosure. There are no criminal or administrative sanctions for not providing a response and there is no appeal mechanism for review of a disclosure denial. Sejilla McDowall Director of Public Prosecutions Office of Public Prosecutions Frenches Gate, Kingstown Telephone: 784-457-1344 Email: dppsvg@vincysurf.com Colin John Commissioner of Police Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force Kingstown Telephone: 784-457-1211 Email: svgpolice@gmail.com 10. Political and Security Environment St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. Elections are peaceful and regarded as being free and fair. The next general elections are constitutionally due in 2025. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to the World Bank, St. Vincent and the Grenadines had an active labor force of approximately 54,945 persons in 2020. The government generally enforces labor laws, and penalties are sufficient to deter violations. The law, including related regulations and statutory instruments, provides for the rights of workers to form and join unions of their choice, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law also provides that it is lawful to conduct peaceful picketing in contemplation of a trade dispute. Trade unions and leaders of the trade union movement enjoy a strong voice in the labor and economic affairs of the country. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and dismissal for engagement in union activities. Although the law does not require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity, a court may order reinstatement. The International Labor Organization has noted with concern the discretionary authority of the government over trade union registration, and the government’s unfettered authority to investigate the financial accounts of trade unions. The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act Chapter 215 provides for establishment of an arbitration tribunal and a board of inquiry in connection with trade disputes and allows provision for the settlement of such disputes. Labor unions and businesses are generally satisfied with the arbitration panels, which have tripartite representation. One of the mandates of the Department of Labor is to serve as a dispute resolution mechanism. The Wages Council Act establishes the Wages Council, which addresses minimum wages, hours of work, overtime, vacation, sick leave, and maternity leave for specified categories of workers. Employers who fail to pay minimum wages are subject to orders for the payment of the wages. The statutory minimum wages are set out in regulations under the Wages Council Act. The hours of work for specified categories of workers are usually eight hours per day with overtime generally calculated at a rate of time and a half and double time for work done on Sundays and public holidays. The Equal Pay Act makes provision for the removal and prevention of discrimination, based on the sex of the employee, in the rates or remuneration for males and females in paid employment. Teachers, police officers, public servants, the Medical Association, industrial workers, and some members of the private sector, especially in financial services, operate under collective bargaining agreements. The Protection of Employment Act No. 20 of 2003 allows for severance. Article 27 (1) allows employees to ask that their services be deemed as severed after six weeks of being laid off from work. There is typically no unemployment insurance or other social security safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. The government, however, offered limited cash grants to some workers whose employment was impacted by the layoffs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law provides for a minimum working age of 16. This provision is generally observed in practice. Compulsory primary and secondary education policies reinforce minimum age requirements. The Labor Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot investigations of enterprises and checked records to verify compliance with the labor laws. These inspectors may refer cases to the police and the public prosecutor’s office for legal action against an employer who employs underage workers. Investors in the country are responsible for maintaining workers’ rights and safeguarding the natural environment. Workers have the right to report and/or leave unsafe work environments without risking their continued employment. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $823 2019 825 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 7 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2019 199.5 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political/Economic Section U.S. Embassy to Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Telephone Number: +1 246 –227 4000 Email Address: BridgetownPolEcon@state.gov Samoa Executive Summary The Independent State of Samoa is a peaceful parliamentary democracy within the Commonwealth of Nations. It has a population of approximately 220,000 and a nominal GDP of USD 799 million. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012. Samoa is experiencing a deep recession due in large part to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In July 2021, the World Bank downgraded Samoa’s classification to “lower-middle income” from its previous status as an “upper-middle income” country. Samoa is one of the most politically and economically stable democratic island countries in the Pacific, featuring a history of strong sociocultural structures and values. Following a months-long peaceful political impasse, Samoa experienced its first political transition in almost 40 years in 2021 and Fiame Naomi Mata’afa became Samoa’s first-ever female prime minister. Samoa has a free press, independent judiciary, and the government has a strong record in protecting human rights. Samoa is located south of the equator, about halfway between Hawaii and New Zealand in the Polynesian region of the Pacific Ocean. Samoa’s total land area is 1,097 square miles, consisting of the two main islands of Upolu and Savai’i, which account for 99 percent of the total land area, and eight small islets. About 80 percent of land is customary land, owned by villages, with the remainder either freehold or government-owned. Customary land can be leased, but not sold. In the past decade, Samoa has taken steps to align its systems more closely with nations in the Southern Hemisphere and Asia. Samoans drove on the right side of the road (like the United States) until 2009, at which time the country shifted to driving on the left side as done in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Until 2011, Samoa was located east of the international dateline in the same time zone as Hawaii but is now one of the first countries in the world to start each day. The small island country has experienced catastrophic natural disasters, including a 2009 earthquake and tsunami that killed hundreds, and severe cyclones in 2012 and 2018. These calamities have inflicted damage equivalent to a quarter of Samoa’s GDP, representing significant setbacks to the economy. In February 2021, the Central Bank of Samoa stated that the country’s economy was in full recession as the impact of COVID-19 global pandemic affected all sectors. From a peak in the third quarter of 2019, Samoa’s GDP has contracted by 12 percent in real terms through the end of 2021. The recession was caused by declines in tourism, business services, transport, and the communications sector. Samoa’s government understands that that its economy needs external investment and is generally welcoming of FDI. The service sector accounts for nearly three-quarters of GDP and employs approximately 65 percent of the formally employed labor force (roughly 30 percent of the population). Pre-COVID-19, tourism was the largest single activity, though the government shut Samoa’s borders in March 2020 in response to the pandemic and had not reopened to tourism as of the end of 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 20M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,050 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Samoa welcomes business and investors. Samoa’s fertile soil, English-speaking and educated workforce, and tropical climate offer advantages to focused investors, though the country’s distance from major markets affects the cost of imports and exports. Historically the main productive sectors of the economy are agriculture and tourism, and the economy depends heavily on overseas remittances. For investors, Samoa offers a trained, productive and industrially adaptable work force that communicates well in English; competitive wage rates; free repatriation of capital and profits; well-developed, reasonably priced transport infrastructure, telecommunications, water supply, and electricity; industry incentive packages for tourism and manufacturing sectors; a stable financial environment with single-digit inflation; a balanced budget and international reserves; relatively low corporate and income taxes; and a pleasant and safe lifestyle. All businesses in the greater Apia area have access to broadband and Wi-Fi, which is reasonably reliable and fast, but relatively expensive. In rural Upolu and on Savaii Island there is limited availability of high-speed internet, but reliable Wi-Fi through personal mobile routers is universal. In 2018, Samoa completed the installation of a National Broadband Highway which provides fiber optic data services and 4G LTE cellular data speeds to the entire country. 4G LTE data speeds are operative and commercially available nationwide. Foreign Investors are permitted 100% ownership in all different sectors of industry except for restricted activities below. The following businesses are reserved for Samoan Citizens only: Bus transport services for the general public; Taxi transport services for the general public; Rental vehicles; Retailing; Saw milling; and Traditional elei garment designing and printing. Please see Samoa’s Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 for a more detailed Restricted List: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act . The Investment Promotion division of the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Labor (MCIL) provides information about investing and doing business in Samoa: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/investment-promotion/ . Foreign Investors are permitted 100% ownership in all different sectors of the industry except for conditions for restricted activities listed above. Please see Samoa’s Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 for a more detailed Restricted List at: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy review of Samoa in 2019: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp486_e.htm . The IMF’s regular Article IV reports are available at: https://www.imf.org/en/countries/wsm?selectedfilters=Article%20IV%20Staff%20Reports#whatsnew . Samoa’s latest national investment policy statement can be found here: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/investment-promotion/ . The Strategy for the Development of Samoa can be found here: https://www.mof.gov.ws/services/economic-policy-planning/national-development-plans-for-samoa/ . Samoa’s Trade, Commerce, and Manufacturing Sector Plan 2017/2018 – 2020/2021 are available here: https://www.mof.gov.ws/services/economic-policy-planning/sector-plans/ . The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor (MCIL) administers Samoa’s foreign investment policy and regulations ( https://www.mcil.gov.ws/ ). To open a branch of an existing corporation in Samoa, one must register the company for about USD 115. For a company to qualify as a “Samoan company,” the majority of shareholders must be Samoan. The fee to register an overseas company is about USD 115. All businesses with foreign shareholdings must obtain and hold valid foreign investment registration certificates. The application fee is about USD 50 and can be obtained by contacting MCIL. Certificates are valid until the business terminates activity. If a business does not commence activity within 2 years after a certificate is issued, the certificate becomes invalid. Upon approval of the FIC, the foreign investor is then required to apply for a business license before operating in Samoa. Fees range from USD 100-USD $250, depending on the type of business. Land has a special status in Samoa, as it does in most Pacific Island countries. Under the country’s land classification system, about 80 percent of all land is customary land, owned by villages, with the remainder either freehold (private) or government-owned. The standard method for obtaining customary land, which cannot be bought or sold, is through long-term leases that must be negotiated with the local communities. A typical lease for business use might be for 30 years, with the option of a further 30 years after that, but longer terms can be negotiated. It should be noted that customary land cannot be mortgaged, and thus cannot be used as collateral to raise capital or credit. Freehold land, mostly based in and around Apia can be bought, sold and mortgaged. Only Samoan citizens may buy freehold land unless approval is obtained from Samoa’s Head of State. The Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 is the preeminent legislation on foreign investment: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act . Business Registration Step 1: Register your company and obtain a Foreign Investment Certificate at MCIL. https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/business-registration/foreign-investment-registration/ Step 2: Obtain a business license and register for VAGST and PAYE from the Ministry of Revenue. https://www.revenue.gov.ws/business-license-matters/ Step 3: Register with the National Provident Fund. http://npf.ws/empregistration Step 4: Register with the Accident Compensation Corporation. https://acc.gov.ws/levy-registration/ Step 5: Apply for Foreign Employment Employee Permit. https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/employment/foreign-employment-employee/ Step 6: Apply for Residence Permit. This allows non-citizens to reside in Samoa. https://mpmc.gov.ws/divisions/immigration/ Many parts of these registrations can be done online, but some may require payment in person. MCIL has an Investment Promotion and Industry Development Division (IPIDD) with services available to all investors: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/ . Samoa’s Ministry of Revenue only distinguishes between small/medium enterprises (less than USD 400,000 in annual turnover) and large enterprises (over USD 400,000 in annual turnover). Priority service is given to large enterprises. There is minimal outward investment from Samoa beyond several stationery and apparel stores having branches in New Zealand and American Samoa. The government and economy are more focused on increasing exports of Samoan products. The government does not appear to restrict investment abroad. Pacific Islands Trade and Invest ( https://pacifictradeinvest.com/about/ ) is a resource for companies looking to establish themselves overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Government uses transparent policies and effective laws to establish “clear rules of the game.” Accounting, legal and regulatory procedures are all consistent with international norms. According to the Samoa Institute of Accountants, businesses adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing and Quality Assurance. Draft bills are made available through the parliamentary website, https://www.palemene.ws/parliament-business/bills/ , but are not made available for formal public comment. Those who wish to make a comment on the bill are given the opportunity to do so before a Parliamentary Committee. Public notices are televised and printed on local newspaper for the awareness of the public that there is an avenue to voice their opinions on drafted Government policies. The Office of the Regulator (OOTR) was established in 2006 under the Telecommunications Act 2005 to provide regulatory services for the telecommunications sector in Samoa. However, the Broadcasting and Postal Services Acts 2010 were recently approved by Parliament, which also provide regulatory framework for broadcasting and postal sectors in Samoa. These Acts require the Regulator to establish a fair, unbiased and ethical regime for implementing the objects of these Acts including licensing of telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services, promotion of new services and investment, consumer protection, prevention of anti-competitive activities by service providers, and management of the radio spectrum and national number plans. OOTR also approves the Electric Power Corporation’s Power Purchase Agreements with Independent Power Providers and reviews EPC’s Power Extension Plan. Finances and expenditures of the government are published twice on an annual basis, and available through the parliament website. Debt obligations are published on a quarterly basis by the Samoa Bureau of Statistics through its quarterly reports. Samoa is a member of the Pacific Islands Forum, which is an 18-member inter-governmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation between the independent countries of the Pacific Ocean. Samoa’s system of government is based on the Westminster Parliamentary system. Samoa’s Companies Act 2001 contains a modern regulatory regime based on New Zealand company law. The Samoan legal system has its foundations in English and Commonwealth statutory and common law. Various business structures utilized in common law are recognized: sole traders, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures and trusts (including unit trusts). These structures are regulated by legislation including the Companies Act 2001, Partnership Act 1975, Trustee Act 1975 and Unit Trusts Act 2008. Samoa’s Companies Act 2001 contains a modern regulatory regime based on New Zealand company law. It allows the incorporation of a sole person company (i.e., one person being both shareholder and director) and directors need not be resident in Samoa. A Samoa incorporated private company is a separate legal entity and a corporation under Samoan law. It must file an annual return with the Registrar of Companies specifying details of directors, shareholders, registered office etc. There is no requirement for private companies to file annual financial reports with the Companies Registry nor are there any minimum capital requirements. The judicial system is largely independent from the executive branch. In December 2020, the National Parliament passed into law three controversial bills that fundamentally changed country’s constitution and judicial system. The three bills, the Constitution Amendment Bill, Lands and Titles Bill, and Judicature Bill, were passed by Parliament with a vote of 41-4. The bills were opposed by the judiciary and the Samoa Law Society for lack of consultation and the impact on human rights and rule of law. The Australian and New Zealand Law Societies, and other international organizations issued statements in support of the judiciary and the law society. The new laws have in effect divided the judicial system into parallel courts of equal standing: one to deal with criminal and civil matters, and the other with customary land and titles. There are outstanding questions about the constitutionality of the new laws. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor administers Samoa’s foreign investment policy and regulations under the Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011. All businesses with any foreign ownership require foreign investment approval by MCIL. ( https://www.mcil.gov.ws/ ). The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Labor’s Fair Trading and Codex Alimentarius Division (FTCD) handles competition related concerns. The main pieces of legislation regarding competition are the Fair Trading Act 1998, the Consumer Information Act 1989, and the Measures Ordinance 1960. Samoa’s constitution prohibits expropriation without compensation, and expropriation cases in Samoa are rare. There was one significant case that occurred in 2009 over land designated for a new six-story government building. A business signed a 20-year lease with the government in 2005 but was then asked to move in 2008 to make way for the new building. The business moved but won a settlement in the Court of Appeals against the government for a much larger sum than the government initially offered the business for vacating the land. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2007 (amended 2013) outlines ADR procedures for both criminal and civil proceedings. Samoa has an Accredited Mediators of Samoa Association that was put in place to help resolve (largely commercial) disputes. Bankruptcies are governed by the Samoa Bankruptcy Act of 1908, which gives broad rights to the judiciary to issue orders related the property of any debtor or bankrupt who becomes subject to the Act. The judiciary has the authority to decide all questions of priorities. 4. Industrial Policies Samoa’s government is very reluctant to provide government guarantees or financing for projects. In rare circumstances, the government may provide land for certain business projects, or be instrumental in securing land of interest. The Industry Development and Investment Promotion Division (IDIPD) under MCIL administers several schemes designed to assist businesses that produce for overseas and domestic markets, enhancing development of domestic businesses as well as property developers in the tourism industry, and also businesses in the private sector. Such schemes offer duty concessions on imported goods for the tourism and manufacturing industries and income tax exemptions for up to five years for hotel operators. The government does not offer incentives for clean energy investments. Samoa does not have any Free Trade Zones, Duty Free Zones, Special Economic Zones, or areas with special tax treatment. In order to hire a non-Samoan citizen for a job, one must prove that the required skillset is not available through the local labor force. It is not an onerous task to hire non-residents. There is no forced localization in terms of goods or technology. There is no forced localization of data other than the industry exceptions outlined in the Intellectual Property section below. 5. Protection of Property Rights Leasing of Land: In accordance with the Alienation of Customary Land Act 1965 and the Alienation of Freehold Land Act 1972, land may be leased for up to 30 years renewable once in the case of land leased or licensed for industrial purposes or a hotel and 20 years renewable once in the other cases. Land holdings and ownership in Samoa fall into three (3) categories: Customary Land: These lands are not for sale but can be leased out to foreigners as well as locals. All leased lands in this category are registered with the Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment. In case of dispute, ownership is decided by the Ministry of Justice and Courts Administration. Public Land: The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources administers the database of Government land available for lease. Applications for leasing of land should be submitted to the Chairman of the Samoa Land Board. Freehold Land: Freehold land cannot be sold or leased to someone who is not a citizen of Samoa, except with the proper consent of the Head of State. Samoa has legislation protecting patents, utility models, designs, and trademarks. Enforcement is moderate. To protect and safeguard intellectual property in Samoa, the Government has passed the following laws: a) Copyrights Act 1998 – applies to work including books, pamphlets, articles, computer programs, speeches, lectures, musical works, audiovisual, works of architecture etc. b) Intellectual Property Act 2013 – for the registration and enforcement of rights of owners of Trademarks, Patents, Industrial designs, GI, and Plant varieties. Samoa is not on USTR’s Special 301 list or the Notorious Markets Report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The capital market is regulated by the Central Bank of Samoa (CBS). Since January 1998, the Central Bank has implemented monetary policy by issuing its own Securities using market-based techniques – commonly known as Open Market Operations (OMO). CBS Securities are the predominant monetary policy instrument, which is issued to influence the amount of liquidity in the financial system. Capital markets in Samoa are in their infancy with the Unit Trust of Samoa (UTOS) domestic market established in 2010, and no international stock exchange. Samoa has accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Samoa is well-served with banking and finance infrastructure. It has four commercial banks, complimented by a dynamic development bank. The sector is ably regulated by the Central Bank of Samoa. The largest banks are regional operators ANZ and BSP, which offer a wide range of services based upon electronic banking platforms. Although they service all markets, they tend to dominate the top-end, encompassing corporate, government and high net worth individuals. Samoa is still a cash-based society, however, and this has enabled two locally owned entrants, the National Bank of Samoa and Samoa Commercial Bank, to each garner double-digit market share, despite entering the market quite recently. The banking sector appears healthy although recent reports have indicated the state-owned development bank is carrying a significant amount of bad debt, over 20% of its loan portfolio. The government also interfered with the bank’s attempts to foreclose on non-performing assets. With its International Finance Centre (Samoa International Finance Authority – SIFA)—the first Pacific center to be white-listed by the OECD—and a well-structured financial services sector, Samoa is well placed to service the needs of both local and offshore businesses. The Government, through the Central Bank, has been largely resistant of block chain technologies. Their skepticism is somewhat warranted with the discovery of several cryptocurrency schemes operating in the country widely believed to be scams. There is no sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Samoa. The country has the Samoa National Provident Fund which manages and invests members’ savings for their retirement. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions. Laws and rules do not offer preferential treatment to SOEs. State-owned enterprises are subject to budget constraints, and these are enforced. SOEs are active in the Energy, Water, Tourism, Aviation, Banking, Agriculture supplies, and Ports/Airports sectors. Laws do not provide for a leading role for SOEs or limit private enterprise activity in sectors in which SOEs operate. SOEs have government-appointed boards and operate with varying degrees of autonomy with respect to their governing Ministry. SOEs follow a normal corporate structure with a board of directors and executive management. All SOEs have boards of directors who are appointed by a cabinet minister. Some SOEs have board seats allocated specifically to the heads of certain government ministries. By law SOEs are required to present financials to their board of directors, shareholding Ministry and the National Auditor. Timely compliance, however, varies between SOEs. Samoa does not have an active privatization program. The most recent major privatizations in Samoa were in broadcasting (2008) and telecommunications (2011), both resulting in significant gains in efficiency and benefits to both producer and consumer. The 2011 telecommunications privatization was to a foreign company. Procedures for establishing all businesses are provided under existing legislation, including the Companies Amendment Act 2006, the Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011, the Business License Act 1998, the Labour and Employment Relations Act 2013, the Central Bank Act and Guidelines, and the Health Ordinance 1959 (Part 11, 111 clause 13 & 15). 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers, and foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Firms that pursue RBC are viewed favorably but consumers generally prioritize value for money ahead of RBC claims. The government fairly enforces domestic laws and protects human rights. The government encourages local enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principals. A national contact point is not known. There are no extractive industries in Samoa. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Samoa’s Nationally Determined Contribution – available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx – provides the basis for the country’s climate strategy. Samoa’s NDC recognizes that the island nation is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to its geographic location and its economic reliance on fisheries, agriculture, and tourism. The NDC states that Samoa is already experiencing higher average temperatures, greater frequency in extreme rainfall events, sea level rise, and increases in ocean acidification and coastal erosion. Per its NDC, Samoa aims to reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions by 26 percent in 2030 as compared to 2007 levels. As part of its adaptation plan, Samoa aims to expand the area of mangrove forests by five percent by 2030 (relative to 2018), expand the area under agroforestry by five percent by 2030 (relative to 2018), and increase total forest cover by two percent by 2030 (relative to 2013). Samoa developed Community Integrated Management (CIM) Plans to identify prioritized adaption plans for each of Samoa’s 368 villages. Samoa’s contribution to the world’s greenhouse gases is negligible. Samoa’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment also released a Climate Change Policy in 2020, available at https://www.mnre.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Samoa-Climate-Change-Policy-2020-2030.pdf . The policy aims to improve coordination of climate change work in the country and enhance cooperation and collaboration between government and all stakeholders. The government does not specify legally binding expectations on private sector contributions to achieving relevant targets and goals, but the government is very focused on climate-friendly policies and any project that depends on government support or approval would benefit from climate-friendly practices. Public procurement practices may include environmental and green growth considerations. The government does not formally offer regulatory incentives for climate-friendly policies. With limited domestic resources, Samoa’s government is explicit that its climate goals cannot be achieved without external financing. 9. Corruption Samoa ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2018. It is not signatory to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. Corruption has not been specifically identified as an obstacle to foreign investment. Both corruption and bribery are criminalized and prosecuted, and the laws appear to be impartially applied. The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with investigating official corruption. There are no international, non-governmental “watchdog” organizations represented locally. Samoa was not assessed by the Transparency International’s CPI report 2021 report. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Ms. Luamanuvao Katalaina Sapolu Ombudsman Level 2, SNPF Plaza, Savalalo P.O. BOX 3036 Apia, Samoa (685) 25394 info@ombudsman.gov.ws Contact at a “watchdog” organization: UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) Bangkok, Thailand +66 2 288 2100 fo.thailand@unodc.org 10. Political and Security Environment Samoa is a peaceful parliamentary democracy with no history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. The risk of civil disorder is low. There is no civil strife or insurrection. There are no significant border disputes at risk of escalating into conflict. Law and order is well maintained by the Samoa Police Service with support from the village chiefs and other traditional/church authorities if required. There are no examples of politically motivated damage to projects or installations in recent years. Samoa experienced a measles epidemic in 2019 and the government implemented strict border closures in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Both severely affected local business with varying degrees of cessation of economic activity. Samoa has demonstrated that it will take extreme measures to prevent loss of life, even at the expense of massive economic losses. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The 2016 Census placed the total workforce at 57,585 people, with the unemployment rate at 3.7 percent, and 36 percent of the workforce engaged in subsistence living. Although the government does not release regular unemployment figures, only about 11 percent of the population – 23,134 people – were registered as employed in the formal sector in the quarter ended December 31, 2021. Wages and salaries are comparatively low. Private sector minimum wage is roughly USD 1.17 an hour. Local skilled labor is available in sufficient quantities to undertake most types of building work, except for some specialized skills and supervisory-level manpower, which is recruited locally and from abroad. To hire foreign workers, one must provide MCIL and Samoan immigration with justification that the position cannot be filled locally. This process is viewed as fair and straightforward. Samoan First Union, the country’s only private sector union, was officially launched in 2015. It is an extension of the New Zealand-based First Union. One of their major pushes was for a WST 3 (USD 1.17) minimum wage, which was achieved in 2019. Collective bargaining in the private sector is allowed, but not common in Samoa. The Labor and Employment Relations Act 2013, the Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 2014, and the Labor and Employment Relations Regulations 2015 are the most current pieces of labor legislation, all of which meet core international standards. Labor laws are not waived to attract new investment. More information can be found through Samoa’s Child Labor Report 14. Contact for More Information Funefe’ai Dikaiosune Atoa Tamaalii Political-Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy, Apia, Samoa (+685) 21631 X2241 AtoaTamaaliiD@state.gov Sao Tome and Principe Executive Summary São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) is a stable, multi-party democracy. It is a developing country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of roughly USD $427.4 million and a population of 215,048 (World Bank, 2019 estimate). Due to STP’s very limited revenue sources, foreign donors finance roughly 90 percent or more of its public investment budget. For the 2021 budget, these donors were China, Japan, Portugal, the World Bank, European Union, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the African Development Bank, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development (BADEA.) STP has taken positive steps over the last decade to improve its investment climate and to make the country a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), including by working to combat corruption and create an open and transparent business environment. In 2021, VISA cards were introduced in the country. To improve the appeal of tourism during the pandemic, the Tourism Directorate launched its “Seal of Clean” Program in 2021. The Value Added Tax (VAT) Law (13/2019) enacted in 2019 to facilitate tax collection and enforcement of the tax code is scheduled for adoption. A modern Labor Code (6/2019) came into force in 2019 to make it easier for investors to understand and abide by the labor standards. In June 2019, STP also became the 25th African country to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). In 2018, it passed its Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Law, Notary Code, and Commercial Register Code. The Regulation of Investment Code was adopted in 2017 and the Investment Code and Code of Fiscal Benefits and Incentives were previously adopted in 2016. The 2013 anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing law brought STP into compliance with international standards. A Millennium Challenge Corporation Country Threshold Program, completed in 2011, modernized STP’s customs administration, reformed its tax policies, and made it less burdensome to start a new business. Together, these efforts helped to develop a modern and transparent legal framework for foreign investment. Due to its reliance on outside investment, STP remains committed to improving its investment climate. The government continues to work with the business community to develop the country economically and to improve basic social services for the country’s young and growing population. In 2018, it approved a four-year program to promote “robust economic growth” focused on the provision of services, including tourism, the financial sector, technology, logistics, and health services associated with the digital economy. Special attention is also being given to traditional sectors, mainly agriculture, livestock, and marine resources. STP’s extensive maritime domain (160,000 km2) may hold opportunities for hydrocarbon production as technology improves. In cooperation with China, STP is seeking to modernize its port infrastructure and capitalize on its fishing potential. In 2020, China also announced funding for airport rehabilitation and upgrades. STP is using Word Bank funding to rehabilitate the road linking the capital to the north of the island. However, foreign investors continue to face challenges identifying viable investment opportunities due to STP’s small and fragile domestic market, inadequate infrastructure, slow moving justice system, high cost of credit, and limited access and expensive electricity. Prime Minister Jorge Bom Jesus is focused on fighting corruption, improving the business environment, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and promoting economic growth. In his inaugural address in 2021, President Carlos Vila Nova expressed support for protecting the environment and investments. The President also welcomed U.S. cooperation. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/sao-tome-and-principe Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $21 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#451 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,060 https://data.worldbank.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe?view=chart 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment According to Article 4 of the Investment Code, both domestic and foreign investors are free to establish and own business enterprises, as well as engage in all forms of business activity in STP, except in the sectors defined by law as reserved for the state, specifically military and paramilitary activities and Central Bank operations. STP is gradually moving towards open competition in all sectors of the economy, and competitive equality is the official standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises regarding access to markets, credit, and other business activities. The government has eliminated former public monopolies in farming, banking, insurance, airline services, telecommunications, and trade (export and import). São Tomé and Príncipe is taking steps toward sustainable economic growth. Its economic prospects depend on the government’s ability to reinforce the capacity of its small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and attract sustainable foreign direct investment. Therefore, the government is eager to improve the country’s investment climate to make it a more attractive destination for foreign investors. Under Article 14 of the Investment Code, the State guarantees equal and non-discriminatory treatment to both foreign and domestic investors operating in the country. The Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI, www.apcistp.com ), housed in the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Blue Economy, promotes and facilitates investment through “single-window” service and multi-sectoral coordination. However, the agency is still struggling to fully comply with its mandate due to a lack of capacity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control except for activities customarily reserved for the state. The form of public participation, namely the percentage of government ownership in joint ventures, varies according to the agreement. Based on Article 8 of the Regulation of the Investment Code, all inbound investment proposals must be screened and approved by the applicable ministry for the economic sector in coordination with APCI. According to Article 14, an investment proposal can be rejected if it threatens national security, public health, or ecological equilibrium, and if the proposal has a negative effect or insufficient contribution to country’s economy. However, these mechanisms do not go beyond the law’s mandate and are not considered barriers to investment. STP is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), nor has the government participated in in any investment policy reviews provided through the body. Neither the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has conducted a review, either. STP currently has observer status in the World Trade Organization, and it is a member of UNCTAD. STP has taken steps to facilitate investment and improve the business environment in recent years. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) worked with STP from 2007 to 2011 on a Threshold Country Program to improve investment opportunities, including by creating a “one-stop shop” to help encourage new investments by making it easier and cheaper to import and export goods, reducing the time required to start a new business, and improving STP’s tax and customs clearance administration. Currently a business can be registered within one to five days. In 2013, with the support of the International Trade Center, the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI) was created. APCI’s business facilitation services, including a “one-stop shop” for business registration, offer equal treatment for women and underrepresented minorities in the economy; however, there is no special assistance provided to these groups. A Single Window website ( http://gue-stp.net/spip.php?article24 ; in Portuguese only) provides information and the application form needed to create and register companies in STP. While STP’s government does not actively promote outward investment, it does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. STP also has signed Investment Protection Agreements with several countries. 3. Legal Regime The laws and regulations that affect direct investment, including environmental, health, and safety rules and regulations, apply equally to foreign and domestic firms. Before approval, investment proposals are evaluated for their environmental and social impacts. STP tax laws reward citizens who return to STP to invest, while also containing provisions for attracting foreigners to invest in STP. The STP legal code is based on Portuguese law, and laws and regulations are applied at the national level. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist at the national level and regulations are developed at the ministerial level, approved by the National Assembly, and promulgated by the President. The ministry concerned is responsible for any regulatory enforcement mechanisms. Rarely, drafted bills or regulations are made available for public comment. Copies of most regulations can be purchased online at https://www.legis-palop.org/ or directly at the Ministry of Justice, Public Administration, and Human Rights in the format of the Official Gazette. The public finances and debt obligations are relatively transparent and are periodically available on the finance ministry website: https://financas.gov.st/ STP is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), whose fundamental goals are to promote exchange and collaboration among the member countries and provide an institutional and legal framework to their cooperative efforts. ECCAS is the largest economic community in Central Africa, including Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) member states (Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea), as well as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Rwanda, and STP. The archipelago is a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and its economic confederation (CE). STP is not a member of the WTO, but it does have observer status. STP is among the 44 African Nations to have signed the agreement on African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in March 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda, and became the 25th African country to ratify the AfCFTA in June 2019. Disputes are generally solved through dialogue or negotiations between parties without litigation. However, there was a dispute in May 2018 between a local businessman and an Angolan investor that led to the unconstitutional dismissal of Supreme Court Judges by the parliament. Relatedly, there have been a few instances of disagreements involving foreign investors reaching international courts. The country has a written commercial law but does not have specialized courts. Overall, the legal system is perceived as acting independently. The judicial process is fair but is subject to manipulation on occasion. All regulations or enforcement actions are appealable to the Supreme Court. The VAT Law was approved in 2019, but it has yet to be legally implemented. A modern Labor Code (6/2019) enacted in April 2019, is designed to make labor standards easier for investors to understand and implement. In June 2019, STP ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA). The Public Private Partnership (PPP) Law, the new Notary Code, and the Commercial Register Code all entered into force in 2018; the Regulation of Investment Code was adopted in 2017; and the Investment Code and Code of Fiscal Benefits and Incentives were adopted in 2016. The Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI) is a one-stop shop for all investment information. Due to the establishment of APCI, the cost and waiting period to start a new business have been substantially reduced. A new business can obtain expedited registration within 24 hours for approximately STN10,190 ($456) and between three to five days for approximately STN 5,190 ($232). Despite this improvement, STP was downgraded to 150 out of 190 countries in terms of starting a new business according to the 2020 World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report. In comparison, the country ranked 35 out of 190 economies in the 2017 survey. Although no online business registration process exists, companies can easily register their businesses at the counter. The following is a general description of how a foreign company can establish a local office: Provide full company documentation, translated into Portuguese. Check the uniqueness of the proposed company name and reserve a name. Notarize the company statutes with the registration office at the Ministry of Justice. File a company declaration with the Tax Administration Office at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Register with the Social Security Office at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Publish the incorporation notice in the official government gazette (Diário da República). Publish the incorporation notice in a national newspaper. Register the company with the Commercial Registry Office at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Apply for a commercial operations permit (also known as an “alvara”). Apply for a taxpayer identification number with the Office of Tax Administration at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Register employees with the Social Security Office. Other required documents include: 1) copies of the by-laws of the parent company and of the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors in which the opening of the STP branch is approved; 2) a certificate of appointment of the general manager for the STP office; 3) a copy of any agreement signed with a São Toméan company or with the STP government; 4) two copies of permits from the Court authorization to operate; and 5) two photographs and a copy of the passport of the General Manager. In addition, the Single Window website ( http://www.gue-stp.net/spip.php?article24 ; in Portuguese only) provides information on creating and registering companies in STP. Beyond the APCI’s “one-stop shop,”, there are no agencies or brokers that provide services to further simplify the procedures for establishing an office in STP. Some companies consult with a legal office for assistance. DRCAE (Directorate of Regulation and Control of Economic Activities) has the mandate to inspect all economic activities and impose penalties, but it lacks the resources necessary to fully perform its duties. DRCAE is housed under the Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry. AGER (General Regulatory Authority of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe) was created to promote competition and prevent operator abuses in the water, electricity, and telecommunications sectors, as well as in the postal service. The AGER was established in 2005 and is housed under the Ministry of Public Works, Infrastructures, Natural Resources, and Environment. The STP Constitution and the Expropriation Code allows only the central government to expropriate private property. The law permits expropriation of private property only if it is deemed to be in the national public interest and only with adequate compensation. There is no evidence to suggest that the government would undertake expropriation in a discriminatory manner or in violation of established principles of international law and standards. Aside from a massive land expropriation from colonial farmers in 1976 – later recognized by the government as detrimental to STP’s economy – there have not been any documented cases of expropriation of foreign-owned properties. The government has reportedly considered expropriating land to expand the runway at the international airport, but thus far has reportedly been reluctant to do so out of concern that any expropriation will deter new investment. STP has a bankruptcy law, but it is not well developed. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, STP ranked 168 out of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency, the same rank it has in 2019. In January 2022, the STP-based commercial bank Energy Bank, founded in 2011 by a Nigeria investor, declared bankruptcy. This led to the Central Bank cancelling all of the bank’s financial operations in STP. 4. Industrial Policies According to 2016 Investment Code, all investments, including those for clean energy, above 50,000 Euros are eligible for guarantees and benefits, including fiscal incentives stated in the Fiscal Benefits and Incentives Code of November 2016. These incentives include deductions on corporation taxes, stamp taxes, taxes on baking operations, and withholding taxes. Other incentives include reductions or exemptions of import and re-export tariffs. The government also provides incentives for human resources training, as well other exceptional and complementary benefits and incentives. Based on Article 31 of the Fiscal Benefits and Incentives Code, the incentives are granted through the Private Investment Registration Certificate (CRIP) issued by the APCI following the approval of the investment project. The conditions for access to these incentives apply equally to both men and women. However, contrary to the 2008 Investment Code, the 2016 Code does not provide access to state-owned land and facilities as incentive to investments. No significant measure was adopted in the last year to incentive investments. STP currently has no free trade zones or free ports but in October 2020, the government formalized a free trade zone project to be developed in Malanza, Caué district, south of São Tomé. Article 33 of the Fiscal Benefits and Incentives Code defines the districts of Cantagalo, Lemba, Lobata, and Caué, as well as Príncipe, as Special Development or Economic Zones. Therefore, any new investment established in these areas under the Investment Code can qualify for special incentives. According to Article 14 of the Investment Code, the state assures fair, non-discriminatory, and equal treatment for all investment in the national territory. Companies that qualify may benefit from reductions or exemptions of taxes under the conditions set forth in the Code of Free and Offshore Activities. The government encourages but does not mandate local employment. STP has no specific performance requirements as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investment. However, under the Code of Fiscal Benefits and Incentives, the government offers better incentives for those companies that choose to reinvest or expand their investment. The government encourages but has not defined requirements for investors to buy local products, to export a certain percentage of output, to invest in a specific geographical area, or use a domestic technology. There is no blanket requirement that STP nationals own shares in foreign investments in STP. The visa application process is straightforward and transparent, and visas or work permits are usually easy to obtain if companies meet all the requirements. Nevertheless, few São Toméan embassies worldwide process visa applications. Under the Legal Regime of Foreign Citizens in STP, the country lifted visa requirements for citizens of the United States, EU, Canada, UK, South Africa, Rwanda and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. In addition, any foreign citizen holding a valid passport with a valid Schengen or U.S. visa can enter and stay in the country up to 15 days. STP recently began accepting online visa applications. Information on submitting an online visa application is available in Portuguese and English at https://evisa.st , though it reportedly suffers from outages, requiring visa applications to be done in person or via email. In March 2022, the government approved a decree stating that effective June 1, 2022, visa-exempt visitors must pay an entry fee of STN 500,00 (roughly USD 23). Currently, to fly into STP, travelers must have a negative COVID-19 PCR test result valid for 72 hours if the traveler does not possess a digital vaccine certificate. If the traveler has a certificate, he/she can submit the results of a COVID-19 rapid antigen test valid for 24 hours. When flying out of the country, COVID test requirements depend on the country of destination. Check https://travel.state.gov/content/travel.html for country-specific information when planning travel for the latest updates. The National Agency for Personal Data Protection (ANPDP) oversees all the rules and requirements for data storage and transfer: https://www.anpdp.st/#13 . 5. Protection of Property Rights Based on Article 46 of the Constitution, private property rights are guaranteed by the State. According to Article 13 of the Expropriation Code, authorities must provide fair, adequate, and effective payment at market value in advance before expropriating any private property. The government owns the vast majority of land in the country, most of which is agricultural land granted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, and Rural Development through concessions of land titles under the Land Reform Law. Less than 10 percent of land is held by private owners. Foreigners cannot purchase land, although they can purchase structures. The 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report ranked STP 172 out 190 economies in terms of registering properties. The 2018 Notary Law provides the country with a modern and practical legal framework that allows for fast and efficient notarial acts, while ensuring judicial security. U.S. companies have not raised property rights concerns with the Embassy. U.S. companies have not raised intellectual property (IP) rights concerns with the Embassy. During the past year, no new IP related laws and regulation were enacted, nor are any reform bills pending. All copyright and industrial property rights proceedings are covered by the Directorate of Industry in collaboration with the National Directorate of Culture, under the Secretariat of State for Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, respectively. STP is listed in the USTR’s Special 301 report but not listed in the notorious market report. STP is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The Regulation on Industrial Property regulates the enforcement of IP, including geographical indications, patents, and trademarks. STP does not report on seizures of counterfeit goods. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investment is undeveloped and unclear. The Central Bank of STP (BCSTP) issued Treasury bills (T-bills) for the first time on June 29, 2015 for STN 75 million (approximately $3.7 million) at the fixed interest rate of 6.2 percent, with a maturity of six months. The demand was 20 percent higher than the offer, due to the participation of three domestic banks. The most recent issuance occurred on March 15, 2018. STP does not have a stock market. Articles 13 and 14 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations facilitate the free flow of financial resources under the supervision of the Central Bank. Foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market; however, access to credit is difficult due to the limited variety of credit instruments, high interest rates, and the number of guarantees requested by the commercial banks. As a result, on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report 2020, STP ranked 165 out 190 economies regarding access to credit, a 4-point drop compared to the previous year. There are currently no significant U.S. investors active in STP. STP has four private commercial banks. Portuguese, Angolan, Cameroonian, Gabonese, Togolese, and as well as Säo Toméan interests are represented in the ownership and management of the commercial banks. The International Bank of STP (BISTP) is believed to be the largest bank in terms of assets; however, banks’ asset estimations are not publicly available. In January 2022, STP-based commercial bank Energy Bank, founded in 2011 by a Nigeria investor, declared bankruptcy leading the Central Bank to cancel all its financial operations in STP. In early 2018, the BCSTP declared the commercial bank “Private Bank” insolvent and opened a public tender to liquidate its assets and liabilities. The Gabonese investment bank BGFI opened its São Toméan operation in March 2012. Banking services, especially from BISTP, are available in the capital with a few smaller branches in cities in the north, south, and center of the country, as well as in Príncipe. In 2021, VISA card was introduced into the country’s financial system In addition to retail banking, commercial banks offer most corporate banking services, or can procure them from overseas. Local credit to the private sector is limited and expensive, but available to both foreign and local investors on equal terms. The country’s main economic actors finance themselves outside STP. Foreigners must establish residency to open a bank account. STP does not have a traditional sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in existence. It does have a small National Oil Account (NOA). The NOA was previously funded by signing bonuses paid by energy and oil companies to gain rights to conduct exploration and production activities. According to officials from the budget department, the Law of Petroleum allows the government to withdraw up to 20 percent of the balance of the NOA every year as calculated on June 30 of the previous year. Details are available on the state budget and under NOA online: www.grip.st/?cntnr_informac=informac&ficherselt=DT-166- Envio de Extracto da Conta Nacional de Petroleo junto BCSTP.pdf 8. Responsible Business Conduct There are no rules or legislation pertaining to responsible business conduct (RBC) in STP. Companies generally act in accordance with laws pertaining to investment, labor, environment, flora and fauna protection, consumer protection, and taxation. There is limited awareness of expectations of or standards for responsible business conduct. STP participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Companies usually respect human and labor rights. On occasion, civil society and NGOs speak up against businesses’ inappropriate conduct, especially as regards environmental destruction. In 2018, a group of civil society organizations and a political party contested the government’s decision to lease a large piece of land in the north of São Tomé to a Chinese business group for the establishment of a quarry. The land was part of a natural park with many preserved species of plants, animals and birds. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/01/30/26321/crime-governo-permite-instalacao-de-uma-pedreira-no-meio-do-parque-natural-obo/ Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption Although STP has taken steps to combat corruption through government reforms the country ranked 66 out 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, dropping one position compared to the previous year. The government passed an anti-corruption law in 2012 that required all payments to government entities over USD $5 be made directly at the BCSTP and all salary payments to civil servants be paid directly to the employee’s bank account. The government has also taken steps to review and update existing contracts with some foreign companies to support liberalization and free market competition. The government has denounced corruption and pledged to take necessary steps to prevent and combat it. Although the government has been taken these steps, in March 2022, President Vila Nova cited a study showing seven out of 10 Santomeans still believed corruption was increasing. Although corruption in customs was historically an issue for foreign investors, the MCC Threshold Program did help establish a modern customs code and related decrees by introducing modern customs tracking software and eliminating manual procedures, with customs agents handling payments for the importer. As a result, customs revenues have increased significantly. while incidents of corruption have reportedly declined. In 2013, the parliament adopted an amended anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) law that complies with international standards. It designates the Financial Information Unit (Unidade de Informação Financeira) as the central agency in STP with responsibility for investigating suspect transactions. STP is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a FATF-style regional body. According to the 2016 Investment Code, all investment proposals must be submitted to the APCI, which is responsible for carrying out all legal inter-institutional coordination with different sectors involved in the analysis and approval of the investment project. The law limits contacts between investment proponents and officials involved in the investment approval process. STP signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. It is not party to the Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. STP does not have a designated agency responsible for combatting corruption but in March 2022, the President promised to create an “Anti-Corruption Committee” comprised of reputable citizens, and uncommitted to any political agenda. “Watchdog” organization: Deodato Capela President Centro de Integridade Pública de São Tomé e Príncipe (STP Public Integrity Center) – Anticorruption, Transparency and Integrity – NGO P.C: 330, Almeirim-São Tomé; São Tomé e Príncipe + 239 991 1116 cipstp.org@gmail.com http://cipstp.st/ 10. Political and Security Environment STP is relatively stable, has no ethnic tensions, and has a relaxed lifestyle, which locals refer to as leve-leve (“take it easy”). Since its democratic reforms in 1990, the archipelago has been a good example of democracy in the sub-region with a history of peaceful transfers of power and consensus in decision-making. In July 2021, following the results of the first round of the presidential elections, the third ranked candidate contested the election’s results, alleging massive fraud. After back-and-forth decisions from the Constitutional Court there was a delay in the holding of the second round of the presidential election. Ultimately, the second round took place and observers announced that they found it to be free, fair, and transparent. The President took office in 2021 without incident. There were some protests in 2018 over the creation of the Constitutional Court, and a lower court decision to recount the votes of the October 7 legislative, local, and regional elections. Despite the post-election protests, the legislative elections led to the peaceful formation of a new coalition Government. STP generally has a good human rights record and demonstrates a respect for citizens’ and workers’ rights. Strikes are not seen as the primary means to settle labor disputes and labor strikes have been sporadic in recent times. Since independence in 1975, there have been no incidents of politically motivated attacks on projects or installations. There is no anti-American sentiment and instances of civil disorder are rare. Recently maritime piracy has affected STP’s territorial waters in the Gulf of Guinea, though the threat of terrorism remains limited. STP has sought to be an active partner in regional maritime security efforts, although its capacity and resources are minimal. Despite two violent murders in early 2020, violent crime rates are at a historical low. 11. Labor Policies and Practices A significant portion of STP’s workforce is young, relatively well-educated, and multilingual (Portuguese and French). Further training of the workforce is needed, however, for the economy to continue developing. The percentage of foreign/migrant workers is low but covered by the new Labor Code (Law 6/2019). The government does not officially require but encourages companies to hire nationals. In March 2022, after negotiations with the labor unions, the government announced that the monthly minimum wage for civil servant will increase from USD $50 to USD $112 as of May, with an expected increase to USD $157 in 2023 and USD $202 in 2024. The unions also announced a leave allowance payment of 40 percent as of May and 100 percent by 2023, retroactive from January. For the first time in 2016, the government set the national minimum wage for private and public sectors. The basic salary varies by the size of the enterprise. For micro enterprises or family businesses, the minimum wage is around STN 800 ($38.80) per month, small business STN 1,000 ($48.50), medium enterprise STN 1,300 ($63.10) and large enterprise STN 1,600 ($77.70). The basic salary for the public sector is approximately STN 1,100 ($50). Women are entitled to state-funded maternity leave for a period of 14 weeks, including 8 weeks after childbirth. The law recognizes the right of workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes (though this is strictly regulated), and bargain collectively. The law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or retaliation against strikers. Workers’ collective bargaining agreements remain relatively weak due to the government’s role as the principal employer and key interlocutor in labor matters, including wages. Special tax incentives are provided under the Fiscal Benefit Code to companies that provide training to its human resources. Labor disputes are usually solved through dialogue between parties, under mediation of the General Labor Inspection Department (IGT), or through litigation if a consensus cannot be reached. The Labor Law was drafted in collaboration with the ILO. The IGT is housed under the Labor Ministry. STP’s private sector is underdeveloped, undiversified and dominated by a large number of informal operators who work mainly in civil construction, agriculture, commerce and fisheries, with a low level of education, lack of organizational and managerial skills, absence of structured accounting systems, as well as minimal business planning procedures in the medium/long term. However, the informal sector makes a substantial contribution to the economy through its dynamism, entrepreneurial culture, innovation and flexibility to adjust to changes in the environment. Thus, it still has the potential to eventually develop into a part of the more mainstream private sector in the coming years. The World Bank 2020 Doing Business Report ranked STP 185 among 190 economies in terms of contract enforcement. Although some reforms are ongoing, the county’s justice system is still seen as slow moving, costly, and biased at times. Therefore, it is still very important to know the given local partner or individual who you are doing business with. Further, it is always advisable to confirm the true ownership of any asset before its acquisition, especially when involving land. According to a government official, there are a total of 11,000 civil servants, more than half the country’s labor force. The World Bank estimated STP’s 2020 total labor force to be about 68,000; among the total number, roughly 35,000 are female between the ages of 15-64 years old. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN?locations=ST 14. Contact for More Information Frank W. Stanley Economic Chief U.S. Embassy Libreville Stanleyfw@state.gov LibrevillePE@state.gov Saudi Arabia Executive Summary In 2021, the Saudi Arabian government (SAG) continued its ambitious socio-economic reforms, collectively known as Vision 2030. Spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Vision 2030 provides a roadmap for the development of new economic sectors and a transition to a digital, knowledge-based economy. The reforms aim to diversify the Saudi economy away from oil and create more private sector jobs for a young and growing population. To accomplish these ambitious Vision 2030 reforms, the SAG is seeking foreign investment in burgeoning sectors such as infrastructure, tourism, entertainment, and renewable energy. Saudi Arabia aims to become a major transport and logistics hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Infrastructure projects related to this goal include various “economic cities” and special economic zones, which will serve as hubs for petrochemicals, mining, logistics, manufacturing, and digital industries. The SAG plans to double the size of Riyadh city and welcomes investment in its multi-billion-dollar giga-projects (including NEOM, Qiddiya, the Red Sea Project, and Amaala), which are the jumping-off points for its nascent tourism industry. The Kingdom is also developing tourism infrastructure at natural sites, such as AlUla, and the SAG continues to grow its successful Saudi Seasons initiative, which hosts tourism and cultural events throughout the country. The Saudi entertainment and sports sector, aided by a relaxation of social restrictions, is also primed for foreign investment. The country hopes to build hundreds of movie theaters and the SAG aims to sign agreements for production studios in Saudi Arabia for end-to-end film production. The SAG seeks to host world class sporting events and has already hosted the European Golf Tour, Diriyah ePrix, Dakar Rally, and Saudi Formula One Grand Prix. In addition, recent film festivals and concerts have demonstrated strong demand for art and cultural events. Lastly, the SAG is eager for foreign investment in green projects related to renewable energy, hydrogen, waste management, and carbon capture to reach net-zero emissions by 2060. It is particularly interested in green capacity-building and technology-sharing initiatives. Despite these investment opportunities, investor concerns persist regarding business predictability, transparency, and political risk. Although some activists have recently been released, the continued detention and prosecution of activists remains a significant concern, while there has been little progress on fundamental freedoms of speech and religion. The pressure to generate non-oil revenue and provide increased employment opportunities for Saudi citizens has prompted the SAG to implement measures that may weaken the country’s investment climate going forward. Increased fees for expatriate workers and their dependents, as well as “Saudization” policies requiring certain businesses to employ a quota of Saudi workers, have led to disruptions in some private sector activities. Additionally, while specific details have not yet been released, Saudi Arabia announced in 2021 that multinational companies wanting to contract with the SAG must establish their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia by 2024. The SAG has taken important steps since 2018 to improve intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, enforcement, and awareness. While some concerns remain regarding IPR protection in the pharmaceutical sector, no new incidents related to regulatory data protection for health and safety information have been reported since October 2020, and in March 2022 Saudi Arabia issued a public statement stipulating that data protection in the Kingdom is for five years. While the sharp downturn in oil prices in 2020 put pressure on Saudi Arabia’s fiscal situation, the subsequent spike in oil prices has increased government revenue and the SAG expects a budget surplus in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 66 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $11,386 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $21,930 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The SAG seeks to attract $3 trillion in foreign investment to promote economic development, transfer foreign expertise and technology to Saudi Arabia, create jobs for Saudi nationals, and increase Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports. In October 2021, Saudi Arabia announced its National Investment Strategy, which will help it deliver on its Vision 2030 goals. The National Investment Strategy outlines investment plans for sectors including manufacturing, renewable energy, transport and logistics, tourism, digital infrastructure, and health care. The strategy aims to grow the Saudi economy by raising private sector contribution to 65 percent of total GDP and increasing foreign direct investment to 5.7 percent of total GDP. The National Investment Strategy aims to raise net foreign direct investment flows to $103 billion annually and increase domestic investment to about $450 billion annually by 2030. The Ministry of Investment of Saudi Arabia (MISA), formerly the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), governs and regulates foreign investment in the Kingdom, issues licenses to prospective investors, and works to foster and promote investment opportunities across the economy. Established originally as a regulatory agency, MISA has increasingly shifted its focus to investment promotion and assistance, offering potential investors detailed guidance and a catalogue of current investment opportunities on its website https://investsaudi.sa/en/sectors-opportunities /. The SAG has adopted reforms to improve the Kingdom’s attractiveness as an investment destination. It has reduced the license approval period from days to hours, decreased required customs documents, reduced the customs clearance period from weeks to hours, and increased the investor license period to five years. It has launched e-licenses to provide a more efficient and user-friendly process and an online “instant” license issuance or renewal service to foreign investors that are listed on a local or international stock market and meet certain conditions. The SAG allows 100 percent foreign ownership in most sectors. Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning entertainment sector provides opportunities for foreign investment. In a country where most public entertainment was once forbidden, the SAG now regularly sponsors and promotes entertainment programming, including live concerts, dance exhibitions, sports competitions, and other public performances. The audiences for many of these events are now gender-mixed, representing a larger consumer base. In addition to reopening cinemas in 2018, the SAG has hosted Formula One and Formula E races, professional golf and tennis tournaments, and a world heavyweight boxing title match. Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority launched the Saudi Seasons initiative in 2019, which hosts tourism and cultural events in each of the country’s 11 regions. The second iteration of Saudi Seasons began in October 2021 after a pause due to COVID. Riyadh Season attracted more than 15 million people and more than 1,200 companies participated, providing 150,000 job opportunities. The program included more than 7,500 entertainment events, including Arab and international concerts, international exhibitions, theatrical shows, and a freestyle wrestling tournament. The initiative also featured 200 restaurants and 70 coffee shops at 14 entertainment zones across Riyadh. The SAG is also seeking foreign investment for its “economic cities” and “giga-projects” that are at various stages of construction. These projects are large-scale, self-contained developments in different regions focusing on particular industries, such as technology, energy, logistics, tourism, entertainment, and infrastructure. These projects include: NEOM: a $500 billion long-term development project to build a futuristic “independent economic zone” and city in northwest Saudi Arabia. This initiative aims to create 380,000 jobs and contribute $48 billon to domestic GDP by 2030. This project includes: The Line: a 100 mile-long, urban smart city that will have no cars, no streets, and no carbon emissions. Oxagon: NEOM’s economic and industrial hub focusing on innovation, research, and technology. Built on the coast, it will include the world’s largest floating structure. Trojena: NEOM’s mountain destination blending natural and developed landscapes. This project will include a man-made lake, a wildlife reserve, and a ski resort. Qiddiya: a large-scale entertainment, amusement, sports, and cultural complex near Riyadh. King Abdullah Financial District: a commercial center development with nearly 60 skyscrapers in Riyadh. Red Sea Project: a massive tourism development on the archipelago of islands along the western Saudi coast, which aims to create 70,000 jobs and attract one million tourists per year. Diriyah Gate: a $50 billion project transforming Diriyah, a suburb of Riyadh, into a premiere destination for culture and heritage, entertainment, hospitality, retail, and education. Amaala: a wellness, healthy living, and meditation resort on the Kingdom’s northwest coast, projected to include more than 2,500 luxury hotel rooms and 700 villas. Asir: a $13 billion project to develop the southwestern region of Asir into a global tourism hub, aiming to attract more than 10 million visitors by 2030. To attract tourists to these new sites, the SAG introduced a new tourism visa in 2019 for non-religious travelers, and the Kingdom no longer requires foreign travelers staying in the same hotel room to provide proof of marriage or family relations. The SAG is facilitating private investments through its Tourism Development Fund, which has initial capital of $4 billion, and the Kafalah program, which provides loan guarantees of up to $400 million. In addition, the Tourism Fund signed MOUs with local banks to finance projects valued up to $40 billion to stimulate tourism investment and increase the sector’s contribution to GDP. Investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia’s mining sector continue to expand. In June 2020, the SAG approved a new law allowing foreign companies to enter the mining sector and invest in the Kingdom’s vast mining resources. The law will facilitate the establishment of a mining fund to provide sustainable finance, support geological survey and exploration programs, and optimize national mineral resources valued at $1.3 trillion. The law could increase the sector’s contribution to GDP by $64 billion, reduce imports by $9.8 billion, and create 200,000 direct and indirect jobs by 2030. Saudi Arabia’s national mining company, Ma’aden, has a $12 billion joint venture with Alcoa for bauxite mining and aluminum production and a $7 billion joint venture with the leading American fertilizer firm Mosaic and the Saudi chemical giant SABIC to produce phosphate-based fertilizers. Saudi Arabia’s transportation sector also provides ample opportunity for international investment. In June 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched the National Transport and Logistics Strategy to upgrade transportation infrastructure throughout Saudi Arabia. The strategy aims to enhance Saudi Arabia’s position as a global logistics center, improve quality of life, and balance the public budget. The strategy calls for the launch of a new national air carrier, with the goal of increasing the number of international destinations served by the country to more than 250. The SAG also aims to raise air freight sector capacity to more than 4.5 million tons. The strategy includes an initiative to connect Saudi Arabia with the other Arab Gulf states via a railway line. The SAG plans to invest $147 billion in transport and logistics over the next eight years. Lastly, the Kingdom’s infrastructure sector is open to foreign investment. The SAG launched an $800 billion project to double the size of Riyadh city in the next decade and transform it into an economic, social, and cultural hub for the region. The project includes 18 “mega-projects” in the capital city to improve livability, strengthen economic growth, and more than double the population to 15-20 million by 2030. The SAG is seeking private sector financing of $250 billion for these projects, with similar contributions from income generated by its financial, tourism, and entertainment sectors. Saudi Arabia fully recognizes rights to private ownership and the establishment of private business. However, the SAG excludes foreign investors from some economic sectors and places some limits on foreign control. Foreign investors must contend with increasingly strict requirements to base a certain percentage of production within Saudi Arabia (localization), labor policy requirements to hire more Saudi nationals (usually at higher wages than expatriate workers), an increasingly restrictive visa policy for foreign workers, and gender segregation in business and social settings (though this is becoming more relaxed as socio-economic reforms progress). The SAG implemented new taxes and fees in 2017 and early 2018, including significant visa fee increases. In 2020, the SAG increased the value-added tax (VAT) from five to 15 percent. In February 2021, MISA and the Royal Commission for Riyadh City (RCRC) announced a new directive requiring that companies wanting to contract with the SAG establish their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia – preferably in Riyadh – by 2024. MISA has yet to publish details regarding this mandate. According to MISA, companies that relocate their regional headquarters to Riyadh will benefit from incentives including relaxed Saudization, spouse work permits, waivers of professional accreditation, visa acceleration, and end-to-end business, personal, and concierge services. Saudi officials have confirmed that offices cannot be headquarters “in name only” but, rather, must be legitimate headquarters offices with C-level executive staff in Riyadh overseeing operations and staff in the rest of the region. Companies choosing to maintain their regional headquarters in another country will not be awarded public sector contracts beginning in 2024. Implementing regulations for this new directive have not been issued and it remains unclear if the rule would affect contracting by parastatal organizations such as Saudi Aramco. Foreign investment is currently prohibited in ten sectors: Oil exploration, drilling, and production except services related to the mining sector listed under Central Product Classification (CPC) 5115+883 Catering to military sectors Security and detective services Real estate investment in the holy cities, Mecca and Medina (Note: Foreign investment in real estate in Mecca and Medina is allowed in certain locations and limited to 99-year leases.) Tourist orientation and guidance services for religious tourism related to Hajj and Umrah Recruitment offices Commission agents internationally classified under CPC 621 Services provided by midwives, nurses, physical therapy services, and quasi-doctoral services classified under CPC 93191 Fisheries Poison centers, blood banks, and quarantine services Foreign firms are barred from investing in the upstream hydrocarbon sector, but the SAG permits foreign investment in the downstream energy sector, including refining and petrochemicals. ExxonMobil, Shell, China’s Sinopec, and Japan’s Sumitomo Chemical are partners with Saudi Aramco in domestic refineries. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, and other international investors have joint ventures with Saudi Aramco and/or the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Saudi Aramco since 2020) in large-scale petrochemical plants. The Dow Chemical Company and Saudi Aramco are partners in the $20 billion Sadara joint venture with the world’s largest integrated petrochemical production complex. Saudi Aramco also maintains a group of contractors to provide engineering, procurement, construction, hook-up, commissioning and maintenance, and modifications and operations jobs for its offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Joint ventures almost always take the form of limited liability partnerships in Saudi Arabia, to which there are some disadvantages. Foreign partners in service and contracting ventures organized as limited liability partnerships must pay, in cash or in kind, 100 percent of their contribution to authorized capital. MISA’s authorization is only the first step in setting up such a partnership. Professionals, including architects, consultants, and consulting engineers, are required to register with, and be certified by, the Ministry of Commerce. In theory, these regulations permit the registration of Saudi-foreign joint venture consulting firms. As part of its WTO commitments, Saudi Arabia generally allows consulting firms to establish a local office without a Saudi partner. Foreign engineering consulting companies, however, must have been incorporated for at least 10 years and have operations in at least four different countries to qualify. Foreign entities practicing accounting and auditing, architecture, and civil planning, or providing healthcare, dental, or veterinary services, must still have a Saudi partner. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has opened additional service markets to foreign investment, including financial and banking services; aircraft maintenance and repair; computer reservation systems; wholesale, retail, and franchise distribution services; basic and value-added telecom services; and investment in the computer and related services sectors. In 2016, Saudi Arabia formally approved full foreign ownership of retail and wholesale businesses in the Kingdom. While some companies have already received licenses under the new rules, the restrictions attached to obtaining full ownership – including a requirement to invest over $50 million during the first five years and ensure that 30 percent of all products sold are manufactured locally – have proven difficult to meet and have precluded many investors from taking full advantage of the reform. Saudi Arabia completed its third WTO trade policy review in March 2021, which included investment policies. The review can be found on WTO’s website https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp507_e.htm . In addition to applying for a license from MISA, foreign and local investors must register a new business via the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), which has begun offering online registration services for limited liability companies at https://mc.gov.sa/en/ . Though users may submit articles of association and apply for a business name within minutes on MOC’s website, final approval from the Ministry often takes a week or longer. Applicants must also complete several other steps to start a business, including obtaining a municipality (baladia) license for their office premises and registering separately with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, Chamber of Commerce, Passport Office, Tax Department, and the General Organization for Social Insurance. From start to finish, registering a business in Saudi Arabia takes about three weeks. Saudi officials have stated their intention to attract foreign small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to the Kingdom. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia aims to increase SME contribution to its GDP to 35 percent by 2030. To facilitate and promote the growth of the SME sector, the SAG established the Small and Medium Enterprises General Authority, Monsha’at, in 2015 and released a new Companies Law in 2016, which was amended in 2018 to update the language vis-à-vis Joint Stock Companies (JSC) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC). It also substantially reduced the minimum capital and number of shareholders required to form a JSC from five to two. The SAG continues to roll out initiatives to spur the development of the SME ecosystem in Saudi Arabia. As of 2019, women no longer need a male guardian to apply for a business license. In February 2021, Monsha’at launched the Bank of Small and Medium Enterprises to provide a one-stop shop for SME financing. In March 2022, Monsha’at and the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology inaugurated the National Business Innovation Portal, which provides guidance and resources for SMEs. Private Saudi citizens, Saudi companies, and SAG entities hold extensive overseas investments. The SAG has transformed its Public Investment Fund (PIF), into a major international investor and sovereign wealth fund. The PIF’s outward investment projects are covered in Section 6 (Financial Sector). Saudi Aramco and SABIC are also major investors in the United States. In 2017, Saudi Aramco acquired full ownership of Motiva, the largest refinery in North America, in Port Arthur, Texas. In December 2021, the ExxonMobil-SABIC $10-billion-dollar joint venture, Gulf Coast Growth Ventures, commenced operations at its new petrochemical facility near Corpus Christi, Texas. 3. Legal Regime Saudi Arabia received the lowest score possible (zero out of five) in the World Bank’s 2017-2018 Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance project, which places the Kingdom in the bottom 13 countries among 186 countries surveyed ( http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/ ). Few aspects of the SAG’s regulatory system are entirely transparent, although Saudi investment policy is less opaque than other areas. Bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome, but red tape can generally be overcome with persistence. Foreign portfolio investment in the Saudi stock exchange is well-regulated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), with clear standards for interested foreign investors to qualify to trade on the local market. The CMA has progressively liberalized requirements for “qualified foreign investors” to trade in Saudi securities. Insurance companies and banks whose shares are listed on the Saudi stock exchange are required to publish financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accounting standards. All other companies are required to follow accounting standards issued by the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants. Stakeholder consultation on regulatory issues is inconsistent. Some Saudi organizations are diligent in consulting businesses affected by the regulatory process, while others tend to issue regulations with no consultation at all. Proposed laws and regulations are not always published in draft form for public comment. An increasing number of government agencies, however, solicit public comments through their websites. In addition, in March 2021, Saudi Arabia’s National Competitiveness Center launched a public consultation platform called “Istitlaa” to solicit feedback on proposed laws and regulations before they are approved. That said, the processes and procedures for stakeholder consultation remain generally opaque and are not codified in law or regulations. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in the industry standards-setting consortia or organizations that are available. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or private sector associations. Saudi Arabia uses technical regulations developed both by the Saudi Arabian Standards Organization (SASO) and by the Gulf Standards Organization (GSO). Although the GCC member states continue to work towards common requirements and standards, each individual member state, and Saudi Arabia through SASO, continues to maintain significant autonomy in developing, implementing, and enforcing technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in its territory. More recently, Saudi Arabia has moved towards adoption of a single standard for technical regulations. This standard is often based on International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards, to the exclusion of other international standards, such as those developed by U.S.-domiciled standards development organizations (SDOs). Saudi Arabia’s exclusion of these other international standards, which are often used by U.S. manufacturers, can create significant market access barriers for industrial and consumer products exported from the United States. The United States government has engaged Saudi authorities on the principles for international standards per the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Committee Decision and encouraged Saudi Arabia to adopt standards developed according to such principles in their technical regulations, allowing all products that meet those standards to enter the Saudi market. Several U.S.-based standards organizations, including SDOs and individual companies, have also engaged SASO, with mixed success, in an effort to preserve market access for U.S. products, ranging from electrical equipment to footwear. A member of the WTO, Saudi Arabia must notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. The Saudi legal system is derived from Islamic law, known as sharia. Saudi commercial law, meanwhile, is still developing. In 2016, Saudi Arabia took a significant step in improving its dispute settlement regime with the establishment of the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (see “Dispute Settlement” section below). Through its Commercial Law Development Program, the U.S. Department of Commerce has provided capacity-building programs for Saudi stakeholders in the areas of contract enforcement, public procurement, and insolvency. The Saudi Ministry of Justice oversees the sharia-based judicial system, but most ministries have committees to rule on matters under their jurisdictions. Judicial and regulatory decisions can be appealed. Many disputes that would be handled in a court of law in the United States are handled through intra-ministerial administrative bodies and processes in Saudi Arabia. Generally, the Saudi Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over commercial disputes between the government and private contractors. The Board also reviews all foreign arbitral awards and foreign court decisions to ensure that they comply with sharia. This review process can be lengthy, and outcomes are unpredictable. The Kingdom’s record of enforcing judgments issued by courts of other GCC states under the GCC Common Economic Agreement, and of other Arab League states under the Arab League Treaty, is somewhat better than enforcement of judgments from other foreign courts. Monetary judgments are based on the terms of the contract – e.g., if the contract is calculated in U.S. dollars, a judgment may be obtained in U.S. dollars. If unspecified, the judgment is denominated in Saudi riyals. Non-material damages and interest are not included in monetary judgments, based on the sharia prohibitions against interest and against indirect, consequential, and speculative damages. As with any investment abroad, it is important that U.S. investors take steps to protect themselves by thoroughly researching the business record of a proposed Saudi partner, retaining legal counsel, complying scrupulously with all legal steps in the investment process, and securing a well-drafted agreement. Even after a decision is reached in a dispute, enforcement of a judgment can still take years. The U.S. government recommends consulting with local counsel in advance of investing to review legal options and appropriate contractual provisions for dispute resolution. In 2021, the Crown Prince announced draft legal reforms including a new personal status law, civil transactions law, evidence law, and discretionary sentencing law that aim to increase predictability and transparency in the legal system, facilitating commerce and expanding protections for women. To date, Saudi Arabia has published the new evidence law and the new personal status law. The two new laws have not yet come into force, but if implemented effectively, these reforms could be a major step towards modernizing the Saudi legal system. In January 2019, the Saudi government established the General Authority for Foreign Trade (GAFT), which aims to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports and investment, increase the private sector’s contribution to foreign trade, and resolve obstacles encountered by Saudi exporters and investors. The authority monitors the Kingdom’s obligations under international trade agreements and treaties, negotiates and enters into new international commercial and investment agreements, and represents the Kingdom before the WTO. The Governor of GAFT reports to the Minister of Commerce. Despite the list of activities excluded from foreign investment (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment” section), foreign minority ownership in joint ventures with Saudi partners may be allowed in some of these sectors. Foreign investors are no longer required to take local partners in many sectors and may own real estate for company activities. They are allowed to transfer money from their enterprises out of the country and can sponsor foreign employees, provided that “Saudization” quotas are met (see “Labor Policies” section). Minimum capital requirements to establish business entities range from zero to $8 million, depending on the sector and the type of investment. MISA offers detailed information on the investment process, provides licenses and support services to foreign investors, and coordinates with government ministries to facilitate investment. According to MISA, it must grant or refuse a license within five days of receiving an application and supporting documentation from a prospective investor. MISA has established and posted online its licensing guidelines, but many companies looking to invest in Saudi Arabia continue to work with local representation to navigate the bureaucratic licensing process. MISA licenses foreign investments by sector, each with its own regulations and requirements: (i) services, which comprise a wide range of activities including IT, healthcare, and tourism; (ii) industrial, (iii) real estate, (iv) public transportation, (v) entrepreneurial, (vi) contracting, (vii) audiovisual media, (viii) science and technical office, (ix) education (colleges and universities), and (x) domestic services employment recruitment. MISA also offers several special-purpose licenses for bidding on and performance of government contracts. Foreign firms must describe their planned commercial activities in some detail and will receive a license in one of these sectors at MISA’s discretion. Depending on the type of license issued, foreign firms may also require the approval of relevant competent authorities, such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Tourism. An important MISA objective is to ensure that investors do not just acquire and hold licenses without investing, and MISA sometimes cancels licenses of foreign investors that it deems do not contribute sufficiently to the local economy. MISA’s periodic license reviews, with the possibility of cancellation, add uncertainty for investors and can provide a disincentive to longer-term investment commitments. MISA has agreements with various SAG agencies and ministries to facilitate and streamline foreign investment. These agreements permit MISA to facilitate the granting of visas, establish MISA branch offices at Saudi embassies in different countries, prolong tariff exemptions on imported raw materials to three years and on production and manufacturing equipment to two years, and establish commercial courts. To make it easier for businesspeople to visit the Kingdom, MISA can sponsor visa requests without involving a local company. Saudi Arabia has implemented a decree providing that sponsorship is no longer required for certain business visas. While MISA has set up the infrastructure to support foreign investment, many companies report that despite some improvements, the process remains cumbersome and time-consuming. The General Authority for Competition (GAC) reviews merger transactions for competition-related concerns, investigates business conduct, including allegations of price fixing, can issue fines, and can approve applications for exemptions for certain business conduct. The competition law, as amended in 2019, applies to all entities operating in Saudi Arabia, and covers all activities related to the production, distribution, purchase, and sale of commodities inside the Kingdom, as well as practices that occur outside of Saudi Arabia and that have an impact on domestic competition. The competition law prohibits anti-competitive practices and agreements. This may include certain aspects of vertically integrated business combinations. Consequently, companies doing business in Saudi Arabia may find it difficult to register exclusivity clauses in distribution agreements but are not necessarily precluded from enforcing such clauses in Saudi courts. Certain merger transactions must be notified to the GAC, and each entity involved in the merger is obligated to notify the GAC. GAC may approve, conditionally approve, or reject a merger transaction. The Embassy is not aware of any cases in Saudi Arabia of expropriation from foreign investors without adequate compensation. Some small- to medium-sized foreign investors, however, have complained that their investment licenses have been cancelled without justification, causing them to forfeit their investments. In August 2018, the SAG implemented new bankruptcy legislation that seeks to “further facilitate a healthy business environment that encourages participation by foreign and domestic investors, as well as local small and medium enterprises.” The law clarifies procedural processes and recognizes distinct creditor classes (e.g., secured creditors). It also includes procedures for continued operation of a distressed company via financial restructuring. Alternatively, the parties may pursue an orderly liquidation of company assets, which would be managed by a court-appointed licensed bankruptcy trustee. Saudi courts have begun to accept and hear cases under this new legislation. 4. Industrial Policies MISA advertises several financial advantages for foreigners looking to invest in the Kingdom, including custom duty drawback and exemption on selected materials, equipment, and machinery; the lack of personal income taxes; and a corporate tax rate of 20 percent on foreign companies’ profits (the lowest among G20 countries). MISA’s website also lists various SAG-sponsored regional and international financial programs to which foreign investors have access, such as the Saudi Export Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Trade Financing Program, and the Islamic Development Bank. In 2021, the Crown Prince announced the Shareek (Arabic for “partner”) program to encourage local investment. To participate in the program, companies must commit to investing a minimum of $5.2 billion by 2030 and have the ability to invest at least $106 million in each additional project. Participating companies will be eligible for loans, grants, and co-investment from the Shareek program, as well as special support from the SAG on regulatory and other issues. The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), a government financial institution, supports private sector industrial investments by providing medium- and long-term loans for new factories and for projects to expand, upgrade, and modernize existing manufacturing facilities. The SIDF offers loans of 50 to 75 percent of a project’s value, depending on the project’s location. Foreign investors that set up manufacturing facilities in developed areas (Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, Jubail, Mecca, Yanbu, and Ras al-Khair), for example, can receive a 15-year loan for up to 50 percent of a project’s value; investors in the Kingdom’s least developed areas can receive a 20-year loan for up to 75 percent of the project’s value. The SIDF also offers consultancy services for local industrial projects in the administrative, financial, technical, and marketing fields. The SIDF’s website is https://www.sidf.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx . The SAG offers several incentive programs to promote employment of Saudi nationals in certain cases. The Saudi Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) ( https://www.hrdf.org.sa/ ), for example, will pay 30 percent of a Saudi national’s wages for the first year of work, with a wage subsidy of 20 percent and 10 percent for the second and third year of employment, respectively (subject to certain limits and caps). “Tamheer” is an on-the-job training program through which the SAG provides Saudi graduates with a 3,000 Saudi riyal (SAR) monthly stipend plus occupational hazard insurance for a period of three to six months. American and other foreign firms can participate in SAG-financed and/or -subsidized research-and-development (R&D) programs. Many of these programs are run through the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), which funds many of the Kingdom’s R&D programs. Saudi Arabia does not operate free trade zones or free ports. However, as part of its Vision 2030 program, the SAG has announced it will create special zones with special regulations to encourage investment and diversify government revenues. The SAG is considering the establishment of special regulatory zones in certain areas, including at NEOM and the King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh. During the G20 Leaders Summit in November 2020, the SAG announced plans to launch special economic zones that will be focused on greenfield investment in various sectors including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and digital industries. These zones will have a special legislative environment and include attractive incentives, according to the SAG. Saudi Arabia has established a network of “economic cities” as part of the country’s efforts to reduce its dependence on oil. Overseen by MISA, these four economic cities aim to provide a variety of advantages to companies that choose to locate their operations within the city limits, including in matters of logistics and ease of doing business. The four economic cities are: King Abdullah Economic City near Jeddah, Prince Abdelaziz Bin Mousaed Economic City in north-central Saudi Arabia, Knowledge Economic City in Medina, and Jazan Economic City near the southwest border with Yemen. The cities are in various stages of development, and their future development potential is unclear, given competing Vision 2030 economic development projects. The Saudi Industrial Property Authority (MODON in Arabic) oversees the development of 35 industrial cities, including some still under development, in addition to private industrial cities and complexes. MODON offers incentives for commercial investment in these cities, including competitive rents for industrial land, government-sponsored financing, export guarantees, and certain customs exemptions. MODON’s website is https://www.modon.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx . The Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) was formed in 1975 and established the industrial cities of Jubail, located in eastern Saudi Arabia on the Persian Gulf coast, and Yanbu, located in northwestern Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea coast. A significant portion of Saudi Arabia’s refining, petrochemical, and other heavy industries are in the Jubail and Yanbu industrial cities. The RCJY’s mission is to plan, promote, develop, and manage petrochemicals and energy-intensive industrial cities. In connection with this mission, RCJY promotes investment opportunities in the two cities and can offer a variety of incentives, including tax holidays, customs exemptions, low-cost loans, and favorable land and utility rates. More recently, the RCJY has assumed responsibility for managing the Ras Al Khair City for Mining Industries and the Jazan City for Primary and Downstream Industries. The RCJY’s website is https://www.rcjy.gov.sa. In 2017, Saudi Aramco began building the King Salman Energy Park (“SPARK”), a sustainable global energy and industrial hub, in the Eastern Province between Dammam and Al-Ahsa. SPARK is designed to attract, establish, and encourage local energy industries in the fields of exploration, production, refining, petrochemicals, conventional power, and water production and treatment. Saudi Aramco aims to finish construction of SPARK in 2035 and expects the hub to add around $6 billion to annual GDP. The government does not impose systematic conditions on foreign investment. In line with its bid to diversify the economy and provide more private sector jobs for Saudi nationals, the SAG has embarked on a broad effort to source goods and services domestically and is seeking commitments from investors to do so. In 2017, the Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA) established the Local Content and Private Sector Development Unit (NAMAA in Arabic) to promote local content and improve the balance of payments. NAMAA is responsible for monitoring and implementing regulations, suggesting new policies, and coordinating with the private sector on all local content matters. In December 2018, a royal decree was issued to establish the Local Content and Government Procurement Authority (LCGPA) to develop local content and to improve government procurement operation. The LCGPA is mandated to set local content requirements for individual contracts, track the amount of local content used by contractors, and obtain and audit commitments by contractors to use local content. Government-controlled enterprises are also increasingly introducing local content requirements for foreign firms. Saudi Aramco’s “In-Kingdom Total Value Added” (IKTVA) program, for example, strongly encourages the purchase of goods and services from a local supplier base and aims to retain Aramco’s percentage of locally manufactured energy-related goods and services at a minimum of 70 percent. In 2017, the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) was established by the Saudi Council of Ministers to develop Saudi Arabia’s national military manufacturing capabilities. GAMI’s mandate is to localize 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s military spending by 2030. Another key player in the defense sector is Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) – a wholly-owned subsidiary of the PIF launched in 2017. SAMI aims to be among the top 25 military industries companies in the world by 2030 and supports the Kingdom’s localization goals by forming joint ventures to manufacture locally defense articles. The government encourages recruitment of Saudi employees through a series of incentives (see “Labor Policies” section for details of the “Saudization” program) and limits placed on the number of visas for foreign workers available to companies. The Saudi electronic visitor visa system defaults to five-year visas for all U.S. citizen applicants. “Business visas” are routinely issued to U.S. visitors, who do not have an invitation letter from a Saudi company, but the visa applicant must provide evidence that he or she is engaged in legitimate commercial activity. “Commercial visas” are issued by invitation from Saudi companies to applicants, who have a specific reason to visit a Saudi company. The SAG has recently increased fees for expatriate employers and levies on expatriates with dependents. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Saudi legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property, consistent with the Islamic practice of upholding private property rights. Non-Saudi corporate entities are allowed to purchase real estate in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the foreign-investment code. Other foreign-owned corporate and personal property is protected by law. Saudi Arabia has a system of recording security interests and plans to modernize its land registry system. In 2017, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal, Rural Affairs, and Housing implemented an annual vacant land tax of 2.5 percent of the assessed value on vacant lands in urban centers to spur development. In 2018, in order to increase Saudis’ access to financing and stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, Saudi Arabia’s central bank lifted the maximum loan-to-value rate for mortgages for first-time homebuyers to 90 percent from 85 percent and increased interest payment subsidies for first-time buyers. Saudi Arabia was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report Priority Watch List in 2022 due to steps Saudi Authority took to address stakeholder concerns including the publication of its IP enforcement procedures and increased enforcement againt counterfeit and pirated goods and online pirated content. In 2018, Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP) to regulate, support, develop, sponsor, protect, enforce, and upgrade IP fields in accordance with the best international practices. In 2020, SAIP worked to consolidate IP protection competence, including creating a government-wide IPR respect program, establishing a specialized IP court, launching online and in-market enforcement programs, continuing market raids against counterfeit and pirated goods, and conducting significant pro-IPR awareness campaigns. SAIP has cooperated with USTR and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), including the signing of a second Cooperation Arrangement in December 2021 between SAIP and USPTO. In 2021, SAIP made 6,400 field inspection tours in 10 cities, conducted 1,912 online inspection visits, and carried out 282 visits to promote awareness of IPR across Saudi Arabia. In addition, in cooperation with Ministry of Commerce, the General Authority for Audio-Visual Media, the Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority and Public Security, SAIP announced in its 2021 enforcement report confiscation of over 5 million counterfeit products during its inspection campaigns, including pirated DVDs, CDs, books, computers, laptops, hard disks, memory chips, TV satellite boxes, CD-copying devices, copied books, and satellite broadcasting devices. In 2021, SAIP blocked over 2,000 websites for violating intellectual property laws. SAIP published a first of its kind statement in March 2022 confirming its commitment to regulatory data protection. In a statement posted on social media, that was also published by the Saudi Food and Drug Authority (SFDA), SAIP clarified its definition of confidential commercial information, described why this type of IP is important to innovation, confirmed its duty to protect this data against disclosure and unfair commercial use, and outlined proper procedures to take if an incident occurs. It states, “Any person harmed as a result of violating the provision of the Regulation of Confidential Commercial Information may file a lawsuit before the competent Court to claim compensation for damages sustained.” In 2022, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development approved the establishment of Saudi Arabia’s first nonprofit intellectual property protection entity, Himayah, to spread societal awareness of intellectual property rights. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Saudi Arabia’s financial policies generally facilitate the free flow of private capital and currency can be transferred in and out of the Kingdom without restriction. Saudi Arabia maintains an effective regulatory system governing portfolio investment in the Kingdom. The Capital Markets Law, passed in 2003, allows for brokerages, asset managers, and other nonbank financial intermediaries to operate in the Kingdom. The law created a market regulator, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), established in 2004, and opened the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) to public investment. Since 2015, the CMA has progressively relaxed the rules applicable to qualified foreign investors, easing barriers to entry and expanding the foreign investor base. The CMA adopted regulations in 2017 permitting corporate debt securities to be listed and traded on the exchange; in March 2018, the CMA authorized government debt instruments to be listed and traded on the Tadawul. The Tadawul was incorporated into the FTSE Russell Emerging Markets Index in March 2019, resulting in a foreign capital injection of $6.8 billion. Separately, the $11 billion infusion into the Tadawul from integration into the MSCI Emerging Markets Index took place in May 2019. The Tadawul was also added to the S&P Dow Jones Emerging Market Index. In November 2021, the CMA allowed financial market institutions to accept subscriptions from non-Saudis in real estate funds that invest in assets within the boundaries of Mecca and Medina. The banking system in the Kingdom is generally well-capitalized and healthy. The public has easy access to deposit-taking institutions. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems used in the banking sector are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. In November 2020, the SAG approved the Saudi Central Bank Law, which changed the name of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) to the Saudi Central Bank. Under the new law, the Saudi Central Bank is responsible for maintaining monetary stability, promoting the stability of and enhancing confidence in the financial sector, and supporting economic growth. The Saudi Central Bank continues to use the acronym “SAMA” due to its widespread use. SAMA generally gets high marks for its prudential oversight of commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. SAMA is a member and shareholder of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. In 2017, SAMA enhanced and updated its previous Circular on Guidelines for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The enhanced guidelines have increased alignment with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, the nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF). In 2019, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab country to be granted full membership to the FATF, following the organization’s recognition of the Kingdom’s efforts in combating money laundering, financing of terrorism, and proliferation of arms. Saudi Arabia had previously been an observer member since 2015. Saudi Arabia is forward leaning on the development of financial technology. In February 2022, the Saudi cabinet approved a license for a local digital bank, D360, to be established with capital of $440 million. In March 2022, SAMA announced the licensing of a new payment financial technology company, Moyasar Financial Company, to provide e-commerce payment services, bringing the number of payment companies licensed by SAMA to 16 companies. In 2021, SAMA introduced the new Instant Payment System (Sarie) to facilitate instant, 24/7 money transfers across local banks. STC Pay, which provides digital payment solutions, achieved a $1.3 billion valuation in 2020, and the SAG recently approved its conversion into a digital bank. Credit is normally widely available to both Saudi and foreign entities from commercial banks and is allocated on market terms. The Saudi banking sector has one of the world’s lowest non-performing loan (NPL) ratios, roughly two percent in 2020. In addition, credit is available from several government institutions, such as the SIDF, which allocates credit based on government-set criteria rather than market conditions. Companies must have a legal presence in Saudi Arabia to qualify for credit. The private sector has access to term loans, and there have been a number of corporate issuances of sharia-compliant bonds, known as sukuk. The New Government Tenders and Procurement Law (GTPL) was approved in 2019. The New GTPL applies to procurement by government entities and procurements executed outside of Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Finance has a pivotal role under the new GTPL to set policies and issue directives, collate and distribute information, maintain a list of boycotts, and approve tender and prequalification forms, contract forms, performance evaluation forms, and other documents. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance launched the Electronic Government Procurement System (Etimad Portal) to consolidate and facilitate the process of bidding and government procurement for all government sectors, enhancing transparency amongst government sectors and competing entities. The Public Investment Fund (PIF, www.pif.gov.sa ) is the Kingdom’s officially designated sovereign wealth fund. While PIF lacks many of the attributes of a traditional sovereign wealth fund, it has evolved into the SAG’s primary investment vehicle. Established in 1971 to channel oil wealth into economic development, the PIF has historically been a holding company for government shares in partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including SABIC, the National Commercial Bank, Saudi Telecom Company, Saudi Electricity Company, and others. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the chairman of the PIF and announced his intention in April 2016 to grow the PIF more than five-fold to a $2 trillion global investment fund by 2030, relying in part on proceeds from the initial public offering of 1.5 percent of Saudi Aramco shares. Under the Vision 2030 reform program, the PIF is financing several of the country’s giga-projects, including NEOM, Qiddiya, the Red Sea Project, and Amaala. The PIF increased its holding of U.S. equities to nearly $44 billion in Q3 2021, acquiring new stakes in 19 firms. In February 2022, the PIF advanced in the global ranking to become the sixth largest sovereign wealth fund with $580 billion in assets under management after receiving a four percent stake in Saudi Aramco, according to data released by the Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute. In an effort to rebalance its investment portfolio, the PIF has divided its assets into six investment pools comprising local and global investments in various sectors and asset classes: Saudi holdings; Saudi sector development; Saudi real estate and infrastructure development; Saudi giga-projects; international strategic investments; and an international diversified pool of investments. In 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched a new five-year strategy for the PIF. The strategy focuses on launching new sectors, empowering the private sector, developing the PIF’s portfolio, achieving effective long-term investments, supporting the localization of sectors, and building strategic economic partnerships. Under the new strategy, by 2025 the PIF aims to invest $267 billion into the local economy, contribute $320 billion to non-oil GDP, and create 1.8 million jobs. In practice, SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings also operate as a quasi-sovereign wealth fund, accounting for the majority of the SAG’s foreign assets. SAMA invests the Kingdom’s surplus oil revenues primarily in low-risk liquid assets, such as sovereign debt instruments and fixed-income securities. SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings peaked at $746 billion in 2014 but have since fallen to $429 billion in January 2022, the lowest level since 2010. This decline may be due to transfers to the PIF, as well as SAMA’s efforts to finance a recovery in import demand following the COVID-19 pandemic. Though not a formal member, Saudi Arabia serves as a permanent observer to the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs play a leading role in the Saudi economy, particularly in water, power, oil, natural gas, petrochemicals, and transportation. Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest exporter of crude oil and a large-scale oil refiner and producer of natural gas, is 94.5 percent SAG-owned, and its revenues typically contribute the majority of the SAG’s budget. Four of the eleven representatives on Aramco’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman, who serves concurrently as the Managing Director of the PIF. In December 2019, the Kingdom fulfilled its long-standing promise to publicly list shares of Saudi Aramco. The initial public offering (IPO) of 1.5 percent of Aramco’s shares on the Saudi Tadawul stock market on December 11, 2019, was the largest-ever IPO and valued Aramco at $1.7 trillion. The IPO generated $25.6 billion in proceeds, exceeding the $25 billion Alibaba raised in 2014 in the largest previous IPO in history. In February 2022, the SAG announced the transfer of four percent of Aramco’s shares to the PIF. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced that after the transfer, the state will remain Aramco’s largest shareholder, retaining more than 94 percent of the total shares. In March 2019, Saudi Aramco signed a share purchase agreement to acquire 70 percent of SABIC, Saudi Arabia’s leading petrochemical company and the fourth largest in the world, from the PIF in a transaction worth $69.1 billion; the acquisition was completed in 2020. Five of the nine representatives on SABIC’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman and vice chairman. The SAG is similarly well-represented in the leadership of other SOEs. The SAG either wholly owns or holds controlling shares in many other major Saudi companies, such as the Saudi Electricity Company, Saudia Airlines, the Saline Water Conversion Company, Ma’aden, the National Commercial Bank, and other leading financial institutions. Saudi Arabia has undertaken a limited privatization process for state-owned companies and assets dating back to 2002. The process, which is open to domestic and foreign investors, has resulted in partial privatizations of state-owned enterprises in banking, mining, telecommunications, petrochemicals, water desalination, insurance, and other sectors. As part of Vision 2030 reforms, the SAG has announced its intention to privatize additional sectors. Privatization is a key element underpinning the Vision 2030 goal of increasing the private sector’s contribution to GDP from 40 percent to 65 percent by 2030. The program endorses several approaches to privatization, including full and partial asset sales, initial public offerings, management buy-outs, public-private partnerships (build-operate-transfer models), concessions, and outsourcing. The Privatization Program report identifies 16 targeted sectors but does not include an exhaustive list of assets to be privatized. The report references education, healthcare, transportation, renewable energy, power generation, waste management, sports clubs, grain silos, and water desalination facilities as prime areas for privatization or public-private partnerships. The full Privatization Program report is available online at http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/ncp . In 2017, Saudi Arabia established the National Center for Privatization and Public Private Partnerships (NCP), which oversees and manages the Privatization Program. The NCP’s mandate is to introduce privatization through the development of programs, regulations, and mechanisms for facilitating private sector participation in entities now controlled by the government. The Center’s website is http://www.ncp.gov.sa/en/pages/home.aspx . In March 2021, Saudi Arabia approved the Private Sector Participation (PSP) Law, which aims to increase private sector participation in infrastructure projects and in the provision of public services. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a growing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Saudi Arabia. The King Khalid Foundation issues annual “responsible competitiveness” awards to companies doing business in Saudi Arabia for outstanding CSR activities. In March 2021, the SAG approved the formation of a committee on corporate social responsibility in the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development. Saudi Arabia does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World: https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab Comply Chain: https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ The SAG announced the first Saudi National Environmental Strategy in 2018. The strategy included a comprehensive restructuring of the environmental sector, the establishment of the Directorate of Environment under the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Agriculture (MEWA), and the creation of the Environmental Special Forces under the Ministry of Interior. The SAG also formed five specialized environmental centers: the National Center for Waste Management, the National Environmental Compliance Center, the National Center for the Development of Vegetation Cover and Combating Desertification, the National Center for Wildlife Conservation, and the National Meteorological Center. In addition, the Kingdom established the National Environmental Fund to support environmental research and the development of environmentally friendly technologies. In March 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman announced the Saudi Green Initiative (SGI) and the Middle East Green Initiative, which are part of Vision 2030 and place Saudi Arabia at the center of regional efforts to meet international targets for climate change mitigation. In October 2021, Saudi Arabia announced its intention to reduce, avoid, and remove greenhouse gas emissions by 278 million tons of CO2 equivalent annually by 2030, more than a two-fold increase of its initial nationally determined contribution (NDC). The Kingdom committed to moving to net-zero emissions by 2060 and signed the Global Methane Pledge. In April 2021, Saudi Arabia joined the United States, Canada, Norway, and Qatar to establish the Net-Zero Producers Forum. The forum aims to explore practical net-zero emission strategies, including methane abatement, carbon capture, and clean energy. Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud noted that Saudi Arabia would welcome foreign investment in its climate initiatives but will not require outside financial support to achieve its climate goals. It does, however, need expertise, capacity-building, and technology-sharing. He emphasized that the timeline for these goals could shift, depending on new technologies and the country’s ability to grow its economy. Saudi Arabia’s flagship environmental initiative is the Circular Carbon Economy (CCE), which it announced during its G20 presidency in 2020. The CCE consists of the “4Rs” model of “reduce, reuse, recycle, and remove” to manage greenhouse gas emissions – a way to offset its carbon emissions while continuing to pump oil. The Kingdom plans to transform the coastal cities of Jubail and Yanbu, both homes to petrochemical, steel, and other heavy industries, into global hubs for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS). By 2030 the SAG plans to generate 50 percent of the country’s electricity from renewables and the other half from natural gas. Currently, 40 percent of electricity generation comes from the burning of crude oil. Saudi company ACWA Power, in which the PIF has a 50 percent stake, has been tasked with developing 70 percent of Saudi renewable energy projects. ACWA Power’s first project under PIF funding, a solar plant in the central city of Sudair, will be one of the largest single-contracted solar PV plants in the world, with an installed capacity of 1,500 megawatts capable of powering 185,000 homes and offsetting nearly 2.9 million tons of emissions each year. As it seeks to diversify its energy sources away from oil, Saudi Arabia aims to become the world’s largest supplier of hydrogen. The Kingdom’s goal is to produce 2.9 million tons/year by 2030 and four million tons/year by 2035 of blue and green hydrogen. Aramco recently signed an initial agreement to build a green hydrogen and ammonia plant with Hong Kong-based green hydrogen developer InterContinental Energy, bringing private investment into the sector. In 2020, U.S. industrial gas producer Air Products, ACWA Power, and NEOM signed a $5 billion agreement to build a green hydrogen plant powered by four gigawatts of wind and solar power. The completed facility will produce 650 tons of green hydrogen daily, enough to run around 20,000 hydrogen-fueled buses. The fuel will be shipped as ammonia to end markets globally, and production is expected to start in 2025. Challenges remain in the hydrogen sector. The required technology for green and blue hydrogen is still nascent, production costs are high, and the market for these types of hydrogen is being developed. Saudi Arabia aims to recycle 100 percent of solid waste in Riyadh by 2025 and 82 percent of all waste streams countrywide by 2035. Waste management is a nascent industry, and current recycling stands at only one percent. To reach its waste management goals, the Saudi Investment Recycling Company (SIRC), a wholly owned subsidiary of the PIF, was established in 2017. SIRC is mandated to develop, own, operate, and finance projects across all waste types to establish recycling capacities and build a circular economy. 9. Corruption In December 2019, King Salman issued royal decrees creating the Oversight and Anti-Corruption Commission (“Nazaha”). Nazaha is responsible for promoting transparency and combating all forms of financial and administrative corruption. Nazaha reports directly to King Salman and has the power to dismiss a government employee even if found not guilty by the specialized anti-corruption court. Throughout 2021, Nazaha published monthly press releases detailing its arrests and investigations, often including high-ranking officials, such as generals and judges, from every ministry in the SAG. The releases are available on the Nazaha website at http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/en/Pages/Default.aspx . Foreign firms have identified corruption as a barrier to investment in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a relatively comprehensive legal framework that addresses corruption, but many firms perceive enforcement as selective. The Combating Bribery Law and the Civil Service Law, the two primary Saudi laws that address corruption, provide for criminal penalties in cases of official corruption. Government employees who are found guilty of accepting bribes face 10 years in prison or fines up to US$267,000. Ministers and other senior government officials appointed by royal decree are forbidden from engaging in business activities with their ministry or organization. Saudi corruption laws cover most methods of bribery and abuse of authority for personal interest, and in December 2021 Saudi Arabia amended the Combating Bribery Law to criminalize foreign bribery. Only senior Nazaha officials are subject to financial disclosure laws. The government is considering disclosure regulations for other officials but has yet to finalize them. SAMA oversees a strict regime to combat money laundering. Saudi Arabia’s Anti-Money Laundering Law provides for sentences up to 10 years in prison and fines up to $1.3 million. The Basic Law of Governance contains provisions on proper management of state assets and authorizes audits and investigations of administrative and financial malfeasance. The Government Tenders and Procurement Law regulates public procurements, which are often a source of corruption. The law provides for public announcement of tenders and guidelines for the award of public contracts. Saudi Arabia is an observer of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Saudi Arabia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in April 2013 and signed the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan in November 2010. Saudi Arabia was admitted to the OECD Working Group on Bribery in February 2021, and the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) elected Saudi Arabia to its Board of Governors in April 2022. The Kingdom ranks 52 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. The National Anti-Corruption Commission’s address is: National Anti-Corruption Commission P.O. Box (Wasl) 7667, AlOlaya – Ghadir District Riyadh 2525-13311 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Fax: +966 11 264-5555 E-mail: info@nazaha.gov.sa Nazaha accepts complaints about corruption through its website www.nazaha.gov.sa or mobile application. 10. Political and Security Environment The Department of State regularly reviews and updates travel advisories to apprise U.S. citizens of the security situation in Saudi Arabia and frequently reminds U.S. citizens of recommended security precautions. Please visit www.travel.state.gov for further information, including the latest travel advisory. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD) sets labor policy and, along with the Ministry of Interior, regulates recruitment and employment of expatriate labor, which makes up a majority of the private sector workforce. About 76 percent of jobs in the country are held by expatriates, who represent roughly 38 percent of the total population. The largest groups of foreign workers come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, and Yemen. Saudis occupy about 93 percent of government jobs, but only about 24 percent of the total jobs in the Kingdom. Roughly 46 percent of employed Saudi nationals work in the public sector. The removal of guardianship laws and travel restrictions for women, the introduction of workplace protections, and recent judicial reforms that provide additional protection have enabled more women to enter the labor force. From 2016 to 2020, the Saudi female labor participation rate increased from 19 percent to 33 percent. As of Q4 2021, Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Statistics estimates unemployment at 6.9 percent for the total population and 11 percent for Saudi nationals, but these figures mask a high youth unemployment rate, a Saudi female unemployment rate of 22.5 percent, and low Saudi labor participation rates (51.5 percent overall; 35.6 percent for women). With approximately 60 percent of the Saudi population under the age of 35, job creation for new Saudi labor market entrants will remain a challenge. The SAG encourages Saudi employment through “Saudization” policies that place quotas on employment of Saudi nationals in certain sectors, coupled with limits on the number of visas for foreign workers available to companies. In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (the forerunner of MHRSD) laid out a sophisticated plan known as Nitaqat, under which companies are divided into categories, each with a different set of quotas for Saudi employment based on company size. The SAG has taken additional measures to strengthen the Nitaqat program and expand the scope of Saudization. The MHRSD has mandated that certain job categories in specific economic sectors only employ Saudi nationals. The ministry has likewise mandated that only Saudi women can occupy retail jobs in certain businesses that cater to female customers. Many elements of Saudization and Nitaqat have garnered criticism from the private sector, but the SAG claims these policies have substantially increased the percentage of Saudi nationals working in the private sector over the last several years and has indicated that there is flexibility in implementation for special cases. Saudi Arabia’s labor laws forbid union activity, strikes, and collective bargaining. However, the government allows companies that employ more than 100 Saudis to form “labor committees” to discuss work conditions and grievances with management. In 2015, the SAG published 38 amendments to the existing labor law with the aim of expanding Saudi employees’ rights and benefits. In March 2021, MHRSD implemented its Labor Reform Initiative (LRI), which allows foreign workers greater job mobility and freedom to exit Saudi Arabia without the need for the employer’s permission. Domestic workers are not covered under the provisions of either the 2015 regulations or the LRI; separate regulations covering domestic workers were issued in 2013, stipulating employers provide at least nine hours of rest per day, one day off a week, and one month of paid vacation every two years. Saudi Arabia has taken significant steps to address labor abuses, but weak enforcement continues to result in credible reports of employer violations of foreign employee labor rights. Foreign workers (particularly domestic staff) have encountered employer practices, including passport withholding and non-payment of wages, that constitute trafficking in persons. The Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report details concerns about labor law enforcement within Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship system. It is available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/saudi-arabia/. Overtime work is normally compensated at time-and-a-half rates. The minimum age for employment is 14. The SAG does not adhere to the International Labor Organization’s convention on protecting workers’ rights. Non-Saudis have the right to appeal to specialized committees in the MHRSD regarding wage non-payment and other issues. Penalties issued by the ministry include banning infringing employers from recruiting foreign and/or domestic workers for a minimum of five years. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $700,118 2020 $700,118 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $11,386 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $6,262 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 34.5% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Saudi General Authority for Statistics According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report, in 2020 Saudi Arabia’s total FDI inward stock was $241.862 billion and total FDI outward stock was $128.759 billion. Detailed data for inward direct investment (below) is as of 2010, which is the latest available breakdown of inward FDI by country. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $169,206 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Kuwait $16,761 10% Country #1 N/A N/A France $15,918 9% Country #2 N/A N/A Japan $13,160 8% Country #3 N/A N/A United Arab Emirates $12,601 7% Country #4 N/A N/A China, P.R. $9,035 5% Country #5 N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2010 – latest available complete data) 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section and Foreign Commercial Service Offices Embassy of the United States of America P.O. Box 94309 Riyadh 11693, Saudi Arabia Phone: +966 11 835-4000 Senegal Executive Summary Senegal’s stable democracy, relatively strong economic growth, and open economy offer attractive opportunities for foreign investment. Senegal’s macroeconomic environment remains generally stable, although aggressive measures to counter the economic impact of COVID-19 and rising commodity costs are pushing public debt to nearly 70 percent of GDP, the internal debt distress threshold of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The currency – the CFA franc used in eight West African countries – is pegged to the Euro and remains stable. The Government of Senegal (GOS) welcomes foreign investment and has prioritized efforts to improve the business climate, and many companies choose Senegal as a base for operations in Francophone Africa. Since 2012, Senegal has pursued an ambitious development program, the Plan Senegal Emergent (Emerging Senegal Plan, or “PSE”), to improve infrastructure, achieve economic reforms, increase investment in strategic sectors, and strengthen private sector competitiveness. The GOS expanded the “single window” system to provide services to companies, opening new service centers across the country, harmonizing more than 60 GOS websites, and digitizing dozens of government services and payment mechanisms. The national digital agency, ADIE, plans to lay 4,500 kilometers of additional fiberoptic cable to increase internet access. Senegal has plans to transition power plants from fuel oil to domestic natural gas starting in 2023, when two recently discovered oil and gas fields come online. A new Public-Private Partnership (PPP) law entered into force in November 2021, modernizing and clarifying PPP procedures and encouraging local content. With good air transportation links, a modern airport, expanding seaports, availability of mobile money and other financial technologies, and improving ground transportation, Senegal aims to become a regional commercial and services hub. Three Special Economic Zones offer investors tax exemptions and other benefits. Repatriation of capital and income is generally straightforward, although the regional central bank sometimes limits the number of “offshore accounts” for companies registered in Senegal and engaged in project finance. Although some companies report problems, Senegal scores favorably on corruption indicators compared to other countries in the region. Despite Senegal’s many advantages, significant challenges remain. Investors at times cite burdensome and unpredictable tax administration, complex customs procedures, bureaucratic hurdles, opaque public procurement practices, an inefficient judicial system, inadequate access to financing, and a rigid labor market as obstacles. High real estate and energy costs, as well as high costs of inputs for manufacturing, also constrain Senegal’s competitiveness. High levels of unemployment and underemployment, especially among the country’s large youth population, represent a long-term macroeconomic challenge. A U.S.-Senegal Bilateral Investment Treaty went into effect since 1990. Senegal’s stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from $3.4 billion in 2015 to $6.4 billion in 2019, according to UNCTAD data. U.S. investment in Senegal has expanded since 2014, including investments in power generation, renewable energy, industry, and offshore oil and gas. The IMF reports that U.S. FDI stock in Senegal was approximately $114 million in 2019 (Table 1; up from $91 million in 2018). Although France is historically Senegal’s largest source of FDI, China overtook France as Senegal’s largest bilateral trade partner in 2019. Turkish economic influence is also rising, particularly in construction. Other important investment partners include Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States, as well as the EU. Sectors attracting substantial investment include petroleum and natural gas, agribusiness, mining, tourism, manufacturing, and fisheries. Investors can consult Senegal’s investment promotion agency (APIX) at www.investinsenegal.com for information on opportunities, incentives, and procedures for foreign investment, including a copy of Senegal’s investment code. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 Transparency International Global Innovation Index 2021 105 of 131 Global Innovation Index U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $114.0 million U.S. Foreign Direct Investment World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,430 World Bank Gross National Income 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOS welcomes foreign investment. The investment code provides for equitable treatment of foreign and local firms. There is no restriction on ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign firms generally can invest in Senegal free from systematic discrimination in favor of local firms. However, some U.S. and other foreign firms have noted that, in practice, Senegal’s investment environment favors incumbents and insiders – often other foreign firms – at the expense of new market entrants. Common complaints include excessive and inconsistently applied bureaucratic processes; nontransparent, slow judicial processes; and an opaque decision-making process for public contracts. Financial and capital markets are open, attracting domestic, regional, and international capital. In the wake of COVID-19, President Sall called for greater “economic sovereignty” in strategic sectors such as food production, pharmaceuticals, and digital technology to strengthen the country’s resilience to external shocks. The GOS consults with the private sector through the Conseil Presidentiel de l’Investissement (Presidential Council on Investment, or “CPI”). Among other activities, the CPI for investor-government dialogue. Another important venue for dialogue is the annual Assises de l’Entreprises (Company Meetings) sponsored by the Conseil National du Patronat (www.cnp.sn), the national employers’ association. Senegal does not have a business ombudsman or other official charged with resolving business disputes. In practice, investors must often engage directly at the minister level to resolve business climate concerns. Senegal’s investment promotion agency, APIX, facilitates government review of investment proposals and the project approval process. APIX is also the exclusive administrator of all special economic zones in Senegal. There are no barriers to ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Exceptions include strategic sectors such as water, electricity distribution, and port services, where the government and state-owned companies maintain responsibility for most physical infrastructure but allow private companies to provide services. Senegal allows foreign investors equal access to ownership of property and does not impose any general limits on foreign control of investments. Senegal’s Investment Code includes guarantees for equal treatment of foreign investors, including the right to acquire and dispose of real property. GOS Ministries offer guidance on large projects, primarily to verify compatibility with the country’s overall development goals and compliance with environmental regulations. The Ministry of Finance and Budget reviews project financing arrangements for projects requiring public funds to ensure compatibility with budget and debt policies. In October 2017, Senegal, along with other members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) underwent a Trade Policies Review by WTO. In January 2020, the Executive Board of the IMF approved a new three-year Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) for Senegal. The IMF published its Second Review under the PCI ( IMF PCI ) on January 19, 2021. The point of entry for business registration is Senegal’s Investment Promotion Agency, APIX, www.investinsenegal.com , which provides a range of administrative services to foreign investors. The World Bank estimates it takes six days to register a firm. In addition to other bureaucratic and documentary requirements, registering a business requires certification of certain documents by a public notary registered in Senegal. Senegalese law provides special preferences to facilitate investment and business operations by medium-sized and small enterprises, including reduced interest rates for Senegalese-owned companies. The GOS continues to expand its “single window” system, offering one-stop government services for businesses and opening new service centers. Since 2019, the GOS has made 25 government processes available online, including applications for construction permits, tax information searches, and tax and customs payments. In 2020, the GOS continued to expand its eGovernance program, harmonizing 60 government websites and creating 30 online service platforms. In 2019, APIX launched an online portal containing extensive information regarding regulations applicable to businesses and investments in Senegal. Senegal’s Agency for the Development and Supervision of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (ADEPME) supports small and medium-sized enterprises (defined as having fewer than 50 employees and annual revenues less than 5 billion CFA (about $9 million)). These include tax incentives, grants for capacity building and feasibility studies, and technical assistance to help firms operating in the informal sector formalize and register. ADEPME has also launched a program to certify the creditworthiness of SMEs, making them eligible for loans at preferential rates. Senegal’s budget and information on debt obligations are generally accessible to the public, including online. Although Senegal included state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt in its overall debt figures, detailed information on the debt of individual SOEs was not available to the public. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Senegal’s supreme audit institution reviews the government’s accounts, and its reports are published online. However, the GOS has not released an audit report since 2017. Senegal is the first Francophone country in sub-Saharan Africa to submit to a fiscal transparency evaluation (FTE) by the IMF. In its January 2019 FTE, the IMF rated Senegal “average” overall for countries of similar income and institutional capacity. Senegal was rated “advanced” or “good” on fiscal forecasting, budgeting, and fiscal reporting. It was rated “basic” on monitoring risks triggered by subnational governments. The process for allocating licenses and contracts for natural resource extraction was outlined in law and appeared to be followed in practice. In 2019, Senegal approved a new Petroleum Code, clarifying investment terms and local content requirements for foreign investment. Senegal is currently offering new offshore exploration blocks through an open tender process conducted in accordance with international standards. In February 2020, Senegal finalized a new Gas Code to govern development of a mid-stream gas distribution network. Basic information on natural resource extraction awards is publicly available, and the government participated actively in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The government neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Senegal has made some progress towards establishing independent regulatory institutions, having set up regulators for energy, telecommunications, and finance. While Senegal lacks established procedures for a public comment process for proposed laws and regulations, the GOS sometimes holds public hearings and workshops to discuss drafts. Suggested regulations are not always made available to the public in a timely manner, however. Although Senegalese law requires proposed legislation to be published in advance in the government’s official gazette, the GOS does not consistently update its website. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Authority to make and enforce rules rests with the relevant government ministry unless there is a separate regulatory authority. Local government bodies do not have a decisive role in regulatory decisions. The Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité (Electricity Sector Regulatory Commission, CRSE) was established in 1998 to regulate the electricity sector and set electricity tariffs. Although the CRSE is by law an independent agency, observers note that the government frequently exercises influence over its decisions. Under the Millennium Challenge Corporation Senegal Power Compact, the GOS has committed to reforms, including adopting a new electricity code in 2021 and strengthening the CRSE’s capacity and independence. The Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications et des Postes (Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority, ARTP) is responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications and postal services in Senegal. The Dakar-based Central Bank of West African States (known by its French acronym, BCEAO) regulates banking. There is no legal requirement to conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations, and regulatory agencies rarely do so. There is no specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impacts. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems closely follow French models. Financial statements must be prepared in accordance with the SYSCOHADA system, based on generally accepted accounting principles in France. As a member of ECOWAS, Senegal generally adheres to regional requirements concerning the movement of people and goods. Similarly, fiscal policy directives of WAEMU are enforced in Senegal, as are regulations issued by the BCEAO. Senegal is a WTO member and generally notifies draft regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, since 2005, Senegal has banned imports of uncooked poultry and poultry products without notifying the WTO. In March 2019, Senegal ratified the AfCFTA, which went into effect in January 2021. Senegal’s legal system is based on French civil law and has well-developed commercial and investment laws. Although settlement of commercial disputes has historically been cumbersome and slow, Senegal launched a new commercial court system in 2018 with jurisdiction over commercial matters and a mandate to resolve cases within three months. The business community welcomed the move, and in the past two years, the court has heard 11,054 cases with a combined value of nearly $500 million. While Senegal’s constitution mandates that the judiciary operate independently of the legislature and executive, the executive frequently exerts influence, particularly in high-profile criminal cases. This type of influence is rare in strictly commercial matters. Some foreign investors, however, report discriminatory treatment by local courts. Investors may consider including binding arbitration in their contracts to avoid prolonged legal entanglements. Companies may seek judicial redress against regulatory decisions. Regulatory appeals are heard in administrative tribunals that specialize in adjudicating claims against the state. Senegal is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Berne Copyright Convention, and in 2019 hosted a regional workshop on protecting intellectual property in the pharmaceutical and pesticide industries that gathered prosecutors, customs, and law enforcement officers. Nevertheless, the country has insufficient capacity to reliably protect intellectual property rights. Senegal’s 2004 Investment Code provides basic guarantees for equal treatment of foreign investors and repatriation of profit and capital. It also specifies tax and customs exemptions according to investment volume and company size and location, with investments outside of Dakar eligible for longer tax exemptions. A law to enhance transparency in public procurement and public tenders entered into force in 2008, establishing a public procurement regulatory body, the Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, ARMP), which publishes annual reviews of public procurement. In February 2021, Senegal’s National Assembly signed into law the long-awaited update to the law governing public-private partnership (PPP) contracts, followed by the implementing decree in November 2021. The amended law includes several important innovations, including: a unified legal framework for private sector-led, GOS-supported projects; a streamlined institutional framework to simplify procedures and avoid incompatibilities; a strengthened monitoring and control system; and provisions about local content requirements. The GOS has stated that the new law will introduce a more flexible and attractive framework for blended finance projects. Some U.S. companies have raised concerns about the local content requirements included in the law. BCEAO regulations proscribe the use of offshore accounts in project finance transactions within the WAEMU, except when approved by ministries of finance with the express consent of the BCEAO. According to BCEAO, these restrictions allow visibility over international transactions, deter money laundering, and help it maintain adequate foreign currency reserves. BCEAO emphasizes the importance of these rules in enabling it to fulfill its mandate of maintaining the stability of the CFA franc’s peg to the Euro. Since 2018, the BCEAO and Senegalese Ministry of Finance and Budget have tightened their approach to the approvals of offshore accounts. Although there is no “maximum” number of accounts permitted, informal guidelines suggest that transactions using one to three accounts have the greatest chance of being approved. According to the BCEAO, the intent is to encourage the minimum number of such accounts necessary to legitimately conduct the transaction. Managers and lenders should raise the subject of offshore accounts with the Ministry of Finance as early in the process as possible and should be prepared to submit a functional justification for each requested account. All offshore accounts must be “reauthorized” annually. The Investment Code, the Mining Code, the Petroleum Code, and a government services one-stop can be found at the following: Investment Code Mining Code Petroleum Code Senegal Services Senegal’s national competition commission, the Commission Nationale de la Concurrence, is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Senegal’s Investment Code includes protection against expropriation or nationalization of private property, with exceptions for “reasons of public utility” provided there is “just compensation” in advance. In general, Senegal has no history of expropriation or creeping expropriation against private companies. The government may sometimes use eminent domain justifications to procure land for public infrastructure projects, with compensation provided to landowners. The U.S.-Senegal BIT specifies that international legal standards are applicable to any cases of expropriation. Senegal is a member of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a signatory of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”). Senegalese law recognizes the Cour d’Appel (Appeals Court) as the competent authority for the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to ICSID. Senegal is also a signatory to the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa Treaty (OHADA). This agreement supports enforcement of awards under the New York Convention. The Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority or ARMP) manages a dispute-resolution mechanism for public tenders. Senegal has growing experience in using international arbitration for resolution of investment disputes with foreign companies, including some cases involving tax disputes with U.S. firms. The government has also prevailed in some arbitration cases, including a 2013 arbitration decision in a high-profile case with a multinational company over an integrated mining/railway/port project, fostering greater confidence within the government in the arbitration process. Senegal’s BIT with the United States includes provisions to facilitate the referral of investment disputes to binding arbitration. International firms have pursued a variety of investment disputes during the last decade, including at least two U.S. firms involved in tax and customs disputes. Other foreign companies in mining and telecommunications have pursued commercial disputes over licensing. These disputes have often been resolved through arbitration or an amicable settlement. Senegal has no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. The GOS has commercial courts and uses alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to expedite dispute resolution. Under the OHADA treaty, Senegal recognizes the corporate law and arbitration procedures common to the 16 member states in Western and Central Africa. Senegalese courts routinely recognize arbitration clauses in contracts and agreements. It is not unusual for courts to rule against SOEs in disputes involving private enterprises. Senegal has commercial and bankruptcy laws that address liquidation of business liabilities. Foreign creditors receive equal treatment under Senegalese bankruptcy law in making claims against liquidated assets. Monetary judgments are normally in local currency. As a member of OHADA, Senegal permits three different types of bankruptcy: liquidation through a negotiated settlement; company restructuring; or complete liquidation of assets. 4. Industrial Policies Senegal’s Investment Code provides for investment incentives, including temporary exemption from customs duties and income taxes, for investment projects. Eligibility for investment incentives depends upon a firm’s size and the type of activity, amount of the potential investment, and location of the project. To qualify for significant investment incentives, firms must invest above CFA 100 million (approximately $165,000) or in activities that lead to an increase of 25 percent or more in productive capacity. Investors may also deduct up to 40 percent of retained investment over five years. However, for companies engaged strictly in “trading activities,” investment incentives may not be available. Senegal does not provide incentives for underrepresented investors such as women, nor does it provide specific incentives for clean energy investments. Eligible sectors for investment incentives include agriculture and agro-processing, fishing, livestock, and related industries, manufacturing, tourism, mineral exploration and mining, banking, and others. All qualifying investments benefit from the “Common Regime,” which includes two years of exemption from duties on imports of goods not produced locally for small and medium-sized firms, and three years for all others. Also included is exemption from direct and indirect taxes for the same period. Exemption from the Minimum Personal Income Tax and from the Business License Tax can be granted to investors who use local resources for at least 65 percent of their total inputs within a fiscal year. Enterprises that locate in less industrialized areas of Senegal may benefit from exemption of the lump-sum payroll tax of three percent, with the exemption running from five to 12 years, depending on the location of the investment. The investment code provides for exemption from income tax, duties, and other taxes, phased out progressively over the last three years of the relief period. Most incentives are automatically granted to investment projects meeting the above criteria. An existing firm requesting an extension of such incentives must be at least 20 percent self-financed. To qualify for these benefits, firms are required to create at least 150 full-time positions for Senegalese nationals, contribute the hard currency equivalent of at least 100 million CFA ($165,000), and keep regular accounts that conform to Senegalese standards. In addition, firms must provide APIX with details on company products, production, employment, and consumption of raw materials. In 2017, Senegal passed legislation to create Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Enterprises approved under the SEZ regime may be granted tax and customs concessions for up to 25 years. Benefits may include exemptions from duties and taxes on imports of goods, raw materials and equipment (except for community levies); application of a reduced 15 percent corporate tax rate; and exemption from certain taxes and charges, such as business and property taxes. To qualify for these benefits, companies must make a minimum investment of CFA 100 million ($165,000), create at least 150 jobs during their first year, and generate at least 60 percent of their revenue from exports. In November 2018, President Sall inaugurated the country’s first SEZ in the Dakar planned suburb of Diamniadio. The GOS has since launched two additional SEZs; one in Sandiara, 80 kilometers from the capital city Dakar, and the other in Ndiass, in the vicinity of Dakar’s International Airport. According to Senegalese officials responsible for digital economy development, the GOS has installed more than 150 kilometers of high-speed fiberoptic cable throughout Diamniadio to boost access and speeds for investors locating there. Senegal’s Data Protection Act was passed in 2008. Senegal has mandatory requirements to register mobile device SIM cards and is a signatory to the Economic Community of West African States Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection from 2010. There is no requirement for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, nor are there measures that prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside Senegal. President Macky Sall inaugurated a 1,000 terabyte government data center in June 2021 with the intent to migrate all Senegalese government data and applications there and host them in the future. In March 2022, President Sall announced that national digital agency ADIE would become Société National Senegal Numerique (National Company for Digital Senegal, SEMUM) to accelerate Senegal’s digitalization. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Senegalese Civil Code provides a framework, based on French law, for enforcing private property rights. The code provides for equality and non-discrimination against foreign-owned businesses. Senegal maintains a property title and a land registration system, but application is uneven outside of urban areas. Establishing ownership rights to real estate can be difficult. Once established, however, ownership is protected by law. The GOS has undertaken several reforms to make it easier for investors to acquire and register property. It has streamlined procedures and reduced associated costs for property registration and developed new land tenure models intended to facilitate land acquisition by resolving conflicts between traditional and government land ownership. If the new models are widely adopted, the GOS and donors expect they will facilitate land acquisition and investment in the agricultural sector while providing benefits to traditional landowners in local communities. The GOS generally pays compensation when it takes private property through eminent domain. Senegal’s housing finance market is under-developed, and few long-term mortgage-financing vehicles exist. There is no secondary market for mortgages or other bundled revenue streams. The judiciary is inconsistent when adjudicating property disputes. According to the World Bank, registering property requires an average of 41 days, compared to an average of 51.6 days in sub-Saharan Africa and 23.6 days in OECD countries. Five separate procedures are required. Senegal maintains an adequate legal framework for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), but the country has limited institutional capacity to enforce IPR laws. Senegal has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) since its inception. Senegal is also a member of the African Organization of Intellectual Property, a grouping of 15 Francophone African countries with a common system for obtaining and maintaining protection for patents, trademarks, and industrial designs. Local statutes recognize reciprocal protection for authors or artists who are nationals of countries adhering to the 1991 Paris Convention on Intellectual Property Rights. Patents may be registered with the Agence Sénégalaise pour la Propriété industrielle et l’Innovation technologique (Senegalese Agency for Industrial Property and Technical Innovation, ASPIT) and are protected for 20 years. An annual charge is levied during this period. Registered trademarks are protected for a period of 20 years. Trademarks may be renewed indefinitely by subsequent registrations. Senegal is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The Senegalese Copyright Office, part of the Ministry of Culture, protects copyrights. Bootlegging of music CDs is common and a source of concern for the local music industry. The Copyright Office has taken actions to combat media piracy, including seizure of counterfeit cassettes, CDs, and DVDs. In 2008, the government established a special police unit to improve enforcement of the country’s anti-piracy and counterfeit laws. The government has limited capacity to combat IPR violations or to seize counterfeit goods. Customs screening for counterfeit goods production is weak and confiscated goods occasionally re-appear in the market. Nevertheless, the GOS has raised awareness of the impact of counterfeit products on the Senegalese marketplace, especially regarding pharmaceuticals, and officers have participated in trainings offered by manufacturers to identify counterfeit products. Senegal is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at WIPO country profiles . 6. Financial Sector Senegalese authorities take a generally positive view of portfolio investment. Assisted by the debt management office of the BCEAO and thanks to a well-functioning regional debt market, Senegal has historically issued regular debt instruments in local currency to manage its finances. Beginning in 2011, the government began accessing international debt markets, issuing U.S. dollar-denominated Eurobonds in 2011, 2014, 2017, and 2018. In June 2021, the authorities issued a 775-million-Euro Eurobond’ its first Euro-denominated obligation. Some observers, including the IMF, have expressed concern over the continued rise in Senegal’s public debt, which has more than doubled over the last decade, in part due to the country’s significant investments associated with the PSE. With the ongoing effects of COVID-19 and the consequences of the political turmoil of March 2021, Senegal’s 2021 debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 73 percent, compared to 52 percent in 2018. In late 2020, Senegal took advantage of the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative, receiving relief from $163 million in debt service payments (0.6 percent of GDP) through the end of 2021. The GOS aims to mitigate concerns about its public debt by containing energy subsidies, prioritizing concessional borrowing, and taking steps to increase government revenues. Senegal does not have its own stock market. A handful of Senegalese companies are listed on the West African Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM), headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The BRVM also has local offices in each of the WAEMU member countries, offering additional opportunities to attract foreign capital and access diversified sources of financing. In 2018, the BCEAO launched the region’s first certification program for dealers in securities and other financial instruments. Modeled on accreditation programs offered by the Chartered Institute for Securities and Investment, the new program was supported by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance. While Senegal’s banking system is generally sound, the financial sector is underdeveloped. Senegal’s 26 commercial banks, primarily based in France, Nigeria, Morocco, and Togo, follow conservative lending guidelines, with collateral requirements that most potential borrowers cannot meet. Few firms are eligible for long-term loans, and small and medium-sized enterprises have little access to credit. According to a 2016 government survey, about 17 percent of enterprises in the formal sector receive financing from commercial banks, compared to 6 percent for informal enterprises. Authorities have committed to implement the national financial inclusion strategy (2021-25) and achieve a financial inclusion rate of 65 percent of adults and 90 percent of SMEs. Senegal’s banking sector is regulated by the BCEAO and the WAEMU regional banking commission. Increasingly available mobile money services offer Senegalese consumers alternatives to traditional banking and credit services. In 2012, Senegal established a sovereign wealth fund (Fonds Souverain d’Investissements Strategiques, FONSIS) with a mandate to leverage public assets to support equity investments in commercial projects supporting economic development objectives. FONSIS invests primarily in strategic sectors defined in the PSE, including agriculture, fishing, infrastructure, energy, mining, tourism, and services. Senegal maintains several taxes and funds allocated for specific purposes such as expanding access to transportation, energy, and telecommunications, including the autonomous road maintenance fund and the energy support fund. For these funds, some information is included in budget annexes; these funds are subject to the same auditing and oversight mechanisms as ordinary budgetary spending. FONSIS reports that it abides by the Santiago Principles for sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Senegal has generally reduced government involvement in SOEs during the last three decades. However, the GOS still owns full or majority interests in 24 SOEs, including the national electricity company (Senelec), Dakar’s public bus service, the Port of Dakar, National Post, the national rail company, and the national water utility. Senelec retains control over power transmission and distribution, but it relies increasingly on independent producers to generate power. The GOS has also retained control of the national oil company, PETROSEN, which is involved in hydrocarbon exploration in partnership with foreign oil companies and operates a small refinery dependent on government subsidies. The GOS has modest and declining ownership of agricultural enterprises, including one involved in rice production. In 2018, the government revived the state-owned airline, Air Senegal. The GOS also owns a minority share in Sonatel-Orange Senegal, the country’s largest internet and mobile communications provider. The Direction du Secteur Parapublic, an agency within the Ministry of Finance, manages the government’s ownership rights in SOEs. The GOS’s budget includes financial allocations to these enterprises, including subsidies to Senelec. SOE revenues are not projected in budget documents, but actual revenues are included in quarterly reports published by the Ministry of Finance. Senegal’s supreme audit institution (the Cour des Comptes) conducts audits of the public sector and SOEs. The government has no program for privatizing the remaining SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Following the lead of foreign companies, some Senegalese firms have begun adopting corporate social responsibility programs and responsible business conduct standards. However, this movement is not yet widespread. Senegal’s 2016 Mining Code specifies the criteria and procedures by which the government awards natural resource extraction contracts or licenses. The code requires mining companies to participate in transparency reporting following the guidelines of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The GOS appears to follow the Mining Code and its implementing regulations in practice, although unregulated artisanal mining is common in some areas. Basic information on awards was publicly available online through the government’s official journal, and included details regarding geographic areas, resources under development, companies involved, and the duration of contracts. In January 2019, the government adopted a new Petroleum Code, which clarifies mechanisms for reserving revenues from oil and gas projects to the government. Senegal has been an active member of the EITI since 2013. In May 2018, the EITI Board declared Senegal the first country in Africa to have made “satisfactory progress” in implementing EITI standards. In October 2019, Senegal hosted the 41st quarterly meeting of the EITI Board, along with a conference on EITI implementation in Africa. The government’s EITI committee reports directly to the President. Senegal’s long-term national economic development policy – the Plan Senegal Emergent (PSE) – includes a green growth program known as “Green PSE” (PSE Vert). Launched in December 2021, the Green PSE is structured around six priority sectors: agriculture, energy, industry, water and sanitation, forestry, and construction. The Green PSE aims to build Senegal’s capacity to access financial resources from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and private sector investment. According to the PSE Operational Bureau within the Office of the President, the GOS will convene representatives from the six priority sectors in May 2022 to identify specific projects and a roadmap for their implementation. In December 2020, the GOS published its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the 2015 Paris Agreement. Senegal’s NDC contains a greenhouse gas mitigation plan for transport, waste, energy, industry, forestry and agriculture and an adaptation plan for key climate impacts affecting Senegal, such as coastal erosion, declining agriculture, fishing, and livestock, risks to public health/biodiversity, and urban flooding. The NDC forecasts two emissions reduction scenarios: one accomplished with domestic resources (unconditional) and the other accomplished with a combination of domestic resources and foreign assistance (conditional). The unconditional scenario calls for a 5 percent reduction by 2025 and 7 percent by 2030, compared to business as usual. The conditional scenario calls for a 23 percent reduction by 2025 and a 29 percent reduction by 2030, compared to business as usual. Biodiversity is included in the adaptation plan of the NDC. The GOS has not formally instituted a net-zero carbon emissions policy. Senegal does not provide regulatory incentives or other policies to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, or other desirable ecological benefits. Senegal’s NDC addresses economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions, including private sector emissions. However, the NDC does not disaggregate public and private sector emissions. Senior GOS climate officials in associated with the National Climate Change Committee have told Post that during the first half of 2022 an inter-ministerial committee will meet to validate a monitoring, reporting, and verification mechanism for emissions. Senegal’s NDC states that the country will meet either its unconditional or conditional emissions reduction targets primarily through four principal means: i) increasing carbon sequestration through improved agroforestry and forest management; ii) transitioning from highly polluting fuel oil to cleaner burning fuels in the energy sector, as well as energy efficiency improvements; iii) improving the management of solid and liquid wastes; and iv) improving industrial processes. Each of these activities involves private sector participation. However, the NDC does not include specific sectoral emissions reductions targets attributable to private sector actors. Bloomberg Markets ranks Senegal as the 13th most attractive market for energy transition investment among emerging markets and 40th globally: Climate Scope . 9. Corruption Senegalese law provides criminal penalties for corruption. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (OFNAC) has a mandate to enforce anti-corruption laws. In January 2020, OFNAC released overdue reports on its activities for 2017 and 2018 and swore in six new executive-level officials, bringing its managing board to a full complement for the first time in several years. A 2014 law requires the President, cabinet ministers, speaker and chief financial officer of the National Assembly, and managers of public funds more than one billion CFA francs (approximately $1.8 million) to disclose their assets to OFNAC. In 2020, all but one of these government officials complied with these disclosure requirements. The GOS has made limited progress in improving its anti-corruption efforts. The current administration has mounted corruption investigations against several public officials (primarily the President’s political rivals) and has secured several convictions. In July 2020, President Sall launched an initiative to enforce a requirement that cabinet members and other high-level officials disclose their assets and issued a report disclosing his own personal assets. The GOS has also taken steps to increase budget transparency in line with regional standards. Senegal ranked 73 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index. Notwithstanding Senegal’s positive reputation for corruption relative to regional peers, the government often did not enforce the law effectively, and some officials continued to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. Reports of corruption ranged from rent-seeking by bureaucrats involved in public approvals to opaque public procurement to corruption in the police and judiciary. Allegations of corruption against President Sall and his brother related to the development of oil and gas emerged in the press in 2019. While a subsequent investigation did not uncover wrong-doing, suspicions of high-level government corruption remain among many in civil society and the political opposition. Senegal’s financial intelligence unit, Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières (National Financial Information Processing Unit, CENTIF), is responsible for investigating money laundering and terrorist financing. CENTIF has broad authority to investigate suspicious financial transactions, including those of government officials. In February 2019, the regional FATF body – the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) – issued a Mutual Evaluation Report of Senegal’s anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CTF) performance, measured by FATF standards. Although GIABA found the GOS’s understanding of AML/CTF standards and risks adequate, it gave Senegal non-compliant or partially compliant ratings on 26 of FATF’s 40 AML/CTF legal standards. Senegal also received ten low ratings and one moderate rating on the FATF’s 11 indicators measuring efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation financing. Key weaknesses included: lack of domestic legislation implementing BCEAO AML/CTF directives; inadequate monitoring of nonprofits and non-financial professions, such as lawyers and accountants, who engage in financial transactions; inadequate inspections and sanctions of financial institutions; weak interagency cooperation; and poor AML/CTF capacity among police, judiciary, and customs. As a result, and in the absence of improvements, in February 2021, FATF added Senegal to its “gray list.” The GOS has committed to an action plan to address its deficiencies. It is important for U.S. companies to assess corruption risks and develop an effective compliance program to prevent corruption, including bribery. U.S. firms operating in Senegal can underscore to partners that they are subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and may seek legal counsel to ensure full compliance with anti-corruption laws. The U.S. Government seeks to level the global playing field for U.S. businesses by encouraging other countries to take steps to criminalize all corruption, including bribery of officials, and requiring governments to uphold their obligations under relevant international conventions. A U.S. firm that believes a competitor is using bribery to secure a contract may convey this to U.S. officials. Senegal is a signatory of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption but is not a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. Contact at the government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Mrs. Seynabou Ndiaye Diakhaté President Office National de Lutte Contre La Fraude et la Corruption (OFNAC) Lot 72-73, Cité Keur Gorgui à Mermoz-Pyrotechnie Telephone: 800 000 900 / +221 33 889 98 38 www.ofnac.sn Mr. Birahim Seck President Forum Civil40 Avenue Malick Sy (1er étage) – B.P. 28 554 – Dakar Telephone: +221 33 842 40 44 forumcivil@orange.sn / http://www.forumcivil.sn/ 10. Political and Security Environment Senegal has long been regarded as an anchor of stability in politically unstable West Africa. It is the only regional country that has never had a coup d’état. International observers assessed the February 2019 presidential election, in which President Sall won a second term, as free and fair, despite a few instances of campaign violence. Public protests occasionally spawn isolated incidents of violence when unions, opposition parties, merchants, or students demand better salaries, working conditions, or other benefits. The March 2021 arrest of opposition figure Ousmane Sonko on alleged rape charges led to several days of intense protests that spiraled into widespread riots and looting. The unrest, Senegal’s worst in decades, was fueled by pandemic-related hardship, particularly among the youth. According to press reports, 14 people died, hundreds were injured, and private businesses across the country were damaged. While a few local businesses were damaged, firms associated with France – historically targeted by some groups as relics of the colonial past — bore the brunt of the looting and property damage. Despite this bout of unrest, foreign investors largely remained confident in Senegal’s stability and economic rebound. Most observers agreed that strong private sector investment, facilitated by improvements to the business climate and better mobilization of capital, is needed to address youth employment. Years of declining violence in the Casamance region, home of a four-decade-old separatist conflict, ignited into a full military conflict between Senegal’s army and elements of the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) in March 2022. The Senegalese government indicated that the military operation would continue until MFDC resistance is eradicated, putting an end to the armed separatist movement. Security is a top priority for the government, which increased its defense and security budget by 92 percent between 2012 and 2017. The Armed Forces Ministry noted a 32 percent budget increase for the fiscal year 2021. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Senegal’s Labor Code, based on the French system, was last updated in 1997. The code retains a rigid approach that, according to some observers, favors social over economic goals. Rules relating to employment contracts, layoffs, and redundancy protections are some of the most stringent in the world, imposing high costs on businesses. However, labor law is not well-enforced, especially in the dominant informal sector. Acquiring work permits for expatriate staff is typically straightforward. Citizens from WAEMU member countries may work freely in Senegal. Senegal has an abundant supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, with a more limited supply of skilled workers in engineering and technical fields. While Senegal has one of the best higher educational systems in West Africa and produces a substantial pool of educated workers, limited job opportunities in Senegal lead many to emigrate. Relations between employees and employers are governed by the Labor Code, industry-wide collective bargaining agreements, company regulations, and individual employment contracts. The Code provides legal protection for women and children and prohibits forced or compulsory labor. It also establishes minimum standards for working age, working hours, and working conditions, and bars children from performing many dangerous jobs. Senegal ratified International Labor Organization Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor in 2000. The Code recognizes the right of workers to form and join trade unions. Any group of workers in a similar trade or profession may create a union, although formal approval by the Ministry of the Interior is required. The right to strike is recognized but sometimes restricted. The GOS has the authority to dissolve trade unions and requisition workers from private enterprises. Two powerful industry associations represent management’s interests: the National Council of Employers and the National Employers’ Association. The principal labor unions are the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers and the National Association of Senegalese Union Workers, a federation of independent labor unions. Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 44 percent of formal sector workers. Most workers, however, work in the informal sector, where labor rules are not enforced. Child labor remains a problem, particularly in the informal sector, mining, construction, transportation, domestic work, agriculture, and fishing, where labor regulations are rarely enforced. Despite some progress, Senegal still struggles with forced child begging. Tens of thousands of religious students (talibés) are enrolled in Koranic schools (daaras) where some are forced to beg to enrich teachers, a corruption of the intended lesson in humility. The GOS has made some progress in combatting these practices, but more progress is needed. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $25,051 Senegal GDP U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $114 U.S. FDI in Senegal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $0 Senegal FDI in United States Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 34.6% Total FDI in Senegal “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) in 2019 Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $4,688 100% Total Outward $949 100% France #1 $2,333 50% France #1 $409 43% Mauritius #2 $636 14% Mali #2 $129 14% Canada #3 $626 14% Cote d’Ivoire #3 $127 13% Nigeria #4 $200 4% India #4 $93 10% China #5 $180 4% Mauritius #5 $69 7% Data 14. Contact for More Information Aichatou Fall Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy, Route des Almadies, B.P. 49, Dakar, Senegal +221 33 879 4000 FallAX@state.gov Serbia Executive Summary Serbia’s investment climate has modestly improved in recent years, driven by macroeconomic reforms, financial stability, and fiscal discipline. Attracting foreign investment is an important priority for the government. In 2020, Serbia improved four places to number 44 on the World Bank’s Doing Business index. Serbia launched a new 30-month Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 2021. U.S. investors in Serbia are generally positive due to the country’s strategic location, well-educated and English-speaking labor force, competitive labor costs, generous investment incentives, and free-trade arrangements with the EU and other key markets. U.S. investors generally enjoy a level playing field. The U.S. Embassy in Belgrade often assists investors when issues arise, and Serbian leaders are responsive to investment concerns. In 2021, the United States and Serbia signed a new Investment Incentive Agreement that may facilitate opportunities in a variety of sectors. Challenges remain, particularly bureaucratic delays and corruption, as well as loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a large informal economy, and an inefficient judiciary. Political influence on the economy is also a concern; this issue was highlighted in January 2022 when the government abruptly withdrew licenses related to a major proposed lithium-mining project in response to public protests. The Serbian government has identified economic growth and job creation as top priorities and has passed significant reforms to labor law, construction permitting, inspections, public procurement, and privatization that have helped improve the business environment. If the government delivers on promised reforms during its EU accession process, business opportunities should continue to grow. Sectors that stand to benefit include agriculture and agro-processing, solid-waste management, sewage, environmental protection, information and communications technology (ICT), renewable energy, health care, mining, and manufacturing. In April 2021, Serbia adopted its first renewable energy law, which should contribute to scaling up renewable energy capacities. Companies and officials have noted that the adoption of reforms has sometimes outpaced implementation. Digitizing certain government functions (e.g., construction permitting, tax administration, and e-signatures) has not yet brought a dramatic improvement in processing times and may not be consistently implemented. The government is slowly making progress on resolving troubled SOEs, through bankruptcy or privatization actions where possible. The government plans to privatize 64 more companies and is also slowly reducing Serbia’s bloated public-sector workforce, mainly through attrition and hiring caps. Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 initially had a limited economic impact on Serbia, and the banking system remains well capitalized and liquid; but inflation, as well as energy and agricultural supply disruptions are likely if the war continues, despite Serbia’s refusal to join U.S. and EU sanctions on Russian entities. Public fear of price spikes and shortages initially led to sporadic panic buying at supermarkets and gas pumps, but fuel and other consumer goods have remained available. Russia continues to supply natural gas and crude oil to Serbia, but supplies are vulnerable due to heavy Russian influence in the sector and the potential effect of sanctions. Serbia’s trade with Russia is otherwise limited, but agricultural exports could suffer from contraction or loss of the Russian market due to sanctions and resulting financial and logistical barriers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 96 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/srb Global Innovation Index 2021 54 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M, historical stock positions) 2019 $149 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI is a priority for the Serbian government. The Law on Investments extends national treatment to foreign investors and prohibits discriminatory practices against them. The Law also allows the repatriation of profits and dividends, provides guarantees against expropriation, allows waivers of customs duty for equipment imported as capital in-kind, and enables foreign investors to qualify for government incentives. The government’s investment-promotion authority is the Development Agency of Serbia (Razvojna agencija Srbije – RAS: http://ras.gov.rs/ ). RAS offers a wide range of services, including support of direct investments, export promotion, and coordinating the implementation of investment projects. RAS serves as a one-stop-shop for both domestic and international companies. The government maintains a dialogue with businesses through associations such as the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce in Serbia, Foreign Investors’ Council (FIC), and Serbian Association of Managers (SAM). Serbia has attracted over $39 billion of foreign direct investment since 2007, according to RAS. Serbia’s strong FDI track-record is substantiated by international awards. The country was ranked at the top of the Financial Times’ FDI 2019 Europe list, based on the criteria of Greenfield investments relative to the size of economy (Financial Times, fDi Report 2020). Serbia was ranked first globally for the fourth consecutive year for creating the most FDI-related jobs per million inhabitants, according to “IBM Global Location Trends 2020”. The government prompted concerns about its commitment to the protection of foreign investors’ rights in 2022 when it halted a lithium-borate mining project which promised to become the country’s largest-ever foreign direct investment. In July 2021, multinational mining firm Rio Tinto committed $2.4 billion to developing a mine and processing plant at the Jadar deposit in western Serbia, which could potentially supply up to 10% of global lithium demand. However, the project became a lightning rod for criticism by environmental activists, resulting in months of public protests targeting Rio Tinto in period prior to Serbia’s national elections in April 2022. The government reacted by first delaying additional permits and then, in January 2022, withdrawing the spatial plan and revoking existing licenses for the project’s development. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own businesses and to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Serbia has no investment screening or approval mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any rules or regulations. For some business activities, licenses are required (e.g., financial institutions must be licensed by the National Bank of Serbia prior to registration). Licensing limitations apply to both domestic and foreign companies active in finance, energy, mining, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, tobacco, arms and military equipment, road transportation, customs processing, land development, electronic communications, auditing, waste management, and production and trade of hazardous chemicals. Serbian citizens and foreign investors enjoy full private-property ownership rights. Private entities can freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. By law, private companies compete equally with public enterprises in the market and for access to credit, supplies, licenses, and other aspects of doing business. Food and Agriculture: Foreign citizens and foreign companies are prohibited from owning agricultural land in Serbia. However, foreign ownership restrictions on farmland do not apply to companies registered in Serbia, even if the company is foreign-owned. Unofficial estimates suggest that Serbian subsidiaries of foreign companies own some 20,000 hectares of farmland in the country. EU citizens are exempt from this ban, although they may buy up to two hectares of agricultural land under certain conditions: they must permanently reside in the municipality where the land is located for at least 10 years, practice farming on the land in question for at least three years, and own adequate agriculture machinery and equipment. Defense: The Law on Investments adopted in 2015 ended discriminatory practices that prevented foreign companies from establishing companies in the production and trade of arms (for example, the defense industry) or in specific areas of the country. Further liberalization of investment in the defense industry continued via a new Law on the Production and Trade of Arms and Ammunition, adopted in May 2018. The law enables total foreign ownership of up to 49% in seven SOEs, collectively referred to as the “Defense Industry of Serbia,” so long as no single foreign shareholder exceeds 15% ownership. The law also cancels limitations on foreign ownership for arms and ammunition manufacturers. Serbia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. The following is a sample of articles that have appeared in 2021 and early 2022 providing reviews of concerns related to investment policy. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/serbians-are-protesting-against-lithium-mine-and-new-draft-laws-which-allegedly-benefit-business/ https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/serbia-chinese-project-raises-concern-over-tender-procedure-transparency-corruption-ngos-warn/ In addition, the Environmental Justice Atlas ( https://ejatlas.org/ ) listed several investments that resulted or could result in environmental degradation in Serbia, including investments in the city of Pancevo, relocation of Vreoci village in the Kolubara coal basin, the highway that killed a 600-year-old oak tree, pollution of Veliki Backi channel, municipal waste in the city of Kraljevo, the potential impact of the planned Buk Bjela hydropower plant on Tara River canyon, and remediation of Palic lake. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, seven procedures and seven days are required to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company in Serbia. This is fewer days but more procedures than the average for Europe and Central Asia. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign parent company establishing a subsidiary in Serbia must translate its corporate documents into Serbian. Under the Business Registration Law, the Serbian Business Registers Agency (SBRA) oversees company registration. SBRA’s website (in Serbian) is www.apr.gov.rs/home.1435.html . All entities applying for incorporation with SBRA can use a single application form and are not required to have signatures notarized. Companies in Serbia can open and maintain bank accounts in foreign currency, although they must also have an account in Serbian dinars (RSD). The minimum capital requirement is symbolic at RSD 100 (less than $1) for limited liability companies, rising to RSD 3 million (approximately $29,900) for a joint stock company. Some foreign companies have difficulties opening bank accounts due to a provision in the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing that requires companies to disclose their ultimate owner. A single-window registration process enables companies that register with SBRA to obtain a tax-registration number (poreski identifikacioni broj – PIB) and health-insurance number with registration. In addition, companies must register employees with the Pension Fund at the Fund’s premises. Since December 2017, the Labor Law requires employers to register new employees before their first day at work; previously, the deadline was registration within 15 days of employment. These amendments represent an attempt by the government to decrease the gray labor market by empowering labor inspectors to penalize employers if they find unregistered workers. Pursuant to the Law on Accounting, companies in Serbia are classified as micro, small, medium, and large, depending on the number of employees, operating revenues, and value of assets. The Development Agency of Serbia supports direct investment and promotes exports. It also implements projects aimed at improving competitiveness, supporting economic development, and supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs. More information is available at http://ras.gov.rs . Serbia’s business-facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of both men and women when a registering company, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index. The government declared 2017-2027 a “Decade of Entrepreneurship” with special programs to support women’s entrepreneurship. Since 2017, the government has provided approximately $1 million annually in grants to support women’s innovative entrepreneurship. The Serbian government neither promotes nor restricts outward direct investment. Restrictions on short-term capital transactions (i.e., portfolio investments) were lifted in April 2018 through amendments to the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations for short-term securities issued or purchased by EU countries and international financial institutions. Prior to this, residents of Serbia were not allowed to purchase foreign short-term securities, and foreigners were not allowed to purchase short-term securities in Serbia. There are no restrictions on payments related to long-term securities. Capital markets are not fully liberalized for individuals. Citizens of Serbia are not allowed to keep accounts abroad except in exceptional situations (such as work or study abroad) listed in the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations. 3. Legal Regime The harmonization of Serbian with EU law in accordance with the EU’s acquis communautaire has created a more favorable legal environment; however, Serbia still needs to address problems with transparency in the development, adoption, and implementation of regulations. The website of Serbia’s unicameral legislature, the National Assembly ( www.parlament.gov.rs ), provides a list of both proposed and adopted legislation. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required for publicly listed companies and financial institutions, as well as for the following large legal entities, regardless of whether their securities trade in a public market: insurance companies, financial leasing lessors, voluntary pension funds and their management companies, investment funds and their management companies, stock exchanges, securities brokerages, and factoring companies. Additionally, IFRS standards are required for all foreign companies whose securities trade on any public market. On January 1, 2021, Serbia introduced environmental, social, and governance disclosure (non-financial reporting) with the new Law on Accounting (Article 37), which obliges all companies with over 500 employees in Serbia to publish non-financial reports. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or the private sector. The Law on Ultimate Beneficial Owners Central Registry (2018) introduced a single, public, online database maintained by the Serbian Business Registers Agency (www.apr.gov.rs), which contains information on natural persons who are ultimate beneficial owners of the companies. Nationally, there are 37 different inspectorates operating within 12 different ministries that do not significantly cooperate or coordinate with one another, despite the existence of the Coordination Commission for Inspection Supervision. The administrative court is the legal entity that considers appeals on inspection decisions. Serbia’s public finances are relatively transparent. The government regularly publishes information related to public debt on the website www.javnidug.gov.rs . Serbia is not a member of the World Trade Organization or the EU. Serbia became an EU candidate country and opened formal accession negotiations in 2012. Details on EU-Serbia relations and the status of Serbia’s accession process are available through the EU Delegation to Serbia at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/serbia_en/ . The WTO accepted Serbia’s application for accession on February 15, 2005, and Serbia currently has observer status. Serbia has a civil law system. The National Assembly codifies laws. The courts have sole authority to interpret legislation, with the exception of so-called “authentic interpretation” which is reserved for the legislature. According to the Constitution, Serbia’s judicial system is legally independent of the executive branch; but in practice, significant obstacles prevent judicial independence. Serbia’s judicial system distinguishes between commercial courts and courts of general jurisdiction. Commercial courts adjudicate commercial matters, including disputes involving business organizations, business contracts, foreign investment, foreign trade, maritime law, aeronautical law, bankruptcy, civil economic offenses, intellectual property rights, and misdemeanors committed by commercial legal entities. When only one of the parties is a business and the other is not, the courts of general civil jurisdiction decide the dispute. The Appellate Commercial Court rules on appeals of commercial courts’ decisions. The average waiting time to bring a case to trial in the Commercial Courts is high. Case processing time for commercial litigation is in line with EU averages, but the law is inconsistently applied. In general, contract enforcement is weak, and the courts responsible for enforcing property rights are overburdened. Under Serbian commercial law, the Law on Obligations regulates contractual relations (also known as the Law on Contracts and Torts). Civil Procedure Law governs contract-related disputes. Serbian law need not be the governing law of a contract entered into in Serbia. The Law on Resolution of Disputes with the Regulations of Other Countries, as well as bilateral agreements, regulates procedures for recognition of foreign court decisions. Significant laws for investment, business activities, and foreign companies in Serbia include: the Law on Investments, the Law on Foreign Trade, the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations, the Law on Markets of Securities and other Financial Instruments, the Law on Registration of Commercial Entities, the Law on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, the Law on Construction and Planning, the Company Law, the Law on Financial Leasing, the Law on Concessions, and Regulations on Conditions for Establishing and Operation of Foreign Representative Offices in Serbia. Other relevant laws include: the Law on Value Added Tax, the Law on Income Tax, the Law on Corporate Profit Tax, the Law on Real Estate Tax, and the Law on Mandatory Social Contributions. Laws and regulations on portfolio investments are on the Securities Commission’s website at https://www.sec.gov.rs/index.php/en/. Laws and regulations related to payment operations can be found on the National Bank of Serbia’s website at https://nbs.rs/sr_RS/drugi-nivo-navigacije/propisi/ . Serbia lacks a primary or “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. However, numerous Serbian firms that provide legal and other professional services publish comprehensive information for foreign investors, including PricewaterhouseCoopers . The Commission for the Protection of Competition is responsible for competition-related concerns and in principle implements the law as an independent agency reporting directly to the National Assembly. In some cases, companies have reported perceptions that political factors have influenced the Commission’s decision-making. Annual reports of the Commission’s actions are published online at http://www.kzk.gov.rs/izvestaji . Laws and regulations related to market competition are available at http://www.kzk.gov.rs/en/zakon-2 . A foreign investor is guaranteed national treatment, which means that any legal entity or natural person investing in Serbia enjoys full legal security and protection equal to those of local entities. A stake held by a foreign investor or a company with a foreign investment cannot be the subject of expropriation. The contribution of a foreign investor may be in the form of convertible foreign currency, contribution in kind, intellectual property rights, and securities. Serbia’s Law on Expropriation authorizes expropriations that have been determined to be in the public interest and for a compensation in the form of similar property or cash approximating the current market value of the expropriated property. The local municipal court is authorized to intervene and decide the level of compensation if there is no mutually agreed resolution within two months of the expropriation order. The Law on Investment provides safeguards against arbitrary government expropriation of investments. There have been no cases of expropriation of foreign investments in Serbia since the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2003. There are, however, outstanding claims against Serbia related to property nationalized under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was dissolved in 1992. The 2014 Law on Restitution of Property and Compensation applies to property seized by the government since March 9, 1945, shortly before the end of World War II, and includes special coverage for victims of the Holocaust, who are authorized to reclaim property confiscated by Nazi occupation forces. Heirless property left by victims of the Holocaust is subject to a separate law, which was approved in February 2016. The deadline for filing restitution applications was March 1, 2014. The Agency for Restitution received 75,414 property claims, and the adjudication process is still ongoing. Information about the Agency for Restitution, restitution procedures and the status of cases is available on its website at www.restitucija.gov.rs/eng/index.php . Serbia’s bankruptcy law is consistent with international standards. According to the Bankruptcy Law, its goal is to provide compensation to creditors via the sale of the assets of a debtor company. The law stipulates automatic bankruptcy for legal entities whose accounts have been blocked for more than three years, and it allows debtors and creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The law ensures a faster and more equitable settlement of creditors’ claims, lowers costs, and clarifies rules regarding the role of bankruptcy trustees and creditors’ councils. Foreign creditors have the same rights as Serbian creditors with respect to initiating or participating in bankruptcy proceedings. Claims in foreign currency are calculated in dinars at the dinar exchange rate on the date the bankruptcy proceeding commenced. Serbia’s Criminal Code criminalizes intentionally causing bankruptcy, as well as fraud in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business index ranked Serbia 41 out of 190 economies with regards to resolving insolvency, with an average time of two years needed to resolve insolvency and average cost of 20% of the estate. The recovery rate was estimated at 34.5 cents on the dollar. 4. Industrial Policies The 2015 Law on Investment defines Serbia’s investment incentives program. Incentives are available to both domestic and foreign investors. The law established a Council for Economic Development and the Development Agency of Serbia (RAS). The Council has oversight responsibility for the investment incentives program, while RAS plays a more operational role. The level of available subsidies for investment projects is determined under the Decree on Defining Conditions for Approving Incentives in Attracting Direct Investments, approved for the current year in January 2019. Investors are obliged to provide 25% of eligible costs from their own resources. For investment projects valued at €50-100 million, subsidies are limited to 25% of the total investment, falling to 17% for projects over €100 million. Under certain conditions, large companies can gain support for up to 50% of eligible costs for investment projects, medium-sized companies up to 60%, and small companies up to 70%. The Decree provides funds for investment projects in manufacturing and customer service centers. For manufacturing investments, state subsidies are available for any company that invests the equivalent of €100,000 and employs at least 10 persons in a “devastated area.” For service center investments, subsidies are available for companies investing the equivalent of €150,000 and creating at least 15 new jobs anywhere in the country. The required minimum investment and employment levels for subsidies increase on a sliding scale according to the level of development of the investment location. For each project in a devastated area, the state will pay the investor 40% of the eligible gross salary costs for newly employed people in the two-year period after reaching employment commitments, up to the equivalent of €7,000 per new job; the subsidy declines to 20% of eligible costs up to €3,000 per job in the most developed regions. For labor-intensive projects that create more than 200 new jobs, the government can approve additional incentives. The state will also provide subsidies for the purchase of fixed assets, again on a sliding scale based on the level of development at the investment location. The subsidy reaches 30% of eligible asset costs in a devastated area and declines to 10% in the most developed areas of Serbia. The total amount of subsidies granted cannot exceed the amount allowed under Serbia’s EU-compliant state aid regulations. The government may sell land for construction at a below-market price in support of an investment project of national importance. There is a separate Decree on Defining Conditions for Approving Incentives in Attracting Direct Investments in Production of Food Products also approved in January 2019 with almost identical conditions to those mentioned above. The only difference is that state subsidies are available for any company that invests the equivalent of the minimum €2 million and employs at least 30 new employees regardless of the level of the municipality development. For projects investing over €20 million in the fixed assets, the government will approve additional incentives. The government also approved a Decree on Conditions and Methods of Attracting Direct Investments in the Hotel Accommodation Service Sector (2019, amended February 2022), making similar state subsidies available for any company that invests a minimum of €2 million equivalent and employs at least 30 new employees in the sector. For investment projects valued at up to €30 million, subsidies are limited to 20% of the of the eligible costs of investment in fixed assets, falling to 10% for projects over €30 million. Details on all three decrees are available at: http://www.ras.gov.rs/en/invest-in-serbia/why-serbia/financial-benefits-and-incentives/ and https://privreda.gov.rs/dokumenta/propisi/uredbe . In May 2021, the government approved a Decree on Defining Conditions for Approving Incentives in Attracting Direct Investments in the Automation of Existing Capacities in the Food Processing Industry. The decree aims to improve the productivity of beneficiaries, increasing the number of domestic subcontractors and increasing the use of raw materials of domestic origin. The measure prescribes almost identical conditions to those of the decree for the hotel sector, with the difference that state subsidies are available for the investment projects in food processing automation equivalent to a minimum of €1 million. Expanding the focus on automation, in February 2022, the government approved a Decree on Defining Conditions for Approving Incentives in Attracting Direct Investments in the Automation of Existing Capacities and Innovation, targeting high added value industries. Under this measure, funds can be allocated for the implementation of investment projects for automation and/or introduction of innovation equivalent to a minimum of €5 million. The Decree lists high value-added industries as follows: chemicals and chemical products; basic pharmaceutical products and medications; electrical equipment; computers, electronic, and optical products; unmentioned machines and unmentioned equipment; motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; production of other means of transport; and rubber and plastic products. In addition to 25% of eligible costs in tangible and intangible assets for investments in automation, the beneficiary is eligible for an additional 5% of eligible costs of investment in tangible and intangible assets if the project forms a supply chain, and for an additional 5% of eligible costs if the project develops a new final product with a high degree of production complexity. The Decrees on Attracting Direct Investments also establish criteria for granting local incentives to investments of importance for local development. At the provincial level, the government of the Vojvodina region offers investment incentives similar to those described above. The main difference is that the program is implemented by the Development Agency of Vojvodina, which was established in February 2017 as the successor to the Vojvodina Investment Promotion Agency (VIP) ( http://rav.org.rs/business-environment/incentives ). Local municipalities may sell land for construction at below-market rates for investments that promote local economic development. Other major incentives at the local level include exemptions or deductions on land-related fees and other local fees. Serbia’s tax laws offer several incentives to new investors. The corporate profit tax rate is a flat 15%, one of the lowest in the region. Non-resident investors are taxed only on income earned in Serbia. A ten-year tax holiday on corporate profits is available for investors who hire more than 100 workers and invest more than RSD 1 billion ($10 million). The tax holiday begins once the company starts making a profit. According to the December 2021 Decree on Film Incentives, both domestic and foreign filmmakers are eligible to apply for a refund of 25% of qualifying costs. For film projects over €5 million, the government offers a refund of up to 30% of qualifying costs. The 2022 budget for film incentives is $15.7 million. Employment incentives allow payroll tax deductions for persons registered with the National Employment Service for at least six months continuously. The incentives currently in place are valid from the moment of employment until December 31, 2022: 1-9 new jobs: 65% deduction 10-99 new jobs: 70% deduction 100+ new jobs: 75% deduction The Serbian Innovation Fund provides various granting opportunities for young entrepreneurs and start-ups, including mini grants for development of technological innovation, matching grants for commercialization of research and development, and a collaborative grant scheme for joint R&D projects creating new products and services. These grants are mainly available for companies established in Serbia with majority private Serbian ownership. Some subsidized loans for start-ups, entrepreneurs, and SMEs are available through the state-owned Fund for Development and various ministries, and part are issued through the Development Agency of Serbia. Detailed information is available at https://fondzarazvoj.gov.rs (Serbian only). These loans are available to foreign-owned companies registered in Serbia, provided the Serbian registered company has not recorded losses in the previous two years. The government guarantees or jointly finances foreign direct commercial investment projects. The government participates as a minority partner in financed infrastructure projects. Serbia adopted its first renewable energy law as part of the reform of its energy-sector legal framework in April 2021. This was a significant advance in meeting EU accession requirements related to renewable energy and should contribute to scaling up renewable-sourced capacities. The Law on the Use of Renewable Energy Sources enables a shift from the previous feed-in-tariff scheme to a market-based support scheme envisaging feed-in premiums (FiP) obtained on auctions based on quotas for projects above 500 kW and 3 MW for wind. Feed-in tariffs will remain for small projects; however, their amount will be determined at auctions. The implementation details are expected to be elaborated in secondary legislation. The guaranteed supplier is responsible for balancing costs until a liquid intraday market is established. Once the regulator announces that the intraday market is liquid, renewable-energy producers with plants above 500 kW capacity (above 3 MW for wind) will have responsibility for balancing costs in accordance with the relevant legislation. In November 2021, the government prescribed a 400 MW quota in the market premium system for wind farms of 3 MW and above. Based on this decree and prescribed methodologies, later that month the Serbian Energy Regulatory Agency (AERS) set a maximum purchase price in auctions for electricity produced from wind farms with an approved capacity of 3 MW and above at 5.57 euro cents/kWh. Although the first auction was expected to occur at the begging of 2022, it is still pending. Most secondary legislation is pending. The new legislation also introduced the so-called prosumer concept or self-consumption (consumers that generate their own energy), including jointly acting self-consumption and energy communities. In August 2021, Serbia adopted a decree on self-consumption, enabling a net-metering scheme for households or housing communities and a net billing scheme for all other self-consumers. In September 2021, the Ministry of Mining and Energy published a call for the program to subsidize households to install solar panels and become self-consumers. Serbia maintains 15 designated customs-free zones: in Apatin, Belgrade, two zones in Kragujevac, Krusevac, Novi Sad, Pirot, Priboj, Sabac, Smederevo, Svilajnac, Subotica, Uzice, Vranje, and Zrenjanin. The zones, established under the 2006 Law on Free Zones, are intended to attract investment by providing tax-free areas for company operations. Businesses operating in the zones qualify for benefits including unlimited duty-free imports and exports, preferential customs treatment, and tax relief in the form of value-added tax exclusions. Companies operating within a customs-free zone are subject to the same laws and regulations as other businesses in Serbia except for their tax privileges. Goods entering or leaving the zones must be reported to customs authorities, and payments must be made in accordance with regulations on hard-currency payments. Goods delivered from customs-free zones into other areas of Serbia are subject to customs duties and tax unless they contain a minimum of 50% Serbian inputs. Earnings and revenues generated within customs-free zones may be transferred freely to any country, including Serbia, without prior approval, and are not subject to taxes, duties, or fees. In 2020 (the most recent year for which complete information is available), there were a total of 215 companies operating in Serbia’s free economic zones, of which 173 were domestically owned and 42 foreign-owned. The number of companies increased by 11 or by 5% compared to 2019. The companies employed a total of 40,031 workers, an increase of 6% compared to 2019. Total exports from free zones exceeded $2 billion in 2020, approximately 12% of Serbia’s total exports. Total imports into the zones were approximately $1.4 billion, or 5% of total imports. Total annual turnover in the free zones in 2020 stood at some $4.3 billion, a 14% drop compared to 2019, mostly due to the impact of COVID-19. The largest drop came in the Kragujevac zone, where total turnover fell by 30% year-on-year, mostly due to production cuts at the Fiat auto manufacturing plant. Free trade zone Subotica became the leader in turnover, accounting for 20% of overall turnover of free trade zones. Many companies operating in free zones are producers of automobile parts and other industrial goods, including large multinationals like Fiat, Michelin, Tigar Tyres, Ametek, DAD Draxlmaier Automotive, Mei Ta Europe, Sevojno Copper Mill, Continental, Yazaki, Lear, PKC, Siemens, Swarovski, and Panasonic. The Serbian government does not mandate local employment or have onerous visa, residence, or work permitting requirements for foreign nationals. It does not impose conditions for foreign investors to receive permission to invest. The government has no policy of forced localization to oblige foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology. Similarly, the government does not force foreign investors to establish or maintain a specified amount of data storage within the country. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. With the Data Protection Law passed in November 2018, Serbia has implemented the requirements of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The law entered into force in 2019 after a nine-month transition period. Some experts have criticized the law as unclear, citing provisions transcribed from EU law that include mechanisms that do not yet exist in Serbia’s domestic legal system, which leads to questions regarding the law’s implementation. Other experts have argued that with the law, Serbia has enacted a high personal data-protection standard, and that defects will be resolved over time. The Decree on Conditions for Approving Incentives in Attracting Direct Investments defines conditions and limitations for investment incentives, such as maintaining investments at a specified location for up to five years. Investors are obliged to maintain newly engaged employees for up to five years. Potential investors who want to use state grants must provide a minimum of 25% of eligible costs from their own resources. The deadline for implementation of investment projects and the creation of new workplaces is three years from the date of applying for state grants. This deadline may be extended for up to five years based on a written justification. Beneficiaries are obliged to provide a bank guarantee as security for the eventual return of received funds. In case of non-fulfilment of the conditions provided for in the state grant contract, the Ministry of Economy and the Council for Economic Development may decide to terminate the contract at any time; however, authorities have generally shown flexibility in favor of investors. Conditions are applied equally to both domestic and foreign investors. 5. Protection of Property Rights Serbia has an adequate body of laws for the protection of property rights, but enforcement through the judicial system can be very slow. A multitude of factors can complicate property titles: restitution claims, unlicensed and illegal construction, limitation of property rights to rights of use, outright title fraud, and other issues. Investors are cautioned to investigate all property title issues on land intended for investment projects. During the country’s socialist years, owners of nationalized land became users of the land and acquired rights of use that, until 2003, could not be freely sold or transferred. In 2015, the government adopted a law that allows for property usage rights to be converted into ownership rights with payment of a market-based fee. In 2015, the government implemented new amendments to the Law on Planning and Construction that separated the issuance of permits from conversion issues. These amendments cut the administrative deadline for issuing construction permits for a potential investor to 30 days and introduced a one-stop shop for electronic construction permits. Serbia’s real-property registration system is based on a municipal cadaster and land books. Serbia has the basis for an organized real-estate cadaster and property-title system. However, legalizing tens of thousands of structures built over the past twenty years without proper licenses is an enormous challenge, as an estimated two million buildings in the country are not registered in the cadaster, of which almost half are residential properties. According to some estimates, one-third of buildings were not built in accordance with legal requirements. In 2015, the government adopted a new Law on Legalization, which simplified the registration process. Since then, however, only slightly more than 230,000 decisions on legalization have been issued. The deadline set by the law for legalization of all buildings constructed without proper permits is November 2023. Serbia is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to all major WIPO treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. While Serbia is not a member of the WTO, the Serbian government has taken steps to adhere to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Serbia’s IPR laws include TRIPS-compliant provisions and are enforced by courts and administrative authorities. Serbia’s IPR legislation is modern and compliant with both EU and international standards. According to the EU’s 2021 Progress Report, Serbia has a good level of preparation in the area of IPR to align with the EU acquis. Procedures for registration of industrial property rights and deposit of works and authorship with the Serbian Intellectual Property Office are straightforward and similar to procedures in most European countries. Relevant information is available at: http://www.zis.gov.rs/home.59.html . Enforcement of IPR remains haphazard but is roughly consistent with levels in neighboring countries. The government has a Permanent Coordination Body for IPR enforcement activities with participation from the tax administration, police, customs, and several state inspection services. Cooperation with the Special Department for High-Technology Crime has resulted in court decisions to impose penalties in test cases against online traders and counterfeits. The Public Procurement Law requires bidders to affirm that they have ownership of any IPR utilized in fulfilling a public procurement contract. Although trade in counterfeit goods – particularly athletic footwear and other clothing – declined in recent years as the government increased enforcement efforts, the overall amount of seized counterfeit and pirated goods increased in 2020. Upon seizure, authorities cannot destroy the goods without formal instructions from the rightsholders, who are billed for the storage and destruction of the counterfeit goods. Rightsholders are encouraged to register their IPR with the Customs Office by filling out an application for surveillance measures. Inspectorates and customs authorities’ actions against IPR violations are relatively fast. However, enforcement of IPR in the court system often lasts up to two years in the first instance. Proceedings improved after the creation of semi-specialized IPR courts in 2015, according to the Serbia’s non-governmental Foreign Investors’ Council. The Serbian Intellectual Property Office continues to train judges on IPR to enable more timely court decisions. Digital IPR theft is not common, but many digital brands are not properly protected, and there is a risk of trademark-squatting. 6. Financial Sector Serbia welcomes both domestic and foreign portfolio investments and regulates them efficiently. The government removed most restrictions on short-term portfolio investments in April 2018. Residents of Serbia, both companies and persons, are now allowed to purchase foreign short-term securities issued by EU residents and EU countries, and by international financial organizations who have EU countries in their membership. Banks registered in Serbia can also purchase short-term securities issued by OECD countries. Foreigners may only purchase short-term securities in Serbia if they have residency and/or headquarters in EU countries. Payments related to long-term securities have no restriction. In 2021, Serbia recorded net inflows of $1.6 billion in portfolio investment, according to the National Bank of Serbia. Analysts have explained this inflow mostly as a result of Serbia’s issuance of Eurobonds. The government regularly issues bonds to finance its budget deficit, including short-term, dinar-denominated T-bills, and dinar-denominated, euro-indexed government bonds. The total value of government debt securities issued on the domestic market reached $12.1 billion in December 2021, with 79% in dinars and 21% in euros. In addition, Serbia issued a total value of €7.3 billion of Eurobonds on the international market. The share of dinar denominated securities held by non-residents was 18%, which was equal to $1.8 billion at the end of December 2021. Total Serbian government-issued debt instruments on the domestic and international markets stood at $20 billion in December 2021. Serbia’s international credit ratings have improved since 2019 but remain below investment grade. In March 2021, Moody’s Investors Service upgraded Serbia’s long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings from Ba3 to Ba2 while adjusting its outlook from positive to stable. In December 2021, S&P improved Serbia’s outlook from stable to positive and confirmed its BB+ rating. In February 2022, Fitch confirmed Serbia’s credit as BB+ with a stable outlook. Serbia’s equity and bond markets are underdeveloped. Corporate securities and government bonds are traded on the Belgrade Stock Exchange (BSE) ( www.belex.rs ). Of 990 companies listed on the exchange, shares of fewer than 100 companies are traded regularly (more than once a week). Total annual turnover on the BSE in 2021 was $380 million, a decrease of 16% from the prior year. Trading volumes have declined from a peak of $2.7 billion in 2007. The Securities Commission, established in 1995, regulates the Serbian securities market. The Commission also supervises investment funds in accordance with the Investment Funds Law. As of February 2022, 19 registered investment funds operate in Serbia: http://www.sec.gov.rs/index.php/en/public-registers-of-information/register-of-investment-funds . Market terms determine credit allocation. In December 2021, the total volume of issued loans in the financial sector stood at $30 billion. Average interest rates, while, decreasing, are still higher than the EU average. The business community cites tight credit policies and expensive commercial borrowing for all but the largest corporations as impediments to business expansion. Around 62% of all lending is denominated in euros, 0.1% in Swiss francs, and 0.2% in U.S. dollars, all of which provide lower rates, but also shift exchange-rate risk to borrowers. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the domestic market. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII, and do not place restrictions on payments or transfers for current international transactions. Hostile takeovers are extremely rare in Serbia. The Law on Takeover of Shareholding Companies regulates defense mechanisms. Frequently after privatization, the new strategic owners of formerly state-controlled companies have sought to buy out minority shareholders. Serbian SMEs often do not access credit, instead turning to friends or family when they need investment and operational funds. Only a few corporate and municipal bonds have been issued, and the financial market is not well developed. In April 2020, the government amended corporate-bond issuance legislation to increase companies’ access to financing in response to COVID-19’s economic impact. The amendments cut the timeline for issuing corporate bonds from 77 to 17 days and the price to issue a corporate bond from $88,000 to $11,000. This measure was in force until November 2020, during which time the total value of corporate bonds issued was $503 million, of which $440 million were issued by state-owned companies. Media reported that the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) purchased $275 million worth of the bonds. NBS regulates the banking sector. Foreign banks may establish operations in Serbia, and foreigners may freely open both local currency and hard currency non-resident accounts. The banking sector comprises 91% of financial sector assets. As of November 2021, consolidation had reduced the sector to 23 banks with total assets of $49 billion (about 85% of GDP), with 89% of the market held by foreign-owned banks. The top ten banks, with country of ownership and estimated assets, are Banca Intesa (Italy, $7.6 billion in assets); OTP (Hungary, $6.4 billion); UniCredit (Italy, $5.3 billion); Komercijalna Banka (recently sold to Slovenia’s NLB Bank, $4.8 billion); Raiffeisen (Austria, $4.3 billion); Postanska Stedionica (Serbian government, $3.3 billion); Erste Bank (Austria, $3.1 billion) AIK Banka Nis (Serbia, $2.2 billion); Eurobank EFG (Greece, $2.1 billion); and Naša AIK Banka (Serbia – formerly Sberbank, $1.9 billion). The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions against Russian banks, including Sberbank, on February 25, 2022, due to Russian aggression in Ukraine and prohibited corresponding relations with these banks. Serbia has not joined U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia. Still, these banks are likely to face significant obstacles in their operations in Serbia, including the inability to transfer assets to and from foreign countries. Until the imposition of banking sanctions, Sberbank’s Serbian affiliate was the only significant Russian bank in Serbia. Its sale to Serbia’s privately owned Agroindustrial Commercial Bank (AIK Bank) was completed March 1, 2022, and it changed its name to Naša AIK Banka. Only two Russian banks are now operating in Serbia: API Bank and Expobank, with combined assets of approximately $300 million, constituting less than one percent of Serbia’s banking-sector assets. For more information, see: https://www.nbs.rs/sr_RS/finansijske-institucije/banke/bilans-stanja/ https://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/NBS_site/documents/kontrola-banaka/kvartalni_izvestaj_IV_19.pdf The IMF assessed in its December 2021 report on Serbia’s Policy Coordination Instrument that the banking system has been stable owing to adequate capitalization, high liquidity, and profitability. As of June 2021, banks’ capital adequacy was stable at 22.2%, well above the regulatory minimum of 8%, while asset quality is improving. Banks’ profitability remains robust with return-on-assets and return-on-equity ratios of 1.2% and 7.4% respectively in August 2021. From 2015 to December 2021, non-performing loans (NPLs) declined from 21.6% to 3.5 % of total Serbian loan portfolios, and NPLs are fully provisioned. Significant foreign-exchange risks remain, as 67% of all outstanding loans are indexed to foreign currencies, primarily the euro. In 2019, the government adopted a law that protected consumers who had taken mortgage loans denominated in Swiss francs by converting them into euros. Banks and the state shared losses resulting from the accompanying reduction of outstanding principal and interest balances. This law enabled borrowers to continue servicing debt on more favorable terms. Serbia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate many sectors of the economy, including energy, transportation, utilities, telecommunications, infrastructure, mining, and natural resource extraction. Serbia’s Agency for Business Registers (ABR) maintains a publicly available database of all SOEs on its website at https://pretraga2.apr.gov.rs/EvidencijaPSRS . As of March 2022, according to this database, 266 SOEs are in normal operation, 42 are in bankruptcy, and two are in liquidation. However, the most recently available ABR annual report (pp. 29-32) recorded 545 SOEs employing a total of more than 114,000 people, or approximately 4% of the formal workforce and accounting for 6% of total business sector revenues. (The report for 2021 is expected to be published in June 2022.) At the beginning of 2022, 64 SOEs with a total of nearly 25,000 employees were slated to be resolved through privatization or bankruptcy, down from 90 companies in early 2019. The government has launched a privatization tendering process for two of those companies, and the Ministry of Economy is preparing 10-15 additional companies for divestiture (see Privatization Program, below). The Law on Public Enterprises, adopted in February 2016, defines a public enterprise as “an enterprise pursuing an activity of common interest, founded by the State or Autonomous Province or a local government unit.” The law also defines “strategically important companies” as those in which the state has at least a 25% ownership share. The law aimed to introduce responsible corporate management in public companies and strengthen supervision over public companies’ management. The law requires that directors of public companies be selected through a public application procedure and that they not hold any political party positions while serving. The law also requires that a portion of public companies’ profits be paid directly to the state, provincial, or local government budget. However, Transparency International Serbia analyzed implementation of the law in an ad hoc report in September 2017 and concluded that almost none of these requirements have been implemented, including the professionalization and transparency of management. The full report can be seen at: http://transparentnost.org.rs/images/publikacije/Political_influence_on_public_enterprises_and_media.pdf SOEs can purchase goods from the private sector and foreign firms under the Public Procurement Law. For example, foreign companies regularly win public tenders for the construction of roads and other infrastructure projects. Under the Public Procurement Law, a buyer must select a domestic supplier if the domestic supplier’s price is no more than 5% higher than a foreign supplier’s price. The Public Procurement Office, an independent state body, supervises implementation of the Law on Public Procurement. Serbia, not yet a member of the WTO, is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises have the same access to financing, land, and raw materials as SOEs, as well as the same tax burden and rebate policies. However, the IMF estimated that in 2014, SOEs enjoyed benefits amounting to approximately 2% of GDP. The IMF has recommended that the government phase out support for SOEs. In 2016, Serbia committed to significantly reduce the fiscal cost of SOEs by curtailing direct and indirect subsidies, strictly limiting the issuance of new guarantees, and enhancing the accountability, transparency, and monitoring of SOEs. This goal remains a key element of Serbia’s current IMF program. The government decreased the level of quasi-fiscal support (issuing of new guarantees) from $860 million in 2016 to $110 million in 2020. In the latest IMF program, launched in June 2021, the IMF stressed the importance of advancing the SOE reform agenda, including improving corporate governance. Serbia, with EBRD support, adopted an action plan to implement a new ownership and governance strategy for SOEs in June 2021. The Action Plan is posted online at: https://privreda.gov.rs/lat/dokumenta/propisi/strategije/akcioni-plan-za-sprovodjenje-strategije-drzavnog-vlasnistva-i . From 2001 through 2015, the Serbian government privatized 3,047 SOEs. The government cancelled 646 of these privatizations, alleging that investors did not meet contractual obligations related to employment and investment. According to the Privatization Law, the deadline for the privatization of the 646 companies in the Privatization Agency’s portfolio was December 31, 2015. However, 62 companies were still unresolved as of February 2022. These companies include health spas, veterinary stations, and companies located in Kosovo, among others. Most significantly, the Ministry of Economy must still resolve several large, strategically important SOEs including the Resavica coal mine in east-central Serbia, chemical company MSK Kikinda, and others. In many cases, closing these companies would do serious damage to their local economies, where they are key employers. The government continues to engage foreign investors in the privatization process, inviting them to submit bids, participate in auctions, and purchase company shares. Invitations for privatization and bidding are published on the Ministry of Economy website at http://www.priv.rs/Naslovna . In December 2018, France-based Vinci Airports took over operation of Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla Airport under a 25-year concession agreement. According to official statements, Vinci had offered €501 million to manage the airport and €732 million in investment, as well as an annual fee of up to €16 million. At the end of 2020, the government completed the sale of the country’s second largest bank, Komercijalna Banka, to Slovenia’s NLB bank. The government sold the petrochemical company Petrohemija to the Russian majority-owned petroleum company Naftna Industrija Serbije (NIS) in December 2021. The government has started the process of converting the country’s largest SOE, the power utility EPS, into a joint share-holding company as recommended by the IMF, but the IMF has not recommended fully privatizing the company, and the government has no plans to do so. The government plans to privatize three companies in 2022: river shipping company Jugoslovensko rečno brodarstvo, Hotel Slavija in Belgrade, and transport company Lasta. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and Corporate Social Responsibility are relatively new concepts in Serbia, and until recently many Serbian companies viewed them mainly as public-relations tools. The Serbian government has no formal mechanism in place to encourage companies to follow a due-diligence approach to RBC. The Council for Philanthropy held its first session in September 2018. The Council, chaired by the Prime Minister and founded with grant support from USAID, aims to use public policy to create a more encouraging environment for corporate giving in Serbia. Members of the Council include ten government ministers, the Belgrade Mayor, the Director of the Tax Administration, several NGOs, and 29 member companies as of April 2020. Donors have pointed to issues that have a negative impact on philanthropy, including a lack of tax incentives for donors, no available VAT exemptions for in-kind donations, the lack of a system for monitoring donations from companies, and the absence of official data on charities. The USAID project “Framework for Giving Activity,” which recently ended, strengthened philanthropy and charitable giving in Serbia. The activity focused on improving the legal and policy framework related to charitable giving to make giving easier and more transparent. According to the 2019 World Giving Index published by the Charities Aid Foundation, Serbia was ranked 123rd out of 126 countries listed in a 10-year aggregate survey of number of people who donate to charity or participate in volunteer work: HYPERLINK “https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/caf_wgi_10th_edition_report_2712a_web_101019.pdf” https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/caf_wgi_10th_edition_report_2712a_web_101019.pdf The Law on Public Procurement allows the government to ask bidders to fulfill additional conditions, especially those related to social and environmental issues, and allows the government to consider criteria such as environmental protection and social impact when evaluating bids. The UN Development Program’s Global Compact initiative has 118 participants in Serbia and has organized a number of educational events intended to strengthen RBC capacity in Serbia. The list of members is available at: http://www.ungc.rs/srb/clanovi . Several local organizations, such as the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), the Foreign Investors’ Council, and the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (PKS) promote the concept of RBC among the Serbian business community and the public. PKS presents a national award to Socially Responsible Businesses. The Trag Foundation supports the Serbian Philanthropy Forum, a networking body for donors (including numerous corporate actors). The NGO Smart Kolektiv provides consulting services in RBC and established in 2016, with USAID support, an RBC Index which is the first national platform for assessing responsible business conduct in Serbia. The Responsible Business Forum Serbia is a network of socially responsible companies that contribute to the development of the community, stimulating the development of corporate social responsibility and the establishment of firm and lasting socially responsible practices in the business sector. It was established in 2008 by 14 leading companies in Serbia. More information about the Forum is available at: https://odgovornoposlovanje.rs/vesti . Multinational companies often bring international best practices in RBC, with U.S. companies among the most active. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many large companies donated money and goods to help government combat the crisis; more info is available at: https://odgovornoposlovanje.rs/vesti . Allegations of labor-rights violations are uncommon in Serbia. However, in December 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for an investigation into forced labor at the construction site for the Chinese-owned LingLong tire-manufacturing plant in Zrenjanin, in northern Serbia. Media and anti-trafficking NGOs reported that approximately 500 Vietnamese workers were living in poor accommodations and lacked access to sufficient food and water, their passports having been confiscated upon arrival. According to a 2016 OECD study on small and medium enterprises, Serbia has no national strategy that targets environmental policy toward small and medium-size enterprises. See http://www.oecd.org/education/sme-policy-index-western-balkans-and-turkey-2016-9789264254473-en.htm . Serbia’s 2011 Corporate Law introduced contemporary corporate standards, but business associations indicate that implementation is inconsistent. The government does not maintain a national point of contact for OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, including OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. The government does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Serbia has a private sector security industry but is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Serbia is also not a supporter of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct Association. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Serbia is a signatory to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. In June 2015, Serbia submitted its intended Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC, committing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 9.8% by 2030 compared to 1990. Serbia has developed a national Low-Carbon Development Strategy as part of a larger Climate Strategy and Action Plan. Although the plan has gone through the public review process, it has never been formally adopted, and the NDCs have not been ratified. The Ministry of Mining and Energy is developing a separate National Energy and Climate Plan that will define Serbia’s 2030 goals for energy efficiency, energy security, and decarbonization, along with implementation plans. At the COP-26 climate conference in Glasgow in November 2021, Serbia joined three international agreements targeting specific high-emitting sectors: those related to clean power, road transport, and hydrogen. Serbia also joined the Declaration on Forests and Land Use, which addresses the role of forest ecosystems in mitigating and adapting to climate change, as well as the Global Methane Pledge. Serbia adopted its first Law on Climate Change in March 2021, with the aim to establish a monitoring, reporting and verification framework, a system to inventory greenhouse gas emissions, climate policies that insert low carbon strategies into the relevant institutional and legal framework, and procedures for setting up a national system for policies, measures, and projections. The climate-change law will set up the framework for the EU’s cap-and-trade emissions-trading system. In December 2021, Serbia opened so-called Cluster 4 in the EU accession negotiations, which includes environment and climate change. Serbia also prepared the National Air Quality Strategy, currently pending government approval, that will address regulating greenhouse gas emissions, including from coal-fired thermal power plants. The action plan for the air quality strategy requires aggressive mitigation based on the most conservative modeling scenario in the next 15 years to meet Serbia’s emissions-reduction goals. Serbia has adopted a National Strategy on Forest Development, under which it is planning to increase the national forest coverage from its current 30% of total area to 42% by 2050. Serbia has also adopted a National Strategy of Water Management for water conservation reform, which sets out long-term directions for water management at the national, regional, and local levels through 2034. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management has an early-warning system for extreme weather events and provides rehabilitation after weather emergencies. According to BloombergNEF’s Climatescope, which evaluates and ranks conditions for energy transition investment, Serbia ranks number 37 among emerging markets and number 66 of 107 countries globally ( https://global-climatescope.org/markets/rs/ ). 9. Corruption Surveys consistently show that corruption remains an issue of concern in many areas. Serbia’s global ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index declined to 96 in 2021 from 91 in 2020. In Serbia’s EU accession process, the European Commission has repeatedly noted that Serbia must do more to fight corruption. Arrests and investigations on corruption charges generally focus on low or mid-level technocrats, and corruption-related trials are typically drawn out and subject to a lengthy appeal process. Serbia is a signatory to the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption, and it has ratified the Council’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the UN Convention against Corruption. Serbia also is a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), a peer-monitoring organization that provides peer-based assessments of members’ anti-corruption efforts. Twenty-five local governments in Serbia participated in USAID’s anti-corruption program, which ended in 2022, and introduced and increased transparency measures in their processes. The government has worked to bring its legal framework for preventing and combating corruption in line with EU norms. A dedicated state body, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, plays a preventative role in fighting corruption, while dedicated Anticorruption Police and prosecutors investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. The Criminal Code specifies numerous bases for prosecution of corruption and economic offenses, including but not limited to giving or accepting a bribe, abuse of office, abuse of a monopoly, malfeasance in public procurement, abuse of economic authority, fraud in service, and embezzlement. However, a new National Strategy for Fighting Corruption to replace the expired 2013-2018 version has yet to be drafted – a concern frequently raised by the European Commission and Serbia’s Anti-Corruption Council, an advisory body to the government. In 2018, Serbia’s Parliament strengthened anti-corruption laws through three pieces of legislation: The Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of State Organs in Suppressing Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Corruption for the first time established specialized anti-corruption prosecution units and police and judicial departments, mandated the use of task forces, and introduced liaison officers and financial forensic experts. The Law on Asset Forfeiture was amended to expand coverage to new criminal offenses, and amendments to the Criminal Code made corruption offenses easier to prosecute. Following these legal changes, specialized anti-corruption departments started operations in March 2018 in Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kraljevo, and Niš to prosecute offenders who have committed crimes of corruption valued at less than RSD 200 million ($2 million). Cases valued above this level are handled by the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office. Serbia’s Law on the Prevention of Corruption, which went into effect in 2020, requires income and asset disclosure by appointed or elected officials, and it regulates conflicts of interest for public officials. Disclosures cover assets of officials, spouses, and dependent children. Declarations should be publicly available on the website of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, and failures to file or to fully disclose income and assets are subject to administrative and/or criminal sanctions. Significant changes to assets or income must be reported annually, upon departure from office, and for a period of two years after separation. Independent media reported cases where high-level officials allegedly did not comply with asset disclosure laws by failing to report assets. The Law on Public Procurement, adopted in 2020, introduced mandatory use of an online public-procurement portal. While the portal noticeably improved transparency and procedures, independent watchdogs reported that more than half of completed public procurement tenders since the implementation of the new law have resulted in only one offer, which indicated continued issues with transparency of public procurement procedures or the establishment of non-competitive procurement processes that favor certain vendors. Serbian authorities do not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct related to corruption or other matters, but some professional associations (e.g., for attorneys, engineers, and doctors) enforce codes of conduct for their members. Private companies often have internal controls, ethics codes, or compliance programs designed to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Large companies often have internal programs, especially in industries such as tobacco, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and industries regularly involved in public procurement. In 2020, the Parliament adopted a Parliamentary Code of Conduct, aimed at addressing GRECO recommendations regarding conflict of interest and other issues of ethics among parliamentarians. However, the code lacks meaningful independent enforcement mechanisms. Serbian law does not provide protection for non-governmental organizations involved in investigating corruption. However, the criminal procedure code provides witness protection measures, and Serbia enacted a Whistleblower Protection Law in June 2015, under which individuals can report corruption in companies and government agencies and receive court protection from retaliation by their employers. Whistleblowers in high profile cases against state-owned enterprises have claimed they do not receive adequate protections under the existing law. U.S. firms interested in doing business or investing in Serbia are advised to perform due diligence before concluding business deals. Legal audits generally are consistent with international standards, using information gathered from public books, the register of fixed assets, the court register, the statistical register, as well as from the firm itself, chambers, and other sources. The U.S. Commercial Service in Belgrade can provide U.S. companies with background information on companies and individuals via the International Company Profile (ICP) service. An ICP provides information about a local company or entity, its financial standing, and reputation in the business community, and includes a site visit to the local company and a confidential interview with the company management. For more information, contact the local office at belgrade@trade.gov and visit www.export.gov/serbia . The U.S. Commercial Service also maintains lists of international consulting firms in Belgrade, local consulting firms, experienced professionals, and corporate/commercial law offices, in addition to its export promotion and advocacy services for U.S. business. Some U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Serbia. Corruption appears most pervasive in cases involving public procurement, natural resource extraction, government-owned property, and political influence/pressure on the judiciary and prosecutors. The Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative maintains a website with updates about anti-corruption efforts in Serbia and the region: http://rai-see.org/ . Corruption may be reported to officers at any police station. If dedicated anti-corruption law-enforcement personnel are not available, the officer in charge is to contact Anti-Corruption Police personnel to report to the location so that a complaint may be filed. Serbian Corruption Prevention Agency Carice Milice 1, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia +381 (0) 11 4149 100 office@acas.rs Transparency International Serbia Transparentnost Srbija Palmoticeva 27, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia +381 (0) 11 303 38 27 ts@transparentnost.org.rs 10. Political and Security Environment Since October 2000, Serbia has had democratically elected governments that have committed publicly to supporting regional stability and security. Governments, however, frequently call early elections at the local and national level, which often leave politicians and elected officials focused on the next campaign. Serbia held parliamentary elections in June 2020. President Aleksandar Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won an overwhelming majority, with more than 60 percent of the vote and obtained 188 of 250 parliamentary seats. Vucic and his party benefitted from prolific media access unavailable to other parties, the effectively blurred distinction between campaign and official activities, and the inability of other parties to campaign during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) concluded that, aside from state-of-emergency restrictions, candidates were able to campaign, and fundamental freedoms of expression and assembly were respected. However, the advantage enjoyed by the governing party, the decision of some opposition parties to boycott the elections, and limited policy debate narrowed the choice and information available to voters, according to ODIHR. The government has made EU membership a primary goal. Serbia has opened 22 of 35 chapters in the EU accession acquis and provisionally closed two. After a long delay in Serbia’s accession process the European Commission in 2021 recommended opening a new “cluster” of accession chapters, pointing to some progress in judicial and rule-of-law reform. Protests are not uncommon, particularly in urban areas, and most protests are peaceful. In late 2021 and in early 2022, environmental activists staged regular nationwide protests that occasionally blocked highways or resulted in a few minor incidents of violence, although police response to these protests was restrained. Past protests, particularly in Belgrade, were at times violent, with protestors attempting to enter the parliament building during protests against COVID lockdown measures in 2020. Press noted that in addition to concerns regarding COVID, many of the demonstrators during these protests were also protesting political corruption. Although previous years had seen some assaults against participants in LGBTQI events in Serbia, following its seventh successive incident-free Pride Parade, Serbia was selected to host EuroPride in 2022. Although this indicates some confidence that a recurrence of wide-scale violence against Serbia’s LGBTQI community is unlikely, discrimination and physical attacks continue. Criminal activity linked to transnational organized crime groups is a regular phenomenon in Serbia. Sport hooliganism is often associated with organized crime, and violent hooliganism remains a concern at matches of rival soccer teams within Serbia. A significant police operation in January 2021 against a major organized crime group linked to Belgrade’s Partizan football club resulted in the arrest of the group’s leader, who was suspected of multiple crimes. Several ultra-nationalist organizations in Serbia have harassed Serbian political leaders, local NGOs, minority groups, migrants, and media outlets considered to be pro-Western, but these incidents are infrequent. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In the last quarter of 2021, according to Serbia’s Statistics Office, the country had a total active labor force of approximately 3.23 million people, of which approximately 2.9 million were employed (55.6% men and 44.4% women) and 316,700 were unemployed. The formal employment rate was 50%, and the informal employment rate was 13.7%, with most of the total informally employed in services and agriculture. Unemployment in the last quarter of 2021 stood at 9.8%. Youth unemployment remained relatively high at 28.7%. Emigration of younger high-skilled working-age citizens is a serious concern, and the share of youth in the total population drops from year to year. The leading sector for employment is manufacturing, followed by government and public administration, agriculture and forestry, fishery, trade, transport, construction, and hospitality services. The socioeconomic status of women is significantly worse than that of men. The largest number of discrimination complaints relate to disability, age, and gender. According to the Statistics Office, the wage gap between women and men is 8.8% in favor of men. Other reports showed women’s career advancement was slower, and that women were underrepresented in most professions and faced discrimination related to parental leave. The presence of foreign workers is increasing, especially in construction. After the initial success of the 2018 Law on Simplified Work Engagement on Seasonal Jobs in Selected Areas, in the field of Agriculture, the government is considering expanding the scope of law from agriculture to other areas, including forestry and fisheries, construction, tourism and hospitality, and domestic work. NGOs and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have raised concerns that the proposed amendments could result in stripping migrant and seasonal workers of labor rights, including the right to form unions and mechanisms for redress of abuse. Demand for IT experts (web developers, programmers, designers) is significantly higher than supply. The National Employment Service (NES) administers various employment support schemes, including new employment, apprenticeship, and re-training programs. For more details see http://www.ras.gov.rs/en/invest-in-serbia/why-serbia/financial-benefits-and-incentives/ and http://rav.org.rs/business-environment/incentives . Serbia’s labor costs are relatively low compared to European averages. In December 2021, the average net take-home salary was approximately $693 per month, while the minimum wage was approximately $324 per month. Investors routinely cite low labor costs, as well as a highly educated, multilingual workforce, as advantages to doing business in Serbia, while availability of skilled labor is limited by large-scale emigration. Approximately 57% of the workforce has completed secondary education, while some 26% have completed higher education. Amendments to the Labor Law in 2014 simplified procedures for hiring and dismissing workers and changed rules for collective bargaining and the extension of collective agreements to non-negotiating parties. The law also changed severance payment requirements, so that the employer pays severance based on the years of service with that specific employer, rather than on the employee’s total years of employment, as was the case previously. Employees may be hired for up to 24 months on a provisional basis before it is required to engage them permanently. The official mechanism for tripartite labor dialogue is the Social and Economic Council, an independent body with representatives of the government, the Serbian Association of Employers, and trade unions. The Council is authorized to conclude an umbrella collective agreement at the national level covering basic employment conditions for all companies in Serbia. Additional information about the Council is available at http://www.socijalnoekonomskisavet.rs/ . Serbia has ratified all eight ILO core conventions, including Forced Labor (No. 29), Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (No. 87), Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98), Equal Remuneration (No. 100), Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105), Discrimination (No. 111), Minimum Age (No. 138), and Worst Forms of Child Labor (No. 182). The Department of Labor’s report on the World Forms of Child Labor in Serbia can be found online at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/serbia . The Staff Leasing Law, which came into force in 2020, regulates leased employees’ status, the staffing agencies, and recipient employers. Under the law, employers may hire up to 10% of their workforce with fixed-term contracts through an agency, with no limit on those with indefinite-term employment contracts. 14. Contact for More Information Dejan Gajic Economic Specialist, U.S. Embassy Bulevar kneza Aleksandra Karadjordjevica 92 11040 Belgrade, Serbia +381-11-706-4271 SerbiaInvestment@state.gov Seychelles Executive Summary Seychelles is an archipelagic nation of 115 islands located off the eastern coast of Africa in the Indian Ocean. The majority of the country’s 99,202 inhabitants live on three most-populated islands of Mahé, Praslin, and La Digue. Seychelles gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1976, at which time the population lived at near subsistence level. With a GDP of $1.1 billion as of 2021, Seychelles has the highest GDP per capita in Africa at $10,764. Although the World Bank has designated Seychelles as a high-income country since 2015, the country’s wealth is not evenly distributed. According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report for 2020, the richest 10 percent of Seychellois earn 40 percent of the total income. Seychelles’ main economic activities are tourism and fishing, and the country aspires to be a financial hub. Seychelles experienced a coup d’etat in 1977, just a year after independence, which brought to power a one-party socialist government. Multiparty democracy was restored in 1993 after the adoption of a new constitution, but the United Seychelles Party (USP) continued to hold power until October 2020, when the opposition coalition Seychellois Democratic Union(Linyon Demokratik Seselwa, or LDS) won both the presidential and legislative elections. This opposition victory ushered in the first democratic transition of power in the country’s history. LDS holds 25 of the 35 assembly seats and includes four main parties: the Seychelles National Party (SNP); the Lalyans Seselwa (Seychellois Alliance); the Seychelles Party for Social Justice and Democracy (SPSD); and the Seychelles United Party (SUP). The former ruling United Seychelles Party (USP currently holds 10 seats in the National Assembly. The next presidential and legislative elections will be held in 2025. Heavy reliance on the tourism industry makes the overall economy vulnerable to external shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2021, the Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS) announced that January to November 2020 tourism revenues decreased by 78 percent. Tourism-related contributions to GDP fell from 22.3 percent in 2019 to 15.5 percent in 2020, per the National Bureau of Statistics. The CBS estimated that the economy contracted 11.3 percent in 2020 compared to 3 percent growth in 2019. Following the reopening of borders in March 2021, tourism in Seychelles gradually picked up, with the country registering a total of 182,849 tourist arrivals for the January to December 2021 period, compared to 114,858 visitors for the same period in 2020 and 384,224 visitors in 2019. According to the IMF, real GDP grew by 6.9 percent in 2021, compared to a decline of 12.9 percent in 2020. The Seychelles National Bureau of Statistics reported a year-on-year percentage increase of 21.7 percent in real GDP for the third quarter of 2021 as compared to the same quarter in 2020. The main drivers of this increase were the accommodation industry, transport and storage, and the information and communication sector. The IMF forecasted that real GDP would increase by 7.7 percent in 2022. In 2019, the government was on track to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50 percent by the end of 2021. According to the Ministry of Finance, however, by the end of 2020 the debt-to-GDP ratio had spiked to 99.4 percent. As was the case during the global economic crisis in 2008, the government turned to the IMF for support. In July 2021, Seychellois authorities and the IMF reached an agreement on economic and structural policies that would be supported by $107 million under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for the duration of 28 months. Seychellois authorities and the IMF agreed to reduce fiscal and debt vulnerabilities while promoting economic growth and protecting the environment and the most vulnerable segments of the population. Governance and transparency commitments included the completion of an audit of COVID-19 emergency spending and related procurement, and improvements in the AML/CFT regime. In November 2021, the IMF assessed that the Seychellois government was making impressive progress in implementing the IMF-supported program and restoring macroeconomic balances. Per the Ministry of Finance, by December 2021, the total government and government-guaranteed debt represented about 74 percent of GDP. Despite the government’s attempts to diversify the economy, activity remained focused on fishing and tourism. However, Seychelles’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which spans 1.3 million square kilometers, is a potential source of untapped oil reserves and represents potential business opportunities for U.S. companies. Seychelles also has a small but growing offshore financial sector. There is also potential for U.S. investment in renewable energy, as Seychelles seeks to reduce its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels while preserving its natural environment. The Seychellois government planned to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions by 26.4 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 value by undertaking reforms in its energy, refrigeration and air conditioning, transport, and waste sectors. Authorities planned to use solar and wind energy to increase the share of renewable energy production from 5 to 15 percent by 2030. While Seychelles welcomes foreign investment though the Seychelles Investment Act, related regulations restrict foreign investment in a number of sectors where local businesses are active, including artisanal fishing, small boat charters, taxi driving, and scuba diving instruction. The country’s investment policies encourage the development of Seychelles’ natural resources, improvements in infrastructure, and increases to productivity levels, but stress that these changes must be implemented in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner. Seychelles puts a premium on maintaining its unique ecosystems and screens all potential investment projects to ensure that any economic, social, or industrial benefits will not compromise the country’s international reputation for environmental stewardship. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 23 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $575 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,200 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Seychelles has a favorable attitude toward most foreign direct investment, though the government reserves certain types of business activities for domestic investors only. The Reserved Economic Activity Policy, enacted in April 2020, provides a detailed list of the types of business in which only Seychellois may invest and is available here: https://www.investinseychelles.com/component/edocman/reserved-economic-activities-policy,-april-2020/download . The Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations also provide details on the limitations on foreign equity for certain types of businesses, as well as a list of economic activities in which need-based investment may be allowed by a foreigner: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/syc_e/WTACCSYC61_LEG_4.pdf . In June 2015, Seychelles implemented a moratorium on the construction of large hotels (25 rooms and above) on the country’s inner islands. This includes the three most-populated islands of Mahé, Praslin, and La Digue. The Seychelles Investment Board (SIB) is the national gateway agency for the promotion and facilitation of investment in Seychelles. The government’s objective is to promote economic and commercial relationships to diversify the economy, as well as to sustain its tourism and fishing industries, which are currently the main drivers of economic growth. The SIB periodically organizes sector-specific meetings with investors and hosts a National Business Forum every two years to engage with the private sector. The 2010 Seychelles Investment Act and 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations govern foreign direct investment (FDI) in Seychelles. These documents are available at: https://www.investinseychelles.com/investors-guide/investor-resources/policies-guidelines-acts . Since the implementation of IMF reforms after the 2008 financial crisis, Seychelles has successfully attracted FDI. According to the Central Bank of Seychelles, gross FDI inflows amounted to $149 million in 2020, representing a decrease of $105 million compared to 2019. This decrease is principally due to investments that were put on hold because of the pandemic. The SIB advises foreign investors on the laws, regulations, and procedures for their activities in Seychelles. The 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations and the 2020 Reserved Economic Activity Policy list the economic activities in which only Seychellois can invest. This regulation is currently being converted into a list of foreign activities in which foreigners can invest to allow for increased transparency and better governance. In the 2021 budget speech, the minister of finance highlighted that the current government aims to protect Seychellois businesses and plans to review the categories in which only Seychellois can invest. This review was still ongoing as of March 2022. Seychelles also places financial limits on foreign equity in certain types of resident companies. These limits are detailed in the 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations. The regulations also provide a list of economic activities in which need-based foreign investment may be allowed. While the SIB and the government encourage foreign investors to collaborate with a local partner, there is no formal requirement to do so. The SIB, in cooperation with other government agencies, also assists in screening potential investment projects. For a business to operate, investors must apply for a license from the Seychelles Licensing Authority. In 2012, the government also established an Investment Appeal Panel to provide a mechanism for investors to challenge the government’s decisions regarding existing or proposed investments in Seychelles. More information is available in the 2010 Seychelles Investment Act: https://www.investinseychelles.com/component/edocman/seychelles-investment-act-2010/download?Itemid=0 . To date, Seychelles has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Seychelles became the 161st WTO member in April 2015. The investment policy review of Seychelles by UNCTAD was published in November 2020: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1238/investment-policy-review-of-seychelles . The Seychellois government is committed to improving the business environment through public-private partnerships (PPP) to upgrade the country’s infrastructure. In March 2021, the cabinet of ministers approved the migration from the 2017 version of the harmonized system of classification to the 2022 version. The government is also currently reviewing the 1972 Companies Act. On average, it takes eight days to obtain a certificate of incorporation and 14 days to obtain a business license. Information on registering a business in Seychelles can be obtained on the SIB website: https://www.investinseychelles.com/investors-guide/start-your-business . Companies, including those that are foreign owned, can register business names online through the following portal: http://www.sqa.sc/BizRegistration/WebBusinessRegsitration.aspx . However, parts of the registration process, such as payments of fees, still must be completed in person. A full digitalization of the registration process is currently ongoing and is expected to be completed in June 2022. Since December 2021, applications for business licenses can be completed online at https://eservice.egov.sc/eGateway/homepage.aspx. SIB also provides post-investment support in the form of consultancy services regarding the laws, regulations, guidelines, minimum operational standards, and land acquisition. This service is provided free of charge and is available to every investor, regardless of the size or nature of the business. The Enterprise Seychelles Agency (ESA) is responsible for providing business development services to improve the performance of micro, small, and medium enterprises in Seychelles. Services provided by ESA include business planning, training, marketing expertise, and identification of business opportunities for SMEs. The Seychellois government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. However, it does not restrict local investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Although the Seychellois government has made considerable efforts to liberalize the economy, the country continues to suffer from overregulation. There is a lack of transparency in the privatization and allocation of government-owned land and businesses. To promote transparency in the public procurement system, Seychelles’ National Tender Board publishes all tenders both on its website (http://www.ntb.sc) and in local newspapers. The board publicizes contracts that have been awarded and includes the names of successful bidders and bid amounts. The government has also set up a Procurement Oversight Unit, which serves as a public procurement policy and monitoring body (http://www.pou.gov.sc/ ). Following the 2016 election victory of the opposition Seychelles Democratic Union (LDS) in winning a majority in the National Assembly for the first time in 40 years, significant procedural changes were implemented. The government also took several measures to combat corruption and nepotism, including establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission; more frequently publishing special audits by the Auditor General’s Office of questionable government transactions; and appointing opposition supporters to various boards of national organizations and important positions. Since 2017, the government has held budget preparation focus group discussions, including key stakeholders such as the business community and civil society organizations. Additionally, there has been considerably more legislative debate on the annual government budget. Increased budget debate and scrutiny has continued following the October 2020 presidential and legislative elections, in which the LDS won the presidency for the first time in the country’s history, and again won a majority in the National Assembly. Every government agency is called to the National Assembly to answer questions on their proposed budgets, as well as general questions related to their organizations. Proposed laws and regulations, as well as final laws, are published in the official gazette on a monthly basis and are available online at https://www.gazette.sc/ . Regulatory transparency improved with the balance of power between the opposition-controlled National Assembly and ruling party-controlled presidency following the 2016 elections. This included several new laws, such as the Freedom of Information Act. In 2018, the access to information law came into force. In 2019, the government appointed a chief executive officer for the Seychelles Information Commission, and appointed information officers in all ministries and departments. The law makes provisions for how citizens may access government information that is not classified as sensitive for security and defense reasons. It also makes provisions for how agencies should respond to requests, mandates proactive disclosure and a duty to assist requestors, and defines information that is deemed classified for security and defense. In 2020, the government also published a manual for using the Freedom of Information Act and accessing information. Additionally, ministries are now required to submit white papers and consult with stakeholders before legislation is adopted. Seychelles’ budget is easily accessible to the general public: http://www.finance.gov.sc/national-budget/47 . Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal and the enacted budget, provide a substantially full picture of Seychelles’ planned expenditures and revenue streams. Publicly available budgets included expenditures broken down by ministry and revenues broken down by source and type. Information on debt obligations is also readily available. In 2019, the government also included a fiscal risk statement, which identified substantial fiscal risks emanating from public enterprises in Seychelles. The statement also contains details on explicit and contingent liabilities, and is available at https://bit.ly/3ivTzDq In its 2022 budget, the government announced a bill for the oversight of public enterprises to be presented to the National Assembly in early 2022. This legislation will establish new obligations for public enterprises and will help the Public Enterprise Monitoring Commission (PEMC) be more efficient and rigorous in its supervisory function. The PEMC oversees 32 state-owned enterprises, which have either been established using public financial resources, or of which the government is a significant shareholder. Other measures to improve transparency and accountability announced by the Seychellois government in 2021 include: (a) a framework for better transparency and justice related to taxes paid by charitable organizations on private sector donations; (b) review of the Income and Non-Monetary Benefits Tax Act to bring more transparency to salaries that are not taxed; (c) implementation of a Results Based Management (RBM) framework to inculcate principles of efficiency, transparency and accountability in public service; and (d) creation of a Public Sector Commission to ensure better transparency and to remove any political agenda in the appointment of senior executives in the public sector. In November 2021, the Seychellois government also announced the establishment of a high-level domestic regulations (HLDRC) committee to represent the public sector and members of the National Assembly. This committee will discuss ways of improving the transparency and efficiency of licensing administrative procedures, especially with regards to business with foreign investors. Seychelles has signed trade agreements with regional blocs such as COMESA, SADC, and the EU. Seychelles has also signed the COMESA- East African Community (EAC)-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) and AfCFTA. Seychelles ratified the AfCFTA in June 2021 and announced its withdrawal from the TFTA in September 2021 to focus its resources on the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA started during the TFTA negotiations but moved at a faster pace and covers a larger number of African countries (54), including the 28 countries negotiating the TFTA. In January 2019, four eastern and southern African (ESA) countries, including Seychelles, signed the UK-ESA Economic Partnership Agreement, which safeguards trade preferences currently enjoyed under iEPA post Brexit. Seychelles joined the WTO in 2015, becoming the 161st member. Seychelles does notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In 2016, Seychelles ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Further details on Seychelles’ TFA notifications to the WTO can be found at https://tfadatabase.org/members/seychelles . Seychelles’ legal system is a blend of English common law, the Napoleonic Code, and customary law. Civil matters, such as contracts and torts, are governed by the Civil Code of Seychelles, which is derived from the French Napoleonic Code. However, the company law and criminal laws are based on British law. In both civil and criminal matters, the procedural rules derive from British law. Seychelles does not maintain a specialized commercial court. Judgments of foreign courts are governed by Section 3 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1961. Under the current government, the perception among Seychellois is that the judiciary is no longer influenced by the executive. In its 2022 budget, the government announced that it will start working with the judiciary to introduce a separate court that will deal specifically with commercial cases. The Seychellois government established the SIB (Seychelles Investment Bureau, https://www.investinseychelles.com/ ) as a one-stop-shop for all matters relating to business and investment in Seychelles. The SIB’s main functions are to promote investment and facilitate investment processes within the country’s administrative and legal framework. The SIB, in cooperation with other government agencies, also assists in screening potential investment projects. It has also implemented a digital customer relations management system to follow up on applications submitted by investors. In 2021, the government announced that it is working on a digital system to integrate functions of all government agencies involved in the administration of online business applications to further improve ease of doing business. The government is keen to ensure that business activities are not conducted at the expense of Seychelles’ natural environment. For a business to operate, investors must apply for a license from the Seychelles Licensing Authority (http://www.sla.gov.sc/ ). The government established an Investment Appeal Panel in 2012 to provide an appeal mechanism for investors to challenge the government’s decisions regarding investments or proposed investments in Seychelles. The SIB only reviews competition cases initiated by other government authorities, private sector entities, or investors. Current legislation does not empower SIB to review on its own accord all transactions for competition-related concerns. The Fair-Trading Commission (http://ftc.sc/ ) is responsible for investigating competition-related concerns. Such investigations may be initiated by the Commission or may be carried out following a complaint. In November 2021, the government announced new measures to promote competition in the financial services sector: (a) modernization of the National Payments System; (b) a new fintech strategy; and (c) the introduction of financial consumer protection legislation, which will give the central bank and financial services authority more power to protect the interests of financial consumers. This new law will likely be complemented by other actions to enhance competition, such as reducing or eliminating costs for switching providers, eliminating abusive practices aimed at keeping customers tied to one particular service provider, and educating the public on its rights. The government also announced measures to promote competition in the telecommunication sector. A new bill that will be presented to the National Assembly in 2022 will address competition issues and establish legal provisions to enable consumers to switch operators. The 1978 Lands Acquisition Act, last amended in 1990, states that when the government takes possession of property, it must pay prompt and full compensation for the property. The government may expropriate property in cases of public interest or for public safety. Following the 1977 socialist takeover, the government engaged in expropriation of land for redistribution or for use by the state. With the return of a multi-party-political system in 1993, the government compensated some of those who had lost land to expropriation/redistribution in the late 1970s. In 2017, Seychelles established the Land Compensation Tribunal to investigate cases where compulsory land acquisition was made by the government without adequate compensation. Seychellois whose land was taken by the government from 1977 to 1993 had until December 2020 to make their claims. The Land Compensation Tribunal completed judgments in all its cases in 2021. The Land Compensation Tribunal also works in close collaboration with the Truth Reconciliation and National Unity Commission (TRNUC), which is investigating cases of human rights abuses prior to and after the 1977 takeover. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both the Land Compensation Tribunal and the TRNUC have not been able to function as planned. The TRNUC’s work is further hindered by an insufficient budget. Illegal land acquisition by the government also forms part of the TRNUC’s mandate. In October 2021, the Seychellois government also introduced a program to return land that was forcibly acquired between 1977 and 1993. This program applies to land acquired through the 1977 Lands Acquisition Act or purchased under a private agreement. The measure is based on the principle that land acquired by the government either compulsorily or through private agreement for a public purpose or in the national interest and which is still undeveloped and not earmarked by the government to be utilized in the public interest or for a public purpose will be considered for return to the original owner or his executor or heir. More information on this is available here: https://bit.ly/3IOIGY3 . U.S. Embassy Port Louis does not anticipate major expropriations in the near future, nor is it aware of any pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1978, Seychelles joined the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). In February 2020, Seychelles deposited its instrument of accession to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), which entered into force in May 2020. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Seychelles has been a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States since April 1978. Seychelles has signed five bilateral investment treaties (BITs), of which two are currently in force: the 2007 France-Seychelles BIT and the 1998 Cyprus-Seychelles BIT. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is aware of at least one investor-government dispute in the current reporting period. The dispute involves the operation of a large hotel resort by a company with U.S. shareholders, in which the Seychellois government also owned a small percentage share. In 2008, the Seychellois government sought to close the company on the grounds that it “had disappeared in its ability to operate as a hotel resort,” allowing the hotel to fall into disrepair. The government’s effort was successful and resulted in the cancellation of the hotel’s operating license. The liquidation and subsequent sell-off of the hotel, formerly the country’s second largest hotel, raised suspicions of government corruption among local press outlets and business institutions, including the chamber of commerce. The former majority shareholder of the hotel claimed that he was threatened into selling the hotel by a businessman with ties to the government. The purchasers of the hotel, a newly formed group allegedly led by the same businessman who threatened the previous owner, were the lowest bidder. In October 2019, the Seychellois Supreme Court recommended that the Seychellois president establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the sale of the hotel, and, in June 2020, then-President Danny Faure appointed such a commission. The commission’s report was expected to be published by the end of May 2021 but has not yet been published as of March 2022. Parties involved in investment disputes are encouraged to resolve their disputes through arbitration and negotiation. The Seychelles Investment Act created the Investment Appeal Panel to which aggrieved investors may appeal a decision made by a public sector agency regarding their investments or proposed investments in Seychelles. In the event investors are not satisfied with the decision of the Investment Appeal Panel, they may appeal to the Court of Appeal. Seychelles has acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which entered into force in May 2020. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The legal framework for international arbitration exists through the Commercial Code of Seychelles, the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure, and Seychelles Investment Act. Seychelles has acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which entered into force in May 2020. Arbitration legislation in the Seychelles is not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, several provisions are compatible with the Model Law. In general, international arbitration is not yet a regular feature of dispute resolution in Seychelles, even though arbitration clauses are used in contracts. Bankruptcy in Seychelles is governed under the Insolvency Act of 2013 (https://www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/act/2013/4 ). According to his act, an individual may be discharged from bankruptcy three years from the date of its declaration. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Seychelles. 4. Industrial Policies The Seychellois government has enacted legislation which provides incentives for investment in several sectors. Examples include the 2005 Agriculture and Fisheries (Incentives) Act, the Tourism Incentives Act, the Seychelles International Trade Zone Act, and fiscal incentives under the Investment Code. Incentives under these laws most often take the form of tax credits, tax holidays, duty-free access for the import of materials required for initial investment, and expedited work permits for foreign employees who move to Seychelles. The SIB has the mandate to promote investment in Seychelles and assist in screening potential investments. In 2018, the government announced an investment policy guided by the following principles: creation of a conducive and transparent environment to attract investment and operate business; modernization of the legal framework for investment; application of international best practices and standards for investment; and respect for the environment and sociocultural fabric of the country. The investment policy statement is available at the following link: https://www.investinseychelles.com/downloads/investment-policy/seychelles-investment-policy/download . According to the SIB, the government does not issue investment guarantees, but Seychelles’ public-private partnership framework allows public and private sector entities to jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. The government offers tax incentives in the form of value-added tax exemptions on imported goods that (a) conserve, generate or produce renewable or environment friendly energy sources; (b) conserve fresh or potable water resources or re-use or recycle wastewater; and (c) recycle, reduce or re-use solid waste. The government also provides rebates to businesses that use rooftop photovoltaic equipment for power generation. The Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ) Act of 1995 (https://fsaseychelles.sc/component/edocman/sitz/legislations?start=0) provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which aim to combine the benefits of a freeport and an export processing zone. Multiple locations have been declared international trade zones under this regime. The list of concessions available to SITZ license holders includes the following: Exemption from customs duties on certain capital equipment to be used in the SITZ. Exemption from certain taxes. Exemption from fees with respect to work permits. Entitlement to full foreign ownership. Entitlement to employ 100 percent foreign labor. Exemption from national labor laws. Activities of the SITZ are regulated by the Seychelles Financial Services Authority. Foreign-owned firms benefit from the same incentives as local firms operating in the SITZ. To meet the requirements of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) standard of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), licensable export services activities under the International Trade Zone Act have been amended. Under the revised regime, the export services licensee will not be allowed to provide services other than repair and reconditioning of goods, warehouse, and rent storage space, or to offer logistical services, provided that these activities relate to goods physically handled in the SITZ. Export services operators licensed on or before October 16, 2017, still enjoy all concessions and exemptions accorded under the International Trade Zone Act until June 30, 2021, provided that the benefits do not extend to assets or activities introduced on or after October 17, 2017. Investors operating in Seychelles are expected to abide by the following obligations: Comply with the provisions of the governing laws on investment procedures and carry out investment activities in accordance with the approvals granted. This includes the responsibility for accuracy and truthfulness in materials submitted in investment proposals and registration. Fully discharge their financial obligations, including taxation, in accordance with the law. Carry out the provisions of the laws on accounting and auditing. Carry out the provisions of the laws on registration of companies and other legal entities. Carry out the provisions of the employment laws and regulations. Seychelles does not have a single comprehensive law that addresses the collection and use of personal data. The Data Protection Act (DPA) was enacted in 2003 to provide individuals with privacy rights regarding processing of their personal data, but as of March 2021 it has not entered into force. Other sectoral laws that include data protection provisions are: the 1976 Civil Code of Seychelles; the 2001 Electronic Transactions Act; the 2004 Central Bank of Seychelles Act; the 2004 Financial Institutions Act; the 2012 Central Bank of Seychelles (Credit Information System) Regulations; the 2013 Financial Services Authority Act; the 2016 Anti-Corruption Act; the 2016 International Business Companies Act; the 2018 Access to Information Act; the 2020 Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Act, and the 2021 Cybercrimes and Other Related Crimes Act. The drafting of a new data protection bill was approved by the cabinet of ministers in December 2021 and is currently ongoing. There is currently no legal requirement obliging foreign IT providers to hand over their source code or provide access to the encryption utilized. Seychelles does not have any legal instrument that prevents or restricts companies from transmitting customer or business-related data outside the country. Consequently, there are currently no government agencies involved in enforcing any rules or regulations with regards to local data storage in Seychelles. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is not aware of any investment performance requirements. 5. Protection of Property Rights Seychellois courts enforce property rights. Mortgages and liens are enforced, and the land registrar resolves land disputes. All lands in Seychelles are either publicly or privately held. In 2014, the government discontinued selling state land to non-Seychellois. The Immovable Property Tax Act, which was enacted in December 2019, introduced an annual tax of 0.25 percent on the assessed market value of residential property owned by all foreigners. The Seychellois government has measures in place to enforce intellectual property rights (IPR), but awareness of IPR is limited and enforcement is weak. Seychelles joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in March 2000. The country became a contracting party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in November 2002. The cabinet of ministers approved plans for Seychelles to accede to the Madrid Protocol. Seychelles also signed the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances in June 2012 and ratified the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in October 2014. Additionally, the cabinet of ministers approved Seychelles’ membership in the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) by way of acceding to the Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs. The 2014 Copyright Act and the 2014 Industrial Property Act, which are the two major laws regarding intellectual property rights, are currently being reviewed, along with their related regulations, with a view to updating them in line with international standards. The 2014 Customs Management (Border Measures) Regulations provide enforcement measures at the border with respect to counterfeit goods. There is currently no legislation for plant variety protection. As required by WTO principles, Seychelles IP law treats foreign nationals and Seychellois citizens equally. Enforcement of IPR protection laws is limited, as very few international brands and trademarks have local or even regional representatives. In 2017, the cabinet of ministers established the National Intellectual Property Committee to serve as a coordinating body for consultations with stakeholders on IP matters. The Committee, which falls under the purview of the Trade Division of the Ministry of Finance, National Planning, and Trade, which comprises representatives from government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, meets on a monthly basis. The Registrar General’s Office serves as the one-stop-shop for both copyright and intellectual property. Chapter 13 of the 2014 Customs Management (Border Measures) Regulations provides for enforcement measures at the border with respect to counterfeit and/or pirated goods. Furthermore, the Trade Division has, in consultation with the Customs Division, developed Procedural Guidelines on Border Measures for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (https://www.src.gov.sc/resources/Guides/2018/IPRs.pdf ) to counter the import and export of counterfeit and pirated goods. The Seychelles Revenue Commission’s customs officials monitor incoming shipments for counterfeit goods. However, their focus is on counterfeit products that pose a public health risk, such as medications and electrical appliances. Counterfeit apparel, CDs, and DVDs are widely available in Seychellois markets. During 2021, the Customs Division intercepted and seized one consignment of counterfeit goods, mainly counterfeit handbags, shoes, and articles of clothing. Seychelles is not in the 2022 United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or on the 2022 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Some Law Firms in Seychelles also handling IPR:* KAREN DOMINGUE Room 8, Trinity House Huteau Lane 41 Victoria, Mahe Seychelles +248 422 6243 icsey@sechelles.net A.G. AMESBURY Room 104, Premier Building Victoria, Mahe Seychelles +248 423 28 41 a.g.amesburyattorney@gmail.com *List for convenience only, not intended to imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 6. Financial Sector Seychelles welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Seychelles Securities Act (https://fsaseychelles.sc/component/edocman/securities-act-2007/download?Itemid=0 ) provides the legal framework for the Seychelles’ stock market. The Seychelles securities exchange, now known as MERJ Exchange, has operated since 2012. Listing and trading are available in Euros, Pounds Sterling, Seychelles Rupees, South African Rand, and Australian Dollars. MERJ is an affiliate of the World Federation of Exchanges, a full member of ANNA and a partner exchange of the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative. By the end of 2021, MERJ reported a total of 54 listings (49 equity and 5 debt listings) with a total market capitalization of $1.29 billion. SECDEX Exchange Limited is the second exchange licensed by the Seychelles Financial Services Authority in 2020 to operate as a multi-asset securities and derivatives exchange. Portfolio investment in Seychelles is limited by the small size of the economy and banking sector. The buying and selling of sizeable positions may have an outsized impact on the Seychelles Rupee and the economy in general. There are no restrictions on trading by foreigners. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources in and out of the economy. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market and through the Seychelles banking system, and a variety of credit instruments are available to both local and foreign investors. Seychelles has a two-tier banking system that separates the central and commercial bank functions and roles. Commercial banks, both domestic and foreign, are regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS). According to the 2004 Central Bank of Seychelles Act, the CBS is responsible for the formulation and implementation of Seychelles’ monetary and exchange rate policies. The CBS is the only administrative body responsible for receiving applications for banking licenses, whether domestic or offshore, and issuing the corresponding licenses. As of March 2022, there were seven commercial banks in operation: Absa Bank, Bank of Baroda, Mauritius Commercial Bank (Seychelles), Nouvobanq, Seychelles Commercial Bank, Al Salam Bank Seychelles Ltd, and Bank of Ceylon. The Pakistani Bank AL Habib Limited closed its branch in Seychelles in September 2021. According to a 2016 report by the CBS, 94 percent of Seychellois use banks. Seychelles also has three non-banking financial institutions: the Seychelles Credit Union, a savings and credit cooperative society; the Development Bank of Seychelles, which provides flexible financing for businesses and projects to promote economic growth and employment; and the Housing Finance Corporation, a government-owned company that provides financing to Seychellois for the purchase of land, the construction of homes, and financing home improvements. Seychelles has multiple laws that govern the financial services sector: the 2004 Financial Institutions Act; the 2004 Prevention of Terrorism Act; the 2004 Central Bank Act; the 2007 Data Protection Act; the 2007 Mutual and Hedge Fund Act; the 2016 International Business Companies Act; the 2020 Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Act, and the 2020 Beneficial Ownership Act. The Seychellois banking sector is generally healthy, though it is limited by its small size and reliance on correspondent bank relationships. Due to concerns about money-laundering and illicit finance in the Seychellois financial sector, some local banks have lost their correspondent banking relationship with foreign banks, a phenomenon known as de-risking, thus making it difficult for local banks to perform international transactions. In 2017, the CBS and the Financial Services Authority visited foreign financial centers to address de-risking. The government is actively working with international experts, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to ensure Seychelles is not perceived as high-risk jurisdiction. In February 2020, the EU added Seychelles to the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as Seychelles had not implemented the tax reforms by the mutually agreed deadline of December 2019. In December 2019, France added Seychelles to its blacklist of tax havens for not providing adequate information on French offshore entities operating in the island nation’s jurisdiction. In 2020, the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Act and the Beneficial Ownership (BO) Act. These two pieces of legislation address the deficiencies identified in the 2018 Mutual Evaluation Report of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The Beneficial Ownership Act (Compliance of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements) Notice was enacted in September 2021 and the Beneficial Ownership Data Base digital platform, managed by the Financial Intelligence Unit, became operational in November 2021. All domestic registered companies, partnerships and associations are required to comply with the provisions of the 2020 Beneficial Ownership Act by January 31, 2022, to populate the information about their beneficial owners on the Beneficial Ownership Data Base, and to keep an up-to-date register of all their beneficial owners or shareholders. In December 2021, the National Assembly approved five bills to make the jurisdiction compliant with FATF recommendations: the Anti-Corruption (Amendment No.3) Bill, the Licenses (Amendment) Bill, the Custody, Management and Disposal of Seized, Forfeited or Confiscated Properties Bill, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Second Amendment) Bill. In February 2022, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) announced that it was conducting a risk assessment of virtual assets and virtual assets service providers. This exercise will guide the authorities on policy decisions related to the development of laws that will allow Seychelles to comply with FATF’s Recommendation 15. The outcome of the risk assessment will feed into the Seychelles National Risk Assessment scheduled for publication in 2022. Other laws enacted during 2021 to upgrade the country’s financial services legal framework include: the Trusts Act, the Foundations (Amendment) Act, the International Service Providers (Amendment) Act, the International Business Companies (Amendment) Act, and the Limited Partnership (Amendment) Act. In September 2021, the Business Tax (Amendment)(Commencement) Notice and the Business Tax (Amendment of Eleventh Schedule) were also enacted to bring into effect certain changes in Seychelles’ territorial tax system. As a result of these new laws and amendments, the EU removed Seychelles from Annex I of its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes in October 2021. Seychelles has been moved to Annex II of the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions (the “EU grey list”) for criterion 1.2 (tax transparency), with removal from Annex II pending the positive outcome of a Global Forum supplementary review, scheduled in 2022. According to the CBS in January 2022, non-performing loans to total gross loans in the Seychellois banking sector stood at 5.39 percent, and foreign currency deposits totaled 12.5 billion Seychelles Rupees (approx. $870 million). A wide range of financial services, such as checking accounts, savings accounts, loans, transactions in foreign currencies, and foreign currency accounts are available in the banking system. Foreigners and foreign/offshore firms must establish residency or proof of business registration to obtain a bank account. Foreign Exchange Since the 2008 IMF reform package, the Seychellois government places no restrictions or limitations on foreign investors converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with investment. Funds are freely converted. Seychelles maintains a floating exchange rate for the Seychelles Rupee (SCR), which fluctuated between SCR 12 and SCR 14.5 to $1 from 2015 to 2019. In 2020, the SCR depreciated by 53 percent with the average rate in January 2020 being SCR 14 to $1 compared to SCR 21.5 in December 2020, due to the unprecedented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism sector. The average exchange rate gradually appreciated through 2021 and was back to SCR14 to $1 in February 2022 as tourism and other economic activities rebounded in the country. Remittance Policies Foreign exchange controls were removed in 2008 and foreign investors are free to repatriate their profits and other incomes. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is unaware of any planned changes to remittance policies, time limits on remittances, or use of any legal parallel market. Sovereign Wealth Funds Seychelles does not maintain any sovereign wealth funds. However, in the 2022 state of the nation address, the president announced that a sovereign wealth fund will be established. This fund had not yet materialized at the time of this report. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Seychellois society has a high level of awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR), especially in environmental protection and social programs, but CSR is generally regarded as a function of government. Since 2013, the Seychelles Revenue Commission has collected a CSR tax of 0.5 percent on monthly turnover for businesses with an annual turnover of SCR 1 million or more. In April 2021, the CSR Tax Repeal Bill was passed to abolish the CSR tax to provide businesses with additional liquidity during the pandemic and to deter businesses from operating in the informal sector to avoid this tax. Officially, there are no waivers available for foreign investors with regard to labor law, employment rights, consumer protection, or environmental standards. The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor. While the government’s efforts to combat labor trafficking significantly increased in 2021, Seychelles still did not meet the minimum international standards. Migrant workers were the population most vulnerable to forced labor, including nonpayment of wages, physical abuse, fraudulent recruitment schemes, delayed payment of their salaries, and failure to provide them with adequate housing, resulting in substandard living conditions. In past years, there have been reports of passport seizures and confiscations to prevent workers from changing employers prior to the end of their two-year contracts. NGOs reported that traffickers have exploited migrant workers aboard foreign-flagged fishing vessels in Seychelles’ territorial waters and ports, including through nonpayment of wages and physical abuse. Labor recruitment agents based in Seychelles have exploited migrant workers, often with the assistance of a local Seychellois accomplice. Migrant workers often signed their employment contracts upon arrival in Seychelles and frequently could not read the language, which traffickers exploited in fraudulent recruitment tactics. Seychelles currently has no production in the extractive sector, but international companies have undertaken petroleum exploration activities offshore. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) accepted Seychelles as a candidate country in August 2014 and Seychelles’ validation against the standard began in January 2018. In September 2020, the EITI Board assessed Seychelles as having achieved “meaningful progress” in implementing the 2019 EITI Standard. The 2020 draft validation assessment can be accessed at: https://eiti.org/documents/seychelles-validation-2020. Seychelles adopted a Beneficial Ownership Act in March 2020, which includes a definition of beneficial owners. The law entered into force in January 2021. Extractive companies are the only sector where beneficial ownership disclosures will be made publicly available. The next validation is scheduled to commence in January 2023. Seychelles, a major player in the global tuna industry, joined the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) in 2017. The FiTI International Board approved Seychelles’ candidate application in April 2020. Seychelles has submitted two FiTI reports covering calendar years 2019 and 2020, and the next report is due by December 2022. The first validation against the FiTI standard is expected to be completed by October 2022. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues According to a UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) report, Seychelles is vulnerable to storms, floods, and landslides. The Seychellois Ministry of Agriculture, Climate Change and Environment (MACE) manages key climate policies. Seychelles’ 2020 National Climate Change Policy created the National Climate Change Council chaired by the vice president to coordinate all climate change actions. The council must report on the implementation status of all national and international climate change obligations to the cabinet of ministers and the National Assembly. In November 2021, at the Conference of Parties 26 (COP 26), the Seychellois government pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 26.4 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 value. To achieve this target, the government plans to reform in its energy, refrigeration and air conditioning, transport, and waste sectors. Details of the reforms for each sector will be included in the 2022 Seychelles Updated National Climate Change Strategy and the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) implementation plan the government was preparing as of March 2022. Seychelles has a long-term strategy to make its energy supply solely based on renewables as outlined in its 2010-2030 energy policy by focusing on the development of offshore wind and photovoltaic technologies. The government expects private sector contributions to reform the energy and transport sectors and to develop the aquaculture sector. While the contributions for the energy and transport sectors will be detailed in upcoming sectoral blueprints, the Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy has created an aquaculture department. The government offers tax incentives in the form of value-added tax exemptions on imported goods that (a) conserve, generate or produce renewable or environment friendly energy sources; (b conserve of fresh or potable water resources or re-use or recycle wastewater; and (c) recycle, reduce or re-use solid waste. There is a purchase rebate plan to incentivize businesses to resort to rooftop photovoltaic equipment for power generation. Policies to preserve biodiversity include: (a) regulating coastal planning and infrastructure at the national and local level to prioritize the consideration of “blue” nature-based solutions for climate resilience; (b) protecting at least 50 percent of its seagrass and mangrove ecosystems by 2025, and 100 percent of seagrass and mangrove ecosystems by 2030; (c) establishing a long-term monitoring program for seagrass and mangrove ecosystems by 2025 and including the greenhouse gas sink of Seychelles’ blue carbon ecosystems within the national greenhouse gas inventory by 2025; and (d) committing to the implementation of its adopted marine spatial plan and the effective management of the 30-percent marine-protected areas within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Public procurement policies in Seychelles do not currently include environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. 9. Corruption Ruling with transparency and accountability are stated priorities of the current government. In 2016, the government established the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS) under the Anti-Corruption Act, which gives it authority to investigate, detect, and prevent corrupt practices. The Seychelles Transparency Initiative (TI), a Transparency International chapter in formation, was set up in 2017. TI’s focus is currently on increasing transparency in tourism, fisheries, finance, and construction. There is currently no legislation protecting NGOs involved in investigating corruption. The Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill (https://seylii.org/sc/legislation/bill/2020/4 ) became law in 2019 giving the ACCS investigative and arresting powers similar to that of the police. The ACCS has received significant criticism for having only achieved one conviction: that of an ACCS employee who was convicted of extortion, corruption, and unlawful disclosure of ACCS information in 2018, when he demanded money in exchange for providing the ACCS’ evidence to an individual under investigation by the ACCS. In September 2021, the ACCS board was dissolved and replaced by an advisory council. The president gave an ultimatum to the ACCS to take actions to prevent, detect, and investigate acts of corruption. In March 2021, the ACCS signed cooperation agreements with the Seychelles Revenue Authority, the Central Bank of Seychelles, and the Registrar General’s Office to better facilitate the exchange of information and assist the ACCS’ investigations. In November 2021, a prominent businessman and his wife, a senior military official, and former government officials were arrested for the alleged theft of more than $50 million in foreign aid given to Seychelles by the United Arab Emirates in 2002 to help overcome foreign exchange shortages and import basic goods. The money was never recorded in government accounts. The suspects are facing charges of conspiracy to commit corruption, conspiracy to commit money laundering, concealment of property, and stealing by person in public service. Chapter 10 of the Seychellois Penal Code provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials. In 2003, the government published the Public Service Code of Ethics and Conduct. The Public Officer’s Ethics Act of 2008 prohibits personal enrichment through public office; defines and outlaws bribery; provides guidelines for avoiding conflict of interest; and mandates declaration of financial assets for public officials, including members of the National Assembly. The 2017 Public Persons (Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and Business Interests) Act requires all National Assembly members, councilors, and the mayor to submit a declaration on their assets, debts, and business interests. Asset declarations are not published but may be made public upon request to the ethics commissioner. Laws to combat corruption do not extend to political parties. The 2008 Public Procurement Act, as amended, counters conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. In March 2021, the cabinet approved amendments to the Public Officers’ Ethics (POE) Act to abolish the POE commission entirely and to shift its responsibility to the ACCS, which has become the umbrella authority overseeing all matters of corruption in the public service. In September 2021, the Public Persons (Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and Business Interests) Bill was approved by the National Assembly to remove the obligation of a public person to submit declarations of assets for spouses or close family members. The bill also provides for establishment of a secure electronic system for submission of declarations and related documents. The government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. Seychelles ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in March 2006. Seychelles is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Resources to Report Corruption Anti-Corruption Commission May De Silva Chief Executive Officer Victoria House, State House Avenue Victoria, Mahe +248 4326061 complaints@accsey.com Office of the Ombudsperson Nicole Tirant-Gherardi Ombudsperson Room 306, Aarti Chambers, Mont Fleuri, Mahe +248 225147 ombuds@seychelles.net 10. Political and Security Environment The current constitution, promulgated in 1993, provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic elections based on universal suffrage. Seychelles has not experienced large-scale political violence since the late 1970s. The United Seychelles party, formerly known as Parti Lepep (People’s Party), governed Seychelles following the 1977 coup d’etat and won every election from the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993 until 2016, when a coalition of opposition parties won the majority of the National Assembly seats. The October 2020 election was the first time since 1976 that Seychellois voters elected an opposition party candidate as president and there was a peaceful and smooth transfer of power. East Africa Standby Force election observers declared the election to have been peaceful, transparent, and orderly. Seychelles remained politically stable at the time of this report. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The national unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2020 was 3.3 percent, of which 51.6 percent was female. In the fourth quarter of 2020, the youth unemployment rate was 12 percent and disaggregation of the data showed that youth unemployment was higher among females. According to the Seychelles Bureau of Statistics, the unemployment rate would have been 4.3 percent if those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic had sought alternative employment, rather than waiting for the amelioration of the COVID-19 pandemic. The private sector accounted for 63 percent of formal employment in the fourth quarter of 2021. Within the private sector, the largest category of employment were accommodation and food services activities (30 percent). There were more local female employees in government (62 percent) and more local male employees in parastatals (44 percent). There were more expatriate males working parastatals, and roughly the same percentage of expatriate males and females in government. Disaggregated data by gender is not available for the private sector. In December 2021, the Employment Department, in collaboration with the Department of Information and Communication Technology, launched the first phase of the Internal Labour Market Information System (LMIS). The LMIS will be used register vacancies, jobseekers, job placements, and applications of redundancy, and will enable the Ministry of Employment, Immigration and Civil Status to better collect and process labor market statistics. In June 2020, the 1995 Employment Act was amended to attempt to limit the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor market. The amendment regulated the deferment of payment, and reduction of wages of a worker pending the termination of the government program for salary support to workers because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The amendment also restricted the temporary lay-off or redundancy of Seychellois workers if the employer is employing a non-Seychellois worker in a similar position as the Seychellois workers, or if the employer has not started the negotiation to temporarily lay-off the employee. Major challenges that persist in the labor market include difficultly recruiting Seychellois for certain jobs and reported low productivity level. Seychelles has long been an importer of foreign labor due to its small population and low human resource base. The share of foreign labor to total employment in the private sector was approximately 40 percent pre-pandemic, with the majority working in the construction and tourism sectors. Since 2014, a quota system has applied to industries for which demand for foreign labor is high. In February 2021, the government restructured the Gainful Occupation Permit (GOP) framework to give local workers greater access to the labor market. The new framework eliminated COVID-19-related concessions that provided foreign nationals with certain rights while the country’s borders were closed. A three-month GOP extension that was granted to foreign workers due to COVID-19 restrictions is no longer applicable. Employers of GOP holders who left Seychelles are no longer permitted to hire GOP applicants. Under the new framework, labor market testing is strictly enforced to ensure that foreign workers are only hired when no qualified local workers are available. The new framework also prohibits non-local workers from changing employment in Seychelles when their contract ends. However, a change in employer is authorized in cases of labor exploitation and/or human trafficking. According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Employment, Immigration and Civil Status, the informal employment rate was 16.9 percent in 2020. There were more males (80 percent) working in the informal sector than females. The three main sectors for informal employment include construction, wholesale and retail trade, agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Seychelles has been a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1977 and has ratified all fundamental International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. Under Seychellois law, all workers, with the exception of police, military, prison, and firefighting personnel, have the right to form and organize unions of their own choosing, to participate in collective bargaining, and to conduct legal strikes. However, in practice, these rights are limited or restricted by other provisions of law. Although collective bargaining is legal, it rarely happens because the law gives the right to the government to review and approve all collective bargaining agreements in both the private and public sector. Strikes are illegal in Seychelles unless all other arbitration procedures have been exhausted. About 15 percent of the workforce is unionized. In January 2020, the minimum wage increased to SCR 5,804 ($426) per month. In 2017, the Unemployment Relief Scheme (URS) was re-introduced for Seychellois aged above 18 and who are dependent on welfare. The new government ended this scheme in February 2021 and the Ministry of Employment, Immigration and Civil Status has been mandated to conduct training and re-skilling programs to enable Seychellois to seek employment. In the event of layoffs where there is no employee misconduct, the employer must provide the worker with one month’s notice or the equivalent of one month’s salary. Additionally, for workers that have been employed for five years or more, the employer must pay one day’s pay for each month that the employee has worked for the employer. For severance calculation, there is no distinction between layoffs and firing with severance. The Employment Tribunal handles employment disputes for private-sector employees. The Public Service Appeals Board handles employment disputes for public-sector employees, and the Financial Services Authority deals with employment disputes of workers in the Seychelles International Trade Zone. The law authorizes the Ministry of Employment, Immigration and Civil Status to establish and enforce employment terms, conditions, and benefits, and workers frequently obtain recourse against their employers through the Employment Tribunal. The government introduced the Occupational Safety and Health Decree in 2012 and the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act in 2014. However, there are very few health or labor inspectors in Seychelles, and they are limited by meager public resources and the vast ocean distances they are expected to cover. In November 2011, Seychelles and the ILO signed the 2011-2015 Decent Work Country Program, which seeks to address such issues as employment creation, consolidation and protection of workers’ rights, enhancing social protection, and strengthening social dialogue. Compliance with international labor standards has in recent years been sufficient such that business in the country should not pose a reputational risk to investors. In 2021, the U.S. State Department, in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report, upgraded Seychelles to a Tier 2 ranking, in recognition of its overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period. The conclusion was that while the government of Seychelles does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, it is making significant efforts to do so. 14. Contact for More Information Smita Bheenick Economic and Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy to Mauritius and Seychelles, Port-Louis, Mauritius + 230 202 4400 BheenickS@state.gov Sierra Leone Executive Summary Sierra Leone, with an estimated population of 8.2 million people (2022 World Population Review), is located on the coast of West Africa between the Republic of Guinea in the north and northeast, the Republic of Liberia in the south and southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean on the west, with a land area of 71,740 square kilometers and a humid tropical climate. Sierra Leone emerged from a decade-long civil war in 2002 and has been politically stable with remarkable religious tolerance among its people. Since 2002, the country economically outperformed other west African countries before it was struck by an outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in 2014. When the country emerged out of the Ebola scourge in 2015, the government turned to foreign direct investment (FDIs) to return the economy to the pre-Ebola growth trajectory. Sierra Leone was recovering from the ravages of the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15 when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020 and took a heavy toll on the economy. The government’s quick and decisive response, which comprised the COVID-19 Health Preparedness and Response Plan and the Quick Action Economic Response Program (QAERP), focused on saving lives and livelihoods to prevent a more significant outbreak. The containment measures addressed broader economic and social concerns combined with strained debt. The government’s 2021 budget prioritized COVID-19 and was augmented by concessional support, primarily in the form of grants from development partners. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in August 2021, Sierra Leone grappled with severe and persistent effects of the COVID-19 pandemic amidst signs of early economic recovery. Economic activity dipped sharply in 2020 with elevated inflation and limited fiscal space. Sierra Leone offers significant investment potential across numerous sectors. The country is rich in mineral reserves and natural resources with a favorable tropical climate, fertile soil advantageous for agriculture, extensive continental shelf with multiple varieties of fishery resources, a natural environment offering touristic prospects, and vast mineral resources, especially iron ore, diamonds, gold, rutile, ilmenite, and bauxite. Possibilities also exist in energy, water, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. FDIs are crucial to the country’s economic recovery. Therefore, there has been a continuous drive and policy focus on encouraging FDIs into the country. There are, however, legislative, institutional, and regulatory challenges to investment, including governance, the rule of law, business and human rights, dispute resolution, finance, and banking. Poor quality and limited infrastructure also pose significant investment challenges as the country lacks the capacity necessary to support practical commercial activities. Challenges similarly persist in corruption, skilled labor, accessing land, high-interest rates, and contract enforcement. The government’s policy focus has been to address all these impediments and shape the economic fundamentals for investment to flourish. Sierra Leone has potential in six primary areas: agriculture, fisheries, mining, tourism, energy, and construction. The country is endowed with a favorable tropical climate with a wide-ranging fertile soil advantageous for agriculture. It also provides an extensive continental shelf with numerous fishery resources, a natural environment offering touristic prospects, and vast mineral resources, especially iron ore, diamonds, gold, rutile, ilmenite, and bauxite. There are also opportunities for public-private partnership projects in energy, water, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. Opportunities further exist for investors to benefit from several preferential trade agreements. These include duty-free access to the Mano River Union market of more than 50 million, ECOWAS market of over 420 million, and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement of about fifty-four African countries with a combined population of more than one billion. The country also benefits from the European Union’s Everything but Arms initiative and the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), who ruled briefly as head of a military regime in 1996, replaced President Ernest Bai Koroma in April 2018. His administration took over a poverty-stricken and debt-burdened country with an elevated level of corruption and fiscal indiscipline. His development aspirations are outlined in the comprehensive medium-term National Development Plan (MTNDP) launched in 2019 to span through 2023. The plan is built on human capital development and economic diversification in agriculture, fisheries, and tourism to facilitate the country’s transformation from a fragile state to a stable and prosperous democracy that would achieve middle-income status by 2035. His foreign policy agenda prioritized economic diplomacy and he has traveled to many countries seeking and marketing Sierra Leone as an investor-friendly country. The government is calling on investors in all sectors of the economy as it looks for private sector-led economic growth and development. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 115 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $510 USD http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) has a strong and positive attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) required to invigorate the country’s economic growth and development. The GoSL’s Medium-Term National Development Plan (2019-2023) sets a growth agenda to support economic diversification and competitiveness towards promoting and developing a viable private sector to increase participation in global trade. The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) is the government’s lead agency established to oversee trade policy, improve the investment climate, and provide information on business registration, applicable incentives, and licenses. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) supervises the registration of limited liability companies. Simultaneously, the Public-Private Partnership Unit, established in the Office of the President, facilitates, and streamlines all public-private partnership agreements. A bill to establish a National Investment Board (NIB) awaits Parliamentary ratification. When established, the NIB will regularize the activities previously marred by bureaucracy and fraud. The NIB will create an Investment and Export Promotion Unit to replace SLIEPA, the Corporate Affairs Unit will take over the management of the Public Private Partnership Unit (PPPU) from the Office of the President, and establish a Business Facilitation Unit. The Investment and Export Promotion Unit will oversee trade policy and improve the investment climate, while the Corporate Affairs Unit will supervise and regulate company incorporation. The PPPU will promote, facilitate, and streamline all public-private agreements, whereas the Business Facilitation Unit will serve as a one-stop shop to facilitate the setting up of businesses and provide support and information to start and operate a business. The aim is to create a conducive and safer investment environment to end the corrupt ways investment has been handled in the past. Sierra Leone allows foreign investors to compete on the same terms as domestic firms. The Investment Promotion Act of 2004 protects foreign entities from discriminatory treatment. The Act creates incentives and customs exemptions, provides for investors to freely repatriate proceeds and remittances, and protects against expropriation without adequate compensation. The Act further provides for arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules in the event of a commercial dispute. However, a draft arbitration bill, which incorporates the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), presently awaits Parliamentary domestication. The diversification initiative of the GoSL is largely directed towards agriculture, fisheries, tourism, and infrastructure. The government is promoting sustainable investment in mechanized commercial agriculture, value addition, and agricultural research. The fishery sector is pushing for investment in lawful cultivation, commercial farming, and preservation of fish products. In the tourism sector, priority areas are investment in the hospitality industry, rehabilitation of historical and cultural sites, and promotion of tourism-based activities that link with the rural economy. The government focuses on public-private partnerships for major infrastructural projects in energy, water, roads, ports, and telecommunications, and encourages investments in local industries like agro-processing, other value addition industries, and small enterprise development. Conversely, poor quality and limited infrastructure pose significant challenges to investment and practical commercial activity. The shortage of skilled labor, the slow legal system, the high level of corruption, and political violence are significant obstacles to FDI. However, Sierra Leone made significant reforms in simplifying the process of setting up a business, and the World Bank ranked the country 58 out of 190 countries in 2020. The country also migrated to the UNCTAD ASYCUDA World System to further enhance trading across borders. In addressing corrupt practices, the country progressed 14 places up in the Transparency International Corruption ranking from 129/180 in 2018 to 115/180 in 2021. Similarly, the government passed the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s indicator on the control of corruption four times in a row, from 71 percent in FY19 to 83 percent in FY22. The disruption of COVID-19 has been widespread and has severely impacted the economy. To mitigate the shock and accelerate economic recovery, the government initiated the Quick Action Economic Response Plan (QAERP), which aimed at saving lives and sustaining livelihoods. QAERP maintained adequate stock of essential commodities, supported hardest-hit businesses and labor-based public works, and assisted local production and processing of food items. After the July 2021 review of Sierra Leone’s Extended Credit Facility, the International Monetary Fund underscored the government’s strong economic and health responses to mitigate the immediate impact of the crisis and safeguard macroeconomic stability. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. Foreigners are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. However, foreign investors cannot invest in arms and ammunition, cement block manufacturing, granite and sandstone excavation, manufacturing of certain consumer durable goods, and military, police, and correctional officers’ apparel and accouterments. Furthermore, there are limits to land ownership by foreign entities and individuals; the limitations vary depending on the location of the land being used and are discussed below in the “Real Property” section. Sierra Leone has few specific restrictions, controls, fees, or taxes on foreign ownership of companies that can outrightly own Sierra Leonean companies subject to certain registration formalities. However, investment in mining of less than $500,000 is an exception as this requires a 25 percent Sierra Leonean holding. Foreign technical and unskilled labor can be used but must seek approval from the Corporate Affairs Commission to transfer shares. Export licenses are required only for certain goods and materials. In comparison, the export of gold and diamonds must comply with internationally accepted standards such as Kimberley Process certification. The permits required to export goods such as cocoa and coffee are issued automatically and at no cost. Small mining investments require a minority partnership with a Sierra Leonean company. The Sierra Leone National Carrier Ratification Agreement Act of 2012 mandates the use of the Sierra Leone National Shipping Company for 40 percent of all goods imported or exported from Sierra Leone. The Petroleum Act 2001 restricts petroleum exploration and production licenses to companies registered or incorporated in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has also identified certain restrictions on foreign investment in its Schedule of Specific Commitments to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, from August 1995, which established limited restrictions on the business services, financial services, and maritime and airport sectors. The Local Content Policy, adopted in 2012, promotes the utilization of locally produced goods and locally provided services and the employment of Sierra Leonean nationals. While failure to follow the policy previously resulted only in denying investment incentives, the Sierra Leone Local Content Agency Act 2016 requires compliance. More information is available below in the “Performance Requirements” section. The 2016 local content policy requires investors to utilize local goods in place of imported goods, promote the employment of citizens, and develop the human capacity of these citizens through training. The legal system generally treats foreign investors in a non-discriminatory fashion, though investors comment that judicial application of the laws is often subject to financial and political influence. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a trade policy review for Sierra Leone in 2017. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) last conducted an investment policy review for Sierra Leone in 2010. Sierra Leone has progressed in simplifying its business registration process in recent years. The Corporate Affairs Commission manages the registration of limited liability companies and provides a “one-stop-shop,” including an online business registration system. The entire process involves five steps and takes, on average, ten days. Additional information is available from the CAC’s website: http://cac.gov.sl . The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency also provides helpful guidance on starting a business, sector-specific business licenses, mining licensing, and certification fees, and marine resources and fisheries. Sierra Leone has no program to promote or incentivize outward investment and places no restrictions on such activity. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties Sierra Leone has bilateral investment treaties with Germany, in force since 1966, the United Kingdom in 1981 and revised in 2001, China signed in 2001 but not yet entered into force, and United Arab Emirates, signed in 2019 but not yet in force. These treaties protect investors with fair and equitable treatment and defense against unlawful expropriation. Though not yet in force since signing in 2001, China and Sierra Leone reaffirmed their commitment to deepening the relationship by a memorandum of understanding signed when President Bio visited China in 2018. Sierra Leone also benefits from its membership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States, signed in 2014 with no bilateral taxation treaty. Double bilateral taxation treaties exist with Norway, South Africa, and the UK, extended to Canada, Denmark, Ghana, New Zealand, Nigeria, and The Gambia. However, the Ministry of Finance plans to review all existing treaties and work on the requested treaties from Kenya and Qatar. 3. Legal Regime The Sierra Leone Parliament is the country’s supreme legislative authority. Generally, Parliament enacts bills that the President signs into law. The judiciary interprets and applies the laws to ensure impartial justice and provides a mechanism for dispute resolution. However, the regulatory system is not entirely consistent with international norms. Laws and regulations are developed at the national level, and the Constitution requires publication of proposed laws and regulations in a government journal, the Gazette, for 21 days. A series of legislative reforms have been carried out since the second trade policy review in 2017 to create a conducive business environment and attract FDI. These include the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Banking Act, the Bank of Sierra Leone Act, the Extractive Industries Revenue Act, and several Finance Acts, to name a few. To strengthen the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, Sierra Leone established a fast-track commercial court, the Credit Reference Bureau, the Corporate Affairs Commission, revised the legislation of company activities, and developed the Local Content Policy. Also, Sierra Leone has taken steps to promote and improve regulatory transparency. The Right to Access Information Commission was established in 2014 to make government records available to the public and imposes a penalty for failure to make information available. Sierra Leone joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2014, an initiative that empowers citizens to fight corruption and promotes transparent and accountable governance. The OGP, now led by the National Council for Civic Education and Development (NaCCED), made significant progress in access to justice, gender, education, and open Parliament, thereby assuring citizens of government’s commitment to provide for the public and to consolidate democracy. In 2020, Parliament passed the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion law and repealed Part 5 of the Public Order Act of 1965 that criminalized libel. In 2021, the government enacted the Cyber Security and Crime Act, signed the abolition of the death penalty, created a fast-track court to try sexual offenders, and a Gender Empowerment Bill 2021 currently before Parliament for enactment. The Audit Service Act of 1998 established the Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL) and further strengthened to carry out audits of all government entities, including statutory corporations and organizations, by the Audit Service Act of 2014. Sierra Leone became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008, established the Sierra Leone Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (SLEITI), and became compliant with EITI rules in 2014. In 2019, the EITI Board agreed that Sierra Leone had made meaningful progress in implementing the EITI Standard but should undertake corrective actions before the second validation in December 2020. However, in 2020, recognizing the challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the EITI Board introduced flexible measures in EITI implementation and tasked the multi-stakeholder group (MSG) to focus on ensuring EITII’s commitment to transparency and accountability. The Public Financial Management Act of 2016 reformed the budget process and improved transparency in the expenditure of public funds. While the Fiscal Management and Control Act of 2017 directed government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to transfer all revenues into the Treasury Single Account, domestically referred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), which was fully complied with in 2018 on the executive order of President Maada Bio. Sierra Leone joined the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1961 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Sierra Leone is committed to the multilateral trading system and has not notified the WTO of any inconsistent measures with the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. It acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2006 and the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, otherwise referred to as the Revised Kyoto Convention in 2015. It became a contracting party to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Convention) in 2015. It replaced its pre-shipment inspection with a destination inspection in 2009 and notified the WTO of the Agreement on Trade facilitation in May 2017. The Customs Act of 2011 upheld the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, which prohibits the use of arbitrary or fictitious values. However, it has not notified the WTO of its sanitary and phytosanitary legislation required for the international movement of any plant materials or products or any state-trading activity. Sierra Leone is not a signatory to any plurilateral agreements concluded under the WTO but established a mission to the WTO in 2011. It ratified six multilateral investment agreements, including the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Conventions, so that foreign investments in Sierra Leone are covered against non-commercial risks such as currency transfer risks, expropriation risks, risks of war and civil disturbance, and repudiation risk. The legal system is derived from the English common law system, but local courts apply customary law to many disputes outside of the capital, Freetown. The courts provide a venue to enforce property and contract rights. The country does not have a consolidated written commercial or contractual law, and disparate pieces of legislation sometimes lead to the uneven treatment of commercial disputes. The Superior Court of Judicature consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court, while the lower courts consist of the magistrate court and the local courts. In 2010, Sierra Leone created a Fast-Track Commercial Court to reduce the duration of commercial cases to as low as six months. In 2017, Sierra Leone hosted a commercial law summit to address gaps in the justice system, resulting in concrete recommendations in critical areas, including arbitration, anti-corruption and bribery, public-private partnerships, and reform of the court process. A draft arbitration bill will bring arbitration proceedings in Sierra Leone up to international standards when passed into law. Foreign investors have equal access to the judicial system, which is slow and often subject to financial and political influence. However, Sierra Leonean courts may acknowledge foreign judgment from specific jurisdictions with reciprocal enforcement arrangements with Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, and the Gambia. Generally, Sierra Leonean courts do not apply foreign law, but foreign judgment can be enforced when registered with the high court. However, the registration may be refused when enforcement is contrary to public policy. On depositing its instrument for accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), Sierra Leone became the 166th state party to the Convention, which came into force in January 2021. Recommended during the inaugural Commercial Law Summit of May 2017, the accession will promote FDI by resolving disputes by arbitration without interference from local courts and will enforce arbitral awards consistently and predictably. The Companies Act of 2009, the Registration of Business Act of 2007, and their subsequent amendments are the primary laws governing the registration of all businesses before commencing operations. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) deals with the incorporation of companies. In contrast, the Office of the Administrator and Registrar General (OARG) deals with sole proprietorships and partnerships, with the process streamlined into a stop-shop. Sierra Leonean law ensures that foreign investors may compete on the same terms as domestic firms. The Investment Promotion Act 2004 protects foreign entities from discriminatory treatment. The law creates incentives for customs exemptions, allows investors to repatriate proceeds and remittances freely, and protects against expropriation without prompt and adequate compensation. The law establishes a dispute settlement framework that will enable investors to submit disputes to arbitration under the UN Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL). Sierra Leonean authorities do not screen, review, or approve foreign direct investments. Companies must register to do business in Sierra Leone, and there are no reports that the registration process has blocked investments or discriminated against investors. In the case of investment guarantees, the government established specific procedures with the U.S. government in agreements signed on December 28, 1962, and November 13, 1963, whereby Sierra Leone authorities approved external investment guarantees in Sierra Leone. Additional information about the laws and regulations applicable to foreign investments is available on the SLIEPA website: https://www.sliepa.gov.sl/ . Sierra Leone does not have a competition law. The European Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have supported the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s attempt to develop a competition policy. This ministry oversees the regulation of anti-competitive practices. Whereas consumer protection has been passed, the cabinet has approved a competition policy but awaits parliamentary ratification. The Constitution authorizes the government to confiscate property only when necessary, in the interest of national defense, public safety, order, morality, town and country planning, or the public benefit or welfare. In such cases, the Constitution guarantees the prompt payment of adequate compensation, with a right of access to a court or other independent authority to consider legality, determine the amount of compensation, and ensure prompt payment. The Bankruptcy Act 2009 establishes a process of bankruptcy for individuals and companies. Bankruptcy is a civil matter, but it may disqualify an individual from holding certain elected public offices and practicing certain professions. The Bankruptcy Act 2009 also encourages and facilitates reorganization as an alternative to liquidation. The World Bank ranked Sierra Leone 162, with a score of 24.7, in the ease of resolving insolvency in 2020. After passing a Credit Reference Act in 2011, Sierra Leone established a Credit Reference Bureau within the Bank of Sierra Leone, mandating all financial institutions to give all information regarding loan applications for credit history checks. The credit history checks will detail all outstanding loans, when and where a loan was taken, and the repayment history guiding financial institutions in their loan decision. The Bureau now operates a digital identification system to control credit information and ensure citizens have secure and complete ownership of their data and information, transforming the financial inclusion landscape. 4. Industrial Policies The Investment Promotion Act 2004 creates various incentives for foreign and domestic investors. SLIEPA compiles information about the benefits and incentives available in various sectors. In particular, these are investment and employment, research and development, value-added manufacturing and training expenses incentives; incentives provided for businesses engaged in agriculture, airlines, fish farming, infrastructure, liquefied petroleum gas and cookers, mineral and petroleum, petroleum refinery, pharmaceuticals, photovoltaic systems, poultry, tourism; and income tax deductions for disabled persons, women and youth employment and skills development, and social services like schools and hospitals, etc. SLIEPA provides details of these investment incentives on its website at: https://www.sliepa.gov.sl/ , and the Ministry of Finance provides a handbook on tax incentives for investment at https://mof.gov.sl/documents/handbook-of-tax-incentives-for-investment-in-sierra-leone/ . The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Act of 2014 established the PPP Unit in the Office of the President to promote and increase private sector involvement in the development plan of the country, especially in public utility services and will ensure that PPP arrangements follow the Act. Since its establishment, the PPP Unit has engaged the private sectors to secure projects in energy, fisheries, health, housing, etc. In conjunction with First Step, a subsidiary of U.S.-based development organization World Hope International, the government established a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 2011 on 54 acres outside of the capital, Freetown. The SEZ policy accords businesses operating in the zone with a three-year tax holiday, duty and tax exemptions on imported goods, expedited government services including customs, immigration, registration, and guaranteed electricity and water supplies. The Sierra Leone Local Content Agency Act 2016 promotes foreign investors’ utilization of the domestic private sector. The Act applies in the mining, industrial, petroleum, manufacturing, agriculture, transportation, maritime, aviation, tourism, public works, fisheries, health, energy sectors, etc. The local content policy is meant to boost the economy by leveraging the power of local industries and citizens through their participation in the economy. It targets several issues, including: Employment of nationals: All foreign businesses must employ Sierra Leoneans, at least 20 percent of the managerial and 50 percent of intermediate positions. After five years, this ratio must increase to 60 percent for managerial and 80 percent for intermediate positions. Preferential Treatment: Preference will be granted to a foreign business that partners with Sierra Leonean businesses over foreign companies with no equity share owned by Sierra Leonean entities. First Consideration: Foreign businesses must give Sierra Leoneans first consideration for employment and training. Use of local goods and services: Firms should give preference to Sierra Leonean goods when they are of equal or comparable value. Companies must use specific amounts of local materials in critical sectors, but if there is inadequate local capacity to meet the law’s target, the Ministry of Trade and Industry may issue a waiver. National preferences in contracts: The policy gives first consideration to Sierra Leonean companies for mining and petroleum awards and licenses and public works contracts. The policy also offers domestic firms a preferential margin in government and private procurements. The Local Content Agency enforces the local content policy. Companies must submit local content plans to demonstrate compliance, and violations are subject to fines, the loss of investment incentives, and civil forfeiture. 5. Protection of Property Rights There are two systems of land tenure in Sierra Leone. The Western Area, the former British colony of Sierra Leone, which includes Freetown, operates under a freehold system. In the provincial areas outside the Western Area, the land is governed under a leasehold system where local communities retain ultimate control. Foreigners cannot own land under either system but can lease land for terms of up to 99 years. In leasehold areas, local Paramount Chiefs control the land and may enter joint ventures with investors to develop or use the land in ways that serve the interests of the local communities. The Constitution protects property rights, but the rule of law is fragile and uneven across the country. In the absence of an effectively functioning legal framework, property rights and contracts are not adequately secure. Mortgages and liens are possible but rare and generally involve high-interest rates and short loan periods. There is no land titling system, and traditional tribal justice systems still supplement the national government’s judiciary, especially in rural areas. In 2020, the World Bank Doing Business Report ranked Sierra Leone 169 in the World Bank ease of registering property. The process takes approximately 56 days with seven procedures and costs about 11 percent of the property’s value. The Land Administration system currently inhibits successful problem resolution. The survey system is manual, and land survey technologies are outdated and inaccurate. Property management procedures are lengthy, unreliable, expensive, and do not guarantee the protection of the property user and or owner’s rights. In 2017, the cabinet approved a comprehensive national land policy to improve and strengthen land laws and administration within the land tenure systems in the Western Area and the provinces. The policy, which awaits parliamentary action, is intended to enhance the abilities of institutions to acquire land for responsible investment and promote sustainable socio-economic development. While the new policy seeks to gradually formalize land transactions while respecting the customary systems, the 2019–23 Medium-term National Development Plan recognizes that land ownership rights and obligations are necessary to attract foreign investment. Sierra Leone has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) since 1986 and a member of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), the common intellectual property body for English-speaking African countries, since 1980. As a member of the WTO, Sierra Leone is bound by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Sierra Leone has not ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the Berne Convention to protect Literary and Artistic Rights. Despite its recognition of international standards, Sierra Leone’s intellectual property protection is limited. Laws pre-dating the colonial era allowed patents and trademarks registered in the United Kingdom to be extended to Sierra Leone. Efforts to update the country’s legal framework have thus far included the Copyright Act 2011, the Patents and Industrial Design Act 2012, and the Trademark Act 2014. Nonetheless, legal protections remain outdated and incomplete, and government enforcement is minimal due to resource and capacity limitations. For companies who may wish to seek advice from local attorneys who are experts in Sierra Leonean law, go to https://sl.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/ for a list of local lawyers. Sierra Leone has not been listed in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Sierra Leone. The country established a Stock Exchange in 2009 to provide a place for enterprise formation and a market for trading stocks and bonds. The exchange initially listed only one stock, a state-controlled bank, but in early 2017, it had three listings that expressed willingness to trade their shares at the exchange. Sierra Leone acceded to the IMF Article VIII in January 1996, which removed all restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The regulatory system does not interfere with the free flow of financial resources. Nonetheless, foreign and domestic businesses alike have difficulty obtaining commercial credit. Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Sierra Leoneans, but banks loan small amounts at high-interest rates. Foreign investors typically bring capital in from outside the country. Sierra Leone’s banking sector, supervised by the central bank of Sierra Leone, consists of 14 commercial banks, 66 foreign exchange bureaus, 18 community banks including Apex Bank, 39 credit-only microfinance, five deposit-taking microfinance, two discount houses, a home mortgage finance company, a leasing company, two mobile financial services providers, and a stock exchange. Bank branches exist throughout the country, with activity concentrated in Freetown. The banking system currently has seven correspondent banks. While the commercial banking sector is characterized by poor performance with significant financial vulnerability, the central bank of Sierra Leone in 2018 approved the takeover of a commercial bank acquired in 2016 by a foreign investor. Foreign individuals and companies are permitted to establish bank accounts. The use of mobile money is becoming more popular. Other electronic payments and ATM usage are available in urban areas but limited in rural settings, while the Bank of Sierra Leone is set to roll out a “national payment switch” to facilitate connectivity among different banks’ electronic systems. Telecommunications companies are upgrading to enhance mobile money services and e-commerce specifically. In December 2021, the Parliament, upon the request of the Bank of Sierra Leone, passed into law the redenomination of the Leone bill. The bill authorizes the elimination of three zeros from the currency- Le 1,000 will now be Le1, and so on. The redenomination is planned to take place in 2022. According to the governor of the central bank, the move is to reduce transaction costs, standardize the Leones bill and save the cost of currency printing. The bank is now embarking on a sensitization campaign. Sierra Leone suffers from a high inflation rate and deteriorating currency exchange rate. In December 2021, the annual national consumer price or inflation rate was 17.94 percent. As part of structural reforms in the banking sector under the Extended Credit Facility of the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of Sierra Leone pledged to establish a particular resolution framework for troubled financial institutions, establish a deposit insurance system, strengthen its capacity to supervise and oversee the non-bank financial institution sector, and facilitate the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) both internally and across the financial industry. Inadequate supervisory oversight of financial institutions, weak regulations, and corruption have made Sierra Leone vulnerable to money laundering. While the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) controls remain underdeveloped and underfunded, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) completed a national risk assessment in 2017. The FIU is currently working with the Economic Crime Team of the Office of Technical Assistance, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to enhance its capacity with technical visits to the FIU. The GIABA (a French acronym for Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action Contre la Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest, which in English is, ‘The Inter-Government Action against Money Laundering in West Africa’) and the EU also funded a workshop on designated non-financial business and professions on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing Terrorism (AML/CFT) preventive measures. Sierra Leone has a floating exchange rate regime. The Leone, has depreciated slowly over the years mainly due to the increasing demand to finance current consumption and a decreasing inflow of foreign currency resulting from decreased exports and remittances. Sierra Leone has not established a sovereign wealth fund which was legislated under the 2018 Extractive Industries Revenue Act and the 2016 Public Financial Management Act. The implementation was delayed because of the collapse of the international iron ore prices in 2014-16, which coincided with the Ebola outbreak, both of which deteriorated the economy’s fundamentals. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sierra Leone has more than 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) mainly active in the utilities, transport, and financial sectors. There is no official or comprehensive government-maintained list of SOEs. There is no official or comprehensive government-maintained list of SOEs. However, notable examples include the Guma Valley Water Company, the Sierra Leone Telecommunication Company, the Electricity Distribution, and Supply Authority, the Electricity Generation and Transmission Company, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation, the Rokel Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company, to name but a few. Some of these SOEs are governed by an independent board of directors, while the relevant government ministries supervise others. Sierra Leone is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the WTO Framework. SOEs may engage in commerce with the private sector, but they do not compete on the same terms as private enterprises, and they often have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs in Sierra Leone do not play a significant role in funding or sponsoring research and development. The National Commission for Privatization was established in 2002 to facilitate the privatization of various SOEs. With support from the World Bank, the commission has focused on privatizing the country’s port operations and other unsuccessful public enterprises. It continues to seek investments in public-private partnerships for SOEs with significant infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy, housing, etc. Privatization processes are open to foreign investors and could be integrated into plans for better capitalizing the stock exchange in Freetown via new equity listings. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government encourages companies to engage in responsible business conduct, and SLIEPA seeks investors who will undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects. Sierra Leone does not have a set of standards or policies for CSR, but the law provides various incentives. For example, the Finance Act 2011 created a tax deduction for expenditures on social services outside the investment’s scope, such as the construction of schools and hospitals for community use. Community leaders generally expect businesses outside of Freetown and the Western Area, where local Paramount Chiefs control the land, to engage in projects to support the communities’ social and economic well-being, human capital development, and physical infrastructure. Throughout the country, there is limited awareness of corporate activities’ impacts on human rights and environmental protection. In 2008, Sierra Leone enacted the Environment Protection Act (amended in 2010), which provides rules for various environmental matters, such as environmental impact assessment and the control of ozone-depleting substances, especially by mining companies. The act established the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), which is the authority on environmental issues and social matters related to issuing and administering environmental licenses for mining activities. There are two systems of land ownership in Sierra Leone – the freehold and the leasehold. The freehold system operates in the Western Area and the leasehold in the provinces. Foreign investors cannot own land outright in Sierra Leone but can take leases for terms of not more than 55 years with an option to renew for a further period of 21 years; or 99 years for mining purposes. In 2019, the GoSL canceled the mining licenses of two iron ore mining companies on the allegation of non-payment of royalties. One was subjected to international arbitration but was later withdrawn and resolved out of court. Sierra Leone became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008, established the Sierra Leone Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (SLEITI), and became compliant with EITI rules in 2014. In 2019, the EITI Board agreed that Sierra Leone had made meaningful progress in implementing the EITI Standard but should undertake corrective action before the second validation in December 2020. However, in 2020, recognizing the challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the EITI Board introduced flexible measures in EITI implementation and tasked the multi-stakeholder group (MSG) to focus on ensuring EITII’s commitment to transparency and accountability. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption Corruption poses a significant challenge in Sierra Leone and is particularly endemic in government procurement, the award of licenses and concessions, regulatory enforcement, customs clearance, and dispute resolution. Sierra Leone signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2004. The country is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 2000, has the authority to investigate and prosecute acts of corruption by individuals and companies. The Anti-Corruption Act of 2008 makes it criminal to offer, solicit, or receive a bribe. This law applies to all appointed and elected officials, close family members, and companies, whether foreign or domestic. The Commission launched a “Pay No Bribe” campaign in 2016, encouraging citizens to report corruption in the public sector. In 2021, Sierra Leone ranked 115/180, improving two places from 117/180 (2020) in the Transparency International Corruption Index. In its efforts with respect to tackling corruption, the country moved up 14 steps from 129/180 in 2018 to 115/180 in 2021. Sierra Leone passed the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s indicator on the control of corruption four times in a row, progressing from 48 percent in FY2018 to 83 percent in FY 2022. The government completed the Commission of Inquiry probing corruption allegations into the past government of former President Koroma in March 2020. A white paper to implement the recommendations of the reports of the Commission of Inquiry is currently being implemented by the Ministry of Justice. In 2019, the GoSL passed an Anti-Corruption Amendment Act, which increased the powers of the ACC in the fight against graft. It protects witnesses and whistleblowers and provides sanctions for failing to submit asset declarations on time or falsified, inaccurate, or misleading information. It empowers the commissioner to prevent contracts that are not of national interest and increases penalties for offenses under the Act. Since then, the ACC has steadily pursued arrests, repayments, and convictions in private and public sectors. As of April 2020, the ACC had recovered millions of dollars in misappropriated funds and prosecuted corruption cases leading to convictions of present and former public officials and private citizens. The Chief Justice established a Special Court to adjudicate corruption cases while the ACC signed several information-sharing agreements with key government institutions, including the Audit Service Sierra Leone and the Financial Intelligence Unit. The ACC also conducted a substantial systems and processes reviews of public offices and public education and outreach activities across the country. In early 2022, the ACC introduced a reward and incentive scheme for informants, whistleblowers, and citizens who support the ACC in the fight against corruption; and is currently focused on aspects of alleged corruption in the 2019 and 2020 audit reports for Sierra Leone. Francis Ben Kelfala, Commissioner Anti-Corruption Commission Cathedral House 3 Gloucester Street, Freetown +232 78 832131 & +232 78 321 321 info@anticorruption.gov.sl http://anticorruption.gov.sl/ Lavina Banduah (lbanduah@tisierraleone.org) Executive Director Transparency International Sierra Leone 20 Dundas Street, Freetown +232 79 060985 & +232 76 618348 tisl@tisierraleone.org http://www.tisierraleone.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature. In March 2018, the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) presidential candidate, Julius Maada Bio, won the fourth cycle of presidential elections since the civil war ended in 2002. It was deemed “free and fair” by international observers. The Sierra Leone Police, supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is responsible for law enforcement and maintaining security within the country, but it is poorly equipped and lacks sufficient investigative and forensic capabilities. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is responsible for external security and has some domestic security responsibilities to assist police upon request in extraordinary circumstances. The RSLAF reports to the Ministry of Defense and the Office of National Security. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Sierra Leone, in 2020, made a historical “Freedom of Speech” move by repealing Part 5 of the Public Order Act of 1965 that criminalized libel. President Bio has also signed into law the abolition of the death penalty. There is tension between social, political, and cultural institutions over power and resources. Policies and positions are sometimes sought for control over public finances. The government launched three Commissions of Inquiry (COI) to probe into the governance activities of the immediate past administration, which created further tensions. The COI was concluded in March 2020, and a government White Paper issued in September 2020 assuring citizens of the full implementation of the recommendations, which included recovery of all monies and confiscation of all assets as detailed in the COI reports. At the outbreak of COVID-19, the government implemented nationwide restrictions and curtailed movement to reduce the risk of the infection. Enforcement provoked sporadic violent clashes around the country, leaving some people dead, many hospitalized, and property destroyed. The President blamed it on the opposition as trying to make the country ungovernable and raised concerns about peace and national cohesion. He cautioned that reverting to the dark days of the war will only make things very difficult for Sierra Leoneans. Sierra Leone’s relations with the neighboring countries of Guinea and Liberia are peaceful. However, Guinea laid claim over the border village of Yenga, in the Kailahun District of Sierra Leone, despite the several meetings between the Presidents of the two countries. There have been isolated incidents of politically motivated violence during and after the 2018 national and local elections. Sierra Leone has declared June 24, 2023, as the official date for the next presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections and will register voters for that election from September 3 to October 4, 2023. Thirteen opposition political parties have established a coalition, the Coalition Progressive Political Party (COPPP), to challenge the current administration in the next presidential election. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Sierra Leone’s labor force is informal, unregulated, and lacking specialized skills. Approximately 90 percent of laborers work in the informal sector, predominantly in subsistence or other small-scale agriculture. Sierra Leone’s labor force was devastated by the country’s civil war of 1991-2002, and the formal employment sector has yet to recover to pre-war levels. The war led to significant migration out of the country and destroyed the nation’s education system. In a country where educational institutions once earned the moniker “the Athens of Africa,” adult literacy was estimated at 43 percent in 2018 (data.worldbank.org). Businesses identify significant shortfalls in skilled professionals due to limited vocational training. While the government is developing Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programs, foreign investors find it challenging to recruit and train enough workers. Youth unemployment is persistently high and will continue to grow due to high birth rates and changing demography. Sierra Leone in 2016 enacted “The Local Content Policy,” stipulating quotas for investment in and employment of Sierra Leonean citizens in corporations operating in the country. The Sierra Leone Local Content Agency (www.localcontent.gov.sl) monitors compliance with the policy. The Minister of Finance reviewed the national minimum wage from Le500,000 to Le600,000 Leones (approximately U.S.$60) per month effective January 2020 and applies to all workers, including those in the informal sector. The law requires paid leave and overtime wages, but enforcement is ineffective, and there is no prohibition on excessive compulsory overtime. Employers can dismiss workers with limited notice and severance. Foreign employees must obtain work permits from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and most countries’ nationals must have visas. Additional information is available from the Embassy of Sierra Leone in the United States and at http://travel.state.gov. Government policies regarding the hiring of Sierra Leonean nationals are described above in the “Performance and Data Localization Requirements” section. The law allows workers to join independent unions without prior authorization, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security estimates that approximately 35-40 percent of workers in the formal economy are unionized, including agricultural workers, mineworkers, and health workers. The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, and the government generally respects this right. However, employers have reportedly intimidated workers in some private industries to prevent them from joining a union, and there is no legal protection against employers’ discriminating against union members. Unions have the right to strike, although the government requires 21-day prior notice. Collective bargaining is widespread in the formal sector, and most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The Employers and Employees Act of 1960, the Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act of 1971, and regulations adopted by the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation govern labor issues. Legal requirements are outdated and poorly enforced, while child labor remains widespread. The law limits child labor, allowing light work at age 13, full-time nonhazardous work at age 15, and all work at age 18. Child labor is more prevalent in agriculture, artisanal gold and diamond mining, granite quarrying, sand mining and construction, domestic service, street hawking, begging, charcoal burning, and fishing. The laws against child labor are not effectively enforced. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security attributes the ineffective enforcement to a lack of funding and the inherent difficulties of monitoring child labor in the informal sector. Also, the International Labor Organization has identified discrepancies between provisions in the Child Rights Act 2007 and provisions of the Employers and Employees Act 1960. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $4.11 2020 $4.06 billion https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ Sierra-Leone/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $12 million https://ustr.gov/countries- regions/africa/sierra-leone Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A https://ustr.gov/countries- regions/africa/sierra-leone Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ Sierra-Leone/ *Host Country Source: https://www.statistics.sl/index.php/gdp.html# Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey data are not available for Sierra Leone. 14. Contact for More Information Economic and Commercial Section U.S. Mission Sierra Leone Southridge, Hill Station Freetown, Sierra Leone +232 99 105 500 freetown-econ@state.gov Singapore Executive Summary Singapore maintains an open, heavily trade-dependent economy that plays a critical role in the global supply chain. The government utilized unprecedented levels of public spending to support the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Singapore supports predominantly open investment policies and a robust free market economy while actively managing and sustaining Singapore’s economic development. U.S. companies regularly cite transparency, business-friendly laws, tax structure, customs facilitation, intellectual property protection, and well-developed infrastructure as attractive investment climate features. Singapore actively enforces its robust anti-corruption laws and typically ranks as the least corrupt country in Asia. In addition, Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index placed Singapore as the fourth-least corrupt nation globally. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), which entered into force in 2004, expanded U.S. market access in goods, services, investment, and government procurement, enhanced intellectual property protection, and provided for cooperation in promoting labor rights and environmental protections. Singapore has a diversified economy that attracts substantial foreign investment in manufacturing (petrochemical, electronics, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and equipment) and services (financial, trade, and business). The government actively promotes the country as a research and development (R&D) and innovation center for businesses by offering tax incentives, research grants, and partnership opportunities with domestic research agencies. U.S. direct investment (FDI) in Singapore in 2020 totaled $270 billion, primarily in non-bank holding companies, manufacturing, finance, and insurance. Singapore received more than double the U.S. FDI invested in any other Asian nation. The investment outlook was positive due to Singapore’s proximity to Southeast Asia’s developing economies. Singapore remains a regional hub for thousands of multinational companies and continues to maintain its reputation as a world leader in dispute resolution, financing, and project facilitation for regional infrastructure development. Singapore is poised to attract future foreign investments in digital innovation, pharmaceutical manufacturing, sustainable development, and cybersecurity. The Government of Singapore (hereafter, “the government”) is investing heavily in automation, artificial intelligence, integrated systems, as well as sustainability, and seeks to establish itself as a regional hub for these technologies. Singapore is also a well-established hub for medical research and device manufacturing. Singapore relies heavily on foreign workers who make up 34 percent of the workforce. The COVID-19 pandemic was initially concentrated in dormitories for low-wage foreign workers in the construction and marine industries, which resulted in strict quarantine measures that brought the construction sector to a near standstill. The government tightened foreign labor policies in 2020 to encourage firms to improve productivity and employ more Singaporean workers, and lowered most companies’ quotas for mid- and low-skilled foreign workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government introduced more programs to partially subsidize wages and the cost to firms of recruiting, hiring, and training local workers Singapore plans to reach net-zero by or around mid-century but faces alternative energy diversification challenges in setting 2050 net-zero carbon emission targets. Singapore launched its national climate strategy – the Singapore Green Plan 2030 – in February 2021, and focuses on increased sustainability, carbon emissions reductions, fostering job and investment opportunities, and increasing climate resilience and food security. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 8 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 270,807 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 54,920 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Singapore maintains a heavily trade-dependent economy characterized by an open investment regime, with some licensing restrictions in the financial services, professional services, and media sectors. The government was committed to maintaining a free market, but also actively plans Singapore’s economic development, including through a network of state wholly owned and majority-owned enterprises (SOEs). As of April, the top three Singapore-listed SOEs (DBS, Singtel, CapitaLand Investment Limited) accounted for 15.6 percent of the Singapore Exchange (SGX) capitalization. Some observers have criticized the dominant role of SOEs in the domestic economy, arguing that they have displaced or suppressed private sector entrepreneurship and investment. Singapore’s legal framework and public policies are generally favorable toward foreign investors. Foreign investors are not required to enter joint ventures or cede management control to local interests, and local and foreign investors are subject to the same basic laws. Apart from regulatory requirements in some sectors (see also: Limits on National Treatment and Other Restrictions), eligibility for various incentive schemes depends on investment proposals meeting the criteria set by relevant government agencies. Singapore places no restrictions on reinvestment or repatriation of earnings or capital. The judicial system, which includes international arbitration and mediation centers and a commercial court, upholds the sanctity of contracts, and decisions are generally considered to be transparent and effectively enforced. The Economic Development Board (EDB) is the lead promotion agency that facilitates foreign investment into Singapore ( https://www.edb.gov.sg ). EDB undertakes investment promotion and industry development and works with foreign and local businesses by providing information and facilitating introductions and access to government incentives for local and international investments. The government maintains close engagement with investors through EDB, which provides feedback to other government agencies to ensure that infrastructure and public services remain efficient and cost competitive. EDB maintains 18 international offices, including in Chicago, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. Exceptions to Singapore’s general openness to foreign investment exist in sectors considered critical to national security, including telecommunications, broadcasting, domestic news media, financial services, legal and accounting services, ports, airports, and property ownership. Under Singaporean law, articles of incorporation may include shareholding limits that restrict ownership in such entities by foreign persons. Since 2000, the Singapore telecommunications market has been fully liberalized. This move has allowed foreign and domestic companies seeking to provide facilities-based (e.g., fixed line or mobile networks) or services-based (e.g., local and international calls and data services over leased networks) telecommunications services to apply for licenses to operate and deploy telecommunication systems and services. Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) – majority owned by Temasek, a state-owned investment company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder – faces competition in all market segments. However, its main competitors, M1 and StarHub, are also SOEs. In April 2019, Australian company TPG Telecom began providing telecommunications services. Approximately 30 mobile virtual network operator services (MVNOs) have also entered the market. The four Singapore telecommunications companies compete primarily on MVNO partnerships and voice and data plans. As of April, Singapore had 76 facilities-based operators offering telecommunications services. Since 2007, Singtel has been exempted from dominant licensee obligations for the residential and commercial portions of the retail international telephone services. Singtel is also exempted from dominant licensee obligations for wholesale international telephone services, international managed data, international intellectual property transit, leased satellite bandwidth (including VSAT, DVB-IP, satellite TV Downlink, and Satellite IPLC), terrestrial international private leased circuit, and backhaul services. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) granted Singtel’s exemption after assessing the market for these services had effective competition. IMDA operates as both the regulatory agency and the investment promotion agency for the country’s telecommunications sector. IMDA conducts public consultations on major policy reviews and provides decisions on policy changes to relevant companies. To facilitate the 5th generation mobile network (5G) technology and service trials, IMDA waived frequency fees for companies interested in conducting 5G trials for equipment testing, research, and assessment of commercial potential. In April 2020, IMDA granted rights to build nationwide 5G networks to Singtel and a joint venture between StarHub and M1. In December 2021, IMDA also extended license and granted rights for TPG Telecom to build 5G networks. IMDA announced a goal of full 5G coverage by the end of 2025. These three companies, along with TPG Telecom, are also now permitted to launch smaller, specialized 5G networks to support specialized applications, such as manufacturing and port operations. Singapore’s government did not hold a traditional spectrum auction, instead charging a moderate, flat fee to operate the networks and evaluating proposals from the MVNOs based on their ability to provide effective coverage, meet regulatory requirements, invest significant financial resources, and address cybersecurity and network resilience concerns. The announcement emphasized the importance of the winning MVNOs using multiple vendors, to ensure security and resilience. Singapore has committed to being one of the first countries to make 5G services broadly available, and its tightly managed 5G-rollout process continues apace, despite COVID-19. The government views this as a necessity for a country that prides itself on innovation, even as these private firms worry that the commercial potential does not yet justify the extensive upfront investment necessary to develop new networks. The local free-to-air broadcasting, cable, and newspaper sectors are effectively closed to foreign firms. Section 44 of the Broadcasting Act restricts foreign equity ownership of companies broadcasting in Singapore to 49 percent or less, although the act does allow for exceptions. Individuals cannot hold shares that would make up more than 5 percent of the total votes in a broadcasting company without the government’s prior approval. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act restricts equity ownership (local or foreign) of newspaper companies to less than 5 percent per shareholder and requires that directors be Singaporean citizens. Newspaper companies must issue two classes of shares, ordinary and management, with the latter available only to Singaporean citizens or corporations approved by the government. Holders of management shares have an effective veto over selected board decisions. Singapore regulates content across all major media outlets through IMDA. The government controls the distribution, importation, and sale of media sources and has curtailed or banned the circulation of some foreign publications. Singapore’s leaders have also brought defamation suits against foreign publishers and local government critics, which have resulted in the foreign publishers issuing apologies and paying damages. Several dozen publications remain prohibited under the Undesirable Publications Act, which restricts the import, sale, and circulation of publications that the government considers contrary to public interest. Examples include pornographic magazines, publications by banned religious groups, and publications containing extremist religious views. Following a routine review in 2015, IMDA’s predecessor, the Media Development Authority, lifted a ban on 240 publications, ranging from decades-old anti-colonial and communist material to adult interest content. Singaporeans generally face few restrictions on the internet, which is readily accessible. The government, however, subjected all internet content to similar rules and standards as traditional media, as defined by the IMDA’s Internet Code of Practice. Internet service providers are required to ensure that content complies with the code. The IMDA licenses the internet service providers through which local users are required to route their internet connections. However, the IMDA has blocked various websites containing objectionable material, such as pornography and racist and religious-hatred sites. Online news websites that report regularly on Singapore and have a significant reach are individually licensed, which requires adherence to requirements to remove prohibited content within 24 hours of notification from IMDA. Some view this regulation as a way to censor online critics of the government, and in September 2021 IMDA suspended the license of alternative news website The Online Citizen with immediate effect for allegedly failing to declare its sources of funding. In April 2019, the government introduced legislation in parliament to counter “deliberate online falsehoods.” The legislation, called the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) entered into force on October 2, 2019, requires online platforms to publish correction notifications or remove online information that government ministers classify as factually false or misleading, and which they deem likely to threaten national security, diminish public confidence in the government, incite feelings of ill will between people, or influence an election. Non-compliance is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment and the government can use stricter measures such as disabling access to end-users in Singapore and forcing online platforms to disallow persons in question from using its services in Singapore. Opposition politicians, bloggers, alternative news websites, and as of recent posts about COVID-19 have been the target of the majority of POFMA cases thus far and many of them used U.S. social media platforms. Besides those individuals, U.S. social media companies were issued most POFMA correction orders and complied with them. U.S. media and social media sites continue to operate in Singapore, but a few major players have ceased running political ads after the government announced that it would impose penalties on sites or individuals that spread “misinformation,” as determined by the government. On January 31, 2020, the Singaporean government temporary lifted the exemption of social media platforms, search engines and Internet intermediaries from complying with POFMA, with the goal of combatting false information on the evolving COVID-19 situation. In September, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to strengthen the country’s ability to “prevent, detect, and disrupt foreign interference” in domestic politics conducted through hostile information campaigns and the use of local proxies. The bill was passed in October 2021 and expanded the government’s powers and tools to control “foreign influence,” but has yet to take effect. Under FICA, the minister for home affairs could compel internet and social media service providers to disclose information, remove online content, block user accounts, and take “countermeasures” against “politically significant persons” who are or are suspected of working on behalf of or receiving funding from “foreign political organizations” and “foreign principals.” While the government provided assurances that “legitimate business activities” would not be targeted by the legislation, opposition parties, foreign businesses, and civil society groups expressed concerns about the law’s expansion of executive powers and potential impacts on the rights to freedom of expression, association, participation in public affairs, and privacy. Mediacorp TV is the only free-to-air TV broadcaster and is 100 percent owned by the government via Temasek Holdings (Temasek). Mediacorp reported that its free-to-air channels are viewed weekly by 80 percent of residents. Local pay-TV providers are StarHub and Singtel, which are both partially owned by Temasek or its subsidiaries. Local free-to-air radio broadcasters are Mediacorp Radio Singapore (owned by Temasek Holdings), SPH Radio (owned by SPH Media Limited), and So Drama! Entertainment (owned by the Ministry of Defense). BBC World Services is the only foreign free-to-air radio broadcaster in Singapore. To rectify the high degree of content fragmentation in the Singaporean pay-TV market and shift the focus of competition from an exclusivity-centric strategy to other aspects such as service differentiation and competitive packaging, the IMDA implemented cross-carriage measures in 2011, requiring pay-TV companies designated by IMDA to be Receiving Qualified Licensees (RQL) – currently Singtel and StarHub – to cross-carry content subject to exclusive carriage provisions. Correspondingly, Supplying Qualified Licensees (SQLs) with an exclusive contract for a channel are required to carry that content on other RQL pay-TV companies. In February 2019, the IMDA proposed to continue the current cross-carriage measures. The Motion Picture Association (MPA) has expressed concern this measure restricts copyright exclusivity. Content providers consider the measures an unnecessary interference in a competitive market that denies content holders the ability to negotiate freely in the marketplace, and an interference with their ability to manage and protect their intellectual property. More common content is now available across the different pay-TV platforms, and the operators are beginning to differentiate themselves by originating their own content, offering subscribed content online via personal and tablet computers, and delivering content via fiber networks. Streaming services have entered the market, which MPA has found leads to a significant reduction in intellectual property infringements. StarHub and Singtel have both partnered with multiple content providers, including U.S. companies, to provide streaming content in Singapore and around the region. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) regulates all banking activities as provided for under the Banking Act. Singapore maintains legal distinctions between foreign and local banks and the type of license (i.e., full service, wholesale, and offshore banks) held by foreign commercial banks. As of April, 30 foreign full-service licensees and 97 wholesale banks operated in Singapore. An additional 21 merchant banks were licensed to conduct corporate finance, investment banking, and other fee-based activities. Offshore and wholesale banks are not allowed to operate Singapore dollar retail banking activities. Only full banks and “Qualifying Full Banks” (QFBs) can operate Singapore dollar retail banking activities but are subject to restrictions on their number of places of business, ATMs, and ATM networks. Additional QFB licenses may be granted to a subset of full banks, which provide greater branching privileges and greater access to the retail market than other full banks. As of April, there were 10 banks operating QFB licenses. China Construction Bank received the most recent QFB award in December 2020. Following a series of public consultations conducted by MAS over a three-year period, the Banking Act 2020 came into operation on February 14, 2020. The amendments include, among other things, the removal of the Domestic Banking Unit (DBU) and Asian Currency Unit (ACU) divide, consolidation of the regulatory framework of merchant banks, expansion of the grounds for revoking bank licenses and strengthening oversight of banks’ outsourcing arrangements. Newly granted digital banking licenses under foreign ownership apply only to wholesale transactions. The government initiated a banking liberalization program in 1999 to ease restrictions on foreign banks and has supplemented this with phased-in provisions under the USSFTA, including removal of a 40 percent ceiling on foreign ownership of local banks and a 20 percent aggregate foreign shareholding limit on finance companies. The minister in charge of MAS must approve the merger or takeover of a local bank or financial holding company, as well as the acquisition of voting shares in such institutions above specific thresholds of 5, 12, or 20 percent of shareholdings. Although Singapore’s government has lifted the formal ceilings on foreign ownership of local banks and finance companies, the approval for controllers of local banks ensures that this control rests with individuals or groups whose interests are aligned with the long-term interests of the Singapore economy and Singapore’s national interests. Of the 30 full-service licenses granted to foreign banks, three have gone to U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase Bank). U.S. financial institutions enjoy phased-in benefits under the USSFTA. Since 2006, only one U.S.-licensed full-service banks has obtained QFB status (Citibank). U.S. and foreign full-service banks with QFB status can freely relocate existing branches and share ATMs among themselves. They can also provide electronic funds transfer and point-of-sale debit services and accept services related to Singapore’s compulsory pension fund. In 2007, Singapore lifted the quota on new licenses for U.S. wholesale banks. Locally and non-locally incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. full-service banks with QFB status can apply for access to local ATM networks. However, no U.S. bank has come to a commercial agreement to gain such access. Despite liberalization, U.S. and other foreign banks in the domestic retail-banking sector still face barriers. Under the enhanced QFB program launched in 2012, MAS requires QFBs it deems systemically significant to incorporate locally. If those locally incorporated entities are deemed “significantly rooted” in Singapore, with a majority of Singaporean or permanent resident members, Singapore may grant approval for an additional 25 places of business, of which up to ten may be branches. Local retail banks do not face similar constraints on customer service locations or access to the local ATM network. As noted above, U.S. banks are not subject to quotas on service locations under the terms of the USSFTA. Credit card holders from U.S. banks incorporated in Singapore cannot access their accounts through the local ATM networks. They are also unable to access their accounts for cash withdrawals, transfers, or bill payments at ATMs operated by banks other than those operated by their own bank or at foreign banks’ shared ATM network. Nevertheless, full-service foreign banks have made significant inroads in other retail banking areas, with substantial market share in products like credit cards and personal and housing loans. In January 2019, MAS announced the passage of the Payment Services Bill after soliciting public feedback. The bill requires more payment services such as digital payment tokens, dealing in virtual currency, and merchant acquisition, to be licensed and regulated by MAS. In order to reduce the risk of misuse for illicit purposes, the new law also limits the amount of funds that can be held in or transferred out of a personal payment account (e.g., mobile wallets) in a year. Regulations are tailored to the type of activity performed and addresses issues related to terrorism financing, money laundering, and cyber risks. In December 2020, MAS granted four digital bank licenses: two to Sea Limited and a Grab/Singtel consortium for full retail banking and two to Ant Group and the Greenland consortium (a China-based conglomerate). Singapore has no trading restrictions on foreign-owned stockbrokers. There is no cap on the aggregate investment by foreigners regarding the paid-up capital of dealers that are members of the SGX. Direct registration of foreign mutual funds is allowed provided MAS approves the prospectus and the fund. The USSFTA relaxed conditions foreign asset managers must meet in order to offer products under the government-managed compulsory pension fund (Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme). The Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA) under the Ministry of Law oversees the regulation, licensing, and compliance of all law practice entities and the registration of foreign lawyers in Singapore. Foreign law firms with a licensed Foreign Law Practice (FLP) may offer the full range of legal services in foreign law and international law, but cannot practice Singapore law except in the context of international commercial arbitration. U.S. and foreign attorneys are allowed to represent parties in arbitration without the need for a Singaporean attorney to be present. To offer Singapore law, FLPs require either a Qualifying Foreign Law Practice (QFLP) license, a Joint Law Venture (JLV) with a Singapore Law Practice (SLP), or a Formal Law Alliance (FLA) with a SLP. The vast majority of Singapore’s 130 foreign law firms operate FLPs, while QFLPs and JLVs each number in the single digits. The QFLP licenses allow foreign law firms to practice in permitted areas of Singapore law, which excludes constitutional and administrative law, conveyancing, criminal law, family law, succession law, and trust law. As of December 2020, there are nine QFLPs in Singapore, including five U.S. firms. In January 2019, the Ministry of Law announced the deferral to 2020 of the decision to renew the licenses of five QFLPs, which were set to expire in 2019, so the government can better assess their contribution to Singapore along with the other four firms whose licenses were also extended to 2020. Decisions on the renewal considers the firms’ quantitative and qualitative performance, such as the value of work that the Singapore office will generate, the extent to which the Singapore office will function as the firm’s headquarter for the region, the firm’s contributions to Singapore, and the firm’s proposal for the new license period. A JLV is a collaboration between a FLP and SLP, which may be constituted as a partnership or company. The director of legal services in the LSRA will consider all the relevant circumstances including the proposed structure and its overall suitability to achieve the objectives for which JLVs are permitted to be established. There is no clear indication on the percentage of shares that each JLV partner may hold in the JLV. Law degrees from designated U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand universities are recognized for purposes of admission to practice law in Singapore. Under the USSFTA, Singapore recognizes law degrees from Harvard University, Columbia University, New York University, and the University of Michigan. Singapore will admit to the Singapore Bar law school graduates of those designated universities who are Singapore citizens or permanent residents, and ranked among the top 70 percent of their graduating class or have obtained lower-second class honors (under the British system). Engineering and architectural firms can be 100 percent foreign owned. Engineers and architects are required to register with the Professional Engineers Board and the Board of Architects, respectively, to practice in Singapore. All applicants (both local and foreign) must have at least four years of practical experience in engineering, of which two are acquired in Singapore. Alternatively, students can attend two years of practical training in architectural works and pass written and/or oral examinations set by the respective board. Many major international accounting firms operate in Singapore. Registration as a public accountant under the Accountants Act is required to provide public accountancy services (i.e., the audit and reporting on financial statements and other acts that are required by any written law to be done by a public accountant) in Singapore, although registration as a public accountant is not required to provide other accountancy services, such as bookkeeping, accounting, taxation, and corporate advisory work. All accounting entities that provide public accountancy services must be approved under the Accountants Act and their supply of public accountancy services in Singapore must be under the control and management of partners or directors who are public accountants ordinarily resident in Singapore. In addition, if the accounting entity firm has two partners or directors, at least one of them must be a public accountant. If the business entity has more than two accounting partners or directors, two-thirds of the partners or directors must be public accountants. Singapore further liberalized its gas market with the amendment of the Gas Act and implementation of a Gas Network Code in 2008, which were designed to give gas retailers and importers direct access to the onshore gas pipeline infrastructure. However, key parts of the local gas market, such as town gas retailing and gas transportation through pipelines remain controlled by incumbent Singaporean firms. Singapore has sought to grow its supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and BG Singapore Gas Marketing Pte Ltd (acquired by Royal Dutch Shell in February 2016) was appointed in 2008 as the first aggregator with an exclusive franchise to import LNG to be sold in its re-gasified form in Singapore. In October 2017, Shell Eastern Trading Pte Ltd and Pavilion Gase Pte Ltd were awarded import licenses to market up to 1 million tons per annum or for three years, whichever occurs first. This also marked the conclusion of the first exclusive franchise awarded to BG Singapore Gas Marketing Pte Ltd. Beginning in November 2018 and concluding in May 2019, Singapore launched an open electricity market (OEM). Previously, Singapore Power was the only electricity retailer. As of October 2019, 40 percent of resident consumers had switched to a new electricity retailer and were saving between 20 and 30 percent on their monthly bills. During the second half of 2020, the government significantly reduced tariffs for household consumption and encouraged consumer OEM adoption. To participate in OEM, licensed retailers must satisfy additional credit, technical, and financial requirements set by Energy Market Authority in order to sell electricity to households and small businesses. There are two types of electricity retailers: Market Participant Retailers (MPRs) and Non-Market Participant Retailers (NMPRs). MPRs have to be registered with the Energy Market Company (EMC) to purchase electricity from the National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS) to sell to contestable consumers. NMPRs need not register with EMC to participate in the NEMS since they will purchase electricity indirectly from the NEMS through the Market Support Services Licensee (MSSL). As of April 2020, there were 12 retailers in the market, including foreign and local entities. In 2021, a number of the electricity retailers withdrew from selling electricity due to high natural gas prices globally, resulting in unfavorable market conditions. Foreign and local entities may readily establish, operate, and dispose of their own enterprises in Singapore subject to certain requirements. A foreigner who wants to incorporate a company in Singapore is required to appoint a local resident director; foreigners may continue to reside outside of Singapore. Foreigners who wish to incorporate a company and be present in Singapore to manage its operations are strongly advised to seek approval from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) before incorporation. Except for representative offices (where foreign firms maintain a local representative but do not conduct commercial transactions in Singapore) there are no restrictions on carrying out remunerative activities. As of October 2017, foreign companies may seek to transfer their place of registration and be registered as companies limited by shares in Singapore under Part XA (Transfer of Registration) of the Companies Act ( https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CoA1967 ). Such transferred foreign companies are subject to the same requirements as locally incorporated companies. All businesses in Singapore must be registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). Foreign investors can operate their businesses in one of the following forms: sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, incorporated company, foreign company branch or representative office. Stricter disclosure requirements were passed in March 2017 requiring foreign company branches registered in Singapore to maintain public registers of their members. All companies incorporated in Singapore, foreign companies, and limited liability partnerships registered in Singapore are also required to maintain beneficial ownership in the form of a register of controllers (generally individuals or legal entities with more than 25 percent interest or control of the companies and foreign companies) aimed at preventing money laundering. While there is currently no cross-sectional screening process for foreign investments, investors are required to seek approval from specific sector regulators for investments in certain firms. These sectors include energy, telecommunications, broadcasting, the domestic news media, financial services, legal services, public accounting services, ports and airports, and property ownership. Under Singapore law, Articles of Incorporation may include shareholding limits that restrict ownership in corporations by foreign persons. Singapore does not maintain a formalized investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. There are no reports of U.S. investors being especially disadvantaged or singled out relative to other foreign investors. Singapore underwent a trade policy review with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in July 2016, after which no major policy recommendations were raised. ( https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/singapore_e.htm ) The OECD and UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) released a joint report in February 2019 on the ASEAN-OECD Investment Program. The program aims to foster dialogue and experience sharing between OECD countries and Southeast Asian economies on issues relating to the business and investment climate. The program is implemented through regional policy dialogue, country investment policy reviews, and training seminars. ( http://www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm ) The OECD released a Transfer Pricing Country Profile for Singapore in February. The profiles focus on countries’ domestic legislation regarding key transfer pricing principles, including the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing methods, comparability analysis, intangible property, intra-group services, cost contribution agreements, transfer pricing documentation, administrative approaches to avoiding and resolving disputes, safe harbors, and other implementation measures. ( https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-country-profile-singapore.pdf ) The OECD released a peer review report in March 2018 on Singapore’s implementation of internationally agreed tax standards under Action Plan 14 of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project. Action 14 strengthens the effectiveness and efficiency of the mutual agreement procedure, a cross-border tax dispute resolution mechanism. ( http://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/reports/singapore-2018-peer-review-report-transparency-exchange-information-aci.html ) As of June 2021, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report assessed how Singapore fared during the global COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent recovery. (https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf) Singapore’s online business registration process is clear and efficient and allows foreign companies to register branches. All businesses must be registered with ACRA through Bizfile, its online registration and information retrieval portal ( https://www.bizfile.gov.sg/), including any individual, firm or corporation that carries out business for a foreign company. Applications are typically processed immediately after the application fee is paid, but could take between 14 to 60 days, if the application is referred to another agency for approval or review. The process of establishing a foreign-owned limited liability company in Singapore is among the fastest in the world. ACRA ( www.acra.gov.sg ) provides a single window for business registration. Additional regulatory approvals (e.g., licensing or visa requirements) are obtained via individual applications to the respective ministries or statutory boards. Further information and business support on registering a branch of a foreign company is available through the EDB ( https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/how-we-help/setting-up.html ) and GuideMeSingapore, a corporate services firm Hawskford ( https://www.guidemesingapore.com /). Foreign companies may lease or buy privately or publicly held land in Singapore, though there are some restrictions on foreign property ownership. Foreign companies are free to open and maintain bank accounts in foreign currency. There is no minimum paid-in capital requirement, but at least one subscriber share must be issued for valid consideration at incorporation. Business facilitation processes provide for fair and equal treatment of women and minorities, and there are no mechanisms that provide special assistance to women and minorities. Singapore places no restrictions on domestic investors investing abroad. The government promotes outward investment through Enterprise Singapore, a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. It provides market information, business contacts, and financial assistance and grants for internationalizing companies. While it has a global reach and runs overseas centers in major cities across the world, a large share of its overseas centers are located in major trading and investment partners and regional markets like China, India, the United States, and ASEAN. 3. Legal Regime In May 2021, DBS Bank (DBS), SGX, Standard Chartered and Temasek started a joint venture to establish a global exchange and marketplace for high-quality carbon credits, called Climate Impact X (CIX). In March, SGX and OCBC established a low-carbon index to analyze the top 50 free-float market capitalization companies based on fossil fuel engagement in an effort to improve sustainable financing. This index plans to exclude companies with high involvement in the fossil fuel sector. The government establishes clear rules that foster competition. The USSFTA enhances transparency by requiring regulatory authorities to consult with interested parties before issuing regulations, and to provide advance notice and comment periods for proposed rules, as well as to publish all regulations. Singapore’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Rule-making authority is vested in the parliament to pass laws that determine the regulatory scope, purpose, rights, and powers of the regulator and the legal framework for the industry. Regulatory authority is vested in government ministries or in statutory boards, which are organizations that have been given autonomy to perform an operational function by legal statutes passed as acts of parliament, and report to a specific ministry. Local laws give regulatory bodies wide discretion to modify regulations and impose new conditions, but in practice agencies use this positively to adapt incentives or other services on a case-by-case basis to meet the needs of foreign as well as domestic companies. Acts of parliament also confer certain powers on a minister or other similar persons or authorities to make rules or regulations in order to put the act into practice; these rules are known as subsidiary legislation. National-level regulations are the most relevant for foreign businesses. Singapore has no local or state regulatory layers. Before a ministry instructs the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) to draft a new bill or make an amendment to a bill, the ministry has to seek in-principle approval from the cabinet for the proposed bill. The AGC legislation division advises and helps vet or draft bills in conjunction with policymakers from relevant ministries. Public and private consultations are often requested for proposed draft legislative amendments. Thereafter, the cabinet’s approval is required before the bill can be introduced in parliament. All bills passed by parliament (with some exceptions) must be forwarded to the Presidential Council for Minority Rights for scrutiny, and thereafter presented to the president for assent. Only after the president has assented to the bill does it become law. While ministries or regulatory agencies do conduct internal impact assessments of proposed regulations, there are no criteria used for determining which proposed regulations are subjected to an impact assessment, and there are no specific regulatory impact assessment guidelines. There is no independent agency tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments and distributing findings to the public. The Ministry of Finance publishes a biennial Singapore Public Sector Outcomes Review ( http://www.mof.gov.sg/Resources/Singapore-Public-Sector-Outcomes-Review-SPOR ), focusing on broad outcomes and indicators rather than policy evaluation. Results of scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted in review of policies and regulations are not made publicly available. Industry self-regulation occurs in several areas, including advertising and corporate governance. Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore (ASAS) ( https://asas.org.sg/ ), an advisory council under the Consumers Association of Singapore, administers the Singapore Code of Advertising Practice, which focuses on ensuring that advertisements are legal, decent, and truthful. Listed companies are required under the SGX Listing Rules to describe in their annual reports their corporate governance practices with specific reference to the principles and provisions of the Code. Listed companies must comply with the principles of the code, and, if their practices vary from any provisions of the code, they must note the reason for the variation and explain how the practices they have adopted are consistent with the intent of the relevant principle. The SGX plays the role of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) in listings, market surveillance, and member supervision to uphold the integrity of the market and ensure participants’ adherence to trading and clearing rules. There have been no reports of discriminatory practices aimed at foreign investors. Singapore’s legal and accounting procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms and rank similar to the United States in international comparisons according to the World Justice Project ( http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index ). The prescribed accounting standards for Singapore-incorporated companies applying to be listed in the public market are known as Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS(I)), which are identical to those of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Non-listed Singapore-incorporated companies can voluntarily apply for SFRS(I). Otherwise, they are required to comply with Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS), which are also aligned with those of IASB. For the use of foreign accounting standards, the companies are required to seek approval of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). For foreign companies with primary listings on the Singapore Exchange, the SGX Listing Rules allow the use of alternative standards such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). Accounts prepared in accordance with IFRS or U.S. GAAP need not be reconciled to SFRS(1). Companies with secondary listings on the Singapore Exchange need only reconcile their accounts to SFRS(I), IFRS, or U.S. GAAP. Notices of proposed legislation to be considered by parliament are published, including the text of the laws, the dates of the readings, and whether or not the laws eventually pass. The government has established a centralized Internet portal ( www.reach.gov.sg ) to solicit feedback on selected draft legislation and regulations, a process that is being used with increasing frequency. There is no stipulated consultative period. Results of consultations are usually consolidated and published on relevant websites. As noted in the “Openness to Foreign Investment” section, some U.S. companies, in particular in the telecommunications and media sectors, are concerned about the government’s lack of transparency in its regulatory and rule-making process. However, many U.S. firms report they have opportunities to weigh in on pending legislation that affects their industries. These mechanisms also apply to investment laws and regulations. The Parliament of Singapore website ( https://www.parliament.gov.sg/parliamentary-business/bills-introduced ) publishes a database of all bills introduced, read, and passed in parliament in chronological order as of 2006. The contents are the actual draft texts of the proposed legislation/legislative amendments. All statutes are also publicly available in the Singapore Statutes Online website ( https://sso.agc.gov.sg ). However, there is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. Regulatory actions are published separately on websites of Statutory Boards. Enforcement of regulatory offences is governed by both acts of parliament and subsidiary legislation. Enforcement powers of government statutory bodies are typically enshrined in the act of parliament constituting that statutory body. There is accountability to parliament for enforcement action through question time, where members of parliament may raise questions with the ministers on their respective ministries’ responsibilities. Singapore’s judicial system and courts serve as the oversight mechanism in respect of executive action (such as the enforcement of regulatory offences) and dispense justice based on law. The Supreme Court, which is made up of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, hears both civil and criminal matters. The chief justice heads the judiciary. The president appoints the chief justice, the judges of appeal and the judges of the High Court if she, acting at her discretion, concurs with the advice of the prime minister. No systemic regulatory reforms or enforcement reforms relevant to foreign investors were announced in 2021. The Monetary Authority of Singapore focuses enforcement efforts on timely disclosure of corporate information, business conduct of financial advisors, compliance with anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism requirements, deterring stock market abuse, and insider trading. In March 2019, MAS published its inaugural Enforcement Report detailing enforcement measures and publishes recent enforcement actions on its website ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/enforcement/enforcement-actions ). Singapore was the 2018 chair of ASEAN. ASEAN is working towards the 2025 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint aimed at achieving a single market and production base, with a free flow of goods, services, and investment within the region. While ASEAN is working towards regulatory harmonization, there are no regional regulatory systems in place; instead, ASEAN agreements and regulations are enacted through each ASEAN Member State’s domestic regulatory system. The WTO’s 2016 trade policy review notes that Singapore’s guiding principle for standardization is to align national standards with international standards, and Singapore is an elected member of the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Councils. Singapore encourages the direct use of international standards whenever possible. Singapore standards (SS) are developed when there is no appropriate international standard equivalent, or when there is a need to customize standards to meet domestic requirements. At the end of 2015, Singapore had a stock of 553 SS, about 40 percent of which were references to international standards. Enterprise Singapore, the Singapore Food Agency, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry are the three national enquiry points under the TBT Agreement. There are no known reports of omissions in reporting to TBT. A non-exhaustive list of major international norms and standards referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory systems include Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, Common Reporting Standards (CRS), Basel III, EU Dual-Use Export Control Regulation, Exchange of Information on Request, 27 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on labor rights and governance, UN conventions, and WTO agreements. Singapore is signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The WTO reports that Singapore has fully implemented the TFA ( https://www.tfadatabase.org/members/singapore ). Singapore’s legal system has its roots in English common law and practice and is enforced by courts of law. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. In the 2021 Rule of Law Index by World Justice Project, it is ranked 17th in the world overall, third on order and security, fourth on regulatory enforcement, third in absence of corruption, eighth on civil justice, seventh on criminal justice, 32nd on constraints on government powers, 34th on open government, and 38th on fundamental rights. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch and the executive does not interfere in judiciary matters. Singapore strives to promote an efficient, business-friendly regulatory environment. Tax, labor, banking and finance, industrial health and safety, arbitration, wage, and training rules and regulations are formulated and reviewed with the interests of both foreign investors and local enterprises in mind. Starting in 2005, a Rules Review Panel, comprising senior civil servants, began overseeing a review of all rules and regulations; this process will be repeated every five years. A Pro-Enterprise Panel of high-level public sector and private sector representatives examines feedback from businesses on regulatory issues and provides recommendations to the government. (https://www.mti.gov.sg/PEP/About) The Cybersecurity Act, which entered into force in August 2018, establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework for cybersecurity. The act provides the Commissioner of Cyber Security with powers to investigate, prevent, and assess the potential impact of cyber security incidents and threats in Singapore. These can include requiring persons and organizations to provide requested information, requiring the owner of a computer system to take any action to assist with cyber investigations, directing organizations to remediate cyber incidents, authorizing officers to enter premises, installing software, and taking possession of computer systems to prevent serious cyber-attacks in the event of severe threat. The act also establishes a framework for the designation and regulation of critical information infrastructure (CII). Requirements for CII owners include a mandatory incident reporting regime, regular audits and risk assessments, and participation in national cyber security stress tests. In addition, the act will establish a regulatory regime for cyber security service providers and required licensing for penetration testing and managed security operations center (SOC) monitoring services. U.S. business chambers have expressed concern about the effects of licensing and regularly burdens on compliance costs, insufficient checks and balances on the investigatory powers of the authorities, and the absence of a multidirectional cyber threat sharing framework that includes protections from liability. Under the law, additional measures, such as the Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme (October 2021), continue to be introduced. Authorities stress that, “in view of the need to strike a good balance between industry development and cybersecurity needs, the licensing framework will take a light-touch approach.” The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) is a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is tasked with administering and enforcing the Competition Act. The act contains provisions on anti-competitive agreements, decisions, and practices; abuse of dominance; enforcement and appeals process; and mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Act was enacted in 2004 in accordance with U.S-Singapore USSFTA commitments, which contains specific conduct guarantees to ensure that Singapore’s government linked companies (GLC) will operate on a commercial and non-discriminatory basis towards U.S. firms. GLCs with substantial revenues or assets are also subject to enhanced transparency requirements under the FTA. A 2018 addition to the act gives the CCCS additional administrative power to protect consumers against unfair trade practices. Singapore has not expropriated foreign-owned property and has no laws that force foreign investors to transfer ownership to local interests. Singapore has signed investment promotion and protection agreements with a wide range of countries. These agreements mutually protect nationals or companies of either country against certain non-commercial risks, such as expropriation and nationalization and remain in effect unless otherwise terminated. The USSFTA contains strong investor protection provisions relating to expropriation of private property and the need to follow due process; provisions are in place for an owner to receive compensation based on fair market value. No disputes are pending. Singapore has bankruptcy laws allowing both debtors and creditors to file a bankruptcy claim. While Singapore performed well in recovery rate and time of recovery following bankruptcies, the country did not score well on cost of proceedings or insolvency frameworks. In particular, the insolvency framework does not require approval by the creditors for sale of substantial assets of the debtor or approval by the creditors for selection or appointment of the insolvency representative. Singapore has made several reforms to enhance corporate rescue and restructuring processes, including features from Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Amendments to the Companies Act, which came into force in May 2017, include additional disclosure requirements by debtors, rescue financing provisions, provisions to facilitate the approval of pre-packaged restructurings, increased debtor protections, and cram-down provisions that will allow a scheme to be approved by the court even if a class of creditors oppose the scheme, provided the dissenting class of creditors are not unfairly prejudiced by the scheme. The Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act passed in 2018 and entered into force in July 2020. It updates the insolvency legislation and introduces a significant number of new provisions, particularly with respect to corporate insolvency. It mandates licensing, qualifications, standards, and disciplinary measures for insolvency practitioners. It also includes standalone voidable transaction provisions for corporate insolvency and, a new wrongful trading provision. The act allows “out of court” commencement of judicial management, permits judicial managers to assign the proceeds of certain insolvency related claims, restricts the operation of contractual “ipso facto clauses” upon the commencement of certain restructuring and insolvency procedures, and modifies the operation of the scheme of arrangement cross class “cram down” power. Authorities continue to seek public consultations of subsidiary legislation to be drafted under the act. Two MAS-recognized consumer credit bureaus operate in Singapore: the Credit Bureau (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Experian Credit Bureau Singapore Pte Ltd. U.S. industry advocates enhancements to Singapore’s credit bureau system, in particular, adoption of an open admission system for all lenders, including non-banks. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Singapore. https://www.acra.gov.sg/CA_2017/ 4. Industrial Policies In 2021, the government announced a plan to deploy 60,000 Electric Vehicle (EV) charging points by 2030. The government anticipates 20,000 EVs will be located within private premises, while the remaining 40,000 will be in public parking areas. As part of this initiative, the government started the Vehicle Common Charger Grant to provide up to approximately $2,750 per charger for installations in non-commercial private developments that are accessible to the public. The Energy Market Authority (EMA) released the “Charting the Energy Transition to 2050” report in March, which set out three decarbonization scenarios for Singapore’s power sector. The government planned to utilize public-private partnerships to develop low carbon hydrogen, geothermal, solar, and nuclear technologies in addition to electricity imports to reach net-zero carbon emissions by or around 2050. The EDB is the lead investment promotion agency facilitating foreign investment into Singapore https://www.edb.gov.sg . The EDB undertakes investment promotion and industry development, and works with international businesses, both foreign and local, by providing information, connection to partners, and access to government incentives for their investments. The Agency for Science, Technology, and Research (A*STAR) is Singapore’s lead public sector agency focused on economic-oriented research to advance scientific discovery and innovative technology https://www.a-star.edu.sg . The National Research Foundation (NRF) provides competitive grants for applied research through an integrated grant management system https://researchgrant.gov.sg/pages/index.aspx . Various government agencies (including Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, NRF, and EDB) provide venture capital co-funding for startups and commercialization of intellectual property. Singapore has nine free-trade zones (FTZs) in five geographical areas operated by three FTZ authorities. The FTZs may be used for storage and repackaging of import and export cargo, and goods transiting Singapore for subsequent re-export. Manufacturing is not carried out within the zones. Foreign and local firms have equal access to the FTZ facilities. Performance requirements are applied uniformly and systematically to both domestic and foreign investors. Singapore has no forced localization policy requiring domestic content in goods or technology. The government does not require investors to purchase from local sources or specify a percentage of output for export. There are no rules forcing the transfer of technology. There are no requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. The industry regulator is the IMDA. In May 2020, Singapore tightened requirements for hiring foreign workers, including raising minimum salary thresholds and additional enforcement of penalties for employers not giving “fair consideration” to local applicants before hiring foreign workers. Personal data matters are independently overseen by the Personal Data Protection Commission, which administers and enforces the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) of 2012. The PDPA governs the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data by the private sector and covers both electronic and non-electronic data. Singapore continues to review the PDPA to ensure that it keeps pace with the evolving needs of businesses and individuals in a digital economy such as introducing an enhanced framework for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data and a mandatory data breach notification regime. Singapore does not have a data localization policy. Singapore participates in various regional and international frameworks that promote interoperability and harmonization of rules to facilitate cross-border data flows. The ASEAN Framework on Digital Data Governance (FDFG) is one example. Under FDFG, Singapore will focus on developing model contractual clauses and certification for cross border data flows within the ASEAN region. Another is Singapore’s participation in the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) and Privacy Recognition for Processors systems, to facilitate data transfers for certified organizations across APEC economies. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are enforced in Singapore. Residents have access to mortgages and liens, with reliable recording of properties. Foreigners are not allowed to purchase public housing in Singapore, and prior approval from the Singapore Land Authority is required to purchase landed residential property and residential land for development. Foreigners can purchase non-landed, private sector housing (e.g., condominiums or any unit within a building) without the need to obtain prior approval. However, they are not allowed to acquire all the apartments or units in a development without prior approval. These restrictions also apply to foreign companies. There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of industrial and commercial real estate. Since July 2018, foreigners who purchase homes in Singapore are required to pay an additional effective 20 percent tax on top of standard buyer’s taxes. However, U.S. citizens are accorded national treatment under the FTA, meaning only second and subsequent purchases of residential property will be subject to 12 and 15 percent additional duties, equivalent to Singaporean citizens. The availability of covered bond legislation under MAS Notice 648 has provided an incentive for Singapore financial institutions to issue covered bonds. Under Notice 648, only a bank incorporated in Singapore may issue covered bonds. The three main Singapore banks: DBS, OCBC, and UOB, all have in place covered bond programs, with the issues offered to private investors. In 2020, MAS increased the asset encumbrance limit of a locally incorporated bank’s total assets from four percent to 10 percent. The banking industry has made suggestions to allow the use of covered bonds in repossession transactions with the central bank. http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations/notices/notice-648 Singapore maintains one of the strongest intellectual property rights regimes in Asia. The chief executive of Singapore’s Intellectual Property Office was elected director general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in April 2020. Singapore is the global hub for patent filing activity and innovation. Effective January 1, 2020, all patent applications must be fully examined by the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore to ensure that any foreign-granted patents fully satisfy Singapore’s patentability criteria. The Registered Designs (Amendment) Act broadens the scope of registered designs to include virtual designs and color as a design feature and will stipulate the default owner of designs to be the designer of a commissioned design, rather than the commissioning party. The USSFTA ensures that government agencies will not grant regulatory approvals to patent- infringing products, but Singapore does allow parallel imports. Under the Patents Act, with regards to pharmaceutical products, the patent owner has the right to bring an action to stop an importer of “grey market goods” from importing the patent owner’s patented product, provided that the product has not previously been sold or distributed in Singapore, the importation results in a breach of contract between the proprietor of the patent and any person licensed by the proprietor of the patent to distribute the product outside Singapore and the importer has knowledge of such. The USSFTA ensures protection of test data and trade secrets submitted to the government for regulatory approval purposes. Disclosure of such information is prohibited. Such data may not be used for approval of the same or similar products without the consent of the party who submitted the data for a period of five years from the date of approval of the pharmaceutical product and 10 years from the date of approval of an agricultural chemical. Singapore has no specific legislation concerning protection of trade secrets. Instead, it protects investors’ commercially valuable proprietary information under common law by the Law of Confidence as well as legislation such as the Penal Code (e.g., theft) and the Computer Misuse Act (e.g., unauthorized access to a computer system to download information). U.S. industry has expressed concern that this provision is inadequate. As a WTO member, Singapore is party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). It is a signatory to other international intellectual property rights agreements, including the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Madrid Protocol, and the Budapest Treaty. The WIPO Secretariat opened a regional office in Singapore in 2005. ( http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/singapore/) Amendments to the Trademark Act, which were passed in January 2007, fulfilled Singapore’s obligations in WIPO’s revised Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks. Singapore ranked 11th out of 55 in the world in the 2022 U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s International Intellectual Property (IP) Index. The index noted that Singapore’s key strengths include an advanced national IP framework and efforts to accelerate research, patent examination, and grants. The index also lauded Singapore as a global leader in patent protection and online copyright enforcement. Despite a decrease in estimated software piracy from 35 percent in 2009 to 27 percent in 2021, the index noted that piracy levels remain high for a developed, high-income economy. Lack of transparency and data on customs seizures of IP-infringing goods is also noted as a key area of weakness. Singapore does not publicly report the statistics on seizures of counterfeit goods and does not rate highly on enforcement of physical counterfeit goods, online sales of counterfeit goods, or digital online piracy, according to the 2018 U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s International IP Index. Singapore is not listed in USTR’s 2021 Special 301 Report, but Shopee, a Singapore-headquartered e-commerce company, is named in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets. On the trade of counterfeit and pirated goods, stakeholders also continue to report dissatisfaction with enforcement in Singapore, including concerns about the lack of coordination between Singapore’s Customs authorities and the Singapore Police Force’s IPR Branch. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment and fixed asset investments. While it welcomes capital market investments, the government has introduced macro-prudential policies aimed at reducing foreign speculative inflows in the real estate sector since 2009. The government promotes Singapore’s position as an asset and wealth management center, and assets under management grew 17 percent in 2020 to $3.3 trillion (4.7 trillion Singapore dollars (SGD)), according to MAS’s Singapore Asset Management Survey 2020. The government facilitates the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets, and the SGX is Singapore’s stock market. An effective regulatory system exists to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors can access credit, U.S. dollars, Singapore dollars (SGD), and other foreign currencies on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments through banks operating in Singapore. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Singapore’s banking system is sound and well regulated by MAS, and the country serves as a financial hub for the region. Banks have a very high domestic penetration rate, and according to World Bank Financial Inclusion indicators, over 97 percent of persons held a financial account in 2017 (latest year available). Local Singapore banks saw net profits rise some 40 percent in 2021. Banks are statutorily prohibited from engaging in non-financial business. Banks can hold 10 percent or less in non-financial companies as an “equity portfolio investment.” The non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio) of Singapore’s banking system was 3 percent in the third quarter of 2021. Foreign banks require licenses to operate in the country. The tiered license system for Merchant, Offshore, Wholesale, Full Banks, and Qualifying Full Banks (QFBs) subject banks to further prudential safeguards in return for offering a greater range of services. U.S. financial institutions enjoy phased-in benefits under the USSFTA. Since 2006, U.S.-licensed full-service banks that are also QFBs have been able to operate at an unlimited number of locations (branches or off-premises ATMs) versus 25 for non-U.S. full service foreign banks with QFB status. Under the OECD Common Reporting Standards (CRS), which has been in effect since January 2017, Singapore-based financial institutions – depository institutions such as banks, specified insurance companies, investment entities, and custodial institutions – are required to: 1) establish the tax residency status of all their account holders; 2) collect and retain CRS information for all non-Singapore tax residents in the case of new accounts; and 3) report to tax authorities the financial account information of account holders who are tax residents of jurisdictions with which Singapore has a Competent Authority Agreement to exchange the information. U.S. financial regulations do not restrict foreign banks’ ability to hold accounts for U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens are encouraged to alert the nearest U.S. Embassy of any practices they encounter with regard to the provision of financial services. Fintech investments in Singapore rose from $2.48 million in 2020 to $3.94 billion in 2021. To strengthen Singapore’s position as a global Fintech hub, MAS has created a dedicated Fintech Office as a one-stop virtual entity for all Fintech-related matters to enable experimentation and promote an open-API (Application Programming Interfaces) in the financial industry. Investment in payments start-ups accounted for about 40 percent of all funds. Singapore has more than 50 innovation labs established by global financial institutions and technology companies. MAS also aims to be a regional leader in blockchain technologies and has worked to position Singapore as a financial technology center. MAS and the Association of Banks in Singapore are prototyping the use of distributed ledger technology for inter-bank clearing and settlement of payments and securities. Following a five-year collaborative project to understand the technology, a test network launched to facilitate collaboration in the cross-border blockchain ecosystem. Technical specifications for the functionalities and connectivity interfaces of the prototype network are publicly available. ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/Project-Ubin ). Alternative financial services include retail and corporate non-bank lending via finance companies, cooperative societies, and pawnshops; and burgeoning financial technology-based services across a wide range of sectors including: crowdfunding, initial coin offerings, and payment services and remittance. In January 2020, the Payment Services Bill went into effect, which will require all cryptocurrency service providers to be licensed with the intent to provide more user protection. Smaller payment firms will receive a different classification from larger institutions and will be less heavily regulated. Key infrastructure supporting Singapore’s financial market include interbank (MEP), Foreign exchange (CLS, CAPS), retail (SGDCCS, USDCCS, CTS, IBG, ATM, FAST, NETS, EFTPOS), securities (MEPS+-SGS, CDP, SGX-DC) and derivatives settlements (SGX-DC, APS) ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/payments/payment-systems ). The government has three key investment entities: GIC Private Limited (GIC) is the sovereign wealth fund in Singapore that manages the government’s substantial foreign investments, fiscal, and foreign reserves, with the stated objective to achieve long-term returns and preserve the international purchasing power of the reserves. Temasek is a holding company wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance with investments in Singapore and abroad. MAS, as the central bank of Singapore, manages the Official Foreign Reserves, and a significant proportion of its portfolio is invested in liquid financial market instruments. GIC does not publish the size of the funds under management, but some industry observers estimate its managed assets may exceed $600 billion. GIC does not invest domestically, but manages Singapore’s international investments, which are generally passive (non-controlling) investments in publicly traded entities. The United States is its top investment destination, accounting for 34 percent of GIC’s portfolio as of March 2021, while Asia (excluding Japan) accounts for 26 percent, the Eurozone 9 percent, Japan 8 percent, and UK 5 percent. Investments in the United States are diversified and include industrial and commercial properties, student housing, power transmission companies, and financial, retail and business services. GIC is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Although not required by law, GIC has published an annual report since 2008. Temasek began as a holding company for Singapore’s state-owned enterprises, now GLCs, but has since branched out to other asset classes and often holds significant stake in companies. As of March 2021, Temasek’s portfolio value reached $267 billion, and its asset exposure to Singapore is 24 percent; 40 percent in the rest of Asia, and 20 percent in Americas. According to the Temasek Charter, Temasek delivers sustainable value over the long term for its stakeholders. Temasek has published a Temasek Review annually since 2004. The statements only provide consolidated financial statements, which aggregate all of Temasek and its subsidiaries into a single financial report. A major international audit firm audits Temasek Group’s annual statutory financial statements. GIC and Temasek uphold the Santiago Principles for sovereign investments. Other investing entities of government funds include EDB Investments Pte Ltd, Singapore’s Housing Development Board, and other government statutory boards with funding decisions driven by goals emanating from the central government. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Singapore has an extensive network of full and partial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) held under the umbrella of Temasek Holdings, a holding company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder. Singapore SOEs play a substantial role in the domestic economy, especially in strategically important sectors including telecommunications, media, healthcare, public transportation, defense, port, gas, electricity grid, and airport operations. In addition, the SOEs are also present in many other sectors of the economy, including banking, subway, airline, consumer/lifestyle, commodities trading, oil and gas engineering, postal services, infrastructure, and real estate. The government emphasizes that government-linked entities operate on an equal basis with both local and foreign businesses without exception. There is no published list of SOEs. Temasek’s annual report notes that its portfolio companies are guided and managed by their respective boards and management, and Temasek does not direct their business decisions or operations. However, as a substantial shareholder, corporate governance within government linked companies typically are guided or influenced by policies developed by Temasek. There are differences in corporate governance disclosures and practices across the GLCs, and GLC boards are allowed to determine their own governance practices, with Temasek advisors occasionally meeting with the companies to make recommendations. GLC board seats are not specifically allocated to government officials, although it “leverages on its networks to suggest qualified individuals for consideration by the respective boards,” and leaders formerly from the armed forces or civil service are often represented on boards and fill senior management positions. Temasek exercises its shareholder rights to influence the strategic directions of its companies but does not get involved in the day-to-day business and commercial decisions of its firms and subsidiaries. GLCs operate on a commercial basis and compete on an equal basis with private businesses, both local and foreign. Singapore officials highlight that the government does not interfere with the operations of GLCs or grant them special privileges, preferential treatment, or hidden subsidies, asserting that GLCs are subject to the same regulatory regime and discipline of the market as private sector companies. However, observers have been critical of cases where GLCs have entered into new lines of business or where government agencies have “corporatized” certain government functions, in both circumstances entering into competition with already existing private businesses. Some private sector companies have said they encountered unfair business practices and opaque bidding processes that appeared to favor incumbent, government-linked firms. In addition, they note that the GLC’s institutional relationships with the government give them natural advantages in terms of access to cheaper funding and opportunities to shape the economic policy agenda in ways that benefit their companies. The USSFTA contains specific conduct guarantees to ensure that GLCs will operate on a commercial and non-discriminatory basis towards U.S. firms. GLCs with substantial revenues or assets are also subject to enhanced transparency requirements under the USSFTA. In accordance with its USSFTA commitments, Singapore enacted the Competition Act in 2004 and established the Competition Commission of Singapore in January 2005. The Competition Act contains provisions on anti-competitive agreements, decisions, and practices, abuse of dominance, enforcement and appeals process, and mergers and acquisitions. The government has privatized GLCs in multiple sectors and has not publicly announced further privatization plans, but is likely to retain controlling stakes in strategically important sectors, including telecommunications, media, public transportation, defense, port, gas, electricity grid, and airport operations. The Energy Market Authority is extending the liberalization of the retail market from commercial and industrial consumers with an average monthly electricity consumption of at least 2,000 kWh to households and smaller businesses. The Electricity Act and the Code of Conduct for Retail Electricity Licensees govern licensing and standards for electricity retail companies. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The awareness and implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Singapore has been increasing since the formation of the Global Compact Network Singapore (GCNS) under the UN Global Compact network, with the goals of encouraging companies to adopt sustainability principles related to human and labor rights, environmental conservation, and anti-corruption. GCNS facilitates exchanges, conducts research, and provides training in Singapore to build capacity in areas including sustainability reporting, supply chain management, ISO 26000, and measuring and reporting carbon emissions. A 2019 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) survey showed a lack of transparency by Singapore companies in disclosing palm oil sources. However, there is growing awareness and the Southeast Asia Alliance for Sustainable Palm Oil has received additional pledges in by companies to adhere to standards for palm oil sourcing set by the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). A group of food and beverage, retail, and hospitality companies announced in January 2019 what the WWF calls “the most impactful business response to-date on plastics.” The pact, initiated by WWF and supported by the National Environment Agency, is a commitment to significantly reduce plastic production and usage by 2030. In June 2016, the SGX introduced mandatory, comply-or-explain, sustainability reporting requirements for all listed companies, including material environmental, social and governance practices, from the financial year ending December 31, 2017 onwards. The Singapore Environmental Council operates a green labeling scheme, which endorses environmentally friendly products, numbering over 3,000 from 2729 countries. The Association of Banks in Singapore has issued voluntary guidelines to banks in Singapore last updated in July 2018 encouraging them to adopt sustainable lending practices, including the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) principles into their lending and business practices. Singapore-based banks are listed in a 2018 Market Forces report as major lenders in regional coal financing. Singapore has not developed a National Action Plan on business and human rights, but promotes responsible business practices, and encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted CSR principles. The government does not explicitly factor responsible business conduct (RBC) policies into its procurement decisions. The host government effectively and fairly enforces domestic laws with regard to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. The private sector’s impact on migrant workers and their rights, and domestic migrant workers in particular (due to the latter’s exemption from the Employment Act which stipulates the rights of workers), remains an area of advocacy by civil society groups. The government has taken incremental steps to improve the channels of redress and enforcement of migrant workers’ rights; however, key concerns about legislative protections remain unaddressed for domestic migrant workers. The government generally encourages businesses to comply with international standards. However, there are no specific mentions of the host government encouraging adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, or supply chain due diligence measures. The Companies Act principally governs companies in Singapore. Key areas of corporate governance covered under the act include separation of ownership from management, fiduciary duties of directors, shareholder remedies, and capital maintenance rules. Limited liability partnerships are governed by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act. Certain provisions in other statutes such as the Securities and Futures Act are also relevant to listed companies. Listed companies are required under the Singapore Exchange Listing Rules to describe in their annual reports their corporate governance practices with specific reference to the principles and provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance (“Code”). Listed companies must comply with the principles of the Code and if their practices vary from any provision in the Code, they must explain the variation and demonstrate the variation is consistent with the relevant principle. The revised Code of Corporate Governance will impact Annual Reports covering financial years from January 1, 2019 onward. The revised code encourages board renewal, strengthens director independence, increases transparency of remuneration practices, enhances board diversity, and encourages communication with all stakeholders. MAS also established an independent Corporate Governance Advisory Committee (CGAC) to advocated good corporate governance practices in February 2019. The CGAC monitors companies’ implementation of the code and advises regulators on corporate governance issues. There are independent NGOs promoting and monitoring RBC. Those monitoring or advocating around RBC are generally able to do their work freely within most areas. However, labor unions are tightly controlled and legal rights to strike are granted with restrictions under the Trade Disputes Act. Singapore has no oil, gas, or mineral resources and is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. A small sector in Singapore processes rare minerals and complies with responsible supply chains and conflict mineral principles. Under the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism framework, it is a requirement for corporate service providers to develop and implement internal policies, procedures, and controls to comply with Financial Action Task Force recommendations on combating of money laundering and terrorism financing. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Singapore plans to reach net-zero by or around mid-century but faces alternative energy diversification challenges in setting 2050 net-zero carbon emission targets. Singapore’s national climate strategy focuses on increased sustainability, carbon emissions reductions, fostering job and investment opportunities, and increasing climate resilience and food security https://www.greenplan.gov.sg/ . According to the National Climate Change Secretariat, the government plans to spend approximately $750 million from 2019 to 2023 to support Singaporean companies become more energy efficient and improve competitiveness. A link to national mitigation strategies can be found here. https://www.nccs.gov.sg/faqs/mitigation-action/ The Energy Conservation Act requires large industry and transportation sector companies that consume more than 15 gigawatt-hours (or 54 terajoules) of energy per year to appoint an energy manager, monitor and report energy usage, submit plans for energy efficiency improvements to appropriate agencies, conduct energy assessments periodically to identify improvement opportunities, implement structured energy management systems, and ensure new or retrofitted energy intensive facilities are designed to be energy efficient. 9. Corruption Singapore actively enforces its strong anti-corruption laws, and corruption is not cited as a concern for foreign investors. Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index ranks Singapore fourth of 180 countries globally, the highest-ranking Asian country. The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), and the Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act provide the legal basis for government action by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which is the only agency authorized under the PCA to investigate corruption offences and other related offences. These laws cover acts of corruption within Singapore as well as those committed by Singaporeans abroad. The anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, and to political parties. The CPIB is effective and non-discriminatory. Singapore is generally perceived to be one of the least corrupt countries in the world, and corruption is not identified as an obstacle to FDI in Singapore. Recent corporate fraud scandals, particularly in the commodity trading sector, have been publicly, swiftly, and firmly reprimanded by the government. Singapore is a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention, but not the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2 Lengkok Bahru, Singapore 159047 +65 6270 0141 info@cpib.gov.sg Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International Alt-Moabit 96 10559 Berlin, Germany +49 30 3438 200 10. Political and Security Environment Singapore’s political environment is stable and there is no recent history of incidents involving politically motivated damage to foreign investments in Singapore. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has dominated Singapore’s parliamentary government since 1959 and currently controls 83 of the 92 regularly contested parliamentary seats. Singaporean opposition Workers’ Party, which currently holds nine regularly contested parliamentary seats, does not usually espouse views that are radically different from mainstream public opinion. The opposition Progress Singapore Party, which is represented in parliament since 2020 after winning two additional parliamentary seats reserved to the best performing losing candidates, advocates for more protectionist policies. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In December 2021, Singapore’s labor market totaled 3.64 million workers; this includes about 1.24 million foreigners, of whom about 84 percent are basic skilled or semi-skilled workers. The overall unemployment rate was 2.3 percent as of January. Local labor laws allow for relatively free hiring and firing practices. Either party can terminate employment by giving the other party the required notice. The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) must approve employment of foreigners. In 2020, females had an employment rate of 73.2 percent compared to males of 87.9 percent. Females accounted for 46.3 percent of the resident labor force as of June 2020. The Council for Board Diversity reported that as of December 2021, women’s representation on boards of the largest 100 companies listed on the Singapore Exchange increased over the previous year to 18.9 percent. Representation of women also increased on statutory boards to 29.7 percent but declined slightly on registered NGOs and charities to 28.4 percent. Singapore’s adjusted gender pay gap was 6 percent as of the most recent data in 2018 but occupational segregation continued. Since 2011, the government has introduced policy measures to support productivity increases coupled with reduced dependence on foreign labor. In Budget 2019, MOM announced a decrease in the foreign worker quota ceiling from 40 percent to 38 percent on January 1, 2020 and to 35 percent on January 1. The quota reduction does not apply to those on Employment Passes (EPs) which are high skilled workers making above $39,750 per year. In Budget 2020, the foreign worker quota was cut further for mid-skilled (“S Pass”) workers in construction, marine shipyards, and the process sectors from 20 to 18 percent by January 1, 2021. The quota will be further reduced to 15 percent on January 1, 2023. Singapore’s labor force increased marginally with the partial reopening of borders after easing of COVID-19 restrictions but is expected to face significant demographic headwinds from an aging population and low birth rates, alongside restrictions on foreign workers. Singapore’s local workforce growth is slowing, heading for stagnation over the next 10 years. To address concerns over an aging and shrinking workforce, MOM has expanded its training and grant programs. The government included a number of individual and company subsidies for existing and new programs in the latest budget, as well as an unprecedented number of supplementary budgets during the initial COVID-19 outbreak in 2020. An example of an existing program is SkillsFuture, a government initiative managed by SkillsFuture Singapore (SSG), a statutory board under the Ministry of Education, designed to provide all Singaporeans with enhanced opportunities and skills-capacity building. SSG also administers the Singapore Workforce Skills Qualifications, a national credential system that trains, develops, assesses, and certifies skills and competencies for the workforce. All foreigners must have a valid work pass before they can start work in Singapore, with EPs (for professionals, managers, and executives), S Pass (for mid-level skilled staff), and Work Permits (for semi-skilled workers), among the most widely issued. Workers need to have a job with minimum fixed monthly salary and acceptable qualifications to be eligible for the EP and S Pass. MOM has increased minimum salaries multiple times, restricting the ability of some companies to hire foreign workers, including spouses of employment pass holders. From September 2023, it will be raised to $3,500 for new EP applicants ($3,850 for those in the financial services sector) and $2,100 for new S Pass applicants ($2,450 for those in the financial services sector). The government further regulates the inflow of foreign workers through the Foreign Worker Levy (FWL) and the Dependency Ratio Ceiling (DRC). The DRC is the maximum permitted ratio of foreign workers to the total workforce that a company can hire and serves as a quota on the hiring of foreign workers. The DRC varies across sectors. It was announced in Budget 2022 that the DRC will be reduced from 87.5 percent to 83.3 percent from January 2024. Employers of S Pass and Work Permit holders are required to pay a monthly FWL to the government. The FWL varies according to the skills, qualifications, and experience of their employees. The FWL is set on a sector-by-sector basis and is subject to annual revisions. FWLs have been progressively increased for most sectors since 2012. MOM requires employers to consider Singaporeans before hiring skilled professional foreigners. The Fair Consideration Framework (FCF), implemented in August 2014, affects employers who apply for EPs, the work pass for foreign professionals working in professional, manager, and executive (PME) posts. Companies have noted inconsistent and increasingly burdensome documentation requirements and excessive qualification criteria to approve EP applications. Under the rules, firms making new EP applications must first advertise the job vacancy in a new jobs bank administered by Workforce Singapore (WSG), http://www.mycareersfuture.gov.sg for at least 28 days. The jobs bank is free for use by companies and job seekers and the job advertisement must be open to all, including Singaporeans. Employers are encouraged to keep records of their interview process as proof that they have done due diligence in trying to look for a Singaporean worker. If an EP is still needed, the employer will have to make a statutory declaration that a job advertisement on http://www.mycareersfuture.gov.sg had been made. Consistent with Singapore’s WTO obligations, intra-corporate transfers (ICT) are allowed for managers, executives, and specialists who had worked for at least one year in the firm before being posted to Singapore. ICT would still be required to meet all EP criteria, but the requirement for an advertisement on http://www.mycareersfuture.gov.sg would be waived. In April 2016, MOM outlined measures to refine the work pass applications process, looking not only at the qualifications of individuals, but at company-related factors. Companies found not to have a “healthy Singaporean core, lacking a demonstrated commitment to developing a Singaporean core, and not found to be “relevant” to Singapore’s economy and society, will be labeled “triple weak” and put on a watch list. Companies unable to demonstrate progress may have work pass privileges suspended after a period of scrutiny. Since 2016, MOM has placed approximately 1,200 companies on its FCF Watchlist. The Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices have worked with 260 companies to be successfully removed from the watchlist. The Employment Act covers all employees under a contract of service, and under the act, employees who have served the company for at least two years are eligible for retrenchment benefits, and the amount of compensation depends on the contract of service or what is agreed collectively. Employers have to abide by notice periods in the employment contract before termination and stipulated minimum periods in the Employment Act in the absence of a notice period previously agreed upon, or provide salary in lieu of notice. Dismissal on grounds of wrongful conduct by the employee is differentiated from retrenchments in the labor laws and is exempted from the above requirements. Employers must notify MOM of retrenchments within five working days after they notify the affected employees to enable the relevant agencies to help affected employees find alternative employment and/or identify relevant training to enhance employability. Singapore does not provide unemployment benefits, but provides training and job matching services to retrenched workers. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment in Singapore. There are no additional or different labor law provisions in free trade zones. Collective bargaining is a normal part of labor-management relations in all sectors. Almost all unions are affiliated with the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), the sole national federation of trade unions in Singapore, which has a close relationship with the PAP ruling party and the government. The current NTUC secretary-general is also a former minister in the Prime Minister’s Office. As of June, the NTUC had more than 1 million members. Given that nearly all unions are NTUC affiliates, the NTUC has almost exclusive authority to exercise collective bargaining power on behalf of employees. Union members may not reject collective agreements negotiated between their union representatives and an employer. Although transfers and layoffs are excluded from the scope of collective bargaining, employers consult with unions on both problems, and the Taskforce for Responsible Retrenchment and Employment Facilitation issues guidelines calling for early notification to unions of layoffs. Data on coverage of collective bargaining agreements is not publicly available. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) regulates collective bargaining. The Industrial Arbitration Courts must certify any collective bargaining agreement before it is deemed in effect and can deny certification on public interest grounds. Additionally, the IRA restricts the scope of issues over which workers may bargain, excluding bargaining on hiring, transfer, promotion, dismissal, or reinstatement of workers. Most labor disagreements are resolved through conciliation and mediation by MOM. Since April 2017, the Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management (TADM) under MOM provides advisory and mediation services, including mediation for salary and employment disputes. Where the conciliation process is not successful, the disputing parties may submit their dispute to the IAC for arbitration. Depending on the nature of the dispute, the court may be constituted either by the president of the IAC and a member of the Employer and Employee Panels, or by the president alone. The Employment Claims Tribunals (ECT) was established under the Employment Claims Act (2016). To bring a claim before the ECT, parties must first register their claims at the TADM for mediation. Mediation at TADM is compulsory. Only disputes which remain unresolved after mediation at TADM may be referred to the ECT. The ECT hears statutory salary-related claims, contractual salary-related claims, dismissal claims from employees, and claims for salary in lieu of notice of termination by all employers. There is a limit of $21,200 on claims for cases with TADM mediation, and $14,100 for all other claims. In March 2019, MOM announced that 85 percent of salary claims had been resolved by TADM between April 2017 and December 2018. Salary-related disputes that are not resolved by mediation are covered by the Employment Claims Tribunals under the State Courts. Industrial disputes may also submit their case be referred to the tripartite Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC). The IAC composed has two panels: an employee panel and a management panel. For a majority of dispute hearings, a court is constituted comprising the president of the IAC and a member each from the employee and employer panels’ representatives and chaired by a judge. In some situations, the law provides for compulsory arbitration. The court must certify collective agreements before they go into effect. The court may refuse certification at its discretion on the ground of public interest. The legal framework in Singapore provides for some restrictions in the registration of trade unions, labor union autonomy and administration, the right to strike, who may serve as union officers or employees, and collective bargaining. Under the Trade Union Act (TUA), every trade union must register with the Registrar of Trade Unions, which has broad discretion to grant, deny, or cancel union registration. The TUA limits the objectives for which unions can spend their funds, including for contributions to a political party or for political purposes, and allows the registrar to inspect accounts and funds “at any reasonable time.” Legal rights to strike are granted with restrictions under TUA. The law requires the majority of affected unionized workers to vote in favor of a strike by secret ballot, as opposed to the majority of those participating in the vote. Strikes cannot be conducted for any reason apart from a dispute in the trade or industry in which the strikers are employed, and it is illegal to conduct a strike if it is “designed or calculated to coerce the government either directly or by inflicting hardship on the community.” Workers in “essential services” are required to give 14 days’ notice to an employer before conducting a strike. Although workers, other than those employed in the three essential services of water, gas, and electricity, may strike, no workers did so since 1986 with the exception of a strike by bus drivers in 2012, but NTUC threatened to strike over concerns in a retrenchment process in July 2020. The law also restricts the right of uniformed personnel and government employees to organize, although the president may grant exemptions. Foreigners and those with criminal convictions generally may not hold union office or become employees of unions, but the ministry may grant exemptions. The Employment Act, which prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor and the Prevention of Human Trafficking Act (PHTA), strengthens labor trafficking victim protection, and governs labor protections. Other acts protecting the rights of workers include the Workplace Safety and Health Act and Employment of Foreign Manpower Act. Labor laws set the standard legal workweek at 44 hours, with one rest day each week, and establish a framework for workplaces to comply with occupational safety and health standards, with regular inspections designed to enforce the standards. MOM effectively enforces laws and regulations establishing working conditions and comprehensive occupational safety and health (OSH) laws and implements enforcement procedures and promoted educational and training programs to reduce the frequency of job-related accidents. Changes to the Employment Act took effect on April 1, 2019, including for extension of core provisions to managers and executives, increasing the monthly salary cap, transferring adjudication of wrongful dismissal claims from MOM to the ECT, and increasing flexibility in compensating employees working during public holidays (for more detail see https://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/employment-act . All workers, except for public servants, domestic workers and seafarers are covered by the Employment Act, and additional time-based provisions for more vulnerable employees. Singapore has no across the board minimum wage law, although there are some exceptions in certain low-skill industries. Generally, the government follows a policy of allowing free market forces to determine wage levels. In specific sectors where wages have stagnated and market practices such as outsourcing reduce incentive to upskill workers and limit their bargaining power, the government has implemented Progressive Wage Models to uplift wages. These are currently implemented in the cleaning, security, elevator maintenance, and landscape sectors and have been raised progressively. The National Wage Council (NWC), a tripartite body comprising representatives from the government, employers, and unions, recommends non-binding wage adjustments on an annual basis. The NWC recommendations apply to all employees in both domestic and foreign firms, and across the private and public sectors. While the NWC wage guidelines are not mandatory, they are published under the Employment Act and form the basis of wage negotiations between unions and management. The NWC recommendations apply to all employees in both domestic and foreign law firms, and across the public and private sectors. The level of implementation is generally higher among unionized companies compared to non-unionized companies. MOM and the Ministry of Home Affairs are responsible for combating labor trafficking and improving working conditions for workers, and generally enforce anti-trafficking legislation, although some workers in low-wage and unskilled sectors are vulnerable to labor exploitation and abuse. PHTA sets out harsh penalties (including up to nine strokes of the cane and 15 years’ imprisonment) for those found guilty of trafficking, including forced labor, or abetting such activities. The government developed a mechanism for referral of potential trafficking-in-persons activities, to the interagency taskforce, co-chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Manpower. Some observers note that the country’s employer sponsorship system made legal migrant workers vulnerable to forced labor, because their abilities to change employers without the consent of the current employer are limited. MOM effectively enforces laws and regulations pertaining to child labor. Penalties for employers that violated child labor laws were subject to fines and/or imprisonment, depending on the violation. Government officials assert that child labor is not a significant issue. The incidence of children in formal employment is low, and almost no abuses are reported. The USSFTA includes a chapter on labor protections. The labor chapter contains a statement of shared commitment by each party that the principles and rights set forth in Article 17.7 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its follow-up are recognized and protected by domestic law, and each party shall strive to ensure it does not derogate protections afforded in domestic labor law as an encouragement for trade or investment purposes. The chapter includes the establishment of a labor cooperation mechanism, which promotes the exchange of information on ways to improve labor law and practice, and the advancement of effective implementation. See the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report as well as the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report. Under the 1966 Investment Guarantee Agreement with Singapore, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (Now the Development Finance Corporation) offers insurance to U.S. investors in Singapore against currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and losses arising from war. Singapore became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1998. In March 2019, Singapore and the United States signed an MOU aimed at strengthening collaboration between the infrastructure agency of Singapore, Infrastructure Asia, and OPIC. Under the agreement, both countries will work together on information sharing, deal facilitation, and capacity building initiatives in sectors of mutual interest such as energy, natural resource management, water, waste, transportation, and urban development. The aim is to enhance Singapore-based and U.S. companies’ access to project opportunities, while building on Singapore’s role as an infrastructure hub in Asia. Singapore’s domestic public infrastructure projects are funded primarily via Singapore government reserves or capital markets, reducing the scope for direct project financing subsidies by foreign governments. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $373,346 2020 $339,998 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $370,115 2020 $270,800 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $26,668 2020 $27,300 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 449.6% 2020 545.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: https://www.singstat.gov.sg/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 1,465,070 100% Total Outward 727,627 100% United States 370,090 25% Mainland China 106,406 15% Cayman Islands 172,690 12% Netherlands 73,272 10% British Virgin Islands 114,520 8% India 46,240 6% Japan 97,930 7% United Kingdom 45,413 6% United Kingdom 88,900 6% Indonesia 44,589 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Aw Wen Hao Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy 27 Napier Road Singapore 258508 +65 9069-8592 AwWH@state.gov Slovakia Executive Summary Slovakia is a small, open, export-oriented economy with a population of 5.5 million people. It joined the EU and NATO in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2009. Slovakia is an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), with a favorable geographic location in the heart of Europe and an investment-friendly regulatory environment. The current ruling coalition, which took power in March 2020, has implemented a range of measures to improve the investment and business climate. The Slovak economy grew by 3.1 percent in 2021, slowed by three waves of COVID-19, which profoundly affected the hospitality, tourism, retail, sports and recreation, transport, and culture sectors. These industries remained shuttered for extended periods of time or were open only to limited groups of the population based on their COVID-19 or vaccination status. Business representatives noted that pandemic measures changed frequently, were announced at the last moment, or lacked sufficient clarity. Anti-pandemic measures were lifted in March 2022. Employers’ combined social and health contributions are equivalent to 35 percent of wages. The corporate income tax is 21 percent for companies with revenues at or above €100,000. The tax rate for companies with revenues below €100,000 is 15 percent. Attracting higher value-added investment is a priority for the current ruling coalition, as well as attracting investment in less-developed regions of Slovakia. In April 2021, the government approved Slovakia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, which presents a roadmap for spending €6.3 billion in EU grants by 2026 on key reforms and investments in the areas of green economy, education and research, healthcare, digitization, and rule of law. Inefficiencies in drawing EU funds persist, however. Slovakia’s government continued its anti-corruption agenda and measures in 2021, resulting in an improvement in the business community’s perception of its impact on the business environment. Slovakia’s economy relies heavily on energy-intensive manufacturing. These companies were particularly affected by global supply chain disruptions leading to shortages of key components including semiconductors and chips, as well as by the rapid price growth of key inputs, including raw materials and energy. Slovakia remains the largest per capita car producer in the world, with four major car producers and hundreds of suppliers. Manufacturing industries, including automotive; machinery and transport equipment; metallurgy and metal processing; electronics; chemicals; and pharmaceuticals remain attractive and have the potential for further growth. Positive aspects of the Slovak investment climate include: Membership in the EU and the Eurozone An open, export-oriented economy close to western European markets Investment incentives, including for foreign investors A firm government commitment to EU deficit and debt targets A sound banking sector deeply integrated with Europe Negative aspects of the Slovak investment climate include: High sensitivity to regional economic developments Weak public administration and an inefficient judiciary Significant regional disparities, suboptimal national transport network Low rates of public and private R&D investment Heavy reliance on EU structural funds, chronic deficiencies in allocation of funds Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 56 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 37 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $778 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $18,920 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Slovakia has one of the most open economies in the EU. The government’s overall attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI) is positive, and the government does not limit or discriminate against foreign investors. FDI plays an important role in the country’s economy, with major foreign investments in manufacturing and industry, financial services, information and communication technologies (ICT), and business service centers, where U.S. companies have a significant presence. The benefits of investing in Slovakia, including access to skilled labor, the country’s EU and Eurozone membership, and its central location in Europe have attracted a significant U.S. commercial and industrial presence, with investments from Accenture, Adient, Amazon, Amphenol, AT&T, Cisco, Dell, Garrett, GlobalLogic, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lear, Oracle, U.S. Steel, Whirlpool, and others. The Ministry of Economy coordinates efforts to improve the business environment, stimulate innovation, and attract investment, and it also coordinates support for less-developed regions. Within the Ministry of Economy, the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) is responsible for identifying and advising potential investors, as well as for providing in-depth information on the Slovak business environment, investment incentives, the process for setting up a business, and advising on suitable locations and real estate leasing. The government encourages investment through tax incentives and grants to support employment, regional development, and training. The current ruling coalition, in power since March 2020, has made it clear that it intends to award government incentives primarily for investments in less-developed regions of Slovakia. Section Four of the Regional Investment Aid Act (57/2018 Coll.) specifies the eligibility criteria for receiving assistance. According to the National Bank of Slovakia’s preliminary data, in 2020, inward FDI flows to Slovakia reached €1.7 billion, and inward FDI stock was €52 billion. EU Member States, including the Netherlands, Austria, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Germany are the largest foreign investors in Slovakia. South Korea remains by far the largest investor among non-EU countries. The Act on a Special Levy on Regulated Sectors (235/2012 Coll.) imposes a special tax on regulated industries, including the energy and network industries, insurance companies, electronic communications companies, healthcare, air transport, and others. The levy applies to profits generated from regulated activities above €3 million. A special levy on the banking sector, in effect since January 2012, was abolished effective January 2021. The Slovak government requires ride-sharing and app-based hospitality platforms that are active on the local market to register a permanent office in Slovakia for tax collection purposes. Those that do not face withholding taxes ranging from 19 to 35 percent on the fees collected that are paid to foreign entities. The government has a formalized process in place to involve employers in policymaking, including in the process of setting the minimum wage, via a social dialog process that includes government representatives, trade unions, and employer/business associations. The government also regularly engages in bilateral talks with major investors and employers to address their needs or concerns. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in Slovakia. Businesses can contract directly with foreign entities. Private enterprises are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of business interests, but must pay all Slovak obligations of liquidated companies before transferring any remaining funds out of Slovakia. All new businesses registered from October 2020 onwards must provide the national registration numbers of their partners, authorized representatives, and members of the boards of directors and supervisory boards when registering a business. Foreigners must provide their passport or residence permit numbers when registering a business. In February 2021, the Slovak Parliament approved legislation, over the opposition of representatives of the business community, requiring government review of ownership transfers larger than 10 percent of companies considered “critical infrastructure,” which includes a number of companies with foreign ownership. The law was passed through a fast-track procedure in response to a reported demand from Russian Sberbank that Slovakia’s electricity generator Slovenske Elektrarne back its debt to the bank with equity. While the Economy Ministry announced it would replace the fast-tracked legislation with a more robust Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism in 2021, based on EU Investment Screening Regulation 2020/1298, as of March 2022 the mechanism is pending government and parliamentary approval. Slovakia has no formal performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, or expanding foreign investments. Large-scale privatizations are possible via direct sale or public auction. Apart from the above-mentioned procedure for reviewing ownership changes in “critical infrastructure” installations, there are no formal requirements to approve FDI, though the government ultimately approves investment incentives. If investment incentives apply, the Economy Ministry manages the associated government approval process. The Act on Regional Investment Aid (57/2018 Coll.) specifies that only three categories of projects may be subsidized: industrial production, technology, or business services. An amendment to the Act in force from January 2021 slightly relaxed the conditions for receiving investment aid by increasing the maximum time to finish work on an investment project from three to five years. The Slovak government treats foreign entities established in Slovakia in the same manner as domestic entities, and foreign entities face no impediments to participating in R&D programs financed and/or subsidized by the Slovak government. Since January 2020, up to 200 percent of R&D spending is tax deductible. In 2023 this share is set to decrease to 100 percent, but a new deductible in the amount of 15 to 55 percent for selected higher value-added investments into moveable property will enter into force. The Slovak government holds stakes in a number of energy companies. It has historically been less open to private investment in energy assets that it considers to be in the national security interest. There are no domestic ownership requirements for telecommunications and broadcast licenses. The Act on Civil Air Transport (143/1998 Coll.) sets out rules for foreign airline operators seeking to operate in Slovakia. Please consult the following websites for more information: R&D Tax-Deductions: Slovakia’s investment and business climate is independently assessed on an annual basis by the European Commission in the course of the so-called European Semester. For more information, please see the European Commission’s latest Country Report on Slovakia from 2020 as well as the its Analysis of the Recovery and Resilience Plan of Slovakia from 2021, which replaced the Country Report for 2021. The OECD’s Economic Survey of Slovakia , released in January 2022, provides an independent assessment of major challenges faced by Slovakia, evaluates the short-term outlook, and makes specific policy recommendations. The following local civil society organizations carry out regular reviews of investment policy-related concerns in Slovakia – the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (INESS ), the Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (INEKO ), Transparency International Slovakia (TIS ). According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, the last one available, Slovakia ranks 118 out of 190 countries surveyed on the ease of starting a business, up from 127 in 2019. It takes, on average, 21.5 days to start a business, versus 26.5 days in 2019, and involves seven procedures. There are private business development companies that help navigate the process of establishing a new business. The main agencies with which a company must register are the business registry, tax office, social security agency, and, if the company employs at least one employee, a healthcare insurance company. In 2022, the government approved a package of nearly 200 measures meant to decrease the administrative burden on businesses, adding to 114 measures introduced by a previous package focused on cutting red tape, which was adopted in 2020. The Ministry of Economy also implemented regular regulatory fitness checks and reviews of EU directive implementing legislation to ensure that implementing laws do not create additional administrative burdens beyond what is required by EU law. The Central Government Portal “slovensko.sk” provides useful information on e-Government services for starting and running a business, citizenship, registering vehicles, social security, etc. Checklists of procedures necessary for registrations, applications for permits, etc., are currently available on the websites of the business registry, tax office, social security agency and health insurance companies. The Economy Ministry is working on streamlining the information into one common platform. The government has also announced plans for a major overhaul to the e-Government service portal to streamline access to public services. Please consult the following websites for more information: Central Government Portal: Commercial Register: Slovak Business Agency: Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency: Due to their limited size, Slovak companies have not made significant outward foreign direct investments, registering just €5.2 million in 2020. Several state agencies share responsibility for facilitating outward investment and trade. SARIO is officially responsible for export facilitation and attracting investment. The Slovak Export-Import Bank supports exports and outward investments with financial instruments to reduce risks related to insurance, credit, credit guarantees, and financial activities. It assists both large companies and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and is the only institution in Slovakia authorized to provide export and outward investment-related government financial assistance. The Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs runs a business center that provides services for exporters and helps identify investment opportunities. Slovakia’s diplomatic missions, the Ministry of Finance’s Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, and the Ministry for Investments, Informatization, and Regional Development (MIRRI) also play a role in facilitating external economic relations. Slovakia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Companies in Slovakia frequently complain about the country’s complex and unpredictable legislative and regulatory environment. The current ruling coalition is making significant efforts to address this issue. Starting June 1, 2021, all government ministries as well as 20 non-ministry central government institutions are legally bound to adhere to a “one-in-one-out” principle, meaning every new regulation that will increase administrative burden by €1 must be matched with a proposal to decrease the administrative burden by €1. As of January 2022, the principle has been further expanded to “one-in-two-out.” Failure to comply does not, however, result in the annulment of the regulation or any other material consequences. The Ministry of Economy flags violations through a mandatory interdepartmental consultation procedure on all draft legislation and prepares an annual report on implementation of the rule. Regulations are drafted on the local and national level with the latter usually having more direct consequences to foreign investors. The Legislative and Information Portal of the Ministry of Justice, Slov-Lex, is a publicly accessible centralized online portal for laws and regulations, including draft texts and information about the interdepartmental and public review processes. Draft bills, including investment laws proposed by ministries through a standard legislative procedure, are available for public comment through the portal, with a comment period of usually between two to three weeks. When fast tracking legislation and regulations comment periods may shrink to one-week, leaving little time for public comment. Affected business associations note that government reactions to comments are often superficial and generic, rather than substantive. While the process of adopting new laws and regulations follows clearly defined rules, MPs or parliamentary groups have the option of proposing legislation without having to adhere to the same legislative rules as the government and without having to hold any public consultations, thus rendering the legislative process less predictable and less transparent than draft laws introduced by the government. Legislative rules are also frequently circumvented by using the “accelerated legislative procedure.” This procedure is, by law, conditioned on extraordinary circumstances, threat to public safety, or imminent economic damage. However, in practice, the procedure is sometimes used to approve bills that do not appear to meet these criteria. In an effort to reduce abuse of the procedure, the President has repeatedly exercised her suspensive veto right in cases when the accelerated procedure was used to pass legislation without clearly meeting the aforementioned criteria. Legislation and regulations are, in most cases, not reviewed on the basis of scientific data assessments and critics assert that some mandatory impact assessments are conducted superficially. Analytical institutes at some ministries produce data-driven assessments of proposed policies or large investment projects, but not all ministries have the needed personnel and/or technical capacity to ensure a uniform and high-quality level of data-driven policymaking across the whole of government. Impact assessments for proposed legislation are available online, as are most policy and/or investment assessments prepared by the analytical units at government ministries. The Commercial Code ( 98/1991 Coll.) and the Act on Protection of Economic Competition (136/2001 Coll.) govern competition policy in Slovakia. As an EU Member State, Slovakia follows relevant EU legislation. The Anti-Monopoly Office, a part of the EU’s European Competition Network (ECN), is an independent state administrative body responsible for ensuring a competitive marketplace. The Public Procurement Office (PPO) supervises and administers public procurement. Public procurement legislation is frequently amended, and challenges remain in striking an adequate balance between protecting competition and eliminating corruption, while keeping the bureaucratic burden and average tendering time at acceptable levels. The PPO has made efforts to improve transparency and communication with stakeholders, as well as to strengthen supervisory activities. Since March 2021, the PPO accepts self-declarations from U.S. companies that are bidding in public procurements, rather than requiring companies to produce non-standard documentation issued by U.S. state or federal entities – which had been overly burdensome to obtain. In October 2021, parliament approved an amendment to the public procurement act aimed at accelerating and streamlining the public procurement process by increasing the threshold for when public tenders are required from €5,000 to €10,000 and by preventing the abuse of the complaint procedures to stall tenders via repetitive formal complaints. The amendment also introduces changes to increase the transparency of the tendering process by moving all tender-related communication online via a specialized electronic platform, by strengthening the independence of the PPO, and by prohibiting selected public servants from doing business with the state. The amendment to the public procurement act will enter into force on March 31, 2022. Oversight over the legality of administrative and regulatory processes, and decisions of the central government, as well as municipalities, is carried out by the prosecution service and an administrative court system consisting of first-instance courts, which are part of regional courts, and a Supreme Administrative Court. Complaints related to administrative malpractice can also be raised via the Public Defender of Rights and, in case these include breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms, also via the Constitutional Court. The government does not proactively promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. As an EU member state, Slovakia is bound by the EU Taxonomy Regulation, which seeks to create a common framework to determine whether certain economic activities can be regarded as environmentally sustainable. All measures implemented through Slovakia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, including investments and reforms, must be in line with the environmental objectives laid down by the EU Taxonomy and must not breach the ‘do no significant harm’ principle. As an EU Member State, Slovakia conforms to the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010), which is the EU’s most recent internationally compatible accounting framework, as well as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS-EU). Slovakia meets the minimum criteria of the U.S. Fiscal Transparency Report. Budget proposals, enacted budgets, and closing statements are substantially complete and publicly available. Departures from budget goals are common. The current ruling coalition introduced a number of changes to the 2021 and 2022 national budgets that have improved transparency and led to better projections compared to previous years. The Ministry of Finance publishes monthly reviews of budget execution, which provide an overview of public revenues and expenditures broken down by source and type. Annex 6 of the State budget describes the Debt Management Strategy including volume, total cost, debt service, structure, financing, forecast, and risk assessments. In February 2022, the government adopted sweeping changes to construction and zoning legislation with the aim to significantly accelerate, streamline, and digitize the process of obtaining construction permits and prevent the ex-post legalization of buildings built without requisite permits. While the business community generally welcomed the legislative changes as long overdue, municipalities and some non-governmental organizations argue that the legislation will strengthen the position of large real-estate developers, while reducing public scrutiny over proposed construction projects. Please consult the following websites for more information: Legislative and Information Portal Slov-Lex: (Note: all legal acts and regulations mentioned throughout this report can be found on this portal.) World Bank: Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic: Office for Public Procurement: Public Administration Budget, Ministry of Finance: The European Commission Country Report – Slovakia 2020: Slovakia is subject to European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction and must comply with all EU legislation and standards, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The national regulatory system is enforced in areas not governed by EU regulatory mechanisms. Slovakia is a WTO member, and the government notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of technical regulations. Please consult the following websites for more information: WTO: Slovakia is a civil law country. The Slovak judicial system is comprised of the Constitutional Court and general courts, including the Specialized Criminal Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Administrative Court, functional from August 1, 2021. General courts decide civil, commercial, and criminal matters, and review the legality of decisions by administrative bodies. However, as of March 2022, a proposal to create a new system of separate first-instance administrative courts in January 2023 is pending Parliament’s approval, as part of the government’s judicial reform plan. The Supreme Administrative Court serves as the second-instance administrative court, including as a disciplinary court for judges, prosecutors, and some other legal professions. The Specialized Criminal Court focuses on cases involving corruption, organized crime, serious crimes like premeditated murder, crimes committed by senior public officials, and crimes related to extremism, such as hate crimes. Enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The right to appeal regulations is limited to some state institutions and selected public officials. The Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights guarantee property rights. Slovakia has a written Commercial Code including contract law in the civil and commercial sectors. The basic framework for investment protection and dispute resolution between Slovakia and the U.S. is outlined in the 1992 U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty. Court rulings by EU Member States are recognized and enforced in compliance with existing EU regulations. Third country rulings are governed by bilateral treaties or by the Act on International Private Law. Contracts are enforced through litigation or arbitration. Laws guarantee judicial independence; however, public perception of judicial independence is among the lowest in the EU. According to the 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard, public trust in the judiciary is low, with trust among the general public standing at 28 percent and 30 percent among the business community. The trend has been improving, however, with the trust in the judiciary among businesses doubling since 2020. In 2019 and 2020 numerous investigations into judicial corruption were opened and about 20 judges were arrested on suspicion of corruption, while several additional judges resigned from office. Businesses and NGOs report that the justice system remains relatively slow and inefficient, and characterizing some verdicts as unpredictable and often poorly justified. Investors generally prefer international arbitration to resolution in the national court system. The government is pursuing an ambitious set of judicial reforms, aiming to address alleged corruption ties, low public trust, and inefficiency, and is also following the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). Judges remain divided on the need for reform though, and a consensus on the reform’s elements within the ruling coalition has not been reached as of March 2022. Accountability mechanisms ensuring judicial impartiality and independence exist and are increasingly utilized. Courts use a digital system for random case assignment to increase transparency. As of 2021, the functional immunity of judges related to their decision-making was significantly reduced, to prevent arbitrary and poorly justified rulings, and a new offence of “abuse of law”, inspired by German law, was introduced to enable prosecution of judges for arbitrary, unlawful decisions. Please consult the following websites for more information: Constitutional Court: Supreme Court: Supreme Administrative Court: Ministry of Justice, Analytical Centre, judicial map reform plan: EU Justice Scoreboard: European Commission 2021 Rule of Law Report: European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 2017 report on the Slovak judiciary: Slovakia is a politically and economically safe destination for foreign investment. Investment incentives are available to motivate investors to place new projects in regions with higher unemployment and to attract projects with higher added value. In February 2021, the government approved a law that allows the Economy Ministry to review and potentially stop ownership transfers larger than 10 percent of companies classified as critical infrastructure (see Section 1 for more detail). The Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) is a specialized government agency in charge of attracting foreign investments to Slovakia and serves as a one-stop shop for foreign investors. Their website offers easily accessible information on laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements relevant to investors or those wanting to register a business. The Slovak Business Agency (SBA) runs a National Business Center (NBC) in Bratislava and several other cities; it provides information and services for starting and establishing businesses. Startups can use a simplified procedure to register their company in order to facilitate the entry of potential investors. The Interior Ministry operates Client Centers around the country where many formal administrative procedures can be completed under one roof. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, the most recently published edition, Slovakia placed 45 out of 190 countries in the report’s overall ranking. Please consult the following websites for more information: Ministry of Economy: Startup Visa: https://www.economy.gov.sk/inovacie/podnikatelsky-zamer-na-realizaciu-inovativneho-projektu Slovak Business Agency: Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency: Information on requirements for investing or registering a business: https://sario.sk/sites/default/files/data/pdf/sario-invest-in-slovakia-ENG.pdf Central Public Administration Portal: Interior Ministry: World Bank Ease of Doing Business Ranking: The Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic is an independent body charged with the protection of economic competition. This office intervenes in cases of cartels, abuse of a dominant position, vertical agreements, and validates that state aid and mergers comply with antitrust law. Decisions of the Anti-Monopoly Office can be appealed to an independent committee and, in the second instance, to administrative courts. The key antitrust legislation regarding fair competition is the Competition Law (136/2001 Coll.). Slovakia complies with EU competition policy. Certain decisions related to competition policy and enforcing competition rules are directly under the purview of the European Commission. In January 2022, the Anti-Monopoly Office fined three Slovak companies nearly €9 million, the second highest issued fine in the authority’s history, for allegedly entering an illegal cartel agreement related to a €38 million renovation of an electricity substation for the Slovak transmission system operator. The involved companies appealed the decision to the Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Office and the case is pending. Please consult the following website for more information: The Anti-Monopoly Office: The European Commission: The Slovak Constitution guarantees the right to property. There is an array of legal acts stipulating property rights, including the Constitution. The Act on Expropriation of Land and Buildings (282/2015 Coll.) mandates that expropriation must only occur to the extent necessary, be in the public interest, provide appropriate compensation based on fair market value, and shall only occur when the goal of expropriation cannot be achieved through agreement or other means. In April 2021, the Slovak Parliament voted to extend by 10 years a sunset clause on expropriations of property for roads, which expired at the end of 2020. Expropriations are used by the government primarily for acquiring land on which planned highways are built, or large industrial parks, and only in the event that direct negotiations with landowners fail. In February 2022, the government proposed, without prior stakeholder consultation, and adopted a 50 percent tax on “excess profit” from electricity generated in nuclear power plants. Reportedly, this would have cost Slovakia’s nuclear operator, a majority foreign-owned company (with state minority ownership), more than €300 million annually, depending on wholesale electricity prices. The proposed tax was withdrawn just before parliamentary approval, after the government and the utility signed an MOU, under which the electricity generation company will provide a set volume of electricity at below market rates for household consumers through the end of 2024. According to a joint press conference announcing the agreement, the government, in turn, agreed to not alter the business environment for the company through 2025. The company is reportedly set to lose an estimated €850 million on the deal. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Slovakia is a contracting state to the International Centre for Settling International Disputes (ICSID) and the World Bank’s Commercial Arbitration Tribunal (established under the 1966 Washington Convention). Slovakia is a member of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrage Awards, which obligates Slovakia to accept binding international arbitration. The Finance Ministry leads on bilateral investment treaty matters and manages and represents Slovakia in international arbitration. Investment contracts with foreign investors in Slovakia are covered by respective ministries depending on the sector, in most cases by the Ministry of Economy. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The basic framework for investment protection and dispute resolution between Slovakia and the United States is governed by the 1992 U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty with an additional protocol that came into force in 2004. To date, twelve known cases of international arbitration have concluded, all of which Slovakia won. In one of the international arbitrations, a U.S. investor made claims under the U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty, but respected the decision of ICSID, which ruled in Slovakia’s favor. In October 2021, a U.S. firm registered a request to commence arbitration proceedings against Slovakia at the ICSID, with a claim under the U.S.- Slovakia BIT related to oil and gas extraction. As of February 2022, the case remained pending. The legal system generally enforces property and contractual rights, but decisions may take years, thus limiting the relevance of the courts in dispute resolution. According to the World Bank Doing Business 2020 report, the last one available, Slovakia ranked 46 out of 190 countries in the “enforcing contracts” indicator, with a 775-day average for enforcing contracts. The report notes that Slovakia made enforcing contracts easier by implementing electronic processing services. Slovak courts recognize and enforce foreign judgments, subject to the same delays. Although the commercial code generally appears to be applied consistently, the business community continues to cite a lack of legislation protecting creditor rights, corruption, political influence, lengthy procedures, and weak enforcement of court rulings as persistent problems. U.S. and other investors privately described instances of multi-million-dollar losses that were settled out of court because of doubts about the court system’s ability to offer a credible legal remedy. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts There are two acts applicable to alternative dispute resolution in Slovakia – the Act on Mediation (420/2004 Coll.) and the Act on Arbitration (244/2002 Coll.). The Slovak Act on Arbitration is largely modeled after UNCITRAL model law. Local courts in Slovakia recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Slovakia are relatively fast compared to the court system. The list of permanent arbitration courts authorized by the Slovak Ministry of Justice is published on the Ministry’s website. Decisions should be reached within 90 days of the date when the lawsuit was filed. It is possible to lodge an appeal to a civil court against an arbitration decision within three months of the date of its issuance or lodge a complaint about an arbitration decision to the chairman of the permanent arbitration court or to the Ministry of Justice. Alternative dispute resolution proceedings for consumer disputes can also be initiated by filing a motion with one of the alternative dispute resolution entities from a list maintained by the Ministry of Economy. Dispute settlement takes place through written communication and has a 90-day timeframe for completion. Unless the parties reach an agreement, the alternative dispute resolution entity will prepare a justified opinion. If any attempt to settle the dispute by mutual agreement fails, and the arbitration entity issues an opinion, there is no avenue for appeal. The other option for extrajudicial dispute settlement is mediation. Mediation can be used even after a court proceeding has started. The agreement resulting from mediation is legally enforceable only if it has the form of a notarial record or court settlement. The list of mediators is published on the website of the Association of Mediators. In the case of an unsuccessful mediation, parties can still take the case to arbitration or to court. Please consult the following websites for more information: List of alternative dispute resolution entities: List of permanent arbitration courts: List of Mediators: U.S.- Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty: Finance Ministry – International Arbitrations: Slovak Chamber of Commerce: World Bank Ease of Doing Business Ranking: The Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring (377/2016 Coll.) governs bankruptcy issues. Companies can undergo court-protected restructuring, and both individuals and companies can discharge their debts through bankruptcy. After its implementation, the International Monetary Fund praised this law for speeding up the bankruptcy process, strengthening creditor rights, limiting the discretion bankruptcy judges may use in adjudicating cases, and randomizing the allocation of cases to judges to reduce potential corruption. The Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring contains provisions to prevent preferential treatment for creditors over company shareholders, reduce arbitrariness in bankruptcy administrators’ conduct, and impose stricter liability rules for those initiating the bankruptcy proceedings. The Commercial Code also contains provisions on bankruptcy and restructuring preventing speculative mergers during ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. Slovakia ranked 46 out of 190 in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 ranking of the ease of resolving insolvency, with an average of four years for resolving insolvency. Please consult the following websites for more information: Slovak Banking Credit Bureau: Non-Banking Credit Bureau: Justice Ministry: Insolvency Register: Dlznik.sk: Central Register of Debtors: 4. Industrial Policies The Economy Ministry manages and coordinates investment aid with other relevant agencies (see Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment in Chapter 1). Eligibility for investment incentives is defined in the Act on Regional Investment Aid (57/2018 Coll.). Investors are encouraged to implement projects in less-developed regions and to invest in high value-added activities. Investment incentives are available to foreign and domestic investors for projects in sectors including industrial production, technology, and shared service centers. The incentives are provided as tax relief, cash grants, contributions for newly created jobs, and transfers of state or municipal property at a discounted price. Eligible costs include acquisition of land, acquisition and construction of buildings, acquisition of technology equipment and machinery, as well as intangible assets (e.g., licenses, patents, etc.) and wages of new employees for a period of two years. Apart from investment aid, the Economy Ministry offers innovation vouchers, that companies can use to innovate their products, services, or technology through cooperation with research and development institutions. The Economy Ministry also provides special loans through its Investment Fund. Individual ministries run EU-supported projects to spur investment in their respective areas of responsibility. State aid granted by the Slovak government must comply with valid EU regulations. The Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic is the coordinating body for state aid granted by individual ministries, as per the Act on State Aid (358/2015 Coll.), and there is a dedicated state aid web portal. The European Commission must approve state aid schemes above a certain threshold. Producers of electricity from renewable sources receive feed-in-tariffs, which are included in the final cost of electricity paid by all consumers. The government also has numerous schemes in place to support clean energy investments, including energy storage, energy efficiency, low-carbon transport and fuels, and decarbonization. These schemes are managed by the Ministries of Economy and Environment and are primarily funded from the EU structural and investment funds and the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. While Slovakia has made important progress in reducing carbon emissions and the share of renewables in its energy mix since the fall of communism in 1989, there is still significant potential for green investments to reduce the energy intensity and carbon footprint of the economy, which remain one of the highest in Europe. Please consult the following websites for more information: Investment Aid: State Aid: Ministry for Investments, Information, and Regional Development: Recovery and Resilience Plan: Ministry of Economy: Ministry of Environment: Slovakia eliminated all foreign trade zones and free ports in 2006. There are no Special Economic Zones in the country. There are no special requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over their source code or to provide access to encrypted documents. However, according to the Act on Electronic Communications (351/2011 Coll.), entities providing public networks or public services that use coding, compression, encryption, or other form of signal transfer concealment must, at their own expense, provide information requested through a legally issued wiretap or network monitoring order to relevant authorities. Slovakia follows the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) regulating data protection and privacy. There are no automated or systemic mechanisms in place enforcing rules on local data storage. Slovakia follows the EU regulation on the free flow of non-personal data 2017/0228 (COD) that sets out the principle that non-personal data is allowed to be located and processed anywhere in the EU without unjustified restrictions, with some exceptions on the grounds of public security. The relevant authority for data localization is the Ministry of Investments, Informatization, and Regional Development and the Office for Personal Data Protection. Slovakia does not engage in “forced localization,” with the exception of military equipment tenders, where, in some cases, the involvement of the local defense industry is either specifically required or is considered in the evaluation of submitted bids. Foreign entities have equal access to investment incentives, as per the Act on Regional Investment Aid (57/2018 Coll.). For more details on eligible projects, please see Section 1 on Investment Incentives. 5. Protection of Property Rights The mortgage market in Slovakia is growing rapidly and Slovak households are taking up new debt, primarily in the form of mortgages, at the highest rate in the European Union. In 2021, Slovakia enjoyed the third lowest interest rates among the EU countries, which oscillated around 1 percent. A reliable system of record keeping for both mortgages and liens exists. Secured interests in property and contractual rights are recognized and enforced. Less than 10 percent of the land in Slovakia lacks a clear title, however, there are instances when a property’s owner is unknown. In such cases, real estate titling can take a significant amount of time to determine. Legal decisions may take years, limiting the utility of the court system for dispute resolution. The fragmentation of land ownership and complications in user relations in Slovakia have their roots in Hungarian inheritance law and later in collectivization. Parcels commonly have a very high number of co-owners. There are currently 8.4 million parcels, 4.4 million recorded owners of land, and 100 million co-owning relationships. On average, one parcel has 11.93 co-owners, and one owner has an average of 22.74 parcels. To address this issue, the Agriculture Ministry started a robust land ownership reform in 2019, projected to last 30 years, to gradually consolidate parcels and simplify ownership records in the cadaster database. A dedicated web portal allows users to verify land information and property ownership. Foreign individuals and private companies can acquire real property without restrictions. In 2021, plans by the Hungarian government to buy Slovak agricultural land through its State Capital Fund met with fierce opposition in Slovakia. While diplomatic talks resulted in the proposed land purchases being withdrawn, in October 2021 the Agriculture Ministry launched an amendment to the Act on the Acquisition of Ownership of Agricultural Land (140/2014 Coll.), with the aim of preventing future foreign government purchases of agricultural land in Slovakia. New regulatory requirements introduced by the legislation include establishing preemption rights for the government and selected public entities and mandatory publication of all offers for the transfer of agricultural land and expressions of interest in such land. As of February 2022, the legislative amendment was not yet approved by parliament. Squatting is illegal in Slovakia and ownership of unoccupied property will not revert to squatters or other parties unless they are entitled to own the land. Slovakia was 8 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business “registering property” indicator, averaging 16.5 days to register a property compared to average of OECD high income countries of 23.6 days. Please consult the following websites for more information: Cadastral portal on land and property ownership: World Bank Doing Business 2020: The Slovak legal system provides strong protection for intellectual property rights (IPR). The country is bound by robust EU regulations and adheres to major international IPR treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, and numerous others on design classification, registration of goods, appellations of origin, patents, etc. The protection of IPR falls under the jurisdiction of two agencies: the Industrial Property Office of the Slovak Republic, the central government body that oversees industrial property protection including patents, and the Culture Ministry, responsible for copyrights including software. The Financial Administration, which is part of the Finance Ministry, plays an important role in enforcing IPR and deals with customs, including the fight against counterfeit goods. Since a new president was appointed to lead the Financial Administration in 2020, the institution has become more open about its law-enforcement activities. In case of IPR infringements, rights holders can bring a civil lawsuit in the district courts in Bratislava, Banska Bystrica, and Kosice and, if applicable, have the right to claim lost profits. The courts can issue injunctions to prevent further infringement of IPR. In certain cases, violation of IPR can be considered a criminal offense. Intellectual property theft is uncommon in Slovakia. In February 2021, the Slovak Parliament approved an amendment to the Copyright Act (185/2015 Coll.), which also transposed EU Directives on copyright 2019/790 and 2019/789 into law. The Amendment, which went into effect at the end of March 2022, brought an extension of mandatory copyright exceptions to include, for example, cultural heritage preservation; introduced a new regulation of obligations and rights in online content sharing services; rolled out new licensing possibilities and dispute resolution methods; and incorporated the country-of-origin principle. In January 2021, an amendment to the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act (308/2000 Coll.), the Telecommunications Act (195/2000 Coll.), and to the Act on Digital Broadcasting of Program Services and Provision of Other Content Services via Digital Transmission (220/2007 Coll.), came into effect, which brought deregulation, the liberalization of conditions for commercial media communication, and removed previous limitation on the number of broadcasting licenses available. Slovakia is not included in USTR’s Special 301 Report Watch Lists or the Notorious Markets List. There were 1,826 suspected breaches of IPR in 2020 for goods imported from third countries (down from 2,781 cases in 2019), primarily in the form of perfumes, cosmetics, jewelry and accessories, sports shoes, and toys. The value of seized counterfeit goods decreased sixteen-fold from 2019 to €414,000. The number of domestic IPR infringement cases decreased from 1,108 in 2019 to 364 in 2020 with a respective decrease in value by 57.5 percent to €892,000. In November 2021, the Financial Administration, together with its Czech and Polish counterparts, disbanded an organized crime group of illicit tobacco producers operating in Slovakia and seized illicit goods with a market price of over €32 million. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Please consult the following websites for more information: Ministry of Culture, Copyright Act: and its current Amendment Intellectual Property: Industrial Property Office: Financial Administration: Financial Administration Annual Report for 2020 (latest): https://www.financnasprava.sk//_img/pfsedit/Dokumenty_PFS/Zverejnovanie_dok/Vyrocne_spravy/FS/2021.06.04_VS_2020.pdf American Chamber of Commerce in the Slovak Republic: 6. Financial Sector The Bratislava Stock Exchange (BSSE) is a member of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE). An effective regulatory system exists that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. BSSE is a joint-stock company whose activities are governed primarily by the Stock Exchange Act (429/2002 Coll.) on the Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange Rules. The stock market in Slovakia is among the smallest in Europe, and dominated by bonds, which constitute 95 percent of sales volume. In 2021, the total volume of transactions at the BSSE was slightly less than €240 million (a 23 percent increase compared to 2020). As of December 31, 2021, the total nominal value of book-entry securities in Slovakia’s Central Depository of Securities reached €102 billion, compared to €94 billion in 2020. The nominal value of shares was roughly €37 billion and the value of bonds €64 billion. The European Single Market and existing European policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Slovakia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms in Slovakia and is available to foreign investors on the local market. Please consult the following websites for more information: Bratislava Stock Exchange: Central Depository of Securities: Central Bank of Slovakia: Central Register of Regulated Information: Slovakia joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2009, becoming part of the Euro system, which forms the central banking system of the euro area within the European System of Central Banks. The Central Bank of Slovakia (NBS) is the independent central bank of the Slovak Republic. Most banks operating in Slovakia are subsidiaries of foreign-owned institutions. Slovak branches operate conservatively and showed strong resilience during the 2009 financial crisis and subsequent EU-wide stress tests. The combined total assets of the financial institutions active in the Slovak market were more than €106 billion and the total capital adequacy ratio of Slovak banks was on average 19.67 percent at the end of 2021. Significant negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the local banking sector, anticipated at the onset of the pandemic, have failed to fully materialize and the Slovak financial and banking sector continues to be stable and profitable. Owing to two serious waves of the pandemic crisis and associated closures of certain economic segments in early and late 2021, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratios increased slightly across all products but remained at sustainable levels with the ratio for non-performing housing loans standing at just 2.2 percent. The NPL ratio for consumer credit stood at 8.8 percent and the ratio for loans to non-financial corporations at 3 percent in September 2021. The net profit of Slovak banks in 2021 is estimated at €229 million, compared to €185 million in 2020 and €167 million in pre-pandemic 2019. The annualized return on equity of Slovak banks increased from 5.88 percent to 7.33 percent q-o-q in Q2 2021 and stood just below the EU median of 7.96 percent. The rise in profitability is attributed primarily to the abolishment of a special levy on the banking industry in 2021. Foreign nationals can open bank accounts by presenting their passport and/or residence permit, depending on the bank. Please consult the following websites for more information: Central Bank of Slovakia: Foreign Exchange and Remittances Foreign Exchange Slovakia joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2009. The exchange rate is free floating. The Foreign Exchange Act (312/2004 Coll.) governs foreign exchange operations and allows for easy conversion or transfer of funds associated with an investment. The Act liberalizes operations with financial derivatives and abolishes any limits on the export and import of domestic and foreign banknotes and coins. It also authorizes Slovak residents to open accounts abroad and eliminates the obligation to transfer financial assets acquired abroad to Slovakia. Slovakia meets all international standards for conversion and transfer policy. Non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts. No permission is needed to issue foreign securities in Slovakia, and Slovak citizens are free to trade, buy, and sell foreign securities. Remittance Policies The basic framework for investment transfers between Slovakia and the United States is set within the 1992 US-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty. Following Slovakia’s approval of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in July 2015, and per the Act on Automatic Exchange of Information on Financial Accounts (359/2015 Coll.), Slovak financial institutions are obligated to report tax information of American account holders to the Slovak Government, which then forwards that information to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Slovakia does not impose limitations on remittances. Dividends are taxed at seven percent. Transfer pricing for controlled transactions must be based on market prices. An obligation to pay a 21 percent tax applies to companies that are moving their assets or activities abroad. Please consult the following websites for more information: U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty: U.S.- Slovakia Bilateral Taxation Treaty: MONEYVAL: Slovakia does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Slovak Investment Holding (SIH) is a fund of funds fully owned by the Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank. Resources are allocated as revolving financial instruments, through financial intermediaries or directly to final beneficiaries, and focus on strategic investment priorities in transport infrastructure, energy efficiency, waste management, SMEs, and social economy. Please consult the following websites for more information: Slovak Investment Holding: 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) has not yet been officially defined nor standardized by the Slovak government. In 2018, the Slovak Association of Corporate Governance, a non-profit civic organization grouping CEOs and managers from two dozen companies, issued a Code of Administration for state-owned companies to be used as guidelines. Slovakia has adopted and agreed to support and monitor the implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct. The Ministry of Interior on its webpage refers to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family continues to refer to Howard R. Bowen’s 1953 text on Social Responsibilities of the Businessman for its definition of social responsibility. The Ministry has not updated the generic webpage on social responsibility nor boosted the awareness of RBC in recent years. Slovakia is a party to the Aarhus Protocol. Consumer protection is guaranteed and enforced through the Civil Rights Act, Consumer Protection Act, and the Act on E-Commerce. In line with OECD Guidelines, Slovakia has adopted key legislation on product safety, protection of the economic interests of consumers, and legislative norms on consumer health protection enforced by the Department of Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Economy. The Slovak Trade Inspection authority supervises the implementation of Consumer Protection Act (634/1992 Coll.). Slovakia has accepted the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and is setting up a working group tasked with preparing a national action plan on business and human rights. As an OECD member, Slovakia adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. A National Contact Point (NCP) was established to promote these guidelines among the wider public (business community, government, trade unions, etc.) and to help resolve RBC disputes. The Slovak Public Procurement Act has integrated several RBC objectives related into public procurements. The NCP can be contacted here: Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic The Strategy Unit Department of Bilateral Trade Cooperation Mlynské nivy 44/A827 15 Bratislava 212 Slovak Republic Tel.: +421 2 4854 2309 E-mail: nkm@mhsr.sk Slovakia’s principle human rights challenges are related to the poor living standards and societal discrimination of the sizable local Roma minority, which according to some estimates makes up nearly 10 percent of the total population of Slovakia. According to civil society organizations, a large part of the Slovak Roma minority lives in marginalized settlements without access to basic amenities and services, and faces discrimination in almost all aspects of life, including access to education and employment. Human rights organizations also cite a lack of acceptance in society and occasional instances of physical or verbal violence against members of the LGBTQI+ community. Inequities in the labor market affect women and mothers, where women are less likely to be offered employment and face a 15 percent pay gap. A lack of affordable childcare effectively prevents many women from reentering the labor market after maternity leave. There have not been any claims filed by indigenous or other communities for land or natural resources ownership. Slovakia adopted Act 330/1991 Coll. that regulates the process of land consolidation and ownership rights, under which an individual or entity whose property was wrongly confiscated may have ownership reinstated. The Slovak government respects the rights of workers and enforces the law prohibiting child labor and discrimination effectively, though does not specifically prohibit discrimination based on HIV status. The law concerning acceptable conditions of work and occupational health and safety is enforced effectively. There have been occasional reports of abuse targeting migrant workers and members of the Roma minority by private employers. Despite progress in recent years, the Slovak government continues to face some challenges in effectively enforcing legislation prohibiting forced or compulsory labor and trafficking in persons. NGOs reported male and female migrants, especially from non-EU countries, substance abusers, people with disabilities, and marginalized Roma, and children in welfare systems or aging out of such systems were particularly vulnerable to become trafficking victims. The Acts on Environmental Impact Assessment (24/2006 Coll.), Air (137/2010 Coll.), and Waste (313/2016 Coll.) govern environmental protection affecting businesses. The mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process applies to a number of industries, including mining, energy, steel, chemical, pharmaceutical, wood, food, agriculture, and infrastructure projects. The Act on Air defines legal obligations for emitters, including emissions limits, monitoring, and reporting in line with valid national and EU legislation. The Act on Waste establishes the obligations for companies producing packaging as well as rules on waste recycling and recovery. Slovakia has corporate governance legislation that protects and facilitates the exercise of shareholder rights and ensures equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders have the right to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights and the right for compensation arrangements pursuant to this legislation. The primary sources of the legislation are the Commercial Code, the Accounting Act, and the Securities Act. Many companies and NGOs adhere to the principles of RBC and actively promote and advocate for this concept. The most significant program is the Via Bona Awards, developed by the Pontis Foundation, which annually recognizes Slovakia’s best RBC programs. The American Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia also plays an important and active role in promoting and advocating for RBC. As an EU member state, Slovakia adheres to the 2017/821 regulation based on the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. The country also enforces similar domestic measure through Act 332/2020 Coll. regulating supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals from conflict-affected areas. Slovakia has ratified the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) but is not a participant in Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative (VP). Slovakia is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies nor a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Slovakia’s environmental regulatory framework is in line with EU policies. Limits imposed by Slovak environmental legislation are stricter than the OECD average, though some critics note that implementation and environmental law enforcement lag. The government’s “Environmental Policy Strategy until 2030,” adopted in 2019, outlines a path toward increased environmental protection and minimizing the use of non-renewable natural resources by 2030. In 2020, Slovakia adopted its Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (INECP) for 2021 to 2030 to meet its EU greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduction commitments. The INECP addresses five dimensions: decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy security, internal energy markets and research, innovation, and competitiveness. Slovakia has committed to the EU Green Deal and endorsed the EU Commission’s “Fit for 55” legislative package, with the aim to achieve a 55 percent reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050. In January 2020, the Slovak government passed the “Low-Carbon Development Strategy until 2030 with a View to 2050.” This Strategy lays down a roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy and introduces sectoral targets of GHG emission reductions through 2030. Both the INECP and the Low carbon Strategy are set to be updated in 2022, to reflect the new EU-wide GHG emission reduction target of 55 percent and updated EU emissions calculations. The state provides regulatory incentives, many of which can be co-financed with EU funds. Some businesses have noted that the conditions for environmental compensations are often set inappropriately by administrators, resulting in incentive money being left on the table. In March 2022 the Environment Ministry reported that only by 38 percent of the total allocated for the State Program for Remediation of Environmental Burdens budget was expended. Due to record-high prices of emission allowances and energy inputs starting in 2021, energy intensive industry leaders have advocated for higher levels of reimbursement from the Environmental Fund for modernization valued at over €1 billion, which is funded in part by emission allowances. The Fund returned €11million to industry as of March 2022, while in 2021 it was only €3 million. Some large industrial emitters are working with the government to develop comprehensive emission reduction action plans that include state aid schemes. Electromobility and hydrogen have been government priorities, with the government providing subsidies to consumers for electric cars purchases and grants. State energy authorities have been working on a plan to increase electricity network capacity, solutions to which may be an opportunity for foreign investment. As one of the EU’s most industrialized countries with a large energy-intensive economy, Slovakia will have to invest significant public and private resources to achieve its ambitious climate and environmental objectives. Slovakia has allocated €2.17 billion of its €6.3 billion Recovery and Resilience Plan towards green investments in energy efficiency and building renovation, renewable energy, sustainable transport, decarbonization, and climate adaption and biodiversity. Some 40 percent of the €13 billion of European Structural and Investments Funds available to Slovakia in the 2021-2027 programing period will also be spent on green investments. Polluters are able to access significant public funding for projects related to decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy storage, and renewable sources from the Modernization Fund and the Environmental Fund, which are funded from profits from Emission Trading Schemes (including the EU ETS) covering about 50 percent of all emissions. Slovakia is also eligible for nearly €1 billion in EU funding from the EU’s “Just Transition Fund” to transition away from coal. Slovakia committed to end the use of domestic coal in electricity and heat generation by 2023. It pledged to end state aid for coal mining beginning January 2024. In January 2022, the government launched a new deposit return scheme for plastic bottles and aluminum cans in which larger retailers are required to participate. The government’s aim is to achieve a ninety percent return rate of recyclable packaging by 2025. Agriculture is a sector vulnerable to both climate change and especially effected by environmental legislation related to land use, animal husbandry practices, and herbicide/pesticide use. In February 2022, the Slovak government approved a Strategic Plan of the Common Agricultural Policy for 2023-2027, which included EU-wide priorities on environmental protection and a domestic focus on modernization and innovation with a budget of €4.3 billion. The Slovak Environmental Inspectorate provides regulatory relief to certified companies by reducing the frequency of inspections to once every ten years. Landowners are granted property tax relief for land use choices, such as leaving intact habitats such as swamps, sodium-rich soils, peat bogs and groves, windbreaks, and water protection zones. Slovakia also introduced tax incentives for environmentally friendlier modes of transport such as a tax exemption for electricity and natural gas in railway, water, and public transport. Slovakia is active in green public procurement and has a National Action Plan for Green Public Procurement (GPP) in place that mandates that central and local contracting authorities apply GPP rules. The Slovak Environment Agency organizes educational activities on green public procurement for public authorities. Within its Strategy for a Greener Slovakia, a component of the Environmental Policy Strategy, the Slovak government committed that GPP will cover at least 70 percent of the total value of public procurement by 2030. The strategy also obliges contracting authorities that carry out ten or more public procurement procedures in a calendar year to make environmental considerations in at least six percent of contracts; reduce negative environmental impacts of the procurement; contribute to environment protection; promote adaptation to climate change; and support sustainable development. Slovakia ranked 20 on the 2021 Global Energy Innovation Index, up four places from 2016. It scored 4.4 points in the MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index, putting it at 50th place. According to Global Green Growth Institute’s 2019-2020 Global Green Growth Index, Slovakia ranked 7 in Europe, improving 10 places since 2005. Please consult the following websites for more information: Environment Ministry’s Law Carbon Strategy: Economy Ministry’s Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan: Ministry of Agriculture: Recovery and Resilience Plan, Green Economy Section: Action Plan for the Transformation of the Upper Nitra Region: 9. Corruption Slovakia is a party to international treaties on corruption. Among them are the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the UN Anti-Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC), the UN Anti-Corruption Convention (UNCAC), and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Slovakia is a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP). The Corruption Prevention Department of the Prime Minister’s Office is a member of the Council of Europe’s Network of Corruption Prevention Authorities. Slovakia is a party to the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). Giving or accepting a bribe constitutes a criminal act according to Slovak law. Since 2021, the law was expanded to include a definition of indirect corruption, making it a crime to accept or offer unjustified benefits or undue advantages. Slovak criminal law incorporates criminal liability for legal persons, including corporations. A major concern for years among the business community, data suggest that corruption concerns among the public and investors are improving. According to the Special Eurobarometer survey from December 2019, the latest one available, 79 percent of respondents believed that corruption is part of Slovakia’s business culture (above the EU average of 61 percent). However, in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Slovakia ranked 56 out of 180 countries, up four spots since 2020, and improved its score to its all-time best. Thirty-nine percent of Slovak respondents in Transparency’s 2021 Global Corruption Barometer, indicated a decrease in their perceptions of the level of corruption over the previous year and 61 percent said the government is doing well in tackling corruption. The trend stands out in the Visegrad region and is attributed to the increased efforts and performance in the investigation and prosecution of corruption, as well as the government’s anti-corruption measures. There is no data available on whether U.S. firms identify corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment. A regular survey conducted by seven foreign chambers of commerce showed positive movement in the business community’s assessment of the government’s fight against crime corruption, moving from a negative attribute in surveys since 2004 to a neutral one in 2021. The ruling coalition’s agenda has focused heavily on strengthening anti-corruption measures. In 2020, it amended legislation regulating selection procedures for the Prosecutor General and the Special Prosecutor, and introduced new leadership in key law enforcement institutions. A new Whistleblower Protection Office commenced operations in September 2021. In 2019, Parliament streamlined an anti-shell company law that requires private companies to reveal their ownership structure in the Register of Public Sector Partners before entering into business contracts with public entities. Disclosure of contracts in the Central Registry of Contracts by public authorities and state-owned enterprises is compulsory. In addition to EU legislation, the public procurement law provides for fair and transparent government procurement, and the Public Procurement Office (PPO) oversees its implementation, including countering possible conflicts of interest. The PPO has a reputation for being effective and independent. A major reform of public procurement law designed to reduce red tape and gold-plating by speeding up procurements organized by government agencies and municipalities entered into force in March 2022. Since 2021, a new law on asset seizure and forfeiture prevents the legalization of assets through their transfer to third parties, and thus extends to family members or close associates. A new Office for the Management of Seized Assets operational from August 2021 should provide for streamlining of the related processes in close cooperation with law enforcement. In January 2020, a regulation on conflicts of interest in the civil service was adopted by Cabinet decree, introducing a Code of Conduct for Civil Servants (400/2019 Coll.). NGO analysts and GRECO point out that conflict of interest and asset declaration regulations lack the necessary level of detail to be implemented and enforced in practice. In its Integrity Review, the OECD recommends Slovakia consider strengthening institutional and technological capacity to process, verify, and audit asset declarations for public officials, and to strengthen parliamentary oversight of adherence to integrity standards. Despite the government’s commitment to address the absence of lobbying regulation, neither a regulatory framework for lobbying nor an associated mandatory register of lobbyists and a code of conduct have been introduced. The OECD Integrity Review published in March 2022 acknowledges Slovakia’s progress towards a strategic approach to public integrity but recommends a range of measures to step up its implementation and delivery of goals. These include applying a risk-based approach, allocating appropriate financial resources, strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and fostering a culture of public integrity. Corruption related probes, including those against former high-ranking officials and influential businesspeople advanced in 2021; during which 136 individuals were indicted for corruption-related crimes, up from 124 in 2020 and 83 in 2019. From 2019-2021 a number of judges, the former Prosecutor General, the former Special Prosecutor, the former Economy and Environment Minister, former Deputy Ministers of Justice and Finance, two former Police Corps Presidents, two former Financial Administration Presidents, several high-ranking Agriculture Ministry officials, several businesspeople and lawyers were charged with corruption, interference in the independence of courts, and organized crime. At least 26 former officials pleaded guilty. Government authorities do not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that would prohibit bribery of public officials. However, businesses have adopted such measures voluntarily, especially those with foreign ownership that often have company-wide internal codes of conduct. In many cases such companies extend these codes of conduct to their contractors. Public entities and private companies with at least 50 employees are required by law to set up an internal channel to report corruption or unlawful conduct. NGOs investigating corruption do not enjoy any special protection, however, they are regularly consulted by government agencies, such as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Public Procurement Office. Please consult the following websites for more information: European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 502, Corruption, December 2019: Transparency International 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index: Transparency International 2021 Global Corruption Barometer – European Union: Spring 2021 Foreign Chambers of Commerce Joint Survey: GRECO’s 5th Evaluation Round Compliance Report on the Slovak Republic, 2021: OECD Integrity Review of the Slovak Republic, March 3, 2022: Whistleblower Protection Office: The Register of Public Sector Partners: Central Registry of Contracts: Public Procurement Office: Office for the Management of Seized Assets: Code of Conduct for Civil Servants: Resources to Report Corruption Contact details of government agencies responsible for combating corruption: Daniel Lipsic Head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office Office of the Special Prosecution under the General Prosecutor’s Office Suvorovova 4343 902 01 Pezinok Telephone: +421 33 690 3171 Daniel.Lipsic@genpro.gov.sk Lubomir Danko Director of the National Criminal Agency Ministry of Interior, National Police Headquarters Racianska 45 812 72 Bratislava Telephone: +421 964052102 Lubomir.Danko@minv.sk Contact details of “watchdog” organizations: Michal Pisko Executive Director Transparency International Slovakia Bajkalska 25 82718 Bratislava Telephone: +421 905 613 779 pisko@transparency.sk Zuzana Petkova Executive Director Stop Corruption Foundation Stare Grunty 18 841 04 Bratislava petkova@zastavmekorupciu.sk Peter Kunder Executive Director Fair Play Alliance Hubeneho 7 P. O. Box 75 830 05 Bratislava Telephone: +421 911 724 189 kunder@fair-play.sk 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence and civil disturbances are rare in Slovakia, but as the government continued imposing stringent measures and a series of lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the country has seen an increase in the number of anti-government demonstrations. The protests often attracted hundreds to thousands of people and remained largely peaceful, though several protests resulted in minor damage to government property, riot police intervention, traffic disruptions, arrests, and minor injuries to police officers and participants. During two separate protests against anti-pandemic measures in July 2021, protestors paralyzed traffic in downtown Bratislava for several hours and verbally and physically harassed journalists. One of the protests resulted in a crowd of several dozen attempting to forcibly enter the parliament building. There have been no recent reports of politically motivated damage to property, projects, and installations nor violence directed toward foreign-owned companies. However, in October and November 2021, coordinated groups targeted large grocery stores (which were generally international grocery retailers) for anti-mask defiance actions, in protest against anti-pandemic measures. On several occasions the incidents resulted in hours-long store closures, causing financial losses to the retailers. In response, an association of the largest companies in retail and wholesale sector in Slovakia, including Billa, Kaufland, Lidl, Metro, and Tesco, issued a call to public authorities to urgently address the situation and take swift and effective action, which drew increased police engagement. There have been no recent reports of similar incidents after government relaxed anti-pandemic rules. The two years of the COVID-19 pandemic measures and their politicization, as well as an antagonistic domestic political scene have contributed to increased political and societal polarization and made space for extremist rhetoric in the mainstream. While some threats were made against Slovak politicians for their support of a politicized international agreement, there have been no reports, however, of actual politically motivated violence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Slovakia is one of the most industrialized economies in the EU with almost 28 percent of the workforce employed in industry, 70 percent in services (including construction), and the rest in agriculture. After a sharp increase in the unemployment rate during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate declined in 2021, dropping from 7.81 percent in January 2021 to 6.96 percent in January 2022, though unemployment still remained well above the pre-pandemic low of 4.92 percent in December 2019. Long-term unemployment remains prevalent in poorer regions, especially in the marginalized Roma communities. Foreign companies frequently praise the labor force’s motivation and productivity, and especially commend younger workers for their proficiency with foreign languages. However, businesses consistently complain about the growing gap between their labor market needs and popular areas of study, with shortages in technical education at both the high school and higher education levels, and the education system’s insufficient focus on teaching critical thinking and soft skills. Slovak PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) scores are persistently below the EU average. The health and IT sectors are among those facing the most severe long-term labor shortages, but most regions also report shortages in workers for lower-skill construction and machinery operation jobs. The minimum wage law indexes the minimum wage to overall wage growth in the economy. The minimum wage increased 4 percent to €646 per month in 2022. Nominal wages grew by 6.8 percent and real wages by 3.5 percent in 2021. The average nominal wage in 2021 increased to €1,171 per month, with wages in the wholesale and hospitality segments increasing the most at 15 and 10 percent y-o-y, respectively. In 2020, the average hourly labor cost was €13.40, significantly lower than the EU average of €28.50. According to Eurostat, the gender pay gap declined from 19.8 to 15.8 percent between 2018 and 2020 but remained above the EU average of 13 percent. The gender employment gap stood at 7.3 percent in 2020. A lack of childcare facilities for children below three years of age combined with three years of paid maternity and parental leave discourages mothers from returning to work and aggravates the gender pay gap. According to the European Commission Education and Training Monitor from January 2022, participation in early childhood education in Slovakia remains among the lowest in the EU. As part of its Recovery and Resilience Plan, Slovakia has allocated significant resources to improve the availability of formal childcare and early childhood education. The Slovak Labor Code (311/2001 Coll.) governs the national labor market, including for foreigners. Businesses cite burdensome labor regulations, frequent and arbitrary changes to the labor code, and a lack of stakeholder input as some of the obstacles to doing business in Slovakia. Employers also note that the system for determining the annual increase in the minimum wage are disconnected from productivity gains, weighing on production costs and reducing the competitiveness of local businesses in comparison to foreign competitors. As of March 2022, a permanent “kurzarbeit” social insurance program entered into force, under which employers may reduce their employees’ work hours instead of laying them off, while receiving a government subsidy of up to 60 percent of a worker’s salary. The “kurzarbeit” scheme may be triggered in an extraordinary situation, including for example the COVID-19 pandemic. On January 1, 2020, the Amendment to the Act on Employment Services (5/2004 Coll.) simplified the process for hiring non-EU nationals by decreasing wait times for temporary residence permits from 90 to 30 days and reducing the wait time for work permits to 20 days. The number of foreign nationals from both EU and non-EU countries in the Slovak labor market had been steadily increasing since Slovakia’s 2004 accession to the EU but saw a dip at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021 there were 167,000 foreign nationals residing in Slovakia, of which 66,000 were legally employed. The number of Ukrainian workers in the Slovak labor market, who together with Serbian nationals already accounted for 80 percent of all non-EU foreign laborers, is expected to rise exponentially in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the decision of the Slovak government to extend a temporary refuge status to all Ukrainian nationals fleeing war, which permits their stay and enables status holders to legally work and access government services. The Anti-discrimination Act (365/2004 Coll.) and the Labor Code ban discrimination in the workplace based on gender, race, nationality, sexual orientation, health impairment, age, language, religion, and political affiliation. It does not, however, specifically prohibit discrimination based on HIV status. Activists frequently allege that employers refused to hire Roma, and an estimated 70 percent of Roma are legally unemployed, although many are believed to work in the informal economy. Slovakia has a standard workweek of 40 hours and the law mandates a maximum workweek of 48 hours, including overtime, except for employees in the health-care sector, whose maximum work week is 56 hours. The Labor Code caps overtime at 400 hours annually and sets minimum remuneration for overtime and work during public holidays or on weekends. There are no serious concerns regarding compliance with international labor standards. The Labor Code differentiates between layoffs and firing. The cost to lay off employees stipulated by the Labor Code is generally less expensive than in Western Europe, ranging from two to three months’ severance pay, depending on the employee’s time in service. Social insurance contributions are compulsory and include healthcare, unemployment, and pension insurance. Both employers and employees must pay social contributions – the employer’s combined social and health contributions amount to 35 percent of wages. The combined tax and mandatory contribution cost-wedge on labor in Slovakia is above average in the region and may discourage legal employment. According to the World Bank Informal Economy Database, the informal economy in Slovakia represented 16.1 percent of GDP in 2018 but experts asserted that the share likely declined since then, consistent with a gradually improving tax collection rate. Collective bargaining is voluntary and takes place without interference from the state. There is a formal trilogue used in negotiating national minimum wage levels for the following year. In absence of an agreement, which has been the norm for several years, the minimum wage is automatically adjusted using a mathematical formula based on average wages. Provisions agreed in multi-employer as well as single-employer collective agreements are legally binding for the contracting parties. EU Agency Eurofound reports up to 35 percent of employees in the national economy are covered by a collective agreement. At the sectoral or regional level, the coverage is about 10 percent. No official national data exist on collective bargaining coverage. The standard mechanisms for dealing with collective labor disputes is conciliation – used in vast majority of cases – and arbitration. Union membership has declined in recent years. A “tripartite arrangement” is used as a discussion platform including state representatives, labor unions, and employer associations. Slovakia is a member of the International Labor Organization and has ratified all eight core conventions. Labor strikes are infrequent in Slovakia. In February 2022, truck drivers organized a series of smaller scale strikes, disrupting traffic at major thoroughfares and border crossing points. Please consult the following websites for more information: The European Commission Country Report – Slovakia 2020: OECD Economic Survey – Slovak Republic 2022: Central Office of Labor, Social Affairs and Family: 14. Contact for More Information Senior Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Bratislava Hviezdoslavovo námestie +421 (2) 5922 3069 Slovenia Executive Summary Several factors make Slovenia an attractive location for foreign direct investment (FDI): modern infrastructure with access to important EU transportation corridors, a major port on the Adriatic Sea with access to the Mediterranean, a highly educated and professional workforce, proximity to Central European and Balkan markets, and membership in the Schengen Area, EU, and Eurozone. With a small domestic market of just over two million people, Slovenia’s economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade and susceptible to international price and currency fluctuations as well as economic conditions among its major trading partners. In recent years, Slovenia’s economic growth rate has outpaced those of most other EU member states, and the country has enjoyed rising incomes, growing domestic consumption, falling unemployment, low inflation, and burgeoning consumer confidence. However, in 2020, GDP contracted by 4.2 percent to EUR 46.9 billion due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic impacted certain industries, including retail and hospitality sectors, more severely than others. Overall, the economy faired relatively well, with a series of government COVID-19 stimulus measures – worth approximately EUR 2.5 billion (USD 2.9 billion) – mainly focused on preserving jobs. Slovenia’s economy rebounded in 2021 with GDP growth of 8.1 percent, exceeding the eurozone average. However, Slovenia is expecting more modest GDP growth in 2022 and 2023, with the Bank of Slovenia estimating growth of 4.0 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively. The central bank warned that the country was experiencing supply chain issues as well as labor shortages and expressed concern about rising inflation and energy prices. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is expected to exacerbate inflationary pressures, making a slowdown more likely. Despite a number of privatizations in the banking sector in 2019 and 2020, approximately 25 percent of Slovenia’s economy remains state-owned or state-controlled based on consultations with economic and financial experts. While estimates of the percentage of state involvement in the economy vary, most experts agree that it is among the highest among EU member states. There is widespread skepticism in some quarters toward privatization and foreign direct investment, despite general awareness of FDI’s importance to economic growth, job creation, and developing new technologies. Potential investors in Slovenia may face significant challenges, including a lack of transparency in economic and commercial decision-making, time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, opaque public tender processes, regulatory red tape, and a heavy tax burden for high earners. According to Bank of Slovenia figures, FDI in Slovenia totaled EUR 16.6 billion (35.3% of GDP) in 2020, a 2.4 percent increase over the previous year. The relatively modest growth in investment flows were largely attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Slovenia’s most important sources for direct foreign investment were Austria (25.6 percent), Luxembourg (13.0 percent), Switzerland (10.7percent), Germany (8 percent), and Italy (7.3 percent). However, Bank of Slovenia data indicated U.S. companies accounted for 9.4 percent of total inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2020, EUR 66 million (USD 72.5 million) invested directly and an additional EUR 1.48 billion (USD 1.63 billion) invested indirectly through U.S. subsidiaries in other European countries. This combined investment of EUR 1.55 billion (USD 1.78 billion) placed the United States as Slovenia’s third largest source of direct and indirect foreign investment, behind Austria (EUR 2.58 billion) and Germany (EUR 2.40 billion). The most important sectors for FDI were manufacturing (33.5 percent), financial and insurance activities (22.5 percent), wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (17.1 percent). Although firms with foreign owners represented just 1.8 percent of all Slovenian firms in 2020, firms with FDI accounted for 24.2 percent of capital, 25.9 percent of assets, and 23.5 of corporate sector employees. Their capital and workforce generated EUR 29.0 billion in net sales revenue and EUR 1.1 billion in operating profit. Foreign companies accounted for 47.7 percent of corporate sector exports and 52.5 percent of corporate sector imports. Slovenia, in line with the European Union (EU), committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. Slovenia’s long-term climate strategy, approved in July 2021, includes a provision specifying that the country will use nuclear energy in the long term, clarifying the country’s energy future and committing to produce a large percentage of its energy supply domestically. In July 2021, the EU approved Slovenia’s national recovery and resilience plan, allowing funds up to EUR 2.5 billion (EUR 1.8 billion in grants and 700 million in loans) to be drawn from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. 42.5 percent of the funds are earmarked for green transition projects. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 41 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 32 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 265 https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 25,360 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Although Slovenia has no formal business roundtable or foreign investment ombudsman, the Slovenian Public Agency for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Development, Investment and Tourism (SPIRIT) promotes FDI and advocates for foreign investors in Slovenia, often in collaboration with diplomatic missions and business associations based in Slovenia. Its mission is to enhance Slovenia’s economic competitiveness through technical and financial assistance to entrepreneurs, businesses, and investors. Foreign companies conducting business in Slovenia have the same rights, obligations, and responsibilities as domestic companies. The principles of commercial enterprise, including national treatment, apply to the operations of foreign companies as well. The Law on Commercial Companies and the Law on Foreign Transactions guarantee their basic rights. According to SPIRIT’s annual survey on foreign investors’ perceptions of Slovenia’s business environment, investors cite the high quality of Slovenia’s labor force as the deciding factor in choosing the country as an investment destination, followed by widespread knowledge of foreign languages, employees’ technical expertise, innovation potential, and strategic geographic position offering easy access to EU and Balkan markets. While generally welcoming greenfield investments, Slovenia presents a number of informal barriers that may prove challenging to foreign investors. According to SPIRIT’s survey, the most significant disincentives to FDI are high taxes, high labor costs, lack of payment discipline, an inefficient judicial system, difficulties in firing employees, and excessive bureaucracy. There are no formal limits on foreign investors’ ability to establish an investment or operate in the market. Foreign companies doing business in Slovenia and the local American Chamber of Commerce have also cited additional factors that adversely affect the local investment climate, including the lack of a high-level FDI promotion strategy, a sizable judicial backlog, difficulties in obtaining building permits, labor market rigidity, and disproportionately high social contributions and personal income taxes coupled with excessive administrative tax burdens. Businesses have also reported a lack of transparency in public procurement, unnecessarily complex and time-consuming bureaucracy, frequent changes in regulation, relatively high real estate prices in some parts of the country, and confusion over lead responsibility or jurisdiction regarding foreign investment among government agencies. The government recognizes some of these constraints and is taking steps to address them. It adopted a De-bureacratization Act in 2021 that simplified administrative procedures, improved communication with government offices, and broadened the authority for signing ministry decisions to state secretaries. The newly-established Government Office for Digital Transformation implemented several measures to advance digitalization and reduce red tape, including plans to introduce new digital services in healthcare, education, and public administration by 2023. This new office also committed to improving the business environment for technology companies, including through offering tax incentives for IT experts and opening a new government center to cater to and reduce red tape for foreigners and Slovenians returning from overseas. The government also succeeded in reducing the income tax rate in the highest tax bracket from 50 percent to 45 percent, but failed to take further action on tax policies that are an impediment to foreign investment and lead to brain drain. Both foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in different forms of remunerative activity. Slovenia has relatively few formal limits on foreign ownership or control. In May 2020, Slovenia enacted a screening mechanism for foreign investments that will remain in force until June 2023. The investment screening mechanism was enacted as part of the COVID-19 stimulus package and will need to be made permanent before the legislation sunsets. The investment screening mechanism stipulates that foreign investments acquiring at least 10 percent of share capital or voting rights in Slovenian companies with activities involving critical infrastructure, critical technologies and dual use items, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information, the freedom and pluralism of the media, and certain projects and programs in the interest of the EU must seek approval from the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. The ministry was also authorized to retroactively screen foreign direct investment transactions within the past five years. The application for such approval must be submitted to the ministry within 15 days from the date of the execution of the agreement. The Slovenian government envisages that the review process can take up to two months. Failure to comply to this new legislation may result in a fine ranging between EUR 50,000 and EUR 500,000 for companies based on their size and a fine of EUR 10,000 for individuals. Sector-specific restrictions: Professional services: There are limits on banking and investment services, private pensions, insurance services, asset management services, and settlement, clearing, custodial, and depository services provided in Slovenia by companies headquartered in non-EU countries. Companies from non-EU countries can operate freely only through an affiliate with a license granted by an appropriate Slovenian or EU institution. Gaming: There is a 20 percent cap on private ownership of individual companies. Air transport: Aircraft registration is only possible for aircraft owned by Slovenian or EU nationals or companies controlled by such entities. Companies controlled by Slovenian nationals or carriers complying with EU regulations on ownership and control are the only entities eligible for Air Operator’s Certificates (AOC) for performing airline services. Maritime transport: The law forbids majority ownership by non-EU residents of a Slovenian-flagged maritime vessel unless the operator is a Slovenian or other EU national. Slovenia underwent an OECD Investment Policy Review and a WTO Trade Policy Review in 2002. The Economist Intelligence Unit and World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” provide current economic profiles of Slovenia. Individuals or businesses may adopt a variety of different legal and organizational forms to conduct economic activities. Businesses most commonly incorporate legally as limited liability companies (LLC or d.o.o.) and public limited companies (PLC or d.d.). Non-residents of the Republic of Slovenia must obtain a Slovenian tax number before beginning the process of establishing a business. Slovenia’s Companies Act, which is fully harmonized with EU legislation, regulates the establishment, management, and organization of companies. Generally, bureaucratic procedures and practices for foreign investors wishing to start a business in Slovenia are sufficiently streamlined and transparent. Start-up costs for businesses are among the lowest in the EU. To establish a business in Slovenia, a foreign investor must produce capital of at least EUR 7,500 (USD 8,835) for a limited liability company and EUR 25,000 (USD 29,450) for a stock company. The investor must also establish a business address and file appropriate documentation with the courts. The entire process usually takes three weeks to one month, but may take longer in Ljubljana due to court backlogs. Individuals or legal entities may establish businesses through a notary, one of several VEM (Vse na Enem Mestu or “all in one place”) point offices designated by the Slovenian government, or online. A list of VEM points is available at http://www.podjetniski-portal.si/ustanavljam-podjetje/vem-tocke/seznam-vstopnih-tock-vem. More information on how to invest and register a business in Slovenia is available at http://www.investslovenia.org/business-environment/establishing-a-company/ and http://www.eugo.gov.si/en/starting/business-registration/. Slovenia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, nor are there any incentives for outward investments. The majority of Slovenia’s outward investments are in the Western Balkans. Croatia is the most popular destination for Slovenian outward investment, constituting 32.9 percent of Slovenia’s investments abroad, followed by Serbia (17.9 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.9 percent), Russia (6.1 percent), and North Macedonia (6 percent). 3. Legal Regime Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures in Slovenia are transparent and consistent with international norms. Financial statements should be prepared by the Slovenian Institute of Auditors in accordance with the Slovenian Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as adopted by the EU. Annual reports of for-profit business entities are publicly available on the website of AJPES, the Slovenian Business Database. There are three levels of regulatory authority: supra-national (Slovenia is a member of the EU), national, and sub-national (municipalities have limited regulatory power over local affairs, and regulations must comply with state regulations). Laws may be proposed by the government, member(s) of parliament, or through signatures of at least 5,000 voters. Slovenia adopted a comprehensive regulatory policy in 2013, focusing on measures aimed at raising the quality of the regulatory environment to improve the business environment and increase competitiveness. Slovenia’s Ministry of Public Administration is required by several legal and policy documents to solicit and include public stakeholder engagement in decision-making processes. Public authorities must solicit stakeholder engagement and inform the public about their work to the greatest extent possible. Government entities that propose regulations must invite experts and the general public to participate by publishing a general invitation, together with a draft regulation, on their websites. The experts and general public must respond by the deadline, ranging from 30 to 60 days from the day of its publication. In addition to the relevant ministry, the proposals are also published on government websites and on the Ministry of Public Administration’s eDemocracy portal. Through the eDemocracy web portal, citizens may actively cooperate in the decision-making process by expressing opinions and submitting proposals and comments on draft regulations. When possible, government entities take into consideration proposals and opinions on proposed regulations submitted by experts and the general public. If such opinions and proposals are not taken into consideration, those proposing the regulation must inform stakeholders in writing and explain the reasons. The public, however, is not invited to comment on proposed regulations when the nature of the issue precludes such consideration, such as in emergency situations and in matters relating to the national budget, the annual financial statement, the rules of procedure of the government, ordinances, resolutions, development and planning documents, development policies, declarations, acts ratifying international treaties, and official decisions. A regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is obligatory for all primary legislation; however, the quality of such assessments varies, and analyses are often only qualitative or incomplete due to the lack of an external body to conduct quality control. The quality of such assessments has improved, however, since the Ministry of Public Administration introduced its Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) test in 2012 to measure regulatory impacts on small and medium-sized businesses. The General Secretariat of the Republic of Slovenia is responsible for administrative oversight to ensure the government follows administrative procedures. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Slovenia’s executive branch initiates approximately 92 percent of primary laws, with regulations often developed rapidly. The government’s frequent use of urgent procedures (normally reserved for national emergencies) to pass legislation often limits the stakeholder engagement process. After the adoption of new legislation, the text is published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia and online at https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs. Slovenia lacks a systematic process to evaluate regulations after their implementation. To measure regulatory burdens on businesses, Slovenia adopted the Standard Cost Model, which has led to a significant reduction of such burdens. The United Nations awarded its Public Service Award to Slovenia in 2009 for its system of one-stop shops (the so-called “VEM points”) to incorporate and establish businesses. The introduction of e-government processes has simplified administrative procedures. The World Bank assigned Slovenia a score of 4.75 out of 5 on its Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance measure in 2018, while the International Budget Partnership gave Slovenia 68 points out of 100 on its Open Budget Survey 2019, assessing Slovenia’s budget transparency as sufficient with substantial information available. Slovenia meets the Department of State’s minimum requirements for fiscal transparency. In 2021, Slovenia’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Slovenia’s supreme audit institution reviewed the government’s accounts and made its reports publicly available. The criteria and procedures by which the national government awards contracts or licenses for natural resource extraction were outlined in law and appeared to be followed in practice. Basic information on natural resource extraction awards was public. Slovenia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and to date there have been no cases of Slovenia violating WTO rules. The law treats domestic and foreign investors equally. The government does not impose performance requirements or any condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. As a WTO member country, Slovenia is required by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) to report to the WTO all proposed technical regulations that could affect trade with other member countries. Slovenia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has implemented all TFA requirements. As an EU member state, Slovenia applies two principles in its regulatory system: the supremacy of EU laws and the principle of direct effect. In areas subject to EU responsibility, EU laws override any conflicting member state laws. Direct effect enables Slovenians and other EU citizens to use EU laws in national courts against the government or private parties. Slovenia is a civil law jurisdiction with a codified system of law. It has a well-developed, independent legal system based on a five-tier (district, regional, appeals, supreme, and administrative) court system. These courts deal with a wide array of legal cases, including criminal, probate, domestic relations, land disputes, contracts, and other business-related issues. A separate social and labor court system, comprised of regional, appeals, and supreme courts, deals strictly with labor disputes, pensions, and other social welfare claims. As with most other European countries, Slovenia has a Constitutional Court which hears complaints alleging violations of human rights and personal freedoms. The Constitutional Court also issues opinions on the constitutionality of international agreements and state statutes and deals with other high-profile political issues. In 1997, Slovenia’s National Assembly established an administrative court to handle legal disputes among local authorities, between state and local authorities, and between local authorities and executors of public authority. In 1999, the National Assembly passed legislation to streamline legal proceedings and speed up administrative judicial processes. The law established a stricter and more efficient procedure for serving court documents and providing evidence. In commercial cases, defendants are required to file their defense within 15 days of receiving a notice of a claim. In 2018, the National Assembly passed Slovenia’s Investment Promotion Act, defining the types of incentives, criteria, and procedures to promote long-term investment in Slovenia. The act establishes that domestic and foreign investors are equal and mandates priority treatment of strategic investments, defined as investments totaling EUR 40 million or more and creating 400 new jobs in manufacturing and services, while R&D strategic investments are defined as totaling at least EUR 200 million and creating 200 new jobs. Under the law, a working group headed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology will assist strategic investors in obtaining necessary permits. The Invest Slovenia website serves as a resource for investors to obtain relevant information on investment regulations and incentives. Slovenia’s Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act regulates restrictive practices, concentrations, unfair competition, regulatory restrictions of competition, and measures to prevent restrictive practices and concentrations that significantly impede effective competition. The law applies to corporate bodies and natural persons engaged in economic activities regardless of their legal form, organization, or ownership. The law also applies to the actions of public companies and complies with EU legislation. Slovenia’s competition and anti-trust laws prohibit restrictive agreements; direct or indirect price fixing; sharing markets or supply sources; limiting or controlling production, sales, technical progress, or investment; applying dissimilar conditions to different trading parties; or subjecting the conclusion of contracts to acceptance of supplementary obligations that, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of their contracts. Companies and entities whose domestic market share exceeds 40 percent for a single undertaking and 60 percent for two or more undertakings (joint dominance) are prohibited from abusing dominant market positions. Slovenian law defines a non-exhaustive list of dominant position abuses describing the most common practices. The government may, however, prescribe market restrictions by means of regulatory instruments and actions in cases of natural disasters, epidemics, or states of emergency; significant market disturbances due to a shortage of goods or disturbances in other fields that represent a risk to the safety and health of the population; or when necessary to satisfy product requirements, raw materials, and semi-finished goods of special or strategic importance to the defense of the nation. The fines for restrictive agreements and abuses of dominant positions may total as much as 10 percent of an undertaking’s annual turnover in the preceding business year. Those legally responsible for a legal entity or sole proprietorship may be subject to a fine of EUR 5,000-10,000, or EUR 15,000-30,000 for more serious violations. Slovenia’s Competition Protection Agency (CPA) supervises the implementation of the Restriction of Competition Act. The agency monitors market conditions to ensure effective competition, conducts procedures and issues decisions, and submits opinions to the National Assembly and the government. The CPA is also responsible for the enforcement of Slovenia’s antitrust and merger control rules. An independent administrative authority, the CPA was established in 2013 through a reorganization of the former Slovenian Competition Protection Office, which was part of the Ministry of the Economy. Some private sector representatives expressed concern about the CPA’s susceptibility to outside influence and ability to reach timely decisions on complex cases, which added an element of unpredictability for some investors and their legal counsel. According to Article 69 of Slovenia’s Constitution, the government may take real property or limit rights to possess real property for public purposes in the public interest, in exchange for in-kind compensation or financial compensation under conditions determined by law. Article 7 of Slovenia’s Investment Promotion Act stipulates that, if the government deems an investment strategic, it may expropriate private property for construction in exchange for compensation, under conditions determined by law. In such cases, a special government task force monitors the investment and coordinates the acquisition of environmental and building permits. The current government is not involved in any expropriation-related investment disputes. National law offers adequate protection to all investments. However, legal disputes continue over private property expropriated by the former Yugoslav government for state purposes. Following its secession from Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s 1991 Denationalization Act established a process to “denationalize” these properties, return them to their rightful owners or their heirs, or pay just compensation if returning the property was not feasible. In some of these cases, the rightful owners and heirs are U.S. citizens. Since the 1993 deadline for filing claims, over 99 percent of denationalization cases have been closed, although only 88 percent of cases involving American owners and heirs have been resolved. Cases involving U.S. citizens have taken longer in part because the claimants generally do not live in Slovenia. In such cases, the Ministry of Justice must determine the nationality of the property’s former owners at the time the property was seized – a generally simple question for Slovenians who never acquired another citizenship, but more complicated in cases involving naturalized American citizens. In addition, some claims may involve property currently controlled by prominent and influential Slovenians, thereby creating additional informal obstacles to restitution. Competition is lively in Slovenia, and bankruptcies are an established and reliable means of working out firms’ financial difficulties. By law, there are three procedural methods for dealing with bankrupt debtors. The first procedure, compulsory settlement, allows the insolvent debtor to submit a plan to the court for financial reorganization. Creditors whose claims represent more than 60 percent of the total amount owed may vote on the proposed compulsory settlement plan. If the settlement is accepted, the debtor is not obligated to pay the creditor any amount exceeding the payment agreed to in the confirmed settlement. The procedure calls for new terms, extended in accordance with the conditions of forced liquidation settlement (see below). Confirmed compulsory settlement agreements affect creditors who have voted against the compulsory settlement as well as creditors who have not reported their claims in the settlement procedure. Creditors or debtors may also initiate bankruptcy proceedings. In such instances, the court names a bankruptcy administrator who sells the debtor’s property according to a bankruptcy senate, the senate president’s instructions, and court-sponsored supervision. Generally, the debtor’s property is sold at public auction. Otherwise, the creditors’ committee may prescribe a different mode of sale such as collecting offers or placing conditions on potential buyers. The legal effect of the completed bankruptcy is the termination of the debtor’s legal status to conduct business, and distribution of funds from the sale of assets to creditors according to their share of total debt. In accordance with the Law on Commercial Companies, the state can impose forced liquidation on a debtor subject to liquidation procedures and legal conditions for ending its existence as a business entity. This would occur, for example, in cases in which an entity’s management has ceased operations for more than 12 months, if the court finds the registration void, or by court order. In 2013, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the Financial Operations, Insolvency Procedures, and Compulsory Dissolution Act to simplify and speed up bankruptcy procedures and deleveraging. Slovenia ranked as 8th out of 168 economies for ease of “resolving insolvency” in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. 4. Industrial Policies Slovenia offers special tax incentives for high-tech sector investments that create jobs and are linked to research and development activities. In some economically depressed and underdeveloped regions (such as the Prekmurje region near the Hungarian border), Slovenia offers special facilities, services, and financial incentives to investors. As defined in Slovenia’s Investment Promotion Act, the government offers the following investment incentives: subsidies, loans, guarantees, subsidized interest rates, and purchase of land owned by municipalities at below-market prices. All companies registered in Slovenia can participate in government-financed or subsidized research and development programs, regardless of the origin of capital. The Port of Koper is Slovenia’s only free trade zone (FTZ). Under Slovenia’s Customs Act, subjects operating in FTZs are not liable for payment of customs duties, nor are they subject to other trade policy measures until goods are released into free circulation. Duties and rights of users include the following: Separate books must be kept for activities undertaken in FTZs; Users may undertake business activities in a FTZ on the basis of contracts with the founders of FTZs; Users are free to import goods (customs goods, domestic goods for export) into FTZs; Goods imported into FTZs may remain for an indefinite period, except agricultural produce, for which the government sets a time limit; Entry to and exit from FTZs is to be controlled; Founders and users must allow customs or other responsible authorities, to execute customs or other supervision; and For the purposes of customs control, users must keep records of all goods imported into, exported from, consumed, or altered in FTZs. The Customs Act also allows the establishment of open FTZs to allow for more flexible organization and supervision of customs authorities. In such FTZs, users may undertake the following activities: Production and service activities, including handicrafts, defined in the founding act or contract, and banking and other financial business transactions, property and personal insurance and reinsurance connected with the activities undertaken; Wholesale transactions; Retail sales, but only for other users of the zone or for use within the FTZ. Slovenia has set aside land for greenfield investments. Most of the newly-developed industrial zones have direct access to well-developed infrastructure, including highways and rail service. Land prices vary greatly. For example, in the eastern Slovenia community of Lendava, one square meter of land costs roughly five euros (USD 5.48), while prices in the vicinity of Ljubljana can run up to 50 euros (USD 54.77) or more. Municipalities and the state often subsidize infrastructure and land costs as incentives to increase employment opportunities, reducing prices for fully-equipped land in industrial zones. Potential investors may access a full range of free services and concessions provided by local development agencies for start-ups. Such assistance may also include assistance in completing all necessary paperwork, securing permits, and in some cases organizing and financing construction in line with investor requirements. Interested investors may contact the U.S. Embassy in Ljubljana for further information. Rigid procedures necessary to acquire work permits can be an impediment for foreign investors. It may take as long as two to three months to obtain a single work and residence permit, which is required for local employment. Applicants must submit their single permit application at an administrative unit or at the diplomatic or consular office in their home country. The Ministry of Labor has established a fast-track procedure for foreigners registered as authorized persons or representatives of companies, managers of branch offices, and foreigners who are temporarily sent to work in organizational units for foreign legal persons (corporate entities) registered in Slovenia. More information on single work and residence permits and employment services is available here. The government does not oblige foreign investors to use domestic content in goods and technology, or to use local data storage. 5. Protection of Property Rights According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 index, registering property in Slovenia requires an average of seven procedures, takes 50.5 days, and costs 2.2 percent of the property’s value. Globally, the World Bank ranks Slovenia 54th out of 190 economies on the ease of registering property. Administrative reforms implemented in 2011 and 2012 simplified property registration, while increased automation in Slovenia’s land registry reduced property registration delays by 75 percent. Slovenia has also made transferring property easier by introducing online procedures and reducing fees. Virtually all land has a clear title. The land registry court (local court) initiates the registration process for the entry of a title in the land registry. Amendments to the Land Registry Act adopted in 2009 and implemented in 2011 require submission to the court of proposals with appendices in electronic form. Submissions are tendered via a notary public or attorneys and real estate agencies acting on the applicant’s behalf. In some cases, applicants may submit registrations directly. Other amendments to the Land Registry Act have transferred responsibility from the courts to the notary for depositing original documents (e.g. contracts) attached to submissions, whereby the notary’s confirmation of authenticity renders the evidence value of the electronic version equal to that of the original. The amendments also enable free access via a web portal to the land registry records, including pending notations and land register extracts, neither of which were free prior to the reform. Land registry proposals are automatically assigned to the least-burdened local court. Once the proposal is filed with the land registry court, the registration process is initiated ex officio and the priority of entry is ensured with a land registry seal. The priority order takes effect the day the proposal has been filed. The buyer may theoretically dispose of the property as soon as the purchase agreement is signed and the buyer obtains (direct or indirect) possession of the property. Buyers whose title is not yet entered into the land registry but who have already taken possession of the property are recognized as proprietary possessor in good faith – the presumed owner. The presumed owner has the right to claim the return of a property in the event of its dispossession from a proprietary possessor in good faith who has the property with a weaker legal title. The buyer may claim the return of the purchase price, but has no claims under the law of property until the title is entered into the land registry. Since May 2011, the law requires submission of proposals in electronic format. Slovenia has enacted advanced and comprehensive legislation for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) that fully reflects various EU directives. Slovenia negotiated its commitments under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as a developing country and implemented the policy as of January 1996. Slovenia is a full member of the TRIPS Council and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Slovenia has ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the Cyber Crime Convention. Slovenia’s Intellectual Protection Office actively participates in the Council of Europe’s Intellectual Property Working Group, the Trademark Committee, and other EU bodies engaged in the formulation of new EU IPR legislation. The Copyright and Related Rights Act, as amended in 2015, 2016, and 2019, deals with all aspects of modern copyright and related laws, including traditional works and their authors, computer programs, audiovisual works, and rental and lending rights. The act also takes into account new technologies such as storage and electronic memory, original databases, satellite broadcasting, and cable re-transmission. Slovenia’s 2004 harmonization with EU legislation introduced a new system of collective management of IPR compliant with the latest directives. The 1994 Law on Courts gives the District Court of Ljubljana exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over IPR disputes. The aim of the law is to ensure specialization of judges and efficiency of relevant proceedings. For enforcement of TRIPS provisions, the law provides a number of civil legal sanctions, including injunctive relief and the removal of the infringement, seizure, and destruction of illegal copies and devices, publication of the judgment in the media, compensatory and punitive damages, border and customs measures, and the securing of evidence and other provisional measures without the prior notification and hearing of the other party. These infringements also constitute a misdemeanor charge, with fines ranging from EUR 400 (USD 470) to EUR 45,000 (USD 53,000) for legal persons and from EUR 40 (USD 47) to EUR 2,000 (USD 2,400) for supervisors of individual offenders, provided that the reported offenses are not criminal in nature. In criminal cases, Slovenia’s Criminal Code applies, which may result in fines or imprisonment. While laws regarding IPR are clearly defined, foreign investors have complained that the court system is too slow. Since the enactment of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights Act, there have been relatively few reported prosecutions regarding copyright infringements and violations. The most notable cases usually involve computer software piracy. In 2004, a long-running software piracy court case ended with a prison sentence and monetary fine. Slovenia has dedicated resources to training prosecutors and public authorities. Slovenia also continues to address the preservation of evidence in infringement procedures and border measures through amendments to existing legislation. The Ministry of Culture has established the Intellectual Property Fund, the Slovenian Copyright Agency, and the Anti-Piracy Association of Software Dealers to combat the problem of piracy in a collective manner. Slovenia is not included in USTR’s Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. The Law on Industrial Property grants and protects patents, model and design rights, trademark and service marks, and appellations of origin. The holder of a patent, model, or design right is entitled to exclusively profit from the protected invention, shape, picture, or drawing; exclusively market any products manufactured in accordance with the protected invention, shape, picture, or drawing; dispose of the patent, model, or design right; and prohibit the use of a protected invention, model, or design by any person without consent. The holder of a trademark has the exclusive right to use the trademark to designate products or services in the course of trade. The authorized user of a protected appellation of origin has the right to use the appellation in the course of trade for labeling products to which the appellation refers. The patent and trademark rights granted by the Law on Industrial Property take effect from the date of filing the appropriate applications. Patents are granted for 20 years from the date of filing, and model and design rights are granted for 10 years. Trademarks are granted for 10 years but may be renewed an unlimited number of times. The term of an appellation of origin is unlimited. All patents and trademarks are registered through the Intellectual Property Office, and all registers are open to the public. Patent and trademark applications filed in member countries of the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property are afforded priority rights in Slovenia. The priority period is 12 months for patents and six months for model and design rights. Any person who infringes upon a patent or trademark right may be held liable for damages and prohibited from carrying on the infringing acts. The Ministry of Finance, through the Customs Authority, tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods in accordance with the European Parliament decree 608/2013. All data on seized goods are stored on a central database at the European Commission. The Commission publishes an annual report on seized goods from all countries, available at https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/customs-controls/counterfeit-piracy-other-ipr-violations/ipr-infringements-facts-figures_en. The Law on Industrial Property also provides for the contractual licensing of patents, model and design rights, and marks. All license agreements must be in writing and specify the duration of the license, the scope of the license, whether the license is exclusive or non-exclusive, and the amount of remuneration for use of the patent, model and design rights, and marks. Compulsory licenses may be granted to another person when the invention is in the public interest or the patentee misuses rights granted under the patent. A misuse of a patent occurs when the patentee does not use or insufficiently uses a patented invention and refuses to license other persons to develop or make use of the protected invention, or imposes unjustified conditions on the licensee. If a compulsory license is granted, the patentee is entitled to compensation. Slovenian industrial property legislation fully complies with EU standards. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain relatively underdeveloped given Slovenia’s level of prosperity. Enterprises rarely raise capital through the stock market and tend to rely on the traditional banking system and private lenders to meet their capital needs. Established in 1990, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE) is a member of the International Association of Stock Exchanges (FIBV). In 2015, the Zagreb Stock Exchange acquired the LSE. However, the number of companies listed on the exchange is limited and trading volume is very light, with annual turnover similar to a single day’s trading on the NYSE. Low liquidity remains an issue when entering or exiting sizeable positions. In 1995, the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (KDD) was established to provide central securities custody services, clear and settle securities transactions, and maintain the central securities registry on the LSE electronic trading system. In 2017, KDD successfully aligned its procedures to that of the uniform European securities settlement platform TARGET2-Securities (T2S). In 2019, Slovenia’s Securities Market Agency (ATVP) licensed KDD to operate under the EU’s Central Securities Depository Regulation (CSDR) and provide services as a Central Securities Depository (CSD), pursuant to Article 17 of the Regulation (EU) 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories. Established in 1994, the ATVP has powers similar to those of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and supervises investment firms, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE), the KDD, investment funds, and management companies. It also shares responsibility with the Bank of Slovenia for supervision of banking and investment services. Slovenia adheres to Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Article of Agreement and is committed to full current account convertibility and full repatriation of dividends. The LSE uses different dissemination systems, including real-time online trading information via Reuters and the Business Data Solutions System. The LSE also publishes information on the Internet at http://www.ljse.si/. Foreign investors in Slovenia have the same rights as domestic investors, including the ability to obtain credit on the local market. There is a relatively high degree of concentration in Slovenia’s banking sector, with 11 commercial banks, three savings banks, and two foreign bank branches in Slovenia serving two million people. All commercial banks are private as of January 2021, and most have foreign owners and shareholders. SID Bank (Slovenian Export and Development Bank), which supports Slovenian companies’ export activities and provides financing for economic development, remains state-owned. In 2008, the combined effects of the global financial crisis, the collapse of the construction sector, and diminished demand for exports led to significant capital shortfalls. Bank assets declined steadily after 2009 but rebounded in 2016 and have remained steady since then. Since the crisis, most banks have refocused their business activities towards SMEs and individuals/households, prompting larger companies to search for alternative financing sources. According to European Banking Federation data, Slovenia’s banking sector assets totaled EUR 44.7 billion (USD 48.9 billion) at the end of 2020, equaling approximately 96.5 percent of GDP, still EUR 8.2 billion less than the total banking assets volume at the end of 2009, when banking sector assets equaled 146 percent of GDP. Slovenia’s banking sector was devastated by the 2009 economic crisis. Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) faced successive downgrades by credit rating agencies due to the large numbers of nonperforming loans in their portfolios. In 2013, the government established a Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) with a management board comprised of financial experts to promote stability and restore trust in the financial system. In exchange for bonds, BAMC agreed to manage the nonperforming assets of three major state banks, conducting three such operations from December 2013 through March 2014. The government also injected EUR 3.5 billion (USD 4.2 billion) into Slovenia’s three largest banks, NLB, NKBM, and Abanka. These measures helped recapitalize and revitalize the country’s largest commercial banks. According to World Bank data, 2.8 percent of NLB’s total assets and an estimated 3.0 percent of all Slovenian banking assets were non-performing as of the end of 2020. According to the Bank of Slovenia, the Slovenian banking sector’s exposure to non-performing loans was 1.2 percent, as of January 2022. NLB, the country’s largest bank, was privatized in 2019, although the government remains a major shareholder with a 25 percent plus one share stake. Of the remaining shares, more than fifty percent are spread among several international investors on fiduciary account at the Bank of New York, while a number of Slovenian institutional and private investors purchased the remainder. The country’s second largest bank, Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), was sold to an American fund (80 percent) and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (20 percent) in 2016. In 2020, NKBM acquired the country’s third largest state-owned bank, Abanka. As of January 2021, the banks have been fully merged. With a total asset of EUR 9.2 billion (USD 11 billion) and approximately 22 percent market share, NKBM is on par with the country’s largest commercial bank, NLB. In May 2021, Hungary’s OTP Bank signed a contract to acquire NKBM, Slovenia’s second largest bank. The deal is expected to be finalized in 2022, pending approval from regulatory authorities. Following sanctions imposed as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Central Bank (ECB) assessed in February 2022 that Sberbank Europe and its two subsidiaries in Croatia and Slovenia were failing or likely to fail due to a deterioration in their liquidity situation. In March 2022, the Bank of Slovenia announced that the country’s largest bank, NLB, acquired Sberbank Slovenia, including its assets, liabilities, and clients. The Bank of Slovenia noted that the swift sale of Sberbank Slovenia helped preserve the banking sector stability in the country. Banking legislation authorizes commercial banks, savings banks, and stock brokerage firms to purchase securities abroad. Investment funds may also purchase securities abroad, provided they meet specified diversification requirements. The Slovenian government adopted in March 2021 a draft banking legislation, which transposed provisions of an EU directive on exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers, and capital conservation measures. The new legislation also addresses the 2019 Constitutional Court decision that invalidated a provision that exempted banks from worker representation requirements in corporate governance. Under the proposed legislation, workers will be entitled to at least one seat of a bank’s supervisory board, but these workers’ representatives must meet professional qualifications of the supervisory board. The banking legislation was passed by the National Assembly in June 2021. In February 2022, Slovenia’s National Assembly passed a bill that retroactively forced Slovenian banks to share the burden of exchange rate fluctuations beyond 10 percent on Swiss Franc loans issued between June 28, 2004, and December 31, 2010, imposing an estimated cost of more than EUR 300 million on banks. The bill also required banks to amend loan contracts within 60 days to include this foreign exchange rate cap or face penalties, including up to revocation of banking licenses. Banks and business associations broadly opposed the bill, expressing concern about the bill’s inconsistencies with existing EU and Slovenian laws and regulations, disproportionately high penalties for incompliance, and the retroactively nature of the bill that calls into question the sanctity of legal contracts in Slovenia. These groups worried that this precedent created unpredictability in the economy and negatively impacted the business climate in Slovenia. Soon after the bill was passed, nine banks with operations in Slovenia requested a constitutionality review. In March 2022, the Constitutional Court stayed the enactment of the bill and will ultimately decide on its legality. Despite Slovenia’s vibrant blockchain technology ecosystem and several global blockchain companies headquartered in the country, Slovenian banks have been slow to adopt blockchain technologies to process banking transactions. The Bank of Slovenia, established on June 25, 1991, is Slovenia’s central bank. The Bank of Slovenia has been a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) since Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004. The Bank of Slovenia gave up responsibility for monetary policy to the Eurosystem when Slovenia adopted the euro as its currency in 2007. As a member of the Eurosystem, the Bank of Slovenia coordinates with other EU central banks to implement the common monetary policy, manage foreign exchange reserves, ensure the smooth functioning of payment systems, and issue euro banknotes. Slovenian law allows non-residents to open bank accounts in Slovenia on presentation of a passport, a Slovenian tax number, and a foreign tax number. Company owners must be present to open a business bank account. Slovenia’s takeover legislation is fully harmonized with EU regulations. In 2006, Slovenia implemented EU Directive 2004/25/ES by adopting a new takeover law. The law was amended in 2008 to reflect Slovenia’s adoption of the euro as its currency. The law defines a takeover as a party’s acquisition of 25 percent of a company’s voting rights and requires the public announcement of a potential takeover offer for all current shareholders. The acquiring party must publicly issue a takeover offer for each additional acquisition of 10 percent of voting rights until it has acquired 75 percent of voting rights. The law also stipulates that the acquiring party must inform the share issuer whenever its stake in the target company reaches, surpasses, or drops below five, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, or 75 percent. The law applies to all potential takeovers. It is common for acquisitions to be blocked or delayed, and drawn out negotiations and stalled takeovers have hurt Slovenia’s reputation in global financial markets. In 2015, the privatization of Slovenia’s state-owned telecommunications company, Telekom Slovenije, failed in large part due to political attempts to discourage the sale of a state-owned company. Slovenia’s biggest retailer, Mercator, faced similar challenges in 2014 when a lengthy and arduous process and strong domestic opposition preceded its eventual sale to a Croatian buyer. The U.S.-owned Central European Media Enterprises dropped its politically controversial sale of Slovenian media house Pro Plus to then-U.S. owned United Group in January 2019 after the Competition Protection Agency failed to issue a ruling on the proposed acquisition despite reviewing the case for more than 18 months. The government has also struggled to meet its commitment to open Slovenia’s economy to international capital markets. Thirteen insurance companies, two re-insurance companies, three retirement companies, and five branches of foreign firms operate in Slovenia. The three largest insurance companies in Slovenia account for over 60 percent of the market, with the largest, state-owned Triglav d.d., controlling 37 percent, while foreign insurance companies constitute less than 10 percent. In 2016, two Slovenian and two Croatian insurance companies merged into a new company, SAVA. Insurance companies primarily invest their assets in non-financial companies, state bonds, and bank-issued bonds. Since 2000, there have been significant changes in legislation regulating the insurance sector. The Ownership Transformation of Insurance Companies Act, which seeks to privatize insurance companies, has stalled on several occasions due to ambiguity over the estimated share of state-controlled capital. Although plans for insurance sector privatization have been under discussion since 2005, there has been no implementation. Slovenia currently has three registered health insurance companies and a variety of companies offering other kinds of insurance. Under EU regulations, any insurance company registered in the EU can market its services in Slovenia, provided the insurance supervision agency of the country where the company is headquartered has notified the Slovenian Supervision Agency of the company’s intentions. Not applicable/information not available. Slovenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Private enterprises compete on the same terms and conditions as public enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. State-owned and partially state-owned enterprises (SOE) are present across most industries in Slovenia. The state has never undergone a wholesale privatization program and has retained significant ownership shares in many large companies since independence. According to a 2017 OECD report on SOEs, 37 companies with a total value of USD 12.5 billion and employing 47,000 people were majority state owned. In 2020, an OECD report assessed that privatization has progressed slowly, with the Slovenian Sovereign Holdings (SSH) maintaining controlling shares in most SOEs. Most state-owned companies are in the energy, transportation, public utilities, telecommunications, insurance, and financial sectors, although the government successfully completed the privatization of the three largest state-owned banks by 2020. Other economic sectors, including retail, entertainment, construction, tourism, and manufacturing, include important firms that are either wholly state-owned or in which the state maintains a controlling interest by virtue of holding the largest single block of shares. In general, SOEs do not receive a greater share of contracts or business than private sector competitors in sectors that are open to private and foreign competition. SOEs acquire goods and services from private and foreign firms. SOEs must follow strict government procurement agreements which require transparent procedures available to all firms. Private firms compete under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products, and incentives. All firms have the same access to financing. SOEs are subject to the same laws as private companies and must fully comply with all legal obligations. They must submit to independent audits and publish annual reports if required (for example, if the SOE is listed on the stock exchange or the size of the company meets a certain threshold). Reporting standards are comparable to international financial reporting standards. Slovenia is an active participant in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices and adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Following OECD recommendations, the government established the Capital Asset Management Agency (AUKN) in 2010 to increase transparency and promote more efficient management of SOEs. In 2013, authorities transformed the AUKN into the Slovenian Sovereign Holding (SSH), which is charged with simplifying and shortening the administrative process of privatizing state assets. SSH took over all AUKN portfolios as well as the portfolios of two other smaller state-owned funds. More than 95 percent of SSH funds are invested domestically. SSH is an independent state authority that reports to the National Assembly. It provides the National Assembly with annual reports regarding the previous year’s implementation of the Annual Plan of the Corporate Governance of Capital Investments. The government then adopts the Annual Plan of the Corporate Governance of Capital Investments based on SSH’s proposal. A list of SSH’s SOEs is available at https://www.sdh.si/en-gb/asset-management/list-of-assets. Foreign investors may participate in the public-bidding processes on an equal basis. However, interested parties often describe the bidding process as opaque, with unclear or unenforced deadlines. In 2015, the government prepared an asset management strategy that classified state-owned assets as strategic, important, or portfolio assets. In companies classified as strategic, the state will maintain or obtain at least a 50 percent plus one share. In companies classified as important, the state will maintain a controlling share (25 percent plus one share). In companies classified as portfolio, it is not mandatory for the state to maintain a controlling share. The government reclassified the list of companies in 2017. SSH publishes online the latest list of state stakes for sale. It is available in Slovenian at https://www.sdh.si/sl-si/prodaje-nalozb/kapitalske-nalozbe-v-postopku-prodaje. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The concept of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) has become increasingly popular among Slovenia’s business community, but the due-diligence approach is not yet commonly recognized. However, to raise their public profiles and improve their images among the public, larger international companies have increasingly undertaken activities such as sponsoring sports teams and community events in the name of corporate social responsibility. Larger Slovenian companies have also focused on developing environmentally-friendly images by implementing green technologies and adhering to high environmental standards. As an OECD member, Slovenia adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles, including the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Slovenia’s Ministry of Economic Development and Technology is the National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines. Slovenia effectively and fairly enforces domestic laws pertaining to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws and regulations to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. Independent NGOs, labor unions, and business associations promote and monitor RBC and are able to conduct their work freely. The government adopted a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in November 2018 to strengthen activities to ensure that human rights are respected in business activities throughout the value chain and encourage cooperation between government, businesses, unions, NGOs, and other stakeholders. Slovenia is not a signatory to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, but adheres to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains. Slovenia is a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies since 2012. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. According to the Slovenia’s Institute for Nature Protection, 41.44 percent of Slovenian territory falls under a protected area or under Natura 2000 – a European network of core breeding and resting sites for rare and threatened species. Natura 2000 covers 37 percent of Slovenia’s territory, among the largest within the European Union (EU). In Slovenia, 71 plant species, 15 genera and one family and 389 animal species, 34 orders and 17 genera are protected. 58 percent of the country’s territory is covered by forests, one of the largest shares in Europe, behind only Sweden and Finland. Slovenia, in line with the EU, is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. In July 2021, Parliament approved Slovenia’s long-term climate strategy, which envisions cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 80-90 percent by 2050, compared to 2005 levels, focusing on transport, energy, industry, agriculture, waste, land use, and forestry to reach targets. Slovenia’s current National Climate and Energy Plan (adopted in February 2020), which details Slovenia’s plan to reach its climate goals, focuses on reducing emissions, improving energy efficiency, reducing energy consumption, and focusing on scientific advances. Slovenia will update the National Climate and Energy Plan by 2023. In general, climate issues garner broad support across both political and public spectrums in Slovenia. With the EU approving Slovenia’s national recovery and resilience plan in July 2021, the country began drawing EUR 2.5 billion from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility to develop and implement green transition projects. The Slovenian government plans to begin implementation of the national plan in the second half of 2022 and must complete projects by the 2026 deadline. 9. Corruption Slovenia has no bribery statute comparable to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. However, Chapter 24 of the Slovenian Criminal Code (SCC) provides statutory provisions for criminal offenses in the economic sector. Corruption in the economy may take many forms, including collusion among private firms or public officials using influence to appoint patrons to the boards of SOEs. The SCC calls for criminal sanctions against officials of private firms for forgery or destruction of business documents, unauthorized use or disclosure of business secrets, insider trading, embezzlement, acceptance of gifts under certain circumstances, money laundering, and tax evasion. Articles 241 and 242 of the SCC make it illegal for a person performing a commercial activity to demand or accept undue rewards, gifts, or other material benefits that will ultimately result in harm or neglect to a business organization. Under Article 261 of the SCC, public officials cannot request or accept a gift to perform or omit an official act within the scope of their official duties. The acceptance of a bribe by a public official may result in a fine or imprisonment of no less than one year, with a maximum sentence of five years. The law also stipulates the seizure of the accepted gift or bribe. Article 262 holds the gift’s donor accountable, making it illegal for natural persons or legal entities to bribe public officials with gifts. Violation of this article carries a sentence of up to three years. In cases in which the gift giver discloses the attempted bribery before it is detected or discovered, punishment may be reduced. The State Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for the enforcement of anti-bribery laws. The number of cases of actual bribery is small and generally limited to instances involving inspection and tax collection. The Prosecutor’s Office has reported that obtaining evidence is difficult in bribery cases, making it equally difficult to prosecute. In 2010, the government established the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), an independent state body with a broad mandate to investigate corruption, prevent breaches of ethics, and ensure the integrity of public officials. The CPC is not part of Slovenia’s law enforcement or prosecution system, and its employees do not have traditional police powers. However, the CPC has broad legal powers to access and subpoena financial and other documents, question public servants and officials, conduct administrative investigations, and direct law enforcement bodies to gather additional information and evidence within the limits of their authority. The CPC may also issue fines for violations. In 2011, to combat Slovenia’s ongoing problems with corruption and non-transparent procedures in public procurement, authorities established a new government-wide Public Procurement Agency under the Ministry of Justice to carry out all public procurements over established EU thresholds, including goods and services above EUR 40,000 (USD 47,000) and projects above EUR 80,000 (USD 93,000). In June 2012, the Ministry of Finance took over the agency’s duties and employees. In 2016, the Directorate for Public Procurement was established under the Ministry of Public Administration to oversee public procurements. By law, the National Review Commission provides non-judicial review of all public procurements. Corruption remains an ongoing problem, although its prevalence is relatively limited and there is no evidence that corruption has been an obstacle to FDI. However, U.S. companies continue to report challenges in some sectors, such as a strong preference for incumbent vendors and tenders written in a way to favor a predetermined winner. Such practices prevent U.S. companies from competing on a level playing field in the public procurement process. The small size of Slovenia’s political and economic elite contributes to a lack of transparency in government procurement and widespread cronyism in the business sector. Several prominent national and local political figures have been charged or tried for corruption in public procurements. Slovenia convicted its first senior public official for accepting a bribe in 2001 and its first member of parliament in 2010. In 2008, investigators accused several public officials, including the prime minister, of accepting bribes from the Finnish defense contractor Patria related to an armored personnel carrier procurement. Although three defendants, including the current prime minister, were convicted in 2013, the convictions were annulled on appeal. In February 2021, four orthopedic surgeons and a salesperson were convicted and sentenced to prison in one of the largest healthcare corruption trials in Slovenia. The court found that the doctors received a bribe in exchange for continuing to use medical supplies made by a particular producer. The court decision is currently under appeal, but the case marks one of the first convictions for corruption in the national healthcare system. The CPC has instituted a new system for tracking corruption in public procurement at the municipal level and has uncovered numerous violations since implementation. The CPC also operates with a broad mandate to prevent and investigate breaches of ethics and integrity involving holders of public office. The president of Slovenia appoints the leadership of CPC, which reports to the National Assembly. Slovenia ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2008. Slovenia is a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 10. Political and Security Environment Except for its brief, 10-day war of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, there have been no significant incidents of political violence in Slovenia since independence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic upheaval, Slovenia’s unemployment rate had fallen steadily since 2014 and reached a ten-year low of 4.5 percent at the end of 2019. Although inflation prior to the crisis remained low at about two percent, private sector contacts reported increasing difficulties in finding qualified staff, which might be expected to put upward pressure on wages and salaries. The government’s COVID-19 stimulus measures focused on preserving jobs, mitigating the brunt of the impact of the pandemic on the labor market. In 2020, the unemployment rate rose slightly to 4.97 percent. Slovenia fully harmonized its labor legislation with the EU in 2004. In line with this legislation, Slovenia maintains strict rules on issuing work permits to non-EU applicants. The 2001 Employment of Aliens Act introduced a quota system for work permits and simplified the procedure for obtaining such permits for foreigners who have worked and lived in Slovenia for an extended period. Slovenia’s wage-setting practice follows the “social partners” model, designed to contain upward pressure by centralizing wage decisions. In practice, however, high wage expectations have pushed Slovenia’s wage levels above those of its neighbors in the Western Balkans. Despite these pressures, Slovenia’s well-educated labor force and position as a productive transition economy allows it to remain competitive in niche markets. In 2003, Slovenia adopted an Employment Relationship Act that defines a full-time workweek as 36 to 40 hours (made up of six to eight-hour days, including a 30-minute lunch break). The act increases protections for critical working groups (including women and children) and eases the conditions under which an employer may terminate employees. Amendments to the act adopted in 2013 further eased the conditions for termination of employment. In December 2020, a provision allowing employers to unilaterally terminate workers once formal conditions for retirement were met was included in the government’s COVID-19 stimulus package and passed in the National Assembly, but is currently being reviewed by the courts. Slovenia’s labor force performs well in higher value-added activities that utilize its skilled technicians and engineers at a competitive cost. Despite the introduction of policies offering greater labor market flexibility, however, labor market rules and regulations remain quite rigid, and investors find that laying off workers is more difficult than in the United States. Low unemployment and demands from public sector unions have placed upward pressure on wages. In November 2015, the National Assembly endorsed a motion sponsored by trade unions to exempt bonuses for night, weekend, and holiday work from the minimum wage and force employers to pay these wages separately. The National Assembly approved legislation in December 2018 to phase in a ten percent minimum wage increase over two years, from its previous after-tax level of EUR 638 per month (USD 691) to EUR 667 (USD 723) in 2019 and EUR 700 (USD 759) in 2020. In addition, the National Assembly agreed to exempt some salary bonuses from taxation. Given such rapid increases in the minimum wage, Slovenia has lost its cost competitiveness in many sectors. In December 2018, the government initialed an agreement with public sector unions to increase salaries, pensions, and bonuses for most public employees, averting fears of public sector strikes while increasing public expenditures by EUR 308 million in 2019-20. Several public sector unions rejected the agreement as insufficient however, including those representing judicial workers, accountants, municipal traffic wardens, soldiers, and some healthcare workers. In November 2019, the National Assembly adopted changes to the retirement law to remove differential treatment for men and women and encourage older workers to remain in the job market. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $53.59 2020 $53.59 https://data.worldbank.org/country/slovenia Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $75 2020 $265 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $57 2018 $5 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 35% 2020 39% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Bank of Slovenia; published in October 2021 N.B.: The Bank of Slovenia (BoS), in its official data, lists U.S. FDI at approximately EUR 66 million in 2020, or 0.4 percent of total inward FDI. However, this amount does not reflect significant investments by U.S. firms not listed as U.S. in origin by the BoS, as U.S. funds are often routed through third-country subsidiaries. In 2017, the BoS began reporting FDI according to the ultimate investing country or originating country of capital. It estimated that USD 1.71 billion (EUR 1.55 billion euros) or 9.4 percent of Slovenia’s total FDI originated in the United States in 2020, putting the United States behind Austria andGermany as a source of foreign investment in Slovenia. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 20,319 100% Total Outward 8,533 100% Austria 5,210 26% Croatia 2,808 33% Luxembourg 2,648 13% Serbia 1,531 18% Switzerland 2,176 11% Bosnia-Herzegovina 672 8% Germany 1,629 8% Russian Federation 522 6% Italy 1,493 7% North Macedonia 515 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2020) https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 Comment: IMF data are consistent with Bank of Slovenia data. Note: The Bank of Slovenia has made an additional breakdown of inward FDI according to the ultimate source of capital. It shows that Germany, the United States, Japan, the Russian Federation, and Mexico are all much more important investor countries in Slovenia than is suggested by the breakdown by the immediate partner country. The U.S. ranks third with 1.48 billion euros (USD 1.71 billion) in 2020. 14. Contact for More Information Onejin Wu Economic & Commercial Officer 31 Presernova Street, Ljubljana, Slovenia +386 1 200 5668 Email: DoingBusinessinSlovenia@state.gov Somalia Executive Summary The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) welcomes foreign direct investment and offers a variety of opportunities for investment, especially in natural resources and agriculture, but remains a difficult place to do business. The government’s collapse in 1991 led to a period of conflict and clan warfare. While there has been some progress since the establishment of the FGS in 2012, potential investors still face challenges such as the lack of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, a civil judicial system incapable of solving disputes and enforcing contracts, and endemic corruption. Investors also face threats from the al-Shabaab terrorist group, which controls portions of the country and routinely extorts taxes from businesses. Businesses also face challenges moving money into and out of Somalia, enforcing protection of intellectual property, and maintaining access to inexpensive and reliable electricity. The current government was elected in 2017 and has pursued a policy of economic reforms that broadened the government’s tax base and strengthened tax administration, resulting in steady increases in domestic revenue for the first time in two decades. These reforms enabled Somalia to re-engage international financial institutions and, in March 2020, the IMF and the World Bank approved Somalia’s eligibility for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. If Somalia takes the additional steps required to reach “Completion Point,” the final stage of debt relief, the country’s total external debt will be reduced from $5.2 billion to $557 million, or nine percent of GDP. Somalia’s economy is rebounding from the “triple shock” that ravaged the country in 2020: the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme flooding, and the locust infestation. GDP grew at two percent in 2021, mostly due to household consumption driven by increased remittances, as well as new export markets for goods. It could expand by an estimated 3.2 percent in 2022 if political challenges are resolved, according to the IMF. Low human development indicators, expensive and unreliable electricity, poor roads, a lack of reliable internet access (especially outside urban areas), and pervasive government corruption constrain investment and development. Moving money into and out of Somalia remains difficult, and the financial sector is constrained by the lack of private sector correspondent banking relationships. The main obstacles are weak “know your customer” (KYC) capabilities and concerns that al-Shabaab is using Somalia’s financial institutions to collect, store, and move money. To address these concerns, the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), Somalia’s financial investigation body, hired its first investigators in 2019 and is slowly improving its capabilities to investigate illegal transactions. Additionally, the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) is becoming increasingly professional and asserting its jurisdiction over additional financial activities, such as mobile money. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 178 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 N/A https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) have a positive attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) and describe Somalia as “open for business.” However, insecurity and uncertainty driven by terrorist groups, lack of transparency, failure to fully constitute governing bodies per the 2012 provisional constitution, and widespread corruption in government sectors present considerable barriers to FDI. Parliament passed a foreign investment law in 2015 to promote and protect foreign investment. The law also provides some incentives to foreign investors, such as tax advantages and guarantees against expropriation. The FGS lacks the capacity to fully enforce these laws. Administration of tax laws across the FMS is not uniform and is inconsistent. In September 2020, Somalia’s investment promotion authority (SOMINVEST) released a five-year National Investment Promotion Strategy , which aims to improve Somalia’s image abroad. The strategy paints a rosy picture of doing business in Somalia, highlighting agriculture, fishing, energy, infrastructure, and banking as keys areas ripe for FDI. The Somalia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) prioritizes investment retention and maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors. SCCI safeguards business interests, liaises with government officials on behalf of investors, and engages with civil society, local media, and the press. There are no laws that address private ownership rights or limit foreign control. There has not yet been a third-party investment review of Somalia. The FGS is an observer to the World Trade Organization. The FGS is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 2017, Somalia submitted a notification of intent to join the WTO. After working through the accession stages in May 2020, Somalia submitted a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, a document that outlines its trade and economic policies and its trade agreements with other countries. In October 2020, the WTO confirmed Somalia’s Working Party chairperson, Swedish Ambassador to the WTO Mikael Anzen, and was planning the first Working Party meeting for mid-2021. The engagements were put on hold as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and have continued on hold due to political instability. The FGS rejoined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in July 2018. As a member, Somalia is required to undertake several institutional, policy, and regulatory reforms to meet the organization’s free trade protocols. The FGS has also applied for East African Community (EAC) membership, which would allow Somalia to formalize trade with its neighbors and facilitate movement of Somali citizens to other EAC member states through acquisition of the common EAC passport. However, at the February 2021 Heads of State Summit, the EAC found that Somalia’s application was not yet ready for a decision. Somalia has also indicated its intent to participate in negotiations on the African Continent Free Trade Agreement. In 2019, the FGS passed a company law formalizing the legal requirements to create and register a company. On March 30, 2022, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry officially launched the Somali Business Registration System (SBRS), which will serve as a “one-stop shop” business registration website to streamline licensing approvals and reduce corruption. The World Bank ranked Somalia 190 of 190 countries in its 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report. In 2021, the World Bank discontinued producing the Ease of Doing Business report, due to several limitations/shortcoming identified in the tool’s accuracy in assessing a country’s business/investment climates. USAID is now working with the World Bank to develop a new methodology. In 2019, the FGS passed a company law formalizing the legal requirements to create and register a company. On January 27, 2021, the FGS Ministry of Commerce issued a supplementary regulation (001/2021) to support enforcement of the company law. Regulation 001/2021 established the Office of the Registrar of Companies, defined its roles/functions, and set the requirements and processes for business registration, licensing fees, and penalties. Because of this regulation, the new Somali Business Registration System (SBRS) was established. 3. Legal Regime Somalia’s regulatory system is largely nonexistent. The 2012 provisional constitution has not been finalized, and there is not yet a constitutional court to enforce it. Many of the current investment laws and regulations predate the 1991 government collapse. The FGS has revised some of these regulations and has begun to develop modern business and investment legislation to conform to the global business environment, but it has a long way to go. Somalia has a procurement act that is intended to provide for transparency in public contracts and concessions, but it is not always followed. In 2020, the FGS passed a petroleum law that provides a regulatory framework for issuing exploration and development licenses. Somalia is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well as the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 2018, Somalia obtained provisional membership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, but it has several conditions to fulfill before achieving full membership. Somalia is an observer, but not yet a member, of the WTO. Somalia’s legal system derives from Italian and British law, customary dispute resolution (xeer) principles, and Islamic law. The provisional constitution establishes a judicial system that is theoretically independent of the executive and the legislature, but in practice the legal system depends on the executive. There are no courts dedicated to commercial disputes. A November 2020 USAID-funded report found that the courts lack political independence, are marked by “pervasive graft,” and face competition from a parallel al-Shabaab court system. There are reports that some citizens choose to bring cases to al-Shabaab courts, finding them less corrupt than government courts. Somalia’s 2015 foreign investment law provides some guidance for foreign investors, but a comprehensive investor and investment bill remains stuck in parliament. In 2019, the Ministry of Planning opened its investment promotion office, SOMINVEST , to provide potential investors with guidance on investing in Somalia. Competition and anti-trust laws do not exist in Somalia. Local business disputes often are informally settled through the intervention of traditional elders. Somalia is rebuilding from decades of civil war, and its legal and regulatory environment remains undeveloped. There are no laws that define how the government can expropriate private property. However, the provisional constitution provides a right to just compensation from the government if property has been compulsorily acquired in the public interest. After the 1991 government collapse, many state-owned properties ended up in private hands, and the FGS has indicated interest in repossessing these properties. There is a draft investor protection bill in parliament that will address expropriation, dispute resolution, and the transfer and repatriation of investments. Somalia does not have any bankruptcy laws. 4. Industrial Policies The 2015 foreign investment law provides some investment incentives, such as tax benefits, to foreign investors. The government does not issue grants or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects, but the FGS informally uses ad hoc tax exemptions and revenue sharing agreements to attract investment. The director of revenue at the Ministry of Finance has authority to grant tax exemptions, but in practice line ministers and the prime minister have offered tax exemptions to foreign investors. SOMINVEST is developing a national investment incentive framework. There are no laws or policies that designate any area as a free trade zone or as an area with special tax treatment. Pursuant to an agreement signed in December 2019, a free trade zone dubbed the Berbera Economic Free Zone is under development in the Somaliland region, funded jointly by the Somaliland government, the UK, and UAE-based Dubai Ports World. The FGS does not require foreign companies to only employ local staff. There are no laws inhibiting foreign investors or foreign employees. Few foreign companies operate in Somalia, and most of them are based within the secure compound surrounding Mogadishu’s international airport. Most of these companies are under contract to the FGS or an international organization to undertake infrastructure and security-related projects. Some, such as hotels, are in the service sector. Foreign companies may contract with foreign employees with specific skillsets not locally available and can obtain entry visas for these employees. 5. Protection of Property Rights Somali laws relating to land are complex and include customary rules and traditions used by Somalia’s clan-based society, Western-style laws from the colonial period, remnants of the pre-1991 authoritarian rule, and Islamic law and tradition. While there have been no federal efforts to catalogue property ownership and title land, some FMS have tried to document land ownership for the purposes of taxation. In addition, land within the major cities, including Mogadishu, is generally documented for taxation purposes. There are no specific regulations regarding land leases or acquisition by foreign investors. When the government collapsed in 1991, there was widespread conflict over land, land-grabbing by warlords, and displacement of local populations, especially in southern Somalia. As a result, fraudulent titles and land disputes are common. A former government official moved all records of pre-1991 property registrations outside the country. Requests to verify titles registered before 1991 therefore take a month to be processed and cost between $1,000 and $2,000. For properties registered more recently, records may be available in the official bulletin. Lawyers charge approximately $50 to verify a title’s authenticity. Somaliland has a more advanced land title framework and dispute mechanism. The Somaliland legal framework addresses urban land management, agricultural land ownership, urban land dispute resolution, and civil procedures for hearing property disputes. There are no laws protecting or enforcing intellectual property (IP). The cabinet approved a new IP law in 2019, but parliament has not yet approved it. The FGS passed a law on standardization and quality control in March 2020 that provides for the creation of the Somalia Bureau of Standards as the enforcement authority for quality control. Although there are no official reports on seizures of counterfeit goods, it is widely believed that many goods entering Somalia are counterfeit. The government has no capacity to seize or track counterfeit goods entering the country. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles . 6. Financial Sector Somalia has no structured financial system and does not have portfolio investment financial products in the market. Somalia does not issue government bonds or corporate bonds. There is one private stock exchange operating in Somalia, but the government has no authority to regulate trade in stocks and securities. Somalia’s banking system has yet to recover from years of conflict. Moving money into and around the country through traditional banking mechanisms is difficult. The Somali shilling lacks legitimacy, as it has not been printed since 1991, and more than 98 percent of the bills in circulation are counterfeit, printed by warlords and rogue business owners. Consequently, much of the Somali economy relies on the U.S. dollar. Since the FGS reestablished the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) in 2009, it has been slowly developing the tools and capabilities to oversee licensing and supervision of commercial banks and money transfer businesses. The CBS has issued licenses to 10 banks and seven informal money transfer systems known as hawalas. A 2019 anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism law requires enhanced KYC controls and created the government’s financial investigation unit, the Financial Reporting Center. Nevertheless, a 2020 UN report found that al-Shabaab moves millions of dollars through the formal banking system, which keeps Somalia’s financial risk profile high. Somalia’s banks are also stymied by the lack of any national identification, which creates challenges in verifying client identity. Only 15 percent of Somalis have formal bank accounts due to a lack of branches in many towns and the difficulty of obtaining acceptable forms of identification to open accounts. Mobile finance therefore plays an important role in the economy. Mobile money platforms have been essentially unregulated since their introduction in 2012. In February 2021, the CBS issued its first mobile money license. There is no publicly available data regarding the assets of privately owned banks. No foreign banks operate in Somalia. There are no sovereign wealth funds or any other state-owned investment fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Somalia does not have any fully or partially state-owned enterprises. Since the government does not own any business entities, there are no entities to privatize. The World Bank has supported the development of a public-private partnership law, but parliament has not yet acted on it. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There are no laws or regulations addressing corporate social responsibility or responsible business conduct. 9. Corruption The provisional constitution criminalizes several forms of corruption such as abuse of office, embezzlement of funds, and bribery. The FGS enacted an anti-corruption bill in September 2019 that provides for the formation of an independent anti-corruption commission at both federal and state levels called the Somalia Independent Anti-Corruption Commission. The commission is now operational, with officers elected in May 2021. Somalia’s procurement laws have provisions to address potential conflicts of interest in awarding government contracts, but enforcement is lax. Corruption is rampant in all sectors of government, particularly government procurement. Transparency International ranked Somalia 178 of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. For the past several years, the FGS has waged a campaign against public corruption and graft, resulting in several high-profile dismissals and arrests. For example, in August 2020 a court convicted four senior Ministry of Health officials of embezzling funds intended to address the COVID-19 pandemic. However, without a robust asset declaration mechanism, an updated penal code, and a functioning criminal justice system, anti-corruption efforts remain ad hoc, and there is little deterrence. Procurement laws require all government contracts to go through an open tender process unless they meet specified conditions for limited competition. However, the FGS has not put the relevant procedures in place, and in practice the FGS still awards lucrative contracts based on close relationships and favors. Moreover, the FGS has not yet established a procurement board as required by law, which further stifles attempts to ensure transparency and accountability in government procurement activities. An interim procurement board exists, but it meets irregularly. 10. Political and Security Environment Somalia has a long history of political and clan-based violence, which destroyed the basic state institutions that support eco/nomic development. Most of Somalia’s infrastructure was destroyed during 30 years of civil war and violence. There are pockets of stability, but Somalia remains an insecure environment. Attacks by al-Shabaab, clan-based militias, and others affect individuals and businesses throughout the country, often with loss of life. The U.S. Department of State advises U.S. citizens against traveling to Somalia due to crime, terrorism, and civil unrest. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The law provides for the right of every worker to form and join a trade union, participate in the activities of a trade union, conduct legal strikes, and engage in collective bargaining. No specific legal restrictions exist that limit these rights. The law does not address anti-union discrimination, or the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. Legal protections did not exclude any specific group of workers. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar violations and were seldom applied. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs hired and trained labor inspectors during the year, but as of December, no inspections had been conducted. Somalia is emerging from three decades of political instability and economic hardship that destroyed government institutions, leaving little data on the status of the current labor market. According to UNICEF statistics from 2017, 75 percent of the population is under the age of 30, and 67 percent of youth are unemployed. There is a mismatch between the skills youth possess and the requirements of the labor market. In 2020, the International Labor Organization (ILO) finalized its survey of Somalia’s labor force, finding that most labor is unskilled and that most Somalis work in the informal sector or in agriculture. Some international partners implement projects to improve vocational training, but these reach a small portion of the workforce and most of the skills offered by technical and vocational training institutions do not match the needs of the local labor markets. Private sector entities, such as the major telecommunications companies, maintain their own training programs to meet the needs of their workforce. Somalia does not have a formal labor or employment policy that would restrict the hiring of foreigners. Somalia has drafted a modern labor code, but it has yet to be enacted. In February 2020, the FGS released a social safety net policy. Conflicts between the government and labor unions resulted in a formal complaint to the ILO in 2018. Since the complaint’s filing, the government has stopped limiting labor unions’ activities and has worked cooperatively with the labor union umbrella organization to draft labor policies and codes. The ILO established an office in Mogadishu in 2018 to address the significant gaps between Somalia’s labor practices and international standards. With ILO and labor union support, in February 2019 the government finalized a draft employment policy, which the cabinet approved. 14. Contact for More Information Lilieth Whyte Economic Officer US Embassy Mogadishu +252683139576 WhyteLR@state.gov South Africa Executive Summary South Africa boasts the most advanced, broad-based economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The investment climate is fortified by stable institutions; an independent judiciary and robust legal sector that respects the rule of law; a free press and investigative reporting; a mature financial and services sector; and experienced local partners. In dealing with the legacy of apartheid, South African laws, policies, and reforms seek economic transformation to accelerate the participation of and opportunities for historically disadvantaged South Africans. The Government of South Africa (GoSA) views its role as the primary driver of development and aims to promote greater industrialization, often employing tariffs and other trade measures that support domestic industry while negatively affecting foreign trade partners. President Ramaphosa’s October 2020 Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan unveiled the latest domestic support target: the substitution of 20 percent of imported goods in 42 categories with domestic production within five years. Other GoSA initiatives to accelerate transformation include labor laws to achieve proportional racial, gender, and disability representation in workplaces and prescriptive government procurement requirements such as equity stakes and employment thresholds for historically disadvantaged South Africans. In January 2022, the World Bank approved South Africa’s request for a USD 750 million development policy loan to accelerate the country’s COVID-19 response. South Africa previously received USD 4.3 billion from the International Monetary Fund in July 2020 for COVID-19 response. This is the first time that the institutions have supported South Africa’s public finances/fiscus since the country’s democratic transition. In November 2021 at COP 26 the GoSA, the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the European Union (EU) announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The partnership aims to accelerate the decarbonization of South Africa’s economy, with a focus on the electricity system, to help achieve the ambitious emissions reduction goals laid out in South Africa’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in an inclusive, equitable transition. The partnership will mobilize an initial commitment of USD 8.5 billion over three-to-five years using a variety of financial instruments. South Africa continues to suffer the effects from a “lost decade” in which economic growth stagnated, hovering at zero percent pre-COVID-19, largely due to corruption and economic mismanagement. During the pandemic the country implemented one of the strictest economic and social lockdown regimes in the world at a significant cost to its economy. South Africa suffered a four-quarter technical recession in 2019 and 2020 with economic growth registering only 0.2 percent growth for the entire year of 2019 and contracting -6.4 percent in 2020. In a 2020 survey of over 2,000 South African businesses conducted by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), over eight percent of respondents permanently ceased trading, while over 36 percent indicated short-term layoffs. Although the economy grew by 4.9 percent in 2021 due to higher economic activity in the financial sector, the official unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 was 34.9 percent. Other challenges include policy certainty, lack of regulatory oversight, state-owned enterprise (SOE) drain on the fiscus, widespread corruption, violent crime, labor unrest, lack of basic infrastructure and government service delivery and lack of skilled labor. Due to growth in 2021, Moody’s moved South Africa’s overall investment outlook to stable; however, it kept South Africa’s sovereign debt at sub-investment grade. S&P and Fitch ratings agencies also maintain assessments that South Africa’s sovereign debt is sub-investment grade at this time. Despite structural challenges, South Africa remains a destination conducive to U.S. investment as a comparatively low-risk location in Africa, the fastest growing consumer market in the world. Google (US) invested approximately USD 140 million, and PepsiCo invested approximately USD 1.5 billion in 2020. Ford announced a USD 1.6 billion investment, including the expansion of its Gauteng province manufacturing plant in January 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 61 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $3.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,010 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoSA is generally open to foreign investment to drive economic growth, improve international competitiveness, and access foreign markets. The Department of Trade and Industry and Competition’s (DTIC) Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) division assists foreign investors. It actively courts manufacturing in sectors where it believes South Africa has a competitive advantage. It favors sectors that are labor intensive and with the potential for local supply chain development. DTIC publishes the “Investor’s Handbook” on its website: HYPERLINKError! Hyperlink reference not valid. and TISA provides investment support through One Stop Shops in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and online at http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ (see Business Facilitation). The 2018 Competition Amendment Bill introduced a government review mechanism for FDI in certain sectors on national security grounds, including energy, mining, banking, insurance, and defense (see section on Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment). The private sector has expressed concern about the politicization of mergers and acquisitions. Currently, there are few limitations on foreign private ownership and South Africa has established several incentive programs to attract foreign investment. Under the Companies Act, which governs the registration and operation of companies in South Africa, foreign investors may establish domestic entities as well as register foreign-owned entities. However, the Act requires that external companies submit their annual returns to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission Office (CIPC) for review. Although generally there are no rules that would prohibit foreign companies from purchasing South African assets or engaging in takeovers, the Act does contain national security interest criteria for certain industries, including energy, mining, banking, insurance, and defense (see section on Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment), that could potentially subject transactions covered to additional scrutiny. Reviews will be conducted by a committee comprised of 28 ministers and officials chosen by President Ramaphosa. The law also states that the president must identify and publish in the Gazette, the South African equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register, a list of national security interests including the markets, industries, goods or services, sectors or regions for mergers involving a foreign acquiring firm. In addition to the Companies Act national security review provisions, there are a small number of industries that are subject to additional requirements through separate acts. On September 28, 2021, President Ramaphosa signed the Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Act, which limits foreign ownership of private security companies to 49 percent based on national security concerns. The Banks Act of 1990 permits a foreign bank to apply to the Prudential Authority (operating within the administration of the South African Reserve Bank) to establish a representative office or a local branch in South Africa. The Insurance Act of 2017 prohibits persons from conducting insurance business in South Africa without being appropriately licensed by the Prudential Authority. The Insurance Act permits a foreign reinsurer to conduct insurance business in South Africa, subject to that foreign reinsurer being granted a license and establishing both a trust (for the purposes of holding the prescribed security) and a representative office in South Africa. The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 imposes limitations on foreign control of commercial broadcasting services. The Act Provides that a foreign investor may not, directly or indirectly, (1) exercise control over a commercial broadcasting licensee; or (2) have a financial interest or an interest in voting shares or paid-up capital in a commercial broadcasting licensee exceeding 20 percent. The Act caps the percentage of foreigners serving as directors of a commercial broadcasting licensee at 20 per cent. Lastly, foreign purchasers of South African securities are obliged to notify an authorized dealer (generally commercial banks) of the purchase and have the securities endorsed “non-resident.” DTIC’s TISA division assists foreign investors, actively courting manufacturers in sectors where it believes South Africa has a competitive advantage. DTIC publishes the “Investor’s Handbook” on its website: www.the DTIC.gov.za and TISA provides investment support through One Stop Shops in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and online at http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ (see Business Facilitation). Foreign companies may be eligible for incentives in South Africa under several ad hoc initiatives as well as the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Act of 2014, which promotes regional industrial development by providing incentives for foreign (and local) investors that elect to operate within the country’s SEZs. More information regarding incentive programs may be found at: http://www.thedtic.go/v.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/incentives/ and below in Incentives. The 2018 Competition Amendment Bill introduced a government review mechanism for FDI in certain sectors on national security grounds, Although South Africa welcomes foreign investment, there are policies that potentially disadvantage foreign companies, including the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2013 (B-BBEE). B-BBEE represents one avenue that South Africa has taken to re-integrate historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) into the economy by requiring companies meet certain thresholds of black ownership and management control to participate in government tenders and contracts. While companies support the Act’s intent, it can be difficult to meet the B-BBEE requirements, which are tallied on B-BBEE scorecards and are periodically re-defined. The higher the score on the scorecard, the greater preferential access a company must bid on government tenders and contracts. In recognition of the challenge the scorecards place on foreign business, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition created an alternative Equity Equivalence Investment Program (EEIP) program for multinational or foreign owned companies to allow them to show alternative paths to meeting B-BBEE ownership and management requirements under the law. Many companies still view the terms as onerous and restrictive. Multinationals, primarily in the technology sector such as Microsoft and Amazon Web Services, participate in the EE program. J.P. Morgan was the first international investment bank in South Africa to launch a DTIC-approved equity equivalent investment program in August 2021. The company will deploy R340 million (approximately USD 22 million) of financing into the South African economy and create more than 1000 permanent jobs. The B-BBEE program has come under sharp criticism in the past several years on the grounds that the Act has not gone far enough to shift ownership and management control in the commercial space to HDIs. In response, the GoSA has increasingly taken measures to strengthen B-BBEE through more restrictive application, increasing investigations into the improper use of B-BBEE scorecards, and is considering additional legislation to support B-BBEE’s policies. For instance, the GoSA is considering a new Equity Employment Bill that will set a numerical threshold, purportedly at the discretion of each Ministry, for employment based on race, gender, and disability, over and above other B-BBEE criteria. The bill is currently with the National Council of Provinces and if it passes, it will move to President Ramaphosa for signature. South Africa has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. In November 2021, civil society organizations launched a constitutional lawsuit against the GoSA, demanding that it cancel plans to build 1,500 Mega Watts (MW) of coal-fired power because this would worsen air and water pollution along with health hazards and global warming. They filed the case in the North Gauteng High Court on the grounds that the new power would pose “significant unjustifiable threats to constitutional rights” and to the climate by pushing up greenhouse gas emissions. South Africa is the 12th worst greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the world. The Center for Environmental Rights provided a review at: https://cer.org.za/news/new-coal-power-will-cost-south-africans-much-more-report-shows . In November 2021, environmental activists gathered at the oil and gas giant Sasol’s annual general meeting demanding commitment to move away from fossil fuels. Activists also want Sasol and its shareholders to accelerate the country’s just transition, which commits to significantly reducing carbon dioxide emissions, and moving towards greener energy alternatives. A domestic shareholder activism organization called JustShare released a report on Sasol and climate change claiming that Sasol is not planning to decarbonize, despite climate science. DTIC has established One Stop Shops (OSS) to simplify administrative procedures and guidelines for foreign companies wishing to invest in South Africa in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. In theory, OSS should be staffed by officials from government entities that handle regulation, permits and licensing, infrastructure, finance, and incentives, with a view to reducing lengthy bureaucratic procedures, reducing bottlenecks, and providing post-investment services. However, some users of the OSS complain that some of the inter-governmental offices are not staffed, so finding a representative for certain transactions may be difficult. The virtual OSS web site is: http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ . The CIPC issues business registrations and publishes a step-by-step guide for online registration at ( http://www.cipc.co.za/index.php/register-your-business/companies/ ), which can be done through a self-service terminal, or through a collaborating private bank. New businesses must also request through the South African Revenue Service (SARS) an income tax reference number for turnover tax (small companies), corporate tax, employer contributions for PAYE (income tax), and skills development levy (applicable to most companies). The smallest informal companies may not be required to register with CIPC but must register with the tax authorities. Companies must also register with the Department of Labour (DoL) – www.labour.gov.za – to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and a compensation fund for occupational injuries. DoL registration may take up to 30 days but may be done concurrently with other registrations. South Africa does not incentivize outward investments. South Africa’s stock foreign direct investments in the United States in 2019 totaled USD 4.1 billion (latest figures available), a 5.1 percent increase from 2018. The largest outward direct investment of a South African company was a gas liquefaction plant in the State of Louisiana by Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and NASDAQ dual-listed petrochemical company SASOL. There are some restrictions on outward investment, such as a R1 billion (USD 83 million) limit per year on outward flows per company. Larger investments must be approved by the South African Reserve Bank and at least 10 percent of the foreign target entities’ voting rights must be obtained through the investment. https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/FinancialSurveillanceAndExchangeControl/FAQs/Pages/Corporates.aspx 3. Legal Regime South African laws and regulations are generally published in draft form for stakeholder comment at: https://www.gov.za/document?search_query=&field_gcisdoc_doctype=545&field_gcisdoc_subjects=All&start_date=&end_date= . South Africa’s process is similar to the U.S. notice and comment consultation process and full draft texts are available to the public; however, foreign stakeholders have expressed concern over the adequacy of notice and the GoSA’s willingness to address comments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The GoSA’s regulatory regime and laws enacted by Parliament are subject to judicial review to ensure they follow administrative processes. DTIC is responsible for business-related regulations. It develops and reviews regulatory systems in the areas of competition, standards, consumer protection, company and intellectual property registration and protections, as well as other subjects in the public interest. It also oversees the work of national and provincial regulatory agencies mandated to assist DTIC in creating and managing competitive and socially responsible business and consumer regulations. DTIC publishes a list of bills and acts that govern its work at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/legislation/legislation-and-business-regulation/?hilite=%27IDZ%27 South Africa has a number of public laws that promote transparency of the business regulatory regime to aid the public in understanding their rights. For instance, South Africa’s Consumer Protection Act (2008) reinforces various consumer rights, including right of product choice, right to fair contract terms, and right of product quality. The law’s impact varies by industry, and businesses have adjusted their operations accordingly. A brochure summarizing the Consumer Protection Act can be found at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/CP_Brochure.pdf . Similarly, the National Credit Act of 2005 aims to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit and for that purpose to provide the general regulation of consumer credit and improves standards of consumer information. A brochure summarizing the National Credit Act can be found at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/NCA_Brochure.pdf The South African National Treasury is developing new legislation that will “seek to enhance the transformation imperatives of the South African financial services sector.” In August 2021, the former Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni said that a new version of the Conduct of Financial Institutions (COFI) bill contains provisions that, if enacted, will require financial institutions to develop transformation plans and commitments around B-BBEE. The bill seeks to enhance market conduct, market development and financial inclusion. National Treasury also published a draft policy document on financial inclusion for public comment, which focuses on general ‘economic inclusiveness’ for South Africa. A summary statement of the draft policy can be found at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2020/20201028%20Media%20Statement%20-%20Updated%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Policy.pdf. Parliament’s National Assembly passed the Employment Equity Amendment Bill in November 2021 and has sent the draft law to the National Council of Provinces for concurrence. The bill will allow the Employment and Labor minister to set employment equity targets for different business sectors and for different designated groups (that is, black people, women, and persons with disabilities). In South Africa the financial sector has been a leader in integrating environmental, social, and governance issues into its practices. For example, regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 requires a pension fund and its board to “before investing in, and whilst invested in an asset, consider any factor which may materially affect the sustainable long-term performance of the asset including but not limited to those of an environment, social and governance character.” There are no specific ESG disclosure rules for companies, but several ESG related laws include a carbon tax law and energy efficiency legislation. The Financial Sector and Deposit Insurance Levies (Administration) and Deposit Insurance Premiums Bill was tabled in parliament in January 2022. The National Treasury had published the bill for comment in December 2021. The bill seeks to “facilitate the funding of financial sector regulators, ombuds and other bodies, to ensure that they are able to effectively regulate the financial sector for the benefit of financial customers.” According to the bill’s memorandum, the deposit insurance premiums will be imposed on licensed banks, mutual banks, co-operative banks and branches of foreign banks that conduct business in South Africa. The model imposes huge expenses on the financial sector and results in an increased burden on already over-taxed citizens. Under the current disclosure regime in South Africa, there is no explicit duty to provide disclosures on ESG matters. However, JSE-listed companies are subject to general continuing disclosure obligations under the JSE Listing Requirements, which apply to financially material ESG issues. Regulatory enforcement processes are legally reviewed and made publicly available for stakeholder comments. The country’s fiscal transparency is overall very good. National Treasury publishes the executive budget online and the enacted budget is usually published within three months of enactment. End of year reports are published within twelve months of the end of the fiscal year. Information on debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) is made publicly available and updated at least annually. Public finances and debt obligations are fairly transparent. The year ending March 2021 report is not yet published. South Africa is a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which commenced trading in January 2021. It is a signatory to the SADC-EAC-COMESA Tripartite FTA and a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), which has a common external tariff and tariff-free trade between its five members (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland). South Africa has free trade agreements with the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the European Union (EU); the EFTA-SACU Free Trade Agreement between SACU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland; and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the SADC EPA States (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Mozambique) and the EU and its Member States. SACU and Mozambique (SACUM) and the United Kington (UK) signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in September 2019. South Africa is a member of the WTO. While it notifies some draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), these notifications may occur after implementation. In November 2017, South Africa ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, implementing many of its commitments, including some Category B notifications. The GoSA is not party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). South Africa has a strong legal system composed of civil law inherited from the Dutch, common law inherited from the British, and African customary law. Generally, South Africa follows English law in criminal and civil procedure, company law, constitutional law, and the law of evidence, but follows Roman-Dutch common law in contract law, law of delict (torts), law of persons, and family law. South African company law regulates corporations, including external companies, non-profit, and for-profit companies (including state-owned enterprises). Funded by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa has district and magistrate courts across 350 districts and high courts for each of the provinces. Cases from Limpopo and Mpumalanga are heard in Gauteng. The Supreme Court of Appeals hears appeals, and its decisions may only be overruled by the Constitutional Court. South Africa has multiple specialized courts, including the Competition Appeal Court, Electoral Court, Land Claims Court, the Labor and Labor Appeal Courts, and Tax Courts to handle disputes between taxpayers and SARS. Rulings are subject to the same appeals process as other courts. The major laws affecting foreign investment in South Africa are: The Companies Act, which governs the registration and operation of companies in South Africa. The Protection of Investment Act, which provides for the protection of investors and their investments. The Labor Relations Act, which provides protection for employees against unfair dismissal and unfair labor practices. The Customs and Excise Act, which provides for general incentives to investors in various sectors. The Competition Act, which is responsible for the investigation, control and evaluation of restrictive practices, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. The Special Economic Zones Act which provides national economic growth and exports by using support measures to attract foreign and domestic investments and technology. In July 2021, the SARS updated the SARS Customs and Excise Client Accreditation rules. Section 64E deals with SARS client accreditation rules and is of interest to importers and exporters who wish to apply for accredited client status in South Africa. An accredited client, or preferred trader, is similar to the authorized economic operator found in many other countries. The new rules set out two levels of accredited client status: Level 1 – Authorized Economic Operator (Compliance) and Level 2 – Authorized Economic Operator (Security). A person that is registered for customs and excise activities in South Africa may apply for Level 1 or 2 accredited client status. According to the new rules, all customs activities for which an applicant is registered or licensed under the provisions of the Act will be considered when assessing applications for either level of accredited client status. The new rules also set out the application process, the validity of the person applying, the renewal process for accredited client status, criteria for levels of accredited client status, and the benefits of the two levels of accredited client status. The Ease of Doing Business Bill was introduced in Parliament in February 2021 and is currently under consideration by the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration. If passed, the bill will provide for a mechanism to allow the executive, Parliament. and others to assess the socio-economic impact of regulatory measures, including the detection and reduction of measures that increase the cost of doing business. DTIC has a one-stop-shop website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors (refer to section one for details). South Africa’s Competition Commission is empowered to investigate, control, and evaluate restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions, and review mergers to achieve equity and efficiency. Its public website is www.compcom.co.za . The Competition Commission is an investigative body. The Competition Tribunal, an adjudicative body that may review Competition Committee actions, functions very much like a court. It has jurisdiction throughout South Africa and adjudicates competition matters. Tribunal decisions may be appealed through the South African court system. International and domestic investors have raised concern the Commission has taken an increasingly social activist approach by prioritizing the public interest criteria found in the Competition Amendment Bill of 2018 over other more traditional anti-trust and monopoly criteria to push forward social and economic policies such as B-BBEE. Concerns include that the new Commission approach has led to more ambiguous, expensive, and lengthy review processes and often result in requests to alter previously agreed-upon terms of the merger and acquisition at a late stage. In January 2021, GovChat, South Africa’s official citizen-government engagement platform, asked the Competition Tribunal to prevent its removal from a U.S.-owned platform, which charges a fee to business and GoSA clients for contacting customers or citizens. The tribunal granted GovChat’s application for interim relief, stating: “The respondents are interdicted and restrained from off-boarding the applicants from their WABA pending the conclusion of a hearing into the applicants’ complaint lodged with the [Competition] Commission, or six months of date hereof, whichever is the earlier.” On March 14, 2022, the Competition Commission referred the investigation to the Tribunal for review, alleging that the U.S. party’s actions against GovChat constituted an “abuse of dominance.” The Commission asked the Tribunal to assess the U.S. party with a maximum penalty constituting 10 percent of its annual turnover, and to enjoin the U.S. party from removing GovChat from the WhatsApp platform. The Competition Commission prohibited the sale of the South African operations of a U.S. fast food chain and Grand Food Meat Plant, its main supplier, by Grand Parade Investments (GPI) to a U.S. private equity firm in June 2021 on the grounds that the sale would reduce the proportion of black ownership from 68 percent to zero percent. The regulator found this to be “a significant reduction in the shareholding of historically disadvantaged persons.” By August 2021, the parties and the Commission had agreed to a revised set of conditions which include the new owner’s commitment to improving its rating for the enterprise and supplier development element under its B-BBEE scorecard, which relates to empowering black-owned and smaller enterprises. In addition, the U.S. private equity firm agreed to establish an employee share ownership program that will entitle workers to a five percent stake in the company. Racially discriminatory property laws and land allocations during the colonial and apartheid periods resulted in highly distorted patterns of land ownership and property distribution in South Africa. Given land reform’s slow and mixed success, the National Assembly (Parliament) passed a motion in February 2018 to investigate amending the constitution (specifically Section 25, the “property clause”) to allow for land expropriation without compensation (EWC). Some politicians, think-tanks, and academics argue that Section 25 already allows for EWC in certain cases, while others insist that amendments are required to implement EWC more broadly and explicitly. Parliament tasked an ad hoc Constitutional Review Committee composed of parliamentarians from various political parties to report back on whether to amend the constitution to allow EWC, and if so, how it should be done. In December 2018, the National Assembly adopted the committee’s report recommending a constitutional amendment. Following elections in May 2019 the new Parliament created an ad hoc Committee to Initiate and Introduce Legislation to Amend Section 25 of the Constitution. The Committee drafted constitutional amendment language explicitly allowing for EWC and accepted public comments on the draft language through March 2021. After granting a series of extensions to complete its work, Parliament finally voted on the Committee’s draft bill on December 7, 2021. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds parliamentary majority (267 votes) to pass, as well as the support of six out of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces. Because no single political party holds such a majority, a two-third vote can only be achieved with the support of two or more political parties. Because the ruling ANC could not garner enough supporting votes from the left-leaning Economic Freedom Fighters, who sought more drastic “state custodianship” of all property, nor the right-leaning Democratic Alliance, which rejected EWC as an investment-killing measure, the bill failed. However, on December 8, Justice Minister Ronald Lamola told media that the ruling party would use its simple majority to pass EWC legislation, which requires a lower threshold than a constitutional amendment. The ANC’s EWC bill is still making its way through Parliament but will likely see constitutional challenges from opposing parties. In October 2020, the GoSA published the draft expropriation bill in its Gazette, which would introduce the EWC concept into its legal system. The application of the draft’s provisions could conflict with South Africa’s commitments to international investors under its remaining investment protection treaties as well as its obligations under customary international law. Submissions closed in February 2021 and the Public Works committee is currently finalizing the language. Existing expropriation law, including The Expropriation Act of 1975 (Act) and the Expropriation Act Amendment of 1992, entitles the GoSA to expropriate private property for reasons of public necessity or utility. The decision is an administrative one. Compensation should be the fair market value of the property as agreed between the buyer and seller or determined by the court per Section 25 of the Constitution. In 2018, the GoSA operationalized the 2014 Property Valuation Act that creates the office of Valuer-General charged with the valuation of property that has been identified for land reform or acquisition or disposal. The Act gives the GoSA the option to expropriate property based on a formulation in the Constitution termed “just and equitable compensation.” The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), enacted in 2004, gave the state ownership of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources. It replaced private ownership with a system of licenses controlled by the GoSA and issued by the Department of Mineral Resources. Under the MPRDA, investors who held pre-existing rights were granted the opportunity to apply for licenses, provided they met the licensing criteria, including the achievement of certain B-BBEE objectives. Parliament passed an amendment to the MPRDA in 2014 but President Ramaphosa never signed it. In August 2018, Minister for the Department of Mineral Resources Gwede Mantashe called for the recall of the amendments so that oil and gas could be separated out into a new bill. He also announced the B-BBEE provisions in the new Mining Charter would not apply during exploration but would start once commodities were found and mining commenced. In November 2019, the newly merged Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) published draft regulations to the MPRDA. In December 2019, the DMRE published the Draft Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Bill for public comment. Parliament continues to review this legislation. Oil and gas exploration and production is currently regulated under MPRDA, but the new Bill will repeal and replace the relevant sections pertaining to upstream petroleum activities in the MPRDA. On September 27, 2018, the Minister of the DMRE released a new mining charter, stating that the new charter would be operationalized within the next five years to bolster certainty in the sector. The charter establishes requirements for new licenses and investment in the mining sector and includes rules and targets for black ownership and community development in the sector to redress historic economic inequalities from the apartheid era. The new rules recognize existing mining right holders who have a minimum 26 percent B-BBEE ownership as compliant but requires an increase to 30 percent B-BBEE ownership within a five-year transitional period. Recognition of B-BBEE ownership compliance is not transferable to a new owner. New mining right licenses must have 30 percent B-BBEE shareholding, applicable to the duration of the mining right. In March 2019 the Minerals Council of South Africa applied for a judicial review of the 2018 Mining Charter. The court was asked to review several issues in the Mining Charter including: the legal standing of the Mining Charter in relation to the MPRDA; the levels of black ownership of mines under B-BBEE requirements; the levels of ownership required when B-BBEE partners sell their shares, and if B-BBEE ownership levels must be maintained in perpetuity, especially when levels of ownership preceded the current Mining Charter. In September 2021, the Pretoria high court ruling set aside key aspects of the Mining Charter, notably those related to black ownership targets. The DMRE resolved not to appeal the high court ruling. The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 sets out liquidation procedures for the distribution of any remaining asset value among creditors. Financial sector legislation such as the Banks Act or Insurance Act makes further provision for the protection of certain clients (such as depositors and policy holders). South Africa’s bankruptcy regime grants many rights to debtors, including rejection of overly burdensome contracts, avoiding preferential transactions, and the ability to obtain credit during insolvency proceedings. 4. Industrial Policies South Africa also offers various investment incentives targeted at specific sectors or types of business activities, including tax allowances to support in the automotive sector and rebates for film and television production. The GoSA favors sectors that are labor intensive and with the potential for local supply chain development More information regarding incentive programs may be found at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/incentives/ . The Public Investment Corporation SOC Limited (PIC) is an asset management firm wholly owned by the GoSA and is governed by the Public Investment Corporation Act, 2004 . PIC’s clients are mostly public sector entities, including the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) and UIF, among others. The PIC runs a diversified investment portfolio including listed equities, real estate, capital market, private equity, and impact investing. The PIC has been known to jointly finance foreign direct investment if the project will create social returns, primarily in the form of new employment opportunities for South Africans. To encourage and support businesses looking to green their operations, there are incentives built in into the income tax. Section 12L of the Income Tax Act was passed in 2013 allowing for deductions for energy efficiency measures. Businesses can claim deductions of 95 cents per kilowatt hour, or kilowatt hour equivalent, of energy efficiency savings made within a year against a verified 12-month baseline. The baseline measurement and verification of savings must be done by a SANAS accredited Measurement and Verification (M&V) body. The incentive allows for tax deductions for all energy carriers, not just electricity, except for renewable energy sources which have separate provisions. An amendment in 2015 allowed businesses to claim savings from electricity co-generation, combining heat and power, if there is an energy conversion efficiency of more than 35 percent. All energy efficiency schemes that businesses want to claim the deductions against need to be registered with the South African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI). https://www.sanedi.org.za/12L.html Section 12B of the Income Tax Act includes a provision for a capital allowance for movable assets used in the production of renewable energy. The incentive allows for 100 percent asset accelerated depreciation in first financial year that the asset is brought online. This could equate to a 28 percent deduction on the business’ income tax. Currently, company tax in South-Africa is 28 percent (it has since been reduced to 27 percent as from April 1, the beginning of the 2022/2023 fiscal year). With this incentive, a company could deduct the value of a new solar power system as a depreciation expense decreasing the company’s income tax liability by the same value as the value of the installed solar system. The reduction can also be carried over to the next financial year as a deferred tax asset. https://www.westerncape.gov.za/energy-security-game-changer/news/clean-energy-tax-incentives Section 12N of the Income Tax Act provides for improvements to property not owned by taxpayers: if the improvements are associated with the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme. Section 12U Income Tax Act provides for additional deduction in respect of supporting infrastructure in respect of renewable energy: such as roads and fences South Africa designated its first Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) in 2001. IDZs offer duty-free import of production-related materials and zero VAT on materials sourced from South Africa, along with the right to sell in South Africa upon payment of normal import duties on finished goods. Expedited services and other logistical arrangements may be provided for small to medium-sized enterprises or for new foreign direct investment. Co-funding for infrastructure development is available from DTIC. There are no exemptions from other laws or regulations, such as environmental and labor laws. The Manufacturing Development Board licenses IDZ enterprises in collaboration with the SARS, which handles IDZ customs matters. IDZ operators may be public, private, or a combination of both. There are currently five IDZs in South Africa: Coega IDZ, Richards Bay IDZ, Dube Trade Port, East London IDZ, and Saldanha Bay IDZ. South Africa also has SEZs focused on industrial development. The SEZs encompass the IDZs but also provide scope for economic activity beyond export-driven industry to include innovation centers and regional development. There are six SEZs in South Africa: Atlantis SEZ, Nkomazi SEZ, Maliti-A-Phofung SEZ, Musina/Makhado SEZ, Tshwane SEZ, and O.R. Tambo SEZ. The broader SEZ incentives strategy allows for 15 percent Corporate Tax as opposed to the current 28 percent, Building Tax Allowance, Employment Tax Incentive, Customs Controlled Area (VAT exemption and duty free), and Accelerated 12i Tax Allowance. For more detailed information on SEZs, please see: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/sectors-and-services-2/industrial-development/special-economic-zones/?hilite=%27SEZ%27 The GoSA does not impose forced localization. However, authorities incentivize the use of local content in goods and technology. In 2021, President Ramaphosa and DTIC Minister Ebrahim Patel announced that South Africa will expand existing localization measures to reboot the economy. DTIC released a policy statement on localization in May 2021. The localization plan’s cornerstone is the implementation of a scheme to substitute 20 percent of imports, or approximately R20 billion (USD 1.3 billion) across selected categories with local goods by 2025. For instance, the industrial master plan for textiles set a goal that 60 percent of all clothing sold in South Africa will be locally manufactured by 2030. Preferential procurement is applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. The GoSA’s B-BBEE requirements, however, make it difficult for foreign investors to score well on the “ownership” element of the B-BBEE scorecard due to corporate rules that can prevent the transfer of discounted equity stakes to South African subsidiaries. Although the GoSA created the EEIP for international companies that cannot meet the ownership element of B-BBEE through the direct sale of equity to local investors, some companies claim that the reporting requirements and high level of required financial contributions make the EE program unviable. A Draft National Data and Cloud Policy, released by the GoSA in April 2021, seeks to put the GoSA at the heart of data control, ownership, and distribution in South Africa. The draft policy proposed a series of government interventions, including the establishment of a new state-owned enterprise to manage government-owned and controlled networks. It aims to consolidate excess capacity of publicly funded data centers and deliver processing, data facilities and cloud computing capacity. The GoSA plans to develop ICT special economic zones, hubs and transformation centers. The draft policy seeks to impose data localization requirements and defines data localization as the “…requirements for the physical storage of data within a country’s national boundaries, although it is sometimes used more broadly to mean any restrictions on cross border data flows.” The draft policy provides inter alia that: data generated in South Africa shall be the property of South Africa, regardless of where the technology company is domiciled; ownership and control of personal information and data shall be in line with the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA); DTIC through the CIPC and the National Intellectual Property Management Office (NIPMO) shall develop a policy framework on data generated from intellectual activities including sharing and use of such data. The POPIA entered fully into force in July 2021 and regulates how personal information may be processed and under which conditions data may be transferred outside of South Africa. Currently, there is no requirement for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. However, compliance burdens may be significant. The Department of Communications and Digital Technologies is responsible for developing ICT policies and legislation. The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa is the regulatory body which regulates the telecommunications sector. 5. Protection of Property Rights The South African legal system protects and facilitates the acquisition and disposition of all property rights (e.g., land, buildings, and mortgages). Deeds must be registered at the Deeds Office. Banks usually register mortgages as security when providing finance for the purchase of property. Foreigners may purchase and own immovable property in South Africa without any restrictions since they are generally subject to the same laws as South African nationals. Foreign companies and trusts are also permitted to own property in South Africa if they are registered in South Africa as an external company. Since South Africa does not have formal land audits, the proportion of land that does not have clear title is unknown. If property legally purchased is unoccupied, property ownership does not revert back to other owners such as squatters. However, squatters are known to occupy properties illegally and may rent the properties to unsuspecting tenants when there are absentee landowners. South Africa enforces intellectual property rights through civil and criminal procedures. It is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and in the process of acceding to the Madrid Protocol. It is also a signatory to the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). Generally, South Africa is considered to have a strong domestic legal framework for protecting intellectual property (IP). Enforcement can be spotty due to lack of resources for additional law enforcement and market surveillance support. However, South African authorities work closely with rights holders and with international stakeholders to address IP violations. Bringing cases to criminal court is costly, with most of the burden placed on rights holders to develop the evidence needed for prosecutions; however, civil and criminal remedies are available. South Africa has not been named in the Special 301 or the notorious market report; however, there are yearly submissions requesting South Africa’s inclusion, primarily based on delays in burdens in patent and trademark registration, draft copyright legislation under review in Parliament described below and increasing counterfeit activity in certain business districts. South Africa does not track seizures of counterfeit goods writ-large, though CIPC and law enforcement agencies release periodic reports on significant raids and media coverage in major metro areas reports on major seizures. Owners of patents and trademarks may license them locally, but when a patent license entails the payment of royalties to a non-resident licensor, DTIC must approve the royalty agreement. Patents are granted for twenty years, usually with no option to renew. Trademarks are valid for an initial period of ten years, renewable for additional ten-year periods. A patent or trademark holder pays an annual fee to preserve ownership rights. All agreements relating to payment for applicable rights are subject to South African Reserve Bank (SARB) approval. A royalty of up to four percent is the standard for consumer goods and up to six percent for intermediate and finished capital goods. Literary, musical, and artistic works, as well as cinematographic films and sound recordings, are eligible for protection under the Copyright Act of 1978. New designs may be registered under the Designs Act of 1967, which grants copyrights for five years. The Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997 provides additional protection to owners of trademarks, copyrights, and certain marks under the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941. The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997 amended the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941, the Performers’ Protection Act of 1967, the Patents Act of 1978, the Copyright Act of 1978, the Trademarks Act of 1993, and the Designs Act of 1993 to bring South African intellectual property legislation into line with TRIPS. To modernize its intellectual property rights (IPR) regime further, DTIC introduced the Copyright Amendment Bill (CAB) and the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill (PPAB). The bills remain under Parliamentary review after being returned by President Ramaphosa in June 2020 on constitutional grounds. Stakeholders have raised several concerns, including the CAB bill’s application of “fair use,” and clauses in both bills that allow DTIC Minister to set royalty rates for visual artistic work or equitable renumeration for direct or indirect uses of copyrighted works. Additional changes to South Africa’s IPR regime are under consideration through a draft DTIC policy document, Phase 1 of the Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa; however, draft legislation has not yet been released. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector South Africa recognizes the importance of foreign capital in financing persistent current account and budget deficits, and South Africa’s financial markets are regarded as some of the most sophisticated among emerging markets. A sound legal and regulatory framework governs financial institutions and transactions. The fully independent SARB regulates a wide range of commercial, retail and investment banking services according to international best practices, such as Basel III, and participates in international forums such as the Financial Stability Board and G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The JSE serves as the front-line regulator for listed firms but is supervised by the Financial Services Board (FSB). The FSB also oversees other non-banking financial services, including other collective investment schemes, retirement funds and a diversified insurance industry. The GoSA has committed to tabling a Twin Peaks regulatory architecture to provide a clear demarcation of supervisory responsibilities and consumer accountability and to consolidate banking and non-banking regulation. South Africa has access to deep pools of capital from local and foreign investors that provides sufficient scope for entry and exit of large positions. Financial sector assets are more than GDP by approximately 48 percent, and the JSE is the largest on the continent with market capitalization of approximately USD 1.282 billion as of October 2021 and 442 companies listed on the main, alternative, and other smaller boards as of January 2021. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) hold about two thirds of financial assets. The liquidity and depth provided by NBFIs make these markets attractive to foreign investors, who hold more than a third of equities and government bonds, including sizeable positions in local-currency bonds. A well-developed derivative market and a currency that is widely traded as a proxy for emerging market risk allows investors considerable scope to hedge positions with interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives. SARB’s exchange control policies permit authorized currency dealers, to buy and borrow foreign currency freely on behalf of domestic and foreign clients. The size of transactions is not limited, but dealers must report all transactions to SARB. Non-residents may purchase securities without restriction and freely transfer capital in and out of South Africa. Local individual and institutional investors are limited to holding 25 percent of their capital outside of South Africa. Banks, NBFIs, and other financial intermediaries are skilled at assessing risk and allocating credit based on market conditions. Foreign investors may borrow freely on the local market. In recent years, the South African auditing profession has suffered significant reputational damage with allegations that two large foreign firms aided, and abetted irregular client management practices linked to the previous administration or engaged in delinquent oversight of listed client companies. South Africa’s WEF competitiveness rating for auditing and reporting fell from number one in the world in 2016, to number 60 in 2019. South African banks are well capitalized and comply with international banking standards. There are 19 registered banks in South Africa and 15 branches of foreign banks. Twenty-nine foreign banks have approved local representative offices. Five banks – Standard, ABSA, First Rand (FNB), Capitec, and Nedbank – dominate the sector, accounting for over 85 percent of the country’s banking assets, which total over USD 390 billion. SARB regulates the sector according to the Bank Act of 1990. There are three alternatives for foreign banks to establish local operations, all of which require SARB approval: separate company, branch, or representative office. The criteria for the registration of a foreign bank are the same as for domestic banks. Foreign banks must include additional information, such as holding company approval, a letter of comfort and understanding from the holding company and a letter of no objection from the foreign bank’s home regulatory authority. More information on the banking industry may be found at www.banking.org.za . The Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) is the dedicated market conduct authority in South Africa’s Twin Peaks regulatory model implemented through the Financial Sector Regulation Act. The FSCA’s mandate includes all financial institutions that provide a financial product and/or a financial service as defined in the Financial Sector Regulation Act. The JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, the sixteenth largest exchange in the world measured by market capitalization, enjoys the global reputation of being one of the best regulated. Market capitalization stood at USD 1.282 billion as of October 2021, with 442 firms listed. The Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) is licensed under the Financial Markets Control Act. Membership includes banks, insurers, investors, stockbrokers, and independent intermediaries. The exchange consists principally of bonds issued by the GoSA, state-owned enterprises, and private corporations. The JSE acquired BESA in 2009. More information on financial markets may be found at www.jse.co.za . Non-residents can finance 100 percent of their investment through local borrowing. A finance ratio of 1:1 also applies to emigrants, the acquisition of residential properties by non-residents, and financial transactions such as portfolio investments, securities lending and hedging by non-residents. Although President Ramaphosa and the finance minister announced in February 2020 the aim to create a Sovereign Wealth Fund, no action has been taken. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a significant role in the South African economy in key sectors such as electricity, transport (air, rail, freight, and pipelines), and telecommunications. Limited competition is allowed in some sectors (e.g., telecommunications and air). The GoSA’s interest in these sectors often competes with and discourages foreign investment. There are over 700 SOEs at the national, provincial, and local levels. Of these, seven key SOEs are overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and employee approximately 105,000 people. These SOEs include Alexkor (diamonds); Denel (military equipment); Eskom (electricity generation, transmission, and distribution); Mango (budget airlines); South African Airways (national carrier); South African Forestry Company (SAFCOL); and Transnet (transportation). For other national-level SOEs, the appropriate cabinet minister acts as shareholder on behalf of the state. The Department of Transport, for example, oversees South African’s National Roads Agency (SANRAL), Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), which operates nine of South Africa’s airports. The Department of Communications oversees the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). A list of the seven SOEs that are under the DPE portfolio are found on the DPE website at: https://dpe.gov.za/state-owned-companies/ . The national government directory contains a list of 128 SOEs at: https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/soe-s . SOEs under DPE’s authority posted a combined loss of R13.9 billion (USD 0.9 billion) in 2019 (latest data available). Many are plagued by mismanagement and corruption, and repeated government bailouts have exposed the public sector’s balance sheet to sizable contingent liabilities. The debt of Eskom alone represents about 10 percent of GDP of which two-thirds is guaranteed by government, and the company’s direct cost to the budget has exceeded nine percent of GDP since 2008/9. Eskom, provides generation, transmission, and distribution for over 90 percent of South Africa’s electricity of which 80 percent comes from 15 coal-fired power plants. Eskom’s coal plants are an average of 41 years old, and a lack of maintenance has caused unplanned breakdowns and rolling blackouts, known locally as “load shedding,” as old coal plants struggle to keep up with demand. Load shedding reached a record 1136 hours as of November 30, 2021, costing the economy an estimated USD eight billion and is expected to continue for the next several years until the GoSA can increase generating capacity and increase its Energy Availability Factor (EAF). In October 2019 the DMRE finalized its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity, which outlines South Africa’s policy roadmap for new power generation until 2030, which includes replacing 10,000 MW of coal-fired generation by 2030 with a mix of technologies, including renewables, gas and coal. The IRP also leaves the possibility open for procurement of nuclear technology at a “scale and pace that flexibly responds to the economy and associated electricity demand” and DMRE issued a Request for Information on new nuclear build in 2020. In accordance with the IRP, the GoSA approved the procurement of almost 14,000 MW of power to address chronic electricity shortages. The GoSA held the long-awaited Bid Window 5 (BW5) of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP) in 2021, the primary method by which renewable energy has been introduced into South Africa. The REIPPPP relies primarily on private capital and since the program launched in 2011 it has already attracted approximately ZAR 210 billion (USD 14 billion) of investment into the country. All three major credit ratings agencies have downgraded Eskom’s debt following Moody’s downgrade of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating in March 2020, which could impact investors’ ability to finance energy projects. Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), the monopoly responsible for South Africa’s ports, charges some of the highest shipping fees in the world. High tariffs on containers subsidize bulk shipments of coal and iron. According to the South African Ports Regulator, raw materials exporters paid as much as one quarter less than exporters of finished products. TNPA is a division of Transnet, a state-owned company that manages the country’s port, rail, and pipeline networks. In May 2020 S&P downgraded Transnet’s local currency rating from BB to BB- based on a generally negative outlook for South Africa’s economy rather than Transnet’s outlook specifically. South Africa’s state-owned carrier, South African Airways (SAA), entered business rescue in December 2019 and suspended operations indefinitely in September 2020. The pandemic exacerbated SAA’s already dire financial straits and complicated its attempts to find a strategic equity partner to help it resume operations. Industry experts doubt the airline will be able to resume operations. United Airlines and Delta Air Lines provide regular service between Atlanta (Delta) and Newark (United) to Johannesburg and Cape Town. The telecommunications sector, while advanced for the continent, is hampered by poor implementation of the digital migration. In 2006, South Africa agreed to meet an International Telecommunication Union deadline to achieve analogue-to-digital migration by June 1, 2015. The long-delayed migration is scheduled to be completed by the end of March 2022, and while potential for legal challenges remain, most analysts believe the migration will be completed in 2022. The independent communications regulator initiated a spectrum auction in September 2020, which was enjoined by court action in February 2021 following suits by two of the three biggest South African telecommunications companies. After months of litigation, the regulator agreed to changes some terms of the auction, and the auction took place successfully in March 2022. One legal challenge remains, however, as third-largest mobile carrier Telkom has alleged the auction’s terms disproportionately favored the two largest carriers, Vodacom and MTN. Telkom’s case is due to be heard in April 2022, and its outcome will determine whether the spectrum allocation will proceed. The GoSA appears not to have fulfilled its oversight role of ensuring the sound governance of SOEs according to OECD best practices. The Zondo Commission of Inquiry into allegations of state capture in the public sector has outlined corruption at the highest echelons of SOEs such as Transnet, Eskom, SAA and Denel and provides some explanation for the extent of the financial mismanagement at these enterprises. The poor performance of SOEs continues to reflect crumbling infrastructure, poor and ever-changing leadership, corruption, wasteful expenditure and mismanagement of funds. The GoSA has taken few concrete actions to privatize SOEs; on the contrary, even minor reorganizations are roundly criticized as attempts to privatize state assets. Meanwhile, failing SOEs like PRASA are propped up by the fiscus. In 2021, the GoSA sought to sell a controlling 51 percent interest in South African Airways to a bespoke consortium funded in large part by the Public Investment Corporation, which controls investments of state pensions. A year later, however, the airline remains under government control because critical terms of the deal, including the sale price, have not been agreed upon. Transnet, Eskom, and defense contractor Denel have been subjects of various reorganization plans, but ultimately remain accountable to Cabinet shareholders. President Ramaphosa, during his February 10, 2022, State of the Nation Address (SONA), announced that the cabinet had approved amendments to the Electricity Regulations Act (ERA) that would liberalize South African electricity markets. The amendment provides changes to definitions that will enable the legal framework for a liberalized energy market and allow for a more competitive and open electricity market in the country including the establishment of a Transmission System Operator, a necessary part of state-owned utility Eskom’s unbundling process. The Eskom generation and distribution divisions are set to be restructured by December 2022. The market structure in the bill provides for a shift to a competitive multimarket electricity supply industry, which represents a significant departure from South Africa’s long-standing vertically integrated model monopolized by Eskom. According to a press release from the DMRE, the changes will provide for “an open market that will allow for non-discriminatory, competitive electricity-trading platform.” 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general awareness of responsible business conduct in South Africa. The King Committee, established by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) in 1993, is responsible for driving ethical business practices. They drafted the King Code and King Reports to form an inclusive approach to corporate governance. King IV is the latest revision of the King Report, having taken effect in April 2017. King IV serves to foster greater transparency in business. It holds an organization’s governing body and stakeholders accountable for their decisions. As of November 2017, it is mandatory for all businesses listed on the JSE to be King IV compliant. South Africa’s regional human rights commitments and obligations apply in the context of business and human rights. This includes South Africa’s commitments and obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In 2015, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) published a Human Rights and Business Country Guide for South Africa which is underpinned by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the State, corporations and business enterprises in upholding and promoting human rights in the South African context. The GoSA promotes Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). The B-BBEE policy, the Companies Act, the King IV Report on Corporate Governance 2016, the Employment Equity Act of 1998 (EEA) and the Preferential Procurement Act are generally regarded as the government’s flagship initiatives for RBC in South Africa. The GoSA factors RBC policies into its procurement decisions. Firms have largely aligned their RBC activities to B-BBEE requirements through the socio-economic development element of the B-BBEE policy. The B-BBEE target is one percent of net profit after tax spent on RBC, and at least 75 percent of the RBC activity must benefit historically disadvantaged South Africans and is directed primarily towards non-profit organizations involved in education, social and community development, and health. The GoSA effectively and fairly enforces domestic laws pertaining to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. The Employment Equity Act prohibits employment discrimination and obliges employers to promote equality and eliminate discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth in their employment policies and practices. These constitutional provisions align with generally accepted international standards. Discrimination cases and sexual harassment claims can be brought to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), an independent dispute reconciliation body set up under the terms of the Labour Relations Act. The Consumer Protection Act aims to promote a fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and services. The National Environmental Management Act aims to to provide for co-operative, environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, institutions that will promote co-operative governance and procedures for co-ordinating environmental functions exercised by organs of state. The SAHRC is a National Human Rights Institution established in terms of the South African Constitution. It is mandated to promote respect for human rights, and the culture thereof; promote the protection, development, and attainment of human rights; and monitor and assess the observance of human rights in South Africa. The SAHRC is accredited with an “A” status under the United Nations’ Paris Principles. There are other independent NGOs, investment funds, unions, and business associations that freely promote and monitor RBC. The South African mining sector follows the rule of law and encourages adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. South Africa is a founding member of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) aimed at preventing conflict diamonds from entering the market. It does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). South African mining, labor and security legislation seek to embody the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Mining laws and regulations allow for the accounting of all revenues from the extractive sector in the form of mining taxes, royalties, fees, dividends, and duties. South Africa has a private security industry and there is a high usage of private security companies by the government and industry. The country is a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. South Africa’s 2019 National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) and National Climate Change Bill (currently under consideration in Parliament) aim to serve as an overarching legislative framework for adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change, supported by the implementation of the low‐emissions development and growth strategy for South Africa. South Africa’s NCCAS supports the country’s ability to meet its obligations in terms of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The 2011 National Climate Change Response Policy is a comprehensive plan to address both mitigation and adaptation in the short, medium and long term (up to 2050). GHG emissions are set to stop increasing at the latest by 2020-2025, to stabilize for up to 10 years and then to decline in absolute terms. The NCCAS specifies strategies for climate change adaptation and mitigation, making use of the short-, medium- and long-term planning horizons. Concerning mitigation, it includes proposals to set emission reduction outcomes for each significant sector and sub-sector of the economy based on an in-depth assessment of the mitigation potential, best available mitigation options and a full assessment of the costs and benefits using a ‘carbon budgets’ approach. It also proposed the deployment of a range of economic instruments, including the appropriate pricing of carbon and economic incentives, as well as the possible use of emissions offset or emission reduction trading mechanisms for those relevant sectors, sub-sectors, companies or entities where a carbon budget approach has been selected. South Africa’s Energy Efficiency and Energy and Demand Management flagship programs cover development and facilitation of an aggressive energy efficiency program in industry, building on previous Demand Side Management programs, and covering non-electricity energy efficiency as well. A structured program will be established with appropriate initiatives, incentives and regulation, along with a well-resourced information collection and dissemination process. Local governments are encouraged to take an active part in demand-side management. The GoSA has called its 2020 Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) “the beginning of our journey towards ultimately reaching a net zero economy by 2050”. The strategy is a response to the Paris Agreement’s call for countries to set out long-term climate strategies. It draws together existing policies, planning and research across economic sectors. Among these are the IRP, which is how South Africa plans its electricity supply. The IRP guides the evolution of the South African electricity supply sector, in that it identifies the preferred electricity generation technologies to be built to meet projected electricity demand. It thus provides a mechanism for the GoSA to drive the diversification of the country’s electricity generation mix and promote the use of renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. South African measures are currently being implemented by government to address GHG emissions mitigation across the four key sectors of the economy, namely energy (supply and demand), industry, AFOLU and waste. Decarbonization of energy supply will largely be driven through the Integrated Energy Plan, the Integrated Resource Plan and the Industrial Biofuels Strategy, issued by the Department of Energy, the predecessor of this Department. South Africa’s Energy planning is guided by the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP). The Energy Act also mandates the Minister of Energy to develop, review and publish the IEP. The IEP approach analyses current energy supply and demand trends within the different sectors of the economy, across all energy carriers. It then uses this information along with assumptions about future demand and technology evolution to project the country’s future energy requirements under a variety of different scenarios, including those with emissions limits and different carbon prices. The IEP provides the overall future direction for the energy mix in South Africa, and thus represents a key instrument for driving the move to a low carbon future. The IEP update with a clear trajectory for the energy sector is critical to guiding overall energy planning for the country. The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of the Republic of South Africa outlines the GoSA’s approach to the development of a biofuel sector in the country. The primary aim of the Strategy is to address poverty and unemployment, although the role in climate change mitigation in the liquid fuels sector is recognized. In support of the strategy, the Regulations Regarding the Mandatory Blending of Biofuels with Petrol and Diesel were published in the Government Gazette in August 2012. The Regulations describe the eligibility and process for purchasing biofuels for blending and specify the type of records that need to be kept. In 2022, South Africa’s Department of Science and Innovation launched its Hydrogen Society Roadmap (HSRM) to, among other things, take advantage of and develop opportunities for direct replacement of hydrogen from natural gas by green hydrogen. The HSRM will focus on the creation of and export market for hydrogen and ammonia, providing power to the electricity grid, decarbonizing heavy-duty transport, decarbonization or energy intensive industry, and local manufacture of hydrogen products and fuel cell components. A diverse range of actions that contribute to GHG emissions mitigation is being seen across the private sector in South Africa, with significant gains having been made in certain sectors on both energy efficiency and emissions mitigation. The private sector action is being driven by a growth in understanding of the business opportunities, local and global market pressure and existing and forthcoming legislation. Actions range from adopting new products and processes to new service offerings to retrofitting of existing operations to make them more energy efficient and less emissions intensive. With suitable support this growth in action will continue. President Ramaphosa signed into law on May 26, 2019, a carbon for company-level carbon taxes, signaling his commitment to mitigate climate change in South Africa. The carbon tax applies to entities that operate emission generation facilities at a combined installed capacity equal or above their carbon tax threshold. Each emissions generating facility must obtain a license to operate and report their emissions through the National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting Regulations of the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries. The GoSA set the carbon tax at 120 ZAR (7.91 USD) per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) but implemented a soft start including a phased rollout. The Minister of Finance in his February 2022 national budget speech announced an increase to the carbon tax rate from USD 8 to USD 9 (R144), effective from 1 January 2022. He also provided more clarity on the tax announcing an increase in the carbon tax rate, a delay in the roll out of the second phase of the carbon tax, and a reference to the Climate Change Bill, under consideration in the parliament, that makes it compulsory for taxpayers to participate in the carbon budget system. To uphold South Africa’s COP26 commitments, the carbon tax rate will increase each year by at least one USD until it reaches USD 20 per ton of CO2. Starting in 2026, the carbon price increases more rapidly every year to reach at least USD 30 by 2030, and USD 120 beyond 2050. The carbon tax is being implemented in three phases, with the second phase originally scheduled to start in January 2023 having been postponed to the beginning of 2026. Taxpayers will continue to enjoy tax-free allowances which reduce their carbon tax liability. These allowances are given as rebates or refunds when the allowances being applied for are verified. The following allowances were permitted: 60 percent allowance for fossil fuel combustion; 10 percent trade exposure allowance; five percent performance allowance: five percent, carbon budget allowance; and a five percent offset allowance. The Act stipulates those multiple allowances can be granted to the same taxpayer. However, the total may not exceed 95 percent. Regulations regarding the trade exposure and performance allowances are determined by National Treasury. The South African Air Quality Act of 2004 established minimum emissions standards (MES) for a wide range of industries and technologies from combustion installation to the metallurgical industry. The MES have been poorly enforced but there is growing pressure on the GoSA to hold companies accountable due to the negative impact air pollution is having on human health. In March 2022 the Pretoria High Court, in a suit brought by the Center for Environmental Rights, ruled that the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) has unreasonably delayed regulations to implement and enforce air pollution standards. South Africa remains one of the most biodiverse countries in the world. The country is home to 10 percent of the world’s plant species and seven percent of its reptile, bird, and mammal species. Furthermore, endemism rates reach 56 percent for amphibians, 65 percent for plants and up to 70 percent for invertebrates. The GoSA has identified the biodiversity economy as a catalyst to address the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has partnered with the GoSA through the Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN) to pilot financial solutions which will advance the biodiversity economy agenda of the country. According to the South African National Biodiversity Assessment, published by the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) in 2018, there are more than 418,000 biodiversity-related jobs in the country. This speaks volumes to the contribution of biodiversity towards addressing issues of unemployment in a post-COVID-19 agenda. South Africa has been recognized globally for its efforts in providing fiscal incentives to promote the conservation of biodiversity. The GoSA, through the National Treasury, has provided fiscal incentives in the form of biodiversity tax incentives aiming to fulfil national environmental policy to preserve the environment. This is facilitated through the government-led regime of entering into agreements with private and communal landowners to formally conserve and maintain a particular area of land. These agreements result in declared protected areas and are established through the national biodiversity stewardship initiative. These agreements result in environmental management expenses incurred by taxpayers as well as loss of economic rights and use. The biodiversity tax incentives present a mechanism to address the mitigation of management costs, address potential loss of production income due to land management restrictions, ensure the continued investment of landowners and communities in long term and effective land management. This mechanism ultimately assists in the sustainability of compatible commercial operations essential to the persistence of the area and the economy and livelihood growth required in South Africa. The BIOFIN program in South Africa is currently working with the DFFE to promote the implementation of biodiversity tax incentives. The feasibility of the biodiversity tax incentives has been thoroughly tested through various projects including the partnership between SANBI and UNDP on the Biodiversity Land Use (BLU) project. The BLU project has successfully made progress in improving tax incentives for biodiversity stewardship. This project was instrumental in advocating for the 2014 amendment to the Income Tax Act that was published, which included a new Section 37D. Section 37D has provided much-needed expense relief as well as long-term financial sustainability to privately and communally owned and managed protected areas. Biodiversity tax incentives have proven to be a lifeline for many during the COVID-19 pandemic by enabling continued conservation and livelihood sustenance BIOFIN considers biodiversity tax incentives as one of the financial mechanisms that can be used to promote biodiversity conservation and bolster the biodiversity economy. The granting of a tax relief encourages landowners (communal and private) to use their land in a sustainable manner whilst reducing the costs associated with managing a protected area. Biodiversity tax incentives effectively enhance the financial effectiveness of South Africa’s protected areas and their compatible commercial activities. They aid in sustainable biodiversity and ecosystem management. This is essential to the longevity of these areas and the creation of broader biodiversity economy livelihoods, the effective growth of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), and commercial operations linked to the wildlife economy. They also increase the protected area estate and area under responsible land management. Non-state investment in establishing and managing protected areas requires a suite of sustainable finance tools to mitigate management costs, offset loss of production income, increase land under protection, and ensure effective growth of enterprises engaged in the biodiversity economy. South Africa recognizes the risk of general environmental decay and global warming and is committed to responding to the climate change challenge. South Africa has taken strides in the environmental domain that support, either directly or indirectly, which include public procurement targets for renewable energy; provisions in the Energy Act; the new Green Economy Accord; and international commitments to climate change mitigation. The GoSA’s REIPPPP is a government-led procurement program that aims to increase the share of renewable energy in the national grid by procuring energy from independent power producers (IPPs). It was issued by the Department of Energy in 2011 to replace a feed-in tariff program. A key objective of the program is economic development: using a competitive bidding process, renewable energy projects submitted are assessed on two factors, namely the tariff they offer (weighted 70 per cent) as well as their contribution to defined economic development criteria. The REIPPPP is an important component of South Africa’s overarching Integrated Resource Plan for electricity and makes clear targets for the procurement of renewable energy. South Africa ranked 10th in the 2021 BNEF’s Climatescope rankings of most attractive markets for energy transition investments. In 2021, the MIT Technology Review’s Green Future Index, which ranks countries and territories on their progress and commitment toward building a low carbon future, ranked South Africa 47th of 76 countries. South Africa is listed at number 11 of 21 African nations ranked by the Global Green Growth Institute’s Global Green Growth Index. 9. Corruption South Africa has a robust anti-corruption framework, but laws are inadequately enforced, and public sector accountability is low. High-level political interference has undermined the country’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). “State capture,” a term used to describe systemic corruption of the state’s decision-making processes by private interests, is synonymous with the administration of former president Jacob Zuma. In response to widespread calls for accountability, President Ramaphosa launched four separate judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate corruption, fraud, and maladministration, including in the Public Investment Corporation, South African Revenue Service, and the NPA which have revealed pervasive networks of corruption across all levels of government. The Zondo Commission of Inquiry, launched in 2018, has published and submitted three parts of its report to President Ramaphosa and Parliament as of March 2022. Once the entire report is reased and submitted to Parliament, Ramaphosa stated his government will announce its action plan. The Zondo Commission findings reveal the pervasive depth and breadth of corruption under the reign of former President Jacob Zuma. The Department of Public Service and Administration coordinates the GoSA’s initiatives against corruption, and South Africa’s Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations focuses on organized crime, economic crimes, and corruption. The Office of the Public Protector, a constitutionally mandated body, investigates government abuse and mismanagement. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA) officially criminalizes corruption in public and private sectors and codifies specific offenses (such as extortion and money laundering), making it easier for courts to enforce the legislation. Applying to both domestic and foreign organizations doing business in the country, the PCCA covers receiving or offering bribes, influencing witnesses, and tampering with evidence in ongoing investigations, obstruction of justice, contracts, procuring and withdrawal of tenders, and conflict of interests, among other areas. Inconsistently implemented, the PCCA lacks whistleblower protections. The Promotion of Access to Information Act and the Public Finance Management Act call for increased access to public information and review of government expenditures. President Ramaphosa in his reply to the debate on his State of the Nation Address on 20 February 2018 announced Cabinet members would be subject to lifestyle audits despite several subsequent repetitions of this pledge, no lifestyle audits have been shared with the public or Parliament. The South Africa government’s latest initiative is the opening of an Office on Counter Corruption and Security Services (CCSS) that seeks to address corruption specifically in ports of entry via fraudulent documents and other means. South Africa is a signatory to the Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. South Africa is also a party to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, which seeks to facilitate and regulate cooperation in matters of corruption amongst Member States and foster development and harmonization of policies and domestic legislation related to corruption. The Protocol defines ‘acts of corruption,’ preventative measures, jurisdiction of Member States, as well as extradition. http://www.sadc.int/files/7913/5292/8361/Protocol_Against_Corruption2001.pdf To report corruption to the GoSA: Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane Public Protector Office of the Public Protector, South Africa 175 Lunnon Street, Hillcrest Office Park, Pretoria 0083 Anti-Corruption Hotline: +27 80 011 2040 or +27 12 366 7000 http://www.pprotect.org or customerservice@pprotect.org Or for a non-government agency: David Lewis Executive Director Corruption Watch 87 De Korte Street, Braamfontein/Johannesburg 2001 +27 80 002 3456 or +27 11 242 3900 http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/make-your-complaint info@corruptionwatch.org.za 10. Political and Security Environment South Africa has strong institutions and is relatively stable, but it also has a history of politically motivated violence and civil disturbance. Violent protests against the lack of effective government service delivery are common. Killings of, and by, mostly low-level political and organized crime rivals occur regularly. In May 2018, President Ramaphosa set up an inter-ministerial committee in the security cluster to serve as a national task force on political killings. The task force includes the Police Minister‚ State Security Minister‚ Justice Minister‚ National Prosecuting Authority, and the National Police Commissioner. The task force ordered multiple arrests, including of high-profile officials, in what appears to be a crackdown on political killings. Criminal threats and labor-related unrest have impacted U.S. companies in the past. In July 2021 the country experienced wide-spread rioting in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces sparked by the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma for contempt of court during the deliberations of the “Zondo Commission” established to review claims of state-sponsored corruption during Zuma’s presidency. Looting and violence led to over USD 1.5 billion in damage to these province’s economies and thousands of lost jobs. U.S. companies were amongst those impacted. Foreign investors continue to raise concern about the government’s reaction to the economic impacts, citing these riots and deteriorating security in some sectors such as mining to be deterrents to new investments and the expansion of existing ones. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2021 was 34.9 percent. The results of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the third quarter of 2021 show that the number of employed persons decreased by 660,000 in the third quarter of 2021 to 14.3 million. The number of unemployed persons decreased by 183,000 to 7.6 million compared to the second quarter of 2021. The youth unemployment (ages 15-24) rate was 66.5 percent in the third quarter of 2021. The GoSA has replaced apartheid-era labor legislation with policies that emphasize employment security, fair wages, and decent working conditions. Under the aegis of the National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), government, business, and organized labor negotiate all labor laws, apart from laws pertaining to occupational health and safety. Workers may form or join trade unions without previous authorization or excessive requirements. Labor unions that meet a locally negotiated minimum threshold of representation (often, 50 percent plus one union member) are entitled to represent the entire workplace in negotiations with management. As the majority union or representative union, they may also extract agency fees from non-union members present in the workplace. In some workplaces and job sectors, this financial incentive has encouraged inter-union rivalries, including intimidation and violence. There are 205 trade unions registered with the Department of Labor as of February 2019 (latest published figures), up from 190 the prior year, but down from the 2002 high of 504. According to the 2019 Fourth QLFS report from StatsSA, 4.071 million workers belonged to a union, an increase of 30,000 from the fourth quarter of 2018. Department of Labor statistics indicate union density declined from 45.2 percent in 1997 to 24.7 percent in 2014, the most recent data available. Using StatsSA data, however, union density can be calculated: The February 2020 QLFS reported 4.071 million union members and 13.868 million employees, for a union density of 29.4 percent. The right to strike is protected on issues such as wages, benefits, organizational rights disputes, and socioeconomic interests of workers. Workers may not strike because of disputes where other legal recourse exists, such as through arbitration. South Africa has robust labor dispute resolution institutions, including the CCMA, the bargaining councils, and specialized labor courts of both first instance and appellate jurisdiction. The GoSA does not waive labor laws for foreign direct investment. The number of working days lost to strike action fell to 55,000 in 2020, compared with 1.2 million in 2019. The sharp decrease is attributable to the GoSA’s imposition of the National State of Disaster at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the accompanying lockdown that commenced on March 26, which forced many businesses either to close or lay off workers and implement wage cuts or shorten time of work. The fact that many wage negotiations were put on hold also led to a reduction in strike figures. Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the current labor relations framework. As of February 2019, the South Africa Department of Labor listed 39 private sector bargaining councils through which parties negotiate wages and conditions of employment. Per the Labor Relations Act, the Minister of Labor must extend agreements reached in bargaining councils to non-parties of the agreement operating in the same sector. Employer federations, particularly those representing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) argue the extension of these agreements – often reached between unions and big business – negatively impacts SMEs. In 2019, the average wage settlement resulted in a 7.1 percent wage increase, on average 2.9 percent above the increase in South Africa’s consumer price index (latest information available). In his 2022 state of the nation address President Ramaphosa spoke of tax incentives for companies that employ youth in efforts to curb youth unemployment. In addition, President Ramaphosa announced measures to move funds in the national budget to address youth unemployment. South Africa’s current national minimum wage is USD 1.45/hour (R21.69/hour), with lower rates for domestic workers being USD 1.27/hour (R19.09/hour). The rate is subject to annual increases by the National Minimum Wage Commission as approved by parliament and signed by President Ramaphosa. Employers and employees are each required to pay one percent of wages to the national unemployment fund, which will pay benefits based on reverse sliding scale of the prior salary, up to 58 percent of the prior wage, for up to 34 weeks. The Labor Relations Act (LRA) outlines dismissal guidelines, dispute resolution mechanisms, and retrenchment guideline. The Act enshrines the right of workers to strike and of management to lock out striking workers. It created the CCMA, which mediates and arbitrates labor disputes as well as certifies bargaining council impasses for strikes to be called legally. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) establishes a 45-hour workweek, standardizes time-and-a-half pay for overtime, and authorizes four months of maternity leave for women. Overtime work must be conducted through an agreement between employees and employers and may not be more than 10 hours a week. The law stipulates rest periods of 12 consecutive hours daily and 36 hours weekly and must include Sunday. The law allows adjustments to rest periods by mutual agreement. A ministerial determination exempted businesses employing fewer than 10 persons from certain provisions of the law concerning overtime and leave. Farmers and other employers may apply for variances. The law applies to all workers, including foreign nationals and migrant workers, but the GoSA did not prioritize labor protections for workers in the informal economy. The law prohibits employment of children under age 15, except for work in the performing arts with appropriate permission from the Department of Labor. The EEA, amended in 2014, protects workers against unfair discrimination on the grounds of race, age, gender, religion, marital status, pregnancy, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, disability, conscience, belief, political, opinion, culture, language, HIV status, birth, or any other arbitrary ground. The EEA further requires large- and medium-sized companies to prepare employment equity plans to ensure that historically disadvantaged South Africans, as well as women and disabled persons, are adequately represented in the workforce. More information regarding South African labor legislation may be found at: www.labour.gov.za/legislation 14. Contact for More Information Shelbie Legg Trade and Investment Officer 877 Pretorius Street Arcadia, Pretoria 0083 +27 (0)12-431-4343 LeggSC@state.gov South Korea Executive Summary The Republic of Korea (ROK) offers foreign investors political stability, public safety, world-class infrastructure, a highly skilled workforce, and a dynamic private sector. Following market liberalization measures in the 1990s, foreign portfolio investment has grown steadily, exceeding 37 percent of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) total market capitalization as of February 2022. Studies by the Korea International Trade Association, however, have shown that the ROK underperforms in attracting FDI relative to the size and sophistication of its economy due to a complicated, opaque, and country-specific regulatory framework, even as low-cost producers, most notably China, have eroded the ROK’s competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. A more benign regulatory environment will be crucial to foster innovative technologies that could fail to mature under restrictive regulations that do not align with global standards. The ROK government has taken steps to address regulatory issues over the last decade, notably with the establishment of a Foreign Investment Ombudsman inside the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to address the concerns of foreign investors. In 2019, the ROK government created a “regulatory sandbox” program to spur creation of new products in the financial services, energy, and tech sectors, adding mobility and biohealth in 2021 and 2022. Industry observers recommend additional procedural steps to improve the investment climate, including Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) and wide solicitation of substantive feedback from foreign investors and other stakeholders. The revised U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) entered into force January 1, 2019, and helps secure U.S. investors broad access to the ROK market. Types of investment assets protected under KORUS include equity, debt, concessions, and intellectual property rights. With a few exceptions, U.S. investors are treated the same as ROK investors in the establishment, acquisition, and operation of investments in the ROK. Investors may elect to bring claims against the government for alleged breaches of trade rules under a transparent international arbitration mechanism. The ROK has taken a transparent approach in its COVID-19 response, under the leadership of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency. Public health experts brief the public almost every day and the public has largely complied with social distancing guidelines and universal mask-wearing. These measures largely staved off the disease through the end of 2021, by which time over 80 percent of Koreans had been vaccinated and the government began relaxing social distancing measures. In February and March 2022, however, a new wave fueled by the omicron variant rapidly spread, peaking at over 621,000 positive cases on March 17. As of March 28, 2022, more than 12 million Koreans have tested positive for COVID-19 and total infections rose over ten million and deaths mounted. The pandemic’s economic impact has been limited. GDP dropped a mere one percent in 2020 before recovering by four percent in 2021, in part due to aggressive stimulus including more than USD 220 billion in 2020. As a result, the Korean domestic economy fared better than nearly all its OECD peers. The economic impact of the omicron outbreak remains uncertain, and Korea’s export-oriented economy remains vulnerable to external shocks, including supply chain disruptions and high energy prices, going forward. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 32 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 5 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $33,888 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $32,960 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROK government welcomes foreign investment. In a February 2022 meeting with foreign business leaders, President Moon Jae-in emphasized the ROK’s status as a stable investment destination and promised to increase tax incentives for foreign firms, especially companies working on strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, batteries, and vaccines. The ROK government plans to spend $40 million on supporting foreign businesses that make an investment in fields related to stable supply chains and carbon neutrality and another $26 million to support foreign investors finding plant locations. Hurdles for foreign investors in the ROK include regulatory opacity, inconsistent interpretation of regulations, unanticipated regulatory changes, underdeveloped corporate governance, rigid labor policies, Korea-specific consumer protection measures, and the political influence of large conglomerates, known as chaebol. The 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) is the principal law pertaining to foreign investment in the ROK. FIPA and related regulations categorize business activities as open, conditionally- or partly-restricted, or closed to foreign investment. FIPA also includes: Simplified procedures to apply to invest in the ROK; Expanded tax incentives for high-technology investments; Reduced rental fees and lengthened lease durations for government land (including local government land); Increased central government support for local FDI incentives; Creation of “Invest KOREA,” a one-stop investment promotion center within the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to assist foreign investors; and Establishment of a Foreign Investment Ombudsman to assist foreign investors. The ROK National Assembly website provides a list of laws pertaining to foreigners, including FIPA, in English ( http://korea.assembly.go.kr/res/low_03_list.jsp?boardid=1000000037 ). The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) facilitates foreign investment through its Invest KOREA office (also on the web at http://investkorea.org ). For investments exceeding 100 million won (about USD 83,577), KOTRA helps investors establish domestically-incorporated foreign-invested companies. KOTRA and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) organize a yearly Foreign Investment Week to attract investment to South Korea. In February 2022, President Moon met with executives of foreign-invested firms in the ROK and encouraged them to expand their investments, noting the stable environment the ROK provided for businesses throughout the pandemic. The ROK’s key official responsible for FDI promotion and retention is the Foreign Investment Ombudsman. The position is commissioned by the ROK President and heads a grievance resolution body that collects and analyzes concerns from foreign firms; coordinates reforms with relevant administrative agencies; and proposes new policies to promote foreign investment. More information on the Ombudsman can be found at http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/index.do . Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity across many sectors of the economy. However, under the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act (FETA), restrictions on foreign ownership remain for 30 industrial sectors, including three that are closed to foreign investment (see below). Relevant ministries must approve investments in conditionally- or partially-restricted sectors. Most applications are processed within five days; cases that require consultation with more than one ministry can take 25 days or longer. The ROK’s procurement processes comply with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement. The following is a list of restricted sectors for foreign investment. Figures in parentheses generally denote the Korean Industrial Classification Code, while those for air transport industries are based on the Civil Aeronautics Laws: Completely Closed Nuclear power generation (35111) Radio broadcasting (60100) Television broadcasting (60210) Restricted Sectors (no more than 25 percent foreign equity) News agency activities (63910) Restricted Sectors (less than 30 percent foreign equity) Newspaper publication, daily (58121) (Note: Other newspapers with the same industry code 58121 are restricted to less than 50 percent foreign equity.) Hydroelectric power generation (35112) Thermal power generation (35113) Solar power generation (35114) Other power generation (35119) Restricted Sectors (no more than 49 percent foreign equity) Newspaper publication, non-daily (58121) (Note: Daily newspapers with the same industry code 58121 are restricted to less than 30 percent foreign equity.) Television program/content distribution (60221) Cable networks (60222) Satellite and other broadcasting (60229) Wired telephone and other telecommunications (61210) Mobile telephone and other telecommunications (61220) Other telecommunications (61299) Restricted Sectors (no more than 50 percent foreign equity) Farming of beef cattle (01212) Transmission/distribution of electricity (35120) Sale of electricity (35130) Wholesale of meat (46313) Coastal water passenger transport (50121) Coastal water freight transport (50122) International air transport (51) Domestic air transport (51) Small air transport (51) Publishing of magazines and periodicals (58122) Open but Separately Regulated under Relevant Laws Growing of cereal crops and other food crops, except rice and barley (01110) Other inorganic chemistry production, except fuel for nuclear power generation (20129) Other nonferrous metals refining, smelting, and alloying (24219) Domestic commercial banking, except special banking areas (64121) Radioactive waste collection, transportation, and disposal, except radioactive waste management (38240) The Special Act to Protect National Strategic Industries will take effect from August 4, 2022, which will require stricter investment screening on foreign investments into companies with national core and strategic technologies as prescribed in the National Core Technology list. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is currently drafting the implementation regulations. The WTO conducted its eighth Trade Policy Review of the ROK in October 2021. The Review does not contain any explicit policy recommendations. It can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp514_e.htm The ROK has not undergone investment policy reviews from the OECD or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the past three years. The Korea International Trade Association (KITA) published a report on September 3, 2018 on foreign direct investment in the ROK and its impact on exports. It can be found at: https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/focusBriefDetail.do?pageIndex=4&no=1842&classification=7&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=7&searchClassification=7&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCondition=TITLE&searchKeyword=&continent_nm=&continent_cd=&country_nm=&country_cd=§or_nm=§or_cd=&itemCd_nm=&itemCd_cd=&searchOpenYn= Registering a business remains a complex process that varies according to the type of business, and requires interaction with KOTRA, court registries, and tax offices. Foreign corporations can enter the market by establishing a local corporation, local branch, or liaison office. The establishment of local corporations by a foreign individual or corporation is regulated by the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) and the Commercial Act; the latter recognizes five types of companies, of which stock companies with multiple shareholders are the most common. Although registration can be filed online, there is no centralized online location to complete the process. For small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises, the online business registration process takes approximately three to four days and is completed through Korean language websites. Registrations can be completed via the Smart Biz website, https://www.startbiz.go.kr/ . The UN’s Global Enterprise Registration (GER), which evaluates whether a country’s online registration process is clear and complete, awarded Smart Biz 5.5 of 10 possible points and suggested improvements in registering limited liability companies. The Invest KOREA information portal received 2 of 10 points. The Korea Commission for Corporate Partnership and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family ( http://www.mogef.go.kr/ ) are charged with improving the business environment for minorities and women. (Note: President-elect Yoon, who takes office on May 10, 2022, pledged during the campaign to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF).) The ROK does not restrict outward investment. The ROK has several institutions to assist small business and middle-market firms with such investments. KOTRA has an Outbound Investment Support Office that provides counseling to ROK firms and holds regular investment information sessions. The ASEAN-Korea Centre, which is primarily funded by the ROK government, provides counseling and business introduction services to Korean SMEs considering investments in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration opened an office in 2019 to advise Korean defense SMEs on exporting unrestricted defense articles. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties As of March 2022, the ROK has 18 FTAs in force, encompassing trade with 58 countries including the United States, and 93 bilateral investment treaties. The ROK has signed (but not ratified) additional FTAs with Indonesia, Israel, and Cambodia. Negotiations for a bilateral FTA with the Philippines have concluded, but the agreement is not yet signed. Ongoing FTA negotiations include a ROK-China-Japan trilateral FTA, and bilateral FTAs with Ecuador, Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), Russia, Uzbekistan, and Malaysia. Negotiations are also in-progress to expand the ROK-China FTA services and investment chapter and to enhance existing FTAs with ASEAN, India, and Chile. The ROK also agreed to begin FTA negotiations with the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) and the Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Peru, Columbia, and Chile). Separately, the ROK signed a digital trade agreement with Singapore in 2021, and started accession negotiations for the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). The ROK is taking steps to apply to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and held a public hearing in March 2022. As of March 2022, the ROK had signed bilateral tax agreements with 94 countries. The ROK National Tax Service has a special unit dedicated to processing Advance Pricing Agreement and Mutual Agreement Procedure requests from North America, Europe, and Australia, as timely processing of these requests has historically been a frequent subject of disputes. The U.S.-ROK bilateral income tax treaty entered into force in 1979. A complete list of countries and economies with which South Korea has concluded bilateral investment protection agreements, such as BITs and FTAs with investment chapters, is available at http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_3834/contents.do and http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA . The ROK is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. Despite formal tax agreements and dispute resolution mechanisms, U.S. investors have raised concerns about discrimination and lack of transparency in tax investigations by ROK authorities. 3. Legal Regime ROK regulatory transparency has improved, due in part to Korea’s membership in the WTO and negotiated FTAs. However, the foreign business community continues to face numerous rules and regulations unique to the ROK. National Assembly legislation on environmental protection or the promotion of SMEs, while broadly targeting big businesses, has created new trade barriers that disadvantage foreign companies. Also, some laws and regulations lack sufficient detail and are subject to differing interpretations by government regulatory officials. In other cases, ministries issue non-legally binding guidelines on implementation of regulations, yet these become the bases for legal decisions in ROK courts. Regulatory authorities also issue oral or internal guidelines or other legally-enforceable dictates that prove burdensome for foreign firms. Intermittent ROK government deregulation plans to eliminate oral guidelines or impose the same level of regulatory review as written regulations have not led to concrete changes. Despite KORUS FTA provisions designed to address transparency issues, they remain persistent and prominent. The ROK constitution allows both the legislative and executive branches to introduce bills. Ministries draft subordinate statutes (presidential decrees, ministerial decrees, and administrative rules), which largely govern the procedural matters addressed by the respective laws. Administrative agencies shape policies and draft bills on matters within their respective jurisdictions. Drafting ministries must clearly define policy goals and complete regulatory impact assessments (RIAs). When a ministry drafts a regulation, it must consult with other relevant ministries before it releases the regulation for public comment. The constitution also allows local governments to exercise self-rule legislative authority to draft ordinances and rules within the scope of federal acts and subordinate statutes. The enactment of laws and their subordinate statutes, ranging from the drafting of bills to their promulgation, must follow formal ROK legislative procedures in accordance with the Regulation on Legislative Process enacted by the Ministry of Government Legislation. Since 2011, all publicly listed companies must follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, or K-IFRS in the ROK). The Korea Accounting Standards Board facilitates ROK government endorsement and adoption of IFRS and sets accounting standards for companies not subject to IFRS. According to the Administrative Procedures Act, authorities proposing laws and regulations (acts, presidential decrees, or ministerial decrees) must seek public comments at least 40 days prior to their promulgation. Regulations are sometimes promulgated after only the minimum required comment period and with minimal consultation with industry. The Official Gazette and the websites of relevant ministries and the National Assembly simultaneously post the Korean language text of draft acts and regulations, accompanied by executive summaries, for a 40-day comment period. Comments are not made public, and firms may struggle to translate complex documentation, analyze, and respond adequately before the expiration of this period. After the comment period, the Ministry of Government Legislation reviews the laws and regulations to ensure they conform to the constitution and monitors government adherence to the Regulation on Legislative Process. While the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC), under the executive branch, reviews all laws and regulations to minimize government intervention in the economy and to abolish all economic regulations that fall short of international standards or hamper national competitiveness, the committee has been less active in recent years. In January 2019, Korea introduced a “regulatory sandbox” program intended to reduce the regulatory burden on companies that seek to test innovative ideas, products, and services. Depending on the business sector in which a particular proposal falls, either MOTIE, the Ministry of Science and ICT, or the Financial Services Commission manages the program. The program is open to Korean companies and foreign companies with Korean branch offices. Websites and applications are only available in Korean. The business community has welcomed this effort by regulators to spur innovation. The ROK government has taken major steps to promote the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices of companies in the past year with the goal to require ESG disclosure for all listed companies with total assets valued at 2 trillion won (about $1.7billion) or more by 2025, and all listed companies by 2030. In December 2021, Korea’s Financial Services Commission and the Korea Exchange launched a an ESG information platform for listed companies ( http://esg.krx.co.kr/ ). Korea’s National Pension Service also plans to invest half of its assets into ESG companies by the end of 2022. The ROK government enforces regulations through penalties (fines, enforcing corrective measures, or criminal charges) in the case of violations of the law. The government’s enforcement actions can be challenged through an appeal process or administrative litigation. The CEOs of local branches can be held legally responsible for all actions of their company and at times have been arrested, charged for company infractions, and placed under travel bans while awaiting or undergoing court procedures. Foreign CEOs have cited this as a significant burden to their business operations in Korea. For large companies with over 5 trillion won of local assets (about $4.2 billion), the ROK Government may designate a single person or entity (for example, the largest subsidiary) to be subject to additional regulatory scrutiny and potential liability for company actions. Industry contacts have indicated the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is considering making such designations for foreigners or entities based outside of the ROK. The ROK’s public finances and debt obligations are generally transparent, with the exception of state-owned enterprise debt. The ROK has revised local regulations to implement commitments under international treaties and trade agreements. Treaties duly concluded and promulgated in accordance with the constitution and the generally recognized rules of international law are accorded the same standing as domestic laws. ROK officials consistently express intent to harmonize standards with global norms by benchmarking the United States and the EU. The U.S., U.K., and Australian governments exchange regulatory reform best practices with the ROK government to encourage local regulators to employ more regulatory analytics, increase transparency, and improve compliance with international standards; however, unique local rules and regulations continue to pose difficulties for foreign companies operating in the ROK. The ROK is a member of the WTO and notifies the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. The ROK is also a signatory of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The ROK amended the ministerial decree of the Customs Act in 2015, creating a committee charged with implementing the TFA. The ROK is a global leader of modernized and streamlined procedures for transportation and customs clearance. Industry sources report the Korea Customs Service enforces rules of origin issues largely in compliance with ROK obligations under its free trade agreements. The ROK legal system is based on civil law. Subdivisions within the district and high courts govern commercial activities and bankruptcies and enforce property and contractual rights with monetary judgments, usually levied in the domestic currency. The ROK has a written commercial law, and matters regarding contracts are covered by the Civil Act. There are also three specialized courts in the ROK: patent, family, and administrative courts. The ROK court system is independent and not subject to government interference in cases that may affect foreign investors. Foreign court judgments, with the exception of foreign arbitral rulings that meet certain conditions, are not enforceable in the ROK. Rulings by district courts can be appealed to higher courts and to the Supreme Court. There is no principle of stare decisis or precedent. The Constitutional Court rules on constitutional issues and is comprised of nine justices who are appointed by the President. The ROK has a transparent legal system with a strong rule-of-law tradition and an independent judiciary. FIPA is the principal basic law pertaining to foreign investment in the ROK. The Invest KOREA website ( http://investkorea.org ) provides information on relevant laws, rules, and procedures for foreign investment in the ROK. Laws and regulations enacted within the past year include: On April 6, 2021, an amended Labor Standards Act (LSA) took effect. The amendments modify certain restrictions on allowable work hours for employees and add certain health and safety requirements for overtime labor. On January 26, 2021, the Serious Accidents Punishment Act (SAPA) was enacted. The law entered into force for businesses with 50 or more employees on January 27, 2022. The Act holds CEOs personally accountable for workplace accidents and occupational illnesses. It also expands the scope of obligations for worker protections and strengthens penalties for violations. In August 2021, the ROK became the first country in the world to pass legislation banning digital platform operators from requiring app developers to use the platforms’ in-app payment systems. The law entered into force on March 15, 2022. Key pending/proposed laws and regulations as of March 2022 include: The 2011 Personal Information Protection Act imposed stringent requirements on service providers seeking to transfer customers’ personal data outside Korea. In September 2021, the Personal Information Protection Commission submitted a proposed amendment to increase the fines to three percent of a company’s total global revenue. The proposed amendment would also grant the Personal Information Protection Committee the authority to suspend a company’s cross border data transfers in the case of a significant violation. As of March 2022, there are several proposed bills in the National Assembly seeking to mandate global over-the-top (OTT) providers pay network usage fees to Korean internet service providers. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) reviews and regulates competition and consumer safety matters under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The amended MRFTA, which came into effect in December 2021, includes strengthened provisions on information exchange between companies, cartel law enforcement, and administrative fine levels. KFTC has a broad mandate that includes promoting competition, strengthening consumer rights, and creating a suitable environment for SMEs. In addition to investigating corporate and financial restructuring, the KFTC can levy sizeable administrative fines and issue corrective measures for violations of law and for failure to cooperate with investigators. Decisions by KFTC are subject to appeal in Korean courts. As part of KORUS implementation, KFTC instituted a “consent decree” process in 2014, whereby firms can settle disputes with KFTC without resorting to the court system. Over the last several years, a number of U.S. firms have raised concerns that KFTC targets foreign companies with aggressive enforcement. An amendment to the MRFTA in September 2020 improved the administrative decision-making process by the KFTC, including permitting access to confidential business information, limited to outside legal counsel, in order to protect possible trade secrets. The ROK follows generally-accepted principles of international law with respect to expropriation. ROK law protects foreign-invested enterprise property from expropriation or requisition. Private property can be expropriated for public purposes such as urban redevelopment, new industrial complexes, or constructing roads, and claimants are afforded due process and compensation. Private property expropriation in the ROK for public use is generally conducted in a non-discriminatory manner, with claimants compensated at or above market value. Embassy Seoul is aware of one case in which a U.S. investor filed an investor-state dispute lawsuit in 2018 against the ROK government, claiming that the government had violated the KORUS FTA in expropriating the investor’s land. The case was dismissed in the ROK judicial system on jurisdictional grounds in September 2019. The ROK government allotted USD 26 billion in its 2022 budget for land expropriation – a 36 percent decrease from the previous year. The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA) stipulates that bankruptcy is a court-managed liquidation procedure where both domestic and foreign entities are afforded equal treatment. The procedure commences after a filing by a debtor, creditor, or a group of creditors, and determination by the court that a company is bankrupt. The court designates a Custodial Committee to take an accounting of the debtor’s assets, claims, and contracts. The Custodial Committee may grant voting rights among creditors. Shareholders and contract holders may retain their rights and responsibilities based on shareholdings and contract terms. Debtors may be subject to arrest once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, even if the debtor has not been declared bankrupt. Individuals found guilty of negligent or false bankruptcy are subject to criminal penalties. The Seoul Bankruptcy Court (SBC) has nationwide jurisdiction to hear major bankruptcy or rehabilitation cases and to provide effective, specialized, and consistent guidance in bankruptcy proceedings. Any Korean company with debt equal to or above KRW 50 billion (about USD 41.8 million) and/or 300 or more creditors may file for bankruptcy rehabilitation with the SBC. Thirteen local district courts continue to oversee smaller bankruptcy cases in areas outside Seoul. 4. Industrial Policies The ROK government provides the following general incentives for foreign investors: Cash incentives for qualified foreign investments in free trade zones, foreign investment zones, free economic zones, industrial complexes, and similar facilities; Tax and cash incentives for the creation and expansion of workplaces for high-tech businesses, factories, and research and development centers; Reduced rent for land and site preparation; Grants for establishment of community facilities for foreigners; Reduced rent for state or public property; and Preferential financial support for investing in major infrastructure projects. Additionally, the ROK government provides incentives for investments that would increase ROK-based production of materials, parts, and equipment in six critical industrial sectors: semiconductors, displays, automobiles, electronics, machinery, and chemicals. The Seoul Metropolitan government provides separate support for SMEs, high-technology businesses, and the biomedical industry. Note that corporate tax exemption for foreign direct investment is limited to firms registered by the end of 2018. The ROK government does not issue guarantees or jointly finance foreign direct investment projects. The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is the key mechanism that the ROK government has put in place to promote renewable energy projects since 2012, replacing the feed-in tariffs (FITs) scheme. Under the RPS, state-run generation companies (GENCOs) and independent power producers (IPPs) that generate over 500MW are required to generate a certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources. The RPS mandate is set at 10 percent in 2022 and expected to rise over time. GENCOs and IPPs which cannot meet the quota must purchase renewable energy certificates (RECs) to fill the gap. The government imposes multipliers for RECs to help compensate power operators’ expenses and adjusts multipliers every three years to promote specific renewable energy technologies and sources. The ROK re-introduced “Korean FITs” in 2018 to encourage small scale solar power projects by providing a 20-year contract with GENCOs at a fixed price. To promote low-carbon transport and fuels, the ROK offers interest subsidies for loans for eco-friendly vehicle and component manufacturers, charging station operators, eco-friendly vehicle purchasing companies, companies shifting to eco-friendly vehicle fleets, and eco-friendly vehicle recycling companies. The government also provides tax benefits (excise tax, acquisition tax, education tax) and subsidies for buyers of electric cars, fuel cell electric vehicles, and hybrid vehicles under the Act on Promotion of Development and Distribution of Environmentally Friendly Automobiles. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) administers tax and other incentives to stimulate advanced technology transfer and investment in high-technology services. There are three types of special areas for foreign investment – Free Economic Zones, Free Investment Zones, and Tariff-Free Zones – where favorable tax incentives and other support for investors are available. The ROK aims to attract more foreign investment by promoting its nine Free Economic Zones: Incheon (near Incheon airport); Busan/Jinhae (in South Gyeongsang Province); Gwangyang Bay (in South Gyeongsang Province); Gyeonggi (in Gyeonggi Province); Daegu/Gyeongbuk (in North Gyeongsang Province); East Coast (in Donghae and Gangneung); Gwangju (in South Jeolla Province); Ulsan; and Chungbuk (in North Chungcheong Province). Additional information is available at http://www.fez.go.kr/global/en/index.do . There are also 26 Foreign Investment Zones designated by local governments to accommodate industrial sites for foreign investors. Special considerations for foreign investors vary among these zones. In addition, there are four foreign-exclusive industrial complexes in Gyeonggi Province designed to provide inexpensive land, with the national and local governments providing assistance for leasing or selling in the sites at discounted rates. There are no ROK requirements that firms hire local workers. Foreigners planning to work during their stay in the ROK are required by law to apply for a visa. Sponsoring employers file work permits and visa applications. Hiring firms are required to confirm that prospective employees of foreign nationality have a valid work permit prior to making a job offer. Once approved, the Ministry of Justice will issue a Certificate of Confirmation of Visa Issuance (CCVI) to the foreign worker. The worker submits this certificate with the relevant visa application forms to the ROK embassy or consulate in the applicant’s country of residence. Work visas are usually valid for one year, and issuance generally takes two to four weeks. Changing a tourist visa to a work visa is not possible within the ROK; applicants for work visas must submit their applications to an ROK embassy or consulate. The ROK has not imposed performance requirements on new foreign investment since 1992; there are no performance requirements regarding local content, local jobs, R&D activity, or domestic shares in the company’s capital. Other conditions to invest in the ROK are elaborated in FIPA. Recent ROK-specific security regulations on the use of cloud computing by public services (broadly defined) effectively exclude U.S. firms from offering cloud services in the ROK. In January 2016, the ROK government announced guidelines requiring Cloud Security Assurance Program (CSAP) Certification for cloud computing services for ROK government agencies or public institutions; the IT Security Certification Center requires disclosure of source code as part of CSAP Certification. Along with data localization provisions, this effectively blocks U.S. or other international cloud service providers from participating in the Korean public cloud market. Furthermore, restrictive ROK data privacy law governs any companies that collect, use, transfer, outsource, or process personal information. The Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) imposes strict conditions on transferring personal information out of the country, requiring data controllers to obtain each end-user’s consent to transfer personal information out of the ROK. In the case of overseas transfer of personal information for the purpose of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) outsourcing, the data controller may forgo obtaining each individual’s consent if the data controller discloses in its privacy policy certain information about the overseas transfer, including the purpose and destination of the overseas transfer; similar requirements apply to transfer of personal information of end-users to a third party within the ROK. The Financial Services Commission took steps to overturn regulations that prohibit financial companies in the ROK from transferring customers’ personal information and related financial transaction data overseas without consumer written consent, but have not specified under what circumstances data can be sent and to which overseas entities. As such, this financial transaction data still cannot be outsourced to overseas ICT vendors, and financial companies in the ROK must store customer financial transaction data locally in the ROK. The Financial Services Commission sets Korea’s financial policies and directs the Financial Supervisory Service in the enforcement of those policies. The ROK government and legislature are considering further restrictions on the use of personal information. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are enforced under the Civil Act. The Alien Land Acquisition Act (amended in 1998) extends to non-resident foreigners and foreign corporations the same rights as Koreans in land purchase and use. The Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Act supports indirect investments in real estate and restructuring of corporations. The REIT Act allows investors to invest funds through an asset management company and in real property such as office buildings, business parks, shopping malls, hotels, and serviced apartments. Property rights are enforced, and there is a reliable system for registering mortgages and liens, managed by the courts. Legally purchased property cannot revert to other owners. Squatters may have limited rights to cultivation of unoccupied land. Four ROK ministries share responsibility for protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR): The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST); the Korea Copyright Protection Agency (KCOPA); the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO); and the Korea Customs Service (KCS). Since being removed from USTR’s Special 301 Watch List in 2009, the ROK has become a regional leader of legal IPR frameworks and enforcement of IPR. The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism announced in January 2021 a plan to fully revise the Copyright Act to reflect a move toward online platforms. The Copyright Act revision has subsequently stalled in the National Assembly, and industry sources assess it has little chance of moving forward in its present form. The amendments aim to implement a system of extended collective licensing, remuneration management, adoption of rights of publicity, updated concepts of digital transmission, and data mining for promotion of machine learning and big data analysis. Industry sources have expressed overall satisfaction with the ROK legal framework, calling the ROK a model for IPR protection in Asia. In July 2019, an amendment to the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act entered into force with the following broad effects: Reduced requirements for secrecy by information owners, broadened scope of what constitutes “theft,” and increased statutory punishments for trade secret theft. KIPO suspended 16,846 online transactions in 2021, up from 10,446 cases in 2020, and closed 451 illegal online shopping malls in 2021, up from 394 in 2020. Since April 2019, KIPO has operated an “online monitoring team” comprised of private citizens to report online sales of counterfeit goods. The team identified 171,606 cases in 2021, up from 126,542 in 2020. KCS handled 87 border enforcement cases in 2021 for goods worth an estimated USD 188 million. Trademark enforcement accounted for over 86 percent of cases, mostly for counterfeit watches, handbags, and apparel. KCS also promoted IPR protection by posting public service announcements on public transportation and social media. Some industry sources have expressed concern the ROK’s low prosecution-to-indictment ratio in IPR violation cases, light sentencing standards, and low punitive damage assessments may not sufficiently deter infringement activity. Stakeholders continue to express concern about Korea’s pharmaceutical reimbursement policy, specifically that it is not conducted in a fair and transparent manner that fully recognizes the value of innovation. The ROK was not listed in the 2021 Special 301 Report, nor were any ROK-based physical or online markets included in the 2020 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The ROK has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The Korea Exchange (KRX) is comprised of a stock exchange, futures market, and stock market following the 2005 merger of the Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Futures Exchange, and Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) stock markets. It is tracked by the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). There is sufficient liquidity in the market to enter and exit sizeable positions. At the end of February 2022, over 2,496 companies were listed with a combined market capitalization of USD 21 trillion. The ROK government uses various incentives, such as tax breaks, to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The ROK does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions, in accordance with the general obligations of member states under International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. Credit is allocated on market terms. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. While non-resident foreigners can issue bonds in South Korean won, they are otherwise unable to borrow money in local currency. Foreign portfolio investors enjoy open access to the ROK stock market. Aggregate foreign investment ceilings were abolished in 1998, and foreign investors owned 36.7 percent of benchmark KOSPI stocks and 9.9 percent of the KOSDAQ as of February 2022. Foreign portfolio investment decreased slightly over the past year. Foreign investors owned 32.4 percent of benchmark stocks and 9.4 percent of listed bonds, according to the Korea Exchange. U.S. investors represent 40.4 percent of total foreign holdings, which has been increasing gradually over the last three years. The ROK Financial Services Commission in March 2020 banned the short-selling of stocks to stabilize stock price volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ban partially expired only for short-selling stocks from companies included in the KOSPI 200 and KOSDAQ 150 in May 2021. The ban on short-selling stock from other companies is set to expire in May 2022. Financial sector reforms enacted to increase transparency and promote investor confidence are often cited as a reason for the ROK’s rapid rebound from the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 1998, the ROK government has recapitalized its banks and non-bank financial institutions, closed or merged weak financial institutions, resolved many non-performing assets, introduced internationally accepted risk assessment methods and accounting standards for banks, forced depositors and investors to assume appropriate levels of risk, and taken steps to help end the policy-directed lending of the past. These reforms addressed the weak supervision and poor lending practices in the Korean banking system that helped cause and exacerbate the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. The ROK banking sector is healthy overall, with a low non-performing loan ratio of 0.5 percent at the end of 2021, dropping 0.14 percentage points from the prior year. Korean commercial banks held more than USD 2.7 trillion in total assets at the end of 2021. Foreign commercial banks or branches can establish local operations, which would be subject to oversight by ROK financial regulators. The ROK has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are any relationships in jeopardy. There are no legal restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the ROK; however, commercial banks may refuse to accept foreign nationals as customers unless they show local residency or identification documents. The Bank of Korea (BOK) is the central bank. The Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) is a wholly government-owned sovereign wealth fund established in July 2005 under the KIC Act. KIC’s steering committee is comprised of its Chief Executive Officer, the Minister of Economy and Finance, the Bank of Korea Governor, and six private sector members appointed by the ROK President. KIC is on the Public Institutions Management Act (PIMA) list. The KIC Act mandates that KIC manage assets entrusted by the ROK government and central bank; the KIC generally adopts a passive role as a portfolio investor. The corporation’s assets under management stood at USD 201 billion at the end of August 2021. KIC is required by law to publish an annual report, submit its books to the steering committee for review, and follow all domestic accounting standards and rules. It follows the Santiago Principles and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. The KIC does not invest in domestic assets, aside from a one-time USD 23 million investment into a domestic real estate fund in January 2015. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Many ROK state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to exert significant control over the economy. There are 36 SOEs active in the energy, real estate, and infrastructure (i.e., railroad and highway construction) sectors. The legal system has traditionally ensured a role for SOEs as sectoral leaders, but in recent years, the ROK has sought to attract more private participation in the real estate and construction sectors. SOEs are currently subject to the same regulations and tax policies as private sector competitors and do not have preferential access to government contracts, resources, or financing. The ROK is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement; a list of SOEs subject to WTO government procurement provisions is available in Annex 3 of Appendix I to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The state-owned Korea Land and Housing Corporation enjoys privileged status on state-owned real estate projects, notably housing. The court system functions independently and gives equal treatment to SOEs and private enterprises. The ROK government does not provide official market share data for SOEs. It requires each entity to disclose financial information, number of employees, and average compensation figures. The PIMA gives the Ministry of Economy and Finance oversight authority over many SOEs, mainly pertaining to administration and human resource management. However, there is no singular government entity that exercises ownership rights over SOEs. SOEs subject to PIMA must report to a cabinet minister. Alternatively, the ROK President or relevant cabinet minister appoints a CEO or director, often from among senior government officials. PIMA explicitly obligates SOEs to consult with government officials on budget, compensation, and key management decisions (e.g., pricing policy for energy and public utilities). For other issues, government officials informally require either prior consultation or subsequent notification of SOE decisions. Market analysts generally acknowledge the de facto independence of SOEs listed on local security markets, such as the Industrial Bank of Korea and Korea Electric Power Corporation; otherwise, SOEs are regarded either as fully-guaranteed by the government or as parts of the government. The ROK adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and reports significant changes in the regulatory framework for SOEs to the OECD. A list of South Korean SOEs is available in Korean at: http://www.alio.go.kr/home.html . The ROK government does not confer advantages on SOEs competing in the domestic market. Although the state-owned Korea Development Bank may enjoy lower financing costs because of a governmental guarantee, this does not appear to have a major effect on U.S. retail banks operating in Korea. Privatization of government-owned assets has historically faced protests by labor unions and professional associations, and has sometimes suffered a lack of interested buyers. No state-owned enterprises were privatized between 2002 and November 2016. In December 2016, the ROK sold part of its stake in Woori Bank, recouping USD 2.1 billion. As of March 2021, the government holds a 17.25 percent stake in Woori Bank. Most analysts do not expect significant movement toward privatization in the near future. Foreign investors may participate in privatization programs if they comply with ownership restrictions stipulated for the 30 industrial sectors indicated in the FETA (see Section 1: Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment). These programs have a public bidding process that is clear, non-discriminatory, and transparent. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of the economic and social value of responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility (CSR) continues to grow in the ROK. The Korea Corporate Governance Service, founded in 2002 by entities including the Korea Exchange and the Korea Listed Companies Association, encourages companies to voluntarily improve their corporate governance practices. Since 2011, its annual assessments have included guidelines and CSR reviews, including of corporate environmental responsibility. The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) Network Korea, established in 2007, actively promotes corporate involvement in the UN Public Private Partnership for Sustainable Development Goals 2016-2030. UNGC is focused on human rights, anti-corruption, labor standards, and the environment, with 275 ROK companies listed as UNGC members as of March 2022. Government subsidies and tax reductions for social enterprises have contributed to an increase in the number of organizations tackling social issues related to unemployment, the environment, and low-income populations. The ROK government promotes the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises online via seminars and by publishing and distributing promotional materials. To enhance implementation, the ROK government established a National Action Plan overseen by the Ministry of Justice’s International Human Rights Division, designated a National Contact Point (NCP), and assigned the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) as the NCP Secretariat. The KCAB handled 405 cases in 2020 with a total claim amount over USD 468 million. The Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL), the Korea Consumer Agency, and the Ministry of Environment impartially enforce ROK laws in the labor, consumer protection, and the environment. The National Human Rights Commission makes non-binding recommendations regarding human rights but only reviews discrimination and harassment cases involving private firms. Shareholder rights are protected by the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Commission, the Act on Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade under the jurisdiction of the KFTC, and the Commercial Act under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The Commercial Act was revised in December 2020 to better protect minority shareholders. Other organizations involved in responsible business conduct include the ROK office of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, the Korea Human Rights Foundation, and the Korean House for International Solidarity. The Korea Sustainability Investing Forum (KOSIF) was established in 2007 to promote and expand socially responsible investment and CSR. Through regular fora, seminars, and publications, KOSIF provides educational opportunities, conducts research to establish a culture of socially responsible investment in the ROK, and supports relevant legislative processes. The ROK has no regulations to prevent conflict minerals from entering supply chains; however, MOTIE supports companies’ voluntary adherence to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. ROK companies are obligated to follow regulations on conflict minerals by export destination countries. The Korea International Trade Association and private sector firms provide consulting services to companies seeking to comply with conflict-free regulations. The ROK is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. It has participated in the Kimberly Process since 2012. The ROK government is taking measures to guarantee transparency through the Mining Act, Overseas Resources Development Business Act, and other relevant laws on taxation, environment, labor, and bribery, as well as through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The ROK is not a signatory to international agreements on private military or security industries, and the ROK’s small security sector focuses primarily on commercial contracts. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The ROK aims to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and in November 2021, the Moon administration strengthened Korea’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), aiming to reduce emissions by 40 percent from 2018 levels. In September 2021, the ROK enacted the Framework Act on Carbon Neutral and Green Growth to Respond to the Climate Crisis becoming the 14th country in the world to legislate a carbon target. The Act includes a comprehensive set of provisions such as establishing a National Carbon Neutral Green Growth Master Plan, policies for greenhouse gas reduction and climate change adaptation across numerous sectors, and policies to promote green growth to foster green industries and a green economy. The government also introduced its “2050 Carbon Neutral Strategy” in December 2020, providing a variety of carbon-neutral social and technological development and policy measures to achieve net-zero emissions Authorities have indicated the forthcoming National Carbon Neutral Green Growth Master Plan will present reduction goals and measures by sector. Meanwhile, the 2030 target represents an intermediate step towards carbon neutrality and is driving efforts to change cultural practices, including through incentives for individuals for carbon-neutral practices such as renting zero emission cars. The government indicated that it plans to establish and operate an integrated information management system for biodiversity and ecosystems, which will aid in investigating the impact of climate change. Additionally, the government introduced an ecosystem service payment system which incentivizes the voluntary protection of ecosystems by raising awareness and compensating local residents for conservation practices. The government designated new ecological protected areas as well as other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). Public procurement policies take into account green growth goals. For example, it is compulsory for public institutions to purchase products deemed green barring certain exceptions. Additionally, as of 2020, all new public buildings with a gross floor area (GFA) of 1,000 square-meters or larger are to be designed as net-zero buildings. 9. Corruption In an effort to combat corruption, the ROK has introduced systematic measures to prevent the illegal accumulation of wealth by civil servants. The 1983 Public Service Ethics Act requires high-ranking officials to disclose personal assets, financial transactions, and gifts received during their terms of office. The Act on Anti-Corruption and the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of 2008 (previously called the “Anti-Corruption Act”) concerns reporting of corruption allegations, protection of whistleblowers, and training and public awareness to prevent corruption; the act also establishes national anti-corruption initiatives through the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC). Implementation is behind schedule, according to Transparency International, which ranked the ROK 32 out of 180 countries and territories in its 2021 Corruption Perception Index with a score of 62 out of 100 (with 100 being the best score). The Department of State’s 2020 ROK Human Rights Report highlighted allegations of corruption levied against former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk and his relatives in October 2020. Former ROK presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak were found guilty in separate corruption trials in 2018; the ROK Supreme Court upheld both verdicts in January 2021 and October 2020, respectively. Park received a pardon on December 31, 2021. Political corruption at the highest levels of elected office has occurred despite more recent efforts by the ROK legislature to pass and enact anti-corruption laws such as the Act on Prohibition of Illegal Requests and Bribes, also known as the Kim Young-ran Act, in March 2015. This law came into effect on September 28, 2016, and institutes strict limits on the value of gifts that can be given to public officials, lawmakers, reporters, and private school teachers. It also extends to spouses of such persons. The Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers is designed to protect whistleblowers in the private sector and equally extends to reports on foreign bribery; the law also establishes an ACRC-operated reporting center. A 2014 ferry disaster that resulted in the deaths of 304 passengers brought to public attention collusion between government regulators and regulated industries. Investigators determined that companies associated with the vessel had used insider knowledge and government contacts to skirt legal requirements by hiring recently-retired government officials. In response, the ROK government tightened regulations for hiring former government officials. This reform expanded the number of sectors restricted from employing former government officials, extended the employment ban from two to three years, and increased scrutiny of retired officials employed in fields associated with their former duties. Most companies maintain an internal audit function to detect and prevent corruption. The Board of Audit and Inspection, which monitors government expenditures, and the Public Service Ethics Committee, which monitors civil servants’ financial activities and disclosures are official agencies responsible for combating government corruption. The ACRC focuses on preventing corruption by assessing the transparency of public institutions, protecting and rewarding whistleblowers, training public officials, raising public awareness, and improving policies and systems. The Act on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, along with and the Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act, protects nongovernment organizations and civil society groups reporting cases of corruption to government authorities. In April 2018, laws were updated to allow individuals filing allegations of corruption to report cases through attorneys without disclosing their identities to the courts. In July 2021, the ACRC announced that the revised Anti-Corruption Rights Act, which allows not only whistleblowers but also respondents to confirm facts, will take effect to solve the issues of infringement of rights and interests. Violations of these legal protections can result in fines or prison sentences. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. The ROK ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2008. It is also a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Anti-Corruption and Transparency Working Group. The ROK Financial Intelligence Unit cooperates with U.S. and UN efforts to disrupt sources of terrorist financing. Transparency International has maintained a national chapter in the ROK since 1999. Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission Government Complex-Sejong (7-dong), 20, Doum 5-ro, Sejong-si 339-012 Tel: +82-44-200-7151 (International Relations Division) Fax: +82-44-200-7916 Email: acrc@korea.kr Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International Korea #1006 Pierson Building, 42, Saemunan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul 110-761 Tel: +82-2-717-6211 Fax: +82-2-717-6210 Email: ti@ti.or.kr http://www.transparency-korea.org/ 10. Political and Security Environment Enshrined by the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-ROK alliance has supported the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and broader region for nearly seven decades. At their May 2021 summit, President Biden and President Moon upgraded our countries’ relationship to a comprehensive partnership – an acknowledgment of the alliance’s evolution from its security-based origins to a future-oriented, multi-pillared relationship. The ROK’s elevation to one of the world’s top ten economies in 2021 and aspirations to build its “Global Korea” brand herald a new era in U.S.-ROK relations, especially as we seek overlap and coordination on our international economic policies. The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remain separated by the world’s most heavily fortified border. After a flurry of diplomatic engagement in 2018-2019, including three inter-Korean summits and two U.S.-DPRK summits, engagement between the ROK and the DPRK has stagnated as North Korea shut its borders in January 2020 in response to the pandemic and resumed its missile testing in 2021. The ROK’s relations with Japan remained strained in 2021, primarily due to the ROK Supreme Court’s 2018 decisions directing Japanese companies to compensate South Koreans subjected to forced labor during World War II, including the court-directed seizure of defendant company assets, as well as Japan’s subsequent tightening of export controls against the ROK in 2019. This prompted consumer boycotts in the ROK against Japanese goods in July 2019, causing a significant drop in local sales for certain products, including beer and automobiles, as well as at certain Japanese retail chains. The ROK does not have a history of political violence directed against foreign investors. There have not been reports of politically-motivated threats of damage to foreign-invested projects or foreign-affiliated installations of any sort, nor of any incidents that might be interpreted as having targeted foreign investments. Labor violence unrelated to the issue of foreign ownership, however, has occurred in foreign-owned facilities in the past. There have also been protests in the past directed at U.S. economic, political, and military interests (e.g., beef imports in 2008 or the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in 2017 with protests continuing into 2022). The ROK is a modern democracy with active public political participation, and well-organized political demonstrations are common. For example, large-scale rallies were a regular occurrence throughout former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment proceedings in 2016 and 2017. The protests were peaceful and orderly. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Upon taking office in May 2017, President Moon Jae-in declared himself the “Jobs President,” and his administration has introduced a number of employment-related reforms since then. In an attempt to reduce the ROK’s notoriously long working hours, the Moon administration introduced a mandatory 52-hour workweek regulation in July 2018. Domestic and foreign companies, however, expressed concern that the measure added further rigidity to the ROK’s already inflexible labor market. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has pledged to ease the 52-hour workweek cap for certain labor-intensive sectors. According to Statistics Korea ( http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action ), there were approximately 28 million economically active people in the ROK as of February 2022, with an employment rate (OECD standard) of approximately 60 percent. The overall unemployment rate of 3.4 percent in February 2022 is much less than the 6.9 percent unemployment rate of youth aged 15-29. The ROK’s female labor force participation rate was 53 percent in 2020. According to the OECD, Korea’s gender wage gap in 2020 stood at 31.5 percent, sharply above the OECD average 12.5 percent. The country has two major national labor federations. As of December 2021, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) had about 1.3 million members, and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) had just over one million members. FKTU and KCTU are affiliated with the International Trade Union Confederation. Most of FKTU’s constituent unions maintain affiliations with international union federations. The minimum wage is reviewed annually. Labor and business set the minimum wage for 2022 at KRW 9,160 (approximately USD 7.7 per hour), a 5 percent increase from 2021. According to Statistics Korea, non-regular workers received 62.8 percent of the wages of regular workers in 2020. Non-regular workers on contracts stipulating monthly pay received KRW 1.73 million per month (about USD 1,445) while regular workers paid monthly received KRW 3.36 million (about USD 2,808). For regular, full-time employees, the law provides for employment insurance, national medical insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance, and participation in the national pension system through employers or employer subsidies. Non-regular workers, such as temporary and contracted employees, are not guaranteed the same benefits. Regarding severance pay for regular workers, ROK law does not distinguish between firing versus laying off an employee for economic reasons. Employers’ reliance on non-regular workers is partially explained by cost savings associated with dismissing regular full-time employees and re-hiring non-regular workers. In 2004, the ROK implemented a “guest worker” program known as the Employment Permit System (EPS) to help protect the rights of foreign workers. The EPS allows employers to legally employ a certain number of foreign workers from 16 countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, with which the ROK maintains bilateral labor agreements. In 2021, the ROK’s annual quota stood at 52,000 migrant workers. At the end of 2021, approximately 16,073 foreigners were working under the EPS in the manufacturing, construction, agriculture, livestock, service, and fishing industries. Legally, unions operate autonomously from the government and employers, although national labor federations comprised of various industry-specific unions receive annual government subsidies. The ratio of organized labor to the entire population of wage earners at the end of 2020 was 14.2 percent. ROK trade union participation is lower than the latest-available OECD average of 16 percent in 2019. More information is available at http://stats.oecd.org/ . Labor organizations are free to organize in export processing zones (EPZs), but foreign companies operating in EPZs are exempt from some labor regulations. Exemptions include provisions that mandate paid leave, require companies with more than 50 employees to recruit persons with disabilities for at least two percent of their workforce, and restrict large companies from participating in certain business categories. Foreign companies operating in Free Economic Zones have greater flexibility to employ “non-regular” workers in a wider range of sectors for extended contractual periods. ROK law affords workers the right of free association and allows public servants and private workers to organize unions. The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides for the right to collective bargaining and action, and allows workers to exercise these rights in practice. In 2021 during a period of COVID-19 social distancing restrictions which included caps on the size of public gatherings, some labor leaders were arrested when demonstrations exceeded those limits. The National Labor Relations Commission is the primary government body responsible for labor dispute resolution. It offers arbitration and mediation services in response to dispute resolution requests submitted by employees, employers, or both parties together. Labor inspectors from the Ministry of Employment and Labor also have certain legal authorities to participate in labor dispute settlement. The Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service handles labor disputes resulting from industrial accidents or disasters. In June 2018, the ROK President established the Economic, Social and Labor Council to serve as an advisory group on economic and labor issues. The Act on the Protection of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Workers prohibits discrimination against non-regular workers and requires firms to convert non-regular workers employed longer than two years to permanent status. The two-year rule went into effect for all businesses on July 1, 2009. Both the labor and business sectors have complained that the two-year conversion law forced many businesses to limit the contract terms of non-regular workers to two years and incur additional costs with the entry of new contract employees every two years. More information can be found in the Department of State’s Report on Human Rights Practices for 2020: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy Seoul 188 Sejong-daero, Sejongno, Jongno-gu, Seoul, South Korea 110-710 Tel: +82 2-397-4114 SeoulECONContacts@state.gov South Sudan Executive Summary Trade and investment conditions in South Sudan improved slightly in the past year, but many challenges remain. The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) continued to implement the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), although key provisions on security, governance, and transitional justice remain outstanding. The transitional government continued implementing public financial management (PFM) reforms including stabilizing the South Sudanese Pound (SSP). In its February 2022 report entitled “ Towards a Jobs Agenda,” the World Bank provided a “cautiously positive” forecast the economy could grow by 3.5 to 5.0 percent in productive sectors including household processing and artisanal production “if the peace process holds.” However, peace agreement implementation is significantly behind schedule. The country remains plagued by large-scale population displacement, widespread food insecurity, restricted humanitarian access, harassment of aid workers and journalists, and catastrophic flooding for the third straight year. The South Sudan economy is highly dependent on oil-revenue. The transitional government did not institute any new programs in the past year to diversify the country’s economy. South Sudan’s oil sector is fraught with corruption and mismanagement. The country’s oil-producing firms and the Ministry of Petroleum remain on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List . The U.S. government assesses the 15 entities BIS added to the Entity List are contributing to the ongoing crisis in South Sudan “because they are a source of substantial revenue that, through public corruption, is used to fund the purchase of weapons and other material that undermine the peace, security, and stability of South Sudan rather than support the welfare of the South Sudanese people.” Corruption and malfeasance extend beyond the oil sector. Transparency International ranked South Sudan the world’s most corrupt country in its 2021 rankings . Additionally, a September 2021 UN Human Rights Commission report highlighted the link between South Sudan’s human rights violations and economic crimes. Humanitarian and development aid is a major source of employment. The difficulties humanitarian service providers face of arbitrary and conflicting regulations, multiple layers of taxation, airport and border obstructions, labor harassment, and looting of warehouses demonstrate what private investors can expect to encounter. The legal system is underfunded, dysfunctional, and subject to corrupt practices and interference. Government entities do not enforce laws equitably or consistently. Corrupt government officials operate with impunity. The legal framework governing investment and private enterprises remains underdeveloped. Contract dispute litigants are sometimes arrested and imprisoned until they agree to pay a financial settlement even when never charged an offense or brought to court. Other factors inhibiting investment in South Sudan include a lack of skilled and unskilled labor and limited physical infrastructure riddled with arbitrary checkpoints. The International Peace Information Service (IPIS) published a December 2021 report that found checkpoints make transport in South Sudan among the most expensive in the world. The U.S. Department of State maintains a Do Not Travel Advisory for South Sudan due to crime, kidnapping, and armed conflict. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 180 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2015 1,090 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Ministry of Investment continued to refine South Sudan’s investment policies in 2021 and into 2022 to increase opportunities for international investors. The Council of Ministers approved some of those investment policies in September 2021, including re-establishing directorates to manage administration and finance, research and planning, investment promotion, service, and investment coordination at the state level. The government seeks to unlock South Sudan’s economic potential and boost diversified growth by facilitating investment in economic priority sectors such as agriculture, transport infrastructure, petroleum, mining, and energy. But while the government claims to have such incentives, it is difficult to take advantage of them. In theory the Ministry of Investment has a One Stop Shop Investment Center. However, both organizations are poorly resourced and neither maintains an active website. The ministries that handle company registration include the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Investment, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Justice. There is no single window registration process, and an investor must visit all the above-mentioned agencies to complete the registration of a company. It is estimated that the registration process could take several months with companies routinely approached to provide bribes to move the process forward. Because registering a business in South Sudan is a lengthy, laborious process involving multiple national, state, and local entities, the Chamber of Commerce recommends hiring a local lawyer to register a business. South Sudan is a member of the African Trade and Insurance Agency , which provides export insurance and other assistance to foreign investors and traders. Local lawyers, some of whom are listed in the Legal Assistance section of the U.S. Embassy Juba website, are willing to advise investors and guide them through the registration process, for a fee. South Sudan’s Chamber of Commerce is government-run with a government-employed director and private business chairpersons whose business interests are linked to government contracts. There is no ombudsman. Despite these resources, foreign investors continue reporting unfair practices including expropriation of assets, unpredictable tax policies, harassment by security services, extortion attempts, and inconsistent results in legal proceedings and labor disputes. Years of conflict and internal displacement have left a complex land rights picture with many properties occupied by squatters or soldiers. Land-based ventures often encounter pre-existing ownership claims and, therefore, claims on royalties or rents. There is no title insurance and no formal way to determine ownership outside of current possession. Under the 2009 Land Act, non-citizens may lease – not own – land in South Sudan. Under the Tax Exemptions and Concessions schedule of the 2009 Investment Promotion Act, foreign investors may lease agricultural land for 30-60 years with the possibility of renewal while mining leases may not exceed the life of the mine or quarry. The 2012 South Sudan Companies Act allows non-South Sudanese to invest in medium and large size companies on the condition a South Sudanese has at least a 31 percent share. Government officials will not issue a business license to a foreign investor without such a local shareholder. Foreign companies that want to establish a subsidiary in South Sudan are not subject to local shareholder requirements. Private security companies operating in South Sudan must have a South Sudanese citizen hold a 51 percent share of the company pursuant to the 2013 Private Security Companies Rules and Regulations. Extractives sector companies must have a South Sudanese national as part owner, but the exact percentage of ownership required is unclear. According to the 2009 Investment Act, foreign investors must apply for an investment certificate from the Ministry of Investment to ensure the project will benefit South Sudan’s society and economy. The government does not make public statements about how it screens applications. Investors must rely on the Act’s language. The Ministry of Investment began issuing a new type of investment certificate in February 2022 citing malpractices and forgeries with older versions. The Third Schedule of the 2009 Investment Act states South Sudanese will receive preferential treatment if they invest in micro-enterprises, postal services, car hire and taxi operations, public relations, retail, and security services, and the cooperative services. The last time a third-party conducted an investment policy review was the 2016 East African Community’s assessment. South Sudan is yet to harmonize its internal laws to conform to the East African Community plans for regional integration. An investor looking to establish a business in South Sudan may spend months interacting with the Ministries of Investment, Justice, Trade and Industry, and Finance and Planning. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act requires the Ministry of Investment to create a “One Stop Shop” investment center, but there is still no active website for this center. The Ministry of Justice established a business registration website ( https://business.eservices.gov.ss/ ) in 2021 offered through the government’s broader eServices.gov.ss platform. There is little information regarding how effective this new registration process is due to the platform’s newness. Investors may still need to hire a local lawyer to register a business. South Sudan does not have a formal mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, due to the lack of banking services, it is difficult for investors to move money outside the country. 3. Legal Regime Opening a business can be especially challenging for foreigners trying to navigate the bureaucratic system without the assistance of a well-connected national. The private sector is governed by a mix of legacy pre-independence laws from Sudan and post-independence South Sudan laws. South Sudan has no securities exchange or publicly listed companies. Post-independence, the national legislature passed laws to improve the transparency of the regulatory system, including the 2012 Companies Act and the 2012 Banking Act. However, enforcement regulations remain lacking and there is little transparency. The national legislature historically passed most bills and regulations without public comment or quantitative analysis. It did not adequately disseminate finalized laws publicly. This trend continues with the Transnational Legislative Assembly (TNLA). The TNLA formed several committees in late 2021 and early 2022, a development that may improve capacity and transparency. Most government ministries and agencies do not hold notice and comment periods before finalizing regulations. There is no centralized online platform for publishing regulatory actions similar to the U.S. Federal Register. A notable exception is the Bank of South Sudan , which lists banking regulations on its website. South Sudan’s 2011 Public Finance and Accountability Act requires budget documents to comply with International Public Sector Accounting Standards; however, published documents often do not comply and therefore are difficult to decipher. There have not been public budget hearings since 2019. The legislature failed to pass a budget for fiscal year 2020/2021, which began in July 2020, and did not table the fiscal year 2021/2022 budget until February 2022, even though the fiscal year began in July 2021. The oil sector attracts the most FDI, but transparency is absent, despite statutory reporting requirements. The Ministry of Finance and Planning does not share foreign debt data at an institutional level and does not release it to the public. The government occasionally releases limited debt obligation information about certain infrastructure loans, but to date has not disclosed the amount of oil it has committed to pay for infrastructure projects. This makes it difficult for analysts to determine how much money the government has available to service debt and pay for public services. The contract process for oil companies that are planning to bid and invest in South Sudan is controlled by the Ministry of Petroleum, but paragraph 11 of the 2012 Petroleum Act says the National Petroleum and Gas Commission is empowered to approve all petroleum agreements on behalf of the government and ensure that they are consistent with the Act. Bidding and tender information is not publicly available. There are no known informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or private sector associations that would affect U.S. investors. National and state bodies are the main source of regulation, but county and sub-county level officials also impose regulations. NGOs regularly report discrepancies between tax, labor, and import rules issued by the national government and those enforced by local authorities. Humanitarian service providers moving goods earmarked for humanitarian relief claim state officials have, at times, barred them entry at state borders. Tax collection and enforcement at the state level is limited, uneven, and unpredictable. The Ministry of Labor has not conducted labor inspections since March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but when it did NGOs and foreign investors reported employees colluded with labor inspectors to extort fines from business managers. Nationally non-oil tax revenue increased dramatically in 2021 as South Sudan improved its collection methods for personal income tax and customs revenue. Some months saw a 100 percent year-over-year increase suggesting prior revenue collection efforts were corrupt, inept, or both. Much of this improvement is due to public financial management (PFM) reforms aimed at strengthening the National Revenue Authority. Despite significant PFM reforms, the government did not announce or implement new enforcement reforms in 2021. The legislative body does not provide effective administrative compliance oversight of government ministers nor do ministries or agencies adequately regulate one another. There were no significant corruption prosecutions in 2021. Media reported in February 2022 that President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, blocked the investigation of former Minister of Petroleum Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth for allegedly stealing millions of dollars in oil revenues between 2016 and 2017. South Sudan is not a WTO member but joined the African Union in 2012 and the East African Community (EAC) in April 2016. It is currently behind in membership payments to both and has its voting rights suspended. The Ministry of East African Community Affairs is responsible for integration into the EAC. South Sudan is adapting its national regulatory system to regional standards. It joined the customs union of the EAC but is behind in implementing regulations, prompting the EAC in February 2022 to urge the government to fully implement the EAC’s Single Customs Territory to boost intra-regional trade. The National Revenue Authority assists in implementing EAC customs regulations and procedures. South Sudan currently has nine members in the EAC parliament. U.S. companies seeking to invest in South Sudan face a complex commercial environment with weak legal enforcement mechanisms. Large U.S. and multinational companies may have enough leverage to extricate themselves from business disputes, but medium-sized enterprises (the more natural counterparts to South Sudan’s fledgling business community) do not. South’s Sudan’s legal system is a combination of statutory and customary laws. There are no dedicated commercial courts and no effective arbitration bodies to handle business disputes. The only official means of settling disputes between private parties is civil court. Enforcement of judgements and awards is weak or nonexistent, leading businesses to seek informal mediation, including through private lawyers, tribal elders, law enforcement officials, and business organizations. Corrupt practices are widespread and undermine pending cases. The lack of a unified, formal judicial system encourages “forum shopping” by businesses motivated to find the venue in which they can achieve the most favorable outcome. As an East African Community (EAC) member, South Sudan is subject to the jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The EAC treaty gives the EACJ broad jurisdiction including trade disputes and human rights violations. However, the court only reviews 40 cases annually and results for the South Sudanese legal community have been inconclusive. Hope for Humanity Africa, an advocacy group, sued the government in the EACJ in June 2021 over oil waste mismanagement that allegedly caused health and environmental damage. The EACJ allowed the government to resolve the case through mediation, although there have not been any published results of the mediation. The executive branch regularly interferes with the work of the judicial branch. State security forces arrest and detain parties to business disputes without charging them with a crime. Security forces continue detaining the person until they agree to make a payment as directed to “resolve” the case. High-level government and military officials are immune from prosecution in practice and frequently interfere with court decisions. Foreign investors face a lack of transparency and capacity in South Sudan’s legal system as well as inconsistent laws and regulations. Most foreign direct investment rules can be found in the 2009 Land Act, the 2009 Investment Promotion Act, and the 2012 Companies Act. The relevant ministries do not have implementing regulations or they do not publish them for public review. The Ministry of Justice has a business registration website, but a foreign investor may still need local counsel to register the business and obtain an investment certificate. South Sudan does not review transactions for competition-related concerns. There were no significant developments in 2021. Investors should be prepared to face a complex commercial environment with a weak civil justice system in which contract disputes are common and often resolved without due process. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act prohibits nationalization of private enterprises unless the expropriation is in the national interest for a public purpose. The Act does not define the terms “national interest” or “public purpose.” According to the Act, expropriation must be in accordance with due process and provide fair and adequate compensation, which is ultimately determined by local domestic courts. While some donor agreements call for the government to receive goods at the conclusion of a project, local government officials have seized assets even without a formal agreement and did not offer compensation for the expropriated property. Although officially denied, credible reports from humanitarian aid agencies indicate both government and opposition forces routinely extort money at checkpoints throughout the country before allowing the delivery of humanitarian aid, amongst several other bureaucratic access impediments. The 2011 Insolvency Act provides for both personal and corporate bankruptcies. Given the lack of commercial courts, there is little information available about the rights of creditors in practice. 4. Industrial Policies The 2009 Investment Promotion Act provides tax exemptions ranging from 20 to 100 percent of the cost of eligible research and capital expenditures, deductible annual allowances ranging from 20 to 40 percent of the cost of certain equipment, and depreciation allowances on certain assets ranging from 8 to 10 percent. A foreign tax credit is available to any resident company paying foreign taxes on income from business activities outside South Sudan. In practice, the exact incentive structure is unclear due to irregular enforcement. The Ministry of Finance and Planning has the legal authority to approve tax exemptions. The government previously used future oil deliveries to attract finance and contract foreign direct investment projects, but in 2021 the Council of Ministers agreed to cease this practice as part of reforms it agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. However, due to a lack of transparency in government procurement and finance, it is unclear to what extent the country’s oil production has already been leveraged through past decisions collateralized against future oil production. There are currently no special incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors such as women. The government does not offer incentives for clean energy investment and in early 2022 had a land dispute with a solar company looking to invest in South Sudan causing delays and possible future cancelation of the project. South Sudan has not established any free trade zones. The 2017 Labor Act requires 80 percent of staff at different levels of management to be South Sudanese nationals. Additionally, authorities in some localities attempt to force NGOs to hire employees from the specific area or from a specific ethnic group even though the law does not require this. The Labor Act does not specifically discuss senior management and boards of directors. The government requires work permit fees for foreign nationals. These are typically several thousand dollars per employee, but the exact amounts change regularly. Foreigners are also subject to a variety of registration requirements, which also change frequently and unpredictably. In February 2022, the Ministry of Petroleum approved a Unified Human Resources Policy Manual which will standardize salary structures for personnel working in the oil sector. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act states that when the Ministry of Investment evaluates an application for an investment certificate, the Ministry must consider whether the investment will generate tax revenues, create jobs, and provide new skills for the people of South Sudan. The Investment Act applies these requirements equally to domestic and foreign investors. The Ministry may also consider whether the investment will provide South Sudan with new technology through transfers, use local raw materials and supplies, and contribute to the local community. The Ministry of Investment may revoke an investment certificate due to breach of performance requirements with 30 days’ notice. There are no provisions regarding adjustments to performance requirements. There are no known requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. There are no known prohibitions on transferring customer or other business data outside the country. There are no known rules requiring data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights There was no progress in 2021 towards comprehensive land reform. There are no laws on mortgages, valuation, or the registration of titles. The 2009 Land Act and the 2009 Investment Promotion Act both state that non-citizens can lease land for investment purposes. However, foreign ownership of land is prohibited and there are no clear regulations governing how a business can access land for investment use. Years of war and recurring natural disasters created increased uncertainty regarding land tenure. According to USAID’s January 2022 South Sudan Complex Emergency Fact Sheet , 4.3 million South Sudanese are internally or internationally displaced from their homes. During the five-year civil war, people illegally occupied land and most remain there. While the rightful owners may hold clear land titles, the legal system is not equipped to handle their claims. Ownership of land is generally unclear, with communities and government often claiming the same property. Land grabbing accusations are common. Property owners or public authorities may try to evict unauthorized occupants under the Land Act, but doing so frequently leads to violent clashes. For example, in December 2021 in Juba law enforcement fired on residents who resisted demolition of their homes resulting in three people killed. The government claimed the evicted residents had built their homes on illegally acquired land. President Kiir formed a committee in 2021 to review land grabbing in Juba, but the committee has not released their findings. The 2014 World Bank-funded South Sudan Country Report Findings of the Land Governance Assessment Framework concluded South Sudan’s underdeveloped legal and institutional framework reflects the difficulties the country faces in establishing effective governance and rule of law institutions after decades of conflict. The report’s conclusions remain accurate and, given the fighting since, perhaps understated the complexity of problem. Most land governance institutions operate according to procedures developed in the colonial era, and there is a wide divergence between law and practice. Bridging this gap has been one of the most difficult challenges of the post-independence period. Poor coordination between different levels of government undermines property rights enforcement. Some businesses lease land from the government, while others lease directly from local communities and/or individuals. Under the Land Act, investment in land acquired from local communities must contribute economically and socially to the development of the local community. Businesses will often sign a memorandum of understanding with the local communities in which they agree to employ locals or invest in social services in exchange for use of the land. Land negotiations can take months or years to complete. The legal structure for intellectual property rights (IPR) is weak and enforcement is lax. Recorded instances of intellectual property theft are rare due to lack of capacity. While the 2009 Investment Promotion Act includes an article on the protection of IPR, neither the legislature nor any government ministry implemented laws or regulations governing trademarks, copyrights, or patents. The government did not enact any new IP-related laws or regulations in 2021. To date, the only intellectual property law South Sudan has is the 2013 Trade Marks Bill (sic). South Sudan does not track or seize counterfeit goods. There has been no known prosecution of IPR violations and there are no estimates available for traffic of counterfeit goods. South Sudan is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector South Sudan does not have a functioning stock market or any other system of exchange for financial assets. It is difficult for foreign investors to obtain credit on the local market due to the shortage of hard currency, the inability to obtain reliable figures or audited accounts, the absence of a credit reference bureau, and South Sudan’s failure to document land ownership properly. Banks are often unwilling to lend because they claim lenders receive inadequate legal protection and because South Sudan lacks verifiable state or national personal identification methods, making most borrowers high risk. Depositors are still reluctant to deposit money in banks after the Bank of South Sudan in 2015 confiscated commercial banks’ deposits at the central bank and diverted then to the government, making it difficult or impossible for companies and individuals to access their funds. The Bank of South Sudan issued treasury bills briefly between 2016 and 2017 and said it would issue them again in 2020, but still has not. The Bank of South Sudan, the central bank, has limited assets and functions more as a commercial bank servicing the federal governments’ transactions; however, in 2021 ongoing public financial management reforms implemented by the Bank of South Sudan led to a change in monetary policy. The central bank helped stabilize the South Sudanese Pound through currency auctions. The banking sector faces significant challenges because of U.S. and United Nations sanctions against certain South Sudanese entities and individuals. South Sudan is on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list,” meaning FATF increased its monitoring due to South Sudan’s deficiencies in countering money laundering and terrorist financing. South Sudan’s banking sector is small and underdeveloped with limited use of demand deposits and few foreign banks. Analysts believe many domestic banks are undercapitalized. South Sudan is one of the most underbanked countries. Most people hold their savings in cash. Banks usually only lend to businesses with well-documented contracts with international organizations. There are two main mobile payment providers: mGurush and Nilepay. However, users of these platforms must have a bank account, which over 90 percent of South Sudanese do not have. There are no known restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act created a Petroleum Revenue Savings Fund consisting of two accounts into which the government was to deposit oil revenues. One was the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, which was to receive 10 percent of oil revenues and serve as a buffer against volatility in oil prices in South Sudan’s budgeting process. The other was the Future Generation Fund, which was to receive 15 percent of oil proceeds and serve as a repository for funds meant to help future generations transition to a post-oil economy. To date, however, neither has received any financing despite the government sometimes including allocations to these accounts in the budget process. The revenue sharing provisions in the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act require the national government to distribute two percent of oil revenue to oil-producing states and three percent to local oil-producing communities. There are no publicly available documents that explain how the states and localities use those funds or whether the funds are actually provided. None of these wealth funds follow the voluntary code of good practices for transparency and accountability known as the Santiago Principles. South Sudan does not participate in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is the primary SOE in South Sudan. The government, through Nilepet, holds minority stakes in other oil producing joint ventures operating in South Sudan. The 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act governs how Nilepet’s profits are invested, but Nilepet does not release information on its activities, even though Chapter IX of the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act states comprehensive, audited reports on the company’s finances must be made publicly available. Nilepet’s revenues and expenditures are not disclosed in the central government budget. Nilepet’s director does not report to the Minister of Petroleum and the government is not transparent about how it exercises ownership or control of Nilepet. Nilepet is on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List. See 83 FR 12475 . The government also owns stakes in construction and trade companies and several banks. It is difficult to obtain information on the number, total income, and employment figures of SOEs in South Sudan. There is no published list of SOEs. The country does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. South Sudan does not have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The idea of responsible business conduct is nascent in South Sudan, and there is little awareness of standards in this area. The few large international firms operating in South Sudan sometimes offer basic benefits to local communities but on an irregular basis. The 2009 Land Act requires investment activities carried out on land acquired from local communities to “reflect an important interest for the community or people living in the locality,” and to contribute economically and socially. Many South Sudanese complain about foreign-owned companies not hiring South Sudanese employees. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act says investors must pay a fine and clean up waste if they do not implement environmentally friendly rules, but the Act does not require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency for investors and consumers. International observers claim many oil producing companies in South Sudan do not practice responsible behavior regarding environmental damage in the oil fields. The 2012 Petroleum Act requires the Ministry of Petroleum to subject projects to environmental and social impact assessments, but it is unclear whether or how the Ministry enforces this requirement. The Ministries of Petroleum and of Environment and Forestry are coordinating to conduct an oil sector environmental audit. The government is expected to announce in 2022 who will conduct the audit and the audit’s timeline. Additionally, the government and Hope for Humanity Africa are currently in mediation to address some of the environmental damage and health impacts of oil waste. The 2018 peace agreement and some national laws (such as the Petroleum Act) contain responsible business conduct provisions, but the government does not enforce them. The government has not instituted corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. NGOs promote responsible business conduct, particularly in the environmental domain, but activists and reporters allege government harassment. The government has demonstrated little capacity or will to enforce laws protecting human and labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impact. There are reports of child labor in supply chains, especially for gold mining. The government does not encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, and there are no functioning domestic measures related to such due diligence. South Sudan does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) although the 2018 peace agreement requires South Sudan to join. The United Nations Development Program’s Governance and Economic Support project (GEMS) and the Kingdom of Norway helped coordinate a conference in Juba in April 2021 with other stakeholders to discuss South Sudan joining the EITI, but the government has not taken any action since then. Several private security companies operate in South Sudan providing protection to various embassies and NGOs. South Sudan is not a signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies or a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers. South Sudan does not participate in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). 9. Corruption South Sudan has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but there is a near total lack of enforcement, and considerable gaps exist in legislation. Transparency International ranked South Sudan the world’s most corrupt country in 2021. Politically connected people are immune from prosecution. There are no laws that prevent conflict of interest in government procurement. Government officials regularly ask companies to pay extralegal taxes and fees. The government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials. There are no indications private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent government bribery. There were no significant anti-corruption cases investigated or prosecuted in 2021. The 2009 Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSAC) Act established a commission with five members and the chairperson appointed by the President with approval from a simple majority in parliament. The commission is tasked with protecting public property, investigating corruption, and submitting evidence to the Ministry of Justice for necessary action. The SSACC lacks the resources or political support to investigate corruption. It has no independent arrest or prosecution authority or capacity to address state corruption. It can only relay its findings to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. South Sudan acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2015. The country is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and is not reported to be a participant in regional anti-corruption initiatives. The country provides no protection to NGOs or journalists who investigate corruption. NGOs and journalists of all types are routinely subject to government harassment, intimidation. Government security services interfere with and demand payments from all major industries including the extractives sector, hotels, airlines, and banking. 10. Political and Security Environment There is a long history of politically motivated violence in South Sudan. Warring parties concluded a peace agreement in September 2018 to stop the civil war that broke out in 2013. The conflict severely disrupted trade, markets, and agricultural activities, while claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and spurring a severe humanitarian crisis the country still grapples with. The conflict was marked by grave human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence. South Sudan is slowly implementing the 2018 revitalized peace agreement and routinely misses critical deadlines associated with implementing the peace agreement. Political and sub-state violence is frequent throughout the country. The country is plagued by large-scale displacement of people (internally and as refugees), widespread food insecurity, severe human-rights abuses, restricted humanitarian assistance access, and harassment of aid workers and journalists. In its January 2022 South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot , the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that out of a population 12.1 million, South Sudan has two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries. The government stabilized conditions in the country to allow IDPs and refugees to safely return to their homes. The country has 8.3 million people who need humanitarian assistance to survive. Humanitarian partners and international donors are reviewing South Sudan’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) IPC ratings and expected to provide revised ratings in spring 2022. Previous violence during conflict with Sudan resulted in damage to installations in one of the major oil producing areas in the country, shutting down production in that region. Repairs to these facilities began in 2018, allowing oil production to increase, although production declined again in 2021 due mostly to the third year of sustained flooding South Sudan is experiencing. Fighting continues in some parts of the country between the government and non-signatories to the 2018 peace deal. Generally, the ceasefire is holding between the government and main opposition groups, but under increasing stress. Persistent sub-national violence stemming from complex socioeconomic, ethnic, and political causes is present throughout South Sudan and has increased since 2019. The government continued to detain political opposition leaders in 2021. The government periodically detained journalists and temporarily shut down media outlets (print and radio) it accused of publishing articles or broadcasting radio programs that allegedly threatened the government, challenged its competence, or reported instances of corruption. NGOs complained of harassment, and armed groups continued to attack aid convoys and depots in 2021 and early 2022. NGOs periodically report ambushes along major supply routes in South Sudan. Such attacks resulted in death and injury to, and even killing of, NGO personnel, vehicles destroyed, and supplies looted or destroyed. Such attacks hinder the delivery of aid to countless South Sudanese throughout the country who area dependent on such assistance to survive. Five aid workers were killed in 2021, and at least three have been killed since January 2022. Since the civil war started in 2013, at least 130 aid workers have been killed, most between 2013 and 2015 when violence peaked. 11. Labor Policies and Practices South Sudan has a shortage of skilled and unskilled workers across most areas in the formal sector. Construction and service sector employers often hire workers from neighboring countries because of the lack of basic skills training among South Sudanese workers. UNESCO Institute of Statistics estimates the adult literacy rate in South Sudan is only 34.5 percent. The most recent changes to South Sudan’s labor laws came from the 2017 Labor Act, but the government generally does not enforce labor laws. The Ministry of Labor has not conducted labor inspections since March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When it did, NGOs and foreign investors reported employees colluded with labor inspectors to extort fines from business managers. Most small South Sudanese businesses operate in the informal economy, where labor laws and regulations are widely ignored. The Ministry of Labor reviews work permit applications to determine whether a position could be filled by a South Sudanese national. Some foreign-owned companies report long delays in receiving work permits for expatriate staff, and many expatriates are only able to obtain work permits for one to three months. State and local authorities reportedly charge additional fees and attempt to restrict employment to people from a certain place or of a certain ethnic group. Government security offices reportedly interfere with hiring in some cases. The 2017 Labor Act allows for Termination for Redundancy “due to changes in the operational requirements of the employer” and requires severance pay in some cases. The law differentiates between this and other forms of termination. South Sudan has limited social safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. The Labor Act establishes an “employment exchange” scheme for unemployed people that reserves vending, driving, office support staffing, and other manual labor for South Sudan nationals only. In April 2020, the World Bank approved a USD 40 million grant to create the South Sudan Safety Net Project (SSSNP) but has not yet released program results information. There are no special labor provisions to attract or retain investment. No formal functioning collective bargaining systems exist. Those seeking resolution of labor disputes must work with the Ministry of Labor, courts, informal mediation, or a combination thereof. Foreign employers report being at a significant disadvantage in such disputes. In 2021, South Sudanese – usually unemployed youths – continued to protest to express displeasure, resorted to violent activities, and threatened and targeted NGOs due to the lack of economic opportunities. Occasionally employees from specific ethnic groups protest or strike if they believe employees from different ethnic groups receive favored treatment. Child labor is rampant. The Ministry of Labor does not enforce child labor laws. Child labor mostly occurs in the informal economy, which the government generally does not monitor. 14. Contact for More Information Economic/Commercial Section U.S. Embassy, Kololo Road, Juba, South Sudan (U.S.) +1 (202) 216-6279, ext 355 JubaCommercial@state.gov Spain Executive Summary Spain is open to foreign investment and actively seeks additional investment as a key component of its COVID-19 recovery. After six years of growth (2014-2019), Spain’s GDP fell 11 percent in 2020 – the worst performance in the Eurozone – due in large part to high COVID-19 infection rates, a strict three-month lockdown, border closures, and pandemic-related restrictions that decimated its tourism and hospitality sectors. By building on healthy fundamentals and fueled by up to 140 billion euros in Next Generation EU recovery funds, Spain rebounded with 5.1 percent GDP growth in 2021, and unemployment improved to 13.3 percent. Economic activity is expected to return to its pre-crisis level in 2023, though Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine could threaten the recovery by pushing up energy prices, compounding supply chain disruptions, and stoking inflation. Service-based industries, particularly those related to tourism, and energy-intensive industries remain most vulnerable to the economic shock. Spain’s key economic risks are high public debt levels and ballooning pension costs for its aging population, though these areas are targets for government reforms. Despite COVID-19’s economic shock, Spain’s excellent infrastructure, well-educated workforce, large domestic market, access to the European Common Market, and leadership on renewable energy make it an appealing foreign investment destination. Spanish law permits up to 100 percent foreign ownership in companies, and capital movements are completely liberalized. According to Spanish data, in 2021, foreign direct investment flow into Spain was EUR 28.8 billion, 17.7 percent more than in 2020. Of this total, EUR 1.6 billion came from the United States, the fifth largest investor in Spain in new foreign direct investment. Foreign investment is concentrated in the energy, real estate, financial services, engineering, and construction sectors. Spain aims to use its Next Generation EU recovery funds to transform the Spanish economy, especially through digitalization and greening of the economy, to achieve long-term increases in productivity and growth. Full financing is contingent on additional economic reforms beyond labor reform. Spain’s credit ratings remain stable, and issuances of public debt – especially for green bonds – have been oversubscribed, reflecting strong investor appetite for investment in Spain. However, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for more than 99 percent of Spanish businesses and have been acutely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, still have some difficulty accessing credit and rely heavily on bank financing. Small firms also experience more challenges accessing EU recovery funds. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 34 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 30 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $38,500 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 27,360 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Foreign direct investment (FDI) played a significant role in modernizing the Spanish economy during the past 40 years. Foreign companies set up operations in large numbers to take advantage of Spain’s large domestic market, export possibilities, and growth potential. Spain’s automotive industry is mostly foreign-owned, and multinationals control half of the food production companies, one-third of chemical firms, and two-thirds of the cement sector. Foreign firms control about one-third of the insurance market. The Government of Spain recognizes the value of foreign investment and sees it as a key part of its post COVID-19 economic recovery. U.S. FDI is especially attractive as Spain looks to deepen its transatlantic ties after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Spain offers investment opportunities in sectors and activities with significant added value. Spanish law permits 100 percent foreign ownership in investments (limits apply regarding audio-visual broadcast licenses and strategic sectors of the economy; see next section), and capital movements are completely liberalized. Due to its openness and the favorable legal framework for foreign investment, Spain has received significant foreign investments in knowledge-intensive activities. New FDI into Spain increased by 17.7 percent in 2021 compared to 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic reduced FDI, according to data from Spain’s Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism. In 2020, acquisitions of existing companies were the predominant form of foreign investment, representing 42.7 percent of the total, compared to 17.8 percent of new greenfield and brownfield investments. In 2021 the United States, as ultimate beneficial owner, had a gross direct investment in Spain of EUR 4.2 billion, accounting for 14.5 percent of total investment and representing an increase of 1.5 percent compared to 2020. According to the latest available Spanish data, U.S. FDI stock in Spain totaled about $88.6 billion in 2019. Spain has a favorable legal framework for foreign investors. The Spanish Constitution and Spanish law establish clear rights to private ownership, and foreign firms receive the same legal treatment as Spanish companies. There is no discrimination against public or private firms with respect to local access to markets, credit, licenses, and supplies. Spain adapted its foreign investment rules to a system of general liberalization, and its inbound investment screening mechanism is focused on protecting national security. Law 18/1992, which established rules on foreign investments in Spain, provides a specific regime for non-EU persons investing in defense, aerospace, gambling, television, and radio. For EU investors, the only sectors with a specific regime are the manufacture and trade of weapons or national defense-related activities. For non-EU investors, the Spanish government restricts individual ownership of audio-visual broadcasting licenses to 25 percent. Specifically, Spanish law permits non-EU companies to own a maximum of 25 percent of a company holding a digital terrestrial television broadcasting license; and for two or more non-EU companies to own a maximum of 50 percent in aggregate. In addition, under Spanish law a reciprocity principle applies (art. 25.4 General Audiovisual Law). The home country of the (non-EU) foreign company must have foreign ownership laws that permit a Spanish company to make the same transaction in the audio-visual sector. The Spanish government issued new regulations on foreign investment in March 2020 that stipulate prior authorization for foreign investments in critical sectors. Prior approval is also required if the foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly by the government of another country, if the investor has invested or participated in sectors affecting the security, public order, or public health in another EU Member State, or if administrative or judicial proceedings have been initiated against the investor for exercising illegal or criminal activities. Failure to request authorization for a transaction is a serious infringement of the law. These new regulations are outlined below (see Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment). Spain is a signatory to the convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Spain is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Spain has not undergone Investment Policy Reviews with these three organizations within the past three years. To set up a company in Spain, the two basic requirements include incorporation before a Public Notary and filing a public deed with the Mercantile Register (Registro Mercantil). The public deed of incorporation of the company can be submitted electronically by the Public Notary. The Central Mercantile Register is an official institution that provides access to companies’ information supplied by the Regional Mercantile Registers after January 1, 1990. Any national or foreign company can use it but must also be registered and pay taxes and fees. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, it takes on average about two weeks to start a business in Spain. “Invest in Spain” is the Spanish investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. Services are available to all investors. It has partner offices in five major U.S. cities. Useful web sites: Mercantile register: http://www.rmc.es/Home.aspx Mercantile register for the Madrid region: https://www.rmercantilmadrid.com/RMM/Home/Index.aspx Investment promotion agency: http://www.investinspain.org/invest/es/cabecera/faq-s/establecimiento-de-una-empresa/index.html Among the financial instruments approved by the Spanish Government to provide official support for the internationalization of Spanish enterprise are the Foreign Investment Fund (FIEX), the Fund for Foreign Investment by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (FONPYME), the Enterprise Internationalization Fund (FIEM), and the Fund for Investment in the Tourism Sector (FINTUR). The Spanish Government also offers financing lines for investment in the electronics, information technology and communications, energy (renewables), and infrastructure concessions sectors. 3. Legal Regime There is transparency throughout the rule making process at all levels of government. The Spanish government launched a transparency website in 2014 that makes more than 500,000 items of public interest freely accessible to all citizens (http://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/en/transparencia_Home/index.html ). The website offers details about the central government, public institutions such as the Royal House, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Power, the Ombudsman, the Audit Court, the Central Bank, and the Economic and Social Council, and other organisms such as the European Commission. Regional and local authorities have developed their own transparency portals and related legislation. Spain’s Boletin Oficial de Estado ( https://www.boe.es/ ) publishes key regulatory actions. Many large established Spanish companies have not yet fully adopted environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, though companies are increasingly committed to making positive impact on society. New companies, especially startups, tend to incorporate ESG values into their operations from the start, acting with transparency and adopting innovative, modern technologies for continuous improvement. Several official Spanish certifications recognized at European and global level accredit companies that meet ESG and CSR criteria, such as Norma SGE21, B Corp Spain, and SDG Certificate (AENOR.) To promote transparency in the disclosure of non-financial information and its impact on corporate governance of companies, the Spanish government published Law 11/2018 on non-financial and diversity matters ( https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2018/12/29/pdfs/BOE-A-2018-17989.pdf ). The law reinforces requirements that companies disclose relevant information about their management in five areas: environment; social impact and workers’ rights; respect for human rights; fight against corruption and bribery; and impact on society. Spain is a member of the European Union, and its local regulatory framework compares favorably with other major European countries, although permitting and licensing processes may result in significant delays. The efficacy of regulation at the regional level is uneven. With a license from only one of Spain’s 17 regional governments or two enclaves, companies can operate throughout Spanish territory. The measures are designed to reduce business operating costs, improve competitiveness, and attract foreign investment. The Spanish judiciary has a well-established tradition of supporting and facilitating the enforcement of both foreign judgments and awards. For a foreign judgment to be enforced in Spain, an order declaring it is enforceable or exequatur is necessary. Once the order is granted, enforcement itself is quite fast, provided that the assets are identified. First instance courts are responsible for the enforcement of foreign rulings. Local legislation establishes mechanisms to resolve disputes if they arise. Spain’s civil (Roman-based) judicial system is fair and accessible, although sometimes slow-moving. Investigating judges are in charge of the criminal investigation, assuring independence from the executive branch of the government. The Spanish judicial system allows for successive appeals to a higher court. The number of civil claims has grown significantly over the past decade, due in part to litigation stemming from Spain’s financial 2008 crisis, resulting in an increased openness to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Although ordinary proceedings are relatively straightforward, due to the significant number of cases within each court, it can take years for a case to come to trial. Domestic court decisions are subject to appeal, and the average time taken for a final judgment to be issued by the Court of Appeal can be anywhere from months to years. A decision may still be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court (although the grounds for appeal are quite limited), a process that generally takes two to three years to produce a final ruling. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the duration of appeals, disputes involving large companies or significant amounts of money tend to be resolved through arbitration. The Spanish government issued new regulations on foreign investment in March 2020 (Royal Decrees 8/2020, 11/2020, and 34/2020) that require prior authorization for foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 10 percent stake in the following critical sectors: critical infrastructures, both physical and virtual (energy industries, transportation, water, healthcare, communications, media, data storage and processing, aerospace, defense, financial services, and sensitive installations) critical technology and dual-use products; essential supplies (energy, hydrocarbons, electricity, raw materials and food and agriculture value chains); sectors with sensitive information such as personal data or with capacity to control such information and; the media. Purchases of less than 10 percent are also subject to authorization if they result in participation in the control or management of the company. Under these new Royal Decrees, foreign investments in any industry must also receive prior approval if the foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly by the government of another country; if the investor has invested or participated in sectors affecting the security, public order, or public health in another EU Member State; or if administrative or judicial proceedings have been initiated against the investor for exercising illegal or criminal activities. Investments less than EUR 1 million are exempted, and investments between EUR 1 and 5 million are subject to a simplified review. Spanish law conforms to multi-disciplinary EU Directive 88/361, which prohibits all restrictions of capital movements between Member States as well as between Member States and other countries. The Directive also classifies investors according to residence rather than nationality. However, Royal Decree 34/2020 also temporarily requires residents of the European Union and European Free Trade Association to receive prior approval for investments into companies listed in Spain or investments exceeding EUR 500 million. This temporary requirement has been extended several times and is valid until December 31, 2022. Registration requirements are straightforward and apply equally to foreign and domestic investments. They aim to verify the purpose of the investment, not block any investment. On September 1, 2016, a resolution established new forms for declaration of foreign investments before the Investment Registry, which oblige the investor(s) to declare foreign participation in the company. In 2015, changes to the Personal Income Tax Law affected the transfer of investments outside of Spain by creating a tax on unrealized gains from investment. Residents who have resided in Spain for at least 10 of the previous 15 years are subject to a tax of 19-23 percent if they relocate their holdings or investments outside of Spain if the market value of the shares held exceeds EUR 4 million or if the individual holds 25 percent or more shares in a venture whose market value exceeds EUR 1 million. A Protocol to the 1990 Income Tax Convention between the United States and Spain entered into force in November 2019. The Protocol significantly reduces taxes on interest, royalties, certain direct dividends, and capital gains. It also provides for mandatory binding arbitration to streamline dispute resolutions between the two countries’ tax administrations. Spain’s digital services tax on companies, approved in January 2021, was dropped as of January 2022 in response to the OECD/G20’s multilateral agreement during international tax negotiations. Spain will credit amounts paid in excess of the global minimum tax from January 2022 against future taxes owed. Useful websites: Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism page on Foreign Investment: https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Paginas/control-inversiones.aspx Invest in Spain (investment promotion agency): http://www.investinspain.org/invest/en/index.html Investment aid and incentives in Spain: https://guidetobusinessinspain.com/en/ The parliament passed Act 3/2013 on June 4, 2013, by which the entities that regulated energy (CNE), telecoms (CMT), and competition (CNC) merged into a new entity: the National Securities Market Commission (CNMC). The law attributes practically all functions entrusted to the National Competition Commission under the Competition Act 15/2007, of July 3, 2007 (LDC), to the CNMC. The CNMC’s website ( https://www.cnmv.es/Portal/home.aspx ) provides information to the public about major cases. Spanish legislation set up safeguards to prevent the nationalization or expropriation of foreign investments. Since the 2008 economic crisis, Spain has altered its renewables policy several times, creating regulatory uncertainty and resulting in losses to U.S. companies’ earnings and investments. As a result, Spain accumulated more than 32 lawsuits, totaling about EUR 7.6 billion in claims. Spain now faces an array of related international claims for solar photovoltaic and other renewable energy projects. Spain registered one case with ICSID in 2021 related to renewable energy generation. Spain has a fair and transparent bankruptcy regime. In 2014, the government approved a reform of the bankruptcy law to promote Spain’s economic recovery by establishing mediation mechanisms. These reforms – nicknamed the Second Chance Law – aimed to avoid the bankruptcy of viable companies and preserve jobs by facilitating refinancing agreements through debt write-off, capitalization, and rescheduling. However, declaring bankruptcy remains less prevalent in Spain than in other parts of the world. 4. Industrial Policies A range of investment incentives exist in Spain, and they vary according to the authorities granting incentives and the type and purpose of the incentives. The national government provides financial aid and tax benefits for activities pursued in certain priority industries (e.g., mining, technological development, research and development, etc.), given these industries’ potential effect on the nation’s overall economy. Regional governments also provide similar incentives. Financial aid includes both nonrefundable subsidies and interest relief on loans obtained by beneficiaries, or combinations of the two. Because Spain is a European Union Member State, potential investors can access European aid programs, which provide further incentives for investing in Spain. Spain’s central government provides numerous financial incentives for foreign investment, which are designed to complement EU financing. The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism assists businesses seeking investment opportunities through the Directorate General for International Trade and Investments and the ICEX Spain Export and Investment office. These offices support foreign investors in both the pre- and post-investment phases. Most grants seek to promote the development of select economic sectors; however, while these sectoral subsidies are often preferential, they are not exclusive. A comprehensive list of incentive programs is available at the website: http://www.investinspain.org The Ministry for the Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge, through the Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving (IDAE), makes grants to promote renewable installations for the production of energy, both thermal and electrical. These grants, financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), are executed through calls for proposals made by the IDAE in each autonomous community/regional government. The grants are non-refundable and are governed by the principle of competitive competition with the aim of optimizing their application as widely as possible. In 2013, Spain passed the “Law of Entrepreneurs,” which established an entrepreneur visa for investors and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may apply for the visa with a business plan approved by the Spanish Commercial Office. Entrepreneurs must demonstrate the intent to develop the project in Spain for at least one year. Investors who purchase at least EUR 2 million in Spanish bonds or acquire at least EUR 1 million in shares of Spanish companies or Spanish banks deposits may also apply. Foreigners who acquire real estate with an investment value of at least EUR 500,000 are also eligible. Spain’s 17 regional governments, known as autonomous communities, provide additional incentives for investments in their region. Many are similar to the incentives offered by the central government and the EU, but they are not all compatible. Additionally, some autonomous community governments grant investment incentives in areas not covered by state legislation, but which are included in EU regional financial aid maps. Royal Decree 899/2007 sets out the areas entitled to receive aid, along with their ceilings. Each area’s specific aspects and requirements (economic sectors, investments which can be subsidized, and conditions) are established in the Royal Decrees. Most are granted on an annual basis. Incentives from national, regional, or municipal governments and the European Union are granted to Spanish and foreign companies alike without discrimination. The most notable incentives include those aimed at fostering innovation, technological improvement, and research and development projects. Both the mainland and islands (and most Spanish airports and seaports) have free trade zones where manufacturing, processing, sorting, packaging, exhibiting, sampling, and other commercial operations may be undertaken free of any Spanish duties or taxes. Spain’s seven free zone ports are located in Vigo, Cadiz, Barcelona, Santander, Seville, Tenerife, and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria – all of which fall under the EU Customs Union, permitting the free circulation of goods within the EU. The entire province of the Canary Islands is a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), offering fiscal benefits that include a reduced corporate tax rate, a reduced Value-Added Tax (VAT) rate, and exemptions for transfer taxes and stamp duties. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla also offer unique tax incentives; they do not impose a VAT but instead tax imports, production, and services at a reduced rate. Spanish customs legislation also allows companies to have their own free trade areas. Duties and taxes are payable only on those items imported for use in Spain. These companies must abide by Spanish labor laws. Spain does not have performance and localization requirements for investors. The Spanish Data Protection Agency and the Spanish Police request data from companies, although the companies may refuse unless required by court order. 5. Protection of Property Rights There are generally no restrictions on foreign ownership of real estate. The buyer must fill out a Declaration to the Foreign Investment Register form before buying the property if the funds for the purchase come from a country or territory considered to be a tax haven. The declaration lasts six months. Foreign individuals require an identification card for foreigners (NIE). Other foreign legal persons require an identification number known as a NIF. Apart from money laundering regulations, no special restrictions or limitations apply to foreign mortgage guarantees and loans. The Land Register provides evidence of title and legal certainty to all parties involved in a transaction. Public or private acts that affect the property are included in the land register. The Property Registry is responsible for managing the Land Register. A right or title recorded in the registry prevails over any other right or title. Certain administrative concessions (licenses for individuals to use or develop publicly owned property for a particular purpose) may also be registered. Anyone who can prove a legitimate interest in the information contained in the register may access the register. It is not possible to make changes to the ownership of the real estate by electronic means. The transfer of real estate or the grant of rights over property should be executed by public deed in front of a notary before being registered with the Land Registry. A registered title includes the plot of land and the buildings attached to the land. Each plot constitutes a registered property. Each registered property is a legal object and has its own separate entry in the registry in which all related data is registered. There are rules that determine whether a parcel of land, a building, farm, spring, or other type of property has a separate entry in the registry system. Lenders generally use mortgages as security. Mortgages are made by public deed and registered at the land registry. Once registered, the mortgage takes priority over the interest of any third party. Anyone with a legitimate interest in a property can find out whether it is mortgaged by consulting the register. Sale and leaseback are another form of real estate financing that has been used by some Spanish financial institutions. These institutions raised financing through the sale of their offices to their clients and subsequently leased them back. The institution raised funds and their clients received a stream of rental income. Spanish law protects intellectual property rights (IPR), and enforcement is carried out at the administrative and judicial levels. In Spain, IPR is separated into industrial property, which refers to industry and innovative activity (patents and trademarks), and intellectual property, which focuses on the rights of creators. Spanish patent, copyright, and trademark laws all approximate or exceed EU standards for IPR protection. Spain is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Madrid Accord on Trademarks, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Phonograms and Performances Treaty. Since its removal from the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Watch List in 2012, Spain has undertaken extensive, multi-year reform measures to strengthen its framework for IPR protections. The latest legislative changes to the 1996 Law on Intellectual Property, in force as of March 2019, streamline anti-piracy and anti-counterfeit measures. As a result, Spain now has a stronger legal framework and corresponding criminal procedures to address IPR violations. USTR removed Spain from its Notorious Markets List in 2020. Although physical and online marketplaces for counterfeit goods persist in Spain, Spanish authorities continue to make significant regulatory, legal, and enforcement progress in protecting IPR, and Spain is now ranked 11th out of 50 countries in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s IPR protection index. Spanish authorities published a new Patents Law in 2015 (Law 24/2015), which entered into force in April 2017. A non-renewable 20-year period for working patents is available if the patent is used within the first three years. Spain permits both product and process patents. Patents can be awarded by the Spanish Office of Patents and Trademark (OEPM), a Spanish autonomous region via an Industrial Property Regional Information Center, or the European Patent Office. Spanish law extends copyright protection to all literary, artistic, or scientific creations, including computer software. Amendments to the 2001 Trademark Law (17/2001), which amend the regulations for the 2001 law, entered in force in April 2019. OEPM oversees protection for national trademarks. Trademarks registered in the Industrial Property Registry receive protection for a 10-year period from the date of application and may be renewed. Protection is not granted for generic names, names that violate Spanish customs, or other inappropriate trademarks. The Spanish parliament passed a reform of the penal code that entered into force in July 2015 (Ley Organica 1/2015). The revised penal code removed the condition that certain IPR crimes related to the sale of counterfeit items meet a threshold of EUR 400 in order to merit prosecution, and it changed the procedure for destruction of counterfeit items seized by law enforcement. Counterfeit items may now be destroyed once an official report is filed unless a judge formally requests the items be retained. Businesses may seek a trademark valid throughout the EU via the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), which is located in Alicante: Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs)Avenida de Europa, 4E-03008 AlicanteTel: (34) 96-513-9100 http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/OHIM/contact.en.do For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The Spanish government welcomes all forms of investment, including portfolio investment, and actively courts foreign investment as part of its COVID-19 recovery plan. Foreign investors do not face discrimination when seeking local financing for projects. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are eligible to receive credit in Spain. A large range of credit instruments are available through Spanish and international financial institutions. Many large Spanish companies rely on cross-holding arrangements and ownership stakes by banks rather than pure loans. However, these arrangements do not restrict foreign ownership. Several of the largest Spanish companies that engage in this practice are also publicly traded in the United States. There is a significant amount of portfolio investment in Spain, including by U.S. entities. Spain has an actively traded and liquid stock market, the IBEX 35. In 2019, the United States and Spain amended their bilateral tax agreement to prevent double taxation of each other’s nationals and firms and to improve information sharing between tax authorities. Spain has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange rate system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, other than restrictions notified to the Fund under Decision No. 144 (52/51). In January 2021, Spain’s new Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) or “Tobin tax,” entered into force. The FTT is an indirect tax of 0.2 percent on the acquisition of Spanish companies with a market capitalization of at least EUR 1 million EUR. The financial intermediary executing the transaction – not the seller or acquirer of the shares – pays the tax. There were about 50 commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults in Spain in 2019, down from 104 in 2007 but still more than twice the eurozone average, according to the IMF. There are 20,421 financial institution branches as of December 2021, after having closed 2,488 offices in 2021, according to the Bank of Spain. Spain’s domestic housing crisis, which began in 2007, was linked to poor lending practices by Spanish savings banks. The government subsequently created a Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) through Royal Decree-law 9/2009, which restructured credit institutions to bolster capital and provisioning levels. The number of Spanish financial entities dropped significantly since 2009 through consolidation as banks have faced increased capital requirements and shrinking profit margins. The COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected the outlook for Spanish banks, though the government’s income support measures, fiscal support for ailing firms, and loan guarantees helped reduce the pressure on the sector. Slim profit margins for the Spanish financial sector are also likely to persist, however, due to slowing growth, low (or negative) interest rates, and nonperforming loans (NPLs). The NPL ratio in Spain – 4.3 percent in December 2021 – was a marked improvement from 2014 levels. The sector has capital buffers to absorb the unexpected losses associated with this crisis, though there is significant disparity between institutions. Spanish financial institutions have significantly higher capital levels than the minimum regulatory requirements, which can be used to absorb unexpected losses from the economic fallout of pandemic. Total profit for the Spanish banking system was about EUR 19.8 billion euros in 2021, compared to the losses of 5.5 billion registered in 2020. The Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank, is a member of the euro system and the European System of Central Banks. Within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Bank of Spain and European Central Bank (ECB) jointly supervise the Spanish banking system. Foreign banks can establish themselves in Spain and are subject to the same conditions as Spanish banks to access the Spanish financial system. Foreign banks with authorization in another EU member state do not need to get authorization from the Bank of Spain to establish a branch or representative office in Spain. The National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) is responsible for the supervision and inspection of Spanish securities markets. Since its creation in 1988, the CNMV’s regime has been updated to adapt to the evolution of financial markets and to introduce new measures to protect investors. Total assets for the five biggest banks in Spain at the end of 2021 were EUR 3.3 trillion: Banco Santander: EUR 1.6 trillion Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA): EUR 662.9 billion CaixaBank: EUR 680 billion Banco Sabadell: EUR 251.9 billion Bankinter: EUR 107.6 billion To open a bank account as a non-resident, a foreigner needs a proof of identity, proof of address in Spain, and proof of employment status or where the funds originated. All documents that are not in Spanish or issued by Spanish authorities must be translated into Spanish. Spain does not have a sovereign wealth fund or similar entity. Spain was among the top ten receiving countries for sovereign wealth investments, attracting EUR 2.8 billion between October 2020 and December 2021. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Spain’s public enterprise sector is relatively small, and the role and importance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) decreased since the privatization process started in the early 1980s. The reform of SOE oversight in the 1990s led the government to create the State Holding for Industrial Participations (SEPI) in 1995. SEPI has direct majority participation in 15 SOEs, which make up the SEPI Group, with a workforce of more than 78,000 employees. It is a direct minority shareholder in nine SOEs (five of them listed on stock exchanges) and participates indirectly in ownership of more than one hundred companies. Either legislative chamber and any parliamentary group may request the presence of SEPI and SOE representatives to discuss issues related to their performance. SEPI and the SOEs are required to submit economic and financial information to the legislature on a regular basis. The European Union, through specialized committees, also controls SOEs’ performance on issues concerning sector-specific policies and anti-competitive practices. Companies with a majority interest: Agencia Efe, Cetarsa, Ensa, Grupo Cofivacasa, Grupo Correos, Grupo Enusa, Grupo Hunosa, Grupo Mercasa, Grupo Navantia, Grupo Sepides, GrupoTragsa, Hipodromodo la Zarzuela, Mayasa, Saeca, Defex (in liquidation) Companies with a minority interest: Airbus Group, Alestis Aerospace, Enagas, Enresa, Hispasat, Indra, International Airlines Group, Red Electrica Corporacion, Ebro Foods Attached companies: RTVE, Corporacion de Radio y Television Espanola SEPI also has indirect participation in more than 100 subsidiaries and other investees of the majority companies, which make up the SEPI Group. Corporate Governance of Spain’s SOEs uses criteria based on OECD principles and guidelines. These include the state ownership function and accountability, as well as issues related to performance monitoring, information disclosure, auditing mechanisms, and the role of the board in the companies. Spain does not have a formal privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Although the visibility of responsible business conduct (RBC) efforts is still moderate by international standards, it has garnered growing interest over the last two decades. Today, almost all of Spain’s largest energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, transportation, financial services, and insurance companies, among many others, undertake RBC projects, and such practices are spreading throughout the economy. Spain enforces domestic and EU laws and regulations to protect human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections. Spain endorsed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and supports the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. The national point of contact is the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Spain’s Climate Change and Energy Transition Law (Law 7/2021) entered into force in May 2021. The law sets a goal of reaching climate neutrality by 2050 and establishes renewable energy, energy efficiency, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction national targets that align with those established in Spain’s Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan. It sets the following targets for 2030: 23 percent reduction of GHG emissions compared to 1990; 42 percent of final energy consumption from renewable energy sources; 74 percent of electricity generation from renewable energy sources; and 39.5 percent reduction of the country’s primary energy consumption. By 2050, Spain expects to generate 100 percent of its electricity from renewable sources. The law allows the Council of Ministers to raise (but not lower) Spain’s targets periodically, with the first review expected in 2023. Law 7/2021 also restricts the future exploitation of fossil fuel deposits in Spain by prohibiting new hydrocarbon exploration and extraction projects, though a new oil and gas exploitation concession may still be awarded if a company with a valid exploration license applied for an exploitation concession prior to the date when Law 7/2021 entered into force. In addition, the law states that existing hydrocarbon research or exploitation concessions will not be extended beyond December 31, 2042, effectively ending fossil fuel production beyond this date. Fossil fuel producers with existing concessions must submit a plan to convert their drilling platforms to produce cleaner types of energy, such as renewables and geothermal, five months before the concession expires. The law also prohibits the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (fracking) for any project and bans new permits for radioactive mining, such as uranium mining. It ends tax benefits for fossil fuel producers, except if producers demonstrate a strong social and economic interest or if there is a lack of technological alternatives. The law introduces provisions that promote renewable gases, including biogas, biomethane, and hydrogen, and allows for annual targets for renewable gas penetration in natural gas sales and consumption. Law 7/2021 stipulates that all new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles must have 0g CO2/km emissions by 2040, with the goal of achieving a decarbonized fleet of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles by 2050. To advance this goal, the government approved a Strategic Project for the Recovery and Economic Transformation ( PERTE) of Electric Vehicles to mobilize EUR 24 billion (roughly EUR 3.4 billion of public funding and EUR 19.7 billion of private investment) for electric vehicle manufacturing. Spain’s Ecological Public Procurement Plan (2018-2025) applies to state administrators, public entities, and social security managing bodies, and responds to the need to incorporate ecological criteria in public procurement. The plan aims to promote the acquisition of goods, works, and services with the least environmental impact; promote the Spanish Circular Economy Strategy; and promote environmental clauses in public procurement. It prioritizes 20 goods, including construction and building management, electricity supply, cleaning products, HVAC systems, and printing equipment. 9. Corruption Spain has a variety of laws, regulations, and penalties to address corruption. The legal regime has both civil and criminal sanctions for corruption, bribery, financial malfeasance, etc. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act. Under Section 1255 of the Spanish civil code, corporations and individuals are prohibited from deducting bribes from domestic tax computations. There are laws against tax evasion and regulations for banks and financial institutions to fight money laundering terrorist financing. In addition, the Spanish Criminal Code provides for jail sentences and hefty fines for corporations’ (legal persons) administrators who receive illegal financing. The Spanish government continues to build on its already strong measures to combat money laundering. After the European Commission threatened to sanction Spain for failing to bring its anti-money laundering regulations into full accordance with the EU’s Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, in 2018, Spain approved measures to modify its money laundering legislation to comply with the EU Directive. These measures establish new obligations for companies to license or register service providers, including identifying ultimate beneficial owners; institute harsher penalties for money laundering offenses; and create public and private whistleblower channels for alleged offenses. The General State Prosecutor is authorized to investigate and prosecute corruption cases involving funds in excess of roughly USD 500,000. The Office of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, a subordinate unit of the General State Prosecutor, investigates and prosecutes domestic and international bribery allegations. The Audiencia Nacional, a corps of magistrates has broad discretion to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of Spanish businesspeople bribing foreign officials. Spain enforces anti-corruption laws on a generally uniform basis. Public officials are subjected to more scrutiny than private individuals, but several wealthy and well-connected business executives have been successfully prosecuted for corruption. In 2021, Spanish courts arraigned 344 defendants involved in 53 corruption cases. The courts issued 65 sentences, with 44 including a full or partial guilty verdict. There is no obvious bias for or against foreign investors. U.S. firms rarely identify corruption as an obstacle to investment in Spain, although entrenched incumbents have frequently attempted and at times succeeded in blocking the growth of U.S. franchises and technology platforms in both Madrid and Barcelona. Spain’s rank in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index fell slightly in 2021 to position 34; its overall score (61) is lower than that of many other Western European countries. Spain is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and the UN Convention Against Corruption. It has also been a member of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) since 1999. Spain has made progress addressing OECD concerns about the low level of foreign bribery enforcement in Spain and the lack of implementation of the enforcement-related recommendations. In a 2021 report, GRECO highlighted that of the group’s 11 recommendations to combat corruption from 2013, six had been fully implemented, four had been partly implemented, and one had not been implemented. Ministry of Finance Calle Alcala, 9 28071 Madrid, Spain Telephone: +34 91 595 8000 Email: informacion.administrativa@minhap.es Website: https://ssweb.seap.minhap.es/ayuda/consulta/PTransparencia Transparency International National Chapter – Spain Fundacion Jose Ortega y Gasset-Marañón Calle Fortuny, 53 28010 Madrid, Spain Telephone: +34 91 700 4105 Email: info@transparencia.org.es Website: http://www.transparencia.org.es/ 10. Political and Security Environment There are periodic peaceful demonstrations calling for salary and pension increases and other social or economic reforms. Public sector employees and union members organize frequent small demonstrations in response to service cuts, privatization, and other government measures. Demonstrations and civil unrest in Catalonia have resulted in vandalism and damage to store fronts and buildings in Barcelona and other cities. Some regional business leaders have expressed concern that disturbances could negatively affect business operations and investments in the region. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The COVID-19 pandemic and public health crisis derailed progress on reducing Spain’s stubbornly high unemployment rate, which peaked at 26.9 percent in 2013 after the European financial crisis. At the end of 2021, unemployment stood at 13.3 percent, among the highest unemployment rates in the EU. The figure, however, excludes about 100,000 workers who were enrolled in temporary government furlough schemes established to provide income support for workers who lost their jobs during the pandemic. The youth unemployment rate decreased to 30.7 percent in 2021, from the 40.1 percent in 2020, representing 452,000 unemployed people under the age of 25. Spain’s economically active population totaled 23.3 million people, of whom 20.2 million were employed and 3.1 million unemployed. Foreign nationals comprised 15.3 percent of Spain’s workforce (3,094,900 people) in 2021. Spain approved a landmark labor reform law in 2022 that satisfies EU requirements to unlock subsequent tranches of European recovery funds. Key components include: Elimination of temporary contracts except for periods of high demand and temporary substitution of workers: The reform allows for two types of temporary contracts: structural, to respond to temporary increases in demand for up to one year, and substitution, to cover workers’ absences due to medical and parental leave. Permanent-intermittent contracts: The reform’s limitations on temporary contracts will push employers to use a permanent-intermittent contract, which provides firms flexibility to use seasonal workers and allows seasonal workers to earn seniority for the entire duration of the employment relationship – not just the time of services provided. Limits on training contracts: The goal of this measure is to reduce the share of Spanish young people employed on temporary contracts. It defines two broad types of educational contracts, including for students under 30 who work part-time while studying for a period of up to two years, and for professional trainees who are seeking work experience toward specific certifications. Workers sector-wide will receive the same benefits: Firms must now apply the appropriate sector-wide labor agreement to the service a subcontractor performs, such as cleaning, maintenance, or information support, rather than the firm-level labor agreement. Restoration of indefinite agreements between firms and unions: Expired labor agreements will now stay in effect until they are replaced. Establishment of permanent state-backed furloughs (ERTEs) and stronger fraud-fighting measures: The reform establishes a permanent furlough scheme to protect workers in firms or sectors facing significant structural economic changes that require workers to retrain and find new employment. The measures strengthen fines for firms “overusing” temporary contracts. The labor market is mainly divided into permanent workers with full benefits and temporary workers with many fewer benefits. In the event of dismissal for an objective reason (e.g., economic reasons), severance pay is available to the worker and amounts to 20 days’ wages per year of service with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. A worker dismissed for disciplinary reasons is not entitled to severance pay. For termination of a fixed term contract (either its term expiration or completion of the work), the worker is entitled to a severance payment of 12 days per year of service. Under Spanish Labor law, an employee may bring a claim against the employer for unfair dismissal within 20 days of receiving a termination letter. Mechanisms for preventing and resolving individual labor disputes in Spain are developed by labor laws and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems through collective bargaining agreements. Each of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities has a different ADR system at different levels generally dealing with collective disputes. Spanish law stipulates that, before taking individual labor disputes to court in search of a solution, parties must first attempt to reach agreement through conciliation or mediation. The Spanish Public Employment Service (SEPE) under the Ministry of Labor and Social Economy administers unemployment benefits called the Contributory Unemployment Protection. This benefit protects those who can and wish to work but become unemployed temporarily or permanently, or those whose normal working day is reduced by a minimum of 10 percent and a maximum of 70 percent. Collective bargaining is widespread in both the private and public sectors. A high percentage of the working population is covered by collective bargaining agreements, although only a minority (generally estimated to be about 10 percent) of those covered are union members. Large employers generally have individual collective bargaining agreements, while smaller companies use industry-wide or regional agreements. As a result of the recent labor reform, sectoral-level agreements currently hold primacy over business-level agreements. The Constitution guarantees the right to strike, and this right has been interpreted to include the right to call general strikes to protest government policy. The informal or underground economy costs Spain an estimated EUR 270 billion, or about 25 percent of GDP as of 2020. The informal economy is most common in sectors such as construction or retail that tend to use more cash in commercial transactions. In July 2021, the Spanish Parliament approved an anti-fraud law (Law 11/2021) to prevent and combat tax fraud, lower the limit for cash payments to EUR 1,000 between professionals and EUR 2,500 between individuals, and prohibit tax amnesties. 14. Contact for More Information Ana Maria Waflar, Economic Specialist, tel.: (34) 91 587 2290 Sri Lanka Executive Summary Sri Lanka, a lower middle-income country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of about $3,680 and a population of approximately 22 million, is experiencing an economic crisis stemming from an unsustainable debt load and perennial deficits on both the international balance of payments and the government budget. The island’s strategic location off the southern coast of India along the main east-west Indian Ocean shipping lanes gives Sri Lanka a regional logistical advantage, especially as India does not have deep-water ports comparable to what Sri Lanka offers. Sri Lanka is transitioning from a predominantly rural-based economy to a more urbanized economy focused on manufacturing and services. Sri Lanka’s export economy is dominated by apparel and cash-crop exports, mainly tea, but technology service exports are a significant growth sector. Prior to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, the tourism industry was rapidly expanding, but the attacks led to a significant decline in tourism that continued into 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19 and the government’s related decision to close its main international airport for commercial passenger arrivals in March 2020. After reopening to visitors early in 2021, tourism revenue for the year reached $261 million, dropping 61 percent year-over-year (YoY) compared to $682 million in 2020. Migrant labor remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange, which saw an increase in 2020 due to the collapse of informal money transfer systems during the pandemic, despite the job losses to Sri Lankan migrant workers, especially in the Middle East. However, worker remittances saw a decline of 22.7 percent in 2021, largely due to inflationary pressures and the expectation of a future depreciation of the exchange rate, which occurred in March 2022. Remittances totaled $5.4 billion for 2021 in comparison to $7.1 billion in 2020. The administration of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was elected in November 2019, has attempted to promote pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As outlined in its election manifesto, the Rajapaksa government’s economic goals include positioning Sri Lanka as an export-oriented economic hub at the center of the Indian Ocean (with government control of strategic assets such as Sri Lankan Airlines), improving trade logistics, attracting export-oriented FDI, and boosting firms’ abilities to compete in global markets. However, COVID-19 and the subsequent lockdowns brought new economic challenges, forcing the government to adapt policies to the situation on the ground. In April 2020, the Ministry of Finance restricted imports of luxury and semi-luxury consumer products such as consumer durables, motor vehicles, and the import of certain agricultural products as a means of saving foreign reserves and creating employment in labor intensive agriculture. Further restrictions on goods deemed non-essential were added in March 2022. With the IMF estimating a public debt-to-GDP ratio at 118.9 percent (of which 65.6 percent is foreign debt), Sri Lanka is facing a liquidity crisis that is exacerbated by an increasing trade deficit. Exports have helped buoy Sri Lankas FX reserves, growing 19.9 percent in 2021. However, imports continued to outstrip this growth by a significant margin with an increase of 46.8 percent in 2021. Exports of goods increased by 24.4 percent to $12.5 billion in 2021, up from $10 billion in 2020. Exports of services for the year 2020 amounted to $3 billion, down from $7.5 billion in 2019. In September 2021, the government committed to cease building new coal-fired power plants and achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 at the United Nations International Energy Forum. Sri Lanka has set a target of achieving 70 percent of all its electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030. However, renewable energy companies accuse the Ceylon Electricity Board of being in arrears to the tune of $60 million (as of May 2022) after not paying for renewable energy supplied to the national grid since August 2021. FDI in Sri Lanka has largely been concentrated in tourism, real estate, mixed development projects, ports, and telecommunications in recent years. With a growing middle class, investors also see opportunities in franchising, information technology services, and light manufacturing for the domestic market. The Board of Investment (BOI) is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. The BOI is committed to facilitating FDI and can offer project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. Sri Lanka’s GDP grew by 3.6 percent according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2021 and is expected to grow by 3.3 percent in 2022. FDI rose to approximately 0.9 percent of GDP in 2021, higher than the 0.5 percent in 2020 and 0.8 percent in 2019 and half of the 1.8 percent in 2018. The IMF projects a GDP growth of 1.2 percent in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 95of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $165 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $3,720 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Sri Lanka is a constitutional multiparty socialist republic. In 1978, Sri Lanka began moving away from socialist, protectionist policies and increasing foreign investment, although changes in government are often accompanied by swings in economic policy. While the incumbent government largely promoted pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract FDI, the government also made interventionist policies to arrest the ongoing economic fallout from COVID-19. This in turn has altered the field of foreign direct investment towards manufacturing intended to the domestic market. The BOI (www.investsrilanka.com ), an autonomous statutory agency, is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, with BOI aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. BOI’s Single Window Investment Facilitation Taskforce (SWIFT) helps facilitate the investment approvals process and works with other agencies in order to expedite the process. BOI can grant project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. Importers to Sri Lanka face high barriers. According to a World Bank study, Sri Lanka’s import regime is one of the most complex and protectionist in the world. U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns the government does not adequately consult with the private sector prior to implementing new taxes or regulations – citing the severe import restrictions imposed as a reaction to COVID-19 as an example. These restrictions, quickly imposed without consulting the private sector, further complicated Sri Lanka’s import regime. Similarly, stakeholders have raised concerns that the government does not allow adequate time to implement new regulations. Additionally, the Sri Lankan government has banned the importation of several “non-essential” items since April 2020 in an attempt to curtail foreign exchange outflow which has now expanded in 2022 to additional goods subject to import licenses. Sri Lanka is a challenging place to do business, with high transaction costs aggravated by an unpredictable economic policy environment, inefficient delivery of government services, and opaque government procurement practices. Investors noted concerns over the potential for contract repudiation, cronyism, and de facto or de jure expropriation. Public sector corruption is a significant challenge for U.S. firms operating in Sri Lanka and a constraint on foreign investment. While the country generally has adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, enforcement is weak, inconsistent, and selective. U.S. stakeholders and potential investors expressed particular concern about corruption in large infrastructure projects and in government procurement. Historically, the main political parties do not pursue corruption cases against each other after gaining or losing political positions. While Sri Lanka is a challenging place for businesses to operate, investors report that starting a business in Sri Lanka is relatively simple and quick, especially when compared to other lower middle-income markets. However, scalability is a problem due to the lack of skilled labor, a relatively small talent pool and constraints on land ownership and use. Investors note that employee retention is generally good in Sri Lanka, but numerous public holidays, a reluctance of employees to work at night, a lack of labor mobility, and difficulty recruiting women decrease efficiency and increase start-up times. A leading international consulting firm claims the primary issue affecting investment is lack of policy consistency. Foreign ownership is allowed in most sectors, although foreigners are prohibited from owning land with a few limited exceptions. Foreigners can invest in company shares, debt securities, government securities, and unit trusts. Many investors point to land acquisition as the biggest challenge for starting a new business. Generally, Sri Lanka prohibits the sale of public and private land to foreigners and to enterprises with foreign equity exceeding 50 percent. However, on July 30, 2018, Sri Lanka amended the Land (Restriction of Alienation) Act of 2014 to allow foreign companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) to acquire land. Foreign companies not listed on the CSE—but engaged in banking, financial, insurance, maritime, aviation, advanced technology, or infrastructure development projects identified and approved as strategic development projects—may also be exempted from restrictions imposed by the Land Act of 2014 on a case-by-case basis. The government owns approximately 80 percent of the land in Sri Lanka, including the land housing most tea, rubber, and coconut plantations, which are leased out, typically on 50-year terms. Private land ownership is limited to fifty acres per person. Although state land for industrial use is usually allotted on a 50-year lease, the government may approve 99-year leases on a case-by-case basis depending on the project. Many land title records were lost or destroyed during the civil war, and significant disputes remain over land ownership, particularly in the North and East. The government has started a program to return property taken by the government during the war to residents in the North and East. The government allows up to 100 percent foreign investment in any commercial, trading, or industrial activity except for the following heavily regulated sectors: banking, air transportation; coastal shipping; large scale mechanized mining of gems; lotteries; manufacture of military hardware, military vehicles, and aircraft; alcohol; toxic, hazardous, or carcinogenic materials; currency; and security documents. However, select strategic sectors, such as railway freight transportation and electricity transmission and distribution, are closed to any foreign capital participation. Foreign investment is also not permitted in the following businesses: pawn brokering; retail trade with a capital investment of less than $5 million; and coastal fishing. Foreign investments in the following areas are restricted to 40 percent ownership: a) production for export of goods subject to international quotas; b) growing and primary processing of tea, rubber, and coconut, c) cocoa, rice, sugar, and spices; d) mining and primary processing of non-renewable national resources, e) timber based industries using local timber, f) deep-sea fishing, g) mass communications, h) education, i) freight forwarding, j) travel services, k) businesses providing shipping services. In areas where foreign investments are permitted, Sri Lanka treats foreign investors the same as domestic investors. However, corruption reportedly may make it difficult for U.S. firms to compete against foreign bidders not subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when competing for public tenders. Sri Lanka has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the last five years. 2004 UNCTAD Report: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/82/investment-policy-review-of-sri-lanka The Department of Registrar of Companies ( www.drc.gov.lk ) is responsible for business registration. Online registration ( http://eroc.drc.gov.lk/ ) was introduced and registration averages four to five days. In addition to the Registrar of Companies, businesses must register with the Inland Revenue Department to obtain a taxpayer identification number (TIN) for payment of taxes and with the Department of Labor for social security payments. The government supports outward investment, and the Export Development Board offers subsidies for companies seeking to establish overseas operations, including branch offices related to exports. New outward investment regulations came into effect November 20, 2017. Sri Lankan companies, partnerships, and individuals are permitted to invest in shares, units, debt securities, and sovereign bonds overseas subject to limits specified by the new Foreign Exchange Regulations. Sri Lankan companies are also permitted to establish overseas companies. Investments over the specified limit require the Central Bank Monetary Board’s approval. All investments must be made through outward investment accounts (OIA). All income from investments overseas must be routed through the same OIA within three months of payment. (Note: In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Sri Lankan government introduced a series of measures attempting to ease pressure on the Sri Lankan rupee. These measures included a temporary suspension on OIA transactions and additional foreign exchange controls for outward investments) 3. Legal Regime Many foreign and domestic investors view the regulatory system as unpredictable with outdated regulations, rigid administrative procedures, and excessive leeway for bureaucratic discretion. BOI is responsible for informing potential investors about laws and regulations affecting operations in Sri Lanka, including new regulations and policies that are frequently developed to protect specific sectors or stakeholders. Effective enforcement mechanisms are sometimes lacking, and investors cite coordination problems between BOI and relevant line agencies. Lack of sufficient technical capacity within the government to review financial proposals for private infrastructure projects also creates problems during the tender process. Corporate financial reporting requirements in Sri Lanka are covered in a number of laws, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL) is responsible for setting and updating accounting standards to comply with current accounting and audit standards adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). Sri Lanka follows International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial reporting purposes set by the IASB. Sri Lankan accounting standards are applicable for all banks, companies listed on the stock exchange, and all other large and medium-sized companies in Sri Lanka. Accounts must be audited by professionally qualified auditors holding ICASL membership. ICASL also has published accounting standards for small companies. The Accounting Standards Monitoring Board (ASMB) is responsible for monitoring compliance with Sri Lankan accounting and auditing standards. Overall legislative authority lies with Parliament. Line ministries draft bills and, together with regulatory authorities, are responsible for crafting draft regulations, which may require approval from the National Economic Council, the Cabinet, and/or Parliament. Bills are published in the government gazette http://documents.gov.lk/en/home.php at least seven days before being placed on the Order Paper of the Parliament (the first occasion the public is officially informed of proposed laws) with drafts being treated as confidential prior to this. Any member of the public can challenge a bill in the Supreme Court if they do so within one week of its placement on the Order Paper of the Parliament. If the Supreme Court orders amendments to a bill, such amendments must be incorporated before the bill can be debated and passed. Regulations are made by administrative agencies and are published in a government gazette, similar to a U.S. Federal Notice. In addition to regulations, some rules are made through internal circulars, which may be difficult to locate. The Central Bank and the Finance Ministry published information on Central Government debt including contingent liabilities and government finance. Central Bank publishes information on debt of major SOE’s. Debt obligations are available online in the Central Bank Annual Report; Fiscal Management Report of the Finance Ministry; Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance. Information on contingent liabilities is available in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance. Since 2018, the Central Bank published guaranteed debt and central government debt annually. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures, however most large companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange disclose these. Sri Lanka is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has made WTO notifications on customs valuation, agriculture, import licensing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Sri Lanka ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and a National Trade Facilitation Committee was tasked with undertaking reforms needed to operationalize the TFA. The WTO conducted a review of the TFA in June 2019 in which Sri Lankan officials noted challenges related to accessing technical assistance and capacity building support for implementation of TFA recommendations. In September 2021 Sri Lanka requested for extension of its definitive implementation dates on certain provisions based on Article 17 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Sri Lanka’s legal system reflects diverse cultural influences. Criminal law is fundamentally British-based while civil law is Roman-Dutch. Laws on marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other issues can also vary based on religious affiliation. Sri Lankan commercial law is almost entirely statutory, reflecting British colonial law, although amendments have largely kept pace with subsequent legal changes in the United Kingdom. Several important legislative enactments regulate commercial issues: the BOI Law; the Intellectual Property Act; the Companies Act; the Securities and Exchange Commission Act; the Banking Act; the Inland Revenue Act; the Industrial Promotion Act; and the Consumer Affairs Authority Act. Sri Lanka’s court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, provincial High Courts, and the Courts of First Instance (district courts with general civil jurisdiction) and Magistrate Courts (with criminal jurisdiction). Provincial High Courts have original, appellate, and reversionary criminal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is an intermediate appellate court with a limited right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises final appellate jurisdiction for all criminal and civil cases. Citizens may apply directly to the Supreme Court for protection if they believe any government or administrative action has violated their fundamental human rights. The principal law governing foreign investment is Law No. 4 (known as the BOI Act), created in 1978 and amended in 1980, 1983, 1992, 2002, 2009 and 2012. The BOI Act and implementing regulations provide for two types of investment approvals, one for concessions and one without concessions. Under Section 17 of the Act, the BOI is empowered to approve companies satisfying minimum investment criteria with such companies eligible for duty-free import concessions. The BOI acts as the “one-stop-shop” to facilitate all the requirements of the foreign investors to Sri Lanka. Investment approval under Section 16 of the BOI Act permits companies to operate under the “normal” laws and applies to investments that do not satisfy eligibility incentive criteria. From April 1, 2017, Inland Revenue Act No. 24 of 2017 created an investment incentive regime granting a concessionary tax rate (for specific sectors) and capital allowances (depreciation) based on capital investments. Commercial Hub Regulation No 1 of 2013 applies to transshipment trade, offshore businesses, and logistic services. The Strategic Development Project Act of 2008 (SDPA) provides tax incentives for large projects that the Cabinet identifies as “strategic development projects.” https://investsrilanka.com/ Sri Lanka does not have a specific competition law. Instead, the BOI or respective regulatory authorities may review transactions for competition-related concerns. In March of 2017, Parliament approved the “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing” and “Safeguard Measures” Acts. These laws provide a framework against unfair trade practices and import surges and allow government trade agencies to initiate investigations relating to unfair business practices to impose additional and/or countervailing duties. Since economic liberalization policies began in 1978, the government has not expropriated a foreign investment, with the last expropriation dispute resolved in 1998. The land acquisition law (Land Acquisition Act of 1950) empowers the government to take private land for public purposes with compensation based on a government valuation. The Companies Act and the Insolvency Ordinance provide for dissolution of insolvent companies, but there is no mechanism to facilitate the reorganization of financially troubled companies. Other laws make it difficult to keep a struggling company solvent. The Termination of Employment of Workmen Special Provisions Act (TEWA), for example, makes it difficult to fire or lay off workers who have been employed for more than six months for any reason other than serious, well-documented disciplinary problems. In the absence of comprehensive bankruptcy laws, extra-judicial powers granted by law to financial institutions protect the rights of creditors. A creditor may petition the court to dissolve the company if the company cannot make payments on debts in excess of LKR 50,000 ($320.00). Lenders are also empowered to foreclose on collateral without court intervention. However, loans below LKR 5 million ($32,000) are exempt, and lenders cannot foreclose on collateral provided by guarantors to a loan. Sri Lanka ranked 94 out of 190 countries in the resolving insolvency index in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020. Resolving insolvency takes, on average, 1.7 years at a cost equivalent to 10 percent of the estate’s value. 4. Industrial Policies The Inland Revenue Act of 2017, implemented April 1, 2018, includes concessionary corporate tax rates for investments in certain sectors and increased capital allowances (depreciation) on capital investments. As per the 2021 budget revisions, which still apply, the standard rate of corporate tax is 14 percent for: a) small and medium companies (with an annual income of less than LKR 500 million or $3.2 million); b) companies exporting goods and services; and c) companies engaged in education services; promotion of tourism; d) companies engaged in construction and e) companies engaged in healthcare services. Companies engaged in information technology services and agricultural business are exempt from taxes. A 40 percent corporate tax rate applies to companies engaged in gaming, liquor, and tobacco related businesses. An 18 percent tax on manufacturing and 24 percent tax on Trading, banking, finance, insurance, and similar businesses. The 2022 budget introduced a retroactive surcharge Tax at 25 percent on persons and entities with taxable income exceeding Rs. 2 billion for the financial year 2020/21. For further information on investment incentives and other investment-related issues, potential investors should contact BOI directly ( www.investsrilanka.com or info@Board of Investment.lk .) and refer the Inland Revenue Act 24 of 2017 http://www.ird.gov.lk/en/sitepages/default.aspx The Women Entrepreneur Development Program of the Sri Lanka Export Development Board (EDB) seeks to engage more women participation in agriculture and manufacturing-based exporter sectors. https://www.srilankabusiness.com/exporters/assisting-women-in-business.html . EDB launched SheTrades ( www.Shetrades.co m) in 2016 in partnership with the International Trade Center (ITC) as a platform for women-owned businesses, organizations, companies and ITC SheTrades partner institutions to showcase their businesses, build strong networks, strike business deals, increase their credibility and connect to markets. Companies and individual buyers can use shetrades.com to include more women entrepreneurs in their supply chains, by sourcing specific products & services from women-owned businesses. Sri Lanka has 15 free trade zones, also called “export processing zones,” which are administered by the BOI. Foreign investors have the same investment opportunities as local entities in these zones. Export-oriented companies located within and outside the zones are eligible to import project-related material and inputs free of customs import duties although such imports may be subject to other taxes. In the past, firms preferred to locate their factories near the Colombo harbor or airport to reduce transportation time and cost. However, excessive concentration of industries around Colombo has caused heavy traffic, higher real estate prices, environmental pollution, and a scarcity of labor. The BOI and the government now encourage export-oriented factories to locate in industrial zones farther from Colombo, although Sri Lanka’s limited road network create other challenges for outlying zones. In 2019, the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) completed the reclamation of 269 hectares of land adjacent to Colombo’s port and historic downtown to form the Colombo Port City Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which government officials describe as a future “international commercial and financial hub.” CHEC invested $1.4 billion in the land reclamation and basic infrastructure of the Port City, in return for which it will have control, via lease, of 116 of the 178 total hectares of marketable land on the site, the balance of which the government will control. Parliament approved on May 20, 2021, legislation to govern the SEZ and establish a commission to act as promoter, manager, regulator, and “single window investment facilitator” to attract foreign direct investment to the project. The legislation also includes tax exemptions and other incentives for potential investors. The legislation was amended prior to approval by a simple majority in Parliament following a Supreme Court ruling on multiple legal challenges to the bill’s constitutionality, though concerns remain about the potential risk of illicit financial flows. Sri Lanka’s State Pharmaceutical Corporation (SPC), a state-owned enterprise established a dedicated pharmaceutical manufacturing zone in Hambantota. The Sri Lankan government has earmarked some 400 acres of land in the Hambantota-Arabokka area and announced tax exemptions for foreign companies ready to set up manufacturing units. The SPC has also approached Indian manufacturers about the possibility of establishing manufacturing centers in the dedicated pharmaceutical manufacturing zone in Hambantota. The goal being to produce at least 40 percent of pharmaceuticals for domestic needs and up to $1 billion in annual pharmaceutical exports. In addition to favorable taxation benefits, all infrastructure facilities will be supplied by the Sri Lanka Board of Investment. Employment of foreign personnel is permitted when there is a demonstrated shortage of qualified local labor. Technical and managerial personnel are in short supply, and this shortage is likely to continue in the near future. Foreign laborers do not experience significant problems in obtaining work or residence permits. Sri Lanka has seen a rise in foreign laborers, mainly in construction sites, with some reportedly working without proper work visas. Foreign investors who remit at least $250,000 can qualify for a five-year resident visa under the Resident Guest Scheme Visa Program: ( http://www.immigration.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=200&lang=en ). Sri Lanka offers dual citizenship status to Sri Lankans who have obtained foreign citizenship in seven designated countries, including the United States. Tourist and business visas are granted for one month with possible extensions. Sri Lanka has no specific requirements for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. Provisions relating to interception of communications for cybercrime issues are subject to court supervision under the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) of 2007. Sri Lanka became a party to the Budapest Cybercrime Convention in 2015, and safeguards based on the convention are in force. Although there is no comprehensive legislative protection of electronic data, the CCA has a provision to protect data and information. The government is currently formulating data protection legislation. There is no ban on the sale of electronic data for marketing purposes. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in real property in Sri Lanka are generally recognized and enforced, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/intellectual-property-law-in-sri-lanka-21205 but many investors claim protection can be flimsy. A reliable registration system exists for recording private property including land, buildings, and mortgages, although problems reportedly exist due to fraud and forged documents. In 1998 the government introduced Bim Saviya Program (Title Registration) to provide stronger and clear Land ownership with the view of improving Land Utilization with the aid of new technology. This program aims to avoid unnecessary disputes due to land ownership or boundaries. Property registration required, on average, completion of eight procedures lasting 39 days. Sri Lanka prohibits the sale of land to foreign nationals and to enterprises with foreign equity exceeding 50 percent. Foreign investors are eligible to lease lands in Sri Lanka to establish their projects and plants under the BOI. Foreigners can freely buy properties as long as they are willing to pay the Land Tax for foreigners at 100 percent of the property value. An alternative is to lease the land for 99 years, bringing the tax down to 7 percent. Under current law, the Prescription Ordinance stipulates that a person holding continuous “adverse possession” of real property for ten years without challenge is entitled to ownership of that property. (Prescription, Cap. 81, No. 22 of 1871, § 3, COMMONLII.) Sri Lanka is a party to major intellectual property agreements. The country adopted an intellectual property law in 2003 intended to meet U.S.-Sri Lanka bilateral IPR agreements and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement obligations. The law governs copyrights and related rights; industrial designs; patents, trademarks, and service marks; trade names; layout designs of integrated circuits; geographical indications; unfair competition; databases; computer programs; and undisclosed information (e.g., trade secrets). While it is not compulsory to register a trademark, it is recommended to register a trademark for easy and effective enforcement. For registration and grant of industrial designs and patents, an applicant must file formal applications with the Director-General of Intellectual Property. Copyright protection is accorded without any formality of registration in Sri Lanka. While trade secrets infringement is considered under the umbrella of unfair competition in the Sri Lankan IP framework, Sri Lanka lacks a separate substantive piece of legislation governing trade secrets. The Government of Sri Lanka has taken concrete steps to strengthen its IP regime. The National Intellectual Property Office (NIPO) has shown its intention to accede to the Madrid Protocol, and the Sri Lankan Parliament approved the proposal to accede to the Madrid Protocol in 2020. The necessary amendments in the existing IP Act have been initiated to facilitate Sri Lanka’s entry into the Madrid protocol. In 2019, the Sri Lankan Government amended its Information Technology (IT) policy. The amended policy requires government agencies only to use licensed or open-source software. However, the Government has yet to put systems to monitor compliance with the policy. In February 2022, the Sri Lankan cabinet approved parliamentary discussion on possible amendments to the IP Act. The objective of the proposed amendment is to incorporate changes to include a fair use exemption for copyrighted audio works to be copied and edited into an accessible format (for disabled persons) and provide protection to Geographical Indications products. The Sri Lankan Government has also made attempts to improve the NIPO by upgrading and modernizing its infrastructure and recruiting new examiners for both trademark and patents, which has led to a decrease in backlogs of trademark and patent examinations. Along with a comprehensive IPR law, Sri Lanka also has good enforcement practices. In 2010, the Sri Lankan government established special anti-piracy and counterfeit unit in the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the police to address IPR concerns specifically. The CID is the primary investigation arm of Sri Lanka and was established in 1870. The Sri Lankan Government has also established an IPR unit in the Social Protection Unit of Sri Lankan Customs to focus on IPR related issues ( https://www.customs.gov.lk/ ). Sri Lanka Customs Department is also working towards developing a trademark database to advance IPR protection and enforcement, though it is yet to be implemented. The overall IP ecosystem in Sri Lanka has improved in recent years. However, the lack of effective strategic policy coordination among entities involved in the implementation and execution of laws and judicial redressal being time-consuming and challenging has led to freely available counterfeit products in Sri Lanka. Counterfeit goods, particularly imports, are still widely available, and music and software piracy are reportedly widespread. Foreign and U.S. companies in the recording, software, movie, clothing, and consumer product industries claim that inadequate IPR protection and enforcement weaken their businesses in Sri Lanka. Local agents of well-known U.S. and other international companies representing recording, software, movie, clothing, and consumer products industries continue to complain that the lack of adequate IPR protection damages their business interests in Sri Lanka. Better coordination among enforcement authorities and government institutions – such as the NIPO, Sri Lankan Customs, Sri Lankan Police, and more trained staff and resources – is needed to strengthen Sri Lanka’s IPR regime. Although infringement of intellectual property rights is a punishable offense under the IP law with criminal and civil penalties, Sri Lanka does not track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods. Sri Lanka is currently not on the Special 301 report Watch List or the Notorious Markets List. Sri Lanka does not track and report on its seizures of counterfeit goods. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: John Cabeca Intellectual Property Counselor for South Asia U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Foreign Commercial Service email: john.cabeca@trade.gov website: https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-attache-program tel: +91-11-2347-2000 For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at Information by Country: Sri Lanka (wipo.int) Local lawyers list: https://lk.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys-2/ Describe the process of protecting and enforcing IP within the country/economy. https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/aspac/en/wipo_inn_tyo_12/wipo_inn_tyo_12_ref_t3srilanka.pdf Sri Lankan Customs will seize and destroy counterfeit or illicit goods https://www.customs.gov.lk/destruction-of-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-on-world-ip-day/ 6. Financial Sector The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) governs the CSE, unit trusts, stockbrokers, listed public companies, margin traders, underwriters, investment managers, credit rating agencies, and securities depositories. https://cse.lk/ Foreign portfolio investment is encouraged. Foreign investors can purchase up to 100 percent of equity in Sri Lankan companies in permitted sectors. Investors may open an Inward Investment Account (IIA) with any commercial bank in Sri Lanka to bring in investments. As of January 31, 2022, 297 companies representing 20 business sectors are listed on the CSE. As stock market liquidity is limited, investors need to manage exit strategies carefully. In accordance with its IMF Article VIII obligations, the government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) generally refrain from restrictions on current international transfers. When the government experiences balance of payments difficulties, it tends to impose controls on foreign exchange transactions. Due to pressures on the balance of payments caused by the COVID-19 and the subsequent economic crisis, Sri Lanka took several measures to restrict imports and limit outward capital transactions in 2020, these limits are still in place as of March 2022. Further, import restrictions The state consumes over 50 percent of the country’s domestic financial resources and has a virtual monopoly on the management and use of long-term savings. This inhibits the free flow of financial resources to product and factor markets. High budget deficits have caused interest rates to rise and resulted in higher inflation. On a year-to-year basis, inflation was approximately 17.5 percent in February of 2022, and the average prime lending rate was 9.91 percent. Retained profits finance a significant portion of private investment in Sri Lanka with commercial banks as the principal source of bank finance and bank loans as the most widely used credit instrument for the private sector. Large companies also raise funds through corporate debentures. Credit ratings are mandatory for all deposit-taking institutions and all varieties of debt instruments. Local companies can borrow from foreign sources. FDI finances about 6 percent of overall investment. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market and are free to raise foreign currency loans. Sri Lanka has a diversified banking system. In terms of physical access to outlets, Sri Lanka also enjoys high levels of banking penetration, with bank branch density at 17 per 100,000 adults, compared to the South Asia regional average of 10.2. There are 25 commercial banks: 13 local and 12 foreign. In addition, there are seven specialized local banks. Citibank N.A. is the only U.S. bank operating in Sri Lanka. Several domestic private commercial banks have substantial government equity acquired through investment agencies controlled by the government. Banking has expanded to rural areas, and by end of 2020 there were over 3,619 commercial bank branches and over 6,176 Automated Teller Machines throughout the country. Both resident and non-resident foreign nationals can open foreign currency banking accounts. However, non-resident foreign nationals are not eligible to open Sri Lankan Rupee accounts. A foreign individual can open a Personal Foreign Currency Account or (PFC account). This is a special type of account that can be opened in foreign currencies carried by the overseas client. Just like an ordinary bank account, this type of account gives interests against the deposits. CBSL https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/ is responsible for supervision of all banking institutions and has driven improvements in banking regulations, provisioning, and public disclosure of banking sector performance as well as setting exchange rates, which have shifted regularly with the ongoing economic crisis. Credit ratings are mandatory for all banks. CBSL introduced accounting standards corresponding to International Financial Reporting Standards for banks on January 1, 2018, and the application of the standards substantially increased impairment provisions on loans. The migration to the Basel III capital standards began in July of 2017 on a staggered basis, with full implementation was kicking in on January 1, 2019 and some banks having had to boost capital to meet full implementation of Basel III requirements. In addition, banks must increase capital to meet CBSL’s new minimum capital requirements deadline, which is set for December 31, 2022. A staggered application of capital provisions for smaller banks unable to meet capital requirements immediately will likely be allowed. Total assets of the banking industry stood at LKR 16,923 billion ($64 billion) as of December 31, 2020. The two fully state-owned commercial banks – Bank of Ceylon and People’s Bank – are significant players, accounting for about 33 percent of all banking assets. The Bank of Ceylon currently holds a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 6 percent (up from 4.89 percent in 2020). The People’s Bank currently holds a NPL ratio of 3.85 percent (up from 3.68 percent in 2019). Both banks have significant exposure to SOEs but, these banks are implicitly guaranteed by the state. The debt moratorium issued by the CBSL for distressed borrowers will expired in 2022, the impact of this is yet to be reflected on the banking sector NPLs. In October 2019, Sri Lanka was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list after making significant changes to its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. CBSL is exploring the adoption of blockchain technologies in its financial transactions and appointed two committees to investigate the possible adoption of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Sri Lanka has a rapidly growing alternative financial services industry that includes finance companies, leasing companies, and microfinance institutes. In response, CBSL has established an enforcement unit to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework of non-banking financial institutions. Credit ratings are mandatory for finance companies as of October 1, 2018. The government also directed banks to register with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to comply with the U.S. Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Almost all commercial banks have registered with the IRS. Sri Lanka does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government manages and controls large retirement funds from private sector employees and uses these funds for budgetary purposes (through investments in government securities), stock market investments, and corporate debenture investments. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are active in transport (buses and railways, ports and airport management, airline operations); utilities such as electricity; petroleum imports and refining; water supply; retail; banking; telecommunications; television and radio broadcasting; newspaper publishing; and insurance. Following the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lankan armed forces began operating domestic air services, tourist resorts, and farms crowding out some private investment. In total, there are over 400 SOEs of which 55 have been identified by the Sri Lanka Treasury as strategically important, and 345 have been identified as non-commercial. The current government has not adopted a strategy of privatizing SOEs. Several attempts to sell the government’s stake in the heavily indebted national carrier, Sri Lankan Airlines, were not successful. The government is also seeking to improve the efficiency of SOEs through private sector management practices. SOE labor unions and opposition political parties often oppose privatization and are particularly averse to foreign ownership. Privatization through the sale of shares in the stock market is likely to be less problematic. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is more widely recognized among Sri Lankan companies than Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). Leading companies in Sri Lanka actively promote CSR, and some SMEs have also started to promote CSR. CSR Sri Lanka is an apex body initiated by 40 leading companies to foster CSR. The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce actively promotes CSR among its membership. The SEC, together with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka, published a Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in order to establish good corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan capital markets. Separate government agencies are tasked with protecting individuals from adverse business impacts in relation to labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections, although the effectiveness of these agencies is questioned by some. The government has not launched an initiative to promote RBC principles, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The government also does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) although Sri Lanka has mineral resources including graphite, mineral sands, and gemstones. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA) prioritizes increased clean energy investment to meet the government’s ambitious 70 percent renewables target by 2030. The SEA is tasked with increasing this investment, but with ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka SEA has been having difficulty bring this to fruition. The government has a National Climate Change Policy with a goal to adapt to climate change and have mitigation measures on the impact of it within the framework of sustainable development. In September 2021 President Gotabaya Rajapaksa committed to ceasing of building new coal-fired power plants and achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 at the United Nations International Energy Forum. Sri Lanka has set a target of achieving 70 percent of all its energy requirements from renewable sources by 2030. Electricity tariffs are time-based tariffs regulated for residential customers. Two types of tariff categories are provided – block tariffs and time of use (ToU) tariffs. The block tariff charges residences on an incremental basis based on monthly power consumption. The Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) has not announced any retail tariff revisions since 2014. According to World Bank, foreign direct investment in the power sector has declined in recent years due to policy uncertainties and the risk of currency depreciation. The electricity act of Sri Lanka requires the government to hold at least a 50 percent share or certain shares determined by the Treasury and Ministry of Finance, which could potentially set barriers for both domestic and international investors. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB)’s short-term borrowings from state banks and total debt to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and independent power producers (IPPs) increased to Rs. 223 billion by the end of 2019, from Rs. 142 billion by end 2018. Its long-term outstanding liabilities rose to Rs.421 billion by end 2019, from Rs. 392 billion by end of 2018. Imports of equipment for renewable energy including solar panels and storage batteries, for example, are exempt from the national building tax (NBT), as well as the ports and airport levy (PAL). Sri Lanka announced plans to ban internal combustion engine (ICE) car sales by 2040. Importation of three-wheelers powered by two-stroke petrol engines, as well as spare parts for such engines, has been banned since 2008. According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Sri Lanka has a high share of hybrid and electric vehicles as a result of strict and aggressive vehicles taxation scheme that provides substantial tax reductions for hybrids imported into the country since 2010 and for electric vehicles since 2015. This has resulted in about 80,000 hybrid vehicles and 2,400 fully electric vehicles in the country. While the Government of Sri Lanka has high renewable energy ambitions, internal political conflict over energy policy, droughts and floods reducing hydroelectricity generation, and, in some cases, inability to front enough money for renewable technologies delay progress. The main renewable resources available in Sri Lanka include biomass, hydropower, solar, and wind. The 2015-25 power plan laid out in the Sri Lanka Energy Sector Development Plan for a Knowledge-based Economy (SLEDP) and the Global Energy Parliament (GEP) will require increased involvement from private companies to meet renewable energy goals. 9. Corruption While Sri Lanka has generally adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, enforcement is often weak and inconsistent. U.S. firms identify corruption as a major constraint on foreign investment, but generally not a major threat to operating in Sri Lanka once contracts have been established. The business community claims that corruption has the greatest effect on investors in large projects and on those pursuing government procurement contracts. Projects geared toward exports face fewer problems. A Right to Information Act came into effect in February of 2017 which increased government transparency. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC or Bribery Commission) is the main body responsible for investigating bribery allegations, but it is widely considered ineffective and has reportedly made little progress pursuing cases of national significance. The law states that a public official’s offer or acceptance of a bribe constitutes a criminal offense and carries a maximum sentence of seven years imprisonment and fine. Bribery laws extend to family members of public officials, but political parties are not covered. A bribe by a local company to a foreign official is also not covered by the Bribery Act and the government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Thus far, the Bribery Commission has focused on minor cases such as bribes taken by traffic police, wildlife officers, and school principals. These cases reportedly follow a pattern of targeting low-level offenses with prosecutions years after the offense followed by the imposition of sentences not always proportionate to the conduct (i.e., sometimes overly strict, other times overly lenient). Government procurement regulations contain provisions on conflicts-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. While financial crime investigators have developed a number of cases involving the misappropriation of government funds, these cases have often not moved forward due to lack of political will, political interference, and lack of investigative capacity. Sri Lanka signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in March of 2004 and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2006. Sri Lanka is a signatory to the OECD-ADB Anti-Corruption Regional Plan but has not joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption No 36, Malalasekara Mawatha, Colombo 7 T+94 112 596360 / 2595039 M+94 767011954 Email: ciaboc@eureka.lk or dgbribery@gmail.com Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International, Sri Lanka 5/1 Elibank Road Colombo 5 Phone: 94-11- 4369783 Email: tisl@tisrilanka.org 10. Political and Security Environment The government’s military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE. During the civil war, the LTTE had a history of attacks against civilians, although none of the attacks were intentionally directed against U.S. citizens. On April 21, 2019, terrorist attacks targeted several churches and hotels throughout Colombo and in the eastern city of Batticaloa, killing more than 250 people, including over 40 foreigners, five of whom were Americans. In the aftermath of the attacks, the government imposed nationwide curfews and a temporary ban on some social media outlets. Public opposition to the current government and growing outrage over power, fuel, and food shortages morphed into a largescale protest movement in March 2022. Since then, peaceful protests have been noted nearly every day both in Colombo and across the country, including an ongoing encampment in central Colombo next to the Presidential Secretariat. As public concern grows, some protests have turned violence due to clashes with pro-government protesters or security forces, such as a confrontation between protesters and police on April 19 in a city about 100 km from Colombo. In addition, protesters have surrounded and entered (or attempted to enter) the residences and offices of MPs and officials, and police have sometimes used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters. The worst violence occurred on May 9, when attacks by pro-government supporters on two major protest sites in Colombo triggered a wave of retaliatory violence in which anti-government protesters set fire to or vandalized approximately 100 homes and other properties around the country belonging to or affiliated with government MPs and officials. Violence continued into the next day, with busses and cars burned on the streets and dozens of people seriously injured. Declaring a state of emergency, the government worked with the military to restore order to the streets. While subsequent protests have mostly been peaceful, the situation remains volatile and ongoing shortages of essentials and power cuts continue to cause distress. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Both local and international businesses have cited labor shortages as a major problem in Sri Lanka. In 2020, 8.1 million Sri Lankans were employed: 46 percent in services, 27 percent in industry and 26 percent in agriculture. Approximately 70 percent of the employed are in the informal sector. The government sector also employs over 1.4 million people. Sri Lanka’s labor laws afford many employee protections. Many investors consider this legal framework somewhat rigid, making it difficult for companies to reduce their workforce even when market conditions warrant doing so. The cost of dismissing an employee in Sri Lanka is calculated based upon a percentage of wages averaged over 54 salary weeks, one of the highest in the world. There is no unemployment insurance or social safety net for laid off workers. Labor is available at relatively low cost, though higher than in other South Asian countries. Sri Lanka’s labor force is largely literate (particularly in local languages), although weak in certain technical skills and English. The average worker has eight years of schooling, and two-thirds of the labor force is male. The government has initiated educational reforms to better prepare students for the labor market, including revamping technical and vocational education and training. While the number of students pursuing computer, accounting, business skills, and English language training programs is increasing, the demand for these skills still outpaces supply with many top graduates seeking employment outside of the country. Youth are increasingly uninterested in labor-intensive manual jobs, and the construction, plantation, apparel, and other manufacturing industries report a severe shortage of workers. The garment industry reports up to a 40 percent staff turnover rate. Lack of labor mobility in the North and East is also a problem, with workers reluctant to leave their families and villages for employment elsewhere A significant proportion of the unemployed seek “white collar” employment, often preferring stable government jobs. Most sectors seeking employees offer manual or semi-skilled jobs or require technical or professional skills such as management, marketing, information technology, accountancy and finance, and English language proficiency. Investors often struggle to find employees with the requisite skills, a situation particularly noticeable as the tourism industry opens new hotels. Many service sector companies rely on Sri Lankan engineers, researchers, technicians, and analysts to deliver high-quality, high-precision products and retention is reasonably good in the information technology sector. Foreign and local companies report a strong worker commitment to excellence in Sri Lanka, with rapid adaptation to quality standards. Women face workforce restrictions such as caps on overtime work, limits on nighttime shifts and restrictions from certain jobs. In 2021 the labor market was characterized by high female unemployment and low female labor force participation: an estimated 55 percent of public sector employees were men and 45 percent women while 70 percent of employees outside the public sector were men and only 30 percent women. As of 2021 due the covid pandemic a total of 807,800 Sri Lankan registered as migrant workers working abroad with the respective Sri Lankan embassies overseas. Remittances from migrant workers, averaged about $5.49 billion in 2021, making up Sri Lanka’s second largest source of foreign exchange. Most of this labor force is unskilled (i.e., housemaids and factory laborers) and located primarily in the Middle East. Sri Lanka is also losing many of its skilled workers to more lucrative jobs abroad. Approximately 6,000 Sri Lankans work in Bangladeshi garment factories. Sri Lanka has seen a gradual rise in foreign workers. Most foreign workers are from India, Bangladesh, and the PRC, many reportedly without proper work visas or other documentation. Approximately 9.5 percent of the workforce is unionized, and union membership is declining. There are more than 2,000 registered trade unions (many of which have 50 or fewer members), and several federations. About 18 percent of labor in the industry and service sector is unionized. Most of the major trade unions are affiliated with political parties, creating a highly politicized labor environment. This is not the case for private companies, which typically only have one union or workers’ council to represent employees. There are also some independent unions. All workers, other than police, armed forces, prison service, and those in essential services, have the right to strike. The President can designate any industry an essential service. Workers may lodge complaints to protect their rights with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal, or the Supreme Court. Unions represent workers in many large private firms, but workers in small-scale agriculture and small businesses typically do not belong to unions. The tea industry, however, is highly unionized, and public sector employees are unionized at high rates. Labor in the export processing zone (EPZ) enterprises tend to be represented by non-union worker councils, although unions also exist within the EPZs. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Freedom of Association Committee observed that Sri Lankan trade unions and worker councils can co-exist but advises that there should not be any discrimination against those employees choosing to join a union. The right of worker councils to engage in collective bargaining has been recognized by the ILO. Collective bargaining exists but is not universal. The Employers’ Federation of Ceylon, the main employers’ association in Sri Lanka, assists member companies in negotiating with unions and signing collective bargaining agreements. While about a quarter of the 660 members of the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon are unionized, approximately 90 of these companies (including a number of foreign-owned firms) are bound by collective agreements. Several other companies have signed memorandums of understanding with trade unions. However, there are only a few collective bargaining agreements signed with companies located in EPZs. All forms of forced and compulsory labor are prohibited. In March of 2016, the government introduced a national minimum wage set at LKR 10,000 ($36) per month or LKR 400 ($1.45) per day. The National Minimum Wage of Workers Act was amended in 2021, increasing the minimum wage to LKR 12,500 ($45) monthly and LKR 500 ($1.81) per day. Forty-four “wage boards” established by the Ministry of Labor set minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry in consultation with unions and employers. The minimum wages established by these sector-specific wage boards tend to be higher than the minimum wage. Sri Lankan law does not require equal pay for equal work for women. The law prohibits most full-time workers from regularly working more than 45 hours per week without receiving overtime (premium pay). In addition, the law stipulates a rest period of one hour per day. Regulations limit the maximum overtime hours to 15 per week. The law provides for paid annual holidays, sick leave, and maternity leave. Occupational health and safety regulations do not fully meet international standards. Child labor is prohibited and virtually nonexistent in the organized sectors, although child labor occurs in informal sectors. The minimum legal age for employment is set at 16 years of age. The minimum age for employment in hazardous work is 18 years of age. Sri Lanka is a member of the ILO and has ratified 31 international labor conventions, including all eight of the ILO’s core labor conventions. The ILO and the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon are working to improve awareness of core labor standards and the ILO also promotes its “Decent Work Agenda” program in Sri Lanka. A 2019 Labor Survey estimated that 62 percent of the country’s workforce was employed informally. Most working in the informal economy are reportedly self-employed, and the informal sector accounts for an estimated 87.5 percent of total employment in agriculture. Those working in the informal economy lack job protections and entitlements. 14. Contact for More Information Luis Salas Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Colombo, Sri Lanka Phone: +94-11-249-8500 Email: commercialcolombo@state.gov Sudan Executive Summary Following the end of the 30-year regime of Omar Bashir in 2019, Sudan’s military and a coalition of civilian opposition groups agreed to a three-year power-sharing agreement under the Civilian-Led Transitional Government (CLTG) that was to culminate with a popularly elected government in 2022. The clock on that agreement was reset to 2024 with the integration of former armed opposition groups into the CLTG following the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement on October 3, 2020. The transition ended abruptly on October 25, 2021, when the country’s military, led by General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, seized power and ousted the CLTG, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The military takeover precipitated a political crisis that continues into 2022. Sudanese citizens, angered and frustrated by the military’s seizure of power, initiated a series of regular nationwide protests demanding a return to civilian rule. In January 2022, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) launched a mediation effort aimed at bringing together a broad range of civilian actors to begin negotiations on a political solution to restore Sudan’s democratic transition; the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development later joined that effort. During its two-year administration, the CLTG initiated a series of political, economic, and legal reforms. In cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government pursued a program that reduced or eliminated several costly subsidy programs, improved fiscal discipline and public financial management, adopted currency and tariff reforms, and launched a revision of its commercial laws. The international community, under U.S. government leadership, took actions to dramatically reduce Sudan’s outstanding $56 billion international debt by paying off debt arrears owed to International Financial Institutions and organizing debt relief among creditors nations. A popularly supported “Dismantling Committee,” in concert with the Ministry of Justice, was intended to root out corruption, identify and seize illegally obtained assets, and return much of the national wealth that was spirited out of the country by Bashir-era cronies. The October 25 military takeover stalled most CLTG reform efforts and threatens to reverse the gains of the previous two years. Sudan’s current military leadership dismissed most of the civilian ministers, including the Prime Minister, appointing in their place “caretaker” ministers absent legal authority to do so. The international community has imposed significant costs on Sudan’s military regime for its actions. The United States has paused all non-humanitarian assistance to Sudan, and much assistance from bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions also remain paused. The United States government has been clear that the only path to restoring financial assistance is predicated on restoring Sudan’s democratic transition. The ongoing political turmoil has produced economic uncertainty, a depreciating national currency, price increases, and shortages of grain, fuel, medicine, and other imported commodities. The sectors of greatest interest to foreign investors remain mineral extraction (primarily gold, non-precious metals, oil, and natural gas) and agriculture. Sudan’s infrastructure is in significant need of modernization and expansion. Many American companies have inquired about investment opportunities and visited Sudan with an expressed interest in direct investment and promotion of U.S. products. The Sudanese have expressed a robust interest in obtaining U.S. goods, services, technologies, and training/capacity building programs. However, a lack of domestic investment capital, poor infrastructure, burdensome bureaucracy, endemic corruption, and low household incomes create challenges for any company considering the Sudanese market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $650 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Sudanese government eagerly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). The Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation acts as the government’s investment promotion agency for foreign investors seeking to initiate projects that include domestically produced content. The Ministry offers, depending on the type of project, a range of tax incentives, customs exclusions, and land grants to attract investment. The Ministry provides “single window” service for potential investors who submit project proposals and feasibility studies for review and possible approval. Project proposals are reviewed by officials and technical experts from related ministries. Potential investors are informed in writing of decisions to approve or reject project proposals. The Investment Encouragement Act of 2021 establishes equal treatment to foreign and domestic business owners, allowing foreign investors to own business enterprises in Sudan. [Note: The law is new and its applicability untested. Officials at the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation strongly encourage foreign investors to engage with a Sudanese partner when considering entering the market.] The Act requires foreign investors to deposit at least $250,000 to obtain a business license. Furthermore, it clarifies the definitions of the various types of investment projects which were regulated in the 2013 Act, including state projects, investment projects, national projects, and strategic projects. There are foreign investment restrictions in the transportation sector, specifically in railway, freight transportation, inland waterways barge service, and airport operations. Most telecommunications and media, including television broadcasting and newspaper publishing, are closed to foreign capital participation. Foreign ownership is also restricted in the electrical power generation and financial services sectors. In addition to those overt statutory ownership restrictions, a comparatively large number of sectors are dominated by government monopolies, including those mentioned above. Such monopolies, together with a high perceived difficulty of obtaining required operating licenses, make it more difficult for foreign companies to invest. Sudan has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPR) through the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the last five years. No civil society organization, including those based in the host country or in third countries, have published reviews of investment policy-related concerns. UNCTAD’s last IPR of Sudan was in 2015. In late 2020, the CLTG launched a series of economic reforms designed to meet the benchmarks established under the IMF’s Staff Monitored Program (SMP). The SMP focused on addressing major macroeconomic imbalances caused by decades of mismanagement, laying the groundwork for inclusive growth, and establishing a track record of sound policies required for debt relief. The CLTG subsequently enacted structural reforms which slashed costly and unsustainable subsidies, adopted foreign exchange liberalization, reduced the government’s fiscal gap, and improved public financial management. The CLTG’s significant progress under the SMP led to an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program launched in June 2021. However, most IMF assistance was paused after the military’s October 25 government takeover. On March 7, 2022, the Central Bank of Sudan abandoned its managed float policy and allowed the Sudanese Pound to freely float against other currencies. However, Sudan faces a severe foreign exchange reserves shortage and the national currency faces depreciation pressures. Domestic businesses have no assurance of obtaining needed levels of foreign currency for international transactions. The government strictly controls incoming hard currency from exports and business owners wishing to retrieve cash can only make withdrawals denominated in Sudanese pounds at the time of this report. Foreign companies operating in Sudan must have the Central Bank of Sudan’s permission to repatriate profits and foreign currency. The Investment Act of 2013 enshrines the right to repatriate capital and profits, provided the investor has opened an investment account at the Central Bank of Sudan before entering into business. To avoid banking delays, many Sudanese firms complete a significant number of transactions outside of official channels or complete transactions abroad in U.S. Dollars, Euros, Riyals, or Dirhams. Whether or not the government will revise its practices to ensure a steady stream of foreign exchange, if international correspondent banking ever resumes, remains to be seen. The Investment Act also established courts to handle investment issues and disputes. According to the 2015 UNCTAD report, Sudan has put in place a relatively open investment legislative framework and many laws are in line with international best practices. However, their implementation is often impeded by the absence of secondary legislation, insufficient institutional capacity, and lack of coordination between different levels of government. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-review/205/sudan Sudan’s investment authority lists the process by which businesses must register to operate at: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Default.htm . The website outlines procedures for companies that wish to invest, including forming and ending relationships and license applications. There is no online business registration process. Officials at the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation recommend enlisting the service on an agent to help facilitate the business registration process. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Publications/Details/148 provides an outline of investment facilitation proposals. www.GER.co provides links to business registration sites worldwide. Sudan’s government does not have policies in place to promote outward investment. It does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Invest-Services.htm 3. Legal Regime Some ministries and regulatory agencies distribute the text or summary of proposed regulations before their enactment to interested stakeholders but are under no legal obligation to do so. There is no period of time set by law for the text of proposed regulations to be publicly available. Some agencies make received comments publicly accessible. There is no specialized government body or department tasked with soliciting and receiving these comments. Some ministries and agencies report on the results of the consultation on proposed regulations in the form of one consolidated response in an official gazette, journal, or other publication or directly distributed to interested stakeholders. This reporting on the results of the consultation is not required by law. https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# . There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# Regulations are developed at the federal (national), state, and local levels. Ministries develop regulations to support federal laws, while state and local jurisdictions can adopt additional regulations to address local concerns. Federal legislation is the most relevant to foreign businesses. Under the CLTG, legislation was drafted using a consensus approach that included input from affected ministries, consultations with local academics, business leaders, and international experts. The consultation period did not make the draft legislation available for public comment. The legislation was next reviewed by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to determine if it conformed to the Sudanese Constitution. After receiving MoJ approval, the legislation was reviewed and endorsed independently by the civilian Council of Ministers and the joint military-civilian Sovereign Council. Following endorsement, the bill would receive final approval by a majority vote during a joint Council of Ministers/Sovereign Council. The approved legislation would become law once it was published in the MoJ’s Official Gazette. [Note: With the ouster of Prime Minister Hamdok and dissolution of the CLTG’s Council of Ministers, military authorities have governed through the Sovereign Council by decree. End Note.] New regulations are posted on ministry websites and made available in printed pamphlets and booklets. Regulations are legally reviewable in court. Several ministries have committees that review complaints and arbitrate regulatory disputes. The CLTG committed to strengthen governance and improve fiscal transparency by establishing civilian control over all public finances and assets, including those under the control of the Sudanese security and intelligence services, and to develop a transparent budget that accounts for all public expenditures. The government sought to institutionalize its commitment to accountability and good governance through the development and adoption of a Public Financial Management (PFM) roadmap by September 2021. The roadmap would seek to outline a series of medium-term actions to address identified PFM vulnerabilities. Although finalization of the roadmap was derailed by the military takeover, the draft roadmap would provide a useful reference point for future civilian leadership to adopt. Sudan’s Ministry of Industry and Trade provides a list of all of Sudan’s bilateral and regional trade agreements: http://www.tpsudan.gov.sd/index.php/en/pages/details/154/Agreements Sudan is a signatory of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area Agreement (GAFTA) and a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMSEA). It is not a member of the WTO. Sudan does not currently qualify for the U.S Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Sudan’s legal code is a mixture of British common law practices, Islamic law, and customary law. Contracts are enforced through the courts. Sudan has written commercial and contractual laws. Business regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The Investment Act of 2013 established courts to handle disputes. Sudan’s investment authority lists the process by which businesses much register to operate at: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Default.htm . The website outlines procedures for companies that wish to invest, including forming and ending relationships and license applications. There is not an online business registration process. On May 12, 2021, Sudan passed Public Private Partnership Law No. 10 of 2021, which aims to create a business-friendly environment that attracts foreign investors. The law is part of a set of reforms driven by the transitional government to achieve a successful transition to an open, dynamic, and business-friendly economy. The law organizes and promotes public private partnerships (PPPs) to encourage private entities to invest and participate in projects alongside public entities. It also intends to ensure transparency and integrity in procedures and equal and fair treatment for bidders. The law creates a central unit with an independent budget to ensure the development, management, and implementation of PPP projects. It allows both the public and private sectors to suggest PPP projects. The Investment Encouragement Act, which was issued on 11 April 2021, seeks to improve on the 2013 Investment Act in terms of treatment of investors regardless of their nationality, and to create a more predictable and transparent regime that facilitates investment. Key changes include: (i) provision of new tax exemptions, including as regards the business profits tax; (ii) creation of an investment register for collecting data on investing entities; (iii) introduction of an online investment guide to clarify and facilitate investment procedures; (iv) creation of a specialized insurance company that insures investors against various risks (e.g., risks of nationalization, risks of war, domestic conflict and civil disobedience, risks of recession, etc.) for an annual premium, and (v) publication of a special exclusion list detailing the sectors and activities not available to foreign investors. The new law also requires foreign investors to deposit at least $250,000 to obtain a license. Furthermore, it clarifies the definitions of the various types of investment projects which were regulated in the 2013 Act, including State Projects, Investment projects, National Projects, and Strategic Projects. The law was published in the official Sudan Gazette of 12 May 2021 and is available at: https://moj.gov.sd/files/index/28 . The Economic Security Department of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) reviews transactions (mergers, acquisitions, etc.) and conduct (cartels, monopolization) for competition-related concerns (whether domestic or international in nature). This system is opaque; however, its decisions can be appealed through the judicial system. The government has the legal right to expropriate private property for public use under its eminent domain powers. The government has a history of expropriating private property without adequately compensating owners. In certain circumstances the government has incarcerated owners who refused to surrender their property. The CLTG formed the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee (commonly called the Dismantling Committee) in November 2019 after the CLTG approved a law to dismantle the institutions established under the Bashir regime. Despite initial steps by the Committee to recover assets stolen during the Bashir dictatorship and remove Bashir allies from leadership positions in government institutions, its efforts lacked a clear strategy and legal framework for recovering assets domestically and abroad associated with the banned National Congress Party, its officials, and its affiliates. Some of the Committee’s actions appeared partisan, capricious, and undertaken unilaterally without coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the agency that should, in theory, lead on asset recovery efforts. For example, the Committee oversaw the firing of over two hundred Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) technical experts in March 2021 but provided no recourse for those who contested their supposed affiliation with the National Congress Party. After the military takeover, members of the Committee were explicitly targeted for arrest. Several former members remain in custody on charges of criminal breach of trust, illicit wealth, and dealing in foreign exchange. Meanwhile, hundreds of government officials dismissed by the Committee were reinstated at the CBOS, Ministries, and other government agencies, although it is unclear how many of those reinstated are genuinely affiliated with the Bashir regime and how many are merely long-serving civil servants. The government controls most of the agricultural land in Sudan and has sold or leased millions of acres to Saudi Arabia and other countries. Land laws have historically been an issue of dispute between local communities and the government. The most recent examples of government expropriations were in 2019 when the Bashir regime bulldozed churches and sold the land to private investors. The government claimed the churches did not have permits. Some churches which had existed for decades lacked permits because the government would not issue them. The government claimed the churches were simply squatting on the land illegally. According to the law, for eminent domain claims the government should have compensated the churches. That did not happen in all cases. Government and Arab militias’ expropriation of land in Darfur, Gedaref, and Kassala states without compensation have been reported. In some cases, displaced persons returned to their land only to be denied access. In most instances, the government did not adequately respond to appeals. The Bankruptcy Act of 1929, Companies Act of 2003, and Insolvency Act of 2011 are the key bankruptcy laws currently in force in Sudan. The bankruptcy system is based on British legal traditions. 4. Industrial Policies The Sudanese government lists the following investment incentives: Exemption from taxes on profits for a term of not less than ten years. Free land or land at an incentivized price for the project. Nondiscriminatory treatment of the capital of investment, whether be it public, private, cooperative, or multi-sector capital. Guarantees the capital shall not to be nationalized, confiscated, or expropriated except through a law and against indemnity. Guarantees that money invested in a project shall not be confiscated or frozen, except through a judicial order. Recognition that the investor is entitled to transfer his or her money and profits; and Customs privileges for vehicles. http://sudanembassyke.org/index.php/economy-investment/why-invest-in-sudan/ The Investment Encouragement Act of 2021 included a provision to establish a specialized insurance company to insure investors against various risks (e.g., risks of nationalization, risks of war, domestic conflict and civil disobedience, risks of recession, etc.) for an annual premium. However, the government has not acted on this provision in the law. The government currently does not offer any special incentives for clean energy investments, including renewable energy, energy storage, energy efficiency, clean hydrogen, carbon sequestration, low-carbon transport and fuels, or other decarbonization technologies. Sudan currently operates free trade zones in Port Sudan and Garri. The Free Zones and Free Markets Law of 1994 govern these zones. The investment authority reports that projects in areas designated as Free Trade Zones and Duty-Free Zones enjoy the following policies: Exemption from a tax on profits for 15 years, renewable for an extra period; Exemption from personal income tax for salaries of expatriates; Exemption from all customs fees and taxes except service fees for products imported into or exported abroad from the zone; Exemption from all taxes and fees for real estate inside the zone; Authorization to transfer invested capital and profits from Sudan abroad through any bank licensed to operate in the zone; Exemption from customs fees for products of industrial projects established in the zones depending on materials used and local costs incurred in production and provided the value be estimated by a designated committee; Guarantees that money invested in the zones may not be frozen, confiscated, or arrested; Authorization to store goods transiting Sudan in zones under the supervision of customs police; and, Authorization to rent its land and buildings according to the terms it agrees upon and without being bound by any other law. http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Sudan-Invest-FreeZone.htm The government does not follow “forced localization” policies but offers tax incentives to foreign investors to establish “value-added” industries within Sudan. 5. Protection of Property Rights Sudanese laws protect private property rights. However, these laws are poorly enforced, and the government has a history of arbitrary property seizures without providing adequate compensation. Mortgages and liens exist, but the property registration system is antiquated. Property disputes, often involving claims over traditional lands, can take years to resolve. The government offers foreign investors restricted leases on land for specific projects. These leases are for five years but can be renewed in five-year increments for up to thirty years. Investors can transfer the leases to other investors, but only if the new investors maintain the general purpose of the original project. The legislative framework on intellectual property rights (IPR) is adequate, but enforcement remains uneven. Trademarks of popular American businesses, usually chain restaurants, are often used or changed slightly to suggest the original brand. Many grocery and hardware stores display American name-brand products shipped from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Sudan is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 2021 Special 301 report or the 2021 Notorious Markets List. Sudan is in the accession process to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is not currently a party to the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Sudan is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Sudan has a stock market (KSE) which is located in Khartoum. The KSE has over 67 companies ( http://www.kse.com.sd/ ) that include banks, brokerage firms, communication/media companies, investment and development houses, and industrial firms. Market trading occurs Sunday-Thursday from 1000-1200 local time. KSE has not published an annual report since 2019. Historically, Sudan has not had access to international banking institutions as it was under comprehensive U.S. economic and financial sanctions until late 2017. The U.S. government delisted Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in December 2022. Despite lifting of these comprehensive sanctions, international banks remain reluctant to operate in Sudan. Most foreign banks operating in Sudan are based in Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, or Qatar. Sudan faces a monetary crisis, with limited foreign exchange and a significant currency black market. The Central Bank of Sudan lists banks operating in Sudan at: https://cbos.gov.sd/en/content/operating-banks-sudan Under the IMF’s ECF program, Sudan has committed to strengthening financial sector soundness and mitigating risks, including through enhanced risk-based anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervision. In June 2021, Sudanese authorities had completed ten required AML/CTF onsite inspections of local banks. The inspections focused on politically exposed persons, suspicious transaction reporting, and higher-risk customers and transactions in the real estate sector. Following the conclusion of these onsite inspections, the Central Bank planned to provide aggregate data to the IMF on violations identified and sanctions levied, in line with Sudan’s existing legal framework. Under the ECF, Sudan has agreed to complete a money laundering and terrorist financing national risk assessment (NRA) and to disseminate the results of the NRA to financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions, and the general public. Sudanese civilian authorities also committed to endorse and adopt a national AML/CTF strategy to mitigate risks identified in the NRA. These are fundamental steps necessary to building an AML/CTF regime which can effectively respond to identified money laundering and terrorist financing threats. Sudan has a sovereign wealth fund called the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, established in 2008. The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) ranked it 32 out of 34 funds in its 2017 Resource Governance Index, and eight of nine funds in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account. ( https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SDN/oil-gas .) The CLTG established a sovereign wealth fund in 2020 to manage real estate recovered by the Dismantling Committee. This fund is not operational. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) associated with the military and security services play an unusually large role in the Sudanese economy and are currently involved in a range of commercial activities, including fuel storage, natural gas projects, solar panel manufacturing, infrastructure, the railroad sector, cotton and textiles, and food industries, including flour milling, bread production, and animal husbandry. Approximately 220 out of approximately 650 SOEs cataloged by the CLTG are associated with Sudan’s military and security services. Reportedly, many of these SOEs are inefficient and poorly managed; however, reforming and transferring them to civilian control has been politically sensitive. Although the CLTG made SOE reform a centerpiece of its broader economic and governance reform program, this agenda has stalled because of the military takeover. As part of the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program, Sudanese authorities committed to take the following actions by June 2022: (1) endorse an ownership strategy that sets forth the oversight and management framework for SOEs and guiding principles for a review of the existing stock of SOEs; (2) publish end-2021 financial statements and audit reports for ten priority SOEs and creating a calendar for annual publication of these reports thereafter; and (3) publish a complete list of SOEs, including those in the intelligence sector. SOE audits from previous years exist but authorities have not yet made them public. The U.S. government, in concert with the IMF, continues to press the Sudanese authorities to accelerate their review of SOE operations and publish the aforementioned documents as steps toward greater transparency and adherence to its IMF program. However, military authorities have resisted these reform efforts. Sudan does not have an active privatization program in place for SOEs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Sudan’s Investment Law (National Investment Encouragement Act, 1999, Amended (2013 and 2021)) sets the standards for business conduct and obligations. The law and its executive rules are applied to both Sudanese and foreign investors. The investment authority maintains oversight for “responsible business conduct” and provides information on regulations, services, and the various departments to which the investor could contact on its website: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/About-Ministry.htm . The investment authority also developed a “one-stop-shop” for information on land, customs, taxes, commercial registration, and agriculture among others. The law under its Chapter 6 “Privileges and Guarantees” and Chapter 8 “General Rules” commits the government to “non-nationalization or non-confiscation of projects.” Sudan’s Investment Council and Specialized Court create the regulations and are the bodies which settle overlapping issues. Sudan makes available an ombudsman at its Public Grievance Chamber ( www.ombudsman.gov.sd ). The Sudanese Constitution (1998) first established the General Ombudsman body. In 2011, Chapter V, Article 147 (1) of the Constitution (2011) established the Public Grievances Chamber. The Ombudsman’s office explains its complaint process and other information online. Corruption in the supply chain for commodities and minerals within the major cities and in the conflict-affected areas remains a concern. Sudan falls short of consistently strong supply chain due diligence. For example, while the government takes positive steps through its Ministry of Animal Resources ( http://mar.gov.sd/en/index.php/departments/view_dept/2 ) to outline regulations for implementation of livestock and fisheries administration, it does not, through its Ministry of Energy and Mining, prohibit the harmful use of cyanide or other dangerous chemicals in gold mining operations. In fact, the government and private companies use cyanide in gold extraction. Sudan is not an adherent to the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct International, does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Index (EITI) nor participates in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Sudan’s government does not have a natural climate strategy nor strategy for monitoring natural capital, such as biodiversity and ecosystems. It does not have policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions, nor are there any regulatory incentives in place to encourage resource efficiency, pollution abatement, or climate resilience. 9. Corruption Corruption is widespread in Sudan. The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials; nevertheless, government corruption at all levels is widespread. The Bashir regime made a few efforts to enforce legislation aimed at preventing and prosecuting corruption. The law provides the legislative framework for addressing official corruption, but implementation under the Bashir regime was weak, and punishments were lenient. Officials found guilty of corrupt acts could often avoid jail time if they returned ill-gotten funds. Under the Bashir regime, journalists who reported on government corruption were sometimes intimidated, detained, and interrogated by security services. A special anticorruption attorney investigated and prosecuted corruption cases involving officials, their spouses, and their children. Punishments for embezzlement include imprisonment or execution for public service workers, although these were almost never carried out. Under the Bashir regime, media reporting on corruption was considered a “red line” set by the National Intelligence and Security Services and a topic that authorities, for the most part, prohibited newspapers from covering. While reporting on corruption was no longer a red line under the CLTG, media continued to practice self-censorship on issues related to corruption. In August 2019, Omar Bashir was formally indicted on charges of corruption and illegal possession of foreign currency. Bashir’s trial began in August 2019; in December 2019, he was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on these charges. Bashir remains imprisoned as further charges are pending. Financial Disclosure: Under the Bashir regime, the law required high-ranking officials to publicly disclose income and assets. There were no clear sanctions for noncompliance, although the former Anti-Corruption Commission possessed discretionary powers to punish violators. The Financial Disclosure and Inspection Committee and the Unlawful and Suspicious Enrichment Administration at the Ministry of Justice both monitored compliance. Despite three different bodies ostensibly charged with monitoring financial disclosure regulations, there was no effective enforcement or prosecution of offenders. The 2019 Constitutional Declaration includes financial disclosure and prohibition of commercial activity provisions for members of the Sovereign Council and Council of Ministers, state and regional governors, and members of the Transitional Legislative Council. It also mandates the creation of an anti-corruption commission (not established) and an Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee (informally called the Dismantling Committee). However, following the October 2021 military takeover, the commission was abolished, many of its members imprisoned on corruption charges, and many government employees dismissed at the Commission’s direction were re-instated in their positions. Sudan ranked 164 out of 180 countries on Transparency International ‘s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index . https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Shaza Elmahdi Consultant on Sudan Center for International Private Enterprise 1211 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036 +1 202-721-9200 selmahdi@cipe.org Transparency International U.S. Office 1100 13th St NW, Suite 800Washington, DC 2000520005 Info-us@transparency.org 10. Political and Security Environment Sudan’s political and security environment is volatile. Neighborhood Resistance Committees, political parties, and other groups opposing the October 25, 2021, military takeover regularly stage large protests aimed at forcing the military leadership to relinquish control and return Sudan to its democratic transition. These protests have become violent, with 102 protesters killed as of June 2022 and over 2,000 injured by police and security forces since October 2021. On March 21, 2022, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Sudan’s Central Reserve Police for the use of excessive force against peaceful protestors. On May 23, 2022 the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Labor issued a business advisory to highlight growing risks to American businesses and individuals associated with conducting business with Sudanese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) which includes all companies under military control (hereafter collectively referred to as “SOEs and military-controlled companies”). These risks arise from recent actions undertaken by Sudan’s Sovereign Council and security forces under the military’s control and could adversely impact U.S. businesses, individuals, other persons, and their operations in the country and the region. U.S. businesses, individuals, and other persons, including academic institutions, research service providers, and investors (hereafter “businesses and individuals”) that operate in Sudan should be aware of the role of SOEs and military-controlled companies in its economy. Though Sudan’s military has long controlled a network of entities, following its seizure of power on October 25, 2021, it is in effective control of all SOEs. Further, Sudan’s military is increasing its direct control of Sudan’s many SOEs and plans for civilian control over SOEs has been abandoned. Businesses and individuals operating in Sudan and the region should undertake increased due diligence related to human rights issues and be aware of the potential reputational risks of conducting business activities and/or transactions with SOEs and military-controlled companies. U.S. businesses and individuals should also take care to avoid interaction with any persons listed on the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls’(OFAC) list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). The business advisory relates specifically to SOEs and military-controlled companies. The U.S. government does not seek to curtail or discourage responsible investment or business activities in Sudan with civilian-owned Sudanese counterparts. The full business advisory here: https://www.state.gov/risks-and-considerations-for-u-s-businesses-operating-in-sudan/. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Sudan suffers from high unemployment, unofficially estimated at 40%. The Sudanese educational system produces many skilled and talented workers, but an absence of career options prompts many to emigrate in search of better opportunities. U.S. business contacts have praised the professionalism of their Sudanese counterparts. Sudan is also experiencing a demographic “bulge” that has resulted in a disproportionate number of potential workers under 25 years of age. There is a large, informal market of small entrepreneurs. The country’s borders are porous, producing a large pool of unskilled labor market, with many workers from Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Syria. In November 2019, the CLTG dissolved all trade unions and associations as part of its effort to dismantle the remnants of the Bashir regime. The CLTG encouraged the formation of new trade unions. In 2021, the Ministry of Labor and Administrative Reform, with technical input from the International Labor Organization (ILO), finalized the drafting of a Trade Union Law. The draft law was not, however, passed prior to the military takeover. 14. Contact for More Information Justine King Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Khartoum +249-(0)18-702-2000 ext.2035 KingJA3@state.gov Suriname Executive Summary The government of Suriname (GOS) officially supports and encourages business development through local and foreign investment. The overall investment climate favors U.S. investors with experience working in developing countries. To attract foreign direct investment (FDI), authorities have planned to update institutional and legal frameworks to protect investors and eliminate restrictions regarding investment income transfers and control related FDI flows. However, the World Trade Organization’s 2019 Trade Policy Review concluded that Suriname’s investment regime has not changed since its last review in 2013. The report states that the overall regime, particularly the approval of FDI, may be discretionary rather than rules based. The extractives sector has historically attracted significant FDI, but numerous factors negatively impact the investment climate. These factors include an unclear process for awarding concessions and public tenders, corruption, institutional capacity constraints, and a lack of overall transparency. In January 2020, Apache and Total announced a “significant oil discovery” off the coast of Suriname, followed by similar discoveries in April 2020, July 2020, January 2021, and February 2022. In December 2020, Malaysian national oil company Petronas and ExxonMobil announced a discovery of hydrocarbons in Suriname’s Block 52. Experts estimate that it could take as much as 5-10 years to begin offshore oil production, assuming world oil prices support it. In 2020, the CEO of state-owned oil company Staatsolie estimated that the government of Suriname could earn $10-$15 billion over the course of 20 years if production reaches similar levels as in neighboring Guyana. Exploration activities are ongoing. U.S.-based Newmont Corporation and Canada-based IAMGOLD – the two major multinational gold companies in Suriname – continue to be the key players in Suriname’s gold mining sector, generating significant revenues for the government. Suriname’s economy has been in decline for the past seven years. To address this decline, the new government developed an economic and recovery plan to deal with these serious economic conditions. After taking office in July 2020, President Chandrikapersad Santokhi’s administration opened negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to arrange a financial assistance package and began talks with international bondholders to restructure Suriname’s repayment schedule. On December 22, 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 36-month, $688 million Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Suriname. The EFF will support the government’s economic recovery plan to restore fiscal sustainability, bring public debt down to sustainable levels, upgrade the monetary and exchange rate policy framework, stabilize the financial system, and strengthen institutional capacity to tackle corruption and money laundering and improve governance. On February 14, 2021, the IMF announced that it has reached a staff level agreement with Suriname on policy measures for the completion of the first review under the EFF arrangement. Since taking office, the Santokhi administration allowed the Surinamese dollar to float on the open market, raised taxes on fuel and high income-earners, increased prices for utilities, passed a new law on foreign currency, amended the State Debt Act to allow the government to take loans to address COVID-19, and began reforms of Suriname’s large civil service sector. The government has said it would implement a value-added tax in the future. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 20xx x of XX N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator N/A U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 20xx USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ N/A World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,620 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Suriname (GOS) supports and encourages local and foreign investment to develop its economy. The overall investment climate favors U.S. investors with experience working in developing countries. Investment opportunities exist in the oil and gas sector, mining, agriculture, timber, fishing, financial technology, and tourism. Suriname has no sector-specific laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, including U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment. The only exception is the petroleum sector. The state-owned oil company, Staatsolie, maintains sole ownership of all oil-related activities. Foreign investment is possible through exploration and production sharing contracts (PSCs) with Staatsolie. Five U.S. companies participate in PSCs as operators and/or contract partners. In May 2021, the National Assembly approved a law to establish a State-owned investment company, Suriname Investment Enterprise NV. The Government of Suriname announced plans to disband its two existing investment entities: the Institute for Promoting Investments in Suriname (InvestSur) and the Investment and Development Corporation of Suriname (IDCS). The MFA established an International Business Directorate to act as a first point of entry for foreign investors. Suriname does not have a formal business roundtable or ombudsman aimed at investment retention or maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control – statutory, de facto, or otherwise. No law requires that domestic nationals own a minimum percentage of domestic companies or that foreign nationals hold seats on the board. No law caps or reduces the percentage of foreign ownership of any private business enterprise. Except for the hydrocarbon sector, there are no sector-specific restrictions applied to foreign ownership and control. With hydrocarbons, the law limits ownership to Staatsolie, the state-owned oil company, which maintains sole ownership of all petroleum-related activities. Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) countries do enjoy favored status over other sources of foreign investment, but in practice international firms from beyond the CSME are not denied investment opportunities. An Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union aims to provide European companies better access to Suriname. Suriname has not yet ratified the EPA. Government ministries screen inbound foreign investments intended for the sector of the economy that they oversee. Special commissions screen all necessary legal and financial documents. Screening criteria vary but are intended to determine a proposed investment’s compliance with local law. The screening process is neither public nor transparent and can be considered a barrier to investment. The Department of International Business at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests that prospective investors fill out an intake form. The intake form will enable its appraisal committee to conduct a quick scan and conclude whether the FDI in question fits the development goals of the government. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted an investment policy review of Suriname in 2019. The Inter-American Development Bank published a report called Framework for Private Development in Suriname in 2013. The World Bank Group published Suriname Sector Competitiveness Analysis, focusing on the agribusiness and extractive sectors in 2017. There are no civil society organizations in the country that have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. The Santokhi administration has emphasized its desire to diversify Suriname’s economy and deepen business ties with the United States, Europe, and others. In 2020, Suriname’s new government began publishing public tenders on the Ministry of Public Works website. The government created a Presidential Commission on the Surinamese Diaspora to explore the possibilities of raising capital and increasing business ties with the Surinamese community in the Netherlands. In May 2021, the National Assembly approved a law to establish a State-owned investment company, Suriname Investment Enterprise NV. The MFA created an International Business Directorate to act as a first point of entry for foreign investors. There is no online registration system. Companies must register with the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which provides guidance on registration procedures. At the time of registration, the company needs a local notary’s assent to ratify the company bylaws. For non-residents, the notary also sends a request to the Foreign Exchange Commission for approval. Applicants must obtain a tax number at the registration office of the tax department. Applications then go to the Ministry of Justice and Police and finally to the President for approval. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technological Innovation launched the Suriname Electronic Single Window (SESW) in September 2019. Online submission and processing of documents required for import, transit of goods, and export is now possible. The World Bank’s Doing Business report indicates starting a business requires 66 days. The local Chamber of Commerce and Industry states it can take as little as 30 days. The Government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Suriname’s outward investment is minimal. Due to the small size of the local market, some domestic companies have expanded to CARICOM member states, such as Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago. 3. Legal Regime Suriname does not have transparent policies nor effective laws to foster competition. The previous National Assembly (2015-2020) indicated that it would vote on a draft competition law but did not do so. The Competitiveness Unit of Suriname coordinates and monitors national competitiveness and is working towards establishing policies and suggesting legislation to foster competition. Current legislation on topics such as taxes, the environment, health, safety, and other matters are not purposefully used to impede investment but may still form obstacles. Employment protection legislation is among the most stringent in the world. Labor laws, for instance, prohibit employers from firing an employee without the permission of the Ministry of Labor once the employee has fulfilled his or her probationary period, which by law is limited to two months. Tax laws are criticized for overburdening the formal business sector, while a large informal sector goes untaxed. Public sector contracts and concessions are not always awarded in a clear and transparent manner. The current administration has announced its commitment to greater transparency in the public tendering process, and the Ministry of Public Works is publishing procurement notices on its website on a regular basis. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist within relevant ministries at the national level. It is this level of regulation that is most relevant for foreign businesses. The government may consult with relevant stakeholders on regulations, but there is no required public process. The government presents draft laws and regulations to the Council of Minsters for discussion and approval. Once approved, the President’s advisory body, the State Council, considers the draft. If approved, the government presents a draft to the National Assembly for discussion, amendment, and approval, and then to the President for signature. Legislation only goes into effect with the signature of the President and after publication in the National Gazette. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are often outdated and therefore not transparent nor consistent with international norms. The National Assembly passed the Act on Annual Accounts in 2017 to create more fiscal transparency by requiring all companies, including state owned enterprises, to publish annual accounts based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The law went into effect in 2020 for large companies, while it went into effect for small and medium sized companies (SMEs) in 2021. Small companies can use the IFRS for SMEs. Suriname passed new legislation in October 2018 to professionalize and institute better standards in the accounting profession. The legislation created the Suriname Chartered Accountants Institute (SCAI) and makes membership mandatory for accountants in Suriname. The board of the SCAI has the responsibility to monitor the quality of the profession and apply disciplinary measures. The intake form used by the division of International Business at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation does mention that companies can submit an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) if available. Draft bills or regulations are discussed in view of the public, and relevant stakeholders may be consulted. The National Assembly has established the email address feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr as a place where individuals can give their opinion on draft legislation. There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. However, the National Assembly publishes the actual text of adopted laws on its website. It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms that ensure the government follows administrative processes might be, as the processes have not been made public. There is no public administration law. The Auditor General’s office is an independent body in charge of supervising the financial management of government funds. The Supreme Audit Institution reports to the National Assembly. The Central Accountant Service exercises control on administrative processes at the ministries and reports to the Ministry of Finance. There are no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions, or their summaries, are published. The minimum wage law was revised by State Decree on July 18, 2019. In January 2021, the government announced its intent to implement a value-added tax (VAT) by January 01, 2022, but it has not yet been implemented. The VAT is now scheduled to be implemented July 1, 2022. No new business rules were announced in 2021. It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms are, as the process has not been made public. Regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years have not been fully implemented. Regulations are developed by ministries that have jurisdiction over the relevant area, in consultation with stakeholders. The government’s executive budget proposal and enacted budget are easily accessible to the public. Actual revenues and expenditures regularly deviate from the budget as passed, and the origin and level of accuracy of some information in the budget is unreliable. A full end-of-year report is not publicly available. The Supreme Audit Institution publishes a limited audit based on self-reporting by the ministries. The State Debt Management Office (SDMO) is responsible for the operational management of the public debt of the government. Data regarding public debt is published every three months in the Government Gazette of Suriname and on the SDMO website. As a member of CARICOM, Suriname has committed to regionally coordinated regulatory systems. Suriname uses national and international standards. Standards developed by international and regional standardization bodies include ISO, Codex Alimentarius, International Electro Technical Commission, CROSQ, ASTM International, COPANT, SMIIC (Standards and Metrology Institute for Islamic Countries), NEN (Nederland Normalisatie Instituut), ETSI, GLOBAL GAP, etc. Suriname is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) lists only one notification from Suriname in 2015. Suriname’s legal system is based on the Dutch civil system. Judges uphold the sanctity of contracts and enforce them in accordance with their terms. When an individual or company disputes a signed contract, they have the right to take the case to court. The judiciary consistently upholds local law, applies it, and enforces it for local and international businesses. Laws are defined in criminal, civil, and commercial codes, and verdicts are based on the judge’s interpretation of those codes. There is no specialized commercial court. The commercial codes contain commercial legislation. Historically, the judicial system has been considered independent of the executive branch. Most observers consider the judicial system to be procedurally competent, fair, reliable, and free of overt government interference. Due to a shortage of judges and administrative staff, processing of civil cases can be delayed. Last year, the Court of Justice appointed seven new judges to ease the delay in court cases. There are now 30 judges. Draft regulations may be reviewed by interested stakeholders, and they may be given the opportunity to comment. Since October 2019, individuals have also had the option to comment on draft legislation via email at feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr. There is no formal, required public consultation process. Suriname has no general administrative law, so there are no special administrative tribunals. Judges of the regular courts also hear cases of administrative law. The overall legal regime, and more particularly the approval of foreign direct investment (FDI), may be discretionary rather than rules based. This can lead to heightened unpredictability and uncertainty and associated risks of favoritism and corruption. In July 2021 the National Assembly approved ratification of The Law of Accession to the Republic of Suriname to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) In April 2020, the previous National Assembly passed the COVID-19 State of Emergency Law, which granted the government broad powers to enforce COVID-19-related precautionary measures. It also created a $53 million fund to assist struggling businesses, and it allowed the government to take loans and advances from local institutions and consolidate them into a single mega-loan. The new National Assembly extended the law in August 2020 and extended it once again in February 2021. The National Assembly extended this law once again in August 2021, for the duration of twelve months. In August 2021, the National Assembly approved an amendment of the turnover tax law. Turnover tax on goods, and services was increased to twelve percent. In February 2021, the Foreign Exchange Commission announced three new measures regarding exchange rate policy. First, exporters are now required to repatriate earned export revenues to Suriname, which requires a buyer abroad to pay for purchased goods through a Surinamese commercial bank. Second, exporters and foreign exchange offices must exchange 30% of their foreign currency income into Surinamese Dollars (SRD). Third, importers are required to pay for imports via Surinamese commercial banks. Several criminal investigations of former government officials began in 2020. In February 2020, former Central Bank Governor Robert van Trikt was arrested on fraud charges. In August 2020, the new National Assembly officially indicted ex-Minister of Finance Gillmore Hoefdraad, which allowed the Attorney General to launch an investigation into alleged financial mismanagement by Hoefdraad in collaboration with the ex-Governor of the Central Bank of Suriname, Robert van Trikt. In December 2020, the National Assembly voted to indict former Vice President (and current National Assembly member) Ashwin Adhin, which allowed the Attorney General to pursue a criminal investigation for embezzlement, fraud, and destruction of government property. In Jan 2022, both Hoefdraad and van Trikt were sentenced to twelve and eight years in prison respectively. There is no primary one-stop-shop website for investments that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. There are no domestic agencies currently reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. The previous National Assembly (2015-2020) considered draft laws on competition and consumer protection but did not ultimately vote on them. According to the authorities, no date for enactment is foreseen. Both draft laws also cover state-owned enterprises. The CARICOM Competition Commission is based in Suriname, and it monitors potential anti-competitive practices for enterprises operating within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. According to Article 34 of Suriname’s constitution, expropriation will take place “only for reasons of public utility” and with prior compensation. In practice, the government has no history of expropriations. However, Article 42 of Suriname’s constitution specifically refers to all natural resources as property of the nation, and states that the nation has inalienable rights to take possession of all natural resources to utilize them for the economic, social, and cultural development of Suriname. There is no history of government measures alleged to be, or that could be argued to be, indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. Suriname has bankruptcy legislation. Creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts, including foreign contract holders, have the right to file for liquidation of debts due to insolvency. In a case where there is a loan from a commercial bank, repayment of the bank loan takes precedence. Bankruptcy, in principle, is not criminalized. However, in cases where a board of directors encouraged a company to pursue bankruptcy to avoid creditors, courts have viewed this behavior as a criminal offense. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Suriname stands at 139 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies Under current regulations, foreign investors, including underrepresented investors such as women can benefit from both tax and non-tax incentives. Tax-based incentives include a nine-year tax holiday that can be extended by one year if the investment is at least $13 million; accelerated depreciation of assets; and tax consolidation. Under the Raw Minerals Act, the government grants an exemption of duties for the import of raw materials from CARICOM member countries. Exemptions are also granted in the food industry, the soft drink industry, and the fruit juice industry. In 2011, the government eliminated import duties on computers and related items. The law accords special consideration on investments exceeding $50 million and investments in the exploration and exploitation of bauxite, hydrocarbons, gold, and radioactive minerals. Large investments in the mining sector are subject to extensive negotiations between the government and investors. The government maintains the ability to grant incentives that depart from the provisions in the 2001 Investment Law, for example, incentives related to the provisions of infrastructure. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects. The government currently does not offer incentives such as feed-in tariffs, discounts on electricity rates, or tax incentives for clean energy investments, including renewable energy, energy storage, energy efficiency, clean hydrogen, carbon sequestration, low-carbon transport and fuels, and other de-carbonization technologies. Suriname does not have a free trade zone or duty-free zone. There are no enforcement procedures for performance requirements on investors. The 2001 Investment Law authorizes the Minister of Finance to grant both tax and non-tax incentives for new investments and for the expansion of existing investments. Incentives for new investments are on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance. Incentives are available for both domestic and foreign investors, but investors must apply for these incentives before the initial investment is made. Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory. There are no mechanisms used to enforce any rules on local data storage within the country. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are enforced. Mortgages and liens are common. Mortgages are registered with the Mortgage Office. However, no effective registration system exists for other types of liens. Non-residents can request to lease land from the government if they have established a company under Surinamese law. However, the process from application to approval is lengthy. The proportion of land in Suriname that lacks a clear land title remains unknown. There is no sustained effort by the government to identify property owners and register land titles. Article 1-1 of the L-1 decree, Principles of Land Policy, states that “all land, to which others have not proven their right to ownership, is the domain of the State.” Furthermore, Article 41 of the Surinamese constitution states that natural wealth and resources are property of the nation and shall be used to promote economic, social, and cultural development. There is no effective demarcation of substantial land claims by indigenous people in the interior. Unoccupied, legally purchased property cannot be reverted to other owners, such as squatters. Suriname is a member of the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization; however, it has not ratified the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Even though Suriname is party to multiple agreements, intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement is weak. The current legal framework mentions protection of copyright, trademarks, and patents; however, that legislation dates to 1912 (amended in 2001). Although the National Assembly passed amendments to the Music Copyright Law of 1913 in March 2015, there is no enforcement. Infringement on rights and theft are not uncommon due to the absence of enforcement capacity. There is also no protection provided for industrial designs, utility models, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated circuits or undisclosed information. No IPR-related laws or regulations have been enacted in the past year. A draft IPR bill had been pending under the previous National Assembly (2015-2020), but it did not receive a vote. Currently, patents and copyrights must be registered abroad due to a lack of local legislation. Suriname doesn’t track or report seizures of counterfeit goods. Statistics are not available. IPR violations are rarely produced. Suriname is not mentioned in the 2022 United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report. Suriname is not named in the 2022 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The government does not promote portfolio investment. There is a small self-regulating stock market with eleven companies registered. It meets twice a month but does not have an electronic exchange. There is no effective regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. At present, Suriname is facing liquidity shortfalls. Sufficient policies do exist to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. As an IMF Article VIII member, Suriname has agreed to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and at market rates. Foreign investors that establish businesses in Suriname are able to get credit on the local market, usually with a payment guarantee from the parent company. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products. There is, however, a Central Bank regulation that limits a commercial bank’s credit exposure to a single client. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products. According to the IMF Article IV Consultation in 2019, the banking system faces pressing vulnerabilities. Based on June 2020 data, the total non-performing loan ratio was 13.5 percent in June 2020, indicating an increase of 2.9 percent compared to 10.5 percent in December 2019, and is well above the internal guideline of five percent. (Source: Financial Nota 2021) The estimated total assets of the economy’s largest banks are: DSB Bank (annual report, 2018): $1,007 million. DSB annual report 2019 is delayed due to COVID-19 and time needed to implement. IFRS Hakrin Bank (semiannual report June 30, 2020): $731.8 million. Republic Bank Limited (2021 annual report, Suriname-based assets): $395.3 million. (The Republic Bank Limited of Trinidad and Tobago acquired Royal Bank of Canada’s Suriname holdings in 2015. Finabank (annual report, 2020): $477.4 million Suriname has a central bank system. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Suriname. They are subject to the same measures and regulations as local banks. According to an IMF assessment in 2016, banks in Suriname are among those in the region that have lost their correspondent relationships. The IMF notes that though the loss of correspondent banking relationships has not reached systemic proportions, a critical risk still exists. According to the IMF’s Article IV Consultation report in 2019, there is a possibility of losing corresponding banking relationships given recent overseas investigations of potential money laundering via Suriname’s financial sector. The reputational risk to both local and foreign banks acting as their correspondents is substantial. In November 2021, Suriname made its National Risk Assessment publicly available. There are no restrictions for foreigners to open a bank account. Banks require U.S. citizens to provide the information necessary to comply with the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The process is a lengthy one. On May 4, 2017, the National Assembly passed legislation establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). In August 2020, President Santokhi announced that the government would operationalize Suriname’s SWF, as the previous government had not instituted the necessary state decrees to do so. In December 2020, the government held talks with experts from Norway to learn about the Norwegian SWF. Suriname does not participate in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in the oil, agribusiness, mining, communications, travel, energy, and financial sectors. The Ministry of Finance is currently working on developing a data base for SOEs. On the website of the Finance Ministry there is a list of 47 parastatals and 57 foundations that are state owned. According to available data from the Ministry of Finance, 22 parastatals are wholly owned. The ministry has also published some annual reports of SOEs from 2015 to 2018. There are SOEs that are governed by a director and some by a board. The Ministry is still in the process of information gathering from SOEs. According to data currently available, the number of employees is 13,789. Data regarding total assets and total net income of SOEs is not yet available. There is no public list of SOEs. SOEs receive advantages when competing in the domestic market. These include access to government guarantees and government loans otherwise unavailable to private enterprises. Additionally, SOEs have access to land and raw materials inaccessible to private entities. The government does not yet adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. However, the government’s 2021 restructuring plan mentions that there are plans to implement policies in cooperation with international institutions such as the IDB regarding corporate governance for SOEs. In 2012, the GoS announced a privatization program largely in the agricultural sector, but the only privatization was the state-owned banana company in 2014. The official governing accord of the ruling coalition states that privatization of SOEs will be considered where appropriate, and President Santokhi has indicated that some SOEs will need to be privatized. However, no privatizations have taken place since the new government installation in July 2020. Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. In 2014, the Belgium multinational, UNIVEG, acquired a 90 percent stake in the state-owned banana company through a public, international bidding process; the European Commission assisted with the bidding. Later, UNIVEG pulled out, and the Government took over the remaining 90 percent of shares and UNIVEG’s $15 million debt and is now the only share holder. This is the only example of privatization in Suriname. No standard privatization or public bidding process has been established. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a growing awareness of expectations and standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) among consumers and producers. Historically, Alcoa’s subsidiary Suralco took the lead on RBC in Suriname, and large multinationals such as Newmont continue to be the largest proponents of RBC. Some larger state-owned and local companies also model RBC, including Staatsolie, Surinam Airways, Telesur, and the Fernandes Group of Companies, which hold the distribution rights for Coca-Cola and the McDonalds franchise rights. In March 2020, several prominent local companies and business leaders established the SU4SU COVID-19 support fund, which raised money and donated medical equipment and PPE to local health authorities to assist their efforts in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic. The government has not taken systematic measures to promote RBC. Companies are allowed to develop their own policies and standards. The government incorporates RBC in some of its partnerships and agreements with multinational firms. For example, recent agreements between Staatsolie and foreign companies for offshore drilling include stipulations regarding RBC. The government has no national point of contact or ombudsman for stakeholders to acquire information or raise concerns about RBC. The GOS has not conducted a National Action Plan on RBC or Business and Human Rights. It is not known if RBC policies are part of the government’s procurement decisions. There have been reported instances of forced labor but none that can be indicative of systemic forced labor and none within the supply chain. Instances of child labor have been reported in agriculture, wood processing, small construction, and street vending but are most pervasive in the artisanal gold mining sector. The government continues to have land rights issues with the Indigenous and Maroon communities as there are no laws recognizing land rights. Both communities have reported cases of land issuances in their regions that have negatively impacted their way of life. There have been no reports of arrests or violence against environmental defenders. There have been no reports of high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights. The Labor Inspection Department from the Ministry of Labor supervises and enforces the observance of legal regulations regarding the conditions of employment and the protection of employees performing duties. Laws were enforced only in the formal sectors. Labor inspectors did not make regular occupational safety and health inspections. The government is drafting consumer and environmental protection laws. In March 2020, the National Assembly passed an Environment Framework Law. There is no legislation for corporate governance nor executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. The Act on Annual Accounts will require companies to publish annual accounts based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) starting in 2020. The Suriname Trade and Business Association has taken the lead in promoting RBC. The Suriname Conservation Foundation initiated a Green Partnership Program in 2020 signed by 14 enterprises, 13 of which are local, to stimulate awareness about a green economy and nature preservation. So far, no incidents have been reported indicating that those monitoring and or advocating around RBC cannot work freely. The host government has not encouraged adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. In March 2019, the government adopted legislation to join the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in order to become a member of the World Diamond Council Association. Suriname became a member of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in 2017. There are no domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments and/or other RBC/BHR policies or practices. Suriname is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security companies, a supporter of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers nor a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA). Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World Comply Chain In March 2020, the National Assembly approved the National Environmental Framework Act. The government sets out its policy regarding the environment in the environmental strategy as laid down in the development plan 2017-2021of Suriname and Suriname’s National Determined Contribution report. The current government is discussing Carbon-Credit policies, but details are not yet known. Although Suriname is carbon negative, the Environmental Authority is considering CO2 and GHG reduction regulations for the private sector. The National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname (NIMOS) is in the process of finalizing the first set regulations. Regulatory incentives are not yet in place. The environmental Framework Act mentions in article 19 that an environmental fund is to be set up to co-finance the activities of the following: The National Environmental Authority ( NMA) within the scope of protecting, conserving and sustainable use of the environment Introducing incentives to reduce environmental pollution Stimulating research amongst others in the context of climate change and loss of biodiversity Increasing environmental awareness in Suriname Other activities for the conservation and restoration of the environment or that are beneficial to the protection of the environment that cannot be financed from other resources. Some types of public procurement policies must follow the Environmental Framework Act, and include environmental, and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement and climate resilience. 9. Corruption Suriname’s legal code penalizes corruption, but often enforcement has been sporadic. Government officials are occasionally removed from assignments, but convictions are rare. On September 1, 2017, the parliament passed anti-corruption legislation nearly 15 years after the initial draft bill was introduced to the National Assembly. An anti-corruption commission, mandated in the legislation, has not been created. In August 2020, President Santokhi established a Presidential committee to inventory executive orders and determine what steps are necessary to start the commission. Suriname ranks 94 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Index of Transparency International. Existing anti-corruption laws do not extend to family members of officials, or to political parties. There are currently no laws or regulations to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. The Ministry of Public Works announced that it will soon adopt stricter, but also flexible, measures for transparency in public tenders. Legal requirements for tenders are to be examined. Non-legal requirements will be adjusted and introduced shortly. Civil servants and politicians will be prohibited from taking part in tenders. The government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials. Local private companies do not use internal controls, ethics, or compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Multinationals follow international standards. Suriname has signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Last November, the authorities announced that Suriname ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Suriname is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. There are no NGOs that focus exclusively on investigating corruption. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. Corruption is believed to be most pervasive in government procurement, the awarding of licenses and concessions, customs, and taxation. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Fraud Department Suriname Police Force (Korps Politie Suriname) Havenlaan, Paramaribo, Suriname (597) 404-943 The government has yet to operationalize an anti-corruption commission. 10. Political and Security Environment Since the conclusion of the interior war in 1992, Suriname has not experienced politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. In July 2019, illegal gold miners damaged property at the Rosebel goldmine after the company’s security personnel fatally shot an illegal goldminer. The mine was subsequently closed for one month, and then reopened. Political polarization has not become severe in Suriname. Elections are considered free and fair by international observers, including national elections on May 25, 2020, which brought the then-opposition parties to power. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In general, both skilled and unskilled labor is available on the local market. Foreign workers are mainly active in the extractive industries and agricultural sector. Haitians and Cubans have entered the workforce and are active in several sectors, often at lower wages. Documented foreign workers are protected by labor laws. Labor force data shows that men are better represented in the labor market. The majority of jobseekers are women. On the Global Gender Gap Index 2021 Suriname has a score of 0.7 in the area of Economic Participation and Opportunity. According to the Statistical Bureau, the unemployment rate in 2019 was 11 percent. An estimated 15 percent of the working-age population worked in the informal economy. There is no recent data on informal employment. Outdated, limited or absent data of the labor force and employment vacancies hinder a complete description and analysis. Heavy equipment operators, welders, and other skilled workers in the extractive industries are in high demand. Business organizations have recently indicated that there is a shortage of workers in the hospitality sector, wood processing industry, and manufacturing. In recent years, Suriname recruited physicians and ER nurses from the Philippines to work in hospital emergency rooms. Because of the economic downturn from 2015-2016, most of these workers left the country, which led to a shortage. Since 2005, Suriname has welcomed Cuban medical professionals on a rolling basis. In March 2020, Cuba sent 20 doctors and 30 nurses to Suriname to assist with the government’s COVID-19 response. In January 2021, the Minister of Public Health announced that approximately 40 of the almost 100 Cuban medical workers in Suriname had voluntarily agreed to return to Cuba. There are no policies that require the hiring of nationals; however, the Work Permits Act prohibits employers from employing foreigners without a work permit granted by the Ministry of Labor. Labor laws make it difficult for employers to respond to fluctuating market conditions. The Dismissal Permits Act prohibits employers from dismissing employees without permission from the Ministry of Labor. Collective redundancy for organizational or economic reasons is permitted in cases such as the closure or decline of a business. Generally, when an employee is laid off, unions negotiate with the employer regarding a package and duration of social benefits. Labor organizations sometimes object to work based on contracts as opposed to full time, ongoing employment. Labor laws are not waived to attract or retain investment. Suriname does not have special economic zones, foreign trade zones, or free ports with alternative labor policies. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread in both the private and public sector. Data regarding the percentage of the economy covered by collective bargaining agreements is unavailable. Employees of most large multi-national firms are unionized. Labor dispute mechanisms are in place and regularly used for mediation and arbitration. Labor Strikes posing an investment risk are rare. Suriname is a member of the International Labor Organization and recognizes international labor law in its domestic legislation. In 2018, Suriname made a moderate advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. The government ratified International Labor Organization Convention 138 concerning the minimum age for admission to employment, acceded to the Protocol to the Forced Labor Convention, and amended the Law on Labor for Children and Young People, raising the minimum age of work to 16 years. Pending draft bills in 2021 at the National Assembly are: Draft Working Conditions Act of 2019, the Draft Equal Treatment Act, and drafts on violence and sexual harassment, working hours regulation, company consultation, and a change to the Work Permit Aliens Act. 14. Contact for More Information Judith Dijks Commercial Assistant U.S. Embassy Paramaribo 165 Kristalstraat Paramaribo, Suriname +597-556-700 dijksjb@state.gov Sweden Executive Summary Sweden is generally considered a highly favorable investment destination. Sweden offers an extremely competitive, open economy with access to new products, technologies, skills, and innovations. Sweden also has a well-educated labor force, outstanding communication infrastructure, and a stable political environment, which makes it a choice destination for U.S. and foreign companies. Low levels of corporate tax, the absence of withholding tax on dividends, and a favorable holding company regime are additional incentives for doing business in Sweden. Sweden’s attractiveness as an investment destination is tempered by a few structural business challenges. These include high personal and VAT taxes. In addition, the high cost of labor, rigid labor legislation and regulations, a persistent housing shortage, and the general high cost of living in Sweden can present challenges to attracting, hiring, and maintaining talent for new firms entering Sweden. Historically, the telecommunications, information technology, healthcare, energy, and public transport sectors have attracted the most foreign investment. However, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail trade have also recently attracted increased foreign funds. Overall, investment conditions remain largely favorable. In the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Competitiveness Report, Sweden was ranked eight out of 138 countries in overall competitiveness and productivity. The report highlighted Sweden’s strengths: human capital (health, education level, and skills of the population), macroeconomic stability, and technical and physical infrastructure. Bloomberg’s 2021 Innovation Index ranked Sweden fifth among the most innovative nations on earth; a pattern reinforced by Sweden ranked second on the European Commission’s 2021 European Innovation Scoreboard and second on the World Intellectual Property Organization/INSEAD 2021 Global Innovation Index. Also in 2021, Transparency International ranked Sweden as one of the most corruption-free countries in the world – fourth out of 180. Sweden is perceived as a creative place with interesting research and technology. It is well equipped to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution with a superior IT infrastructure and is seen as a frontrunner in adopting new technologies and setting new consumer trends. U.S. and other exporters can take advantage of a test market full of demanding, highly sophisticated customers. The COVID-19 pandemic considerably impacted the Swedish economy, but following several fiscal stimulus packages, a successful vaccination rollout, and a relaxation of pandemic-related restrictions, Sweden’ economy has recovered fully to pre-pandemic levels with no notable impact on the investment climate. Climate and the environment are a central concern for the Swedish government, political parties across the political spectrum, businesses, and the public at large. Successive Swedish governments have actively lobbied for ambitious action to protect the environment and to curb greenhouse gases within a multilateral, internationally binding framework and by welcoming research, innovation, and investment within the fields of climate and the environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 2 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $63,847 https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $54,050 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are no laws or practices that discriminate or are alleged to discriminate against foreign investors, including and especially U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy (either at the pre-establishment (market access) or post-establishment phase of investment). Until the mid-1980s, Sweden’s approach to direct investment from abroad was quite restrictive and governed by a complex system of laws and regulations. Sweden’s entry into the European Union (EU) in 1995 largely eliminated all restrictions. Restrictions to investment remain in the defense and other sensitive sectors, as addressed in the next section “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment.” The Swedish Government recognizes the need to further improve the business climate for entrepreneurs, education, and the flow of research from lab to market. Swedish authorities have implemented a number of reforms to improve the business regulatory environment and to attract more foreign investment. In addition, Sweden introduced supplementary provisions to the EU Regulation on Foreign Direct Investments (adopted in March 2019), which entered into force November 1, 2020. Sweden is in the process of drafting its domestic Investment Screening Regime, and the government commission report has been circulated for comments. A final comprehensive regime is expected to enter into force in 2023. In the meantime, Sweden does however have the obligation and ability to review and prevent investments that pose national security threats. There are very few restrictions on where and how foreign enterprises can invest, and there are no equity caps, mandatory joint-venture requirements, or other measures designed to limit foreign ownership or market access. However, Sweden does maintain some limitations in a select number of situations: Accountancy: Investment in the accountancy sector by non-EU-residents cannot exceed 25 percent. Legal services: Investment in a corporation or partnership carrying out the activities of an “advokat,” a lawyer, cannot be done by non-EU residents. Air transport: Foreign enterprises may be restricted from access to international air routes unless bilateral intergovernmental agreements provide otherwise. Air transport: Cabotage is reserved to national airlines. Maritime transport: Cabotage is reserved to vessels flying the national flag. Defense: Restrictions apply to foreign ownership of companies involved in the defense industry and other sensitive areas. On January 1, 2020, Sweden enacted new regulations giving Swedish armed forces and security services authority to deny or revoke operating licenses to mobile radio providers that threaten national security. Swedish company law provides various ways a business can be organized. The main difference between these forms is whether the founder must own capital and to what extent the founder is personally liable for the company’s debt. The Swedish Act (1992:160) on Foreign Branches applies to foreign companies operating through a branch and also to people residing abroad who run a business in Sweden. A branch must have a president who resides within the European Economic Area (EEA). All business enterprises in Sweden (including branches) are required to register at the Swedish Companies Registration Office, Bolagsverket. An invention or trademark must be registered in Sweden in order to obtain legal protection. A bank from a non-EEA country needs special permission from the Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, to establish a branch in Sweden. Sweden also adheres to EU regulations on investment screening and approval mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. Sweden has in the past five years not undergone an investment policy review (IPRs) by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the past five years, Sweden has not undergone a review of investment policy-related concerns by civil society organizations, including those based in the host country or in third countries. Business Sweden’s Swedish Trade and Invest Council is the investment promotion agency tasked with facilitating business. The services of the agency are available to all investors. All forms of business enterprise, except for sole traders, have to be registered with the Swedish Companies Registration Office, Bolagsverket, before starting operations. Sole traders may apply for registration in order to be given exclusive rights to the name in the county where they will be operating. Online applications to register an enterprise can be made at https://www.bolagsverket.se/en and are open to foreign companies. The process of registering an enterprise is clear and can take a few days or up to a few weeks, depending on the complexity and form of the business enterprise. All business enterprises, including sole traders, need also to be registered with the Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverket, before starting operations. Relevant information and guides can be found at http://www.skatteverket.se . Depending on the nature of business, companies may need to register with the Environmental Protection Agency, Naturvårdsverket, or, if real estate is involved, the county authorities. Non-EU/EEA citizens need a residence permit, obtained from the Swedish Board of Migration, Migrationsverket, in order to start up and/or run a business. A compilation of Swedish government agencies that work with registering, starting, running, expanding and/or closing a business can be found at http://www.verksamt.se . The Government of Sweden has commissioned the Swedish Exports Credit Guarantee Board (EKN) to promote Swedish exports and the internationalization of Swedish companies. EKN insures exporting companies and banks against non-payment in export transactions, thereby reducing risk and encouraging the expansion of operations. As part of its export strategy presented in 2015, the Swedish Government has also launched Team Sweden to promote Swedish exports and investment. Team Sweden is tasked with making export market entry clear and simple for Swedish companies and consists of a common network for all public initiatives to support exports and internationalization. The Government does not generally restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. The only exceptions are related to matters of national security and national defense; the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) is tasked with control and compliance regarding the sale and export of defense equipment and dual-use products. ISP is also the National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention and handles cases concerning targeted sanctions. 3. Legal Regime As an EU member, Sweden has altered its legislation to comply with the EU’s stringent rules on competition. The country has made extensive changes in its laws and regulations to harmonize with EU practices, all to avoid distortions in, or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of investment. The institutions of the European Union are publicly committed to transparent regulatory processes. The European Commission has the sole right of initiative for EU regulations and publishes extensive, descriptive information on many of its activities. More information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/decision-making/index_en.htm ; http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm . There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Nongovernmental organizations and private sector associations may submit comments to government draft bills. The submitted comments are made public in the public consultation process. Rule-making and regulatory authority on a national level exists formally in the legislative branch, the Riksdag. As a member of the EU, a growing proportion of legislation and regulation stem from the EU. These laws apply in some case directly as national law or are put before the Riksdag to be enacted as national law. The executive branch, the Government of Sweden, and its various agencies draft laws and regulations that are put before the Riksdag and are adopted on a national level when they enter into force. Municipalities may draft regulations that are within their spheres of competence. These regulations apply at the respective municipality only and may vary between municipalities. Sweden is in principle supportive of the creation of an EU-wide environmental, social, and governance (ESG) taxonomy for sustainable activities. The EU taxonomy is a classification system, establishing a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities to help the EU scale up sustainable investment and implement the European green deal. The ambition is that the EU taxonomy would provide companies, investors, and policymakers with appropriate definitions for which economic activities can be considered environmentally sustainable. In this way, the taxonomy is believed to create security for investors, protect private investors from greenwashing, help companies to become more climate-friendly, mitigate market fragmentation, and help shift investments where they are most needed. Draft bills and regulations, which include investment laws, are made available for public comment through a public consultation process, along the lines of U.S. federal notice and comment procedures. Current and newly adopted legislation can be found at the Swedish Parliament’s homepage and in the various government agencies dealing with the relevant regulation: http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/ . Key regulatory actions are published at Lagrummet: https://lagrummet.se/ . Lagrummet serves as the official site for information on Swedish legislation and provides information on legislation in the public domain, all statutes currently in force, and information on impending legislation. “Post och Inrikes Tidningar” serves in certain aspects a similar role as the Federal Register in the U.S., through which public notifications are published. The proclamations of “Post och Inrikes Tidningar” can be found at the Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket): https://poit.bolagsverket.se/poit/PublikPoitIn.do . The judicial branch and various agencies are tasked with regulation oversight and/or regulation enforcement. The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen, known as the Justitieombuds-männen (JO), are tasked to make sure that public authority complies with the law and follows administrative processes. They also investigate complaints from the general public. Regulations are reviewed on the basis of scientific and/or data-driven assessments. The principle of public access to official documents, offentlighetsprincipen, governs the availability of the results of studies that are conducted by government entities and furthermore to comments made by government entities. The principle provides the Swedish public with the right to study public documents as specified in the Freedom of the Press Act. The status of Sweden’s public finances is available at Statistics Sweden, Sweden official statistics agency: https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/public-finances/ . The status of Sweden’s national debt is available at the Swedish National Debt Office (Riksgälden): https://www.riksgalden.se/en/statistics/statistics-regarding-swedens-central-government-debt/ . As an EU-member, Sweden complies with EU-legislation in shaping its national regulations. If a national law, norm, or standard is found to be in conflict with EU-law, then the national law is altered to be in compliance with EU-law. Sweden adheres to the practices of WTO and coordinates its actions in regard to WTO with other EU-member countries as the EU-countries have a common trade policy. Sweden’s legal system is based on the civil law tradition, common to Europe, and founded on classical Roman law, but has been further influenced by the German interpretation of this tradition. Swedish legislation and Swedish agencies provide guidance on whether regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. Swedish courts are independent and free of influence from other branches of government, including the executive. Sweden has a written commercial law and contractual law and there are specialized courts, such as commercial and civil courts. The Swedish courts are divided into: Courts of general jurisdiction (the District Courts, the Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court) which have jurisdiction with respect to civil and criminal cases; Administrative courts (County Administrative Courts, Administrative Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Administrative Court) which have jurisdiction with respect to issues of public law, including taxation; Specialist courts for disputes within certain legal areas such as labor law, environmental law and market regulation. Sweden is a signatory to the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Law; foreign awards may be enforced in Sweden regardless of which foreign country the arbitral proceedings took place. The main source of arbitration law in Sweden is the Swedish Arbitration Act, which contains both procedural and substantive regulations. Sweden is a party to the Lugano and the Brussels Conventions, and, by its membership of the EU, Sweden is also bound by the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. An arbitral award is considered final and is not subject to substantive review by Swedish courts. However, arbitral awards may be challenged for reasons set out in the Arbitration Act. An award may, for example, be set aside after a challenge because of procedural errors, which are likely to have influenced the outcome. During the 1990s, Sweden undertook significant deregulation of its markets. In a number of areas, including the electricity and telecommunication markets, Sweden has been on the leading edge of reform, resulting in more efficient sectors and lower prices. Nevertheless, a number of practical impediments to direct investments remain. These include a fairly extensive, though non-discriminatory, system of permits and authorizations needed to engage in many activities and the dominance of a few very large players in certain sectors, such as construction and food wholesaling. Foreign banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, and cooperative mortgage institutions are permitted to establish branches in Sweden on equal terms with domestic firms, although a permit is required. Swedes and foreigners alike may acquire shares in any company listed on NASDAQ OMX. Sweden’s taxation structure is straightforward and corporate tax levels are low. In 2013, Sweden lowered its corporate tax from 26.3 percent to 22 percent in nominal terms and lowered it again to 21.4 percent in 2019. The effective rate can be even lower as companies have the option of making deductible annual appropriations to a tax allocation reserve of up to 25 percent of their pretax profit for the year. Companies can make pre-tax allocations to untaxed reserves, which are subject to tax only when utilized. Certain amounts of untaxed reserves may be used to cover losses. Due to tax exemptions on capital gains and dividends, as well as other competitive tax rules such as low effective corporate tax rates, deductible interest costs for tax purposes, no withholding tax on interest, no stamp duty or capital duties on share capital, and an extensive double tax treaty network, Sweden is among Europe’s most favorable jurisdictions for holding companies. Unlisted shares are always tax-exempt, meaning there is no qualification time or minimum holding of votes or capital. Listed shares are exempt if the holding represents at least 10 percent of the voting rights (or is contingent on the holder’s business) and the shares are held for at least one year. As part of a COVID-19 stimulus package, the government lowered the payroll tax for persons aged 19-23 from 31.42 percent to 19.73 percent. The lower rate is temporary and applies until March 31, 2023. Personal income taxes are among the highest in the world. Since public finances have improved due to extensive consolidation packages to reduce deficits, the government has been able to reduce tax pressure as a percentage of GDP. Though well below the national average in the EU area, public debt, as a share of GDP, rose to approximately 40 percent as a result of the enactment of several fiscal stimulus packages which aimed to boost the economy in the COVID-19 pandemic. Early 2022 figures indicate public debt will fall below 40 percent by the end of 2022. Significant tax increases in the near future remain unlikely. One particular focus of the Swedish government has been tax reductions to encourage employers to hire the long-term unemployed. Dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries in Sweden to their parent company are not subject to Swedish taxation. Dividends distributed to other foreign shareholders are subject to a 30 percent withholding tax under domestic law, unless dividends are exempt or taxed at a lower rate under a tax treaty. Tax liability may also be eliminated under the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive. Profits of a Swedish branch of a foreign company may be remitted abroad without being subject to any other tax than the regular corporate income tax. There is no exit taxation and no specific rules regarding taxation of stock options received before a move to Sweden. Instead, cases of double taxation are solved by applying tax treaties and cover not only moves within the EU but all countries, including the United States. For detailed tax guidance, see the Swedish Tax Administration’s website (in English): http://www.skatteverket.se/servicelankar/otherlanguages/inenglish.4.12815e4f14a62bc048f4edc.html There is no primary or “one-stop-shop” website that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Business Sweden, Sweden’s official trade and investment organization, is the investment promotion agency tasked with developing business in Sweden. The services of the agency are available to all investors. As an EU member, Sweden has altered its legislation to comply with the EU’s stringent rules on competition. The competition law rules are contained in the Swedish Competition Act (2008:579), which entered into force in November 2008. The fundamental antitrust provisions have been the same since 1993. The Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) is the main enforcement authority of the Swedish Competition Act. The agency adheres to transparent norms and procedures, which are made available on its homepage: Konkurrensverket | Välfärd genom väl fungerande marknaderSwedish Competition Authority | Welfare through well-functioning markets . SCA decisions can be appealed to the administrative courts. This can be done by submitting a written appeal to the Swedish Competition Authority within three weeks from the day the applicant received the SCA’s initial decision. Private property is only expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, with fair compensation, and in accordance with established principles of international law. The Swedish legislation on bankruptcy is found in a number of laws that came into force in different periods of time and to serve different purposes. The main laws on insolvency are the Bankruptcy Act (1987:672) and the Company Reorganization Act (1996:764), but the Preferential Rights of Creditors Act (1970:979), the Salary Guarantee Act (1992:497), and the Companies Act (1975:1385) are equally important. In 2010, Sweden strengthened its secured transactions system through changes to the Rights of Priority Act that give secured creditors’ claims priority in cases of debtor default outside bankruptcy. According to data collected by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency takes two years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold as a going concern. The average recovery rate is 78 cents on the dollar. Globally, Sweden ranked 17 of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business 2020 report. 4. Industrial Policies The Swedish government offers certain incentives to set up a business in targeted depressed areas. Loans are available on favorable terms from the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, Tillväxtverket, and from regional development funds. A range of regional support programs, including location and employment grants, low rent industrial parks, and economic free zones are available. Regional development support is concentrated in the lightly populated northern two-thirds of the country. In addition, EU grant and subsidy programs are generally available only for nationals and companies registered in the EU, usually on a national treatment basis. The Swedish government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing direct investment projects. The Swedish government incentivizes investment in clean energy through a quota system, tax regulation mechanisms, and a subsidy scheme. For more information, visit the Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten) website: https://www.energimyndigheten.se/en/sustainability/ The Swedish government evaluates the efforts to support clean energy pursuant to Article 22 of Directive 2009/28 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. The most recent report (in Swedish) can be found here (link to download pdf): https://www.regeringen.se/4aff0d/contentassets/93b13493aa734f01bf14ade8412365a4/ses-5e-rapport-utvecklingen-fornybar-energi.pdf Sweden has foreign trade zones with bonded warehouses in the ports of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, and Jönköping. Goods may be stored indefinitely in these zones without customs clearance, but they may not be consumed or sold on a retail basis. Permission may be granted to use these goods as materials for industrial operations within a free trade zone. The same tax and labor laws apply to foreign trade zones as to other workplaces in Sweden. There are no Special Economic Zones in Sweden. As an EU Member State, Sweden adheres to the EU’s General Data Protection Directive (GDPR) (95/46/EC) which spells out strict rules concerning the processing of personal data. Businesses must tell consumers that they are collecting data, what they intend to use it for, and to whom it will be disclosed. Data subjects must be given the opportunity to object to the processing of their personal details and to opt-out of having them used for direct marketing purposes. This opt-out should be available at the time of collection and at any point thereafter. GDPR entered into force on May 18, 2018 – and it is a Regulation, i.e. directly applicable in member states. The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Frameworks were designed by the U.S. government (Department of Commerce) and the European Commission to provide companies on both sides of the Atlantic with a mechanism to comply with data protection requirements when transferring personal data from the European Union to the United States in support of transatlantic commerce. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a July 16 ruling in the Schrems II case invalidated the legal basis for the U.S. Department of Commerce-managed EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework (“Privacy Shield”) and imposed substantial burdens on parties using standard contractual clauses (SCCs). Subsequent guidance from the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) threatens to impose additional obstacles to use of the SCCs to transfer personal data to the United States. The United States continues to engage the European Commission to develop a new Privacy Shield mechanism and to ensure SCCs can be used for data transfers to the United States. For further information and guidance on the Privacy Shield Framework, please see: Privacy Main Page, Office of Privacy and Open Government, U.S. Department of Commerce (doc.gov) The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection, Integritetsskyddsmyndigheteten, works to prevent encroachment upon privacy through information and by issuing directives and codes of statutes. Integritetsskyddsmyndigheteten (IMY) also handles complaints and carries out inspections. By examining government bills, IMY ensures that new laws and ordinances protect personal data in an adequate manner. Further guidance and information are available in English on their website at Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection | IMY . There are no measurements that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside Sweden’s territory. Sweden imposes no performance requirements on presumptive foreign investors. In general, there is no government policy that requires the hiring of nationals. There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. Sweden does not follow “forced localization,” the policy in which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology and there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. Various municipal-level agencies and business associations have targeted U.S. cloud service providers in Sweden. These entities have claimed that any information processed by a U.S. cloud provider is subject to U.S. government scrutiny through the CLOUD Act, limiting customers’ privacy. This perception has adversely impacted U.S. cloud service providers’ sales in Sweden and given local cloud service firms an unfair advantage in the market. In addition, this perception has spurred a two-year government project to examine the options for the development of a Swedish government cloud, effectively halting U.S. cloud service sales as customers await the investigation’s outcome. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government’s investigation report was delayed. The final part of the report was released on December 15, 2021. The report proposed that the government initiates an assignment to establish a coordinated state IT operation start on 1 January 2023. Final reporting of the assignment must take place no later than 30 June 2024. The ordinance on coordinated government IT operations and necessary changes the authorities’ instructions shall enter into force on 1 July 2024. 5. Protection of Property Rights Swedish law generally provides for adequate protection of real property. Mortgages and liens exist, and the recording system is reliable. Almost all land has clear title and unoccupied property ownership cannot revert to other owners. Financial mechanisms are available in Sweden for securitization of properties for lending purposes and have been in use since the early 1990s. Nordic banks account for the vast majority of secured lending transactions. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, can provide further information regarding the regulations involved with securitization of properties at https://www.fi.se/en/ . As a member of the European Union, Sweden adheres to a series of multilateral conventions on industrial, intellectual, and commercial property. Patents: Protection in all areas of technology may be obtained for 20 years. Sweden is a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention of 1973; both entered into force in 1978. Copyrights: Sweden is a signatory to various multilateral conventions on the protection of copyrights, including the Berne Convention of 1971, the Rome Convention of 1961, and the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Swedish copyright law protects computer programs and databases. Between 2005-2008, Sweden gained notoriety as a safe haven for internet piracy due to rapid internet connection speeds, a lag in implementing EU Directives, and weak enforcement efforts. In 2009, however, Sweden implemented the EU’s Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED) 2004/48/EC and increased its enforcement against internet piracy and, a few years later, also saw the conviction of the operators behind the Pirate Bay.org, a notorious BitTorrent tracker for illegal file sharing, and an increase in legal file sharing. Legislative measures combined with added resources for enforcement and the emergence of successful legal alternatives have all contributed to a substantial increase in music and film distribution by legal means since 2010. In 2016, Sweden set up a Specialist Court for IPR-related cases, to further increase efficiency by pooling specialist competence. In 2020, severe copyright infringement was added to the criminal code, giving police and prosecutors additional enforcement tools, and increasing the maximum penalty for such crimes to six years imprisonment. Trademarks: Sweden protects trademarks under a specific trademark act (1960:644) and is a signatory to the 1989 Madrid Protocol. Trade secrets: Proprietary information is protected under Sweden’s patent and copyright laws unless acquired by a government ministry or authority, in which case it may be made available to the public on demand. Designs: Sweden is a party to the Paris Convention and the Locarno Agreement and designs are protected by the Swedish Design Protection Act, as well as the Council Regulation on Registered and Unregistered Designs. Protection under the act lasts for renewable terms of one, or several five-year periods with a maximum protection of 25 years. Sweden is not included in USTR’s Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector Credit is allocated on market terms and is made available to foreign investors in a non-discriminatory fashion. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. NASDAQ-OMX is a modern, open, and active forum for domestic and foreign portfolio investment. It is Sweden’s official stock exchange and operates under specific legislation. Furthermore, the Swedish government is neutral toward portfolio investment and Sweden has a fully capable regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investments. Several foreign banks, including Citibank, have established branch offices in Sweden, and several niche banks have started to compete in the retail bank market. The three largest Swedish banks are Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), Svenska Handelsbanken, and Swedbank. Nordea is the largest foreign bank and largest bank in Sweden, while Danske Bank is the second largest foreign bank and the fifth largest bank in Sweden. A deposit insurance system was introduced in 1996, whereby individuals received protection of up to SEK 250,000 (USD 29,250) of their deposits in case of bank insolvency. On December 31, 2010, the maximum compensation was raised to the SEK equivalent of 100,000 euro. The Swedish Central Bank, Riksbank, functions as Sweden’s central bank system. https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/ The banks’ activities are supervised by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, http://www.fi.se , to ensure that standards are met. Swedish banks’ financial statements meet international standards and are audited by internationally recognized auditors only. The Swedish Bankers’ Association, http://www.bankforeningen.se , represents banks and financial institutions in Sweden. The association works closely with regulators and policy makers in Sweden and Europe. Sweden is not part of the Eurozone; however, Swedish commercial banks offer euro-denominated accounts and payment services. On July 1, 2014, Sweden signed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement with the U.S. Financial institutions in Sweden are now obligated to submit information in accordance with FATCA to the Swedish Tax Agency. In February 2015, the Swedish Parliament decided on new laws and regulations needed to implement FATCA. The Parliamentary decision means the government’s proposals in Bill 2014/15:41 were adopted, including for example, the introductions of: a new law on the identification of reportable accounts with respect to the agreement; changes to tax procedure act; new legislation on the exchange of information with respect to the agreement; and consequential amendments to the Income Tax Act and other laws. The provisions entered into force on April 1, 2015. For full text of Bill 2014/15:41, please see http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/bd8cf7f897364944b35f5f30c099bc0c/genomforande-av-avtal-mellan-sveriges-regering-och-amerikas-forenta-staters-regering-for-att-forbattra-internationell-efterlevnad-av-skatteregler-och-for-att-genomfora-fatca-prop.-20141541 . Foreign banks or branches offering financial services must have an authorization from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, to conduct operations. As part of the authorization application process, FI reviews the firm’s capital situation, business plan, owners, and management. Parts of the firm’s daily operations may also require authorization from FI. The applicable regulatory code can be found at http://www.fi.se/en/our-registers/search-fffs/2009/20093/ . There are no reported losses of correspondent banking relationships in the past three years and there are no current correspondent banking relationships that are in jeopardy. Foreigners have the right to open an account in a bank in Sweden provided he/she can identify him/herself and the bank conducts an identity check. The bank cannot require the person to have a Swedish personal identity number or an address in Sweden. Sweden does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund or similar entity. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is widespread awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers in Sweden. All businesses are expected to comply with local laws and regulations, and to observe the international norms and principles for human rights, labor protection, sustainable development, and anti-corruption. Firms that pursue RBC are viewed favorably, often publicizing their adherence to generally accepted RBC principles such as those contained in OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Volvo Trucks, for example, has collaborated with USAID in pursuing RBC efforts outside of Sweden. The Swedish National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines can be found at: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/handel-och-investeringsframjande/nationella-kontaktpunkten/ . The Government of Sweden has adopted a platform for sustainable business, the term it uses for efforts related to RBC/CSR (link to pdf): https://www.government.se/49b750/contentassets/539615aa3b334f3cbedb80a2b56a22cb/sustainable-business—a-platform-for-swedish-action . Sweden effectively and fairly enforces domestic laws in relation to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. There are no alleged/reported human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC that foreign businesses should be aware of, as for example, alleged instances of forced and/or child labor in domestic supply chains, forced evictions of indigenous peoples, or arrests of and violence against environmental defenders.Sweden has put in place corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. Sweden is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).Sweden is one of seventeen states that have finalized The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. It is a supporter of and participant in International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Representatives of the Sámi people have repeatedly requested meaningful consultation on issues that relate to mining, wind, and other projects proposed for their areas. One area of focus is the proposed Gállok (Kallak) iron ore mine in a traditional reindeer herding area. UN Human Rights Council special rapporteurs urged against a license for the open pit mine, which they noted would create significant and irreversible risks to Sámi lands, resources, culture, and livelihoods. The Sámi also express concern about the lack of good-faith consultations and the failure to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of the Sámi. Sweden adopted a new law in January 2022, which requires consultations with the Sámi on issues that affect their interests. The law takes effect March 2022 at the national level, but local and regional consultations will not be required for another two years. In 2020, Sweden’s supreme court ruled that Sámi hunting rights lost in 1993 should be restored to the Sámi village Girjas Sameby. The ruling has been interpreted as a move to restore lost land resource rights to the Sámi. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Sweden adopted in January 2018 a Climate Policy Framework consisting of three pillars: revised climate policy targets, a climate law binding future governments to targets set by Parliament, and a Climate Policy Council. Sweden’s long-term climate target is to achieve zero net GHG emissions by 2045 and to reach negative emissions after that (i.e., emissions lower than what nature absorbs and/or the amount of GHG emissions Sweden curbs abroad through funding climate projects in other countries). To achieve that, remaining emissions within Sweden need to be at least 85 percent lower than emissions in 1990. The climate law requires the Swedish government to present a climate policy action plan to Parliament at the beginning of each quadrennial parliamentary cycle and to report to Parliament on its implementation each year. The national Climate Policy Council – an independent, interdisciplinary expert body comprised of scholars and experts from a broad range of society – is tasked with evaluating how well government policy is aligned with the 2045 goal. Sweden also has a framework in place to safeguard biodiversity and a sustainable environment referred to as “Sweden’s environmental goals.” The environmental goal system consists of a generational goal, 16 environmental quality goals and milestones in the areas of waste, biodiversity, hazardous substances, sustainable urban development, air pollution and climate. Sweden’s environmental goals are the national implementation of the environmental dimension of the global sustainability goals. The framework can be found here: https://www.sverigesmiljomal.se/miljomalen/ There are regulatory incentives implemented by the Swedish government to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity, clean air, or other desirable ecological benefits. Public procurement policies in Sweden include environmental and green growth considerations such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience. Sweden refers to its implemented procurement policy framework as “sustainable public procurement” and it includes not only the impact on the environment, but also a broader definition of sustainability, which includes the social and economic dimensions. More information can be found at The National Public Procurement Agency (Upphandlingsmyndigheten): https://www.upphandlingsmyndigheten.se/en/sustainable-public-procurement/ 9. Corruption Investors have an extremely low likelihood of encountering corruption in Sweden. While there have been cases of domestic corruption at the municipal level, most companies have high anti-corruption standards, and an investor would not typically be put in the position of having to pay a bribe to conduct business. There are cases of Swedish companies operating overseas that have been charged with bribing foreign officials; however, these cases are relatively rare. Although Sweden has comprehensive laws against corruption, and ratified the 1997 OECD Anti-bribery Convention, in June of 2012, the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group has given an unfavorable review of Swedish compliance to the dictates of that Convention. The group faulted Sweden for not having a single conviction of a Swedish company for bribery in the last eight years, for having unreasonably low fines, and for not re-framing their legal system so that a corporation could be charged with a crime. Swedish officials object to the review, claiming that lack of convictions is not proof of prosecutorial indifference, but rather indicative of high standards of ethics in Swedish companies. In 2019, the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group repeated its recommendations and urged Sweden to follow them. Over the last five years, two high-profile cases have involved Swedish companies. Telia Company’s operations in Uzbekistan received considerable public attention and cost the CEO and other senior officials their jobs. Telia Company was in the process of divesting its operations in Uzbekistan following a probe by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) pertaining to illegal payments. In September 2017, Telia Company reached an agreement to pay $965.8 million to settle U.S. and European criminal and civil charges that the company had paid bribes to win business in Uzbekistan. In December 2019, Ericsson reached an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay more than $1 billion to resolve a foreign corrupt practices case which involved bribing government officials, falsifying books and records, and failing to implement reasonable internal accounting controls. The resolutions covered criminal conduct in Djibouti, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Kuwait. Ericsson also entered into a three-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ. As part of this resolution, Ericsson agreed to engage an independent compliance monitor for three years. The monitor’s main responsibilities include reviewing Ericsson’s compliance with the terms of the settlement and evaluating Ericsson’s progress in implementing and operating its enhanced compliance program and accompanying controls as well as providing recommendations for improvements.Sweden does not have a specific agency devoted exclusively to anti-corruption, but a number of agencies cooperate together. A list of Sweden’s Public and Private Anti-Corruption Initiatives can be found at https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/sweden . UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery Sweden has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention (see list of signatories at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html ). Sweden is party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (see list of signatories and their implementation reports at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm ). The National Anti-Corruption Group at the Swedish Police, Nationella anti-korruptionsgruppen, handles the investigation of corruption offenses and is engaged in prevention efforts. Corruption claims can be reported to the Group by calling +46 114 14. Watchdog organization: Transparency International Sweden Telephone: + 46 (0)72 74 45 558 E-mail address: info@transparency.se https://www.transparency.se/ 10. Political and Security Environment Sweden is politically stable, and no changes are expected. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In 2021, there were 5,602,000 people aged 15–74 years in the labor force, not seasonally adjusted. There were 2,952,000 men and 2,650,000 women in the labor force. The relative labor force participation rate was 74.5 percent. This rate was 77.3 percent for men and 71.7 percent for women. Sweden’s labor force of 5.6 million is disciplined, well educated, and highly skilled. Approximately 68 percent of the Swedish labor force is unionized, although membership is declining. Swedish unions have helped to implement business restructuring to remain competitive, and strongly favor employee education and technical advancements. Management- labor cooperation is generally excellent and non-confrontational. The National Mediation Office, which mediates labor disputes in Sweden, reported in its summary findings for 2020 that no working day was lost due to a strike in Sweden in 2020. Foreign/migrant workers are covered by Swedish and EU labor laws. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. In general, there is no government policy that requires the hiring of nationals. Sweden has a Co-determination at Work Act, which provides for labor representation on the boards of corporate directors once a company has reached more than 25 employees. This law also requires management to negotiate with the appropriate union, or unions prior to implementing certain major changes in company activities. It calls for a company to furnish information on many aspects of its economic status to labor representatives. Labor and management usually find this system works to their mutual benefit. The Co-determination at Work Act and the Employment Protection Act together set the rules for the adjustment employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions. Severances and layoffs are based on seniority and are conducted in consultation with unions. Unemployment insurance and other social safety net programs are available for workers laid off for economic reasons. Government-sponsored training programs to facilitate the transition for unemployed persons into areas reporting labor shortages are available, but their scope is targeted. The cost of doing business in Sweden is generally comparable to most OECD countries, though some country-specific cost advantages are present. Overall salary costs have become increasingly competitive due to relatively modest wage increases over the last decade and a favorable exchange rate. This development is even more pronounced for highly qualified personnel and researchers. There is no fixed minimum wage by legislation. Instead, wages are set by collective bargaining by sector. The traditionally low-wage differential has increased in recent years as a result of increased wage setting flexibility at the company level. Still, Swedish unskilled employees are relatively well paid, while well-educated Swedish employees are relatively less well paid compared to those in competitor countries. The average increases in real wages in recent years have been high by historical standards, in large part due to price stability. Even so, nominal wages in recent years have been slightly above those in competitor countries, about 2 percent annually. Employers must pay social security fees of about 31.5 percent. The fee consists of statutory contributions for pensions, health insurance, and other social benefits. Sweden has ratified most International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions dealing with worker’s rights, freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the major working conditions and occupational safety and health conventions. More information on Sweden’s labor agreements and legislation in English can be found on the Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s website at http://www.lo.se/english/startpage . An amended Labor law was agreed upon in June 2021. The amendments to the law are proposed to enter into force on June 30, 2022. The amendments to the Labor law will give employers greater flexibility to manage their workforce based on the skills needed for their business and improve predictability at various stages in a dismissal process. Employees will in return get more predictability regarding different employment conditions and forms of employment. Employers may, among other things, have an increased opportunity to make exceptions from the order of ending employment contracts, as Swedish labor laws are based on seniority. The rules for dismissal for personal reasons are made clearer in the amended law and the employer does not bear the wage cost in the event of dismissal disputes. At the same time, there will be a better balance between employees with different employment conditions. Sweden is a member of the European Union (EU). The EU impacts Sweden’s trade relationship with the United States in that the EU has a common trade policy for all member countries. A study conducted by the Swedish Tax Authority in 2020 assessed the size of the informal economy in Sweden to be 2.3 percent as share of GDP (2006 figure) and the share had remained largely constant in the last thirteen years. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $46,503 2020 $63,847 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $81,935 2020 $55,404 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $73.5% 2020 76.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Statistics Sweden (SCB). Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 413,512 100% Total Outward 464,891 100% Luxembourg 59,401 14.4% United States 85,939 18.5% The Netherlands 58,890 14.2% The Netherlands 46,019 9.9% United Kingdom 50,825 12.3% United Kingdom 33,311 7.2% United States 48,767 11.8% Norway 32,700 7.0% Germany 41,219 10.0% Finland 28,730 6.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Unit U.S. Embassy Stockholm Dag Hammarskjölds Väg 31 115 89 Stockholm, Sweden +46 (0)8 783 5309 StockholmICS@state.gov U.S. Commercial Service U.S. Embassy Stockholm Dag Hammarskjölds Väg 31 115 89 Stockholm, Sweden www.export.gov/sweden office.stockholm@trade.gov Switzerland and Liechtenstein Executive Summary Switzerland is welcoming to international investors, with a positive overall investment climate. The Swiss federal government enacts laws and regulations governing corporate structure, the financial system, and immigration, and concludes international trade and investment treaties. However, Switzerland’s 26 cantons (analogous to U.S. states) and largest municipalities have significant independence to shape investment policies locally, including incentives to attract investment. This federal approach has helped the Swiss maintain long-term economic and political stability, a transparent legal system, extensive and reliable infrastructure, efficient capital markets, and an excellent quality of life for the country’s 8.6 million inhabitants. Many U.S. firms base their European or regional headquarters in Switzerland, drawn to the country’s modest corporate tax rates, productive and multilingual workforce, and well-maintained infrastructure and transportation networks. U.S. companies also choose Switzerland as a gateway to markets in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Furthermore, U.S. companies select Switzerland because of favorable and less restrictive labor laws compared to other European locations as well as availability of a skilled workforce. In 2019, the World Economic Forum rated Switzerland the world’s fifth most competitive economy. This high ranking reflects the country’s sound institutional environment and high levels of technological and scientific research and development. With very few exceptions, Switzerland welcomes foreign investment, accords national treatment, and does not impose, facilitate, or allow barriers to trade. According to the OECD, Swiss public administration ranks high globally in output efficiency and enjoys the highest public confidence of any national government in the OECD. The country’s competitive economy and openness to investment brought Switzerland’s cumulative inward direct investment to USD 1.4 trillion in 2020 (latest available figures) according to the Swiss National Bank, although nearly half of this amount is invested in regional hubs or headquarters that further invest in other countries. In order to address international criticism of tax incentives provided by Swiss cantons, the Federal Act on Tax Reform and Swiss Pension System Financing (TRAF) entered into force on January 1, 2020. TRAF obliges cantons to offer the same corporate tax rates to both Swiss and foreign companies, while allowing cantons to continue to set their own cantonal tax rates and offer incentives for corporate investment. These can be deductions or preferential tax treatment for certain types of income (such as for patents), or expenses (such as for research and development). Switzerland joined the Statement of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) in July 2021. It intends to implement the BEPS effective minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent by January 2024, after a referendum to amend the Swiss constitution. Personal income and corporate tax rates vary widely across Switzerland’s cantons. Effective corporate tax rates ranged between 11.85 and 21.04 percent in 2021, according to KPMG. In Zurich, for example, the combined effective corporate tax rate (including municipal, cantonal, and federal taxes),was 19.7 percent in 2021. The United States and Switzerland have a bilateral tax treaty. Key sectors that have attracted significant investments in Switzerland include information technology, precision engineering, scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, and machine building. Switzerland hosts a significant number of startups. A new “blockchain act” came fully into force in August 2021, which is expected to benefit Switzerland’s already sizeable ecosystem for companies in blockchain and distributed ledger technologies. There are no “forced localization” laws designed to require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology (e.g., data storage within Switzerland). Switzerland follows strict privacy laws and certain personal data may not be collected in Switzerland. Switzerland is a highly innovative economy with strong overall intellectual property protection. Switzerland enforces intellectual property rights linked to patents and trademarks effectively, and new amendments to the country’s Copyright Act to strengthen copyright enforcement on the internet came into force in April 2020. There are some investment restrictions in areas under state monopolies, including certain types of public transportation, telecommunications, postal services, alcohol and spirits, aerospace and defense, certain types of insurance and banking services, and the trade in salt. The Swiss agricultural sector remains protected and heavily subsidized. Liechtenstein Liechtenstein’s investment conditions are identical in most key aspects to those in Switzerland, due to its integration into the Swiss economy. The two countries form a customs union, and Swiss authorities are responsible for implementing import and export regulations. Both Liechtenstein and Switzerland are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, which also includes Iceland and Norway). EFTA is an intergovernmental trade organization and free trade area that operates in parallel with the European Union (EU). Liechtenstein participates in the EU single market through the European Economic Area (EEA), unlike Switzerland, which has opted for a set of bilateral agreements with the EU instead. Liechtenstein has a stable and open economy employing 40,328 people in 2020 (latest figures available), exceeding its domestic population of 39,055 and requiring a substantial number of foreign workers. In 2020, 70.6 percent of the Liechtenstein workforce were foreigners, mainly Swiss, Austrians and Germans, most of whom commute daily to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein was granted an exception to the EU’s Free Movement of People Agreement, enabling the country not to grant residence permits to its workers. Liechtenstein is one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Liechtenstein’s gross domestic product per capita amounted to USD 162,558 in 2019 (latest data available). According to the Liechtenstein Statistical Yearbook , the services sector, particularly in finance, accounts for 63 percent of Liechtenstein’s jobs, followed by the manufacturing sector (particularly mechanical engineering, machine tools, precision instruments, and dental products), which employs 36 percent of the workforce. Agriculture accounts for less than one percent of the country’s employment. Liechtenstein’s corporate tax rate, at 12.5 percent, is one of the lowest in Europe. Capital gains, inheritance, and gift taxes have been abolished. The Embassy has no recorded complaints from U.S. investors stemming from market restrictions in Liechtenstein. The United States and Liechtenstein do not have a bilateral income tax treaty. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings – Switzerland Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 7 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 1 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 211,936 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 82,620 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment With the exception of its agricultural sector, foreign investment into Switzerland is generally not hampered by significant barriers, with no reported discrimination against foreign investors or foreign-owned investments. Incidents of trade discrimination do exist, for example with regards to agricultural goods such as bovine genetics products. A Swiss government-affiliated non-profit organization, Switzerland Global Enterprise (S-GE), has a nationwide mandate to attract foreign business to Switzerland on behalf of the Swiss Confederation. S-GE promotes Switzerland as an economic hub and fosters exports, imports, and investments. Some city and cantonal governments offer access to an ombudsman, who may address a wide variety of issues involving individuals and the government, but does not focus exclusively on investment issues. Foreign and domestic enterprises may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises in Switzerland. In August 2021, the Swiss government released a broad framework for a future foreign direct investment (FDI) screening regime. A draft bill is expected to be issued for public consultation in 2022. The bill is expected to focus on any mergers or acquisitions by foreign interests, but with a particular focus on foreign state-owned or state-related investors, regardless of the sector involved. For foreign private-sector investors, no list has been published indicating any specific sectors that would be subject to mandatory reporting and approval. There are some investment restrictions in areas under state monopolies, including certain types of public transportation, postal services, alcohol and spirits, aerospace and defense, certain types of insurance and banking services, and the trade in salt. Restrictions (in the form of domicile requirements) also exist in air and maritime transport, hydroelectric and nuclear power, operation of oil and gas pipelines, and the transportation of explosive materials. Additionally, the following legal restrictions apply within Switzerland: Corporate boards: A company registered in Switzerland must be represented by at least one person domiciled in Switzerland. This can be either a member of the board of directors or a member of the executive board (article 718 para. 4 of the Code of Obligations). Foreign-controlled companies often meet this requirement by nominating Swiss directors. However, the manager of a company need not be a Swiss citizen, and company shares may be controlled by foreigners. Further, since January 1, 2021, larger publicly listed companies headquartered in Switzerland must fill at least 30 percent of their board positions with women. Companies have five years to meet this requirement, otherwise they will be required to state the reasons and outline planned remediation measures in their compensation report to shareholders. The establishment of a commercial presence by persons or enterprises without legal status under Swiss law requires a cantonal establishment authorization. These requirements do not generally pose a major hardship or impediment for U.S. investors. Hostile takeovers: Swiss corporate equity can be issued in the form of either registered shares (in the name of the holder) or bearer shares. Provided the shares are not listed on a stock exchange, Swiss companies may, in their articles of incorporation, impose certain restrictions on the transfer of registered shares to prevent hostile takeovers by foreign or domestic companies (article 685a of the Code of Obligations). Hostile takeovers can also be annulled by public companies under certain circumstances. The company must cite in its statutes significant justification (relevant to the survival, conduct, and purpose of its business) to prevent or hinder a takeover by a foreign entity. Furthermore, public corporations may limit the number of registered shares that can be held by any shareholder to a percentage of the issued registered stock. Under the public takeover provisions of the 2015 Federal Act on Financial Market Infrastructures and Market Conduct in Securities and Derivatives Trading and its 2019 amendments, a formal notification is required when an investor purchases more than three percent of a Swiss company’s shares. An “opt-out” clause is available for firms that do not want to be taken over by a hostile bidder, but such opt-outs must be approved by a super-majority of shareholders and must take place well in advance of any takeover attempt. Banking: Those wishing to establish banking operations in Switzerland must obtain prior approval from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), a largely independent agency administered under the Swiss Federal Department of Finance. FINMA promotes confidence in financial markets and works to protect customers, creditors, and investors. FINMA approval of bank operations is generally granted if the following conditions are met: reciprocity on the part of the foreign state; the foreign bank’s name must not give the impression that the bank is Swiss; the bank must adhere to Swiss monetary and credit policy; and a majority of the bank’s management must have their permanent residence in Switzerland. Otherwise, foreign banks are subject to the same regulatory requirements as domestic banks. Banks organized under Swiss law must inform FINMA before they open a branch, subsidiary, or representation abroad. Foreign or domestic investors must inform FINMA before acquiring or disposing of a qualified majority of shares of a bank organized under Swiss law. If exceptional temporary capital outflows threaten monetary policy, the Swiss National Bank, the country’s independent central bank, may require other institutions to seek approval before selling foreign bonds or other financial instruments. Insurance: A federal ordinance requires the placement of all risks physically situated in Switzerland with companies located in the country. Therefore, it is necessary for foreign insurers wishing to provide liability coverage in Switzerland to establish a subsidiary or branch in-country. U.S. investors have not identified any specific restrictions that create market access challenges for foreign investors.Other Investment Policy Reviews The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) September 2017 Trade Policy Review of Switzerland and Liechtenstein includes investment information. Other reports containing elements referring to the investment climate in Switzerland include the OECD Economic Survey of January 2022. Link to the WTO report: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry Link to the OECD reports / papers: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-switzerland-2019_7e6fd372-en The Swiss government-affiliated non-profit organization Switzerland Global Enterprise (SGE) has a mandate to attract foreign business to Switzerland on behalf of the Swiss Confederation. SGE promotes Switzerland as an economic hub and fosters exports, imports, and investments. Larger regional offices include the Greater Geneva-Berne Area (which covers large parts of Western Switzerland), the Greater Zurich Area, and the Basel Area. Cantonal and regional Chambers of Commerce provide similar support. Each canton has a business promotion office dedicated to helping facilitate real estate location, beneficial tax arrangements, and employee recruitment plans. These regional and cantonal investment promotion agencies do not require a minimum investment or job-creation threshold in order to provide assistance. However, these offices generally focus resources on attracting medium-sized or larger entities with the potential to create higher numbers of jobs in their region. References: The Swiss government’s online portal (“easygov”) is Switzerland’s online registration website and includes links to the main local interlocutors for business related questions: https://www.easygov.swiss/easygov/#/ Switzerland Global Enterprise connects companies with potential host regions: https://www.s-ge.com/en/investment-promotion Some of the larger promotion offices are: Greater Geneva-Bern Area: https://www.ggba-switzerland.ch/en/ Greater Zürich Area: https://www.greaterzuricharea.com/en Basel Area: https://www.baselarea.swiss/ Switzerland has a dual system for granting work permits and allowing foreigners to create their own companies in Switzerland. Employees who are citizens of the EU/EFTA area can benefit from the EU Free Movement of Persons Agreement. Permits for people from countries outside the EU/EFTA area, such as U.S. citizens, are restricted to highly qualified personnel. U.S. citizens who want to become self-employed in Switzerland must meet Swiss labor market requirements. The criteria for admittance, which usually do not create unusual hindrances for U.S. persons, are contained in: The Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (unofficial English translation): https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20020232/index.html Decree on Admittance, Residence and Employment (VZAE) (available in German, French, Italian): https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20070993/index.html Setting up a company in Switzerland requires registration at the relevant cantonal Commercial Registry. The cost for registering a company can range considerably, from a few hundred Swiss francs in the case of sole proprietorships or joint partnerships, to higher registration costs for limited liability companies or corporations. A list of Swiss federal fees generally applied for small and medium-sized companies is available at https://www.kmu.admin.ch/kmu/en/home/concrete-know-how/setting-up-sme/starting-business/commercial-register%20/registration-costs.html. However, additional cantonal fees can add significantly to total registration costs, and Public Notary fees may also be necessary, which can also vary considerably by canton. Other steps/procedures for registration include: 1) placing paid-in capital in an escrow account with a bank; 2) drafting articles of association in the presence of a notary public; 3) filing a deed certifying the articles of association with the local commercial register to obtain a legal entity registration; 4) paying the stamp tax at a post office or bank after receiving an assessment by mail; 5) registering for VAT; and 6) enrolling employees in the social insurance system (federal and cantonal authorities). While Switzerland does not explicitly promote or incentivize outward investment, Switzerland’s export promotion agency Switzerland Global Enterprise facilitates overseas market entry for Swiss companies through its Swiss Business Hubs in several countries, including the United States. Switzerland does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Swiss government uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster a competitive investment climate. Proposed laws and regulations are open for three-month public comment from interested parties, interest groups, cantons, and cities before being discussed within the bicameral parliament or promulgated by the appropriate regulatory authority. Authorities take comments into account carefully, particularly since proposals may be subject to optional or automatic referenda that allow Swiss voters to reject or accept the proposals. Only in rare instances – such as the case of the extension of a moratorium until 2025 on planting GMO crops – are regulations reviewed on the basis of political or customer preferences rather than solely on the basis of scientific analysis. Switzerland is not a member of the European Union. However, Switzerland adopts many EU standards in line with a series of agreements with the EU. The WTO concluded in 2017 that Switzerland has regularly notified its draft technical regulations, ordinances, and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO TBT Committee. Switzerland has been a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) since 2015. Swiss civil law is codified in the Swiss Civil Code (which governs the status of individuals, family law, inheritance law, and property law) and in the Swiss Code of Obligations (which governs contracts, torts, commercial law, company law, law of checks and other payment instruments). Switzerland’s civil legal system is divided into public and private law. Public law governs the organization of the state, as well as the relationships between the state and private individuals or other entities, such as companies. Constitutional law, administrative law, tax law, criminal law, criminal procedure, public international law, civil procedure, debt enforcement, and bankruptcy law are sub-divisions of public law. Private law governs relationships among individuals or entities. Intellectual property law (copyright, patents, trademarks, etc.) is an area of private law. Labor is governed by both private and public law. All cantons have a high court, which includes a specialized commercial court in four cantons (Zurich, Bern, St. Gallen and Aargau). The organization of the judiciary differs by canton; smaller cantons have only one court, while larger cantons have multiple courts. Cantonal high court decisions can be appealed to the Swiss Supreme Court. The court system is independent, competent, and fair. Switzerland is party to a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Lugano Convention, a multilateral treaty tying Switzerland to European legal conventions, entered into force in 2011 (replacing an older legal framework by the same name). A set of bilateral treaties is also in place to handle judgments of specific foreign courts. While no such agreement is in place between the United States and Switzerland, Switzerland operates under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Law, meaning local courts must enforce international arbitration awards under specific circumstances. The major laws governing foreign investment in Switzerland are the Swiss Code of Obligations, the Lex Friedrich/Koller, Switzerland’s Securities Law, the Cartel Law and the Financial Market Infrastructure Act. There is currently no specific screening of foreign investment beyond a normal anti-trust review. However, Parliament instructed the Federal Council to prepare a foreign investment screening mechanism in March 2020. The Federal Council decided on the basic tenets of Switzerland’s future investment screening mechanism in August 2021, and a draft law is expected to go to Parliament in 2022, with the earliest potential date for entry into force in 2023. There are few sectoral or geographic incentives or restrictions; exceptions are described below in the section on performance requirements and incentives. There is no pronounced interference in the court system that should affect foreign investors. Useful websites: The Swiss Code of Obligations, including an unofficial English translation: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/index.html Information on the acquisition of property in Switzerland by persons abroad: https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/wirtschaft/grundstueckerwerb/lex-e.pdf The Federal Act on Financial Market Infrastructures and Market Conduct in Securities and Derivatives Trading (Unofficial English translation): https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20141779/index.html The Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition including an unofficial English translation: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19950278/index.html Switzerland Global Enterprise provides a “handbook for investors” with the relevant laws: https://www.s-ge.com/en/publication/handbook-investors/handbook-investors The Swiss Competition Commission and the Swiss Takeover Board review competition-related concerns, and regularly decide on questions concerning mergers, market access, abuse of market position, and other matters affecting competitive advantage. In May and July 2021, the Competition Commission decided on cases involving collusive behavior in public and private tenders in the field of electrical installation and maintenance, and fined Ford Credit Switzerland for unlawful coordination of leasing conditions. The Competition Commission found an amicable conclusion with a German tobacco producer which colluded with several European partners distributors export pans to Switzerland. Decisions by the Swiss Competition Commission may be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court, those by the Swiss Takeover Board to the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). A revision to the Swiss Cartel Act came into force in January 2022, regarding the conduct of companies with relative market power, the freedom of powerful companies to set prices, and geo-blocking practices applies. Under the revised law, all Swiss competition law rules against the abuse of a dominant position will apply not only to dominant companies, but also to companies with relative market power. A new category of abusive pricing by dominant companies and companies with relative market power was also introduced. Further, the geo-blocking of Swiss customers in distance selling and e-commerce is now prohibited. There are no known cases of expropriation within Switzerland. Switzerland’s bankruptcy law, the Federal Act on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy of 11 April 1889 (in German, French and Italian), does not criminalize bankruptcy. Under the bankruptcy law, the same rights and obligations apply to foreign and Swiss contract holders. Swiss authorities provide information about Swiss residents and companies regarding debts registered with the debt collection register. The Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (PILS, Art. 166-175, in force since January 1, 1989) governs Swiss recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, including bankruptcies, foreign composition, and arrangements. Swiss law requires reciprocity for recognition of foreign insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies Many of Switzerland’s cantons make significant use of financial incentives to attract investment to their jurisdictions. Some of the more forward-leaning cantons have in the past waived taxes for new firms for up to ten years. However, after criticism by the OECD and European Union, the Federal Council proposed tax reform measures to create an internationally compliant, competitive tax system that became known as “Tax Reform and AHV Financing” (TRAF), which entered into force in January 2020. TRAF obliged Swiss cantons to offer the same corporate tax rates to both Swiss and foreign companies, while allowing cantons to continue to set their own cantonal rates and offer incentives for corporate investment. This can be deductions and preferential tax treatment for certain types of income, such as patents, or expenses, such as research and development. In its latest locational quality survey in 2021, Credit Suisse noted that many cantons offer attractive tax rates, and that the relative advantage of low corporate tax rates between cantons has declined. Under TRAF, effective tax rates of between 12 and 15 percent including municipal, cantonal and federal tax can be expected in most cantons, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers. In Zurich, which is sometimes used as a reference point for corporate location tax calculations within Switzerland due to its role as a prominent business center, the combined effective corporate tax rate stood at 19.7% in 2021. The implementation of the OECD/G20 corporate global minimum tax rate of 15%, planned to come in force in Switzerland in January 2024, would decrease Switzerland’s relative tax advantage even further. The Swiss government estimates that 3,000-4,000 companies based in Switzerland would be affected, including 250 Swiss-owned companies. Although countries are likely to have some differences in how they calculate corporate profits, a number of Swiss cantons could come under pressure to raise their corporate tax rates once the measure comes into force. Personal income tax rates may also vary widely across the 26 cantons. Producers of renewable electricity (wind, solar, geothermal and biomass) may benefit from various subsidies, e.g. feed-in tariffs for electricity production, or investment subsidies covering a certain percentage of the investment costs. Large-scale hydropower plants may benefit from special subsidies and other support. Further subsidies are available for geothermal exploration projects, and for the improvement of energy efficiency and ecological rehabilitation. Subsidies for large-scale solar plants are under review in Parliament. Switzerland’s free ports remain an important hub particularly for art works and collectibles from all over the world. The country has taken steps in recent years to strengthen anti-money laundering measures and minimize the risks of abuse in free ports, to ensure that processes are in line with international standards. Switzerland does not mandate local employment, but the work of foreign nationals is subject to work permit regulations. Employees who are citizens of the EU/EFTA area can benefit from the EU Free Movement of Persons Agreement. Permits for people from countries outside the EU/EFTA area, such as U.S. citizens, are restricted to highly qualified personnel. There are no “forced localization” laws designed to require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology (e.g. data storage within Switzerland). In a June 2017 court decision regarding a 2014 Federal Council decision to exclude a foreign competitor from bidding on services related to the government’s critical infrastructure, the court ruled in favor of the Swiss state-owned enterprise involved in the bid. U.S. companies have to date not voiced concerns. Switzerland follows strict privacy laws and certain data may not be collected in Switzerland, as it is deemed personal and “worthy of protection.” The collection of certain data may need to be registered at the office of the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner. Some foreign companies have located data centers in Switzerland due to the country’s strict privacy rules and neutrality. In April 2018, FINMA published an outsourcing circular clarifying regulations for data storage for the banking and insurance sector at: https://www.finma.ch/en/documentation/circulars/ . On September 8, 2020, the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) of Switzerland issued an opinion concluding that the Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework does not provide an adequate level of protection for data transfers from Switzerland to the United States pursuant to Switzerland’s Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP). Privacy Shield had provided a framework for companies in both countries since 2017 to comply with data protection requirements when transferring personal data from Switzerland to the United States in support of transatlantic commerce. The Swiss action followed a July 2020 judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union declaring in the Schrems II case as “invalid” the European Commission’s Decision 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. As a result of the FDPIC opinion, organizations wishing to rely on the Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield to transfer personal data from Switzerland to the United States should seek guidance from the FDPIC or legal counsel. Like the EU decision, the FDPIC left open the possibility of data transfers under the EU’s standard contractual clauses. The United States and the European Union announced in March 2022 that they had agreed in principle on a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework to foster trans-Atlantic data flows and address the concerns raised by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework will have a strong impact on a new U.S.-Swiss data privacy framework as well. 5. Protection of Property Rights Physical property rights are recognized and enforced within Switzerland. Restrictions on the acquisition of real estate by persons abroad are regulated in the Federal Law on the Acquisition of Real Property by Persons Abroad ( Permit Act ) and the Permit Ordinance. In general, persons abroad require a permit from the competent cantonal authority to acquire real estate. However, not all foreign nationals require a permit; the decisive factor is the nationality, and in some circumstances also the residence status of the foreign person. EU/EFTA nationals and cross-border commuters do not need a permit. Third-country nationals with a residence permit in Switzerland only need a permit for the purchase of second homes or properties for rent. U.S. citizens resident in Switzerland can face obstacles opening obtaining a mortgage. In Switzerland, mortgages may be contingent on whether or not the applicant can obtain a life insurance policy, but U.S. citizens have reported that insurance companies scrutinize applications involving U.S. citizens in great detail due to potential liabilities. This creates additional burdens on mortgage lenders, which may as a result refuse mortgages services to U.S. citizens or offer them at significantly higher rates. Squatting is considered trespassing according to Art. 186 of the Swiss Criminal Code. A partial revision of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure with the aim of improving the protection of property owners and facilitating expulsions in cases of unlawful squatting is ongoing. Substantial and procedural amendments to the law are pending Parliamentary review and approval. Switzerland is one of the world’s top countries for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection overall. It is ranked second in the world in the 2021 International Property Rights Index , and ninth in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 2021 Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) report . The country’s strong protection for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets also helps Switzerland maintain high rankings in global competitiveness and innovation indices. Switzerland was again ranked first worldwide for innovation by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2021. A revision of the Swiss Copyright Act came into force on April 1, 2020, intending to address specific difficulties in Switzerland’s system of online copyright protection and provisions to facilitate civil and criminal enforcement, particularly regarding online infringement. It is now allowed to collect internet protocol (IP) addresses, and the revision also implemented a “take down and stay down” provision. The United States is monitoring the implementation, interpretation, and effectiveness of the newly enacted legislation. In addition, cable TV operators and broadcasters reached an agreement in May 2021 on a tariff for time-shifting services, which came into force on January 1, 2022. Federal customs authorities in Switzerland have the authority to seize counterfeit goods, upon request from the IPR holder or from related interest groups (e.g. professional associations). Goods can be seized for 10 days if there is reasonable suspicion that they are counterfeit. Provisional measures can also be obtained from a Swiss court to ensure evidence is not destroyed. If the destruction of goods is requested by an IPR holder, the owner of the goods can dispute that claim in writing within 10 days. The boom in online trade and tighter border controls during the health crisis have led to a major increase in the number of counterfeit goods seized by federal customs. In 2021, Swiss Customs conducted 5,959 interventions to seize counterfeit commercial goods, up 34 percent from the number of cases in 2020. After travel restrictions eased again, the number of items seized increased again to 33,285 in 2021 from 18,788 in 2020 , most of which were counterfeit bags and watches. In 2021, a total of 11,263 consignments of unauthorized pharmaceuticals were seized, the large majority of which were unauthorized erectile dysfunction medications. Detailed information is available on Swiss Customs website: https://www.bazg.admin.ch/dam/bazg/en/dokumente/stab/jahreszahlen_2021.pdf.download.pdf/BAZG_Jahreszahlen_F_Z_2021_e.pdf For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Swiss government’s attitude toward foreign portfolio investment and market structures is positive, resulting in high global rankings by many indices. The SIX Swiss stock exchange based in Zurich is a significant international stock market based on market capitalization. Switzerland is home to a sophisticated banking system that provides a high degree of service to both foreign and domestic entities. Switzerland also has an effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The Swiss Bankers Association, which has nearly 300-member financial institutions, estimated that Switzerland’s banking sector managed assets amounting to approximately USD 8.4 trillion in 2020. Switzerland is the global market leader in cross-border private banking, accounting for a quarter of all cross-border assets under management worldwide. The largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, have total assets of approximately USD 1 trillion and USD 826 million, respectively, while Raiffeisen Switzerland holds about USD 260 billion and Zurich Cantonal Bank holds roughly USD 209 billion. Switzerland’s independent central bank is the Swiss National Bank (SNB). U.S. citizens who are resident in Switzerland may face difficulties in opening bank accounts at Swiss banks, as some banks seek to avoid the administrative costs of complying with additional regulatory and administrative procedures required for the accounts of U.S. persons under accepted disclosure rules. Many banks, especially smaller ones, assess that the additional compliance costs involved with U.S. citizens exceed the potential benefit they would receive from U.S. accountholder business. As a result, these banks offer limited or no services to U.S. citizens. U.S.-owned companies have also reported that Swiss banks treat them unequally as compared to companies owned by shareholders of other nationalities. One multinational corporation reported that its Swiss subsidiary has long held a corporate account in Switzerland, but the bank was unwilling to set up a business account for its U.S. parent company. In another case, a consortium of international citizens resident in Switzerland, including U.S. citizens, purchased a Swiss company, but reported that the Swiss company’s bank refused to maintain its corporate account as long as there were U.S. citizen shareholders. Several associations provide information about Swiss banks that offer services to U.S. clients. For more information, see the following page at the U.S. Embassy Bern website: https://ch.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/living-in-ch/banking-resources/. In 2018, the Swiss government created a blockchain task force and endorsed a report on the legal framework for blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) in the financial sector, with the goal of creating favorable conditions for Switzerland to evolve as a leading location for fintech and DLT companies while maintaining anti-money laundering controls. The new “blockchain act,” consisting of company law reforms came into force in February 2021, while legislation on financial market infrastructure upgrades came into force in August 2021. This opens the doors to a fully regulated cryptocurrency and digital securities industry in Switzerland. There are now a wide range of companies in Switzerland that can create and list DLT-compatible digital securities. . In September 2021, for the first time a license was issued in Switzerland for infrastructure to facilitate the trading of digital securities in the form of tokens and their integrated settlement. SIX Digital Exchange AG was authorized to act as a central securities depository, and the associated company SDX Trading AG to act as a stock exchange. Switzerland does not have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Swiss Confederation is the largest or sole shareholder in Switzerland’s five state-owned enterprises (SOEs), active in the areas of ground transportation (SBB), information and communication (Swiss Post, Swisscom), defense (RUAG, which was divided into two companies in January 2020 – see below), and aviation / air traffic control (Skyguide). These companies are typically responsible for “public function mandates,” but may also cover commercial activities (e.g., Swisscom in the area of telecommunications). These SOEs typically have commercial relationships with private industry. Private sector competitors can compete with the SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Additional publicly owned enterprises are controlled by the cantons in the areas of energy, water supply, and a number of subsectors. SOEs and canton-owned companies may benefit from exclusive rights and privileges (some of which are listed in Table A 3.2 of the most recent WTO Trade Policy Review – https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp455_e.htm ). Switzerland is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Some areas are partly or fully exempted from the GPA, such as the management of drinking water, energy, transportation, telecommunications, and defense. Private companies may encounter difficulties gaining business in these exempted sectors. In the aftermath of a 2016 cyberattack, the Federal Council reviewed Swiss defense and aerospace company RUAG’s structure in light of cybersecurity concerns for the Swiss military, and decided in June 2018 to split the company. RUAG was split into two holding companies as of January 1, 2020. A smaller company, MRO Switzerland, remains state-owned and provides essential technology and systems support to the Swiss military. A larger company, RUAG International, includes non-armaments aviation and aerospace businesses, and will be gradually fully privatized in the medium term, according to the Swiss government. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Swiss Confederation and Swiss companies are generally aware of the importance of pursuing due diligence to responsible business conduct (RBC) and demonstrating corporate social responsibility (CSR). In response to criticism from civil society about the business practices of Swiss companies abroad, the Swiss government commissioned a series of reports on the government’s role in ensuring CSR, particularly in the commodities sector, and in December 2016 published a national action plan in conjunction with its commitments under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ( https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-64884.html ). In June 2017, the Swiss government concluded that Switzerland promotes voluntary principles, such as the upholding of human rights standards, and also supports including mandatory CSR market incentives, such as minimum conditions for the protection of workers abroad, in forthcoming legislation. In January 2020, the Swiss government approved the CSR Action Plan 2020-2023 , which covers sixteen measures – particularly promoting sustainability reporting and due diligence by companies, stakeholder dialogue, and the alignment of private section CSR instruments with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The latest updates on corporate social responsibility are available on https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/Gesellschaftliche_Verantwortung_der_Unternehmen.html In November 2020, a referendum known as the “Responsible Business Initiative,” which would have placed new obligations on Swiss companies to protect human rights and the environment internationally, was narrowly rejected by Swiss voters. Instead, a proposal of Parliament came into force in January 2022, obliging covered companies to report on environmental and labor issues, human rights and the fight against corruption and to exercise due diligence with regard to conflict minerals and child labor. After a one-year transition period, the new reporting obligations will apply as of 2023, and companies will submit their first reports in2024. Also, Swiss companies involved in minerals extraction abroad are required to source all minerals in compliance with international labor standards and applicable environmental laws, and must report on measures to ensure their international activities do not involve or support child labor. In March 2021, Swiss voters approved a free trade agreement between Indonesia and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), of which Switzerland is a member. The agreement requires that any palm oil imported under preferential tariffs be produced sustainably. This is said to be the first-ever agreement of its type that links trade preferences to sustainable methods of production. Switzerland ranked 3rd out of 180 countries in the 2020 Yale University-based Environmental Performance Index (EPI). The Swiss government implements the OECD Due Diligence Guide for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict and High-Risk Areas. Switzerland is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and supports the Better Gold Initiative, which promotes responsible gold mining in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. Switzerland’s Point of Contact for the OECD Guidelines at the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) may be contacted at: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/switzerland.htm . Information about the Swiss Better Gold Association is available at: https://www.swissbettergold.ch . Switzerland has signed a number of nonbinding agreements outlining best practices for corporations, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The latter was the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative launched by Switzerland. Switzerland is also a signatory state of the Montreux Document, a non-binding instrument on the obligations of states under international law with regard to the activities of private military and security companies. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. In 2019, Switzerland set a 2050 target for net-zero emissions, and in January 2021 it adopted a corresponding Long-Term Climate Strategy, which sets out climate policy guidelines up to 2050 and establishes strategic targets for key sectors. The strategy presents development scenarios and strategic targets up to 2050 for the buildings, industry, transport, agricultural and food sectors, financial markets, aviation, and the waste industry. Additionally, in February 2020, Switzerland updated and enhanced its nationally determined contribution (NDC) to reflect the latest findings by the IPCC indicating a need to reduce global CO2 emissions by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030, and to achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050 in order to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. In June 2021, the Swiss population rejected a revision of the country’s CO2 Act in a referendum. The revised Act aimed to further reduce CO2 output in Switzerland by at least 50% by 2030 in line with the commitments made under the Paris Climate Agreement. However, observers believe the Act was rejected because it relied strongly on new taxes on fossil fuels, which were argued to disproportionately affect residents of rural areas. The Federal Council introduced a new revision of the CO2 Act to parliament in December 2021, relying more on incentives investments rather than taxes. In August 2021, the Federal Council set the parameters for future binding disclosure requirements in line with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). Public companies, banks, and insurance companies with 500 or more employees more than CHF 20 million (USD 2.13 million) in total assets, or more than CHF 40 million ($4.25 million) in turnover will be required to publicly report on all climate issues. A draft law should be prepared by mid-2022. The Swiss government also issued guidance that asset managers should publish their methodology and strategy for weighing climate and environmental risks when managing clients’ assets. Switzerland currently ranks 5 out of 34 countries in ITIF’s Global Energy Innovation Index, and 19 out of 76 countries in MIT’s Technology Review’s Green Future Index. Switzerland currently ranks 8 out of 29 European countries in the Global Green Growth Index of the Global Green Growth Institute. 9. Corruption Switzerland is ranked 7th of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, reflecting low perceptions of corruption in society. Under Swiss law, officials are not to accept anything that would “challenge their independence and capacity to act.” In case of non-compliance the law foresees criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years, for official corruption, and the government generally implements these laws effectively. The bribery of public officials is governed by the Swiss Criminal Code (Art. 322), while the bribery of private individuals is governed by the Federal Law Against Unfair Competition. The law defines as granting an “undue advantage” either in exchange for a specific act, or in some cases for future behavior not related to a specific act. Some officials may receive small gifts valued at no more than CHF 200 or CHF 300 for an entire year, which are not seen as “undue.” However, officials in some fields, such as financial regulators, may receive no advantages at all. Transparency International has recommended that a maximum sum should be set at the federal level. Investigating and prosecuting government corruption is a federal responsibility. A majority of cantons require members of cantonal parliaments to disclose their interests. A joint working group comprising representatives of various federal government agencies works under the leadership of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to combat corruption. Some multinational companies have set up internal hotlines to enable staff to report problems anonymously. Switzerland ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2009. Swiss government experts believe this ratification did not result in significant domestic changes, since passive and active corruption of public servants was already considered a crime under the Swiss Criminal Code. A review by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in 2017 recommended the adoption of a code of ethics/conduct, together with awareness-raising measures, for members of the federal parliament, judges, and the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to avoid conflict of interests. These measures needed to be accompanied by a reinforced monitoring of members of parliament’s compliance with their obligations. In March 2018, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions recommended that Switzerland adopt an appropriate legal framework to protect private sector whistleblowers from discrimination and disciplinary action, to ensure that sanctions imposed for foreign bribery against natural and legal persons are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and to ensure broader and more systematic publication of concluded foreign bribery cases. The OECD Working Group positively highlighted Switzerland’s proactive policy on seizure and confiscation, its active involvement in mutual legal assistance, and its role as a promoter of cooperation in field of foreign bribery. Regarding detection, the OECD Working Group commended the key role played by the Swiss Financial Intelligence Unit (MROS) in detecting foreign bribery. A number of Swiss federal administrative authorities are involved in combating bribery. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) deals with issues relating to the OECD Convention. The Federal Office of Justice deals with those relating to the Council of Europe Convention, while the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (MFA) deals with the UN Convention. The power to prosecute and judge corruption offenses is shared between the relevant Swiss canton and the federal government. For the federal government, the competent authorities are the Office of the Attorney General, the Federal Criminal Court, and the Federal Police. In the cantons, the relevant actors are the cantonal judicial authorities and the cantonal police forces. In 2001, Switzerland signed the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. In 1997, Switzerland signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which entered into force in 2000. Switzerland signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003. Switzerland ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2009. In order to implement the Council of Europe convention, the Swiss parliament amended the Penal Code to make bribery of foreign public officials a federal offense (Title Nineteen “Bribery”); these amendments entered into force in 2000. In accordance with the revised 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the Swiss parliament amended legislation as of 2001 on direct taxes of the Confederation, cantons, and townships to prohibit the tax deductibility of bribes. Switzerland maintains an effective legal and policy framework to combat domestic corruption. U.S. firms investing in Switzerland have not raised with the Embassy any corruption concerns in recent years. Government Agency Contact: Michel Huissoud Director Swiss Federal Audit Office Monbijoustrasse 45 3003 Bern / Switzerland Ph. +41 58 463 10 35 Messages can be submitted via https://www.bkms-system.ch/bkwebanon/report/clientInfo?cin=5efk11 “Watchdog” Organization Contact: Martin Hilti Executive Director Transparency International Switzerland Schanzeneckstrasse 25 P.O. Box 8509 3001 Bern / Switzerland Ph. +41 31 382 3550 E-Mail: info@transparency.ch 10. Political and Security Environment There is minimal risk from civil unrest in Switzerland. Protests do occur in Switzerland, but authorities carefully monitor protest activities. Urban areas regularly experience demonstrations, mostly on global trade and political issues, and some occasionally sparked by U.S. foreign policy. Protests held during the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) occasionally draw participants from several countries in Europe. Historically, demonstrations have been peaceful, with protestors registering for police permits. Protestors have blocked traffic; spray-painted areas with graffiti, and on rare occasions, clashed with police. Political extremist or anarchist groups sometimes instigate civil unrest. Right-wing activists have targeted refugees/asylum seekers/foreigners, and more recently have organized protests against COVID-19 restrictions. Meanwhile, left-wing activists (who historically have demonstrated a greater propensity toward violence) usually target organizations involved with globalization, alleged fascism, and alleged police repression. Swiss police have at their disposal tear gas and water cannons, which are rarely used. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Swiss labor force is highly educated and highly skilled. The Swiss economy is capital intensive and geared toward high value-added products and services. In 2021, 77.2 percent of the workforce was employed in services, 20.4 percent in manufacturing, and 2.4 percent in agriculture. Full-time work compared to part-time work is more prevalent among foreign workers than among Swiss workers: 40.4 percent of the Swiss population works part-time, compared to 27.8 percent of the foreign working population. Part-time work is three times more common among women than men. Wages in Switzerland are among the highest in the world. Switzerland continues to observe International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions. Government regulations cover maximum work hours, minimum length of holidays, sick leave, compulsory military service, contract termination, and other requirements. There is no federal minimum wage law. Foreigners fill not only low-skilled, low-wage jobs, but also highly technical positions in the manufacturing and service industries. In 2021, foreigners account for 26.4 percent of Switzerland’s labor force estimated at about 4.7 million people. Many foreign nationals are long-time Swiss residents who have not applied for or been granted Swiss citizenship. Foreign seasonal workers take many lower-wage jobs in agriculture. Switzerland has one of the smallest informal economies in Europe, accounting for approximately 6% of GDP since 2016. In the wake of a 2014 referendum to impose limits on immigration, the government introduced a series of measures aimed at bringing traditionally underemployed groups into the labor market – women, older job seekers, refugees, and temporarily accepted asylum seekers. In 2018 the Federal Council implemented a parliamentary decision that companies in sectors with more than 5 percent unemployment provide information on job openings to government-run employment centers, which make the openings available to cross-border commuters and EU nationals as well. Trade union density – the percentage of the workforce represented by trade unions – is on the decline in Switzerland, according to OECD data. From over 20 percent in 2000, trade union density had fallen to 14.4 percent by 2018, according to the OECD (latest data available). Labor-management relations are generally constructive, with a general willingness on both sides to settle disputes by negotiation rather than labor action. According to the Federal Office of Statistics, some 581 collective agreements were in force in Switzerland in March 2018 (latest data available). Of these, approximately 64 percent concern the services sector, 34 percent the manufacturing sector, and one percent the agricultural sector; these are usually renewed without major difficulties. Trade unions continue to promote a wider coverage of collective agreements for the Swiss labor force. Although the number of workdays lost to strikes in Switzerland is among the lowest in the OECD, Swiss trade unions have encouraged workers to strike on several occasions in recent years. A general prohibition on strikes by Swiss public servants was repealed in 2000, although restrictions remain in place in a few cantons. The Federal Council may now only restrict or prohibit the right to strike where it affects the security of the state, external relations, or the supply of vital goods to the country. In difficult economic times, employers may temporarily shift full-time employees to part-time by registering with cantonal authorities and justifying reductions as necessary to business activities. This practice, known as Kurzarbeit (“short-time work”), allows for the government to make partial salary payments through the unemployment insurance fund. Employees can reject the shift to part-time work, but risk dismissal in that case. Kurzarbeit became widespread with the onset of the COVD-19 crisis and the temporary shutdown of wide segments of the Swiss economy in 2020. By October 2021 this was drastically reduced to 48,264 affected employees from 7,917 companies, compared to 1.91 million employees in May and 219,388 in October 2020. . The Swiss government has continued expanded financial support for the Kurzarbeit program throughout the pandemic. Switzerland’s average unemployment rate was 4.8 percent in 2020 under ILO Labor Force Survey methodology, while according to Swiss authorities registered unemployment in 2021 was 3.0 percent. Cantons bordering EU countries experience higher unemployment rates than Switzerland as a whole. 14. Contact for More Information Theodore Fisher Economic/Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy in Bern, Sulgeneckstrasse 19, 3003 Bern +41 31 357 7011 Business-bern@state.gov Taiwan Executive Summary Taiwan is an important market for regional and global trade and investment. Taiwan is one of the world’s top 25 economies in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and serves as the United States’ 8th largest trading partner according to 2021 statistics. An export-dependent economy of 23.5 million people with a highly skilled workforce, Taiwan is at the center of regional high-technology supply chains due to advanced capabilities to develop products for industries such as semiconductors, 5G telecommunications, AI, and the Internet of Things (IoT). Taiwan is also a central shipping hub in East Asia. The Taiwan authorities continue to actively launch initiatives to partner with foreign investors to foster resilient, diverse supply chains in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan welcomes and actively courts foreign direct investment (FDI) and partnerships with American and other foreign firms. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration seeks to promote economic growth by increasing domestic investment and FDI. Taiwan authorities offer investment incentives and aim to leverage Taiwan’s strengths in advanced technology, manufacturing, and R&D. Some Taiwan and foreign investors regard Taiwan as a strategic location to insulate themselves against potential supply chain disruptions caused by regional trade frictions and the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2019, the Taiwan government launched three investment promotion programs, including a reshoring initiative to lure Taiwanese companies to shift production back to Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Taiwan government extended these investment incentives to the end of 2024 to support its domestic economy and counter the adverse impact from COVID-19. Over the past few years, Taiwan has witnessed increases in greenfield investments by foreign firms, including from companies trying to reduce their over-reliance on PRC supply chains and from firms in the offshore wind sector. Taiwan’s finance, wholesale and retail, and electronics sectors remain top targets of inward FDI. Taiwan attracts a wide range of U.S. investors, including in advanced technology, digital, traditional manufacturing, and services sectors. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest single source of FDI after the Netherlands, through which some U.S. firms also choose to invest. In 2020, according to U.S. Department of Commerce data, the total stock of U.S. FDI in Taiwan reached US $31.5 billion. U.S. services exports to Taiwan totaled US $10.2 billion in 2021. Leading services exports from the United States to Taiwan were intellectual property, transport, and financial services. Structural impediments in Taiwan’s investment environment include the following: excessive or inconsistent regulation; market influence exerted by domestic and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the utilities, energy, postal, transportation, financial, and real estate sectors; foreign ownership limits in sectors deemed sensitive; and regulatory scrutiny over the possible participation of PRC-sourced capital. Taiwan has among the lowest levels of private equity investment in Asia, although private equity firms are increasingly pursuing opportunities in Taiwan’s market. Foreign private equity firms have expressed concern over the lack of transparency and predictability in the investment approvals and exit processes and regulators’ reliance on administrative discretion when rejecting certain transactions. Private equity entry and exit challenges are especially apparent in sectors that are deemed sensitive for national security reasons, but still permit foreign ownership. Taiwan has strived to enact relevant regulation to fight climate change. Taiwan set a goal for renewable energy sources to provide 27 gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2025. Taiwan aims to phase out nuclear power by 2025 and derive 20 percent of its power supply from renewable sources (mainly solar and offshore wind installation). Taiwan industry continues to question the feasibility for Taiwan to phase out nuclear power by 2025 and increase the use of liquified natural gas (LNG) and renewables. Labor relations in Taiwan are generally harmonious. The current Tsai administration made improving labor welfare one of its core priorities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 25 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 31,544 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 N/A https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Promoting inward FDI has been an important policy goal for the Taiwan authorities because of Taiwan’s self-imposed public debt ceiling that limits public spending, and its low levels of private investment. Despite the global economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan’s domestic private investment registered 19 percent y-o-y growth in 2021 due to continuous reshoring of investment by overseas Taiwan companies since late 2018. Taiwan has pursued various measures to attract FDI from both foreign companies and Taiwan firms operating overseas. A network of science and industrial parks, technology industrial zones, and free trade zones aims to expand trade and investment opportunities by granting tax incentives, tariff exemptions, low-interest loans, and other favorable terms. Incentives tend to be more prevalent for investment in the manufacturing sector. In January 2019, Taiwan launched a reshoring incentive program to attract Taiwan firms operating in the PRC to return to Taiwan. Thus far, Taiwan has received favorable responses from Information Communication Technology (ICT) manufacturers. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) Department of Investment Services (DOIS) Invest in Taiwan Center serves as Taiwan’s investment promotion agency and provides streamlined procedures for foreign investors, including single-window and employee recruitment services. For investments over US $17.6 million (New Taiwan Dollar NTD 500 million), Taiwan authorities will assign a dedicated project manager for the investment process. DOIS services are available to all foreign investors. The Center’s website contains an online investment aid system (https://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/smartIndexPage?lang=eng ) to help investors retrieve all the required application forms based on various investment criteria and types. Taiwan also passed the Foreign Talent Retention Act to attract foreign professionals using relaxed visa and work permit issuance process and tax incentives. As of December 2021, 3,927 foreigners received the Taiwan Employment Gold Card, a government initiative to attract highly skilled foreign talent to Taiwan (https://goldcard.nat.gov.tw/en/ ). The Taiwan Employment Gold Card also includes a residency permit for the applicant and his/her immediate relatives (parents, spouse, children), a work permit for three years, an alien resident certificate, and a re-entry permit. The Employment Gold Card policy helped alleviate recruiting companies’ liability in work permit applications and associated administrative expenditures. The MOEA is also in the process of drafting a proposed amendment to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, which would replace the existing pre-approval investment review process with an ex-post reporting mechanism and strengthen investment screening in industries of national security concern. Taiwan maintains a negative list of industries closed to foreign investment in sectors related to national security and environmental protection, including public utilities, power distribution, natural gas, postal service, telecommunications, mass media, and air and sea transportation. These sectors constitute less than one percent of the production value of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector and less than five percent of the services sector. Railway transport, freight transport by small trucks, pesticide manufactures, real estate development, brokerage, leasing, and trading are open to foreign investment. The negative list of investment sectors, last updated in February 2018, is available at http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/download-file.jsp?do=BP&id=ZYi4SMROrBA=. The Taiwan authorities actively promote a “5+2 Innovative Industries” and six strategic industries development program to accelerate industrial transformation. Target industries under this campaign include smart machinery, biomedicine, IoT, green energy, national defense, advanced agriculture, circular economy, and semiconductors. The Taiwan authorities also offer subsidies for the research and development expenses for partnerships with foreign firms. Taiwan’s central authorities take a cautious approach to approving foreign investment in innovative industries that utilize new and potentially disruptive business models, such as the sharing economy. Taiwan’s authorities regularly meet with foreign business groups. For example, Taiwan’s National Development Council (NDC) meets with the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (AmCham Taiwan) to discuss AmCham Taiwan’s annual White Paper. Some U.S. investors have expressed concerns about a lack of transparency, consistency, and predictability in the investment review process, particularly regarding private equity investment transactions. U.S. investors claim to experience lengthy review periods for private equity transactions that involve redundant inquiries from the MOEA Investment Commission and its constituent agencies. Some U.S. investors report that public hearings convened by Taiwan regulatory agencies about specific private equity transactions appear to promote opposition to private equity rather than foster transparent dialogue. Private equity transactions and other previously approved investments have, in the past, attracted Legislative Yuan scrutiny, including committee-level resolutions that opposed specific transactions. Foreign entities are entitled to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, similar with local firms, unless otherwise specified in relevant regulations. Taiwan sets foreign ownership limits in certain industries, such as a 60 percent limit on foreign ownership of wireless and fixed-line telecommunications firms, including a direct foreign investment limit of 49 percent in that sector. State-controlled Chunghwa Telecom, which controls 92 percent of the fixed-line telecom market, maintains a 49 percent limit on direct foreign investment and a 60 percent limit on overall foreign investment, including indirect ownership. There is a 20 percent limit on foreign direct investment in cable television broadcasting services, but foreign ownership of up to 60 percent is allowed through indirect investment via a Taiwan entity. However, in practice, this kind of investment is subject to heightened regulatory and political scrutiny. In addition, there is a foreign ownership limit of 49.99 percent for satellite television broadcasting services and piped distribution of natural gas and a 49 percent limit for high-speed rail services. These foreign ownership limits also apply to all public switched telecommunications resources (“PSTN”) that use telecommunications resources. The foreign ownership cap on airport ground services firms, air-catering companies, aviation transportation businesses (airlines), and general aviation businesses (commercial helicopters and business jet planes) is less than 50 percent, with a separate limit of 25 percent for any single foreign investor. Foreign investment in Taiwan-flagged merchant shipping services is limited to 50 percent for Taiwan shipping companies operating international routes. Taiwan has opened more than two-thirds of its aggregate industrial categories to PRC investors, with 97 percent of manufacturing sub-sectors and 51 percent of construction and services sub-sectors open to PRC capital. PRC nationals are prohibited from serving as chief executive officer in a Taiwan company, although a PRC board member may retain management control rights. The Taiwan authorities regard PRC investment in media or advanced technology sectors, such as semiconductors, as a national security concern. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services and the Cross-Strait Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Enhancement of Tax Cooperation were signed in 2013 and 2015, respectively, but have not taken effect. Negotiations on the Agreement on Trade in Goods with the PRC were halted in 2016. Taiwan’s Investment Commission screens applications for FDI, mergers, and acquisitions. Taiwan authorities claim that 95 percent of investments not subject to the negative list and, with capital less than US $17.6 million (NTD 500 million), obtain approval at the Investment Commission staff level within two to four days. Investments between US $17.6 million (NTD 500 million) and US $53 million (NTD 1.5 billion) in capital take three to five days to screen. The approval authority for these types of transactions rests with the Investment Commission’s executive secretary. For investment in restricted industries, in cases where the investment amount or capital increase exceeds NTD 1.5 billion, or for mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs, screening takes 10 to 20 days and includes review by relevant supervisory ministries. Final approval rests with the Investment Commission’s executive secretary. Screening for foreign investments involving cross-border mergers and acquisitions or other special situations takes 20-30 days, as these transactions require interagency review and deliberation at the Investment Commission’s monthly meeting. The investment screening process provides Taiwan’s regulatory agencies opportunities to attach conditions to investments to mitigate concerns about ownership, structure, or other factors. Screening may also include an assessment of the impact of proposed investments on a sector’s competitive landscape and the rights of local shareholders and employees. Screening is also used to detect investments with unclear funding sources, especially PRC-sourced capital. To ensure monitoring of PRC-sourced investment in line with Taiwan law and public sentiment, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau participates in every investment review meeting regardless of the size of the investment. Blocked deals in recent years reflected the authorities’ increased focus on national security concerns beyond the negative-list industries. Taiwan authorities also review proposals to prevent illegal PRC investment via third-areas or through dummy accounts. Foreign investors must submit an application form containing their funding plan, business operation plan, entity registration, and documents certifying the inward remittance of investment funds. Applicants and their agents must provide a signed declaration certifying that any PRC investors in a proposed transaction do not hold more than a 30 percent ownership stake and do not retain managerial control of the company. When an investment fails review, an investor may re-apply when the reason for the denial no longer exists. Foreign investors may also petition the regulatory agency that denied approval or may appeal to the Administrative Court. Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2002. In September 2018, the WTO conducted the fourth review of Taiwan’s trade policies and practices. Related reports and documents are available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp477_crc_e.htm MOEA took steps to improve the business registration process, including finalizing amendments to the Company Act to make business registration more efficient. Since 2014, Taiwan shortened the application review period for company registration to two days. Applications for a taxpayer identification number, labor insurance (for companies with five or more employees), national health insurance, and pension plans can be processed at the same time for approval within five to seven business days. Since January 2017, MOEA’s Central Region Office processes foreign investors’ company registration applications. In recent years, the Taiwan authorities revised rules to improve the business climate for startups. To develop Taiwan into a startup hub in Asia, Taiwan authorities launched an entrepreneur visa program to permit foreign entrepreneurs to remain in Taiwan if they meet one of the following requirements: raise at least US $70,400 (NTD 2 million) in funding, hold patent rights or a professional skills certificate; operate in an incubator or innovation park in Taiwan; win prominent startup or design competitions, or receive grants from the Taiwan authorities. Since in 2019, startup entrepreneurs – including foreign investors – can use intellectual property (IP) as collateral to obtain bank loans. In July 2021, the Taiwan authorities further introduced additional tax and social security measures to attract foreign professionals to Taiwan. Further details about Taiwan’s business registration process can be found in Invest Taiwan Center’s business one-stop service request website at https://onestop.nat.gov.tw/oss/web/Show/engWorkFlowEn.do . The Investment Commission website lists the rules, regulations, and required forms for seeking foreign investment approval: https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/businessPub.view?lang=en&op_id_one=1 Approval from the Investment Commission is required for foreign investors before proceeding with business registration. After receiving an approval letter from the Investment Commission, an investor can apply for capital verification and then file an application for a corporate name and proceed with business registration. The new company must register with the Bureau of Labor Insurance and the Bureau of National Health Insurance before recruiting employees. For the manufacturing, construction, and mining industries, the MOEA defines small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as companies with less than US $2.8 million (NTD 80 million) of paid-in capital and fewer than 200 employees. For all other industries, SMEs are defined as having less than US $3.5 million (NTD 100 million) of paid-in capital and fewer than 100 employees. Taiwan runs a Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund to help SMEs obtain financing from local banks. Firms established by foreigners in Taiwan may receive a guarantee from the Fund. Taiwan’s National Development Fund has set aside NTD 10 billion (US $350 million) to invest in SMEs. The PRC used to be the top destination for Taiwan companies’ overseas investment given the low cost of factors of production there, such as wages and land. Since rising trade tensions between the United States and the PRC in 2018, the Taiwan authorities have intensified their efforts to assist Taiwan firms to diversify production by either relocating back to Taiwan or to other markets, including in Southeast Asia. The Tsai administration launched the New Southbound Policy to enhance Taiwan’s economic engagement with 18 countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. In 2021, Taiwan companies’ investment in the 18 countries totaled US $5.8 billion. The Taiwan authorities seek investment agreements with these countries to incentivize Taiwan firms’ investment in those markets. Invest Taiwan Center provides consultation and loan guarantee services to Taiwan firms operating overseas. Taiwan’s financial regulators have urged Taiwan banks to expand their presence in Southeast Asian economies either by setting up branches or acquiring subsidiaries. According to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, all Taiwan individuals, juridical persons, organizations, or other institutions must obtain approval from the Investment Commission to invest in or have any technology-oriented cooperation with the PRC. The Taiwan authorities maintain a negative list for Taiwan firms’ investment and have special rules governing technology cooperation in the PRC. The Taiwan authorities, Taiwan companies, and foreign investors in Taiwan are increasingly vigilant about the threat of IP theft and illegal talent poaching in key strategic industries, such as the semiconductor industry. 3. Legal Regime Taiwan generally maintains transparent regulatory and accounting systems that conform to international standards. Publicly listed Taiwan companies fully adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) IFRS 16 in 2019. Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has affirmed that Taiwan will begin implementing IFRS 17 in January 2026. Ministries generally originate business-related draft legislation and submit it to the Executive Yuan for review. Following approval by the Executive Yuan, draft legislation is forwarded to the Legislative Yuan for consideration. Legislators can also propose legislation. While the cabinet-level agencies are the primary contact windows for foreign investors before entry, foreign investors also need to abide by local government rules, including those related to transportation services and environmental protection, among others. Draft laws, rules, and orders are published on The Executive Yuan Gazette Online for public comment. Beginning December 29, 2016, the Taiwan authorities instituted a 60-day public comment period for new rules. All draft regulations and laws are required to be available for public comment and advanced notice unless they meet specific criteria allowing a shorter window. While welcomed by the U.S. business community, the 60-day comment period is not uniformly applied. Draft laws and regulations of interest to foreign investors are regularly shared with foreign chambers of commerce for their comments. These announcements are also available for public comment on the NDC’s public policy open discussion forum at https://join.gov.tw/index. Foreign chambers of commerce and Taiwan business groups’ comments on proposed laws and regulations, and Taiwan ministries’ replies, are posted publicly on the NDC website. In October 2017, the NDC launched a separate policy discussion forum specifically for startups, which can be found online at https://law.ndc.gov.tw/ProcessFlowNewLaw.aspx, serving as the central platform to harmonize regulatory requirements governing innovative businesses and startups operation. The Executive Yuan Legal Affairs Committee oversees the enforcement of regulations. Ministries are responsible for enforcement, impact analysis, draft amendments to existing laws, and petitions to laws pursuant to their respective authorities. Impact assessments may be completed by in-house or private researchers. To enhance Taiwan’s regulatory coherence in the wake of regional economic integration initiatives, the NDC in 2017 released a Regulatory Impact Analysis Operational Manual as a practical guideline for central government agencies. Taiwan authorities place a high priority on promoting socially responsible investment. Both the regulators and investors are gearing up to integrate environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) into investment processes. Taiwan authorities mandate that publicly listed companies with more than US $180 million (NTD 5 billion) in capital and firms in sectors with direct impact on consumers, such as food processing, restaurants, chemicals, and financial services, etc., prepare annual social responsibility reports. A total of 586 of Taiwan’s publicly listed companies issued annual social responsibility reports, and nearly half of the reports are prepared voluntarily. In April 2021, Taiwan’s Public Service Pension Fund announced that it will target to fund a total of US $400 million to two foreign asset managers for its “Global Quality ESG Indexed Equity” mandate. Taiwan regularly discloses government finance data to the public, including all debts incurred by all levels of government. Past information is also retrievable in a well-maintained fiscal database. Taiwan’s national statistics agency also publishes contingent debt information. Taiwan is not a member of any regional economic agreements but is a full member of international economic organizations such as the WTO, APEC, ADB, and Egmont Group. Although Taiwan is not a member of many international organizations, it voluntarily adheres to or adopts international norms, including with finance, such as IFRS. Taiwan is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and met some of the customs facilitation requirements specified in the TFA, such as single-window customs services and preview of the origin. In 2018, citing tax parity for domestic retailers and the risk of fraud, Taiwan lowered the de minimis threshold from US $150 (NTD 3,000) to US $70 (NTD 2,000), an approach regarded as contrary to facilitating customs clearance and trade, especially for small- and medium-sized U.S. businesses. NDC is drafting a proposed amendment to the Personal Information Protection Act and related regulations to meet the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) standards and obtain adequacy status. Taiwan maintains a codified system of law. In addition to the specialized courts, Taiwan maintains a three-tiered court system composed of the District Courts, the High Courts, and the Supreme Court. The Compulsory Enforcement Act provides a legal basis for enforcing the ownership of property. Taiwan does not have discrete commercial or contract laws. Various laws regulate businesses and specific industries, such as the Company Law, the Commercial Registration Law, the Business Registration Law, and the Commercial Accounting Law. Taiwan’s Civil Code provides the basis for enforcing contracts. Taiwan’s court system is generally viewed as independent and free from overt interference by other branches of government. Taiwan established its Intellectual Property Court in July 2008 in response to the need for a more centralized and professional litigation system for IPR disputes. There are also specialized labor courts at every level of the court system to deal with labor disputes. Foreign court judgments are final and binding and enforced on a reciprocal basis. Companies can appeal regulatory decisions in the court system. Regulations governing FDI principally derive from the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese. These two laws permit foreign investors to transact either in foreign currency or the NTD. The laws specify that foreign-invested enterprises must receive the same regulatory treatment accorded to local firms. Foreign companies may invest in state-owned firms undergoing privatization and are eligible to participate in publicly financed R&D programs. Amendments the Legislative Yuan passed in 2015 to the Merger and Acquisition Act clarified investment review criteria for mergers and acquisition transactions. The Investment Commission is drafting amendments to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals to simplify the investment review process. Included is an amendment that would replace a pre-investment approval requirement with a post-investment reporting system for investments under a certain threshold. Ex-ante approval would still be required for investments in restricted industries and those exceeding the threshold. The new proposal would also allow the authorities to impose various penalties for violations of the law. Guidance that previously required special consideration of the impact of a private equity fund’s investment has been folded into the set of general evaluation criteria for foreign investment in important industries. In 2016, the MOEA released a supplementary document to clarify required certification for different types of investment applications. This document, which was last revised in August 2021 and in Chinese only, can be found at https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/download-file.jsp?do=BP&id=k/wXjgwG3BM= In December 2020, Taiwan authorities amended the Regulations Governing the Approval of PRC Investment in Taiwan to ensure the complex structure of foreign investments by investors from the PRC do not circumvent the investment control through any indirect investment structure. The new PRC investment rules introduced stricter criteria for identifying PRC investment through third-area intermediary, expanded the scope of investment subject to the authorities’ approval, and forbid PRC investment with any political or military affiliation. All foreign investment-related regulations, application forms, and explanatory information can be found on the Investment Commission’s website, at http://run.moeaic.gov.tw/MOEAIC-WEB-SRC/OfimDownloadE.aspx . The Invest in Taiwan Portal also provides other relevant legal information of interest to foreign investors, such as labor, entry and exit regulations, at https://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/showPageeng1031003?lang=eng&search=1031003 Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act was enacted in 1992. Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) examines business practices that might impede fair competition. Parties may appeal a TFTC decision directly to the High Administrative Court. After the High Administrative Court issues its opinion, either party may file an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which will only review decisions to determine if the lower court failed to apply the law. According to Taiwan law, the authorities may expropriate property whenever it is deemed necessary for the public interest, such as for national defense, public works, and urban renewal projects. The U.S. government is not aware of any recent cases of nationalization or expropriation of foreign-invested assets in Taiwan. There are no reports of indirect expropriation or any official actions tantamount to expropriation. Under Taiwan law, no venture with 45 percent or more foreign investment may be nationalized, as long as the 45 percent capital contribution ratio remains unchanged for 20 years after establishing the foreign business. Taiwan law requires fair compensation must be paid within a reasonable period when the authorities expropriate constitutionally protected private property for public use. Taiwan’s bankruptcy law guarantees creditors the right to share a bankrupt debtor’s assets on a proportional basis. Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced through a registration system. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Taiwan. Corporate bankruptcy is generally governed by the Company Act and the Bankruptcy Act, while the Consumer Debt Resolution Act governs personal bankruptcy. The quasi-public Joint Credit Information Center is the only credit-reporting agency in Taiwan. In 2020 (latest data available,) there were 200 rulings on bankruptcy petitions. 4. Industrial Policies The Statute for Industrial Innovation provides the legal basis for offering tax credits for companies’ R&D expenditures. MOEA also operates several R&D subsidy programs for target industries including the IoT, smart machinery, biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals, green energy, national defense, the circular economy, 5G equipment, and agriculture. Investors can receive tax incentives for investing in free trade zones, public construction, and biotechnology or biopharmaceuticals. Investment support from the central authorities may be available for priority projects. Industrial zones, export processing zones, science parks, and local governments offer various subsidies, financing, and tax deductions. Investors may receive low-interest loans or subsidies for participating in industrial R&D and industry revitalization programs. R&D tax credits, equivalent to 15 percent of total R&D expenditures, are available only to companies who file corporate income taxes in Taiwan. The Act for the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Professionals of 2018 offers relaxed visa requirements and high-earner tax deductions to foreign professionals. For a detailed list of investment incentives programs, please refer to the Invest in Taiwan website at https://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/showPage?lang=eng&search=1031001 . Taiwan government has various programs to support underrepresented entrepreneurs, including the Phoenix Micro Start-up Loan and interest subsidies for women, offshore island residents and the middle-aged and senior citizens at the early stage of start-up. In promotion of Taiwan’s green energy industry, Taiwan’s National Development Fund and local banks collectively provided US $3.4 billion in financial guarantees to steer continued green investment into offshore wind projects and other major infrastructure projects in Taiwan. Since 2018, international renewable energy companies have rushed to set up offshore wind farms in Taiwan because of the 20-year power purchase agreement and generous feed-in tariffs (FIT) pricing scheme. Taiwan’s domestic banks have provided special loans of over US $42 billion to green energy companies and nearly US $9.1 billion to offshore wind businesses. Taiwan’s installed solar PV capacity had tripled over the past four years to reach 7.8 GW since Taiwan authorities in 2016 announced the 2025 installed solar capacity target of 20 GW. Investors have been drawn to Taiwan’s streamlined application process for solar PV projects and incentives such as higher FIT rates. There are seven free trade/free port zones in Taiwan: Anping, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Suao, Taichung, Taipei, and Taoyuan International Airport. The authorities have relaxed restrictions on the movement of merchandise, capital, and personnel into and out of these zones. As part of a broader restructuring and to increase the competitiveness of Taiwan’s ports, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication established the Taiwan International Ports Corporation (TIPC) in 2012 to manage commercial activities of Taiwan’s ports and free trade zones. TIPC facilitates cooperation with foreign shipping operations and related businesses. In addition to preferential tariffs and fees, the foreign labor ceiling for manufacturers in the free ports zones is 40 percent. Kaohsiung Port also serves as a London Metal Exchange (LME) delivery port of primary aluminum, aluminum alloy, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc. With one prominent counterexample, Taiwan does not mandate any forced localization or performance requirements and does not ask software firms to disclose their source code nor access to encryption. In this counterexample, the National Communications Commission prohibited a local telecom carrier from contracting a PRC cloud services company due to concerns over personal data protection. Positive examples of data mobility include new businesses such as Uber and Food Panda and mobile payment firms like Apple Pay, all of which are freely transmitting data cross-border. The authorities may, subject to strict legal proceedings based on Personal Data Protection Act, examine financial crime data from services providers. In September 2019, the Taiwan FSC amended rules to allow banks to store data on overseas cloud servers, as long as the FSC can obtain information for such operations and maintain the right to execute on-site examinations. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property interests are enforced in Taiwan, and it maintains a reliable recording system for mortgages and liens. Taiwan law protects the land use rights of indigenous peoples. Taiwan’s Land Act stipulated that forests, fisheries, hunting grounds, salt fields, mineral deposits, water sources, and lands lying within fortified and military areas and those adjacent to national frontiers may not be transferred or leased to foreigners. Based on the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) Operational Regulations for Foreigners to Acquire Land Rights in Taiwan, foreigners coming from countries that provide Taiwan residents the same land rights will be allowed to acquire or set the same rights in Taiwan. In May 2015, the Cadastral Clearance Act was passed to promote better land registration management. As in other investment categories, Taiwan has specific regulations governing property acquisition by PRC investors. Taiwan’s laws to protect IPR include: the Patent Act, Trademark Act, Copyright Act, and Trade Secrets Act. Taiwan established the pharmaceutical Patent Linkage system in mid-2019. The Taiwan Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) is responsible for policy formulation, laws drafting, and inter-agency enforcement coordination. The Intellectual Property Rights Protection Corps. Of the Criminal Investigation Brigade (CIB) and National Police Administration (NPA) receive IP infringement reports (through toll free direct line of 0800-016-597; and email: 0800016597@iprp.spsh.gov.tw ), and then provide them to the Ministry of Justice for investigations. IP cases are tried in both District Courts and the specialized IP Court. In January 2022, the Executive Yuan (EY) approved draft amendments to the Copyright Act and Trademark Act to prepare for Taiwan’s ascension to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific (CPTPP). The draft amendment on Copyright Act proposes that illegal digital piracy, distribution, and public transmission be deemed as actionable-without-compliant offenses (same as indictable crimes); and pirated optical discs shall be included in the scope of digital piracy, resulting to higher penalties. The draft amendment on the Trademark Act expands counterfeiting crimes from originally defined as “knowingly” to “intentional” and “negligent.” Criminal liabilities are included in the draft, which as of late March 2022, is in the Legislative Yuan (LY) for review. In April 2021, the EY approved the draft amendment of the Copyright Act. This draft covers a wide range of changes, including: (1) the protection from simultaneous further communication to the public (e.g. a retailer plays a YouTube video inside its store); (2) fair use applies to distance learning, libraries and other archival institutions, museums, and regularly held non-profit events; (3) online advertisement of pirated goods deemed as copyright infringement; and (4) minimum six-month imprisonment. This draft amendment is meant to counter the development of digital technology and the internet. As of late March 2022, the draft is in the LY for review. In 2021, Taiwan’s National Police Agency investigated 3,672 IP (including trademark, copyright, and trade secrets) infringement cases, with seizures totaling US $35.5 billion (NTD 103.0 billion). Taiwan Customs prosecuted 228 IP-infringement import cases, with 2.23 million items of trademark infringement and three items of copyright infringement. The majority of those cases were related to bags, pharmaceuticals, and clothing. The Prosecutors’ Offices of the District Courts handled down verdicts of 6,258 IP infringement cases in 2021, with 53 percent of them not indicted. Although some industries lobbied for Taiwan’s inclusion the 2022 301 Report, AIT recommended not including Taiwan on the watch list based on consultations with related agencies as well as Taiwan-based stakeholders. Given Taiwan’s progress in recent years, on both regulations and also the inter-agency efforts on enforcement, AIT concluded that Taiwan’s conclusion would be counterproductive. Another assessment made by AIT for the Notorious Market List concluded that Taiwan-based U.S. stakeholders and law enforcement do not have concerns about brick and mortar markets. As for online markets, local investigation agencies confirmed that the infringing sites allegedly hosted in Taiwan were actually hosted outside of Taiwan. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Taiwan authorities welcome foreign portfolio investment in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE), with foreign investment accounting for approximately 43.5 percent of TWSE capitalization in 2021. Taiwan allows the establishment of offshore banking, securities, and insurance units to attract a broader investor base. The FSC utilizes a negative list approach to regulating local banks’ overseas business not involving the conversion of the NTD. Taiwan’s capital market is mature and active. At the end of 2021, 959 companies were listed on the TWSE, with a total market value of US $2.2 trillion (including transactions of stocks, Taiwan Depository Receipts, exchange-traded funds, and warrants). Foreign portfolio investors are not subject to a foreign ownership ceiling, except in certain restricted companies, and are not subject to any ceiling on portfolio investment. The turnover ratio in the TWSE rose to 205.3 percent in 2021 as the TWSE Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) soared 23.7 percent in 2021. Payments and transfers resulting from international trade activities are fully liberalized in Taiwan. A wide range of credit instruments, all allocated on market terms, is available to domestic- and foreign-invested firms alike. Taiwan’s banking sector is healthy, tightly regulated, and competitive, with 39 banks including three online-only banks servicing the market. The sector’s non-performing loan ratio has remained below 1 percent since 2010, with a sector average of 0.17 in December 2021. Capital-adequacy ratios (CAR) are generally high, and several of Taiwan’s leading commercial lenders are government-controlled, enjoying implicit state guarantees. The sector had a CAR of 14.82 percent as of September 2021, far above the Basel III regulatory minimum of 10.5 percent required by 2019. Taiwan banks’ liquidity coverage ratio, which was required by Basel III to reach 100 percent by 2019, averaged 134.2 percent in September 2021. Taiwan’s banking system is primarily deposit-funded and has limited exposure to global financial, wholesale markets. Regulators have encouraged local banks to expand to overseas markets, especially in Southeast Asia, and minimize exposure in the PRC. Taiwan Central Bank statistics show that Taiwan banks’ PRC net exposure on an ultimate risk basis was USD 70.8 billion in the third quarter of 2021, trailing the United States’ USD 110.2 billion. Taiwan’s largest bank in terms of assets is the wholly state-owned Bank of Taiwan, which had USD 198.2 billion of assets as of December 2021. Taiwan’s eight state-controlled banks (excluding the Export and Import Bank) jointly held nearly US $1,015.6 billion, or 48 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The Taiwan Central Bank operates as an independent agency and state-owned company under the Executive Yuan, free from political interference. The Central Bank’s mandates are to maintain financial stability, develop Taiwan’s banking business, guard the stability of the NTD’s external and internal value, and promote economic growth within the scope of the three aforementioned goals. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Taiwan as branches and foreign-owned subsidiaries, but financial regulators require foreign bank branches to limit their customer base to large corporate clients. Foreigners holding a valid visa entering Taiwan are allowed to open an NTD account with local banks with passports and an ID number issued by the immigration office. Please refer to the Taiwan Bankers’ Association’s webpage: https://www.ba.org.tw/PublicInformation/BusinessDetail/10?returnurl=%2F for detailed information regarding various types of bank services for foreigners in Taiwan. Taiwan does not have a sovereign wealth fund, although the American business community continues to advocate for one. Taiwania Capital Management Company, a partially government-funded investment company, was established in October 2017 to promote investment in innovative and other target industries. As of August 2021, Taiwania raised US $490 million for four funds investing in IoT, biotech, digital health, and early startups in automation, 5G and networking, and advanced manufacturing. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Taiwan has 17 SOEs with stakes by the central authorities exceeding 50 percent, including official agencies such as the Taiwan Central Bank. Please refer to the list of all central government, majority-owned SOEs available online at https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzEwL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMjk1LzM3NGExNjVjLWM5MzAtNDYxZS1iYjViLTA3ODkzYjNlNWVhMi5kb2M%3d&n=M2ZjMzZmMDItZjVjOC00ZjU2LThiMTctZmM3Y2EzMTE1MDRhLmRvYw%3d%3d&icon=.doc Some of these SOEs are large in scale and exert significant influence in their industries, especially monopolies such as Taiwan Power (Taipower) and Taiwan Water. CPC Corporation (formerly China Petroleum Corporation) controls over 70 percent of Taiwan’s retail gasoline market. The most recent privatization took place in 2014, when the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) was successfully privatized through a public listing on the TWSE. Taiwan authorities retain control over some SOEs that were privatized, including managing appointments to boards of directors. These enterprises include Chunghwa Telecom, China Steel, China Airlines, Taiwan Fertilizer, Taiwan Salt, CSBC Corporation (shipbuilding), Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., and eight public banks. In 2020 (latest data available), the 17 SOEs together had a net income of NTD 258 billion (US $9.2 billion), down 21 percent from the NTD 325 billion (US $11.6 billion) in 2019. The SOEs’ average return on equities continued to decline from a recent peak of 11.13 percent in 2015 to 6.67 percent in 2020. These 17 SOEs employed a total of 120,606 workers. Taiwan has not adopted the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. In Taiwan, SOEs are defined as public enterprises in which the government owns more than 50 percent of shares. Public enterprises with less than a 50 percent government stake are not subject to Legislative Yuan supervision. Still, authorities may retain managerial control through senior management appointments, which may change with each administration. Each SOE operates under the supervising ministry’s authority, and government-appointed directors should hold more than one-fifth of an SOE’s board seats. The Executive Yuan, the Ministry of Finance, and MOEA have criteria for selecting individuals for senior management positions. Each SOE has a board of directors, and some SOEs have independent directors and union representatives sitting on the board. Taiwan’s central and local government entities, and SOEs are all covered by the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA.) Except for state monopolies, SOEs compete directly with private companies. SOEs’ purchases of goods or services are regulated by the Government Procurement Act and are open to private and foreign companies via public tender. Private companies have the same access to financing as SOEs. Taiwan banks are generally willing to extend loans to enterprises meeting credit requirements. SOEs are subject to the same tax obligations as private enterprises and are regulated by the Fair Trade Act as private enterprises. The Legislative Yuan reviews SOEs’ budgets each year. There are no privatization programs in progress. Taiwan’s most recent privatization of AIDC in 2014 included the imposition of a foreign ownership ceiling of 10 percent due to the sensitive nature of the defense sector. In August 2017, Taiwan authorities identified CPC Corporation, Taipower Company, and Taiwan Sugar as their next privatization targets. Following the passage of the Electricity Industry Act amendments in January 2017, MOEA has stated that Taipower’s privatization will not occur in the near future, but plans to restructure it as a new holding company after separating Taipower’s distribution business from power generation. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Taiwan public has high expectations for and is sensitive to responsible business conduct (RBC), in part due to concerns about such issues as food safety and environmental pollution. Taiwan authorities actively promote RBC. MOEA and the FSC issued guidelines on ethical standards and internal control mechanisms to urge businesses to take responsibility for the impact of their activities on the environment, consumers, employees, and communities. Although not a member of the United Nations, Taiwan pledged on its own initiative to uphold international human rights conventions. In December 2020, Taiwan’s Cabinet released the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (NAP) in an aim to provide better protections for human rights in the workplace. Taiwan’s labor law provides a minimum age for employment of 15 but has an exception for work by children younger than 15 if they have completed junior high school and the competent authorities have determined the work will not harm the child’s mental and physical health. The law prohibits children younger than 18 from doing heavy or hazardous work. Working hours for children are limited to eight hours per day, and children may not work overtime or on night shifts. There is no reported RBC related to forced labor or child labor issues. The TWSE conducts an annual review of the corporate governance performance of all publicly listed companies. To promote more profit-sharing with employees, Taiwan’s Securities and Futures Act mandates that all publicly listed companies establish a compensation committee. In November 2018, the Act was amended to require all publicly listed companies to disclose average employee compensation and wage adjustment information. Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation, a government-run securities depository of Taiwan, in 2020 launched Taiwan ESG Dashboard to encourage sustainable investing and enhance companies’ performance on ESG issues. In 2021, 30 Taiwan companies were included in the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index. Taiwan ranks fourth among 12 Asian markets in the Corporate Governance Watch 2020 report, behind only Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. There are also independent NGOs and business associations promoting or monitoring RBC in Taiwan. In August 2020, the FSC announced that it will implement the “Corporate Governance 3.0–Sustainable Development Roadmap” for the TWSE listed companies. All TWSE-listed companies are required to appoint a chief corporate governance officer. They must complete the carbon footprint verification and disclosure by 2027, and all the certification by 2029. Starting in January 2022, 42 listed petrochemical companies and 44 financial institutions were required to obtain third-party assurance for sustainability reporting. The FSC also mandates greenhouse gas emissions disclosure in annual reports beginning in 2023 for all steel and cement companies, as well as listed companies with paid-in capital of over US $360 million (NTD 10 billion). Taiwan does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Taiwan authorities encourage Taiwan firms to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, and many Taiwan-listed companies have voluntarily enclosed conflict minerals free statement in their annual social responsibility reports. Taiwan has a private security industry. Taiwan is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, nor a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA.) Taiwan’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act in 2015 includes long-term reduction goals in its official legislation to combat climate change and maps out general guidelines in the 2017 National Climate Change Action Guidelines for greenhouse gas mitigation and climate change adaptation. Taiwan has a national strategy to protect biodiversity and maintain sustainable ecosystems. Taiwan established a national ecological network in 2018 and compiled ecological survey data over the past five years to identify key biodiversity areas and promote ecofriendly land production. The Cabinet is amending the ‘Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act’ into the ‘Climate Change Response Act (CCRA)” and will strengthen climate management by appointing cabinet-level authorities to enhance Taiwan’s overall capacities for climate change mitigation through emission controls and incentive mechanisms to facilitate carbon reduction and adopting a carbon pricing mechanism with levies on Taiwan’s carbon-intensive emitters and imported commodities. Taiwan authorities are in discussion with industry and business to promote voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reduction, decarbonized energy systems, higher energy efficiency in industry, green transportation and negative emissions technologies to achieve relevant targets/goals. The Taiwan Alliance for Net-Zero Emissions, a group comprised of local traditional manufacturing, technology, finance, and service industries, supports Taiwan authorities’ efforts to attain net-zero carbon emissions at office sites by 2030 and production sites by 2050. Another consortium, the Taiwan Climate Alliance, formed by eight ICT companies in Taiwan, plans to use 100 percent renewable energy in their manufacturing processes by 2050. Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Administration (TEPA) adopted a carbon emission offset program in 2015. TEPA initiated a Green Mark product labeling as a voluntary scheme of environmental performance certification in Taiwan beginning from 1992. In 2011, TEPA mandated the post-market verification for green products. Subsidies are also available for renewable energy-use generators. TEPA also subsidizes new motorcycles to phase out motorcycles made before June 2007. Taiwan’s Government Procurement Act authorizes central and local authorities and other public institutions to give preference in tenders to products with a government-approved eco-label, as well as those that increase social benefits or reduce social costs. Taiwan central authorities set annual green procurement targets and require that the public sector procurement prioritizes environmentally friendly products. Since the program started in 2012, Taiwan’s green procurement rate increased from 30 percent to 95 percent. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . 9. Corruption Agency Against Corruption and Northern Investigation Office, Ministry of Justice No.166, Bo’ai Rd., Zhongzheng District, Taipei Anti-corruption Hotline opens 24 hrs: +886-0800-286-586 https://www.aac.moj.gov.tw/7170/278724/ TI Chinese Taipei, TICT https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/taiwan http://www.tict.org.tw/ Wang Shen-jieh Specialist TI Chinese Taipei 5F, No.111 Mu-Cha Road, Section 1, Taipei, Taiwan 11645 Tel: +886-2-2236-2204 Email: tict@tict.org.tw; transparencytaiwan@gmail.com Taiwan implemented laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, including in public procurement. The Act on Property Declaration by Public Servants mandates annual property declaration for senior public services officials and their immediate family members. In 2021, the Control Yuan discovered 29 violations and imposed a total of US $485,000 in fines. The Corruption Punishment Statute and Criminal Code contain specific penalties for corrupt activities, including maximum jail sentences of life in prison and a maximum fine of up to NTD 100 million (US $3.5 million). Laws provide for increased penalties for public officials who fail to explain the origins of suspicious assets or property. The Government Procurement Act and the Act on Recusal of Public Servants Due to Conflict of Interest both forbid incumbent and former procurement personnel and their relatives from engaging in related procurement activities. Although not a UN member, Taiwan voluntarily adheres to the UN Convention against Corruption and published its first country report in March 2018. Guidance titled Ethical Corporate Management Best Practice Principles for all publicly listed companies was revised in November 2014. It asks publicly listed companies to establish an internal code of conduct and corruption-prevention measures for activities undertaken with government employees, politicians, and other private sector stakeholders. The Ministry of Justice is drafting a Whistle Blowers Protection Act to effectively combat illegal behaviors in both government agencies and the private sector. The Anti-money Laundering Act implemented June 2017 requires the mandatory reporting of financial transactions by individuals listed in the Standards for Determining the Scope of Politically Exposed Persons Entrusted with Prominent Public Function, Their Family Members and Close Associates, and by the first-degree lineal relatives by blood or by marriage; siblings, spouse and his/her siblings, and the domestic partner equivalent to a spouse of these politically exposed individuals. The U.S. government is not aware of cases where bribes have been solicited for foreign investment approval. 10. Political and Security Environment Taiwan is a young and vibrant multi-party democracy. The transitions of power in both local and presidential elections have been peaceful and orderly. There are no recent examples of politically motivated damage to foreign investment. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Tsai Ing-wen administration has made improving labor welfare one of its core priorities. Minimum monthly wage has been consistently raised since 2017 and reached US $890 (NTD 25,250) in 2022. Affected by the global pandemic, Taiwan’s unemployment rate in 2021 edged up to 3.64 percent. Taiwan Ministry of Labor (MOL) data show that 53 percent of Taiwan’s population aged above 15 years is at least college-educated. Taiwan’s female worker participation rate is 51.4 percent, similar to neighboring countries’ figures. According to the MOL, informal employment hit a record high at 799,000 labors in 2020, accounting for 7.0 percent of total employment. The size of Taiwan’s labor force is decreasing as the society ages. Taiwan transitioned from an “aging society” to an “aged society” in 2018. In 2020, 15.8 percent of its population were 65 years old or above, up from 10.6 percent in 2009. Taiwan’s total fertility rate in 2020 was 0.99, marking the first time it went under one and remaining one of the lowest in the world. As of December 2021, there were 669,992 foreign laborers in Taiwan, of which 443,104 were working in the industrial sector. The Labor Standard Act and the Act of Gender Equality in Employment are universally applied to both domestic and foreign workers, with the exception that domestic foreign helpers are not covered by the Labor Standard Act. MOL data indicated that, while labor shortage rates remained stable at around three percent in the manufacturing industry, the rates have been increasing over past few years in services industries such as food and accommodation, information and communication, art and entertainment, recreation, and real estate activities. Industry groups have long claimed that the lack of blue-collar workers is one of the major issues facing manufacturers operating in Taiwan and have urged the authorities to increase the ceiling on foreign workers. To attract Taiwan businesses to relocate back to Taiwan, Taiwan authorities lifted the foreign workers ceiling for specific industries, but across the board, the ceiling remained at 40 percent of total employees. Taiwan businesses consistently urge the authorities to ease work visa requirements to recruit foreign professionals, especially the skilled white-collar labor in the ICT sector. However, wage growth in Taiwan, compared with neighboring economies, poses a challenge for talent recruitment and retention. Taiwan issued 40,993 working permits to foreign professionals in 2021, with 20 percent to individuals from Japan, followed by 15.9 percent from Malaysia, and 8.3 percent from the United States. 26.7 percent of foreign professionals work in the manufacturing industry. Private companies are not required to hire nationals. Employers may institute unpaid leave with employees’ consent but must notify the labor authorities and continue to make health insurance, labor insurance, and pension contributions. Due to the global pandemic, 58,731 employees suffered from unpaid leave in 2021. Taiwan provides unemployment relief based on the Employment Insurance Law, vocational training allowances for jobless persons, and employment subsidies to encourage hiring. Labor laws are not waived to attract or retain investment. Labor relations in Taiwan are generally harmonious. Although Taiwan is not a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), it adheres to ILO conventions on the protection of workers’ rights. Taiwan law protects the right to join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Labor unions have become more active in Taiwan over the past decade, and the Collective Agreement Act outlines the negotiation mechanism for collective bargaining to protect labor’s interests in the negotiations. The majority of labor unions exist in the manufacturing sector. The authorities provide financial incentives to enterprise unions to encourage negotiation of “collective agreements” with employers that detail their employees’ immediate labor rights and entitlements. No strike has initiated/conducted in 2020-21 due to the stringent economic impact by the global pandemic. Taiwan’s labor authorities have announced the increasing frequency and coverage of labor inspections. Since 2019, government incentives for business growth and industrial development have incorporated the labor inspection record as a core evaluating item for the applying entities. Violating employers will not be eligible for tax reduction or grants. The Labor Incident Act of 2020 mandates the establishment of special labor courts, which helps accelerates dispute resolution and reduces financial cost for labor filing employment lawsuits. In December 2020, Taiwan implemented the Middle-aged and Elderly Employment Promotion Act to promote employment opportunities for employees aged above 45 years. 14. Contact for More Information Arati Shroff Deputy Chief, Economic Section, American Institute in Taiwan 100 Jinhu Road, Taipei, Taiwan +886-2-2162-2000 ShroffA@state.gov Tajikistan Executive Summary Tajikistan is a challenging place to do business but presents potential high-risk, high-reward opportunities for foreign investors who have experience in the region, a long-term investment horizon, and the patience and resources to conduct significant research and due diligence. At the most senior levels, the Tajik government continues to express interest in attracting more foreign investment. The government hosted an October 2021 investment forum to highlight its commitment to simplifying investment policies. Tajikistan’s ambassador to the United States – who formerly served as the head of the government’s Investment Committee – enlisted high-level government support for outreach to U.S. companies in 2021. Nevertheless, the poorest of the Central Asian countries harbors few U.S. investors and remains an uncompetitive investment destination. President Emomali Rahmon publicly emphasizes the need to foster private-sector-led growth, and attracting investment is prioritized in national development strategies. These strategy documents notwithstanding, authoritarian policies, bureaucratic and financial hurdles, widespread corruption, a flawed banking sector, and countless business and tax inspections greatly hinder investors. The government’s commitment to dedicate significant financial resources to the construction of the Roghun Dam hydropower plant creates pressure for the Tax Committee to enforce or creatively interpret arbitrary tax regulations on companies outside of the wide business interests of President Rahmon’s family in order to meet ever-increasing revenue targets. Politics also play a role. Remittances sent by Tajik labor migrants typically account for one-third of Tajikistan’s GDP, and the Russian Federation uses this leverage to ensure Tajik support for Russian foreign policy priorities, and/or to pressure Tajikistan into joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Tajikistan is also saturated in opaque loans connected to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese investments account for more than 60 percent of the country’s total Foreign Direct Investment. Finally, despite Tajikistan’s 2013 accession to the World Trade Organization, the Tajik government has imposed trade policies to protect private domestic interests without notifying its partners, notably in the poultry, mining, and alcoholic beverage sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare endemic transport and infrastructure challenges in landlocked Tajikistan, imposed by geography but exacerbated by political isolation as borders with Afghanistan (following the Taliban’s return to power) and the Kyrgyz Republic (following deadly April 2021 border clashes) remain closed. Tajikistan’s rigid economy represents another systemic barrier as analyses show growth is consistently driven by remittance-fueled consumption and exports are concentrated in mining, metals, and agriculture, making Tajikistan especially vulnerable to commodity shocks in world markets. Despite these challenges and risks to potential investors, Tajikistan is pursuing greater trade and investment links and has made modest progress on trade facilitation and tax reform to improve its investment climate in past years. In 2021 authorities continued small steps towards compliance on intellectual property rights protections. Should the government pursue an economic reform path, opportunities in energy, agribusiness, food processing, tourism, textiles, and mining could prove promising. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/tajikistan Global Innovation Index 2021 103 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/Home U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $38 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=TJ 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Tajik government consistently calls for greater U.S. investment. Despite this, Tajikistan has traditionally courted state-led investment and external loans from the People’s Republic of China and Russia. In 2021, overall Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Tajikistan roughly doubled to $342 million, and Chinese investments, which account for forty percent of all FDI, increased 175 percent to $211 million. Iran ($32.6 million) was the second largest source of FDI in 2021, followed by Turkey ($25.1 million) and Switzerland ($21.5 million). Tajikistan’s Investment Law (Article 7) guarantees equal rights for both local and foreign investors. According to this law, foreigners can invest by jointly owning shares in existing companies with other Tajik companies or Tajik citizens; by creating fully foreign-owned companies; or by concluding agreements with legal entities or citizens of Tajikistan that provide for other forms of foreign investment activity. Foreign firms may acquire assets, including shares and other securities, as well as land leasing and mineral usage rights. Foreign firms may also exercise all property rights to which they are entitled, either independently or shared with other Tajik companies and citizens of Tajikistan. Most of Tajikistan’s current international agreements provide most-favored-nation status. Tajikistan’s legislation does not discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment. To receive permission and licenses for operation, however, a foreign investor must navigate a complicated, cumbersome, and often corrupt bureaucratic system. In practice foreign companies may encounter different types of hurdles while exercising their rights. For example, registration of a company by a foreign entity or foreigner may be a more complicated process than for local founders. Several Tajik government agencies are responsible for investment promotion, but they frequently have competing interests. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management ( https://investcom.tj ) facilitates FDI. In addition, state-owned enterprise Tajinvest under the State Committee on Investments and State Property Management is responsible for attracting investment into Tajikistan ( https://www.tajinvest.tj ). Although a donor-supported Consultative Council on the Improvement of the Investment Climate provides a formal venue for dialogue, investors continue to claim that complaints to the government go unheeded. Tajikistan’s legislation provides a right for all forms of foreign and domestic ownership to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control of firms and no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access. Local law considers all land and subsoil resources to belong exclusively to the state, although initial efforts to establish a private land market are underway. Tajikistan’s legislation allows for 100 percent foreign ownership of local companies. In the context of jointly owned companies, local partners generally seek to possess a controlling share (51 percent or more) at the initial stage of business development and in some cases may seek to increase their stake over time. All sectors of Tajikistan’s economy are open to foreign participation except for aviation, defense, security, and law enforcement, which require special government permission for the operation of such types of businesses or services. Tajikistan does not restrict foreign investment; it does not mandate local stakeholder equity positions or local partnership. In some cases, the government requires specific licenses. There are no mandatory IP/technology transfer requirements. Tajikistan’s State Committee on Investments and State Property Management screens inbound foreign investments involving government interests, including investments into its five Free Economic Zones, and issues approval or rejection statements. The government takes particular interest in investments requiring government financial support or state guarantees as well as projects that may impact the country’s national security. Investors must submit their proposals to all relevant government agencies to solicit feedback or objection, and this process can be lengthy and cumbersome. Screening proposals often involve background checks on the company, the person(s) representing the company, and identification of a financial source to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. The review process could reject proposals that violate Tajik law or flag a proposal as “incomplete.” Applicants may appeal the government’s decision by submitting a claim to the Tajik Economic Court. In December 2021 the World Trade Organization conducted its first Trade Policy Review for Tajikistan. Additionally, in 2020 an OECD Peer Review of Investment Promotion in Tajikistan suggested enhancing communication with existing investors and establishing a clear investment strategy that articulates economic objectives and agency roles. Although the Tajik government simplified the business registration process by adopting a single-window registration system for investors in 2019, that process still requires significant legal and human resources, government connections, and time. The Tax Committee is the primary agency responsible for business registration ( www.andoz.tj ). In addition to obtaining state registration through a single-window, a company must also register with the Social Protection Agency ( www.nafaka.tj ); Statistics Agency under the President of Tajikistan ( www.stat.tj ); Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment ( www.mehnat.tj ); Sanitary-Epidemiological Service at the Ministry of Health ( www.moh.tj ); as well as with local authorities and municipal services. According to Tajik regulations, registering a business should take less than five business days; in reality, it may take several weeks or even months due to inappropriate or unlawful actions of the registering agencies. The international donor community, in coordination with the government, funds a number of projects that stimulate development of small and medium enterprises in Tajikistan. The Tajik government does not promote outward investments. Private companies from Tajikistan have invested in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkey, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the UAE, primarily in trade, food processing, real estate, and business development. The Tajik government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Tajikistan’s regulatory system lacks transparency, and the government does not encourage companies to disclose environmental, social, or governance transparency. Despite recent improvements to allow access to presidential decrees and laws online, governmental instructions, ministerial memos, and regulations are often inaccessible to the public or unpublished. Although Tajikistan archives laws, regulations, and policies at www.mmk.tj , investors must purchase access to Adliya, a commercial legal database, to obtain updated legal and regulatory information. The Tajik government rarely publishes proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Government agencies submit proposed draft regulations to government commissions, which receive a final review and approval from the Executive Office of President. TajikStandard, the government agency responsible for certifying goods and services and supervising compliance with state standards, lacks experts and appropriate equipment. TajikStandard does not publish its fees for licenses and certificates, or its regulatory requirements. Ongoing assistance from the World Bank helps the Ministry of Finance and some parastatals adopt International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in order to comply with the government’s 2011 Accounting Law. Publicly available budget documents fall short of internationally accepted standards, but the government has made progress towards greater fiscal transparency in recent years. Tajikistan is a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Government officials are still studying the prospect of membership in the EAEU. The regulatory system that governs Tajikistan’s cotton sector incorporates CIS and U.S. technical norms. Tajikistan became a WTO member in 2013. According to a December 2021 WTO report, Tajikistan has outstanding or outdated notifications in a number of areas. Tajikistan has a civil legal system in which parties to a contract can seek enforcement by submitting claims or disputes to Tajikistan’s Economic Court. Nominally, the judicial system is independent. In practice, the executive branch interferes in judiciary matters. The current judicial process is neither fair nor reliable. Outcomes tend to favor the government’s executive branch. The Tajik government regulates investments through several laws, inter alia, the Law on Investment Agreement, Law on Concessions, Law on Resources, Law on Legal Status of Foreigners, Law on Free Economic Zones, Law on Investments, Concept of State Policy on Investments and Protection of Investments, Law on Natural Resources Tenders, and Law on Privatization of Housing. The Tajik government’s “one-stop-shop” Single Window website for investors launched in 2019: https://investcom.tj/en/investments/single-window/ . The Antimonopoly Service under the Government ( http://www.ams.tj ) is responsible for regulating prices for products of monopolistic enterprises and for preventing and eliminating monopolistic activity, abuse, and unfair competition. The agency’s decisions are subject to a legal appeals process, although there are few instances in which decisions have been overruled. The Tajik government can legally expropriate property under the terms of Tajikistan’s Law on Investments, Law on Privatization, civil code, and criminal code. The laws authorize expropriation if the Tajik government identifies procedural violations in privatizations of state-owned assets or determines a property has been used for anti-government or criminal activities, as defined in the criminal code. Tajikistan has a history of expropriating land that was illegally privatized following independence. After an investigation by government anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, and other law enforcement agencies, the State Committee for Investments and State Property Management can issue a finding that the asset was illegally privatized and request that the Tajik court system order its return to government control. Domestic law requires owners be reimbursed for expropriated property, but the amount of the compensation is usually well below the property’s fair market value. The Tajik government has not shown any pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons by way of illegal expropriation. Under Tajikistan’s 2003 Law on Bankruptcy, both creditors and debtors may file for an insolvent firm’s liquidation. The debtor may reject overly burdensome contracts and choose whether to continue contracts supplying essential goods or services, or avoid preferential or undervalued transactions. The law does not provide for the possibility of the debtor obtaining credit after the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Creditors have the right to demand the debtor return creditors’ property if that property was assigned to the debtor less than four months prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Tajik law does not criminalize bankruptcy. 4. Industrial Policies According to statements by President Rahmon, there are over 200 tax, regulatory, and legal incentives for businesses. According to the IFC Business Regulation and Investment Policy project, there are 97 incentives for investments. In practice, businesses and investors cannot access or utilize most of these incentives. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management’s website lists government-promoted investment opportunities ( https://map.investcom.tj/ ). The Tajik government has officially expressed an interest in attracting FDI and in recent years the government has issued state guarantees for joint projects, principally with Chinese investments. Tajikistan’s ambitious National Development Strategy 2016-2030 highlights the critical role of private sector investment, but the strategy’s goal to attract $55 billion in FDI by 2030 may be more aspirational than realistic. The Tajik government has established five Free Economic Zones ( http://www.fez.tj ) offering reduced taxes and customs fees to both foreign and domestic businesses. To be eligible for preferential tax treatment, manufacturing companies must invest a minimum of $500,000, trading companies $50,000, and service and consulting companies $10,000. The newest Free Economic Zone was created in March 2019, in Kulob. The government does not practice forced data localization but does require telecommunication service providers to install surveillance equipment provided by the Russian Federation as part of a Collective Security Treaty Organization agreement. Since 2017, Tajikistan’s Telecommunication Agency sends all internet traffic through its unified communication center. The government does not impede the transmission of customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory unless the data violates anti-terrorist and anti-extremist laws. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Tajik government uses an outdated cadaster system to record, protect, and facilitate acquisition and disposition of property, and enforcement remains an issue. Investors should be aware that establishing title might be a more involved process than in Western countries because title histories can be difficult to find. Since 2007, the U.S. government has provided significant, sustained, and focused support to the Tajik government on market-driven land reforms. The activity also supports the launch of a new automated registration system designed to centralize records, streamline procedures, and further simplify land registration. According to domestic law, all land belongs exclusively to the state; individuals or entities may be granted first or second-tier land-use rights. The government restricts foreigners’ first-tier land-use rights to 50 years, while Tajik individuals and entities may have indefinite first-tier land-use rights. Foreigners may request second-tier land-use rights from the government similar to the first-tier rights of Tajik individuals and entities, for periods of up to 50 years. Tajik first-tier land-use rights holders may also grant foreigners lease agreements for up to 20 years. Tajik law does not allow the formal sale of land. In 2008, however, the government passed mortgage legislation that allows parties to use immovable property as collateral. If leaseholders do not use land in accordance with the purpose of the lease, then authorities can revert it to other owners. Tajikistan is a signatory to several international conventions that protect intellectual property rights (IPR), including the World International Property Organization (WIPO) Convention. Tajikistan has signed 18 WIPO administered treaties. IPR-related laws, regulations, and treaties are listed here: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=TJ The IPR landscape underwent few changes in 2021 as the government took largely cosmetic steps towards the protection of intellectual property. The government adopted a 2021-2030 National Strategy for the Development of Intellectual Property, but the strategy offers few specifics or benchmarks to guide officials in its implementation and comes with no additional resources or funding. Tajikistan was removed from the United States Trade Representative’s Special Watch List in 2019 and is not included in the Notorious Markets List. At present, sales from IP intensive industries do not represent a sizeable portion of the Tajik economy. Moreover, estimates indicate over 90 percent of software and other media products sold in the country are unlicensed copies, and many “brand name” consumer goods are counterfeit products manufactured in the People’s Republic of China. Officially, Tajikistan amended its customs code during WTO accession to provide authority for customs officers to seize and destroy counterfeit goods; in practice, IP enforcement actions are limited. To register a patent or trademark with the National Center for Patents and Information (NCPI), applicants must submit an application and pay a fee. The NCPI ( www.ncpi.tj ) will search its records for conflicts and, if none is found, should register the IP within 30 days from the time the application is received. In general, the issuance of a trademark might take four to seven months, while obtaining a patent for an invention could take up to two years. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Foreign portfolio investment is not a priority for the Tajik government, and the country lacks a securities market. According to government statistics, portfolio investment in Tajikistan totaled $502.5 million at the end of 2021. This includes the $500 million Eurobond the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) issued in 2017. The NBT has made efforts to develop a system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investments, including credit rating mechanisms implemented by Moody’s and S&P. Apart from these initial steps, however, Tajikistan has not established policies to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. Tajikistan does not place any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, per IMF Article VIII. It regards transfers from all international sources as revenue, however, and taxes them accordingly. Politically-driven lending has historically saddled commercial banks with a high percentage of non-performing loans. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, but those operating in Tajikistan avoid local credit because of comparatively high interest rates. According to the NBT report from December 2021, 62 credit institutions, including 13 banks, including one Islamic bank, 18 microcredit deposit organizations, four microcredit organizations, and 27 microcredit funds, function in Tajikistan. Tajikistan has 295 bank branches and 1,204 banking service centers. The National Bank has estimated roughly 25 percent of Tajiks have a bank account. Tajikistan’s banking system is on a recovery path following a 2015 financial crisis. AgroInvestBank and TojikSodirotbank, two of Tajikistan’s largest, entered the liquidation process in May 2021. Tajikistan’s banking sector has assets of $1.98 billion as of December 2021, while liabilities reached $1.53 billion. Although authorities report 13.4 percent of commercial loans are non-performing, other independent estimates are considerably higher. The NBT is Tajikistan’s central bank and, in recent years, has pursued policies to strengthen financial inclusion and cashless payments. Foreign banks can establish operations but are subject to NBT regulations. United States commercial banks discontinued correspondent banking relations with Tajik commercial banks in 2012. To establish a bank account, foreigners must submit a letter of application, a passport copy, and Tajik government-issued taxpayer identification number. Tajikistan does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises World Bank and IMF reports indicate there are 920 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which employ 24 percent of the labor force, use 50 percent of all available credit, and account for 17 percent of the country’s economic output. The State Committee for Investments and State Property Management maintains a private database of all SOEs in Tajikistan. SOEs are active in travel, transportation, energy, mining, metal manufacturing/products, food processing/packaging, agriculture, construction, heavy equipment, services, finance, and information and communication sectors. The government divested itself of smaller SOEs in successive waves of privatization but retained ownership of the largest Soviet-era enterprises and any sector deemed to be a natural monopoly. The government appoints directors and boards to SOEs, but the absence of clear governance and internal control procedures means the government retains full control. Tajik SOEs do not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. When SOEs are involved in investment disputes, domestic courts typically rule in their favor. In sectors that are open to private sector and foreign competition, SOEs receive a larger percentage of government contracts/business than their private sector competitors. Tajikistan has undertaken a commitment, as part of its WTO accession protocol, to initiate accession to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), but the agreement does not cover SOEs. The Tajik government conducted privatization on an ad-hoc basis in the 1990s, and again in the early 2000s. Following a World Bank recommendation, in 2020 the government began splitting national energy parastatal Barqi Tojik, which is now legally three distinct public/private partnerships. Foreign investors are able to participate in Tajikistan’s privatization programs. There is a public bidding process, but the privatization process is not transparent. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Tajik government has given no guidance on responsible business conduct for companies and does not promote OECD or UN recommendations on these issues. There are no standards on corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation to protect shareholders. There are no independent NGOs, worker organizations/unions, or business associations in Tajikistan that promote or monitor responsible business conduct. Authorities protect consumer rights through the Law on Consumer Protection, and citizens may file lawsuits against violators of consumer rights with the court system. Tajikistan’s state labor union is responsible for safeguarding labor and employment rights but in practice, no enforcement is in place. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . The government’s 2016-2030 National Development Strategy and midterm goals in the 2021-2025 period of the strategy promote green economy principles with few specifics. Tajikistan uses tree plantings, hydropower, and regional energy integration to work towards environmental goals but has stressed that international cooperation and financial assistance would be keys to success. Tajikistan has prioritized industrialization for economic development and poverty reduction and, accordingly, has not pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions. Additionally, the government’s National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for the period up to 2030 stresses the country’s vulnerability to climate change, which it identifies as a barrier to development priorities. Priority sectors under the strategy include energy, water resources, transport, and agriculture. Tajikistan ranks 135 in terms of global emissions rankings, and 96 percent of energy generation is hydropower. In the 2021 Climatescope ranking of the most attractive destinations for energy transition investments, Tajikistan places 97 of 136 countries ranked. 9. Corruption Tajikistan has enacted anti-corruption legislation, but enforcement is politically motivated, and generally ineffective in combating corruption of public officials. Amendments to the criminal code in 2016 allow individuals convicted of bribery-related crimes to avoid prison in return for payment of fines (roughly $25/day they would have served in prison). Tajikistan’s laws provide conditions to counter conflict of interest in awarding contracts. The Tajik government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Tajikistan became a signatory to the UN’s Anticorruption Convention in 2006. Tajikistan is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Tajik authorities do not provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to investment and have reported instances of corruption in government procurement, awards of licenses and concessions, dispute settlements, regulations, customs, and taxation. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Sulaimon Sultonzoda Head, Agency for State Financial Control and Fight with Corruption 78 Rudaki Avenue, Dushanbe 992 37 221-48-10; 992 27 234-3052 info@anticorruption.tj; agenti@anticorruption.tj (The agency requests that contact be made via a form on their website – www.anticorruption.tj ) Contact at a “watchdog” organization: United Nations Development Program 39 Aini Street, Dushanbe +992 44 600-56-00 10. Political and Security Environment Tajikistan’s civil war lasted from 1992 to 1997 and resulted in the deaths of 50,000 people. Apart from a minor uprising in September 2015, however, political violence following the end of the civil war has been rare. In 2020, President Rahmon won his fifth-consecutive term in office with 91 percent of the vote. Earlier in the year, the President’s political party won 47 of 63 seats in parliament. Tajikistan’s authoritarian ruler has consolidated power by silencing opposition voices and political parties. As part of its security efforts, the Tajik government has placed numerous restrictions on religious, media, and civil freedoms. The state, as an extension of the regime, furthers the interests of the ruling elite, often to the detriment of the business community. Democratic reform is viewed by many elites as a threat to important political and financial interests. Government institutions are often unwilling or unable to protect human rights, the judiciary is not independent, and the court system does not present Tajiks with a fair or effective forum in which to seek protection. Law enforcement institutions often overuse their authority to monitor, question, or detain a wide spectrum of individuals, and the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) exercises a wide degree of influence in all aspects of government. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The official unemployment rate at the end of 2021 was 2.2 percent, although the World Bank estimates the unemployment rate to be 10.9 percent. Estimates on labor force participation in the informal sector vary widely, but some Embassy contacts speculate half of all Tajiks work outside of the formal sector. Government unemployment statistics do not include the roughly one million citizens (12.5 percent of the population) that migrate in search of work in other countries – primarily to Russia. According to information provided by the Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment, Tajikistan’s labor force is comprised of 5.6 million workers. Due to demographic growth, the World Bank estimates that demand for jobs exceeds job growth by a ratio of two to one. Tajikistan placed last in the Eastern Europe and Central Asian Region in the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Global Gender Gap Index (125 of 156 countries ranked), which noted women make up only 31 percent of the Tajik labor force and often hold jobs with few protections and meager earnings. Unskilled labor is widely available, but skilled labor is in short supply, as many Tajiks with marketable skills choose to emigrate due to limited domestic employment opportunities. Corruption in secondary schools and universities means degrees may not accurately reflect an applicant’s level of professional training or competency. Foreign businesses, international organizations, and NGOs report difficulty recruiting qualified staff for their organizations in all specialties. The Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment is expanding its network of donor-assisted training centers at which Tajik workers can become more marketable. The curriculum at these centers is primarily focused on the migrant community, offering training in English, Russian, culture, and history. Centers also provide certification of a worker’s existing skills, and short-term vocational training as welders, electricians, tractor operators, textile workers, and confectioners. The labor market favors employers. Article 36 of Tajikistan’s Labor Code gives employers the right to change workers’ contracts (remuneration, hours, responsibilities, etc.) due to fluctuating market conditions. If the worker does not accept the amended contract, the employer may terminate the worker, but the worker can claim a severance payment equivalent to two months’ salary. Tajikistan’s Labor Code does not include any provisions for waiving labor regulations in Tajikistan’s Free Economic Zones or to attract or retain investments, but the Tajik government has in some cases waived requirements on the percentage of Tajiks which make up a company’s labor force. According to the Tajik Law on Licenses, foreign companies may negotiate the percentage of the foreign work force under an investment agreement. Large-scale projects signed between the Tajik government and a foreign entity or government require 80 percent of the workforce to be locally hired. Tajik legislation permits foreigners to hold senior management and directorial positions. It is possible to obtain visas and residence/work permits, but applicants are required to provide documentary support, and most permits cannot exceed one year. The International Labor Organization in its 2021 annual report on the application of international labor standards requested additional information from Tajikistan on both the country’s labor inspection practices and legal framework related to trade unions due to concerns of non-compliance with various international regulations. Although the majority of workers are technically unionized, most are not aware of their rights, and few unions effectively advocate for workers’ rights. The Tajik government controls unions. Tajikistan has no formal labor dispute resolution mechanisms. Although collective bargaining can occur, it is rare. There were no significant labor strikes in Tajikistan during 2021. 14. Contact for More Information Almaz Saifutdinov Economic/Commercial Specialist 109A I. Somoni +992 37 2292355 saifutdinov@state.gov Tanzania Executive Summary The United Republic of Tanzania achieved lower-middle income country status in July 2020, following two decades of sustained economic growth. The country’s solid macroeconomic foundation, sound fiscal policies, rich natural endowments, and strategic geographic position have fostered a diverse economy resilient to external shocks. This proved critical as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an economic downturn, though Tanzania avoided a more severe pandemic-induced recession. The Government of Tanzania (GoT) welcomes foreign direct investment. In March 2021, President Samia Suluhu Hassan assumed the presidency following the death of President John Pombe Magufuli. In her first months in office, President Hassan promised reforms to improve the business climate and identified attracting foreign investment as a key priority. This commitment to increasing investment has continued throughout her tenure and economic issues remain at the forefront of the administration’s policies, strategies, and goals. President Hassan’s government has sought to engage stakeholders, including local private sector organizations and development partners, to improve the business climate and regain investor confidence. Consistent with this shift in rhetoric, significant changes to improving the business environment and investment climate have been made over the past year: improving the complex, and sometimes inconsistent, work permit issuance process for foreign workers and investors; streamlining Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) operations; disbandment of the special ‘Tax Task Force’ previously associated with heavy-handed and arbitrary tax enforcement; and strengthening regional trade cooperation. However, while several laws have been reviewed, business climate legislative reforms have not yet been sweeping. There remain significant legislative obstacles to foreign investment such as the Natural Resources and Wealth Act, Permanent Sovereignty Act, Public Private Partnership Act, and the Mining Laws and Regulations. Despite pledges by President Hassan and senior government officials, these have yet to be resolved; rather, the administration has selectively eased the application of these laws. The primary business and investment challenges lie in tax administration; opening and closing businesses; inconsistent institutions compounded by corruption and requests for “facilitation payments” at many levels of government; late payment issues; and cross-border trade obstacles. In recent years, aggressive and arbitrary tax collection policies targeted foreign and domestic companies and individuals alike, and tough labor regulations made it difficult to hire foreign employees, even when the required skills were not available within the local labor force. Corruption, especially in government procurement, taxation, and customs clearance remains a concern for foreign investors, though the government has prioritized efforts to combat the practice. The country’s drastic and improved shift in its acknowledgement of and approach to COVID-19 in 2021 led to the creation and implementation of a national COVID-19 response plan that addressed both health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Tanzania has reengaged with the international community to support implementation of its robust national pandemic response plan with key pillars for improving data sharing, welcoming vaccines, and conducting vaccination outreach campaigns. Sectors traditionally attracting U.S. investment include infrastructure, transportation, energy, mining and extractive industries, tourism, agriculture, fishing, agro-processing, and manufacturing. Other opportunities exist in workforce development, microfinance solutions, technology, and consumer products and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 90 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (historical stock positions) 2020 USD 1,510 Million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD 1,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The United Republic of Tanzania welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI) as it pursues its industrialization and development agenda. On her inauguration in March 2021, President Samia Suluhu Hassan identified removing obstacles to inward foreign investment as a key priority, along with other measures to improve the overall business climate and rebuild trust between the private sector and government. This follows declining FDI and investor confidence over the past six years, with UNCTAD’s 2021 World Investment Report indicating around $1.0 billion in FDI for 2020, stagnant growth in recent years and well below 2015 levels. The development of a $3.5 billion 1,400 km oil pipeline to transport crude oil extracted in Uganda to the Tanzanian port of Tanga could sustain investment in both countries in the future. Investors and potential investors note the biggest challenges to investment include difficulty in hiring foreign workers, unfriendly and opaque tax policies, increased local content requirements, regulatory and policy instability, lack of trust between the GoT and the private sector, and mandatory initial public offerings (IPOs) in key industries. In 2020 and 2021, the GoT recognized many of these concerns’ impacts on both foreign and domestic investment and created task forces and working groups to engage the private sector to identify solutions. These efforts were expanded by President Hassan’s government. The United Republic of Tanzania has framework agreements on investment and offers various incentives and the services of investment promotion agencies. Investment is mainly a non-Union matter (i.e., different laws, policies, and practices apply between mainland Tanzania and the semi-autonomous state of Zanzibar). Zanzibar updated its investment policy in 2019, while the mainland/Union policy dates from 1996. Efforts to update the Mainland Investment Policy and Investment Act are underway, but incomplete as of the date of this publication. International agreements on investment are covered as Union matters and therefore apply to both regions. The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) is intended to be a one-stop center for investors, providing services such as permits, licenses, visas, and land ( view TIC’s portal ). The Zanzibar Investment Promotion Authority (ZIPA) provides the same function in Zanzibar ( view ZIPA ). The GoT has an ongoing dialogue with the private sector via the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). TNBC meetings are chaired by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and co-chaired by the head of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF). President Hassan reinvigorated this formal mechanism during her first months in office. There is also a Zanzibar Business Council (ZBC), as well as Regional Business Councils (RBCs), and District Business Councils (DBCs). Investors have found that technical expertise of their negotiating partners is a stumbling block to completing their investment plans. Investors should examine the level of sophistication of their negotiating partners at the onset of discussions to determine if outside expertise or training may be necessary. The U.S. government offers programs to develop expertise to facilitate investments and investors are encouraged to work with the Embassy’s economic and commercial sections to determine what, if any, programs may be available. Foreign investors generally receive treatment equivalent to domestic investors, though limits persist in a number of sectors. There are no geographical restrictions on private establishments with foreign participation or ownership, no limitations on number of foreign entities that can operate in any given sector, and no sectors in which approval is required for greenfield FDI but not for domestic investment. However, Tanzania discourages foreign investment in several sectors through limitations on foreign equity ownership or other activities, including aerospace; agribusiness (fishing); banking; insurance; construction and heavy equipment; travel and tourism; energy and environmental industries; information and communication; and publishing, media, and entertainment. In 2020, Tanzania relaxed but did not eliminate the foreign ownership limitations in the mining sector. Specific examples include the following: The Tourism Act of 2008 bars foreign companies from engaging in mountain guiding activities, and states that only Tanzanian citizens can operate travel agencies, car rental services, or engage in tour guide activities (with limited exceptions). Per the Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, only citizen-owned ships are authorized to engage in local trade, a requirement that can be waived at the minister’s discretion. Furthermore, the Tanzania Shipping Agencies Act of November 2017 gives exclusive monopoly power to the Tanzania Shipping Agency Corporation (TASAC) to conduct business as shipping agent, shipping regulator, and licensor of other private shipping agencies. The Act also gives TASAC an exclusive mandate to provide clearing and forwarding functions relating to imports and exports of minerals, mineral concentrates, machinery and equipment for the mining and petroleum sector, products and/or extracts related to minerals and petroleum. arms and ammunition, live animals, government trophies, and any other goods that the minister responsible for maritime transport may specify. A 2019 amendment extended this exclusive mandate to additional imports, including fertilizers, sugar (both industrial and domestic), cooking oil, wheat, oil products, liquefied gas, and chemicals related to the products. As of May 2021, the extended mandate has yet to go into effect, following extensive objections for private sector stakeholders. A 2009 amendment to the Fisheries Regulations imposes onerous conditions for foreign citizens to engage in commercial fishing and the export of fishery products, sets separate licensing costs for foreign citizens and Tanzanians, and limits the types of fishery products that foreign citizens may work with. Foreign construction contractors can only obtain temporary licenses, per the Contractors Registration Act of 1997, and contractors must commit in writing to leave Tanzania upon completion of the set project. 2004 amendments to the Contractors Registration By-Laws limit foreign contractor participation to specified, more complex classes of work. Foreign capital participation in the telecommunications sector is limited to a maximum of 75 percent. All insurers require one-third controlling interest by Tanzania citizens, per the Insurance Act. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations 2011 limits foreign ownership of Tanzanian TV stations to 49 percent and prohibits foreign capital participation in national newspapers. Mining projects must be at least partially owned by the GoT and “indigenous” companies, and hire – or at least favor – local suppliers, service providers, and employees. (See Chapter 4: Laws and Regulations on FDI for details.). Gemstone mining is limited to Tanzanian citizens with waivers of the limitation at ministerial discretion. In February 2019, responding to low growth and investment in the sector, the government revised the 2018 Mining Regulations to reduce local ownership requirements from 51 percent to 20 percent. Currently, foreigners can invest in stock traded on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), but only East African residents can invest in government bonds. East Africans, excluding Tanzanian residents, however, are not allowed to sell government bonds bought in the primary market for at least one year following purchase. There have not been any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) on Tanzania in the past several years, the most recent OECD report is for 2013. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review in 2019 on all the East African Community states, including Tanzania. WTO – Trade Policy Review: East African Community (2019) UNCTAD– Tanzania Investment Policy Review (2002) WTO – Secretariat Report of Tanzania UNCTAD – Trade and Gender Implications (2018) The Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA) issues certificates of compliance for foreign companies, certificates of incorporation for private and public companies, and business name registrations for sole proprietor and corporate bodies. After registering with BRELA, the company must: obtain a taxpayer identification number (TIN) certificate, apply for a business license, apply for a VAT certificate, register for workmen’s compensation insurance, register with the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (OSHA), receive inspection from OSHA, and obtain a Social Security registration number. The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) now sits under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), after being moved around several times in recent years. The TIC is a one-stop shop which provides simultaneous registration with BRELA, TRA, and social security for enterprises whose minimum capital investment is not less than USD 500,000 if foreign-owned or USD 100,000 if locally owned. Throughout 2021, TIC has streamlined its operations to facilitate the process of business registration. The government has been slow to implement its May 2018 Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to improve the business environment and attract more investors. The reforms seek to improve the country’s ease of doing business through regulatory reforms and to increase efficiency in dealing with the government and its regulatory authorities. The official implementation of the Business Environment Improvement Blueprint started in July 2019, though there have been few tangible changes or advancements. President Hassan’s government identified implementation of the Blueprint as a priority for her first term. Tanzania does not promote or incentivize outward investment. There are restrictions on Tanzanian residents’ participation in foreign capital markets and ability to purchase foreign securities. Under the Foreign Exchange (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (FEAR), however, there are circumstances when Tanzanian residents may trade securities within the East African Community (EAC). In addition, FEAR provides some opportunities for residents to engage in foreign direct investment and acquire real assets outside of the EAC. 3. Legal Regime According to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ( view the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ), Tanzania scores low in regulatory governance with 1.25 out of 5 totals in transparency of regulatory governance (neighboring Kenya and Uganda, by contrast, both score 3.25). Tanzania has formal processes for drafting and implementing rules and regulations. Generally, after an Act is passed by Parliament, the creation of regulations is delegated to a designated ministry. In theory, stakeholders are legally entitled to comment on regulations before they are implemented. However, ministries and regulatory agencies frequently fail to provide adequate opportunity for meaningful input as there is no minimum period of time for public comment set forth in law. Stakeholders often report that they are either not consulted or given too little time to provide meaningful input. Ministries or regulatory agencies do not have the legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. Sometimes, it is difficult to obtain the final, adopted version of a bill in a timely manner nor is it always public information if and when the President signed the bill. Moreover, the government over the past few years used presidential decree powers to bypass regulatory and legal structures. The 2016 Access to Information law in theory grants citizens more rights to information; however, some claim that the Act gives too much discretion to the GoT to withhold disclosure. Although information, including rules and regulations, is available on the GoT’s “Government Portal” ( view the Government Portal ), the website is generally not current and is incomplete. Alternatively, rules and regulations can be obtained on the relevant ministry’s website, but many offer insufficient information. Nominally, independent regulators are mandated with impartially following the regulations. The process, however, has been criticized as being subject to political influence, depriving the regulator of the independence it is granted under the law. Tanzania does not meet the minimum standards for transparency of public finances and debt obligations ( view the Department of State’s Fiscal Transparency Report). Tanzania is part of both the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and subject to their respective regulations. Notably in 2021, Tanzania ratified the EAC’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Protocol after a protracted period of deliberation. Tanzania is a member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The national standards body, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, was established in 1975. It has been most active in promoting standards and quality in process technology, including agro-processing, chemicals and textiles, and engineering, including mining and construction. Tanzania is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its National Enquiry Point (NEP) is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). As the WTO NEP, TBS handles information on adopted or proposed technical regulations, as well as on standards and conformity assessment procedures. Tanzania does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Tanzania’s legal system is based on the English Common Law system. The first source of law is the 1977 Constitution, followed by statutes or acts of Parliament; and case law, which are reported or unreported cases from the High Courts and Courts of Appeal and are used as precedents to guide lower courts. The Court of Appeal, which handles appeals from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, is the highest court, followed by the High Court, which handles civil, criminal and commercial cases. There are four specialized divisions within the High Courts: Labor, Land, Commercial, and Corruption and Economic Crimes. The Labor, Land, and Corruption and Economic Crimes divisions have exclusive jurisdiction over their respective matters, while the Commercial division does not claim exclusive jurisdiction. The High Court and the District and Resident Magistrate Courts also have original jurisdiction in commercial cases subject to specified financial limitations. Apart from the formal court system, there are quasi-judicial bodies, including the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal and the Fair Competition Tribunal, as well as alternate dispute resolution procedures in the form of arbitration proceedings. Judgments originating from countries whose courts are recognized under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (REFJA) are enforceable in Tanzania. To enforce such judgments, the judgment holder must make an application to the High Court of Tanzania to have the judgment registered. Countries currently listed in the REFJA include Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Zambia, Seychelles, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the United Kingdom, and Sri Lanka. The Tanzanian constitution guarantees judicial independence. However, the degree of judicial independence has varied significantly in the past few years, and many perceive that political interference and corruption in the form of illicit payments to influence decisions in justice is a concern. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system. Several laws and regulations enacted over the past six years affect the risk-return profile on foreign investments, especially those in the extractives and natural resources industries. The laws/regulations include the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017, Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017, Written Laws (Miscellaneous Act) 2017, and Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2019. These acts were introduced by the executive branch under a certificate of urgency, meaning that standard advance publication requirements were waived to expedite passage. As a result, there was minimal stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders continue to call for revision to these laws. Investors, especially those in natural resources and mining, express concern about the effects of these laws. Two laws apply to “natural wealth and resources,” which are broadly defined and not only include oil and gas, but in theory, could include wind, sun, and air space. Investors are encouraged to seek legal counsel to determine the effect these laws may have on existing or potential investments. For natural resources, the new laws subject the contracts, past and present, to Parliamentary review. More specifically, the law states “Where [Parliament] considers that certain terms …or the entire arrangement… are prejudicial to the interests of the People and the United Republic by reason of unconscionable terms it may, by resolution, direct the Government to initiate renegotiation with a view to rectifying the terms.” Further, if the GoT’s proposed renegotiation is not accepted, the offending terms are automatically expunged. “Unconscionable” is defined broadly, including catch-all definitions for clauses that are, for example, “inequitable or onerous to the state.” Under the law, the judicial branch does not play a role in determining whether a clause is “unconscionable.” The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2019 require that ‘indigenous’ Tanzanian companies are given first preference for mining licenses. An ‘indigenous Tanzanian company’ is one incorporated under the Companies Act with at least 20 percent of its equity owned by and 100 percent of its non-managerial positions held by Tanzanians (this is an improvement from the 2018 regulations which required 51 percent Tanzanian ownership). Furthermore, foreign mining companies must have at least five percent equity participation from an indigenous Tanzanian company and must grant the GoT a 16 percent carried interest. Lastly, foreign companies that supply goods or services to the mining industry must incorporate a joint venture company in which an indigenous Tanzanian company must hold equity participation of at least 20 percent. The Tanzania Investment Center contains many relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors on its portal ( view the portal ), though it is not comprehensive. Note: TIC and the GoT are currently in the process of reviewing several investment- and business-related regulations. Investors are encouraged to contact the U.S. Embassy or to seek legal counsel with a firm operating in Tanzania. The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) is an independent government body mandated to intervene, as necessary, to prevent significant market dominance, price fixing, extortion of monopoly rent to the detriment of the consumer, and market instability. The FCC has the authority to restrict mergers and acquisitions if the outcome is likely to create market dominance or lead to uncompetitive behavior. The constitution and investment acts require government to refrain from nationalization. However, the GoT may expropriate property after due process for the purpose of national interest. The Tanzanian Investment Act guarantees payment of fair, adequate, and prompt compensation; access to the court or arbitration for the determination of adequate compensation; and prompt repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. For protection under the Tanzania Investment Act, foreign investors require $500,000 minimum capital and Tanzanian investors require $100,000. There are numerous examples of indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. This is another area that the GoT expected to address in 2021, though significant changes to tax-related laws and regulations have yet to be finalized. Tanzania has a bankruptcy law which allows for companies to declare insolvency. The insolvency process includes the appointment of receiver managers, administrative receivers, or liquidators. In practice the process is very long and expensive. Preferential debts such as government taxes and rents, outstanding wages and salaries, and other employee compensation take priority over other claims, including those from creditors. Insolvent or illiquid companies may also seek the protection of the courts by seeking a compromise or arrangement as proposed between a company and its creditors, a certain class of creditors, or its shareholders. Bankruptcy proceedings can take several years to conclude in Tanzania. The recovery rate for creditors on insolvent firms was reported at 20.4 U.S. cents on the dollar, with judgments typically made in local currency. 4. Industrial Policies The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) offers a package of investment benefits and incentives to both domestic and foreign investors without performance requirements. A minimum capital investment of $500,000 if foreign owned or $100,000 if locally owned is required. (At the time of this publication, the government was revising these incentives. Investors are advised to consult the TIC for up-to-date information.) Current investment incentives include the following: Discounts on customs duties, corporate taxes, and VAT paid on capital goods for investments in mining, infrastructure, road construction, bridges, railways, airports, electricity generation, agribusiness, telecommunications, and water services. 100 percent capital allowance deduction in the years of income for the above-mentioned types of investments – though there is ambiguity as to how this is accomplished. No remittance restrictions. The GoT does not restrict the right of foreign investors to repatriate returns from an investment. Guarantees against nationalization and expropriation. Any dispute arising between the GoT and investors may be settled through negotiations or submitted for arbitration. Allowing interest deduction on capital loans and removal of the five-year limit for carrying forward losses of investors. Investors may apply for “Strategic Status” or “Special Strategic Status” to receive further incentives. The criteria used to determine whether an investor may receive these designations are available on TIC’s website ( view TIC’s website ). The government introduces waivers through the Public Finance Act with the aim of attracting investment in certain targeted sectors. In Financial year 2021/2022, the government introduced VAT exemption on entities with agreements with the GoT for the operation or execution of strategic projects, to the extent that the agreements provide for such exemption; a strategic project is defined as a project that has been so determined by the Cabinet of Ministers. The government also re-introduced VAT exemption for non-governmental organizations having agreements with the GoT, to the extent that the agreements provide for such exemption. The minister of finance may make regulations prescribing the manner of application, granting and monitoring of exemptions, which previously required the minister to appoint a technical committee for guidance on these matters. The government does not currently offer any incentives for clean energy investments. The Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) oversees Tanzania’s Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). EPZA’s core objective is to build and promote export-led economic development by offering investment incentives and facilitation services ( view EPZA ). Minimum capital requirements for EPZ and SEZ investors are $500,000 for foreign investors and $100,000 for local investors. Investment incentives offered for EPZs include the following: An exemption from corporate taxes for ten years. An exemption from duties and taxes on capital goods and raw materials. An exemption on VAT for utility services and on construction materials. An exemption from withholding taxes on rent, dividends, and interests. Exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements. SEZs offer similar incentives, excluding the ten-year exemption from corporate taxes. The Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency (ZIPA) and the Zanzibar Free Economic Zones Authority (ZAFREZA) offer the following incentives: Category “A” Free Economic Zone Developers: Development of Infrastructure The developer of a Free Economic Zone shall benefit to the following incentives: exemption from payment of taxes and duties for machinery, equipment, heavy duty vehicles, building and construction materials, and any other goods of capital nature to be used for purposes of development of the Free Economic Zone infrastructure. exemption from payment of corporate tax for an initial period of ten years and thereafter a corporate tax, shall be charged at the rate specified in the Income Tax Act. exemption from payment of withholding tax on rent, dividends ‘and interest for the first ten years. exemption from payment of property tax for the first ten years. remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, ambulances, firefighting equipment and firefighting vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation to and from the Free Economic Zone. exemption from payment of stamp duty on any instrument executed in or outside the Free Economic Zone relating to transfer, lease or hypothecation of any movable or immovable property situated within the Free Economic Zone or any document, certificate, instrument, report or record relating to any activity, action, operation, project, undertaking, or venture in the Free Economic Zone; treatment of goods destined into Free Economic Zones as transit goods; and on site customs inspection of goods within Free Economic Zones. Category “B” Free Economic Zones Operators: Approved Investors Producing for Sale into the Customs Territory Approved Investors whose primary markets are within the customs territory shall be entitled to the: remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax charged on raw materials and goods of capital nature related to the production in the Free Economic Zones; exemption from payment of withholding tax on interest on foreign sourced loan; remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, one ambulances, firefighting equipment and firefighting vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation into and from the Free Economic Zones; exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements; on site customs inspection of goods within Free Economic Zones; access to competitive, modern and reliable services available within the Free Economic Zones; and subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures for foreign exchange and payment of tax whenever appropriate, unconditional transfer through any authorized dealer bank in freely convertible currency of: (i) net profits or dividends attributable to the investment; (ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained; (ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained; (iii) royalties, fees and charges for any technology transfer agreement; (iii) royalties, fees and charges for any technology transfer agreement; (iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the licensed business or any interest attributable to the licensed business; (iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the licensed business or any interest attributable to the licensed business; and (v) payments of emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel employed in Tanzania in connection with the licensed business. Category “C” Free Economic Zone Operators: Approved Investors Producing for Export Markets Approved Investors producing for export markets in non-manufacturing or processing sectors shall be entitled to the: subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures, accessing the export credit guarantee scheme; remission of customs duty, value added, and any other tax charged on raw materials and goods of capital nature related to the production in the Free Economic Zones; exemption from payment of corporate tax for an initial period of ten years and thereafter, a corporate tax shall be charged at the rate specified in the Income Tax Act; exemption from payment of withholding tax on rent, dividends and interests for the first ten years; exemption from payment of all taxes and levies imposed by the Local Government Authorities for products produced in the Free Economic Zones for a period of ten years; exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements; on site customs inspection of goods in the Free Economic Zones; remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, ambulances, firefighting equipment and vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation to and from the Free Economic Zones; treatment of goods destined into Free Economic Zones as transit goods; access to competitive, modern and reliable services available within the Free Economic Zones; and subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures for foreign exchange and payment of tax whenever appropriate, unconditional transfer through any authorized dealer bank in freely convertible currency of: (i) net profits or dividends attributable to the investment; (ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained; (iii) royalties, fees and charges for any technology transfer agreement; (iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the business enterprises or any interest attributable to the investment; (v) payments of emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel employed in Tanzania in connection with the business enterprise; twenty percent of total turnover is allowed to be sold to the local market and is subject to the payment of all taxes; twenty percent of total turnover is allowed to be sold to the local market and is subject to the payment of all taxes; hundred percent foreign ownership is allowed; and no limit to the duration that goods may be stored in the Freeport Zones. 2. For purposes of this section, investors licensed primarily for export markets are investors whose exports are more than eighty percent of total annual production. Incentives and allowances outside Free Economic Zones 1. Approved investor investing outside Free Economic Zones, may be granted the: exemption from payment of import duty, excise duty Value Added Tax and other similar taxes on machinery, equipment, spare parts, vehicles and other input necessary and exclusively required by that enterprise during construction period indicated in the Investment Certificate; exemption from payment of business license fee for the first three months of trial operation; corporate tax exemption for up to five years; hundred percent foreign ownership; hundred percent retention of all profits after tax; hundred percent allowance Research and Development; and hundred percent allowance for free repatriation of profit after tax. 2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Part, approved investor investing in manufacturing sector may further be granted the: exemption from payment of any tax on all goods produced for exports; exemption from payment of trade levy for raw materials and industrial inputs procured from Tanzania mainland; exemption from payment of import duty, VAT, and other similar taxes on raw and packaging materials during project operations; exemption of Income Tax on interest on registered borrowed capital; and hundred percent allowance investment deduction on capital expenditure within five years. 3. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Part, Approved Investor investing in real estate business may also be granted the: exemption of income tax on interest on borrowed capital; stamp duty exemption; hundred percent allowance investment deduction on capital expenditure within five years; and capital gains tax on properties sold or purchased. Tanzania’s export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones (SEZs) are assigned geographical areas or industries designated to undertake specific economic activities with special regulations and infrastructure requirements. EPZ status can also be extended to stand-alone factories at any geographical location. EPZ status requires the export of 80 percent or more of the goods produced. SEZ status has no export requirement, allowing manufacturers to sell their goods locally. There are currently 14 designated EPZ/SEZ industrial parks, 10 of which are in development, and 75 stand-alone EPZ factories. The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act of 2015 (see Section 12 Labor Policies and Practices below) requires employers to attempt to fill positions with Tanzanian citizens before seeking work permits for foreign employees, and to develop plans to transition all positions held by foreign employees to local employees over time. The Act was amended in June 2021 to extend the time limit for work permits of non-citizen employees from the initial five years to eight years; applications are now submitted through the Online Work Permit Application and Issuance System (OWAIS). The amendment also allows an investor who has been granted incentives and registered with the TIC and Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) to employ up to ten non-citizens. Prior to the amendment, an investor could employ up to five non-citizens during the initial period of investment. Because the local content (LC) initiative cuts across all economic sectors, the government decided that oversight of LC development should take a multi-sector approach, rather than being confined to a single ministry or sector. In 2015, the government directed the National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) to oversee implementation of local empowerment initiatives. The objective of the local content policy is to put local products and services – delivered by businesses owned and operated by Tanzanians – in an advantageous position to exploit opportunities emanating from inbound foreign direct investments. In 2015, the GoT enacted The Petroleum Act and, subsequently, issued The Petroleum (Local Content) Regulations 2017. Similarly, in 2017, the GoT amended mining laws, issuing The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2018. (See Chapter 4: Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment for more on recent local content laws.) Bank of Tanzania (BoT) regulations require banks to physically house their primary data centers in Tanzania or face steep penalties. The GoT launched a USD 94 million National Internet Data Center (NIDC) in 2016, which is operated by the GoT’s Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited (TTCL). Under the Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation (TTC) Act 2017, the TTC plans, builds, operates and maintains the “strategic telecommunications infrastructure,” which is defined as transport core infrastructure, data center and other infrastructure that the GoT proclaims “strategic” via official public notice. 5. Protection of Property Rights All land is owned by the government and procedures for obtaining a lease or certificate of occupancy may be complex and lengthy. Less than 15 percent of land has been surveyed, and registration of title deeds is handled manually, mainly at the local level. Foreign investors may occupy land for investment purposes through a government-granted right of occupancy (“derivative rights” facilitated by TIC), or through sub-leases from a granted right of occupancy. Foreign investors may also partner with Tanzanian leaseholders to gain land access. Land may be leased for up to 99 years, but the law does not allow individual Tanzanians to sell land to foreigners. There are opportunities for foreigners to lease land, including through TIC, which has designated specific plots of land (a land bank) to be made available to foreign investors. Foreign investors may also enter into joint ventures with Tanzanians, in which case the Tanzanian provides the use of the land (but retains ownership, i.e., the leasehold). Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. Though TIC maintains a land bank, restrictions on foreign ownership may significantly delay investments. Land not in the land bank must go through a lengthy approval process by local-level authorities, the Ministry of Lands, Housing, Human Settlements Development (MoLHHSD), and the President’s Office to be designated as “general land,” which may be titled for investment and sale. The MoLHHSD handles registration of mortgages and rights of occupancies and the Office of the Registrar of Titles issues titles and registers mortgage deeds. Title deeds are recognized as collateral for securing loans from banks. In January 2018, the GoT amended the land law, requiring that loan proceeds secured by mortgaging underdeveloped land be used solely to develop the specific piece of land used as collateral. The changes apply to general land managed by the MoLHHSD’s Commissioner for Lands, who must receive a report from the lender showing how loan proceeds will be used to develop the land. The law does not apply to village land allocated by village councils, which cannot be mortgaged to a financial institution. The GoT’s Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) is responsible for registration and enforcement of copyrighted materials, while the Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA) within the Ministry of Trade administers trademark and patent registration. It is the responsibility of the rights holders to enforce their rights where relevant, retaining their own counsel and advisors. The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) promotes competition, protects consumers against unfair market conduct, and has quasi-judicial powers to determine trademark and patent infringement cases. The FCC is also tasked with combating the sale of counterfeit merchandise. However, the Tanzania Medicines and Medical Devices Authority (TMDA) handles counterfeit human medicines, cosmetics, and packaged food materials, and its mandate is stipulated in the Tanzania Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act (TFDCA) as per the amendment of 2019. Despite its efforts, limited resources make it difficult for the GoT to adequately combat counterfeiting. Tanzania is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) is a self-listed publicly owned company. In 2013, the DSE launched a second-tier market, the Enterprise Growth Market (EGM) with lower listing requirements designed to attract small and medium sized companies with high growth potential. As March 2022, the total market capitalization was $7.076 billion, a 5.6 percent increase from March 2021 ($6.7 billion). The Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) Act facilitates the flow of capital and financial resources to support the capital market and securities industry. Tanzania, however, restricts the free flow of investment in and out of the country, and Tanzanians cannot sell or issue securities abroad unless approved by the CMSA. Under the Capital Markets and Securities (Foreign Investors) Regulation 2014, there is no aggregate value limitation on foreign ownership of listed non-government securities. Only companies or citizens from EAC nations are permitted to participate in the government securities market. Even with this recent development allowing EAC participation, foreign ownership of government securities is still limited to 40 percent of each security issued. Tanzania’s Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010 amended in 2016 by the Finance Act 2016 requires telecom companies to list 25 percent of their shares via an initial public offering (IPO) on the DSE. Of the seven telecom companies that filed IPO applications with the CMSA, only Vodacom’s application received approval. As part of the Mining (Minimum Shareholding and Public Offering) Regulations 2016, large scale mining operators were required to float a 30 percent stake on the DSE by October 7, 2018. Currently, no mining companies are listed on the DSE. Tanzania’s financial inclusion rate increased significantly over the past decade thanks to mobile phones and mobile banking. However, participation in the formal banking sector remains low. Low private sector credit growth and high non-performing loan (NPL) rates are persistent problems. The NPL ratios further deteriorated with the COVID 19 pandemic. According to the IMF’s most recent Financial System Stability Assessment ( view assessment ), Tanzania’s bank-dominated financial sector is small, concentrated, and at a relatively nascent stage of development. Financial services provision is dominated by commercial banks, with the ten largest institutions being preeminent in terms of mobilizing savings and intermediating credit. The report found that nearly half of Tanzania’s 45 banks are vulnerable to adverse shocks and risk insolvency in the event of a global financial crisis. The two largest banks are CRDB Bank and National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which represent almost 30 percent of the market. The only U.S. bank operating in Tanzania is Citibank Tanzania Limited. Private sector companies have access to commercial credit instruments including documentary credits (letters of credit), overdrafts, term loans, and guarantees. Foreign investors may open accounts and earn tax-free interest in Tanzanian commercial banks, however a special exemption is required from the Bank of Tanzania to open an account as a “foreign entity.” A foreign entity account is an account owned by a company without a registered, legal business presence in Tanzania. The Banking and Financial Institution Act 2006 established a framework for credit reference bureaus, permits the release of information to licensed reference bureaus, and allows credit reference bureaus to provide to any person, upon a legitimate business request, a credit report. Currently, there are two private credit bureaus operating in Tanzania: Credit Info Tanzania Limited and Dun & Bradstreet Credit Bureau Tanzania Limited. Tanzania does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Public enterprises do not compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises because they have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs are active in the power, communications, rail, telecommunications, insurance, aviation, and port sectors. SOEs generally report to ministries and are led by a board. Typically, a presidential appointee chairs the board, which usually includes private sector representatives. SOEs are not subjected to hard budget constraints. SOEs do not discriminate against or unfairly burden foreigners, though they do have access to sovereign credit guarantees. Specific details on SOE financials and employment figures are not publicly available. As of June 2019, the GoT’s Treasury Registrar reported shares and interests in 266 public parastatals, companies and statutory corporations ( view the most recent Treasury Registrar report ). The government retains a strong presence in energy, mining, telecommunication services, and transportation. The government is increasingly empowering the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Limited (TTCL) with the objective of safeguarding the national security, promoting socio-economic development, and managing strategic communications infrastructure. The government also acquired 51 percent of Airtel Telecommunication Company Limited and became the majority shareholder. In the past, the GoT has sought foreign investors to manage formerly state-run companies in public-private partnerships, but successful privatizations have been rare. Though there have been attempts to privatize certain companies, the process is not always clear and transparent. The GoT currently has 20 companies/assets awaiting privatization. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The GoT’s National Environment Management Council (NEMC) undertakes enforcement, compliance, review, and monitoring of environmental impact assessments; performs research; facilitates public participation in environmental decision-making; raises environmental awareness; and collects and disseminates environmental information. Stakeholders, however, have expressed concerns over whether the NEMC has sufficient funding and capacity to handle its broad mandate. There are no legal requirements for public disclosure of RBC, and the GoT has not yet addressed executive compensation standards. Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) listed companies, however, must release legally required information to shareholders and the general public. In addition, the DSE signed a voluntary commitment with the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative in June 2016, to promote long-term sustainable investments and improve environmental, social, and corporate governance. Tanzania has accounting standards compatible with international accounting bodies. The Tanzanian government does not usually factor RBC into procurement decisions. The GoT is responsible for enforcing local laws, however, the media regularly reports on corruption cases where offenders allegedly avoid sanctions. There have also been reports of corporate entities collaborating with local governments to carry out controversial undertakings that may not be in the best interest of the local population. Some foreign companies have engaged NGOs that monitor and promote RBC to avoid adversarial confrontations. In addition, some of the multinational companies who are signatories to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) have taken the lead and appointed NGOs to conduct programs to mitigate conflicts between the mining companies, surrounding communities, local government officials and the police. Tanzania is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and in 2015 Tanzania enacted the Extractive Industries Transparency and Accountability Act, which demands that all new concessions, contracts and licenses are made available to the public. The government produces EITI reports that disclose revenues from the extraction of its natural resources. Investors should be aware of human and labor rights concerns in the minerals and extractives sector, as well as agriculture. In May 2021 there was a high-profile USD 6 million out of court settlement for alleged breaches of human rights associated with third-party security operations at the Williamson Diamond Mine in Tanzania, which is 25% owned by the Government of Tanzania and 75% owned by Petra (UK). Petra (UK) agreed to pay claimants and committed to invest in programs dedicated to providing long-term sustainable support to the communities living around the Mine. Petra is also establishing a new and independent (“Tier 2”) Operational Grievance Mechanism (“OGM”). It will be managed by an independent panel and operate according to the highest international standards, as set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Tanzania maintains a national climate strategy, and recently developed and submitted its second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2021. Its second NDC builds on the 2021 National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS), the 2014 Zanzibar Climate Change Strategy (ZCCS) and other national climate change development processes. Tanzania has also developed/adopted and implements various other policies, legislation, strategies, plans and programs to address climate change. This includes Tanzania’s National Communications Plans (2003 and 2015); Natural Gas Policy (2013); the Zanzibar Environmental Policy (2014); the Renewable Energy Strategy (2014); the Natural Gas Act (2015); the National Forestry Policy (1998); the National Transport Master Plan (2013); the National Environmental Policy (1997 and 2022); the Zanzibar Environmental Policy (2013); the National Environmental Action Plan (2012-2017); the National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan (2013); the National Climate-Smart Agriculture Program (2015-2025); and the National Environment Management Act (2004). Despite Tanzania’s low greenhouse gas emissions, the country is committed to climate change mitigation and adaption strategies. Tanzania’s 2021 National Environmental Policy reflects the country’s commitment to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Strategies and policies exist, but specifics are lacking, as is data sharing on progress towards targets and goals. The GoT’s second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) – submitted to UNFCCC in 2021 – highlights an overall mitigation goal of nationally reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 30-35% relative to Business-As-Usual scenario by 2030, and indicates that it has formulated the cost of net-zero emissions by 2050, though the details are not clear. 9. Corruption Tanzania has laws and institutions designed to combat corruption and illicit practices. It is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption, but it is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. While former President Magufuli’s focus on anti-corruption translated into an increased judiciary budget and new corruption cases, corruption is still viewed as a major, and potentially growing, problem. There have been various efforts to mitigate corruption – including implementing electronic services to reduce the opportunity for corruption through human interactions at agencies such as the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), the Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA), and the Port Authority – however, the broader concerns surrounding corruption persist. Tanzania has three institutions specifically focused on anti-corruption. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) prevents corruption, educates the public, and enforces the law against corruption. The Ethics Secretariat and its associated Ethics Tribunal under the President’s office enforce compliance with ethical standards defined in the Public Leadership Codes of Ethics Act 1995. Companies and individuals seeking government tenders are required to submit a written commitment to uphold anti-bribery policies and abide by a compliance program. These steps are designed to ensure that company management complies with anti-bribery polices, though the effectiveness of this step is unclear. The GoT is currently implementing its National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan Phase III (2017-2022) (NACSAP III) which is a decentralized approach focused on broad government participation. NACSAP III has been prepared to involve a broader domain of key stakeholders including GoT local officials, development partners, civil society organization (CSOs), and the private sector. The strategy puts more emphasis on areas that historically have been more prone to corruption in Tanzania such as oil, gas, and other natural resources. Despite the outlined role of the GoT, CSOs, NGOs and media find it increasingly difficult to investigate corruption in the current political environment. The GoT’s anti-corruption campaign affected public discourse about the prevailing climate of impunity, and some officials are reluctant to engage openly in corruption. Some critics, however, question how effective the initiative will be in tackling deeper structural issues that have allowed corruption to thrive. Transparency International (TI), which ranks perception of corruption in public sector, gave Tanzania a score of 39 points out of 100 for 2021 and 38 points for 2020. The Afrobarometer report estimates that between 2015 and 2019 the corruption increase in the previous 12 months was only 10 percent in Tanzania, the lowest in Africa. While for the same period, 23 percent of the respondents voted that Tanzania is doing a bad job of fighting corruption, again the lowest in Africa. Thirty-two percent of the respondents also noted that business executives are corrupt, up from 31 percent in 2015. The Director General Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau P.O. Box 4865, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Tel: +255 22 2150043 Email: dgeneral@pccb.go.tz Executive Director Legal and Human Rights Centre P.O. Box 75254, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Tel: +255 22 2773038/48 Email: lhrc@humanrights.or.tz 10. Political and Security Environment Since gaining independence, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively high degree of peace and stability compared to its neighbors in the region. Tanzania has held six national multi-party elections since 1995, the most recent in October 2020 which saw the ruling party’s candidates win by vast majorities. There were serious doubts about the credibility of the October 2020 elections on the mainland and Zanzibar, as there were for byelections in 2018 and 2019. Zanzibar, particularly experienced political violence several times since 1995, including in 2020. Following the untimely death of President Magufuli (elected in October 2020) in March 2021, a peaceful transfer of power to Vice President Samia Suhulu Hassan took place in accordance with constitutionally mandated procedures. President Hassan continues to follow the CCM ruling party’s manifesto and has begun to lay out her own priorities, which include a reset on international relations and an effort to revive the private sector and attract foreign investment. Tanzania is generally free from violent conflict, however, there are ongoing concerns about insecurity spilling over from neighboring countries, particularly religious extremism from the Tanzania-Mozambique border. There are a significant number of refugees from crisis and conflicts in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, and the continuing violence in neighboring Mozambique has resulted in Mozambican citizens seeking refuge across the border in southern Tanzania. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Despite Tanzania’s large youth population, there is a shortage of skilled labor and gaps remain in professional training to support industrialization. Only 3.6 percent of Tanzania’s 20-million-person labor force is highly skilled. On the regional front, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya have committed to the EAC’s 2012 Mutual Recognition Agreement of engineers, making for a more regionally competitive engineering market. In Tanzania, labor and immigration regulations permit foreign investors to recruit up to ten expatriates with the possibility of additional work permits granted under specific conditions. The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2015 introduced stricter rules for hiring foreign workers. Under the Act, the Labor Commissioner must determine if “all possible efforts have been explored to obtain a local expert” before approving a non-citizen work permit. In addition, employers must submit “succession plans” for foreign employees, detailing how knowledge and skills will be transferred to local employees. The Act was amended in 2021, increasing the period of work permit validity from five years to eight years, with applications to be renewed every 24 months. The non-citizens quota shall not preclude the investor from employing other non-citizens provided that such employment complies with the employment ratio of one non-citizen to ten local employees and that the investor has satisfied the Labor Commissioner that the nature of the business necessitates such number of non-citizens. Foreign investors may be granted ten-year work permits which may be extended if the investor is determined to be contributing to the economy and wellbeing of Tanzanians. In April 2021, the government introduced a simplified online system of applying and issuing work permit which reduces the waiting period from 33 days to less than a week. Mainland Tanzania’s minimum wage, which has not changed since July 2013, is set by categories covering 12 employment sectors. The minimum wage ranges from TZS 100,000 ($43.20) per month for agricultural laborers to TZS 400,000 ($172.79) per month for laborers employed in the mining sector. Zanzibar’s minimum wage is TZS 300,000 ($129.59). Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar governments maintain separate labor laws. Workers on the mainland have the right to join trade unions. Any company with a recognized trade union possessing bargaining rights can negotiate in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. In the public sector, the government sets wages administratively, including for employees of state-owned enterprises. Mainland workers have the legal right to strike, and employers have the right to a lockout. The law restricts the right to strike when doing so may endanger the health of the population. Workers in certain sectors are restricted from striking or subject to limitations. In 2017, the GoT issued regulations that strengthened child labor laws, created minimum one-year terms for certain contracts, expanded the scope of what is considered discrimination, and changed contract requirements for outsourcing agreements. The labor law in Zanzibar applies to both public and private sector workers. Zanzibar government workers have the right to strike as long as they follow procedures outlined in the Employment Act of 2005, but they are not allowed to join Mainland-based labor unions. Zanzibar requires a union with 50 or more members to be registered and sets literacy standards for trade union officers. An estimated 40 percent of Zanzibar’s workforce is unionized. The Integrated Labor Force Survey of 2020/21 indicates that employment in the informal sector has increased from 22 percent in 2014 to 29.4 percent in 2020/21, with the most significant increase in rural areas. The informal sector operates outside of the legal system with no formal contracts, leaving workers vulnerable to precarious working conditions, limited social protection, and low earnings. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2019 $63 billion 2020 $62.41 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $1.47 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $ (-2) million BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 1.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/Economic Trends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: host country data not publicly available. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). According to the Bank of Tanzania, the top sources for inward foreign investment into Tanzania are South Africa, Canada, Nigeria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Kenya, United States, Vietnam, and France. Data on outward direct investment is not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). 14. Contact for More Information Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Dar es Salaam 686 Old Bagamoyo Road Msasani, Dar es Salaam Tel: 255-22-229-4000 DarPolEconPublic@state.gov Thailand Executive Summary Thailand is an upper middle-income country with a half-trillion-dollar economy, generally pro-investment policies, and well-developed infrastructure. General Prayut Chan-o-cha was elected by Parliament as Prime Minister on June 5, 2019. Thailand celebrated the coronation of King Maha Vajiralongkorn May 4-6, 2019, formally returning a King to the Head of State of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy. Despite some political uncertainty, Thailand continues to encourage foreign direct investment as a means of promoting economic development, employment, and technology transfer. In recent decades, Thailand has been a major destination for foreign direct investment, and hundreds of U.S. companies have invested in Thailand successfully. Thailand continues to encourage investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. The Foreign Business Act (FBA) of 1999 governs most investment activity by non-Thai nationals. Many U.S. businesses also enjoy investment benefits through the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed in 1833 and updated in 1966. The Treaty allows U.S. citizens and U.S. majority-owned businesses incorporated in the United States or Thailand to maintain a majority shareholding or to wholly own a company or branch office located in Thailand, and engage in business on the same basis as Thai companies (national treatment). The Treaty exempts such U.S.-owned businesses from most FBA restrictions on foreign investment, although the Treaty excludes some types of businesses. Notwithstanding their Treaty rights, many U.S. investors choose to form joint ventures with Thai partners who hold a majority stake in the company, leveraging their partner’s knowledge of the Thai economy and local regulations. The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages investment. Some investors have nonetheless expressed views that the framework is overly restrictive, with a lack of consistency and transparency in rulemaking and interpretation of law and regulations. The Board of Investment (BOI), Thailand’s principal investment promotion authority, acts as a primary conduit for investors. BOI offers businesses assistance in navigating Thai regulations and provides investment incentives to qualified domestic and foreign investors through straightforward application procedures. Investment incentives include both tax and non-tax privileges. The Thai government is actively pursuing foreign investment related to clean energy, electric vehicles, and related industries. Thailand is currently developing a National Energy Plan that will supersede the current Alternative Energy Development Plan that sets a 20 percent target for renewable energy by 2037. Revised plans are expected to increase clean energy targets in line with the Prime Minister’s November 2021 announcement during COP26 that Thailand will increase its climate change targets, as well as domestic policies focused on sustainability, including the “Bio-Circular Green Economy” model. The government passed laws on cybersecurity and personal data protection in 2019; as of March 2022, the cybersecurity law has been enforced while the personal data protection law is still in the process of drafting implementing regulations. The government unveiled in January 2021 a Made in Thailand (MiT) initiative that will set aside 60 percent of state procurement budget for locally made products. As of March 2022, Federation of Thai Industry registered 31,131 products that should benefits from the MiT initiative. The government launched its Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) development plan in 2017. The EEC is a part of the “Thailand 4.0” economic development strategy introduced in 2016. Many planned infrastructure projects, including a high-speed train linking three airports, U-Tapao Airport commercialization, and Laem Chabang and Mab Ta Phut Port expansion, could provide opportunities for investments and sales of U.S. goods and services. In support of its “Thailand 4.0” strategy, the government offers incentives for investments in twelve targeted industries: next-generation automotive; intelligent electronics; advanced agriculture and biotechnology; food processing; tourism; advanced robotics and automation; digital technology; integrated aviation; medical hub and total healthcare services; biofuels/biochemical; defense manufacturing; and human resource development. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 43 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 17,450 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 7,040 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Thailand continues to generally welcome investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. However, the Foreign Business Act (FBA) prescribes a wide range of business that may not be conducted by foreigners without additional licenses or exemptions. The term “foreigner” includes Thai-registered companies in which half or more of the capital is held by non-Thai individuals and foreign-registered companies. Although the FBA prohibits majority foreign ownership in many sectors, U.S. investors registered under the United States-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (AER) are exempt. Nevertheless, the AER’s privileges do not extend to U.S. investments in the following areas: communications; transportation; fiduciary functions; banking involving depository functions; the exploitation of land or other natural resources; domestic trade in indigenous agricultural products; and the practice of professions reserved for Thai nationals. The Board of Investment (BOI) assists Thai and foreign investors to establish and conduct businesses in targeted economic sectors by offering both tax and non-tax incentives. In recent years, Thailand has taken steps to reform its business regulations and has improved processes and reduced time required to start a business from 29 days to 6 days. Thailand has steadily improved its ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report in the last several years and was 21 out of 190 countries in the 2020 ranking, trailing only Singapore (2) and Malaysia (12) in the ASEAN bloc. Thai officials routinely make themselves available to investors through discussions with foreign chambers of commerce. U.S. entities planning to invest in Thailand are advised to obtain qualified legal advice. Thai business regulations are governed predominantly by criminal, not civil, law. Foreigners are rarely jailed for improper business activities, yet violations of business regulations can carry heavy criminal penalties. Thailand has an independent judiciary and government authorities are generally not permitted to interfere in the court system once a case is in process. Various Thai laws set forth foreign-ownership restrictions in certain sectors. These restrictions primarily concern services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. The FBA details the types of business activities reserved for Thai nationals. Foreign investment in those businesses must comprise less than 50 percent of share capital, unless specially permitted or otherwise exempt. The following three lists detail FBA-restricted businesses for foreigners. List 1. This contains activities non-nationals are prohibited from engaging in, including newspaper and radio broadcasting stations and businesses; agricultural businesses; forestry and timber processing from a natural forest; fishery in Thai territorial waters and specific economic zones; extraction of Thai medicinal herbs; trading and auctioning of antique objects or objects of historical value from Thailand; making or casting of Buddha images and monk alms bowls; and land trading. List 2. This contains activities related to national safety or security, arts and culture, traditional industries, folk handicrafts, natural resources, and the environment. Restrictions apply to the production, distribution and maintenance of firearms and armaments; domestic transportation by land, water, and air; trading of Thai antiques or art objects; mining, including rock blasting and rock crushing; and timber processing for production of furniture and utensils. A foreign majority-owned company can engage in List 2 activities if Thai nationals or legal persons hold not less than 40 percent of the total shares and the number of Thai directors is not less than two-fifths of the total number of directors. Foreign companies also require prior approval and a license from the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). List 3. Restricted businesses in this list include accounting, legal, architectural, and engineering services; retail and wholesale; advertising businesses; hotels; guided touring; selling food and beverages; and other service-sector businesses. A foreign company can engage in List 3 activities if a majority of the limited company’s shares are held by Thai nationals. Any company with a majority of foreign shareholders (more than 50 percent) cannot engage in List 3 activities unless it receives an exception from the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) under its Foreign Business License (FBL) application. Aside from these general categories, Thailand does not maintain a national security screening mechanism for investment, and investors can receive additional incentives/privileges if they invest in priority areas, such as high-technology industries. Investors should contact the Board of Investment [ https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=index ] for the latest information on specific investment incentives. The U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations allows approved businesses to engage in some FBA restricted sectors; however, the Treaty does not exempt U.S. investments from restrictions applicable to: owning land; fiduciary functions; banking involving depository functions; inland communications & transportation; exploitation of land and other natural resources; and domestic trade in agricultural products. To operate restricted businesses as defined by the FBA’s List 2 and 3, non-Thai entities must obtain a foreign business license. These licenses are approved by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and/or Director-General of the MOC’s Department of Business Development, depending on the business category. Every year, the MOC reviews business categories restricted by the FBA. In 2022, the MOC announced it plans to remove four additional businesses – banking, bank branches, life insurance and non-life insurance – from List 3 by the end of the year. American investors who wish to take majority shares or wholly own businesses under the FBA may apply for benefits under the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity. https://2016.export.gov/thailand/treaty/index.asp#P5_233 The U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Bangkok is responsible for issuing a certification letter to confirm that a U.S. company is qualified to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity. The applicant must first obtain documents verifying that the company has been registered in compliance with Thai law. Upon receipt of the required documents, the U.S. Commercial Service office will then certify to the Foreign Administration Division, Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce (MOC) that the applicant is seeking to register an American-owned and managed company or that the applicant is an American citizen and is therefore entitled to national treatment under the provisions of the Treaty. For more information on how to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity, please e-mail ktantisa@trade.gov . The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy Review of Thailand in November 2020 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp500_e.htm ). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded its Investment Policy Review for Thailand in January 2021 ( https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c4eeee1c-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/c4eeee1c-en ). The MOC’s Department of Business Development (DBD) is generally responsible for business registration. Registration can be performed online or manually. Registration documentation must be submitted in the Thai language. Many foreign entities hire a local law firm or consulting firm to handle their applications. Firms engaging in production activities also must register with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Labor (MOL). A company is required to have registered capital of two million Thai baht per foreign employee in order to obtain work permits. Additionally, foreign companies may have no more than 20 percent foreign employees on staff. Companies that have obtained special BOI investment incentives may be exempted from this requirement. Foreign employees must enter Thailand on a non-immigrant visa and then submit work permit applications directly to the MOL’s Department of Employment. Work permit application processing takes approximately one week. For more information on Thailand visas, please refer to https://www.thaiembassy.com/thailand/work-permit-requirements In February 2018, the Thai government launched a Smart Visa program for investors in targeted industries and foreigners with expertise in specialized technologies. Under this program, foreigners can be granted a maximum four-year visa to work in Thailand without having to obtain a work permit or re-entry permit. Other relaxed immigration rules include having visa holders report to the Bureau of Immigration just once per year (instead of every 90 days) and providing the visa holder’s spouse and children many of the same privileges as the primary visa holder. More information is available online at https://smart-visa.boi.go.th/home_detail/general_information.php . Outward investment from Thailand has increased rapidly in recent years and Thailand has become one of the largest outward investors in ASEAN. During 2020 and 2021, Thai companies continued to expand and invest overseas despite the pandemic. These investments primarily target neighboring ASEAN countries, China, the United States, and Europe. A relatively stable domestic currency, rising cash holdings, and subdued domestic growth prospects are driving outward investment. Faced with the effects of the pandemic, the government may prioritize domestic investment to stimulate the economy. Previously, food, agro-industry, energy, and chemical sectors accounted for the main share of outward flows. Purchasing shares, developing partnerships, and making acquisitions help Thai investors acquire technologies for parent companies and expand supply chains in international markets. Thai corporate laws allow outbound investments to be made by an independent affiliate (foreign company), a branch of a Thai legal entity, or by any Thai company in the case of financial investments abroad. BOI and the MOC’s Department of International Trade Promotion (DITP) share responsibility for promoting outward investment. BOI focuses on outward investment in ASEAN (especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) and emerging economies. DITP covers smaller markets. 3. Legal Regime Generally, Thai regulations are readily available for public review. Foreign investors have, on occasion, expressed frustration that some draft sub-regulations are not made public until they are finalized. Comments stakeholders submit on draft regulations are not always taken into consideration. Non-governmental organizations report; however, the Thai government actively consults them on policy, especially in the health sector and on intellectual property issues. In other areas, such as digital and cybersecurity laws, the Thai government has taken stakeholders’ comments into account and amended draft laws accordingly. U.S. businesses have repeatedly expressed concerns about Thailand’s customs regime. Complaints center on lack of transparency, the significant discretionary authority exercised by Customs Department officials, and a system of giving rewards to officials and non-officials for seized goods based on a percentage of the value of the goods. Specifically, the U.S. government and private sector have expressed concern about inconsistent application of Thailand’s transaction valuation methodology and the Customs Department’s repeated use of arbitrary values. Thailand’s latest Customs Act, which entered into force on November 13, 2017, was a moderate step forward. The Act removed the Customs Department Director General’s discretion to increase the Customs value of imports. It also reduced the percentage of remuneration awarded to officials and non-officials from 55 percent to 40 percent of the sale price of seized goods (or of the fine amount) with an overall limit of five million baht ($160,000). The 2017 changes, however, have not fully satisfied those concerned that Customs officials problematic incentives to manufacture violations under the system. The Thai Constitution requires the government to assess the environmental impact of a wide range of undertakings, including by holding a public hearing of relevant stakeholders. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) is responsible for determining which projects, activities, or actions are required to have an environmental impact assessment report and for prescribing the regulations, methods, procedures, and guidelines in preparing an environmental impact assessment report. Additional information can be found here: http://www.onep.go.th/eia/. Inconsistent and unpredictable enforcement of government regulations remains problematic. In 2017, the Thai government launched a “regulatory guillotine” initiative to cut down on red tape, licenses, and permits. The initiative focused on reducing and amending outdated regulations in order to improve Thailand’s ranking on the World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” report. The regulatory guillotine project is still underway and making slow progress. Gratuity payments to civil servants responsible for regulatory oversight and enforcement remain a common practice despite stringent gift bans at some government agencies. Firms that refuse to make such payments can be placed at a competitive disadvantage to other firms that do engage in such practices. The Royal Thai Government Gazette ( www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th ) is Thailand’s public journal of the country’s centralized online location of laws, as well as regulation notifications. Thailand is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies most draft technical regulations to the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Committee. However, Thailand does not always follow WTO and other international standard-setting norms or guidance (e.g., Codex Alimentarius maximum residue limits for pesticides on food) but prefers to set its own standards in some cases. Thailand’s legal system is primarily based on the civil law system with strong common law influence. Thailand has an independent judiciary that is generally effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. Most commercial and contractual disputes are generally governed by the Civil and Commercial Codes. The legal process is slow in practice and monetary compensation is based on actual damage that resulted directly from the wrongful act. Decisions of foreign courts are not accepted or enforceable in Thai courts. Most legal cases in Thailand will be under the jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice; however, there are also specialized courts that handle specific or technical problems: the Labor Court, the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, the Bankruptcy Court, the Tax Court, and the Juvenile and Family Courts. Thailand also established the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct Case to specifically handle corruption cases. The Foreign Business Act or FBA (described in detail above) governs most investment activity by non-Thai nationals. Other key laws governing foreign investment are the Alien Employment Act (1978) and the Investment Promotion Act (1977). However, as explained above, many U.S. businesses enjoy investment benefits through the U.S.-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (often referred to as the ‘Treaty of Amity’), which was established to promote friendly relations between the two nations. Pursuant to the Treaty, American nationals are entitled to certain exceptions to the FBA restrictions. Pertaining to the services sector, the 2008 Financial Institutions Business Act unified the legal framework and strengthened the Bank of Thailand’s (the country’s central bank) supervisory and enforcement powers. The Act allows the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to raise foreign ownership limits for existing local banks from 25 percent to 49 percent on a case-by-case basis. The Minister of Finance can authorize foreign ownership exceeding 49 percent if recommended by the central bank. Details are available at https://www.bot.or.th/English/AboutBOT/LawsAndRegulations/SiteAssets/Law_E24_Institution_Sep2011.pdf . In addition to acquiring shares of existing (traditional) local banks, foreign banks can enter the Thai banking system by obtaining new licenses. The Ministry of Finance issues such licenses, following consultations with the BOT. The BOT is currently preparing rules for establishing virtual banks or digital-only banks (no physical branches), a tool meant to enhance financial inclusion and keep pace with consumer needs in the digital age. Digital-only banks can operate at a lower cost and offer different services than traditional banks. The guidelines are expected to be released by mid-2022. The 2008 Life Insurance Act and the 2008 Non-Life Insurance Act apply a 25 percent cap on foreign ownership of insurance companies. Foreign membership on boards of directors is also limited to 25 percent. However, in January 2016 the Office of the Insurance Commission (OIC), the primary insurance industry regulator, announced that Thai life and non-life insurance companies wishing to exceed these limits could apply to the OIC for approval. Any foreign national wishing to hold more than 10 percent of the voting shares in an insurance company must seek OIC approval. With approval, a foreign national can acquire up to 49 percent of the voting shares. Finally, the Finance Minister, with OIC’s positive recommendation, has discretion to permit greater than 49 percent foreign ownership and/or a majority of foreign directors, if the operation of the insurance company may cause loss to insured parties or to the public. While OIC has not issued a new insurance license in the past 20 years, OIC is now contemplating issuing new virtual licenses for firms to sell insurance digitally without an intermediary. Full details have not yet been announced. The Board of Investment offers qualified investors several benefits and provides information to facilitate a smoother investment process in Thailand. Information on the BOI’s “One Start One Stop” investment center can be found at http://osos.boi.go.th . Thailand’s Trade Competition Act covers all business activities, except state-owned enterprises exempted by law or cabinet resolution; specific activities related to national security, public benefit, common interest and public utility; cooperatives, agricultural and cooperative groups; government agencies; and other enterprises exempted by the law. The Act’s definition of a business operator includes affiliates and group companies, and subjects directors and management to criminal and administrative sanctions if their actions (or omissions) resulted in violations. The Act also provides details about penalties in cases involving administrative court or criminal court actions. The Office of Trade Competition Commission (OTCC) is an independent agency and the main enforcer of the Trade Competition Act (2018). The Commission advises the government on issuance of relevant regulations; ensures fair and free trade practices; investigates cases and complaints of unfair trade; and pursues criminal and disciplinary actions against those found guilty of unfair trade practices stipulated in the law. The law focuses on the following areas: unlawful exercise of market dominance; mergers or collusion that could lead to monopoly; unfair competition and restricting competition; and unfair trade practices. The Thai government, through the Ministry of Commerce’s Central Commission on Price of Goods and Services, has the legal authority to control prices or set de facto price ceilings for selected goods and services, including staple agricultural products and feed ingredients (such as, pork, cooking oil, wheat flour, feed wheat, distiller’s dried grains with solubles (DDGs), and feed quality barley), liquefied petroleum gas, medicines, and sound recordings. In 2022, there are 56 goods and services under the price-controlled products list, which can be found here . The controlled list is reviewed at least annually, but the price-control review mechanisms are non-transparent. In practice, Thailand’s government influences prices in the local market through its control of state monopoly suppliers of products and services, such as in the petroleum, oil, and gas industry sectors. Thailand’s Constitution provides protection from expropriation without fair compensation and requires the government to pass a specific, tailored expropriation law if the expropriation is required for the purpose of public utilities, national defense, acquisition of national resources, or for other public interests. The Investment Promotion Act also guarantees the government shall not nationalize the operations and assets of BOI-promoted investors. The Expropriation of Immovable Property Act (EIP), most recently amended in 2019, applies to all property owners, whether foreign or domestic nationals. The Act provides a framework and clear procedures for expropriation; sets forth detailed provision and measures for compensation of landowners, lessees and other persons that may be affected by an expropriation; and recognizes the right to appeal decisions to Thai courts. However, the EIP and Investment Promotion Act do not protect against indirect expropriation and do not distinguish between compensable and non-compensable forms of indirect expropriation. Thailand has a well-established system for land rights that is generally upheld in practice, but the legislation governing land tenure still significantly restricts foreigners’ rights to acquire land. Thailand’s bankruptcy law is modeled after the United States. The Thai Bankruptcy Act (1940) authorizes restructuring proceedings that require trained judges who specialize in bankruptcy matters to preside. Thailand’s bankruptcy law allows for corporate restructuring similar to U.S. Chapter 11 and does not criminalize bankruptcy. The law also distinguishes between secured and unsecured claims, with the former prioritized. Within bankruptcy proceedings, it is also possible to undertake a “composition” in order to avoid a long and protracted process. A composition takes place when a debtor expresses in writing a desire to settle his/her debts, either partially or in any other manner, within seven days of submitting an explanation of matters related to the bankruptcy or during a time period prescribed by the receiver. Despite these laws, some U.S. businesses complain that Thailand’s bankruptcy courts in practice can slow processes to the detriment of outside firms seeking to acquire assets liquidated in bankruptcy processes. The National Credit Bureau of Thailand (NCB) provides the financial services industry with information on consumers and businesses. The NCB is required to provide the financial services sector with payment history information from utility companies, retailers and merchants, and trade creditors. 4. Industrial Policies The Board of Investment: The Board of Investment (BOI) offers investment incentives to qualified domestic and foreign investors. To upgrade Thailand’s technological capacity, the BOI presently gives more weight to applications in high-tech, innovative, and sustainable industries. These include digital technology, “smart agriculture” and biotechnology, aviation and logistics, automation and robotics, medical and wellness tourism, and other high-value services. The most significant privileges offered by the BOI for promoted projects include: corporate income tax exemptions; tariff reductions or exemptions on imports of machinery used in the investment; tariff-free treatment on imported raw materials used in production for export. permission to own land; permission to bring foreign experts; and visa and work permit facilitation. The Thai government is developing a National Energy Plan which will supersede the current Alternative Energy Development Plan that sets a 20 percent target for renewable energy by 2037 and has established a special committee, under supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, to support increased investment in clean energy, electric vehicles, and related industries. In support of these policies, electricity producers can access tax and non-tax incentives from Thailand’s BOI. The tax incentives include a corporate income tax holiday of six or eight years, depending on the type of power production used in electricity generation. Tax incentives also include custom duty exemptions for the import of new equipment. Thailand also has a feed-in-tariff (FiT) program and additional tax and investment incentives to meet the 20 percent renewable energy electricity supply target by 2037. The FiT program, launched in 2015, replaced the previously offered “adder” scheme. With declining investment costs across various renewable energy technologies, especially solar and onshore wind installation, in 2015, the government moved to competitive bidding with FiT set as the ceiling price. In February 2022, Thailand joined the U.S.-led Clean Energy Demand Initiative, in which the Thai government agreed to pursue policies that will increase access to alternative energy for the private sector. Electric vehicles are another key focus area for the Thai government. In 2022, the Thai government approved a suite of measures to increase foreign investment in EVs, including a range of tax incentives, subsidies, and other mechanisms. Investment projects with a significant R&D, innovation, or human resource development component may be eligible for additional grants and incentives. Moreover, grants are provided to support targeted technology development under the Competitive Enhancement Act. BOI offers a one-stop service to expedite multiple business processes for investors. For additional information, contact the Office of Board of Investment (662-553-8111 or website at www.boi.go.th.) Office of the Eastern Economic Corridor: Thailand’s flagship investment zone, the “Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC),” spans the provinces of Chachoengsao, Chonburi, and Rayong (5,129 square miles). The EEC leverages the developed infrastructure networks of the adjacent Eastern Seaboard industrial area, Thailand’s primary investment destination for more than 30 years. The Thai government’s goal is to develop the EEC as a primary investment and infrastructure hub in ASEAN and a gateway to east and south Asia. Among the EEC development projects are smart cities; an innovation district (EECi); a digital park (EECd); an aerotropolis (EEC-A); a medical hub (EECmd); and other state-of-the-art facilities. The EEC is targeting twelve key industries: Next-generation automotive Intelligent electronics Advanced agriculture and biotechnology Food processing Tourism Advance robotics and automation Integrated aviation industry Medical hub and total healthcare services Biofuels and biochemicals Digital technology Defense industry Human resource development The EEC Act authorized investment incentives and privileges. Investors can obtain long-term land leases of 99 years (with an initial lease of up to 50 years and a renewal of up to 49 years). The EEC Act shortens the public-private partnership approval process to approximately nine months. The BOI works in cooperation with the EEC Office. BOI offers corporate income tax exemptions of up to 13 years for strategic projects in the EEC area. Foreign executives and experts who work in targeted industries in the EEC are subject to a maximum personal income tax rate of 15-17 percent. For additional information, contact the Eastern Economic Corridor Office (662-033-8000 and website at https://eng.eeco.or.th/en). The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT), a state-enterprise under the Ministry of Industry, develops suitable locations to accommodate industrial properties. IEAT has an established network of industrial estates in Thailand, including Laem Chabang Industrial Estate in Chonburi Province and Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate in Rayong Province in Thailand’s eastern seaboard region, a common location for foreign-owned factories due to its proximity to seaport facilities and Bangkok. Foreign-owned firms generally have the same investment opportunities in the industrial zones as Thai entities. Although the IEAT is required to consider and approve the amount of space/land bought or leased by foreign-owned firms in industrial estates, there is no record of disapproval for requested land. Private developers are heavily involved in the development of these estates. The IEAT currently operates 15 estates, plus 50 more in conjunction with the private sector, in 16 provinces nationwide. Private-sector developers independently operate over 50 industrial estates, most of which have received promotion privileges from the Board of Investment. Amata Industrial Estate and WHA Industrial Development are Thailand’s leading private industrial estate developers. Most major foreign manufacturing investors, including U.S. manufacturers, are located in these two companies’ industrial estates and in the eastern seaboard region. Thailand Free Trade Zones have two main types – General Industrial Zone (either under private-sector or the IEAT) and Special Economic Zones. The IEAT has established 12 special IEAT “free trade zones” reserved for industries manufacturing exclusively for export. Businesses may import raw materials into, and export finished products from, these zones free of duty (including value added tax). These zones are located within industrial estates, and many have customs facilities to speed processing. In addition to these zones, factory owners can apply for permission to establish a bonded warehouse within their premises to which raw materials, used exclusively in the production of products for export, may be imported duty-free. Thai Customs Act also allows the Customs Director General to grant permits for companies to establish “free zones” for industries and sectors deemed beneficial to the country. Goods imports and exports through free zones are exempt from customs duties, and import duties are also waived for machinery, equipment, tools, appliances, and components necessary for the operation of the business or assembly, installation, or operation of the equipment. To date, there are established free zones at Don Muang Airport, Suvarnabhumi Airport, U-Tapao Airport, Special Economic Development Zone, and in the Eastern Economic Corridor. The Thai government also established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in ten provinces bordering neighboring countries. Business sectors and industries that can benefit from tax and non-tax incentives offered in the SEZs include: logistics; warehouses near border areas; distribution; services; labor-intensive factories; and manufacturers using raw materials from neighboring countries. These SEZs support Thai government goals for closer economic ties with neighboring countries and allow investors to tap into abundant migrant labor; however, these SEZs have proven less attractive to overseas investors due to their remote locations far from Bangkok and other major cities. Thai Customs implemented various measures to improve trade and customs processing: Pre-Arrival Processing (PAP); an “e-Bill Payment” electronic payment system; and an e-Customs system, National Single Window System (NSW) that reduces the use of paper and enhance single stop service in the custom process. The measures comply with the World Trade Organizations (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which requires WTO members to adopt procedures for pre-arrival processing for imports and to authorize electronic submission of customs documents, where appropriate. The NSW was also developed in conjunction with the ASEAN Single Window, which is a regional initiative that will connect and integrate NSW of ASEAN member States to expedite cargo clearance and enable electronic exchange of border-trade related documents. The measures have also improved Thailand’s ranking in the World Bank’s “Doing Business: Trading Across Borders 2020” index. The Thai government does not have specific laws or policies regarding performance or data localization requirements. Foreign investors are not required to use domestic content in goods or technology, but the Thai government has encouraged such an approach through domestic preferences in government procurement proceedings. In March 2021, Thailand announced the “Made in Thailand” initiative, which will direct government agencies to procure at least 60 percent of their goods from local producers. There are currently no requirements for foreign IT providers to localize their data, turn over source code, or provide access to surveillance. However, the Thai government in 2019 passed new laws and regulations on cybersecurity and personal data protection that have raised concerns about Thai authorities’ broad power to potentially demand confidential and sensitive information. IT operators and analysts have expressed concern with private companies’ legal protections, ability to appeal, or ability to limit such access. IT providers have expressed concern that the new laws might place unreasonable burdens on them and have introduced new uncertainties in the technology sector. In 2021, the National Cybersecurity Agency (NCSA) published implementing regulations for the CSA that define critical information infrastructure (CII) and establish a national coordination center to monitor and resolve cyber threats. The seven sectors classified as CII are national security, essential government services, banking and finance, information technology and telecommunication, transportation and logistics, public utilities (electricity, petroleum and natural gas, water utilities), and health. Legal experts have raised concerns that the implementing regulations lack clear CII criteria and will grant sector regulators broad authority to classify additional essential services to be CII, creating uncertainty for businesses in those sectors. In addition, there are concerns that the law gives NCSA broad powers to enter premises and to monitor, test, freeze, or seize computers without sufficient protections or opportunities to appeal, and that cybersecurity awareness and systems to prevent cyberattacks at public sector organizations remain weak and outdated. While the laws on Personal Data Protection remain unaffected as the government is still in the process of considering the implementing regulations. Thailand has implemented a requirement that all debit transactions processed by a domestic debit card network must use a proprietary chip. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights are guaranteed by the Thai Constitution. While the government provides fair compensation in instances of expropriation, Thai policy generally does not permit foreigners to own land. There have been instances, however, of granting such permission to foreigners under certain laws or ministerial regulations for residential, business, or religious purposes. Foreign ownership of condominiums and buildings is permitted under certain laws. Foreigners can freely lease land. Relevant articles of the Civil and Commercial Codes do not distinguish between foreign and Thai nationals in the exercise of lease rights. Secured interests in property, such as mortgage and pledge, are recognized and enforced. Unoccupied property legally owned by foreigners or Thais may be subject to adverse possession by squatters who stay on that property for at least 10 years. The National Committee on Intellectual Property Policy sets Thailand’s overall Intellectual Property (IP) policy. The National Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister with two Deputy Prime Ministers as vice chairs while 18 heads of government agencies serve as committee members. In 2017, this Committee approved a 20-year IP Roadmap to reform the country’s IP system. The Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) is responsible for IP-related administration, including registration and recording of IP rights and coordination of IP enforcement activities. DIP also acts as the secretary of the National Committee on Intellectual Property Policy. Thailand has a robust legal and enforcement regime for IP rights. Thailand is a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). Thailand’s patent regime generally provides protection for most new inventions. The process of patent examination through issuance of patents is slow, taking on average six to eight years. The patent approval process, particularly for non-pharmaceutical products, has been significantly reduced to one year from 5 to 6 years prior to 2020 as the DIP increased substantial number of patent examiners and streamlined the process. However, the patenting process may take longer for certain technology sectors such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. Thailand protects trademarks, traditional marks, and sound marks. As a member of the “Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks” (Madrid Protocol), Thailand allows trademark owners to apply for trademark registrations in Thailand directly at DIP or through international applications under the Madrid Protocol. DIP historically takes 10 to 14 months to register a trademark. As Thailand is a member of the “Berne Convention,” copyright works are protected automatically. However, copyright owners may record their works with DIP to establish proof of ownership. Thailand joined the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled in January 2019. Thailand’s Geographical Indications (GI) Act has been in force since April 2004. Thailand protects GIs, which identify goods by their specific geographical origins. The geographical origins identified by a GI must be directly attributable to the reputation, qualities, or characteristics of the good. In Thailand, a registered trademark does not prevent a similar geographical name to be registered as a GI. As of March 2022, Thailand remained in the process of amending its Patent Act to streamline the patent registration process, to reduce patent backlog and pendency, and to help prepare for accession to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs. Furthermore, Thailand has increased the number of examiners to reduce the patent backlog. The February 2022 amendment of the Copyright Act will enhance mechanisms to protect copyrights in the digital environment and prepare Thailand for accession to the WIPO copyright treaty (WCT); it will enter into force on August 23. The amendment expanded the term of protection for photographic works, adopted liability exemptions for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and added criminal offences for circumventing of technological protection measures (TPMs). DIP adopted voluntary registration of copyright (collective management) agents and Code of Conduct (CoC) for Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) to curb illegal activities of rogue agents and fine-tune the regulations to conform with international standards. To register, an agent must meet certain qualifications and undergo prescribed training. The roster of registered agents along with associated licensed copyrights and a list of CMOs that comply with the COC are available on the DIP website. The Central Committee on Goods and Service also issued the new implementing regulation requiring the CMOs to update music and copyright fees (including song name, songwriter, right-owner, copyright fee, copyright expiration date) on its website. Thailand also organized an MOU in January 2021 between internet platforms, DIP, and rightsholders, to streamline the process of removing IP-infringing and counterfeit goods from the country’s most popular online marketplaces. Regular meetings with the signatories were held and signatory e-commerce platforms have set up channels for receiving reports on sales of IPR-infringing goods in accordance with the MOU. Thailand maintains a database on seizures of counterfeit goods ( https://www.ipthailand.go.th/en/ipr-enforcement-operation.html ). In 2021, the Royal Thai Police conducted 1,381 raids and seized 854,716 items, the Department of Special Investigation conducted four raids on trademark violations resulting in 2,922,630 items being seized, and the Customs Department had 1,869 seizures that stopped 1,347,022 IP-infringing items from entering Thailand. Thailand’s Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court (CIPIT) is the court of first instance with jurisdiction over both civil and criminal intellectual property cases and the appeals from DIP administrative decisions. The Court of Appeal for Specialized Cases hears appeals from the CIPIT. According to data from Thailand’s Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, the number of IP criminal cases filed at the court significantly dropped compared to previous years while the IP civil cases slightly declined. This trend has encouraged rights-owners to file civil cases in addition to criminal cases, which is in line with the government’s data. Thailand remained on the Special 301 Watch List in 2021. USTR highlights Thailand not being a party to major international IP treaties, the unauthorized activities of collective management organizations, online piracy from streaming devices and applications, the use of unauthorized software in the public and private sectors, and a continued backlog in pharmaceutical patent applications as the main challenges confronting the country’s protection of intellectual property rights. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the DIP website at https://www.ipthailand.go.th/en/ and WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The Stock Exchange of Thailand, the country’s national stock market, was established under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act in 1992. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to allow investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. Government policies generally do not restrict the free flow of financial resources to support product and factor markets. The Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, has respected IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms rather than by “direct lending.” Foreign investors are not restricted from borrowing on the local market. In theory, the private sector has access to a wide variety of credit instruments, ranging from fixed term lending to overdraft protection to bills of exchange and bonds. However, the private debt market is not well developed. Most corporate financing, whether for short-term working capital needs, trade financing, or project financing, requires borrowing from commercial banks or other financial institutions. Thailand’s banking sector, with 15 domestic commercial banks, is sound and well-capitalized. As of December 2021, the gross non-performing loan rate was low (around 2.97 percent industry wide), and banks were well prepared to handle a forecast rise in the NPL rate in 2021 due to the pandemic. The ratio of capital funds/risk-weighted assets (capital adequacy) was high (19.9 percent). Thailand’s largest commercial bank is Bangkok Bank, with assets totaling USD 112 billion as of December 2021. The combined assets of the five largest commercial banks totaled USD 494 billion, or 71.9 percent of the total assets of the Thai banking system, at the end of 2021. In general, Thai commercial banks provide the following services: accepting deposits from the public; granting credit; buying and selling foreign currencies; and buying and selling bills of exchange (including discounting or re-discounting, accepting, and guaranteeing bills of exchange). Commercial banks also provide credit guarantees, payments, remittances and financial instruments for risk management. Such instruments include interest-rate derivatives and foreign-exchange derivatives. Additional business activities to support capital market development, such as debt and equity instruments, are allowed. A commercial bank may also provide other services, such as bank assurance and e-banking. Thailand’s central bank is the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which is headed by a Governor appointed for a five-year term. The BOT serves the following functions: prints and issues banknotes and other security documents; promotes monetary stability and formulates monetary policies; manages the BOT’s assets; provides banking facilities to the government; acts as the registrar of government bonds; provides banking facilities for financial institutions; establishes or supports the payment system; supervises financial institutions; manages the country’s foreign exchange rate under the foreign exchange system; and determines the makeup of assets in the foreign exchange reserve. Apart from the 15 domestic commercial banks, there are currently 11 registered foreign bank branches, including three American banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase), and four foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Thailand. To set up a bank branch or a subsidiary in Thailand, a foreign commercial bank must obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance and the BOT. Foreign commercial bank branches are limited to three service points (branches/ATMs) and foreign commercial bank subsidiaries are limited to 40 service points (branches and off-premises ATMs) per subsidiary. Newly established foreign bank branches are required to have minimum capital funds of 125 million baht (USD 3.8 million at 2021 average exchange rates) invested in government or state enterprise securities, or directly deposited with the Bank of Thailand. The number of expatriate management personnel is limited to six people at full branches, although Thai authorities frequently grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Non-residents can open and maintain foreign currency accounts without deposit and withdrawal ceilings. Non-residents can also open and maintain Thai baht accounts; however, in an effort to curb the strong baht, the Bank of Thailand capped non-resident Thai deposits at 200 million baht across all domestic bank accounts. However, in January 2021, the Bank of Thailand began allowing non-resident companies greater flexibility to conduct baht transactions with domestic financial institutions under the non-resident qualified company scheme. Participating non-financial firms that trade and invest directly in Thailand are allowed to manage currency risks related to the baht without having to provide proof of underlying baht holdings for each transaction. This will allow firms to manage baht liquidity more flexibly without being subject to the end-of-day outstanding limit of 200 million baht for non-resident accounts. Withdrawals are freely permitted. Since mid-2017, the BOT has allowed commercial banks and payment service providers to introduce new financial services technologies under its “Regulatory Sandbox” guidelines. Recently introduced technologies under this scheme include standardized QR codes for payments, blockchain funds transfers, electronic letters of guarantee, and biometrics. Thailand’s alternative financial services include cooperatives, micro-saving groups, the state village funds, and informal money lenders. The latter provide basic but expensive financial services to households, mostly in rural areas. These alternative financial services, with the exception of informal money lenders, are regulated by the government. Thailand does not have a sovereign wealth fund and the Bank of Thailand is not pursuing the creation of such a fund. However, the International Monetary Fund has urged Thailand to create a sovereign wealth fund due to its large accumulated foreign exchange reserves. As of December 2021, Thailand had the world’s 14th largest foreign exchange reserves at USD 246 billion. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Thailand’s 52 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have total assets of USD 448 billion and a combined gross income of USD 131 billion (end of 2021 figures, latest available). In 2021, they employed 255,397 people, or 0.65 percent of the Thai labor force. Thailand’s SOEs operate primarily in service delivery, in particular in the energy, telecommunications, transportation, and financial sectors. More information about SOEs is available at the website of the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) under the Ministry of Finance at www.sepo.go.th . A 15-member State Enterprises Policy Commission, or “superboard,” oversees operations of the country’s 52 SOEs. In May 2019, the Development of Supervision and Management of State-Owned Enterprise Act (2019) went into effect with the goal to reform SOEs and ensure transparent management decisions. The Thai government generally defines SOEs as special agencies established by law for a particular purpose that are 100 percent owned by the government (through the Ministry of Finance as a primary shareholder). The government recognizes a second category of “limited liability companies/public companies” in which the government owns 50 percent or more of the shares. Of the 52 total SOEs, 42 are wholly-owned and 10 are majority-owned. Three SOEs are publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited, PTT Public Company Limited, and MCOT Public Company Limited. By regulation, at least one-third of SOE boards must be comprised of independent directors. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives in most sectors, but there are some exceptions, such as fixed-line operations in the telecommunications sector. While SEPO officials aspire to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs, there is not a level playing field between SOEs and private sector enterprises, which are often disadvantaged in competing with Thai SOEs for contracts. Generally, SOE senior management reports directly to a cabinet minister and to SEPO. Corporate board seats are typically allocated to senior government officials or politically affiliated individuals. The 1999 State Enterprise Corporatization Act provides a framework for conversion of SOEs into stock companies. Corporatization is viewed as an intermediate step toward eventual privatization. [Note: “Corporatization” describes the process by which an SOE adjusts its internal structure to resemble a publicly traded enterprise; “privatization” denotes that a majority of the SOE’s shares is sold to the public; and “partial privatization” is when less than half of a company’s shares are sold to the public.] Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatizations, but restrictions are applied in certain sectors, as regulated by the FBA and the Act on Standards Qualifications for Directors and Employees of State Enterprises of 1975, as amended. However, privatization efforts have been on hold since 2006 largely due to strong opposition from labor unions. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Thailand is among the top 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change and the world’s 20th largest emitter of greenhouse gases. At the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 26), Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha announced that the country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent in 2030, achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, and become greenhouse gas neutral by 2065. In line with these ambitious goals, Thailand is in the process of updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and other related plans, which as of this writing are expected to be announced before COP 27 in November 2022. Thailand is also drafting a new Climate Change Act that will help ensure stronger interagency coordination among authorities and solidify Thailand’s Climate Change Master Plan, which will be revised every five years. Other notable components of the draft law include establishment of a greenhouse gas emissions database, reporting requirements for government and private sector entities (along with penalties for non-compliance), and guidelines for use of the Thailand Environment Fund. Clean energy technology is featured prominently in Thailand’s climate landscape, since the energy sector is currently the main source of greenhouse gas emissions. The Thai government is actively pursuing foreign investment related to clean energy, electric vehicles, and related industries. Thailand is currently developing a National Energy Plan that will further increase the 2037 target of renewable energy from 20 percent in order to meet the new climate goals and align energy production with the government’s “Bio-Circular Green Economy” model. Private sector investment is a key driver of success. The Thai government has established a special committee, under supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, to support increased investment in this area. In support of these policies, electricity producers can access tax and non-tax incentives from Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI). The tax incentives include a corporate income tax holiday of six or eight years, depending on the type of power production used in electricity generation. Tax incentives also include custom duty exemptions for the import of new equipment. Thailand also has a feed-in-tariff (FiT) program and additional tax and investment incentives through the BOI. The FiT is designed to accelerate growth in renewable energy investment by offering a guaranteed, above-market price for long-term power purchase agreements (20 – 25 years). The FiT is currently offered for solar, solar with energy storage, wind, biomass, biogas, and waste-to-energy power production. In February 2022, Thailand joined the U.S.-led Clean Energy Demand Initiative, in which the Thai government agreed to pursue policies that will increase access to alternative energy for the private sector. Electric vehicles are another key focus area for the Thai government and its “30@30” policy aims to have 30 percent of domestic vehicle production be electric vehicles by 2030. To achieve this, the Thai government in 2022 approved a suite of measures to increase foreign investment in electric vehicles, including a range of tax incentives, subsidies, and other mechanisms. 9. Corruption Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Thailand 110th out of 180 countries with a score of 35 out of 100 in 2021 (zero is highly corrupt). Bribery and corruption are still problematic. Despite increased usage of electronic systems, government officers still wield discretion in the granting of licenses and other government approvals, which creates opportunities for corruption. U.S. executives with experience in Thailand often advise new-to-market companies to avoid corrupt transactions from the beginning rather than to stop such practices once a company has been identified as willing to operate in this fashion. American firms that comply with the strict guidelines of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are able to compete successfully in Thailand. U.S. businesses say that publicly affirming the need to comply with the FCPA helps to shield their companies from pressure to pay bribes. Thailand has a legal framework and a range of institutions to counter corruption. The Organic Law to Counter Corruption criminalizes corrupt practices of public officials and corporations, including active and passive bribery of public officials. The anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties. As of February 2022, the Thai government is working on an Anti-SLAPP law (strategic lawsuit against public participation) proposed by the Thai National Anti-Corruption Commission. The new law provides a legal definition of SLAPP lawsuits as cases where the plaintiff intends to “suppress public participation in defense of the public interest in good faith” or has the purposed of intimidation, suppressing information, negotiating, or ending litigation” and empowers law enforcement to file Anti-SLAPP charges in court. Thai procurement regulations prohibit collusion among bidders. If an examination confirms allegations or suspicions of collusion among bidders, the names of those applicants must be removed from the list of competitors. Thailand adopted its first national government procurement law in December 2016. Based on UNCITRAL model laws and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the law applies to all government agencies, local authorities, and state-owned enterprises, and aims to improve transparency. Officials who violate the law are subject to 1-10 years imprisonment and/or a fine from Thai baht 20,000 (approximately USD 615) to Thai baht 200,000 (approximately USD 6,150). Since 2010, the Thai Institute of Directors has built an anti-corruption coalition of Thailand’s largest businesses. Coalition members sign a Collective Action Against Corruption Declaration and pledge to take tangible, measurable steps to reduce corruption-related risks identified by third party certification. The Center for International Private Enterprise equipped the Thai Institute of Directors and its coalition partners with an array of tools for training and collective action. Established in 2011, the Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand (ACT) aims to encourage the government to create laws to combat corruption. ACT has 54 member organizations drawn from the private, public, and academic sectors. ACT’s signature program is the “Integrity Pact,” run in cooperation with the Comptroller General Department of the Ministry of Finance and based on a tool promoted by Transparency International. The program forbids bribes from signatory members in bidding for government contacts and assigns independent ACT observers to monitor public infrastructure projects for signs of collusion. Member agencies and companies must adhere to strict transparency rules by disclosing and making easily available to the public all relevant bidding information, such as the terms of reference and the cost of the project. Thailand is a party to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, but not the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Thailand’s Witness Protection Act offers protection (to include police protection) to witnesses, including NGO employees, who are eligible for special protection measures in anti-corruption cases. International Affairs Strategy Specialist Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission 361 Nonthaburi Road, Thasaai District, Amphur Muang Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand Tel: +662-528-4800 Email: TACC@nacc.go.th Dr. Mana Nimitmongkol Secretary General Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand (ACT) 44 Srijulsup Tower, 16th floor, Phatumwan, Bangkok 10330 Tel: +662-613-8863 Email: mana2020@yahoo.com 10. Political and Security Environment Street clashes between anti-government protesters and police occurred regularly in a major Bangkok intersection in the early months of 2021. Several protesters were injured by rubber bullets, two of whom later died. Violence related to an ongoing ethno-nationalist insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has claimed more than 7,000 lives since 2004. Although the number of deaths and violent incidents has decreased in recent years, efforts to end the insurgency have so far been unsuccessful. The government is currently engaged in preliminary talks with the leading insurgent group. Almost all attacks have occurred in the three southernmost provinces of the country. 11. Labor Policies and Practices In 2021, 38.6 million people were in Thailand’s formal labor pool, comprising 66 percent of the total population. Thailand’s official unemployment rate stood at 1.6 percent at the end of 2021, interestingly, workers with university degrees have the highest unemployment rate compared with other groups. The working hours in the private sector are still below the pre-Covid era with the average working hours of 45.6 hours per week. The Thai government is actively seeking to address shortages of both skilled and unskilled workers through education reform and various worker-training incentive programs. Low birth rates, an aging population, and skill mismatch, are exacerbating labor shortage problems in many sectors. Despite provision of 15 years of free education for every child in Thailand, Thailand continues to suffer from a skills mismatch that impedes innovation and economic growth. Thailand also has a shortage of high-skill workers such as researchers, engineers, and managers, as well as technicians and vocational workers. The statistics from the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board show that 49.3 percent of new graduates are in the fields of business and social science. Regional income inequality and labor shortages, particularly in labor-intensive manufacturing, construction, hospitality, and service sectors, have attracted millions of migrant workers, mostly from neighboring Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. At the end of 2021, there were more than two million migrant workers registered with the Ministry of Labor. Employers may dismiss workers provided the employer pays severance. When an employer temporarily suspends business, in part or in whole, the employer must pay the employee at least 75 percent of his or her daily wages throughout the suspension period. At the end of 2021, there were a total of 1,432 labor unions in Thailand with 364 of them located in Bangkok. Thai law allows private-sector workers to form and join trade unions of their choosing without prior authorization, to bargain collectively, and to conduct legal strikes, although these rights come with some restrictions. Noncitizen migrant workers, whether registered or undocumented, do not have the right to form unions or serve as union officials. Migrants can join unions organized and led by Thai citizens. In 2020, the Department of Labor Protection and Welfare issued a ministerial regulation on occupational safety, health and working environment for diving work; the regulation sets a minimum age of 18. In March 2022, the Ministry of Labor issued a regulation regarding the Protection of Fishery Workers to provide additional protection for the workers’ rights in this industry. Additional information on migrant workers issues and rights can be found in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report, as well as the Labor Rights chapter of the U.S. Human Rights report. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $490,297 2020 $501,644 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $18,499 2020 $17,450 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $8,724 2020 $1,810 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 59.3% 2019 46.8% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Bank of Thailand (http://bot.or.th/) Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $290,774 100% Total Outward $173,437 100% Japan $94,929 32.7% China, P.R.: Hong Kong $31,836 18.4% Singapore $53,612 18.4% Singapore $20,910 12.1% China, P.R.: Hong Kong $35,141 12.1% The Netherlands $12,711 7.3% United States $18,499 6.4% Indonesia $10,757 6.2% The Netherlands $13,849 4.8% Vietnam $9,545 5.5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Bangkok Economic Section BangkokEconSection@state.gov The Bahamas Executive Summary Title The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is a nation of islands stretching 760 miles from the coast of Florida to the coast of Haiti. Despite historical and cultural similarities with many Caribbean countries, The Bahamas’ proximity to Florida reenforces its close ties to the United States. Only twenty-nine of its 700 islands are inhabited, and the population is clustered around the two largest cities of Nassau and Freeport. The country has a stable investment climate, democratic tradition, respect for the rule of law, and well-developed legal system. Bahamians’ use of English and frequent travel to the U.S. contribute to their preference for U.S. goods and services. The World Bank classifies The Bahamas as a developed country with a high per capita GDP of $25,194. The Bahamas relies primarily on imports from the United States to satisfy its fuel and food needs, and conducts more than 85 percent of its international trade with the United States. U.S. exports to The Bahamas were valued at $2.9 billion in 2021, giving the U.S. a trade surplus of $2.5 billion. The Progressive Liberty Party (PLP) returned to power in September 2021 elections. The landslide victory reflected public discontent over the slumping economy and the government’s handling of the pandemic. Both crises highlighted The Bahamas’ dependence on tourism, vulnerability to external shocks, and lack of economic diversification. The World Bank classifies The Bahamas as a high-income country, which belies the country’s extreme income inequality. Tourism and related services contribute to over 70 percent of the country’s GDP and employs just over half the workforce. However, Hurricane Dorian (2019) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021) devastated the economy and forced tens of thousands out of jobs. A survey of the labor force has not been completed since December 2019, yet government and international agencies estimate unemployment at 20 to 25 percent. Although tourism is on the rebound, it has yet to reach the pre-pandemic level of more than seven million mostly American annual tourists. Financial services is the second most important sector of the economy, accounting for 15 percent of GDP. To diversify the economy, the government has targeted investment in light manufacturing, technology, agriculture, fisheries, extractive industries, and renewable energy. The government has also committed to digitizing business services and jumpstarting domestic productivity through small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially those operating in non-traditional sectors. Grand Bahama, the most northern Bahamian island, depends less on tourism and has the most diversified economic activity of any island in the country. Its capital, Freeport, is a free trade zone featuring many U.S.-owned businesses. The Bahamas’ economic future depends on the government’s ability to revive the tourism industry, diversity the economy, attract foreign direct investment, manage debt obligations, and demonstrate fiscal responsibility. Following two years of pandemic-related government borrowing, spending, and tax concessions, the country has seen recent economic growth credited to rebounding tourism and the lifting of COVID restrictions. The government also reports a strong pipeline of investment proposals in tourism, renewable energy, airport and infrastructure development, mining, and agriculture. The government affirms its support for SMEs (representing 85 percent of registered businesses), with $250 million earmarked to fund entrepreneurial developments over five years. The Small Business Development Centre (SBDC), launched in 2018, has prioritized the economic empowerment of women entrepreneurs and the reduction of the income gap between men and women. The Bahamas has leaned on international financial institutions for loans and thus far rejected offers from foreign governments to prop up its economy. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have voiced concern about The Bahamas’ reluctance to impose additional taxes to address its 96 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The country does not have corporate, personal, inheritance or capital gains taxes. The government also faces international pressure to improve aspects of its anti-money laundering policies. The Bahamas is not a member of the WTO and does not offer export subsidies, engage in trade-distorting practices, or maintain a local content requirement. The country has a strict $500,000 dollar minimum on foreign capital investments. The country attracts FDI and over the past decade has benefitted from significant investments in the tourism sector by PRC-based and backed companies. Since taking office, the government has shown its willingness to engage investors from non-traditional markets such as the Middle East. Investments from the United States are primarily in the tourism sector and range from general services to billion-dollar resort developments. U.S. companies have also shown interest in emerging sectors, such as non-oil and renewable energy, niche tourism, extractive industries, and digital technology. Positive aspects of The Bahamas’ investment climate include political stability, a parliamentary democracy, an English-speaking labor force, a profitable financial services infrastructure, established rule of law, general respect for contracts, an independent judiciary, and strong consumer purchasing power. Negative aspects include a lack of transparency in government procurement, labor shortages in certain sectors, high labor costs, a bureaucratic and inefficient investment approvals process, a lengthy legal disputes resolution process, internet connectivity issues on smaller islands, and energy costs four times higher than in the United States. The high cost of electricity is driven by antiquated generation systems and inefficient diesel power plants. The current government has prioritized infrastructure projects focused on non-oil energy, including a liquid natural gas (LNG) plant and an onshore LNG regasification terminal. The government is also promoting solar energy, particularly on the smaller islands. Another barrier to investment in the country is the prohibition of foreign investment in 15 sectors of the economy without prior approval from the National Economic Council (NEC). These sectors include commercial fishing, public transport, advertising, retail operations, security services, real estate agencies, and others. Accession to the WTO, which would require opening at least some of these protected areas to foreign investment, is unlikely to take place before 2025. The absence of transparent investment procedures and legislation is also problematic. U.S. and Bahamian companies report business dispute resolution often takes years and debt collection can be difficult, even with a court judgment. Companies describe the approval process for FDI and work permits as cumbersome and time-consuming. The government passed a Public Procurement Act and launched an e-procurement and suppliers registry system in 2021. While the registry system is in place, the Public Procurement Act has yet to be fully implemented. Companies complain that the tender process for public contracts is inconsistent, and allege it is difficult to obtain information on the status of bids. The Bahamas scored 64 out of 100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2020 (where zero is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 is very transparent). This means The Bahamas is perceived as notably transparent when compared to the 180 ranked countries. However, the country’s score has dropped seven points since 2012. The new administration confirmed its intention to amend several good governance laws, including the Public Procurement Act, but has not provided a timeline. The Bahamas still lacks an Office of the Ombudsman and has not fully enacted its Freedom of Information Act (2017). Legislation to support an Integrity Commission and campaign reform have also been delayed. An independent Information Commissioner, supported by technical and administrative staff, was appointed in mid-2021. The country grapples with high crime, unemployment, and xenophobia directed towards irregular migrants, especially Haitians. Conservative and patriarchal norms sometimes lead to inequality of opportunity, including for women. Women have raised concerns regarding bureaucratic hurdles to register businesses and cited difficulty in securing financing. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 30 of 180 (rank) http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2020 46,061 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 26,070 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness to and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment The government encourages FDI, particularly in the tourism and financial services sector. The National Investment Policy (NIP) and the Commercial Enterprises Act (CEA) encourage foreign investment in the following sectors of the economy: tourism; international business centers; aircraft and maritime services; marinas; information and data processing; information technology services; light industry manufacturing and assembly; agro-industries; aquaculture; food and beverage processing; banking and other financial services; offshore medical centers and services; e-commerce; arbitration; international arbitrage; computer programming; software design and writing; bioinformatics and analytics; and data storage and warehousing. After the September 2021 elections, the new administration established the Ministry of Tourism, Investments and Aviation headed by the Deputy Prime Minister. This new ministry is charged with promoting the tourism sector and driving economic development with investments in non-traditional sectors. The new administration stressed its commitment to an investment-friendly environment and touted plans to diversify the economy through targeted investments in non-traditional sectors such as light manufacturing, technology, agriculture and fisheries, extractive industries, and renewable energy. Since taking office, the government has also shown its willingness to engage investors from relatively untapped markets, such as the Middle East. Operating from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Bahamas Investment Authority (BIA) ( www.bahamas.gov.bs/bia ) administers investment policies, functions as the investment facilitation agency, and assists investors in navigating the sometimes-cumbersome approvals process. All foreign investors must apply for BIA approval. If operating in Grand Bahamas’ free port area, investors must seek approval from Invest Grand Bahama, the investment arm of the Grand Bahama Port Authority (GBPA) – a privately owned organization that oversees the city of Freeport. Newly elected administrations consistently support investment and generally honor agreements made by previous administrations. The Bahamas reserves the following 15 sectors of the economy for Bahamian investors: wholesale and retail operations (although international investors may engage in the wholesale distribution of any product they produce locally); agencies engaged in import or export; real estate agencies and domestic property management; domestic newspapers and magazine publications; domestic advertising and public relations firms; nightclubs and restaurants except specialty, gourmet, and ethnic restaurants, and those operating in a hotel, resort or tourist attraction; security services; domestic distribution of building supplies; construction companies except for special structures requiring foreign expertise; personal cosmetic or beauty establishments; commercial fishing including both deep water fishing and shallow water fishing of crustaceans, mollusks, fish, and sponges; auto and appliance services; public transportation including boat charters; and domestic gaming. The government does make exceptions, and the Embassy is aware of several cases in which it granted foreign investors full market access. The government does not give preferential treatment to investors based on nationality, and investors have equal access to incentives, including land grants, tax concessions, and direct marketing and budgetary support. The government provides guidelines for investment through the National Investment Policy (NIP), administered by the BIA, and through the Commercial Enterprises Act (CEA), administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The CEA provides incentives to domestic and foreign investors to establish specific projects, including approval of work permits for senior posts and the expedited issuance of work permits. The National Economic Council (NEC) must grant special approval for foreign investment projects valued at $10 million or more, those with national security implications, or those that require environmental and economic impact assessments. The NEC is comprised of government ministers, including the Prime Minister in his dual role as the Minister of Finance. The approval process generally requires review by multiple government agencies and a BIA recommendation prior to NEC consideration. Bureaucratic impediments are not limited to the NEC approvals process. The country continues to lag behind on international metrics related to starting a business, registering property, acquiring construction permits, accessing credit, and resolving property disputes. Significant delays in the approvals process have occurred, including cases where the government failed to respond to investment applications. To fast-track FDI and mobilize local investments the new administration is establishing the independent agency Bahamas Invest. Bureaucratic delays, functionality, and transparency are expected to improve under this new agency. Investment priorities are likely to include public-private partnerships, tourism, infrastructure, technological upgrades, renewable energy investments, and climate adaptability projects. Bahamas Invest will include a Domestic Investment Board to support Bahamian businesses and an Investment Compliance Unit to ensure international investors comply with government statutes. BIA will serve as the investment promotion arm of Bahamas Invest. Foreign investors have the right to establish private enterprises and most companies operate unencumbered once approved. Key considerations for approval include economic impact, job creation, infrastructure development, economic diversification, environmental protection, and corporate social responsibility. With the assistance of a local attorney, investors can create the following types of businesses: sole proprietorship, limited or general partnership, joint stock company, or subsidiary of a foreign company. The most popular all-purpose vehicles for foreign investors are the International Business Company (IBC) and the Limited Duration Company (LDC). Both benefit from income, capital gains, gift, estate, inheritance, and succession tax exemptions. Investors are required to establish a local company and register to operate in The Bahamas. A Beneficial Ownership Registry established in 2021 requires legal entities (defined as companies incorporated, continued, or registered in The Bahamas) to file beneficial ownership information with the Registrar General within 15 days of identifying any person as a beneficial owner of that legal entity. Investment screening mechanisms assess the creditworthiness of principals, capital investment, land and personnel requirements, financial arrangements, and economic and environmental impacts. It is not clear if national security risks are assessed. The Bahamas is the only Western Hemisphere country not in the WTO, and therefore has never benefitted from a WTO trade policy review. None of the OECD, UNCTAD, or the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights have conducted investment policy reviews. In April 2020, the government appointed an Economic Recovery Committee (ERC) to recommend policies to addresses the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The public-private coalition recommended significant changes to the investment landscape. The ERC’s full report can be accessed via https://opm.gov.bs/economic-recovery-committee-executive-summary-report-2020/ . In 2017, The Bahamas government streamlined the process to start a business with the launch of an e-business portal. The new process allows companies to apply for or renew their business licenses online from the Department of Inland Revenue ( http://inlandrevenue.finance.gov.bs/business-licence/copy-applying-b-l/ ). The government claims approvals are normally granted within seven working days, provided all required information and documentation has been submitted correctly. Foreign owned companies must provide evidence of BIA approval when applying for business licenses. Foreign companies and most larger businesses, regardless of national affiliation, are not eligible for provisional licenses, expedited renewals, or new business license fee exemptions. All companies with an annual turnover of $100,000 or more are required to register with the government to receive a Tax Identification Number and a Value Added Tax Certificate. The lengthy registration process is generally viewed as an impediment to the ease of doing business. The Bahamas government neither promotes nor prohibits its citizens from investing internationally, however, all outward direct investments by residents require the prior approval of the Exchange Control Department of the Central Bank of The Bahamas ( https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/exchange-control-notes-and-guidelines ). The Central Bank considers the probable impact an investment could have on The Bahamas’ balance of payments, specifically business activities that promote the receipt of foreign currency. In an effort to maintain adequate foreign reserves during the pandemic, the Central Bank suspended purchases of foreign currency on May 4, 2020 for transactions that could jeopardize the country’s ability to maintain a fixed, one-to-one exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank also suspended investments in U.S.-dollar denominated funds. The Central Bank began reauthorizing these investments on October 1, 2021 after the country’s foreign reserves stabilized. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties The Bahamas has no bilateral investment agreements but has signed tax information exchange agreements with 34 countries, including the United States in 2002. The agreement designates The Bahamas as a qualified jurisdiction and provides U.S. companies tax credits for conventions and related corporate expenses. Tax information exchange agreements signed to date can be accessed via https://www.bahamas.gov.bs/wps/portal/public/International%20Agreements . The Bahamas was the first country in the Caribbean region to sign the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Agreement (FATCA) with the United States. Since September 2015, The Bahamas has implemented a non-reciprocal, inter-governmental agreement (Model 1B) to satisfy the obligations of the agreement. Additionally, in January 2017, the government implemented the OECD-developed Common Reporting Standard (CRS) through the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information Act and has activated exchange relationships with 63 partners ( www.taxreporting.finance.gov.bs/ ). The Bahamas is a signatory to the 2008 Economic Partnership Agreement between the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and the European Union, and the 2019 Economic Partnership Agreement between CARIFORUM and the United Kingdom. Both agreements provide for the asymmetric liberalization of trade in goods and services between CARIFORUM and the other signatories and include specific commitments on investments and trade-in services. The Bahamas has not yet ratified either trade agreement, but provisionally applies both. The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) but does not participate in the single market, single economy, or the customs union. The Bahamas does not have a free trade agreement with the United States but is a signatory to the US-CARICOM Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (2013). 3. Legal Regime The Bahamas’ accounting, legal, and regulatory systems are generally consistent with international norms. The Bahamas has no equivalent to the U.S. Federal Register, but the government regularly updates its website ( www.bahamas.gov.bs ) to list draft legislation, bills before parliament, and its legislative agenda. Proposed legislation is available at the Government Publications Office, and public and private sector engagement is usually encouraged. Public consultation on investment proposals is not required by law. The Embassy is unaware of any informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations that restrict foreign participation in the economy. Throughout 2021, the government passed legislation to improve the country’s fiscal governance and enhance transparency and accountability. The Public Debt Management Act (2021) enshrines debt management policies into law and improves central government and state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt transparency. The Public Finance Management Act (2021) expands budgetary and fiscal reporting requirements for central government and SOEs. The Statistics Act (2021) transforms the current Department of Statistics into a quasi-independent National Statistics Institute. The Public Procurement Act (2021) brings transparency and accountability to government tenders and contracts. Only the Statistics Act has been fully implemented. In late 2021, the new administration confirmed its intention to amend these laws, as well as the Fiscal Responsibility Act passed in 2018. The Embassy is not aware of a timeline for the proposed amendments, which skeptics argue could stymie the original intent of enacting an ambitious transparency regime. Although efforts have been made to meet international best practices, The Bahamas’ supreme audit institution, the Office of the Auditor General, has not published a timely government budget audit report for several years. The last publicly available audit covers fiscal year 2018/2019. The U.S. Global Accountability Office is assisting the Office of the Auditor General to identify ways to fulfill its reporting obligations. The government made key budget documents publicly available, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end of fiscal year report. The government also submitted a Supplementary Budget following elections in September 2021. Budget documents include estimates of revenue and expenditure (including estimates from prior years), the budget communication (the budget speech), appropriation bills, tax bills, resolutions, and proposed legislative changes. The government also publicizes information on debt obligations, including that of SOEs, during the annual budget submissions to the Parliament. Budget documents are available at www.bahamas.gov.bs and www.bahamasbudget.gov.bs . The Bahamas is not a member of the WTO, so it does not notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. As part of WTO accession negotiations relaunched in 2018, The Bahamas announced it is reviewing investment policies with the aim of developing comprehensive, WTO-compliant investment legislation. However, the Embassy is not aware of significant progress in this area in 2021. The Bahamas is not a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The Bahamas Bureau of Standards and Quality (BBSQ), launched in 2016, governs standards for goods and services, particularly metrology (weights and balances). BBSQ also cooperates with other ministries on quality standards, such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the Ministry of Agriculture and Marine Resources and the Bahamas Health and Food Safety Agency (BAHFSA). BBSQ serves as the country’s focal point on trade barrier issues and has received technical support on the development of national standards from the EU and the Caribbean Regional Organization for Standards and Quality (CROSQ). Trade barriers are not a hindrance to trade with the United States, and U.S. products are widely accepted. The Bahamas legal system is based on English common law and foreign nationals are afforded full rights in legal proceedings. Contracts are legally enforced through the courts, however, there are some instances where civil disputes get tied up in the court system for years. Throughout 2020 and 2021, a U.S. investor and a government utility company were engaged in a civil dispute concerning the termination of a contract, non-payment for services provided, and ownership of equipment and materials. This case was settled in late 2021 with the local courts awarding the U.S. investor full payment and retention of its equipment. The judiciary is independent, and allegations of government interference in the judicial process are rare. With the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the Governor General appoints the highest-ranking officials in the judicial system, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the President of the Court of Appeals. The Bahamas is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and uses the Privy Council Judicial Committee in London as the final court of appeal for civil and criminal matters. The Bahamas continues to advance efforts to develop its reputation as a center for international arbitration by drafting legislation, namely the International Commercial Arbitration Bill (2021) which updates the Arbitration Act (2009). The Bill governs domestic arbitration and incorporates key provisions of the Model Law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The legislation has not yet passed. In 2020, The Bahamas also established an Alternative Dispute Resolution unit, and developed a two-year strategic plan to promote this method for settling commercial and other types of disputes. Judgments by British courts and select Commonwealth countries can be registered and enforced in The Bahamas under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act. Court judgments from other countries, including those of the United States, must be litigated in local courts and are subject to local legal requirements. The government is taking steps to modernize the justice system and increase judicial transparency and efficiency. Efforts throughout 2021 included implementation of an Integrated Case Management System, a Court Automated Payment System, Digital Court Reporting and Bail Management Systems, the launch of a Digitization Unit, and the expansion of the Bahamas Judicial Education Institute. The Court Services Bill (2020) has not yet been debated or enacted. This law would give the courts more autonomy and control over their administrative, financial, and operational affairs. There has been little movement on the construction of a new Supreme Court complex. While some public pronouncements have been made on FDI policies, no major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions have been passed since publication of the 2021 Investment Climate Statement. The government has drafted a Foreign Investment Bill purported to codify the existing National Investment Policy, align with international investment best practices, and bring additional transparency, accountability, and predictability to the country’s foreign investment process. The Embassy is not aware of efforts to advance this bill in 2021. The government committed to establishing Bahamas Invest – a new, autonomous agency to oversee a modern investment regime and fast-track investments. Bahamas Invest remains in the planning stages. All relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors can be found on the website of the Bahamas Investment Authority (BIA) ( www.bahamas.gov.bs/bia ). The Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA) regulates and imposes antitrust restrictions in the telecommunications and energy sectors. However, there is no legislation governing competition or anti-trust. A Competition (antitrust) Bill was drafted in 2018 in line with The Bahamas’ CARIFORUM-EU obligations and WTO accession requirements. Initial public consultations were held in August 2018. The Embassy is not aware of efforts to advance the Bill in 2021. Property rights are protected under Article 27 of the country’s constitution, which prohibits the deprivation of property without prompt and adequate compensation. There have been compulsory acquisitions of property for public use, but in all instances, there was satisfactory compensation at fair market value. The March 2020 Emergency Power (COVID-19) Regulations granted the government authorization to requisition any building, ship, aircraft, or article if it is reasonably required for any statutory purpose for the duration of the emergency. At the conclusion of the requisition, the government was to make prompt and adequate compensation to the owner. The Embassy is not aware of any instance in 2021 where the government invoked this law. The Emergency Power Regulations expired with the cancelation of the state of emergency in October 2021. Company liquidations, voluntary or involuntary, proceed according to the Companies Act. Liquidations are routinely published in newspapers in accordance with legislation. Creditors of bankrupt debtors and liquidated companies participate in the distribution of the bankrupt debtor’s or liquidated company’s assets according to the statute. U.S. investors should be aware that there is no equivalent to Chapter 11 bankruptcy law provisions to protect assets located in The Bahamas. The Credit Reporting Act was passed in February 2018 to improve credit reporting systems and better assess borrowers’ risk. The Central Bank confirmed Italian-based CRIF S.P.A. launched The Bahamas’ first credit bureau in April 2021, but it is not yet fully functional. Bahamian commercial banks and personal lenders will be required to share their clients’ credit history with CRIF. CRIF will provide lenders access to credit reports. The Central Bank identified 45 entities as credit information providers as of October 2021. 4. Industrial Policies Tax relief is by far the most compelling and significant investment incentive in The Bahamas. The government does not impose taxes on income, estates, or inheritances. Other incentives for investment include waivers on import duties, property tax abatement, and, in some cases, land grants or extended leases for private development at below-market rates. Certain incentives are negotiated directly with the Bahamas Investment Authority (BIA) and require the approval of the National Economic Council (NEC). Other investment incentives are outlined in concessionary legislation such as the Hotels Encouragement Act, the Bahamas Vacation Plan and Timeshare Act, the Agricultural Manufacturers Act, the Family Islands Development Encouragement Act, the Industries Encouragement Act, the Tariff Act, the International Persons Landholding Act, the City of Nassau Revitalization Act, the Hawksbill Creek Agreement, Grand Bahama Act, and the Commercial Enterprises Act. BIA either administers the legislation or acts as the intermediary between the foreign investor and relevant government ministry or agency. Further information on investment incentives is available at http://www.bahamas.gov.bs . The city of Freeport is a 233-square-mile Free Trade Zone on the island of Grand Bahama. The Hawksbill Creek Agreement (1955) between the Bahamas government and the Grand Bahama Port Authority guarantees the “special economic zone” until 2054. Businesses operating in Freeport must obtain a license from the Grand Bahama Port Authority, but are exempt from most taxes (including property, excise, import, and business taxes). The government has made efforts to regulate business activities and extract tax revenues from the free zone, but most have been litigated to the Port’s benefit. In the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian in September 2019, the islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama were both declared Special Economic Recovery Zones (SERZ), which allowed residents and businesses to benefit from wide-ranging tax exemptions and incentives. In December 2021, the government extended most of the tax concessions to December 2022, including the tax-free sale of fuel and importation of building materials and household goods, continuing tax concessions on replacement vehicles, and a value-added tax (VAT) discount on the sale of real estate valued up to $500,000. The Bahamas maintains few formal performance requirements for investments. During the approvals process, an investor provides proof of adequate and legitimate sources of funding and, depending on the type of investment, produces economic and environmental impact assessments. The government negotiates requirements on a project-by-project basis, and, in the case of large developments, offers a Heads of Agreement between the government and the investor. These agreements include government obligations to the investor. There is no official mandate to hire local personnel, though many Heads of Agreement stipulate a percentage of workers must be Bahamian. The government encourages commercial enterprises to source from local producers and transfer skills to the local labor market. This engagement is a part of the negotiations with the government during the approval phase, and it is common for an investor to gain concessions where they can benefit local businesses, create jobs, or support the transfer of skills and technology. In January 2022, the government announced a policy that required investors, including large resorts, wholesalers, and retailers to purchase at least forty percent of agricultural and marine products from local producers. This policy is not supported by legislation, and the Embassy understands it is negotiated directly with investors. The government negotiates and sometimes facilitates work permits for key employees as part of the investment approvals process, usually under the Commercial Enterprises Act (CEA). For non-essential services, the government requires investors to document efforts to recruit local Bahamians as part of their applications for work permits, but the law does not stipulate an exact percentage. Buyers of second homes can apply for permanent residency (not citizenship) and benefit from expedited approval for home purchases that exceed $500,000. The government generates revenue by collecting fees for work permits. Depending on the category, work permits range from $1,000 to $15,000 annually. Fees can be assessed and paid at www.immigration.gov.bs . 5. Protection of Property Rights Despite the high number of second-home owners in The Bahamas, local and international investors describe the process of registering property as difficult. The time to complete the registration process is lengthy, and there has been limited progress on establishing digital land registries or time limits for procedures. Successive governments have committed to creating a digital land registry to improve market transparency, facilitate the ease of doing business, and ensure households and businesses have secure titles. The government does not publish statistics regarding the percent of land without clear title. Unoccupied property cannot revert to other owners, such as squatters. This leads to a high incidence of unoccupied, derelict, and partially constructed residences. The commercial district of downtown Nassau suffers from a high incidence of abandoned buildings. Successive governments have promised but failed to address the situation. Land ownership in The Bahamas is founded on English law and can include crown land, commonage land, and generational land. The investor’s secured interest in mobile and immobile property is recognized and enforced by law. Mortgages in real property and legal rights in personal property are recorded with the Registrar General of The Bahamas. The Embassy has received reports of problems obtaining clear title to property, often delaying real estate transaction closings. This can be due to the seller having no legal right to convey or because separate claims to ownership arose after a purchase was made. In 2019, the government took steps to strengthen Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in response to pressure from the business community and as part of its protracted WTO accession process. These regulations cover patents, trademarks, copyrights, integrated circuits, false trade descriptions, new plant varieties, and geographic indicators. The government anticipates the new regulations will bring The Bahamas into compliance with the terms of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. The Embassy is not aware of new IP-related laws or regulations introduced in 2021. The Bahamas is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) but has not ratified the WIPO Internet treaties. The Bahamas is also a signatory to the following intellectual property conventions and agreements. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property The Bahamas has not recently been listed as a country of concern in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report and is not included in USTR’s 2020 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. The Bahamas’ intellectual property registry is maintained by the Department of the Registrar General ( https://www.bahamas.gov.bs/rgd ), and enforcement is coordinated by the Royal Bahamas Police Force with support from Bahamas Customs. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, established under the Copyright Act, is responsible for royalty-related activities, such as collecting and distributing royalties. U.S. companies should be aware that intellectual property is primarily a private right, and the U.S. government cannot enforce rights for private individuals in The Bahamas. It is the responsibility of the rights’ holders to register, protect, and enforce their rights where relevant, and retain counsel and advisors where necessary. Companies may wish to seek advice from local attorneys or IP consultants who are experts in Bahamian law. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The government encourages free capital markets, and the Central Bank supports this through its regulatory functions. The Bahamas is an Article VIII member of the IMF and has agreed not to restrict currency transactions, such as payments for imports. The Bahamas Securities Commission regulates the activities of investment funds, securities, and capital markets ( www.scb.gov.bs ). The Bahamas International Stock Exchange (BISX), established in 1999, excludes foreign investors and is regulated by the Securities Commission of The Bahamas. There are no legal limitations on foreigners’ access to the domestic credit market, and commercial banks make credit available at market rates. The government encourages Bahamian-foreign joint ventures, which are eligible for financing through both commercial banks and the Bahamas Development Bank ( http://www.bahamasdevelopmentbank.com/ ). The government does not prohibit its citizens from investing internationally. However, all outward direct investments by residents, including foreign portfolio investments, require the prior approval of the Exchange Control Department of the Central Bank of The Bahamas ( https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/exchange-control-notes-and-guidelines ). Applications are assessed by their probable impact on The Bahamas’ balance of payments. In an effort to maintain adequate foreign reserves during the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic, the Central Bank suspended purchases of foreign currency on May 4, 2020 for specific transactions that could drain reserves and jeopardize the country’s ability to maintain a fixed, one-to-one exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank also suspended Bahamian investments in U.S.-dollar denominated investment. The Central Bank resumed access to these facilities on October 1, 2021 as the country’s foreign reserves stabilized. The financial sector of The Bahamas is highly developed and consists of savings banks, trust companies, offshore banks, insurance companies, private pension funds, cooperative societies, credit unions, commercial banks, a development bank, a publicly controlled pension fund, a housing corporation, and the state-owned Bank of The Bahamas. These institutions provide a wide array of services via several types of financial intermediaries. The financial sector is regulated by the Central Bank of The Bahamas, the Securities Commission, the Insurance Commission, the Inspector of Financial and Corporate Service Providers, the Gaming Board, and the Compliance Commission. In the domestic banking sector, four of the eight commercial banks are subsidiaries of Canadian banks, three are locally owned, and one is a branch of Citibank, a U.S.-based institution which has operated for more than fifty years providing corporate and investment banking services in the country. Continued reorganization by Canadian banks, including closure of several brick-and-mortar branches, has severely limited banking services on some of the less populated islands. All domestic commercial banks have correspondent banking relationships, and the Embassy is not aware of any of these relationships being in jeopardy. According to the Central Bank’s December 2021 Quarterly Economic Review, the private sector delinquency or non-performing rate on commercial bank loans increased to 9.6 percent at the end of 2021 from a pre-pandemic level of 8.0 percent. The Central Bank believes this rate will stabilize and begin to decline before the end of 2022. The Central Bank responded to the loss of brick-and-mortar banks by introducing the “Sand Dollar” in December 2019, the first central bank-backed digital currency in the world. The introduction of the new digital currency provides individuals with efficient access to financial services. Its launch has facilitated the financial inclusion of unbanked and underbanked residents. To date, nine firms (including clearing banks, money transfer services, credit unions and payment service providers) have successfully completed a cybersecurity assessment and been authorized to distribute Sand Dollars within their proprietary mobile wallets. In February 2021, the Central Bank collaborated with Mastercard and Island Pay (a local digital payment platform) to launch Sand Dollar prepaid cards allowing the option to instantly convert the digital currency to traditional Bahamian dollars and pay for goods and services anywhere Mastercard is accepted. As of December 2021, the Central Bank estimated 20,000 individuals utilized Sand Dollars and approximately $300,000 of the digital currency is in circulation. The bank has prioritized interoperability with the automated clearing house, so there can be direct linkages between Sand Dollar wallets and local deposit accounts. When this interoperability exercise is complete, additional businesses are expected to accept Sand Dollar as payments. Although Sand Dollar accounts and transactions are theoretically subject to the same stringent anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer (KYC) safeguards as traditional commercial banks, the Embassy continues to work with the Central Bank to ensure there is capacity to enforce safeguards and account audit capabilities. Additional information on the Sand Dollar can be accessed via www.sanddollar.bs/ . The Bahamian government passed omnibus legislation to manage the oil and gas sector in 2017 but has not yet promulgated supporting regulations. The legislation calls for the creation of a sovereign wealth fund which has yet to be completed. Discussions of a possible sovereign wealth fund were reignited when the Isle of Man-registered Bahamas Petroleum Company began exploratory oil drilling in Bahamas waters. The company confirmed in February 2021 that its exploratory drilling did not produce commercially viable quantities of oil and exited the market. Nonetheless, the recently elected administration committed to present legislation to support a Sovereign Wealth Fund in early 2022 to monetize the concessionary access to Crown Land and Seabed leases already provided to foreign investors. Future Crown Land investments and royalty payments from exports of the country’s natural resources (such as salt, sand, rock, and aragonite) are also likely to contribute to the fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises are active in the utilities and services sectors of the economy. A list of the 25 SOEs is available on www.bahamas.gov.bs . Key SOEs include Bahamasair Holdings Ltd. (the national airline), Public Hospitals Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, Nassau Airport Development Authority, University of The Bahamas, Health Insurance Authority, Bank of The Bahamas, Bahamas Power and Light (BPL), Water and Sewerage Corporation (WSC), Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas (ZNS), Nassau Flight Services, and the Hotel Corporation of The Bahamas. In April 2019, the government announced plans to introduce a State-Owned Enterprises Bill to impose proper corporate governance and address the risk inefficient SOEs pose to the government’s financial health. The Embassy is unaware of efforts to advance this Bill in 2021. However, a suite of legislation passed in March 2021 aimed at improving the country’s fiscal governance may also improve the performance and accountability of SOEs. Within the past decade, no SOE has returned profits or paid dividends, although SOEs account for significant government expenditure with approximately $419 million budgeted for fiscal year 2021-2022. The government has maintained SOE reforms are integral to its fiscal consolidation plans and confirmed commitments to reduce subsidies by $100 million annually over the next four years. The savings from SOE reform are expected to assist with meeting additional debt servicing obligations. The government has permitted foreign investment in sectors where SOEs operate and has approved licenses to private suppliers of electrical and water and sewerage services. These licenses have been issued for private real estate developments or where there is limited government capacity to provide services. The city of Freeport on the island of Grand Bahama has its own licensing authority and maintains monopolies for the provision of electricity, water, and sanitation services. The government has not taken definitive steps to privatize SOEs but has proposed public-private partnerships as the preferred model going forward. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatization programs. The government divested 49 percent of the Bahamas Telecommunication Company in 2011 to U.S.-based Cable & Wireless Communications. The government also issued a second license for cellular services and retained 51 percent equity in the new company, Cable Bahamas/Aliv. In February 2019, the government entered a 25-year, $250 million lease agreement with UK-based Global Ports Holdings to redevelop the Nassau Cruise Port. In May 2021, the company announced it successfully raised over $130 million through its private bond offering. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Local and foreign companies operating in The Bahamas have progressively become more committed to the tenets of responsible business conduct (RBC). Local and foreign companies have led RBC-related initiatives, including educational programs directed at capacity building for specific industries, the maintenance of public spaces, financial and technical assistance to charitable organizations, and commitments to sustainability and environmental responsibility. There have been no high-profile or controversial instances of corporate violations of human or labor rights, but civil society remains active in bringing attention to social issues. The Bahamas has strong trade unions, and labor laws prohibit discrimination in employment based on race, creed, sex, marital status, political opinion, age, HIV status, or disability. The Bahamas does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise. The country is already suffering the effects of climate change with rising water levels and more intense storms, including hurricane Dorian in 2019, from which the islands of Grand Bahama and Abaco are still recovering. In 2016, The Bahamas ratified the Paris Agreement and established its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). The NDC commits the Bahamas to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2030, conditional upon international support. The government remains dedicated to meeting this goal. The Prime Minister led a large delegation to COP26 and has prioritized climate change action. The Ministry of the Environment is developing a national climate change strategy. The Embassy is not aware of any regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes or specific public procurement policies that include environmental or green growth considerations, such as resource efficiency, pollution abatement, or climate resilience. 9. Corruption The government’s laws to combat corruption by public officials have been inconsistently applied. The law provides criminal penalties for corruption, and the government generally implemented the law effectively when applied. However, there was limited enforcement of conflicts of interest related to government contracts and isolated reports of officials engaging in corrupt practices, including accepting small-scale “bribes of convenience.” The political system is plagued by reports of corruption, including allegations directing contracts to political supporters and providing favorable treatment to wealthy or politically connected individuals. In The Bahamas, bribery of a government official is a criminal act carrying a fine of up to $10,000, a prison term of up to four years, or both. The current administration has accused the former administration of inappropriate spending and misappropriation of millions of dollars, particularly during the state of emergency issued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Emergency Power (COVID-19) Regulations, passed in March 2020, granted widespread powers to the government during the state of the emergency. For example, the legislation allowed the government to bypass normal spending rules and procurement processes, although it did require the government to present Parliament with reports of contracts and pandemic-related funding within six weeks of the expiration of the state of emergency. Despite the state of emergency expiring and being extended several times throughout 2020 and 2021, the former administration failed to report. The Emergency Power Regulations expired for the final time without extension in October 2021. The new administration has called into question several contracts awarded to companies and individuals by the former administration under the Emergency Power Regulations and has ordered forensic audits of government ministries and agencies. Initial findings suggest significant misappropriation of funds. The former administration admitted it failed to report but denies allegations of corruption. The new administration also accused the former administration of $821 million in undisclosed liabilities and unfunded obligations identified in the former administration’s pre-election report. The former administration denies these allegations, explaining the reporting irregularities were due to differences in accounting methodologies. As of April 2022, no criminal charges have been filed against members of the former government for these corruption allegations. The current government pledged any decision to prosecute would be supported by independently collected and verified evidence. The Public Disclosure Act requires senior public officials, including senators and members of Parliament, to declare their assets, income, and liabilities annually. For the 2021 deadline, the government gave extensions to all who were late to comply. The government did not publish a summary of the individual declarations, and there was no independent verification of the information submitted. The campaign finance system remains largely unregulated with few safeguards against quid pro quo donations, creating a vulnerability to corruption and foreign influence. In September 2021, the government enacted the Public Procurement Act (2021), which overhauls the administration of government contracts to improve transparency and accountability. Senior government officials have called for the legislation to be amended to reflect government capabilities and strengthened with new regulations. Though functional, most agencies with large procurement budgets do not utilize the existing e-procurement portal or registry. Senior Officials purport that the existing e-procurement portal requires modernization to improve functionality. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, The Bahamas ranked 30 out of 180 countries with a score of 64 out of 100. There are no specific protections for NGOs involved in investigating corruption. U.S firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI and have reported perceived corruption in government procurement and in the FDI approvals process. The government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. No charges of drug-related corruption were filed against government officials in 2021. The Bahamas ratified major international corruption instruments, including the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in 2000, and has been a party to the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) since 2001. The Bahamas is not party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: Royal Bahamas Police Force Anti- Corruption Unit P.O. Box N-458 (242) 322-4444 Email: info@rbpf.bs Watchdog organizations: Citizens for a Better Bahamas Transparency International (Bahamas Chapter) (242) 322-4195 Website: www.abetterbahamas.org Email: info@abetterbahamas.org Organization for Responsible Governance (ORG) Bay Street Business Center, Bethell Estates East Bay Street (at Deveaux St.) Website: www.orgbahamas.com Phone: 1-242-828-4459 Email: info@orgbahamas.com 10. Political and Security Environment The Bahamas has no history of politically motivated violence and, barring a few incidents leading up to general elections in 2021, the political process is violence-free and transparent. The 2021 incidents were minor and included damage to political party installations and billboards, social media harassment, and altercations between political party supporters. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The labor force is considered well-educated by international literacy and numeracy standards, and both skilled and unskilled labor is readily available. Although a formal Labor Force Survey has not been completed since December 2019 when the unemployment rate was 10.7 percent, government and international agencies estimate the 2021 unemployment rate at 20 to 25 percent due to the pandemic. The National Statistical Institute expects to complete the next Labor Force Survey in May 2022. Under normal conditions, wage rates are lower than in the United States but higher than most countries in the region. The minimum wage is $5.25 per hour ($210 per week), although the government is considering increasing the wage to $6.25 per hour ($250 per week). There are significant numbers of documented and undocumented foreign workers. There are 40,000 registered work permit holders in The Bahamas, and the majority are designated as unskilled or semi-skilled. This group is comprised primarily of Haitian nationals. The Bahamian government has granted special permission to several construction projects to bring in foreign workers. These concessions were negotiated as part of the Heads of Agreement for specific, large-scale investments. In most other cases, the employment of foreigners requires applying for individual work permits. Bahamian labor law governs all workers, both foreign and domestic. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week, paid annual vacations, and employer contributions to National Insurance (Social Security). The Act also requires overtime pay (time and a half) for working more than 40 hours a week or on public holidays. A 1988 law provides for maternity leave and the right to re-employment after childbirth. The Minimum Labor Standards Act, the Employment Act, Health and Safety at Work Act, Industrial Tribunal and Trade Disputes Act, and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act were passed in 2001 and early 2002. Foreign workers also have the right to social security benefits after five consecutive years of contributions. Bahamian law grants labor unions the right to free assembly and association and to bargain collectively. The unions and associations exercise these rights extensively, particularly in state-owned industries. The Industrial Relations Act governs the right to strike, which requires a simple majority of union members to vote in its favor. The Ministry of Labor oversees strike votes and manages overall industrial relations. Industrial unrest occurred throughout 2021 due to the effects of the pandemic and longstanding issues such as outstanding industrial agreements and delayed promotions. Demonstrations were organized by the Bahamas Public Services Union, the Union of Public Officers, the Nurses Union, the Doctors Union, the Consultant Physicians Staff Association, the Bahamas Educators and Managerial Union, Customs, Immigration and Allied Workers Union, the Union of Tertiary Educators, and the Union of Teachers. In 2016, the government amended legislation to require employers to inform the Minister of Labor in instances where more than ten people were being laid off. The Bahamas ratified most International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions and domestic law recognizes international labor rights. The Department of Labor’s Inspection Section has been strengthened to investigate occupational safety and health issues, including both on request and random inspections. The country is committed to eliminating the worst forms of child labor, and the Ministry of Labor has periodically inspected grocery stores and other establishments where child labor in commonplace to ensure the enforcement of laws governing child labor. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2019 13,164 2019 21,433,000 https://data.worldbank.org/country/bahamas Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 46,061 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 1,944 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/w orld-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political-Economic Section U.S. Embassy Nassau New Providence, The Bahamas P.O. Box N-8197 Telephone: (242) 322-1181 Email: NassauCommercialDL@state.gov The Gambia Executive Summary Located in West Africa, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa with a population of roughly 2.25 million people. The Gambia has an active private sector, and the government has announced its support for encouraging local investment and attracting foreign direct investment. The government’s Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency is dedicated to attracting foreign investment and promoting exports and it provides guidelines and incentives to all investors whose portfolios qualify for a Special Investment Certificate. The Gambia has a small economy that relies primarily on agriculture, tourism, and remittances for support. The Gambia remains heavily dependent on the agriculture sector, with 75 percent of the population dependent on crops and livestock for their livelihoods. However, recent economic growth has been mainly driven by the services sector, including financial services, telecommunication, and construction. The country also has a long trading history and is a party to several trade agreements, which have the potential to make it an attractive production platform for the region and beyond. The Gambia’s largest trade partner is Cote D’Ivoire, a fellow ECOWAS member, from which The Gambia imports the majority of its fuel products. Other major trade partners include China and Europe. The Gambia is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic union of 15 countries located in West Africa. With its young and rapidly growing population, Gambia provides a market with numerous opportunities for the sale of international products and services. Many Gambians have strong personal or professional ties to the United States, as well as a strong affinity for American brands. With a continued interest in new American brands, many Gambians have opened shops strictly selling American products. The quality and durability of American products are highly regarded. English is the official language and the business language. Local languages are also spoken by Gambians, and many of them are multilingual. Registered property rights are crucial to support investment, productivity, and growth; however, the absence of a land policy means disputes over land are a major problem in The Gambia. Occasional disagreements occur in rural areas, mainly the West Coast Region, over land ownership or succession. Most conflicts result when community leaders sell a plot of land to multiple buyers. The Lands Office record-keeping system is manual and poor. Frequent power outages, high data tariffs, and interruptions in internet services hinder businesses’ operational efficiency. Telecommunication operating costs remain high, and service is slow and subject to blackouts due to constant maintenance. In addition, the road system is heavily trafficked and can become impassable during the rainy season due to lack of drainage. The Gambia lacks the energy infrastructure necessary to support advanced commercial activities. In December 2021, President Adama Barrow from the National People’s Party was re-elected for a second term five-year term. During his inaugural speech, Barrow pledged to jumpstart the economy and ensure broad-based development gains. In January 2021, the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources launched the development process of Gambia’s Long-Term Climate Change Strategy (LTS), which aims to help in the full integration of climate into the country’s policies and strategies, better supporting the needs, priorities, and adaptive capacities of communities most affected by climate change. The plan, Vision 2050, has four strategic priorities and was intended to be released in late 2021, but is still in the works. Domestic Economy Developments The 2021 fiscal year was a challenging one for the Gambian economy, but it was an improvement from 2020. The economy was expected to grow by 3.2 percent in 2021 in comparison to the -0.2 percent growth rate recorded in 2020. The improved growth rate is attributed to a rebound in the economy, especially in the service sector. In 2021, the agricultural sector was expected to increase at a rate of 4.5 percent, a considerable decrease from the previous year’s 11.7 percent. Due to late rains resulting to an estimated decline in all agricultural sub-components except for livestock, which has an estimated growth rate of 4.2 percent in 2021. In essence, rain dependent agriculture continues to make the sector highly vulnerable to climate change. The industry sector was predicted to register the same growth rate of 9.9 percent in 2021 as it did in 2020. This is due to the lingering impact of the pandemic on construction especially the new road expansion project funded by Organization for Islamic Countries. Mining, quarrying, electricity, water, and construction sub-sectors are all projected to register a decline in 2021. Manufacturing is the only sub-sector projected to record an improved growth rate from -21.2 percent in 2020 to -1.7 percent in 2021. The Service sector, which remains the largest contributor to GDP, was estimated to register a growth from -7.2 percent in 2020 to 0.2 percent in 2021. The growth in the sector is mainly driven by modest performance in most of its sub-components such as wholesale and retail trade; information and communication; financial and insurance activities; professional and technical activities; and education, all of which are all projected to grow by less than 10 percent over the review period. Economy and Impact of COVID-19 Prior to outbreak of the pandemic, The Gambia had shown strong macroeconomic performance in the few years following the remarkable political transition in 2016-17. Economic growth accelerated, debt vulnerabilities decreased, external stability strengthened, structural and legislative reforms progressed, and key social indicators improved. However, the COVID-19 pandemic halted some of the hard-won progress, slowing economic activity and re-igniting extreme poverty. The Gambia experienced a third wave of the pandemic in mid-2021, which has receded. The COVID-19 vaccination rate currently stands at about 12 percent of the target population. The first quarter of 2021 looked promising, thanks to a huge vaccination campaign and a dramatic drop in the number of cases and fatalities by the virus. However, the recent emergence of new strains, especially the omicron variant, has dampened this prospect. The economy took a hit due to the closure of businesses and schools, and a slowdown in tourism activities in 2020. The Gambia had projected the start of economic recovery in 2021, as economic activity began showing early signs of recovery from the pandemic-induced contraction registered in 2020. The Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education reported COVID-19 related school closures affected about 674,300 students from Early Childhood Development to senior secondary schools in 2020. While most schools have since reopened, school closures resulted in many dropouts—highest among girls—and learning losses, which will likely have long-term detrimental economic and societal consequences. Limited digital infrastructure further hampered online learning. Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs), which form the backbone of the Gambian economy by employing 60 percent of the active labor force and contributing approximately 20 percent to GDP, were particularly hard hit during the COVID crisis. The survival of MSMEs is crucial for mitigating the negative impact of COVID-19 on the economy and to sustain employment and create the conditions needed for future growth once the pandemic is over. Recovery efforts may provide an opportunity to “rebuild better” by prioritizing sustainability, resilience, and inclusiveness. The World Bank indicated the key to The Gambia’s post-COVID economic strategy will require the creation of a skilled labor force that is more productive and better able to adopt and adapt to new technologies. This includes infrastructure improvements to increase productivity and create jobs. Inclusive and sustained economic growth remains one of the main objectives of the Government of The Gambia (GoTG), and the medium-term policy priorities will be anchored on achieving and sustaining a more diversified growth to improve the living standards of all citizens, in addition to creating a favorable environment for the private sector to thrive. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A http://www.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $750 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoTG encourages foreign investment and has made increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) a priority. It also recognizes the importance of creating an environment that allows the private sector to be the engine of growth, transformation, and job creation. FDI is welcomed in almost every sector of the Gambian economy. There is no restriction on ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign companies can invest in Gambia without facing systemic discrimination in favor of local companies. Excessive and inconsistently applied bureaucratic procedures, decision-making process for public tenders, and contracts are all common complaints. The Gambia Investment & Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) is the national agency established responsible for the promotion and facilitation of private sector investments into The Gambia. Through the GIEPA, eight areas are also identified as “priority sectors” which attract a Special Investment Certificate (SIC) that provides several incentives, including duty waivers and tax holidays. The Investment Section at Office of The President plans to start handling foreign direct investment matters. To maintain dialogue with investors, The Gambia Competitiveness Improvement Forum was created as part of the 2015 GIEPA Act, which hosts sector-based forums to maintain dialogue with investors. GIEPA normally hosts forums at which investors comment on the government’s policies and action. In 2021, GIEPA launched a new National Export Strategy for 2021-2025 which will focus on supporting The Gambia’s export-ready and export-potential firms to enter the regional and global value chains, particularly in value addition, horticulture and agro-processing, groundnuts, cashew, fisheries, light manufacturing, and hospitality or services – particularly tourism – to bring further benefits to the country. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to own business enterprises and engage in in all forms of remunerative activities in The Gambia. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control of businesses except in the operations of defense industries, which are closed to all private sector participation, irrespective of nationality. Apart from Defense related activities, there are no sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements were legally applied to foreign ownership and control. Foreign investors are not denied national treatment (i.e. the same treatment as domestic firms) or Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (i.e. the same treatment as the most favored foreign investor) in any sector. There is no mandatory screening of foreign direct investment, but such screening may be conducted if there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing. Investors subjected to such a screening may be asked for business registration documents and bank statements. As part of the country’s privatization program, foreign investors are treated equal to local investors. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a Trade Policy Review (TPR) in January 2018. The Gambia has maintained its generally open trade and investment regime since the last TPR in 2010. The main trade policy reform has been the adoption of the five-band ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) from 1 January 2017. An executive summary of the findings can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp465_e.htm . The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an Investment Policy Review (IPR) in 2017. The review shows The Gambia has adopted an open regime for investment and a range of modern business regulation tools. However, supply-side constraints, vulnerability to exogenous shocks and remaining regulatory and institutional bottlenecks have negatively affected the development of the private sector and the country’s performance in attracting FDI. The report can be downloaded at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-gambia . The Ministry of Justice, which offers a range of administrative services to foreign investors, is the point of entry for company registration. The government has drastically reduced the average number of days it takes to start a business in recent years. In the past it would usually take 25 days to start a business, but this has been decreased to a few days. According to the 2020 Doing Business report, it takes six procedures and, on average, a few days to start a business in the country. These procedures include registering a unique company name, notarizing company status, obtaining a tax identification number (TIN), registering employees with the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation, registering with the Commercial Registry, and obtaining an operational license. While this can be done by anyone in theory, a local attorney who is familiar with the system can facilitate the process. In 2010, a Single Window Business Registration Desk was established at the Ministry of Justice. This initiative has reduced the number of days it takes to register a business in the country to one day. All projects that could have a negative impact on the environment require an Environmental Clearance issued by the National Environment Agency (NEA) using guidelines set out by the NEA as per the Environment Act 1994. Foreign investment in The Gambia is facilitated by the GIEPA and the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI). Their mandate includes export promotion and support for MSMEs’s development. Domestic investors have no limitations when it comes to investing abroad. Post has been working with the American Chamber of Commerce to expand its role in facilitating trade between The Gambia and the United States. 3. Legal Regime The GOTG uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis to establish “clear rules of the game.” The Gambia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Consumer Protection Act of 2007 mandates the Commission to advocate for competition in The Gambia; and to determine and impose penalties or appropriate remedies to ensure businesses comply with prohibited restrictive practices, and monitor compliance, among other things. The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCP) is a commercial watchdog that ensures the protection of consumers from unfair and misleading market practices and administers the prohibition of illegal business practices. Rule-making and regulatory authority exists with the President, his cabinet of Ministers, and the committee members under the National Assembly of The Gambia, and various government parastatals. The accounting, legal, and regulatory procedural systems of The Gambia are consistent with international norms. Draft bills or regulations are made available to the public for commenting through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. This practice is in line with the U.S. federal notice and comment procedures and applies to investment laws and regulations in The Gambia. There are no informal regulatory processes that are managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. There is no formal stock market such as a stock exchange for trading equity securities. The accounting, legal, and regulatory procedural systems of The Gambia are consistent with international norms. Draft bills or regulations are made available to the public for commenting through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. A contract was concluded with LexisNexis in 2009 for the publication of the entire country’s legislation; however, access is not free of charge. The National Assembly is also in the process of compiling all regulatory actions on its website. No centralized online location exists where key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. The Gambia also lacks a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. There are no informal regulatory processes that are managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. There are two types of courts in The Gambia: the Superior Courts and the Magistrates Court. The Cadi Court and District Tribunals and such lower courts and tribunals may be established by an act of the National Assembly. The judicial power of The Gambia is vested in the courts, which exercise this power according to the respective jurisdictions conferred by an act of the National Assembly. No new regulatory system reforms have been announced since the previous Investment Climate Statement report, but regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years are being implemented. The Investment Policy Plan of The Gambia is still in draft stages. Proposed laws and regulations are made available to all the relevant stakeholders for their review and discussion at validation workshops. During the process of enactment in the National Assembly, deputies are free to suggest changes. Regulations are not reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. There are no known scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted on the impact of regulations made publicly available for comment, but there is a public agency, The Gambia Bureau of Statistics, that does develop data based on enacted legislation. Public comments received by regulators are not made public. Only limited information on debt obligation is made available. Documents lack complete information on natural resource revenues as well as financial earnings from state-owned enterprises. The Gambia is a member of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and as such, is signatory to the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, which harmonizes investment rules. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) first introduced competition legislation in 2008, including a prohibition on anticompetitive mergers. The Gambia has its own regulatory system, designed from collaboration with stakeholders from the international community of NGOs, but international norms or standards referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory system are often based on the UK system of regulations. The international norms and standards of the United Kingdom are referenced and incorporated into The Gambia’s regulatory system. The Gambia is a member of the WTO. The government does not notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. However, draft technical regulations are available to relevant stakeholders like the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), if requested. The country’s legal system is based on English common law and there are effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. The Gambia has a written and consistently applied commercial law, which is found in the Companies Act. Monetary judgments can be made in both the investor’s currency and local currency. The Gambia does not have a written commercial and/or contractual law as its legal system is based on Common Law. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and although the courts are not totally free from influence of the executive branch, they have demonstrated their independence on occasion. The Supreme Court, presided over by a chief justice, has both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Appeals against decisions of district tribunals (or the industrial tribunal in the case of labor disputes) may be lodged with the lower courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court, which is the highest court of appeal in the country. The investment laws and regulations of The Gambia apply equally to local and foreign investors. These include unclear provisions of some of the laws related to investment, such as competition, labor and corruption, and, in some instances, regulations do not exist to implement the laws effectively. For information on the laws, rules, procedures, and reporting required, foreign investors can visit the website of GIEPA (http://www.giepa.gm/). The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) (https://gcc.gm/) is the body primarily responsible for the promotion of competition and the protection of consumers mandated by three acts, namely: The Competition Act 2007, The Consumer Protection Act 2014, and The Essential Commodities Act 2015. No major investment-related laws, regulations, or judicial decisions came out within the past year. The GCCPC’s 3rd Strategic Plan (2019 to 2021) covers enforcement and promotion of the Competition Act 2007, administration and promotion of the Consumer Protection Act 2014, advocacy and awareness creation and empowerment, mobilization and optimal utilization of resources, and infrastructure and human capital development. GCCPC is a commercial watchdog that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns and ensures the protection of consumers from unfair and misleading market practices and administers the prohibition of illegal business practices. The Constitution of The Gambia provides the legal framework for the protection of private ownership of property and only provides for compulsory acquisition by the state if this is found to be necessary for defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town, and country planning. During President Jammeh’s 22 years in office, state paramilitary officials were known to arrive unannounced on private property and tear down any standing structures on the property in question. Claimants alleged a lack of due process and compensation stemming from these incidents under President Jammeh. Bankruptcy is covered by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of 1992. Creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts may file for both liquidation and reorganization. 4. Industrial Policies With a minimum investment threshold of US$100,000 and US$250,000, the following incentives are offered to domestic investors and foreign investors respectively: Tax Holiday: A newly established investment enterprise that falls within any priority investment category is granted a tax holiday with respect to its corporate or turnover tax and depreciation allowance. Tariff and Import Value-Added Tax (VAT) Incentives: A newly established investment enterprise that falls within any priority investment category is granted an import VAT waiver on imported specific goods as per the agreed list of items. Export Promotion Incentives: An investment enterprise located outside the export processing zone that exports at least 30 percent of its output is entitled to the following: 10 percent corporate or turnover tax concession for 5 years. Financial planning services and advice. Participation in training courses, seminars, and workshops. Export market research. Advertisement and publicity campaigns in foreign markets. Product design and consultancy Zone Investor Incentives: An investor operating in an Export Processing Zone and exports at least 80 percent of its outputs is exempt from payment of numerous duties and taxes, including import VAT waiver on imported goods/items, excise duty, import duty on capital equipment, corporate or turnover tax, municipal tax, and depreciation allocation. SME Support: SMEs are entitled to the following facilities: Support for research and development. Income tax deposit waiver. Matching grants. Market survey and research support. The Government currently does not offer any incentives for clean energy investments. The GIEPA Act provides for Export Processing Zones (EPZ) to be established in separate selected areas to which special customs territory status shall be conferred as well as for the establishment of single factory EPZs for which GIEPA will be the regulator. An investor operating within an export processing zone that exports at least eighty percent of its output is exempted from the payment of: Import or excise duty and sales tax on goods produced within or imported into an export processing zone unless the goods are entered for consumption into the customs territory. Import duty on capital equipment. Corporate or turnover tax Municipal tax. An investment enterprise located outside an export-processing zone that exports at least thirty percent of its output is entitled to the following incentives: A 10 percent corporate or turnover tax concession for five years. Participation in training courses, symposia, seminars, and workshops on export promotion. Financial planning services and advice. Export market research. Advertisement and publicity campaigns in foreign markets Product design and consultancy. Incentives for investors in the EPZ are valid for a maximum period of ten years. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as local companies. In 2020, the first phase in construction of the GIETAF Special Economic Zone began. The GIETAF is a 160-hectare mixed-use business park being developed through a public private partnership between the Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) and TAF Africa Global Limited (TAF). GIETAF incentives will include: A Tax Holiday in respect of income tax including corporate or turnover tax. An annual allowance at the rate of 15 percent for depreciation of buildings including structural improvements. Exemption from import duty in respect of capital goods in accordance with the Customs and Excise Act, 2010. Exemption from import value-added tax. Additional deduction from taxable income of 50 percent of training, research, and product development costs. Foreign ownership of investments. The government mandates local employment. There is no legislation that applies this scheme to senior management and boards of directors. Foreigners can only represent up to 20 percent of the total number of employees of a company, with no distinction between management personnel and workers. It is not difficult to obtain visas, residence, and work permits or other requirements inhibiting the mobility of foreign investors and their employees. The recruitment of foreigners is subject to annually renewed applications and payment of an expatriate quota tax, which varies for West African and non-West African employees. The Government of The Gambia restricts the ability of foreigners to invest in The Gambia to the extent that the GIEPA Act states that “a person shall not invest in or operate an investment enterprise which is prejudicial to national security, detrimental to the natural environment, public health, or public morality, or which contravenes the laws of The Gambia.” There is no known legislation in the investment policy of The Gambia that follows “forced localization” production methods. Additionally, no enforcement procedures exist for performance requirements. The Consumer Protection Act of 2014 prevents companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside The Gambia. There are no known laws that require foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption to the local government. As mandated by the Competition Act of 2007 and the Consumer Protection Act of 2014, the Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) is the agency responsible for the enforcement of rules on local data storage within the country and the economy. This organization also undertakes a critical review of the Competition Act; subsidiary legislation and the GCCPC guidelines; performs all in-house legal advisory work required in the execution of GCCPC’s functions and represents GCCPC in all court and appeal proceedings. The GCCPC Enforcement Committee provides the agency with all the legal and enforcement expertise necessary for it to fulfill its mission of championing competition for growth and choice. Specifically, the Legal Committee Division takes the lead in enforcement action and applies rigorous legal analysis in all investigations and notifications under the Competition Act. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests exist and are clearly protected under the laws of The Gambia. The Department of Lands and Regional Government issues title deeds, which are reliable. Property rights and interests, though clearly protected under the laws, were not enforced under the old regime. However, the new administration has vowed to uphold the laws going forward. Mortgages and liens exist but are largely unused. The Department of Lands and Regional Government issues title deeds which are reliable. There are specific regulations regarding land lease or acquisition by foreign and/or non-resident investors. In 2007, the Lands Commission Act was established by the Ministry of Lands and Regional Government. There are specific regulations regarding land lease or acquisition by foreign and/or non-resident investors. In 2007, the Ministry of Lands and Regional Government established the Lands Commission Act: Section 14 of the act provides for the following functions: “The Commission shall: (a) advise the Secretary of State on political matters relating to land administration to ensure strict adherence to those policies and transparency in land allocations. (b) investigate disputes on land ownership and occupation in any area in The Gambia. (c) assess land rent and premium for properties within any area in The Gambia. (d) monitor the registration of properties and inspect land registers and records. (e) be responsible for all matters relating to national boundaries, including monitoring and reporting to the Secretary of State; and (f) perform such other functions as the Secretary of State may assign. In 2013, the Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) was launched in The Gambia to assess the number of lands without clear title, but to date, the LGAF implementation has been practically non-existent. Legal owners normally allow squatters to occupy empty lands until they are ready to begin construction, at which time disputes often result in the squatters and “other owners” being evicted. The Gambia is a signatory to both the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. However, due to a lack of intellectual property rights (IPR) experts, the legal structure for IPR protection is largely weak. Thus, there has been a history of IPR infringement in The Gambia, and according to the Gambia Police Force (GPF), few IPR crimes have been reported. Cabinet approved the intellectual property policy 2018-2023 in 2019 and the implementation process is ongoing. The policy is basis for The Gambia acceding to all relevant international intellectual property agreements and the enactment of the intellectual property act 2020. The AfCFTA was also ratified by the National Assembly and has intellectual property components. The implementation process of The Gambia Intellectual Property (IP) Policy and Strategy 2018-2023, under the auspices of the Office of Registrar General, Ministry of Justice, is ongoing. The National Intellectual Property Council (NIPC) comprising of the key intellectual property stakeholders in The Gambia; namely, the Ministry of Justice, National Centre for Arts and Culture, Judiciary of The Gambia, Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency, Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology, Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, Gambia Technical Training Institute, Gambia Police Force, and the Gambia Armed Forces. is tasked with the implementation and monitoring of the five-year policy. The NIPC is supported by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) in this endeavor. The Gambia Police Force (GPF) established an Anti-Intellectual Property Crime Unit at the Police Headquarters in Banjul. The Gambia does keep track of seizures of counterfeit goods. However, there have been no recent reports of the government seizing counterfeit goods, despite the prevalence of counterfeit goods such as pirated movies, music CDs, toothpaste, and cigarettes imported from China. The Gambia does not prosecute IPR violations. The Gambia is not listed in the United States Trade Representative (USTR)’s Special 301 report, nor is it listed in the Notorious Market List. 6. Financial Sector Banks and policymakers alike would like to see the exposure ratio return to the long-run average over time, if the emergence of lending opportunities, both large-scale investment projects and retail credit, can be supported by the banks without compromising their financial soundness and overall financial stability. Gambian banks are trying to return to a more balanced portfolio structure in the medium run following the secular decline in private sector lending relative to investment in government securities. The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) staff contends that the decline in the ratio was delayed by foreign banks entering the local market with an aggressive lending strategy to capture market share. The country does not have its own stock market. Sufficient liquidity does not exist in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. There is no effective regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment, or policies to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the products and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors can get credit from the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Government respects the IMF Article obligations for member countries, including refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Currently, the total number of customers in The Gambia stands at 772,101 and only 14 percent use E-Banking. The Gambia currently has 80 branches and 208 point-of-sale (POS) terminals. The banking system has been resilient to shocks and this includes challenges posed by COVID-19. The total assets of the banking industry as of the end of December 2021 increased to $1.4 billion from D58.82 billion ($1.2 million) in 2020 due to increases in balances due from other banks, investments and loans and advances. The country’s asset quality improved, mirroring improvement in the non-performing loan ratio. The ratio decreased by 1.2 percentage points to 5.2 percent at the end of December 2021. The industry’s capital and reserves exposure to foreign exchange activities declined to a long position of 0.37 percent in December 2021 from a long position of 4.6 percent in the corresponding period a year ago. The Gambia’s gross loans amounted to $175 million. The banking system had been adequately capitalized, liquid and profitable with a capital adequacy ratio of 32.6 percent in December 2020, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets at 63.8 percent and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans at 6.82 percent. The two largest banks account for $513 million and 36.6 percent of the industry’s total assets. Most of the industry’s banks are foreign subsidiaries locally incorporated in The Gambia. However, no foreign branch operates in the country. Further to this, they are subject to prudential measures or regulations in line with the Central Bank’s Banking Act and guidelines. The country has a central bank system. Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in The Gambia. They are subject to the banking regulations of The Gambia. No correspondent banking relationships were lost in the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening a bank account. Finance companies dominate the non-bank financial sector with robust financial indicators for the period under review. Assets of FCs at end-December 2021 stood at D2.39 billion ($45 million) compared to D2.01 billion ($37 million) same period a year earlier. The increase in assets size was largely driven by gross loans, cash, and bank balances. Capital increased by 31.0 percent to D378.13 million ($7 million) in December 2021 surpassing the minimum requirement of D50.0 million ($932K). Mobile money financial services, similarly, grew in terms of customer base, but declined in terms of transactions. Year-on-year, the value of cash-in and cash-out transactions decreased by 20.8 and 20.7 while number of account holders surged by 93.8 percent. Neither the host government nor a government affiliate maintains a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Gambia has a majority ownership in 14 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that operate in key economic sectors. Seven of the SOEs are commercial and operate more independently from the government, while the others are public corporations or institutions, some providing regulatory functions. While the President appoints the chief executive officer (CEO), or Director General, and the full boards of most of the SOEs, the enterprises remain under the supervision of line ministries. such as agriculture, power generation, energy, and gas. SOEs can also be found in the information and telecommunications, aviation, and finance industries. SOE revenues are not projected in budget documents. Audits of the public sector and SOEs are conducted by the Gambia’s Supreme Audit Institution. The following is a list of 14 SOEs. Assets Management & Recovery Corporation (AMRC) Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GCC) Gambia International Airlines (GIA) Gambia National Petroleum Company (GNPC) Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) Gambia Postal Services (GAMPOSTS) Gambia Public Printing Cooperation (GPPC) Gambia Radio & Television Services (GRTS) Gambia Telecommunication Cellular Company (GAMCEL) Gambia Telecommunication Company (GAMTEL) National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC) Public Utility and Regulatory Authority Social Security Housing & Finance Corporation (SSHFC) The Gambia’s government imposed an embargo on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) borrowing from each other in June 2020, according to the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs during a National Assembly session. Based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 2018 between SSHFC and SOEs, SOEs defaulted in their payments to Social Security. Other SOEs include Gambia International Airline (GIA), Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), GAMCEL, and GAMTEL, with NAWEC being the largest defaulter. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. The Ministry of Finance website published the list of SOEs ( https://mofea.gm/soe ). The Public-Private Partnership Unit at the Ministry of Finance monitors the SOEs. By using the Public-Private Partnership Unit SOE Guidelines to form an integral part in organizing good practices among their state-owned enterprise sectors, promoting the implementation of the Guidelines in establishing their ownership practices, defining a framework for corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, and disseminating this Recommendation of the Guidelines among Ministries. Additionally, the GOTG is open to a review by the Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices and for follow-up on the implementation of the OECD Council on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises’ Recommendations. The Government of The Gambia is currently not engaged in any forms of privatization programs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The notion of corporate social responsibility is not well known in The Gambia and only some state-owned enterprises and some private companies, such as banks and mobile phone companies, adopt Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) as a policy. Gambian laws generally contain a provision that ensures social and environmental protection of its citizens, regardless of activity and its potential for income for the country. There have been no recent high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or the resolution of such cases in the past year. Currently, no national action plan on RBC has been enacted. Agencies that promote or enforce RBC include the Public Utilities Regulatory Agency (PURA), The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC), The Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA), The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI), the Standards Bureau, and the Gambia Revenue Authority. In 2015, the Director General of The Standards Bureau established the first Technical Committee (TC) on food which reviewed and adopted ten (10) standards on food and related matters in The Gambia. Any project with potential environmental impact is subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted by the National Environment Agency (NEA) before a license or permit is granted. These projects include hotels, roads, bridges, mining, large-scale agricultural projects, processing and manufacturing industries, fish processing, waste disposal, installation of electrical lines, etc. Despite its efforts to enforce domestic laws, the NEA is heavily underfunded and short of resources to implement adequate environmental protections. The Gambia has adopted several measures to support environmental protection and reduce the impact of environmental damage. According to the GIEPA Act, “The Government shall take all necessary measures to protect investments and the property of investors in accordance with the laws of The Gambia and the bilateral investment Treaties.” (Section 41). In most cases, the understanding of RBC is limited to the allocation of funds to charitable causes such as supporting schools and health projects, disaster relief, and environmental enhancement. However, the banks and mobile phone companies often use such donations for publicity and marketing reasons. The Gambian public often views these firms favorably. In most cases, the understanding of RBC is limited to the allocation of funds to charitable causes, such as supporting schools and health projects, disaster relief, and environmental enhancement. There are no reports or concerns relating to responsible business conduct in The Gambia of which foreign businesses should be aware. Foreign and local enterprises are encouraged to follow RBC principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Areas, where natural resources are extracted, are not subject to conflict; GOTG does not specifically promote the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. The Gambia does have a budding extractives industry, but GOTG does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standards or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. There are no domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to the government and/or of RBC/BHR policies or practices. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The government finalized “The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision” in 2021. The document lays out The Gambia’s aspiration “to be a climate-resilient, middle-income country through green economic growth supporting sustainable, low emissions development, contributing its fair share to global efforts to address climate change.” The climate plan calls for input from private sector entities. The government has also identified specific plots of land that are protected as nature preserves. The government pledged to control emissions to comply with the Paris Agreement in 2015. Since then, it has introduced policies favoring renewable energy, restoration of depleted agricultural land, and reforestation. The Gambia aims to reduce emissions by 2.7% by 2030 below business-as-usual (BAU) and, conditional on international financial support, aims for a target of 45.4% reduction by 2030. 9. Corruption There are laws in place to combat corruption by public officials in The Gambia. These laws are largely ineffective because the committees, which are commissioned to enforce them, are yet to be fully established. In cases when trials are conducted, they are conducted in a non-discriminatory manner. The anti-corruption laws of The Gambia extend to family members of officials and political parties alike. The anti-corruption laws of The Gambia contain laws or regulations that counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. The Gambian Government encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. The constitution of The Gambia calls for internal codes of conduct (Section 222), as do the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance to which The Gambia is a signatory. Private companies use internal controls and other programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Private companies use internal controls and other programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. The Gambia has signed and ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences but has not ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In May 2014, The Gambia ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. During former President Jammeh’s rule, the GOTG did not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. However, such protections are likely as part of the new administration’s pledge to act regarding the African Union convention on preventing and combatting corruption. At least one U.S. firm complained in 2016 of corruption as an obstacle to FDI. This complaint was reported in the water resource management sector and involved a commercial dispute between the GOTG and a U.S. firm. The firm has since indicated that the new administration is taking steps to resolve the matter. A growing number of Gambians say corruption is on the rise and the government is not doing enough to combat it, the latest Afrobarometer survey shows. Over the past three years, citizens’ perceptions of widespread corruption among public officials have increased significantly. A number of Gambians report having to pay bribes to obtain public services, and only half believe they can report corruption to the authorities without fear of retaliation (Source: https://afrobarometer.org/countries/gambia-1). An anti-corruption bill introduced in the National Assembly in December 2019 has yet to be passed, and the Gambia has no anti-corruption commission, despite being a signatory to numerous conventions, including the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked The Gambia 102nd, or more corrupt than 101 out of 179 countries. No international, regional, or local NGOs operating as “watchdog” organizations monitoring corruption are known to exist in the country. Nuha Sanyang Commanding Officer, Fraud & Commercial Crime Unit Gambia Police Force Police Headquarters, ECOWAS Avenue, Banjul, The Gambia (+220) 4223015 / 4222307 10. Political and Security Environment The Gambia was ruled for over two decades by former president Yahya Jammeh, who consistently violated political rights and civil liberties. The 2016 election resulted in a surprise victory for opposition candidate Adama Barrow. Fundamental freedoms including the rights to free assembly, association, and expression initially improved thereafter, but the progress toward the consolidation of the rule of law is slow. The Barrow government has faced increasing criticism over corruption. LGBT+ individuals face severe discrimination and violence against women remains a serious problem. In January, authorities forcefully dispersed a Banjul demonstration against President Barrow’s decision to remain in office beyond a three-year timetable. Authorities arrested 137 people, including high-ranking members of the Three Years Jotna (ThreeYears Is Enough) pressure group; the group was banned that month and eight members received charges including rioting, which remained pending at year’s end. In September, legislators rejected a draft constitution that would have introduced term limits for presidents. President Barrow imposed a COVID-19-related state of emergency in March 2020, which expired in September. Public assemblies were restricted in March and a curfew was instituted in August, though most restrictions were rescinded or loosened by year’s end. The authorities reported nearly 3,800 cases and 124 deaths to the World Health Organization at year’s end. 11. Labor Policies and Practices As of 2021, the total labor force in The Gambia stood at 768,986, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators. The total labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the International Labor Organization definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the unemployed. While national practices vary in the treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time workers, in general the labor force includes the armed forces, the unemployed and first-time job seekers, but excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal sector. In 2019, the labor force participation rate is 60.75 percent. The Gambia suffers from high unemployment and underemployment, compounded by a shortage of skilled workers and trained professionals. About 59 percent of the individuals in the labor force have no formal education. Many of the skilled workers in the construction and mechanical industries are foreigners from neighboring countries. However, many Gambians are now taking up these trades and the government has taken extraordinary steps to increase primary and secondary school enrollment. Several government policies require the hiring of nationals, including the Labor Act of 2007, the Payroll Tax Act of 2008, and the social security act. The Labor Act of 2007 and its regulations provide the legal framework for labor relations in The Gambia. The Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment enforces the act. It covers most conditions of employment, including dismissals, recruitment and hiring, registration and training, protection of wages, registration of trade unions and employees’ organizations, and industrial relations in general. The act also contains procedures for the settlement of disputes, including an industrial tribunal. Minimum wages and working hours are established through six joint industrial councils: commerce, artisans, transport, port operations, agriculture, and fisheries. Private-sector employees receive between 14 and 30 days of paid annual leave, depending on the length of service. No additional/different labor law provisions are imposed in special economic zones, foreign trade zones or free ports compared to the economy. No new labor related laws were enacted during the last year. Depending on how the person’s wage is paid, one- or two-months’ notice to quit or a week to two weeks’ notice is required (Section 55 of the Labor Act 2007). In Gambia, there is no unemployment insurance. Although laid-off workers are entitled to a portion of their social security contributions. In Gambia, collective bargaining is uncommon. Gambia has no organized trade unions, as a result, there is no data for the Gambia in the International Labor Organization’s statistics database (ILOSTAT) for Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) and Trade Union Density, despite the fact that the Gambia has ratified Convention 98. The Gambian Department of Labor (DOL) plans to hold a public awareness campaign about the importance of collective bargaining at the enterprise and sectoral levels. However, DOL is limited to carry out some of the tasks due to funding gap. The Department of Labor settles individual and collective conflicts by inviting parties to a tripartite meeting to conciliate or mediate with the goal of amicably settling the matter. If the matter is not resolved within a month, the DOL refers the dispute to the industrial tribunal for resolution (Sections 90, 91 & 92 of the Labor Act 2007). There were no strikes during the last year that posed an investment risk. There are no serious questions of compliance in law or practice with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors. The International Labor Organization reported potential gaps in law or practice with respect to international labor standards, including reporting on Gambia’s ratified Fundamental Conventions. Every three years, a report must be submitted on the implementation of these Conventions. The Department of Labor has reviewed all labor law legislation, which has been pending National Assembly approval for more than ten years. This documentation includes the labor bill, the trade union bill, the factory bill, and the compensation for injuries bill. The Labor Migration Strategy, Pre-departure Training Manual and ethical recruitment guidelines are all new developments. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) N/A N/A 2020 $1.87 billion https://data.worldbank.org /indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GM Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/Ax N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/ Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Daniel Capone Political and Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Banjul. P.M.B. 19. Banjul, The Gambia +220-438-1355 CaponeDM@state.gov Samuel J. Sarre Economic and Commercial Specialist U.S. Embassy Banjul, P.M.B. 19. Banjul, The Gambia +220-438-1325 SarreSJ@state.gov The Netherlands Executive Summary The Netherlands consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive industrialized economies. It offers an attractive business and investment climate and remains a welcoming location for business investment from the United States and elsewhere. Strengths of the Dutch economy include the Netherlands’ stable political and macroeconomic climate, a highly developed financial sector, strategic location, well-educated and productive labor force, and high-quality physical and communications infrastructure. Investors in the Netherlands take advantage of its highly competitive logistics, anchored by the largest seaport and fourth-largest airport in Europe. In telecommunications, the Netherlands has one of the highest levels of internet penetration in the European Union (EU) at 96 percent and hosts one of the largest data transport hubs in the world, the Amsterdam Internet Exchange. The Netherlands is among the largest recipients and sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world and one of the largest historical recipients of direct investment from the United States. This can be attributed to the Netherlands’ competitive economy, historically business-friendly tax climate, and many investment treaties containing investor protections. The Dutch economy has significant foreign direct investment in a wide range of sectors including logistics, information technology, and manufacturing. Dutch tax policy continues to evolve in response to EU attempts to harmonize tax policy across member states. Until the COVID-19 crisis, economic growth had placed the Dutch economy in a very healthy position, with successive years of a budget surplus, public debt that was well under 50 percent of GDP, and record-low unemployment of 3.5 percent. This allowed the Dutch government significant fiscal space to implement coronavirus relief measures. In response to COVID, the Dutch government implemented wide-ranging support for businesses affected by the COVID crisis, including support to cover employee wages, benefits to self-employed professions to bridge a loss of income, and compensation for fixed costs other than wages. The financial support measures added up to about $70.5 billion (€60 billion) in the first year of the crisis. These programs prevented a wave of bankruptcies – bankruptcy filings in 2020 and 2021 were the lowest in two decades. The new coalition government announced in early 2022 plans to be climate neutral by 2050. The government said it would adjust domestic climate goals to at least 55 percent CO2 reduction by 2030 compared to 1990, with ambitions to aim higher for a 60 percent reduction. The government has named a Minister for Climate and Energy Policy to work on domestic issues in addition to a Climate Envoy focused on international efforts. The Netherlands joined the U.S.-EU Global Methane Pledge and promised to end all investment in new coal power generation domestically and internationally. In April 2022, the government joined the AIM for Climate initiative. The 2019 National Climate Agreement contains policy and measures to achieve climate goals through agreements with various economic sectors on specific actions. The participating sectors include electricity, industry, “built environment,” traffic and transport, and agriculture. The Netherlands business community suffered a two-pronged loss in the planned departure of two of its major national corporate champions. Energy leader Shell and food and household products conglomerate Unilever announced in 2021 a relocation of their corporate headquarters from The Hague and Rotterdam, respectively, to London. The companies cited concerns with Dutch tax law relative to dividend taxation and need for consolidated management structure. (Note: Both companies previously split their corporate governance between the Netherlands and the UK. End Note.) In March 2022, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) published its 2022 economic projections. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the outlook was marked by uncertainty and flagged “even higher” energy prices as the most important economic consequence. Because of increased energy prices and high inflation from the COVID pandemic, CPB estimates a 5.2% inflation rate for 2022 with a range of 6.0% and 3.0% depending on how long energy prices remain high. CPB estimated economic growth of 3.6% in 2022 and 1.7% in 2023. CPB predicted unemployment at 4 percent in 2022, down from 4.2% in 2021. The low unemployment rate reflects a similar challenge also faced by the United States – businesses are finding it difficult to recruit qualified staff. Government debt is expected to rise to 61 percent of GDP by 2025 due to increased spending under the new coalition government, including on defense, outlays to support an aging population, and support to low-income families to offset inflation in energy and food prices. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), when measured by country of foreign parent, the Netherlands is the second largest destination for U.S. FDI abroad in 2020 after the UK, holding $844 billion out of a total of $6.1 trillion total outbound U.S. investment – about 14 percent. Investment from the Netherlands contributed $484 billion FDI to the United States, making it the fourth largest investor at the end of 2020 of about $4.6 trillion total inbound FDI to the United States– about 10.5 percent. Measured by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), the Netherlands was the seventh largest investor at $236 billion. For the Netherlands, outbound FDI to the United States represented 14 percent of all direct investment abroad. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 8 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation Index 2021 6 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysisindicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $844 million Bea: Netherlands – International Trade and Investment Country Facts World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 51,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment In 2020, the Netherlands was the 18th largest economy in the world and is the fifth largest economy in the European Union with a gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 of over $913 billion according to the World Bank. The Netherlands consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive industrialized economies in global rankings that measure competitiveness, innovation, and access to infrastructure. According to the OECD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2020 the Netherlands was the second largest source and recipient for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world, although the Netherlands is not the ultimate destination for the majority of this investment. Similarly, in its 2020 investment report, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identified the Netherlands as the world’s fourth largest destination of global FDI inflows and the third largest source of FDI outflows. The government of the Netherlands maintains liberal policies toward FDI, has established itself as a platform for third-country investment with some 145 investment agreements in force, and adheres to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Codes of Liberalization and Declaration on International Investment, including a National Treatment commitment and adherence to relevant guidelines. The Netherlands is the recipient of eight percent of all FDI inflow into the EU. The Netherlands has become a key export platform and pan-regional distribution hub for U.S. firms. Roughly 60 percent of total U.S. foreign-affiliate sales in the Netherlands are exports, with the bulk of them going to other EU members. The nearly 3,000 U.S. owned corporations represent more than 20% of all foreign owned firms in the Netherlands and they create more than 200,000 jobs. Foreign owned firms operate predominantly in business services, wholesale, and retail sectors. Although policy makers feared that Brexit would have an extremely negative impact on the Dutch economy, the Netherlands is benefitting from companies exiting the United Kingdom in search of an anchor location inside the EU Single Market. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) also relocated from London to Amsterdam. According to the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA), since the referendum in 2016, 316 companies have chosen to relocate to the Netherlands. The companies are mainly from the health, creative industry, financial services, and logistics sectors. The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) expects Amsterdam to emerge as a main post-Brexit financial trading center in Europe for automated trading platforms and other ‘fintech’ firms, as more of these companies cross the Channel to keep their European trading within the confines of the EU regulatory oversight. Dutch tax authorities provide a high degree of customer service to foreign investors, seeking to provide transparent, precise tax guidance that makes long-term tax obligations more predictable. Advance Tax Rulings (ATR) and Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) are guarantees given by local tax inspectors regarding long-term tax commitments for a particular acquisition or greenfield investment. Dutch tax policy continues to evolve as the EU seeks to harmonize tax measures across member states. A more detailed description of Dutch tax policy for foreign investors can be found at https://investinholland.com/why-invest/incentives-taxes/ . Dutch corporations and branches of foreign corporations are currently subject to a corporate tax rate of 25 percent on taxable profits, which puts the Netherlands in the middle third among EU countries’ corporate tax rates and below the tax rates of its larger neighbors. Corporate income tax rates in the Netherlands are currently 15% for the first €395,000 of taxable profits and 25.8% for taxable profits exceeding €395,000 in 2022. Dutch corporate taxation generally allows for exemption of dividends and capital gains derived from a foreign subsidiary. Surveys of the corporate tax structure of EU member states note that both the corporate tax rate and the effective corporate tax rate in the Netherlands are around the EU average. Nevertheless, the Dutch corporate tax structure ranks among the most competitive in Europe considering other beneficial measures such as the possibility for the tax authorities to provide corporations with clarity on future treatment of taxes via “advance” rulings and agreements such as ATR and/or APA. The Netherlands also has no branch profit tax and does not levy a withholding tax on interest and royalties. Maintaining an investment-friendly reputation is a high priority for the Dutch government, which provides public information and institutional assistance to prospective investors through the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) ( https://investinholland.com/ ). Historically, over a third of all “greenfield” FDI projects that NFIA attracts to the Netherlands originate from U.S. companies. Additionally, the Netherlands business gateway at https://business.gov.nl/ – maintained by the Dutch government – provides information on regulations, taxes, and investment incentives that apply to foreign investors in the Netherlands and clear guidance on establishing a business in the Netherlands. The NFIA maintains five regional offices in the United States (Washington, DC; Atlanta; Chicago; New York City; and San Francisco). The American Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands ( https://www.amcham.nl/ ) also promotes U.S. and Dutch business interests in the Netherlands. With few exceptions, the Netherlands does not discriminate between national and foreign individuals in the establishment and operation of private companies. The government has divested its complete ownership of many public utilities, but in a number of strategic sectors, private investment – including foreign investment – may be subject to limitations or conditions. These include transportation, energy, defense and security, finance, postal services, public broadcasting, and the media. Air transport is governed by EU regulation and subject to the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement. U.S. nationals can invest in Dutch/European carriers as long as the airline remains majority-owned by EU governments or nationals from EU member states. Additionally, the EU and its member states reserve the right to limit U.S. investment in the voting equity of an EU airline on a reciprocal basis that the United States allows for foreign nationals in U.S. carriers. The Netherlands has not recently undergone an investment policy review by the OECD, World Trade Organization (WTO), or UNCTAD. All companies must register with the Netherlands’ Chamber of Commerce and apply for a fiscal number with the tax administration, which allows expedited registration for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with fewer than 50 employees: https://www.kvk.nl/english/registration/foreign-company-registration/ The Netherlands business gateway at https://business.gov.nl/ – maintained by the Dutch government – provides a general checklist for starting a business in the Netherlands: https://business.gov.nl/starting-your-business/checklists-for-starting-a-business/how-to-start-a-business-in-the-netherlands-a-checklist/ . The Dutch American Friendship Treaty (DAFT) from 1956 gives U.S. citizens preferential treatment to operate a business in the Netherlands, providing ease of establishment that most other non-EU nationals do not enjoy. U.S. entrepreneurs applying under the DAFT do not need to satisfy a strict, points-based test and do not have to meet pre-conditions related to providing an innovative product. U.S. entrepreneurs setting up a sole proprietorship only have to register with the Chamber of Commerce and demonstrate a minimum investment of 4,500 euros. DAFT entrepreneurs receive a two-year residence permit, with the possibility of renewal for five subsequent years. In order to sustain the top ten ranking of the Netherlands among the world’s largest exporting nations, the Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs coordinates with the government and private sector trade promotion agencies in setting an annual ‘overseas trade mission’ agenda. The Netherlands Enterprise Agency (https://english.rvo.nl/) has the lead in organizing a custom-tailored and topical format of trade missions to accompany State visits and other official delegations abroad. Participation in these missions is open to any enterprise established in the Netherlands. 3. Legal Regime Dutch commercial laws and regulations accord with international legal practices and standards; they apply equally to foreign and Dutch companies. The rules on acquisition, mergers, takeovers, and reinvestment are nondiscriminatory. The Social Economic Council (SER)–an official advisory body consisting of employers’ representatives, labor representatives, and government appointed independent experts–administers Dutch mergers and acquisitions rules. The SER’s rules serve to protect the interests of stakeholders and employees. They include requirements for the timely announcement of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and for discussions with trade unions. As an EU member and Eurozone country, the Netherlands is firmly integrated in the European regulatory system, with national and European institutions exercising authority over specific markets, industries, consumer rights, and competition behavior of individual firms. Financial markets are regulated in an interconnected EU and national system of prudential and behavioral oversight. The domestic regulators are the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Market (AFM). Their EU counterparts are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The Dutch Civil Code requires boards’ statements of large companies to include non-financial performance indicators in their annual report. EU law is relevant in the Netherlands. Companies often voluntarily disclose ESG-related issues and refer to the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures recommendations on its website. Some sectors such as the pension sector have committed to the 2018 Covenant on International Socially Responsible Investing (IMVB). In December 2021, the Netherlands became the latest European government to announce plans to introduce mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) legislation at a national level should the EU continue to delay an introduction of mandatory HREDD legislation. Traditionally, public consultation in drafting new laws is achieved by invitation of various civil society bodies, trade associations, and organizations of stakeholders. In addition, the SER has a formal mandate to provide the government with advice, both solicited and of its own accord. Recently, the SER has provided the government with advice on emissions reduction of greenhouse gases, energy transition, and pension reforms. New laws and regulations are subject to legal review by the Council of State and must be approved by the Second and First Chambers of Parliament. The World Bank scores the Netherlands at 4.75 out of 5 on its Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance which assesses transparency around proposed regulations and access to enacted laws. All proposed regulations are published publicly including on a unified website and on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator. The Netherlands is a member of the WTO and does not maintain any measures that are inconsistent with obligations under Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). Dutch contract law is based on the principle of party autonomy and full freedom of contract. Signing parties are free to draft an agreement in any form and any language, based on the legal system of their choice. Dutch corporate law provides for a legal and fiscal framework that is designed to be flexible. This element of the investment climate makes the Netherlands especially attractive to foreign investors. The Dutch civil court system has a chamber dedicated to business disputes, called the Enterprise Chamber. The Enterprise Chamber includes judges who are experts in various commercial fields. They resolve a wide range of corporate disputes, from corporate governance disputes to high-profile shareholder conflicts over mergers or hostile take-overs. Since 2019, the Enterprise Chamber houses an English-language commercial court. The Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) and its appellate chamber (NCCA) offer parties the opportunity to litigate in English and will provide judgments in English. Both the NCC and NCCA will focus primarily on major international commercial cases. See also: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx The Dutch government has demonstrated a growing concern with the protection of its open, market-based economy against foreign state malign activity. The Netherlands is in the process of establishing a formal domestic investment screening mechanism as per EU directive. In May 2020, the long-awaited investment screening law in the telecommunications sector came into force. In December 2020, the law on establishing a framework for investment screening for all critical sectors came into force, aimed at protecting Dutch national security. In concert with the European Union, the Dutch government is considering how to best protect its economic security and also continue as one of the world’s most open economies. The Netherlands has foreign investment and procurement screening mechanisms in place for certain vital sectors that could present national security vulnerabilities. The first such laws (one on investment screening per EU directive and one on unwanted outside influence in the telecommunications sector) passed in 2020. The government is in the process of expanding screening measures to cover sensitive technologies more broadly, and a new law, which will apply retroactively from September 2020, is expected to be passed by Parliament in 2022. Among policymakers, foreign investment and procurement screening is considered a non-partisan issue with support across the political spectrum. There is no requirement for Dutch nationals to have an equity stake in a Dutch registered company. Structural and regulatory reforms are an integral part of Dutch economic policy. Laws are routinely developed for stimulating market forces, liberalization, deregulation, and tightening competition policy. As an EU and Eurozone member, the Netherlands is firmly integrated in the European regulatory system with national and European institutions exercising authority over specific markets, industries, consumer rights, and competition behavior of individual firms. The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) provides regulatory oversight in three key areas: consumer protection, post and telecommunications, and market competition. The Netherlands maintains strong protection on all types of property, including private and intellectual property rights, and the right of citizens to own and use property. Expropriation of corporate assets or the nationalization of industry requires a special act of Parliament, as demonstrated in the nationalization of ABN AMRO during the 2008 financial crisis (the government returned it to public shareholding through a 2016 IPO). In the event of expropriation, the Dutch government follows customary international law, providing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, as well as ample process for legal recourse. The U.S. Mission to the Netherlands is unaware of any recent expropriation claims involving the Dutch government and a U.S. or other foreign-owned company. Dutch bankruptcy law is governed by the Dutch Bankruptcy Code, which applies both to individuals and to companies. The code covers three separate legal proceedings: 1) bankruptcy, which has a goal of liquidating the company’s assets; 2) receivership, aimed at reaching an agreement between the creditors and the company; and 3) debt restructuring, which is only available to individuals. 4. Industrial Policies General requirements to qualify for investment subsidy schemes apply equally to domestic and foreign investors. Industry-specific, targeted investment incentives have long been a tool of Dutch economic policy to facilitate economic restructuring and to promote economic priorities. Such subsidies and incentives are spelled out in detailed regulations. Subsidies are in the form of tax credits disbursed through corporate tax rebates or direct cash payments if there is no tax liability. For an overview of government subsidies and investment programs, see: http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes. FDI tends to be concentrated in growth sectors including information and communications technology (ICT), biotechnology, medical technology, electronic components, and machinery and equipment. Investment projects are predominantly in value-added logistics, machinery and equipment, and food. Since 2010, the government shifted from traditional industrial support policies to a comprehensive approach to public/private financing agreements in areas where investment is deemed of strategic value. Government, academia, and industry work together to determine recipient sectors for co-financed (public and private) R&D. The government’s industrial policy focuses on nine “Top Sectors”: creative industries, logistics, horticulture, agriculture and food, life sciences, energy, water, chemical industry, and high tech. (For more information, see https://www.government.nl/topics/enterprise-and-innovation/contents/encouraging-innovation.) The Netherlands has no free trade zones (FTZs) or free ports where commodities can be processed or reprocessed tax-free. However, FTZs exist for bonded storage, cargo consolidation, and reconfiguration of non-EU goods. This reflects the key role that transport, transit, logistics, and distribution play in the Dutch economy. Dutch Customs oversee a large number of customs warehouses, free warehouses, and free zones along many of the Netherlands’ trade routes and entry points. Schiphol Airport handles around 1.7 million tons of goods per year for distribution, making it the third largest cargo airport in Europe. In 2021, a relaxation of COVID-19 measures and rebound in global trade activity combined to boost air freight volumes in cargo operations. Specific parts of Schiphol are designated customs-free zones. The Port of Rotterdam is Europe’s largest seaport by volume, handling over 37 percent of all cargo shipping on Europe’s Le Havre-Hamburg coastline and processing nearly 470 million tons of goods and handling a record 15.3 million twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) containers in 2021. Port of Rotterdam’s throughput in 2021 matched the pre-pandemic level of 2019 and rose by over seven percent compared with 2020. Many agents operate customs warehouses under varying customs regimes on the premises of the Port of Rotterdam. There are no trade-related investment performance requirements in the Netherlands and no requirements for employment of local capital or managerial personnel. The Dutch government does not follow a “forced localization” policy and does not require foreign information technology (IT) providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. The Dutch Data Protection Authority (DPA) monitors and enforces Dutch legislation on the protection of personal data (https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en). The Dutch DPA is active in the EU’s Article 29 Working Party, the collective of EU national DPAs. The primary law on protection of personal data in the Netherlands is the Dutch law implementing EU directive 95/46/EC. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is directly applicable in member states, entered into force May 25, 2018, as part of the EU’s comprehensive reform on data protection. The Dutch DPA recognized U.S. firms that registered and self-certified with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor program that began in 2000 and focused on safe transfer of personal data between the European Union and the United States. On July 12, 2016, the European Commission issued an adequacy decision on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework which replaced the Safe Harbor program, providing a legal mechanism for companies to transfer personal data from the EU to the United States. Although the Dutch government strongly supported Privacy Shield, a 2020 verdict of the European Court of Justice declared the Privacy Shield framework inadequate for the protection of personal data as it found that U.S. intelligences services have overly broad powers of access. In March 2022, the United States and European Union announced a political agreement, following over a year of negotiations, on a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework to replace the invalidated Privacy Shield instrument. The new framework will enter into force through a series of legal adoptions within the EU and an Executive Order in the United States. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Netherlands fully complies with international standards on protection of real property. The number of procedures involved is at the OECD average, while the processing time of 2.5 days is nearly ten times faster than the OECD average. The Netherlands’ Cadaster, Land Registry, and Mapping Agency (Cadaster) was established in 1832 to collect and register administrative and spatial data on real property. The Cadaster is publicly available and can be accessed online (https://www.kadaster.com/). The Netherlands is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The Netherlands generally conforms to accepted international practice for intellectual property rights (IPR), including the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Despite participating in negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty, the Netherlands, like other EU member states, has stated it will not sign the treaty in its current form. The EU has requested the European Court of Justice to advise on the compatibility of ACTA with existing European treaties, in particular the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Netherlands is a signatory to the European Patent Convention and so is a contracting state of the European Patent Organization. In the Netherlands, patents for foreign investors are granted retroactively to the date of the original filing in the home country, provided the application is made through a Dutch patent lawyer within one year of the original filing date. Dutch patents are valid for 20 years, in line with EU regulations. Because the Netherlands and the United States are both party to the PCT, U.S. inventors may file for rights in the Netherlands using the PCT application. Legal procedures exist for compulsory licensing if the patent is inadequately used after a period of three years, but these procedures have rarely been invoked. With the implementation of EU Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of IPR, rights holders have a number of instruments at their disposal to enforce their rights in civil court. In addition to possible civil remedies, all IPR laws contain penal bylaws and reference to the Criminal Code. In 2012, the Dutch Parliament passed legislation that strengthened oversight and coordination of seven different collective institutions that oversee control, administration, and remuneration for commercial use of IPR. Policymakers agree on the need to raise public awareness of IPR rules and regulations and to strengthen enforcement. The Dutch government has recognized the need to protect IPR, and law enforcement personnel have worked with industry associations to find and seize pirated software. Current Dutch IPR legislation explicitly includes computer software under copyright statutes. The Netherlands has resisted criminalizing online copyright infringement for personal use, instead placing a surcharge on the sales of blank media, such as CDs, DVDs, and USB storage devices, to remunerate rights holders for the downloading of material from legal and illegal sources alike. The Netherlands is not included in the USTR Special 301 Report but is mentioned as hosting infringing websites in the 2021 Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=NL . Contact at American Embassy The Hague: Alex Mayer – Economic Officer John Adams Park 1 2244 BZ Wassenaar Telephone: +31 (0)70 310 2270 E-mail: MayerA@state.gov Country-Specific Resource: BREIN Foundation https://stichtingbrein.nl/ P.O. Box 133 2130 AC Hoofddorp The Netherlands Telephone: +31 (0)85 011 0150 American Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands: P.O. Box 15783 1001 NG Amsterdam Telephone: +31 (0)20 795 1840 Email: office@amcham.nl Local lawyers list: https://nl.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/?_ga=2.237170691.2093708730.1527074319-1722725267.1486978519 6. Financial Sector The Netherlands is home to the world’s oldest stock exchange – established four centuries ago – and Europe’s first options exchange, both located in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam financial exchanges are part of the Euronext group that operates stock exchanges and derivatives markets in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris. Dutch financial markets are fully developed and operate at market rates, facilitating the free flow of financial resources. The Netherlands is an international financial center for the foreign exchange market, Eurobonds, and bullion trade. The flexibility that foreign companies enjoy in conducting business in the Netherlands extends into the area of currency and foreign exchange. There are no restrictions on foreign investors’ access to sources of local finance. The Dutch banking sector is firmly embedded in the European System of Central Banks, of which the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) is the national prudential banking supervisor. AFM, the Dutch securities and exchange supervisor, supervises financial institutions and the proper functioning of financial markets and falls under the EU-wide European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The highly concentrated Dutch banking sector is over three times as large as the rest of the Dutch economy, making it one of Europe’s largest banking sectors in relation to GDP. Three banks, ING, ABN AMRO, and Rabobank, hold nearly 85 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The largest bank, ING, has a balance sheet of just over $1 trillion (€937 billion). The DNB does not consider Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies to be legitimate currency, as they do not fulfill the traditional purpose of money as a stable means of exchange or saving, and their value is not supported via central bank guarantee mechanisms. DNB considers current cryptocurrencies to be risky investments that are especially vulnerable to criminal abuse and has begun requiring that providers of financial services related to exchange and deposit of cryptocurrencies register with the DNB, per anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. The DNB acknowledges that, in the future, cash transactions will likely be replaced with digital transactions that require central bank-issued and -guaranteed cryptocurrencies. Dutch society has already embraced cash-less commerce to a high degree – seventy percent of over-the-counter shopping is via PIN transactions and contactless payment – and DNB is participating with central banks from Canada, Japan, England, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Bank for International Settlements in research about a possible central bank-issued cryptocurrency. The Netherlands has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Dutch government maintains an equity stake in a small number of enterprises and some ownership in companies that play an important role in strategic sectors. In particular, government-controlled entities retain dominant positions in gas and electricity distribution, rail transport, and the water management sector. The Netherlands has an extensive public broadcasting network, which generates its own income through advertising revenues but also receives government subsidies. For a complete list of government-owned entities, please see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/staatsdeelnemingen/vraag-en-antwoord/in-welke-ondernemingen-heeft-de-overheid-aandelen Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises with respect to market access, credits, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. Government-appointed supervisory boards oversee state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In some instances involving large investment decisions, SOEs must consult with the cabinet ministry that oversees them. As with any other firm in the Netherlands, SOEs must publish annual reports, and their financial accounts must be audited. The Netherlands fully adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. There are no ongoing privatization programs in the Netherlands. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The Netherlands is a global leader in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Principles of CSR are promoted and prescribed through a range of corporate, governmental, and international guidelines. In general, companies carefully guard their CSR reputation and consumers are increasingly opting for products and services that are produced in an ethical and sustainable manner. The Netherlands adheres to OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy houses the National Contact Point (NCP) that promotes OECD guidelines and helps mediate concerns that persons, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and enterprises may have regarding implementation by a specific company. For more information, visit http://www.oecdguidelines.nl. The Dutch government strongly encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which states that businesses have a social responsibility to respect the same human rights norms in other countries as they do in the Netherlands. Under the law, there is no differentiation for men and women regarding equal access to investment. Furthermore, no groups are excluded from participating in financial markets and the financial system. The Netherlands has strong standards for corporate governance. Publicly listed companies are required to publish audited financial reports. As of 2017, the EU requires these companies to include a chapter on Responsible Business Conduct. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy established an independent networking organization on CSR called MVONederland in 2004. MVONederland currently has over 2050 members, including SMEs, multinational corporations, and NGOs, as well as local and national administrative bodies. See https://www.mvonederland.nl/en/about-mvo-nederland/about-csr-corporate-sustainability-and-responsibility/ The Dutch government also encourages companies to engage in CSR through incentive programs and by setting high standards. Examples include: The government reviews CSR activities of more than 500 corporations annually and presents an award to the company with the highest transparency score. The government boosts the development of sustainable products through its own sustainable procurement policy. Dutch companies can only join government trade missions if they have endorsed OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Companies that observe the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are eligible for financial support for their international trade and investment activities. The government supports the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), which helps companies make their international production chains more sustainable. The government conducts sector-risk analyses to identify where problems are most likely to occur and target improvements. The government has completed nine of 13 sector-wide Responsible Business Conduct Agreements it intends to make with the private sector in the area of international CSR. The nine agreements cover garments and textiles, banking, pensions, insurance, food products, sustainable forestry, natural stone, metals, and gold. See https://www.government.nl/topics/responsible-business-conduct-rbc/responsible-business-conduct-rbc-agreements The government has national strategies for climate and natural capital. The Netherlands’ 2019 Climate Act sets legally binding targets to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 49 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and 95 percent by 2050. The 2019 National Climate Agreement contains the policy and measures to achieve these climate goals through agreements with various economic sectors on specific actions. In addition, a lower court ruling later upheld by the Supreme Court requires the government to reduce GHG emissions 25 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels. The case set an international precedent for climate-related legal action and argued that not addressing harmful climate change endangered the human rights of Dutch citizens. The 2017 Dutch Nature Conservation Act protects nature reserves as well as certain plants and animals. The government published in 2014 its strategy on managing the natural environment up to 2025 entitled “The Natural Way Forward: Government Vision 2014.” A central part of the strategy and legislation is the National Ecological Network, which is made up of existing and planned nature areas. The government commissions work on monitoring and accounting for biodiversity and ecosystem services from Statistics Netherlands and Wageningen university. The 2019 National Climate Agreement contains the policy and measures to achieve climate goals through agreements with various economic sectors on specific actions. The participating sectors include electricity, industry, “built environment,” traffic and transport, and agriculture. The government has designated 10 percent of the Netherlands land area as “Natura 2000” areas under the EU’s Habitats Directive. These areas are subject to ceilings on nitrogen depositions. Around 80 percent of Dutch legislation on the environment is derived from EU legislation. The National Environmental Management Act, which sets out how the environment is to be protected, is based on EU legislation and regulations. The government has published an extensive National Plan on Sustainable Public Procurement for 2021-2025 with seven lines of action to address environmental and social concerns. The 2021 National Trade Estimate of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) referred to some Dutch sustainability criteria that can bring about trade impediments: “The Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have developed standards for soybeans and wood pellets, respectively, that have been supported by the Dutch government and effectively require U.S. producers to meet onerous certification requirements. [… ] These criteria include a requirement for sustainability certification at the forest level, which effectively precludes reliance on the U.S. risk-based approach to sustainable forest management. As a result of the implementation of the criteria, wood pellet exports to the Netherlands have not kept pace with demand.” 9. Corruption The Netherlands fully complies with international standards on combating corruption. Transparency International ranked the Netherlands eighth in its 2020 Corruption Perception Index. Anti-bribery legislation to implement the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) entered into effect in 2001. The anti-bribery law reconciles the language of the ABC with the EU Fraud Directive and the Council of Europe Convention on Fraud. Under the law, it is a criminal offense if one obtains foreign contracts through corruption. At the national level, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and Ministry of Justice and Security have both taken steps to enhance regulations to combat bribery in the processes of public procurement and issuance of permits and subsidies. Most companies have internal controls and/or codes of conduct that prohibit bribery. Several agencies combat corruption. The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority serves as a knowledge center, develops new instruments for tracking problems, and identifies trends on matters of integrity. The Independent Commission for Integrity in Government is an appeals board for whistleblowers in government and law enforcement agencies. The Netherlands signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention and is party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Government agency that aids and protects whistleblowers is the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority or “Huis for Klokkenluiders.” The Whistleblowers Authority Act, which came into force in the Netherlands on July 1, 2016, underlies the establishment of the Whistleblowers Authority. An English version of the Act can be found at https://www.huisvoorklokkenluiders.nl/Publicaties/publicaties/2016/07/01/dutch-whistleblowers-act . Huis for Klokkenluiders Maliebaan 72 3581 CV Utrecht The Netherlands Website: https://www.huisvoorklokkenluiders.nl/english Telephone: +31 (0)88 – 133 1000 E-mail info@huisvoorklokkenluiders.nl The Dutch office of Transparency International is located in Amsterdam: Transparency International Nederland Offices at KIT: Royal Tropical Institute, room d-3 Mauritskade 64 1092 AD Amsterdam The Netherlands Website: https://www.transparency.nl/ Telephone: +31 (0)6 81 08 36 27E-mail: communicatie@transparency.nl 10. Political and Security Environment Although political violence rarely occurs in the highly stable and consensus-oriented Dutch society, public debate on issues such as immigration and integration policy has been contentious. While rare, there have been some politically and religiously inspired acts of violence. The Dutch economy derives much of its strength from a stable business climate that fosters partnerships among unions, business organizations, and the government. Strikes are rarely used as a way to resolve labor disputes. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Netherlands has a strongly regulated labor market (over 75 percent of labor contracts fall under some form of collective labor agreement) that comprises a well-educated and multilingual workforce. Labor/management relations in both the public and private sectors are generally good in a system that emphasizes the concept of social partnership between industry and labor. Although wage bargaining in the Netherlands is increasingly decentralized, there still exists a central bargaining apparatus where labor contract guidelines are established. The terms of collective labor agreements apply to all employees in a sector, not only union members. To avoid surprises, potential investors are advised to consult with local trade unions prior to making an investment decision to determine which, if any, labor contracts apply to workers in their business sector. Collective bargaining agreements negotiated in recent years have, by and large, been accepted without protest. Every company in the Netherlands with at least 50 workers is required by law to institute a Works Council (“Ondernemingsraad”), through which management must consult on a range of issues, including investment decisions, pension packages, and wage structures. The Social Economic Council has helpful programs on establishing employee participation that allow firms to comply with the law on Works Councils. See https://www.ser.nl/en/SER/About-the-SER/What-does-the-SER-do. The working population consists of 9 million persons. Workers are sought through government-operated labor exchanges, private employment firms, or direct hiring. At 50 percent, the Netherlands has the highest share of part-time workers in its workforce of all EU member states (in 2017, the EU average of part-time workers was 19 percent). A rise in female participation in the workforce led to a 37 percent increase in the share of part-time workers in the total working population. Three-quarters of women and one quarter of men work less than a 36-hour week. Labor market participation, especially by older workers, is growing, and the number of independent contractors is rapidly increasing. To ensure continued economic growth and address the impact of an aging population, increased labor market participation is critical. The age to qualify for a state pension (AOW) will increase from age 66 to 67 by 2024. Governmental labor market policies are targeted at increasing productivity of the labor force, including the expansion of working hours. For example, access to daycare is improving in order to raise the average number of hours per week worked by women (28 hours), which is 11 hours below the average of hours worked by men. Effective January 1, 2022, the minimum wage for employees older than 21 years is €1,725 ($1,850) per month. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $859,001 2020 $914,000 GDP (current US$) – Netherlands | Data (worldbank.org) Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $976,750 2020 $844,000 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $744,720 2020 $484,000 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 170% (excluding SFI) 2020 318% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB): GDP, Dutch Central Bank (DNB): FDI. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 4,512,447 100% Total Outward 5,876,798 100% United States 1,190,180 26% United Kingdom 801,255 14% Luxemburg 435,166 10% United States 792,311 13% United Kingdom 433,383 10% Switzerland 521,553 9% Germany 332,293 7% Germany 418,576 7% Switzerland 226,734 5% Luxembourg 330,020 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. 14. Contact for More Information Tracy Taylor Economic Unit Chief John Adams Part 1 2244 BZ Wassenaar Telephone: +31 (0)70 3102276 Email: TaylorTL1@state.gov The Philippines Executive Summary The Philippines remains committed to improving its overall investment climate and recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sovereign credit ratings remain at investment grade based on the country’s historically sound macroeconomic fundamentals, but one credit rating agency has updated its ratings with a negative outlook indicating a possible downgrade within the next year due to increasing public debt and inflationary pressures on the economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rebounded to USD 10.5 billion, up 54 percent from USD 6.8 billion in 2020 and surpassing the previous high of USD 10.3 billion in 2017, according to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Philippine Central Bank). While 2021 was a record year for inward FDI, since 2010 the Philippines has lagged behind regional peers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in attracting foreign investment. The Philippines ranked sixth out of ten ASEAN economies for total FDI inflows in 2020, and last among ASEAN-5 economies (which include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in cumulative FDI inflows from 2010-2020, according to World Bank data. The majority of FDI equity investments in 2021 targeted the manufacturing, energy, financial services, and real estate sectors. (https://www.bsp.gov.ph/SitePages/MediaAndResearch/MediaDisp.aspx?ItemId=6189) Poor infrastructure, high power costs, slow broadband connections, regulatory inconsistencies, and corruption are major disincentives to investment. The Philippines’ complex, slow, and sometimes corrupt judicial system inhibits the timely and fair resolution of commercial disputes. Traffic in major cities and congestion in the ports remain barriers to doing business. The Philippines made progress in addressing foreign ownership limitations that has constrained investment in many sectors, through legislation such as the amendments to the Public Services Act, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, and Foreign Investment Act, that were signed into law in 2022. Amendments to the Public Services Act open previously closed sectors of the economy to 100 percent foreign investment. The amended law maintains foreign ownership restrictions in six “public utilities:” (1) distribution of electricity, (2) transmission of electricity, (3) petroleum and petroleum products pipeline transmission systems, (4) water pipeline distribution systems, (5) seaports, and (6) public utility vehicles. The newly approved Retail Trade Liberalization Act aims to boost foreign direct investment in the retail sector by reducing the minimum per-store investment requirement for foreign-owned retail trade businesses from USD 830,000 to USD 200,000. It will also reduce the quantity of locally manufactured products foreign-owned stores are required to carry. The Foreign Investment Act will ease restrictions on foreigners practicing their professions in the Philippines and grant them access to investment areas that were previously reserved for Philippine nationals, particularly in the education, technology, and retail sectors. In addition, the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises (CREATE) Act signed in March 2021 reduced the corporate income tax from ASEAN’s highest rate of 30 percent to 25 percent for large firms, and 20 percent for small firms. The rate for large firms will be gradually lowered to 20 percent by 2025. CREATE could attract new business investment, although some foreign investors have concerns about the phase-out of their incentive benefits, which are replaced by the performance-based and time-bound nature of the incentives scheme adopted in the measure. While the Philippine bureaucracy can be slow and opaque in its processes, the business environment is notably better within the special economic zones, particularly those available for export businesses operated by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), known for its regulatory transparency, no red-tape policy, and one-stop shop services for investors. Finally, the Philippines’ infrastructure spending under the Duterte Administration’s “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure program is estimated to have exceeded USD100 billion over the 2017-2022 period. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 51 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 5,199 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD3,430 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Philippines seeks foreign investment to support economic recovery, generate employment, promote economic development, and contribute to inclusive and sustained growth in targeted areas. In 2021, the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises (CREATE) Act standardized the incentives regime across 14 investment promotion agencies (IPAs). With the reform, the Board of Investments (BOI) and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) continue to be the country’s lead IPAs. The BOI approves incentives for projects with an investment capital of USD 20 million and below; the interagency Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) approves incentives for projects beyond the USD 20 million investment capital threshold. Noteworthy advantages of the Philippine investment landscape include free trade zones, including economic zones, and a large, educated, English-speaking, and relatively low-cost Filipino workforce. Philippine law treats foreign investors the same as their domestic counterparts, except in sectors reserved for Filipinos by the Philippine Constitution and the Foreign Investment Act (see details under Limits on Foreign Control section). Additional information regarding investment policies and incentives are available on the BOI (http://boi.gov.ph) and PEZA (http://www.peza.gov.ph) websites. Restrictions on foreign ownership in some sectors, inadequate public investment in infrastructure, and lack of transparency in procurement tenders hinder foreign investment. The Philippines’ regulatory regime remains ambiguous in many sectors of the economy, and corruption is a significant problem. Large, family-owned conglomerates dominate the economic landscape, crowding out other smaller businesses. Foreigners are prohibited from fully owning land under the 1987 Constitution, although the 1993 Investors’ Lease Act allows foreign investors to lease a contiguous parcel of up to 1,000 hectares (2,471 acres) for a maximum of 75 years. Dual citizens are permitted to own land. The 2022 Foreign Investment Act (FIA) still requires the publishing every two years of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL), which outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted. The latest FINL was released in October 2018; an updated version of the FINL is currently under draft. The FINL bans foreign ownership/participation in the following investment activities: mass media (except recording and internet businesses); small-scale mining; private security agencies; utilization of marine resources; cockpits; manufacturing of firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices; manufacturing and distribution of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons; and manufacturing and distribution of anti-personnel mines. With the exception of the practices of law, radiologic and x-ray technology, and marine deck and marine engine officers, foreign professionals are allowed to practice in the Philippines if their country permits reciprocity for Philippine citizens. These professions include medicine, pharmacy, nursing, dentistry, accountancy, architecture, engineering, criminology, teaching, chemistry, environmental planning, geology, forestry, interior design, landscape architecture, and customs brokerage. In practice, however, language exams, onerous registration processes, and other barriers make it difficult for foreigners to practice in these fields. The Philippines limits foreign ownership to 40 percent in the manufacturing of explosives, firearms, and military hardware; private radio communication networks; natural resource exploration, development, and utilization (with exceptions); educational institutions (with some exceptions); operation and management of public utilities; operation of commercial deep sea fishing vessels; Philippine government procurement contracts (40 percent for supply of goods and commodities); contracts for the construction and repair of locally funded public works (with some exceptions); ownership of private land; and rice and corn production and processing (with some exceptions). Other areas that carry varying foreign ownership ceilings include the following: private employee recruitment firms (25 percent) and advertising agencies (30 percent). The amended FIA includes 100 percent foreign ownership for enterprises with a minimum paid-in capital of USD 100,000 involved in advanced technology (as determined by the Department of Science and Technology), endorsed as start-ups or start-up enablers (pursuant to the Innovative Startup Act), and where a majority of direct hires (but not less than 15 workers) are local talent. The FINL, however, is limited in scope since it cannot change prior laws related to foreign investments, such as Constitutional provisions which bar investment in mass media, utilities, and natural resource extraction. In the telecommunications sector, the Philippines’ existing regulations limit competition and create barriers to entry. Telecommunications services in the Philippines are classified as either “basic” or “enhanced” value added. Internet service providers as value-added service providers cannot build their own fiber network for commercial purpose and are required to connect to franchised telecommunication facilities for their service. Only companies with a legislative franchise and public telecommunication entities are allowed to build transmission and switching facilities, offer a local exchange service (landline), and operate inter-exchange service (backbone) and an international gateway facility. Amendments to the Retail Trade Liberalization Act lowered the minimum investment requirement for foreign retailers from USD 2.5 million to USD 500,000 and per-store investment requirement from USD 830,000 to USD 200,000. It also removed the USD 250,000 minimum investment for retailers of luxury goods. In effect, retail trade enterprises with capital of less than USD 500,000 are still reserved for Filipinos. The Philippines allows up to full foreign ownership of insurance adjustment, lending, financing, or investment companies; however, foreign investors are prohibited from owning stock in such enterprises, unless the investor’s home country affords the same reciprocal rights to Filipino investors. Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches or own up to 100 percent of the voting stock of locally incorporated subsidiaries if they can meet certain requirements. However, a foreign bank cannot open more than six branches in the Philippines. A minimum of 60 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking system should, at all times, remain controlled by majority Philippine-owned banks. Ownership caps apply to foreign non-bank investors, whose aggregate share should not exceed 40 percent of the total voting stock in a domestic commercial bank and 60 percent of the voting stock in a thrift/rural bank. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a Trade Policy Review of the Philippines in March 2018 and an Investment Policy Review of the Philippines in 2016, respectively. The reviews are available online at the WTO website (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp468_e.htm) and OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/daf/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-philippines-2016-9789264254510-en.htm). Business registration in the Philippines is cumbersome due to multiple agencies involved in the process. It takes an average of 33 days to start a business in Quezon City in Metro Manila, according to the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report. The Duterte Administration’s landmark law, Republic Act No. 11032 or the Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act of 2018 (better known as the “Ease of Doing Business Act”), sought to address the issues through the amendment of the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007 (https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2018/05/28/republic-act-no-11032/). The Ease of Doing Business Act legislates standardized deadlines for government transactions, a single business application form, a one-stop-shop to issue or renew permits and licenses, automation of business permits processing, a zero-contact policy, and a central business databank. Implementing rules and regulations for the Act were signed in 2019 (http://arta.gov.ph/pages/IRR.html). The law also created an Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA) under the Office of the President to oversee national policy on anti-red tape issues and implement reforms to improve competitiveness rankings. ARTA also monitors compliance of agencies and issues notices to erring and non-compliant government employees and officials. ARTA is governed by a council that includes the Secretaries of Trade and Industry, Finance, Interior and Local Governments, and Information and Communications Technology. The Department of Trade and Industry serves as interim Secretariat for ARTA. Since passage of the 2018 Ease of Doing Business Act, the Philippines jumped 29 notches in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranking to 95th, with the ARTA pushing for the full adoption of an online application system as an efficient alternative to on-site application procedures, issue online permits, and use e-signatures in the processing of government transactions. In the past year, ARTA has launched integrated business registration portals, a database of government services and service standards, and the country’s first Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) manual, in line with the Ease of Doing Business Act’s mandate for government agencies to undergo an RIA process before proposing new regulations. The Revised Corporation Code, a business-friendly amendment that encourages entrepreneurship, improves the ease of business and promotes good corporate governance. This new law amends part of the four-decade-old Corporation Code and allows for existing and future companies to hold a perpetual status of incorporation, compared to the previous 50-year term limit which required renewal. More importantly, the amendments allow for the formation of one-person corporations, providing more flexibility to conduct business; the old code required all incorporation to have at least five stockholders and provided less protection from liabilities. There are no restrictions on outward portfolio investments for Philippine residents, defined to include non-Filipino citizens who have been residing in the country for at least one year; foreign-controlled entities organized under Philippine laws; and branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates of foreign enterprises organized under foreign laws operating in the country. However, outward investments funded by foreign exchange purchases above USD 60 million, or its equivalent per investor per year, require prior notification to the Central Bank. 3. Legal Regime Proposed Philippine laws must undergo public comment and review. Government agencies are required to craft implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) through public consultation meetings within the government and with private sector representatives after laws are passed. New regulations must be published in newspapers or in the government’s online official gazette before taking effect (https://www.gov.ph/). The 2016 Executive Order on Freedom of Information (FOI) mandates full public disclosure and transparency of government operations, with certain exceptions. The public may request copies of official records through the FOI website (https://www.foi.gov.ph/). Government offices in the Executive Branch are expected to develop their respective agencies’ implementation guidelines. The order is criticized for its long list of exceptions, which render the policy less effective. Stakeholders report regulatory enforcement in the Philippines is generally weak, inconsistent, and unpredictable. Many U.S. investors describe business registration, customs, immigration, and visa procedures as burdensome and frustrating. Regulatory agencies are generally not statutorily independent but are attached to cabinet departments or the Office of the President and, therefore, are subject to political pressure. Issues in the judicial system also affect regulatory enforcement. The Philippines is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and provides notice of draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). (http://tbtims.wto.org/en/Notifications/Search?ProductsCoveredHSCodes=&ProductsCoveredICSCodes=&DoSearch=True&ExpandSearchMoreFields=False&NotifyingMember=Philippines&DocumentSymbol=&DistributionDateFrom=&DistributionDateTo=&SearchTerm=&ProductsCovered=&DescriptionOfContent=&CommentPeriod=&FinalDateForCommentsFrom=&FinalDateForCommentsTo=&ProposedDateOfAdoptionFrom=&ProposedDateOfAdoptionTo=&ProposedDateOfEntryIntoForceFrom=&ProposedDateOfEntryIntoForceTo=). The Philippines continues to fulfill required regulatory reforms under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The Philippines officially joined live operations of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) on December 30, 2019. The country’s National Single Window (NSW) now issues an electronic Certificate of Origin via the TRADENET.gov.ph platform, and the NSW is connected to the ASW, allowing for customs efficiencies and better transparency. The Philippines passed the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act in 2016, which enables the country to largely comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation. The Philippines has a mixed legal system of civil, common, Islamic, and customary laws, along with commercial and contractual laws. The Philippine judicial system is a separate and largely independent branch of the government, made up of the Supreme Court and lower courts. The Supreme Court is the highest court and sole constitutional body. More information is available on the court’s website (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/). The lower courts consist of: (a) trial courts with limited jurisdictions (i.e., Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, etc.); (b) Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); (c) Shari’ah District Courts (Muslim courts); and (d) Courts of Appeal (appellate courts). Special courts include the Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court for public officials) and the Court of Tax Appeals. A total of 147 RTCs have been designated as Special Commercial Courts (SCC) to hear intellectual property (IP) cases, with four SCCs authorized to issue writs of search and seizure on IP violations, enforceable nationwide. In addition, nearly any case can be appealed to appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, increasing caseloads and further clogging the judicial system. Foreign investors describe the inefficiency and uncertainty of the judicial system as a significant disincentive to investment. Many investors decline to file dispute cases in court because of slow and complex litigation processes and corruption among some personnel. The courts are not considered impartial or fair. Stakeholders also report an inexperienced judiciary when confronted with complex issues such as technology, science, and intellectual property cases. The Philippines ranked 152nd out of 190 economies, and 18th among 25 economies from East Asia and the Pacific, in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report in terms of enforcing contracts. The interagency Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) is the ultimate governing body that oversees the administration and grant of tax incentives by investments promotions agencies (IPAs). Chaired by the Philippine Secretary of Finance, the FIRB also determines the target performance metrics used as conditions to avail of tax incentives and reviews, approves, and cancels incentives for investments above USD 20 million as endorsed by IPAs. The BOI regulates and promotes investment into the Philippines that caters to the domestic market. The Strategic Investment Priorities Plan (SIPP), administered by the BOI, identifies preferred economic activities approved by the President. Government agencies are encouraged to adopt policies and implement programs consistent with the SIPP. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) requires the publishing of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) that outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted. The FINL consists of two parts: Part A details sectors in which foreign equity participation is restricted by the Philippine Constitution or laws; and Part B lists areas in which foreign ownership is limited for reasons of national security, defense, public health, morals, and/or the protection of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The 1995 Special Economic Zone Act allows the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to regulate and promote investments in export-oriented manufacturing and service facilities inside special economic zones, including the granting of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for investments worth USD 20 million and below. Further information about investing in the Philippines is available at the BOI website (http://boi.gov.ph/) and PEZA website (http://www.peza.gov.ph). The 2015 Philippine competition law established the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), an independent body mandated to resolve complaints on issues such as price fixing and bid rigging, to stop mergers that would restrict competition. More information is available on PCC website (http://phcc.gov.ph/#content). The Department of Justice (https://www.doj.gov.ph/) prosecutes criminal offenses involving violations of competition laws. Philippine law allows expropriation of private property for public use or in the interest of national welfare or defense in return for fair market value compensation. In the event of expropriation, foreign investors have the right to receive compensation in the currency in which the investment was originally made and to remit it at the equivalent exchange rate. However, the process of agreeing on a mutually acceptable price can be protracted in Philippine courts. No recent cases of expropriation involve U.S. companies in the Philippines. The 2016 Right-of-Way Act facilitates acquisition of right-of-way sites for national government infrastructure projects and outlines procedures in providing “just compensation” to owners of expropriated real properties to expedite implementation of government infrastructure programs. The 2010 Philippine bankruptcy and insolvency law provides a predictable framework for rehabilitation and liquidation of distressed companies, although an examination of some reported cases suggests uneven implementation. Rehabilitation may be initiated by debtors or creditors under court-supervised, pre-negotiated, or out-of-court proceedings. The law sets conditions for voluntary (debtor-initiated) and involuntary (creditor-initiated) liquidation. It also recognizes cross-border insolvency proceedings in accordance with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, allowing courts to recognize proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction involving a foreign entity with assets in the Philippines. Regional trial courts designated by the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over insolvency and bankruptcy cases. 4. Industrial Policies The Philippines’ Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) enumerates investment activities entitled to incentives facilitated by BOI, such as an income tax holiday. Non-fiscal incentives include the following: employment of foreign nationals, simplified customs procedures, duty exemption on imported capital equipment and spare parts, importation of consigned equipment, and operation of a bonded manufacturing warehouse. The transitional 2020 IPP provides incentives for the following activities: COVID-19 mitigation, manufacturing (e.g., agro-processing, modular housing components, machinery, and equipment); agriculture, fishery, and forestry (e.g., hatcheries, postharvest facilities, nurseries); integrated circuit design, creative industries, and knowledge-based services (e.g., IT-Business Process Management services for the domestic market); repair, maintenance, and overhaul of aircraft; charging/refueling stations for alternative energy vehicles; industrial waste treatment; telecommunications (e.g., connectivity facilities and mobile broadband services); engineering, procurement, and construction; healthcare and disaster risk reduction management services (e.g., hospitals, drug rehabilitation centers, and quarantine and evacuation centers); mass housing; infrastructure and logistics (e.g., airports, seaports, and PPP projects); inclusive business models (activities of medium and large enterprises in agribusiness and tourism that include micro and small enterprises in their value chains); energy (development of energy sources, power generation plants, and ancillary services); innovation drivers (e.g., fabrication laboratories); and environment (e.g., climate change-related projects). Further details of the 2020 IPP are available on the BOI website (http://boi.gov.ph/). The BOI was tasked to update the investment priorities and formulate a Strategic Investment Priorities Plan to replace the IPP in light of the enactment of the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises (CREATE) Act on March 26, 2021 under the Comprehensive Tax Reform Program. Domestic-oriented foreign-owned enterprises whose foreign ownership exceeds 40 percent may qualify for BOI incentives, such as specific tax credits and tax exemptions, if the enterprise’s proposed activity is listed in the SIPP or meets the criteria of industry tiers and/or location. The first package of the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) law, which took effect January 1, 2018, removed the 15 percent special tax rate on gross income of employees of multinational enterprises’ regional headquarters (RHQ) and regional operating headquarters (ROHQ) located in the Philippines. RHQ and ROHQ employees are now subject to regular income tax rates, usually at higher and less competitive rates than before the implementation of the TRAIN law. Export-oriented businesses enjoy preferential tax treatment when located in export processing zones, free trade zones, and certain industrial estates, collectively known as economic zones, or ecozones. Businesses located in ecozones are considered outside customs territory and are allowed to import capital equipment and raw material free of customs duties, taxes, and other import restrictions. Goods imported into ecozones may be stored, repacked, mixed, or otherwise manipulated without being subject to import duties and are exempt from the Bureau of Customs’ Selective Pre-shipment Advance Classification Scheme. While some ecozones are designated as both export processing zones and free trade zones, individual businesses within them are only permitted to receive incentives under a single category. The BOI imposes a higher export performance requirement on foreign-owned enterprises (70 percent of production) than on Philippine-owned companies (50 percent of production) when providing incentives under SIPP. Companies registered with BOI and PEZA may employ foreign nationals in supervisory, technical, or advisory positions for five years from date of registration (possibly extendable upon request). Top positions and elective officers of majority foreign-owned BOI-registered enterprises (such as president, general manager, and treasurer, or their equivalents) are exempt from employment term limitation. Foreigners intending to work locally must secure an Alien Employment Permit from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), renewable every year with the duration of employment (which in no case shall exceed five years). The BOI and PEZA facilitate special investor’s resident visas with multiple entry privileges and extend visa facilitation assistance to foreign nationals, their spouses, and dependents. The 2006 Biofuels Act establishes local content requirements for diesel and gasoline. Regarding diesel, only locally produced biodiesel is permitted. For gasoline, all local ethanol must be bought off the market before imports are allowed to meet the blend requirement, and the local ethanol production may only be sourced from locally produced sugar/molasses feedstock. The Philippines does not impose restrictions on cross-border data transfers. Sensitive personal information is protected under the 2012 Data Privacy Act, which provides penalties for unauthorized processing and improper disposal of data even if processed outside the Philippines. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Philippines recognizes and protects property rights, but the enforcement of laws is weak and fragmented. The Land Registration Authority and the Register of Deeds (http://www.lra.gov.ph/ ), which facilitate the registration and transfer of property titles, are responsible for land administration, with more information available on their websites. Property registration processes are tedious and costly. Multiple agencies are involved in property administration, which results in overlapping procedures for land valuation and titling processes. Record management is weak due to a lack of funds and trained personnel. Corruption is also prevalent among land administration personnel and the court system is slow to resolve land disputes. The Philippines ranked 120th out of 190 economies in terms of ease of property registration in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report. The Philippines is not listed on the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Watch List. The country has a generally robust intellectual property rights (IPR) regime in place, although enforcement is irregular and inconsistent. The total estimated value of counterfeit goods reported seized in 2021 was close to USD 500 million, significantly higher than the USD 193 million recorded in 2020 and the previous record high of USD 472 million in 2018, a sign of enforcement activities returning to pre-pandemic levels. The sale of imported counterfeit goods in local markets has visibly decreased since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, though the amount of counterfeit goods sold online has dramatically increased due to the shift of most businesses to online activities. The Intellectual Property (IP) Code provides a legal framework for IPR protection, particularly in key areas of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) is the implementing agency of the IP Code, with more information available on its website (https://www.ipophil.gov.ph/). The Philippines generally has strong patent and trademark laws. IPOPHL’s IP Enforcement Office (IEO) reviews IPR-related complaints and visits establishments reportedly engaged in IPR-related violations. However, weak border protection, corruption, limited enforcement capacity by the government, and lack of clear procedures continue to weaken enforcement. In addition, IP owners still must assume most enforcement and storage costs when counterfeit goods are seized. Enforcement actions are often not followed by successful prosecutions. The slow and capricious judicial system keeps most IP owners from pursuing cases in court. IP infringement is not considered a major crime in the Philippines and takes a lower priority in court proceedings, especially as the courts become more crowded with criminal cases deemed more serious, which receive higher priority. Many IP owners opt for out-of-court settlements (such as ADR) rather than filing a lawsuit that may take years to resolve in the unpredictable Philippine courts. The IPOPHL has jurisdiction to resolve certain disputes concerning alleged infringement and licensing through its Arbitration and Mediation Center. The Philippines has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) since 1980. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at the local IP offices, see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector The Philippines welcomes the entry of foreign portfolio investments, including in local and foreign-issued equities listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE). Investments in certain publicly listed companies are subject to foreign ownership restrictions specified in the Constitution and other laws, but the recent amendments to the Public Service Act opened several economic sectors like transportation and telecommunications that were previously closed to 100 percent foreign ownership. Non-residents are allowed to issue bonds/notes or similar instruments in the domestic market with prior approval from the Central Bank; in certain cases, they may also obtain financing in Philippine pesos from authorized agent banks without prior Central Bank approval. Although growing, the PSE (with 281 listed firms as of March 2022) lags many of its neighbors in size, product offerings, and trading activity. Efforts are underway to deepen the equity market, including introduction of new instruments (e.g., real investment trusts) and amend listing rules for small and medium enterprises (SME). In 2021, companies raised a record $4.5 billion in capital in PSE, including eight initial public offerings. The growth in market participation of local retail investors also supported robust PSE trading activity over the past year amid a retreat by foreign investors. The securities market is growing, and while it remains dominated by government bills and bonds, corporate issuances continue to expand due to the favorable interest rate environment, regulatory reforms, and digital transition. Hostile takeovers are uncommon because most companies’ shares are not publicly listed and controlling interest tends to remain with a small group of parties. Cross-ownership and interlocking directorates among listed companies also decrease the likelihood of hostile takeovers. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP/Central Bank) does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions in accordance with the country’s acceptance of International Monetary Fund Article VIII obligations of September 1995. Purchase of foreign currencies for trade and non-trade obligations and/or remittances requires submission of a foreign exchange purchase application form if the foreign exchange is sourced from banks and/or their subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations falls within specified thresholds (USD 500,000 for individuals and USD 1 million for corporates/other entities). Purchases above the thresholds are also subject to the submission of minimum documentary requirements but do not require prior Central Bank approval. Meanwhile, a person may freely bring in or carry out foreign currencies up to USD 10,000; more than this threshold requires submission of a foreign currency declaration form. Credit is generally granted on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit from the liquid domestic market. Some laws require financial institutions to set aside loans for preferred sectors such as agriculture, agrarian reform, and MSMEs. Notwithstanding, bank loans to these sectors remain constrained; for example, MSMEs loans only had a 4.7 percent share of the total banking system loans as of end-June and had been declining since 2015, despite comprising 99 percent of domestic firms. The government has implemented measures to promote lending to preferred sectors at competitive rates, including the establishment of a centralized credit information system, enactment of the 2018 Personal Property Security Law allowing the use of non-traditional collaterals (e.g., movable assets like machinery and equipment and inventories), and the temporary use of MSME loans as commercial banks’ alternative compliance with the reserve requirements against deposit liabilities and substitutes. The government also established the Philippine Guarantee Corporation in 2018 to expand development financing by extending credit guarantees to priority sectors, including MSMEs. The BSP is a highly respected institution that oversees a stable banking system. It has pursued regulatory reforms promoting good governance and aligning risk management regulations with international standards. The Philippines’ banking system sustained its solid footing amid the pandemic, with capital adequacy ratios well above the Bank for International Settlements’ eight percent minimum threshold and the BSP’s 10 percent regulatory requirement. Loan quality remained manageable, with a non-performing loan ratio of 4.0 percent as of end-2021. High liquidity coverage ratio (197.6 percent) and net stable funding ratio (143.6 percent) suggest that banks can meet funding requirements during short and medium term liquidity shocks. Commercial banks constitute more than 93 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking industry. As of September 2021, the five largest commercial banks represented 60 percent of the total resources of the commercial banking sector. The banking system was liberalized in 2014, allowing the full control of domestic lenders by non-residents and lifting the limits to the number of foreign banks that can operate in the country, subject to central bank prudential regulations. Twenty-six of the 45 universal and commercial banks operating in the country are foreign branches and subsidiaries, including three U.S. banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase). Citibank sold its consumer banking unit to a local bank in 2021, with the transition expected to be completed in 2022. Despite the adequate number of operational banks, 15 percent of cities and municipalities in the Philippines were still without banking presence as of end-June 2021 and 4.4 percent were without any financial access point. The BSP nonetheless has made significant progress in expanding financial inclusion, with 53 percent of adults having bank accounts (from 34 percent in 2019) as of end-June 2021 – closer to its 70 percent target by 2023. Recent payment system reforms through the BSP’s National Retail Payment System have also increased individuals and enterprises’ access to e-wallet accounts, allowing them to do financial transactions without formal bank accounts, increasing the efficiency of financial transactions in the country. Foreign residents and non-residents may open foreign and local currency bank accounts. Although non-residents may open local currency deposit accounts, they are limited to the funding sources specified under Central Bank regulations. Should non-residents decide to convert to foreign currency their local deposits, sales of foreign currencies are limited up to the local currency balance. Non-residents’ foreign currency accounts cannot be funded from foreign exchange purchases from banks and banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations. The Philippines does not presently have sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises, known in the Philippines as government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC), are predominantly in the finance, power, transport, infrastructure, communications, land and water resources, social services, housing, and support services sectors. The Governance Commission for GOCC (GCG) further reduced the number of GOCCs to 118 in 2020 (excluding water districts), from 133 the prior year; a list is available on their website (https://gcg.gov.ph). The government corporate sector has combined assets of USD 150 billion and liability of USD 103 billion (or net assets/equity worth about USD 46 billion) as of end-2020. Using adjusted comprehensive income (i.e., without subsidies, unrealized gains, etc.), the GOCC sector’s income declined by 55 percent to USD 1.1 billion in 2020, the lowest since 2015. GOCCs are required to remit at least 50 percent of their annual net earnings (e.g., cash, stock, or property dividends) to the national government. Competition-related concerns, arising from conflicting mandates for selected GOCCs, exist in the transportation sector. For example, both the Philippine Ports Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines have both commercial and regulatory mandates. Private and state-owned enterprises generally compete equally. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the only agency, with limited exceptions, allowed to provide coverage for the government’s insurance risks and interests, including those in build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects and privatized government corporations. Since the national government acts as the main guarantor of loans, stakeholders report GOCCs often have an advantage in obtaining financing from government financial institutions and private banks. Most GOCCs are not statutorily independent, thus could potentially be subject to political interference. The Philippines is not an OECD member country. The 2011 GOCC Governance Act addresses problems experienced by GOCCs, including poor financial performance, weak governance structures, and unauthorized allowances. The law allows unrestricted access to GOCC account books and requires strict compliance with accounting and financial disclosure standards; establishes the power to privatize, abolish, or restructure GOCCs without legislative action; and sets performance standards and limits on compensation and allowances. The GCG formulates and implements GOCC policies. GOCC board members are limited to one-year terms and subject to reappointment based on a performance rating set by GCG, with final approval by the Philippine President. The Philippine Government’s privatization program is managed by the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance. The privatization of government assets undergoes a public bidding process. Apart from restrictions stipulated in FINL, no regulations discriminate against foreign buyers, and the bidding process appears to be transparent. The PMO is currently reviewing the privatization of government-owned mining assets as part of the Philippine government’s revenue-generating measures adopted during the pandemic. Additional information is available on the PMO website (http://www.pmo.gov.ph/ ). 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is regularly practiced in the Philippines, although no domestic laws require it. The Philippine Tax Code provides RBC-related incentives to corporations, such as tax exemptions and deductions. Various non-government organizations and business associations also promote RBC. The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is the largest corporate-led social development foundation involved in advocating corporate citizenship practice in the Philippines. U.S. companies report strong and favorable responses to RBC programs among employees and within local communities. The Philippines is not an OECD member country. The Philippine government strongly supports RBC practices among the business community but has not yet endorsed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to stakeholders. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Philippines is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and is already observing its effects, including increased storms and increased storm intensity of up to 50 percent, as well as climate-sensitive diseases such as dengue fever. Philippine government agencies are researching effects on food security, including crop performance and fish population sustainability. Agriculture sector representatives note climate change has also changed typhoon paths. The Asian Development Bank estimated the Philippines would lose 6 percent of its GDP annually by 2100 if it disregards climate change risks. While the Philippines emits less than 0.4 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, through its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement it committed to reduce or avoid 75 percent of GHG emissions by 2020 to 2030 (compared to a business-as-usual model), with reductions coming from the agriculture, waste, industry, transport, and energy sectors. The NDC commitment is predicated on significant international support (including through grants, concessional finance, and private sector investment) and calls for the Philippine government to ensure access to climate finance, support technology development and transfer, provide capacity building, and implement circular economy and sustainable consumption and production practices. The Philippines is poised to rely on private investment to fund its planned commercially viable “green” infrastructure investment opportunities, which will support the country’s transition to a low carbon economy. The Philippines Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) and the Committee on Infrastructure of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) identified big-ticket green infrastructure projects to be added to the national project pipeline, including opportunities in ICT, water, transportation, the digital economy, and the health care sector. The Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission adopted measures to develop a sustainable financial market, including ASEAN Green Bond Standards, ASEAN Social Bond Standards, and ASEAN Sustainability Bond Standards. In 2020, Philippine sustainable bond issuance totaled USD 3.4 billion, 90 percent of which was issued by Philippine banks or Philippine renewable energy, infrastructure, and real estate companies. The Philippine Climate Change Commission (CCC) formulated the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) which outlines the country’s agenda for climate adaptation and mitigation for 2011 to 2028. The NCCAP includes a framework to assign economic value to natural resources. The Philippine Development Plan (2017-2022) also calls for strengthened law enforcement to enhance compliance with existing environmental laws and innovative waste and pollution management strategies (to include mitigating effects from COVID-19 response and medical waste). The NCCAP also encourages public investment in climate change action, while the People’s Survival Fund (managed by the CCC) offers local government units dedicated funding to finance local climate adaptation programs and projects. Foreign investment restrictions remain in the renewable energy sector. While foreign companies can fully own and operate biomass and geothermal projects in the country, the National Renewable Energy Board interprets the Constitutional provision “all natural resources with energy potential should undergo service contracting” as restricting wind and solar projects to the common 40 percent foreign equity ceiling (similar to public utilities). These restrictions hamper badly needed foreign investment in the wind and solar energy sectors. 9. Corruption Corruption is a pervasive and long-standing problem in both the public and private sectors. The country’s ranking in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index declined to the 117th spot (out of 180), its worst score in nine years. The 2021 ranking was also dragged down by the government’s poor response to COVID-19, with Transparency International characterizing it as abusive enforcement of laws and accusing the government of major human rights and media freedom violations. Various organizations, including the World Economic Forum, have cited corruption among the top problematic factors for doing business in the Philippines. The Bureau of Customs is still considered to be one of the most corrupt agencies in the country. The Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 outlines strategies to reduce corruption by streamlining government transactions, modernizing regulatory processes, and establishing mechanisms for citizens to report complaints. A front-line desk in the Office of the President, the Presidential Complaint Center, or PCC (https://op-proper.gov.ph/contact-us/ ), receives and acts on corruption complaints from the general public. The PCC can be reached through its complaint hotline, text services (SMS), and social media sites. The Philippine Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the Code of Ethical Conduct for Public Officials all aim to combat corruption and related anti-competitive business practices. The Office of the Ombudsman investigates and prosecutes cases of alleged graft and corruption involving public officials. Cases against high-ranking officials are brought before a special anti-corruption court, the Sandiganbayan, while cases against low-ranking officials are filed before regional trial courts. The Office of the President can directly investigate and hear administrative cases involving presidential appointees in the executive branch and government-owned and controlled corporations. Soliciting, accepting, and/or offering/giving a bribe are criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment, a fine, and/or disqualification from public office or business dealings with the government. Government anti-corruption agencies routinely investigate public officials, but convictions by courts are limited, often appealed, and can be overturned. Recent positive steps include the creation of an investors’ desk at the office of the ombuds Office, and corporate governance reforms of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Philippines ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2003. It is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Office of the Ombudsman Ombudsman Building, Agham Road, North Triangle Diliman, Quezon City Hotline: (+632) 8926.2662 Telephone: (+632) 8479.7300 Email/Website: pab@ombudsman.gov.ph / http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/ Presidential Complaint Center Gama Bldg., Minerva St. corner Jose Laurel St. San Miguel, Manila Telephone: (+632) 8736.8645, 8736.8603, 8736.8606 Email: pcc@malacanang.gov.ph / https://op-proper.gov.ph/presidential-action-center/ Contact Center ng Bayan Text: (+63) 908 881.6565 Email/Website: email@contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph / https://contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph/ 10. Political and Security Environment Terrorist groups and criminal gangs operate around the country. The Department of State publishes a consular information sheet and advises all Americans living in or visiting the Philippines to review the information periodically. A travel advisory is in place for those U.S. citizens considering travel to the Philippines. Terrorist groups, including the Islamic State East Asia (IS-EA) and its affiliate Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), the communist insurgent group the New People’s Army, and elements of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), periodically attack civilian targets, kidnap civilians – including foreigners – for ransom, and engage in armed attacks against government security forces. These groups have mostly carried out their activities in the western and central regions of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea. Groups affiliated with IS-EA continued efforts to recover from battlefield losses, recruiting and training new members, and staging suicide bombings and attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms that targeted security forces and civilians. The Philippines’ most significant human rights problems are killings allegedly undertaken by vigilantes, security forces, and insurgents; cases of apparent governmental disregard for human rights and due process; official corruption; shrinking civic spaces; and a weak and overburdened criminal justice system notable for slow court procedures, weak prosecutions, and poor cooperation between police and investigators. In 2021, the Philippines continued to see red-tagging (the act of labelling, branding, naming, and accusing individuals or organizations of being left-leaning, subversives, communists, or terrorists that is used as a strategy by state agents against those perceived to be “threats” or “enemies of the State”), arrests, and killings of human rights defenders and members of the media. President Duterte’s administration continued its nationwide campaign against illegal drugs, led primarily by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), which continues to receive worldwide attention for its harsh tactics. In 2021, the government retained its renewed focus on antiterrorism with a particular emphasis on communist insurgents. In addition to Philippine military and police actions against the insurgents, the Philippine government also pressured political groups and activists – accusing them of links to the NPA, often without evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, signed into law on July 3, intends to prevent, prohibit, and penalize terrorism in the country, although critics question whether law enforcement and prosecutors might be able to use the law to punish political opponents and endanger human rights. Following the passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 2020, various human rights groups and private individuals filed petitions questioning the constitutionality of the act. On December 9, the Supreme Court announced its ruling that only two specific provisions of the bill were unconstitutional: first, making dissent or protest a crime if such act had an intent to cause harm; and second, allowing the Anti-terrorism Council to designate someone a terrorist based solely off UN Security Council designation. The petitioners and other human rights groups said, however, that the ruling against the two provisions still does not provide protection to the Filipino people. The upcoming May 2022 elections could impact the political and security environment in the country, given the Philippines’ history of election-related violence. The Philippine police and military keep a close watch on certain areas they classify as “election hotspots.” 11. Labor Policies and Practices Managers of U.S. companies in the Philippines report that local labor costs are relatively low and workers are highly motivated, with generally strong English language skills. As of December 2021, the Philippine labor force reached 49.5 million workers, with an employment rate of 93.4 percent and an unemployment rate of 6.6 percent. These figures include employment in the informal sector and do not capture the substantial rates of underemployment in the country. Youths between the ages of 15 and 24 made up more than 28.9 percent of the unemployed. More than half of all employment was in the services sector, with 56.6 percent. Agriculture and industry sectors constitute 25.6 percent and 17.8 percent, respectively. Compensation packages in the Philippines tend to be comparable with those in neighboring countries. Regional Wage and Productivity Boards meet periodically in each of the country’s 16 administrative regions to determine minimum wages. The non-agricultural daily minimum wage in Metro Manila is approximately USD 10, although some private sector workers receive less. Most regions set their minimum wage significantly lower than Metro Manila. Violation of minimum wage standards is common, especially non-payment of social security contributions, bonuses, and overtime. Philippine law also provides for a comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) has responsibility for safety inspection, but a shortage of inspectors has made enforcement difficult. The Philippine Constitution enshrines the right of workers to form and join trade unions. The trend among firms using temporary contract labor to lower employment costs continues despite government efforts to regulate the practice. The DOLE Secretary has the authority to end strikes and mandate a settlement between parties in cases involving national interest. DOLE amended its rules concerning disputes in 2013, specifying industries vital to national interest: hospitals, the electric power industry, water supply services (excluding small bottle suppliers), air traffic control, and other industries as recommended by the National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (NTIPC). Economic zones often offer on-site labor centers to assist investors with recruitment. Although labor laws apply equally to economic zones, unions have noted some difficulty organizing inside the zones. The Philippines is signatory to all International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions but has faced challenges with enforcement. Unions allege that companies or local officials use illegal tactics to prevent workers from organizing. The quasi-judicial National Labor Relations Commission reviews allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with union activities. Meanwhile, the NTIPC monitors the application of international labor standards. Reports of forced labor in the Philippines continue, particularly in connection with human trafficking in the commercial sex, domestic service, agriculture, and fishing industries, as well as online sexual exploitation of children. 14. Contact for More Information John Avrett, Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Manila 1201 Roxas Boulevard, Manila, Philippines Telephone: (+632) 5301.2000 Email: ManilaEcon@state.gov Timor-Leste Executive Summary The Government of Timor-Leste has welcomed foreign-investment and business-development opportunities since gaining independence in 2002. In practice the investment climate continues to be hampered by inadequate regulatory mechanisms, corruption, insufficient personnel capacity, and deficient infrastructure. The government is working to address these issues but limited human capacity and a time-consuming bureaucratic/legislative system has made progress on reform slow. Initially plagued by conflict and turmoil after independence, Timor-Leste has emerged as a peaceful and stable democracy. Peaceful changes of government and freely contested elections, including a 2022 presidential election that drew 16 candidates, demonstrated an active political climate with competing views for how to best develop an economy largely dependent on public-sector spending for growth. Timor-Leste’s desire to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides incentive to implement fiscal and economic reforms to meet regional and international norms. After an 8.6% economic contraction in 2020, Timor-Leste’s economy rebounded slightly in 2021, growing by 1.8%. Timor-Leste’s private sector is weak and primarily dependent on government contracts, and the government’s ability to regulate industry remains limited. The agriculture sector supplied less than 10% of the country’s total GDP. Oil and gas production represents the largest share of GDP and has attracted the most foreign investment, but the producing fields are depleting, and the Government of Timor-Leste (GOTL) continues to seek partners to develop onshore and offshore blocks. The GOTL is focused on development of the Greater Sunrise offshore natural gas reserves in which the GOTL controls a majority share of the joint venture. The GOTL also wants to develop its own domestic petroleum refinery capabilities on its south coast, which it seeks partners to develop, even as the international community moves towards decarbonization and a clean energy transition. The government has said it would like additional investment in the country’s southern coast, and it maintains Special Economic Zones in Oecusse and Atauro Island. Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy by employment but has been historically undeveloped and is dominated by subsistence farming. The United States was instrumental in fostering the coffee industry in Timor-Leste, and over the last decade coffee has been the third largest contributor to GDP. Focused efforts to develop other crops could potentially yield similar returns. Timor-Leste has not developed green development policies that impact the investment climate. The government supports responsible business conduct and protections for labor rights, although it lacks institutional capacity to ensure compliance. In practice, labor and human rights concerns do not pose significant risks to doing business responsibly. Beginning in March 2020, the government declared a State of Emergency implementing measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including closing its borders, suspending commercial passenger flights, and sometimes enforcing internal travel restrictions. These measures, renewed for most of 2020-2021 every 30 days, hampered progress on development projects, including those involving foreign investments. In November 2021, the government passed amendments to public health laws that enabled the lifting of the SOE. U.S. assistance to Timor-Leste has contributed to improvements in the customs system and is helping to strengthen the legal regime for cybercrime. U.S. assistance also promotes diversification of Timor-Leste’s economy, support for private-sector, health and agricultural development, strengthening of democratic institutions, and reinforcing a commercial law framework. USAID support for public-private partnerships in the tourism sector and improving agriculture value chains contributes to strengthening the non-oil sector. The Commerce Department’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) provides training opportunities for Timorese government officials in key legal and regulatory agencies to improve the business environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 82 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#660 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,990 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Timor-Leste welcomes and strives to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The government has made considerable effort to establish effective legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, draft laws and regulations, and build personnel capacity. In 2011, parliament unanimously approved the government’s National Strategic Development Plan. The plan directs petroleum revenues to support non-petroleum economic development and help the country move to become a middle-income country by 2030. Despite its openness to FDI and efforts to improve the enabling environment, Timor-Leste’s legal, regulatory, and human capacity remain weak and continue to present challenges for investors. TradeInvest Timor-Leste, I.P. is Timor-Leste’s investment and export promotion agency. The organization’s goal is to facilitate and support potential investors in the country and assist foreign companies in identifying projects among the limited business opportunities emerging in Timor-Leste. TradeInvest is a one-stop-shop that provides services such as licensing, taxes, investment opportunities, permits, tariffs, and educating importers on correct procedures and policies. TradeInvest also provides post-investment aftercare services. The agency’s official website is www.tradeinvest.tl . There are no laws or practices in the country that U.S. investors allege discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy. However, under the constitution, only citizens may own land. Timor-Leste enacted laws in 2017 and 2018 to facilitate and protect foreign private investment by adhering to international agreements and reducing bureaucratic hurdles. Private Investment Law No. 15/2017 states that foreigners can be granted the right to private property for investment and reinvestment projects subject to the limits set out in the Constitution and in legislation on land and commercial companies. The government views building international ties as part of its effort to increase foreign direct investment opportunities. Timor-Leste is applying for full membership to ASEAN and served as President of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries from 2014-2016. (A Timorese citizen has served as Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries since July 2021.) Timor-Leste is also pursuing WTO accession. It is also pursuing trilateral economic cooperation opportunities with Indonesia and Australia to boost cross-country investment. The government’s Strategic Development Plan highlights key investment areas to include oil and gas, forestry and livestock, fisheries, tourism, energy, infrastructure, civil construction, coffee, spices, and transportation. In an April 2021 speech, Timor-Leste’s Ambassador to the United States also highlighted many of these sectors. The government, through its autonomous agency, the National Petroleum and Minerals Authority (ANPM), contracts with foreign firms to explore and develop offshore oil and gas deposits. Pre-qualification for Timor-Leste’s second licensing round of 11 onshore and 7 offshore blocks closed on January 14, 2022. Thirteen companies submitted bid documents. Bid results were announced April 22, 2022 with five blocks awarded. ANPM has also hosted annual Oil, Gas, and Energy Summits for four years to attract international investors to the oil and gas industry in Timor-Leste, collectively drawing virtual and in-person attendance from over 350 participants from nearly 225 companies. The 2022 summit was held in Dili in June. The government deposits oil and gas revenues into a sovereign petroleum fund. Investment income represents the majority of fund income with revenues from oil and gas currently a relatively small share of income. Strong recovery of global oil prices in 2021, however, reaching historic highs in early 2022 has bolstered revenue from depleting production. The fund value has experienced considerable fluctuation as the COVID-19 pandemic impacted global financial markets. Government expenditures, including efforts to combat COVID-19, rely heavily on the fund. Business and individual tax collections comprise less than 10% of GOTL operating revenues. Government spending, coffee exports, subsistence agriculture, remittances from workers abroad, and small-scale retail activities are the other sources of employment and economic drivers. In August 2019, Australia and Timor-Leste ratified a Maritime Boundary Treaty under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, which defined the exclusive economic zone borders between the two countries, removing development hurdles for both the Greater Sunrise and Buffalo offshore projects, and formalized the governance structure and tax sharing arrangement between the two countries. In 2018 the Timor-Leste government bought out the majority rights of several companies involved in a consortium to develop the Greater Sunrise oil and gas reserve. The government has stated its intention to build oil and gas refineries and significant associated infrastructure on its south coast to process the offshore reserves. Due to the cost of these infrastructure projects, the government may seek investment partners for all or some of them. Timorese authorities are intent on expanding private sector economic activities to provide employment for new labor market entrants. The country has one of the world’s most rapidly growing populations, with three-fourths of the population under 35 years of age and a birth rate around five per adult female. The population as of June 2021 was approximately 1.36 million. By law, foreign investors may invest in any sector other than postal services, public communications, transportation, protected natural areas, funeral services, and weapons production and distribution, as these are specifically reserved for the state. Investors are also prohibited from investing in sectors otherwise restricted by law. However, in practice, foreign companies have significant holdings in reserved sectors. For example, Brazilian, Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Chinese investors control large shares of the country’s three telecommunications providers. Section 54 of Timor-Leste’s constitution grants the right of land ownership exclusively to Timorese nationals, either individuals or corporate entities; however, foreigners may conclude long-term (up to 50-year) leases. Investors who wish to lease property must often sort through competing claims from the Portuguese colonial administration, the Indonesian occupation era, and the post-independence period. Resolution may be delayed for years. TradeInvest reviews foreign investment applications which are then presented to the Private Investment Commission for further study and evaluation. The Executive Director of TradeInvest chairs the Private Investment Commission, which is composed of directors general or equivalent from the relevant government ministries in the areas of taxation, customs, land and properties, economic activities of licensing, professional training, labor, immigration, building and housing, territorial planning, and the environment. Other ad-hoc members may also be called upon to be present during the meeting. Prospective investments are reviewed for their economic cost and benefits as well as for the capacity of the investor. The Private Investment Commission evaluates applications for foreign investment permits, verifying the following: Compliance of the application with requirements established in the National Development Plan, in the Procedural Regulation for Foreign Investment and other applicable legislation. Suitability, capacity, experience, and availability of financial resources necessary for implementation and operation of the proposed investment enterprise. Capacity, experience, and business or technical characteristics of the promoter or its managers in order to guarantee implementation and operation of the enterprise. Positive operational balance of the business, according to the project proposal. Environmental, infrastructural, and social implications which could condition the viability of the enterprise or that can result from its implementation. Guaranteeing availability of necessary land for installation and functioning of the investment enterprise. Ensuring consistency of the expected new jobs to be created in the short and medium term. Establishing interconnection with other economic sectors. The documents required for investments include: TradeInvest application form Descriptive project summary (project briefs, technical plans) Identification of promoters, professional CV/Firm Corporate Capability Bank credentials (bank statement, bank reference) Business plan Documents of Land Ownership Lot location Budget for construction/remodeling Environmental Impact Assessment (Environmental Licensing) Criminal Records (Original/Certified copy) TradeInvest can issue a certificate of investment for projects approved by the Private Investment Commission valued at less than $20 million. Investments of more than $20 million or that require more than 5 hectares of state land for tourism or 100 hectares of state land for agriculture, livestock, or forestry require approval from the Council of Ministers. Investors can also request a Special Investment Agreement, through TradeInvest, prior to submitting the project to the Council of Ministers for approval. The TradeInvest website reports that application fees are $500 for national investors and $2,000 for international investors. TradeInvest should issue investment decisions within 30 days. Regulatory actions needing approval from the Council of Ministers may require additional time to resolve. After nearly a decade, the government granted a foreign company the rights to invest an initial $100 million to develop 16 hectares into an upscale resort just west of the capital in March 2020. In January 2022, the Council of Ministers approved a Special Investment Agreement (SIA) for the development that had been pending since 2010. Other multi-million-dollar large-scale investments, including the Tibar Port and Baucau cement plant, might directly employ hundreds of Timorese but are yet to open and have been delayed by COVID-19 and opaque government processes. Timor-Leste has not yet conducted any investment policy reviews through OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD. Timor-Leste was accepted as an observer to the WTO in 2016, and its Working Party for accession to the WTO was established in December 2016 and held its first meeting in October 2020. In May of 2022, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and WTO Accession Chief Negotiator led a large government delegation in bilateral meetings with WTO members, the WTO Secretariat and development partners in Geneva. Timor-Leste’s overall political stability has allowed some businesses to grow; political impasses, however, during which the country operated without state budgets, reduced opportunities for government contracts in 2017, 2018, and 2020. The political impasses affected many areas of the economy, including commerce, public services, and larger public works projects. The government passed its 2021 and 2022 state budgets on time in December prior to the start of the respective fiscal year (January – December). In March 2020, the government enacted a State of Emergency (SOE) to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and restricted many “non-essential” commercial enterprises. In November 2021, the government passed amendments to the Health Law that allowed it to implement some of the public health measures previously only possible under an SOE. The last SOE expired on November 28, 2021. In August 2020, the government released an economic recovery plan to promote Timor-Leste’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery, including short-, medium-, and long-term interventions. The plan includes support to the private sector as well as to households and local producers. Although the government is committed to improving its services in critical sectors, challenges remain: bureaucratic inefficiency, infrastructure bottlenecks, the absence of real property and information communications technology (ICT) laws and other essential legislation, a lack of commercial courts, uncertain implementation of government procedures, significant deficiencies in human capacity, conflicts of interest, and corruption are some of the most notable challenges. Timor-Leste has not been the subject of investment policy reviews by domestic or third country civil society groups. Timor-Leste’s Business Verification and Registration Service office (SERVE) processes business registration and licensing in the country. SERVE was created in 2013 as one-stop-shop to make business registration faster and easier. The agency’s website is http://www.serve.gov.tl . Business registration and application processes require an in-person visit to SERVE’s office. Getting a business license takes between one and five days; however, actual timelines may be greater. For companies involved in civil construction, food processing, or pharmaceutical industries, the agency works closely with relevant ministries, particularly the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce, and Industry, to facilitate business licenses, although since 2017 all registration requirements have been centralized with SERVE. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict it. 3. Legal Regime Timor-Leste’s regulatory system is still in formative stages. Existing tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws and policies do not present obvious impediments to investment. Government policies and practices generally are transparent. The Ministry of Finance launched an online Procurement Portal in 2011, intended to increase transparency by providing equal access to information on government tenders and procurement contracts. However, updates are inconsistent and not all tenders appear to be included in the site. Reports say when tenders are posted, it is only for a few days and winners may be pre-selected. The Audit Chamber, under the Court of Appeals, is responsible for reviewing government procurements above $5 million. In 2018 and 2019, the Ministry of Finance launched the ASYCUDA system in APORTIL, the organization managing international port, and International Airport of Nicolao Lobato customs, as part of the fiscal reform process with the aim of improving efficiency, customer service, and transparency. The government hopes to facilitate trade by implementing a modern and reliable system to track and manage imports and exports. USAID’s Customs Reform Project helped Timor-Leste’s Customs Authority to streamline processes, improve government-wide integration, and align with laws and international standards. The project also established a National Customs Hotline for reporting illegal activities and an online Customs Trade portal providing the public with trade-related information, improving transparency for import/export procedures. In May 2021, Timor-Leste’s Customs Authority launched a Customs Hotline, allowing anyone to anonymously report by phone or online possible customs infractions. This and similar international programming help the GOTL reduce trade costs by adopting best-practice customs clearance and transit procedures. In addition, SERVE issues no-cost business licenses for what it determines to be low-risk undertakings. High- and medium-risk business licenses may incur application fees. Initial and renewal business license are generally valid for 12 months. SERVE also supports the private sector’s compliance with mandatory social security contribution laws. Parliament and parliamentary committees regularly hold hearings and debates on proposed laws. For certain major legislation, the government holds limited public consultations or solicits public comment. Since March 2020, the GOTL has reduced public consultations due to COVID-19 protocols. There is no legal requirement to publish draft regulations prior to enactment. Relevant functional agencies generally are responsible for formulating regulations, which is then presented by the parent Ministry for consideration and approval by the Council of Ministers. Regulations are adopted and implemented at the national level; there are no sub-national levels of regulation. Most oversight occurs in the capital by relevant ministries, although some agencies have staff at the district level that monitor compliance. Legislation and regulations are published in the national journal (Jornal da República de Timor-Leste, www.mj.gove.tl/jornal/ ), in full text, to signify entry into force, although applicable information may be tardily printed or difficult to find. Public finances and debt obligations are published and available to the public. Financial reports available through internet-based access are not consistently updated, but they are generally made available upon request. Government encourages businesses to engage in good corporate social responsibility practices, although this effort is only codified in the oil and gas sector. The Petroleum Act of 2005 includes a local content regulation that requires applicants for production sharing contracts to include proposals for environmental protection, health and safety, and training and preferential employment of Timor-Leste nationals. Reforms currently underway in Timor-Leste’s fiscal and economic systems aim to bring the country into compliance with ASEAN standards. The Timor-Leste ASEAN Mobilization Plan (TLAMP) aims to bring all the relevant line ministries into compliance with ASEAN economic best practices. Timor-Leste was accepted as an observer to the WTO in 2016, and its Working Party for accession was established in December 2016. The first meeting of the Working Party was held in October 2020. A Timor-Leste government delegation visited Geneva in May 2022 for bilateral meetings with WTO members and the WTO Secretariat and participated in roundtable discussions on the country’s WTO accession. The Portuguese legal system heavily influences Timor-Leste’s civil law system. Timor-Leste applies Indonesian law, which was in force until August 1999, as a subsidiary source of law for issues not yet addressed in Timorese legislation. The country does not have a written commercial code. The judicial system operates independently of the executive but is evolving and short staffed. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed to the court system. The Office of the Prosecutor General continues to accumulate experience and capacity to establish and implement case management and other essential systems. Timor-Leste has courts of first instance and a court of appeal. However, courts operate in only four of the country’s thirteen districts, and customary law governs most cases at the local level. Additional courts outlined in the Constitution and law, such as specialized tax courts, have not yet been established. Waiting times to bring a case before a judge remain long, and cases may be unresolved for years. Conciliation and arbitration judicial reforms to reduce pending caseloads are preliminary. In practice, the system generally prioritizes criminal cases. The Timorese legal system is based on a mix of Indonesian laws and regulations, acts passed by the United Nations Transitional Administration, and post-independence Timorese legislation modeled on Portuguese civil law. The country is reviewing its legislation to harmonize the system but has yet to undergo a comprehensive overhaul of the overlapping yet disparate systems. Timor-Leste has two official languages (Tetum and Portuguese) and two working languages (Indonesian and English); all new legislation is enacted in Portuguese and is based on the civil law tradition, though is supposed to be published in Tetum as well. The Private Investment Law (Law No. 15/2017) specifies the conditions and incentives for both domestic and foreign investment and guarantees full equality before the law for international investors. Other major laws affecting incoming foreign investment include the Companies Code of 2004, the Commercial Registration Code, and the Taxation Act of 2008. The Government of Timor-Leste announced the establishment of TradeInvest, a one-stop-shop for investment and export promotion in 2015 (https://www.tradeinvest.tl). The agency has the responsibility to promote Timorese exports and investment opportunities in the country and to encourage domestic entrepreneurship. There are ongoing fiscal reform efforts designed to align Timorese legislation and regulation with best practices in ASEAN (under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement) and under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Timor-Leste does not have a competition or anti-trust law. Both Article 54 of the Constitution and the Private Investment Law permit the expropriation or requisition of private property in the public interest only if just proper compensation is paid to the investor. The Private Investment Law calls for the equal treatment of foreign and national investors in expropriation cases and prohibits nationalization policies or land policies that deliberately target the property of investors. The government relocated significant numbers of residents for large development projects in Oecusse and Suai. Two known private investments in Dili have negotiated with the government to remove residents as part of the investment agreement. A large-scale hospitality development close to the capital is a cautionary example of unregistered tenets establishing domiciles on claimed property of a private investor and demanding compensation from the corporation or government before vacating, and all parties are outwardly refusing to relocate, compensate, or compromise. The government has not used methods that could be considered indirect expropriation. The government has at times been accused of not offering fair market value as compensation for expropriations, or for not following due process for evictions of squatters on government or disputed land. The Council of Ministers approved an insolvency law in March 2017, but parliament did not act on the law. In the most recent publication (2020), the World Bank ranked the country 168 of 190 in resolving insolvency with a score of zero reflecting no history of recovery. 4. Industrial Policies The Government of Timor-Leste offers investment incentives, including tax credits and import duty exemptions, to both domestic and international investors. There are no investment incentive programs specifically targeting underrepresented investors. An investment might be exempt from income tax, sales tax, and/or service taxes. For most industries, the corporate tax rate is 10%. Domestic investments worth over $50,000, foreign investments of over $1.5 million, and joint foreign and national resident investments where the national resident controls at least 75 percent of shares totaling $750,000 benefit from a five-year exemption from income, sales, and service taxes, and customs duties for goods and equipment used in the construction or management of the investment. The period of exemption is extended to eight years for investments in Rural Zones (outside of the cities of Dili and Baucau) and to ten years for investments in Peripheral Zones (the exclave of Oecusse and the island of Atauro). Even after these periods have expired, investors may deduct from their tax obligations up to 100 percent of the costs of constructing or repairing transportation infrastructure. Government guarantees or joint financing of foreign direct investment is not common practice; however, the government has engaged in a limited number of public-private partnerships, including development of the Tibar Port. The government does not currently offer incentives to promote clean energy investments. There are no foreign trade zones in Timor-Leste. Law No.3/2014 of 2014 defines and regulates a free trade zone in the Oecusse exclave called the Special Zone for Social Market Economy (ZEESM). The ZEESM prioritized socioeconomic activities to promote the quality of life and well-being of the community, namely: Development of commercial agriculture Creation of an ethical financial center Creation of a free trade zone (Note: the FTZ has not been established to date.) Increased tourism Creation of a center for international studies and research on climate change Creation of a center of green research Implementation and development of industrial activities for export and import Other economic activities that add value to the region, as well as strengthen its international competitiveness The government approved a decree law in 2016 on the development of Atauro (an island offshore from Dili) as part of ZEEMS. As of March 2022, most of these objectives have yet to be realized. Individual investment agreements and government contracts may specify local content requirements. Local content requirements in the oil and gas sector are particularly strict; requirements in other sectors are often not enforced. In the oil and gas sector, to be considered for production sharing contracts, potential partners are required to include provisions for training and preferential employment for Timor-Leste nationals and for acquisition of goods and services from Timor-Leste. Requirements are applied uniformly to domestic and international investors. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights remain an issue of concern for foreign investors and businesses. The legal regime governing land and property ownership in Timor-Leste remains incomplete. A history of displacement, overlapping titles, and lack of legal clarity regarding competing claims on land and properties arising from various occupancies during Portuguese, Indonesian, and post-independence eras makes protecting land titles and property rights difficult. While substantial amounts of land are subject to ownership dispute there is no consolidated accounting of the overall share. A comprehensive land law was promulgated in 2017 and national land surveys and registrations have been done. Under the law, claimants must register claims, which will be decided in arbitration. However, issuance of land titles and resolution of disputed title is pending additional government action on additional complementary legislation. Additionally, there are no administrative systems in place to track land transactions following initial titling Foreign persons may lease but not acquire land in Timor-Leste. Mortgages exist, however there is no legal mechanism for foreign banks to repossess property in cases of default. There are no requirements to occupy or develop property to retain legal ownership. Section 60 of Timor-Leste’s constitution provides for the protection of literary, scientific, and artistic work. In addition, Article 1223 of the country’s Civil Code stipulates the necessity of specific regulations to protect authors of the property. Also, Article 19 of the Private Investment Law states all investors are entitled to the protection of industrial secrets, copyrights, industrial property rights, distinctive trademark signs, or any other intellectual property rights recognized by law. However, legislators have yet to create specific regulations to codify domestic protection of intellectual property rights. In May and June 2021, the U.S. Embassy facilitated virtual meetings of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with TradeInvest and the Office of the Minister Coordinator of Economic Affairs. No new IP related laws or regulations were enacted in 2021; a draft IP law has been prepared with USAID assistance but is still pending as of June 2022. International companies have printed notices in local newspapers to demonstrate claims to their trademarks and patents. However, the dearth of domestic legislation in this area means that it is unclear the extent to which these practices afford any legal protection. Timor-Leste is not listed on USTR’s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. The government does not track or report on seizures of counterfeit goods. No official or unofficial data is available regarding the prevalence of counterfeit goods in the economy. Timor-Leste is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Timor-Leste does not have a stock market. There is limited access to credit and liquidity to facilitate investment. There are no known restrictions on portfolio investment. As of 2019 only 54% of Timorese adults were depositors with commercial banks, and only 4% held bank loans. There are five commercial banks operating in Timor-Leste: ANZ of Australia, Mandiri of Indonesia, BRI of Indonesia, BNU of Portugal, and a subsidized National Commercial Bank of Timor-Leste. The banking system was estimated to hold $734 million in net assets in 2021. All banks in Timor-Leste are subject to prudential measures and regulation by the Central Bank. Since most of the country’s operating banks are branches of foreign banks, the system is relatively resistant to domestic economic shocks. Foreign citizens must have a tax identification number demonstrating residency in Timor-Leste to maintain an individual bank account. According to World Bank data, lending to the private sector totaled approximately $290 million in 2020. The overall non-performing loan rate was 5.1% in 2020. The Central Bank of Timor-Leste is the country’s monetary authority. It supervises the activities of commercial banks, money transfer operators, currency exchange offices, insurance companies, and other deposit-taking corporations, as well as serving as the operational manager of the country’s sovereign wealth Petroleum Fund. The bank also operates as the clearing house for interbank payments and undertakes bank operations for the government and Timor-Leste’s public administration. Established in 2005, the Petroleum Fund is Timor-Leste’s sovereign wealth fund. The Minister of Finance is responsible for its overall management and investment strategy. The Central Bank of Timor-Leste is responsible for its operational management, although the Minister of Finance has the authority to select a different operational manager. By law, all petroleum and related revenues must be paid into the Fund, with the balance of the Fund invested in international financial markets for the benefit of present and future generations of Timor-Leste’s citizens. The Fund’s receipts are invested in approximately 40 percent equities and 60 percent bonds, but 2021 changes to the Petroleum Fund Law permit the Fund to invest up to 50 percent in equities. The Petroleum Fund publishes monthly, quarterly, and annual reports online. Laws governing the Fund provide that it must maintain an independent auditor, which shall be an internationally recognized accounting firm. The Petroleum Fund meets the 24 generally accepted principles and practices for sovereign wealth funds, commonly referred to as the “Santiago Principles.” Timor-Leste is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Petroleum Fund is the primary source of funding for the government budget, with a ceiling on annual withdrawals set by law at 3 percent of Timor-Leste’s total petroleum wealth (defined as the current Petroleum Fund balance plus the net present value of future petroleum receipts). Recent budgets and supplementals have exceeded the annual ceiling with parliamentary approval. However, budgets are rarely fully executed, regularly returning up to one-third of their value to government coffers. The Petroleum Activities Law no 13/2005, article 22, limits the government to investing 20 percent of the fund in petroleum activities. The government amended the law in 2019 to allow 5% of the Petroleum Fund to be invested in Timor Gas and Petroleum (Timor GAP), the national oil company, while reducing the percentage of the Fund held in stocks from 40% to 35%. Timor GAP must use the investment to exploit known oil and gas fields, which are commercially competitive and will contribute to development and diversification of the national economy. Timor GAP shall pay 4.5% interest on the investment and comply with reporting requirements. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Timorese government operates a small number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across various sectors, including broadcasting, aviation, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. There is no published list of SOEs. The Government of Timor-Leste owns 20.6 percent of Timor Telecom -a telecommunications provider- while privately-owned Telecommunicators Públicas de Timor (TPT) owns 54 percent. In 2013, two private foreign companies began telecommunications operations, ending Timor Telecom’s monopoly of the fixed and mobile network. In exchange for the end of the monopoly, Timor Telecom acquired certain equipment procured by the government and will retain no-cost usage rights of some government-owned infrastructure and equipment until 2062. In mid-2011, the government established Timor GAP, E.P., a 100-percent state-owned petroleum company intended to partner with international firms in exploration and development of Timor-Leste’s petroleum resources and to provide downstream petroleum services. Timor GAP is supervised by the Minister of Petroleum but is governed by an independent Board of Directors. Firms that partner with Timor GAP will receive preferential treatment in tenders for petroleum projects. In November 2008, the Timorese government transformed Timor-Leste’s Public Broadcasting Service, Radio Televisão de Timor-Leste (RTTL), into a state-owned enterprise known as RTTL. The government owns RTTL under the supervision of the State Secretary of Social Communication and governed by an independent Board of Directors. In 2016, the government established an official news agency, TATOLI. In November 2005 (Government Decree No.8/2005), the government established ANATL, E.P., a state-owned company to administer the domestic airports in all aspects, including air navigation. The government also created SAMES, E.P. in April 2004 (Government Decree No. 2/2004) – a public enterprise that imports, stores, and distributes medicines and medical products and equipment. In April 2015, the government converted SAMES, E.P. into SAMES, I.P., an autonomous institution, which operates under the tutelage and supervision of the Ministry of Health. In 2020, the government approved two decree laws to convert the public electricity utility known as the Department of National Electricity to Public Enterprise (EDTL, E.P) into a state-owned enterprise in the hope it will deliver better services to the customer and improve its cost recovery. Timor-Leste loses nearly half of its generated power by inefficient distribution infrastructure and consumer theft, costing the government millions annually. In 2020, the government through Decree Law no. 41/2020 established Bee Timor-Leste Empressa Publica (BTL, E.P.) as a state-owned public water utility company. Several autonomous government agencies are active in the economy: The Dili Port Authority (APORTIL), Timor-Leste’s Agency for Information and Communication Technology (TIC Timor), the National Electrical Authority (ANE), and the National Aviation Authority (AACTL) are four such agencies. Other autonomous and self-funded institution includes the National Petroleum and Mineral Authority (ANPM), which regulates the oil and gas sector. Line ministers or the prime minister’s office supervise SOEs, but independent boards of directors administer them. Senior management reports directly to government-appointed boards of directors. Line ministers are responsible for nominating or dismissing the president of the board of directors with approval from the Council of Ministers Timor-Leste does not have a formalized privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Businesses are generally aware of expectations and standards for responsible business conduct, although regulation of those standards is inconsistent. The government monitors business compliance with labor and environmental regulations, although the capacity to do so is insufficient. Timor-Leste is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and is rated as making Satisfactory progress across all assessed requirements. Labor violations are infrequently cited or prosecuted. There have been no high-profile business-related instances of corporate impact on human rights. Child labor exists; it mostly occurs in agriculture and the informal economy but could be a concern for certain supply chains. Timor-Leste has laws concerning labor, the environment, and mineral and petroleum exploitation and worked to enforce them, although inspection and judicial capacity limits constrained enforcement effectiveness. Land tenure is often unclear, and disputes are common. Communities have protested or rejected instances of government allocation of land for infrastructure or public use. Groups have complained that expropriated property was not valued properly by the government when paying compensation. Civil society and other organizations generally monitor and promote human rights, both related to corporate actions and otherwise, without undue interference from the government. Timor-Leste is not an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Timor-Leste released a National Climate Change Policy in 2020 but has not established any policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The country submitted a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) in 2020 as part of its commitment to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Timor-Leste submitted its first Intended Nationally Determined Contributions in 2017 but has not made any updates. The government does not have policies or regulatory incentives to promote renewable energy. Timor-Leste has enacted several laws addressing environmental policies, including the Environmental Basic Law (which includes climate change adaptation and mitigation issues), the Environmental License Decree Law, the Operational Law of Clean Development Mechanism, The Decree Law on Export, Import, and Use of Ozone Depleting Substances in Timor-Leste, and the Decree Law on Protected Areas. Public procurement policies do not include environmental or green growth considerations for resource efficiency, pollution abatement, or climate resilience. Data for greenhouse gas emissions do not exist beyond 2015. 9. Corruption Transparency International ranked Timor-Leste 82 out of 180 countries in its 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2010, the Anti-Corruption Commission (CAC), an independent agency, opened its doors, with support from USAID and the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. That same year, the Office of the Prosecutor General forwarded its first high-profile corruption case to the courts. Since then, the CAC has referred several cases to the Office of the Prosecutor General, which have resulted in several ongoing investigations. In 2016, former Minister of Finance Emilia Pires and former Vice-Minister of Health Madalena Hanjam, were convicted of participating in improper procurement of hospital beds. Both received prison sentences. In 2020 and 2021, the government waived immunity for multiple former and current parliamentarians to criminal prosecution for fraud. In January 2022, the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Social Justice was accused of corruption involving a contract to supply set-top cable boxes. The Prime Minister waived any immunities, and the CAC conducted an investigation. The Dili Prosecutor’s office will determine if there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to the court. Under Timorese law, bribery is a crime punishable with up to four years of imprisonment. Timor-Leste has also signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention; however, it is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In July 2020, parliament approved a new anti-corruption bill with new identified offenses, including in the private sector, which included penalties for construction fraud and a failure to declare assets or unjustified wealth. The Law on Measures to Prevent and Fight Corruption (No. 7/2020) went into effect in late 2020. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Anti-Corruption Commission of Timor-Leste Rua Sergio Vieira de Mello Farol Dili, Timor-Leste Phone: +670 77305564; +670 77326597; or +670 77326599 Contact at a “watchdog” organization: La’o Hamutuk – Walk Together PO Box 340, Bebora, Dili Timor-Leste Phone: +670 3321040 Mobile: +670 77234330 Email: info@laohamutuk.org Lalenok ba Ema Hotu (LABEH) – The Mirror for the People Avenida Presidente Nicolao Lobato-Comoro-(in front of SDN.07-Malinamuc) Comoro Dili, Timor-Leste Phone: +670 3331068 Email: info@labeh.org 10. Political and Security Environment Timor-Leste emerged from a history of colonialism, occupation, and civil strife to the period of relative domestic calm that it has enjoyed for more than a decade. After twenty-four years of occupation by Indonesia, under an agreement between the United Nations, former colonial power Portugal, and Indonesia, a popular consultation was held on August 30, 1999, to allow the Timorese to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia or to become independent. Seventy-nine percent of Timor-Leste voters rejected Indonesia’s governance proposal, effectively putting Timor-Leste on a path to independence. Timorese militias opposed to the decision organized and, supported by the Indonesian military, commenced a campaign of retribution. Approximately 1,300 Timorese were killed and as many as 300,000 people were forcibly relocated into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly 100 percent of the country’s electrical grid were destroyed. On September 20, 1999, at the request of the Timorese government, Australia led a deployment of peacekeeping troops (the International Force for East Timor, INTERFET), which ended the violence. After almost three years of UN administration, Timor-Leste became a fully independent republic with a parliamentary form of government on May 20, 2002. UN peacekeepers departed in 2005 leaving a special political mission in its stead. In 2006, however, civil order collapsed due to domestic political struggles, which led to armed conflict between the police and military. The government of Timor-Leste urgently requested police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal. In August 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1704, creating the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) to assist in restoring stability, rebuilding the security sector institutions, supporting the Government of Timor-Leste to conduct the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, and achieving accountability for crimes against humanity and atrocities committed in 1999. An Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) supported UNMIT’s mission. Timor-Leste held free, fair, and largely peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate José Ramos-Horta assumed the presidency, and former guerilla leader and outgoing president Xanana Gusmão became prime minister. National elections for president and parliament in 2012 were peaceful, free, and fair. UNMIT and the ISF departed from Timor-Leste at the end of 2012. Following free, fair, and peaceful parliamentary elections in July 2017, Mari bin Amude Alkatiri became prime minister of a two-party coalition government. In a March 2017 presidential election, also judged as free and fair, voters elected Francisco Lu Olo Guterres. In contrast with previous years, elections proceeded without extensive support from the international community. Security forces maintained public order with no reported incidents of excessive use of force. Alkatiri’s government was not able to pass its program or budget. Early parliamentary elections in May 2018 were considered fair and transparent, with 81% voter turnout. In January 2020, the coalition government rejected its own budget in protest of ongoing ministerial vacancies, and the prime minister submitted his resignation to the president. The prime minister subsequently withdrew the request to resign and assumed leadership of the country’s COVID-19 response. The president maintains the authority to determine whether the country will hold early elections to resolve a political impasse or whether the political parties in parliament should form a new government. Following changes in the ruling coalition membership, the Eighth Constitutional Government continues. After political instability in the governing coalition delayed passage of the 2020 budget by ten months, the 2021 and 2022 budgets were successfully passed on time. In April 2021, the government passed a budget amendment responding to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, including severe flooding in Dili. Two rounds of presidential elections in March and April 2022 were peaceful, free, and fair, with over 75% voter turnout. Occasional factional political violence can temporarily impact local retail businesses. There have been no instances in the past ten years of damage to projects or installations. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The Private Investment Law stipulates that all investors are required to employ Timorese workers and promote their professional training for the performance of qualified functions, including the improvement of technical or managerial knowledge. The law does grant qualified investors the right to a minimum of five work visas for workers or collaborators qualified for supervisory, directing, or technical functions necessary for the investment project, and the ability to request work visas for foreign workers required to install or operate the venture. Timor-Leste’s immigration laws permit workers to apply for work permits in-country after entry on a 30-day visa acquired at arrival; however, U.S. citizens consistently report difficulties getting work permits approved in time. Delays in work permits can subsequently lead to penalties for overstaying visas, which can amount to hundreds of dollars Shortages of skilled labor remain a significant constraint on private sector growth in Timor-Leste. Shortages of skilled workers are particularly notable in the construction and fishing sectors. Public and private sector employers also consistently encounter problems locating managerial, clerical, and other office staff. There is a surplus of young, inexperienced, unskilled labor, with roughly 15,000 new entrants into the labor market each year in an economy with an estimated total of 70,000 formal sector jobs for a total country population of approximately 1.36 million. Youth unemployment is estimated at 13.4%. Agriculture employs 59% of the population, the largest sector, the majority of which is subsistence agriculture. Data shows that the unemployment rate increases at higher levels of education, indicating a mismatch between training and skills sought by employers, and in particular a lack of vocational training. The government, donors, and employers place considerable emphasis on education and training to build local capacity. This policy aims not only to fill the skill gaps but also to meet local hiring requirements for foreign investors. There is a significant gender imbalance in employment, with the percentage of working age women having substantially lower participation rates, and higher unemployment rates than men. Only about a quarter of the working age population works in the formal economy. About 28% are unemployed, unpaid household workers, informal workers, retired, or not seeking work. Another 27% are subsistence farmers or fisher people, and 21% are students. Apart from agriculture and fisheries, informal employment largely involves small-scale commerce, including informal vending and handicrafts. Of those formally employed, 82% work in the capital municipality of Dili. The oil and gas sector employs only 0.1% of the working age population, although it contributes 12% of the national GDP. Foreign migrant workers constitute a small portion of the workforce, with unemployment rates equal to or higher than domestic workers. Substantial numbers of Timorese go overseas to work, with the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Korea being popular destinations. Government programs support training for out-going migrant workers. Worker remittances represent a significant source of national income, totaling $397 million in 2020. The 2012 Labor Law put in place regulations for labor conditions, including a 44-hour work week, standard benefits such as leave and premium pay for overtime, and minimum standards of worker health and safety. In June 2012, the government set the minimum wage for full-time employment at $115 per month. Enforcement of labor laws declined in recent years due to budget shortfalls, and enforcement in 2020 and 2021 was constrained by COVID-19. The government’s labor inspectorate identifies and remediates labor violations and holds violators accountable, investigates and prosecutes unfair labor practices, such as harassment and/or dismissal of union members, and investigates and prosecutes instances of forced and/or child labor. Most cases come from temporary labor agreements in the construction and service sectors. Labor inspection numbers rose in 2021 after having been limited in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related government measures. As stipulated in labor code, workers have the right to strike; however, they must notify companies in advance of the planned strike, and most labor disputes are settled through mediation and arbitration. Workers must present claims in writing to their employer and give the employer five days to respond prior to declaring a strike. If the employers do not respond within that timeframe or respond but the parties do not reach agreement within 20 days, the organization representing the workers must provide five days’ advance notice of a strike. Strikes can be stopped by the government if they disturb public order. Various businesses have protested state-of-emergency provisions imposed to control the COVID-19 pandemic that severely limited economic activity. Government responses and outcomes have been peaceful. A successful vaccination campaign and falling case counts has led to the relaxation of most restrictive measures but international travel remains limited. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, strikes against international companies occurred primarily over employment contracts and salary entitlements but yielded limited disruption. The Government of Timor-Leste is member to the following major international labor and human rights conventions: International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights The Maritime Boundary Treaty with Australia, which entered into force in 2019, delineates special labor and migration regulations for Timorese and foreign workers on the Bayu Undan project and other offshore projects in the EEZ. 14. Contact for More Information Political, Economic, and Consular Section United States Embassy Av. De Portugal, Praia dos Coqueiros Dili, Timor-Leste Phone: +670 330-2400 Email: DiliEcon@state.gov Togo Executive Summary With a welcoming investment climate and modern transportation infrastructure, Togo’s steadily improving economic outlook offers opportunities for U.S. firms interested in doing business locally and in the sub-region. Even with a dip in growth due to the pandemic, Togo has sustained steady economic expansion since 2008 through reforms to encourage economic development and a better business environment, growing 5.5% in 2019, 1.8% in 2020 and 4.8% in 2021. It ranked 97th on the Work Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, an improvement of 59 places from the previous two years and the highest ranking in West Africa. Current government policy is guided by the National Development Plan (PND) and an addendum policy roadmap for 2020-2025 that integrates business reforms and infrastructure projects designed to attract investment. Togo launched its five-year PND in 2018, focusing on three axes. The plan’s first goal is to leverage the country’s geographic position by transforming Lome into a regional trading center and transport hub. Togo has already completed hundreds of kilometers of refurbished roadways, expanded and modernized the Port of Lome, and inaugurated in 2016 the new Lome international airport that conforms to international standards. The second goal is to increase agricultural production through agricultural centers (Agropoles) and increase manufacturing. The third goal is improving social development, including furthering electrification of the country. The government seeks private sector investment to fulfill its PND goals and has had notable successes, including a new 2022 connection with the “Equiano” subsea cable owned by Google that will dramatically improve the quality of local broadband. In January 2021, Prime Minister Victoire Tomégah-Dogbe presented a detailed developmental roadmap to extend, supplement, and focus the goals of the PND for the remainder of the presidential term, which ends in 2025. The roadmap incorporates 42 specific projects, including universal access to identity documents and electricity; increased access to education, drinking water and sanitation; 20,000 new social housing units; a digital bank; construction of an industrial park around the port of Lome; and the extension of the road network. Nevertheless, Togo must tackle several challenges to maintain its momentum. Challenges include a weak and opaque legal system, lack of clear land titles, and government interference in various sectors. Corruption remains a common problem in Togo, especially for businesses. Often “donations” or “gratuities” result in expedited registrations, permits, and licenses, thus resulting in an unfair advantage for companies that engage in such practices. Although Togo has government bodies charged with combatting corruption, corruption-related charges are rarely brought or prosecuted. The government has made efforts to professionalize key institutions such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP), the Chamber of Commerce (CCIT), and the National Employment Agency (ANPE) including with new anti-corruption, ethics, and transparency measures. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 134 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 125 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $690 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a priority for Togo. The most recent data shows annual FDI flows to Togo almost doubling between 2019 and 2020 to $639 million, driven largely by increased investment from other West African countries, especially in the cement sector (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2021). CimMetal Group (Burkina Faso) in 2021 established a $125 million construction materials plant) and Dangote (Nigeria) in 2020 invested in a $60 million cement plant. Reforms to increase the ease of doing business and new power plant should sustain continued FDI growth over the next several years, with opportunities available in infrastructure, information and communications technology, agribusiness, energy, banking, and mining. The Ministry of Investments serves as an interface for potential investors, allowing them to target investment sectors and present priority projects. Despite the pandemic, government officials made trips abroad in 2021 to promote Togo as a place to invest and show the government’s desire to diversify its economic partners. Togo does not have any laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. The Investment Code, adopted in June 2019, prescribes equal treatment for Togolese and foreign businesses and investors; free management and circulation of capital for foreign investors; respect of private property; protection of private investment against expropriation; and investment dispute resolution regulation. The code meets West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) standards. As an Investment Holding Company, Togo Invest Corporation focuses on investments involving the government through Public-Private-Partnerships. Although Togo prioritizes investment retention, the government does not maintain a formal dialogue channel with investors. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The foreign investor can also create a wholly owned subsidiary. It has no obligation to associate itself with a local investor. This right is contained in the Investment Code “le Code des Investissements,” adopted June 17, 2019, and there are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Section 3 of the Investment Code states that any company established in the Togolese Republic freely determines its production and marketing policy, in compliance with the laws and regulations in force in the Togolese Republic. Additionally, there are no formal investment approval mechanisms in place for inbound foreign investment nor rules, restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to private investments. Togo conducted an investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2017. A link to the report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm There have been no major recent reviews of investment policy by civil society. Togo has dramatically improved its business climate in recent years through the implementation of bold reforms. It now takes only seven hours to register a new company online with the “Centre de Formalité des Entreprises” (https://www.cfetogo.org/eentreprise ), and Togo has continued to work simply procedures and reduce costs for businesses, including digitizing and automating tax payments. Togo has streamlined construction permits and eliminated a redundant requirement to receive a certificate of registration from the National Association of Architects. A new central office for property transactions (called the Guichet Unique Foncier) at the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR) also allows applicants to drop off their applications and retrieve their permits in one place, eliminating the need to visit multiple administrative offices to process paperwork. Togo has also improved the monitoring and regulation of power outages by recording data on the annual Average System Outage Duration Index (SAIDI) and Average System Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). In August 2021, with support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Togo launched two digital portals to provide information and assist investors in accessing finance and completing administrative procedures to facilitate market entry. The website investautogo.tg provides information on the business environment and investment in Togo, including the documentation required for administrative procedure. It also promotes business opportunities and tax incentives, with information on the investment code and the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). The website apizf.tg also presents useful documentation for investors to better understand the Togo business environment and investment procedures. Togo’s efforts have received international recognition, enabling it to achieve the rank of African Top Performer and third best in the world in terms of improving the business environment relative to its size (Greenfield FDI Performance Index Best Performers 2020). Togo’s ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report has also spiked, moving from 137th globally in 2019 to 97th in 2020, the most recent report. Togo does not promote outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime In June 2019, the National Assembly adopted a new investment code, which is in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan (PND) and embraces the government’s desire to make the private sector the driver of economic growth. The Investment Code seeks to make Togo an attractive place for international companies, supporting the development of logistics hubs by offering tax incentives. The incentives are proportional to the size of the investments made and the number of jobs created. At a time when Togo is committed to decentralization, the new investment code provides additional advantages to investments that create jobs outside of major urban centers. The code operationalizes the National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) which simplifies formalities. The deadline for adjudicating files is now set at 30 days maximum. As a member of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Togo participates in zone-wide plans to harmonize and rationalize regulations governing economic activity within the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA – Organisation pour L’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires). OHADA includes sixteen African countries, including Togo, and one of the principal goals is a common charter on investment. Togo directly implements WAEMU and OHADA regulations without requiring an internal ratification process by the National Assembly. Togo’s Investment Code also specifies the provision of incentives to encourage investment. Incentives are to be proportional to the size of investment, with tax benefits conditional on job creation. Tax benefits include a lump sum tax reduction per job created and incentives to invest in rural areas, to consolidate social development and strengthen inclusion measures. Although the government does not make draft bills and proposed regulations available for public comment, ministries and regulatory agencies in Togo generally give notice of and distribute the text of proposed regulations to relevant stakeholders. Ministries and regulatory agencies also generally request and receive comments on proposed regulations through targeted outreach to business associations and other stakeholders. Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities, persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. The site is generally up-to-date and useful. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency with respect to government procurements. Each responsible ministry ensures compliance with its regulations which are developed in conformity with international standards and agreements such as WTO or WAEMU norms. Regulations are not reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. The government has not announced any upcoming changes to the regulatory enforcement system. In December 2021, the government adopted Law 2021-033 on public procurement aimed at improving the legal framework and reducing the delays in procurement procedures, in particular through digitalization. Togo joined the Development Center of OECD in June 2019, an opportunity to share experiences and pool resources. Togo is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is not known if the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). For the most part, in economic terms, the Togolese legal and administrative framework is aligned with the community texts of UEMOA, ECOWAS or larger groups. On the financial side, Togo depends on sub-regional institutions, notably the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) whose head office is in Dakar. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets (CREPMF), headquartered in Abidjan, regulates financial markets. The Togolese insurance market is subject to the rules of the CIMA zone (Inter African Conference of Insurance Markets). With regard to intellectual property, Togo relies on OAPI (African Intellectual Property Organization). The main laws and directives of these different legal and administrative areas are available, among others, on the website www.droit-afrique.com under the heading Togo. More broadly, Togo is a member of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). At the African level, the country is also party to the Council of the Agreement, the Benin Electric Community (CEB), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Alliance Zone and the Co-operation Zone for Prosperity (ZACOP), and the African Union. Togo practices a code-based legal system inherited from the French system. The judiciary is recognized as the third power after the executive and the legislative (the press being the 4th) and thus remains independent of the executive branch. Togo, as a member of the OHADA, has a judicial process that is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable like any other civil actions and are adjudicated in the national court system. A Court of Arbitration and Mediation created in 2011 legally enforces contracts. The main law covering commercial issues is the Investment Code adopted in 2012. In 2013, Togo created three commercial Chambers within the Lomé tribunal with specialized magistrates who have exclusive trial court level jurisdiction over contract enforcement and business disputes. The Investment Code allows the resolution of investment disputes involving foreigners through: (a) bilateral agreements between Togo and the investor’s government; (b) arbitration procedures agreed to between the interested parties; or (c) through the offices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. The OHADA also provides a forum and legal process for resolving legal disputes in 16 African countries. Investment disputes are managed by SEGUCE Togo (Societe d’Exploitation du Guichet Unique pour le Commerce Exterieur), and can be accessed at www.segucetogo.tg Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency for competition-related concerns. The government regularly seeks to improve the framework for public procurement (including professionalizing the public procurement sector, moving procurement online, enacting legislative regulations, etc). The Public Procurement Bill of December 2021 aims to increase transparency and efficiency in the consumption of investment credits. These reforms directly benefit the private sector, which serves as the driver of the National Development Plan (PND) and related Government Roadmap. The government can legally expropriate property through a Presidential decree submitted by the cabinet of ministers and signed by the President. Only two major expropriations of property have taken place in Togo’s history. The first was the February 1974 nationalization of the then French-owned phosphate mines. The second was the November 2014 nationalization of the Hôtel du 2 Février after it had ceased operations for several years. Shortly after the nationalization of the hotel, Togo announced that it was establishing a commission to determine the fair market amount owed as compensation to the hotel’s Libyan owners/investors. Setting aside the case of the Hôtel du 2 Février as an isolated example, there is little evidence to suggest a trend towards expropriation or “creeping expropriation.” The government designed the 2012 Investment Code to protect against government expropriations. There are some claimants from lands expropriated for recent road construction, however, and the procedure to investigate and resolve those claims is slow. Another issue is that land titles are very unclear with traditional and modern systems overlapping. The government has occasionally earmarked land for development with unclear title that has raised complaints from local communities. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Togo is not a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Togo is, however, a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention – also known as the Washington Convention), which it ratified in 1967. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Togo does not have Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States. Togo does not have a history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors, notwithstanding the two historical examples above. There do not appear to be any investment disputes involving U.S. persons from the past ten years. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The dispute resolution alternative is the Court of Arbitration of Togo (CATO), which conforms to standards as established by the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF). Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and there are no known State-Owned Enterprise investment disputes that have gone to the domestic court system. The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) worked with the Government of Togo to improve commercial justice through the strengthening of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The aim of the project was to increase the speed and efficiency of settlement of commercial disputes through the procedures used by the CATO. As a result of the project, 30 new arbitrators and 100 magistrates and professionals received training in mediation/arbitration techniques. Further, the new CATO procedure manual is explicit that the time between filing and judgment shall be a maximum of six months as per article 36 of the ruling procedures. Togo uses the standards set forth under the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). That law states that if bankruptcy occurs, the competent jurisdiction designates an expert that concludes an agreement with creditors and stakeholders (preventive arrangement). The Manager (or managers) can be put under “patrimonial sanctions,” meaning they can be personally liable for the debts of the company. The manager is then forbidden to do business, to manage, administer, or control an enterprise, or hold political or administrative office, for three to ten years. Bankruptcy is criminalized, but generally as a last resort. According to data collected by the World Bank, insolvency proceedings take three years on average and cost approximately 15 percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold off in pieces. The average recovery rate is 27.9 cents on the dollar. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 places Togo at 88 of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator, well above the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average. 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives are available to foreign investors that invest more than $100,000. Incentives include exemption from VAT and Customs Duties on new imported plant and materials, reduced income taxes for up to five years, and depending on the number of permanent jobs created for nationals, reduction on salary taxes during an approved period of time. Incentives are also available in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). With the creation of the High Council of Togolese Abroad (HCTE), Togo wants to mobilize and attract investment from its diaspora. For this, the government has set up a diaspora office, appointed diaspora points of contact in strategic institutions like the Togolese Revenue Office (L’Office Togolais des Recettes – OTR) and the National Employment Agency (ANPE – Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi) and inaugurated the Maison de la Diaspora in November 2021 to assist Togolese expatriates in realizing investment projects. For clean energy investments, while some long-term Power Purchase Agreements and taxation incentives exist, these measures tend to favor firms with a government stake, rather than private investment. The 2011 law modifying the 1989 law creating the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) provides an advantageous taxation scheme for companies based in the EPZ with a reduced tax bill on their profits for their first 20 years of operation, including a five percent tax on profits for the first five years. The law also exempts companies from customs duties and VAT on imported equipment and inputs, as well as an exemption from VAT on goods and services purchased locally. It also provides EPZ companies the freedom to repatriate capital, including dividends and other income. The law also exempts companies within the EPZ from providing workers with many legal protections, including protection against anti-union discrimination with regard to hiring and firing. The National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) is a government agency designed to help accelerate the growth of investments in line with the government road map and boost national and international investments across all sectors. The new operating model of API-ZF is to attract investment, facilitate the installation of investors in Togo, and offer a post-investment service. Togo hopes to leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA / ZLECAF) to facilitate intra-African trade and eliminate customs duties for 90% of goods from other African countries. The trade accord also aims to reduce or eliminate non-tariff impediments such as corruption and border delays and encourage trade facilitation measures. Additionally, UNDP and AfCFTA signed a March 2021 agreement to promote trade as a stimulus for Africa’s socio-economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, especially for women and youth. Firms are required by law to employ Togolese nationals on a priority basis, and after five years foreign workers cannot account for more than 20 percent of the total workforce or of any professional category. In practice, the Togolese government strongly encourages large foreign employers outside of the EPZ to hire as many Togolese nationals as practical. These encouragement schemes do not typically apply to senior management level employees. There are reports that foreigners seeking to legalize their status for long-term work and residence purposes have encountered significant administrative obstacles and delays, although the steps for receiving residence permits are well defined. Issuance of such permits is the responsibility of the National Police. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest and there is no policy on “forced localization.” Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption and there are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are enforced, although nearly 80% of court cases are reported to involve land title disputes. Mortgages and liens exist but land titles are precarious and often subject to litigation. Most land does not have a clear title, especially outside of urban areas. The government is attempting to fix this issue through various commissions that will issue recommendations, but it will take years to resolve. The average time to proceed with property transfer decreased from eight days in 2018 to five days in 2019. All land-related operations are carried out via the government’s “One-Stop Shop” for property transactions (called the Guichet Unique Foncier) at the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR). This “One-Stop Shop” within the OTR simplifies property transfer procedures, reduces administrative costs, and minimizes the risks in the process. The government has reduced the registration fee for property transfer to a 35,000 FCFA ($64) flat fee rather than the previous 4% of market value. The process of issuing a land title now takes only five hours, down from 48 hours in 2018. An independent complaints mechanism exists in the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR). OTR has been set up to deal with land complaints. The office gives itself 48 hours to respond to requests. Since December 10, 2019, all cadastral maps of greater Lomé (2,568 in total) were digitized and are made available in a database. This makes it possible to update the targeted plans and to carry out studies and validation of files at the “Guichet Unique Foncier” (GUF). In Togo, only Togolese citizens, French citizens, foreign governments, and those granted citizenship by the judiciary are allowed to possess real property. Other foreigners must request permission from the Prime Minister, which is usually granted for investors who will develop the land. Land speculation is discouraged by the government. Property legally purchased that remains unoccupied will not be reverted to other owners under the law; however, in practice, unused land that is not protected will likely be occupied or used by others and potentially subject to lengthy court battles to prove ownership. The regional African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and National Institute for Industrial Property and Technology (INPIT) are the two agencies that protect IP in Togo. On November 30, 2020, Togo ratified the Bangui Agreement, which governs intellectual property in the 17 OAPI member states. There are no official figures available on how the country tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. The country may prosecute IPR violations, but there are no known cases. Togo is not listed in USTR’s Special 301 report or in the notorious market report. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Togo and the other West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs. Togo relies on the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Regional Stock Exchange in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to trade equities for Togolese public companies. WAEMU has established a common accounting system, periodic reviews of member countries’ macroeconomic policies based on convergence criteria, a regional stock exchange, and the legal and regulatory framework for a regional banking system. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII and refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms. With sufficient collateral, foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market. The private sector in general has access to a variety of credit instruments when and if collateral is available. The penetration of banking services in the country is low and generally only available in major cities. The government and the banking sector have worked to restore Togo’s reputation as a regional banking center, which was weakened by political upheavals from 1991 to 2005, and several regional and sub-regional banks now operate in Togo, including Orabank, Banque Atlantique, Bank of Africa, NSIA Group, International Bank of Africa in Togo (BIA Togo), and Coris Bank. Additionally, Togo is home to the headquarters of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Development Bank (BOAD – the development bank of the West African Economic and Monetary Union), Oragroup, and Ecobank Transnational Inc. (ETI), the largest independent regional banking group in West Africa and Central Africa, with operations in 36 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The banking sector is generally healthy, and the total assets of Togo’s largest banks are approximately $25-30 billion, including Ecobank, a very large regional bank headquartered in Lomé. Togo’s monetary policy and banking regulations are managed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). No known correspondent relationships were lost in the past four years. No known correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy. Foreign Exchange There are no restrictions on the transfer of funds to other FCFA-zone countries or to France. The transfer of more than FCFA 500,000 (about $1,000) outside the FCFA-zone requires justification documents (e.g. pro forma invoice) to be presented to bank authorities. The exchange system is free of restrictions for payments and transfers for international transactions. Some American investors in Togo have reported long delays (30 – 40 days) in transferring funds from U.S. banks to banks located in Togo. This is reportedly because banks in Togo have limited contacts with U.S. banks to facilitate the transfer of funds. Togo uses the CFA franc (FCFA), which is the common currency of the eight West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. The currency is fixed to the Euro at a rate of 656 FCFA to 1 Euro. As a result of this fixed exchange rate, Togo’s inflation rate is consistently below 2%. Remittance Policies The 2019 Investment Code provides for the free transfer of revenues derived from investments, including the liquidation of investments, by non-residents. Sovereign Wealth Funds Togo does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or other similar entity. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is not officially addressed in Togo by the government, other than as it relates to corruption and criminal activity. RBC and its variants such as “Fair Trade” is known by independent NGOs and businesses which promote these practices and are able to do their work freely. Some American-owned companies follow generally accepted RBC principles and participate in outreach programs to local villages where they supply, among other things, school buildings, water, electricity, and flood abatement resources. In accordance with a law passed in March 2011, new construction projects must now address environmental and social impacts. Togo joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2009 and has been officially recognized as EITI-compliant since 2013. Togo’s EITI Secretariat carries out a yearly verification of financial statements relating to the extractive industry. The Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, Administrative Reform, and Social Protection sets workplace health and safety standards and is responsible for enforcement of all labor laws. There have been no high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights or resolution of such cases in the recent past. Togolese law provides workers, except security forces (including firefighters and police), the right to form and join unions and bargain collectively. There are supporting regulations that allow workers to form and join unions of their choosing. Workers have the right to strike, although striking healthcare workers may be ordered back to work as necessary for the security and well-being of the population. While no provisions in the law protect strikers against employer retaliation, the law requires employers to get a judgment from the labor inspectorate before they fire workers. If firms fire workers illegally, including for union activity, the companies must reinstate the employees and compensate them for lost salary. The law recognizes the right to collective bargaining; representatives of the government, labor unions, and employers negotiate and endorse a nationwide agreement. This collective bargaining agreement sets nationwide wage standards for all formal sector workers. For sectors where the government is not an employer, the government participates in this process as a labor-management mediator. For sectors with a large government presence, including the state-owned companies, the government acts solely as an employer and does not mediate. The government follows OHADA recommended rules and regulations on corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation. Private security companies are present in Togo, but the country is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA). Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Togo seeks unconditional greenhouse gas emissions reductions of 21% below its business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2030, compared to the projected increase in emissions without the new government measures. It has also made a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by an additional 30% by the same date, contingent upon international support and finance. For methane emissions, Togo’s National Plan for the Reduction of Air Pollution and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants projects a 56% reduction in methane emissions by 2040 versus the BAU scenario absent government action. Togo has not set a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions goal and was ranked 37/51 for Middle East/Africa by Climatescope in 2021. Togo’s current National Electrification Strategy aims to provide universal access to electricity by 2030, while increasing the share of renewables in Togo’s energy mix to 50% by the same date by ambitiously rolling out new power plants and off-grid solutions. In 2021, Togo launched one solar and one thermal power plant and has plans for two additional solar plants, 315 mini-grids, and 550,000 solar kits. Togo government has limited capacity to monitor natural capital. The National Agency of Environment Management (Agence Nationale de Gestion de l’Environnement, ANGE) under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry Resources (MERF) enforces environmental regulations, and there has been significant progress over the past two decades in promoting sustainability. While still lacking personnel and equipment, agency technical capabilities are adequate for evaluating environment and social risks for major government projects. Togo is also working to increase the legal weight of environmental standards. A revised public procurement law and new public-private partnership (PPP) both mandate consideration of environment and climate change impact, encouraging low carbon infrastructure projects and incorporation of climate adaption and mitigation measures. 9. Corruption The Togolese government has established several important institutions designed in part to reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for bribery and fraud: the Togolese Revenue Authority (OTR), the One-Stop Shop to create new businesses (CFE), and the Single Window for import/export formalities. In 2015, the Togolese government created the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HAPLUCIA), which the government designed to be an independent institution dedicated to fighting corruption. The government appointed members in 2017. HAPLUCIA encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. HAPLUCIA presented on February 7, 2019 its strategic plan for the period 2019-2023; it set up a toll-free number, the “8277” to receive complaints and denunciations. Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, and to political parties and the government does not interfere in the work of anti-corruption NGOs. In 2011, the government effectively implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption. The government announces procurements weekly in a government publication. Once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication. Other measurable steps toward controlling corruption include joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and establishing public finance control structures and a National Financial Information Processing Unit. Togo signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003 and ratified it on July 6, 2005. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Essohana Wiyao President of HAPLUCIA, the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses Tel. +228 90 21 28 46 / 90 25 77 40 Email: essohanawiyao@yahoo.fr Lomé, Togo Directeur, Anti-Corruption Office Togolais des Recettes (OTR) 41 Rue des Impôts 02 BP 20823 Lomé, Togo +228 – 22 53 14 00 otr@otr.tg Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Samuel Kaninda Regional Coordinator, West Africa Transparency International Alt-Moabit 96 10559 Berlin Germany +49 30 3438 20 773 skaninda@transparency.org 10. Political and Security Environment After a period of political instability and economic stagnation from 1990 to 2007, the government started the country along a gradual path to political reconciliation and democratic reform. Togo has held multiple presidential, legislative, and local elections that were deemed generally free and fair by international observers, though the most recent legislative elections were boycotted by the majority of the opposition. Political reconciliation has moved slowly. A political crisis erupted in 2017 regarding the failure of the government to implement political measures, such as presidential term limits. After international facilitation between the government and opposition parties, in May 2019 the government implemented non-retroactive term limits and a two-round election system. The government held local elections in 2019, the first since 1986. President Faure Gnassingbe was elected for a fourth term on February 22, 2020 in a peaceful election. Political protests still occur on occasion and can often lead to tire burning, stone throwing, and government responses include the use of tear gas and other crowd control techniques. There are no known examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations pertaining to foreign investment due to political violence. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The labor market is predominately unskilled and there is a shortage of skilled labor and English-speaking employees. Some migrant farm workers arrive from Ghana and Benin based on familial ties. Widespread underemployment exists, and an estimated 3 million workers participate in the informal economy, which motors the economy. In general, government labor policy favors employment of nationals. Regulations require that firms hire workers with time specific contracts that include severance requirements. The labor code, and regulations called the “Convention Collective” differentiate between layoffs and firings, but both require severance payments. Free Trade zones offer different labor law provisions to encourage investment. Public employee unions (teacher, judicial clerks, etc) use collective bargaining, and are willing to take to the streets in non-violent protest to raise the profile of their demands. Labor disputes are often resolved on an ad-hoc basis, usually with the intervention of parliamentarians. Togo adopted a new Labor Code on December 29, 2020, replacing the 2006 code. The new code has increased social protection measures, requires employers to register employees with the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and introduces severance pay and precarious work premiums. At the same time, it provides greater flexibility in the labor market by allowing for a variety of contract types depending on a company’s activities (e.g. seasonal labor, project-based contracts, telework). Finally, the new code allows the government to favor disadvantaged geographic areas and social groups. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A NA 2020 $7.575 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $350 2017 $0 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $0 2017 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 8.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey – Data by Economy – IMF Data Note: U.S. based ContourGlobal built a 100 megawatt power plant in Togo in 2010. This FDI is not recorded in official U.S. government statistics. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 2,302 100% Total Outward 5,312 100% South Africa 943 41% Niger 1,763 33% Qatar 546 24% Benin 561 11% Cyprus 138 6% Gambia 541 10% Côte d’Ivoire 112 5% Sao Tome & Principe 444 8% Gibraltar 83 4% Côte d’Ivoire 428 8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information Political-Economic Section U.S. Embassy, Lomé 4332 Blvd Eyadéma – BP 852, Lomé, Togo +228 2261 5470, ext 4466 togocommercial@state.gov Trinidad and Tobago Executive Summary Trinidad and Tobago (TT) is a high-income developing country with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $15,425 and an annual GDP of $21.6 billion (2020). It has the largest economy in the English-speaking Caribbean and is the third most populous country in the region with 1.4 million inhabitants. The International Monetary Fund predicts GDP for 2022 will increase by 5.4 percent as the economy rebounds following the economic impact of COVID-19 mitigation. TT’s investment climate is generally open and most investment barriers have been eliminated, but stifling bureaucracy and opaque procedures remain. Energy exploration and production drive TT’s economy. This sector has historically attracted the most foreign direct investment. The energy sector usually accounts for approximately half of GDP and 80 percent of export earnings. Petrochemicals and steel are other sectors accounting for significant foreign investment. Since the economy is tethered to the energy sector, it is particularly vulnerable to fluctuating prices for hydrocarbons and petrochemicals. Since the last ICS, TT has rolled back several pandemic-related measures that affected the investment climate including reopening borders to air travel; ending the state of emergency that only permitted essential services to operate; reopening the hospitality and entertainment sector to vaccinated individuals; and reopening schools. TT is working towards implementing its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Climate Agreement through 15 percent reduction is emissions from power generation (including by the ongoing construction of utility-scale renewable power generation plants), public transportation (through the conversion to compressed natural gas as a fuel, and development of an e-mobility policy) and industry by 2030. The TT government (GoTT) is developing policies on carbon capture and storage, but this technology has been predominantly used to inject carbon into hydrocarbon reservoirs for greater output. There are no significant risks to responsibly doing business in areas such as labor and human rights. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 82 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 97 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $ 4,974 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 15,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoTT seeks foreign direct investment and has traditionally welcomed U.S. investors. The U.S. Mission is not aware of laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, but some have seen the decision-making process for tenders and the subsequent awarding of contracts turn opaque without warning, especially when their interests compete with those of well-connected local firms. InvesTT is the country’s investment promotion agency that assists investors through the process of setting up a non-energy business and provides aftercare services once established. Specifically, it provides market information, offers advice on accessing investment incentives, assists with regulatory and registry issues, and provides property and location services. It also assists with general problem solving and advocacy to the government. While TT prioritizes investment retention, the U.S. Mission is not aware of a formal, ongoing dialogue with investors, either through an Ombudsman or formal business roundtable. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership. Under the Foreign Investment Act of 1990, a foreign investor is permitted to own 100 percent of the share capital in a private company. A license is required to own more than a 30 percent of a public company. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any sector-specific restrictions or limitations applied to U.S. investors. TT maintains an investment screening mechanism for foreign investment related to specific projects that have been submitted for the purpose of accessing sector-specific incentives, such as for those offered in the tourism industry. Information on criteria to access the development incentives are listed in various legislative acts such as the Tourism Development Act of 2001. The World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review for TT in 2019: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp488_e.htm The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre noted concerns about the expansion of Chinese investment in TT in 2019. The GoTT’s business facilitation efforts focus primarily on investor services (helping deal with rules and procedures) through its investment promotion agency and is attempting to make the rules more transparent and predictable overall. However, more work needs to be done to achieve efficient administrative procedures and dispute resolution. TT ranks 158th of 190 countries for registering property, 174th for enforcing contracts, and 160th for payment of taxes in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, representing a deterioration of indicators that reflect a difficulty of doing business. The business registration website is: www.ttbizlink.gov.tt . In 2022, the Global Enterprise Registration Network (GER) gives the TT business registration website an above-average score of 8.5 out of 10 for its single electronic window, and a below average score of 4 out of 10 for providing information on how to register a business ( http://www .TTconnect.gov.tt ). While the process is clear, the inability to make online payments and submit online certificate requests are the two primary reasons for the low score. A feedback mechanism allowing users to communicate with authorities is a strength of the TT business registration website. Foreign companies can use the website and business registration requires completion of seven procedures over a period of 10 days. The agencies with which a company must typically register include: Companies Registry, Ministry of Legal Affairs Board of Inland Revenue National Insurance Board; and Value Added Tax (VAT Office, Board of Inland Revenue) The GoTT does not promote or incentivize outward investment. The GoTT does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Through the TT Fair Trading Commission, the GoTT develops transparent policies and effective laws to foster market-based competition on a non-discriminatory basis and establishes “clear rules of the game.” Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist within the ministries and regulatory agencies at the national level. The government consults frequently, but not always, with international agencies and business associations in developing regulations. The GoTT submits draft regulations to parliament for approval. The process is the same for each ministry. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. International financial reporting standards are required for domestic public companies. The GoTT promotes but does not require companies’ environmental, social and corporate governance disclosures to facilitate transparency to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Proposed laws and regulations are often published in draft form electronically for public review at http://www.ttparliament.org/ , though there is no legal obligation to do so. The GoTT often solicits private sector and business community comments on proposed legislation, although there is no timeframe for the length of a consultation period when it happens, nor is reporting mandatory on the consultations. All draft bills and regulations are printed in the official gazette and other websites: www.news.gov.tt/content/e-gazette# www.ric.org.tt; www.ttparliament.org The U.S. Mission is not aware of an oversight or enforcement mechanism that ensures that the GoTT follows administrative processes. There has not been any announcement regarding reforms to the regulatory system, including enforcement, since the last ICS report. Regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years, such as the mechanism to calculate and collect property tax and the establishment of the revenue authority, have not been fully implemented. Establishment of the revenue authority is intended to increase collections and streamline the system for paying taxes. At present, regulatory enforcement mechanisms are usually a combination of moral suasion and the use of applicable administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. The enforcement process is not legally reviewable. Regulation is usually reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. Scientific studies or quantitative analyses are not made publicly available. Public comments received by regulators are generally not made public. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and publicly available on the central bank website: https://www.central-bank.org.tt TT is not a part of a regional economic block, although it participates in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional trading bloc that gives duty-free access to member goods, free movement to some CARICOM nationals, and establishes common treatment of non-members on specific issues. The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is an initiative currently being explored by CARICOM that would eventually integrate its member-states into a single economic unit. When fully completed, the CSME would succeed CARICOM. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally consistent with United Kingdom standards. The GoTT has not consistently notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. TT’s legal system is based on English common law. Contracts are legally enforced through the court system. The country has a written commercial law. There are few specialized courts and resolution of legal claims is time consuming. An industrial court exclusively handles cases relating to labor practices but also suffers from severe backlogs and is widely seen to favor claimants. Civil cases of less than $2,250 are heard by the Magistrate’s Court. Matters exceeding that amount are heard in the High Court of Justice, which can grant equitable relief. There is no court or division of a court dedicated solely to hearing commercial cases. TT’s judicial system is independent of the executive, and the judicial process is competent, procedurally and substantively fair, and reliable, although very slow. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, TT ranks 174 of 190 in ease of enforcing contracts and its court system requires 1,340 days to resolve a contract claim, nearly double the Latin American and Caribbean regional average. Decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal in the first instance. The United Kingdom Privy Council Judicial Committee is the final court of appeal. TT’s judicial system respects the sanctity of contracts and generally provides a level playing field for foreign investors involved in court matters. Due to the backlog of cases, however, there can be major delays in the process. It is imperative that foreign investors seek competent local legal counsel. Some U.S. companies are hesitant to pursue legal remedies, preferring to attempt good faith negotiations in order to avoid an acrimonious relationship that could harm their interests in the country’s small, tight-knit business community. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment providing relevant laws, rules, and procedures. Useful websites to help navigate foreign investment laws, rules, and procedures include: http://www.legalaffairs.gov.tt https://www.rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt http://www.tradeind.gov.tt https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/46/trinidad-and-tobago-foreign-investment-act The TT Fair Trading Commission is an independent statutory agency responsible for promoting and maintaining fair competition in the domestic market. It is tasked with investigating the various forms of anti-competitive business conduct set out in the Fair-Trading Act. No cases that involve foreign investment have arisen in the past 12 months. The agency adheres to fair and transparent norms and procedures. The agency’s decisions can be appealed to the judicial system. The GoTT can legally expropriate property based on the needs of the country and only after due process including adequate compensation generally based on market value. Various pieces of legislation make provisions for compulsory licensing in the interest of public health or intellectual property rights. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any direct or indirect expropriation actions since the 1980s. All prior expropriations were compensated to the satisfaction of the parties involved. Energy sector contacts occasionally describe the tax regime as confiscatory, pointing to after-the-fact withdrawal or weakening of tax incentives offered to entice investment once investment occurs. Claimants did not allege a lack of due process in prior expropriation cases. Creditors have the right to be notified within 10 days of the appointment of a receiver and to receive a final report, a statement of accounts, and an assessment of claim. Claims of secured creditors are prioritized under the Bankruptcy Act. No distinction is made between foreign and domestic creditors or contract holders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The World Bank ranked TT 83rd out of 190 countries in resolving insolvency in its Doing Business 2020 report. This reflects TT’s recovery rate (cents on the dollar), which is worse than the regional average, and cost as a percentage of estate. 4. Industrial Policies Investment incentives include the following: exemption from import duties and customs duties; tax credits and deferrals; cash refunds; carry-over of losses; and access to loans. These are available equally to foreign and domestic investors, but delays in cash refund payments are a frequent complaint of those due them. There are no specific incentives for underrepresented investors such as women. Additional information is available on the following websites: https://www.finance.gov.tt/mof-investment-incentives-in-trinidad-and-tobago/ http://www.investt.com The GoTT sometimes jointly finances foreign direct investment projects, but it is not common. The Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries continues to work on a Feed in Tariff (FIT) policy and a FIT Implementation plan under the Global Climate Change Alliance+ initiative. The Free Zones Act of 1988 (last amended in 1997) established the TT Free Zones Company (TTFZ) to promote export development and encourage both foreign and local investment projects in a relatively bureaucracy-free, duty-free, and tax-free environment. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as TT entities. There are currently 15 approved enterprises located in 12 free zones. Three are located within a multiple-user site in north-central Trinidad. The Minister of Trade and Industry can designate any suitable area in TT as a free zone. Free zone enterprises are exempt from customs duties on capital goods, parts, and raw materials for use in the construction and equipping of premises and in connection with the approved activity; import and export licensing requirements; land and building taxes; work permit fees; foreign currency and property ownership restrictions; capital gains taxes; withholding taxes on distribution of profits and corporation taxes or levies on sales or profits; VAT on goods supplied to a free zone; and duty on vehicles for use only within the free zone. A corporation tax exemption for entities that qualify for free zone status is also in force. Application to carry out an approved activity in an existing free zone area is made on specified forms to the TTFZ. Free zone activities that qualify for approval include manufacturing for export, international trading in products, services for export, and development and management of free zones. Activities that may be carried on in a free zone but do not qualify as approved activities include exploration and production activities involving petroleum, natural gas, or petrochemicals. For more information, please review the following website: http://ttfzco.com/ The TT Special Economic Zones Bill, 2021, was passed in the Parliament in January 2022. The legislation will result in the creation of a Special Economic Zone Authority. The act will take effect upon proclamation by the President of TT (no date has been set). The GoTT does not mandate – although it strongly encourages through negotiable incentives – projects that generate employment and foreign exchange; provide training and/or technology transfer; boost exports or reduce imports; have local content; and generally contribute to the welfare of the country. The GoTT does not mandate that Trinbagonian nationals be recruited to senior management and boards of directors. Several foreign firms have encountered inconsistencies leading to long delays in the issuance of long-term work permits, but there are no explicit, onerous requirements. There are no government/authority-imposed conditions on permission to invest. There are no forced localization requirements. There are no performance requirements, and thus no enforcement procedures. There is no indication of an intention to implement across-the-board performance requirements. Investment incentives are uniform for domestic and foreign investors but offered on a case-by-case, vice across-the-board, basis. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There are no measures that prevent or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. There are no rules on local data storage within TT. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and interests are enforced in court. Mortgages and liens exist. TT has a dual system of land titles, the old common law system and the registered land title system governed by the Real Property Act of 1946. Nearly 80 percent of land in TT remains under the more complicated common law system, which is not reliable for recording secured interests. The Foreign Investment Act of 1990 governs the acquisition of any interest in land by foreign investors. It states that foreign investors wishing to acquire land larger than five acres must obtain a license from the Ministry of Finance. Licenses are generally granted in practice per the criteria provided here: https://www.finance.gov.tt/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/51.pdf . It is not clear what proportion of land does not have clear title. The GoTT does not make a defined effort to identify property owners and register land titles. Property ownership can revert to squatters if they can prove exclusive possession of another’s land, without permission, for at least 16 years in the case of private lands and 30 years on State lands. The process of protecting intellectual property involves applying for and registering patents, trademarks, or designs. TT’s intellectual property rights (IPR) legal structure is strong, but enforcement is generally weak. Infringement on rights and theft is common. TT is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In 2020, TT acceded to the Madrid Protocol on Trademarks. Implementing regulations remain in drafting for the 2000 Patent Law Treaty and the Hague Agreement on Industrial Designs. TT does not track seizures of counterfeit goods. At its May 2019 WTO Trade Policy Review, it reported one seizure in 2018. TT has prosecuted IPR violations in the past, but such prosecutions are uncommon. TT is listed in the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report Watch List for 2021. Challenges concern widespread copyright infringement and the country’s lack of institutional commitment to enforce IPR. TT is not included in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The GoTT welcomes foreign portfolio investment. TT has its own stock market and has an established regulatory framework to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. There is enough liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The GoTT and the Central Bank of TT respect IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payment and transfers for current international transactions. Shortages of foreign exchange, exacerbated by the government’s maintenance of the local currency at values higher than those which the market would bear, however, cause considerable delays in payments and transfers for international transactions. A full range of credit instruments is available to the private sector. There are no restrictions on borrowing by foreign investors who are able to access credit. Credit is allocated on market terms, but interest rates tend to be higher for foreign borrowers. Banking services are widespread throughout urban areas, but penetration is significantly lower in rural areas. Although the banking sector is healthy and well-capitalized, the IMF in its 2020 Financial Stability Assessment Program noted TT’s banks are exposed to sovereign risk and potential liquidity risks stemming from non-bank financial entities in the group. The financial system overall faces risks of increasing household debt, a lack of supervisory independence and out-of-date regulatory frameworks, the sovereign-bank nexus and the absence of a macro-prudential toolkit, and contagion risks between investment funds and banks. The report further states the financial sector legislation and regulation have not kept pace with international best practice. The supervisors operate with guidelines in key areas instead of binding powers, which limits their authority In December 2021, the estimated total assets of TT’s largest banks was $23.1 billion. TT has a central bank system. Foreign banks may establish operations in TT provided they obtain a license from the central bank. TT has lost correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any current correspondent banking relationships that are in jeopardy. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The value of TT’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Heritage and Stabilization Fund, as of September 2021 is approximately $5.6 billion. The fund invests in U.S. short duration fixed income, U.S. core domestic fixed income, U.S. core domestic equities, and non-U.S. core international equities. The SWF follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles. TT participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. None of the SWF is invested domestically. There are no potentially negative ramifications for U.S. investors in the local market. 7. State-Owned Enterprises TT has 55 SOEs comprised of 43 wholly owned companies, eight majority-owned, and four in which the government has a minority share. SOEs are in the energy, manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, financial services, transportation, and communication sectors. Information on the total assets of SOEs, total net income of SOEs and number of people employed by SOEs is not available. The Investments Division of the Ministry of Finance appoints directors to the boards of state enterprises, reportedly at the direction of the Minister of Finance. SOEs are often informally or explicitly obligated to consult with government officials before making major business decisions. According to TT’s constitution, the government is entitled to: exercise control directly or indirectly over the affairs of the enterprise appoint a majority of directors of the board of directors of the enterprise; and hold at least 50 per cent of the ordinary share capital of the enterprise. A published list of SOEs for 2022 can be found here: https://www.finance.gov.tt/2021/10/04/https-www-finance-gov-tt-wp-content-uploads-2021-10-state-enterprises-investment-programme-seip-2022-pdf/ In sectors that are open to both the private sector and foreign competition, SOEs are sometimes favored for government contracts, which might negatively impact U.S. investors in the market. The country has not adhered to the OECD corporate governance guidelines for SOEs. TT does not have a privatization program in place, but the GoTT has issued initial public offerings of various state-owned companies to obtain revenue, primarily in the finance and energy sectors. Foreign investors can participate in the initial public offerings of SOEs. The purchase of initial public offering shares on past occasions was open to the public, easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. For example: https://ngc.co.tt/media/news/ngl-initial-public-offering-brokerage-details/ 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is general awareness of expectations of, and standards for, responsible business conduct (RBC), including obligations to proactively conduct due diligence to ensure businesses are doing no harm, including with regards to environmental, social, and governance issues. The GoTT has not put forward a clear definition of responsible business conduct, nor does it have specific policies to promote and encourage it. The GoTT has not conducted a national action plan on RBC, nor does it currently factor it into procurement decisions. There are five reports of forced labor in the last 12 months. There are no reported claims in the last five years by indigenous or other communities that a government entity improperly allocated land or natural resources. There have not been any high-profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights. TT has laws to ensure protection of human rights, labor rights, consumers, and the environment. Enforcement, however, is lacking due to staffing shortages, capacity issues, and a bureaucratic judiciary. The GoTT, in collaboration with civil society, created the TT Corporate Governance Code, which incorporates governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. The code, however, is not mandatory. The Caribbean Corporate Governance Institute is a not-for-profit organization headquartered in TT that freely advocates for responsible business conduct and improved corporate governance practices in the Caribbean. The GoTT does not encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. There are no domestic measures requiring supply chain due diligence for companies sourcing minerals originating from conflict-affected areas. As a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the GoTT publicly declares annually all revenues received from companies engaged in the extractive industries. The companies, in turn, publicly declare payments to the government. TT is not a signatory of the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. 9. Corruption Various pieces of legislation address corruption of public officials: The Integrity in Public Life Act requires public officials to disclose assets upon taking office and at the end of tenure. The Freedom of Information Act gives members of the public a general right (with specified exceptions) of access to public authorities’ official documents. The intention of the act was to address the public’s concerns of corruption and to promote a system of open and good governance. In compliance with the act, designated officers in each ministry and statutory authority process applications for information. The Police Complaints Authority Act establishes a mechanism for complaints against police officers in relation to, among other things, police misconduct and police corruption. The Prevention of Corruption Act provides for certain offences and punishment of corruption in public office. The laws are non-discriminatory in their infrequent application. Effectiveness of these measures has been limited by a lack of thorough enforcement. These laws do not extend to family members of officials or to political parties. TT does not have laws or regulations to counter conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. The GoTT has been a party to the development of corporate governance standards (non-binding) to encourage private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies, particularly the larger firms, use internal controls and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials, although this is not a government requirement. TT adheres to the UN Anticorruption Convention. There are no protections for NGOs involved in investigating corruption, but investigations are not feared since corrupt actors are rarely punished. U.S. firms often say corruption is an obstacle to FDI, particularly in government procurement, since TT’s procurement processes are not transparent. 10. Political and Security Environment While non-violent demonstrations occasionally occur, widespread civil disorder is not typical. There have been no serious incidents of political violence since a coup attempt in 1990. Subsequent to the closure of state oil firm Petrotrin in November 2018, which resulted in the lay-off of nearly 6,000 workers, there were reports of damage to installations. Certain areas of TT are increasingly insecure due to a critical level of violent crime. 11. Labor Policies and Practices The labor market includes many skilled and experienced workers, and the educational level of the population is among the top 10 in North America, according to the Human Development Index, although there is a gap between official literacy statistics and functional literacy. In 2020, the International Labor Organization’s estimate of unemployment was 4.5 percent, while youth unemployment rate (15-24 years of age) was estimated at 11.17 percent in 2020. Information on the informal economy is not widely available. Agricultural employment accounts for 3.6 percent of total employment while employment in services accounts for over 60 percent. The estimated non-agricultural workforce in the informal economy is 10 percent of the overall labor force. TT’s workforce includes not only TT nationals but also citizens of 11 other CARICOM countries as part of the free movement of labor without the need to obtain a work permit. In 2019, TT granted 16,523 Venezuelan refugees and migrants the right to work in the country for a period of one year under a temporary protective status. In 2021, the GoTT allowed registered Venezuelan refugees a one-year extension of status. Some members of the business community have indicated that many migrant workers have returned to their countries of origin due to the unavailability of job opportunities following the pandemic related closures. TT is a net importer of expatriate labor, including doctors, nurses, construction workers, and extractive industry specialists. There are surpluses of accountants and attorneys and shortages of unskilled workers for the hospitality, retail, and agriculture sectors. The GoTT subsidizes tertiary-level education for citizens whose income falls within a minimum range. The Multi-Sector Skills Training Program provides training in construction and hospitality and tourism for eligible citizens of TT. The GoTT also encourages continuing learning opportunities for the disadvantaged via the Skills Training Program, which develops skills that can aid in the creation of home-based production of goods and services and employment generation. There is no government policy requiring hiring of nationals, although it is encouraged, particularly in the energy sector. There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions via severance. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. The Retrenchment and Severance Benefits Act provides guidance entitlements based on specific circumstances. Severance pay is usually only paid to retirees and workers who have been made redundant. An employer is not required to pay severance to workers if everyone is severed, since the business is being closed. However, if only a portion of the workforce is rendered redundant, the employer must pay severance. Unemployment insurance does not exist for workers who have been laid off for economic reasons, but programs designed to help job seekers get employed as quickly as possible are available. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government instituted a 3-6-month unemployment benefit program for those laid off. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. There are no separate labor law provisions for special economic zones, trade zones, or free ports. Collective bargaining is common, with approximately 15 percent of the population covered by collective bargaining agreements. Government workers, including civil servants, police officers, firefighters, military personnel, and staff in several state-owned enterprises, are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Unions are also quite active in the energy, steel, and telecommunications industries. Collective bargaining takes place between the firm and the recognized majority union rather than on an industry-wide basis. The government as an employer also bargains collectively. The process of collective bargaining is regulated by the Industrial Relations Act. There are close to 30 active, independent labor unions in TT. The Industrial Relations Act provides for dispute resolution through an industrial court in instances where the issue cannot be resolved by collective bargaining or through conciliation efforts by the Ministry of Labor. There was no strike in the past year that posed an investment risk. The International Labor Organization has not identified any compliance gaps in law or practice regarding international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors. The GoTT does not have a labor inspectorate system to identify and remediate labor violations, but the industrial court investigates and prosecutes unfair labor practices, such as harassment and/or improper dismissal of union members. There were no new labor related laws or regulations enacted or in draft over the last year. 14. Contact for More Information Valerie Laboy Economic-Commercial Officer 15 Queen’s Park West Port of Spain, TT +1 (868) 622-6371 ext. 5926 poscommercial@state.gov Tunisia Executive Summary In 2021, Tunisia’s economy continued to be heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite a loosening of containment measures from those in place in 2020, Tunisia’s GDP grew by 3.1 percent in 2021 after a record contraction of 8.8 percent in 2020. The country still faces high unemployment, high inflation, and rising levels of public debt, in addition to a shortage of staple food products and low tourism revenues due to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied took “exceptional measures” under Article 80 of the constitution to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift the immunity of members of parliament. On August 23, Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period and on September 22, he issued a decree granting the president certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two, which guarantee rights and freedoms. Civil society organizations and multiple political parties raised concern that through these decrees President Saied granted himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, she formed a government. On December 13, Saied announced a timeline for constitutional reforms including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. On March 30, 2022, the President issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Before the pandemic and President Saied’s decisions on July 25, successive governments had advanced some much-needed structural reforms to improve Tunisia’s business climate, including an improved bankruptcy law, investment code, an initial “negative list,” a law enabling public-private partnerships, and a supplemental law designed to improve the investment climate. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) encouraged entrepreneurship through the passage of the Start-Up Act in June 2018. The GOT passed a new budget law in January 2019 that ensures greater budgetary transparency and makes the public aware of government investment projects over a three-year period. These reforms are intended to help Tunisia attract both foreign and domestic investment. Nevertheless, substantial bureaucratic barriers to investment remain and additional economic reforms have yet to be achieved. State-owned enterprises play a large role in Tunisia’s economy, and some sectors are not open to foreign investment. The informal sector, estimated at 40 to 60 percent of the overall economy, remains problematic, as legitimate businesses are forced to compete with smuggled goods. Due to a growing budget deficit, the GOT sought international lending support in 2021. In February 2022, high-level discussions on economic reforms and government spending cuts were held between the GOT and the IMF, in the hopes of reaching an agreement on an IMF lending package. Such a program would likely include structural reforms. Tunisia’s strengths include its proximity to Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East; preferential or free-trade agreements with the EU and much of Africa; an educated workforce; and a strong interest in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Sectors such as agribusiness, aerospace, infrastructure, renewable energy (notably green hydrogen), telecommunication technologies, and services remain promising. The decline in the value of the dinar over recent years has strengthened investment and export activity in the electronic component manufacturing and textile sectors. Since 2011, the United States has provided more than $500 million in economic growth-related assistance, in addition to loan guarantees in 2012, 2014, and 2016 that enabled the GOT to borrow nearly $1.5 billion at low interest. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 71 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 258 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,300 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOT has made efforts to improve the business climate and attract FDI. The GOT prioritizes attracting and retaining investment, particularly in the underdeveloped interior regions, and reducing unemployment by providing tax breaks, subsidizing social security fee contributions for new hires, and offering investment bonuses. However, government policies have not always yielded the anticipated flow of foreign investment in the country, and political developments have had a mitigating effect. More than 3,700 foreign companies currently operate in Tunisia, and the government has historically encouraged export-oriented FDI in key sectors such as call centers, electronics, aerospace and aeronautics, automotive parts, textile and apparel, leather and shoes, agro-food, and other light manufacturing. Through the first half of 2021, the sectors that attracted the most FDI were electrical and electronic (31.3 percent), energy (29 percent), services (10 percent), mechanical (8.2 percent), and agro-food (7.4 percent). Inadequate infrastructure in the interior regions results in the concentration of foreign investment in the capital city of Tunis and its suburbs (54.7 percent), the northern coastal region (20 percent), the eastern coastal region (18.8 percent), and the northwest region (5.7 percent). Internal western and southern regions attracted only 0.8 percent of foreign investment despite special tax incentives for those regions. The Tunisian Parliament passed an Investment Law (#2016-71) in September 2016 that went into effect April 1, 2017 to encourage the responsible regulation of investments. The law provided for the creation of three major institutions: The High Investment Council, whose mission is to implement legislative reforms set out in the investment law and decide on incentives for projects of national importance (defined as investment projects of more than 50 million dinars ($17.9 million) and 500 jobs). The Tunisian Investment Authority, whose mission is to manage investment projects of more than 15 million dinars ($5.4 million) and up to 50 million dinars ($17.9 million). Investment projects of less than 15 million dinars ($5.4 million) are managed by the Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII). The Tunisian Investment Fund, which funds foreign investment incentive packages. These institutions were all launched in 2017. However, the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) continues to be Tunisia’s principal agency to promote foreign investment. FIPA is a one-stop shop for foreign investors. It provides information on investment opportunities, advice on the appropriate conditions for success, assistance and support during the creation and implementation of the project, and contact facilitation and advocacy with other government authorities. Under the 2016 Investment Law (article 7), foreign investors have the same rights and obligations as Tunisian investors. Tunisia encourages dialogue with investors through FIPA offices throughout the country. Foreign investment is classified into two categories: “Offshore” investment is defined as commercial entities in which foreign capital accounts for at least 66 percent of equity, and at least 70 percent of the production is destined for the export market. However, investments in some sectors can be classified as “offshore” with lower foreign equity shares. Foreign equity in the agricultural sector, for example, cannot exceed 66 percent and foreign investors cannot directly own agricultural land, but agricultural investments can still be classified as “offshore” if they meet the export threshold. “Onshore” investment caps foreign equity participation at a maximum of 49 percent in most non-industrial projects. “Onshore” industrial investment may have 100 percent foreign equity, subject to government approval. Pursuant to the 2016 Investment Law (article 4), a list of sectors outlining which investment categories are subject to government authorization (the “negative list”) was set by decree no. 417 of May 11, 2018. The sectors include natural resources; construction materials; land, sea and air transport; banking, finance, and insurance; hazardous and polluting industries; health; education; and telecommunications. The decree specified the deadline to respond to authorization requests for most government agencies and fixed a deadline of 60 days for all other government decision-making bodies not specifically mentioned in the decree. The decree went into effect on July 1, 2018. In June 2021, the government announced the elimination of government authorization requirements for 27 business activities in various sectors, about 10 percent of the total authorization categories. The change allows foreign and local investors to open businesses under conditions detailed in books of specifications without waiting for a government license. The action is meant to revive an economy heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and boost investment in sectors such as tourism, transportation, finance, and renewable energy. For example, government authorizations are no longer required for business ventures such as the opening of shopping malls and supermarkets, operation of certain aircraft for tourism and leisure activities, management of financial portfolios by non-resident companies, organization of sporting events, cement manufacturing, self-production of electricity from renewable energies under 1 megawatt, import and marketing of films, sale and distribution of tobacco and alcohol, and import of used clothes. While the government decree has yet to be published, the elimination of authorization categories will likely improve Tunisia’s investment climate. The WTO completed a Trade Policy Review for Tunisia in July 2016. The report is available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp441_e.htm . The OECD completed an Investment Policy Review for Tunisia in November 2012. The report is available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/tunisia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm . The list of Tunisia’s environmental conflicts on Environmental Justice Atlas is available at https://ejatlas.org/country/tunisia In May 2019, the Tunisian Parliament adopted law 2019-47, a cross-cutting law that impacts legislation across all sectors. The law is designed to improve the country’s business climate. The law simplified the process of creating a business, permitted new methods of finance, improved regulations for corporate governance, and provided the private sector the right to operate a project under the framework of a public-private partnership (PPP). This legislation and previous investment laws are all referenced on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/221/tunisia . The Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII) and the Tunisia Investment Authority (TIA) are the focal point for business registration. Online project declaration for industry or service sector projects for both domestic and foreign investment is available at: www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=16&mrub=122 . The 2019 new online TIA platform allows potential investors to electronically declare the creation, extension, and renewal of all types of investment projects. The platform also allows investors to incorporate new businesses, request special permits, and apply for investment and tax incentives. https://www.tia.gov.tn/ . APII has attempted to simplify the business registration process by creating a one-stop shop that offers registration of legal papers with the tax office, court clerk, official Tunisian gazette, and customs. This one-stop shop also houses consultants from the Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Employment, National Social Security Authority (CNSS), postal service, Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Trade and Export Development. Registration may face delays as some agencies may have longer internal processes. Prior to registration, a business must first initiate an online declaration of intent, to which APII provides a notification of receipt within 24 hours. For agriculture and fisheries, business registration information can be found on the Agricultural Investment Promotion Agency’s (APIA) website: www.apia.com.tn . In February 2022, APIA announced the establishment of a 100% online investment declaration service for Tunisian and foreign investors in agricultural projects. The online service provides investors with an electronic investment declaration certificate (in PDF format) authenticated by a QR code. The service is accessible through “Espace Promoteur” (apia.com.tn) In the tourism industry, companies must register with the National Office for Tourism at: http://www.tourisme.gov.tn/en/investing/administrative-services.html . The central points of contact for established foreign investors and companies are the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA): https://www.tia.gov.tn/en and the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA): http://www.investintunisia.tn . The GOT does not incentivize outward investment, and capital transfer abroad is tightly controlled by the Central Bank. 3. Legal Regime The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied invoked Article 80 of the constitution and took “exceptional measures” to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift immunity for members of parliament. On August 23, President Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period, and on September 22, issued a decree granting himself certain executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and the authority to rule by decree, subject to rights guaranteed in the constitution. Civil society organizations criticized the president for granting himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without institutional checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, President Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11 she formed a government composed of 24 ministers and one secretary of state. On December 13, President Saied announced a timeline including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. According to local polling, the measures were broadly popular, although some civil society groups and political parties expressed concern regarding the lack of transparency and inclusivity of Saied’s actions. On March 30, the President issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. After adoption, all laws, decrees, and regulations are published on the website of the Official Gazette and enforced by the Government at the national level. The Government has historically taken few proactive steps to raise public awareness of the public consultation period for new draft laws and decrees. Civil society, NGOs, and political parties have pushed for increased transparency and inclusiveness in rulemaking. Many draft bills, such as the budget law, were reviewed before submission for a final vote under pressure from civil society. Business associations, chambers of commerce, unions, and political parties reviewed the 2016 Investment Law prior to final adoption. In January 2019, the Tunisian Parliament passed the Organic Budget Law, which is a foundational law defining the parameters for the government’s annual budgeting process. The law aims to bring the budget process in line with principles expressed in the 2014 constitution by enlarging Parliament’s role in the budgetary process and strengthening the financial autonomy of the legislative and judiciary branches. The law requires the government to organize its budget by policy objective, detail budget projections over a three-year timeframe, and revise its accounting system to ensure greater transparency. Due to the freezing of the Tunisian Parliament as of July 25, 2021, Tunisia’s 2022 budget law was passed directly through Presidential decree law #2021-21 on December 28, 2021. In May 2020, the government adopted decree #2020-316, establishing simplified conditions and procedures for granting project concessions and their monitoring based on a new public-private partnership (PPP) approach. The decree aims to further promote investment by young entrepreneurs (under the age of 35) and projects of all sizes, including those less than 15 million dinars ($5.5 million). Not all accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are in line with international standards. Publicly listed companies adhere to national accounting norms. Prior to July 25, the Parliament had oversight authority over the GOT but could not ensure that all administrative processes are followed. Following the exceptional measures implemented by President Saied on July 25 suspending Parliament, the Council of Ministers led by President Saied and at times, Prime Minister Bouden, have deliberated and approved decree laws. On March 30, President Saied issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Parliament will be established following legislative elections in December 2022. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance for Tunisia are available here: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/tunisia . Tunisia is a member of the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance: http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/tunisia . Prior to July 25, most of Tunisia’s public finances and debt obligations were debated and voted on by the Parliament. Since July 25, the Council of Ministers has discussed and approved Tunisia’s finances. In general, Tunisia promotes companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency but does not require it. As part of its negotiations toward a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the EU, the GOT is considering incorporating a number of EU standards in its domestic regulations. Tunisia became a member of the WTO in 1995 and is required to notify the WTO regarding draft technical regulations on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, in October 2018 the Ministry of Commerce released a circular that temporarily restricted the import of certain goods without going through the WTO notification process, which negatively impacted some business operations without forewarning. In February 2017, Tunisia domestically ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and presented its instrument of ratification to the WTO in July 2020 for all categories A, B, and C. However, Tunisia has yet to communicate indicative and definitive dates under category B and is overdue in submitting notifications related to technical assistance requirements and support and information on assistance and capacity building (Article 22.3). Tunisia has also yet to submit two transparency notifications related to: (1) import, export, and transit procedures, contact information of enquiry points, (Article 1.4) and (2) contact points for customs cooperation (Article 12.2.2). The Tunisian legal system is secular and based on the French Napoleonic code and meets EU standards. While the 2014 Tunisian constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, constitutionally mandated reforms of courts and broader judiciary reforms are still ongoing. Citing corruption in the judiciary, on February 12, Saied dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial authority responsible for judicial assignments and enforcing ethical standards and discipline and replaced it with a temporary council. Tunisia has a written commercial law but does not have specialized commercial courts. Regulations or enforcement actions can be appealed at the Court of Appeals. The 2016 Investment Law directs tax incentives towards regional development promotion, technology and high value-added products, research and development (R&D), innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the education, transport, health, culture, and environmental protection sectors. Foreign investors can apply for government incentives online through the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA) website: https://www.tia.gov.tn/en . The primary one-stop-shop webpage for investors looking for relevant laws and regulations is hosted at the Investment and Innovation Promotion Agency website, http://www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=12&mrub=209 . The 2016 Investment Law (article 15) calls for the creation of an Investor’s Unique Point of Contact within the ministry in charge of investment to assist new and existing investors to launch and expand their projects. In addition, the Parliament adopted a number of economic reforms since 2015, including laws concerning renewable energy, competition, public-private partnerships (PPP), bankruptcy, and the independence of the Central Bank of Tunisia, as well as the Start-Up Act to promote the creation of new businesses and entrepreneurship. The 2015 Competition Law established a government appointed Competition Council to reduce government intervention in the economy and promote competition based on supply and demand. This law voided previous agreements that fixed prices, limited free competition, or restricted the entry of new companies as well as those that controlled production, distribution, investment, technical progress, or supply centers. While the law ensures free pricing of most products and services, there are a few protected items, such as bread, sugar, milk, water, and electricity, for which the GOT can still intervene in pricing. Moreover, in exceptional cases of large increases or collapses in prices, such as sharp price increases of surgical masks, sanitizer, and disinfection products during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Trade and Export Development reserved the right to regulate prices for a period of up to six months. The ministry can also intervene in some other sectors to ensure free and fair competition. However, the Competition Council can make exceptions to its anti-trust policies if it deems it necessary for overall technical or economic progress. The Competition Council also has the power to investigate competition-inhibiting cases and make recommendations to the Ministry of Trade and Export Development upon the Ministry’s request. Competition Council rulings can range from ordering temporary closures of a business to penalties and fines which could amount to a maximum of 10 percent of business revenue. There are no outstanding expropriation cases involving U.S. interests. The 2016 Investment Law (article 8) states that investors’ property may not be expropriated except in cases of public interest. Expropriation, if carried out, must comply with legal procedures, be executed without discrimination on the basis of nationality, and provide fair and equitable compensation. U.S. investments in Tunisia are protected by international law as stipulated in the U.S.-Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). According to Article III of the BIT, the GOT reserves the right to expropriate or nationalize investments for the public good, in a non-discriminatory manner, and upon advance compensation of the full value of the expropriated investment. The treaty grants the right to prompt review by the relevant Tunisian authorities of conformity with the principles of international law. When compensation is granted to Tunisian or foreign companies whose investments suffer losses owing to events such as war, armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, civil disturbance, etc., U.S. companies are accorded “the most favorable treatment in regard to any measures adopted in relation to such losses.” Parliament adopted in April 2016 a new bankruptcy law that replaced Chapter IV of the Commerce Law and the Recovery of Companies in Economic Difficulties Law. These two laws had duplicative and cumbersome processes for business rescue and exit and gave creditors a marginal role. The 2016 law increases incentives for failed companies to undergo liquidation by limiting state collection privileges. The improved bankruptcy procedures are intended to decrease the number of non-performing loans and facilitate access of new firms to bank lending. 4. Industrial Policies Preferential status is usually linked to the percentage of foreign corporate ownership, percentage of production for the export market, and investment location. The 2016 Investment Law provides investors with a broad range of incentives linked to increased added value, performance and competitiveness, use of new technologies, regional development, environmental protection, and high employability. To incentivize the employment of new university graduates, the GOT assumes the employer’s portion of social security costs (16 percent of salary) for the first seven years of the investment, with an extension of up to 10 years in the interior regions. Investments with high job-creation potential may benefit from the purchase of state-owned land at the price of one Tunisian dinar ($0.35) per square meter. Investors who purchase companies in financial distress may also benefit from tax breaks and social security assistance. These advantages are determined on a case-by-case basis. Further benefits are available for offshore investments, such as tax exemptions on profits and reinvested revenues, duty-free import of capital goods with no local equivalents, and full tax and duty exemption on raw materials, semi-finished goods, and services necessary for operation. On March 9, 2017, the GOT adopted decree no. 2017-389 on financial incentives to investment in priority sectors, economic performance areas, and regional development. Investors have to declare their projects through the regional APII offices to receive incentives. Investors can also request incentives online through the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA) website: https://www.tia.gov.tn/en . Tunisia has free-trade zones, officially known as “Parcs d’Activités Economiques,” in Bizerte and Zarzis. While the land is state-owned, a private company manages the free-trade zones. They enjoy adequate public utilities and fiber-optic connectivity. Companies established in the free-trade zones are exempt from taxes and customs duties and benefit from unrestricted foreign exchange transactions, as well as limited duty-free entry into Tunisia of inputs for transformation and re-export. Factories operate as bonded warehouses and have their own assigned customs personnel. For example, companies in Bizerte’s free-trade zone may rent space for three Euros ($3.28) per square meter annually – a level unchanged since 1996 – plus a low service fee. Long-term renewable leases, up to 25 years, are subject to a negotiable 3 percent escalation clause. Expatriate personnel are allowed duty-free entry of personal vehicles. During the first year of operations, companies within the zone must export 100 percent of their production. Each following year, the company may sell domestically up to 30 percent of the previous year’s total volume of production, subject to local customs duties and taxes. Lease termination has not been a problem, and all companies that desired to depart the zone reportedly did so successfully. Foreign resident companies face restrictions related to the employment and compensation of expatriate employees. The 2016 Investment Law limits the percentage of expatriate employees per company to 30 percent of the total work force (excluding oil and gas companies) for the first three years and to 10 percent starting in the fourth year. There are somewhat lengthy renewal procedures for annual work and residence permits, and the GOT has announced its intention to ease them in the future. Although rarely enforced, legislation limits the validity of expatriate work permits to two years. Central Bank regulations impose administrative burdens on companies seeking to pay for temporary expatriate technical assistance from local revenue. For example, before it receives authorization to transfer payment from its operations in Tunisia, a foreign resident company that utilizes a foreign accountant must document that the service is necessary, fairly valued, and unavailable in Tunisia. This regulation hinders a foreign resident company’s ability to pay for services performed abroad. The host government does not follow “forced localization,” but encourages the use of domestic content. There are no requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to turn over source code that is protected by the intellectual property law; however, they are required to inform the Ministry of Communication Technologies and Digital Economy about encrypted equipment. Public companies and institutions are prohibited by the Ministry of Communication Technologies from freely transmitting and storing personal data outside of the country. Private and public institutions must comply with the recommendations of the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (INPDP) when handling personal data, even if it is business-related. The National Institute of Office Automation and Micro-computing (INBMI) enforces the rules on local data storage. Until recently, performance requirements were generally limited to investment in the petroleum sector. Now, such requirements are in force in sectors such as telecommunications and for private sector infrastructure projects on a case-by-case basis. These requirements tend to be specific to the concession or operating agreement (e.g., drilling a certain number of wells, or producing a certain amount of electricity). 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property are enforced in Tunisia. Mortgages and liens are in common use, and the recording system is reliable. Foreign and/or non-resident investors are allowed to lease any type of land but can only acquire non-agricultural land. A large portion of privately held land, especially agriculture land, has no clear title, and the government is investing a great deal of effort to encourage people to clear and register their properties. For the past 10 years, it has been estimated that privately held land accounts for approximately 45 percent of all land. Properties legally purchased must be duly registered to ensure they remain the property of their actual owners, even if they have been unoccupied for a long time. Tunisia is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signatory to the United Nations Agreement on the Protection of Patents and Trademarks. The agency responsible for patents and trademarks is the National Institute for Standardization and Industrial Property (INNORPI — Institut National de la Normalisation et de la Propriété Industrielle). Tunisia also is party to the Madrid Protocol for the International Registration of Marks. Foreign patents and trademarks should be registered with INNORPI. Tunisia’s patent and trademark laws are designed to protect owners duly registered in Tunisia. In the area of patents, foreign businesses are guaranteed treatment equal to that offered to Tunisian nationals. Tunisia updated its legislation to meet the requirements of the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Copyright protection is the responsibility of the Tunisian Copyright Protection Organization (OTDAV — Office Tunisien des Droits d´Auteurs et des Droits Voisins), which also represents foreign copyright organizations. The 2009 Intellectual Property Law greatly expanded the scope of protections. The minimum fine for counterfeiting is 10,000 Tunisian dinars (approximately USD 3,700), and copyright protection is valid for the holder’s lifetime. Customs agents have the authority to seize suspected counterfeit goods immediately. Tunisia’s 2014 constitution enshrined intellectual property protection in article 41. If customs officials suspect a copyright violation, they are permitted to inspect and seize suspected goods. For products utilizing foreign trademarks registered at INNORPI, the Customs Code empowers customs agents to enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) throughout the country. Tunisian copyright law applies to literary works, art, scientific works, new technologies, and digital works. Its application and enforcement, however, have not always been consistent with foreign commercial expectations. Print, audio, and video media are particularly susceptible to copyright infringement in Tunisia. Smuggling of illegal items takes place through Tunisia’s porous borders. The prevalence of, and trade in, counterfeit and pirated goods remains a concern and illegal internet protocol television (IPTV) streaming services is an emerging trend. In 2015, the GOT issued a decree defining registration and arbitration procedures for trade and service marks and establishing a national trademark registry. The new decree contained provisions governing the registration of trademarks under the Madrid Protocol and included improvements such as the extension of the deadline for opposition to the registration of trademarks, as well as the electronic filing of applications for trademarks registration. In March 2020, the Tunisian Parliament approved the government’s request for Tunisia to host the headquarters of the Pan-African Intellectual Property Body (PAIPO). Tunisia is waiting for at least 14 African countries to ratify the formation of PAIPO in order for it to enter into force. The registration of pharmaceutical drugs in Tunisia requires that the product is both registered and marketed in the country of origin. In 2005, Tunisia removed its restriction on pharmaceutical imports where there are similar generic products manufactured locally. Tunisia has yet to ratify the 2006 Singapore Treaty on the law of trademarks which aims to further harmonize the registration procedures for trademarks. Peter Mehravari Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East and North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi U.S. Department of Commerce Global Markets U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 peter.mehravari@trade.gov AmCham Tunisia: http://www.amchamtunisia.org.tn/ Attorneys list: https://tn.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/ For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Tunisia’s financial system is dominated by its banking sector, with banks accounting for roughly 85 percent of financing in Tunisia. The GOT’s overreliance on bank financing impedes economic growth and stronger job creation. Equity capitalization is relatively small; Tunisia’s stock market provided 9.1 percent of corporate financing in 2019 according to the Financial Market Council annual report. Other mechanisms, such as bonds and microfinance, contribute marginally to the overall economy. Created in 1969, the Bourse de Tunis (Tunis stock exchange) listed 85 companies as of December 2021. Market capitalization increased by 0.74 percent to $8.3 billion (19 percent of GDP), versus $7.9 billion in 2020 (19.7 percent of GDP). Financial institutions still dominate market capitalization with a share of 42.3 percent. Foreign transactions generated a net outflow of $99.2 million in 2021, and their share of market capitalization declined to 23.1 percent in 2021 versus 25.3 percent in 2020; only a small share of foreign capitalization is floating. During the last five years, the exchange’s regulatory and accounting systems have been brought more in line with international standards, including compliance and investor protections. The exchange is supervised and regulated by the state-run Capital Market Board. Most major global accounting firms are represented in Tunisia. Firms listed on the stock exchange must publish semiannual corporate reports audited by a certified public accountant. Accompanying accounting requirements exceed what many Tunisian firms can, or are willing to, undertake. GOT tax incentives attempt to encourage companies to list on the stock exchange. Newly listed companies that offer a 30 percent capital share to the public receive a five-year tax reduction on profits. In addition, individual investors receive tax deductions for equity investment in the market. Capital gains are tax-free when held by the investor for two years. Listing on the stock exchange helps ensure transparent financial statements, whereby the public sharing of certified financial statements has generally discouraged the introduction of more companies on the stock exchange. Foreign investors are permitted to purchase shares in resident (onshore) firms only through authorized Tunisian brokers or through established mutual funds. To trade, non-resident (offshore) brokers require a Tunisian intermediary and may only service non-Tunisian customers. Tunisian brokerage firms may have foreign participation, as long as that participation is less than 50 percent. Foreign investment of up to 50 percent of a listed firm’s capital does not require authorization. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) annual report on banking supervision published in January 2022, Tunisia hosts 30 banks, of which 23 are onshore and seven are offshore. Onshore banks include three Islamic banks, two microcredit and SME financing banks, and 18 commercial universal banks. Domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks stood at 64 percent of GDP in 2019. According to the World Bank, this level is higher than the MENA region average of 56.7 percent. Eighty-seven percent of banks are located in the coastal regions, with about 41 percent in the greater Tunis area alone. The number of bank accounts has increased by 5 percent over the last five years to reach 10.3 million accounts at the end of 2020, of which 6 million are savings accounts. Tunisia’s banking system activity is mainly within the 23 onshore banks, which accounted for 92 percent of total assets, 94 percent of loans, and 96 percent of deposits in 2020. The onshore banks offer identical services targeting Tunisia’s larger corporations. Meanwhile, SMEs and individuals often have difficulty accessing bank capital due to high collateral requirements. The CBT report noted that in 2020, overall lending totaled $32.8 billion, an increase of 5 percent compared to a 3.1 percent increase in 2019. Loans to professionals were driven mainly by the increase in commitments of public enterprises, which rose by $586 million in 2020 (26.8 percent increase). Loans to the private sector increased by only 2.4 percent in 2020, the same rate as the previous year. These credits benefited mostly industry, trade, real estate development and tourism sectors. Tourism — alone made up nearly 80 percent of the lending. Foreign banks are permitted to open branches and establish operations in Tunisia under the offshore regime and are subject to the supervision of the Central Bank. Government regulations control lending rates. This prevents banks from pricing their loan portfolios appropriately and incentivizes bankers to restrict the provision of credit. Competition among Tunisia’s many banks has the effect of lowering observed interest rates; however, banks often place conditions on loans that impose far higher costs on borrowers than interest rates alone. These non-interest costs may include collateral requirements that come in the form of liens on real estate. Often, collateral must equal or exceed the value of the loan principal. Collateral requirements are high because banks face regulatory difficulties in collecting collateral, thereby adding to costs. According to the CBT banking supervision report, nonperforming loans (NPLs) were at 15.6 percent of all bank loans in 2020, mostly in the agriculture (28.4 percent) and tourism (41.3 percent) sectors. Beyond the banks and stock exchange, few effective financing mechanisms are available in the Tunisian economy. A true bond market does not exist, and government debt sold to financial institutions is not re-traded on a formal, transparent secondary market. Private equity remains a niche element in the Tunisian financial system. Firms experience challenges raising sufficient capital, sourcing their transactions, and selling their stakes in successful investments once they mature. The microfinance market remains underexploited, but profitable for microfinance institutions with non-governmental organization Enda Inter-Arabe the dominant lender in the field. The GOT recognizes two categories of financial service activity: banking (e.g., deposits, loans, payments and exchange operations, and acquisition of operating capital) and investment services (reception, transmission, order execution, and portfolio management). Non-resident financial service providers must present initial minimum capital (fully paid up at subscription) of 25 million Tunisian dinars ($8.9 million) for a bank, 10 million dinars ($3.5 million) for a non-bank financial institution, 7.5 million dinars ($2.6 million) for an investment company, and 250,000 dinars ($89,400) for a portfolio management company. By decree no. 85-2011, the GOT established a sovereign wealth fund, “Caisse des Depots et des Consignations” (CDC), to boost private sector investment and promote small and medium enterprise (SME) development. It is a state-owned investment entity responsible for independently managing a portion of the state’s financial assets. The CDC was set up with support from the French CDC and the Moroccan CDG (Caisse des Depots et de Gestion) and became operational in early 2012. The original impetus for the creation of the CDC was to manage assets confiscated from the former ruling family as independently as possible to serve the public interest. More information is available about the CDC at www.cdc.tn . As of June 2021, CDC had 9.7 billion dinars ($3.5 billion) in assets and 466 million dinars ($167 million) in capital. All CDC investments are made locally, with the objective of boosting investments in the interior regions and promoting SME development. The CDC is governed by a supervisory committee composed of representatives from different ministries and chaired by the Minister of Finance. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are 110 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public institutions in Tunisia per the Ministry of Finance’s most recent (May 2020) report on public enterprises. SOEs are still prominent throughout the economy but are heavily indebted. Per the Tunisian Ministry of Finance report on transfers and guarantees to SOEs, total transfers reached $2.6 billion in 2021 with $392 million dedicated to payroll. Annual budgetary transfers amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2021, with significant amounts directed to three SOEs in the form of subsidies for cereals, fuel, and electricity. Many SOEs compete with the private sector, in industries such as telecommunications, banking, and insurance, while others hold monopolies in sectors considered sensitive by the government, such as railroad, transportation, water and electricity distribution, and port logistics. Importation of basic food staples and strategic items such as cereals, rice, sugar, and edible oil also remains under SOE control. The GOT appoints senior management officials to SOEs, who report directly to the ministries responsible for the companies’ sector of operation. SOE boards of directors include representatives from various ministries and personnel from the company itself. Similar to private companies, the law requires SOEs to publish independently audited annual reports, regardless of whether corporate capital is publicly traded on the stock market. The GOT encourages SOEs to adhere to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance, but adherence is not enforced. Investment banks and credit agencies tend to associate SOEs with the government and consider them as having the same risk profile for lending purposes. The GOT allows foreign participation in its privatization program. A significant share of Tunisia’s FDI in recent years has come from the privatization of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Privatization has occurred in many sectors, such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and fuel distribution, among others. In 2011, the GOT confiscated the assets of the former regime. The list of assets involved every major economic sector. According to the Commission to Investigate Corruption and Malfeasance, a court order is required to determine the ultimate handling of frozen assets. Because court actions frequently take years – and with the government facing immediate budgetary needs – the GOT allowed privatization bids for shares in Ooredoo (a foreign telecommunications company of which 30 percent of shares were confiscated from the previous regime), Ennakl, Alpha Ford, and City Cars (car distribution), Goulette Shipping Cruise (cruise terminal management), Airport VIP Service (business lounge management), and Banque de Tunisie and Zitouna Bank (banking). The government is expected to sell some of its stakes in state-owned banks; however, no clear plan has been adopted or communicated so far due to fierce opposition by labor unions. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Tunisia adopted law no. 35 in June 2018 to encourage Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The law requires companies to allocate a portion of their budgets to finance CSR projects such as those in sustainable development, green economy, and youth employment. According to the law, an organization in charge of monitoring CSR projects will be created to ensure that the projects comply with the principles of good governance and sustainable development. Tunisia is an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Since 1989, the public sector has been subject to a government procurement law that requires labor, environmental, and other impact studies for large procurement projects. All public institutions are subject to audits by the Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes). The Tunisian Central Bank issued a circular in 2011 setting guidelines for sound and prudent business management and guaranteeing and safeguarding the interests of shareholders, creditors, depositors and staff. The circular also established policies on recruitment, appointment, and remuneration, as well as dissemination of information to shareholders, depositors, market counterparts, regulators, and the general public. In January 2019, the High Committee for Administrative and Financial Control (HCCAF) under the Presidency of the Government, published a guide on best practices for improved governance of public enterprises and establishments. In May 2019, the Parliament adopted law no. 2019-47, which introduced in Chapter 5 a set of articles designed to improve corporate governance and increase transparency. For example, the new legislation required that all companies listed on Tunisia’s stock exchange have on their board of directors at least two independent members, and separate individuals serving as the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer. On October 14, 2020, the High Instance for Public Procurement (HAICOP) under the Presidency of the Government, published a report on risk management strategy in public procurement. In March 2022, President Saied issued decrees regarding the creation of “community companies” and the penal reconciliation program that will help fund them. The intention is for community companies to be established by private communities in marginalized areas of the country to help with infrastructure development and job creation. Community companies will receive funding from financial penalties paid by businesspeople found guilty of economic and financial crimes, and they will receive amnesty in return. The national point of contact for OECD for Multinational Enterprises guidelines is: Ministry of Economy Avenue Mohamed V 1002 Tunis Tel: +216 7184 9596 Fax: +216 7179 9069 Tunisia has not yet joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, in June 2012, former Prime Minister Hammadi Jebali announced the GOT’s decision to implement the EITI. In June 2016, Tunisia officially began publicizing all documents pertaining to oil agreements signed in Tunisia, including permits and operating benefits governed by specific agreements and annexes dating to 1960. Tunisia participated in the eighth world conference of the EITI in Paris, France, in 2019. Per Tunisia’s 2014 constitution, projects related to commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals are subject to Parliamentary approval. However, following the July 25, 2021 events resulting in the freeze of the Parliament, these decisions are currently made by the Ministerial Council. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . Tunisia updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Climate Accord in September 2021 with a commitment to reduce its carbon intensity by 45 percent by 2030, compared to 2010. Tunisia’s first NDC submitted in 2015 called for a 41 percent carbon intensity reduction between 2010 and 2030. Tunisia’s new plan requires the mobilization of approximately $19.3 billion ($14.3 billion for mitigation, $4.3 billion for adaptation, and $0.7 billion for capacity building) from both domestic resources and international support. The energy sector accounts for 73 percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions, requiring the largest share of investment. The updated NDC also covers other sectors such as industrial processes, agriculture, forestry, other land use (AFOLU), and waste. Tunisia’s 2022 Finance Law included several articles to support business financing for the green economy and sustainable development, establish tax relief for electric cars, reduce customs duties on the import of solar panels, and increase the tax rate for the protection of the environment. Tunisia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1993, the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, and Paris Agreement in 2017. Tunisia’s Initial Communication (2001) under the UNFCCC ( https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/summary.pdf ) Tunisia’s second national communication as part of the UNFCCC (2013) (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/tunnc2.pdf ) Tunisia’s 2015 NDCs (https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tunisia%20First/INDC-Tunisia-English%20Version.pdf ) Tunisia’s third national communication as part of the UNFCCC (2017) (https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Synthese%20Ang%20Finalise%20Tunisia.pdf ) Tunisia’s 2018 Climate Risk Profile (USAID)(https://www.climatelinks.org/resources/climate-risk-profile-tunisia ) Tunisia’s 2021 NDCs (https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tunisia%20First/INDC-Tunisia-English%20Version.pdf ) 9. Corruption Most U.S. firms involved in the Tunisian market do not identify corruption as a primary obstacle to foreign direct investment. However, some have reported that routine procedures for doing business (customs, transportation, and some bureaucratic paperwork) are sometimes tainted by corrupt practices. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 gave Tunisia a score of 44 out of 100 and a rank of 70 among 180 countries marking the same score and a slight ranking improvement from 69 in 2020. Regionally, Tunisia is ranked 7 for transparency among MENA countries and first in North Africa, ahead of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. Transparency International expressed concern that Tunisia’s score has not improved in recent years despite advances in anti-corruption legislation, including laws to protect whistleblowers, improve access to information, and encourage asset declarations by public officials or individuals with public trust roles. Polls indicated that most citizens viewed widespread corruption as a key hindrance to effective government. President Saied has consistently stated that ending corruption and prosecuting corrupt businesspeople and others is one of his top priorities. Since July 25, 2021, some members of parliament were charged and detained based on corruption allegations. Recent government efforts to combat corruption include: assurances that price controls on staple and basic food products are respected; combatting price gouging; hoarding, and monopolistic practices; enhancement of commercial competition in the domestic market; arrests of corrupt businessmen and officials; and harmonization of Tunisian corruption laws with those of the European Union. The constitution requires those holding high government offices to declare assets “as provided by law.” In 2018, Parliament adopted the Assets Declaration Law, identifying 35 categories of public officials required to declare their assets upon being elected or appointed and upon leaving office. By law, the National Authority for the Combat Against Corruption (INLUCC) is then responsible for publishing the lists of assets of these individuals on its website. In addition, the law requires other individuals in specified professions that have a public role to declare their assets to the INLUCC, although this information is not made public. This provision applies to journalists, media figures, civil society leaders, political party leaders, and union officials. The law also enumerates a “gift” policy, defines measures to avoid conflicts of interest, and stipulates the sanctions that apply in cases of illicit enrichment. In 2019, Tunisia’s newly elected government officials declared their assets, including the 217 Members of Parliament. The declaration of assets was also made in September 2020 and again in October 2021, when new governments took office. On August 20 security personnel ordered the closure of INLUCC’s headquarters. Beside the declaration of assets by the new cabinet on October 15, 2021, INLUCC’s offices have remained closed and its work paused. INLUCC’s regional offices have been closed since January 1, 2022. The government has not given a reason for the ongoing closure and has not announced plans for the creation of an alternative anticorruption institution. In February 2017, Parliament passed law no. 2017-10 on corruption reporting and whistleblower protection. The legislation was a significant step in the fight against corruption, as it establishes the mechanisms, conditions, and procedures for denouncing corruption. Article 17 of the law provides protection for whistleblowers, and any act of reprisal against them is considered a punishable crime. For public servants, the law also guarantees the protection of whistleblowers against possible retaliation from their superiors. In September 2017, the GOT established the Independent Access to Information Commission. This authority was prescribed in the 2016 Access to Information Law to proactively encourage government agencies to comply with the new law and to adjudicate complaints against the government for failing to comply with the law. Following the passage of the access to information and whistleblower protection laws, the government initiated an anti-corruption campaign led by then prime minister Youssef Chahed. A series of arrests and investigations targeted well-known businesspersons, politicians, journalists, police officers, and customs officials. Preliminary charges included embezzlement, fraud, and taking bribes. Tunisia’s penal code devotes 11 articles to defining and classifying corruption and assigns corresponding penalties (including fines and imprisonment). Several other regulations also address broader concepts of corruption. Detailed information on the application of these laws and their effectiveness in combating corruption is not publicly available, and there are no GOT statistics specific to corruption. The Independent Commission to Investigate Corruption handled corruption complaints from 1987 to 2011. The commission referred 5 percent of cases to the Ministry of Justice. In 2012, the commission was replaced by the National Authority to Combat Corruption (INLUCC), which has the authority to forward corruption cases to the Ministry of Justice, give opinions on legislative and regulatory anti-corruption efforts, propose policies and collect data on corruption, and facilitate contact between anti-corruption efforts in the government and civil society. Tunisia’s constitution stipulates that INLUCC is a temporary institution, and that Parliament must appoint members to a permanent Institute for Good Governance and Anticorruption. Parliament did not make substantive progress toward establishing this permanent institution prior to July 25, 2021. Prime Minister Fakhfakh resigned on July 15, 2020, following allegations of a conflict of interest involving his partial ownership of companies that received government contracts. In apparent retaliation for his ouster, Fakhfakh dismissed then INLUCC president Chawki Tabib, replacing him with Imed Boukhris, a former judge. During a March 16, 2019 press conference, INLUCC president Chawki Tabib said that it takes 7-10 years on average for corruption cases to be processed in the judicial system. In 2018, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee, which operates under the auspices of the Central Bank as a financial intelligence unit, announced that it froze approximately 200 million dinars ($70 million) linked to suspected money-laundering transactions. The committee received approximately 600 reports of suspicious transactions related to corruption and illicit financial flows during the year. Since 1989, a comprehensive law designed to regulate each phase of public procurement has governed the public sector. The GOT also established the Higher Commission on Public Procurement (HAICOP) to supervise the tender and award process for major government contracts. The government publicly supports a policy of transparency. Public tenders require bidders to provide a sworn statement that they have not and will not, either by themselves or through a third party, make any promises or give gifts with a view to influencing the outcome of the tender and realization of the project. Starting September 2018, the government imposed by decree that all public procurement operations be conducted electronically via a bidding platform called Tunisia Online E-Procurement System (TUNEPS). Despite the law, competition on government tenders appears susceptible to corrupt behavior. Pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.S. Government requires that American companies requesting U.S. Government advocacy certify that they do not participate in corrupt practices. Contacts at agencies responsible for combating corruption: “Watchdog” organization Achraf Aouadi President I WATCH Tunisia 14 Rue d’Irak 1002 Lafayette, Tunisia + 216 71 844 226 contact@iwatch.tn 10. Political and Security Environment President Kais Saied was elected in the aftermath of presidential and parliamentary elections held in September and October 2019, the country’s first elections since its post-revolution constitution was ratified in 2014, which were widely regarded as well-executed and credible. The transition of power was smooth and without incident, following a clear procedure outlined by the 2014 constitution. In the 10 years since the revolution, Tunisia has made significant progress in the areas of civil society and rights-based reforms, but economic indicators continue to lag and have been a major driver of frequent protests. Public opinion polls indicated that corruption, poor economic conditions, and persistently high unemployment fuel public discontent with the political class. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied took “exceptional measures” under Article 80 of the constitution to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift the immunity of members of parliament. On August 23, Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period and on September 22, he issued a decree granting the president certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two, which guarantee rights and freedoms. Civil society organizations and multiple political parties raised concern that through these decrees President Saied granted himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, she formed a government. On December 13, Saied announced a timeline for constitutional reforms including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. On March 30, President Saied issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Terrorist groups continue to operate in the mountains of Western Tunisia and developments in Libya continue to affect the security situation along the Tunisian-Libyan border. Extremist groups, including ISIS affiliates, operate and recruit in the country’s interior, particularly in disadvantaged regions. Tunisia has been under a State of Emergency since November 24, 2015, following two major terrorist attacks that targeted tourism destinations. Under the state of emergency, security forces have more authority to maintain civil order, enabling the government to focus on combating terrorism. Despite COVID-19 and economic challenges that affect national resources, Tunisia continues to demonstrate consistent security force readiness to combat security threats. There have been no terrorist attacks targeting tourists or other western interests since June 2015. Extremist elements continue to target police and military forces in suspected “lone wolf” attacks, including in front of the U.S. Embassy on March 6, 2020, and more recently in November 2021 at the Ministry of Interior in downtown Tunis. Travelers are urged to visit www.travel.state.gov for the latest travel alerts and warnings regarding Tunisia. 11. Labor Policies and Practices According to National Institute of Statistics (INS) 2021 figures, Tunisia has a labor force of 3.4 million, 29 percent of which are women and 71 percent men. The number of unemployed in 2021 reached 746,400 people. The official 2021 unemployment rate was 18.4 percent (representing the unemployment rate for the third quarter of 2021). In November 2021, the INS published 2021unemployment rates per region, including 30 percent in the northwest, 25 percent in the southwest, 22.1 percent in the center-west, 23.4 percent in southeast, and 15.8 percent in Greater Tunis. Professionals, such as IT engineers, doctors, and professors, continue to seek employment abroad. Tunisian interlocuters maintain that around 70 percent of Tunisian young professionals seek employment in other countries after graduation. Additionally, an INS study estimated that 44.8 percent of the Tunisian workforce is employed in the parallel economy, including 11.8 percent in agriculture and fisheries. Over the past two decades, the structure of the workforce remained relatively stable, and as of the last quarter of 2020, it stood at 13.3 percent in agriculture and fishing, 33.9 percent in industry, and 52.8 percent in commerce and services. Tunisia has developed its industrial sector and created low-skilled employment, although several manufacturers struggle to find qualified technical workers. Tunisian law provides workers with the right to organize, form and join unions, and bargain collectively. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination by employers and retribution against strikers. The government generally enforces applicable laws. Currently, four national labor confederations operate in Tunisia. The oldest and largest is the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT — Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens). The others are the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers (CGTT — Confederation Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens), the Tunisian Labor Union (UTT — Union Tunisienne du Travail), created in May 2011, and the Tunisian Labor Organization (OTT — Organisation Tunisienne du Travail), created in August 2013. However, based on the criteria established by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2018, only UGTT can negotiate with the government on behalf of all Tunisian workers within the National Council of Social Dialogue, which has drawn criticism from other labor federations. UGTT claims about one third of the salaried labor force as members, although more are covered under UGTT-negotiated contracts. Wages and working conditions are established through triennial collective bargaining agreements between the UGTT, the national employers’ association (UTICA — Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce, et de l’Artisanat), and the GOT. These tripartite agreements set industry standards and generally apply to about 80 percent of the private sector labor force, regardless of whether individual companies are unionized. The regional tripartite commissions also arbitrate labor disputes. Employees have strong legal protections against dismissal. According to the labor code, employer bankruptcy is not a just cause for termination of an employee contract. Dismissal of an employee for economic considerations requires notification to the regional labor inspectorate for review and concurrence. In January 2022, UGTT and UTICA signed an agreement to increase wages in the private sector in 2022, 2023 and 2024. This agreement includes an increase in the Guaranteed Minimum Wage (SMIG) and in allowances/benefits. This convention implements the agreement signed on September 19, 2018 between the two organizations 14. Contact for More Information Embassy Tunis Commercial Section Commercial Officer U.S. Embassy Tunis, Les Berges du Lac, 1053, Tunisia +216 71 107 000 TunisCommercial@state.gov Turkey Executive Summary Turkey experienced strong economic growth on the back of the many positive economic and banking reforms it implemented between 2002 and 2007, and it weathered the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 better than most countries, establishing itself as a relatively stable emerging market with a promising trajectory of reforms and a strong banking system. However, over the last several years, economic and democratic reforms have stalled and by some measures regressed. GDP growth was 2.6 percent in 2018 as the economy entered a recession in the second half of the year. Challenged by the continuing currency crisis, particularly in the first half of 2019, the Turkish economy grew by only 0.9 percent in 2019. Turkey’s expansionist monetary policy pushed Turkey’s economy to grow by 1.8 percent in 2020 despite the pandemic, though high inflation and persistently high unemployment have been exacerbated. In 2021, Turkey’s GDP grew 11 percent year-over-year (YOY), the highest growth rate in ten years. However, this year growth is expected to be around 3.3 percent, but with significant downside risks. The spending of over USD 100 billion in foreign reserves in a vain attempt to stop the lira’s devaluation, and unorthodox monetary policies that have fueled inflation have left Turkey vulnerable to external shocks. Despite recent growth, the government’s economic policymaking remains opaque, erratic, and politicized, contributing to long-term and sometimes acute depreciation of the Turkish lira. In September 2021, the Central Bank of Turkey embarked on a series of rate cuts that lowered the key interest rate by 500 basis points, leaving real rates deeply negative. Inflation in 2021 was 48.7 percent and unemployment 11.2 percent, with a slight recovery in labor force participation (52.9 percent). Macroeconomic instability and the government’s push to require manufacturing and data localization in many sectors have negatively impacted foreign investment into the country. Turkey has maintained its 2020 digital service taxes but agreed to a plan to rescind the tax once pillar one of the OECD Inclusive Framework on a global minimum tax is implemented. Other issues of importance include tax reform and the decreasing independence of the judiciary and the Central Bank. Laws targeting the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector have increased regulations on data, social media platforms, online marketing, online broadcasting, tax collection, and payment platforms. ICT and other companies report Government of Turkey (GOT) pressure to localize data, which the GOT views as a precursor to greater access to user information and source code. Law No. 6493 on Payment and Security Systems, Payment Services, and E-money Institutions also requires financial institutions to establish servers in Turkey to localize data. The Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) is the authority that issues business licenses if companies localize their IT systems in Turkey and keep the original data (not copies) in Turkey. Regulations on data localization, internet content, and taxation/licensing have chilled investment by other possible entrants to the e-commerce and e-payments sectors. The laws affect all companies that collect private user data, such as payment information provided online for a consumer purchase. In 2020, a law requiring social network providers (SNPs) that serve more than one million users in Turkey to appoint a domestic representative entered into force. The SNPs in-country representatives are obliged to accept service of documents from the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA), which mainly requests removal of content on the grounds of articles 9 and 9/A of local Law No. 5651. The SNP’s country representative must be a Turkish citizen or a legal person registered in Turkey, and easily accessible to local users. The immediate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy was sharp, but Turkey managed to contain the number of COVID-19 cases relatively effectively with targeted lockdowns and thanks to its strong health-services infrastructure. The tourism sector, which generates demand for products and various service sectors, was particularly affected. The GOT provided support to protect corporate liquidity, employment, and household incomes. Government investment incentives were refined during the pandemic to attract FDI and encourage green investments. The pandemic exacerbated structural challenges related to high unemployment and the country’s widespread informal economy, which hit the informal sector workers and the self-employed the hardest. While there has been progress in creating quality jobs over the past 15 years, the number of jobs decreased after both the 2018 financial turmoil and because of COVID-19. Turkey ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 and continues to make progress on its green initiatives. Turkey’s FDI incentive packages are updated regularly, and in 2021 they were altered to include more incentives targeted at green projects as identified by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. The opacity and inconsistency of government economic decision making, and concerns about the government’s commitment to the rule of law, have led to historically low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). While there are still an estimated 1,700 U.S. businesses active in Turkey, many with long-standing ties to the country, the share of American activity is relatively low given the size of the Turkish economy. Investment inflows in 2021 were USD 14.1 billion, an increase of 19 percent from 2019 and the highest rate in the last five years. However, real estate acquisition by foreign nationals accounted for 41 percent of the total inflows in 2021 with USD 5.8 billion, and equity capital inflows were the biggest slice of the FDI pie with USD 7.6 billion. Increased protectionist measures continue to add to the challenges of investing in Turkey. Progress in combatting corruption is also necessary for many of the GOT’s current and future policies to work effectively. Turkey’s investment climate is positively influenced by its favorable demographics and prime geographical position, providing access to multiple regional markets. Turkey is an island of relative stability in a turbulent region, making it a popular hub for regional operations. Turkey has a relatively educated work force, well-developed infrastructure, and a consumption-based economy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 41 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $5,814 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $9,050 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Turkey acknowledges that it needs to attract significant new foreign direct investment (FDI) to meet its ambitious development goals. As a result, Turkey has one of the most liberal legal regimes for FDI among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. According to the Central Bank of Turkey’s balance of payments data, Turkey attracted a total of USD 7.59 billion of FDI in 2021, almost USD 1.8 billion higher than 2020’s USD 5.79 billion. The figures demonstrate that Turkey needs to take steps to stabilize its macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to improve enforcement of international trade rules, ensure the transparency and timely execution of judicial awards, increase engagement with foreign investors on policy issues, and to implement consistent monetary and fiscal economic policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Turkey also needs to take other political measures to increase stability and predictability for investors. A stable banking sector, tight fiscal controls, efforts to reduce the size of the informal economy, increased labor market flexibility, improved labor skills, and continued privatization of state-owned enterprises would, if pursued, have the potential to improve the investment environment in Turkey. Most sectors open to Turkish private investment are also opened to foreign participation and investment. All investors, regardless of nationality, face similar challenges: macroeconomic instability, excessive bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, relatively high and inconsistently applied taxes, and frequent changes in the legal and regulatory environment. Structural reforms that would create a more transparent, equal, fair, and modern investment and business environment remain stalled. Venture capital and angel investing are still relatively new in Turkey. Turkey does not screen, review, or approve FDI specifically. However, the government has established regulatory and supervisory authorities to regulate different types of markets. Important regulators in Turkey include the Competition Authority; the Excessive Pricing Evaluation Board; Energy Market Regulation Authority; Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority; Information and Communication Technologies Authority; Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulation Board; Privatization Administration; Public Procurement Authority; Radio and Television Supreme Council; and Public Oversight, Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority. Screening mechanisms are executed to maintain fair competition and for other economic benefits. If an investment fails a review, possible outcomes can vary from a notice to remedy, which allows for a specific period to correct the problem, to penalty fees. The Turkish judicial system allows for appeals of any administrative decision, including tax courts that deal with tax disputes. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. However, there is increasing pressure in some sectors for foreign investors to partner with local companies and transfer technology, and some discriminatory barriers to foreign entrants, based on “anti-competitive practices,” especially in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector and the pharmaceuticals sector. In many areas, Turkey’s regulatory environment is business friendly. Investors can establish a business in Turkey irrespective of nationality or place of residence. There are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against foreign investor access, which are prohibited by World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. The OECD published an Environmental Performance Review for Turkey in February 2019, noting the country was the fastest growing among OECD members, and an Economic Survey of Turkey in 2021, which noted that investor confidence in policy predictability could not be consolidated, and risk premium and exchange rate volatility remained very high. The OECD survey which includes details on policy recommendations can be found at: https://www.oecd.org/turkey/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019-9789264309753-en.htm Turkey’s most recent investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) was conducted in March 2016. Turkey has cooperated with the World Bank to produce several reports on the general investment climate that can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp431_e.htm The International Investors Association (YASED)’s members represent 85 percent of all FDI in Turkey. YASED has a working group structure to support the demands of investors and targets common themes to express investors’ perspectives and concerns to the government to shape the policymaking processes. YASED’s publications can be found at: https://www.yased.org.tr/reports The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office is the official organization for promoting Turkey’s sectoral investment opportunities to the global business community and assisting investors before, during, and after their entry into Turkey. Its website is clear and easy to use, with information about legislation and company establishment. https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/pages/home-page.aspx The conditions for foreign investors setting up a business and transferring shares are the same as those applied to local investors. International investors may establish any form of company set out in the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), which offers a corporate governance approach that meets international standards, fosters private equity and public offering activities, creates transparency in managing operations, and aligns the Turkish business environment with EU legislation as well as with the EU accession process. Turkey defines micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises according to Decision No. 2022/5315 of the Official Gazette dated March 17, 2022: Micro-sized enterprises: fewer than 10 employees and less than or equal to 5 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. Small-sized enterprises: fewer than 50 employees and less than or equal to 50 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. Medium-sized enterprises: fewer than 250 employees and less than or equal to 250 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. The government promotes outward investment via investment promotion agencies and other platforms. It does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GOT has adopted policies and laws that, in principle, should foster competition and transparency. The GOT makes its budgetary spending reports available online. Copies of draft bills are generally made available to the public by posting them to the websites of the relevant ministry, Parliament, or Official Gazette. Foreign companies in several sectors; however, claim that regulations are applied in a nontransparent manner. Public tender decisions and regulatory updates can be opaque and politically driven. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures appear to be consistent with international norms, including standards set forth by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the EU, and the OECD. Publicly traded companies adhere to international accounting standards and are audited by well-respected international firms. Turkey is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. In 2021, Turkey’s Office of the Presidency partnered with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to assess the Impact Investing Ecosystem in Turkey and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Investor Map Turkey. These efforts provided preliminary steps towards environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulations. Turkey’s Capital Markets Board (CMB) amended its Corporate Governance Communique on Turkey’s Sustainability Principles Compliance Framework for publicly traded companies in 2020. The Framework offers publicly traded companies an opportunity to take their social, environmental, and governance impact seriously, beyond shareholders’ demands. There is no standard ESG legal framework but the GOT recommends that all companies operating in Turkey proactively adopt EGT standards. Turkey is a candidate for EU membership; however, the accession process has stalled, with the opening of new chapters put on hold. Some, though not all, Turkish regulations have been harmonized with the EU, and the country has adopted many European regulatory norms and standards. Turkey is a member of the WTO, though it does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Turkey’s legal system is based on civil law, provides means for enforcing property and contractual rights, and has written commercial and bankruptcy laws. Turkey’s court system is overburdened, which sometimes results in slow decisions and judges lacking sufficient time to consider complex issues. Judgments of foreign courts, under certain circumstances, need to be upheld by local courts before they are accepted and enforced. Recent developments reinforce the Turkish judicial system’s need to undertake significant reforms to adopt fair, democratic, and unbiased standards. The government is currently implementing a series of judicial reform packages introduced since 2019, but Amnesty International noted the reforms “fail to bring Turkey’s laws in line with human rights law and standards, and rather tinker at the edges of a system marked by the deepening erosion of independence of the judiciary.” The judiciary remains subject to influence, particularly from the executive branch, and faces significant challenges that limit judicial independence. The judicial reform strategy’s nine priorities are: protecting and improving rights and freedoms, improving judicial independence, objectivity and transparency, improving both the quality and quantity of human resources, increasing performance and productivity, enabling the right of defense to be used effectively, making justice more approachable, increasing the effectiveness of the penal justice system, simplifying civil justice and administrative procedures, and popularizing alternative mediation methods. Turkey’s investment legislation is simple and complies with international standards, offering equal treatment for all investors. The New Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (“New TCC”) was published in February , 2011. The backbone of the investment legislation is made up of the Encouragement of Investments and Employment Law No. 5084, Foreign Direct Investments Law No. 4875, international treaties, and various laws and related sub-regulations on the promotion of sectorial investments. Regulations related to mergers and acquisitions include: the Turkish Code of Obligations: Article 202 and Article 203; the Turkish Commercial Code: Articles 134-158; the Execution and Bankruptcy Law: Article 280; the Law on the Procedures for the Collection of Public Receivables: Article 30; and the Law on Competition: Article 7. https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/ The Competition Authority is the sole authority on competition issues in Turkey and handles private sector transactions. Public institutions are exempt from its authority. The Constitutional Court can overrule the Competition Authority’s finding of innocence in a competition case. There have been some cases of Turkish courts blocking foreign company operations based on competition concerns, with a few investigations into foreign companies initiated. Such cases can take over a year to resolve, during which time the companies can be prohibited from doing business in Turkey, which benefits their (local) competitors. The Government of Turkey established a related board, called the Excessive Pricing Evaluation Board, in 2019 and under the authority of the Ministry of Trade. As inflation has increased, exacerbated by the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, some private sector contacts note a marked increase in the frequency and aggressiveness of audits by the board. The board reportedly uses a “secret comparable,” whereby a product’s price is compared against that of another company whose name is not revealed. In 2021, an increasingly active Competition Authority of Turkey (RK) has stepped up its investigations with the purported intent of protecting consumers from anticompetitive behavior and price gouging. On October 29, 2022, RK fined five supermarkets and one supplier a combined USD 283 million for violating antitrust regulations. Under the U.S.-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), expropriation can only occur in accordance with due process of law, can only be for a public purpose, and must be non-discriminatory. Compensation must be prompt, adequate, and effective. The GOT occasionally expropriates private real property for public works or for state industrial projects. The GOT agency expropriating the property negotiates the purchase price. If the owners of the property do not agree with the proposed price, they are able to challenge the expropriation in court and ask for additional compensation. There are no known outstanding expropriation or nationalization cases for U.S. firms. Although there is not a pattern of discrimination against U.S. firms, the GOT has aggressively targeted businesses, banks, media outlets, and mining and energy companies with alleged ties to the so-called “Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO)” and/or the July 2016 attempted coup, including the expropriation of over 1,100 private companies worth more than USD 11 billion. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Turkey is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and is a signatory to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Foreign arbitral awards will be enforced if the country of origin of the award is a New York Convention state, if the dispute is commercial under Turkish law, and if none of the grounds under Article V of the New York Convention are proved by the opposing party. Investor-State Dispute Settlement U.S. investors generally have full access to Turkey’s local courts and the ability to take the government directly to international binding arbitration if a breach of the U.S.-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty has occurred. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Turkey adopted the International Arbitration Law, based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law, in 2001. Local courts accept binding international arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and the state. In practice, however, Turkish courts have sometimes failed to uphold international arbitration awards involving private companies and have favored Turkish firms. There are two main arbitration bodies in Turkey: the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (www.tobb.org.tr ) and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Arbitration and Mediation Center (www.itotam.com/en ). Most commercial disputes can be settled through arbitration, including disputes regarding public services. Parties decide the arbitration procedure, set the arbitration rules, and select the language of the proceedings. The Istanbul Arbitration Center was established in October 2015 as an independent, neutral, and impartial institution to mediate both domestic and international disputes through fast-track arbitration, emergency arbitrator, and appointments for ad hoc procedures. Its decisions are binding and subject to international enforcement (www.istac.org.tr/en ). As of January 2019, some commercial disputes may be subject to mandatory mediation; if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute through mediation, the case moves to a trial. Turkey criminalizes bankruptcy and has a bankruptcy law based on the Execution and Bankruptcy Code No. 2004 (the “EBL”), published in t 1932, and numbered 2128. 4. Industrial Policies Turkey’s investment incentives program consists of four main pillars: the General Investment Incentive Scheme, Regional Investment Incentive Scheme, Priority Investment Incentive Scheme, and the Strategic Investment Incentive Scheme. These incentives can provide corporate tax reductions; customs duty exemptions; value added tax (VAT) exemption and VAT refunds; support with the employer’s share social security premiums; income tax withholding allowances; land allocation; and interest rate support for investment loans. The incentive schemes are updated almost every year by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, and the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office publishes these offerings on their websites. https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/ https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/publications/lists/investpublications/guide-to-state-incentives-for-investments-in-turkey.pdf Renewable energy investments Investments in electrical power generation from biomass, solar energy, hydroelectric energy, geothermal energy, and wind energy are supported within the framework of the general incentive system and can receive VAT and customs tax exemptions. Green investments can also receive investment support under Turkey’s Priority Investment Scheme. Project-Based Investment Incentives There is a special category of investment incentives that is tailored for projects that will serve the country’s current or future critical needs such as security of supply, reduction of foreign dependency, realization of technological transformation, innovation, and R&D-intensive and high-value-added solutions. Incentives for these types of projects are screened by the Ministry of Industry and Technology and approved by presidential decree. There are no restrictions on foreign firms operating in any of Turkey’s 18 free zones. The zones are open to a wide range of activities, including manufacturing, storage, packaging, trading, banking, and insurance. Foreign products enter and leave the free zones without imposition of customs or duties if they are exported to third country markets. Income generated in the zones is exempt from corporate and individual income taxation and from the value-added tax, but firms are required to make social security contributions for their employees. Additionally, standardization regulations in Turkey do not apply to the activities in the free zones, unless the products are imported into Turkey. Sales to the Turkish domestic market are allowed with goods and revenues transported from the zones into Turkey subject to all relevant import regulations. Taxpayers who possessed an operating license as of February 6, 2004, do not have to pay income or corporate tax on their earnings in free zones for the duration of their license. Earnings based on the sale of goods manufactured in free zones are exempt from income and corporate tax until the end of the year in which Turkey becomes a member of the European Union. Earnings secured in a free zone under corporate tax immunity and paid as dividends to real person shareholders in Turkey, or to real person or legal-entity shareholders abroad, are subject to 15 percent withholding tax. https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/serbest-bolgeler The government mandates a local employment ratio of five Turkish citizens per foreign worker. These schemes do not apply equally to senior management and boards of directors, but their numbers are included in the overall local employment calculations. Foreign legal firms are forbidden from working in Turkey except as consultants; they cannot directly represent clients and must partner with a local law firm. There are no onerous visa, residence, work permits or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. There are no known government-imposed conditions on permissions to invest. Recent laws targeting the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector have increased regulations on data, social media, online marketing, online broadcasting, tax collection, and payment platforms. ICT and other companies report GOT pressure to localize data, which it views as a precursor to greater GOT access to user information and source code. Law No. 6493 on Payment and Security Systems, Payment Services, and e-money Institutions, also requires financial institutions to establish servers in Turkey to localize data. The Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) is the authority that issues business licenses if companies localize their IT systems in Turkey and keep the original data (not copies) in Turkey. Regulations on data localization, internet content, and taxation/licensing have resulted in the departure of several U.S. tech companies from the Turkish market and have chilled investment by other possible entrants to the e-commerce and e-payments sectors. The laws potentially affect all companies that collect private user data, such as payment information provided online for a consumer purchase. Turkey enacted the Personal Data Protection Law in April 2016. The law regulates all operations performed upon personal data including obtaining, recording, storage, and transfer to third parties or abroad. For all data previously processed before the law went into effect, there was a two-year transition period. After two years, all data had to be compliant with new legislation requirements, erased, or anonymized. All businesses are urged to assess how they currently collect and store data to determine vulnerabilities and risks regarding legal obligations. The law created the Data Protection Authority (KVKK), which is charged with monitoring and enforcing corporate data use. There are no performance requirements imposed as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investment in Turkey. GOT requirements for disclosure of proprietary information as part of the regulatory approval process are consistent with internationally accepted practices, though some companies, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, worry about data protection during the regulatory review process. Enterprises with foreign capital must send their activity report submitted to shareholders, their auditor’s report, and their balance sheets to the Ministry of Trade, Free Zones, Overseas Investment and Services Directorate, annually by May. Turkey grants most rights, incentives, exemptions, and privileges available to national businesses to foreign business on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in government-financed and/or subsidized research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Offsets are an important aspect of Turkey’s military procurement, and increasingly in other sectors, and such guidelines have been modified to encourage direct investment and technology transfer. The GOT targets the energy, transportation, medical devices, and telecom sectors for the usage of offsets. In February 2014, Parliament passed legislation requiring the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology, currently named the Ministry of Industry and Technology, to establish a framework to incorporate civilian offsets into large government procurement contracts. The Ministry of Health (MOH) established an office to examine how offsets could be incorporated into new contracts. The law suggests that for public contracts above USD 5 million, companies must invest up to 50 percent of contract value in Turkey and “add value” to the sector. In general, labor, health, and safety laws do not distort or impede investment, although legal restrictions on discharging employees may provide a disincentive to labor-intensive activity in the formal economy. 5. Protection of Property Rights Secured interests in property, both movable and real, are generally recognized and enforced, and there is a reliable system of recording such security interests. For example, real estate is registered with a land registry office. Turkey’s legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposal of property rights, including land, buildings, and mortgages, although some parties have complained that the courts are slow to render decisions and are susceptible to external influence. However, following the July 2016 coup attempt, the GOT confiscated over 1,100 companies as well as significant real estate holdings for alleged terrorist ties. Although the seizures did not directly impact many foreign firms, it nonetheless raises investor concerns about private property protections. The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization enacted a law on title-deed registration in 2012 removing the previous requirement that foreign purchasers of real estate in Turkey had to be in partnership with a Turkish individual or company that owns at least a 50-percent share in the property, meaning foreigners can now own their own land. The law is also much more flexible in allowing international companies to purchase real property. The law also increases the upper limit on real estate purchases by foreign individuals to 30 hectares and allows further increases up to 60 hectares with permission from the Council of Ministers. As of March 2020, a valuation report, based upon real market value, must be prepared for real estate sales transactions involving buyers that are foreign citizens. To ensure that land has a clear title, interested parties may inquire through the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadaster. www.tkgm.gov.tr Turkey continues to implement its intellectual property rights (IPR) law, the Industrial Property Code No. 6769, which entered into force in 2017. The law brings together a series of “decrees” into a single, unified, modernized legal structure. It also greatly increases the capacity of the country’s patent office (TurkPatent) and improves the framework for commercialization and technology transfer. Turkey is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. However, while legislative frameworks are improving, IPR enforcement remains lackluster. Turkey remains on USTR’s Special 301 Watch List for 2022. Concerns remain about policies requiring local production of pharmaceuticals, inadequate protection of test data, and a lack of transparency in national pricing and reimbursement. IPR enforcement suffers from a lack of awareness and training among judges and officers, as well as a lack of prioritization relative to terrorism and other concerns. Law enforcement officers do not have ex-officio authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods, which are prevalent in the local markets. Software piracy is also high. Additionally, the practice of issuing search-and-seizure warrants varies considerably. IPR courts and specialized IPR judges only exist in major cities. Outside these areas, an application for a search warrant must be filed at a regular criminal court (Courts of Peace) and/or with a regular prosecutor. The Courts of Peace are very reluctant to issue search warrants. Although, by law, “reasonable doubt” is adequate grounds for issuing a search-and-seizure order, judges often set additional requirements, including supporting documentation, photographs, and even witness testimony, which risk exposing companies’ intelligence sources. In some regions, Courts of Peace judges rarely grant search warrants, for example in popular tourist destinations. Overall, according to some investors, it is difficult to protect IPR and general enforcement is deteriorating. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en . 6. Financial Sector The Turkish Government encourages and offers an effective regulatory system to facilitate portfolio investment. Since the start of 2020, a currency crisis that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and high levels of dollarization have raised liquidity concerns among some commentators. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, though the GOT has increased low- and no-interest loans for certain parties, and pressured state-owned banks to increase their lending, especially for stimulating economic growth and public projects. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Turkish Government adopted a framework Capital Markets Law in 2012, aimed at bringing greater corporate accountability, protection of minority-shareholders, and financial statement transparency. Turkish capital markets in 2020 drew growing interest from domestic investors, according to data from the Central Registry Agency (MKK). In 2021, the number of local real investors reached 2.3 million, up an average of 65,200 per month, with the total portfolio value reaching USD 22.2 billion. The Turkish banking sector remains relatively healthy. The estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks were as follows at the end of 2021: Ziraat Bankasi A.S. – USD 102.69 billion, Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi – USD 77.08 billion, Halk Bankasi – USD 67.49 billion, Is Bankasi – USD 69.44 billion, Garanti Bankasi– USD 56.78 billion, Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi – USD 58.51 billion, Akbank – USD 57.15 billion. According to the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), the share of non-performing loans in the sector was approximately 3.15 percent at the end of 2021, though there appears to have been some regulatory forbearance during the COVID pandemic. The only requirements for a foreigner to open a bank account in Turkey are a passport copy and either an identification number from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a Turkish tax identification number. The BDDK monitors and supervises Turkey’s banks. The BDDK is headed by a board whose seven members are appointed for six-year terms. Bank deposits are protected by an independent deposit insurance agency, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). Because of historically high local borrowing costs and short repayment periods, foreign and local firms frequently seek credit from international markets to finance their activities. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. Foreign Exchange Turkish law guarantees the free transfer of profits, fees, and royalties, and repatriation of capital. This guarantee is reflected in Turkey’s 1990 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, which mandates unrestricted and prompt transfer in a freely usable currency at a legal market-clearing rate for all investment-related funds. There is little difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange in Turkey, and there are no foreign-exchange restrictions. Throughout 2021, the GOT continued to encourage businesses to conduct trade in lira. An amendment to the Decision on the Protection of the Value of the Turkish Currency was made with Presidential Decree No. 85 in September 2018 wherein the GOT tightened restrictions on Turkey-based businesses conducting numerous types of transactions using foreign currencies or indexed to foreign currencies. The Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance may grant exceptions, however. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency. A limit on banks’ currency swap, forward and option transactions with non-resident partners at 10 percent of their capital since September 2020. In November 2020, the limit for swaps, forward and option transactions where banks pay Turkish lira at maturity was raised to up to 30 percent, depending on their remaining maturities. Turkey took a variety of such measures to prop up the Turkish lira, including the mandatory surrender and repatriation requirements on FX export proceeds; generally, within 180 days and at least 80 percent had to be surrendered to a local bank in exchange for Turkish liras. In January 2020, the surrender requirement was dropped, but the repatriation requirement remained. However, in January 2022 the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announced it would buy 25 percent of all euro, dollar, or British Pound-denominated export income from exporters. There is no limit on the amount of foreign currency that may be brought into Turkey, but not more than 25,000 Turkish lira or 10,000 euros worth of foreign currency may be taken out without declaration. Although the Turkish lira is fully convertible, most international transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars or euros due to their universal acceptance. Banks deal in foreign exchange and do borrow and lend in foreign currencies. While for the most part foreign exchange is freely traded and widely available, a May 2019 government decree imposed a settlement delay for FX purchases by individuals of more than USD 100,000; there is also a 0.2 percent tax on FX purchases. The settlement delay provision was repealed in December of 2020. Foreign investors are free to convert and repatriate their Turkish lira profits. The exchange rate was heavily managed by the CBRT with a “dirty float” regime until November 2020, when a new central bank governor assumed responsibility. After several months of increased policy rates, tight monetary policy, and a more stable Turkish lira, the governor was fired, because of which the lira quickly depreciated by 10 percent. Macroeconomic policy has remained largely unpredictable since then. Remittance Policies In Turkey, there have been no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. Waiting periods for dividends, return on investment, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees do not exceed 60 days. There are no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOT announced the creation of a sovereign wealth fund (called the Turkey Wealth Fund, or TVF) in August 2016. Unlike traditional sovereign wealth funds, the controversial fund consists of shares of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and is designed to serve as collateral for raising foreign financing. However, the TVF has not launched any major projects since its inception. Several leading SOEs, such as natural gas distributor BOTAS, Turkish Airlines, and Ziraat Bank have been transferred to the TVF, which in 2020 became the largest shareholder in domestic telecommunications firm Turkcell. Critics worry management of the fund is opaque and politicized. The fund’s consolidated financial statements are available on its website (https://www.tvf.com.tr/en/investor-relations/reports ), although independent audits are not made publicly available. Firms within the fund’s portfolio appear to have increased their debt loads substantially since 2016. International ratings agencies consider the fund a quasi-sovereign. The fund was already exempt from many provisions of domestic commercial law and new legislation adopted April 16, 2020, granted it further exemptions from the Capital Markets Law and Turkish Commercial Code, while also allowing it to take ownership of distressed firms in strategic sectors. Turkey issued government debt securities worth USD 4.16 billion in April 2019 to support its state banks and TVF injected 21 billion Turkish Lira of additional capital in May 2020 into three public banks engaged in COVID-19 measures (Ziraat, Halkbank and Vakifbank). 8. Responsible Business Conduct In Turkey, responsible business conduct (RBC) is gaining traction. Reforms carried out as part of the EU harmonization process have had a positive effect on laws governing Turkish associations, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, recent democratic backsliding has reversed some of these gains, and there has been increasing pressure on civil society since the coup attempt. Turkey has a National Contact Point (NCP), or central coordinating office, to assist companies in their efforts to adopt a due-diligence approach to responsible conduct. The NCP performs informative activities for the introduction of the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization (OECD)’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and finalize the applications of alleged violations regarding the implementation of the Guidelines in an impartial, predictable, and fair manner and in accordance with the principles and standards included in the Guidelines. The Ministry of Industry and Technology’s General Directorate of Incentive Implementation and Foreign Investments is designated as the NCP of Turkey to promote the Guidelines, to examine and resolve complaints.Contact Information for the NCP: Dr. Mehmet Yurdal ŞahinDirector General of Incentive Implementation and Foreign InvestmentMinistry of Industry and Technology turkeyncp@sanayi.gov.tr Tel: +90 312 201 6702 NGOs and business associations are active in the economic sector; the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD) issue regular reports and studies, and hold events aimed at encouraging Turkish companies to become involved in policy issues. In addition to influencing the political process, these two NGOs also assist their members with civic engagement. The Business Council for Sustainable Development Turkey (http://www.skdturkiye.org/en ) and the Corporate Social Responsibility Association in Turkey (www.csrturkey.org ), founded in 2005, are two NGOs devoted exclusively to issues of responsible business conduct. The Turkish Ethical Values Center Foundation, the Private Sector Volunteers Association (www.osgd.org ) and the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (www.tusev.org.tr ) also play an important role. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues Turkey has a Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2023, which can be found at https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/iklim_degisikligi_stratejisi_EN(2).pdf . In addition, the GOT signed the Paris Agreement in 2015 and ratified it on October 6, 2021. Turkey has registered its first non-binding Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The NDC targets announced a 21 percent reduction target in greenhouse gases by 2030. Turkey is on its way to becoming a green energy leader, with 52 percent of installed electricity capacity from renewables and official goals to increase this number, but still lacks a plan to phase out coal power generation. In February 2022, the GOT held its first Climate Council. Coal currently accounts for over 30 percent of Turkey’s electricity production. The EU is Turkey’s biggest external market, and Turkish exporters will be subject to the EU’s carbon border tax, which could be as high as USD 1.8 billion annually, according to the Turkish Industry and Business Association. In August 2021, Turkey adopted a “Green Deal Action Plan” to comply with the European Green Deal. Turkey lacks an emissions trading system. 9. Corruption Corruption remains a concern, a reality reflected in Turkey’s sliding score in recent years in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, where it ranked 96 of 180 countries and territories around the world in 2021. Government mechanisms to investigate and punish alleged abuse and corruption by state officials remained inadequate, and impunity remained a problem. Though independent in principle, the judiciary remained subject to government, and particularly executive branch, interference, including with respect to the investigation and prosecution of major corruption cases. (See the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for more details: https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/). Turkey is a participant in regional anti-corruption initiatives such as the G20 Anti-Corruption working group. The Presidential State Supervisory Council is responsible for combating corruption. Public procurement reforms were designed in Turkey to make procurement more transparent and less susceptible to political interference, including through the establishment of an independent public procurement board with the power to void contracts. Critics claim that government officials have continued to award large contracts to firms friendly with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), especially for large public construction projects. Turkish legislation prohibits bribery, but enforcement is uneven. Turkey’s Criminal Code makes it unlawful to promise or to give any advantage to foreign government officials in exchange for their assistance in providing improper advantage in the conduct of international business. The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) placed Turkey in October 2021 onto its list of countries subject to increased monitoring. Turkey was added alongside 22 other jurisdictions, for strategic deficiencies in its regime to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. The provisions of the criminal law regarding bribing of foreign government officials are consistent with the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 of the United States (FCPA). There are, however, several differences between Turkish law and the FCPA. For example, there is no exception under Turkish law for payments to facilitate or expedite performance of a “routine governmental action” in terms of the FCPA. Another difference is that the FCPA does not provide for punishment by imprisonment, while Turkish law provides for punishment by imprisonment from 4 to 12 years. The Presidential State Supervisory Council, which advises the Corruption Investigations Committee, is responsible for investigating major corruption cases brought to its attention by the Committee. Nearly every state agency has its own inspector corps responsible for investigating internal corruption. The Parliament can establish investigative commissions to examine corruption allegations concerning cabinet ministers; a majority vote is needed to send these cases to the Supreme Court for further action. Turkey ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Officials and passed implementing legislation in 2003 to make bribing foreign, as well as domestic, officials illegal. In 2006, Turkey’s Parliament ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Organization: Presidential State Supervisory Council Address: Beştepe Mahallesi, Alparslan Türkeş Caddesi, Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, Yenimahalle Telephone number: Phone: +90 312 470 25 00 Fax: +90 312 470 13 03 Name: Seref Malkoc Title: Chief Ombudsman Organization: The Ombudsman Institution Address: Kavaklidere Mah. Zeytin Dali Caddesi No:4 Cankaya ANKARA Telephone number: +90 312 465 22 00 Email address: iletisim@ombudsman.gov.tr 10. Political and Security Environment The period between 2015 and 2016 was one of the more violent times in Turkey since the 1970s. However, since January 2017, Turkey has experienced historically low levels of violence even when compared to past periods of calm, and the country has greatly ramped up internal security measures. Turkey can experience politically motivated violence, generally at the level of aggression against opposition politicians and political parties. A July 2016 attempted coup resulted in the death of more than 240 people and injured over 2,100 others. Since the July 2015 collapse of the cessation of hostilities between the government and the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), along with sister organizations like the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), have regularly targeted security forces, with civilians often getting injured or killed by PKK and TAK attacks. (Both the PKK and TAK have been designated as terrorist organizations by the United States.) Other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and the leftist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) are present in Turkey and have conducted attacks in 2013, 2015, 2016, and early 2017. The indigenous Marxist-Leninist insurgent group, DHKP/C, for example, which was established in the 1970s and designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997, is responsible for several attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and the U.S. Consulate General Istanbul in recent years, including a suicide bombing at the embassy in 2013 that killed one local employee. The DHKP/C has stated its intention to commit further attacks against the United States, NATO, and Turkey. Still, widespread internal security measures, especially following the failed July 2016 coup attempt, seem to have hobbled its success. In addition, violent extremists associated with ISIS and other groups transited Turkey enroute to Syria in the past, though increased scrutiny by government officials and a general emphasis on increased security – including a newly constructed 911 km wall along Turkey’s border with Syria – has significantly curtailed this access route, especially when compared to the earlier years of the conflict. There have been past instances of violence against religious missionaries and others perceived as proselytizing for a non-Islamic religion in Turkey, though none in recent years. On past occasions, perpetrators have threatened and assaulted Christian and Jewish individuals, groups, and places of worship, many of which receive specially assigned police protection, both for institutions and leadership. Anti-Semitic discourse periodically features in both popular rhetoric and public media, and evangelizing activities by foreigners tend to be viewed suspiciously by the country’s security apparatus. However, government officials support religious freedom as policy and points to Turkey’s religious minorities as a sign of the country’s diversity. Religious minority figures periodically meet with the country’s president and other senior members of national political leadership. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Turkey has a population of 84.7 million, with 22.4 percent under the age of 14 as of 2021. Ninety-three percent of the population lives in urban areas. Official figures put the labor force at 30.9 million in December 2020. Approximately one-fifth of the labor force works in agriculture (17.6 percent) while another fifth works in industrial sectors (20.5 percent). The country retains a significant informal sector at 30.6 percent. In 2021, the official unemployment rate stayed at 12 percent, with 22.6 percent unemployment among those 15-24 years old. Turkey provides twelve years of free, compulsory education to children of both sexes in state schools. Authorities continue to grapple with facilitating legal employment for working-age Syrians, a major subset of the 3.6 million displaced Syrian men, women, and children—unknown numbers of which were working informally. Women constitute more than half of Turkey’s population, but their labor participation rate stands at 34.5 percent, while male labor participation is 71.8 percent. While most women remain out of the labor market, many are working in the informal economy, which presents unfavorable working conditions that are far from the four pillars of decent work definition of the International Labor Organization (ILO). The EU Delegation, various UN organizations, World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and other international financial institutions (IFIs) in Turkey are working together with multiple stakeholders including the GOT and its related public institutions, on projects related to women. Some provide entrepreneurship funds and vocational-education support, and some initiatives advocate for heightened expectations of local and foreign investors and loan recipients to including a female labor workforce agenda into their business proposals. Turkey has an abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, and vocational training schools exist at the high school level. There remains a shortage of high-tech workers. Individual high-tech firms, both local and foreign owned, typically conduct their own training programs. Within the scope of employment mobilization, the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services, Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) and Turkey Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) has launched the Vocational Education and Skills Development Cooperation Protocol (MEGIP). Turkey has also undertaken a significant expansion of university programs, building dozens of new colleges and universities over the last decade. The use of subcontracted workers for jobs not temporary in nature remained common, including by firms executing contracts for the state. Generally ineligible for equal benefits or collective bargaining rights, subcontracted workers—often hired via revolving contracts of less than a year duration— remained vulnerable to sudden termination by employers and, in some cases, poor working conditions. Employers typically utilized subcontracted workers to minimize salary/benefit expenditures and, according to critics, to prevent unionization of employees. The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. A minimum of seven workers is required to establish a trade union without prior approval. To become a bargaining agent, a union must represent 40 percent of the employees at a given work site and one percent of all workers in that industry. Certain public employees, such as senior officials, magistrates, members of the armed forces, and police, cannot form unions. Nonunionized workers, such as migrant seasonal agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and those in the informal economy, are also not covered by collective bargaining laws. Unionization rates generally remain low. Independent labor unions—distinct from their government-friendly counterpart unions—reported that employers continued to use threats, violence, and layoffs in unionized workplaces across sectors. Service-sector union organizers report that private sector employers sometimes ignore the law and dismiss workers to discourage union activity. Turkish law provides for the right to strike but prohibits strikes by public workers engaged in safeguarding life and property and by workers in the coal mining and petroleum industries, hospitals and funeral industries, urban transportation, and national defense. The law explicitly allows the government to deny the right to strike for any situation it determines a threat to national security. Turkey has labor-dispute resolution mechanisms, including the Supreme Arbitration Board, which addresses disputes between employers and employees pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. Labor courts function effectively and relatively efficiently. Appeals, however, can last for years. If a court rules that an employer unfairly dismissed a worker and should either reinstate or compensate him or her, the employer generally pays compensation to the employee along with a fine. Turkey has ratified key International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions protecting workers’ rights, including conventions on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; Rights to Organize and to Bargain Collectively; Abolition of Forced Labor; Minimum Age; Occupational Health and Safety; Termination of Employment; and Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. Implementation of a number of these, including ILO Convention 87 (Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize) and Convention 98 (Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively), remained uneven. Implementation of legislation related to workplace health and safety likewise remained uneven. Child labor continued, including in its worst forms and particularly in the seasonal agricultural sector, despite ongoing government efforts to address the issue. See the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for more details on Turkey’s labor sector and the challenges it continues to face. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $795,950 2020 $719,920 * www.turkstat.gov.tr Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $1,430 2020 $5,814 BEA data available athttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data *https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/dashboard/4944 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1,557 2020 $2,578 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 19.9% 2019 21.9% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World percent20Investment percent20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * www.tcmb.gov.tr The IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data is not consistent with Turkey’s data as reported by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, which can be found at: https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TR/TCMB+TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+ve+Ilgili+Istatistikler/Uluslararasi+Yatirim+Pozisyonu/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 124923 100% Total Outward 50,726 100% Qatar 32,445 26% North Macedonia 19,668 39% North Macedonia 17,994 4% United Kingdom 5,211 10% United Kingdom 13,083 10% Germany 2,561 5% Germany 9,360 7% Austria 2,286 .5% Luxembourg 5,291 4% Jersey 2,285 4.5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data available at: http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 14. Contact for More Information: Economic Specialist American Embassy Ankara 110 Atatürk Blvd. Kavaklıdere, 06100 Ankara – Turkey Phone: +90 (312) 455-5555 Email: Ankara-ECON-MB@state.gov Turkmenistan Executive Summary Turkmenistan is currently considered high risk for U.S. foreign direct investment due to endemic corruption, a weak commercial law and regulatory regime, opaque and onerous bureaucratic processes, and strict foreign currency controls. The government has not taken measures to incentivize foreign direct investment outside the petroleum industry and there is no significant U.S. FDI in the country. Turkmenistan has the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, though just outside the top ten largest natural gas producers. Almost all government revenue comes from the sale of natural gas, mostly to China, with a lesser dependence on export of petrochemicals, cotton, and textiles. Strict foreign currency controls have resulted in a black-market exchange rate for dollars that averaged over five times the official rate in 2020-2021. This results in an inability to repatriate profits or to convert local currency to dollars to import supplies or equipment. It also distorts data, especially GDP, contributing to the widely held view that most economic indicators released by the government are unreliable. The government often fails to implement or consistently enforce investment-related legislation. There are no meaningful legal protections against government expropriation of assets and there is no independent judiciary. Foreign companies typically pay significantly higher prices for services. Weak education and healthcare systems, as well as underdeveloped physical and telecommunications infrastructure are also challenges. Turkmenistan’s status as one of the most restrictive and isolated countries in the world only grew during the pandemic; the country’s borders were closed for average Turkmen citizens, internal movement between provinces restricted, and regularly scheduled commercial air traffic completely stopped in March 2020 and continuing through publication in April 2022. International travelers, to include foreign workers in the construction, oil and gas industries, travel in and out of the country on charter flights. The government often counts foreign loans as FDI, but there is little genuine FDI in the country. The government has promoted efforts to expand downstream petrochemical production, reduce greenhouse gasses, especially methane, improve energy and water efficiency, increase digitalization, and begin production of hydrogen. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/country/TKM Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2021/ U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=343&UUID=912a1109-0ce4-466a-8e93-3c0adb2c4b89 World Bank GNI per capita 2019 7,220 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=TM 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Turkmenistan regularly announces its desire to attract more foreign investment, but tight state control of the economy, a lack of transparency, underdeveloped commercial law field, healthcare and infrastructure, and a restrictive visa regime have created a difficult foreign investment climate. There is extremely limited genuine foreign investment in the country outside the oil and gas sector. The government often incorrectly touts foreign loans as investment, which it repays fastidiously. Turkmenistan does not have a functional investment promotion agency. The government selectively chooses its investment partners and establishing a strong relationship with a government official is often essential to achieving commercial success. Decisions to allow foreign participation in projects often appear politically driven. Officials reportedly may “seek rents” for permitting or assisting foreign investors to enter the local market. Some foreign investors have found success working through foreign business representatives who are able to leverage their personal relationships with senior leaders to advance their business interests. A number of foreign companies though have been forced out of the market in recent years due to non-payment of invoices by the government or government connected suppliers and currency controls limiting their ability to repatriate profits. There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of companies. In practice, however, the government has only allowed significant foreign ownership and foreign direct investment in the energy sector. The law permits foreigners to establish and own businesses and generally engage in business activities, but profit repatriation remains a major hurdle due to a near ban on official currency conversion. All contractors operating in Turkmenistan for a period of at least 183 days a year must register with the Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (formerly the Main State Tax Service). National accounting and international financial reporting standards apply to foreign investors. In the energy sector, Turkmenistan precludes foreign investors from investing in the exploration and production of its onshore gas resources. All land in Turkmenistan is government owned. Turkmenistan generally requires that citizens of Turkmenistan make up 90 percent of the workforce of foreign-owned companies (i.e., for every foreign worker, nine Turkmen citizen must be hired). This policy does not apply to foreign-owned oil and gas companies, which are subject to a more lenient policy requiring only 30 percent of the workforce to be Turkmen citizens, with the expectation that expats will also gradually be replaced by local workers through training programs. Other governmental barriers that have reportedly been used to discriminate against investors include excessive and arbitrary tax examinations, arbitrary license extension denials, and customs clearance and visa issuance obstacles. In most cases, the government has insisted on maintaining a majority interest in any joint venture (JV). Foreign investors have been reluctant to enter JVs controlled by the government, mainly because of differing business cultures and conflicting management styles. Although there is no specific legislation requiring foreign investors to receive government approval to divest, in practice they are expected to coordinate such actions with the government. Private entities in Turkmenistan have the right to establish and own business enterprises. The 2000 Law on Enterprises defines the legal forms of state and private businesses (state enterprises, sole proprietorships, cooperatives, partnerships, corporations, and enterprises of non-government organizations). The law allows foreign companies to establish subsidiaries, though the government does not currently register subsidiaries. The Civil Code of Turkmenistan and the Law on Enterprises govern the operation of representative and branch offices. Enterprises must be registered with the Registration Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The 2008 Law on the Licensing of Certain Types of Activities (last amended in November 2015) lists 44 activities that require government licenses. The Law on Enterprises and the Law on Joint Stock Societies allow acquisitions and mergers. Turkmenistan’s legislation is not clear, however, about acquisitions and mergers involving foreign parties, nor does it have specific provisions for the disposition of interests in business enterprises, both solely domestic and those with foreign participation. Governmental approval is necessary for acquisitions and mergers of enterprises with state shares. Foreign companies with approved government contracts and wishing to operate in Turkmenistan generally receive government support and do not face problems or significant delays when registering their operations in Turkmenistan. Under Turkmen law, all local and foreign entities operating in Turkmenistan are required to register with the Registration Department under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Before the registration is granted, however, an inter-ministerial commission that includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, law enforcement agencies, and industry-specific ministries must approve it. Foreign companies without approved government contracts that seek to establish a legal entity in Turkmenistan must go through a lengthy and cumbersome registration process involving the inter-ministerial commission mentioned above. The commission evaluates foreign companies based on their financial standing, work experience, reputation, and perceived political and legal risks. The inter-ministerial commission does not give a reason when denying the registration of a legal entity. In order to participate in a government tender, companies are not required to be registered in Turkmenistan. However, a company interested in participating in the tender process must submit all the tender documents to the respective ministry or agency in person. Many foreign companies with no presence in Turkmenistan provide a limited power of attorney to local representatives who then submit tender documents on the company’s behalf. A list of required documents for screening is usually provided by the state agency announcing the tender. The tender process is opaque and difficult to navigate, particularly for companies outside Turkmenistan, and not all tenders are publicly announced. Many tenders are not fully available online and require a local agent to pay a fee to obtain the information on paper. Before most contracts can be signed, the agreement must be approved by the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange, the Central Bank, the Supreme Control Chamber, and the Cabinet of Ministers. The approval process is not transparent and often appears politically driven. There is no legal guarantee that the information provided by companies to the government will be kept confidential. After becoming an observer to the WTO in 2020, Turkmenistan submitted its formal application to join the WTO in 2021. However, the government has not yet undergone an investment policy review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review. Post is not aware of a civil society organization that has provided review of investment policy related concerns. Turkmenistan does not have a business registration website for use by domestic or foreign companies. Depending on the type of business activity a foreign company seeks in Turkmenistan, registration with the local statistics office, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, the Registration and Tax Departments under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange could all be required. Business registration usually takes about six months and often depends on personal connections in various government offices. Development and implementation of public policies to attract foreign investment, investment coordination, and assistance to foreign investors are carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan. The Agency for Protection from Economic Risks under the Ministry of Finance and Economy makes decisions on providing any investment-related services to potential foreign investors based on criteria such as the financial status of the investor. Turkmenistan’s Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises (adopted in August 2009) defines small- and medium-sized enterprises as follows: in industry, power generation, construction, and gas and water supply sectors, small enterprises are defined as those with up to 50 employees and medium enterprises are those with up to 200 employees; in all other sectors small enterprises are those with up to 25 employees and medium enterprises are those with up to 100 people. However, the benefits of the Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises do not apply to: 1) state-owned enterprises; 2) enterprises with foreign investment carrying out banking or insurance activities; and 3) activities related to gambling and gaming for money. As in many countries, business-related activities, particularly any large-scale contracts for goods or services, benefits from face-to-face contact. Foreigners wishing to visit Turkmenistan for business must request a letter of invitation issued by State Migration Service from the inviting Ministry/State Agency to travel to the country; permission also must be received from the government to meet with state ministries, agencies, and enterprises. It is possible to conduct business with the government by hiring a local agent. The U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat can assist U.S. companies interested in identifying potential local partners and requesting a letter of invitation, which allows a traveler to board a plane for Turkmenistan and to request a visa on arrival at the airport. Turkmenistan closed its borders to regularly scheduled international commercial air travel in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (domestic flights are still available). It is unclear when scheduled international commercial flights will resume. Foreign embassies and some foreign companies arrange charter flights into and out of the country (Istanbul is the most common point of departure and arrival for charter flights). However, these flights are not typically permitted to land at Ashgabat International Airport and instead must land and take off from Turkmenabat or Turkmenbashi Airports. Private citizens are currently subject to 21-days quarantine upon entry. All travelers should refer to travel.state.gov for the most up-to-date information on travel restrictions and quarantine measures. The government of Turkmenistan does not promote or incentivize outward investment and there is no investment promotion agency. The existing policies are aimed at reducing imports and promoting exports. According to unofficial reports, individual entrepreneurs have been known to invest in real estate abroad, namely in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Those entrepreneurs who invest abroad tend not to disclose such information, fearing possible retribution from the government. 3. Legal Regime The government does not use transparent policies to foster competition and foreign investment. Laws have frequent references to bylaws that are not publicly available. Most bylaws are passed in the form of presidential decrees. Such decrees are not categorized by subject, which makes it difficult to find relevant cross references. Personal relations with government officials can play a decisive role in determining how and when government regulations are applied. There is no information available on whether the government conducts any market studies or quantitative analysis of the impact of regulations. Regulations often appear to follow the government’s “try-and-see approach” to addressing issues. Arbitrary audits and investigations by government bodies are common in relation to both foreign and local companies. Bureaucratic procedures are opaque, confusing, and onerous. The government does not generally provide informational support to investors. As a result, foreign companies may spend months conducting due diligence in Turkmenistan. A serious impediment to foreign investment is the lack of knowledge of internationally recognized business practices, as well as the limited number of fluent English speakers in Turkmenistan, especially outside Ashgabat. English-language material on legislation is scarce, and there are very few business consultants to assist investors. Proposed laws and regulations are not generally published in draft form for public comment. There are no standards-setting consortia or organizations besides the Main State Standards Service. There is no independent body for filing complaints. Financial disclosure requirements are neither transparent nor consistent with international norms. Government enterprises are not required to publicize financial statements, even to foreign partners. Financial audits are often conducted by local auditors, not internationally recognized firms. The legal framework contained in the Law on Petroleum (2008) was a partial step toward creating a more transparent policy in the energy sector. Turkmenistan’s banks completed the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). State-owned agencies began the transition to IFRS in 2012 and fully transitioned to National Financing Reporting Standards (NFRS) in January 2014, which is reportedly in accordance with IFRS. While IFRS may improve accounting standards by bringing them into compliance with international standards, they have no discernible impact on Turkmenistan’s fiscal transparency since fiscal data remains inaccessible to the public. There is no publicly available information regarding the budget’s conformity with IFRS. There is no public consultation process on draft bills and there are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Public finances and debt obligations are not transparent. Turkmenistan pursues a policy of neutrality (acknowledged by the United Nations in 1995) and generally does not join regional blocs. In drafting laws and regulations, the government usually includes a clause that states international agreements and laws will prevail in the case of a conflict between local and international legislation. Turkmenistan is not a member of Eurasian Economic Union. In July 2020, Turkmenistan became an observer to the WTO and in 2021 applied for full membership. Turkmenistan is a civil law country, and the parliament adopts around 50 laws per year without involving the public, though Presidential decrees often supersede legislation. Most contracts negotiated with the government have an arbitration clause. The Embassy strongly advises U.S. companies to include an arbitration clause identifying a dispute resolution venue outside Turkmenistan. Investment and commercial disputes involving Turkmenistan have three common themes: nonpayment of debts, non-delivery of goods or services, and contract renegotiations. The government may claim the provider did not meet the terms of a contract as justification for nonpayment. Several disputes have centered on the government’s unwillingness to pay in freely convertible currency as contractually required. In cases where government entities have not delivered goods or services, the government has often ignored demands for delivery. Finally, a change in leadership in the government agency that signed the original contract routinely triggers the government’s desire to re-evaluate the entire contract, including profit distribution, management responsibilities, and payment schedules. The judicial branch is independent of the executive on paper only, but in practice is heavily influenced by the executive branch. In February 2015, an updated law, “On the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Turkmenistan” (first adopted in 1993) was signed. The new law redefined the legal and economic framework for the activities of the Chamber, defined the state support measures, and created a new body for international commercial arbitration under the Chamber’s purview. This body can consider disputes arising from contractual and other civil-legal relations in foreign trade and other forms of international economic relations, if at least one of the parties to the dispute is located outside of Turkmenistan. The enforcement of the decisions of commercial arbitration outside of Turkmenistan may be denied in Turkmenistan under certain conditions listed under Article 47 of the Law of Turkmenistan “On Commercial Arbitration” adopted in 2014 and in force as of 2016. According to the law, the parties in dispute can appeal the arbitration decision only to the Supreme Court of Turkmenistan and nowhere abroad. The government of Turkmenistan recognizes foreign court judgements on a case-by-case basis. According to the 2008 Law on Foreign Investment, all foreign and domestic companies and foreign investments must be registered at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The Petroleum Law of 2008 (last amended in 2012) regulates offshore and onshore petroleum operations in Turkmenistan, including petroleum licensing, taxation, accounting, and other rights and obligations of state agencies and foreign partners. The Petroleum Law supersedes all other legislation pertaining to petroleum activities, including the Tax Code. According to the Land Code (last amended February 2017), foreign companies or individuals are permitted to lease land for non-agricultural purposes, but only the Cabinet of Ministers has the authority to grant the lease. Foreign companies may own structures and buildings. Turkmenistan adopted a Bankruptcy Law in 1993. Other laws affecting foreign investors include the Law on Investments (last amended in 1993), the Law on Joint Stock Societies (1999), the Law on Enterprises (2000), the Law on Business Activities (last amended in 1993), the Civil Code enforced since 2000, and the 1993 Law on Property. Turkmenistan requires that import/export transactions and investment projects be registered at the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange (SCRME) and the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The procedure applies not only to contracts and agreements signed at SCRME, but also to contracts signed between third parties. SCRME is state-owned and is the only exchange in the country. The contract registration procedure includes an assessment of “price justification,” and while SCRME does not directly dictate pricing, it does generally set a ceiling for imports and a minimum price for exports. Import transactions must be registered before goods are delivered to Turkmenistan. The government generally favors long-term investment projects that do not require regular hard currency purchases of raw materials from foreign markets. The Law on Foreign Investment, as amended in 2008, is the primary legal instrument defining the principles of investment. A foreign investor is defined in the law as an entity owning a minimum of 20 percent of a company’s assets. Under Turkmenistan’s law, all local and foreign entities operating in Turkmenistan are required to register with the Registration Department under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Before the registration is granted, however, an inter-ministerial commission that includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, law enforcement agencies, and industry-specific ministries must approve it. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Foreign companies without approved government contracts that seek to establish a legal entity in Turkmenistan must go through a lengthy and cumbersome registration process involving the inter-ministerial commission mentioned above. The commission evaluates foreign companies based on their financial standing, work experience, reputation, and perceived political and legal risks. There is no publicly available information on which agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns. The government does not publish information on any competition cases. While Turkmenistan does not have a specific law that governs competition, Article 17 (Development of Competition and Antimonopoly Activities) of the Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises seeks to promote fair competition in the country. The government has a history of arbitrarily expropriating the property of local businesses and individuals. Three known cases raise expropriation concerns for foreign businesses investing in Turkmenistan. In December 2016, the government expropriated the largest (and only foreign owned) grocery store in Ashgabat, Yimpaş (Yimpash) shopping and business center, without compensation or other legal remedy. In April 2017, the Turkish Hospital in Ashgabat was expropriated without compensation. In September 2017, Russian cell phone service provider MTS suspended its operations after the state-owned Turkmen Telecom cut the company off from the network over an alleged expired license. In each case the companies involved had valid licenses or leases. Turkmenistan’s legislation does not provide for private ownership of land. Turkmenistan adopted a Bankruptcy Law in 1993 (last amended March 2016), which protects certain rights of creditors, such as the satisfaction of creditors’ claims in case of the debtor’s inability or unwillingness to make payments. The law allows for criminal liability for intentional actions resulting in bankruptcy. The law does not specify the currency in which the monetary judgments are made. 4. Industrial Policies According to the Law on Foreign Investments, foreign investors, especially those operating in the free economic zones, may enjoy some incentives and privileges, including license and tax exemptions, reduced registration and certification fees, land leasing rights, and extended visa validity. However, the law is inconsistently implemented and enforced, and currently no free economic zones are known to be in operation. Foreign investors are disadvantaged because they face higher tax rates than most local companies. The value-added tax rate (VAT) is 15 percent, an income tax of eight percent is applied to JVs, and an income tax of 20 percent is applied to wholly owned foreign companies and state-owned enterprises. Dividends are taxed at 15 percent. The personal income tax rate is 10 percent. Under the Simplified Tax System of Turkmenistan, most individual entrepreneurs pay a flat two percent income tax. The president has issued special decrees granting exemptions from taxation and other privileges to specific investors while they recoup their initial investments. The assets and property of foreign investors should be insured with the State Insurance Company of Turkmenistan pursuant to Article 53 of the 2008 Petroleum Law (if applicable) and Article 3 of the 1995 Insurance Law. National accounting and financial reporting requirements apply to foreign investors. All contractors operating in Turkmenistan for a period of at least 183 days a year must register at the Main State Tax Service. As of January 2017, 90 percent of the workforce of a company owned by a foreign investor must be composed of citizens of Turkmenistan. Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) holders are regulated by the 2008 Petroleum Law. They are subject to a 20 percent income tax and royalties up to 15 percent, depending on the level of production. The social welfare tax, which is 20 percent of the total local staff payroll, is paid by foreign investors and their subcontractors. PSA holders’ employees and their subcontractors pay a personal income tax of 10 percent. Subcontractors of PSA holders can bring their equipment into the country only for the duration of a valid contract. There is no specific legislation that regulates the operations of oil and gas subcontractors. Turkmenistan currently lists 49 import and 20 export goods and materials that are subject to customs duties. The goods and materials on these lists are subject to a 0.2 percent customs fee payment and a charge of TMT 20 ($5.70) for every hour a Customs official spends inspecting the imported goods. The Customs Service maintains a list of goods subject to customs duty payment. State enterprises often receive preferential treatment; for example, wool carpets produced at state factories are exempt from customs duties. In contrast, private carpet producers pay $20 per square meter in customs duties to export a carpet. Foreign investors are required to adhere to the sanitary and environmental standards of Turkmenistan and should produce products of equal or higher quality than prescribed in national standards. The Law on Free Economic Zones was enacted in October 2017. The law guarantees the rights of businesses, both foreign and domestic, to operate in free economic zones (FEZs) without profit ceilings. The law forbids the nationalization of enterprises operating in the zones and discrimination against foreign investors. The law does not list any FEZs currently in Turkmenistan. Previously there were ten FEZs, but these zones were not successful in drawing increased economic activity, to some extent because the government interfered in the business decisions of firms located in the zones and did not provide financing for FEZ infrastructure. The Government of Turkmenistan does not follow forced localization policies for content in goods and technology. Some foreign companies working in the construction sector on government contracts reported that the government required them to use locally produced cement for their projects. However, this seems to be more of an exception than a rule. The government does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or encryption keys. We are not aware of any rules that require foreign companies to maintain a certain amount of data storage in Turkmenistan. 5. Protection of Property Rights All land is owned by the government. Individuals and entities may own property on the land. The 1993 Law on Property (last amended November 2015) defines the following types of property owners: private, state, non-government organizations, cooperative, joint venture, foreign states, legal entities and citizens, international organizations, and mixed private and state. Some dwellings have been privatized, allowing Turkmenistan’s citizens to rent and sell apartments and houses. The Law on Privatization of State Housing came into force in January 2014. The October 2007 amendments to the Land Code (last amended February 2017) provide land leases for up to 40 years for hotels and recreational facilities in National Tourist Zones. Land and facilities subsequently built on the plot must be transferred to the state after the expiration of the contract. According to the Law on Foreign Investment, foreign investments in Turkmenistan are not subject to nationalization and requisition; foreign properties may be confiscated only following a court decision. However, this law has not been respected in practice. Banks provide preferential mortgage loans (at an annual interest rate of 1% for up to 30 years, including a five-year grace period) for the purchase of a new residence. Only government employees qualify for such concessional loans. In addition, government entities often pay 15-50% of the price of the new residence for their employees. Until mid-2015, banks also provided regular mortgage loans (with an annual interest rate of 7-8% for up to 10 years) for housing in locations other than so-called “elite” apartments. Liens are not common in Turkmenistan. While the legal structure to protect intellectual property (IP) is strong, enforcement is weak. IP infringement and theft are common. The government has enacted laws designed to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) domestically, but these laws are either arbitrarily implemented or not implemented at all. Turkmenistan has been on the United States government’s Special 301 Watch List since 2000. Turkmenistan is not, however, listed in USTR’s notorious market report. There were no reports of seizures of counterfeit goods by the government. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The only stock market in the country is the Ashgabat Stock Exchange. The website, https://agb.com.tm/, is currently available only in Turkmen. According to the website, the only shares listed are in three state-controlled banks, and the five members of the exchange are all state controlled banks. Over the past decade, the Government of Turkmenistan has adopted several laws, including the Law On Securities and Stock Exchanges of Turkmenistan (2014), the Law of Turkmenistan On Foreign Investments (2019), the State Program for the Development of the Banking System of Turkmenistan for 2011-2030. And the launch of the Ashgabat Stock Exchange in 2016. In 2021, USAID sponsored training and expert consultations for the development of the Ashgabat Stock Exchange in conjunction with the Rysgal Joint-Stock Bank. Turkmenistan’s underdeveloped financial system and severe hard currency shortage significantly hinder the free flow of financial resources. There is no publicly available information to confirm whether the government or Central Bank respect IMF Article VIII. There were no reported cases where foreign investors received credit on the local market. According to unofficial reports, credit is not allocated on market terms. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides some loans to private small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkmenistan. The banking system is underdeveloped. The largest state banks include: The State Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (Vnesheconombank), Dayhanbank, Turkmenbashy Bank, Turkmenistan Bank, Halk Bank, Senagat Bank, and Rysgal bank. These banks generally operate within narrow specializations, such as foreign trade, agriculture, industry, social infrastructure, and savings and mortgages. There are also four foreign commercial banks in the country: a joint Turkmen-Turkish bank (joint venture of Dayhanbank and Ziraat Bank), a branch of Saderat Bank of Iran, as well as Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank offices, which provide European bank guarantees for companies and for the Turkmen government; they do not provide general banking services. The National Bank of Pakistan permanently closed its Ashgabat branch. State banks primarily service state enterprises and allocate credit on subsidized terms to state entities. Foreign investors are only able to secure credit on the local market through equity loans from EBRD and Turkmen-Turkish Bank. There are no capital markets in Turkmenistan, although the 1993 Law on Securities and Stock Exchanges outlines the main principles for issuing, selling, and circulating securities. The 1999 Law on Joint Stock Societies further provides for the issuance of common and preferred stock and bonds and convertible securities in Turkmenistan, but in the absence of a stock exchange or investment company, there is no market for securities. The Embassy is not aware of any official restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account based on residency status, though in practice foreigners may only open foreign currency accounts, and not manat accounts. The country’s largest bank, Turkmenistan Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs, also known as Vnesheconombank, handles most transactions with foreign companies, especially in transactions involving the Government of Turkmenistan. Vnesheconombank’s list of correspondent banks is available at: http://www.tfeb.gov.tm/index.php/en/about-bank-en/correspondent-relations . All banks, including commercial banks, are tightly regulated by the state. The government maintains a sovereign wealth fund known as the Stabilization Fund, which mainly holds state budget surpluses. The government also keeps a separate fund known as the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) for oil and gas revenues. There is no publicly available information about the size of these funds or how they are managed. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate Turkmenistan’s economy and control the lion’s share of the country’s industrial production, especially in onshore hydrocarbon production, transportation, refining, electricity generation and distribution, chemicals, transportation, and construction material production. Education, healthcare, and media enterprises are, with some rare exceptions, also state owned and tightly controlled. SOEs are also to varying degrees involved in agriculture, food processing, textiles, communications, construction, trade, and services. Although SOEs are often inefficient, the government considers them strategically important. While there are some small-scale private enterprises in Turkmenistan, the government continues to exert significant influence on most economic sectors. There are no mechanisms to ensure transparency or accountability in the business decisions or operations of SOEs. There is no publicly available information on the total assets of SOEs, total net income of SOEs, the number of people employed by SOEs and the expenses these SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D). There is no published list of SOEs. Turkmenistan is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. SOEs are not uniformly subject to the same tax burden as their private sector competitors Efforts to privatize former state enterprises have attracted little foreign or domestic investment. Outdated technology, poor infrastructure, and bureaucratic obstacles can make privatized enterprises unattractive for foreign and local investors. Strategic facilities, as identified by the government, are not subject to privatization, including those related to natural resources. Other property not subject to privatization includes objects of cultural importance, the property of the armed and security forces, government institutions, research institutes, the facilities of the Academy of Sciences, the integrated energy system, and the public transportation system. The rules and procedures governing privatization in Turkmenistan lack transparency. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in the bidding process only after they have been approved by the State Agency for Protection from Economic Risks under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. In December 2013, the parliament passed the Law on the Denationalization and Privatization of State Property, which took effect in July 2014. Despite official comments emphasizing the importance of private sector growth, supporting privatization has been low on the government’s agenda. All land is government owned. Private citizens have some land usage rights, but these rights exclude the sale or mortgage of land. Land rights can be transferred only through inheritance. Foreign companies or individuals are permitted to lease land for non-agricultural purposes, but only the Cabinet of Ministers has the authority to grant leases. Since 2018, the government has offered some agricultural land for 99-year leases to farmers. As of 2019, 40 such leases existed. There was no information publicly available on the number of such leases in 2021. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government implements various policies and regulations that it states promote socially responsible business conduct (RBC), though there is no point of contact or ombudsperson for stakeholders to raise concerns about RBC. In the past, foreign companies operating in Turkmenistan were not required to implement social projects. Social welfare activities connected with doing business in Turkmenistan generally take the form of financial sponsorship of cultural or athletic events, providing academic scholarships to Turkmen students, or the construction of small-scale facilities, such as medical clinics, to benefit the locality around a company’s facilities. Some large foreign firms have felt pressured to make significant contributions to government construction projects. There are no independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations promoting or monitoring RBC. In March 2013, Turkmenistan introduced mandatory environmental insurance for all types of enterprises and organizations (with the exception of government-financed entities) carrying out activities that are potentially hazardous to the environment. This insurance program was adopted to raise environmental awareness and hold industries and businesses accountable for violating environmental laws and regulations. The mandatory environmental insurance regulation includes a list of hazardous work and facilities subject to such insurance. The insurance is also required foreign legal entities, their branch offices, and entrepreneurs. The State Committee for Environmental Protection and Land Resources conducts ecological inspections for companies’ compliance with regulations. Turkmenistan is not a participant in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) . It is not clear if the government of Turkmenistan follows the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The government of Turkmenistan announced its intention in Glasgow at COP26 to stop growth in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, with significant reductions in following years. The statement singled out methane as an area of concern, but Turkmenistan did not sign the Global Methane Pledge and is not a member of the Global Methane Initiative or Climate and Clean Air Coalition. The government did not submit new nationally determined contributions to the United Nations for COP26, though has stated it intends to. 9. Corruption There is no single specifically designated government agency responsible for combating corruption. In June 2017, Turkmenistan set up the State Service for Combating Economic Crimes (SSCEC) to investigate officials and state-owned enterprises on corruption charges. SSCEC was later terminated by the President. There is no independent corruption watchdog organization. Anti-corruption laws are not generally enforced, and endemic corruption remains a problem. Formally, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including the police), the Ministry of National Security, and the General Prosecutor’s Office are responsible for combating corruption. President Berdimuhamedov has publicly stated that corruption will not be tolerated. In 2021, Transparency International ranked Turkmenistan 169 among 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index. Foreign firms have identified widespread government corruption, including in the form of bribe seeking, as an obstacle to investment and business development throughout all economic sectors and regions. It is most pervasive in the areas of government procurement, the awarding of licenses, and customs. In March 2014, the parliament adopted the Law on Combating Corruption to help identify and prosecute cases of corruption. The law prohibits government officials from accepting gifts (in person or through an intermediary) from foreign states, international organizations, and political parties. It also severely limits the ability of government officials to travel on business at the expense of foreign entities. Notwithstanding the 2014 law, corruption remains rampant. There are no NGOs involved in monitoring or investigating corruption. Certain government officials, including traffic police, are known to ask for bribes. 10. Political and Security Environment Turkmenistan’s political system has remained stable since Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov became president in February 2007 and had a peaceful transfer of power to his son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov in 2022. With the exception of a reported coup attempt in 2002, there is no history of politically motivated violence. There have been no recorded examples of damage to projects or installations. The government does not permit political opposition and maintains a tight grip on all politically sensitive issues, in part by requiring all organizations to register their activities. The Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs actively monitor locals and foreigners. The country’s parliament passed a Law on Political Parties in January 2012 that defines the legal grounds for the establishment of political parties, including their rights and obligations. In August 2012, under the directive of President Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan created a second political party, the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. This pro-government party, created from the membership of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, has a platform nearly identical to the President’s Democratic Party. The same is true for the Agrarian Party, which was created in September 2014 in an effort to move Turkmenistan towards a multi-party system. Organized crime is rare, and authorities have effectively rooted out organized crime groups and syndicates. Turkmenistan does not publish crime statistics or information about crime. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Labor issues are governed by the Labor Code of Turkmenistan (last amended in July 2009), the Social Welfare code, and a number of regulations approved by presidential resolutions. Turkmenistan joined the International Labor Organization in 1993. Unemployment and underemployment are major societal issues, particularly among Turkmenistan’s youth and in rural communities. Unofficial estimates of unemployment range from 10 to 50 percent. Due to a severe shortage of jobs and low salaries in the country, anecdotal evidence indicates that growing numbers of young Turkmen have emigrated or are emigrating to other countries, including Turkey, Russia, and other former Soviet republics. In order to stop outward migration, the State Migration Service of Turkmenistan on numerous occasions has arbitrarily denied exit to citizens at the airport and border points. In February 2016, President Berdimuhamedov signed a decree “On Matters of Registration of the Individuals Arriving in Ashgabat for Employment Purposes,” making it more difficult for residents from other regions to seek employment in the capital city, Ashgabat. The decree introduces a work permit system by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, which may issue work permits for a maximum of one year. Ashgabat residents are given priority over non-residents for job openings in the city. The government has also introduced a requirement that 90 percent of any firm’s workforce be Turkmen citizens. The government continues to be the largest employer in the country. The Law on Child Labor (2004) prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 and makes employment in hazardous and harmful labor illegal for any individual under the age of 18. The National Center of Trade Unions of Turkmenistan, the successor to the Soviet-era system of government-controlled trade unions, is the only trade union association allowed in the country. When oil and gas prices fell in 2015, the government took steps to reduce expenses by laying off some public sector employees. There have been many reports of ministries not meeting payroll requirements for staff. Article 294 of the Labor Code of Turkmenistan states that the courts handle employer-employee labor disputes. Article 368 states that disputes arising out of collective bargaining and collective agreements can be investigated by commissions on labor disputes, trade unions of enterprises, and the court system. Although the Labor Code allows for collective bargaining, in practice it is not used and the courts do not perform the labor dispute resolution function they are assigned. The official workday in Turkmenistan is eight hours, with the standard work week consisting of 40 hours over five days. The 2009 Labor Code reconfirmed a 40-hour work week, protected workers’ rights by promoting the role of trade unions, guaranteed job security by restricting short-term contracts, and extended the duration of annual leave from 24 calendar days to 30 calendar days. In practice, however, government and many private sector employees are often required to work 10 hours per day and/or a sixth day without compensation. Health and safety regulations exist but are not commonly enforced. Foreigners with government permission to reside in Turkmenistan may work and are subject to the same labor regulations as citizens unless otherwise specified by law. 14. Contact for More Information Ed O’Bryan Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Ashgabat Economic-Commercial Section 9 Pushkin Street, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan (+993 12) 94-00-45 trade-Ashgabat@state.gov Uganda Executive Summary Uganda’s investment climate presents both important opportunities and major challenges for U.S. investors. With a market economy, ideal climate, ample arable land, a young and largely English-speaking population, and development underway of fields containing at least 1.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil, Uganda offers numerous opportunities for investors. Despite the negative effects of COVID-19 related countermeasures on the economy, including a 40-day July-August 2021 national lockdown, according to the Bank of Uganda (BOU), the economy grew by 6.5% in 2021, recovering from 1.5% contraction in 2020. On a fiscal year basis, the economy grew by 3.3% in FY 2020/21 (July 1, 2020-June 30, 2021) compared to 3% in FY 2019/20. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is still yet to recover from pre-pandemic levels, with receipts dropping by 35% to $847 million in FY 2020/21 compared to $1.3 billion in FY 2019/20. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects FDI to rebound due to oil-related investments projected at $10 billion over the next five years and the IMF also projects Uganda’s economy to return to pre-pandemic growth that averaged 5.3% from 2014 to 2019. Oil-related investments were spurred by the February 1, 2022 announcement by Uganda and its partners – Tanzania, TotalEnergies, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the state-owned Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) – of final investment decision (FID) on upstream oil production, with first oil expected in 2025. Uganda maintains a liberal trade and foreign exchange regime. In 2021, the IMF approved a $1 billion Extended Credit Facility (ECF) to the government to enable the country to deal with the COVID-19 crisis and spur economic recovery. Uganda received the first tranche of $258 million in June 2021 and the second tranche of $125 million in March 2022. As the economy begins to recover, Uganda’s power, agricultural, construction, infrastructure, technology, and healthcare sectors present attractive potential opportunities for U.S. business and investment. President Yoweri Museveni and government officials vocally welcome foreign investment in Uganda. However, the government’s actions sometimes do not support its rhetoric. The closing of political and democratic space, poor economic management, endemic corruption, growing sovereign debt, weak rule of law, growing calls for protectionism from some senior policymakers, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health and education sectors all create risks for investors. U.S. firms often find themselves competing with third-country firms that cut costs and win contracts by disregarding environmental regulations and labor rights, dodging taxes, and bribing officials. Shortages of skilled labor, a complicated land tenure system, and increased local content requirements, also impede the growth of businesses and serve as disincentives to investment. An uncertain mid-to-long-range political environment also increases risk to foreign businesses and investors. President Museveni was declared the winner in the widely disputed and discredited January 2021 general elections and started a five-year term in May 2021 after 35 years already in power. Domestic political tensions increased following election-related violence and threats to democratic institutions. Many of Uganda’s youth, a demographic that comprises 77% of the population, openly clamor for change. However, the 77-year-old President has not provided any indication that he or his government are planning reforms to promote more inclusive, transparent, and representative governance. On the legislative front, Uganda’s parliament passed a Mining and Minerals Bill on February 17, 2022, aimed at reforming the mining sector and attracting larger mining companies to exploit Uganda’s cobalt, copper, nickel, rare earth, and other mineral deposits. However, the private sector has noted that the bill could limit potential international investment since it contains high tax and free carried interest provisions and insufficient legal protections for mining firms. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/uga Global Innovation Index 2021 119 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $50 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#446 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $800 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=UG 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Ugandan government and authorities vocally welcome FDI and celebrate its job creation benefits. Furthermore, the country’s free market economy, liberal financial system, and close to 45-million-person consumer market together attract investors. However, rampant corruption, weak rule of law, threats to open and free internet access – including a five-day complete internet shutdown surrounding January 2021 elections and an ongoing, year-long ban on Facebook – and an increasingly aggressive tax collection regime by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) create a challenging business environment. In June 2021, the government scrapped the $0.056 Over the Top (OTT) daily tax for consumers to access social media channels. The tax was replaced by a 12% excise duty levy on each internet package purchased. The 2019 Investment Code Act (ICA) abolished restrictions on technology transfer and repatriation of funds by foreign investors, and established new incentives (e.g., tax waivers) for investment. However, the ICA also set a minimum value of $250,000 for FDI and a yet-to-be-specified minimum value for portfolio investment. Additionally, the ICA authorized the Ugandan government to alter these thresholds at any time, thereby creating potential uncertainty for investors. Under the ICA, investment licenses carry specific performance conditions varying by sector, such as requiring investors to allow the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) to monitor operations, or to employ or train Ugandan citizens, or to use Ugandan goods and services to the greatest extent possible. Further, the ICA empowers the Ugandan government to revoke investment licenses of entities that “tarnish the good repute of Uganda as an attractive base for investment.” The government has yet to revoke any investor license on this ground. In December 2021, MTN Uganda – the largest telecom company in Uganda – sold 13% of its shares to the public when it listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE). MTN listed the shares in order to move toward compliance with the 2020 Communications Licensing Framework (CLF). The CLF requires telecommunication (telecom) companies to list 20% of their equity on the USE with the aim of increasing local ownership and reducing the repatriation of profits. Airtel, the second largest telecom, is expected to float shares by mid-2022. In 2020, MTN and Airtel paid $100 million and $75 million, respectively, to renew their licenses for 12 years and 20 years, respectively. The Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) facilitates investment by granting licenses to foreign investors, and is tasked with promoting, facilitating, and supervising foreign investments. UIA provides a “one-stop shop” online where investors can apply for a license, pay fees, register businesses, apply for land titles, and apply for tax identification numbers. In practice, however, investors may also need to liaise with other authorities to complete legal requirements. The UIA also triages complaints from foreign investors. The UIA’s website ( www.ugandainvest.go.ug ) and the International Trade Administration’s website ( https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/uganda-market-overview ) provide information on the laws and reporting requirements for foreign investors. Investors often bypass the UIA, citing bureaucratic delays and corruption. For larger investments, companies have reported that political support from and relationship-building with high-ranking Ugandan officials is a prerequisite. President Museveni hosts an annual investors’ roundtable to consult a select group of foreign and local investors on increasing investment, occasionally including U.S. investors. However, the last meeting was held in March 2020, a few days before the first national lockdown was announced to control the spread of COVID-19. Every Ugandan embassy has a trade and investment desk charged with advertising investment opportunities in the country. Except for land, foreigners have the right to own property, establish businesses, and make investments. Ugandan law permits foreign investors to acquire domestic enterprises and to establish greenfield investments. The Companies Act of 2010 permits the registration of companies incorporated outside of Uganda. Foreigners seeking to invest in the oil and gas sector must register with the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) to be added to its National Supplier Database. More information on this process is available on the Embassy’s website (select – Registering a U.S. Firm on the National Supplier Database): ( HYPERLINK “https://ug.usembassy.gov/business/commercial-opportunities/” h https://ug.usembassy.gov/business/commercial-opportunities/). The Petroleum Exploration and Development Act and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act require companies in the oil sector to prioritize using local goods and labor when possible and give the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) the authority to determine the extent of local content requirements in the sector. All investors must obtain an investment license from the UIA. The UIA evaluates investment proposals based on several criteria, including potential for generation of new earnings; savings of foreign exchange; the utilization of local materials, supplies, and services; the creation of employment opportunities in Uganda; the introduction of advanced technology or upgrading of indigenous technology; and the contribution to locally or regionally balanced socioeconomic development. The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued its World Investment Report, 2020, available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf The IMF issued an Article IV Consultation and Review of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Requests for Modifications of Performance Criteria in 2022, and its concluding statement is available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/03/15/Uganda-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-and-First-Review-under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-515168 The World Trade Organization (WTO) issued its most recent Trade Policy Review in 2019; the report is available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=254764,251521,117054,95202,80262,80232,82036,106989&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True Global Witness reviewed the state of the mining sector in 2017 and proposed reforms to the mining code: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined/ The UIA “one-stop shop” website assists in registering businesses and investments. In practice, investors and businesses may need to liaise with multiple authorities to set up shop, and the UIA lacks the capacity to play a robust business facilitation role. Prospective investors can also register online and apply for an investment license at https://www.ebiz.go.ug/ . The UIA also assists with the establishment of local subsidiaries of foreign firms by assisting in registration with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau ( http://ursb.go.ug/ ). New businesses are required to obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN) from the URA, by clicking the “My TIN” link at https://www.ura.go.ug/ or through the UIA. Businesses must also secure a trade license from the municipality or local government in the area in which they intend to operate. Investors in specialized sectors such as finance, telecoms, and petroleum often need an additional permit from the relevant ministry in coordination with the UIA. Under the Uganda Free Zones Act of 2014, the government continues to establish free trade zones for foreign investors seeking to produce goods for export and domestic use. Such investors receive a range of benefits including tax rebates on imported inputs and exported products. An investor seeking a free zone license may apply to the Uganda Free Zones Authority ( https://freezones.go.ug/ ). The Ugandan government does not promote or incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime On paper, Uganda’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and non-discriminatory, and they comply with international norms. In practice, bureaucratic hurdles and corruption significantly impact all investors, but with disproportionate effect on foreigners learning to navigate a parallel informal system. While Ugandan law requires open and transparent competition on government project tenders, U.S. investors have alleged that endemic corruption means that competitors not subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or similar legislation, often pay bribes to win awards. Ugandan law allows the banking, insurance, and media sectors to establish self-regulatory processes through private associations. The government continues to regulate these sectors, however, and the self-regulatory practices generally do not discriminate against foreign investors. Potential investors must be aware of local, national, and supranational regulatory requirements in Uganda. For example, EAC rules on free movement of goods and services would affect an investor planning to export to the regional market. Similarly, regulations issued by local governments regarding operational hours, or the location of factories would only affect an investor’s decision at the local level. Foreign investors should liaise with relevant ministries to understand regulations in the proposed sector for investment. Uganda’s accounting procedures are broadly transparent and consistent with international norms, though full implementation remains a challenge. Publicly listed companies must comply with accounting procedures consistent with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. Governmental agencies making regulations typically engage in only limited public consultation. Draft bills similarly are subject to limited public consultation and review. Local media typically cover public comment only on more controversial bills. Although the government publishes laws and regulations in full in the Uganda Gazette, the gazette is not available online and can only be accessed through purchase of hard copies at the Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation offices. The Uganda Legal Information Institute also publishes all enacted laws on its website ( https://ulii.org/ ). Uganda’s court system and Inspector General of Government are responsible for ensuring the government adheres to its administrative processes; however, anecdotal reports suggest that corruption significantly undermines the judiciary’s oversight role. In July 2020, the URA started the implementation of the amended Income Tax Act, which imposes presumptive taxes on rental income based on location using a blockchain compliance system meant to improve transparency and reduce corruption. Generally, there is legal redress to review regulatory mechanisms through the courts, and the process is made public. Uganda’s legislative process includes public consultations and, as needed, subject matter expert presentations before parliament; however, not all comments received by regulators are made publicly available and parliament’s decisions tend to be primarily politically driven. Formal scientific or economic analyses of the potential impact of a pending regulation are seldom conducted. Public finances are generally transparent and budget documents are available online. The government annually publishes the Annual Debt Statistical Bulletin, which contains the country’s debt obligations including status of public debt, cost of debt servicing, and liabilities. However, the government’s significant use of supplementary and classified budget accounts – which accounted for 9% of the FY2020/21 budget – undermines parliamentary and public oversight of public finances. The government does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) profiles. Per treaty, Uganda’s regulatory systems must conform to the below supranational regulatory systems (though in practice, domestication of supranational legislation remains imperfect): African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) African Union (AU) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Commonwealth of Nations East African Community (EAC) Uganda, through the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS), is a member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Codex Alimentarius, and International Organization of Legal Metrology (OIML). Uganda applies European Union directives and standards, but with modifications. Uganda is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations through the Ugandan Ministry of Trade’s National TBT Coordination Committee. Uganda’s legal system is based on English Common Law. The courts are responsible for enforcing contracts. Litigants must first submit commercial disputes for mediation either within the court system or to the government-run Center for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CADER). Uganda does not have a singular commercial law; multiple statutes touch on commercial and contractual law. A specialized commercial court decides commercial disputes. Approximately 80% of commercial disputes are resolved through mediation. Litigants may appeal commercial court decisions and regulatory and enforcement actions through the regular national court system. While in theory the court system is independent, in practice there are credible reports that the executive has attempted to influence the courts in certain high-profile cases. More importantly for most investors, endemic corruption and significant backlogs hamper the judiciary’s impartiality and efficacy. The Constitution and ICA regulate FDI. The UIA provides an online “one-stop shop” for investors ( https://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/ ). Uganda does not have any specialized laws or institutions dedicated to competition-related concerns, although commercial courts occasionally handle disputes with competition elements. There was no significant competition-related dispute handled by the courts in 2021. The constitution guarantees the right to property for all persons, domestic and foreign. It also prohibits the expropriation of property, except when in the “national interest” such as eminent domain and preceded by compensation to the owner at fair market value. In 2020, the two National Telecom Operators – MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda – renewed their licenses to operate in Uganda for 12 and 20 years respectively. One requirement of those license renewals is for the telecom companies to list 20% stakes on the Ugandan stock market within two years of being granted the license. MTN Uganda listed on the stock exchange in 2021. In 1972, then-President Idi Amin expropriated assets owned by ethnic South Asians. The expropriation was extrajudicial and was ordered by presidential decree. The government did not allow judicial challenge to the expropriations or offer any compensation to the owners. The Ugandan government has since returned most of the properties to the original owners or their descendants or representatives. There have not been any expropriations since, and government projects are often significantly delayed by judicial disputes over compensation for property the Ugandan government seeks to expropriate under eminent domain. The Bankruptcy Act of 1931, the Insolvency Act of 2011, and the Insolvency Regulations of 2013 generally align Uganda’s legal framework on insolvency with international standards. On average, Uganda recovers $ 0.39 per dollar, well above the sub-Saharan average of $0.20. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. 4. Industrial Policies The Public Private Partnership Act of 2015 creates a legal framework for the government to partner with private investors, both local and foreign, to finance investments in key sectors. The government has undertaken joint ventures with foreign investors in the oil and gas sector and for infrastructure projects. In June 2020, the government scrapped 18% excise duty on cooking gas in order to encourage clean energy cooking. This is meant to reduce the use of charcoal that contributes to deforestation. While the scrapping of this excise duty is positive, the usage of cooking gas is still limited to major cities because the cost is still high. The Uganda Free Zones Authority (UFZA) ( https://freezones.go.ug/ ) regulates free trade zones, which offer a range of tax advantages. The government’s process in awarding free trade zone status is generally transparent. In 2021, UFZA licensed three private Free Zone Developers, bringing the total number of free zones to 27. Estimates from UFZA indicate that in FY 2020/2021, the 27 free zones attracted $527 million worth of capital investment, created 8,610 jobs, and contributed $1.25 billion to total exports. The ICA does not impose any direct requirements regarding local employment or specify mandatory numbers for local employment in management positions. The broadness of its provisions, however, arguably leaves the door open for enforcement of local employment requirements. The Petroleum Exploration, Development, and Production Act and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act require investors in the oil sector to contribute to the creation of a locally skilled workforce. While the UIA has significantly improved its processing of work permits and investment licenses for foreigners, bureaucratic hurdles, inconsistent enforcement, and corruption can still make obtaining visas and work permits onerous and expensive. All foreign investors must acquire an investment license from the UIA. No general localization law exists in Uganda, but sector-specific laws impose localization requirements. The petroleum laws require foreign oil companies to prioritize the use of local goods and labor when available, and the MEMD has the authority to determine the extent of local content requirements in the sector. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, which regulates government procurements, also imposes thresholds on the contracts for which a foreign company can apply. Per the petroleum laws, MEMD has the responsibility to monitor companies in the oil sector to ensure they are meeting the local content requirements. Additionally, the Office of the Auditor General carries out audits of the oil and gas sector to ensure adherence to local content requirements. These performance reviews can form grounds for granting incentives or enforcement of the restrictions. Since the 2013 oil laws were passed, no company has been punished for breaching local content rules. Investment incentives in Uganda are quite controversial because they are applied on a case-by-case basis, even though the ICA lists seven grounds for granting investment incentives. While there are no general requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to hand over to the Ugandan government any source code or information related to encryption, the National Information Technology Authority Act allows the Minister for Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) to order an IT provider to submit any information to the National Information Technology Authority (NITA). However, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the Ugandan government has invoked this law. Similarly, the Computer Misuse Act allows the government to “compel a service provider…to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of traffic data in real time, associated with specified communication transmitted by means of a computer system.” These regulatory requirements apply to all IT providers, both foreign and local. There are no measures to prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside of Uganda. In 2017, however, the BOU interpreted Uganda’s cyber security legislation as providing it with the mandate to require financial institutions to relocate their data centers to Uganda to provide the government with access to customers’ digital financial information. Supervised financial institutions are currently implementing this policy. A U.S.- owned data center firm inaugurated in May 2021 a Tier III data center targeting the market for localizing data storage and opportunities for cloud services. 5. Protection of Property Rights Land rights are complicated in Uganda and present a significant barrier to investment. Uganda enforces property rights through the courts; however, corruption often influences final judgments. The Mortgage Act and associated regulations make provision for mortgages, sub-mortgages, trusts, and other forms of lien. However, due to widespread corruption and an inefficient bureaucracy, investors frequently struggle with the integrity of land transactions and recording systems. Foreigners cannot own land directly and may only acquire leases. Such leases cannot exceed 99 years. However, foreign investors can create a Ugandan-based firm to purchase and own real estate. The Land Act provides for four forms of land tenure: freehold, customary, “Mailo” (a form of freehold), and leasehold. Freehold, leasehold, and Mailo tenure owners hold registered titles, while customary or indigenous communal landowners – who account for up to 80% of all landowners – do not. Ugandan law provides for the acquisition of prescriptive rights by individuals who settle onto land (squatters) and whose settlement on such land is unchallenged by the owner for at least twelve years. Ugandan law provides for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), but enforcement mechanisms are weak. The country lacks the capacity to prevent piracy and counterfeit distribution. As a result, theft and infringement of IPR is common and widespread. Uganda did not enact any IP-related laws and regulations in the past year. In August 2021, Uganda did adopt the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO)’s draft protocol on regional voluntary registration of Copyright and Related Rights. The Protocol was adopted by ARIPO member countries with the aim of ensuring African creators benefit from their creative works. Uganda does not track seizures of counterfeit goods or prosecutions of IPR violations. Agriculture experts estimate some 20% of agriculture products under copyright in Uganda are counterfeit. Uganda is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector The government generally welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has put in place a legal and institutional framework to manage such investments. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) licenses brokers and dealers and oversees the USE, which is now trading the stock of 18 companies. USE liquidity remains low, constraining entry and exit from sizeable positions. Capital markets are open to foreign investors and there are no restrictions for foreign investors to open a bank account in Uganda. However, the government imposes a 15% withholding tax on interest and dividends. Foreign-owned companies may trade on the stock exchange, subject to some share issuance requirements. The government respects IMF Article VIII and refrains from restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is available from commercial banks on market terms, and foreign investors can access credit. However, persistently high yields on Ugandan government-issued securities push up lending rates more broadly, including interest rates on commercial loans, undermining the private sector’s access to affordable credit. For instance, commercial lending rates averaged 19.4% and government 10-year bonds averaged 14% at the end of February 2022. Formal banking participation remains low, with only 35.5% of Ugandans having access to bank accounts, many via their membership in formal savings groups. However, there are 19 million total bank accounts and more than 32 million mobile money accounts used to conduct basic financial transactions as some Ugandans hold multiple accounts. Uganda’s banking and financial sector is generally healthy, though non-performing loans remain a problem. According to the Bank of Uganda’s Financial Soundness Indicators, Uganda’s non-performing loan rate stood at 4.25% at the end of June 2021, down from 6% in June 2020. Uganda has 26 commercial banks, with the top six controlling at least 62% of the banking sector’s total assets, valued at $10 billion. The Bank of Uganda regulates the banking sector, and foreign banks may establish branches in the country. In June 2021, the BOU started the direct regulation of mobile money service providers under the National Payment Systems Act, 2020. In February 2020, the Financial Action Taskforce added Uganda to its “Grey List” due to the country’s insufficient implementation of its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies. As of the end of February 2021, Uganda was still on this watch list due to seven strategic deficiencies in the implementation of AML/CFT policies. As a result, Uganda’s correspondent banking relationships face increased oversight. Uganda has made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group) ESAAMLG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and plans to implement FATF’s recommendations by May 2022. Uganda does not restrict foreigners’ ability to establish a bank account. In 2015, the government established the Uganda Petroleum Fund (PF) to receive and manage all government revenues from the oil and gas sector. By law, the government must spend a portion of proceeds from the fund on oil-related infrastructure, with parliament appropriating the remainder of revenues through the normal budget procedure. As of June 2021, the PF had a balance of $65 million. Uganda does not have a sovereign wealth fund but established a fund called the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR) to ensure responsible and long-term management of revenue from Uganda’s oil resources when oil production begins. As of the end of 2021, the government had not passed the Petroleum Revenue Investment policy to determine where petroleum revenue would be invested. In the 2021 – 2026 Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, the government has committed to spending oil revenue worth 0.8% of non-oil GDP from the previous fiscal year as part of the national budget. The balance would be sent to the PRIR for Investment. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Uganda has thirty State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, the Ugandan government does not publish a list of its SOEs, and the public is unable to access detailed information on SOE ownership, total assets, total net income, or number of people employed. The government has not established any new SOEs in 2021 but has ramped up expenditure for car manufacturer Kiira Motors Corporation. While there is insufficient information to assess the SOEs’ adherence to the OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance, the Ugandan government’s 2021 Office of Auditor General report noted corporate governance issues in seven SOEs. In February 2021, the Ugandan government embarked on a plan to merge some of the SOEs to reduce duplication of roles and costs of administration. This process is still ongoing. SOEs do not get special financing terms and are subject to hard budget constraints. According to the Ugandan Revenue Authority Act, they have the same tax burden as the private sector. According to the Land Act, private enterprises have the same access to land as SOEs. One notable exception is the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC), which receives proprietary exploration data on new oil discoveries in Uganda. UNOC can then sell this information to the highest bidder in the private sector to generate income for its operations. The government privatized many SOEs in the 1990s. Uganda does not currently have a privatization program. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of responsible business conduct varies greatly among corporate actors in Uganda. No organizations formally monitor compliance with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards. CSR is not a requirement for an investor to obtain an investment license and CSR programs are voluntary. While government officials make statements encouraging CSR, there is no formal government program to monitor, require, or encourage CSR. In practice, endemic corruption often enables companies to engage in harmful or illegal practices with impunity. Regulations on human and labor rights, and consumer and environmental protection, are seldom and inconsistently enforced. Uganda’s capacity and political will to regulate the mineral trade across its borders remain weak. On March 17, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Belgian national Alain Goetz, his company the African Gold Refinery in Uganda, and a network of companies involved in the illicit movement of gold valued at hundreds of millions of dollars per year from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Uganda’s gold refining sector, which includes at least two other refineries in addition to African Gold Refinery (AGR), relies on conflict minerals illicitly imported from neighboring countries, especially from eastern DRC. While Uganda has no significant gold reserves, in FY 2020/21, gold remained the country’s largest export for the third FY in a row, totaling $2.2 billion. Due to Uganda’s rampant corruption, the Ugandan government does not adequately enforce domestic laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, or other laws intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. According to the UN Panel of Experts reports, AGR, Uganda’s largest gold refinery, does not adhere to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, and there is no indication the Ugandan government is urging it to do so. Uganda joined the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in August 2020. As part of the process, Uganda formed a multi-stakeholder group (MSG) composed of government, industry, and civil society. As Uganda looks to develop its oil and gas sector, the MSG will monitor transparency and accountability in the sector, including environmental impact and land rights issues. Uganda has not formally adopted the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Uganda’s Nationally Determined Contribution, or NDC, covers the energy, forestry, and wetland sectors. It is looking to reduce emissions by 22% by 2030 compared to a business-as-usual scenario, with estimated emissions of 77.3 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent a year in 2030. As a part of this goal, it seeks to raise renewable electricity generation capacity from 729 megawatts in 2013 to at least 3,200 megawatts by 2030 and to reverse deforestation and increase forest cover from approximately 14% in 2013 to 21% in 2030 through forest protection. It also plans to increase wetland coverage from 10.9% in 2014 to 12% by 2030. The objective of Uganda’s NDC is to pursue a low-carbon development pathway and reduce the vulnerability of the population, environment, and economy to the impacts of climate change by implementing measures and policies that build resilience, with a primary focus on forest and wetland conservation. The government has not introduced any policies to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, and public procurement policies do not include environment and green growth considerations. 9. Corruption Uganda has generally adequate laws to combat corruption, and an interlocking web of anti-corruption institutions. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Act’s Code of Ethical Standards (Code) requires bidders and contractors to disclose any possible conflict of interest when applying for government contracts. However, endemic corruption remains a serious problem and a major obstacle to investment. Transparency International ranked Uganda 144 out of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, dropping two places from 2020. While anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and political parties, in practice many well-connected individuals enjoy de facto immunity for corrupt acts and are rarely prosecuted in court. The government does not require companies to adopt specific internal procedures to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Larger private companies implement internal control policies; however, with 80% of the workforce in the informal sector, much of the private sector operates without such systems. While Uganda has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, it is not yet party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and does not protect non–governmental organizations investigating corruption. Some corruption watchdog organizations allege government harassment. U.S. firms consistently identify corruption as a major hurdle to business and investment. Corruption in government procurement processes remains particularly problematic for foreign companies seeking to bid on Ugandan government contracts. Contacts at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Beti Kamya Inspector General of Government Inspectorate of Government Jubilee Insurance Centre, Plot 14, Parliament Avenue, Kampala Telephone: +256-414-344-219 Website: www.igg.go.ug Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) UEDCL Towers Plot 39 Nakasero Road P.O. Box 3925, Kampala Uganda Telephone: +256-414-311100. Email: info@ppda.go.ug Website: https://www.ppda.go.ug/ Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda Cissy Kagaba Telephone: +256-414-535-659 Email: kagabac@accu.or.ug Website: http://accu.or.ug 10. Political and Security Environment There has been an uptick in crime over the past several years – particularly after the start of the pandemic – and Uganda has also experienced periodic political violence associated with elections and other political activities. Security services routinely use excessive force to stop peaceful protests and demonstrations. In 2021, Uganda experienced twin suicide bombings in the capital, Kampala, and another bomb explosion in the city outskirts. In the twin suicide explosions, one targeted the main central police station and the other took place a few dozen meters away from parliament gate. Four victims and the bombers were killed in the twin suicide bombings; ISIS-DRC claimed responsibility for both, as well as the earlier bombing on the outskirts, which killed one. Also in 2021, Minister of Works and Transport Gen. Katumba Wamala was targeted by armed assailants who fired bullets at his car, killing his daughter and driver. He survived with minor injuries. Political tensions increased dramatically prior to, during, and after the January 2021 general elections. Security forces in unmarked cars picked up dozens of opposition supporters and held them in detention long past the constitutionally mandated limit. Cases of torture allegedly perpetrated by elements within the security forces persist. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Over 70% of Ugandans are engaged in the agriculture sector, and only 20% work in the formal sector. Statistics on the number of foreign/migrant workers are not publicly available; however, given the abundance of cheap domestic labor, there is minimal import of unskilled labor. Conversely, there is an acute shortage of skilled and specialized laborers. Uganda has a large informal sector that is estimated to contribute at least 50% of Uganda’s GDP. The informal sector, however, contributes less direct tax revenue; Uganda’s government is implementing several tax policies to raise revenue. Targeting the informal sector would reduce the pressure to tax foreign businesses. The passing of the Landlord and Tenant Bill in 2022 also sought to formalize the relationship between landlords and, especially, informal tenants. While there are no explicit provisions requiring the hiring of Ugandan nationals, there are broad standards requiring investors to contribute to the creation of local employment. The Petroleum Exploration, Development, and Production Act of 2013 and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act of 2013 require investors to contribute to workforce development by providing skills training for workers. Ugandan labor laws specify procedures for termination of employment and for termination payments. Depending on the employee’s duration of employment, employers are required to notify an employee two weeks to three months prior to the termination date. Employees terminated without notice are entitled to severance wages. Ugandan law only differentiates between termination with notice (or payment in lieu of notice) and summary dismissal (termination without notice). Summary dismissal applies when the employee fundamentally violates his/her terms of employment. Uganda does not provide unemployment insurance or any other social safety net programs for terminated workers. Current law requires employers to contribute 10% of an employee’s gross salary to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority Act of 2011 provides a framework for the establishment and management of retirement benefits schemes for the public and private sectors and created an enabling environment for liberalization of the pension sector. The Employment Act of 2006 does not allow waivers of labor laws for foreign investors. Ugandan law allows workers, except members of the armed forces, to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) has 20 member unions. Its rival, the Central Organization of Free Trade Unions (COFTU), also has 20 member unions. Union officials estimate that nearly half of employees in the formal sector belong to unions. In 2014, the Government of Uganda created the Industrial Court (IC) to arbitrate labor disputes. Public sector strikes are not uncommon in Uganda; however, there were no strikes during the past year. Uganda ratified all eight International Labor Organization fundamental conventions enshrining labor and other economic rights, and partially incorporated these conventions into the 1995 Constitution, which stipulates and protects a wide range of economic rights. Despite these legal protections, many Ugandans work in unsafe environments due to poor enforcement and the limited scope of the labor laws. Labor laws do not protect domestic, agricultural, and informal sector workers. Uganda’s monthly minimum wage remains $1.64. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Economic and Commercial Office Uganda Embassy of the United States of America Plot 1577 Ggaba Road, P.O. Box 7007, Kampala, Uganda Tel. +256 414 306001 E-mail: commercialkampala@state.gov United Arab Emirates Executive Summary The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is urgently pursuing economic diversification and regulatory reforms to promote private sector development; reduce dependence on hydrocarbon revenues; and build a knowledge economy buttressed by advanced technology and clean energy. The UAE serves as a major trade and investment hub for the Middle East and North Africa, as well as increasingly for South Asia, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Multinational companies cite the UAE’s political and economic stability, excellent infrastructure, developed capital markets, and a perceived absence of systemic corruption as factors contributing to the UAE’s attractiveness to foreign investors. The UAE seeks to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by i) not charging taxes or making restrictions on the repatriation of capital; ii) allowing relatively free movement into the country of labor and low barriers to entry (effective tariffs are five percent for most goods); and iii) offering FDI incentives. The UAE in 2021 launched broad economic and social reforms to strengthen pandemic recovery, respond to growing regional economic competition, and commemorate its 50-year founding anniversary with a series of reforms. The UAE and the country’s seven constituent emirates have passed numerous initiatives, laws, and regulations to attract more foreign investment. Recent measures include visa reforms to attract and retain expatriate professionals, a drive to create new international economic partnerships, major investments in critical industries, and policies to encourage Emirati entrepreneurship and labor force participation. These economic development projects offer both challenges and opportunities for foreign investors in the coming years. In 2022, UAE changed its work week for government bodies from Sunday to Thursday to Monday to Thursday with a half day on Friday in order to more closely align with world markets. Additionally, the UAE approved a comprehensive reform of the national legal system, which, among other aims, developed the legal frameworks around data privacy, investment, regulation and legal protection of industrial property, copyrights, trademarks, and residency. The first-ever federal data protection law regulates how personal data are processed across the UAE, with separate laws on government, financial, and healthcare data to follow. The new Commercial Companies law removes restrictions to facilitate further mergers and acquisition activity. The federal trademark law further expands the scope of legal protection for companies’ trademarks, products, innovations, and trade names by protecting non-traditional patterns of trademarks. These legal reforms are broadly considered to be positive by U.S. companies, but investors will need to carefully consider how these broad changes affect their operations. The Ministry of Finance announced in January 2022 that the UAE will introduce a federal corporate tax on business profits starting in 2023 as part of its membership in the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Companies await further guidance on how the new tax policy will be implemented, but it is expected to have a broad and significant impact on companies operating both inside in the UAE and “offshore” in the country’s many economic free zones. The UAE announced in October 2021 that it would pursue net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, to include an investment of $163 billion in renewable energy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 24 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 33 out of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $19.5 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $39,410 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The UAE actively seeks FDI, citing it as a key part of long-term economic development plans. In 2021, as part of the series of reforms to commemorate the UAE’s 50th anniversary, the government announced a series of programs to with the goal of attracting $150 billion worth foreign investment in the coming decade. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated government efforts to attract foreign investment to promote economic growth. Under Federal Decree-Law No (26) of 2020, the “Commercial Companies Law,” onshore UAE companies are no longer required to have a UAE national or a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) national as a majority shareholder. UAE joint stock companies no longer must be chaired by an Emirati citizen or have Emirati citizens comprise the majority of its board. Local branches of foreign companies no longer must have a UAE national or a UAE-owned company act as an agent. In March 2021, an intra-emirate committee recommended a list of strategically important sectors requiring additional licensing restrictions. The Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development (ADDED) published in May 2021 a list of 1,105 commercial and industrial business activities that are eligible for 100 percent foreign ownership, effective June 2021. In August 2021, ADDED introduced the “Reduction Program” to facilitate investment and ease of doing business in Abu Dhabi emirate by reducing requirements and cutting fees. As part of the program, Abu Dhabi cut business startup fees by 94 percent in 2021. In June 2021, the Dubai government published guidelines for full ownership procedures for more than 1,000 commercial and industrial activities. Federal Law No (32) of 2021 introduced two new types of companies: the special purpose acquisition company, or “SPAC,” and the special purpose vehicle, or “SPV.” The law also amended certain provisions related to Limited Liability Companies and public joint stock companies and introduced a regime to allow for the division of Joint Stock Companies. Non-tariff barriers to investment persist in the form of visa sponsorship and distributorship requirements. Several constituent emirates have introduced new long-term residency visas and land ownership rights to attract and retain expatriates with sought-after skills in the UAE. The Federal Decree-Law No (26) of 2020, outlined above, reduced limits on foreign control and right to private ownership of companies. Neither Embassy Abu Dhabi nor Consulate General Dubai (collectively referred to as Mission UAE) has received any complaints from U.S. investors that they have been disadvantaged relative to other non-GCC investors. UAE officials emphasize the importance of facilitating business investment and tout the broad network of free trade zones as attractive to foreign investors. The UAE’s business registration process varies by emirate, but generally happens through an emirate’s Department of Economic Development. The UAE issued Federal Law No (37) of 2021 on commercial registry law to make the Economic Register a comprehensive reference for economic activities in the country and enable use of the unified economic register number as a digital identity for establishments. Links to information portals from each of the emirates are available at https://ger.co/economy/197 . Dubai waived and reduced fees for a total of 88 services provided by various Dubai Government entities in July 2021. In September 2021, the UAE introduced the “Green Visa,” which allows self-employed individuals meeting certain professional requirements to achieve residency for themselves and family members without obtaining a work permit, a shift from previous immigration policies. The UAE also created a “Freelancers Visa” and expanded “Golden Visa” eligibility to include certain managers, CEOs, specialists in science, engineering, health, education, business management, and technology. The Golden Visa, first announced in 2019, allows foreigners who make major investments or focus on in-demand professions to live and work in the UAE without Emirati sponsors and offers extended visa validity compared to the UAE’s traditional work-related visa program. The UAE introduced in September 2021 a single online platform to present all foreign investment opportunities in the UAE: invest.ae . Dubai launched the Invest in Dubai platform, a “single-window” service in February 2021 to enable investors to obtain trade licenses and launch their business quickly. In August 2020, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) introduced a new license for startups, entrepreneurs, and technology firms, starting at $1,500 per year. In January 2022, ADDED announced it had removed more than 20,000 requirements to set up businesses in the emirate as part of an ongoing overhaul of procedures. Twenty-six local and federal partner entities participated in the reductions program. As part of Dubai Multi Commodities Center’s (DMCC) broader environment, social, and governance strategy, the DMCC announced in February 2022 that it will bring 20 social and environmental impact-driven businesses into its community through an Impact Scale-Up Program. Accordingly, the DMCC will provide qualifying companies with substantial discounts on business setup costs for five years. Five-year residence visas are available for investors who purchase property worth $1.4 million or more, and 10-year residence visas are available for individuals who invest $2.8 million in a business. The government also provides visas for entrepreneurs and specialized talent in science, medicine, and specialized technical fields. The Abu Dhabi Department of Culture and Tourism launched in February 2021, the Creative Visa for individuals working in cultural and creative industries, including heritage, performing arts, visual arts, design and crafts, gaming and e-sports, media, and publishing. The UAE is an important participant in global capital markets, including through several sizeable sovereign wealth funds, as well as through several emirate-level, government-related investment corporations. 3. Legal Regime The onshore regulatory and legal framework in the UAE continues to generally favor local Emirati investors over foreign investors. The Trade Companies Law requires all companies to apply international accounting standards and practices, generally the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) Board Decision issued a decision in 2020 that public joint stock companies listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) or the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) must publish a sustainability report. In March 2021, the SCA made it mandatory for listed companies to have at least one female representative on their board. Generally, legislation is only published after it has been enacted into law and is not formally available for public comment beforehand. Government-friendly press occasionally reports details of high-profile legislation. The government may consult with large private sector stakeholders on draft legislation on an ad hoc basis. Final versions of federal laws are published in Arabic in an official register “The Official Gazette,” though there are private companies that translate laws into English. The UAE Ministry of Justice (MoJ) maintains a partial library of translated laws on its website. Other ministries and departments inconsistently offer official English translations via their websites. The emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah publish official gazettes online in Arabic. Regulators are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment. As a GCC member, the UAE maintains regulatory autonomy, but coordinates efforts with other GCC members through the GCC Standardization Organization (GSO). In 2021, the UAE submitted 109 notifications to the WTO committee, including notifications of emergency measures and issues relating to Intellectual Property Rights. Islam is identified as the state religion in the UAE constitution and serves as the principal source of domestic law. Common law principles, such as following legal precedents, are generally not recognized in the UAE, although lower courts commonly follow higher court judgments. Judgments of foreign civil courts are typically recognized and enforceable under local courts. Domestic law is a dual legal system of civil and Sharia laws – the majority of which has been codified. Most codified legislation in the UAE is a mixture of Islamic law and other civil laws. The legal system of the country is generally divided between a British-based system of common law used in offshore free trade zones (FTZs) and onshore domestic law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York signed a memorandum with the DIFC courts providing companies operating in Dubai and New York with procedures for the mutual enforcement of financial judgments. The Abu Dhabi-based financial free zone hub Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department in February 2018 allowing reciprocal enforcement of judgments, decisions, orders, and arbitral awards between ADGM and Abu Dhabi courts. The UAE constitution stipulates each emirate can set up a local emirate-level judicial system (local courts) or rely exclusively on federal courts. The Federal Judicial Authority has jurisdiction over all cases involving a “federal entity.” The Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi is the highest federal court. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in seven categories of cases: disputes between emirates; disputes between an emirate and the federal government; cases involving national security; interpretation of the constitution; questions over the constitutionality of a law; and cases involving the actions of appointed ministers and senior officials while performing their official duties. The federal government administers the courts in Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al Quwain, and Sharjah, including vetting, appointing, and paying judges. Judges in these courts apply both local and federal law, as appropriate. Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi administer their own local courts, hiring, vetting, and paying local judges and attorneys. Abu Dhabi operates both local (the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department) and federal courts in parallel. Employment Law: In December 2021, the UAE issued Federal Law No (33) of 2021, which took effect on February 2, 2022, and repealed UAE Federal Law No (8) of 1980. The new labor law defines contracts, working hours, leave entitlements, safety, and healthcare regulations. The new labor law also sets a minimum wage for employees in the private sector to be determined by the UAE Cabinet. Trade unions, strikes, and collective bargaining is prohibited. Expatriates’ legal residence in the UAE is tied to their employer (kafala system), but skilled labor usually has more flexibility in transferring their residency visa. In 2009, the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE) introduced a Wages Protection System (WPS) to ensure unbanked workers were paid according to the terms of their employment agreement. Most domestic workers remain uncovered by the WPS. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, and national origin. The new labor law protects UAE government efforts to enhance the participation of Emirati citizens and notes that such efforts do not constitute discrimination. Federal Law No (06) of 2020 stipulates equal wages for women and men in the private sector. The DIFC issued amendments in September 2021 to The DIFC Employment Law No (2) of 2019, addressing issues such as paternity leave, sick pay, and end-of-service settlements. ADGM also issued new employment regulations with effect in January 2020, which allowed employers and employees more flexibility in negotiating notice periods and introduced protective provisions for employees ages 15-18. The UAE signaled throughout 2021 its intention to develop a more commercially friendly legislative environment to strengthen foreign investment. In March 2021, the UAE government announced it would allow full foreign investments in the industrial investments as part of its ten-years comprehensive industrial strategy the so called “Operation 300 Billion,” by updating the industrial law to support local entrepreneurs and attract foreign direct investment. It said the new industrial law would include flexible conditions to provide opportunities to small and medium-sized companies and allow 100 percent foreign ownership. The Commercial Companies Law removes the restriction that the nominal value of a share in a joint stock company must be no less than $272,000. The new law also makes certain changes to the provisions regulating limited liability companies and public joint stock companies. It abolishes the maximum and minimum percentage of the founders’ contribution to the company’s capital, and cancels the legal limitation of the subscription period. The law eliminates the requirement for the nationality of the members of the board of directors, and allows companies to transform into a public joint stock company and offer new shares without being restricted to a certain percentage. It allows companies to divide and create legal rules governing division operations. Branches of foreign companies licensed in the UAE would be also allowed to transform into a commercial company with UAE citizenship. To register with the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, go to: https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/Members/BecomeAMember/default.aspx To obtain an investor number for trading on Dubai Exchanges, go to: http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/assets/docs/NIN-Form.pdf The Ministry of Economy’s Competition Regulation Committee reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Mission UAE is not aware of foreign investors subjected to any expropriation in the UAE in the recent past. There are no federal rules governing compensation if expropriations were to occur. Individual emirates would likely treat expropriations differently. In practice, authorities would be unlikely to expropriate unless there were a compelling development or public interest need to do so. The bankruptcy law for companies, Federal Decree Law No (9) of 2016, came into effect in February 2019. The law covers companies governed by the Commercial Companies Law, FTZ companies (with a few exceptions for free zones with their own bankruptcy and insolvency regime, such as the DIFC and ADGM), sole proprietorships, and companies conducting professional business. It allows creditors owed $27,225 or more to file insolvency proceedings against a debtor 30 business days after written notification to the debtor. The law decriminalized “bankruptcy by default,” ending a system in which out-of-cash businesspeople faced potential criminal liability, including fines and potential imprisonment, if they did not initiate insolvency procedures within 30 days. In October 2020, the UAE Cabinet approved amendments to the law and added provisions regarding “Emergency Situations” that impinge on trade or investment, to enable individuals and business to overcome credit challenges during extraordinary circumstances such as pandemics, natural and environmental disasters, and wars. Under the amendments, a debtor may request a grace period from creditors, or negotiate a debt settlement for a period up to 12 months. The bankruptcy law for individuals, Insolvency Law No (19) of 2019, came into effect in November 2019. It applies only to natural persons and estates of the deceased. The law allows a debtor to seek court assistance for debt settlement or to enter liquidation proceedings as a result of the inability to pay for an extended period of time. Under this law, a debtor facing financial difficulties may apply to the court for assistance and guidance in the settlement of his financial commitments through one or more court-appointed experts, or through a court-supervised binding settlement plan. 4. Industrial Policies All FTZs offer unique incentives to foreign investors. The UAE does not offer incentives to underrepresented investor groups nor does it yet offer green investment incentives. There are numerous FTZs throughout the UAE. Foreign companies generally enjoy the same investment opportunities within those zones as Emirati citizens. All FTZs provide 100 percent import and export tax exemptions, 100 percent exemptions from commercial levies, 100 percent repatriation of capital and multi-year leases, easy access to ports and airports, buildings for lease, energy connections (often at subsidized rates), and assistance in labor recruitment. In addition, FTZ authorities provide extensive support services, such as visa sponsorship, worker housing, dining facilities, and physical security. Free zone businesses which conduct business with mainland UAE, will be subject to corporate tax from June 1, 2023. FTZs have their own independent authorities with responsibility for licensing and helping companies establish their businesses. Investors can register new companies in an FTZ, or license branch or representative offices. All Abu Dhabi FTZs as well as several Dubai FTZs offer dual licensing in cooperation with local Department of Economic Development. A dual license enables an LLC established in an FTZ to obtain an onshore license allowing the company to conduct onshore business in that emirate without partnering with an Emirati national, recruiting extra staff using the services of an onshore labor office, or to rent extra office space onshore. The cabinet published Federal Decree Law No (45) of 2021 in November 2021 regarding personal data protection (the Data Protection Law). The law came into effect in January 2022, and the executive regulations are due to be issued in March 2022. The law indicates that personal data may be transferred outside the UAE, if the country or territory to which the personal data is to be transferred has adequate protection of personal data, or if the UAE accedes to bilateral or multilateral agreements related to personal data protection with the countries to which the personal data is to be transferred. The UAE Data Office, established under a separate law (Federal Decree Law No (44) of 2021), will be the single national data privacy regulator. All foreign defense contractors with over $10 million in contract value over a five-year period must participate in the Tawazun Economic Program, previously known as the UAE Offset Program. This program also requires defense contractors that are awarded contracts valued at more than $10 million to establish commercially viable joint ventures with local business partners, which would be projected to yield profits equivalent to 60 percent of the contract value. The UAE does not force foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology or compel foreign IT providers to turn over source code, but it strongly encourages companies to utilize local content. In February 2018, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) launched the In-Country Value (ICV) strategy, which gives preference in awarding contracts to foreign companies that use local content and employ Emiratis. In February 2020, the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development and ADNOC signed an agreement to standardize ADNOC’s ICV certification program across the Abu Dhabi Government’s procurement process. 5. Protection of Property Rights The federal government allows emirates to decide the mechanisms through which ownership of land may be transferred within their borders. Abu Dhabi has generally limited land ownership to Emiratis or other GCC citizens, who may then lease the land to foreigners. The property reverts to the owner at the conclusion of the lease. However, in 2019, the Abu Dhabi Government issued Law No (13) of 2019 amending the rules on foreign ownership of real estate in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Under the law, foreign individuals and companies wholly or partially owned by foreigners are allowed to own freehold interests in land located within certain investment areas of Abu Dhabi for an unrestricted period. Although Dubai has restricted ownership to UAE nationals in certain older, more established neighborhoods, traditional freeholds, also known as outright ownership, are widely available, particularly in newer developments. Freehold owners own the land and may sell it on the open market. The contract rights of lienholders, as well as ownership rights of freeholders, are generally respected and enforced throughout the UAE. Mortgages and liens are permitted with restrictions, and each emirate has its own system of recordkeeping. In Dubai, for example, the system is centralized within the Dubai Land Department, and is considered extremely reliable. In January 2022, the ruler of Dubai issued Law No (2) of 2022 on the expropriation of property for public use in the Emirate of Dubai. The new Law regulates the terms and conditions under which buildings and facilities can be expropriated and sets out the terms for providing compensation to the owners whose properties are expropriated. In July 2021, Dubai issued resolution No (25) of 2021 to add some lands to the areas for ownership by non-UAE nationals of real property in the Emirate of Dubai. The UAE has an established a legal and regulatory framework for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. In recent years intellectual property holders have seen marked improvement in the protection and enforcement of IPR. In April 2021, the UAE was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report Watch List. Recent UAE government changes include enhancing IP protections for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries; transforming legislation surrounding patents, industrial design, trade secrets, copyrights and trademarks; acceding to the Madrid Protocol; lowering previously prohibitive trademark fees; increasing transparency in the outcomes of counterfeit seizures; increasing notifications, seizures, and public destructions by Dubai Customs; and creating intergovernmental and quasi-governmental groups responsive to USG and U.S. industry concerns; and licensing music at Expo 2020. While additional steps are needed to remedy problems with music licensing and IPR enforcement in FTZs, the UAE government has taken action to address several concerns of rights holders. Emirate-level authorities such as economic development authorities, police forces, and customs authorities enforce IPR-related issues, while federal authorities manage IPR policy. Before 2021, inventors could receive patent protection in UAE through either the UAE national patent office or the regional GCC Patent Office. On January 5, 2021, the GCC Patent Office stopped accepting new patent applications as the regional patent system undergoes significant reforms. While GCC patent applications filed before January 5th will continue to be processed, inventors will need to rely on the national UAE patent office to seek patent rights until the new regional GCC system is established. Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector The UAE issued investment fund regulations in September 2012 known as the “twin peak” regulatory framework designed to govern the marketing of investment funds established outside the UAE to domestic investors and the establishment of local funds domiciled inside the UAE. These regulations gave the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA), rather than the Central Bank, authority over the licensing, regulation, and marketing of investment funds. The marketing of foreign funds, including offshore UAE-based funds, such as those domiciled in the DIFC, require the appointment of a locally licensed placement agent. The UAE government has also encouraged certain high-profile projects to be undertaken via a public joint stock company to allow the issuance of shares to the public. The UAE government requires any company carrying out banking, insurance, or investment services for a third party to be a public joint stock company. The UAE has three stock markets: Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, and NASDAQ Dubai. SCA, the onshore regulatory body, classifies brokerages into two groups: those that engage in trading only while the clearance and settlement operations are conducted through clearance members, and those that engage in trading clearance and settlement operations for their clients. Under the regulations, trading brokerages require paid-up capital of $820,000, whereas trading and clearance brokerages need $2.7 million. Bank guarantees of $367,000 are required for brokerages to trade on the bourses. In March 2021, the SCA issued new corporate governance rules under the Chairman of SCA Board Decision No (03 R.M) of 2020 concerning adopting the Corporate Governance Guide for Public Joint Stock Companies. The new Rules describe the principles and objectives of corporate governance which are centered around the key pillars of accountability, fairness, disclosure, transparency, and responsibility. In January 2022, the SCA approved the Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) regulatory framework, paving the way for the listing of the first SPAC on ADX during 2022. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can access local credit markets. Interest rates usually closely track those in the United States since the local currency is pegged to the dollar. The UAE has a robust banking sector with 48 banks, 21 of which are foreign institutions, and six which are GCC-based banks. The number of national bank branches declined to 521 in September 2021, compared to 559 in September 2020, due to bank mergers and the transition to online banking. Non-performing loans (NPL) comprised 8.2 percent of outstanding loans in Q2 2021, compared with 7.4 percent in Q2 2020, according to figures from the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE). The CBUAE recorded total sector assets of $897 billion as of November 2021. The banking sector remains well-capitalized but has experienced a decline in lending and a rise in NPL as a result of the pandemic. These factors have significantly reduced reported profits as banks have made greater provisions for non-performing loans. On March 15, 2020, the CBUAE announced the USD $ 27.2 billion Targeted Economic Support Scheme (TESS) stimulus package, which included USD $13.6 billion in zero-interest, collateralized loans for UAE-based banks, and USD $13.6 billion in funds freed up from banks’ capital buffers. In November 2020, the CBUAE extended TESS to June 2021. In April 2021, the CBUAE extended parts of the TESS until mid-2022, accordingly financial institutions will continue to be eligible to access the collateralized USD $13.6 billion zero-cost liquidity facility. CBUAE’s financing for loan deferrals under the TESS was terminated at end of 2021, marking the first stage of the gradual exit strategy from the measures implemented during the pandemic. In December 2021, the CBUAE extended relief measures regarding banks’ capital buffers and liquidity and stable funding requirements until 30 June 2022. This includes temporary lowering of the capital conservation buffer, and the capital buffer for systemically important domestic banks. Abu Dhabi maintains several major sovereign wealth funds. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is chaired by UAE President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and holds assets of approximately $829 billion. Mubadala Investment Company is chaired by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan with estimated total assets of approximately $250 billion. Board members of each fund are appointed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi and is the chair of Mubadala. Abu Dhabi Holding (ADQ) includes both investment portfolios and state-owned firms with interests in agriculture, aviation, financial services, healthcare, industries, logistics, media, real estate, tourism and hospitality, transport and utilities with estimated total assets of approximately $ 110 billion. Emirates Investment Authority, the UAE’s federal sovereign wealth fund has estimated assets of $86 billion. The Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD) is Dubai’s primary sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated $301.6 billion in assets according to ICD’s June 2021 financial report. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a key component of the UAE economic model. There is no published list of SOEs or GREs at the national or individual emirate level. The influential Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is strategically important and provides a major source of revenue for the government. Emirates Airlines and Etisalat, the largest local telecommunications firm, are also internationally recognized brands. In some cases, these firms compete against other state-owned firms (Emirates and Etihad airlines, for example, or telecommunications company Etisalat against du). While they are not granted full autonomy, these firms leverage ties between entities they control to foster national economic development. In Dubai, SOEs have been used as drivers of diversification in sectors including construction, hospitality, transport, banking, logistics, and telecommunications. Sectoral regulations in some cases address governance structures and practices of state-owned companies. The UAE is not party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. There is no privatization program in the UAE. There have been several listings of portions of SOEs, on local UAE stock exchanges, as well as some “greenfield” IPOs focused on priority projects. However, several SOEs have allowed partial foreign ownership in their shares. For example, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, many national banks, some utility operators and the telecom operators, Etisalat and du, now allow minority foreign ownership. In November 2021, Dubai announced plans to list ten SOEs on the Dubai Financial Market as part of a broader strategy to double the financial market’s size to $817 billion. 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is a general expectation that businesses in the UAE adhere to responsible business conduct standards, and the UAE’s Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards (Ministerial Resolution No 518 of 2009) encourage companies to apply social policy towards supporting local communities. In January 2021, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) UAE Fund announced that it would launch an index as an annual performance measurement tool for CSR & Sustainability practices in the UAE. Many companies maintain CSR offices and participate in CSR initiatives, including mentorship and employment training; philanthropic donations to UAE-licensed humanitarian and charity organizations; and initiatives to promote environmental sustainability. The UAE government actively supports and encourages such efforts through official government partnerships, as well as through private foundations. In December 2021, the Dubai Executive Council approved a CSR policy to raise the role of companies and private establishments in social and economic development, and to align their projects and contributions with the priorities set by the government. The UAE has not subscribed to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and has not actively encouraged foreign or local enterprises to follow the specific United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The UAE government has not committed to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, nor does it participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC), however, passed the DMCC Rules for Risk-Based Due Diligence in the Gold and Precious Metals Supply Chain. The UAE has pledged to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050 and announced it would invest $163 billion in clean and renewable energy and key technologies. The UAE has made significant progress in developing its urban infrastructure, as the country diversifies from an hydrocarbons-focused economy to a knowledge-based economy. UAE’s per capita energy and water consumption are among the highest in the world, leading to a heavy carbon footprint. The UAE is one of the world’s most water-scarce nations, caused by a dry climate, high temperatures, and very low levels of precipitation. With limited natural freshwater resources, the country relies on desalinated seawater to meet its demand for potable water. The UAE takes the need to address and mitigate negative impacts on the environment seriously and has taken steps to demonstrate the importance of the issue, including establishing the Ministry of Climate Change and Environment (MOCCAE) in 2016. The UAE launched a National Climate Change Plan in 2017 and was one of the first Gulf countries to ratify and sign the Paris Accord in 2015. The UAE has adopted policies and strategies aimed at addressing the impacts of climate change, improving air quality, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, improving water and food security, promoting low-carbon energy, and conserving the UAE’s natural resources. The UAE aims to increase its global competitiveness by increasing the share of low-carbon energy in the country’s total energy mix; establishing robust recycling and waste management industries, including several waste-to-energy plants; developing massive reverse osmosis seawater desalination plants to replace older, energy-intensive thermal plants; improving water efficiency through “reduce and reuse” initiatives; implementing green standards in the construction and management of buildings; and adopting green products and technologies. The UAE and local governments in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have launched various platforms to engage businesses to share knowledge and best practices. The Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (MASDAR), founded by the Abu Dhabi government’s Mubadala Investment Company and co-owned by government-owned energy firm the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) and ADNOC, develops and finances greenfield renewable energy projects in UAE and abroad. 9. Corruption The UAE has strict laws, regulations, and enforcement against corruption and has pursued several high-profile cases. The UAE federal penal code and the federal human resources law criminalize embezzlement and the acceptance of bribes by public and private sector workers. There is no evidence that corruption of public officials is a systemic problem. In August 2021, the president of the UAE issued a federal decree holding ministers and senior officials accountable for wrongdoing. Under the decree, the Public Prosecution can receive and accordingly investigate complaints against senior official and take necessary actions, including banning travel and freezing family financial accounts. The Companies Law requires board directors to avoid conflicts of interest. In practice, however, given the multiple roles occupied by relatively few senior Emirati government and business officials, conflicts of interest exist. Business success in the UAE also still depends much on personal relationships. The monitoring organizations GAN Integrity and Transparency International describe the corruption environment in the UAE as low-risk and rate the UAE highly on anti-corruption efforts both regionally and globally. Some observers note, however, that the involvement of members of the ruling families and prominent merchant families in certain businesses can create economic disparities in the playing field, and most foreign companies outside the UAE’s free zones rely on an Emirati national partner, often with strong connections, who retains majority ownership. The UAE has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. There are no civil society organizations or NGOs investigating corruption within the UAE. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Dr. Harib Al Amimi President State Audit Institution 20th Floor, Tower C2, Aseel Building, Bainuna (34th) Street, Al Bateen, Abu Dhabi, UAE +971 2 635 9999 info@saiuae.gov.ae , reportfraud@saiuae.gov.ae 10. Political and Security Environment Violent crimes and crimes against property are rare. U.S. citizens should take the same security precautions in the UAE that one would practice in the United States or any large city abroad. In March 2022, the United States published a travel advisory for UAE noting pandemic concerns and the potential for missile or drone strikes. The latest information can be found at https://travel.state.gov/. Visitors should enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive security messages. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Despite a pandemic-induced economic slowdown in 2020, unemployment among UAE citizens remains low. Although there were significant departures of foreign workers during the pandemic, expatriates represent over 88.5 percent of the country’s 9.6 million residents, accounting for more than 95 percent of private sector workers. As a result, there would be large labor shortages in all sectors of the economy if not for expatriate workers. Most expatriate workers derive their legal residency status from their employment. The Emiratization Initiative is a federal incentive program to increase Emirati employment in the private sector. Requirements vary by industry, but the Vision 2021 national strategic plan aimed to increase the percentage of Emiratis working in the private sector from five percent in 2014 to eight percent by 2021; in 2019 the UAE reached 3.64 percent. The government said it would work closely with the private sector to achieve this target. In August 2020, the Emirates Job Bank (EJB), a government-facilitated job portal for UAE nationals, obliged government, and onshore private employers to provide an explanation for interviewed UAE citizens were not hired, before allowing the employer to hire a non-citizen. Most Emirati citizens in the private sector are employed by government-related entities (GREs). In September 2021, the UAE launched Program Nafis (“compete” in English) to support the employment of Emirati nationals in the private sector. Under Nafis, the UAE will spend up to $6.5 billion to employ 75,000 Emiratis in the private sector over 2021-2025, with the aim for Emiratis to hold 10 per cent of the UAE’s private sector jobs by 2026. A significant portion of the country’s expatriate labor population consists of low-wage workers who are primarily from South Asia and work in labor-intensive industries such as construction, manufacturing, maintenance, and sanitation. In addition, several hundred thousand domestic workers, primarily from South and Southeast Asia and Africa, work in the homes of both Emirati and expatriate families. Federal labor law does not apply to domestic, agricultural, or public sector workers. In 2014, the federal government implemented a law mandating a standard contract for all domestic workers. The UAE in 2017 issued a domestic workers law, which regulates their rights and contracts. Under the new UAE labor law, employers must pay severance to workers who complete one year or more of service, which is calculated on the basis of their basic salary. Expatriate workers do not receive UAE government unemployment insurance. Termination of UAE nationals in most situations requires prior approval from the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE). The guest worker system generally guarantees transportation back to country of origin at the conclusion of employment. Repatriation insurance costs $16 per year per employee. Most employees are not subject to excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility. Article (8) of the new Law indicates that unlimited contracts are to be abolished and replaced with work contracts of a fixed term for a period of three years. Employees who live in the UAE on a sponsored work visa can undertake part-time jobs and work for multiple employers simultaneously to earn additional income. The new labor law allows children aged 15 and over to take on part-time jobs. The UAE Cabinet approved a measure in January 2021 permitting foreign university students in the UAE to sponsor their families, provided they have the financial means to do so and can afford suitable housing. Although UAE federal law prohibits the payment of recruitment fees, many prospective workers continue to make such payments in their home countries. In 2018, the UAE government launched Tadbeer Centers, publicly regulated but privately operated agencies to improve recruitment regulation and standards. Tadbeer Centers are currently the only legally operating recruitment agencies. There is no minimum wage in the UAE; however, article 27 of the new federal labor law (Federal Law No (33) of 2021) says the cabinet may, upon the proposal of the Minister of Human Resources and Emiratization and in coordination with the concerned authorities, issue a resolution to determine the minimum wage for workers or any category thereof. MOHRE unofficially mandates an AED 5,000 ($1,360) monthly minimum wage for locals at job fairs and requires job titles offered for Emiratis to be socially acceptable. Some labor-sending countries require their citizens to receive certain minimum wage levels as a condition for allowing them to work in the UAE. In January 2020, the UAE government introduced a salary requirement for residents seeking to directly sponsor a domestic worker, raising the minimum monthly income for the individual or entire family from $1,630 to $6,810, inclusive of all allowances. The law prohibits public sector employees, security guards, and migrant workers from striking, and allows employers to suspend private sector workers for doing so. In addition, employers can cancel the contracts of striking workers, which can lead to deportation. Changes to the penal code effective January 2022 mandate deportation of noncitizen workers inciting or participating in a strike. According to government statistics, there were approximately 30 to 60 strikes per year between 2012 and 2015, the last year for which data is available. In December 2019, construction workers in Abu Dhabi engaged in an hours-long strike, claiming they had not been paid in months and that each was owed over $3,400. The police intervened to defuse the protests and arrested some of the workers for resisting. Mediation plays a central role in resolving labor disputes. MOHRE and local police forces maintain telephone hotlines for labor dispute and complaint submissions. MOHRE manages 11 centers around the UAE that provide mediation services between employers and employees. Disputes not resolved by MOHRE are transferred to the labor court system. MOHRE inspects company workplaces and company-provided worker accommodations to ensure compliance with UAE law. Emirate-level government bodies, including the Dubai Municipality, also carry out regular inspections. MOHRE also enforces a mid-day break from 12:30 p.m.-3:00 p.m. during the extremely hot summer months. The federally mandated Wages Protection System (WPS) monitors and requires electronic transfer of wages to approximately 4.5 million private sector workers (about 95 percent of the total private sector workforce). There are reports that small private construction and transport companies work around the WPS to pay workers less than their contractual salaries. In 2020 the UAE began a pilot program to begin integrating domestic workers into the WPS. Less than one percent of domestic workers are enrolled in WPS. MOHRE announced the optional implementation of WPS for domestic workers starting January 27, 2022. Following the promulgation of similar legislation in Abu Dhabi, Dubai’s government fully implemented Law No 11 in May 2017, which mandates employers provide basic health insurance coverage to their employees or face fines. Dubai’s mandatory health insurance law covers 4.3 million people. The multi-agency National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking is the federal body tasked with monitoring and preventing human trafficking, including forced labor. Child labor is illegal and rare in the UAE. The UAE continues to participate in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, engage in the Colombo Process, and partner with other multilateral organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime regarding labor exploitation and human trafficking. Section 7 of the Department of State’s Human Rights Report (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt) provides more information on worker rights, working conditions, and labor laws in the UAE. The Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report (https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/) details the UAE government’s efforts to combat human trafficking. 14. Contact for More Information Samuel Juh Economic Officer First Street, Umm Hurair -1 Dubai UAE Juhshk@state.gov United Kingdom Executive Summary The United Kingdom (UK) is a popular destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and imposes few impediments to foreign ownership. In the past decade, the UK has been Europe’s top recipient of FDI. The UK government provides comprehensive statistics on FDI in its annual inward investment report: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/department-for-international-trade-inward-investment-results-2020-to-2021. The COVID pandemic triggered a massive expansion of government support for households and businesses. The government focused on supporting business cashflow and underwriting over £200 billion ($261 billion) in loans from banks to firms. Although aggregate investment grew by 5.3 percent in 2021, levels remain below their pre-pandemic peak. Most analysts expect a rebound in investment growth in 2022, however, driven in part by the government’s investment tax super-deduction, which allows business to claim back 130 percent of the cost of an eligible capital investment on their taxable profits up until March 2023, a more stable post-Brexit regulatory framework, and the reduction of economic and mobility restrictions imposed to cope with the pandemic. Most of these measures were phased out by October 2021. Their fiscal impact has been large, however, and the budget deficit reached 8.5 percent of GDP. The government has committed to fiscal consolidation, and in September 2021 announced that it planned to increase the corporation tax rate from 19 percent to 25 percent by 2023 and national insurance contributions by 2.5 percent to fund additional health and social care spending. In response to declining inward foreign investment each year since 2016, and amidst the sharp but temporary recession related to the pandemic, the UK government established the Office for Investment in November 2020. The Office is focused on attracting high-value investment opportunities into the UK which “align with key government priorities, such as reaching net zero, investing in infrastructure, and advancing research and development.” It also aims to drive inward investment into “all corners of the UK through a ‘single front door.’” The UK formally withdrew from the EU’s political institutions on January 31, 2020, and from the bloc’s economic and trading institutions on December 31, 2020. The UK and the EU concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on December 24, 2020, setting out the terms of their future economic relationship. The TCA generally maintains tariff-free trade between the UK and the EU but introduced several new non-tariff, administrative barriers. Market entry for U.S. firms is facilitated by a common language, legal heritage, and similar business institutions and practices. The UK is well supported by sophisticated financial and professional services industries and has a transparent tax system in which local and foreign-owned companies are taxed alike. The pound sterling is a free-floating currency with no restrictions on its transfer or conversion. There are no exchange controls restricting the transfer of funds associated with an investment into or out of the UK. UK legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international standards. The UK legal system provides a high level of protection. Private ownership is protected by law and monitored for competition-restricting behavior. U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and the UK in the conduct of business, and common law prevails as the basis for commercial transactions in the UK. The United States and UK have enjoyed a “Commerce and Navigation” Treaty since 1815 which guarantees national treatment of U.S. investors. A Bilateral Tax Treaty specifically protects U.S. and UK investors from double taxation. The UK has, however, taken some steps that particularly affect U.S. companies in the technology sector. A unilateral digital services tax came into force in April 2020, taxing digital firms—such as social media platforms, search engines, and marketplaces—two percent on revenue generated in the UK. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK’s competition regulator, has indicated that it intends to scrutinize and police the sector more thoroughly. From 2020-2021, the CMA investigated the acquisition of Giphy by Meta Platforms (formerly Facebook). The CMA found that the acquisition may impede competition in both the supply of display advertising in the UK, and in the supply of social media services worldwide (including in the UK) and ordered Meta to sell Giphy. The United States is the largest source of direct investment into the UK on an ultimate parent basis. Thousands of U.S. companies have operations in the UK. The UK also hosts more than half of the European, Middle Eastern, and African corporate headquarters of American-owned multinational firms. In October 2021, the UK government introduced its Net Zero Strategy, which comprehensively sets out UK government plans to cut emissions, seize green economic opportunities, and use private investment to achieve a net zero economy by 2050. The Net Zero Strategy allocates £7.8 billion ($10.5 billion) in new spending and aims to leverage up to £90 billion ($118 billion) of private investment by 2030. In its latest spending review, Her Majesty’s Treasury’s (HMT) estimated that net-zero spending between 2021-22 and 2024-25 would total £25.5 billion ($34.5 billion). The UK government is endeavoring to position the UK as the first net-zero financial center and a global hub for sustainable financial activity. The UK Infrastructure Bank, established in 2021, is providing £22 billion ($29 billion) of infrastructure finance to tackle climate change. In 2021 HMT sold £16 billion ($20.8 billion) worth of the UK’s Green Gilt to help fund green projects across the UK. Through the Greening Finance Roadmap, HMT outlines the UK government’s intent to implement a detailed sovereign green taxonomy, which is expected to be published by the end of 2022, along with sustainable disclosure requirements that would serve as an integrated framework for sustainability throughout the UK economy. Currency conversions have been done using XE and Bank of England data. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 11 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 4 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $890,086 https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/direct-investment-country-and-industry World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $45,870 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The UK actively encourages inward FDI. With a few exceptions, the government does not discriminate between nationals and foreign individuals in the formation and operation of private companies. The Department for International Trade, including through its newly created Office for Investment, actively promotes inward investment and prepares market information for a variety of industries. U.S. companies establishing British subsidiaries generally encounter no special nationality requirements on directors or shareholders. Once established in the UK, foreign-owned companies are treated no differently from UK firms. The UK government is a strong defender of the rights of any UK-registered company, irrespective of its nationality of ownership. Foreign ownership is limited in only a few strategic private sector companies, such as Rolls Royce (aerospace) and BAE Systems (aircraft and defense). No individual foreign shareholder may own more than 15 percent of these companies. Theoretically, the government can block the acquisition of manufacturing assets from abroad by invoking the Industry Act of 1975, but it has never done so. Investments in energy and power generation require environmental approvals. Certain service activities (like radio and land-based television broadcasting) are subject to licensing. The National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) 2021 came into force on January 4, 2022. The NSIA created a new screening regime for transactions which might raise national security concerns in the UK called the Investment Security Unit (ISU). The ISU sits within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). It is responsible for identifying, addressing and mitigating national security risks to the UK arising when a person gains control of a qualifying asset or qualifying entity. The UK requires that at least one director of any company registered in the UK be ordinarily resident in the country. The UK, as a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), subscribes to the OECD Codes of Liberalization and is committed to minimizing limits on foreign investment. The Economist Intelligence Unit and the OECD’s Economic Forecast Summary have current investment policy reports for the United Kingdom: http://country.eiu.com/united-kingdom https://www.oecd.org/economy/united-kingdom-economic-snapshot/ The UK government has promoted administrative efficiency successfully to facilitate business creation and operation. The online business registration process is clearly defined, though some types of companies cannot register as an overseas firm in the UK, including partnerships and unincorporated bodies. Registration as an overseas company is only required when the company has some degree of physical presence in the UK. After registering their business with the UK governmental body Companies House, overseas firms must separately register to pay corporation tax within three months. Since 2016, companies have had to declare all “persons of significant control.” This policy recognizes that individuals other than named directors can have significant influence on a company’s activity and that this information should be transparent. More information is available at this link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-to-the-people-with-significant-control-requirements-for-companies-and-limited-liability-partnerships . Companies House maintains a free, publicly searchable directory, available at https://www.gov.uk/get-information-about-a-company. The UK offers a welcoming environment to foreign investors, with foreign equity ownership restrictions in only a limited number of sectors covered by the World Bank’s Investing Across Sectors indicators. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-trade https://www.gov.uk/set-up-business https://www.gov.uk/topic/company-registration-filing/starting-company http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom/starting-a-business The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) comprise Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. The BOTs retain a substantial measure of responsibility for their own affairs. Local self-government is usually provided by an Executive Council and elected legislature. Governors or Commissioners are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the British Foreign Secretary, and retain responsibility for external affairs, defense, and internal security. Many of the territories are now broadly self-sufficient. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), however, maintains development assistance programs in St. Helena, Montserrat, and Pitcairn. This includes budgetary aid to meet the islands’ essential needs and development assistance to help encourage economic growth and social development to promote economic self-sustainability. In addition, all other BOTs receive small levels of assistance through “cross-territory” programs for issues such as environmental protection, disaster prevention, HIV/AIDS, and child protection. Seven of the BOTs have financial centers: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. These territories have committed to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of taxpayer financial account information. They are already exchanging information with the UK, and began exchanging information with other jurisdictions under the CRS from September 2017. Of the BOTs, Anguilla is the only one to receive a “non-compliant” rating by the Global Forum for Exchange of Information on Request. The Global Forum has rated the other six territories as “largely compliant.” Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and the Turks and Caicos Islands have committed in reciprocal bilateral arrangements with the UK to hold beneficial ownership information in central registers or similarly effective systems, and to provide UK law enforcement authorities with near real-time access to this information. These arrangements came into effect in June 2017. Anguilla: Anguilla is a neutral tax jurisdiction. There are no income, capital gains, estate, profit or other forms of direct taxation on either individuals or corporations, for residents or non-residents of the jurisdiction. The territory has no exchange rate controls. Non-Anguillan nationals may purchase property, but the transfer of land to an alien includes a 12.5 percent tax on the assessed value of the property or the sales proceeds, whichever is greater. British Virgin Islands: The government of the British Virgin Islands offers a series of incentive packages aimed at reducing the cost of doing business on the islands. This includes relief from corporation tax payments over specific periods, but companies must pay an initial registration fee and an annual license fee to the BVI Financial Services Commission. Crown land grants are not available to non-British Virgin Islanders, but private land can be leased or purchased following the approval of an Alien Land Holding License. Stamp duty is imposed on transfers of real estate and the transfer of shares in a BVI company owning real estate in the BVI at a rate of four percent for belongers (i.e., residents who have proven they meet a legal standard of close ties to the territory) and 12 percent for non-belongers. There is no corporate income tax, capital gains tax, branch tax, or withholding tax for companies incorporated under the BVI Business Companies Act. Payroll tax is imposed on every employer and self-employed person who conducts business in BVI. The tax is paid at a graduated rate depending upon the size of the employer. The current rates are 10 percent for small employers (those that have a payroll of less than $150,000, a turnover of less than $300,000 and fewer than seven employees) and 14 percent for larger employers. Eight percent of the total remuneration is deducted from the employee, while the remainder of the liability is met by the employer. The first $10,000 of remuneration is free from payroll tax. Cayman Islands: There are no direct taxes in the Cayman Islands. In most districts, the government charges stamp duty of 7.5 percent on the value of real estate at sale, but certain districts, including Seven Mile Beach, are subject to a rate of nine percent. There is a one percent fee payable on mortgages of less than KYD 300,000 ($360,237), and one and a half percent on mortgages of KYD 300,000 ($360,237) or higher. There are no controls on the foreign ownership of property and land. Investors can receive import duty waivers on equipment, building materials, machinery, manufacturing materials, and other tools. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas): Companies located in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) are charged corporation tax at 21 percent on the first £1 million ($1.4 million) and 26 percent for all amounts more than £1 million ($1.4 million). The individual income tax rate is 21 percent for earnings below £12,000 ($16,800) and 26 percent above this level. Gibraltar: The government of Gibraltar encourages foreign investment. Gibraltar has a buoyant economy with a stable currency and few restrictions on moving capital or repatriating dividends. The corporate income tax rate is 20 percent for utility, energy, and fuel supply companies, and 12.5 percent for all other companies. There are no capital or sales taxes. Gibraltar is not currently a part of the EU, and its post-Brexit relationship with the bloc is the subject of ongoing negotiations between London and Brussels. Under the terms of an agreement in principle reached between the UK and Spain on December 31, 2020, free movement of workers and goods across the land border between Gibraltar and Spain is temporarily continuing. Montserrat: The government of Montserrat welcomes new private foreign investment. Foreign investors are permitted to acquire real estate, subject to the acquisition of an Alien Land Holding license, which carries a fee of five percent of the purchase price. The government also imposes stamp and transfer fees of 2.6 percent of the property value on all real estate transactions. Foreign investment in Montserrat is subject to the same taxation rules as local investment and is eligible for tax holidays and other incentives. Montserrat has preferential trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and Australia. The government allows 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses, but the administration of public utilities remains wholly in the public sector. St. Helena: The island of St. Helena is open to foreign investment and welcomes expressions of interest from companies wanting to invest. Its government is able to offer tax-based incentives, which will be considered on the merits of each project – particularly tourism projects. All applications are processed by Enterprise St. Helena, the business development agency. Pitcairn Islands: The Pitcairn Islands have approximately 50 residents, with a workforce of approximately 29 employed in 10 full-time equivalent roles. The territory does not have an airstrip or safe harbor. Residents exist on fishing, subsistence farming, and handcrafts. Turks and Caicos Islands: The islands operate an “open arms” investment policy. Through the policy, the government commits to a streamlined business licensing system, a responsive immigration policy to give investment security, access to government-owned land under long-term leases, and a variety of duty concessions to qualified investors. The islands have a “no tax” status, but property purchasers must pay a stamp duty on purchases over $25,000. Depending on the island, the stamp duty rate may be up to 6.5 percent for purchases up to $250,000, eight percent for purchases $250,001 to $500,000, and 10 percent for purchases over $500,000. The Crown Dependencies: The Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown. This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal, and legal systems, and their own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament. Jersey’s standard rate of corporate tax is zero percent. The exceptions to this standard rate are financial service companies, which are taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; and income specifically derived from Jersey property rentals or Jersey property development, taxed at 20 percent. A five percent VAT is applicable in Jersey. Guernsey has a zero percent rate of corporate tax. Exceptions include some specific banking activities, taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; Guernsey residents’ assessable income is taxed at 20 percent; and income derived from land and buildings is taxed at 20 percent. The Isle of Man’s corporate standard tax is zero percent. The exceptions to this standard rate are income received from banking business, which is taxed at 10 percent, and income received from land and property in the Isle of Man, which is taxed at 20 percent. In addition, a 10 percent tax rate also applies to companies that carry on a retail business in the Isle of Man and have taxable income in excess of £500,000 ($695,000) from that business. A 20 percent rate of VAT is applicable in the Isle of Man. The tax data above are current as of March 2022. The UK is one of the largest outward investors in the world, often through bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which are used to promote and protect investment abroad and have been adopted by many countries. The UK’s international investment position abroad (outward investment) in 2020 was $2.1 trillion. The main destination for UK outward FDI is the United States, which accounted for approximately 25 percent of UK outward FDI stocks at the end of 2020. Other key destinations include the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Spain which, together with the United States, account for a little over half of the UK’s outward FDI stock. Europe and the Americas remain the dominant areas for UK international investment positions abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties The UK has concluded 105 bilateral investment treaties, which are known in the UK as Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. For a complete current list, including actual treaties, see: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/221#iiaInnerMenu The United Kingdom is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 agreement on the global minimum corporate tax. 3. Legal Regime U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and UK in the conduct of business. The regulatory system provides clear and transparent guidelines for commercial engagement. Common law prevails in the UK as the basis for commercial transactions, and the International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) of the International Chambers of Commerce are accepted definitions of trading terms. In terms of accounting standards and audit provisions, firms in the UK must use the UK-adopted international accounting standards (IAS) instead of the EU-adopted IAS for financial years beginning on or after January 1, 2021. The UK’s Accounting Standards Board provides guidance to firms on accounting standards and works with the IASB on international standards. Statutory authority over prices and competition in various industries is given to independent regulators, for example the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat), the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Rail Regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA was created out of the dissolution of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2013. The PRA reports to the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the Bank of England. The PRA is responsible for supervising the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, while the FPC takes a systemic view of the financial system and provides macro-prudential regulation and policy actions. The FCA is a regulatory enforcement mechanism designed to address financial and market misconduct through legally reviewable processes. These regulators work to protect the interests of consumers while ensuring that the markets they regulate are functioning efficiently. Most laws and regulations are published in draft for public comment prior to implementation. The FCA maintains a free, publicly searchable register of their filings on regulated corporations and individuals here: https://register.fca.org.uk/. The UK government publishes regulatory actions, including draft text and executive summaries, on the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy webpage listed below. The current policy requires the repeal of two regulations for any new one in order to make the business environment more competitive. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/business-regulation https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-delivery The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has not yet caused dramatic shifts in the UK’s regulatory regimes but has opened the door to regulatory divergence. The future regulatory direction of the UK remains uncertain as the UK determines whether to maintain the current regulatory regime inherited from the EU or to deviate towards new regulations. The UK is an independent member of the WTO and actively seeks to comply with all WTO obligations. The UK is a common-law country. UK business contracts are legally enforceable in the UK, but not in the United States or other foreign jurisdictions. International disputes are resolved through litigation in the UK Courts or by arbitration, mediation, or some other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method. The UK has a long history of applying the rule of law to business disputes. The current judicial process remains procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, which helps position London as an international hub for dispute resolution with over 10,000 cases filed per annum. The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which took effect March 15, 2022, established a registry of foreign beneficial owners of real property (freeholds or leases of seven years or more) expected to go into place in September 2022. The Act requires registry of ultimate beneficial owners, including those controlling at least 25 percent of overseas entities that own such property. The requirement applies retroactively to properties purchased in England and Wales since 1999 and in Scotland since December 2014. Entities or their officers who refuse to register or keep their information up to date face tough restrictions on selling the property, and those who break the rules could face a fine of up to £2,500 ($3,270) per day or up to five years in prison. The procedure for establishing a company in the UK is identical for British and foreign investors. No approval mechanisms exist for foreign investment, apart from the process outlined in Section 1. Foreigners may freely establish or purchase enterprises in the UK, with a few limited exceptions, and acquire land or buildings. As noted above, the UK is currently reviewing its procedures and has proposed new rules for restricting foreign investment in those sectors of the economy with higher risk for affecting national security. The National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 – which applies equally to foreign or domestic investment – requires mandatory reporting of significant investments (generally over 25 percent) in 17 sensitive sectors; the reporting requirement extends to investments in intellectual property and in higher education and research. The UK government aims to review cases expeditiously, with most reviews of notifications completed within 30 days. Alleged tax avoidance by multinational companies, including by several major U.S. firms, has been a controversial political issue and subject of investigations by the UK Parliament and EU authorities. Foreign and UK firms are subject to the same tax laws, however, and several UK firms have also been criticized for tax avoidance. Foreign investors may have access to certain EU and UK regional grants and incentives designed to attract industry to areas of high unemployment, but these do not include tax concessions. Access to EU grants ended on December 31, 2020. In 2015, the UK flattened its structure of corporate tax rates. The UK currently taxes corporations at a flat rate of 19 percent for non-ring-fenced companies, with marginal tax relief granted for companies with profits falling between £300,000 ($420,000) and £1.5 million ($2.1 million). On March 3, 2021, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak announced that, starting in 2023, UK corporate tax would increase to 25 percent for companies with profits over £250,000 ($346,000). A small profits rate (SPR) will also be introduced so that companies with profits of £50,000 ($69,000) or less will continue to pay Corporation Tax at 19 percent. Companies with profits between £50,000 ($69,000) and £250,000 ($346,000) will pay tax at the main rate reduced by a marginal relief providing a gradual increase in the effective Corporation Tax rate. Tax deductions are allowed for expenditure and depreciation of assets used for trade purposes. These include machinery, plant, industrial buildings, and assets used for research and development, such as cloud computing. A special rate of 20 percent is given to unit trusts and open-ended investment companies. There are different Corporation Tax rates for companies that make profits from oil extraction or oil rights in the UK or UK continental shelf, known as “ring-fenced” companies. Small “ring-fenced” companies are taxed at a rate of 19 percent for profits up to £300,000 ($420,000), and 30 percent for profits over £300,000 ($420,000). A supplementary tax known as the bank Corporation Tax Surcharge, is applied to companies in the banking sector at eight percent of profits in excess of £25 million ($33 million). To maintain equitable tax rates for banks with the upcoming tax rise, the government has changed the surcharge rate to three percent applied to profits above £100 million ($132 million), starting in April 2023. The UK has a simple system of personal income tax. The marginal tax rates for 2020-2021 are as follows: up to £12,570 ($16,500), 0 percent; £12,501 ($17,370) to £57,700 ($75,740), 20 percent; £57,701 ($75,740) to £150,000 ($196,900), 40 percent; and over £150,000 ($196,900), 45 percent. UK citizens also make mandatory payments of about 13.25 percent of income into the National Insurance system, which funds healthcare, social security, and retirement benefits. The UK requires non-domiciled residents of the UK to either pay tax on their worldwide income or the tax on the relevant part of their remitted foreign income being brought into the UK. If they have been resident in the UK for seven tax years of the previous nine, and they choose to pay tax only on their remitted earnings, they may be subject to an additional charge of £30,000 ($42,000). If they have been resident in the UK for 12 of the last 14 tax years, they may be subject to an additional charge of £60,000 ($84,000). The Scottish Parliament has the legal power to increase or decrease the basic income tax rate in Scotland, currently 20 percent, by a maximum of three percentage points. For guidance on laws and procedures relevant to foreign investment in the UK, follow the link below: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investment-in-the-uk-guidance-for-overseas-businesses The UK competition regime is established by the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended by the Enterprise and Regulator Reform Act 2013. This legislative framework created the UK’s independent competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which is responsible for enforcing UK competition law. The government has limited powers to intervene in either the assessment of mergers or the investigation of markets. Before Brexit, the prohibitions in UK law on abusing dominant market positions and anti-competitive agreements were based on and underpinned by equivalent provisions in EU law. Since Brexit, under the terms of the UK-EU trade agreements, EU competition law is no longer enforced in the UK, and the UK and EU now operate separate competition regimes. The CMA is responsible for: investigating phase 1 and phase 2 mergers, conducting market studies and market investigations, investigating possible breaches of prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act 1998, bringing criminal proceedings against individuals who commit cartel offenses, enforcing consumer protection legislation, particularly the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Directive and Regulations, encouraging sectoral regulators to use their powers to protect competition, considering regulatory references and appeals, and, regulation of public sector subsidies to business. While merger notification in the UK is voluntary, the CMA may impose substantial fines or suspense orders on potentially non-compliant transactions. The CMA has no prosecutorial authority, but it may refer entities for prosecution in extreme cases, such as those involving cartel activity, which carries a penalty of up to five years imprisonment. In 2021, the UK established the Digital Markets Unit on a non-statutory basis within the CMA to oversee and operationalize a forthcoming pro-competition regime for digital markets. Powers for the DMU and the new regulatory regime will require new legislation. In the interim, the DMU is supporting and advising the government on establishing the statutory regime, including by gathering evidence on digital markets. In addition to the CMA, the Takeover Panel, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Pensions Regulator have principal regulatory authority: The Takeover Panel is an independent body, operating per the (the “Code”), which regulates takeovers of public companies, and some private companies, centrally managed or controlled in the UK, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey. The Code provides a binding set of rules for takeovers aimed at ensuring fair treatment for all shareholders in takeover bids, including requiring bidders to provide information about their intentions after a takeover. The Financial Conduct Authority administers Listing Rules, Prospectus Regulation Rules, and Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules, which can apply to takeovers of publicly listed companies. The Pensions Regulator has powers to intervene in investments in pension schemes. The UK is a member of the OECD and adheres to the OECD principle that when a government expropriates property, compensation should be timely, adequate, and effective. In the UK, the right to fair compensation and due process is uncontested and is reflected in all international investment agreements. Expropriation of corporate assets or the nationalization of industry requires a special act of Parliament. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the UK government nationalized Northern Rock bank (sold to Virgin Money in 2012) and took major stakes in the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group. As a member of the World Bank-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the UK accepts binding international arbitration between foreign investors and the State. As a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the UK provides local enforcement on arbitration judgments decided in other signatory countries. London is a thriving center for the resolution of international disputes through arbitration under a variety of procedural rules such as those of the London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association International Centre for Dispute Resolution, and others. Many of these arbitrations involve parties with no connection to the jurisdiction, but who are drawn to the jurisdiction because they perceive it to be a fair, neutral venue with an arbitration law and courts that support efficient resolution of disputes. They also choose London-based arbitration because of the general prevalence of the English language and law in international commerce. A wide range of contractual and non-contractual claims can be referred to arbitration in this jurisdiction including disputes involving intellectual property rights, competition, and statutory claims. There are no restrictions on foreign nationals acting as arbitration counsel or arbitrators in this jurisdiction. There are few restrictions on foreign lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction as evidenced by the fact that over 200 foreign law firms have offices in London. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In addition to its membership in ICSID, the UK is a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The latter convention has territorial application to Gibraltar (September 24, 1975), Hong Kong (January 21, 1977), Isle of Man (February 22, 1979), Bermuda (November 14, 1979), Belize and Cayman Islands (November 26, 1980), Guernsey (April 19, 1985), Bailiwick of Jersey (May 28, 2002), and British Virgin Islands (February 24, 2014). The United Kingdom has consciously elected not to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Enforcement of an arbitral award in the UK is dependent upon where the award was granted. The process for enforcement in any particular case is dependent upon the seat of arbitration and the arbitration rules that apply. Arbitral awards in the UK can be enforced under a number of different regimes, namely: The Arbitration Act 1996, The New York Convention, The Geneva Convention 1927, The Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, and Common Law. The Arbitration Act 1996 governs all arbitrations seated in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, both domestic and international. The full text of the Arbitration Act can be found here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/data.pdf. The Arbitration Act is heavily influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law, but it has some important differences. For example, the Arbitration Act covers both domestic and international arbitration; the document containing the parties’ arbitration agreement need not be signed; an English court is only able to stay its own proceedings and cannot refer a matter to arbitration; the default provisions in the Arbitration Act require the appointment of a sole arbitrator as opposed to three arbitrators; a party retains the power to treat its party-nominated arbitrator as the sole arbitrator in the event that the other party fails to make an appointment (where the parties’ agreement provides that each party is required to appoint an arbitrator); there is no time limit on a party’s opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator; parties must expressly opt out of most of the provisions of the Arbitration Act which confer default procedural powers on the arbitrators; and there are no strict rules governing the exchange of pleadings. Section 66 of the Arbitration Act applies to all domestic and foreign arbitral awards. Sections 100 to 103 of the Arbitration Act provide for enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention 1958. Section 99 of the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of arbitral awards made in certain countries under the Geneva Convention 1927. Under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act, the court’s permission is required for an international arbitral award to be enforced in the UK. Once the court has given permission, judgment may be entered in terms of the arbitral award and enforced in the same manner as a court judgment or order. Permission will not be granted by the court if the party against whom enforcement is sought can show that (a) the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction and (b) the right to raise such an objection has not been lost. The length of arbitral proceedings can vary greatly. If the parties have a relatively straightforward dispute, cooperate, and adopt a fast-track procedure, arbitration can be concluded within months or even weeks. In a substantial international arbitration involving complex facts, many witnesses and experts and post-hearing briefs, the arbitration could take many years. A reasonably substantial international arbitration will likely take between one and two years. There are two alternative procedures that can be followed in order to enforce an award. The first is to seek leave of the court for permission to enforce. The second is to begin an action on the award, seeking the same relief from the court as set out in the tribunal’s award. Enforcement of an award made in the jurisdiction may be opposed by challenging the award. The court may also, however, refuse to enforce an award that is unclear, does not specify an amount, or offends public policy. Enforcement of a foreign award may be opposed on any of the limited grounds set out in the New York Convention. A stay may be granted for a limited time pending a challenge to the order for enforcement. The court will consider the likelihood of success and whether enforcement of the award will be made more or less difficult as a result of the stay. Conditions that might be imposed on granting the stay include such matters as paying a sum into court. Where multiple awards are to be rendered, the court may give permission for the tribunal to continue hearing other matters, especially where there may be a long delay between awards. UK courts have a good record of enforcing arbitral awards. The courts will enforce an arbitral award in the same way that they will enforce an order or judgment of a court. At the time of writing, there are no examples of the English courts enforcing awards which were set aside by the courts at the place of arbitration. Most awards are complied with voluntarily. If the party against whom the award was made fails to comply, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court. The length of time it takes to enforce an award which complies with the requirements of the New York Convention will depend on whether there are complex objections to enforcement which require the court to investigate the facts of the case. If a case raises complex issues of public importance the case could be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court. This process could take around two years. If no complex objections are raised, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court using a summary procedure that is fast and efficient. There are time limits relating to the enforcement of the award. Failure to comply with an award is treated as a breach of the arbitration agreement. An action on the award must be brought within six years of the failure to comply with the award or 12 years if the arbitration agreement was made under seal. If the award does not specify a time for compliance, a court will imply a term of reasonableness. The UK has strong bankruptcy protections going back to the Bankruptcy Act of 1542. Today, both individual bankruptcy and corporate insolvency are regulated in the UK primarily by the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency Rules 1986, regulated through determinations in UK courts. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report Ranks the UK 14 out of 190 for ease of resolving insolvency. Regarding individual bankruptcy law, the court will oblige a bankrupt individual to sell assets to pay dividends to creditors. A bankrupt person must inform future creditors about the bankrupt status and may not act as the director of a company during the period of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in the UK, and the Enterprise Act of 2002 dictates that for England and Wales bankruptcy will not normally last longer than 12 months. At the end of the bankrupt period, the individual is normally no longer held liable for bankruptcy debts unless the individual is determined to be culpable for his or her own insolvency, in which case the bankruptcy period can last up to 15 years. For corporations declaring insolvency, UK insolvency law seeks to distribute losses equitably between creditors, employees, the community, and other stakeholders in an effort to rescue the company. Liability is limited to the amount of the investment. If a company cannot be rescued, it is liquidated and assets are sold to pay debts to creditors, including foreign investors. In March 2020, the UK government announced it would introduce legislation to change existing insolvency laws in response to COVID-19. The new measures enabled companies undergoing a rescue or restructuring process to continue trading and help them avoid insolvency. These measures expired in March 2022. HMG does not currently require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investor and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The majority of ESG reporting is not currently mandatory in the UK. However, some specific metrics that come under the ESG regulation reporting umbrella are mandatory, including: Greenhouse gas reporting: Mandatory for quoted companies since 2013 under the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013. Energy use: Quoted companies must report on their global energy use, and large businesses must disclose their UK annual energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. This is required by the Companies (Directors’ Report) and Limited Liability Partnerships (Energy and Carbon Report) Regulations 2018. Gender pay gap: Any employer with a headcount of 250 or more must comply with gender pay gap reporting regulations. Modern Slavery: UK organizations with an annual turnover of £36 million ($47 million) or more must publish an annual statement setting out the steps to prevent modern slavery. 4. Industrial Policies The UK offers a range of incentives for companies of any nationality locating in depressed regions of the country, as long as the investment generates employment. DIT works with its partner organizations in the devolved administrations – Scottish Development International, the Welsh Government, and Invest Northern Ireland – and with London and Partners and Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) throughout England–to promote each region’s particular strengths and expertise to overseas investors. Local authorities in England and Wales also have power under the Local Government and Housing Act of 1989 to promote the economic development of their areas through a variety of assistance schemes, including the provision of grants, loan capital, property, or other financial benefit. Separate legislation, granting similar powers to local authorities, applies to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Invest NI is the economic development agency for Northern Ireland. Invest NI provides guidance and support to businesses seeking to invest in Northern Ireland throughout the lifespan of their investment. This support includes grants for employment, R&D, training, and assistance with recruitment and real estate. HMG offers tax incentives for businesses that purchase new: Electric cars and cars with zero CO2 emissions Plant and machinery for gas refueling stations, for example storage tanks, pumps Gas, biogas and hydrogen refueling equipment Zero-emission goods vehicles Equipment for electric vehicle charging points Plant and machinery for use in a freeport tax site If businesses buy an eligible asset, they can deduct the full cost from their profits before tax. They cannot normally claim on items bought to lease to other people or for use within a home they let out. Most analysts suggest these incentives have helped uptake of green vehicles. HMG’s Feed-In Tariff Scheme (FITS) ran from 2010 and was closed to new entrants in 2019. FITS helps to promote the uptake of renewable and low-carbon electricity generation technologies through payments made for the electricity a business generates and exports. In March 2021, the UK government identified eight sites as post-Brexit freeports to spur trade, investment, innovation, and economic recovery. The eight sites are: East Midlands Airport, Felixstowe and Harwich, Humber, Liverpool City Region, Plymouth and South Devon, Solent, Thames, and Teesside. The UK government has said it will establish at least one freeport in each of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the future. The designated areas will offer special customs and tax arrangements and additional infrastructure funding to improve transport links. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is retained in domestic UK law as the UK GDPR, though the UK has the independence to keep the framework under review. Entities based in the UK must also continue to comply with the amended version of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018, which sits alongside UK GDPR. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is the UK’s independent data protection authority. The UK permits transfers of data from the UK to the European Economic Area (EEA). In 2021, the EU Commission published data adequacy decisions for the UK. As a result, data transfers from the EEA to the UK are permitted in most cases. Transfers of personal data for the purposes of UK immigration control, or which would otherwise fall within the scope of the immigration exemption in the DPA 2018, are excluded from the scope of the adequacy decision. While the UK GDPR does not impose data localization requirements, it requires controllers and processors of personal data to put in place appropriate technical and organizational measures to implement data protection effectively and safeguard individual rights. This may include an organization’s appointment of a data protection officer (DPO). A DPO is anyone an organization appoints to monitor internal compliance, inform and advise on data protection obligations, provide advice regarding Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), and act as a contact point for data subjects and the ICO. A DPO can be an existing employee or externally appointed, but must be independent, an expert in data protection, adequately resources, and report to the highest management level. The UK has robust real property laws stemming from legislation including the Law of Property Act 1925, the Settled Land Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1972, the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, and the Land Registration Act 2002. Interests in property are well enforced, and mortgages and liens have been recorded reliably since the Land Registry Act of 1862. The Land Registry is the government database where all land ownership and transaction data are held for England and Wales, and it is reliably accessible online: https://www.gov.uk/search-property-information-land-registry . Scotland has its own Registers of Scotland, while Northern Ireland operates land registration through the Land and Property Services. Long-term physical presence on non-residential property without permission is not typically considered a crime in the UK. Police take action if squatters commit other crimes when entering or staying in a property. The UK legal system provides a high level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Enforcement mechanisms are comparable to those available in the United States. The UK is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The UK is also a member of the following major intellectual property protection agreements: the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The UK has signed and, through implementing various EU Directives, enshrined into UK law the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), known as the internet treaties. The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) is the official UK government body responsible for intellectual property rights, including patents, designs, trademarks, and copyright. The IPO web site contains comprehensive information on UK law and practice in these areas. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/intellectual-property-office According to the Intellectual Property Crime Report (IPCR) for 2019/20, imports of counterfeit and pirated goods to the UK accounted for as much as £13.6 billion ($18.8 billion) in 2016 – the equivalent of three percent of UK imports in genuine goods. The most recent IPCR for 2020/2021 does not quantify the UK’s counterfeit imports. The UK is not on the Special 301 Report nor on the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . London houses one of the oldest and most developed financial markets in the world. London offers the full range of financial services underpinned by high quality regulation and strong standards of disclosure and transparency, a supportive market infrastructure, and a dynamic, highly skilled workforce. The UK government is generally hospitable to foreign portfolio investment. Government policies are intended to facilitate the free flow of capital and to support the flow of resources in product and services markets. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit in local markets at normal market terms, and a wide range of credit instruments are available. The principles underlying legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent, and they are consistent with international standards. In all cases, regulations have been published and are applied on a non-discriminatory basis by the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The London Stock Exchange is one of the most active equity markets in the world and has seen robust activity in 2021 in terms of both the number of IPOs as well as the amount of equity raised. London’s markets have historically been the main financial hub serving the EU and have the advantage of bridging the gap between the day’s trading in the Asian markets and the opening of the U.S. market. Despite the pandemic and Brexit, the UK retains its global place and has the lead in trading in areas such as foreign exchange, cross border bank lending, and international insurance premium income. Starting in early 2021, the UK government, based on the review of the London listing regime led by Lord Hill, the UK’s former European Commissioner for Financial Services, has introduced a series of reforms to the UK’s listing regime to improve its competitiveness and enhance London’s attractiveness as a listing location for innovative and high growth businesses. Further reforms are expected during 2022 based on reviews and consultations now underway. In May 2017, the LSE launched a new market for non-equity securities, known as the International Securities Market (ISM). This market is aimed at professional investors and is outside the scope of the UK Prospectus Regulation regime. The Alternative Investment Market (AIM), established in 1995 as a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, is specifically designed for smaller, rapidly expanding companies. The AIM has a more flexible regulatory system than the main market and has no minimum market capitalization requirements. Since its launch, the AIM has raised more than £68 billion ($95 billion) for more than 3,000 companies. The UK banking sector assets totaled £10.3 trillion ($14.3 trillion) at the end of the first half of 2021, the third largest in the world and the largest in Europe. In 2020, the financial services sector contributed £164.8 billion ($221 billion) to the UK economy, accounting for 8.6 percent of total economic output. There were 1.1 million financial services jobs in the UK in Q1 2021, accounting for 3.3 percent of all jobs. The long-term impact of Brexit and the pandemic on the financial services industry has been minor so far. Some firms continue to move limited numbers of jobs outside the UK to service EU-based clients, but the UK is anticipated to remain a top financial hub. The Bank of England (BoE) is the central bank of the UK. According to its guidelines, foreign banking institutions are legally permitted to establish operations in the UK as subsidiaries or branches. More than 200 foreign banks have branches in London, and London serves as an important center for global private and investment banking firms. Responsibilities for the prudential supervision of a foreign branch are split between the parent’s home state supervisors and the PRA. The PRA, however, expects the whole firm to meet the PRA’s threshold conditions. The PRA expects new foreign branches to focus on wholesale and corporate banking and to do so at a level that is not critical to the UK economy. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the regulator for all banks operating in the United Kingdom. For foreign bank branches operating in the UK, the FCA’s Threshold Conditions and conduct of business rules apply, including rules in areas such as anti-money laundering. Eligible deposits placed in foreign branches may be covered by the UK deposit guarantee program and therefore foreign branches may be subject to regulations concerning UK depositor protection. There are no legal restrictions that prohibit foreign residents from opening a business bank account; setting up a business bank account as a non-resident is in principle straightforward. In practice, however, most banks will not accept applications from overseas due to fraud concerns and the additional administration costs. To open a personal bank account, an individual must at minimum present an internationally recognized proof of identification and prove residency in the UK. This is a problem for incoming FDI and American expatriates. Unless the business or the individual can prove UK residency, they will have limited banking options. Foreign Exchange The pound sterling is a free-floating currency with no restrictions on its transfer or conversion. Exchange controls restricting the transfer of funds associated with an investment into or out of the UK are not exercised. Remittance Policies Not applicable. The United Kingdom does not maintain a national wealth fund. Although there have at time been calls to turn The Crown Estate – created in 1760 by Parliament as a means of funding the British monarchy – into a wealth fund, there are no current plans to do so. Moreover, with assets of just under $20 billion, The Crown Estate would be small in relation to other national funds. There are 20 partially or fully state-owned enterprises in the UK. These enterprises range from large, well-known companies to small trading funds. Since privatizing the oil and gas industry, the UK has not established any new energy-related state-owned enterprises or resource funds. The privatization of state-owned utilities in the UK is now essentially complete. With regard to future investment opportunities, the few remaining government-owned enterprises or government shares in other utilities are likely to be sold off to the private sector when market conditions improve. Businesses in the UK are accountable for a due-diligence approach to responsible business conduct (RBC), or corporate social responsibility (CSR), in areas such as human resources, environment, sustainable development, and health and safety practices – through a wide variety of existing guidelines at national, EU, and global levels. There is a strong awareness of CSR principles among UK businesses, promoted by UK business associations such as the Confederation of British Industry and the UK government. The British government fairly and uniformly enforces laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other statutes intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. The UK government adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. It is committed to the promotion and implementation of these Guidelines and encourages UK multinational enterprises to adopt high corporate standards involving all aspects of the Guidelines. The UK has established a National Contact Point (NCP) to promote the Guidelines and to facilitate the resolution of disputes that may arise within that context. The NCP is part of the Department for International Trade. A Steering Board monitors the work of the UK NCP and provides strategic guidance. It is composed of representatives of relevant government departments and four external members nominated by the Trades Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industry, the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and the NGO community. The results of a UK government consultation on CSR can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300265/bis-14-651-good-for-business-and-society-government-response-to-call-for-views-on-corporate-responsibility.pdf. Information on UK regulations and policies relating to the procurement of supplies, services and works for the public sector, and the relevance of promoting RBC, are found here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/public-sector-procurement-policy. Additional Resources Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain Climate Issues In October 2021, the UK government introduced its Net Zero Strategy (NZS), which comprehensively sets out UK government plans to cut emissions, seize green economic opportunities, and use private investment to achieve a net zero economy by 2050. The NZS allocates £7.8 billion ($10.5 billion) in new spending and aims to leverage up to £90 billion ($118 billion) of private investment by 2030. In its latest spending review, Her Majesty’s Treasury’s (HMT) estimated that net-zero spending between 2021-22 and 2024-25 would total £25.5 billion ($34.5 billion). HMG has committed to several policies in its NZS, including: 1. Quadruple offshore wind capacity by 2030 2. 5GW of low carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030 3. End the sale of new gasoline and diesel cars and vans by 2030 4. Install 600,000 heat pumps in homes by 2028 5. Capture and store 10Mt of CO2 per year by 2030 6. Restoring approximately 280,000 hectares of peat in England by 2050 and trebling woodland creation rates in England, contributing to the UK’s overall target of increasing planting rates to 30,000 hectares per year by the end of the Parliament 7. Eco-labelling regulation introduction by the late 2020s 8. Introduce Local Nature Recovery Strategies (LNRS), a spatial planning tool for nature, which allows local government and communities to identify priorities and opportunities for nature recovery and nature-based solutions across England HMG’s public procurement policy states that contracting authorities should consider 1) creating new businesses, new jobs and new skills; 2) tackling climate change and reducing waste; 3) improving supplier diversity, innovation and resilience, alongside any additional local priorities in their procurement activities. Through the Greening Finance Roadmap, HMT outlines the UK government’s intent to implement a detailed sovereign green taxonomy, which is expected to be published by the end of 2022, along with sustainable disclosure requirements that would serve as an integrated framework for sustainability throughout the UK economy. The UK ranked fourth in the Global Energy Innovation Index (GEII), five spaces higher than its 2016 score. The GEII is available here: https://itif.org/publications/2021/10/18/2021-global-energy-innovation-index-national-contributions-global-clean The UK ranked 17th in the Green Future Index (GFI), which noted that 40 percent of its energy is derived from renewable sources. The GFI is available here: https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/25/1016648/green-future-index/ The UK ranked 23rd in the Green Growth Index (GGI), a fall of eight spaces from its 2005 ranking. The GGI is available here: https://greengrowthindex.gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Green-Growth-Index.pdf Although isolated instances of bribery and corruption have occurred in the UK, U.S. investors have not identified corruption of public officials as a factor in doing business in the UK. The Bribery Act 2010 amended and reformed UK criminal law and provided a modern legal framework to combat bribery in the UK and internationally. The scope of the law is extra-territorial. Under the Act, a relevant person or company can be prosecuted for bribery if the crime is committed abroad. The Act applies to UK citizens, residents, and companies established under UK law. In addition, non-UK companies can be held liable for a failure to prevent bribery if they do business in the UK. Section 9 of the Act requires the UK government to publish guidance on procedures that commercial organizations can put in place to prevent bribery on their behalf. It creates the following offenses: active bribery, described as promising or giving a financial or other advantage; passive bribery, described as agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage; bribery of foreign public officials; and the failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery by an associated person (corporate offense). This corporate criminal offense places a burden of proof on companies to show they have adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery ( http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act/adequate-procedures-guidance/ ). To avoid corporate liability for bribery, companies must make sure that they have strong, up-to-date and effective anti-bribery policies and systems. It is a corporate criminal offense to fail to prevent bribery by an associated person. The briber must be “associated” with the commercial organization, a term which will apply to, amongst others, the organization’s agents, employees, and subsidiaries. A foreign corporation which “carries on a business, or part of a business” in the UK may therefore be guilty of the UK offense even if, for example, the relevant acts were performed by the corporation’s agent outside the UK. The Act does not extend to political parties and it is unclear whether it extends to family members of public officials. The UK formally ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery in 1998 and ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2006. UK law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government routinely implements these laws effectively. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is an independent government department, operating under the superintendence of the Attorney General with jurisdiction in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It investigates and prosecutes those who commit serious or complex fraud, bribery, and corruption, and pursues them and others for the proceeds of their crime. All allegations of bribery of foreign public officials by British nationals or companies incorporated in the United Kingdom—even in relation to conduct that occurred overseas—should be reported to the SFO for possible investigation. When the SFO receives a report of possible corruption, its intelligence team makes an assessment and decides if the matter is best dealt with by the SFO itself or passed to a law enforcement partner organization, such as the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit of the City of London Police (OACU) or the International Corruption Unit of the National Crime Agency. Allegations can be reported in confidence using the SFO’s secure online reporting form: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/contact-us/reporting-serious-fraud-bribery-corruption/ . Details can also be sent to the SFO in writing: SFO Confidential Serious Fraud Office 2-4 Cockspur Street London, SW1Y 5BS United Kingdom In March 2022, the UK strengthened its Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO) regime to enable law enforcement to investigate the origin of property and recover the proceeds of crime. A UWO is an investigatory order placed on a respondent whose assets appear disproportionate to their income to explain the origins of their wealth. A UWO requires a person who is a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) or reasonably suspected of involvement in, or of being connected to a person involved in, serious crime to explain the origin of assets (minimum combined value of £50,000) that appear to be disproportionate to their known lawfully obtained income. A UWO is not (by itself) a power to recover assets. However, any response from a UWO can be used in subsequent civil recovery proceedings. A failure to respond will mean that the assets can be made subject to civil recovery action under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. A person can also be found guilty of an offence if they provide false or misleading information in response to an UWO. The UK’s terrorism threat level was at the third-highest rating (“substantial”) for most of 2021. On February 4, the UK lowered the threat level from “severe” to “substantial,” indicating a terrorist attack remains “likely” rather than “highly likely,” citing a “significant reduction in the momentum of attacks in Europe.” On November 15, 2021, following the October 15, 2021 stabbing of David Amess MP and the November 14, 2021 Liverpool bombing, the UK increased the threat level to “severe” due to an overall change in the threat picture. UK officials categorize Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to national security, though they recognize the growing threat of racially and ethnically motivated terrorism (REMT), also referred to as “extreme right-wing” terrorism. On November 18, the Home Office reported that in the year ending March 2021, the UK’s Prevent counterterrorism program received more referrals related to “extreme right-wing” radicalization (1,229) than “Islamist” radicalization (1,064) for the first time. From March 2017 to December 2021, police and security services disrupted 32 plots, including 18 related to Islamist extremism; 12 to “extreme right-wing” extremism; and two to “left, anarchist, or single-issue terrorism.” On February 9, 2022, the UK Government passed legislation designed to strengthen the political stability of Northern Ireland’s devolved Government. This legislation allows the Northern Ireland Executive cabinet and the NI Assembly to continue to function for an extended period should either the First Minister or deputy First Minister resign from their positions in the Executive. Northern Ireland’s terrorist threat level rating was reduced to substantial from severe in March 2022. Environmental advocacy groups in the UK have been involved with numerous protests against a variety of business activities, including: airport expansion, bypass roads, offshore structures, wind farms, civilian nuclear power plants, and petrochemical facilities. These protests tend not to be violent but can be disruptive, with the aim of obtaining maximum media exposure. Brexit has waned as a source of political instability. Nonetheless, the June 2016 EU referendum campaign was characterized by significant polarization and widely varying perspectives across the country. Differing views about the future UK-EU relationship continue to polarize political opinion across the UK. Some Scottish political leaders have indicated that the UK leaving the EU may provide justification to pursue another Referendum on Scotland leaving the UK. Implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement has contributed to heightened political and sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Protocol, part of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, entered into force on January 1, 2021. The Protocol allows businesses based in Northern Ireland to export free from customs declarations, rules of origin certificates, and non-tariff barriers on the sale of goods to both Great Britain and the EU. Under the terms of the Protocol, Northern Ireland remains a part of the UK customs territory but is subject to EU standards and customs regulations as far as trade in goods is concerned. Goods shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland are subject to customs declarations but are tariff free unless deemed “at risk” of transshipment and use within the EU. Goods shipped to Northern Ireland from outside the EU are subject to the UK Global Tariff, unless deemed “at risk” of onward travel into the EU – in which case they would be liable to the EU’s Common Customs Tariff (CCT). Northern Ireland is included in the territorial scope of any free trade agreement the UK concludes with other countries, provided that such an agreement does not prejudice the application of the Protocol. Northern Ireland remains in the UK VAT area but will align with EU VAT rules; lower VAT rates or exemptions in the Republic of Ireland may be applied in Northern Ireland. Checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, both physical and documentary, are conducted at the region’s ports and airports, not at the land border with the Republic of Ireland, where goods flow freely between the two jurisdictions. However, not all Protocol checks have yet been fully implemented because of temporary grace periods implemented by the UK in coordination with the EU, which remain in force. The EU and UK continue to discuss potential changes to the Protocol to ease the flow of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The UK formally departed the bloc on January 31, 2020, following the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, and completed its transition out of the EU on December 31, 2020. The Conservative Party, traditionally the UK’s pro-business party, was, until the COVID-19 pandemic, focused on implementing Brexit, a process many international businesses oppose because they expect it to make trade in goods, services, workers, and capital with the UK’s largest trading partners more problematic and costly, at least in the short term. In addition, the Conservative Party-led government has implemented a Digital Services Tax (DST), a two percent tax on the revenues of predominantly American search engines, social media services and online marketplaces which derive value from UK users and has legislated for an increase in the Corporation Tax rate from 19 percent to 25 percent. The Labour Party’s leader, Sir Keir Starmer, is widely acknowledged to be more economically centrist than his predecessor. In his first major economic speech following his election as Labour Party leader, Starmer declared his intention to repair and improve the party’s relationship with the business community but has proposed few policies as the UK’s political system contended with the COVID-19 crisis. The UK’s labor force comprises more than 34.7 million workers. The employment rate between November 2021 and January 2022 was 75.6 percent, with 29.7 million workers employed full-time. There were 1.3 million workers unemployed in January 2022, or 3.9 percent. The female employment rate was 72.2 percent. The most serious issue facing British employers is a skills gap derived from a high-skill, high-tech economy outpacing the educational system’s ability to deliver work-ready graduates. The government has placed a strong emphasis on improving the British educational system in terms of greater emphasis on science, research and development, and entrepreneurial skills, but any positive reforms will necessarily lag in delivering benefits. The UK’s skills base stands around the OECD average and continues to improve. As of 2020, approximately 23.7 percent of UK workers belonged to a union. Public-sector workers represented a much higher share of union members at 52 percent, while the private sector was 13 percent. Manufacturing, transport, and distribution trades are highly unionized. Unionization of the workforce in the UK is prohibited only in the armed forces, public-sector security services, and police forces. Union membership has risen slightly in recent years, despite a previous downward trend. In the 2019, a total of 234,000 working days were lost from 35 official labor disputes. The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the British nation-wide labor federation, encourages union-management cooperation. On April 1, 2022, the UK raised the minimum wage to £9.50 ($12.47) an hour for workers ages 23 and over. The increased wage impacts about 2 million workers across Britain. The 2006 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations make it unlawful to discriminate against workers, employees, job seekers, and trainees because of age, whether young or old. The regulations cover recruitment, terms and conditions, promotions, transfers, dismissals, and training. They do not cover the provision of goods and services. The regulations also removed the upper age limits on unfair dismissal and redundancy. It sets a national default retirement age of 65, making compulsory retirement below that age unlawful unless objectively justified. Employees have the right to request to work beyond retirement age and the employer has a duty to consider such requests. HMG brought forward new immigration rules on January 1, 2021. The new rules have wide-ranging implications for foreign employees, students, and EU citizens. The new rules are points-based, meaning immigrants need to attain a certain number of points in order to be awarded a visa. The previous cap on visas has been abolished. Applicants will need to be able to speak English and be paid the relevant salary threshold by their sponsor. This will either be the general salary threshold of £25,600 ($33,600) or the going rate for their job, whichever is higher. If applicants earn less–but no less than £20,480 ($26,880)–they may still be able to apply by “trading” points on specific characteristics against their salary. For example, if they have a job offer in a shortage occupation or have a PhD relevant to the job. More details are available here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/new-immigration-system-what-you-need-to-know The DFC does not prioritize investments in the UK. Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) financing is available to support major investment projects in the UK. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Ex-Im Bank and its UK equivalent, the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), enables bilateral U.S.-UK consortia intending to invest in third countries to seek investment funding support from the country of the larger partner. This removes the need for each of the two parties to seek financing from their respective credit guarantee organizations. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $2,910,000 2019 $2,880,000 https://data.worldbank.org/country/united-kingdom Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $629,016 2020 $890,086 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $524,906 2020 $446,179 BEA data available at https://www.selectusa.gov/country-fact-sheet/United-Kingdom Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 19% 2020 16.2% Calculated using respective GDP and FDI data Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $2,532 Proportion Total Outward $2,178 Proportion USA $628.80 24.8% USA $523.70 24.8% Netherlands $262.90 10.4% Netherlands $243.50 11.2% Belgium $172 6.8% Luxembourg $130 6% Germany $139.90 5.5% France $112.30 5.2% Japan $134.30 5.3% Spain 110.7 5.1% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. U.S. Embassy London Economic Section 33 Nine Elms Ln London SW11 7US United Kingdom +44 (0)20-7499-9000 LondonEconomic@state.gov Uruguay Executive Summary Title The Government of Uruguay recognizes the important role foreign investment plays in economic development and offers a stable investment climate that does not discriminate against foreign investors. Uruguay’s legal system treats foreign and national investments equally, and most investments are allowed without prior authorization. Investors can freely transfer capital and profits from their investments abroad. International investors can choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment. In 2021, Transparency International ranked Uruguay as the most transparent country in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the second most transparent in the Western Hemisphere after Canada. Uruguay is a stable democracy, one of only three full democracies in the Western Hemisphere and ranked 13th in the world, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. As of March 2022, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rated Uruguay one step above the investment grade threshold with a stable outlook. Fitch Ratings rated it at the investment grade threshold with a stable outlook. Investment rose substantially from 2004-2014 as a result of an historic commodities boom but dropped significantly 2015-2019 as the boom flagged. However, investment picked up again in 2021 as a result of: tax incentives for investors; a successful COVID vaccination program; government COVID spending; a dynamic tech industry; and a $2 billion foreign investment in a pulp-mill. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reports FDI inflows increased 43 percent to $2.6 billion in 2021, the highest level since 2012. About 150 U.S. firms operate locally in a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services, and telecommunications. The IT services sector is a significant recent growth area, with several Uruguayan companies listing on U.S. stock markets, or being bought by U.S. companies. In 2020, the United States had the fourth largest stock of foreign investment, reflecting its longstanding presence in the country. Uruguay has bilateral investment treaties with over 30 countries, including the United States. The United States does not have a double-taxation treaty with Uruguay, but does have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in place, in addition to agreements on open skies, trade facilitation, customs mutual assistance, promotion of small and medium enterprises, and social security totalization. Uruguay is a founding member of Mercosur, the Southern Cone Common Market, created in 1991 and headquartered in Montevideo, along with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. (Note: Venezuela joined the bloc in June 2012 but was suspended in December 2016.) Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are associate members of Mercosur. The current administration is lobbying Mercosur to relax its requirement for members to negotiate as a bloc and allow Uruguay to embark on independent trade negotiations. Uruguay and Mexico have had a comprehensive trade agreement in place since 2004, and in 2018, Uruguay extended its existing free trade agreement with Chile to increase trade in goods and services. Over the past decade, Uruguay strengthened bilateral trade, investment, and political ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), its principal trading partner since 2013. In 2018, Uruguay was the first country in the Southern Cone to join the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. Uruguay formally joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2020. In September 2021, the government announced that it would start negotiating a free trade agreement with the PRC, independently from its Mercosur partners. A pre-feasibility study was planned to be completed by the end of 2021. A 2018 survey by Uruguay’s Ministry of Economy and Finance showed that about half of foreign investors were satisfied or very satisfied with Uruguay´s investment climate, principally due to its rule of law, low political risk, macroeconomic stability, strategic location, and investment incentives. Almost all investors were satisfied or highly satisfied with Uruguay’s twelve free trade zones (FTZs) and its free ports. However, roughly one-fourth of investors were dissatisfied with at least one aspect of doing business locally, expressing concerns about high labor costs, taxes, union/labor conflicts and high energy costs. The World Bank’s 2020 “Doing Business” Index placed Uruguay fourth out of twelve countries in South America. Uruguay’s strategic location (in the center of Mercosur’s wealthiest and most populated area), and its special import regimes (such as free zones and free ports) make it a well-situated distribution center for U.S. goods into the region. Several U.S. firms warehouse their products in Uruguay’s tax-free areas and service their regional clients effectively. With a small market of middle-class consumers, Uruguay can also be a good test market for U.S. products. There are no significant risks to doing business responsibly in areas such as labor and human rights. Additionally, the government’s long-term climate strategy, announced in December 2021, focuses on mitigation and adaptation to climate change and seeks to reach carbon neutrality, with stable emissions of methane and nitrous oxide in its agricultural sector, by 2050. The government is gradually including environmental variables in designing public economic and capital market policies. Uruguay is proposing in international fora, including the World Bank and the IMF, tying the cost of sovereign funding to advanced environmental indicators. Table 1: International Rankings and Statistics Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 65 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ dex U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 999 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 15,790 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=UY 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Uruguay recognizes the important role foreign investment plays in economic development and offers a stable investment climate that does not discriminate against foreign investors. Uruguay’s legal system treats foreign and national investments equally. Most investments are allowed without prior authorization. Investors can freely transfer capital and profits from their investments abroad, and choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. The judiciary is independent and professional. Foreign investors are not required to meet any specific performance requirements. Moreover, foreign investors are not subject to discriminatory or excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements. The government does not require nationals to own shares or that the share of foreign equity be reduced over time, or impose conditions on investment permits. Uruguay normally treats foreign investors as nationals in public sector tenders. Uruguay’s law permits investors to participate in any stage of the tender process. Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI ( http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy ), provides information on Uruguay’s business climate and investment incentives, at both a national and sectoral level. The agency also has several programs to promote the internationalization of local firms and regularly participates in trade missions. There is no formal business roundtable or ombudsman responsible for regular dialogue between government officials and investors. Uruguay levies value-added and non-resident income taxes on foreign-based digital services, while locally-based digital services are generally tax exempt. Tax rates vary depending on whether the company provides audiovisual transmissions or intermediation services, and on the geographical locations of the company and consumers of the service. Aside from the few limited sectors involving national security and limited legal government monopolies in which foreign investment is not permitted, Uruguay practices neither de jure nor de facto discrimination toward investment by source or origin, with national and foreign investors treated equally. In general, Uruguay does not require specific authorization for firms to set up operations, import and export, make deposits and banking transactions in any particular currency, or obtain credit. Screening mechanisms do not apply to foreign or national investments, and investors do not need special government authorization for access to capital markets or to foreign exchange. The World Trade Organization published its Trade Policy Review of Uruguay, which included a detailed description of the country’s trade and investment regimes in 2018 and is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp474_e.htm . While Uruguay is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it has gradually endorsed several of its principles and joined some of its institutions. In March 2021, it became the 50th adherent to OECD´s Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise, and in July 2021 the OECD published its first Investment Policy Review on the country (available at https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-uruguay-1135f88e-en.htm ). Uruguay is a member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but the organization has not yet conducted an Investment Policy Review on the country. The civil society organization, Un Solo Uruguay, was founded in 2018 and frequently raises investment policy-related concerns and suggestions to the government. In 2020, Uruguay was ranked 66th in the World Bank’s “Starting a Business” sub-indicator (against its overall aggregate ranking of 101st for the ease of doing business). Domestic and foreign businesses can register operations in approximately seven days without a notary at http://empresas.gub.uy . Uruguay receives high marks in electronic government. The UN’s 2020 Electronic Government Development Index ranked Uruguay second in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Uruguay is a member of the D9, the group that gathers the leading digital governments globally. In recent years, some U.S. industrial small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in chemical production for example, have described Uruguay’s market as difficult for new foreign entrants. Those SMEs pointed to legacy business relationships and loyalties, along with a cultural resistance by distributors and clients to trusting new producers. The government does not promote nor restrict domestic investment abroad. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties In November 2005, Uruguay and the United States signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to promote and protect reciprocal investments. The BIT, which entered into force on November 1, 2006, grants national and most-favored-nation treatment to investments and investors sourced in each country. The agreement also includes detailed provisions on compensation for expropriation, and a precise procedure for settling bilateral investment disputes. The annexes include sector-specific measures not covered by the agreement and specific sectors or activities that governments may restrict further. The BIT is available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties/bit-documents . Besides the United States, Uruguay has Bilateral Investment Agreements in force with 30 countries from different regions. The full list is available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ . Uruguay and the United States do not have double taxation or tax information agreements in place. Uruguay has been a member of the OECD Development Center and its Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes since 2009. In 2016, it passed a fiscal transparency law, and in 2017, it began implementing an automatic exchange of tax information with the countries with which it has established Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). Uruguay is a member of OECD´s Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and a signatory to its agreement on the global minimum corporate income tax. In February 2020, Uruguay deposited its instrument of ratification for the OECD’s Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes indicates that Uruguay has exchange-of-information relationships with 35 jurisdictions through 19 double-taxation agreements and 16 Tax Information Exchange Agreements. The full list is available at https://eoi-tax.com/jurisdictions/Uruguay . A social security totalization agreement with the United States has been in effect since November 2018. The agreement eliminates dual social security taxation and helps workers who have split their careers between the United States and Uruguay to meet the minimum eligibility requirements (years worked) more quickly by adding together years worked in both countries to qualify for benefits ( https://www.ssa.gov/international/Agreement_Texts/uruguay.html ). 3. Legal Regime Transparent and streamlined procedures regulate local and foreign investment in Uruguay at the state and national level. The Constitution does not provide for supra-national regulations. Most draft laws, except those having an impact on public finances, can start either in the executive branch or in the parliament. Uruguay’s president needs the agreement of all ministries with competency on the regulated matter to issue decrees. Ministers may also issue resolutions. All regulatory actions —including bills, laws, decrees, and resolutions — are publicly available at https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/normativa . The U.S. government’s Fiscal Transparency Report labels Uruguay as a “fiscally transparent” country. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are transparent. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The government only occasionally proposes laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Parliamentary commissions typically engage stakeholders while discussing a bill. Non-governmental organizations or private sector associations do not manage any informal regulatory processes. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Article 10 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT mandates that both countries publish promptly or make public any law, regulation, procedure, or adjudicatory decision related to investments. Article 11 sets transparency procedures that govern the accord. Uruguay is a member of several regional economic blocs, including Mercosur and the Latin American Integration Association (known by its Spanish acronym, ALADI), neither of which have supranational legislation. To create local law, Uruguay’s parliament must ratify these blocs’ decisions. Uruguay is also a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to its committee on technical barriers to trade. The legal system in Uruguay follows civil law based on the Spanish civil code. The highest court in the country is the Supreme Court. The executive branch nominates judges and Parliament’s General Assembly appoints them. Supreme Court judges serve a ten-year term and can be reelected after a lapse of five years following the previous term. Other subordinate courts include the court of appeal, district courts, peace courts, and rural courts. Uruguay has a written commercial law and specialized civil courts. The judiciary remains independent of the executive branch. Critics of the court system complain that its civil sector can be slow. The executive branch rarely interferes directly in judicial matters, but at times has voiced its dissatisfaction with court rulings. Investors can appeal to local or international courts for commercial disputes. International investors may choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Uruguayan law treats foreign and domestic investment alike. Law No. 16,906 (passed in 1998) declares that the promotion and protection of investments made by both national and foreign investors is in the nation’s interest and allows investments without prior authorization or registration. The law also provides that investors can freely transfer their capital and profits abroad and that the government may not prevent the establishment of investments in the country. U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in local or national government-financed or subsidized research and development programs. Uruguay’s Accountancy and Administration Document (known by its Spanish acronym, TOCAF) contains the norms and regulations that govern public purchases, including the laws, decrees, resolutions, and international agreements that apply to the contracting process. Uruguay uses government procurement as a tool for promoting local industry, especially micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and enterprises that innovate in technological and scientific areas. Most government contracts (except for those in areas in which the public and private sectors compete) prioritize goods, services, and civil engineering works produced or supplied by domestic MSMEs. The most used preferential regime grants an eight percent price preference to goods and services produced domestically, regardless of the firm’s size. MSME programs grant price preferences ranging from 12 to 16 percent for MSMEs competing against foreign firms. Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI , helps potential investors navigate Uruguayan laws and rules. When awarding bids, the government often prioritizes price over quality. This has led to several projects needing a price adjustment post award. Uruguay has transparent legislation established by the Commission for the Promotion and Defense of Competition at the Ministry of Economy to foster competition. The main legal pillars (Law No. 18,159 and decree 404, both passed in 2007) are available at the commission’s site: https://www.mef.gub.uy/578/5/areas/defensa-de-la- percent20competencia—uruguay.html . A 2017 peer review of Uruguay´s competition law and policy is available at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1640 . In 2001, Uruguay created regulatory and controlling agencies for telecommunications (URSEC), water, and energy. In 2020, the new government enhanced URSEC’s autonomy through article 256 of an omnibus reform law (No. 19,889), making it a decentralized and independent service directed by a three-member board appointed by the Presidency. Uruguay passed an Audiovisual Communications Law (Law No. 19,307) in December 2014. Also known as the media law, it includes provisions on market caps for cable TV providers that could limit competition. In April 2016, Uruguay’s Supreme Court ruled that these market caps and some local content requirements were unconstitutional. The government proposed new legislation in April 2020 to change the media law, which as of March 2022 remains under review by Parliament. U.S. companies have expressed concerns about some of the proposed articles. Uruguay’s Constitution declares property rights an “inviolable right” subject to legal determinations that may be taken for general interest purposes and states that no individuals can be deprived of this right — except in case of public need and with fair compensation. Article 6 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT rules out direct and indirect expropriation or nationalization of private property except under specific circumstances. The article also contains detailed provisions on how to compensate investors, should expropriation take place. There are no known cases of expropriation of investment from the United States or other countries within the past five years. The Bankruptcy Law passed in 2008 (Law No. 18,387) expedites bankruptcy procedures, encourages arrangements with creditors before a firm may go bankrupt, and provides the possibility of selling the firm as a single unit. Bankruptcy has criminal and civil implications with intentional or deliberate bankruptcy deemed a crime. The law protects the rights of creditors according to the nature of the credit, and workers have privileges over other creditors. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranks Uruguay second out of twelve countries in South America for its ease of “resolving insolvency.” Uruguay ranks 70th globally in this sub-index (vs. its overall aggregate global ranking of 101st for ease of doing business). 4. Industrial Policies Law No. 16,906 (passed in 1998) regulates the ordinary investment promotion regime and grants automatic tax incentives to several activities. In addition to automatic tax exemptions, Uruguay has several other incentives for greenfield and brownfield investments that help achieve some of the government´s strategic goals, including: creating jobs, increasing exports, contributing to geographical decentralization away from the capital, fostering the use of clean technologies, and promoting research and development. The principal incentive consists of the deduction from corporate income tax of a share of total investment over a pre-defined period. Other incentives include the exemption from tariffs and taxes on imports of capital goods and the refunding of the Value Added Tax paid on domestic purchases of certain goods. Please refer to a detailed document on incentives to investment, available in English at http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy/guide/schemes.html . Uruguay dramatically shifted its energy matrix from petroleum-based electricity generation to renewable sources over the past two decades, and currently generates almost all electricity from renewable sources –primarily hydro and wind. Solar and wind parks installed in the past sold all production to the government electricity company at a fixed convenient price in long-term contracts. The government continues offering incentives for clean energy investments, mainly related to lower corporate income tax, for clean energy investments and is developing national plans for green hydrogen. Uruguay seldom issues sovereign guarantees or jointly financed FDI projects. Notwithstanding, the government did commit to undertake substantial public works, including the construction of a railroad and port-related infrastructure, as a pre-condition for a $2billion investment in a major pulp mill project by Finnish company UPM. The government took numerous measures to incentivize investment and stimulate employment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Decree 268/020 expanded the definition of companies eligible for tax incentives, relaxed previous provisions to facilitate firms’ access to the incentives, and increased corporate income tax-related benefits. In May 2020, the government issued another decree to promote investment in large construction projects. These regulations aimed at enticing firms to undertake new, or expand existing, investments. The full list of measures is available (in Spanish) at https://www.gub.uy/presidencia/politicas-y-gestion/medidas-del-gobierno-para-atender-emergencia-sanitaria-coronavirus-covid-19-8 Uruguay has increasingly promoted itself as a regional, world-class logistics and distribution hub. In 2010, Uruguay created the National Logistics Institute (known by its Spanish acronym as INALOG), a public-private sector institution that seeks to coordinate efforts towards establishing Uruguay as the leading Mercosur distribution hub. INALOG and Uruguay XXI have issued several reports on Uruguay’s role and advantages as a logistics hub. Uruguay established free trade zones (FTZs) in 1987 (Law No. 15,921). Legislation in 2017 (Law No. 19,566) included minor changes in tax benefits, streamlined the requirements and activities that companies must accomplish to be able to operate inside an FTZ, and improved international cooperation related to the prevention of international tax evasion. Full legislation and regulations are available at http://zonasfrancas.mef.gub.uy/ . Almost all foreign investors surveyed in 2018 were satisfied or highly satisfied with Uruguay’s FTZs and free ports. There are 12 FTZs throughout the country. Most FTZs host a wide variety of tenants performing various services, including financial, software development, call centers, warehousing, and logistics. One FTZ is dedicated exclusively to the development of pharmaceuticals, and three to the production of paper pulp. The government is considering additional FTZs. Mercosur regulations treat products manufactured in most member states’ FTZs, except for Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) and Manaus (Brazil), as extra-territorial and charge them the common external tariff upon entering any member country. As a result, industrial production in local FTZs is usually destined for non-Mercosur countries. Firms may bring foreign goods, services, products, and raw materials into the FTZs. Firms may hold, process, and re-export the goods without payment of Uruguayan customs duties or import taxes. Uruguay exempts firms operating in FTZs from national taxes. Laws governing legal monopolies do not apply within the FTZs. Additionally, employers do not pay social security taxes for non-Uruguayan employees who have waived coverage under Uruguay’s social security system. Uruguay treats goods of Uruguayan origin entering FTZs as exports from Uruguay for tax and other legal purposes. Uruguay has other special import regimes in place called “temporary admission,” “bonded warehouse,” and “free port.” The temporary admission regime allows manufacturers to import duty-free raw materials, supplies, parts, and intermediate products they will use in manufacturing products for export. However, the regime requires government authorization, and firms must export all finished products within 18 months. Firms do not have to be in a specific location to benefit from temporary admission. Free ports and bonded warehouses are special areas where goods that remain on the premises are exempted from all import-related duties and tariffs. The two main differences between free ports and bonded warehouses are that goods can stay for an unlimited amount of time in free ports and up to one year in bonded warehouses, and that firms may not significantly modify goods in free ports. Firms may engage in “industrialization,” including limited product transformation, in bonded warehouses. Firms operating in both premises may re-label and re-package merchandise. Law No. 17,547 passed in August 2002 allows for the establishment of industrial parks. Several additional decrees signed since 2007 allow for the establishment of sector-specific industrial parks. Industrial-park advantages include tax exemptions and benefits, and they may be established by the private sector, or by national or local governments. There are three industrial parks that operate under Law No. 17,547, and eleven that operate under state’s regulations. Foreign investors are not required to meet any specific performance requirements, and have not reported impediments or onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements. The government does not require that nationals own shares or that the share of foreign equity be reduced over time, and does not impose conditions on investment permits. A labor-related requirement is that tenants of free trade zones employ at most 25 percent of foreign workers. The law provides that, in special cases, Uruguay can allow a higher percentage of foreign workers. Article 8 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT bans both countries from imposing certain performance requirements on new investments or tying the granting of existing or new advantages to performance requirements. Uruguay does not require foreign investors to use local content in goods or technology to invest. However, local content may be required in some sectors to become eligible for special tax treatment or government procurements. Uruguay does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access for surveillance. Companies can freely transmit customer or business-related data across borders. Banks can transmit information out of Uruguay on their loan portfolios but not on their depositor base. Banks are obliged to provide information once a year to the local tax authority on their depositors. This information is exchanged with tax authorities from countries that enjoy Tax Information Exchange Agreements with Uruguay (Uruguay does not have a TIEA with the United States). Legislation governs the central government’s computer system security, requiring all personal and sensitive data to remain in Uruguay. Uruguay’s Agency for e-government and Information Society (AGESIC) oversees enforcing this regulation. 5. Protection of Property Rights Uruguay recognizes and enforces secured interests in property and contracts. Mortgages exist, and Uruguay has a recognized and reliable system of recording such securities. Uruguay’s legal system protects the acquisition and disposition of all property, including land, buildings, and mortgages. Law No. 19,283, passed in 2014, prevents foreign governments from buying land, either directly or in association with private companies. Traditional use rights are not applicable as there is no applicable indigenous community in Uruguay. Most land has clear property titles. Due to rising instances of union-supported sit-ins or occupation of workplaces in recent years, business chambers filed cases before the International Labor Organization. In 2020, the government included an article in the Law No. 19,889 providing for the peaceful exercise of the right to strike, the right of non-strikers to access and work in their respective establishments, and the right of the management of the companies to enter their facilities freely. In practice, this law gives police the authority to physically remove strikes blocking access to workplaces, and to prevent the occupation of workplaces. Uruguay has not been on the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report since 2006, nor on USTR’s Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy since 2016. Uruguay is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, as well as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. In March 2017, the executive branch sent a bill to parliament to adhere to WIPO’s Patent and Cooperation Treaty, which was not approved. Uruguay is also a member of PROSUR, the Latin American Intellectual Property Network that encompasses 13 countries. Some industry groups criticize the slowness of the patent-granting process, as well as the lack of data protection for proprietary research submitted as part of the grant process. They also strongly criticize an amendment to the Patent Law (passed in a 2013 omnibus law) that removed the ability of patent right holders to claim damages for infringement of their rights from the date of the patent application filing up to its granting date. In 2021 the government submitted a bill to close this loophole, but it was passed by Parliament with language that excluded pharmaceuticals from this protection. While enforcement of trademark rights has improved in recent years, local citizens have sometimes managed to register trademarks without the owners’ prior consent. Customs officers have authority to enforce trademark protection. After temporarily freezing a shipment of suspicious goods, Customs must communicate with the local representatives of the trademarks’ right-holders to determine the legality of the goods and seek cooperation. Uruguay tracks and reports on Custom’s seizures of goods, some of which are counterfeit, but there is no centralized dedicated reporting system for seizures of counterfeit goods. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Over time Uruguay has added regulations and legislation to develop its capital markets, including law No. 18,627 in 2009. However, the local capital market remains underdeveloped and highly concentrated in sovereign debt, making it difficult to finance business ventures through the local equity market. Due to such underdevelopment and lack of sufficient liquidity, Uruguay typically receives only “active” investments oriented to establishing new firms or gaining control over existing ones and lacks “passive investments” from major investment funds. The government maintains an open attitude towards foreign portfolio investment, though there is no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate it. Uruguay does not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Uruguay allocates credit on market terms, but long-term banking credit has traditionally been difficult to obtain. Foreign investors can access credit on the same market terms as nationals. As part of the process of complying with OECD requirements (see Bilateral Investment Agreements section), Uruguay banned “bearer shares” in 2012, which had been widely used. Private firms do not use “cross shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict foreign investment, nor do they restrict participation in or control of domestic enterprises. Uruguay established its Central Bank (BCU) in 1967 as an autonomous state entity. The government-owned Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU) is the nation’s largest commercial bank and has the largest market share. The rest of the banking system comprises a government-owned mortgage bank and nine international commercial banks. The BCU’s Superintendency of Financial Services regulates and supervises foreign and domestic banks or branches alike. The Superintendency reports that as of March 2022, the banking sector has good capital and liquidity ratios. Since Uruguay’s establishment of a financial inclusion program in 2011, and especially after the passage of a financial inclusion law in 2014 (No. 19,210), the use of debit cards, credit cards, and bank accounts has increased significantly. Several private sector firms issue electronic currency. Articles 215 and 216 of Law No. 19,889 reinstated the possibility of paying workers’ salaries in cash instead of electronically. Regarding technological innovation in the financial sector, Montevideo hosted the first regional Fintech Forum in 2017, which led to the creation of the Fintech Ibero-American Alliance. Some local firms have developed domestic and international electronic payment systems, but emerging technologies like blockchain and crypto currencies remain underdeveloped. There have been some cases of U.S. citizens having difficulties establishing a first-time bank account, mostly related to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act provisions. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Uruguay. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The State still plays a significant role in the economy and Uruguay maintains government monopolies or oligopolies in certain areas, including the importing and refining of oil, workers compensation insurance, and landline telecommunications. Uruguay’s largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) include: the petroleum, cement, and alcohol company ANCAP; telecommunications company ANTEL; the electric utility UTE; the water utility OSE; and Uruguay’s largest bank BROU. While deemed autonomous, in practice these enterprises coordinate in several areas with various ministries and the executive branch. The boards of these entities are appointed by the executive branch, require parliamentary approval, and remain in office for the same term as the executive branch. Uruguayan law requires SOEs to publish an annual report, and independent firms audit their balances. Some traditionally government-run monopolies have opened to private-sector competition. Cellular phone service, international long-distance services, insurance, and media services are open to local and foreign competitors. Uruguay permits private-sector generation of power and private interests dominate renewable energy production, but the state-owned power company UTE holds a monopoly on the transfer of electrical power through transmission and distribution lines from one utility’s service area to another’s, otherwise known as wheeling rights. State-owned companies tend to have the largest market share even in sectors open to competition. Potential cross-subsidies likely give SOEs an advantage over their private sector competitors. Uruguay does not adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. The current government plans to reform and increase the efficiency of its SOEs. Uruguay has not undertaken any major privatization program in recent decades. While Uruguay opened some previously government-run monopolies to private-sector competition, the government continues to maintain a monopoly in the import and refinement of petroleum, landline telecommunications and water treatment and distribution. Parliament passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law in 2011 and created regulations with Decree 007/12. The law allows private sector companies to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain certain infrastructure, including brownfield projects. With some exceptions (such as medical services in hospitals or educational services in schools), PPPs can also be applied to social infrastructure. The return for the private sector company may come in the form of user payments, government payments, or a combination of both. In 2015, Uruguay passed regulations (Decree 251/15) to simplify the procedures and expedite the PPP process. The only fully operational project to date is a $93 million prison. In May 2021 (latest data available), there were three PPP projects in the implementation phase, the largest of which is a 170-mile railroad for approximately $1 billion. There are ten other projects worth $873 million in different stages of development, related to roads, education, and health. The current government aims to improve PPP approval times. U.S. companies have tended to be suppliers of equipment and services to local companies that compete for PPPs rather than direct bidders, with some exceptions. In the 2020 omnibus reform law, the government determined that –with a transition period of up to three years– local fuel prices should closely track import parity prices (i.e., international price plus import cost). The legislation was aimed at increasing the efficiency of the state-owned oil company in order to reduce the local price of fuels. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The concept of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is relatively new to producers, consumers, and the government. The government has not developed a national action plan on RBC. However, many companies do abide by relevant principles as a matter of course. Many multinational companies promote RBC awareness and make significant contributions in promoting safety, better regulation, a positive work environment, and sustainable environmental practices. U.S. companies have proven to be leaders in promoting a greater awareness of and appreciation for RBC in Uruguay. Consumers tend to pay attention to the RBC image of companies, especially as it relates to a firm’s work with local charities or community causes. The Catholic University (Universidad Catolica) has a program to monitor RBC matters ( http://www.ucu.edu.uy/es/rse ). DERES is a non-profit business organization to promote corporate social responsibility, and currently has over 120 member companies. There have been no human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC over the past five years. 9. Corruption Overall, U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment. Transparency International’s 2021 edition of the Corruption Perception Index ranked Uruguay as having the lowest levels of perceived corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean, and ranked it as the second most transparent country in the Western Hemisphere, after Canada. Uruguay has laws to prevent bribery and other corrupt practices (No. 17,060), and the acceptance of a bribe is a felony under Uruguay’s penal code. The government neither encourages nor discourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct. The Transparency and Public Ethics Board (known by its Spanish acronym JUTEP) is the government office responsible for dealing with public sector corruption. It gained some relevance in recent years – especially as a result of a case that ended in the resignation of Uruguay´s Vice-President in 2017 – but continues having a low-profile and limited resources. There are no major NGOs involved in investigating corruption. A 2017 law (No. 19,574) established an integral framework to fight money laundering and terrorism finance, brought Uruguay into compliance with OECD and UN norms, and included corruption as a predicate crime. Uruguay signed and ratified the UN’s Anticorruption Convention. It is not a member of the OECD and therefore is not party to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery. 10. Political and Security Environment Uruguay is a stable democracy in which respect for the rule of law and transparent national debates to resolve political differences are the norm. The majority of the population is committed to non-violence. In 2021, the Economist magazine ranked Uruguay the only “full democracy” in South America, and one of three in the Western Hemisphere. There have been no cases of political violence or damage to foreign investment projects or installations over the past decade. While violent crime rose to historic levels in 2019, it has decreased over the last two years. The issue of deteriorating citizen security was a central issue in the 2019 presidential election and is a top priority of the current government. 11. Labor Policies and Practices As a result of flagging economic growth in 2015-2019, the unemployment rate rose substantially and wage increases moderated. The COVID-19 pandemic aggravated the situation in 2020 but the labor market improved significantly in 2021. As of January 2022, the unemployment rate was 7.4 percent, below pre-pandemic levels. Labor laws and regulations prohibit discrimination with respect to employment and occupation based on race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national origin or citizenship, social origin, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity, age, language, HIV status, or other communicable diseases. In general, the government effectively enforced applicable law and regulations, and penalties were sufficient to deter violations. The Labor and Social Security Inspection Division of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security investigates discrimination and workplace abuse claims filed by union members. Please refer to the State Department´s Report on Human Rights Practices in Uruguay for more information. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/uruguay/ Unemployment is structurally higher among the youth, especially among young women. Unemployment is also structurally higher among the Afro-descendant population and varies significantly with education. The government reports a falling trend in informal labor over the past fifteen years, to about 22 percent of the labor market in late 2021, and the UN´s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) ranks Uruguay as having the lowest rate among sixteen Latin American countries. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in migrant workers from Venezuela, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. The declining quality of Uruguay’s public education system may limit the number of qualified workers available over the mid- to long-term. There is a structural shortage of workers in the IT sector and other specialized technical industries. Labor-intensive businesses are increasingly under stress, and new business creation in Uruguay is not replacing the better-paying jobs lost from exiting private sector enterprises. Uruguay’s labor system is compliant in law and practice with most international labor standards. The Uruguayan Constitution and supporting laws guarantee workers the right to organize, strike, and engage in union activities without fear of dismissal. Uruguay has ratified numerous International Labor Organization conventions that protect worker rights, and generally adheres to their provisions. Domestic and foreign business owners and managers often describe local labor laws as rigid and burdensome. Uruguay ranked 108th (of 141 countries) in the labor market flexibility index of the 2019 edition of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. It also ranked 141st in the “flexibility of wage determination” sub-index. (Note: In 2020 the World Economic Forum changed the structure of its report, the 2019 edition is the last one that includes sets and subsets of indicators by country.) Several labor unions espouse strongly leftist, “anti-imperialist,” and anti-capitalist ideological positions. Uruguay ranked 138th (of 141 countries) in the “cooperation in labor-employer relations” in the 2019 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. Many foreign investors report high absentee rates by employees and resulting lower-than-average productivity rates. Productivity is not included in the negotiations that take place in the country’s Salary Councils which determine sector-wide policies on wage adjustments. Labor unions are independent from the government, though they have a politically close relationship with the left-leaning Frente Amplio coalition, which ruled from March 2005 through February 2020. Unionization quadrupled from about 110,000 in 2003 to over 400,000 in 2018 (almost one-fourth of employed workers) and is particularly high in the public sector and some private sectors, such as construction, the metal industry, and banking. Frente Amplio administrations that governed in 2005-2020 passed over 30 labor laws that: promoted and protected labor unions; reinstated collective bargaining; regulated outsourcing activities; regulated work times in rural activities; extended the term to claim worker’s rights; restricted the eviction of employees who occupy workplaces; and imposed criminal sanctions on employers who fail to adopt safety standards in their firms. In 2020, the new administration included an article in Law No. 19,889 providing for the peaceful exercise of the right to strike, along with the right of non-strikers to access and work in their respective establishments, and the right of the management of the companies to enter their facilities freely. The government argued the change was necessary to comply with a longstanding ILO requirement and instructed the Ministry of Interior to enforce the regulation. Collective bargaining is practiced in Uruguay. Salary councils are responsible for assessing wage increases annually at a sectoral level. The councils then apply agreed-upon wage increases to all individual firms in the sector, irrespective of their size or geographical location. Councils consist of a three-party board, which includes representatives from unions, employers, and the government. If unions and employers fail to reach an agreement to determine the wage increase, the government makes the final decision. Labor provisions apply across the board, and the government does not normally issue waivers to attract or retain investment. Except for the construction sector, social security payments are approximately 13 percent of workers’ basic salary. Including health care insurance, social security, and other charges, employers pay approximately 40 percent of a worker’s basic total salary to the government. In addition, there is a mandatory annual bonus and vacation pay, which result in employers paying the equivalent of 14 months of salary per employee each year. Labor laws do not differentiate between layoffs and firing unless the firing is “for cause.” Employers must pay dismissed workers one month for each year of work with a cap of six months, except in cases of “for cause” firings. Dismissals often result in labor conflicts, even if dismissals are required to adjust employment to fluctuating market conditions. Unemployment insurance pays workers a percentage of their salary for up to six months. In the past, the government has extended the term of the unemployment insurance for select groups of laid-off workers. In labor trials, the judiciary tends to rule in favor of the worker, assuming the worker to be the disadvantaged party. Article 393 of the referred 2020 omnibus reform law created a commission to study and propose reforms to Uruguay’s social security system. In June 2020, Uruguay became the first country in the world to ratify ILO’s Convention 190, which recognizes that violence and harassment at work is a human rights violation. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $51,734 2020 $53,629 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 2,248 2019 $3,578 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2018 $391 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 94% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report *Host country source: https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Paginas/Default.aspx The vast majority of U.S. investment consisted of intra-company loans, and not greenfield, brownfield, or reinvestment projects. U.S. investment is distributed among a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services (e.g., call centers or back office), and telecommunications. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data, 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 29,642 100% Total Outward N/A Spain – 5,911 20% N/A N/A Argentina – 4,533 15% N/A N/A Switzerland – 3,483 12% N/A N/A United States – 2,248 8% N/A N/A The Netherlands– 2,044 7% N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- $500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey 14. Contact for More Information David Lonardo Political/Economic Officer Lauro Muller 1776, U.S. Embassy Montevideo Tel: (598)2-1770-2321 E-mail: LonardoDA@state.gov Uzbekistan Executive Summary Uzbekistan is a populous double land-locked country in the middle of Central Asia with an emerging lower-middle income economy. State-owned enterprises still dominate its industrial and financial sectors, and foreign trade centers on commodities. The declared goal of its current economic policy is to achieve sustainable growth and overcome underemployment and poverty as soon as possible. Fast growing external public debt limits the availability of public funds and loans to support economic growth, so attraction of private and foreign investment (FDI) has become a vital priority. Five years ago, the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) launched a program of radical market reforms, with a focus on improving the business environment. Notable progress has been made so far in addressing a rage of systemic business regulation problems and overcoming the dominance of state monopolies, but more is yet to be done to completely unlock all benefits of FDI for the economy. Uzbekistan has the potential to become a strong regional economy: a dynamic and entrepreneurial population, the largest in Central Asia; relatively good infrastructure; and a large potential consumer market. In the past, most FDI was directed into the oil, gas, and mining sectors. In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards increasing FDI in manufacturing, production and distribution of electricity, tourism, and banking. Such diversification was facilitated by positive changes in state regulation and the beginning of a privatization program. Further advancing privatization, as well as implementation of a long-expected capital market development policy, may create unique investment opportunities. Over the past five years, the GOU has made efforts to improve the investment attractiveness of the country. The GOU has modernized its legislation through the adoption of the Law on Investments and Investment Activities and other acts that streamlined interactions of investors with the state, reduced the tax load, liberalized access to certain commodities, and started the privatization of major state-owned enterprises. As a result, the inflow of FDI has grown from about $2 billion in 2017 to over $8 billion in 2021. The government’s efforts to attract funding for various development and social support programs contributed to sustained economic growth despite severe quarantine restrictions in 2020. With the removal of major pandemic restrictions in 2021, GDP grew 7.4 percent. Notable progress has been made in development of renewable energy capacity. Uzbekistan already attracted FDI to develop nearly 4,000 MW of solar and wind capacity and plans to build another 4,000 MW in generation capacity by 2026, which will increase the share of renewables to 25 percent and displace 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas usage annually. The GOU’s current environmental policy goal is to achieve a 35 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP from 2010 levels by 2030. At the same time, the GOU still attempts to channel foreign investments into predetermined import-substituting or export-oriented projects. In some cases, transparency is sacrificed for the urgency of investment. Pandemic-related challenges and the subsequent disruption of global of supply chains have slowed the progress of liberalization reforms because the GOU expanded the use of direct administrative control methods. Another restraining factor is the lack of experience among middle and lower-level government officials in working transparently and properly enforcing legislation that protects the rights of entrepreneurs. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 86 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $90 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#345 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,740 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOU has maintained economic growth by directing more investments into accelerated industrialization programs – a policy chosen to address social issues caused by disturbingly high unemployment and poverty rates. The goal is to create more jobs by building new competitive production capacity, modernizing infrastructure, and expanding the service sector. The GOU declared that increasing the share of private investment is a top policy priority, acknowledging that strong inflow of private capital could ensure economic stability in the medium and long-term. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, which entered into force on January 27, 2020, guaranteed unrestricted transfer of funds out of Uzbekistan and the protection of investments from nationalization. For the effective implementation of this law, in 2021 the GOU created a multi-level mechanism of interaction between public authorities and investors. These include the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade (MIFT), designated deputy heads of regional governments, diplomatic missions abroad, and commercial banks. In 2021, the GOU demonstrated its continued willingness to improve the business environment by focusing on implementing previously adopted programs and strengthening law enforcement practices. Several measures were taken to facilitate the legalization of business practices and incentivize entrepreneurs to transition out of the non-transparent cash-based grey economy. The fight against corruption has intensified. To prevent pandemic-related business losses, despite repeated outbreaks, the government refrained from imposing new lockdowns. Several large state-owned enterprises were privatized, including the Coca-Cola Bottlers of Uzbekistan and Asia Alliance Bank. Special incentives were offered to attract investments into the provinces and critical industries. Over $1.5 billion in FDI was attracted to renewable energy projects. In general, according to official reports, a total of $8.1 billion of FDI was raised in 2021 for 318 large and about 15 thousand smaller regional projects, which created over 273 thousand new jobs. Realizing that there are still major problems hindering investor confidence, the MIFT has asked international financial institutions and experts help in creating a stronger reform roadmap, the National Strategy and Roadmap for Attracting FDI. Meanwhile, the GOU has yet to address several fundamental problems reported by U.S. businesses and investors, such as the lack of transparency in public procurements, its poor record of enforcing public-private contracts, poor protection of private property rights, and insufficient enforcement of intellectual property rights. Local entrepreneurs also complain about losses due to non-compliance with the law on the inviolability of private property, the lack of real business protection tools, and excessive pressure from government agencies that still have disproportionately and inappropriately high regulatory authority. Uzbekistan is ranked 140th (of 180) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. By law, foreign investors are welcome in all sectors of Uzbekistan’s economy and the government cannot discriminate against foreign investors based on nationality, place of residence, or country of origin. However, the government has demonstrated a continued desire to control capital flows in major industries, encouraging investments in a preapproved list of import-substituting and export-oriented projects, while investments in import-consuming projects can generally expect very little support. The Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade ( https://mft.uz/en/ , http://www.invest.gov.uz/en/ ) provides foreign investors with consulting services, information and analysis, business registration, and other legal assistance, as does the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Uzbekistan ( http://www.chamber.uz/en/index ), on a contractual basis. The GOU organizes and attends media events and joint government-business forums on a regular basis and at these events officials stress their interest in seeing new companies establish operations in Uzbekistan. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, which entered into force on January 27, 2020, obliges Uzbekistan’s state bodies, diplomatic missions, and consular institutions abroad to provide advisory and informational assistance to investors. On August 20, 2021, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev chaired the first direct dialogue session with investors and local businesses, an event attended by about 10 thousand entrepreneurs. During the meeting, the president discussed issues raised by businesses, such as expensive loans and cumbersome tax administration, and announced that such dialogues would become regular. Earlier, in 2019, the President’s office established the Council of Foreign Investors, which operates as an institutional advisory body ( https://fics.uz/en/ ). The GOU established the Institute of the Business Ombudsperson (IBO) in 2017 to protect the rights and legitimate interests of businesses and provide legal support. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities obliged the IBO to assist foreign businesses in resolving emerging disputes through extrajudicial and pre-trial procedures. In 2021, the number of cases reviewed by the IBO has doubled and exceeded six thousand. At the beginning of 2022, the IBO received the right to apply fines to violators of investor rights. During the reporting period, various GOU officials attended several of in-person and virtual meetings with representatives of U.S. companies. U.S. business facilitation agencies and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) met with Uzbekistan’s government officials under the framework of the Strategic Partnership Dialogue in December 2021. By law, Uzbekistan guarantees the right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises, and to engage in most forms of remunerative activity. However, due to the prevalence in state-owned or state-supported monopolies in several sectors, in reality, the right to establish business enterprises is still limited in some sectors. In 2020, the GOU started the process of reducing the role of large state-owned enterprises (SOE), especially in the transportation, banking, energy, and cotton sectors. It introduced measures to reduce government involvement in the economy, enforcement of an antimonopoly compliance system in SOE operations, reorganization of some large SOEs for optimized corporate governance, and privatization of certain formerly off-the-table state-owned assets. This privatization program includes state-owned monopolies in the mining, energy, ITC, chemical, transportation, construction, banking, and insurance sectors. In November 2021, the GOU set a target to privatize two thirds of SOE assets. The state still reserves the exclusive right to export some commodities, such as nonferrous metals and minerals. In theory, private enterprises may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of equity interests in private businesses, but, in practice, this is difficult to do because Uzbekistan’s securities markets are still underdeveloped. Private capital is not allowed in some industries and enterprises. The Law on Denationalization and Privatization (adopted in 1991, last amended in 2020) lists state assets that cannot be sold off or otherwise privatized, including land with mineral and water resources, the air basin (atmospheric resources in the airspace over Uzbekistan), flora and fauna, cultural heritage sites and assets, state budget funds, foreign capital and gold reserves, state trust funds, the Central Bank, enterprises that facilitate monetary circulation, military and security-related assets and enterprises, firearm and ammunition producers, nuclear research and development enterprises, some specialized producers of drugs and toxic chemicals, emergency response entities, civil protection and mobilization facilities, public roads, and cemeteries. Foreign ownership and control for airlines, railways, long-distance telecommunication networks, and other sectors deemed related to national security requires special GOU permission, but so far foreigners have not been welcomed in these sectors. By law, foreign nationals cannot obtain a license or tax permit for individual entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan. In practice, therefore, they cannot be self-employed, and must be employed by a legally recognized entity. According to Uzbekistan’s law, local companies with at least 15% foreign ownership can qualify as having foreign investment. The minimum fixed charter-funding requirement for a company with foreign investment is 400 million s’om (USD 1 equals about 10,850 s’om as of March 2022). The same requirement for companies registered in the Republic of Karakalpakstan and the Khorezm region is 200 million s’om. Minimum charter funding requirements can be different for business activities subject to licensing. For example, the requirement for banking activities is 100 billion s’om; for activities of microcredit organizations – 2 billion s’om; for pawnshops – 500 million s’om; for production of ethyl alcohol and alcoholic beverages – 10,000 Base Calculation Rates (BCR) (one BCR equals 270,000 s’om or about $25, as of March 2022); lotteries – 200 million s’om; and for tourism operators – 400 BCRs. Foreign investment in media enterprises is limited to 30%. The government may scrutinize foreign investment, with special emphasis on sectors of the economy that it considers strategic, such as mining, energy, transportation, banking, and telecommunications. There is no standard, transparent screening mechanism, and some elements of Uzbekistan’s legal framework are expressly designed to protect domestic industries and limit competition from abroad, such as a list created in January 2021 of 529 imported items banned from the public procurement process. The basis for inclusion of items to the list was the presence of two or more domestic suppliers of similar goods and services. There are no legislative restrictions that specifically disadvantage U.S. investors. On December 2021, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its Uzbekistan Investment Policy Review ( https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-uzbekistan ). The report contains findings on Uzbekistan´s investment environment and policies and 10 recommendations for improving the climate for FDI, which address policy and administration with regard to entry of foreign investment; regulatory and tax policy; measures to improve the competitive provision of business services; and investment promotion issues. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and have not conducted investment policy reviews of Uzbekistan in the past four years. Since 2019, several international and Uzbekistan-based civil society organizations and NGOs have published reports on issues related to forced labor monitoring in the cotton harvest ( https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&content_types=reports&language=en&countries=UZ ). The GOU has declared that business facilitation and improvement of the business environment are among its top policy priorities. Uzbekistan’s working-age population has been growing by over 200,000 people per year over the past decade. Therefore, the GOU prioritizes private businesses and joint ventures with the potential to create additional jobs and help the government address unemployment concerns. The introduction of one-window and on-line registration practices and electronic reporting systems simplified and streamlined business registration procedures. The GOU has created 23 Special Economic Zones (SEZ), as well nearly 350 special small industrial zones (SIZ) in all regions of the country to attract more FDI. New legislation has created additional tax incentives for private businesses and promised firms protection against unlawful actions by government authorities. By legislation (effective from January 2018), foreign and domestic private investors can register their business in Uzbekistan using any Center of Government Services (CGS) facility, which operate as “Single Window” (SW) registration offices, or the Electronic Government (EG) website – https://my.gov.uz/en . The registration procedure requires electronic submission of an application, company name or trademark, and foundation documents. The SW/EG service will register the company with the Ministry of Justice, Tax Committee, local administration, and other relevant government agencies. The registration fee is equivalent to 20% of a BCR for local investors and 10 BCRs for foreign investors (one BCR equals 270,000 s’om, or about $25, as of March 2022). Applicants receive a 50% discount for using the EG website. The new system has reduced the length of the registration process from several weeks to 30 minutes. Depending on the extent of foreign participation, a business can be defined as an “enterprise with foreign capital” (EFC) if less than 15% foreign-owned, or as an “enterprise with foreign investment” (EFI) if more than 15% foreign-owned and holding a minimum charter capital of 400 million s’om (about $37,000 as of March 2022). Foreign companies may also maintain a physical presence in Uzbekistan as “permanent establishments” without registering as separate legal entities, other than with the tax authorities. A permanent establishment may have its own bank account. In general, the GOU does not promote or incentivize outward investments. The Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade coordinates outward investments mainly in the form of bilateral economic cooperation engagements. Some state-owned enterprises invest in development of their marketing networks abroad as part of efforts to boost export sales. Private companies that operate primarily in the retail, manufacturing, transportation, construction, and textile sectors use outward investments for market outreach, to access foreign financial resources, for trade facilitation, and, in some cases, for expatriation of capital. The most popular destinations for outward investments are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Singapore, UAE, Scotland, Turkey, and Germany. There are no formal restrictions on outward investments. However, financial transactions with some foreign jurisdictions (such as Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Yemen) and offshore tax havens can be subject to additional screening by the authorities. 3. Legal Regime Uzbekistan has a substantial body of laws and regulations aimed at protecting the business and investment community. Primary legislation regulating competition includes the 2012 Law on Competition (last updated in 2019), the Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity, the 2003 Law on Private Enterprise (last updated in 2020), the 2019 Law on Investments and Investment Activities and a body of decrees, resolutions, and instructions. In late 2016, the GOU publicly recognized the need to improve and streamline business and investment legislation, which is still perceived as complicated, often contradictory, and not fully consistent with international norms. In some cases, the government may require businesses to comply with decrees or instructions that are not publicly available. To simplify and streamline legislation, Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers have initiated a “regulatory guillotine” policy, under which nearly eight thousand laws and regulations were abolished in 2020-2021. For example, the GOU Resolution N87 of February 22, 2021, invalidated 1,887 government decisions, and the Ministry of Justice invalidated 4,343 resolutions of regional governments. To avoid problems with tax and regulatory measures, foreign investors often secure government benefits through Presidential Decrees and GOU resolutions. These, however, have proven to be easily revocable. For additional information, please review the World Bank’s Regulatory Governance assessment on Uzbekistan: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/uzbekistan . Practices that appear as informal regulatory processes are not associated with nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, but rather with influential local politicians or well-connected local elites. Most rule-making and regulatory authority exists on the national level. Businesses in some regions and special economic zones can be regulated differently, but relevant legislation must be adopted by the central government and then regulated by national-level authorities. Only a few local legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and fully consistent with international norms. Although the GOU has started to unify local accounting rules with international standards, local practices are still document- and tax-driven, with an underdeveloped concept of accruals. Uzbekistan is just beginning to develop its Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations. In 2021, the country presented its first ever ESG report, which described the progress of ongoing reforms in various areas, such as Infrastructure for Growth, Active Governance & Strong Civil Society, and Sustainable Livelihoods. Key findings of the report include that GOU efforts to work with international NGOs on the issue of forced labor in the agricultural sector are re-positioning the country as an attractive partner for reliable textiles sourcing, and that the GOU is making efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. (Uzbekistan’s ESG report can be reviewed here: https://changeinuzbekistan.com/report/ ). Parliament and GOU agencies publish some draft legislation for public comment, including draft laws, decrees and resolutions on the government’s development strategies, tax and customs regulation, resolutions of regional governments, and other legislation. Public review of the legislation is available through the website https://regulation.gov.uz . Uzbekistan’s laws, presidential decrees, and government decisions are available online. Uzbekistan’s legislation digest ( http://www.lex.uz/ ) serves as a centralized online location for current legislation in effect. As of now, there is no centralized nor comprehensive online location for Uzbekistan’s legislation, similar to the Federal Register in the United States, where all key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. There are other online legislative resources with executive summaries, interpretations, and comments that could be useful for businesses and investors, including http://www.norma.uz/ and http://www.minjust.uz/ru/law/newlaw/ . Formally, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan are responsible for oversight to ensure that government agencies follow administrative processes. In some cases, however, local officials have inconsistently interpreted laws, often in a manner detrimental to private investors and the business community at large. GOU officials have publicly suggested that improvement of the regulatory system is critical for the overall business climate. In 2021, Uzbekistan adopted laws and regulations to streamline business related legislation. In particular, the Ministry of Justice abolished 878 presidential decrees, 1,887 government resolutions, and 336 ministerial level acts, which shrank the national legal framework by almost 10%. In addition, 4,343 decrees of regional governments were invalidated, downsizing their total number by 70%. Several new laws adopted in the reviewing period introduced amendments related with the enforcement of business-related legislation. Regulatory reform efforts implemented in previous years, which include Presidential Decree UP-5690 “On Measures for the Comprehensive Improvement of the System of Support and Protection of Entrepreneurial Activity,” adopted in March 2019, set enforcement mechanisms for effective protection of private businesses, including foreign investors. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, adopted in December 2019, guarantees free transfer of funds to and from the country without any restrictions. This law also guarantees protection of investments from nationalization. The GOU has implemented several additional reforms in recent years, including the currency exchange liberalization, tax reform, simplification of business registration and foreign trade procedures, and establishment of the business Ombudsperson. The government’s development strategies include a range of targets for upcoming reforms, such as ensuring reliable protection of private property rights; further removal of barriers and limitations for private entrepreneurship and small business; creation of a favorable business environment; suppression of unlawful interference of government bodies in the activities of businesses; improvement of the investment climate; decentralization and democratization of the public administration system; and expansion of public-private partnerships. Previously implemented regulatory system reforms often left room for interpretation and were, accordingly, enforced subjectively. New and updated legislation continues to leave room for interpretation and contains unclear definitions. In many cases, private businesses still face difficulties associated with enforcement and interpretation of the legislation. More information on Uzbekistan’s regulatory system can be reviewed at the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ( http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/data/explorecountries/uzbekistan ). The Ministry of Justice and the system of Economic Courts are formally responsible for regulatory enforcement, while the Institute of Business Ombudsperson was established in May 2017 to protect the rights and legitimate interests of businesses and render legal support. The state body responsible for enforcement proceedings is the Bureau of Mandatory Enforcement under the General Prosecutor’s Office. Several GOU policy papers call for expanding the role of civil society, non-governmental organizations, and local communities in regulatory oversight and enforcement. The government also publishes drafts of business-related legislation for public comments, which are publicly available. However, the development of a new regulatory system, including enforcement mechanisms outlined in various GOU reform and development roadmaps, has yet to be completed. Uzbekistan’s fiscal transparency still does not meet generally accepted international standards. In 2021, the GOU demonstrated some progress in its efforts to ensure compliance with the requirements of fiscal transparency, continuing the reform of the budgeting system launched in 2019. The process of awarding natural resource extraction contracts became more statutory and transparent. The web portal of the Finance Ministry https://openbudget.uz , created to be the main source of budget-related information, provides comprehensive information on the enacted budget, its implementation (with a breakdown by categories and territories), as well as the report of the Accounts Chamber (the supreme audit). However, the portal is still not fully operational. It does not provide detailed information on budget amendments to the budget adopted during the fiscal year, regional budgets, or specialized funds. The GOU did not publish its FY2022 budget proposal for public review. Most of GOU agencies do not publish reports on their off-budget funds and other socially significant information, although the law of 2020 introduced amendments to the Administrative Code establishing fines for senior GOU officials for non-disclosure of reports on the execution of budgets, off-budget funds and state trust funds, or other violations that undermine the transparency of the budget process. Uzbekistan is not currently a member of the WTO or any existing economic blocs although it is pursuing WTO accession. In 2020, Uzbekistan assumed observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union. No regional or other international regulatory systems, norms, or standards have been directly incorporated or cited in Uzbekistan’s regulatory system – although GOU officials often claim the government’s regulatory system incorporates international best practices. Uzbekistan joined the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement in 2014, but that does not constitute an economic bloc with supranational trade tariff regulation requirements. Uzbekistan’s contemporary legal system belongs to the civil law family. The hierarchy of Uzbekistan’s laws descends from the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, constitutional laws, codes, ordinary laws, decrees of the president, resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers, and normative acts, in that order. Contracts are enforced under the Civil Code, the Law “About the Contractual Legal Base of Activities of Business Entities” (No. 670-I issued August 29, 1998, and last revised in 2020), and several other regulations. Uzbekistan’s contractual law is established by the Law “About the Contractual Legal Base of Activities of Business Entities.” It establishes the legal basis for the conclusion, execution, change, and termination of economic agreements, the rights, and obligations of business entities, and also the competence of relevant public authorities and state bodies in the field of contractual relations. Economic disputes, including intellectual property claims, can be heard in the lower-level Economic Court and appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Economic court judges are appointed for five-year terms. This judicial branch also includes regional, district, town, city, Tashkent city (a special administrative territory) courts, and arbitration courts. On paper, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is independent, but government interference and corruption are common. Government officials, attorneys, and judges often interpret legislation inconsistently and in conflict with each other’s interpretations. In recent years, for example, many lower-level court rulings have been in favor of local governments and companies which failed to compensate plaintiffs for the full market value of expropriated and demolished private property, as required under the law. In July 2021, President Mirziyoyev approved a new Law on Courts (ZRU-703), which tightens the requirements for judicial candidates, describes the disciplinary liability of judges, and expands their socially protected status. Uzbekistan also adopted a law (ZRU-717) on reforming the Supreme Judicial Council of Uzbekistan by strengthening its independence and authority, as well as several new laws to simplify court proceedings and to improve the institutions for judicial reviews. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration (ZRU-647 adopted February 16, 2021) established the procedures for setting arbitration agreements, appointing arbitrators, and conducting arbitration proceedings. In 2020, the President ordered for additional measures to eliminate corruption in the courts and ensure the independence of judges (Decree UP-6127). Court decisions or enforcement actions are appealable though a process that can be initiated in accordance with the Economic Procedural Code and other applicable laws of Uzbekistan, and can be adjudicated in the national court system. Several laws, presidential decrees, and government resolutions relate to foreign investors. The main laws are: Law on Investments and Investment Activities (ZRU-598, December 25, 2019) Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity (ZRU-328, 2012) Law on Special Economic Zones (ZRU-604, February 17, 2020) Law on Production Sharing Agreements (№ 312-II, 2001) Law on Concessions (№ 110-I, 1995) Law on Investment and Share Funds (ZRU-392, 2015) Law on Public-Private Partnership (ZRU 537, 2019) In 2021, the GOU adopted 85 laws, over a hundred decrees, nearly six hundred resolutions, and thousands of judicial decisions. New legislation that could affect foreign investors includes: The Law on the State Budget for 2022, (ZRU-742, adopted December 30, 2021). Subsequent laws made amendments in the Tax Code and other regulations. Law on Insurance Activities (ZRU-730, adopted November 23,2021). Law on Privatization of Non-Agricultural Lands (ZRU-728, adopted November 15, 2021). Transport Law (ZRU-706, adopted August 9, 2021). Law on Licensing, Permitting and Notification Procedures (ZRU-701, adopted July 14, 2021). Law on the Ratification of International Labor Organization Convention No.187 on Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health (Geneva, 15 June 2006) (ZRU-693, adopted June 4, 2021). Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Uzbekistan (No. ZRU-692, adopted June 4, 2021). Public Procurement Law (ZRU-684, adopted April 22, 2021). Environmental Audit Law (ZRU-678, adopted March 15, 2021). Audit Law (ZRU-677, adopted February 25, 2021). International Commercial Arbitration Law (ZRU-674, adopted February 16, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Regulate the Cotton and Textile Clusters (UP-14, adopted November 16, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Stimulate Geological Exploration and on the Taxation of Subsoil Users (UP-6319, adopted October 6, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Reduce the Administrative and Tax Burden for Businesses and Improve the Protecting of their Legitimate Interests (UP-6314, adopted September 15, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Improve Contractual Relations (UP-6313, adopted September 14, 2021). Presidential Decree on the Simplification of Customs Procedures (UP-6310, adopted September 10, 2021). Presidential Decree on Improving the Tax Administration for Businesses (UP-6307, adopted September 07, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Stimulate Exporting Enterprises (UP-6306, adopted September 7, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Ensure Transparency in Land Relations, Reliable Protection of Land Rights and Their Transformation Into a Market Asset (UP-6243, adopted June 8, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures for Capital Market Development (UP-6207, adopted April 13. 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Improve Public Services for Businesses (UP-6191, adopted March 23, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Accelerate the Privatization of State Assets (UP-6167, adopted February 11, 2021). As of now, there is no real “one-stop-shop” website for investors that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements in Uzbekistan. In December 2018, the GOU created a specialized web portal for investors called Invest Uz ( http://invest.gov.uz/en/ ), which provides some useful information. The website of the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade ( http://mift.uz/ ) offers some general information on laws and procedures, but mainly in the Uzbek and Russian languages. Competition and anti-trust legislation in Uzbekistan is governed by the Law on Competition (ZRU-319, issued January 6, 2012, and last revised in 2019). The main entity that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns is the State Antimonopoly Committee (established in January 2019). This government agency is responsible for advancing competition, controlling the activities of natural monopolies, protecting consumer rights, and regulating the advertisement market. There were no significant competition-related cases involving foreign investors in 2021. Private property is protected against baseless expropriation by legislation, including the Law on Investments and Investment Activities and the Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity. Despite these protections, however, the government potentially may seize foreign investors’ assets due to violations of the law or for arbitrary reasons, such as a unilateral revision of an investment agreement, a reapportionment of the equity shares in an existing joint venture with an SOE, or in support of a public works or social improvement project (similar to an eminent domain taking). By law, the government is obligated to provide fair market compensation for seized property, but many who have lost property allege the compensation has been significantly below fair market value. Uzbekistan has a history of expropriations. Profitable, high-profile foreign businesses have been at greater risk for expropriation, but smaller companies are also vulnerable. Under the previous administration, large companies with foreign capital in the food processing, mining, retail, and telecommunications sectors faced expropriation. In cases where the property of foreign investors is expropriated for arbitrary reasons, the law obligates the government to provide fair compensation in a transferable currency. However, in most cases the private property was expropriated based upon court decisions after the owners were convicted for breach of contract, failure to complete investment commitments, or other violations, making them ineligible to claim compensation. Decisions of Uzbekistan’s Economic Court on expropriation of private property can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan in accordance with the Economic Procedural Code or other applicable local law. Reviews usually are quite slow. Some foreign investors have characterized the process as unpredictable, non-transparent, and lacking due process. There were several cases in recent years when the government imposed excessive import controls for the supplies of enterprises with foreign investment, which were alleged to be measures applied for indirect expropriation. The Law on Bankruptcy regulates bankruptcy procedures. Creditors can participate in liquidation or reorganization of a debtor only in the form of a creditor’s committee. According to the Law on Bankruptcy and the Labor Code, an enterprise may claim exemption from paying property and land taxes, as well as fines and penalties for back taxes and other mandatory payments, for the entire period of the liquidation proceedings. Monetary judgments are usually made in local currency. Bankruptcy itself is not criminalized, but in August 2013, the GOU introduced new legislation on false bankruptcy, non-disclosure of bankruptcy, and premeditated bankruptcy cases. In 2021, the GOU and Parliament conducted a legislative review of the procedures for bringing economically bankrupt enterprises out of the financial crisis and decided that they were not effective. Therefore, a new draft Law on Insolvency was prepared to replace the Law on Bankruptcy. The new act should address all controversial issues of current bankruptcy legislation. The draft law is in the process of public review. In its 2020 Doing Business report, the World Bank ranked Uzbekistan 100 out of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator (https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/uzbekistan ). 4. Industrial Policies All investment incentives to foreign investors are regulated by national level legislation, which can be adopted only by the president. Regional and local governments have limited authorities to offer any additional preferences. Exceptions can be made for tax incentives granted by special government resolutions or presidential decrees. By the new Tax Code, the GOU may provide holidays for land taxes, property taxes and water use taxes to some companies with foreign direct investments on a case-by-case basis. In 2021, the GOU initiated various programs to support businesses owned by underrepresented investors as part of efforts to reduce and unemployment. The programs included government sponsored business and financial literacy trainings and co-financing of startups. About $95 million of budget funds were allocated to only women’s startups in 2021. This program, however, cannot be used to support foreign underrepresented investors. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities (ZRU-598, December 25, 2019) provides a range of general guarantees to foreign investors, including protection against illegal interference of local authorities in their activities, protects from any discrimination or unjustified nationalization, and ensures the right to use, transfer and repatriate funds and capital. The law also provides guarantees the protection of investors from any business environment deterioration due to legislation changes. ( https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/328/uzbekistan-the-law-on-investments-and-investment-activity ). In some cases, the GOU may issue investment guarantees to certain foreign or local investors if, it finds the project worthy of such support. The current legislation also allows the GOU to provide joint financing of FDI funded projects. Such joint financing can be provided under public-private-partnership (PPP) agreement framework, or through involvement of the Uzbekistan Direct Investments Fund and the Fund for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan. In all cases, however, a special GOU resolution is required. The GOU set an ambitious goal to raise the share of renewable energy generation to 25 percent by 2030. To stimulate private investors, the Parliament approved the Law on Renewable Energy (ZRU-539, May 21, 2019). It provides a range of tax and other incentives for renewable energy sector businesses. By the law, specialized equipment producers get five-year relief from paying all taxes beginning from the date of registering the entity. Renewable energy producers get ten-year relief from paying property and land tax (allied only for energy generation facilities with a nominal power of 0.1 MW and above). Individuals that invest in renewable energy also may enjoy three-year property and land tax relief for the facility equipped with energy generators. Private investors also have the preferential right to sell the energy to state-owned companies at a negotiated price. The first law on free economic zones in Uzbekistan appeared in 1996. After dozens of modifications, in February 2020 it was finally replaced by the Law on Special Economic Zones (SEZ) (ZRU-604), which entered into force May 19, 2020 (the text is available in English: https://lex.uz/docs/4821319 ). The law provides the following classification of special economic zones: Free Economic Zone (FEZ) – territory allocated for the construction of new high-tech, competitive, import-substituting, and export-oriented industrial production capacities, and for development of industrial, engineering, telecommunications, road, and social infrastructure, as well as appropriate logistics services. Special Scientific and Technological Zone – territory allocated for the development of innovation infrastructure by scientific and science-related organizations, including technology parks, technology distribution/transfer centers, innovation clusters, venture funds, and business incubators. Tourist-Recreational Zone – territory allocated for tourism infrastructure development investment projects, including construction of hotels, cultural and recreational facilities, and functional and seasonal recreation areas. Free Trade Zones – territories for consignment warehouses, areas of special customs and tax regimes, facilities at border crossing points for processing, packing, sorting, storing goods, airports, railway stations or other custom control sites. Special Industrial Zone – territory with special economic and financial regulations of production and logistical business activities. According to the new Law of SEZ (Article 39) and the Tax Code (Article 473), investors to special economic zones of Uzbekistan may expect: Holidays for paying property taxes, land taxes and taxes for the use of water resources. The term of the holiday shall be determined by a separate presidential resolution depending on the size of investments. Such tax holidays can be applied only to business activities stipulated in the relevant investment agreement with administration of a special economic zone. Participants of special economic zones also may get some VAT exemptions and other tax benefits. Exemption from paying customs payments (except for value added tax and customs clearance fees) for construction materials that cannot be sourced locally; technological equipment that cannot be sourced locally, raw materials, materials and components used to produce export-oriented output. The following activities are prohibited within the SEZs: Businesses that violate environmental and labor protection standards. Businesses related to weapons and ammunition. Businesses related to nuclear materials and radioactive substances. Production of alcohol and tobacco products. Rawhide processing, livestock corrals, or slaughter of animals. Production of cement, concrete, cement clinker, bricks, reinforced concrete slabs, coal, lime and gypsum products. Processing, decomposition, incineration, gasification, chemical treatment, final or temporary storage or burial underground of all types of waste. Placement of oil refineries, nuclear power plants, nuclear installations, or radiation sources, or points and installations designed for storage, disposal, and processing of nuclear fuel, radioactive substances, and waste, as well as other radioactive waste. The first Free Industrial and Economic Zone (FIEZ) was created in 2008 in the Navoi region. By the end of 2021, the GOU had created 23 large and about 350 small industrial zones, which created nearly 40,000 jobs and attracted over $470 million of investments. The government welcomes foreign investors mainly in the areas of localization, building local production capacities, and developing export potential. To support local producers, the GOU introduced a rule (GOU Resolution PKM-41, adopted January 29, 2021), which says import contracts of enterprises and joint ventures with at least a 50% state share exceeding 50,000 BCRs ($1,244,240 as of March 2022) are subject to mandatory review by the supervisory boards of these entities on a quarterly basis. The government also bans import of 529 categories of goods and certain services through public procurement processes. The basis for inclusion of items to the list was the presence of two or more domestic suppliers of similar goods and services. It currently includes food products, construction materials, fertilizers, industrial products, textile and clothing products, footwear and leather goods, furniture, household goods, household electrical appliances, vehicles, paper and cellulose products, and medical products. The GOU also has established a procedure for public procurement of these imported goods through the website of the Center for Electronic Cooperation Portal under the Ministry of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction. Uzbekistan’s legislation stipulates that the government must apply requirements to use domestic inputs in manufacturing uniformly to enterprises with domestic and foreign investments, but in practice, this is not always the case. There are no requirements for using only local sources of financing. To qualify as an enterprise or business with foreign investment and be eligible for tax and other incentives, the share of foreign investment must be at least 15% of the charter capital of a company. The investment must consist of hard currency or new equipment, delivered within one year of registering the enterprise. The minimum requirements for charter capital for incentives (except financial institutions) is 400 million s’om (about $37,000 as of March 2022). Tax incentives for foreign investment are essentially the same as for local enterprises participating in an investment, localization, or modernization program. Enterprises with significant investment in priority sectors or registered in one of free economic or special industrial zones can expect additional benefits. The GOU requires localization of personal data storage in line with the Law on Personal Data (ZRU-547), adopted July 2, 2019. Per the law, large internet companies like Facebook, Google, and Russian search engine Yandex are encouraged to move their server equipment with local users’ personal data to the territory of Uzbekistan. According to the law, the GOU may block services in the country in the event of non-compliance. As of now, the legislation of Uzbekistan prevents or restrict companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country. Transfers of technology or proprietary information are not required by the law and can be the subject of an agreement between the foreign investor and its local partner. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property ownership is governed by the Law on Protection of Private Property and Guarantees of the Owner’s Rights. Uzbekistani and foreign entities may own or lease buildings, but not the underlying land. Mortgages are available for local individuals only, but not for legal entities. There are no mortgage lien securities in Uzbekistan. The new Law on Privatization of Non-agricultural Land Plots (ZRU-522, August 13, 2019) allows private land ownership for plots that do not fall under the definition of agricultural land by the Land Code of Uzbekistan. Land ownership is granted only to entities and individuals who are residents of Uzbekistan. Foreign citizens and entities do not have land property rights in Uzbekistan. Effective March 1, 2020, Uzbekistan residents can privatize: Land plots of entities, on which their buildings, structures and industrial infrastructure facilities are located, as well as the land extensions necessary for their business activities; Land plots provided to citizens for individual housing construction and maintenance; Unoccupied land plots; Land plots allocated to the Urban Development Fund under the Ministry of Economy and Industry. The following types of land cannot be privatized: Land plots located in territories that are not covered by officially documented layout plans. Land plots that contain mineral deposits or state property of strategic importance. The list of such land plots shall be specified by appropriate legislation. Land plots reserved for environmental, recreational, and historical-cultural purposes, state owned land and water resources, and public areas of cities and towns (e.g. squares, streets, roads, boulevards). Land plots affected by hazardous substances or susceptible to biogenic contamination. Land plots provided to residents of special economic zones. However, according to Article 55 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution, the land, its subsoil, waters, flora and fauna and other natural resources are national wealth, subject to rational use and are protected by the state. The Land Code also states that the land is state property (Article 16). Contradictions in the legislation are still to be resolved. The World Bank ranked Uzbekistan 72nd in the world in the Registering Property category of its 2020 Doing Business Report. More details can be reviewed here: https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/uzbekistan#DB_rp Land privatization is a new concept for Uzbekistan. All agricultural land in Uzbekistan is still owned by the state. As of March 1, 2020, a new law on privatization allows for the privatization of non-agricultural land plots. Legislation governing the acquisition and disposition of immoveable property (buildings and facilities) poses relatively few problems for foreign investors and is similar to laws in other CIS countries. Immoveable property ownership is generally respected by local and central authorities. District governments have departments responsible for managing commercial real estate issues, ranging from valuations to sale and purchase of immoveable property. Legally purchased but unoccupied immoveable property can be nationalized for several reasons, including by an enforcement process of a court decision, seizure for past due debts on utility or communal services, debts for property taxes, and, in some cases, for security considerations. Unauthorized takeover of unoccupied immoveable property by other private owners (squatters) is not a common practice in Uzbekistan. Usually, authorities inspect the legitimacy of immoveable property ownership at least once every year. While the concept of registering intellectual property (IP) is still new to Uzbekistan, the GOU recognizes intellectual property rights (IPR) protections as critical to its economic goals. As Uzbekistan prepares for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), its leaders have demonstrated a significant political shift towards improved IPR protections. In 2018 and 2019, Uzbekistan completed accession to the Geneva Phonograms Convention and two WIPO Internet Treaties. Responsibility for IPR issues lies with the formerly independent Uzbekistan Agency for Intellectual Property (AIP), which was subsumed under the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) (AIP, http://www.ima.uz/ ) in February 2019. Uzbekistan’s Customs Code (which came into force on April 22, 2016) allows rights holders to control the importation of intellectual property goods. The Code introduced a special Customs Record procedure, which is based on a database of legal producers and their distributors. Uzbekistan also introduced several amendments to IPR law, as well as amendments to civil and criminal codes meant to enforce stricter punishment for IPR violations. Uzbekistan’s patent protections are generally sufficient, but enforcement remains one of the biggest IP challenges. Foreign companies face obstacles proving IP violations and receiving compensation for losses sustained due to violations. IP violators are rarely obligated to cease infringing activities or pay meaningful penalties. AIP lacks any kind of enforcement power, as does the MOJ. Enforcement is weak across different kinds of IP. Copyright cases are almost never brought before the Antimonopoly Committee (the body responsible for responding to IP complaints) because companies make the decision that the cost of fighting copyright violations outweighs the benefits. Trademark cases often take years to settle in the courts, driving up costs and consuming time and resources. For companies who cannot meet the demands of a multiyear court battle it becomes cost prohibitive to pursue action to protect their IP. While Uzbekistan took important steps in 2018-2021 to address longstanding issues pertaining to IPR, there remain serious deficiencies in trademark and copyright protections, judicial processes related to IPR, and enforcement of actions against IPR violations and violators. On January 28, 2021, President Mirziyoyev signed a Resolution on Measures to Improve the Objects of Intellectual Property (PR-4965). It ordered to set a network of Intellectual Property Protection Centers throughout the country to ensure enforcement of IPR legislation in all regions. Currently the Centers operate in cooperation with local tax, customs, and law enforcement agencies. In 2021, they identified over 3,000 counterfeit products in domestic markets. On January 13, 2022, Uzbekistan joined the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled. On December 26, 2018, Uzbekistan adopted a law to accede to the Geneva Phonograms Convention. The GOU forwarded signed copies of the law to WIPO and the UN, thus completing the formal ratification of these conventions. Later, on February 16, 2019, the President approved adoption of two bills into the law for Uzbekistan to accede to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (“Internet Treaties”). Currently Uzbekistan is in the process of accession to other international treaties and agreements, including the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome, October 26, 1961); Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (Singapore, March 27, 2006); and Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (Geneva, July 2, 1999). The GOU is working on amendments to national legislation to bring it in line with the requirements of the IPR Treaties. These measures represent the necessary short-term actions for Uzbekistan to maintain its benefits under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The full list of IPR-related international agreements/treaties that Uzbekistan has acceded to is available here: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/profile/UZ . In April 2018, the GOU provided greater authority to a new Inspectorate under the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications to monitor compliance and enforce copyright protections on the internet. There are no publicly available reports on seizures of counterfeit goods. According to the report provided by the AIP, in 2021, local authorities initiated four criminal and 140 administrative cases on IPR violations; issued about 900 warnings to retailers and identified over 3,000 types of new counterfeit goods. Fifteen cases involved the violation of U.S. companies’ trademark rights. These included Subway, Amazon, Burger King, Apple, KFC, Snickers, Colgate, and Starbucks. All these cases are subject to litigation. The Board of Appeal (as a pre-trial body for IPR disputes) under the Ministry of Justice reviewed 108 cases, including several filed by U.S. companies Colgate-Palmolive Company, British American Tobacco Inc., Energy Beverages LLC., Under Armor Inc., D Delta Hotels Marriott, Apple Inc., and Emerson. The agency also recorded production and sale of counterfeit products branded as Nike, iPhone, Puma, Head & Shoulders, and Tommy Hilfiger. Under current Uzbekistani law, the court considers copyright infringement cases only after the copyright holder submits a claim of damages. Similarly, for imported products, customs officials do not have an ex-officio function, and the onus is on the rights holder to initiate an action against a suspected infringer. The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) has the authority to both penalize violators and order them to desist from producing, marketing, or selling infringing goods, but few cases ever make it to the PGO. The burden of proving an IP violation is so high that most cases never leave the Antimonopoly Committee or the administrative court system. While these cases are stalled in the court system, infringing companies may continue to operate without restrictions. Uzbekistan has been on the Watch List of the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report since 2000. The political will to improve IPR protection seems to exist at the highest levels of the government, but effective enforcement policies are still not in place. The country is not listed in USTR’s 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 6. Financial Sector Prior to 2017, the government focused on investors capable of providing technology transfers and employment in local industries and had not prioritized attraction of portfolio investments. The first plans to improve the capital market and use stock market instruments to meet its economic development goals were announced in 2017. In April 2021, the government created a Department for Capital Market Development under the Ministry of Finance. Currently the Department is drafting the Law on Capital Market. The U.S. Government is supporting the Ministry of Finance through a technical assistance program led by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Uzbekistan has its own stock market, which supports trades through the Republican Stock Exchange “Tashkent,” Uzbekistan’s main securities trading platform and only corporate securities exchange ( https://www.uzse.uz ). The stock exchange mainly hosts equity and secondary market transactions with shares of state-owned enterprises. In most cases, government agencies determine who can buy and sell shares and at what prices, and it is often impossible to locate accurate financial reports for traded companies. Uzbekistan formally accepted IMF Article VIII in October 2003, but due to excessive protectionist measures of the government, businesses had limited access to foreign currency, which stimulated the grey economy and the creation of multiple exchange rate systems. Effective September 5, 2017, the GOU eliminated the difference between the artificially low official rate and the black-market exchange rate and allowed unlimited non-cash foreign exchange transactions for businesses. The Law on Currency Regulation (ZRU-573 of October 22, 2019) fully liberalized currency operations, current cross-border, and capital movement transactions. In 2019, the GOU considerably simplified repatriation of capital invested in Uzbekistan’s industrial assets, securities, and stock market profits. According to the law (ZRU-531), foreign investors that have resident entities in Uzbekistan can convert their dividends and other incomes to foreign currencies and transfer them to their accounts in foreign banks. Non-resident entities that buy and sell shares of local companies can open bank accounts in Uzbekistan to accumulate their revenues. Under the law, foreign investors and private sector businesses can have access to various credit instruments on the local market, but the still-overregulated financial system yields unreliable credit terms. Access to foreign banks is limited and is usually only granted through their joint ventures with local banks. Commercial banks, to a limited degree, can use credit lines from international financial institutions to finance small and medium sized businesses. As of January 2022, 33 commercial banks operate in Uzbekistan. 10 commercial banks are state-owned, 22 banks are registered as joint-stock financial organizations (eight of which are partly state-owned), seven banks have foreign capital, and five banks are private. Commercial banks have 887 branches and a network of exchange offices and ATMs throughout the country. State-owned banks hold 81.5% of banking sector capital and 84% of banking sector assets, leaving privately owned banks as relatively small niche players. The nonbanking sector is represented by 72 microcredit organizations and 73 pawn shops. In May 2020, President Mirziyoyev approved a five-year strategy for reformation of the banking sector to address existing weaknesses of the banking sector, such as excessive share of state assets, insufficient competition, poor quality of corporate governance and banking services in comparison with best international standards, as well as a relatively low penetration of modern global technologies. The goal of the strategy is to reduce the state share in the sector from the current 84% to 40% and to increase the market share of the non-banking sector from current 0.35% to 4%. By 2025 the government plans to privatize its shares in six banks and facilitate modernization of banking services in remaining state-owned banks. According to assessments of international rating agencies, including Fitch and Moody’s, the banking sector of Uzbekistan is stable and poses limited near-term risks, primarily due to high concentration and domination of the public sector, which controls over 80% of assets in the banking system. The average rate of capital adequacy within the system is 17%, and the current liquidity rate is 98%. The growing volume of state-led investments in the economy supports the stability of larger commercial banks, which often operate as agents of the government in implementing its development strategy. Fitch Ratings notes, however, that the banking sector faces increasing asset-quality risks due to rapid lending growth, high balance-sheet dollarization, and an increased reliance on external funding. Privately owned commercial banks are relatively small niche players. The government and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) still closely monitor commercial banks. According to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, the share of nonperforming loans out of total gross loans is 5.2% (as of January 1, 2022). The average share of nonperforming loans in state-owned banks is 5.4% and 4.1% in private banks. A majority of Uzbekistan’s commercial banks have earned “stable” ratings from international rating agencies. In July 2021, Moody’s Investors Service took rating actions on 14 banks following the change of outlook on the GOU’s B1 long-term issuer rating to positive from stable and upward revision of the banking system’s Macro Profile to “Weak-” from “Very Weak+” given the improving operating conditions in the country. As of January 1, 2022, the banking sector’s capitalization was about $6.6 billion, and the value of total bank assets in the whole country was equivalent to about $41 billion. The three largest state-owned banks – the National Bank of Uzbekistan, Asaka Bank, and Uzpromstroybank – hold 41% of the banking sector’s capital ($2.7 billion) and 44.3% of the assets ($18.3 billion). Uzbekistan maintains a central bank system. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) is the state issuing and reserve bank and central monetary authority. The bank is accountable to the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan and is independent of the executive bodies (the bank’s organization chart is available here: http://www.cbu.uz/en/ ). In general, any banking activity in Uzbekistan is subject to licensing and regulation by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. Foreign banks often feel pressured to establish joint ventures with local financial institutions. Currently there are seven banks with foreign capital operating in the market, and seven foreign banks have accredited representative offices in Uzbekistan, but do not provide direct services to local businesses and individuals. Information about the status of Uzbekistan’s correspondent banking relationships is not publicly available. Foreigners and foreign investors can establish bank accounts in local banks without restrictions. They also have access to local credit, although the terms and interest rates do not represent a competitive or realistic source of financing. The Fund for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan (UFRD) serves as a sovereign wealth fund. Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Finance, and the five largest state-owned banks were instrumental in establishing the UFRD, and all those institutions have membership on its Board of Directors. The fund does not follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles, and Uzbekistan does not participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on sovereign wealth funds. The GOU established the UFRD in 2006, using it to sterilize and accumulate foreign exchange revenues, but officially the goal of the UFRD is to provide government-guaranteed loans and equity investments to strategic sectors of the domestic economy. The UFRD does not invest, but instead provides debt financing to SOEs for modernization and technical upgrade projects in sectors that are strategically important for Uzbekistan’s economy. All UFRD loans require government approval. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate those sectors of the economy recognized by the government as being of national strategic interest. These include energy (power generation and transmission, and oil and gas refining, transportation, and distribution), metallurgy, mining (ferrous and non-ferrous metals and uranium), telecommunications (fixed telephony and data transmission), machinery (the automotive industry, locomotive and aircraft production and repair), and transportation (airlines and railways). Most SOEs register as joint-stock companies, and a minority share in these companies usually belongs to employees or private enterprises. Although SOEs have independent boards of directors, they must consult with the government before making significant business decisions. The government owns majority or blocking minority shares in numerous non-state entities, ensuring substantial control over their operations, as it retains the authority to regulate and control the activities and transactions of any company in which it owns shares. The Agency for Management of State-owned Assets is responsible for management of Uzbekistan’s state-owned assets, both those located in the country and abroad. There are no publicly available statistics with the exact number of wholly and majority state-owned enterprises, the number of people employed, or their contribution to the GDP. According to some official reports and fragmented statistics, there are over 3,500 SOEs in Uzbekistan, including 27 large enterprises and holding companies, about 2,900 unitary enterprises, and 486 joint stock companies, which employ about 1.5-1.7 million people, or about 13% of all domestically employed population. In 2021, the share of SOEs in the GDP was about 55%, and taxes paid by the ten largest SOEs contributed about 40% of total state budget revenues. The published list of major Uzbekistani SOEs is available on the official GOU website (listing large companies and banks only): http://www.gov.uz/en/pages/government_sites . By law, SOEs are obligated to operate under the same tax and regulatory environment as private businesses. In practice, however, private enterprises do not enjoy the same terms and conditions. In certain sectors, private businesses have limited access to commodities, infrastructure, and utilities due to legislation or licensing restrictions. They also face more than the usual number of bureaucratic hurdles if they compete with the government or government-controlled firms. Most SOEs have a range of advantages, including various tax holidays, as well as better access to commodities, energy and utility supplies, local and external markets, and financing. There are cases when gaps in the legislation are used to ignore the rights of private shareholders (including minority shareholders and holders of privileged shares) in joint stock companies with a state share. An April 2021 IMF Staff Report concluded that SOEs absorbed disproportionate shares of skilled labor, energy, and financial resources, while facing weak competition enforcement and enjoying a wealth of investment preferences. The GOU has officially recognized the problem. President Mirziyoyev said strong involvement of the state in the fuel and energy, petrochemical, chemical, transport, and banking sectors was hampering their development. In 2020, he issued several decrees and resolutions to improve the competition environment and reduce the dominance of SOEs in the economy. New legislation has strengthened the role of the Anti-Monopoly Committee, overturned over 600 obstructing laws and regulations, abolished 70 (out of 266) types of licenses and 35 (out of 140) permits for various types of businesses. The Presidential decree on SOE reformation and privatization (adopted October 27, 2020) orders 32 large SOEs to optimize and transform their corporate structure, 39 SOEs to introduce advanced corporate governance and financial audit systems, the privatization of state-owned shares in 541 enterprises through public auctions, and the sale of 15 public facilities to the private sector. The reform covers large SOEs in the energy, mining, telecommunications, transportation, construction, chemical, manufacturing, and other key industries. Another decree orders large-scale privatization in the banking sector. In 2020, the government started projects to privatize six state-owned banks in cooperation with international financial institutions. In addition to privatization efforts, the GOU intends to attract private investments to the public sector through promotion of public-private partnerships (PPP). The new law on PPP, adopted in 2019, and a number of follow-up regulations introduced in 2020, create a more favorable environment for such partnerships. Implementation of this SOE optimization and reform program will likely take some time, as the GOU seeks to avoid high social costs, such as mass unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic and global economic slowdown have almost stopped SOE reform. In September 2020, the IMF staff noted, “The crisis should not delay the reform of the state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises—including by improving their governance—and the agricultural sector. As the crisis abates, the authorities should also continue with reducing the role of the state in the economy, opening markets, and enhancing competition, and improving the business environment.” The IMF’s 2021 statement said: “After years of little progress, it is important to make a start [to reform the SOE sector]”. GOU policy papers indicate it is prioritizing further privatization of state-owned assets. The GOU’s goal is to reduce the public share of capital in the banking sector and business entities through greater attraction of foreign direct investments, local private investments, and promotion of public-private partnerships. The new public sector optimization policy was first announced in 2018. A special working group headed by the Prime Minister performed careful due diligence on about 3,000 enterprises with state shares and developed proposals for their reorganization and privatization. Based on the results, the GOU approved a program that covers over 620 SOEs in the energy, mining, telecommunications, transportation, construction, chemical, manufacturing, and other key industries. The program foresees privatization of 541 state-owned enterprises, six state-owned banks, and the sale of 15 public facilities to the private sector. In a longer-term perspective, the government plans to privatize over 1,115 SOEs and offer about 50 SOEs for public-private partnership projects. Companies that operate critical infrastructure and enterprises that qualify as companies of strategic importance will remain in full state ownership. Senior government officials see privatization and public-private partnerships as a solution to improve the economic performance of inefficient large SOEs and as an instrument to attract private investments. They view such investments as critical for the creation of new jobs and mitigation of state budget deficits. The GOU believes it needs to prepare SOEs for privatization by introducing advanced corporate governance methods and restructuring the organization and finances of underperforming SOEs. By law, privatization of non-strategic assets does not require government approval and can be cleared by local officials. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatization programs. For investors that privatize assets at preferential terms, the payment period is three years, and the investment commitment fulfillment term is five years. Large privatization deals with the involvement of foreign investment require GOU approval. Privatization programs officially have a public bidding process. The legislation and regulations adopted in 2020 for acceleration of the privatization program are intended to ensure the transparency and fairness of the process, as well as facilitating greater involvement of international financial institutions and foreign experts as consultants. In the past, however, privatization procedures have been confusing, discriminatory, and non-transparent. Many investors note a lack of transparency at the final stage of the bidding process when the government negotiates directly with bidders before announcing the results. In some cases, the bidders have been foreign-registered front companies associated with influential Uzbekistani families. The State Assets Management Agency of Uzbekistan coordinates the privatization program ( https://davaktiv.uz/en/privatization ). 8. Responsible Business Conduct There is no legislation on responsible business conduct (RBC) in Uzbekistan, and the concept has not been widely adopted, though many companies are active in charitable and corporate social responsibility activities, either through their own initiative or because they were mandated by local government officials. Historically, the level of forced labor involved in the annual cotton harvest (September – November) was high, as citizens were pressed into service in the fields to meet government targets for cotton production. However, much has changed since President Mirziyoyev took office and the GOU has reversed course and worked hard to eradicate forced labor from the harvest and move away from Soviet-era cotton production targets. The International Labor Organization (ILO) coordinated Third-Party Monitoring and observed a sharp decrease in forced labor during the 2021 cotton harvest. Efforts to eliminate trafficking in persons and forced labor leaped forward with the government’s February 2020 decision to end the state quota system for cotton. Dismantling the complex quota system required further development of the cluster system, first introduced in 2018 as a means to reduce forced labor. By the end of 2021, more than 96 clusters (privately operated, vertically integrated, cotton textile producing enterprises, including those with foreign capital) were registered in Uzbekistan and the percentage of land cultivated by or on behalf of private businesses grew considerably. With increased privatization of cotton production, the government ceded decisions about labor to private businesses. Relevant government agencies and departments inspect both newly registering and operating local businesses and enterprises for enforcement of the Labor Code in respect to labor and employment rights; the Law on Protection of Consumer’s Rights for consumer protections; and the Law on Protection of Nature for environmental protections. Labor or environmental laws and regulations are not waived for enterprises with private and foreign investments. Legislation, including the Law on Joint-Stock Companies and Protection of Shareholder’s Rights, issued in 1996 and last updated in 2018, sets a range of standards to protect the interests of minority shareholders. In 2018, the GOU approved corporate governance rules for SOEs. Their introduction is in progress. The Law on the Securities Market requires businesses that issue securities (except government securities) to publish annual reports, which should include a summary of business activities for the previous year, financial statements with a copy of an independent audit, and material facts on the activities of the issuer during the corresponding period. There are no independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations promoting or monitoring RBC in Uzbekistan. Some international organizations, like the Asian Development Bank, provide technical and advisory assistance to the government and local enterprises. Uzbekistan adopted its Corporate Governance Code in 2015 as a voluntary requirement. The same year, the GOU set corporate governance requirements for joint-stock companies (Decree UP-4720). At present, Uzbekistan does not adhere to the OECD guidelines regarding responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-afflicted and high-risk areas, and there has been no substantial evidence to suggest the government encourages foreign and local businesses to follow generally accepted CSR principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Uzbekistan does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Uzbekistan’s legislation prohibits the private security industry or use of private security companies within the country. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain . In recent years, the climate and natural capital monitoring strategies have taken a visible place in the GOU agenda although they are still at the stage of goal setting. In October 2019, President Mirziyoyev approved the Green Economy Transition Strategy for 2019-2030 (PP-4477). The Strategy is focused on improving energy efficiency of the basic sectors; diversifying energy consumption through introduction of renewable energy sources; mitigating and adapting to climate change, improving efficiency in the use of natural resources and conserving of natural ecosystems. The natural capital agenda of the GOU has been developed in close cooperation with, and with financial support from, international financial institutions, such as UNDP, World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and others. The Center for Hydrometeorological Services of Uzbekistan implements the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; the State Committee for Ecology and Environmental Protection implements the UN Convention on Biodiversity; and the State Forestry Committee implements the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. To some extent, environmental considerations are reflected in many policy papers, including the National Sustainable Development Goals, Environmental Protection Concept, Agriculture Development Strategy, Renewable Energy Plan, and Municipal Solid Waste Policy. The GOU is finalizing its Climate Change Strategy for the next decade. In 2021, Uzbekistan increased its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement – it plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP by 35 percent of 2010 levels by 2030, compared to the 10 percent reduction stated in the original NDC. The GOU is working on a new 2022-2050 NDC and Decarbonization Strategy in cooperation with EBRD and international expert consortium of Corporate Solutions, Tractebel, and Guidehouse, assisted by the Government of Japan. The approach is based on assumption that Uzbekistan can achieve zero carbon energy as early as 2050, both technically and economically. The GOU expects greater private sector contributions to achieving its environmental and natural capital goals. New policies that are currently under development expected to provide more financial and non-financial tools to support the green economy transition. Existing legislation, primarily the Law on Public-Private Partnership (ZRU-537 adopted May 10, 2019) contains incentives for the development of renewable energy generation. The GOU intends to attract private investment for building 8,000 MW wind and solar generators by 2026. Uzbekistan has introduced a set of national pollution standards for air, water, and soil. The GOU also maintain several projects on nature preservation, introduction of nature-based solutions in various industries, and sustainable forest management. However, the regulatory incentives to facilitate achievements of environmental and ecological goals are still underdeveloped. Uzbekistan is drafting its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) with the support of UNDP and the Green Climate Fund. The NAP may provide a framework for new regulatory incentives in six priority sectors: agriculture, water resources, healthcare, biodiversity, energy efficient housing and emergency management. As of now, resource efficiency, pollution abatement, and climate resilience considerations have very little influence on public procurement policies in Uzbekistan. The GOU is working on a new National Climate Change Strategy, which may facilitate introduction of public procurement and other incentives. 9. Corruption Uzbekistan’s legislation and Criminal Code both prohibit corruption. President Mirziyoyev has declared combatting widespread corruption one of his top priorities. On January 3, 2017, he approved the Law on Combating Corruption. The law is intended to raise the efficiency of anti-corruption measures through the consolidation of efforts of government bodies and civil society in preventing and combating cases of corruption, attempted corruption, and conflict of interest, ensuring punishment for such crimes. On June 29, 2020, Presidential Decree UP-4761 created an Anti-Corruption Agency. Subordinate to the president and reporting to Parliament, the agency is responsible for developing and implementing state policy to prevent and combat corruption. On July 6, 2021, Presidential Decree UP-6257 approved 2021-2022 State Anti-Corruption program, which includes a range of measures to ensure the transparency of the government and tighten criminal liability for violators. This program complements the strategy adopted in 2019. Its goals are to strengthen the independence of the judiciary system, develop a fair and transparent public service system requiring civil servants to declare their incomes, establish mechanisms to prevent conflicts of interest, and facilitate civil society and media participation in combating corruption. Along with the Anti-Corruption Committee, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan (PGO) is the government arm tasked with fighting corruption. Since Mirziyoyev took office in September 2016, the number of officials prosecuted under anti-corruption laws has increased. According to official statistics, over 9,000 corruption-related crimes were registered in 2017-2020. In 2021, Uzbekistani law enforcement agencies initiated 2,345 corruption related criminal cases and prosecuted 2,804 government officials, including 16 central, 241 regional and 2,547 local government officials. By preliminary assessments, the damage caused by budget embezzlement and corruption crimes in 2021 exceeded $90 million. Punishment has varied from fines to imprisonment with confiscation of property. Despite more active criminal prosecution of corrupt officials, however, fundamental reforms to eliminate the prerequisites for such offenses again showed no progress – the adoption of the Law on State Civil Service, which was first drafted 25 years ago, is still on hold. Formally, the anti-corruption legislation extends to all government officials, their family members, and members of all political parties of the country. From January 1, 2022, Uzbekistan introduces a system of mandatory declaration of income and property for all civil servants, heads and deputies of state-owned enterprises and institutions (entities with state ownership share over 50%), as well as for their spouses and minor children. In recent years, the GOU has demonstrated efforts to improve the legal framework of awarding contracts and procedures for public procurement. To reduce corruption, the new legal framework provides for the introduction of more transparent electronic bidding systems. The new Law on Natural Resources (ZRU-403 of June 23, 2020), in combination with the Law on Production Sharing Agreements, the Law on Concessions, and various Government Resolutions specify procedures for awarding natural resource extraction contracts and licenses. The most recent Public Procurement Law (ZRU-684, adopted April 22, 2021, effective January 1, 2022) streamlines relevant procedures and requirements. According to the legislation, public procurement or a natural resource extraction contract/license can be awarded through an open auction through E-IJRO AUKSION electronic auction platform, or by decision of the government. In the latter case, the legislation lacks details on actual application procedures and the government’s decision-making process. While enforcement of the new legislation is still at early stage, the process of awarding GOU contracts continues to lack transparency. The Law on Combating Corruption (ZRU-419, adopted January 3, 2017, last updated November 19, 2021) prescribes a range of measures for preventing corruption, including raising public awareness and introducing transparent rules for public-private interactions. According to the law, all public officials are obliged to notify their supervisors or law enforcement agencies of all cases of proposed corruption from businesses or individuals, as well as any similar offenses committed by other public service employees. The law, however, does not specifically encourage companies to establish relevant internal codes of conduct. Currently only a few local companies created by or with foreign investors have effective internal ethics programs. Uzbekistan is a member of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network (ACN) for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. One of the latest OECD reports on anti-corruption reforms in Uzbekistan (March 21, 2019) says that, although Uzbekistan has already undertaken a number of key anti-corruption reforms, the GOU now needs to systematize its anti-corruption policy by making it strategic in nature. The Law on Combating Corruption encourages more active involvement of NGOs and civil society in investigation and prevention of crimes related with corruption. However, there are still very few officially registered local anti-corruption NGOs. One of them – Transparency Uzbekistan – was registered in September 2021. Embassy Tashkent is not aware of any active corruption investigations conducted by local NGOs. There is evidence of unjust persecution of local civil society activists who are fighting corruption. Corruption is still a notable factor in the economy and social sphere of Uzbekistan due to the insufficiency of law enforcement practices and relatively low wages in the public sector. Recognizing the issue, the country’s leadership has initiated legislative and institutional reforms, which has already raised Uzbekistan’s rating in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 157 (out of 180 rated countries) in 2017 to 140 in 2021. U.S. businesses have cited corruption and lack of transparency in bureaucratic processes, including public procurements and licensing, as among the main obstacles to foreign direct investment in Uzbekistan. The government agencies that are responsible for combating corruption are the Anti-Corruption Agency, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice. Currently, no international or local nongovernmental watchdog organizations have permission to monitor corruption in Uzbekistan. Contact information for the office of the Anti-Corruption Agency of Uzbekistan: Address: 8A, Shota Rustavely St., 100070, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Website: https://anticorruption.uz/en/item/report-corruption Hotline telephone numbers: +998(71) 202-0400 (Ext 709), 271-1007 Email: info@unticorruption.uz Contact information for the office of Uzbekistan’s Prosecutor General: Address: 66, Akademik Gulyamov St., 100047, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Website: www.prokuratura.uz Hotline telephone numbers: +998(71) 1007, 202-0486 Contact information for the office of Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Justice: Address: 5, Sayilgoh Street, 100047, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Website: http://www.minjust.uz/en/ , http://www.minjust.uz/ru/anticorruption/feedback/ Hotline telephone numbers: +998(71) 1008, 262-9245б 207-0443 E-mail: info@adliya.uz 10. Political and Security Environment Uzbekistan does not have a history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. There have not been any examples of damage to projects or installations over the past ten years. Uzbekistani authorities maintain a high level of alert and aggressive security measures to thwart terrorist attacks. The environment in Uzbekistan is not growing increasingly politicized or insecure. 11. Labor Policies and Practices During 2020, the population of Uzbekistan increased by 712,363 people (2.3%) to 35,271,276. The gender distribution is roughly equal: 17.5 million men and 17.4 million women. According to publicly available statistics, about 30% of the population is under 16 years old; 60% is working age (16-60); and 10% is 60 years old and older. Uzbekistan’s State Statistics Agency reports indicate the total number of laborers, as of January 1, 2022, was 19.3 million people (a 1% increase year-on-year). Nearly 12 million of them were considered employed. The share of the non-agricultural workforce is about 73%. There are about three million Uzbekistani citizens who work abroad as labor migrants. The official number of unemployed is over 1.4 million people, or 9.5%. Note: The accuracy of given statistics is based on records of the residents’ registration offices and studies conducted by the Ministry of Labor but does not always reflect the actual situation in the country. The next national census in Uzbekistan is expected in 2023, while the last one was in 1989. End note. It is relatively easy to find qualified employees in Uzbekistan, and salaries are low by Western standards. According to both government and independent analysts’ statistics, about 9-12% of the population live below the poverty level (on poverty ratio applicable for lower middle-income countries, or $3.20 a day based on purchasing-power-parity in constant prices of 2011), and approximately 48% of the employed population have low-productivity and low-income jobs. Accordingly, Uzbekistan is one of the largest suppliers of labor migrants among former Soviet Union republics. Independent consultants estimated Uzbekistan’s informal economy at 48-62% of GDP, or up to $40 billion. The number of unofficially employed people is close to 6 million. There is no clear line between formal and informal economies, as many companies practice double bookkeeping to avoid some tax liabilities. In addition to clearly criminal activities, the share of which is relatively insignificant, “grey economy” businesses may be observed in various sectors, including trade, financial services, construction, home-based manufacturing, and transportation. The GOU recognizes the scale of the problem. A strategy to combat the informal economy was adopted in 2020 and expanded in 2021. The main rules for ensuring business legality came into force in January 1, 2022. Their ill-conceived and brutal introduction, especially in the field of tax administration, caused shock and confusion, especially among small businesses. As a result of intense public debate, the government had to postpone their enforcement. In general, businesses in the informal economy have been the main violators of intellectual property rights, and the main suppliers of counterfeit products that created marketing difficulties for U.S. and other foreign business. At 99%, literacy is nearly universal, but most local technical and managerial training does not meet international business standards. Foreign firms report that younger Uzbekistanis are more flexible in adapting to changing international business practices but are also less educated than their Soviet-trained elders. Widespread corruption in the education sector has lowered educational standards as unqualified students purchase grades and even admittance to prestigious universities and lyceums. Legislation requires companies to hire Uzbekistani nationals for specified positions in banking and auditing companies. The chief accountant must be an Uzbekistani national, as should either the CEO or any one member of the board of directors. Only Uzbekistani nationals can be tour guides. Businesses registered within special economic and industrial zones must have at least 90% locally sourced labor force. According to Uzbekistan’s Labor Code, labor-management relations should be formalized in a fixed-term or temporary employment contract. The maximum length of a single fixed-term contract is 60 months ( https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/labormarketeconomy/uzbekistan ). The Labor Code and subordinate labor legislation differentiate between layoffs and firing. Employees can terminate their employment by filing written notice two-weeks prior or applying for leave without pay. Layoffs or temporary leave without pay can be initiated by an employer if the economic situation declines. For firing (severance), the employer should personally give two months’ advance notice in the case of corporate liquidation or optimization, two weeks’ advance notice in the case of an employee’s incompetence, and three days’ advance notice in the case of an employee’s malpractice or unacceptable violations. In case of severance caused by corporate liquidation or optimization, an employee should receive compensation, which should not be less than two average monthly salaries paid during their employment plus payment for unused leave (if another form of compensation was not agreed to in the employment contract). In reality, however, many businesses choose to avoid signing formal contracts with employees, especially those involved in seasonal agricultural or construction work. Officially, labor legislation cannot be waived or applied differently for private or foreign-owned enterprises, including those that operate in special economic and industrial zones. On March 4, 2020, Uzbekistan joined the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The new Law on Trade Unions (ZRU-588) was adopted in December 2019. According to this law, all trade union activities should be based on the principles of the compliance, voluntariness, non-discrimination, independence and self-governance, equality, transparency and openness. The law guarantees rights of trade unions and their associations and protects them from illegal interventions of government agencies, officials and employers. Currently, the Board of the Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan incorporates 37,659 primary organizations and 14 regional trade unions, with official reports of 6.1 million employees in the country participating. These trade unions are all government owned and operated, including the Federation of Trade Unions. By law, all employees of either local or foreign-owned enterprises operating in Uzbekistan have the right to: fair and timely payment of wages that should not be less than the minimum monthly salary amounts set by the government; a standard workweek of forty hours, with a mandatory rest period of twenty-four hours and annual leave; overtime compensation as specified in employment contracts or agreed to with an employee’s trade union, which can be implemented in the form of additional pay or leave. The law states that overtime compensation should not be less than 200% of the employee’s average monthly salary rate (broken down by hours worked). Additional leave time should not be less than the length of actual overtime work; working conditions that meet occupational health and safety standards prescribed by legislation; compensation of any health or property damages incurred as a result of professional duties through an employer’s fault; professional training; formation and joining of labor unions; pensions; and legal support in protection of workers’ rights. There is no single state institution responsible for labor arbitration. The general court system, where civil and criminal cases are tried, is responsible for resolving labor-related disputes. This can be done on a regional or city level. Formally, workers can file their complaints through the Prosecutor General’s Office. The Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations should provide legal support to employees in their labor disputes. The law neither provides for nor prohibits the right to strike. In recent years, SOE employees in the mining and petrochemical industries and workers involved in various public projects conducted strikes, protesting against salary payment delays and demanding improvement of their working conditions. Reportedly, ministerial and local government officials met with strike initiators and promised to resolve issues raised by the workers. There is no public information about the role of official unions in these negotiations. Although employees in Uzbekistan enjoy many rights by law, in practice these laws are subject to arbitrary and inconsistent interpretation. For example, the law prohibits compulsory overtime – and only 120 hours of overtime per year is permitted. In practice, overtime limitations are not widely observed, and compensation is rarely paid. Wage violations have become more common in recent years. 18 conventions and one Protocol of the UN’s International Labor Organization (ILO) are officially in force in Uzbekistan: Forced Labor Convention; Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention; Equal Remuneration Convention; Abolition of Forced Labor Convention; Discrimination [Employment and Occupation] Convention; Minimum Age Convention; Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention; Labor Inspection Convention; Employment Policy Convention; Labor Inspection (agriculture) Convention; Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention; Forty-Hour Week Convention; Holidays with Pay Convention; Maternity Protection Convention [Revised]; Workers’ Representatives Convention; Collective Bargaining Convention; Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 (No. 187); and Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labor Convention. The most recent observations of the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) can be reviewed here: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103538 The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including by children, except as legal punishment for offenses such as robbery, fraud, or tax evasion, or as specified by law. Uzbekistan has eliminated the systematic use of child labor in the annual cotton harvest and has implemented reforms to significantly improve its record on adult forced labor. Despite strong political will in the central government to eradicate adult forced labor, at the local level its use in the cotton harvest is still reported, albeit in steadily decreasing numbers. The Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations establishes and enforces occupational health and safety standards. Labor inspectors conduct routine inspections of small and medium-sized businesses once every four years and inspect larger enterprises once every three years. The labor inspectorate – significantly expanded in size — was previously unable to conduct unscheduled inspections, but these are now legal and in regular use. In 2021, Uzbekistan adopted and enacted several labor related laws and regulations, including: The Law on Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (New York, December 13, 2006) (ZRU-695, adopted June 7, 2021). By this law, Uzbekistan recognizes the right of persons with disabilities to work on an equal basis with others, including the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labor market and work environment that is open, inclusive, and accessible to persons with disabilities. The Law on Ratification of the ILO Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 No. 187 (ZRU-693, adopted June 4, 2021). By this law, Uzbekistan became committed to the continuous improvement of occupational safety and health through the development of a national programs for the prevention of occupational diseases, occupational injuries, and fatalities. The Law on Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Health of Citizens and the Labor Code (ZRU-705, adopted August 2, 2021). The law introduces amendments related with mandatory vaccination requirements in cases of pandemic threats, as well as the possibility of suspension of employment in case of employee’s refusal from mandatory vaccination. The Law on the Legal Status of Foreign and Stateless Persons (ZRU-692, adopted June 4, 2021). The law guarantees the rights of foreign citizens and stateless persons to have employment, social security, health care, education, etc. The Law on Employment of the Population (ZRU-642, adopted October 20, 2020, entered into force January 21, 2021). This law applies to citizens of Uzbekistan, foreign citizens, and individuals without citizenship, as well as foreign citizens permanently residing or employed in the country. The law obliges government bodies to pursue a policy of developing the labor market and ensuring employment, developing family entrepreneurship, handicrafts, agricultural production on personal subsidiary plots, and home-based employment. The law establishes the status of a self-employed person, the procedure for their taxation, and their rights to have benefits. The law also specifies the rights of unemployed people. The Law on Persons with Disabilities (ZRU-641, adopted October 15, 2020, entered into force January 16, 2021). The law defines the rights of persons with disabilities, and stipulates issues of their education, vocational training, advanced training, and employment. 14. Contact for More Information Eric Salzman Economic and Commercial Officer 3, Maykurgan St., Yunusabad District, 100093, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Telephone Number: +998-71-140-2130 Email address: BusinessInUzbekistan@state.gov . Vietnam Executive Summary Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to be of vital importance to Vietnam, as a means to support post-COVID economic recovery and drive the government’s aspirations to achieve middle-income status by 2045. As a result, the government has policies in place that are broadly conducive to U.S. investment. Factors that attract foreign investment include government commitments to fight climate change issues, free trade agreements, political stability, ongoing economic reforms, a young and increasingly urbanized and educated population, and competitive labor costs. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), which oversees investment activities, at the end of December 2021 Vietnam had cumulatively received $241.6 billion in FDI. In 2021, Vietnam’s once successful “Zero COVID” approach was overwhelmed by an April outbreak that led to lengthy shutdowns, especially in manufacturing, and steep economic costs. However, the government reacted quickly to launch a successful national vaccination campaign, which enabled the country to switch from strict lockdowns to a “living with COVID” policy by the end of the year. The Government of Vietnam’s fiscal stimulus, combined with global supply chain shifts, resulted in Vietnam receiving $19.74 billion in FDI in 2021 – a 1.2 percent decrease over the same period in 2020. Of the 2021 investments, 59 percent went into manufacturing – especially in electronics, textiles, footwear, and automobile parts industries; 8 percent in utilities and energy; 15 percent in real estate; and smaller percentages in other industries. The government approved the following major FDI projects in 2021: Long An I and II LNG Power Plant Project ($3.1 billion); LG Display Project in Hai Phong ($2.15 billion); O Mon II Thermal Power Plant Factory in Can Tho ($1.31 billion); Kraft Vina Paper Factory in Vinh Phuc ($611.4 million); Polytex Far Eastern Vietnam Co., Ltd Factory Project ($610 million). At the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh made an ambitious pledge to reach net zero emissions by 2050, by increasing use of clean energy and phasing out coal-fueled power generation. In January 2022 Vietnam introduced new regulations that place responsibility on producers and importers to manage waste associated with the full life cycle of their products. The Government also issued a decree on greenhouse gas mitigation, ozone layer protection, and carbon market development in Vietnam. Vietnam’s recent moves forward on free trade agreements make it easier to attract FDI by providing better market access for Vietnamese exports and encouraging investor-friendly reforms. The EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) entered into force August 1, 2020. Vietnam signed the UK-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement entered into force May 1, 2021. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) entered into force January 1, 2022 for ten countries, including Vietnam. These agreements may benefit U.S. companies operating in Vietnam by reducing barriers to inputs from and exports to participating countries, but also make it more challenging for U.S. exports to Vietnam to compete against competitors benefiting from preferential treatment. In February 2021, the 13th Party Congress of the Communist Party approved a ten-year economic strategy that calls for shifting foreign investments to high-tech industries and ensuring those investments include provisions relating to environmental protection. On January 1, 2021, Vietnam’s Securities Law and new Labor Code Law, which the National Assembly originally approved in 2019, came into force. The Securities Law formally states the government’s intention to remove foreign ownership limits for investments in most industries. The new Labor Code includes several updated provisions including greater contract flexibility, formal recognition of a greater part of the workforce, and allowing workers to join independent workers’ rights organizations, though key implementing decrees remain pending. On June 17, 2020, Vietnam passed a revised Law of Investment and a new Public Private Partnership Law, both designed to encourage foreign investment into large infrastructure projects, reduce the burden on the government to finance such projects, and increase linkages between foreign investors and the Vietnamese private sector. Despite a comparatively high level of FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP – 7.3 percent in 2020 – significant challenges remain in Vietnam’s investment climate. These include widespread corruption, entrenched State Owned Enterprises (SOE), regulatory uncertainty in key sectors like digital economy and energy, weak legal infrastructure, poor enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), a shortage of skilled labor, restrictive labor practices, and the government’s slow decision-making process. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 44 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2,820 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,650 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment FDI continues to play a key role in upholding the country’s economy. Vietnam Customs reported that FDI companies exported $247 billion worth of goods in 2021, representing 73.6 percent of total exports, a 21.1 percent increase over 2020. The government, at both central and municipal levels, actively seeks to welcome FDI. The Politburo issued Resolution 55 in 2019 to increase Vietnam’s attractiveness to foreign investment. This Resolution aims to attract $50 billion in new foreign investment by 2030. In 2020, the government revised laws on investment and enterprise, in addition to passing the Public Private Partnership Law, to further the goals of this Resolution. The revisions encourage high-quality investments, use and development of advanced technologies, and environmental protection mechanisms. While Vietnam’s revised Law of Investment says the government must treat foreign and domestic investors equally, foreign investors have complained about having to cross extra hurdles to get ordinary government approvals. The government continues to have foreign ownership limits (FOLs) in industries Vietnam considers important to national security. In January 2020, the government removed FOLs on companies in the electronic payment sector and reformed electronic payments procedures for foreign firms. Some U.S. investors report that these changes have provided more regulatory certainty, which has, in turn, instilled greater confidence as they consider long-term investments in Vietnam. U.S. investors continue to cite concerns about confusing tax regulations and retroactive changes to laws – including tax rates, tax policies, and preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). U.S. companies also reported facing difficulties in extending/renewing investment certificates – citing prolonged periods of non-responsiveness from government agencies. In 2021, a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Hanoi listed the need for “administrative reforms that streamline regulations and promote transparency” as the top key element of a roadmap for a sustainable growth in Vietnam. The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is the country’s national agency charged with promoting and facilitating foreign investment; most provinces and cities also have local equivalents. MPI and local investment promotion offices provide information and explain regulations and policies to foreign investors. They also inform the Prime Minister and National Assembly on trends in foreign investment. However, U.S. investors should still consult legal counsel and/or other experts regarding issues on regulations that are unclear. Vietnam’s senior leaders often meet with foreign governments and private-sector representatives to emphasize Vietnam’s attractiveness as an FDI destination. The semiannual Vietnam Business Forum includes meetings between foreign investors and Vietnamese government officials. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council (USABC), AmCham, and other U.S. associations also host multiple yearly missions for their U.S. company members, which allow direct engagement with senior government officials. Foreign investors in Vietnam have reported that these meetings and dialogues have helped address obstacles. Both foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises in Vietnam and engage in most forms of legal remunerative activity in non-regulated sectors. Vietnam has some statutory restrictions on foreign investment, including FOLs or requirements for joint partnerships, projects in banking, network infrastructure services, non-infrastructure telecommunication services, transportation, energy, and defense. The new Decree 31/2021/ND-CP dated 26 March 2021 provides a list of 25 business lines in which foreigners are prohibited to invest and 59 other business lines subjected to market access requirements. By law, the Prime Minister can waive these FOLs on a case-by-case basis. In practice, however, when the government has removed or eased FOLs, it has done so for the whole industry sector rather than for a specific investment. MPI plays a key role with respect to investment screening. All FDI projects required approval by the People’s Committee in the province in which the project would be located. By law, large-scale FDI projects must also obtained the approval of the National Assembly before investment can proceed. MPI’s approval process includes an assessment of the investor’s legal status and financial strength; the project’s compatibility with the government’s long- and short-term goals for economic development and government revenue; the investor’s technological expertise; environmental protection; and plans for land use and land clearance compensation, if applicable. The government can, and sometimes does, stop certain foreign investments if it deems the investment harmful to Vietnam’s national security. The following FDI projects also require the Prime Minister’s approval: airports; grade 1 seaports (seaports the government classifies as strategic); casinos; oil and gas exploration, production, and refining; telecommunications/network infrastructure; forestry projects; publishing; and projects that need approval from more than one province. In 2021, the government removed the requirement that the Prime Minister needs to approve investments over $271 million or investments in the tobacco industry. Recent third-party investment policy reviews include: WTO’s 2021 Trade Policy Review World Bank’s Review from 2020 OECD’s 2018 Review UNCTAD Investment Policy Review The Government of Vietnam has several initiatives in progress to implement administrative reforms, such as building e-Government platforms and single window services. In May 2021, USAID and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) released the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 2020 Report, which examined trends in economic governance. This annual report provides an independent, unbiased view on the provincial business environment by surveying over 8,500 domestic private firms on a variety of business issues. Overall, Vietnam’s median PCI score improved, reflecting the government’s efforts to improve economic governance and the quality of infrastructure, as well as a decline in the prevalence of corruption. Vietnam’s nationwide business registration site is here. In addition, as a member of the UNCTAD international network of transparent investment procedures, information on Vietnam’s investment regulations can be found online (Vietnam Investment Regulations Website). The website provides information for foreign and national investors on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal and regulatory citations for seven major provinces. The government does not have a clear mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it have regulations restricting domestic investors from investing abroad. According to a preliminary report from the General Statistics Office, Vietnam invested $819 million in 134 projects abroad in 2020. By the end of 2020, total outward FDI investment from Vietnam was $21 billion in more than 1,400 projects in 78 countries. Laos received the most outward FDI, with $5 billion, followed by Russia and Cambodia with $2.8 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively. The main sectors of outward investment for Vietnam are mining, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, telecommunication, and energy. 3. Legal Regime U.S. companies continue to report that they face frequent and significant challenges with inconsistent regulatory interpretation, irregular enforcement, and an unclear legal framework. AmCham members have consistently voiced concerns that Vietnam lacks a fair legal system for investments, which affects U.S. companies’ ability to do business in Vietnam. The 2020 PCI report documented companies’ difficulties dealing with land, taxes, and social insurance issues, but also found improvements in procedures related to business administration and anti-corruption. Accounting systems are inconsistent with international norms, and this increases transaction costs for investors. The government had previously said it intended to have most companies transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2020. Unable to meet this target, the Ministry of Finance in March 2020 extended the deadline to 2025. In Vietnam, the National Assembly passes laws, which serve as the highest form of legal direction, but often lack specifics. Ministries provide draft laws to the National Assembly. The Prime Minister issues decrees, which provide guidance on implementation. Individual ministries issue circulars, which provide guidance on how a ministry will administer a law or decree. After implementing ministries have cleared a particular law to send the law to the National Assembly, the government posts the law for a 60-day comment period. However, in practice, the public comment period is sometimes truncated. Foreign governments, NGOs, and private-sector companies can, and do, comment during this period, after which the ministry may redraft the law. Upon completion of the revisions, the ministry submits the legislation to the Office of the Government (OOG) for approval, including the Prime Minister’s signature, and the legislation moves to the National Assembly for committee review. During this process, the National Assembly can send the legislation back to the originating ministry for further changes. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s Politburo reserves the right to review special or controversial laws. In practice, drafting ministries often lack the resources needed to conduct adequate data-driven assessments. Ministries are supposed to conduct policy impact assessments that holistically consider all factors before drafting a law, but the quality of these assessments varies. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) oversees administrative procedures for government ministries and agencies. The MOJ has a Regulatory Management Department, which oversees and reviews legal documents after they are issued to ensure compliance with the legal system. The Law on the Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents requires all legal documents and agreements to be published online and open for comments for 60 days, and to be published in the Official Gazette before implementation. Business associations and various chambers of commerce regularly comment on draft laws and regulations. However, when issuing more detailed implementing guidelines, government entities sometimes issue circulars with little advance warning and without public notification, resulting in little opportunity for comment by affected parties. In several cases, authorities allowed comments for the first draft only and did not provide subsequent draft versions to the public. The centralized location where key regulatory actions are published can be found here . The Ministry of Finance has provisions laws instructing public companies to produce an annual report disclosing their environmental, social and corporate governance policies. In 2016, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam, in cooperation with the International Finance Corporation, published an Environmental and Social Disclosure Guide which encourages independent external assurance. While almost all public companies in Vietnam now perform an environmental and social impact assessment when investing in a new project, many see this exercise as merely procedural. While general information is publicly available, Vietnam’s public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) are not transparent. The National Assembly set a statutory limit for public debt at 65 percent of nominal GDP, and, according to official figures, Vietnam’s public debt to GDP ratio at the end of 2021 was 43.7 percent – down from 53.3 percent the previous year. However, the official public-debt figures exclude the debt of certain large SOEs. This poses a risk to Vietnam’s public finances, as the government is liable for the debts of these companies. Vietnam could improve its fiscal transparency by making its executive budget proposal, including budgetary and debt expenses, widely and easily accessible to the general public long before the National Assembly enacts the budget, ensuring greater transparency of off-budget accounts, and by publicizing the criteria by which the government awards contracts and licenses for natural resource extraction. Vietnam’s legal system mixes indigenous, French, and Soviet-inspired civil legal traditions. Vietnam generally follows an operational understanding of the rule of law that is consistent with its top-down, one-party political structure and traditionally inquisitorial judicial system, though in recent years the country has begun gradually introducing elements of an adversarial system. The hierarchy of the country’s courts is: 1) the Supreme People’s Court; 2) the High People’s Court; 3) Provincial People’s Courts; 4) District People’s Courts, and 5) Military Courts. The People’s Courts operate in five divisions: criminal, civil, administrative, economic, and labor. The Supreme People’s Procuracy is responsible for prosecuting criminal activities as well as supervising judicial activities. Vietnam lacks an independent judiciary and separation of powers among Vietnam’s branches of government. For example, Vietnam’s Chief Justice is also a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. According to Transparency International, there is significant risk of corruption in judicial rulings. Low judicial salaries engender corruption; nearly one-fifth of surveyed Vietnamese households that have been to court declared that they had paid bribes at least once. Many businesses therefore avoid Vietnamese courts as much as possible. The judicial system continues to face additional problems: for example, many judges and arbitrators lack adequate legal training and are appointed through personal or political contacts with party leaders or based on their political views. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and appeals are adjudicated in the national court system. Through a separate legal mechanism, individuals and companies can file complaints against enforcement actions under the Law on Complaints. The 2005 Commercial Law regulates commercial contracts between businesses. Specific regulations prescribe specific forms of contracts, depending on the nature of the deals. If a contract does not contain a dispute-resolution clause, courts will have jurisdiction over a dispute. Vietnamese law allows dispute-resolution clauses in commercial contracts explicitly through the Law on Commercial Arbitration. The law follows the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law as an international standard for procedural rules. Vietnamese courts will only consider recognition of civil judgments issued by courts in countries that have entered into agreements on recognition of judgments with Vietnam or on a reciprocal basis. However, with the exception of France, these treaties only cover non-commercial judgments. The legal system includes provisions to promote foreign investment. Vietnam uses a “negative list” approach to approve foreign investment, meaning foreign businesses are allowed to operate in all areas except for six prohibited sectors – from which domestic businesses are also prohibited. These include illicit drugs, wildlife trade, prostitution, human trafficking, human cloning, and debt collection services. The law also requires that foreign and domestic investors be treated equally in cases of nationalization and confiscation. However, foreign investors are subject to different business-licensing processes and restrictions, and companies registered in Vietnam that have majority foreign ownership are subject to foreign-investor business-license procedures. The Ministry of Planning and Investment enacted Circular No. 02/2022/TT-BKHĐT, which came into effect on April 1, 2022, guiding the supervision and investment assessments of foreign investment activities in Vietnam, providing a common template. It also examines the implementation of financial obligations towards the State; the execution of legal provisions on labor, foreign exchange control, environment, land, construction, fire prevention and fighting and other specialized legal regulations; the financial situation of the foreign-invested economic organization; and other provisions related to the implementation of investment projects. The 2019 Labor Code, which came into effect January 1, 2021, provides greater flexibility in contract termination, allows employees to work more overtime hours, increases the retirement age, and adds flexibility in labor contracts. The Law on Investment, revised in June 2020, stipulated that Vietnam would encourage FDI through financial incentives in the areas of university education, pollution mitigation, and certain medical research. The Public Private Partnership Law, passed in June 2020, lists transportation, electricity grid and power plants, irrigation, water supply and treatment, waste treatment, health care, education, and IT infrastructure as prioritized sectors for FDI and public-private partnerships. Vietnam has a “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The Vietnam Competition and Consumer Authority (“VCCA”) of MOIT reviews transactions subject to complaints for competition-related concerns. In 2021, VCCA reported that 125 merger control notifications, most of which related to real estate, have been submitted since 2019. Thirty percent of cases notified involved offshore transactions. The VCCA clarified that the Vietnam merger control regime seeks to regulate only relevant transactions that may have an anticompetitive impact on Vietnamese markets, especially those that enable enterprises to hold a dominant or monopoly position and heighten the risk of an abuse of dominance. Under the law, the government of Vietnam can only expropriate investors’ property in cases of emergency, disaster, defense, or national interest, and the government is required to compensate investors if it expropriates property. Under the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam must apply international standards of treatment in any case of expropriation or nationalization of U.S. investor assets, which includes acting in a non-discriminatory manner with due process of law and with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The U.S. Mission in Vietnam is unaware of any current expropriation cases involving U.S. firms. Under the 2014 Bankruptcy Law, bankruptcy is not criminalized unless it relates to another crime. The law defines insolvency as a condition in which an enterprise is more than three months overdue in meeting its payment obligations. The law also provides provisions allowing creditors to commence bankruptcy proceedings against an enterprise and procedures for credit institutions to file for bankruptcy. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report, Vietnam ranked 122 out of 190 for resolving insolvency. The report noted that it still takes five years on average to conclude a bankruptcy case in Vietnam. The Credit Information Center of the State Bank of Vietnam provides credit information services for foreign investors concerned about the potential for bankruptcy with a Vietnamese partner. 4. Industrial Policies Foreign investors are exempt from import duties on goods imported for their own use that cannot be procured locally, including machinery; vehicles; components and spare parts for machinery and equipment; raw materials; inputs for manufacturing; and construction materials. Remote and mountainous provinces and special industrial zones are allowed to provide additional tax breaks and other incentives to prospective investors. Investment incentives, including lower corporate income tax rates, exemption of some import tariffs, or favorable land rental rates, are available in the following sectors: advanced technology; research and development; new materials; energy; clean energy; renewable energy; energy saving products; automobiles; software; waste treatment and management; and primary or vocational education. The government rarely issues guarantees for financing FDI projects; when it does so, it is usually because the project links to a national security priority. Joint financing with the government occurs when a foreign entity partners with an SOE. The government’s reluctance to guarantee projects reflects its desire to stay below a statutory 65 percent public debt-to-GDP ratio cap, and a desire to avoid incurring liabilities from projects that would not be economically viable without the guarantee. This has delayed approval of many large-scale FDI projects. Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is seeking to implement a Direct Power Purchase Agreement (DPPA) pilot scheme which, for the first time, will enable renewable energy generators to directly sell clean electricity to private-sector customers. Under current electricity regulations in Vietnam, Electricity Vietnam (EVN) has a statutory monopoly over the transmission, distribution, wholesale, and retail of electricity and is also the sole off taker in the market. The pilot scheme is expected to run from 2022 to 2024 and support Vietnam’s transition in the liberalization of Vietnam’s wholesale and retail electricity markets. It is anticipated that DPPAs will be introduced into the market on a permanent basis from 2025 onwards. Vietnam has prioritized efforts to establish and develop different kinds of foreign trade zones (FTZs) over the last decade. Industrial Zones (IZs) are dedicated areas for industrial activities; Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are specific kind of IZ, focused on export-oriented production and activities. Vietnam currently has more than 350 IZs and EPZs. Many foreign investors report that it is easier to implement projects in IZs than in other types of zoned land because they do not have to be involved in site clearance and infrastructure construction. Enterprises in FTZs pay no duties when importing raw materials if they export the finished products. Customs warehouse companies in FTZs can provide transportation services and act as distributors for the goods deposited. Additional services relating to customs declaration, appraisal, insurance, reprocessing, or packaging require the approval of the provincial customs office. In practice, the time involved for clearance and delivery of goods by provincial custom officials can be lengthy and unpredictable. Companies operating in economic zones are entitled to more tax reductions as measures to incentivize investments. According to the Law on Investment (LOI) 2020, Article 11 “Guarantees for business investment activities,” the State cannot require investors to: Give priority to purchase or use of domestic goods/services; or only purchase or use goods/services provided by domestic producers/service providers; Achieve a certain export target; restrict the quantity, value, types of goods/services that are exported or domestically produced/provided; Import a quantity/value of goods that is equivalent to the quantity/value of goods exported; or balance foreign currencies earned from export to meet import demands; Reach a certain rate of import substitution; Reach a certain level/value of domestic research and development; Provide goods/service at a particular location in Vietnam or overseas; and Have the headquarters situated at a location requested by a competent authority. There are additional market entry requirements and limitations for investments in “conditional” sectors listed in Appendix IV of the LOI. As of March 2022, MPI and respective ministries and regulatory agencies are working to specify detailed conditions for each sector. All investors, foreign or domestic, must obtain formal approval, in the form of business licenses or other certifications, to satisfy “necessary conditions for reasons of national defense, security or order, social safety, social morality, and health of the community.” In addition, the LOI 2020 also introduces the regulation of sectors “with market entry restrictions,” including: (i) Percentage ownership limits; (ii) Restrictions on the form of investment; (iii) Restrictions on the scope of business and investment activities; (iv) Financial capacity of the investors and partners; and (v) Other conditions under international treaties and Vietnamese law. As of March 2022, MPI is drafting additional guidance to specify conditions for each sector. In addition to market access conditions, the LOI 2020 adds two additional conditions for foreign investors investing in or acquiring capital/share in a Vietnamese company as follows: The investment must not compromise national defense and security of Vietnam; and The investment must comply with the conditions relating to the use of sea-lands, borderlands, and coastal lands in accordance with the applicable laws. The term “national defense and security” is not defined under the LOI 2020; this ambiguity gives regulatory agencies considerable flexibility to restrict investment activities in sensitive sectors or locations. Future investment projects could also be ratified based on other laws, National Assembly Resolution, Ordinance, National Assembly Standing Committee’s Resolution, Government Decree and international treaties, which has been creating complexity and volatility in Vietnam’s business investment. For existing investment projects, the extension of the investment term will not be granted to any project using outdated technology, having any potential negative impact on the environment, or involving any exploitation of natural resources. On January 1, 2019, the Law on Cybersecurity (LOCS) came into effect, requiring cross-border services to store data of Vietnamese users in Vietnam and establish local presence, despite sustained international and domestic opposition to the regulation. The government committed to consider comments from the U.S. government, companies, and trade associations and promised to consult with the U.S. government before finalization. In September 2020, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) released a partial draft Decree to guide the implementation of the LOCS, which requires foreign services providers to localize their data and establish local presence only when they violate Vietnamese laws and fail to cooperate with MPS to address their violations. However, local companies must comply with data localization requirements, which would cause unnecessary burdens for local companies and foreign business partners. The draft Decree is also expected to prescribe procedures for law enforcement to handle digital evidence, which may include source code and/or access to encryption, to serve criminal investigation. As of March 2022 the latest version of the draft Decree is reportedly with the Office of the Government for the Prime Minister’s approval. In early 2020, the MPS released a draft outline of the Personal Data Protection Decree (PDPD) and then published the first full draft in February 2021 for public comment. Industry and human rights activists have major concerns about data localization provision for personal data, including requirements for local presence, licensing, and registration procedures. If implemented as written, the heavy-handed regulations of cross-border transfer of personal data would affect a wide range of Internet companies. In February 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam announced that the GVN sent the draft Decree to National Assembly, specifically to the National Assembly Standing Committee, for further review. The Prime Minister set out the deadline of May 2022 for the approval of the Decree and also tasked the MPS to start developing a new Law on Data Privacy. 5. Protection of Property Rights The State collectively owns and manages all land in Vietnam, and therefore neither foreigners nor Vietnamese nationals can own land. However, the government grants land-use and building rights, often to individuals. According to the Ministry of National Resources and Environment (MONRE), as of September 2018 – the most recent time period in which the government has made figures available – the government has issued land-use rights certificates for 96.9 percent of land in Vietnam. If land is not used according to the land-use rights certificate or if it is unoccupied, it reverts to the government. If investors do not use land leased within 12 consecutive months or delay land use by 24 months from the original investment schedule, the government is entitled to reclaim the land. Investors can seek an extension of delay but not for more than 24 months. Vietnam is building a national land-registration database, and some localities have already digitized their land records. State protection of property rights are still evolving, and the law does not clearly demarcate circumstances in which the government would use eminent domain. Under the Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law of November 2014, the government can take land if it deems it necessary for socio-economic development in the public or national interest if the Prime Minister, the National Assembly, or the Provincial People’s Council approves such action. However, the law loosely defines “socio-economic development.” Disputes over land rights continue to be a significant driver of social protests in Vietnam. Foreign investors also may be exposed to land disputes through merger and acquisition activities when they buy into a local company or implement large-scale infrastructure projects. Foreign investors can lease land for renewable periods of 50 years, and up to 70 years in some underdeveloped areas. This allows titleholders to conduct property transactions, including mortgages on property. Some investors have encountered difficulties amending investment licenses to expand operations onto land adjoining existing facilities. Investors also note that local authorities may seek to increase requirements for land-use rights when current rights must be renewed, particularly when the investment in question competes with Vietnamese companies. Vietnam does not have a strong record on protecting and enforcing intellectual property (IP). Fractured authority and lack of coordination among ministries and agencies responsible for enforcement are the primary obstacles, and capacity constraints related to enforcement persist, in part, due to a lack of resources and IP expertise. Vietnam has no specialized IP courts and judges, thus continuing to rely heavily on administrative enforcement actions, which have consistently failed to deter widespread counterfeiting and piracy. There were some positive developments in 2020-2021, such as the issuance of a national IP strategy, public awareness campaigns and training activities, and reported improvements on border enforcement in some parts of the country. The 2005 IP Law is currently under revision with amendments planned to be passed in May 2022. It is expected that the law would bring Vietnam’s IP regulations in line with its commitments under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA). However, IP enforcement continues to be a challenge. The United States is closely monitoring and engaging with the Vietnamese government in the ongoing implementation of amendments to the Penal Code, particularly with respect to criminal enforcement of IP violations. Counterfeit goods are widely available online and in physical markets. In addition, issues persist with online piracy (including the use of piracy devices and applications to access unauthorized audiovisual content), book piracy, lack of effective criminal measures for cable and satellite signal theft, and both private and public-sector software piracy. Vietnam’s system for protecting against the unfair commercial use and unauthorized disclosure of undisclosed tests or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products needs further clarification. The United States is monitoring the implementation of IP provisions of the CPTPP, and the EVFTA. The EVFTA grandfathered prior users of certain cheese terms from the restrictions in the geographical indications provisions of the EVFTA, and it is important that Vietnam ensure market access for prior users of those terms who were in the Vietnamese market before the grandfathering date of January 1, 2017. In its international agreements, Vietnam committed to strengthen its IP regime and is in the process of drafting implementing legislation and other measures in a number of IP-related areas, including in preparation for acceding to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. In September 2019, Vietnam acceded to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs, and the United States will monitor implementation of that agreement. The United States, through the U.S.-Vietnam Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and other bilateral fora, continues to urge Vietnam to address IP issues and to provide interested stakeholders with meaningful opportunities for input as it proceeds with these reforms. The United States and Vietnam signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement in December 2019, which will facilitate bilateral cooperation in IP enforcement. For more information, please see the following reports from the U.S. Trade Representative: Special 301 Report Notorious Markets Report For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles . 6. Financial Sector The government generally encourages foreign portfolio investment. The country has two stock markets: the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE), which lists publicly traded companies, and the Hanoi Stock Exchange, which lists bonds and derivatives. The Law on Securities, which came into effect January 1, 2021, states that Vietnam Exchange, a parent company to both exchanges, with board members appointed by the government, will manage trading operations. Vietnam also has a market for unlisted public companies (UPCOM) at the Hanoi Securities Center. Although Vietnam welcomes portfolio investment, the country sometimes has difficulty in attracting such investment. Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) classifies Vietnam as a Frontier Market, which precludes some of the world’s biggest asset managers from investing in its stock markets. Vietnam did not meet its goal to be considered an “emerging market” in 2020 and pushed back the timeline to 2025. Foreign investors often face difficulties in making portfolio investments because of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, in the first three months of 2021, surges in trading frequently crashed the HOSE’s decades-old technology platform, resulting in investor frustration. Vietnam put into place the HOSE’s interim trading platform in July 2021, provided by FPT Corporation – Vietnam’s largest information technology service company – that has addressed HOSE’s overload issues while awaiting the new trading system purchased from the South Korean Exchange (KRX). The new system is expected to begin official operations in late 2022 and meet the requirements for Vietnam’s stock trading, including market information, market surveillance, clearing, settlement and depository and registration. There is enough liquidity in the markets to enter and maintain sizable positions. Combined market capitalization at the end of 2021 was approximately $334 billion, equal to 92 percent of Vietnam’s GDP, with the HOSE accounting for $250 billion, the Hanoi Exchange $21 billion, and the UPCOM $60 billion. Bond market capitalization reached over $64 billion in 2021, the majority of which were government bonds held by domestic commercial banks. Vietnam complies with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. The government notified the IMF that it accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, effective November 8, 2005. Local banks generally allocate credit on market terms, but the banking sector is not as sophisticated or capitalized as those in advanced economies. Foreign investors can acquire credit in the local market, but both foreign and domestic firms often seek foreign financing since domestic banks do not have sufficient capital at appropriate interest rate levels for a significant number of FDI projects. Vietnam’s banking sector has been stable since recovering from the 2008 global recession. Nevertheless, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), Vietnam’s central bank, estimated in 2020 that 30 percent of Vietnam’s population is underbanked or lacks bank accounts due to a preference for cash, distrust in commercial banking, limited geographical distribution of banks, and a lack of financial acumen. The World Bank’s Global Findex Database 2017 (the most recent available) estimated that only 31 percent of Vietnamese over the age of 15 had an account at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider. The COVID-19 pandemic increased strains on the financial system as an increasing number of debtors were unable to make loan payments. However, low capital cost, together with credit growth rally, increased bank profits in 2021 by 25 percent compared to 2020. At the end of 2021, the SBV reported that the percentage of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking sector was 1.9 percent, up from 1.7 percent at the end of 2020. By the end of 2021, per SBV, the banking sector’s estimated total assets stood at $651 billion, of which $268 billion belonged to seven state-owned and majority state-owned commercial banks – accounting for 41 percent of total assets in the sector. Though classified as joint-stock (private) commercial banks, the Bank of Investment and Development Bank (BIDV), Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), and Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) all are majority-owned by SBV. In addition, the SBV holds 100 percent of Agribank, Global Petro Commercial Bank (GPBank), Construction Bank (CBBank), and Oceanbank. Currently, the total foreign ownership limit (FOL) in a Vietnamese bank is 30 percent, with a 5 percent limit for non-strategic individual investors, a 15 percent limit for non-strategic institutional investors, and a 20 percent limit for strategic institutional partners. The U.S. Mission in Vietnam did not find any evidence that a Vietnamese bank had lost a correspondent banking relationship in the past three years; there is also no evidence that a correspondent banking relationship is currently in jeopardy. Vietnam does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The 2020 Enterprises Law, which came into effect January 1, 2021, defines an SOE as an enterprise that is more than 50 percent owned by the government. Vietnam does not officially publish a list of SOEs. In 2018, the government created the Commission for State Capital Management at Enterprises (CMSC) to manage SOEs with increased transparency and accountability. The CMSC’s goals include accelerating privatization in a transparent manner, promoting public listings of SOEs, and transparency in overall financial management of SOEs. SOEs do not operate on a level playing field with domestic or foreign enterprises and continue to benefit from preferential access to resources such as land, capital, and political largesse. Third-party market analysts note that a significant number of SOEs have extensive liabilities, including pensions owed, real estate holdings in areas not related to the SOE’s ostensible remit, and a lack of transparency with respect to operations and financing. Vietnam officially started privatizing SOEs in 1998. The process has been slow because privatization typically transfers only a small share of an SOE (two to three percent) to the private sector, and investors have had concerns about the financial health of many companies. Additionally, the government has inadequate regulations with respect to privatization procedures. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Companies are required to publish their corporate social responsibility activities, corporate governance work, information of related parties and transactions, and compensation of management. Companies must also announce extraordinary circumstances, such as changes to management, dissolution, or establishment of subsidiaries, within 36 hours of the event. Most multinational companies implement Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs that contribute to improving the business environment in Vietnam, and awareness of CSR programs is increasing among large domestic companies. The VCCI conducts CSR training and highlights corporate engagement on a dedicated website in partnership with the UN. AmCham also has a CSR group that organizes events and activities to raise awareness of social issues. Non-governmental organizations collaborate with government bodies, such as VCCI and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), to promote business practices in Vietnam in line with international norms and standards. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was introduced to Vietnam many years ago but the government has not officially participated in it. Overall, the government has not defined responsible business conduct (RBC), nor has it established a national plan or agenda for RBC. The government has yet to establish a national point of contact or ombudsman for stakeholders to get information or raise concerns regarding RBC. The new Labor Code, which came into effect January 1, 2021, recognizes the right of employees to establish their own representative organizations, allows employees to unilaterally terminate labor contracts without reason, and extends legal protection to non-written contract employees. For a detailed description of regulations on worker/labor rights in Vietnam, see the Department of State’s 2020 Human Rights Report. Vietnam participates in the OECD Southeast Asia Regional Program since its launch in 2014 and has cooperated in several policy reviews with the OECD, notably Investment Policy Reviews (2009 and 2018), Clean Energy Finance (2021), and the Vietnam Economic Review (forthcoming). Vietnam also participates in the OECD-Southeast Asia Corporate Governance Initiative. Engagement with businesses will include activities in the agriculture (with a focus on seafood), garment and footwear sectors, and building resilient supply chains. Vietnam doesn’t have any domestic measures requiring supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals that may originate from conflict-affected areas. Vietnam’s Law on Consumer Protection is largely ineffective, according to industry experts. A consumer who has a complaint on a product or service can petition the Association for Consumer Protection (ACP) or district governments. ACP is a non-governmental, volunteer organization that lacks law enforcement or legal power, and local governments are typically unresponsive to consumer complaints. The Vietnamese government has not focused on consumer protection over the last several years. Vietnam allows foreign companies to work in private security. Vietnam has not ratified the Montreux Documents, is not a supporter of the International Code of Conduct or Private Security Service Providers and is not a participant in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). Vietnamese legislation clearly specifies businesses’ responsibilities regarding environmental protection. The revised 2020 Environmental Protection Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, states that environmental protection is the responsibility and obligation of all organizations, institutions, communities, households, and individuals. The law also specifies that manufacturers bear two responsibilities, including responsibility for waste recycling and responsibility for waste treatment. The Penal Code, revised in 2017, includes a chapter with 12 articles regulating different types of environmental crimes. In accordance with the Penal Code, penalties for infractions carry a maximum of 15 years in prison and a fine equivalent to $650,000. However, enforcement remains a problem. To date, no complaint or request for compensation due to damages caused by pollution or other environmental violations has ever been successfully resolved in court due to difficulties in identifying the level of damages and proving the relationship between violators and damages. In the past several years, there have been high-profile, controversial instances of impacts on human rights by commercial activities – particularly over the revocation of land for real estate development projects. Government suppression of these protests ranged from intimidation and harassment via the media (including social media) to imprisonment. There are numerous examples of government-supported forces beating protestors, journalists, and activists covering land issues. Victims have reported they are unable to press claims against their attackers. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. At COP 26, the Prime Minister announced Vietnam’s commitment to net zero emissions by 2050. Right after the event, Vietnam established a National Steering Committee on Implementation of COP 26 Commitments headed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has requested all relevant ministries to study and develop programs to fulfill Vietnam’s commitments. Vietnam issued a climate change strategy in 2011 that will be valid through 2030, with “a vision” to 2050, and it has reviewed implementation for the 2011-2020 period. Vietnam is revising the strategy to achieve the net zero commitment, with the new version expected to be released by the end of 2022. The country is also updating its Nationally Determined Contributions in line with its net zero emission commitment. On October 1, 2021, Vietnam issued its National Strategy on Green Growth in the 2021-2030 Period, with a Vision to 2050. The strategy sets specific goals on GHG reductions and tasks various Ministries to develop specific plans and strategies. The strategy also targets at a 35 per cent green procurement proportion of the total public procurement. On February 7, 2022, Vietnam approved the National Biodiversity Strategy for the 2021-2030 period. Vietnam will increase the size of its protected and restored natural eco-systems under the new strategy, aiming to conserve and use biodiversity as a sustainable response to the effects of climate change. The New Decree 08/ND-CP issued in January 2022 regulating in details the implementation of the 2020 Environment Protection Law has specified three groups of environmental businesses that will be qualified for incentives, including businesses involved in the waste collection, treatment, re-use or recycling; businesses manufacturing or supplying technologies, equipment, products and services serving the environmental protection and non-business operations related to the environmental protection such as application of best technologies earlier than regulated, installation of waste water, air quality monitoring systems earlier than scheduled. The incentives listed under the Decree include investment capital support from Environmental Protection Funds, Vietnam Development Fund, preferential terms for taxes, fees and charges, and land support. 9. Corruption Vietnam has laws to combat corruption by public officials, and they extend to all citizens. Communist Party of Vietnam General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has made fighting corruption a key focus of his administration, and the CPV regularly issues lists of Party and other government officials that have been disciplined or prosecuted. Trong recently expanded the campaign to include “anti-negativity,” described loosely as acts that can cause public anger or reputational harm to the CPV. Nevertheless, corruption remains rife. Corruption is due, in large part, to low levels of transparency, accountability, and media freedom, as well as poor remuneration for government officials and inadequate systems for holding officials accountable. Competition among agencies for control over businesses and investments has created overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic procedures that, in turn, create opportunities for corruption. The government has tasked various agencies to deal with corruption, including the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption (chaired by the General Secretary Trong), the Government Inspectorate, and line ministries and agencies. Formed in 2007, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption has been under the purview of the CPV Central Commission of Internal Affairs since February 2013. The National Assembly provides oversight on the operations of government ministries. Civil society organizations have encouraged the government to establish a single independent agency with oversight and enforcement authority to ensure enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Mr. Phan Dinh Trac Chairman of Communist Party Central Committee Internal Affairs 4 Nguyen Canh Chan, Ba Dinh, Hanoi Tel: +84 0804-3557 Contact at a watchdog organization: Ms. Nguyen Thi Kieu Vien Executive Director ,Towards Transparency International National Floor 4, No 37 Lane 35, Cat Linh Street, Dong Da, Hanoi, Vietnam Tel: +84-24-37153532 Fax: +84-24-37153443 Email: kieuvien@towardstransparency.vn 10. Political and Security Environment Vietnam is a unitary single-party state, and its political and security environment is largely stable. Protests and civil unrest are rare, though there are occasional demonstrations against perceived or real social, environmental, labor, and political injustices. In August 2019, online commentators expressed outrage over the slow government response to an industrial fire in Hanoi that released unknown amounts of mercury. Other localized protests in 2019 and early 2020 broke out over alleged illegal dumping in waterways and on public land, and the perceived government attempts to cover up potential risks to local communities. Citizens sometimes protest actions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), usually online. For example, in June 2019, when PRC Coast Guard vessels harassed the operations of Russian oil company Rosneft in Block 06-01, Vietnam’s highest-producing natural gas field, Vietnamese citizens protested via Facebook and, in a few instances, in public. In April 2016, after the Formosa Steel plant discharged toxic pollutants into the ocean and killed a large number of fish, affected fishermen and residents in central Vietnam began a series of regular protests against the company and the government’s lack of response to the disaster. Protests continued into 2017 in multiple cities until security forces largely suppressed the unrest. Many activists who helped organize or document these protests were subsequently arrested and imprisoned. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Although Vietnam has made some progress on labor issues in recent years, including, in theory, allowing the formation of independent unions, the sole union that has any real authority is the state-controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). Workers will not be able to form independent unions legally until the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) issues guidance on implementation of the 2019 Labor Code, including decrees on procedures to establish and join independent unions, and to determine the level of autonomy independent unions will have in administering their affairs. MOLISA expects to issue this guidance in 2022. Vietnam has been a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1992 and has ratified seven of the core ILO labor conventions (Conventions 100 and 111 on discrimination, Conventions 138 and 182 on child labor, Conventions 29 and 105 on forced labor, and Convention 98 on rights to organize and collective bargaining). In June 2020 Vietnam ratified ILO Convention 105 – on the abolition of forced labor – which came into force July 14, 2021. The EVFTA also requires Vietnam to ratify Convention 87, on freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, by 2023. Labor dispute resolution mechanisms vary depending on situations. Individual labor disputes and rights-based collective labor disputes must go through a defined process that includes labor conciliation, labor arbitration, and a court hearing. Only interest-based collective labor disputes may legally be pursued via demonstration, and only after undergoing through conciliation and arbitration. However, in practice strikes organized by ad hoc groups at individual facilities are not uncommon, and are usually resolved through negotiation with management. In 2021 there were 105 strikes nationwide, 20 fewer than in 2020 as reported by VGCL. According to Vietnam’s General Statistics Office (GSO), in 2021 there were 50.7 million people participating in the formal labor force in Vietnam out of over 74.9 million people aged 15 and above, around 1.4 million lower than 2020. The labor force is relatively young, with workers 15-39 years of age accounting for half of the total labor force. 61.6 percent of women in the working age participate to the labor force in comparison to 74.3 percent of men in the working age while 65.3 percent of people in the working age in the urban areas participate in the labor force in comparison to 69.3 percent in the rural areas. Estimates on the size of the informal economy differ widely. The IMF states 40 percent of Vietnam’s laborers work on the informal economy; the World Bank puts the figure at 55 percent; the ILO puts the figure as high as 79 percent if agricultural households are included. Vietnam’s GSO stated that among 53.4 million employed people, 20.3 million people worked in the informal economy. An employer is permitted to dismiss employees due to technological changes, organizational changes (in cases of a merger, consolidation, or cessation of operation of one or more departments), when the employer faces economic difficulties, or for disruptive behavior in the workplace. There are no waivers on labor requirements to attract foreign investment. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Section U.S. Embassy 7 Lang Ha, Ba Dinh, Hanoi, Vietnam +84-24-3850-5000 InvestmentClimateVN@state.gov West Bank and Gaza Executive Summary Title The Palestinian economy is small, and while the internal economy in the West Bank is relatively open, there are significant constraints on movement and access of goods and people both within the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the small size of the local market (about 5 million consumers with relatively low purchasing power), access to foreign markets through trade is essential for private sector growth. Enterprises are highly dependent on Israel for either inputs or as a market, and 90 percent of Palestinian exports are sold to Israel. Preliminary 2021 export statistics obtained from the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) show total exports increased from $1.1 billion in 2020 to $1.4 in 2022. However, the trade deficit remained high at -$4.96 billion because of high levels of imports ($6.42 billion in 2021). Palestinian businesses have a reputation for professionalism and quality products. Ninety-nine percent of firms in the West Bank and Gaza are family owned small and medium-sized enterprises employing fewer than 20 people. Most private sector firms have moderate productivity, low investment, and limited competition, with the majority operating in retail and wholesale trading activities. Large Palestinian enterprises — only 1 percent of Palestinian companies — dominate certain sectors and are connected internationally, with partnerships extending to Asia, Europe, the Gulf, and the Americas. However, Israeli government restrictions on the movement and access of goods and people between the West Bank, Gaza, and external markets – which Israel states are necessary to address its security concerns — continue to limit Palestinian private sector growth. Roughly 40 percent of the West Bank falls under the civil control of the Palestinian Authority (PA), referred to as Area A and Area B following the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 1994 economic agreement commonly known as the Paris Protocol. Under those agreements, pending a final negotiated peace agreement defining borders and control of territory, the Israeli government maintains full administrative and security control of Area C, which comprises roughly 60 percent of the West Bank. A 2017 USAID study found that high transaction costs stemming from limitations on movement, access, and trade are the most immediate impediment to Palestinian economic growth, followed by energy and water insecurity. The Palestinian labor force is well educated, boasting a 98 percent literacy rate, and the West Bank and Gaza enjoy high technology penetration, despite poor internet service and limited access to modern, high-speed mobile networks. Nevertheless, already high unemployment persisted and worsened in 2021. According to the latest figures available from the PCBS, the combined West Bank and Gaza unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 was 24.2 percent. While the unemployment rates in both the West Bank and Gaza have remained the same in the last few years, the West Bank’s rate of 13.2 percent pales by comparison with the Gaza’s 44.7 percent, according to the PCBS. The rates were high for youth aged 20-24 years old (37.4percent), and for the educated (28 percent). The unemployment rate among women is 39.2 percent in the West Bank and Gaza compared to 20.4 percent among men. The average daily wage in the West Bank is $32, and $13 in Gaza compared to $82 in Israel. The public sector continues to be the largest Palestinian employer, providing 21.3 percent of all jobs. In 2021, the economy grew by 6 percent, according to World Bank preliminary estimates, due to the removal of the PA’s severe pandemic measures that affected all economic sectors during the prior year. With population growth at roughly 3 percent per year, real per capita GDP is projected to decline as unemployment and poverty rates rise. Ongoing political, economic, and fiscal uncertainty has generally deterred large-scale internal and foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment, representing 1 percent of GDP, is also very low in comparison with other economies. According to the World Bank, in 2021 investment rates remained low, with the majority channeled into non-traded activities that generate low productivity employment and returns that are less affected by political risk, such as internal trade and real estate development. Private investment levels, averaging about 15-16 percent of GDP in recent years, have been low compared with rates of over 25 percent in middle-income economies. The manufacturing and agricultural sectors’ contribution to GDP is also in decline. Manufacturing fell from 19 percent of GDP in 1994 to 11 percent in 2020 and agriculture fell from 12 percent of GDP in 1994 to seven percent in 2020. To reverse these trends, the Palestinian Investment Promotion and Industrial Estates Agency (IPIEA) included both sectors in its National Export Strategy. Target sectors include: Stone and marble Tourism Agriculture, including olive oil, fresh fruits, vegetables, and herbs Food and beverage, including agro-processed meat Textiles and garments Manufacturing, including furniture and pharmaceuticals Information and communication technology (ICT) Renewable energy To improve its foreign direct investment policies, the PA enacted a new Companies Law in December 2021, which updates the 1964 Jordanian law, to facilitate business incorporation online, and eliminate costly bureaucratic practices. The new law removes restrictions to foreign investors, such as foreign equity limits and local partner requirements. It improves rules for larger businesses with multiple shareholders. The new law also introduces new business types, including sole proprietorships and limited liability companies, and creates a legal framework for mergers, divisions, and transformations that will allow businesses to adapt their business model as they grow. In December 2021, the PA’s Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT) facilitated the soft launch of a $3.5 million e-government initiative to ensure government services are more efficient and accessible to PA residents and the business community. The new e-services include online renewal of driver licenses, applications for government-provided health insurance, and registration for new companies. In 2021, the PA ran a total fiscal deficit of nearly $ 1.257 billion, of which around $317million ($186 million in recurrent budget support and $131 million in development financing) was covered by foreign donors, leaving the PA with $940 million financing gap. The PA covered its financing gap by taking additional bank loans (reaching unprecedented levels of $2.5 billion) and accumulating further arrears to the private sector suppliers of goods and services (with the stock of arrears exceeding $1 billion), and the PA civil servants’ pension fund (arrears estimated at $2 billion). The Palestinian Monetary Authority and the banking sector have stated that banks can no longer provide further loans, as the PA has already exceeded established lending limits; further, lending to the PA and public sector employees now comprises roughly 40 percent of all banking loans. The PA remains heavily dependent on clearance revenues (customs duties collected on imports by Israel on the PA’s behalf) which comprised 68 percent of all PA revenues in 2021. The PA’s continued practice of making prisoner and “martyr” payments – paying families of Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails and the families of Palestinians killed or seriously injured due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including terrorists – jeopardized these transfers. Israel imposes penalties to deter such payments, a position shared by the United States and applied to U.S. assistance through the Taylor Force Act and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Substantial economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza depends on a number of factors: further easing of Israeli movement and access restrictions balanced with Israeli security concerns; expanded external trade and private sector growth; continued PA approval and implementation of long-pending commercial legislative reforms; political stability; increased water and energy supply to the productive sectors at lower cost; and PA fiscal stability. Economic sectors that are not dependent on traditional infrastructure and freedom of movement, such as information and communications technologies, are able to grow somewhat independently of these factors and therefore have enjoyed greater success in the Palestinian economy during the past decade. However, communications technology lags behind and is an impediment to further growth. The West Bank implemented Third Generation (3G) communications technology in 2018, while Gaza is still limited to outdated 2G communications technology. Israel and the PA, with international pressure, are negotiating allowing 4G technology in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian economy is expected to recover slowly (6 percent growth in 2021 and a projected 3 percent for 2022) after a sharp 11 percent decline in 2020. West Bank investment opportunities continue to exist in information technology, stone and marble, real estate development, light manufacturing, agriculture, and agro-industry. COVID-19 pandemic response measures have led to setbacks in both the stone and marble industry and the tourism sector, previously considered growth areas; the loss of inbound tourism throughout 2022, negatively affecting 37,800 tourism industry workers. It is anticipated that the waning pandemic will allow for eased restrictions and these sectors will flourish again. The increased cost of shipping and global disruptions in supply chains remain challenges despite the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions. The Gaza Strip effectively has been closed to traditional tourism since the 2007 Hamas takeover. This report focuses on investment issues related to areas under the administrative jurisdiction of the PA, except where explicitly stated. Where applicable, this report addresses issues related to investment in Gaza, although the de facto Hamas-led government’s implementation of PA legislation and regulations may differ significantly from PA’s. For issues where PA law is not applicable, Gazan courts typically refer to Israeli and Egyptian law; however, Hamas does not consistently apply PA, Egyptian, or Israeli law, and businesses in Gaza have reported instances where Hamas courts and officials have employed coercion or have otherwise acted outside the legal system when engaging with private businesses. These inconsistencies in the legal environment, among a number of other, more challenging factors, are strong deterrents to private investment in Gaza. Due to evolving circumstances, potential investors are encouraged to contact the PA Ministry of National Economy (MONE) ( www.mne.gov.ps ),IPIEA ( www.PIPA.ps ), the Palestine Trade Center ( www.paltrade.org ), and the Palestinian-American Chamber of Commerce ( www.pal-am.com ), as well as the Palestinian Affairs Unit of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem ( https://il.usembassy.gov/palestinian-affairs-unit/) and the U.S. Commercial Service ( http://export.gov/westbank ) for the latest information. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global -Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2018 $3,882 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.KN?locations=PS 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The West Bank and Gaza received an overall ranking of 117 out of 190 in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report (the latest available), a slight decrease from 116 out of 190 in 2019. (World Bank rankings range from 1 to 190, with a lower rank representing greater ease of doing business. In the 2020 Doing Business Report, the Getting Credit component achieved a score of 25. However, the West Bank continues to rank poorly and needs significant regulatory improvement in the critical business-enabling categories of Resolving Insolvency (168 of 190), Starting a Business (173 of 190), Protecting Minority Investors (114 of 190), and Dealing with Construction Permits (148 of 190). The ease of registering real property score fell from 84 to 91 out of 190. The 2017-2022 National Policy Agenda is both a national development policy and a political document outlining the PA’s aspirations in three pillars: the path to independence; government reform; and sustainable development. The last section highlights the need for economic independence, including domestic reform to promote economic growth with fewer regulatory restrictions, supporting business start-ups and micro, small, and medium enterprises, as well as looking ahead to economic opportunities following the resolution of the political conflict with Israel. PA-Israeli government trade relations are governed by the 1994 Paris Protocol, which was intended to endure for five years until a final peace agreement was signed. Many of the stipulations are outdated or not fully implemented. Since 1995, the PA has taken steps to facilitate and increase foreign trade by signing free trade agreements independently with Russia, Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States, Morocco, Tunisia, Mercosur, Vietnam, and Germany, and it is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Israel does not recognize the PA’s signed trade agreements with the European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Canada, and Turkey which therefore cannot be implemented; however, the West Bank and Gaza remain eligible for the benefits of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement The PA participates roughly every other year in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial meetings as an ad hoc observer, most recently in 2017 as more recent WTO Ministerial meetings have been delayed since 2020 due to COVID-19 but are currently scheduled to take place on June 13, 2022. The PA’s 2014 amendments to the Promotion of Investment in Palestine Law No. 1 of 1998 shifted promotional incentives from a focus on those that benefit from providing large capital investments to industrial projects to a focus on employment growth, development of human capital, increased exports, and local sourcing of machinery and raw materials (see Investment Incentives section below). The updated Companies Law enacted on December 30, 2021, removes restrictions to foreign investors, such as foreign equity limits and local partner requirements, making it easier for multinational corporations to open a branch or subsidiary in the West Bank. The updated law provides improved regulations for larger businesses with multiple shareholders. It introduces legal frameworks for mergers, divisions, and transformation, that will allow businesses to adapt their business models as they grow. In addition, the new law allows sole proprietorship, and individual entrepreneurs can take advantage of limited liability and can build their businesses in a way that responds to their needs. The law also introduces stronger protections for minority shareholders, including clear rules to mitigate conflicts of interest and priority rights to existing shareholders when new shares are issued. Certain investment categories require pre-approval by the Council of Ministers (PA Cabinet). These include investments involving (1) weapons and ammunition, (2) aviation products and airport construction, (3) electrical power generation/distribution, (4) reprocessing of petroleum and its derivatives, (5) waste and solid waste reprocessing, (6) wired and wireless telecommunication, and (7) radio and television. Purchase of land by foreigners also requires approval by the Council of Ministers. U.S. investors are not specifically disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms, relative to other foreign investors. The Office of the Quartet (OQ), an organization under the UN working to support Palestinian economic development, rule of law, and improved movement and access for goods and people, has continued to work on advancing economic initiatives and the application of the rule of law. The OQ gives priority to areas where accomplishments are most viable under current conditions. Its current priorities are: (1) energy; (2) water; (3) rule of law; (4) movement and trade; and (5) telecommunications. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) do not provide investment policy reviews for the West Bank and Gaza. Foreign companies may register businesses in the West Bank and Gaza according to the new Companies Law enacted in December 2021 (in practice, Hamas-controlled Gaza continues to apply a separate 2012 Companies Law). The IPIEA provides information online about the business registration process, at http://www.pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c1ba7y1842087Y1c1ba7 but the PA does not offer a business registration website. The West Bank and Gaza rank low in Starting a Business on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, with a score in 2020 of 173 out of 190. The PA simplified the process of starting a business, which now can be done online according to the new Companies Law. Foreign investors must obtain a required business license from the Municipality and approval from the MONE and the relevant ministries. Foreign companies may work with IPIEA to obtain the investment registration certificate and investment confirmation certificate. See http://pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c395fy1849695Y1c395f and http://pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c1ba7y1842087Y1c1ba7 . In addition, foreign companies seeking to open branches in the West Bank or Gaza must submit registration documents certified by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in their home country. Due to the closure of the PLO office in New York in 2018, U.S. investors can use the PLO office in Canada. According to IPIEAA, the majority of Palestinian companies are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); consequently, the PA has sought to support SME development and financing. The PA categorizes SMEs according to staff size: small enterprises employ up to nine people, while medium enterprises employ 10-19 people. The PA does not have any mechanism for tracking outward private investment. 2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties The PA recognizes the international trade agreements listed below, which refer implicitly or explicitly to WTO rules. These include: Paris Protocol Agreement with Israel (1994) – free trade in products between Israel and Palestinian markets Technical and Economic Cooperation Accord with Egypt (1994) Trade Agreement between the PA and Jordan (1995) Duty Free Arrangements with the United States (1996) The EuroMed Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-operation (1997) Interim Agreement between European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states and the PLO (1997) Joint Canadian-Palestinian Framework for Economic Cooperation and Trade (1999) Agreement on Commercial Cooperation with Russia – extends MFN status Greater Arab Free Trade Area, to which the PA is a party (2001) Free Trade Agreement with Turkey (2004) Trade Agreement with the EU – duty-free access for Palestinian agricultural and fishery goods (2011) Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur (2011) Unilateral acts by other Arab trade partners extending preferential treatment to trade with the Palestinians. Since 1996, duty-free treatment has been available for all goods exported from the West Bank and Gaza to the United States, provided they meet qualifying criteria as spelled out in the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area (FTA) Implementation Act of 1985, as amended. The benefits for imports provided by all of the trade agreements listed above are subject to the Israeli government’s application of the terms, since all goods destined for the West Bank or Gaza must enter through Israeli-controlled crossings or ports. The Israeli government generally applies duties and tariffs consistent with its trade agreements, not with the PA’s trade agreements. There is no bilateral taxation treaty with the United States that covers the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian Authority is not a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 3. Legal Regime The PA Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with Birzeit University, publishes online the Official Gazette of all PA legislation since 1994 at http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/en/index.aspx . The PA established a legislative framework for business and other economic activity in the areas under its jurisdiction in 1994; however, implementation and monitoring of implementation needs to be strengthened, according to many observers. The PA Ministry of National Economy is in the process of drafting key pieces of economic legislation to improve business and commercial regulation, including new intellectual property rights protections, a Competition Law, and procedures for resolving bankruptcy. The PA Ministry of National Economy holds stakeholder meetings for draft commercial legislation to gather input from the private sector and publishes drafts of the proposed laws. Because the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has not met since 2007, each law must be approved by the Cabinet and adopted as a Presidential decree, an effort that often delays reform efforts. The laws will likely need to be approved by the PLC also, should it reconvene in the future. The PA budget execution reports are publicly available, including on the Ministry of Finance website ( http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/index.php ). A regulatory body governs the insurance sector, and the PA has adopted a telecommunications law that calls for establishment of an independent regulator. Establishment of the telecommunications regulator remains stalled, however. The Palestinian Standards Institution (PSI) also has a website with information on standards for the business community ( http://www.psi.pna.ps/en ). The PA is not a member of the WTO but has consistently expressed an interest in Permanent Observer status, having participated in the 2005, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 WTO Ministerial meetings as an ad hoc observer. Commercial disputes can be resolved by way of conciliation, mediation, or domestic arbitration. Arbitration in the Palestinian territories is governed by PA Law No. 3 of 2000. International arbitration is accepted. The law sets out the basis for court recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Generally, every dispute may be referred to arbitration by agreement of the parties, unless prohibited by the law’s Article 4, including disputes involving marital status, public order issues, and cases where no conciliation is permitted. If the parties do not agree on the formation of the arbitration tribunal, each party may choose one arbitrator and those arbitrators shall then choose a presiding arbitrator, unless the parties agree to do otherwise. Judgments made in other countries that need to be enforced in the West Bank and Gaza are honored, according to the prevailing law in the West Bank, primarily Jordanian Law No. 8 of 1952 as amended by the PA in 2005. Gazan courts refer back to Israeli and Egyptian laws, which were in force prior to 1993, for matters not covered by PA law; however, the de facto Hamas-led government in Gaza does not consistently apply PA, Egyptian, or Israeli laws, and has previously acted outside of existing legal frameworks, including to coerce private businesses. Laws that govern foreign direct investment are overseen by the PA Ministry of National Economy. There is no current Competition Law for the West Bank and Gaza. The PA drafted a law in 2003 that was not enacted. An effort to develop, draft, and implement a new Competition Law began in 2017 with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP). The PA’s resulting revised draft law has not yet been issued and is currently undergoing review by the President’s Office and must be approved and published in the official gazette to be enacted. Because of the geographic divisions between and within the West Bank and Gaza anwd strict Israeli controls on the movement of people as well as goods between the West Bank and Gaza, many firms have little to no competition, causing variations in both pricing and firm productivity between regions and sometimes between cities within a region. The Investment Law, as amended in 2014, prohibits expropriation and nationalization of approved foreign investments, other than in exceptional cases for a public purpose with a court decision and in return for fair compensation based on market prices and for losses suffered because of such expropriation. PA sources and independent lawyers say that any Palestinian citizen can file a petition or a lawsuit against the PA. In 2011, the PA established specialized courts for labor, chambers, customs, and anti-corruption. These courts are composed of judges and representatives from the Ministries of National Economy and Finance. There is a lack of confidence in the judicial system, though businesses sometimes rely on the courts and police to enforce contracts and seek redress. Alternative means of arbitration, including through familial or tribal mechanisms, are still used to resolve many disputes. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report (latest available) did not cite any cases involving foreclosure, liquidation, or reorganization proceedings filed during that year. According to that report, no priority is assigned to post-commencement creditors, and debtors may only file for liquidation. The PA Ministry of National Economy, with the assistance of international donors, is in the process of drafting several proposed laws related to bankruptcy, but no bankruptcy reform has been enacted. The newly enacted Companies Law includes a chapter on insolvency. 4. Industrial Policies To align the PA’s development priorities with the investment incentives provided by Palestinian law, in 2014, PA President Abbas enacted by decree amendments to the Promotion of Investment in Palestine Law No. 1 of 1998, also known as the investment and tax law. These amendments extended tax incentives to small and medium-sized enterprises, exporters, and agriculture and tourism businesses, and shifted the focus toward incentives on human capital instead of fixed assets. The amendments added tourism and agricultural projects to qualifying industries and removed real estate development projects from the industries promoted through the incentives. The amendments also provided additional authority to the IPIEA to create incentive packages targeted to individual business needs ( www.pipa.ps ). The PA is also currently working on a package of incentives in the information and communications technology (ICT), industrial, and energy sectors, in addition to those focused on development in Area C. The 2014 amendment to Article 23 of the Promotion of Investment in Palestine Law No. 1 of 1998 granted the following incentives and exemptions for projects approved by IPIEA: Income tax of zero percent for producers of agricultural products whose income is directly generated from land cultivation or livestock. Income tax of 5 percent commencing from the date of realizing profit, but not exceeding four years of operation, whichever is earlier. Income tax of 10 percent for a period of three years commencing from the end of the first phase. It will thereafter be calculated based on the applicable and in-effect percentages and segments. Projects that may be targeted for taxation incentives and support services include the following: Industrial sector projects; Tourism sector projects; New projects within any sector that employ at least 25 workers during the period of benefit; Projects that increase their production exports ratio by more than 40 percent; Projects within any sector that use approximately 70 percent locally sourced machinery and raw materials; Any existing project that adds 25 workers to the number of existing workers; Developmental expansions of projects (to be based on percentage of paid-in capital but not land value); Projects in which the IPIEA Board of Directors provides specific incentive packages that comply with special criteria, meet international environment conditions or alternative energy services, or are projects located within areas of developmental priorities. Any project determined by IPIEA’s Board of Directors to advance the public interest (subject to the nature of a project’s activity, geographical location, the extent to which the project contributes to increasing exports, creating job opportunities, advancing development, transferring knowledge, and supporting research and development for the purposes of enhancing the public benefit). Excluded from the incentives are: Commercial projects; Insurance companies; Banks; Money changers; Real estate projects; Some electricity projects; Telecommunication services; Commercial services; Crushers; Quarries; Any companies that obtained concessions contracts from the Council of Ministers and operate as monopolistic companies. In cooperation with the Palestinian Industrial Estates & Free Zones (PIEFZA), IPIEA (then PIPA) in 2017 introduced incentive packages targeting investors in the Bethlehem Industrial Park and Jericho Agro Industrial Park. The packages extend incentives for three extra years, reducing income tax by 66 percent for eight years, followed by a 33 percent reduction for three years. Tax incentives are also included for financial institutions that provide financing for the enterprises within the industrial zones. There are no foreign trade zones or free ports in the West Bank or Gaza. The current performance requirements for investment incentives focus on job growth and locally sourced production. Under PA law, there are no data storage requirements for IT companies. The PA does not follow a forced localization policy and there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. 5. Protection of Property Rights The Acquisition Law in the West Bank, which regulates foreign acquisition and rental or lease of immovable properties, classifies foreigners into three categories with differing rights: Foreigners who formerly possessed Palestinian or Jordanian passports shall have the right to own certain properties sufficient to erect buildings and/or for their agricultural projects. Foreigners who hold other Arab passports have the right to own certain property that suffices for their living and business needs only. Other foreigners, including Jerusalem ID holders, must receive permission from the PA Cabinet to own buildings or purchase land. The permit process can be lengthy and includes clearances from the intelligence and preventive security agencies. It is critical that potential purchasers of land or buildings perform a title search to ensure that no outstanding violations or unpaid penalties exist on the properties. Under current law, outstanding violations and penalties are transferred to the new owners. Title searches can only be obtained from the PA Land Authority (al-Taboh). Land registration is done through the Land Registries in Hebron, Ramallah, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jericho, Jenin, and Gaza City. In order to purchase land in the West Bank or Gaza, an application that includes supporting documents such as deeds to the property and powers of attorney, should be submitted to the land registry office having jurisdiction over the land. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business report gave Registering Property a score of 91 out of 190 and in 2019 the PA made the process easier by removing the requirement to obtain a security check when issuing a purchase permit and by publishing official statistics on property transactions at the land registry. The issue of land registration in the West Bank is complicated by overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, laws and customs derived from the Ottoman, British Mandate, and Jordanian periods of rule. In addition, there is no comprehensive registry of land ownership for the West Bank, and efforts to complete one are expected to take years at the current pace. The majority of the land has not been registered; even where land is registered, titles are often more than a generation old, with unresolved rights to numerous inheritors. Israeli administrative control over 60 percent of the West Bank, designated as Area C, adds an additional layer of bureaucracy and restrictions with respect to sale and use of privately held lands in those areas. The West Bank and Gaza do not have modern intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in place; existing IPR legislation originates from a combination of Ottoman era, British Mandate, and pre-1967 Jordanian laws. Currently, intellectual property is governed by the Civil Claims Law of 1933 for the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Trademark and Patent Laws of 1938 in Gaza, the Commercial Law No. 19 of 1953 for the West Bank and Gaza, and the Patent Law No. 22 of 1953 in the West Bank. The PA was indirectly committed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the agreement of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (GATT-TRIPS) when it signed the 1995 Interim Agreement on West Bank/Gaza according to Annex III (Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs), Appendix 1, Article 23. Despite different authorizing legislation, there are few substantive differences between IPR laws in the West Bank and Gaza. To register a trademark, four copies of the proposed trademark must be attached to the application, one of them in color, along with a copy of the company’s Certificate of Registration. A foreign company is entitled to register its trademark in the West Bank or Gaza by giving power of attorney either to a trademark agent or to a lawyer. Trademarks can be registered unless they fall within a recognized prohibition, such as being similar or identical to an already registered trademark, are likely to lead to deception of the public, or are contrary to public morality. Trademark protection is available for registered trademarks for a period of seven years, which may be extended for additional periods of 14 years. The proprietor of a trademark in the West Bank or Gaza owns the sole right to the use of the trademark in association with the goods with which the trademark is registered. The trademark is open for opposition after being published in the Gazette for a period of three months. The holder of a trademark retains the right to bring civil action against any perpetrator in addition to criminal proceedings. Trade names are registered by the PA according to specific procedures and conditions that are laid out in the Jordanian Trade Names Registration Law No. 30 of 1953, which is still applicable in the West Bank, and Law No. 1 of 1929 in Gaza. The Patents and Design Law No. 22 of 1953 is applicable in the West Bank and the Patents Design Law No. 64 of 1947 is applicable in Gaza. With the requisite documents, a foreign company can register a patent or design by giving power of attorney to a patent agent or to a lawyer. Patent protection is provided for a period of 16 years from the date of filing the patent application. Copyright in the West Bank and Gaza is governed by the Copyright Laws of 1911 and 1924. The protection lasts for a period of 50 years after the death of the author of the work. The law also deals with infringements, compulsory licenses, and procedural issues. The law prescribes imprisonment for a maximum period of one year or a fine not exceeding 100 Jordanian dinars for infringement of a registered trademark. There are no commercial or IPR courts in the Palestinian legal system. The lack of IPR protection and enforcement allows some small businesses to display trademarks without authorization. As a result, there is inconsistency in upholding U.S. trademarks and unpredictability of legal challenges to infringement. There is minimal enforcement of IPR laws for music and movies in the West Bank and Gaza, but the PA has enforced some IPR laws to protect the Palestinian pharmaceutical industry. The PA has drafted a modern law to encompass international regulations for IPR, including copyright, patents and designs, trademarks, and merchandise branding, but the law has not yet been adopted in the absence of a functioning legislature. The PA is eager to obtain membership in various organizations and accede to agreements concerning intellectual property, such as the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); it has held observer status in WIPO since 2005. In 2012, USAID helped the PA draft a modern IPR law that has been reviewed by WIPO. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office worked with the PA and other Palestinian stakeholders to raise capacity for implementing IPR processes. Given local procedures for drafting, reviewing, and approving new legislation, a new IPR law is not expected to be enacted in 2022 according to the MONE. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders: Peter Mehravari Patent Attorney Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov 6. Financial Sector In 2004, the PA enacted the Capital Markets Authority Law and the Securities Commission Law and created the Capital Market Authority to regulate the stock exchange, insurance, leasing, and mortgage industries. In 2010, a Banking Law was adopted to bring the Palestinian Monetary Authority’s (PMA) regulatory capabilities in line with the Basel Accords, a set of recommendations for regulating the banking industry. The 2010 law provides a legal framework for the establishment of deposit insurance, management of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, and treatment of weak banks in areas such as merger, liquidation, and guardianship. It also gives the PMA regulatory authority over the microfinance sector. In 2013, the PA passed a Commercial Leasing Law and in 2015 the MONE finalized a registry for moveable assets, intended to facilitate secured transactions, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. In April 2016, the PA passed the Secured Transactions Law, which established the legal grounds and modern systems to regulate the use of movable assets as collateral. Notwithstanding this regulatory environment, the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report assigned the West Bank and Gaza a particularly low score for Protecting Minority Investors (114 out of 190) and Resolving Insolvency (168 out of 190). Founders of recently established SMEs complain that loan terms from Palestinian creditors fail to allow the borrower sufficient time to establish a sustainable business, although the new Moveable Assets Registry, coupled with the Secured Transactions Law and Commercial Leasing Law, led to a substantial improvement in the Getting Credit ranking (25 out of 190) from 2018. The Palestine Exchange (PEX) was established in 1995 to promote investment in the West Bank and Gaza. Launched as a private shareholding company, it was transformed into a public shareholding company in February 2010. The PEX was fully automated upon establishment – the first fully automated stock exchange in the Arab world, and the only Arab exchange that is publicly traded and fully owned by the private sector. The PEX is registered with the Companies Controller at the Ministry of National Economy and it operates under the supervision of the Palestinian Capital Market Authority. PEX’s 49 listed companies are divided into five sectors: banking and financial services, insurance, investment, industry, and services, with a USD 3.5 billion market capitalization. Shares trade in Jordanian dinars and U.S. dollars. PEX member securities companies (brokerage firms) operations are found across the West Bank and Gaza and authorized custodians are available to work on behalf of foreign investors. The Palestinian banking sector continues to perform well under the supervision of the PMA. World Bank reports to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) have consistently noted that the PMA is supervising the banking sector effectively. The PMA continues to enhance its institutional capacity and provides rigorous supervision and regulation of the banking sector, consistent with international practice. The PMA regulates and supervises 13 banks (6 Palestinian, 6 Jordanian, and 1 Egyptian) with 379 branches and offices in the West Bank and Gaza, with $ 20.9 billion net assets. No Palestinian currency exists and, as a result, the PA places no restrictions on foreign currency accounts. The PMA is responsible for bank regulation in both the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian banks are some of the most liquid in the region, with customers deposits of USD 11.5billion and gross credit of USD 10.7 billion as of the end of 2021. An Anti-Money Laundering Law that was prepared in line with international standards with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and USAID came into force in October 2007. In December 2015, the PA President signed the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) Decree Law Number 20 for the PA to join the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF), a voluntary organization of regional governments focused on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. Improvements contained in the 2015 law make terrorist financing a criminal offense and defines terrorists, terrorist acts, terrorist organizations, foreign terrorist fighters, and terrorist financing. The PMA completed a National Risk Assessment (NRA) — an AML/CTF self-assessment — in 2018. The PMA is implementing the recommendations from the self-assessment to strengthen the AML/CTF regime in preparation for a MENA/FATF member review of the Palestinian economy’s AML/CFT safeguards, initially scheduled for August 2020 but postponed at the PA’s request to August 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Swedish Riks Bank completed its assessment of the financial sector in preparation for the upcoming MENA/FATF mutual evaluation. Credit is affected by uncertain political and economic conditions and by the limited availability of real estate collateral due to non-registration of most West Bank land. Despite these challenges, the sector’s loan-to-deposit ratio continues to increase towards parity, moving from 58 percent at the end of 2015 to 68 percent at the end of 2019. However, in 2020 and 2021, the loan to deposit ratio slightly declined to 66.6 percent and 65.1 percent respectively due to reduced lending to businesses because of COVID-19. The increase in the loan to deposit ratio in the past was in part because of the PMA’s encouragement to banks to participate in loan guarantee programs sponsored by the United States and international financial institutions, by supporting a national strategy on microfinance, and by imposing restrictions on foreign placements. The PA Ministry of National Economy’s enactment of the Secured Transactions Law in April 2016 allows for use of moveable assets, such as equipment, as collateral for loans. Non-performing loans in 2021 were 4.15 percent of total loans, due to credit bureau assessments of borrowers’ credit worthiness and a heavy collateral system. In addition, in 2021 banks continued to avoided default by restructuring and rescheduling loans to help customers cope with the impact of COVID-19. Palestinian banks have remained stable in general but have suffered from a deterioration in relations with Israeli correspondent banks since the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza when Israeli banks cut ties with Gazan branches and gradually restricted cash services provided to West Bank branches. In 2008, all Palestinian banks were required to move their headquarters to Ramallah. Israeli restrictions on the movement of cash between West Bank and Gaza branches of Palestinian banks have caused intermittent liquidity crises in Gaza and for all commonly used major currencies, including U.S. dollars, Jordanian dinars, and Israeli shekels. An Israeli government decision in the first quarter of 2021 increased the cash deposit transfer amount from Palestinian banks to the Bank of Israel to NIS 1.2 billion monthly. However, banks still say that this increase is not enough to mitigate the problem of a surplus of shekel bank notes stranded in the West Bank, and the PMA requested the BOI increase the quota to NIS 2.75 billion per month. Despite Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian banks operating in Gaza follow strict PMA measures in order to maintain their operations and avoid running afoul of AML/CFT regulations. The privately-run Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) acts as a sovereign wealth fund, owned by the Palestinian people. According to PIF’s 2020 annual report (the most recent available), its assets reached $ 934 million and a net income of $ 8.6 million. These investments covered strategic economic sectors, and focused on high added-value productive sectors, such as the energy sector, both traditional and renewable, health, telecommunication and infrastructure, technology and education, agriculture, industry, commerce, construction, and small enterprises. 90 percent of PIF investments are domestic, but excess liquidity is invested in international and regional fixed income and equity markets. In 2014, the fund established the Palestine for Development Foundation, a separate not-for-profit foundation managing PIF’s corporate social responsibility initiatives, which are primarily focused on support to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, and abroad. Since 2003, PIF has transferred over $ 850 million to the PA in annual dividends, but PIF leadership does not report to the PA per PIF bylaws. International auditing firms conduct both internal and external annual audits of the PIF. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Although there are no state-owned enterprises (SOEs), some observers have noted that the PIF essentially acts as a sovereign wealth fund for the PA, and enjoys a competitive advantage in some sectors, including housing and telecommunications, due to its close ties with the PA. The import of petroleum products falls solely under the mandate of the Ministry of Finance’s General Petroleum Corporation, which then re-sells the products to private distributors at fixed prices. There is no PA privatization program for industries within the West Bank and Gaza. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Most large or multinational businesses in the West Bank include corporate social responsibility (CSR) in their business plans, mainly focusing on philanthropy related to education, health, and youth. Some medium-sized enterprises, particularly in healthcare and the food industry, started CSR initiatives to create goodwill for their products. CSR engagement remains relatively low overall, because over 90 percent of companies are small, family-run businesses. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. 9. Corruption The Palestinian public views corruption as the most important issue in their daily lives according to an October 2021 poll by the Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), the Palestinian chapter of Transparency International According to USAID’s West Bank and Gaza Inclusive Growth Diagnostic Study conducted in 2017, only 11 percent of the Palestinian firms surveyed reported ever being asked to pay a bribe, compared to 48 percent in Egypt. Private sector businesses assert that the PA has been successful in reducing institutional corruption and local perceptions of line ministries and PA agencies are generally favorable. The Anti-Graft Law (AGL) of 2005 criminalizes corruption, and the State Audit and Administrative Control Law and the Civil Service Law both aim to prevent favoritism, conflict of interest, or exploitation of position for personal gain. Despite the AGL, the perception that access to power is needed to succeed in business is pervasive according to contacts. The AGL was amended in 2010 to establish both a specialized anti-graft court and the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission, which was tasked with collecting, investigating, and prosecuting allegations of public corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission, first appointed in 2010, has indicted several high-profile PA officials. Palestinian civil society and media are active advocates of anti-corruption measures and there are international and Palestinian non-governmental organizations that work to raise public awareness and promote anti-corruption initiatives. The most active of these is the Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), which is the Palestinian chapter of Transparency International ( http://www.aman-palestine.org/eng/index.htm ). In April 2014, the PA acceded to the UN Anticorruption Convention. The PA is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. Resources to Report Corruption Contact at U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem: Palestinian Affairs Unit Economic Section +972 2 622 6952 JerusalemECON@State.Gov Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption: The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity – AMAN +972-2-298-9506 info@aman-palestine.org http://www.aman-palestine.org 10. Political and Security Environment Israeli government restrictions on the movement and access of goods and people between the West Bank, Gaza, and external markets – which Israel states are necessary to address its security concerns – continue to limit Palestinian private sector growth. Israeli Defense Forces under the Israeli Ministry of Defense are responsible for the West Bank, but PA Security Forces were granted security control of 17.5 percent (called Area A) under the 1993 Oslo Accords. Area A and Area B together make up the 36 percent of the West Bank and fall under PA civil control. Pending a final negotiated peace agreement defining borders and control of territory, Israel maintains all administrative and security control of Area C, which comprises 61 percent of the West Bank. A 2017 USAID study found that high transaction costs stemming from limitations on movement, access, and trade are the most immediate impediment to Palestinian economic growth, followed by energy and water insecurity. The security situation can change rapidly. Potential investors should regularly consult the State Department’s latest travel warnings, available at https://travel.state.gov. Clashes between security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank as well as between Israeli settlers and Palestinians have resulted in deaths and injuries. The Israeli government may restrict access to and within the West Bank and may place some areas under curfew. In June 2007, Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), seized control of the Gaza. The security environment within Gaza and on its borders is volatile. Violent demonstrations and shootings occur sporadically and with little warning, and the collateral risks are high. While the situation remains calm following a large escalation in May 2021, periodic mortar and rocket fire and Israeli military responses continue to occur. Following the 2007 Hamas takeover, the Israeli government implemented a closure policy that restricted imports to limited humanitarian and commercial shipments, effectively blocking exports from Gaza until 2015, when exports rebounded to an average of 115 truckloads per month. The economic situation and investment outlook in Gaza have deteriorated since the 2007 takeover, with especially challenging periods following Israeli combat operations there: December 2008-January 2009; November 2012; and July-August 2014; and May 2021. The Israeli government has at times eased its closure policy by lifting some restrictions on goods imported into and exported out of Gaza, most recently following the May 2021 escalation. However, businesses continue to face opaque restrictions on delays in importing and exporting goods, spare parts, and through Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom crossing, the sole entry and exit point for goods traveling between Israel and Gaza. The Israeli government allows limited exports (transshipments) to overseas markets and to Israel, and some sales to the West Bank. 11. Labor Policies and Practices With its growing youth population and high rates of attendance across the schooling systems, the West Bank and Gaza have an abundant supply of educated and skilled labor. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the total population of the West Bank and Gaza in December 2020 was approximately 5 million, including 3 million in the West Bank and 2 million in the Gaza. PCBS estimated there were 1,443,000 people in the Palestinian labor force as of the end of 2021, with 939,700 in the West Bank and 503,300 in Gaza. An estimated 143,000 Palestinians from the West Bank worked in Israel and Israeli settlements and an estimated 10,000 from Gaza worked in Israel at the end of 2021. The most recent PCBS labor statistics estimate 20201unemployment was at 13.2 percent in the West Bank and 44.7 percent in Gaza. According to PCBS, at the end of 2021, the service sector was the largest employer in the local market with more than one-third in the West Bank and more than half in Gaza. The public sector employed 33.9 percent of the employed in 2021(32.6 percent in the West Bank and 52.8percent in Gaza). According to the most recent Labor Force Survey (Q4, 2021), private sector labor distribution in the West Bank and Gaza, by sector, is as follows: 33.9 percent – Services and Other Branches 21.9percent – Commerce, Hotels, Restaurants 18.7percent – Construction 13percent – Mining, Quarrying, Manufacturing 6.7percent – Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting 5.8 percent – Transportation, Storage, Communication Women face additional obstacles to employment opportunities and experience higher unemployment rates and lower labor force participation rates than men, despite comparable education levels. Only 17 percent of Palestinian women, compared to 69 percent of Palestinian men, participate in the labor force, according to a December 2021 PCBS report. The report also estimated that women’s unemployment rate (39 percent) is double that of men’s (20 percent), and female post-secondary graduates experienced 66 percent unemployment compared to the 39 percent experienced by their male counterparts. Many factors contribute to this phenomenon including lacking legal protections against discrimination and sexual harassment; labor regulations prohibiting women’s participation in certain jobs or shift times; cultural attitudes about appropriate work for women and household responsibility expectations; and men’s greater freedom of movement and willingness to take lower wage jobs. The Palestinian minimum wage remained legally mandated at NIS 1,450 ($381.57) per month throughout 2020. In January 2022 the PA cabinet implemented an increase of the minimum wage to NIS 1,880 ($570) per month. However, according to the PCBS, at the end of 2021, 30 percent of the private sector wage employees received less than the minimum wage. The average daily wage in the West Bank was NIS 123 ($38), compared with NIS 65.6 ($20) in Gaza while for the workers in Israel it was NIS 269 ($84). PA labor law does not explicitly prohibit forced or compulsory labor, but does forbid the use of child labor, in accordance with international standards. However, there are reports of forced labor and child labor in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly in agricultural work and the informal economy. According to the PCBS, in 2021, 3 percent of children (aged 10-15 years) were employed (4percent in the West Bank and one percent in Gaza). Despite the widespread informal economy, most large Palestinian employers rely on standard, long-term employment contracts with minimal use of temporary workers. Israeli labor law applies to settlements in the West Bank, but authorities do not enforce it uniformly. PA law provides for the rights of workers to form and join independent unions and conduct legal strikes. The law requires conducting collective bargaining without any pressure or influence but does not explicitly provide for the right to collective bargaining. Anti-union discrimination and employer interference in union functions are illegal, but the law does not specifically prohibit termination due to union activity. Non-governmental organizations do not consider labor unions to be independent of authorities and political parties. The requirements for legal strikes are cumbersome and strikers have little protection from retribution. The PA Ministry of Labor can impose arbitration; in such cases, workers or their trade unions face disciplinary action if they reject the result. If the ministry cannot resolve a dispute, it can be referred first to a committee chaired by a delegate from the ministry and composed of an equal number of members designated by the workers and by the employer, and, if the committee is unsuccessful, it can be referred to a specialized labor court. Teachers, who comprise the most significant portion of the public sector work force, participated in a large-scale strike with demonstrations in early 2016 protesting partial pay. In early 2016, the PA President approved a new Social Security Law mandating compulsory social security contributions from private sector employees and their employers to a new Palestinian Social Security Fund. It was to be implemented on November 1, 2018; however, in late 2018, the PA President postponed implementation indefinitely due to large-scale private sector opposition. The ILO together with the PA Ministry of Labor, civil society organizations, and the private sector plan continue to hold social dialogue sessions to address specific points of contention. A report to the PA on these points is due by end of March 2022 but contacts tell us they do not expect the PA to resurrect the law. 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy Jerusalem Palestinian Affairs Unit, Economic Section +972 2 622 6952 JerusalemECON@state.gov Zambia Executive Summary Zambia is a landlocked country in southern Africa that shares a border with eight countries: Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia. It has an estimated population of 17.86 million, GDP of $19.3 billion and GDP per capita of USD $1,086. Zambia has been in a financial and economic crisis since at least 2020, when the country became the world’s first COVID-era default after Zambia missed a payment on $3 billion of outstanding Eurobonds. The Zambian economy contracted in 2020 by 3.0 percent and grew by a meager 1.0 percent in 2021. The IMF forecasts 2022 real GDP growth of only 1.1 percent. Zambia’s debt overhang remains a severe inhibitor of economic growth, effectively eliminating the government’s access to international capital markets and forcing it to finance a persistent budget deficit through domestic borrowing, which crowds out private sector access to capital and limits growth. Despite broad economic reforms and debt relief under the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in the early 2000s, Zambia has generally struggled to meet its full economic potential. A decade of democratic and economic backsliding under former President Edgar Lungu and the Patriotic Front resulted in widespread use of corruption and economic rent-seeking that has further damaged Zambia’s reputation as an investment destination. Cumbersome administrative procedures and unpredictable legal and regulatory changes continue to inhibit Zambia’s immense potential for private sector investment, compounded by insufficient transparency in government contracting, ongoing lack of reliable electricity, and a high cost of doing business due to poor infrastructure, high cost of capital, and the lack of skilled labor. President Hakainde Hichilema achieved a resounding victory at the polls in August 2021 on a platform of democratic and economic reform and renewal. By December 2021, Zambia achieved staff-level agreement with the IMF on a $1.4 billion Extended Credit Facility that is expected to anchor macroeconomic and fiscal reforms and restore investor confidence. With the appointment of respected economists and technocrats to lead the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, the Hichilema administration has made significant strides reducing inflation, which has dropped from nearly 25.0 percent in July 2021 to 13.1 by the end of March 2022. The Hichilema administration is currently seeking debt restructuring under the auspices of the G-20 Common Framework, which would provide the basis for IMF board approval of Zambia’s Extended Credit Facility. A successful businessman and investor in his own right, President Hichilema has pledged to tackle fiscal and regulatory reforms aimed at strengthening Zambia’s investment climate. Zambia remains highly dependent on its mining and extractives industry. It is Africa’s second-largest producer of copper and is an important source of several other critical minerals, including nickel and cobalt. According to the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative, mining products accounted for 77 percent of Zambia’s total export earnings and 28 percent of government revenues in 2019. Investment in the mining sector fell substantially during the Lungu era due to multiple changes to Zambia’s minerals tax regime and an unstable regulatory environment. The Hichilema administration in its maiden budget introduced a key reform to Zambia’s minerals tax policy that is expected to attract new investment in the sector. The agriculture, healthcare, energy, financial services, and ICT sectors all offer potentially attractive opportunities for expanded U.S. trade and investment. The U.S. Embassy works closely with the American Chamber of Commerce of Zambia (AmCham) to support its American and Zambian members seeking to increase two-way trade. Agriculture and mining remain headlining sectors for the Zambian economy. U.S. firms are present and are exploring new projects in tourism, power generation, agriculture, and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 121 of 190 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $21 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,160 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment In general, Zambian law does not restrict foreign investors in any sector of the economy, although there are a few regulations and practices limiting foreign control laid out below. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) continues to play an important role in Zambia’s economy. The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) is charged with attracting more FDI to Zambia, in addition to promoting trade and investment and coordinating the country’s private sector-led economic development strategy. Zambia has undertaken certain institutional reforms aimed at improving its attractiveness to investors; these reforms include the Private Sector Development Reform Program (PSDRP), which addresses the cost of doing business through legislation and institutional reforms, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which addresses issues relating to transparency and good governance. However, frequent government policy changes have created uncertainty for foreign investors. The ZDA does not discriminate against foreign investors, and all sectors are open to both local and foreign investors. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities, and no business ventures are reserved solely for the government. Although private entities may freely establish and dispose of interests in business enterprises, investment board approval is required to transfer an investment license for a given enterprise to a new owner. Currently, all land in Zambia is considered state land and ownership is vested in the president. Land titles held are for renewable 99-year leases; ownership is not conferred. According to the government, the current land administration system leaves little room for the empowerment of citizens, especially the poor and vulnerable rural communities. The government began reviewing the current land policy in earnest in March 2017; though shorter terms continue to be suggested, no changes have been adopted to date. Foreign investors in the telecom sector are required to disclose certain proprietary information to the ZDA as part of the regulatory approval process. Further information regarding information and communication regulation can be found at the website of the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority at http://www.zicta.zm The ZDA board screens all investment proposals and usually makes its decision within 30 days. The reviews appear to be routine and non-discriminatory, and applicants have the right to appeal investment board decisions. Investment applications are screened, with effective due diligence to determine the extent to which the proposed investment will help to create employment; the development of human resources; the degree to which the project is export-oriented; the likely impact on the environment; the amount of technology transfer; and any other considerations the Board considers appropriate. The following are the requirements for registering a foreign company in Zambia: At least one and not more than nine local directors must be appointed as directors of a majority foreign-owned company. At least one local director of the company must be resident in Zambia, and if the company has more than two local directors, more than half of them shall be residents of Zambia. There must be at least one documentary agent (a firm, corporate body registered in Zambia, or an individual who is a resident in Zambia). A certified copy of the Certificate of Incorporation from the country of origin must be attached to Form 46. The charter, statutes, regulations, memorandum and articles, or other instrument relating to a foreign company must be submitted. The Registration Fee of K5,448.50 (~ USD 320.00) must be paid. The issuance and sealing of the Certificate of Registration marks the end of the process for registration. This and further information can be found through the following Government of Zambia’s regulatory websites: Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), https://www.pacra.org.zm/ ; Zambia Development Agency http://www.zda.org.zm/ ; Business Regulatory Review Agency, http://www.brra.org.zm/ ; and Business License Portal, http://www.businesslicenses.gov.zm/ . Zambia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews since 2012 through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD. However, domestic investment policies and legislation have been revised periodically, whenever impediments to investment laws are identified. The Zambian government, often with support from cooperating partners, has undertaken economic reforms to improve its business facilitation process and attract foreign investors, including steps to support more transparent policymaking and to encourage competition. The impact of these progressive policies, however, has been undermined by persistent fiscal deficits, struggling economy, high cost of doing business and widespread corruption. Business surveys, including TRACE International, generally indicate that corruption in Zambia is a major obstacle for conducting business in the country. The Zambian Business Regulatory Review Agency (BRRA) manages Regulatory Services Centers (RSCs) that serve as a one-stop shop for investors. RSCs provide an efficient regulatory clearance system by streamlining business registration processes; providing a single licensing system; reducing the procedures and time it takes to complete the registration process; and increasing accessibility of business registration institutions by placing them under one roof. The government established RSCs in Lusaka, Livingstone, Kitwe, and Chipata, and has plans to establish additional RSCs so that there is at least one in each of the country’s 10 provinces. Information about the RSCs can be found at the following links: The Companies Act No. 10 of 2017 was operationalized through a statutory instrument (June 2018) and implementing regulations (February 2019) aimed at fostering accountability and transparency in the management of companies. Companies are required to maintain a register of beneficial owners, and persons holding shares on behalf of other persons or entities must now disclose those beneficial owners. In order to facilitate improved access to credit, the Patents and Company Registration Office (PACRA) established the collateral registry system, a central database that records all registrations of charges or collaterals created by borrowers to secure credits provided by lenders. This service allows lenders to search for collateral offered by loan applicants to see if that collateral already an existing claim has registered against it. Creditors can also register security interests against the proposed collateral to protect their priority status in accordance with the Movable Property (Security Interest) Act No. 3 of 2016. Generally, the first registered security interest in the collateral has first priority over any subsequent registrations. Parliament passed the Border Management and Trade Facilitation Act in December 2018. The Act, among other things, calls for coordinated border management and control to facilitate the efficient movement and clearance of goods; puts into effect provisions for one-stop border posts; and simplifies clearance of goods with neighboring countries. While one-stop border posts have existed for several years and agencies are co-located at some border crossings, the new law seeks to harmonize conflicting regulations and processes within the interagency. There are no incentives for outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Proposed laws and other statutory instruments are often insufficiently vetted with interest groups or are not released in draft form for public comment. Proposed bills are published on the National Assembly of Zambia website ( http://www.parliament.gov.zm/ ) for public viewing and to facilitate public submissions to parliamentary committees reviewing the legislation; however, these are frequently issued with little advanced notice. Hard copies of the documents are delivered by courier to the stakeholders’ premises/mailboxes. Opportunities for comment on proposed laws and regulations sometimes exist through trade associations and policy thinktanks such as the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, Centre for Trade Policy and Development, Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Zambia Association of Manufacturers, Zambia Chamber of Mines, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Zambia. The government established the Business Regulatory Review Agency (BRRA) in 2014 with the mandate to administer the Business Regulatory Act. The Act requires public entities to submit for Cabinet approval a policy or proposed law that regulates business activity, after the policy or proposed law has BRRA approval. A public entity that intends to introduce any policy or law for regulating business activities should give notice, in writing, to the BRRA at least two months prior to submitting it to Cabinet; hold public consultations for at least 30 days with relevant stakeholders; and perform a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The BRRA works in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, which does not approve any proposed law to regulate business activity without the approval of BRRA. While this framework exists on paper, the BRRA and the consultative process is still relatively new and unknown even by other government officials, and in some cases, it appears that the BRRA was informed after the Ministry of Justice had already approved a law. While there are clear public procurement guidelines, transparency remains a concern for potential investors and bidders. To enhance the transparency, integrity, and efficiency of Zambia’s procurement system, the GRZ launched the Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) in July 2016. President Hichilema has made public procurement reform a key priority for his administration, introducing a new financial crimes fast track court and strengthening the mandate of key investigative institutions. Zambia is a member of several regional and international economic groupings, including the COMESA and SADC Free Trade Areas. Zambia was also an active participant in the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area between COMESA, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). The top five intra-COMESA exports from Zambia include tobacco, sugar, wire, refined copper, and cement. Trade among SADC member states is conducted on reciprocal preferential terms. Rules of Origin define the conditions for products to qualify for preferential trade in the SADC region. Products have to be “wholly produced” or “sufficiently processed” often warranting change in tariff heading in the SADC region to be considered compliant with the SADC Rules of Origin, which are product-specific and not generic. COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states agreed in October 2008 to negotiate a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) covering half of Africa. The TFTA was launched in June 2015 in Egypt; to date, Zambia is one of the 22 out of the 26 member states which have signed the agreement. The Agreement will enter into force once it has been ratified by 14 Member States-with 10 Members (Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Eswatini, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa and Zambia) ratified. According to OECD trade facilitation indicators, Zambia performs better than the average sub-Saharan African and lower middle-income countries in the areas of information availability, involvement of the trade community, appeal procedures, and automation. Zambia’s performance for internal border agency co-operation and governance and impartiality is below average for sub-Saharan African and lower middle-income countries. In February 2019, Zambia signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and in February 2021 it deposited the instruments of ratification with the African Union, making Zambia the 36th member to fully accede to the agreement. The trade agreement among 54 African Union member states creates in theory a continent-wide single market, with plans for free movement of people and a single-currency union. At the multilateral level, Zambia has been a WTO member since 1995. Zambia’s investment incentives program is transparent and has been included in the WTO’s trade policy reviews. The incentive packages are also subject to reviews by the Board of the ZDA and to periodic reviews by the Parliamentary Accounts Committee. Zambia is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), but still faces major challenges in expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, which is a major requisite of the TFA. The new administration has committed to implement a robust infrastructure development for roads and bridges which form a backbone of Zambia’s transport network and regional connectivity. Zambia has benefited from duty-free and quota-free market access to the EU through its Everything but Arms FTA, and to the United States via the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and AGOA agreements. Zambia has a dual legal system that consists of statutory and customary law enforced through a formal court system. Statutory law is derived from the English legal system with some English Acts of Parliament still deemed to be in full force and effect within Zambia. Traditional and customary laws, which remain in a state of flux, are generally not written or codified, although some of them have been unified under Acts of Parliament. No clear definition of customary law has been developed by the courts, and there has not been systematic development of this subject. Zambia has a written commercial law. The Commercial Court, a division of the High Court, deals with disputes arising out of commercial transactions. All commercial matters are registered in the commercial registry and judges of the Commercial Court are experienced in commercial law. Appeals from the Commercial Court, based on the amended January 2016 constitution, now fall under the recently established Court of Appeals, comprised of eight judges. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Chapter 76, makes provision for the enforcement in Zambia of judgments given in foreign countries that accord reciprocal treatment. The registration of a foreign judgment is not automatic. Although Zambia is a state party to international human rights and regional instruments, its dualist system of jurisprudence considers international treaty law as a separate system of law from domestic law. Domestication of international instruments by Acts of Parliament is necessary for these to be applicable in the country. Systematic efforts to domesticate international instruments have been slow but continue to see progress. The courts support Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and there has been an increase in the use of arbitration, mediation, and tribunals by litigants in Zambia. Arbitration is common in commercial matters and the proceedings are governed by the Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000. The Act incorporates United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Zambian courts have no jurisdiction if parties have agreed to an arbitration clause in their contract. The establishment of the fee-based judicial commercial division in 2014 to adjudicate high-value claims has helped accelerate resolution of such cases. The courts in Zambia are generally independent, but contractual and property rights enforcement is weak and final court decisions can take a prohibitively long time. At times, politicians have exerted pressure on the judiciary in politically controversial cases. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and adjudication depends on the matter at hand and the principal law or act governing the regulations. The major laws affecting foreign investment in Zambia include: The Zambia Development Agency Act of 2006, which offers a wide range of incentives in the form of allowances, exemptions, and concessions to companies. The Companies Act of 1994, which governs the registration of companies in Zambia. The Zambia Revenue Authority’s Customs and Excise Act, Income Tax Act of 1966, and the Value Added Tax of 1995 provide for general incentives to investors in various sectors. The Employment Code Act of 2019, Zambia’s basic employment law that provides for required minimum employment contractual terms. The Immigration and Deportation Act, Chapter 123, regulates the entry into and residency in Zambia of visitors, expatriates, and immigrants. The Zambian economy operates under free market norms with a fairly developed competition and regulatory framework. There is freedom of pricing, currency convertibility for a small currency basket, freedom of trade, and free use of profits. A fairly strong institutional framework is provided for strategic sectors, such as mining and mining supply industries, and large-scale commercial farming. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) is a statutory body established with a unique dual mandate to promote competition in the economy, curtail restrictive business practices and protect consumer rights. The CCPC’s mandate implemented through the CCPC ACT cuts across all economic sectors in an effort to eliminate abuse of dominant position of market power, anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, and cartels, and to enhance consumer protection and safeguard competition. In 2016 the CCPC published a series of guidelines and policies that included adoption of a formal Leniency Policy intended to encourage persons to report information that may help to uncover prohibited agreements. In certain circumstances the person receives immunity from prosecution, imposition of fines, or the guarantee of a reduction in fines. The policy also calculates administrative penalties. In addition, the CCPC in 2016 published draft Settlement Guidelines, which provide a formal framework for parties seeking to engage the CCPC to reach a settlement. The CCPC Act, Chapter 417, prevents firms from distorting the competitive process through conduct or agreements designed to exclude actual or potential competitors, and applies to all entities, regardless of whether private, public, or foreign. Although the CCPC largely opens investigations when a complaint is filed, it can also open investigations on its own initiative. Zambian competition law can also be enforced by civil lawsuits in court brought by private parties, while criminal prosecution by the CCPC is possible in cartel cases without the involvement of the Director of Public Prosecution under the Competition and Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) No. 24 of 2010. However, the general perception is that the Commission may be restricted in applying the competition law against government agencies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), especially those protected by other laws. Zambia is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank and other international agreements. This guarantees foreign investment protection in cases of war, strife, disasters, and other disturbances, or in cases of expropriation. Zambia has signed bilateral reciprocal promotional and protection of investment protocols with a number of countries. The ZDA also offers further security for investments in the country through the signing of the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs). Investments may only be legally expropriated by an act of Parliament relating to the specific property expropriated. Although the ZDA Act states that compensation must be at a fair market value, the method for determining fair market value is ill-defined. Compensation is convertible at the current exchange rate. The ZDA Act also protects investors from being adversely affected by any subsequent changes to the Investment Act of 1993 for seven years from their initial investment. Leasehold land, which is granted under 99-year leases, may revert to the government if it is determined to be undeveloped after a certain amount of time, generally five years. Land title is sometimes questioned in court, and land is re-titled to other owners. There is no pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons by way of an illegal expropriation by the government or authority in the country. There are no high-risk sectors prone to expropriation. The Bankruptcy Act, Chapter 82, provides for the administration of bankruptcy of the estates of debtors and makes provision for punishment of offenses committed by debtors. It also provides for reciprocity in bankruptcy proceedings between Zambia and other countries and for matters incidental to and consequential upon the foregoing. This applies to individuals, local, and foreign investors. Bankruptcy judgments are made in local currency but can be paid out in any internationally convertible currency. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a person can be charged as a criminal. A person guilty of an offense declared to be a felony or misdemeanor under the Bankruptcy Act in respect of which no special penalty is imposed by the Act shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Zambia has made strides in improving its credit information system. Since 2008, the credit bureau, TransUnion, requires banks and some non-banks to provide loan requirement information and consult it when making loans. The credit bureau eventually captures data from other institutions, such as utilities. However, the bureau’s coverage is still less than ten percent of the population, the quality of its information is suspect, and there it lacks clarity on data sources and the inclusion of positive information. 4. Industrial Policies Under the Income Tax Act, Chapter 323, or the Customs and Excise Act, Chapter 322, investors (local and foreign) who invest not less than USD 50,000 in a Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ), an industrial park, a priority sector (among them manufacturing, agro processing, energy and tourism), or who invest in a Rural Enterprise under the ZDA Act, are entitled to the following fiscal incentives: Zero corporate tax for five years from commencement of operations. Taxation on only 50 percent of profits in year six through year eight from commencement of operations and only 75 percent for years nine and ten. Five-year exemption on dividend taxes following the first year of declaration. Five-year customs duties exemption on imported machinery and equipment. Improvement allowance of 100 percent of capital expenditure on improvements or upgrading of infrastructure. An investor may apply to establish and operate a bonded factory under Section 65 of the Customs and Excise Act. The GRZ created MFEZs in 2007, providing investors with waivers on customs duty on imported equipment, excise duty, and value added tax, among other concessions. It is currently unclear if the government will maintain these incentives (see Investment Incentives section). There are four MFEZs currently operating: the Chambishi MFEZ in Copperbelt Province, the Lusaka South MFEZ which houses a mix of multi-national firms, and the Lusaka East MFEZ located near Lusaka’s Kenneth Kaunda International Airport and Chibombo MFEZ in Central Province which are heavily (if not exclusively) dominated by Chinese-owned enterprises. Foreign-owned firms enjoy the same investment opportunities as domestic firms in MFEZs. The ZDA Act is the primary legislation for investment in Zambia. An investor, foreign or local, is free to identify and suggest any other location in the country deemed economical for MFEZ development, although the government has prioritized designated areas in Lusaka, Chibombo, Ndola, Mpulungu, Chembe, Nakonde, Kasumbalesa, and Mwinilunga. Investors are encouraged to provide local employment and skills transfer to local entrepreneurs and communities. Investors are also encouraged to utilize local raw materials and intermediate goods and engage in technology transfer to qualify to operate in an MFEZ. Zambia is active in several key regional organizations that promote regional trade and regulatory harmonization. COMESA launched its FTA in October 2000 and established a customs union in June 2009. Although performance requirements are not imposed, authorities expect commitments made in applications for investment licenses to be fulfilled. Foreign contractors bidding on infrastructure projects are required by law to give 20 percent of works to Zambian small contractors. Outside of infrastructure projects, no requirements currently exist for local content, equity, financing, employment, or technology transfers. However, in January 2018 the government issued a Statutory Instrument (SI) instructing all industries to transport 30 percent of their cargo by rail. The Data Protection Bill, which was signed into law in March 2021, mandates data localization for sensitive personal data, but also outlines conditions for the cross-border transfer of other kinds of personal data. The government does not impose offset or local content requirements or preconditions for permission to invest in a specific geographic area, but investors are encouraged to employ local nationals. There is no legal definition of local content, and the most comprehensive local content legislation is contained in the Mines and Minerals Development Act of 2008. The Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of 2006 and Statutory Instrument of 2008 also contain local content provisions. The GRZ encourages employment of local workers for unskilled labor as well as for skilled middle or senior management workers. Under the ZDA Act, any foreign investor who invests a minimum of $250,000 or its equivalent and employs a minimum of 200 employees at certain technical or managerial levels is entitled to a self-employment permit or resident permit. The GRZ encourages investors where possible to use domestic content in goods or technology if available. Government through the Ministry of Commerce has developed the Local Content Strategy (launched 2018) to promote inclusive and sustainable growth through increased use of locally available goods and services in development sectors. The Strategy will be implemented through a law currently under formulation in a Bill and will compels businesses to use a predetermined local content percentage of local inputs and products in the production and provision of goods and services. Currently, there is no requirement for foreign information technology providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance. The telecommunications sector is governed by the Information and Communications Technology Act No. 15 of 2009 (ICT Act) and falls under the Ministry of Technology & Science and regulated by the Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority (ZICTA). Government is committed to ensuring compliance and consistency with multilateral obligations through Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) requirements. Although performance requirements are not imposed, authorities expect commitments made in applications for investment licenses to be fulfilled. 5. Protection of Property Rights Property rights and the regulation of property are well defined in principle, but face problems in implementation. Contractual and property rights are weak. Courts are often inexperienced in commercial litigation and are frequently slow in reaching their decisions. The ZDA Act ensures investors’ property rights are respected. Secured interests in property, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced. Property can be owned individually, jointly in undivided shares, or by an entity such as a company, close corporation or trust, or similar entity registered outside Zambia. The ZDA Act provides for legal protection and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights such as land, buildings, and mortgages. The Lands and Deeds Registry Act of Zambia states that a mortgage is only to operate as security and not a transfer or lease of the estate or interest mortgaged. There are two types of mortgages in Zambia, a legal and an equitable mortgage. A legal mortgage is created in respect to a legal estate by deed. An equitable mortgage does not convey legal title to the mortgage, and no power of sale vests in the mortgagee. The president holds all land on behalf of the people of Zambia, which he may give to any Zambian, but the process is set in law. The Lands Act, Chapter 184, places a number of restrictions on the president’s allocation of land to foreigners. The ZDA Act makes provision for leasehold tenure of land by investors. The ZDA, in consultation with the Ministry of Lands, assists an investor in identifying suitable land for investment, as well as assisting the investor to apply through the Ministry of Lands. While land is technically owned by the president, it is worth noting that traditional chiefs have jurisdiction over traditional, or customary, land, which makes up roughly 70 percent of Zambia. The Commissioner of Lands verifies that properties can be transferred after checking if ground rent has been paid and by conducting due diligence on the purchaser. Land held under customary tenure has no title, but where a sketch plan of the area exists, the chief can give written consent to an investor and a 14-year lease can be obtained for traditional land. Despite Zambia’s abundant land for agriculture and other purposes, the process of land acquisition and registration is a major obstacle for investors in part due to extensive traditional ownership. Its acquisition involves negotiations with traditional leaders, who have to balance the demands of their subjects against the pressure to convert land for commercial purposes. Most available land has not been surveyed or mapped and, where this has been done, records are often outdated or difficult to retrieve from the Ministry of Lands. The Ministry of Lands is centralized in Lusaka and faces problems with poor record keeping and slow processing of title deeds. To address these challenges the government, with the support of donor partners, has been working to reform land policy, including modernization of the Lands Department at Ministry of Lands, establishment of Land Banks, establishment of a Land Development Fund, demarcation of MFEZs and industrial parks, and development of farming blocks. Intellectual property laws in Zambia cover domain names, traditional knowledge, transfer of technology, trademarks, patents, and copyrights, etc. Zambia is party to several international intellectual property agreements. The legal framework for trademark protection in Zambia is adequate; however, enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) is weak, and courts have little experience with commercial litigation. Copyright protection is limited and does not cover computer applications. Of the many pirated and counterfeit goods in Zambia, the main ones are DVDs, CDs, audio-visual software, infant milk, pharmaceuticals, body lotions, motor vehicle spare parts (such as tires and brake pads), beverages, cigarettes, toothpaste, electrical appliances, fertilizer, pesticides, and corn seed. Small-scale trademark infringement occurs in connection with some packaged goods utilizing copied or deceptive packaging. The Industrial Designs Act encourages the creation of designs and development of creative industries through enhanced protection and utilization of designs, and it provides for the registration and protection of designs and the rights of proprietors of registered designs. The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, and Expressions of Folklore Act provides a transparent legal framework for the protection of, access to, and use of, traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and expressions of folklore and guarantees equitable sharing of benefits and effective participation of holders. The Zambia Police Service Intellectual Property Unit (IPU) carries out raids in shops and markets to confiscate counterfeit and pirated materials. The IPU tracks and reports on seizures of counterfeit goods but no consolidated record is available. There are fines for revealing proprietary business information, but they are not large enough to adequately penalize possible disclosures. Zambia’s patent laws conform to the requirements of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to which Zambia is a signatory. It takes a minimum of four months to patent an item or process. Duplicative patent searches are not performed, but patent awards may be appealed on grounds of infringement. Zambia is a signatory to a number of international agreements on patents and intellectual property, including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Paris Convention and Bern Convention, as well as the Universal Copyright Convention of UNESCO. Zambia is also a member of the African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO). The country is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is an international legal agreement between all the member nations of the World Trade Organization. The Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry and the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) are the leading institutions responsible for the implementation of IPR laws in Zambia. The industrial property registration system at PACRA underwent an upgrade that linked its electronic documentation management system to WIPO’s WIPOScan, which provides for digitization of IPR records. Zambia is not included in USTR’s Special 301 Report nor its Notorious Markets List. For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . 6. Financial Sector Government policies generally facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the entry of resources in the product and factor market. Banking supervision and regulation by the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) has improved slightly over the past few years. Improvements include revoking licenses of some insolvent banks, denying bailouts, limiting deposit protection, strengthening loan recovery efforts, and upgrading the training of and incentives for bank supervisors. High domestic lending rates, a lack of dollar and foreign exchange liquidity, and the limited accessibility of domestic financing have constrained business for several years. High returns on government securities encourage commercial banks to invest heavily in government debt to the exclusion of financing productive private sector investments, particularly for SMEs. The Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE), established in 1993, is structured to meet international recommendations for clearing and settlement system design and operations. There are no restrictions on foreign participation in the LuSE, and foreigners may invest in stocks on the same terms as Zambians. The LuSE has offered trading in equity securities since its inception and, in March 1998, the LuSE became the official market for selling Zambian government bonds. Investors intending to trade a listed security or government bond are now mandated to trade via the LuSE. The market is regulated by the Securities Act of 1993 and enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Zambia. Secondary trading of financial instruments in the market is very low or non-existent in some areas. The financial sector is comprised of three sub-sectors according to financial sector supervisory authorities. The banking and financial institutions sub-sector is supervised by the BoZ, the securities sub-sector by the SEC, and the pensions and insurance sub-sector by the Pensions and Insurance Authority. The Banking and Financial Services Act, Chapter 387, and the Bank of Zambia Act, Chapter 360, govern the banking industry. Zambia’s banking sector is considered relatively well-developed in the African context, but the sector remains highly concentrated. There are currently 19 banks in Zambia with the largest four banks holding nearly two-thirds of total banking assets. The dominance of the four largest banks in deposits and total assets has been diluted by increased market capture of smaller banks and new industry entrants, an indication of growing competitive intensity in this segment of the banking market. Government policies generally facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the entry of resources in the product and factor market. There continued to be a steady increase in electronic banking and related services over the last few years. The BoZ’s current policy rate as of March 2022 is 9.0 percent. Commercial lending rates averaged 25.65 percent in 2021, among the highest in the region, making the cost of capital for investment unattractive. One factor inhibiting more affordable lending is a culture of tolerating loan default, which many borrowers view as a minor transgression. Non-performing loans (NPLs) have continued to decline, closing the 2021 financial year at 5.82 percent compared to 11.63 percent in 2020. The government contributes to this problem, with arrears to government contractors estimated at $1.3 billion. Banking officials acknowledge the need to upgrade the risk assessment and credit management skills of their institutions to better serve borrowers but note widespread financial illiteracy limits borrowers’ ability to access credit. Banks provide credit denominated in foreign currencies only for investments aimed at producing goods for export. Banks provide services on a fee-based model and banking charges are generally high. Home mortgages are available from several leading Zambian banks, although interest rates are still very high. To operate a bank in Zambia, the bank must be licensed by the Registrar of Banks, Financial Institutions, and Financial Businesses (“the Registrar”) whose office is based at the BoZ. The decision to license banks lies with the Registrar. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to operate in country as long as they fulfill BoZ requirements and meet the minimum capital requirement of $100 million for foreign banks and $20 million for local banks. According to the BoZ, many banks in the country have correspondent banking relationships. Generally, all regulatory agencies that issue operating licenses have statutory reporting requirements that businesses operating under their laws and regulations must meet. For example, the Banking and Financial Services Act has stringent reporting provisions that require all commercial banks to submit weekly returns indicating their liquidity position. Late submission of the weekly returns or failure to meet the minimum core liquidity and statutory reserves incur punitive penalty interest and may lead to the placement of non-compliant commercial banks under direct supervision of BoZ, closure of the undertaking, or the prosecution of directors. All companies listed under the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) are obliged to publish interim and annual financial statements within three months after the close of the financial year. Listed companies are also required to disclose in national print media any information that can affect the value of the price of their securities. According to the Companies Act, Chapter 388, company directors need to generate annual account reports after the end of each financial year. The annual account, auditor’s report or reports on the accounts, and directors’ report should be sent to each person entitled to receive notice of the annual general meeting and to each registered debenture holder of the company. A foreign company is required to submit annual accounts and an auditor’s report to the Registrar. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) are licensed and regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Banking and Financial Services Act of 1994 (BFSA) and related Regulations and Prudential Guidelines. As key players in the financial sector, NBFIs are subject to regulatory requirements governing their prudential position, consumer protection, and market conduct in order to safeguard the overall soundness and stability of the financial system. The NBFIs comprise eight leasing and finance companies, three building societies, one credit reference bureau, one savings and credit institution, one development finance institution, 80 bureaux de change, one credit reference bureau, and 34 micro-finance institutions. Private firms are open to foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. The CCPC reviews and handles big mergers and acquisitions. The High Court of Zambia may reverse decisions made by the Commission. Under the CCPA, foreign companies without a presence in Zambia and taking over local firms do not have to notify their transactions to the Commission, as it has not established disclosure requirements for foreign companies acquiring existing businesses in Zambia. Zambia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently 34 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in different sectors in Zambia including agriculture, education, energy, financial services, infrastructure, manufacturing, medical, mining, real estate, technology, media and communication, tourism, and transportation and logistics. Most SOEs are wholly owned, or majority owned by the government under the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) established in 2015. Zambia has two categories of SOEs: those incorporated under the Companies Act and those established by particular statutes, referred to as statutory corporations. There is a published list of SOEs in the Auditor General’s annual reports; SOE expenditure on research and development is not detailed. There is no exhaustive list or online location of SOEs’ data for assets, net income, or number of employees. Consequently, inaccurate information is scattered throughout different government agencies/ministries. The majority of SOEs have serious operational and management challenges. In theory, SOEs do not enjoy preferential treatment by virtue of government ownership, however, they may obtain protection when they are not able to compete or face adverse market conditions. The Zambia Information Communications Authority Act has a provision restricting the private sector from undertaking postal services that would directly compete with the Zambia Postal Services Corporation. Zambia is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO, however private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. SOEs in Zambia are governed by Boards of Directors appointed by government in consultation with and including members from the private sector. The chief executive of the SOE reports to the board chairperson. In the event that the SOE declares dividends, these are paid to the Ministry of Finance. The board chair is informally obliged to consult with government officials before making decisions. The line minister appoints members of the Board of Directors from within public service, the private sector, and civil society. The independence of the board, however, is limited since most boards are comprised of a majority of government officials, while board members from the private sector or civil society that are appointed by the line minister can be removed. SOEs can and do purchase goods or services from the private sector, including foreign firms. SOEs are not bound by the GPA and can procure their own goods, works, and services. SOEs are subject to the same tax policies as their private sector competitors and are generally not afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs are audited by the Auditor General’s Office, using international reporting standards. Audits are carried out annually, but delays in finalizing and publishing results are common. Controlling officers appear before a Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts to answer audit queries. Audited reports are submitted to the president for tabling with the National Assembly, in accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution and the Public Audit Act, Chapter 378. In 2015, the government transferred most SOEs from the Ministry of Finance to the revived Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The move, according to the government, was to allow line ministries to focus on policy making thereby giving the IDC direct mandate and authorization to oversee SOE performance and accountability on behalf of the government. The IDC’s oversight responsibilities include all aspects of governance, commercial, financing, operational, and all matters incidental to the interests of the state as shareholder. There were no sectors or companies targeted for privatization in 2021. The privatization of parastatals began in 1991, with the last one occurring in 2007. The divestiture of state enterprises mostly rests with the IDC, as the mandated SOE holding company. The Privatization Act includes the provision for the privatization and commercialization of SOEs; most of the privatization bidding process is advertised via printed media and the IDC’s website ( www.idc.co.zm ). There is no known policy that forbids foreign investors from participating in the country’s privatization programs. 8. Responsible Business Conduct The government in theory limits its direct involvement in business to strategic investments deemed critical for the delivery of public goods and services and seeks to maintain high standards of consumer protection. While Zambia is a high performer among low-income countries in terms of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), it lacks clearly formulated or well-implemented RBC policies. The government has sought to improve implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms that impact RBC. As an example, most investment ventures are required to create and submit environmental impact assessments as a prerequisite to the approval process. The government requires many investment sectors, such as insurance, banking, and financial services, to submit annual audited financial statements as a licensing condition. In the case of financial services, quarterly publication of financial statements is compulsory and rigidly enforced by the BoZ. Zambia has ratified a number of international human rights conventions, such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. At the national level, the lead authority for upholding human rights norms is the Human Rights Commission (HRC), while the Industrial and Labor Relations Act addresses labor issues. The Act provides the legal framework for trade unions, employers’ organizations and their federations, the Tripartite Consultative Labor Council, and the Industrial Relations Court. The Employment Act, Chapter 268, is the basic employment law, while the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act makes provisions for the regulation of minimum wage levels and minimum conditions of employment. Currently, the average minimum wage per month for employees, starting with general or domestic workers, stands at 1,132 kwacha (~$62@04/2022), to include food and transportation. The government supports measures that encourage responsible business conduct and has recognized the importance of adopting international practices. The main challenges include domesticating international practices and strengthening regulatory capacities. In many cases, the business sector is encouraged by the government to adopt practices that promote responsible business conduct on a “voluntary basis.” For example, the Institute of Directors Zambia (IODZ) actively advocated the introduction of “Board Charters” that set out good corporate standards (such as ethical conduct) with which business enterprises will be associated and will implement. The Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC) is also promoting the adoption of “Sector Codes” by the business sectors that commit themselves to supporting citizens’ economic empowerment. In addition, a number of public institutions have established Integrity Committees that address the strengthening of internal policies and procedures for combating corruption, in compliance with the Anti-Corruption Act of 2012. The private sector is also encouraged to either establish similar Integrity Committees or to strengthen their corporate governance standards to effectively address corruption. The Zambian government seeks to maintain high standards of consumer protection by, for example, following the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection. The Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 seeks to encourage competition in the economy, protect consumer welfare, strengthen the efficiency of production and distribution of goods and services, secure the best possible conditions for the freedom of trade, expand the base of entrepreneurship, and regulate monopolies and concentrations of economic power. Most local manufacturers of consumer products have submitted to voluntary product testing and certification by the Zambia Bureau of Standards (ZABS); ZABS certification is then embossed on the product labels as a “mark of quality” indicating the product’s suitability for consumption. Legislative measures have also been agreed with food processors and drug manufacturers that indicate product manufacturing and expiry dates. A number of mining companies have acceded to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), adapted in February 2009 for Zambian conditions, and allow independent audits of their operations and financial reporting. EITI audit results are available to the general public. Zambia has been an EITI compliant country since September 2012. The government receives revenue in the form of taxes and royalties from all extractive industries, including mining. The mining sector accounts for about 12 percent of GDP and around 70 percent of export revenue. All exploration and mining activities are governed by the Mines and Minerals Act of 2008 and other mining related regulations that include: the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, the Explosives Act, and the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act. The GRZ, through the Ministry of Mines and Minerals, conducts open bidding and grants mining licenses to qualified bidders. The Zambian Revenue Authority collects all payments from mining companies and remits them to the Ministry of Finance. The Zambian Revenue Authority regularly publishes production volumes for copper, cobalt, and gold, and the names of companies operating in the country. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. The Hichilema administration has made climate a priority with the establishment of a new Ministry of Green Economy & Environment. The new ministry consolidates several departments that were previously spread across multiple ministries, including the Forest Department, Climate Change Department, and the Zambia Environmental Management Agency. Zambia’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is pioneering metrics for resilience under its monitoring plan; however, the government has identified room for improvement in developing more qualitative indicators to support the quantitative indicators currently in place. Zambia has policies, strategies and programs aimed at promoting the conservation of fauna and flora. The government has developed a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) that guides conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Zambia’s NBSAP has a monitoring and evaluation component with a monitoring matrix that includes key performance indicators and targets. Other relevant policies include the Climate Change Policy and the National Policy on Environment. Zambia does not currently have a net-zero GHG emission target. According to the government’s NDC commitments, Zambia has made a conditional pledge to reduce GHG emissions by 25 percent (20,000 Gg CO2 eq.) by 2030 against a base year of 2010, with substantial international support. Zambia’s two-year tenure as the lead of the Africa Group of Negotiators started in November 2021. Regulatory reform is needed to promote increasing access to modern energy, improve reliability of the existing energy supply, and the expand the proportion of renewable energy available and utilized, both on- and off-grid. The Zambian government says that it intends to use nature-based solutions for the sustainable management and use of natural resources to address climate change, water security, water pollution, food security, human health, biodiversity loss, and disaster risk management. The Zambian government has implemented a zero-rated tax on the following components of solar energy equipment: solar panels, inverters, batteries, and charge controllers to encourage users of solar energy-based equipment. Customs duties and value added taxes are not charged on these components of solar energy equipment. The taxes remain in force on other equipment such as diesel generators. 9. Corruption Zambia’s anti-corruption activities are governed by the Anti-Corruption Act of 2012 and the National Anti-Corruption Policy of 2009, which stipulate penalties for different offenses. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is the supreme institution mandated to fight corruption in Zambia and works with partner institutions-Zambia Police, Drug Enforcement Agency and Intelligence Services. While legislation and stated policies on anti-corruption are adequate in theory, implementation often falls short due to limited technical capacity and suspected corruption within key government institutions. The Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act of 2010 provides for the disclosure of conduct adverse to the public interest in the public and private sectors. However, like with other laws and policies, enforcement is weak. Zambia lacks adequate laws on asset disclosure, evidence, and freedom of information. Although the ACC has the mandate to investigate corruption and sometimes prosecute, it lacks autonomy to fully prosecute cases, often requiring authorization to prosecute from the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). This practice has been criticized as a conduit for shielding high level crime and corruption through the executive which is perceived as influencing the DPP as an appointing authority. In March 2019 Cabinet approved the Access to Information Bill (ATI), but the draft bill has not been made public or presented to Parliament as of March 2022. The bill aims to ensure the government is proactive and organized in disseminating information to the public. Versions of the ATI Bill have been pending since 2002. In 2021, Zambia established a fast-track financial crimes court to prosecute public corruption cases. The Hichilema administration has dismissed several key civil service staff and arrested numerous former government officials on suspicion of corruption. Zambia maintained a ranking of 117 out of 180 countries in the 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) report — a drop from 113 in the 2019 report. The legal and institutional frameworks against corruption have been strengthened, and efforts have been made to reduce red tape and streamline bureaucratic procedures, as well as to investigate and prosecute corruption cases, including those involving high-ranking officials. Most of these cases, however, remain on the shelves waiting to be tried while officials remain free, sometimes still occupying the positions through which the alleged corruption took place. In March 2018, Parliament passed the Public Finance Management Bill, which allows the government to prosecute public officials for misappropriating funds, something previous legislation lacked. The government published the implementing regulations in November 2020. Despite this progress, corruption remains a serious issue in Zambia, affecting the lives of ordinary citizens and their access to public services. Corruption in the police service has emerged as an area of particular concern (with frequency of bribery well above that found in any other sector), followed by corruption in the Road Transport and Safety Agency. The government has cited corruption in public procurements and contracting procedures as major areas of concern. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit of the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) also assists with investigation of allegations of corruption and financial misconduct. An independent Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) was established in 2010 but does not have the authority to prosecute financial crimes. Zambia’s anti-corruption agencies generally do not discriminate between local and foreign investors. Transparency International has an active Zambian chapter. The government encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Most large private companies have internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery. The Integrity Committees (ICs) Initiative is one of the strategies of the National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP), which is aimed at institutionalizing the prevention of corruption. The NACP received the Cabinet’s approval in March 2009 and the Anti-Corruption Commission spearheads its implementation. The NACP targets eight institutions, including the Zambia Revenue Authority, Immigration Department, and Ministry of Lands. The government has taken measures to enhance protection of whistleblowers and witnesses with the enactment of the Public Disclosure Act, as well as to strengthen protection of citizens against false reports, in line with Article 32 of the UN Convention. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement and dispute settlement. Giving or accepting a bribe by a private, public, or foreign official is a criminal act, and a person convicted of doing so is liable to a fine or a prison term not exceeding five years. A bribe by a local company or individual to a foreign official is a criminal act and punishable under the laws of Zambia. A local company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from taxes. Many businesses have complained that bribery and kickbacks, however, remain rampant and difficult to police, as some companies have noted government officials’ complicity in and/or benefitting from corrupt deals. Zambia signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in December 2007. Other regional anti-corruption initiatives are the SADC Protocol against Corruption, ratified in 2003, and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, ratified in 2007. Zambia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions but is a party to the Anticorruption Convention. Currently, there are no local industries or non-profit groups that offer services for vetting potential local investment partners. Normally, the U.S. Embassy provides limited vetting of potential local investment partners for U.S. businesses, when contracted as a commercial service. Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption: Mr. Silumesi Muchula Acting Director General, Anti-Corruption Commission Kulima House, Cha Cha Cha Road, P.O. Box 50486, Lusaka +260 211 237914 e-mail: smuchula@acc.gov.zm Contact at “watchdog” organization: Mr. Maurice Nyambe Executive Director, Transparency International Zambia 3880 Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, P.O. Box 37475, Lusaka +260 211 290080 e-mail: MNyambe@tizambia.org.zm 10. Political and Security Environment Zambia has benefited from almost 30 years of largely peaceful multi-party politics, with 3 peaceful transfers of executive power. Zambia does not have a history of large-scale political violence. National elections in 2021 were largely peaceful and former President Edgar Lungu conceded defeat to Hakainde Hichilema. The rise in street crime remains a significant concern as the Zambian economy struggles to create meaningful employment opportunities for young people. 11. Labor Policies and Practices About a third of Zambia’s employed population works in the formal sector. While an abundance of unskilled labor exists in Zambia, investors complain that the supply of skilled and semi-skilled labor is inadequate, while labor-management relations vary by sector. Zambia’s population is estimated to be around 17.86 million, the majority being of employable age. Zambia’s 2020 Labor Force Survey reported that the working-age population (i.e., 15 years or older) was 9,905,071. Labor demand, however, does not match supply and Zambia has high rates of unemployment, youth unemployment, and underemployment while living costs have risen steadily. The government adheres closely to International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and has ratified all eight ILO core conventions. The government has continuously sought to revise labor laws and improve compliance, but there are still gaps in law and practice. Strikes are not uncommon in the public sector and often are related to the government’s failure to pay salaries or allowances on time, but lawful strikes are very difficult to hold due to several restrictions and conditions. Labor laws provide for extremely generous severance pay, leave, and other benefits to workers, which can impede investment. Such rules do not apply to personnel hired on a short-term basis. As such, the vast majority of Zambian employees are hired on an informal or short-term basis. In September 2018, the Minimum Wage and Conditions of Employment Act 276 of the laws of Zambia were revised following issuance of Statutory Instrument (SI) number 69 of 2018 covering domestic workers. This revision doubled the minimum wage of certain classes of low-wage workers. The Employment Code Act No. 3 of 2019, which went into effect in May 2020, furthers the employees’ protections and expands severance and gratuity payments, whether the employee is terminated or come to an end of contract, regardless of who employs them. The Employment Act, Chapter 268 covers employment and labor related issues. While the law recognizes the right of workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively, there are statutory restrictions limiting these rights. Police officers, military personnel, and certain other categories of workers are excluded from exercising these rights. No trade union can be registered if it claims to represent a class of employees already represented by an existing trade union. At least 25 members are required, and registration may take up to six months. The government has discretionary power to exclude certain categories of workers, including prison staff, judges, registrars of the court, magistrates, and local court justices from labor law provisions. The law also gives the labor commissioner the power to suspend and appoint an interim executive board of a trade union, as well as to dissolve the board and call for a new election. The government generally protects unions’ right to conduct their activities without interference. Trade unions are independent of government, but the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is ultimately responsible for employment exchange services and enforcing labor legislation. An employer is allowed to terminate a contract of service on grounds of redundancy; however, the Employment Act requires the employer fulfill certain conditions before terminating a contract of service on such grounds. One of these conditions is notifying the employee’s trade union. The Act makes a clear distinction between layoffs and severance. In the event an employee is summarily dismissed, he/she shall be paid upon dismissal the wages and allowances due up to the date of such dismissal. The government formally permits employment of expatriate labor only in sectors where there is scarcity of local personnel, but investors promoting large scale investments can negotiate the number of work permits that they can obtain from the Department of Immigration to employ expatriates. The law does not limit the scope of collective bargaining, but it allows either party, in certain cases, to refer a labor dispute to court or arbitration. The law also allows for a maximum period of one year from the day on which the complaint is filed within which a court must consider the complaint and issue its ruling. The law provides for the right to strike if recourse to all legal options is first exhausted. The law prohibits workers engaged in a broadly defined range of essential services from striking. Under Zambian law, essential services are defined as any activity relating to the generation, supply, or distribution of electricity; the supply and distribution of water and sewage removal; fire departments; and the mining sector. Employees in the Zambian Defense Forces, judiciary, police, prison, and the Zambia Security Intelligence Service (ZSIS) personnel are also considered essential. The government has power to add other services to the list of essential services, in consultation with the tripartite consultative labor council. The process of exhausting the legal alternatives to a strike is lengthy. The law also limits the maximum duration of a strike to 14 days, after which, if the dispute remains unsolved, it is referred to the court. A strike can be discontinued if the court finds it not to be “in the public interest.” Workers who engage in illegal strikes may be dismissed by employers. The Industrial and Labor Relations Act, Chapter 269, Part IX covers the settling of labor disputes. Aggrieved parties may report the matter to a labor officer, who would take steps deemed fit to affect a settlement between the parties and would encourage the use of collective bargaining facilities where applicable. In the event of a collective dispute between an employer and a trade union regarding the terms and conditions of employment, claims and demands must be put in writing and both parties must have held at least one meeting with a view to reaching a settlement. Such disputes are referred to a conciliator or board of conciliators to be appointed by both parties to the dispute. If the conciliator fails to resolve the problem, the conciliator will inform the Labor Commissioner, who will call on the Minister of Labor to appoint a conciliator who will again call the parties to consider dispute resolution. If all efforts to resolve the matter fail, it is then taken to the Industrial Relations Court for arbitration. Other internationally recognized fundamental labor rights, including the elimination of forced labor, child labor employment, discrimination, minimum wage, occupational safety and health, and weekly work hours are all recognized under domestic law, but enforcement is often weak. The government has supported the development of programming to empower adolescent girls and reduce child labor in rural areas. However, children in Zambia continue to engage in the worst forms of child labor, including in the production of tobacco, and in commercial sexual exploitation, sometimes as a result of human trafficking. Gaps remain in the legal framework related to children; for example, the Education Act does not include the specific age to which education is compulsory, which may leave children under the legal working age vulnerable to the worst forms of child labor. In addition, law enforcement agencies lack the necessary human and financial resources to adequately enforce laws against child labor. There is no documented number of children in Zambia who are engaged in child labor, but studies point to a yearly increase in the number of these children, who work primarily in the agriculture and mining sectors. Cotton, tobacco, cattle, gems, and stones are included on the U.S. Government’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor in Zambia. The Department of Labor and the Department of Occupational Safety and Health of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security monitor labor abuses, as well as health and safety standards in low-wage assembly operations such as construction. Two primary labor stakeholders, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE), assist with Ministry of Labor enforcement. The worker and employer organizations are consulted at tripartite gatherings on any proposed policy document or legislation, and they participate in labor inspections. The Ministry of Labor produces annual inspection reports, which are made available to social partners. In December 2015, Parliament passed, and the president signed a suite of amendments to the Employment Act that prohibit casual labor and increase protections for unskilled workers. Zambia has benefited from duty-free and quota-free market access from the GSP in the U.S. market under AGOA. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($BM USD) 2020 N/A 2020 $18.11 https://data.worldbank.org/ country/zambia Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $21 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 -$1 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 1.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/ Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Host country statistical data released is almost non-existent. If it exists, there is not a central source for retrieving the data, and at most times it does not match international sources. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data** From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Stock Outward Direct Investment Stock Total Inward $12,383.6 100% Total Outward $725.8 100% Canada $3,387 27.4% Switzerland $165.8 22.8% China $2,439 19.7% United States $22.3 3% Switzerland $2,382 19.2% South Africa $6.5 0.9% Netherlands $1,775 14.3% Mauritius $3 0.4% Australia $890 7.2% Rest of the World $2.6 0.4% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. **Bank of Zambia Private Capital Flow 2021 Report 14. Contact for More Information U.S. Embassy | Political/Economic Section Commercial Team Stand 100, Kabulonga Road, Ibex Hill, Lusaka, Zambia +260 211 35 7000 Email Address: CommercialLusaka@state.gov Zimbabwe Executive Summary Zimbabwe suffered serious economic contractions in 2019 and 2020 due to the economic mismanagement, the extended effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate shocks that crippled agriculture and electricity generation. According to the government of Zimbabwe, the economy recovered strongly, growing by 7.8 percent, in 2021 although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the economy grew by 6.1 percent, thanks to increased agricultural production, high commodity prices, and improved capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector. The government expects the economy to grow by 5.5 percent in 2022 as the negative impacts of COVID-19 subside. International financial institutions also project positive but more modest growth, with the IMF forecasting a real GDP growth of 3.1 percent in 2022. Inflation remained high in 2021, but steadily declined to end the year at 60.6 percent. Authorities attributed the decline to the introduction of a weekly foreign exchange auction system in June 2020 and fiscal consolidation that resulted in near balanced budgets in 2020 and 2021. However, the inflation rate has continued to rise to 72.7 percent by March 2022 due to the negative effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on commodity prices as well as the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. Zimbabwe’s local currency has lost 79 percent of its value relative to the U.S. dollar since the government adopted an auction system on June 23, 2020. A gap between the auction and parallel-market exchange rates has persisted, with U.S. dollars more than twice as expensive on the parallel market. To improve the ease of doing business, the government formed the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA) in 2020, intended as a one-stop-shop to promote and facilitate both domestic and foreign investment in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s incentives to attract FDI include tax breaks for new investment by foreign and domestic companies, and making capital expenditures on new factories, machinery, and improvements fully tax deductible. The government waives import taxes and surtaxes on capital equipment. It has made gradual progress in improving the business environment by reducing regulatory costs, but policy inconsistency and weak institutions have continued to frustrate businesses. Corruption remains rife and there is little protection of property rights, particularly with respect to agricultural land. Historically, the government has committed to protect property rights but has also expropriated land without compensation. The Finance Act (No 2) at the end of 2020 amended the Indigenization Act by removing language designating diamonds and platinum as the only minerals subject to indigenization (requiring majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans), finally ending indigenization requirements in all sectors. However, the new legislation also granted broad discretion to the government to designate minerals as subject to indigenization in the future. The government subsequently issued statements to reassure investors that no minerals will be subject to indigenization, including diamonds and platinum. The government ended its 2019 ban on using foreign currencies for domestic transactions in March 2020. However, the authorities decreed businesses selling in foreign exchange must surrender 20 percent of the receipts to the central bank in exchange for local currency at the overvalued auction rate. Exporters must surrender 40 percent of foreign currency earnings at the unfavorable auction rate. Zimbabwe owes approximately US$10.7 billion (US$6.5 billion of which is in arrears) to international financial institutions accounting for 71 percent of the country’s GDP. The country’s high external debt (public and private) limits its ability to access official development assistance at concessional rates. Additionally, domestic banks do not offer financing for periods longer than two years, with most financing limited to 180 days or less. The sectors that attract the most investor interest include agriculture (tobacco, in particular), mining, energy, and tourism. Zimbabwe has a well-earned reputation for the high education levels of its workers. Although the United States has a targeted sanctions program against Zimbabwe, it currently applies to only 83 individuals and 37 entities. The U.S. Government imposed sanctions against specifically identified individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, as a result of the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons that undermine democratic institutions or processes in Zimbabwe, violate human rights, or facilitate corruption. U.S. companies can do business with Zimbabwean individuals and companies that are not on the specially designated nationals (SDN) list. After reaching US$745 million in 2018, Zimbabwe witnessed significant declines in foreign direct investment (FDI). According to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows into Zimbabwe fell from US$280 million in 2019 to US$194 million in 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 113 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 (D) https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,140 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (D) – Information suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment To attract FDI and improve the country’s competitiveness, the government has encouraged public-private partnerships and emphasized the need to improve the investment climate by lowering the cost of doing business as well as restoring the rule of law and sanctity of contracts. Implementation, however, has been limited. The government amended the Indigenization Act by removing diamonds and platinum from minerals subject to indigenization (requiring majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans), although the new legislation appeared to grant broad discretion to the GOZ to designate minerals as subject to indigenization in the future. Subsequently, the GOZ reassured investors that no minerals will be subject to indigenization, including diamonds and platinum. However, there are smaller sectors “reserved” for Zimbabweans (see below). To improve the ease of doing business, the government enacted legislation that led to the formation of the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA) in 2020. ZIDA replaced the Zimbabwe Investment Authority and serves as a one-stop-shop center in promoting and facilitating both domestic and foreign investment in Zimbabwe. While the government has committed to prioritizing investment retention, there are still no mechanisms or formal structures to maintain ongoing dialogue with investors. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, but foreign ownership of businesses in certain reserved sectors is limited. Foreign investors are free to invest in most sectors without any restrictions as the government aims to bring in new technologies, value-add manufacturing, and generate employment. According to the ZIDA Act, “foreign investors may invest in, and reinvest profits of such investments into, any and all sectors of the economy of Zimbabwe, and in the same form and under the same conditions as defined for Zimbabweans under the applicable laws and regulations of Zimbabwe.” However, the government reserves certain sectors for Zimbabweans such as passenger buses, taxis and car hire services, employment agencies, grain milling, bakeries, advertising, dairy processing, and estate agencies. The country screens FDI through the ZIDA in liaison with relevant line ministries to confirm compliance with the country’s laws. According to the country’s laws, U.S. investors are not especially disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms relative to other foreign investors. In its investment guidelines, the government states its commitment to non-discrimination between foreign and domestic investors and among foreign investors. In a 2019 review, Global Witness recommended reform of Zimbabwe’s shadowy diamond sector through publication of all diamond mining contracts, shareholdings, and their ultimate beneficial owners; production of timely annual reports, including audited accounts detailing revenues raised and all payments to the Treasury and all transfers to private shareholders. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/time-zimbabwes-opaque-diamond-sector/ The Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA) published in October 2021 and March 2022 reports focused on the investment climate around the extractive sector. Though the reports view the extractive sector through the lens of PRC engagement, the information on laws, regulations, and gaps in legislation and enforcement remain relevant for all interested investors. The Handbook of Zimbabwe-China Economic Relations: Zimbabwe Open for Business: Progress Check on Implementation: Policy inconsistency, administrative delays and costs, and corruption hinder business facilitation. Zimbabwe does not have a fully online business registration process, though one can begin the process and conduct a name search online via the ZimConnect web portal. The government created the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA, https://www.zidainvest.com/ ) which replaced the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA), the Special Economic Zones Authority, and the Joint Venture Unit to oversee the licensing and implementation of investment projects in the country. The Agency has established a one-stop investment services center (OSISC) which houses several agencies that play a role in the licensing, establishment, and implementation of investment projects including the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), Environmental Management Agency (EMA), Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), National Social Security Authority (NSSA), Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA), Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, the State Enterprises Restructuring Agency, and specialized investment units within relevant line ministries. The business registration process currently takes 27 days. Zimbabwe does not promote or incentivize outward investment due to the country’s tight foreign exchange reserves. Although the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, any outward investment requires approval by exchange control authorities. Firms interested in outward investment would face difficulty accessing the limited foreign currency at the more favorable official exchange rate. 3. Legal Regime The government officially encourages competition within the private sector and seeks to improve the ease of doing business, but the bureaucracy within regulatory agencies lacks transparency, and corruption is prevalent. Investors complain of policy inconsistency and unpredictability. Moreover, Zimbabwe does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published, and investors must contact ZIDA. The government at times uses statutory instruments and temporary presidential powers to alter legislation impacting economic policy. These powers have limited duration – the government must pass legislation within six months for the presidential powers to become permanent. These measures, which can appear without warning, often surprise businesses and lack implementation details, leading firms to delay major business decisions until gaining clarity. For example, the government unexpectedly prohibited the use of foreign currencies for domestic transactions in June 2019 but lifted the ban in March 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and growing economic pressure. The government has made changes to the share of foreign currency earnings exporters must surrender to the central bank without warning or stakeholder consultations. The standard legislative process, on the other hand, does provide ample opportunity for public review and comment before the final passage of new laws. The development of regulations follows a standard process and includes a period for public review and comment. According to the Department of State’s 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report, public budget documents do not provide a full picture of government expenditures, and there is a notable lack of transparency regarding state-owned enterprises and the extraction of natural resources. Information on public finances is generally unreliable, as actual revenues and expenditures have deviated significantly from the enacted budgets. Information on some debt obligations is publicly available, but not information on contingent debt. Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and it is a signatory to the SADC and COMESA trade protocols establishing free trade areas (FTA) with the aim of growing into a customs union. Zimbabwe is also a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which came into force on January 1, 2021, with the aim of creating a single continental market and paving the way for the establishment of a customs union. Although the country is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it normally notifies only SADC and COMESA of measures it intends to implement. According to the country’s law and constitution, Zimbabwe has an independent judicial system whose decisions are binding on the other branches of government. The country has written commercial law and, in 2019, established four commercial courts at the magistrate level. The government also trained 55 magistrates in the same year. Administration of justice in commercial cases that do not touch on political interests is still generally impartial, but for politicized cases government interference in the court system has hindered the delivery of impartial justice. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. Foreign investors are free to invest in most sectors including mining without any restrictions. In 2020, the government amended the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act which required majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans to attain its goal to bring in new technologies, generate employment, and value-added manufacturing. In certain sectors, such as primary agriculture, transport services, and retail and wholesale trade including distribution, foreign investors may not own more than 35 percent equity. The ZIDA ( https://www.zidainvest.com/ ), which now acts a one-stop shop for investors, promotes and facilitates both local and foreign direct investment. The government officially encourages competition within the private sector according to the Zimbabwe Competition Act. The Act provided for the formation of the Tariff and Competition Commission charged with investigating restrictive practices, mergers, and monopolies in the country. The Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) is an autonomous statutory body established in 2001 with the dual mandate of implementing and enforcing Zimbabwe’s competition policy and law and executing the country’s trade tariffs policy. The Act provides for transparent norms and procedures. Although the decision of the Commission is final, any aggrieved party can appeal the decision to the Administrative Court. In 2000, the government began to seize privately-owned agricultural land and transfer ownership to government officials and other regime supporters. In April 2000, the government amended the constitution to grant the state’s right to assert eminent domain, with compensation limited to the improvements made on the land. In September 2005, the government amended the constitution again to transfer ownership of all expropriated land to the government. Since the passage of this amendment, top government officials, supporters of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, and members of the security forces have continued to disrupt production on commercial farms, including those owned by foreign investors, those owned by black indigenous farmers, and those covered by bilateral investment agreements. Similarly, government officials have sought to impose politically connected individuals as indigenous partners on privately and foreign-owned wildlife conservancies. In 2006, the government began to issue 99-year leases for land seized from commercial farmers, retaining the right to withdraw the lease at any time for any reason. These leases, however, are not readily transferable, and banks do not accept them as collateral for borrowing and investment purposes. The government continues to seize commercial farms without compensating titleholders, who have no recourse to the courts. The seizures continue to raise serious questions about respect for property rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In 2017, the government announced its intention to compensate farmers who lost their land and made small partial payments to the most vulnerable claimants. In July 2020, the government and white commercial farmers who lost land to the land reform program signed a US$3.5 billion Global Compensation Deed Agreement for improvements made by commercial farmers on the farms. The government promised to pay a 50 percent deposit within 12 months of signing the agreement and 25 percent of the remainder in each subsequent year so that it makes full payment over five years. Given fiscal constraints, it remains unclear how the government will finance this sum. As of July 2021, the GOZ paid a token US$1 million towards compensating former commercial farmers, but it still lacks a credible plan to pay the remaining US$3.499 billion and has pushed back its deadline for doing so. In the event of insolvency or bankruptcy, Zimbabwe applies the Insolvency Act. All creditors have equal rights against an insolvent estate. Zimbabwe does not criminalize bankruptcy unless it is the result of fraud, but the government blacklists a person declared bankrupt from undertaking any new business. 4. Industrial Policies Government incentives to foreign investors depend on the form of investment, the sector, and whether the GOZ awards the investment national project status. For investment in industrial parks and tourism development zones, investors are exempt from paying tax for the first five years, after which they will pay tax at the rate of 25 percent (the normal tax rate is 35 percent). For build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) and build, operate, and transfer (BOT) joint ventures, investors are exempt from paying taxes for the first five years after which they will pay tax at the rate of 15 percent. Investors in the mining sector who export 50 percent of output benefit from a reduced corporation tax of 20 percent and are exempt from import duties on capital goods while losses are carried forward indefinitely for mining operations. Moreover, the government generally allows for duty exemptions in the importation of raw materials used in the manufacture of goods for export. In addition to these incentives, investments with national project status such as those in the renewable energy sector are allowed to borrow on local capital markets where lenders enjoy incentives including tax exemption on interest. The GOZ set up a Zimbabwe Women’s Microfinance Bank in 2018 so marginalized women could access credit facilities with affordable rates and innovative women-centered financial products and services. The GOZ encourages investment in renewable energy by waiving payment of duty on importation of solar equipment including batteries and panels. Zimbabwe now has approximately 183 companies operating in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Benefits include a five-year tax holiday, duty-free importation of raw materials and capital equipment for use in the EPZ, and no tax liability from capital gains arising from the sale of property forming part of the investment in EPZs. The government generally requires foreign capital comprise a majority of the investment in an EPZ-designated company and requires the company to export at least 80 percent of output. The latter requirement has constrained foreign investment in the zones. ZIDA took over the regulation of EPZs and the Special Economic Zones. However, to date, activity in special economic zones has been limited despite the incentives. Although there are no discriminatory import or export policies affecting foreign firms, the government’s approval criteria heavily favor export-oriented projects. Import duties and related taxes range as high as 110 percent. Foreigners intending to engage in meetings or discussions for business purposes are advised to secure a business visa for entry into Zimbabwe. Individuals found to be engaging in business-related activities on a tourist visa have been arrested, expelled from the country, and/or fined. A passport, visa, return ticket, and adequate funds are required to enter Zimbabwe. In 2019, the government approved the Zimbabwe local content strategy to promote local value addition and linkages through utilization of domestic resources. According to the strategy, the country wants to increase local content levels in prioritized sectors from 25 to approximately 80 percent by 2023. However, the government has found it difficult to implement such a strategy. There are no general performance requirements for businesses located outside Export Processing and Special Economic Zones. Government policy, however, encourages investment in enterprises that contribute to rural development, job creation, exports, the addition of domestic value to primary products, use of local materials, and the transfer of appropriate technologies. Government participation is required for new investments in strategic industries such as energy, public water provision, and railways. The terms of government participation are determined on a case-by-case basis during license approval. The few foreign investors (for example, from China, Russia, and Iran) in reserved strategic industries have either purchased existing companies or have supplied equipment and spares on credit. While foreign investors are not currently forced to use domestic content in production, the government is in the process of developing a local content policy designed to encourage the use of local inputs in production. The government does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance. Only banks are required to maintain all their data in the country through the escrow agreement. The new government investment guidelines do not permit mandatory and/or arbitrary performance requirements that distort or limit the expansion of trade and investment. 5. Protection of Property Rights The government enforces property rights in residential and commercial properties in cities although this is not the case with agricultural land, as discussed above. Mortgages and liens do exist for urban properties although liquidity constraints have led to a fall in the number of mortgage loans. The recording of mortgages is generally reliable. The government retains ownership of all agricultural land with 99-year leases guaranteeing use. These leases remain too weak to serve as collateral for bank loans. Zimbabwe follows international patent and trademark conventions, and it is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Generally, the government seeks to honor intellectual property ownership and rights, although a lack of expertise and manpower as well as corruption limit its ability to enforce these obligations. Pirating of books, videos, music, and computer software is common. The government has not enacted new IP related laws or regulations over the past year. The country does not publish information on the seizures of counterfeit goods. Zimbabwe is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ 6. Financial Sector Zimbabwe has two stock exchanges in Harare and Victoria Falls. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) in Harare currently has 51 publicly listed companies with a total market capitalization of US$13 billion as of March 16, 2022. Stock and money markets are open to foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors can take up to a maximum of 49 percent of any locally listed company with any single investor limited to a maximum of 15 percent of the outstanding shares. Regarding the money market, foreign investors may buy up to 100 percent of the primary issues of bonds and stocks and there is no limit on the level of individual participation. There is a 1.48 percent withholding tax on the sale of marketable securities, while the tax on purchasing stands at 1.73 percent. Totaling 3.21 percent, the rates are comparable with the average of 3.5 percent for the region. As a way of raising funds for the state, the government mandated insurance companies and pension funds invest between 25 and 35 percent of their portfolios in prescribed government bonds. Zimbabwe’s high inflation has greatly eroded the value of domestic debt instruments and resulted in negative real interest rates on government bonds. Zimbabwe launched the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) in September 2020. Four companies have listed on the VFEX with a market capitalization of US$256 million as of March 16, 2022. The country respects the IMF’s Article VIII and refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions provided there is sufficient foreign exchange to finance the transactions. Depending on foreign currency availability, foreign companies with investments in Zimbabwe can borrow locally on market terms. Although credit is allocated on market terms and foreigners are allowed to borrow on the local market, lack of foreign exchange constrains the financial sector from extending credit to the private sector. Three major international commercial banks and several regional and domestic banks operate in Zimbabwe, but they have reduced their branch network substantially in line with declining business opportunities. The central bank (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)) maintains the banking sector is generally stable despite a harsh operating environment characterized by high credit risk, high inflation, and foreign exchange constraints. Most Zimbabwean correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy or have already been severed due to international bank efforts to reduce risk (de-risking) connected to the high penalties for non-compliance with prudential anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism finance (AML/CFT) guidelines in developed countries. However, in March 2022, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Zimbabwe from the “gray list” in response to “significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime” and Zimbabwe is no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. As of December 31, 2021, the sector had 19 operating institutions, comprising 13 commercial banks, five building societies, and one savings bank. According to the RBZ, as of December 2021, 11out of 13 operating commercial banking institutions and two out of five building societies complied with the prescribed minimum core capital requirements. The level of non-performing loans rose slightly from 0.31 percent in December 2020 to 0.94 percent by December 2021. The RBZ attributed the increase to the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The RBZ reports the total loans-to-deposits ratio rose from 40.4 percent in December 2020 to 48.3 percent in December 2021. According to the central bank, total deposits (including interbank deposits), rose from ZWL$204.13 billion in December 2020 to ZWL$476.35 billion in December 2021, an increase of 76 percent in U.S. dollar terms. The total assets of the banking sector stood at ZWL$763 billion or US$7 billion at the end of December 2021 up from ZWL$349.6 billion or US$4.3 billion on December 31, 2020. The government set aside US$1 million toward administrative costs related to the setting up of a SWF in its 2016 budget. Although the government proposed to capitalize the SWF through a charge of up to 25 percent on royalty collections on mineral sales, as well as through a special dividend on the sale of diamond, gas, granite and other minerals, it has not done so. In 2021, state media listed the SWF as a shareholder of a new major mining company in Zimbabwe. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Zimbabwe has 107 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), defined as companies wholly owned by the state. A list of the SOEs appears here . Many SOEs support vital infrastructure including energy, mining, and agribusiness. Competition within the sectors where SOEs operate tends to be limited. However, the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) invites private investors to participate in infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Most SOEs have public function mandates, although in more recent years, they perform hybrid activities of satisfying their public functions while seeking profits. SOEs should have independent boards, but in some instances such as the recent case of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), the government allows the entities to function without boards. Zimbabwe does not appear to subscribe to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same taxes and same value-added tax rebate policies as private sector companies. SOEs face several challenges that include persistent power outages, mismanagement, lack of maintenance, inadequate investment, a lack of liquidity and access to credit, and debt overhangs. As a result, SOEs have performed poorly. Few SOEs produce publicly available financial data and even fewer provide audited financial data. SOE poor management and lack of profitability has imposed significant costs on the rest of the economy. Although the government committed itself to privatize most SOEs in the 1990s, it only successfully privatized two parastatals. In 2018, the government announced it would privatize 48 SOEs. So far, it has only targeted five in the telecommunications, postal services, and financial sectors for immediate reform, but the privatizations have not yet concluded. The government encourages foreign investors to take advantage of the privatization program to invest in the country, but inter-SOE debts of nearly USD 1 billion pose challenges for privatization plans. According to the government’s investment guidelines, it is still working out the process under which it will dispose its shareholding to the private sector. 8. Responsible Business Conduct Awareness of standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) is mainly driven by the private sector through the Standards Association of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government has not taken any measures to encourage RBC and it does not take into account RBC policies or practices in procurement decisions. The private sector developed the National Corporate Governance Code of Zimbabwe (ZimCode), which is a framework designed to guide Zimbabwean companies on RBC. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, an industrial advocacy group, , has a standing committee on business ethics and standards that drives ethical conduct within the Zimbabwean private sector. The organization has developed its own charter according to OECD guidelines, highlighting good corporate governance and ethical behavior. Firms that demonstrate corporate social responsibility do not automatically garner favorable treatment from consumers, employees, or the government. The U.S Department of Labor’s (DOL) report https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods published in September 2020 reports that children work in Zimbabwe’s sugarcane and tobacco industries. The DOL’s report https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/zimbabwe found children in Zimbabwe engage in the worst forms of child labor, including in mining, agriculture, and tobacco production. Law enforcement agencies lack resources to enforce child labor laws. The COVID-19 crisis severely limited the government’s ability to combat the worst forms of child labor. The country’s continuing economic decline and school closures due to COVID-19 lockdown restrictions likely increased the number of children working in informal labor sectors, including those that harbor the worst forms of child labor, to support family incomes. The government regularly thwarts union efforts to demonstrate with violence and excessive force and harasses labor leaders. Police and state intelligence services regularly attend and monitor trade union activities, sometimes preventing unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. Although unions are not required by law to notify police of public gatherings, police require such notification in practice. Those unions engaging in strikes deemed illegal risk fines and imprisonment. The government ordered in March 2021 the eviction of 13,000 members of the Chilonga community in the southeastern part of the country, but eventually backed down after a court ruled in favor of a temporary relief. Although the Chilonga villagers appealed the eviction citing unconstitutionality of sections of the Communal Land Act the government used in its eviction order, the High Court ruled in favor of the government but recommended a review of the Act. Although the Zimbabwean government has expressed its intention to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles to strengthen accountability, good governance, and transparency in the mining sector, it has yet to launch an EITI program. A domestic initiative called the Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency Initiative (ZMRTI) has produced limited results. Zimbabwe is not signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol issued a withhold release order on Zimbabwean rough diamonds from Marange in 2019 after an investigation concluded that forced labor contributed to the mining activity. Widespread artisanal and small-scale gold mining presents a threat to the environment, and informal miners have little-to-no safety and labor protections. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain. Zimbabwe developed a national climate policy in 2017 which provides an overarching framework that gives the country basic principles and guidance under which climate change response strategy will be implemented. The government has stated its intention to reduce emissions of sectoral greenhouse gasses without specifying action plans to achieve these objectives. The policy does not specify any regulatory incentives towards achievement of set objectives. 9. Corruption Endemic corruption presents a serious challenge to businesses operating in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s scores on governance, transparency, and corruption perception indices are well below the regional average. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI, with many corruption allegations stemming from opaque procurement processes. In theory, the government has specified laws that require managers and directors to declare their financial interests in the public sector, although these may not be followed in practice. As noted below, Zimbabwe does not have laws that guard against conflict of interest with respect to the conduct of private companies, but existing rules on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange compel listed companies to disclose, through annual reports, minimum disclosure requirements. While anti-corruption laws exist and extend to family members of officials and political parties, the government tends to engage in selective enforcement against the opposition while engaging in “catch and release” of government officials and their business partners. As a result, Transparency International ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 175 countries and territories surveyed in 2020 with respect to perceptions of corruption. In 2005, the government enacted an Anti-Corruption Act that established a government-appointed Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the structure of which has evolved over time. Following the end of Robert Mugabe’s rule in November 2017, the government pledged to address governance and corruption challenges by appointing a new ZACC chaired by a former High Court Judge and granting it new powers. President Mnangagwa also established a special unit within his office to deal with corruption cases. Despite these developments, the government has a track record of prosecuting individuals selectively, focusing on those who have fallen out of favor with the ruling party and ignoring transgressions by members of the favored elite. Accusations of corruption seldom result in formal charges and convictions. Zimbabwe does not provide any special protections to NGOs investigating corruption in the public sector. Journalists reporting on high-level corruption have suffered from arbitrary arrests and lengthy detentions. While Zimbabwe does not have laws that guard against conflict of interest with respect to the conduct of private companies, existing rules on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange compel listed companies to disclose, through annual reports, minimum disclosure requirements. Regarding SOEs, the government has specified laws that require managers and directors to declare their financial interests. In 2016, the World Bank report on the extent of conflict-of-interest regulation index (0-10), put Zimbabwe at 5. While Zimbabwe signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2004 and ratified the treaty in 2007, it is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption: Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 172 Herbert Chitepo Avenue, Harare. +263 (242) 369602; +263 71 952 9483 reports@zacc.co.zw Contact at a “watchdog” organization: Transparency International Zimbabwe 96 Central Avenue, P O Box CY 434, Causeway Harare +263 4 793 246/7 tiz@tizim.org ; info@tizim.org 10. Political and Security Environment Political parties, labor organizations, and civil society groups sometimes encounter state-sponsored intimidation and repression from government security forces and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) – linked activists. Disagreements between and within political parties occasionally result in violence targeting political party members. Political tensions and civil unrest persist since the end of Robert Mugabe’s rule in November 2017. On August 1, 2018, the army fired upon people demonstrating against the delay in announcing official presidential election results, killing six civilians. In response to January 2019 demonstrations against rising fuel prices, security forces killed 17, raped 16, injured hundreds, and arrested more than 800 people over the course of several weeks. The crackdown targeted members of the main opposition party, civil society groups, and labor leaders. In 2020 and 2021, the government arrested and detained journalists, several leaders of opposition parties, and trade union activists for organizing demonstrations against corruption and allegedly violating bail conditions. Police also arrested three women members of the opposition party, MDC Alliance (now Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)), including a member of parliament for violating lockdown measures when they demonstrated against corruption and food shortages during the first of several lockdowns imposed on the country to fight COVID-19. They were subsequently abducted from police custody and tortured by alleged security agents. Since then, the government routinely arrests and detains the three leaders whenever they speak out against the government. Political tensions also prevailed during campaigns for the March 26, 2022 by-elections. On February 26, 2022, ZANU-PF-affiliated youths allegedly killed CCC rally attendee Mboneli Ncube and injured 22 others after they stormed a CCC rally in Kwekwe. The CCC also reported attacks targeted at its activists and supporters across the country. Political uncertainty remains high. Violent crime, such as assault, smash and grabs, and home invasion, is common. Armed robberies perpetrated by serving members of the army and police have increased. Local police lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents. Incidents of violence have typically not targeted investment projects. 11. Labor Policies and Practices Decades of political and economic crises have led to the emigration of many of Zimbabwe’s skilled and well-educated citizens. Formal sector employment has fallen significantly. Anecdotal evidence shows widespread youth unemployment as the country continues to produce graduates without a matching growth in employment opportunities. According to the Labor Force Survey, Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate stood at 16.4 percent in 2019, the latest available data. As a result, most end up joining the informal sector estimated at over 85 percent of the workforce. The government strongly encourages foreign investors to make maximum use of Zimbabwean management and technical personnel and any investment proposal that involves the employment of foreigners must present a strong case to obtain work and residence permits. Normally, the maximum contract period for a foreigner is three years but with possible extension to five years for individuals with highly specialized skills. According to the IMF, Zimbabwe has the second largest informal economy (as a share of GDP) in the world, after Bolivia, with a 60.6 percent contribution to the country’s GDP. Official data from the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZimStat) shows women accounted for 43 percent of the people involved in the informal sector in 2019. The country’s labor laws make it very difficult for employers to adjust employment in response to an economic downturn except in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) where labor laws do not apply. Outside the SEZs, the employer must engage the employees and their representatives and agree to adopt measures to avoid retrenchment. If the measures fail, the employer can retrench and pay an all-inclusive package of one-month salary for each two years of service or the pro rata share thereof. Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and severance with the former falling under retrenchment where the retrenchment law must apply. The law does not accept unfair dismissal or layoffs of employees. The 2015 amendments to the act only permit terminations of contracts to be in terms of a registered code of conduct, expiry of a contract of fixed term duration, or mutual agreement. There is no unemployment insurance or other safety net programs for workers laid off for economic reasons. Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise and industry levels. At the enterprise level, work councils negotiate collective agreements, which become binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining unit. Industry-level bargaining takes place within the framework of National Employment Councils. Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers may bargain with the authorization of the Minister of Public Service and Labor. The law encourages the creation of employee-controlled workers’ committees in enterprises where less than 50 percent of workers are unionized. Workers’ committees exist in parallel with trade unions. Their role is to negotiate shop floor grievances, while that of the trade unions is to negotiate industry-level grievances, notably wages. The minister and the registrar have broad powers to take over the direction of a workers’ committee if they believe it is mismanaged. Trade unions regarded the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that allows employers to undermine the role of unions. Employers in all sectors rely heavily on temporary or contract workers to avoid having to pay severance costs and follow other onerous termination procedures. The Labor Amendment Act of 2015, however, requires employment councils to put a limit on the number of times employers can renew short-term contracts. The government does not waive labor laws in order to attract or retain investment, except in the case of SEZs. The law provides for the right of private-sector workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Public-sector workers may not form or join trade unions but may form associations that bargain collectively and strike. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination, provides that the labor court handle discrimination complaints, and may direct reinstatement of workers fired due to such discrimination. However, the government does not respect workers’ rights to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. Parliament enacted a bill establishing the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) in 2019 to formalize dialogue efforts among government, labor leaders, and employers to discuss social and economic policy and address demands. However, the forum met only once in 2020. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) stated the TNF did little to address workers’ demands for wage increases and labor law reform, and the government showed little progress in supporting workers’ protections, fairness, and peaceful resolution of labor disputes. The country has a labor dispute resolution process that starts at the company level through disciplinary or grievance committees. If the issue is not resolved at this level, the aggrieved party can appeal to either the employment council or the Labor Court depending on the industrial agreement. Other redress is through the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare in which labor officers settle disputes for industries without employment councils. From the Labor Court, an aggrieved party can appeal to the Supreme Court. Labor inspections are minimal due to a lack of inspectors. The government continues to harass labor unions and their leaders. Police and state intelligence services regularly attend and monitored trade union activities and sometimes prevented unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. Although unions are not required by law to notify police of public gatherings, police require such notification in practice. Those unions engaging in strikes deemed illegal risk fines and imprisonment. The government used violence and excessive force when some unions tried to demonstrate during the period under review. Police arrested three members of the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) following a June 2020 protest in Masvingo to demand increased salaries paid in U.S. dollars. Police also arrested 13 nurses at Harare Central Hospital in July and charged them with contravening COVID-19 lockdown regulations, with photos and video of police holding clubs and chasing nurses circulating widely on social media. In July 2020, the Zimbabwe Republic Police published a list of 14 prominent government critics wanted for questioning, including the presidents of ZCTU and ARTUZ, regarding planned anti-corruption demonstrations on July 31, 2020. In the lead-up to the planned July 31 protests, the ZCTU president suspected state security agents slashed his car tires and unsuccessfully tried to seize his relatives, and the ARTUZ president alleged that armed suspected state security agents detained his wife and besieged the home of a relative demanding to know his whereabouts. The government is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has ratified conventions protecting worker rights. The country has been subject to ILO supervisory mechanisms for practices that limit workers’ rights to freely associate, organize, and hold labor union meetings. At the 108th session of the ILO’s International Labor Conference in June 2019, the Committee on the Application of Standards noted concern regarding the government’s failure to implement specific recommendations of the 2010 Commission of Inquiry, which found the government responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights by its security forces, including a clear pattern of intimidation that included arrests, detentions, violence, and torture against union and opposition members. The Committee also noted persisting allegations of violations of the rights of the freedom of assembly of workers’ organizations. The Committee urged the government to accept a direct contacts mission of the ILO to assess progress before the next conference. The government ultimately agreed to accept a direct contacts mission, originally scheduled for May 2020 but postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020 the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative initiated a review of Zimbabwe’s eligibility for trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences due to concerns of worker rights related to a lack of freedom of association, including the rights of independent trade unions to organize and bargain collectively, and government crackdown on labor activists. The review has not yet concluded. 14. Contact for More Information Economic Specialist U.S. Embassy Harare 2 Lorraine Drive, Bluffhill, Harare +263 8677011000 zimbizopps@state.gov